[client] Reuse existing sessionExpired label for expired tray row

Drop the newly added tray.session.expired string and render the expired
tray row with the existing tray.status.sessionExpired label, which is
already translated in every locale and short enough for the tray.

.github/workflows/golang-test-linux.yml

@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ jobs:
         # resolve; the grep then drops the broken package by path. Without -e,
         # go list aborts with empty stdout and `go test` falls back to the repo
         # root, which has no Go files.
-        run: CGO_ENABLED=1 GOARCH=${{ matrix.arch }} CI=true go test -coverprofile=coverage.txt -tags devcert -timeout 10m -p 1 $(go list -e ./... | grep -v -e /management -e /signal -e /relay -e /proxy -e /combined -e /client/ui)
+        run: CGO_ENABLED=1 GOARCH=${{ matrix.arch }} CI=true go test -coverprofile=coverage.txt -tags 'devcert privileged' -exec 'sudo --preserve-env=CI,CGO_ENABLED' -timeout 10m -p 1 $(go list -e ./... | grep -v -e /management -e /signal -e /relay -e /proxy -e /combined -e /client/ui -e /client/testutil/privileged)
 
       - name: Upload coverage reports to Codecov
         if: matrix.arch == 'amd64'

.github/workflows/release.yml

@@ -293,8 +293,11 @@ jobs:
           ${{ steps.goreleaser.outputs.artifacts }}
           JSON
 
+          # dockers_v2 artifacts have no top-level goarch field, so match the
+          # per-platform -amd64 tag suffix instead; it works for both the old
+          # dockers and the new dockers_v2 image naming.
           mapfile -t src_images < <(
-            jq -r '.[] | select(.type == "Docker Image") | select(.goarch == "amd64") | .name | select(startswith("ghcr.io/"))' /tmp/goreleaser-artifacts.json
+            jq -r '.[] | select(.type == "Docker Image") | .name | select(startswith("ghcr.io/") and endswith("-amd64"))' /tmp/goreleaser-artifacts.json
           )
 
           for src in "${src_images[@]}"; do

.gitignore

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+.claude
 .idea
 .run
 *.iml

agent-network/README.md

@@ -1,16 +1,47 @@
 # NetBird Agent Network
 
-Agent Network is NetBird's access control layer for AI agents and the people who run
-them. It gives every agent a real identity, tied to your identity provider (IdP), and
-governs what it can reach — the LLM APIs and AI gateways it can call, and the internal
-resources it can access. Traffic flows only over the encrypted NetBird tunnel, scoped by
-policy, with no API keys to leak.
+Agent Network is NetBird's access control layer for AI agents and the people who run them. 
+It gives every agent a real identity, tied to an identity provider (IdP), and governs what it can reach: LLM APIs and 
+AI gateways it can call, and the internal resources it can access. Traffic flows only over the encrypted NetBird tunnel, 
+scoped by policy, with no API keys or other credentials to leak. It also gives you control over cost and token usage.
 
-> **Beta.** Agent Network is open source and can be self-hosted on your own
-> infrastructure.
+Because every LLM request passes through an
+identity-aware proxy, you can:
+
+- **Set spending and rate limits** per agent, per user, or per team — with hard caps
+  that stop requests once a budget is reached.
+- **Restrict models and providers** so agents can only call approved (and cost-appropriate)
+  endpoints, keeping expensive models off-limits unless explicitly allowed.
+- **Attribute usage** by tracking token consumption and cost per identity, group, or cost center so every
+  request is tied back to the agent and person responsible.
+- **Reuse your existing AI gateway** — point the proxy at a gateway you already run,
+  keeping its routing and config in place while it adds identity on top, so you skip
+  API key distribution.
+
+https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/44d18286-d8ab-49f8-a457-98ccd66f3268
+
+> **Beta.** Agent Network is in beta, but it's stable and already running in
+> production environments. It's fully open source and can be self-hosted on your own
+> infrastructure, with no vendor lock-in and no data leaving your environment.
 
 ## How it works
 
+Say you have a simple use case: your Engineering or IT team needs access to Claude Code or Codex, and you want visibility into usage plus the ability to enforce budgets.
+How can you do that without creating a dedicated API key for every team?
+
+With Agent Network you get a private endpoint inside your network, for example: https://mirror.netbird.ai
+Teams configure their agents to point to that endpoint instead of using individual API keys directly. 
+
+This endpoint is only reachable when users are connected to your NetBird network and authenticated through your IdP. Otherwise, it is not accessible from the public internet.
+You can then use this private endpoint to configure your AI agents, whether that is Claude Code, Codex, or another tool.
+
+## Quickstart
+
+Full step-by-step setup:
+**https://docs.netbird.io/agent-network/quickstart**
+
+## Architecture 
+
 Agent Network is built on two existing NetBird capabilities:
 
 - **Overlay network** — the encrypted WireGuard mesh between peers.
@@ -22,6 +53,9 @@ LLM traffic is routed through the proxy's identity-aware pipeline, while interna
 resources (databases, internal APIs, self-hosted models) are reached directly over
 peer-to-peer WireGuard tunnels, governed by the same identities and access policies.
 
+<img width="4720" height="2218" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1afa5da1-4b82-4f8a-a7a8-f417efadf1eb" />
+
+
 ## Where the code lives
 
 There is no separate "agent-network" service — it reuses the reverse-proxy and management

client/android/env_list.go

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ var (
 	EnvKeyNBForceRelay = peer.EnvKeyNBForceRelay
 
 	// EnvKeyNBLazyConn Exported for Android java client to configure lazy connection
-	EnvKeyNBLazyConn = lazyconn.EnvEnableLazyConn
+	EnvKeyNBLazyConn = lazyconn.EnvLazyConn
 
 	// EnvKeyNBInactivityThreshold Exported for Android java client to configure connection inactivity threshold
 	EnvKeyNBInactivityThreshold = lazyconn.EnvInactivityThreshold

client/cmd/login.go

@@ -17,7 +17,9 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/auth"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
+	nbnet "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/net"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/server"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/system"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
 )
@@ -331,6 +333,14 @@ func doForegroundLogin(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, setupKey string,
 		return fmt.Errorf("read config file %s: %v", configFilePath, err)
 	}
 
+	// Mirror runInForegroundMode: recover residual state (DNS, firewall,
+	// ssh config, legacy routing) from a previous unclean shutdown and
+	// enable advanced routing before dialing management.
+	if err := server.RestoreResidualState(ctx, profilemanager.NewServiceManager(configFilePath).GetStatePath()); err != nil {
+		log.Warnf("failed to restore residual state: %v", err)
+	}
+	nbnet.Init()
+
 	err = foregroundLogin(ctx, cmd, config, setupKey, activeProf.ID)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("foreground login failed: %v", err)

client/cmd/root.go

@@ -71,12 +71,14 @@ var (
 	extraIFaceBlackList     []string
 	anonymizeFlag           bool
 	dnsRouteInterval        time.Duration
-	lazyConnEnabled         bool
-	mtu                     uint16
-	profilesDisabled        bool
-	updateSettingsDisabled  bool
-	captureEnabled          bool
-	networksDisabled        bool
+	// lazyConnEnabled is the parse target for the deprecated --enable-lazy-connection
+	// flag. The flag is inert; the value is no longer read (use NB_LAZY_CONN instead).
+	lazyConnEnabled        bool
+	mtu                    uint16
+	profilesDisabled       bool
+	updateSettingsDisabled bool
+	captureEnabled         bool
+	networksDisabled       bool
 
 	rootCmd = &cobra.Command{
 		Use:          "netbird",
@@ -210,7 +212,8 @@ func init() {
 	upCmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVar(&rosenpassEnabled, enableRosenpassFlag, false, "[Experimental] Enable Rosenpass feature. If enabled, the connection will be post-quantum secured via Rosenpass.")
 	upCmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVar(&rosenpassPermissive, rosenpassPermissiveFlag, false, "[Experimental] Enable Rosenpass in permissive mode to allow this peer to accept WireGuard connections without requiring Rosenpass functionality from peers that do not have Rosenpass enabled.")
 	upCmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVar(&autoConnectDisabled, disableAutoConnectFlag, false, "Disables auto-connect feature. If enabled, then the client won't connect automatically when the service starts.")
-	upCmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVar(&lazyConnEnabled, enableLazyConnectionFlag, false, "[Experimental] Enable the lazy connection feature. If enabled, the client will establish connections on-demand. Note: this setting may be overridden by management configuration.")
+	upCmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVar(&lazyConnEnabled, enableLazyConnectionFlag, false, "Deprecated: no longer used. Lazy connections are controlled by the server and the NB_LAZY_CONN environment variable.")
+	_ = upCmd.PersistentFlags().MarkDeprecated(enableLazyConnectionFlag, "no longer used; lazy connections are controlled by the server and the NB_LAZY_CONN environment variable")
 
 }
 

client/cmd/service.go

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ package cmd
 import (
 	"context"
 	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
 	"runtime"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
@@ -22,15 +23,21 @@ var serviceCmd = &cobra.Command{
 	Short: "Manage the NetBird daemon service",
 }
 
+const defaultJSONSocket = "unix:///var/run/netbird-http.sock"
+
 var (
-	serviceName    string
-	serviceEnvVars []string
+	serviceName      string
+	serviceEnvVars   []string
+	jsonSocket       string
+	enableJSONSocket bool
 )
 
 type program struct {
 	ctx              context.Context
 	cancel           context.CancelFunc
 	serv             *grpc.Server
+	jsonServ         *http.Server
+	jsonServMu       sync.Mutex
 	serverInstance   *server.Server
 	serverInstanceMu sync.Mutex
 }
@@ -46,6 +53,8 @@ func init() {
 	serviceCmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVar(&updateSettingsDisabled, "disable-update-settings", false, "Disables update settings feature. If enabled, the client will not be able to change or edit any settings. To persist this setting, use: netbird service install --disable-update-settings")
 	serviceCmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVar(&captureEnabled, "enable-capture", false, "Enables packet capture via 'netbird debug capture'. To persist, use: netbird service install --enable-capture")
 	serviceCmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVar(&networksDisabled, "disable-networks", false, "Disables network selection. If enabled, the client will not allow listing, selecting, or deselecting networks. To persist, use: netbird service install --disable-networks")
+	serviceCmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVar(&enableJSONSocket, "enable-json-socket", false, "Enables the HTTP/JSON API socket served by grpc-gateway. To persist, use: netbird service install --enable-json-socket")
+	serviceCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&jsonSocket, "json-socket", defaultJSONSocket, "HTTP/JSON API socket address [unix|tcp]://[path|host:port]. Requires --enable-json-socket to serve. To persist, use: netbird service install --enable-json-socket --json-socket")
 
 	rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVarP(&serviceName, "service", "s", defaultServiceName, "Netbird system service name")
 	serviceEnvDesc := `Sets extra environment variables for the service. ` +

client/cmd/service_controller.go

@@ -5,9 +5,6 @@ package cmd
 import (
 	"context"
 	"fmt"
-	"net"
-	"os"
-	"strings"
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/kardianos/service"
@@ -22,41 +19,56 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
 )
 
+func validateJSONSocketFlags() error {
+	if serviceCmd.PersistentFlags().Changed("json-socket") && !enableJSONSocket {
+		return fmt.Errorf("--json-socket requires --enable-json-socket to configure the daemon JSON gateway")
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
 func (p *program) Start(svc service.Service) error {
 	// Start should not block. Do the actual work async.
 	log.Info("starting NetBird service") //nolint
 
+	if err := validateJSONSocketFlags(); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
 	// Collect static system and platform information
 	system.UpdateStaticInfoAsync()
 
 	// in any case, even if configuration does not exists we run daemon to serve CLI gRPC API.
 	p.serv = grpc.NewServer()
 
-	split := strings.Split(daemonAddr, "://")
-	switch split[0] {
-	case "unix":
-		// cleanup failed close
-		stat, err := os.Stat(split[1])
-		if err == nil && !stat.IsDir() {
-			if err := os.Remove(split[1]); err != nil {
-				log.Debugf("remove socket file: %v", err)
-			}
-		}
-	case "tcp":
-	default:
-		return fmt.Errorf("unsupported daemon address protocol: %v", split[0])
-	}
-
-	listen, err := net.Listen(split[0], split[1])
+	daemonListener, err := listenOnAddress(daemonAddr)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("listen daemon interface: %w", err)
 	}
-	go func() {
-		defer listen.Close()
 
-		if split[0] == "unix" {
-			if err := os.Chmod(split[1], 0666); err != nil {
-				log.Errorf("failed setting daemon permissions: %v", split[1])
+	var jsonListener *socketListener
+	if enableJSONSocket {
+		jsonListener, err = listenOnAddress(jsonSocket)
+		if err != nil {
+			_ = daemonListener.Close()
+			return fmt.Errorf("listen daemon JSON interface: %w", err)
+		}
+	} else {
+		removeStaleUnixSocketForAddress(jsonSocket)
+	}
+
+	go func() {
+		defer daemonListener.Close()
+		if jsonListener != nil {
+			defer jsonListener.Close()
+		}
+
+		if err := daemonListener.chmodUnixSocket("daemon"); err != nil {
+			log.Error(err)
+			return
+		}
+		if jsonListener != nil {
+			if err := jsonListener.chmodUnixSocket("daemon JSON"); err != nil {
+				log.Error(err)
 				return
 			}
 		}
@@ -71,8 +83,16 @@ func (p *program) Start(svc service.Service) error {
 		p.serverInstance = serverInstance
 		p.serverInstanceMu.Unlock()
 
-		log.Printf("started daemon server: %v", split[1])
-		if err := p.serv.Serve(listen); err != nil {
+		if jsonListener != nil {
+			if err := p.startJSONGateway(jsonListener, daemonAddr); err != nil {
+				log.Fatalf("failed to start daemon JSON server: %v", err)
+			}
+		} else {
+			log.Debug("daemon JSON socket disabled")
+		}
+
+		log.Printf("started daemon server: %v", daemonListener.address)
+		if err := p.serv.Serve(daemonListener.Listener); err != nil {
 			log.Errorf("failed to serve daemon requests: %v", err)
 		}
 	}()
@@ -92,6 +112,20 @@ func (p *program) Stop(srv service.Service) error {
 
 	p.cancel()
 
+	p.jsonServMu.Lock()
+	jsonServ := p.jsonServ
+	p.jsonServMu.Unlock()
+	if jsonServ != nil {
+		shutdownCtx, shutdownCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Second)
+		if err := jsonServ.Shutdown(shutdownCtx); err != nil {
+			log.Errorf("failed to stop daemon JSON server gracefully: %v", err)
+			if err := jsonServ.Close(); err != nil {
+				log.Errorf("failed to close daemon JSON server: %v", err)
+			}
+		}
+		shutdownCancel()
+	}
+
 	if p.serv != nil {
 		p.serv.Stop()
 	}
@@ -148,6 +182,9 @@ var runCmd = &cobra.Command{
 		if err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
+		if err := validateJSONSocketFlags(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
 
 		return s.Run()
 	},
@@ -162,6 +199,9 @@ var startCmd = &cobra.Command{
 		if err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
+		if err := validateJSONSocketFlags(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
 
 		if err := s.Start(); err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("start service: %w", err)
@@ -198,6 +238,9 @@ var restartCmd = &cobra.Command{
 		if err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
+		if err := validateJSONSocketFlags(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
 
 		if err := s.Restart(); err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("restart service: %w", err)

client/cmd/service_installer.go

@@ -67,6 +67,10 @@ func buildServiceArguments() []string {
 		args = append(args, "--disable-networks")
 	}
 
+	if enableJSONSocket {
+		args = append(args, "--enable-json-socket", "--json-socket", jsonSocket)
+	}
+
 	return args
 }
 
@@ -106,6 +110,10 @@ func configurePlatformSpecificSettings(svcConfig *service.Config) error {
 
 // Create fully configured service config for install/reconfigure
 func createServiceConfigForInstall() (*service.Config, error) {
+	if err := validateJSONSocketFlags(); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
 	svcConfig, err := newSVCConfig()
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("create service config: %w", err)

client/cmd/service_json_gateway.go

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+//go:build !ios && !android
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"net"
+	"net/http"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/grpc-ecosystem/grpc-gateway/v2/runtime"
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+	"google.golang.org/grpc"
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials/insecure"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
+)
+
+func grpcGatewayEndpoint(addr string) string {
+	return strings.TrimPrefix(addr, "tcp://")
+}
+
+func (p *program) startJSONGateway(jsonListener *socketListener, daemonEndpoint string) error {
+	mux := runtime.NewServeMux()
+	opts := []grpc.DialOption{grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials())}
+	if err := proto.RegisterDaemonServiceHandlerFromEndpoint(p.ctx, mux, grpcGatewayEndpoint(daemonEndpoint), opts); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	jsonServer := &http.Server{
+		Handler:           mux,
+		ReadHeaderTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
+		BaseContext: func(net.Listener) context.Context {
+			return p.ctx
+		},
+	}
+
+	p.jsonServMu.Lock()
+	p.jsonServ = jsonServer
+	p.jsonServMu.Unlock()
+
+	go func() {
+		log.Printf("started daemon JSON server: %v", jsonListener.address)
+		if err := jsonServer.Serve(jsonListener.Listener); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, http.ErrServerClosed) {
+			log.Errorf("failed to serve daemon JSON requests: %v", err)
+		}
+	}()
+
+	return nil
+}

client/cmd/service_json_socket_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+//go:build !ios && !android
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"net"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"runtime"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
+	"github.com/spf13/pflag"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+func preserveJSONSocketTestState(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	origJSONSocket := jsonSocket
+	origEnableJSONSocket := enableJSONSocket
+	origChanged := map[string]bool{}
+	serviceCmd.PersistentFlags().VisitAll(func(flag *pflag.Flag) {
+		origChanged[flag.Name] = flag.Changed
+	})
+
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		jsonSocket = origJSONSocket
+		enableJSONSocket = origEnableJSONSocket
+		serviceCmd.PersistentFlags().VisitAll(func(flag *pflag.Flag) {
+			flag.Changed = origChanged[flag.Name]
+		})
+	})
+}
+
+func TestJSONSocketFlagsArePositiveEnableOnly(t *testing.T) {
+	assert.NotNil(t, serviceCmd.PersistentFlags().Lookup("enable-json-socket"))
+	assert.NotNil(t, serviceCmd.PersistentFlags().Lookup("json-socket"))
+	assert.Nil(t, serviceCmd.PersistentFlags().Lookup("disable-json-socket"))
+	assert.Equal(t, "false", serviceCmd.PersistentFlags().Lookup("enable-json-socket").DefValue)
+}
+
+func TestBuildServiceArgumentsDefaultDisablesJSONSocket(t *testing.T) {
+	preserveJSONSocketTestState(t)
+
+	enableJSONSocket = false
+	jsonSocket = "tcp://127.0.0.1:8080"
+
+	args := buildServiceArguments()
+
+	assert.NotContains(t, args, "--enable-json-socket")
+	assert.NotContains(t, args, "--json-socket")
+}
+
+func TestBuildServiceArgumentsIncludesJSONSocketWhenEnabled(t *testing.T) {
+	preserveJSONSocketTestState(t)
+
+	enableJSONSocket = true
+	jsonSocket = "tcp://127.0.0.1:8080"
+
+	args := buildServiceArguments()
+
+	enableIndex := indexOfArg(args, "--enable-json-socket")
+	jsonIndex := indexOfArg(args, "--json-socket")
+	require.NotEqual(t, -1, enableIndex)
+	require.NotEqual(t, -1, jsonIndex)
+	require.Less(t, enableIndex, jsonIndex)
+	require.Less(t, jsonIndex+1, len(args))
+	assert.Equal(t, "tcp://127.0.0.1:8080", args[jsonIndex+1])
+}
+
+func TestJSONSocketWithoutEnableValidation(t *testing.T) {
+	preserveJSONSocketTestState(t)
+
+	enableJSONSocket = false
+	require.NoError(t, serviceCmd.PersistentFlags().Set("json-socket", "tcp://127.0.0.1:8080"))
+
+	err := validateJSONSocketFlags()
+
+	require.Error(t, err)
+	assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "--enable-json-socket")
+}
+
+func TestJSONSocketWithEnableValidation(t *testing.T) {
+	preserveJSONSocketTestState(t)
+
+	require.NoError(t, serviceCmd.PersistentFlags().Set("enable-json-socket", "true"))
+	require.NoError(t, serviceCmd.PersistentFlags().Set("json-socket", "tcp://127.0.0.1:8080"))
+
+	assert.NoError(t, validateJSONSocketFlags())
+}
+
+func TestJSONSocketServiceParamsPersistEnableAndAddress(t *testing.T) {
+	preserveJSONSocketTestState(t)
+	serviceCmd.PersistentFlags().VisitAll(func(flag *pflag.Flag) {
+		flag.Changed = false
+	})
+
+	enableJSONSocket = true
+	jsonSocket = "tcp://127.0.0.1:8080"
+
+	params := currentServiceParams()
+	require.True(t, params.EnableJSONSocket)
+	require.Equal(t, "tcp://127.0.0.1:8080", params.JSONSocket)
+
+	enableJSONSocket = false
+	jsonSocket = defaultJSONSocket
+	applyServiceParams(testServiceEnvCommand(), params)
+
+	assert.True(t, enableJSONSocket)
+	assert.Equal(t, "tcp://127.0.0.1:8080", jsonSocket)
+}
+
+func TestRemoveStaleUnixSocketDoesNotRemoveRegularFile(t *testing.T) {
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "netbird-http.sock")
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(path, []byte("not a socket"), 0600))
+
+	removeStaleUnixSocket(path)
+
+	data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Equal(t, []byte("not a socket"), data)
+}
+
+func TestRemoveStaleUnixSocketRemovesSocket(t *testing.T) {
+	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
+		t.Skip("unix sockets are not available on Windows")
+	}
+
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "netbird-http.sock")
+	addr := &net.UnixAddr{Name: path, Net: "unix"}
+	listener, err := net.ListenUnix("unix", addr)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	listener.SetUnlinkOnClose(false)
+	require.NoError(t, listener.Close())
+
+	_, err = os.Lstat(path)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "test setup must leave a stale Unix socket path")
+
+	removeStaleUnixSocket(path)
+
+	_, err = os.Lstat(path)
+	assert.True(t, os.IsNotExist(err), "expected stale Unix socket to be removed, got %v", err)
+}
+
+func TestRemoveStaleUnixSocketDoesNotRemoveLiveSocket(t *testing.T) {
+	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
+		t.Skip("unix sockets are not available on Windows")
+	}
+
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "netbird-http.sock")
+	listener, err := net.Listen("unix", path)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	defer listener.Close()
+
+	removeStaleUnixSocket(path)
+
+	_, err = os.Lstat(path)
+	assert.NoError(t, err, "expected live Unix socket to be preserved")
+}
+
+func testServiceEnvCommand() *cobra.Command {
+	cmd := &cobra.Command{}
+	cmd.Flags().StringSlice("service-env", nil, "")
+	return cmd
+}
+
+func indexOfArg(args []string, arg string) int {
+	for i, candidate := range args {
+		if candidate == arg {
+			return i
+		}
+	}
+	return -1
+}

client/cmd/service_params.go

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ const serviceParamsFile = "service.json"
 type serviceParams struct {
 	LogLevel              string            `json:"log_level"`
 	DaemonAddr            string            `json:"daemon_addr"`
+	JSONSocket            string            `json:"json_socket"`
 	ManagementURL         string            `json:"management_url,omitempty"`
 	ConfigPath            string            `json:"config_path,omitempty"`
 	LogFiles              []string          `json:"log_files,omitempty"`
@@ -30,6 +31,7 @@ type serviceParams struct {
 	DisableUpdateSettings bool              `json:"disable_update_settings,omitempty"`
 	EnableCapture         bool              `json:"enable_capture,omitempty"`
 	DisableNetworks       bool              `json:"disable_networks,omitempty"`
+	EnableJSONSocket      bool              `json:"enable_json_socket,omitempty"`
 	ServiceEnvVars        map[string]string `json:"service_env_vars,omitempty"`
 }
 
@@ -75,6 +77,7 @@ func currentServiceParams() *serviceParams {
 	params := &serviceParams{
 		LogLevel:              logLevel,
 		DaemonAddr:            daemonAddr,
+		JSONSocket:            jsonSocket,
 		ManagementURL:         managementURL,
 		ConfigPath:            configPath,
 		LogFiles:              logFiles,
@@ -82,6 +85,7 @@ func currentServiceParams() *serviceParams {
 		DisableUpdateSettings: updateSettingsDisabled,
 		EnableCapture:         captureEnabled,
 		DisableNetworks:       networksDisabled,
+		EnableJSONSocket:      enableJSONSocket,
 	}
 
 	if len(serviceEnvVars) > 0 {
@@ -113,9 +117,8 @@ func applyServiceParams(cmd *cobra.Command, params *serviceParams) {
 		return
 	}
 
-	// For fields with non-empty defaults (log-level, daemon-addr), keep the
-	// != "" guard so that an older service.json missing the field doesn't
-	// clobber the default with an empty string.
+	// For fields with non-empty defaults, keep the != "" guard so that an older
+	// service.json missing the field doesn't clobber the default with an empty string.
 	if !rootCmd.PersistentFlags().Changed("log-level") && params.LogLevel != "" {
 		logLevel = params.LogLevel
 	}
@@ -124,6 +127,14 @@ func applyServiceParams(cmd *cobra.Command, params *serviceParams) {
 		daemonAddr = params.DaemonAddr
 	}
 
+	if !serviceCmd.PersistentFlags().Changed("json-socket") && params.JSONSocket != "" {
+		jsonSocket = params.JSONSocket
+	}
+
+	if !serviceCmd.PersistentFlags().Changed("enable-json-socket") {
+		enableJSONSocket = params.EnableJSONSocket
+	}
+
 	// For optional fields where empty means "use default", always apply so
 	// that an explicit clear (--management-url "") persists across reinstalls.
 	if !rootCmd.PersistentFlags().Changed("management-url") {

client/cmd/service_params_test.go

@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ func TestSaveAndLoadServiceParams(t *testing.T) {
 	params := &serviceParams{
 		LogLevel:              "debug",
 		DaemonAddr:            "unix:///var/run/netbird.sock",
+		JSONSocket:            "tcp://127.0.0.1:8080",
+		EnableJSONSocket:      true,
 		ManagementURL:         "https://my.server.com",
 		ConfigPath:            "/etc/netbird/config.json",
 		LogFiles:              []string{"/var/log/netbird/client.log", "console"},
@@ -63,6 +65,8 @@ func TestSaveAndLoadServiceParams(t *testing.T) {
 
 	assert.Equal(t, params.LogLevel, loaded.LogLevel)
 	assert.Equal(t, params.DaemonAddr, loaded.DaemonAddr)
+	assert.Equal(t, params.JSONSocket, loaded.JSONSocket)
+	assert.Equal(t, params.EnableJSONSocket, loaded.EnableJSONSocket)
 	assert.Equal(t, params.ManagementURL, loaded.ManagementURL)
 	assert.Equal(t, params.ConfigPath, loaded.ConfigPath)
 	assert.Equal(t, params.LogFiles, loaded.LogFiles)
@@ -101,6 +105,8 @@ func TestLoadServiceParams_InvalidJSON(t *testing.T) {
 func TestCurrentServiceParams(t *testing.T) {
 	origLogLevel := logLevel
 	origDaemonAddr := daemonAddr
+	origJSONSocket := jsonSocket
+	origEnableJSONSocket := enableJSONSocket
 	origManagementURL := managementURL
 	origConfigPath := configPath
 	origLogFiles := logFiles
@@ -110,6 +116,8 @@ func TestCurrentServiceParams(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Cleanup(func() {
 		logLevel = origLogLevel
 		daemonAddr = origDaemonAddr
+		jsonSocket = origJSONSocket
+		enableJSONSocket = origEnableJSONSocket
 		managementURL = origManagementURL
 		configPath = origConfigPath
 		logFiles = origLogFiles
@@ -120,6 +128,8 @@ func TestCurrentServiceParams(t *testing.T) {
 
 	logLevel = "trace"
 	daemonAddr = "tcp://127.0.0.1:9999"
+	jsonSocket = "tcp://127.0.0.1:8080"
+	enableJSONSocket = true
 	managementURL = "https://mgmt.example.com"
 	configPath = "/tmp/test-config.json"
 	logFiles = []string{"/tmp/test.log"}
@@ -131,6 +141,8 @@ func TestCurrentServiceParams(t *testing.T) {
 
 	assert.Equal(t, "trace", params.LogLevel)
 	assert.Equal(t, "tcp://127.0.0.1:9999", params.DaemonAddr)
+	assert.Equal(t, "tcp://127.0.0.1:8080", params.JSONSocket)
+	assert.True(t, params.EnableJSONSocket)
 	assert.Equal(t, "https://mgmt.example.com", params.ManagementURL)
 	assert.Equal(t, "/tmp/test-config.json", params.ConfigPath)
 	assert.Equal(t, []string{"/tmp/test.log"}, params.LogFiles)
@@ -142,6 +154,8 @@ func TestCurrentServiceParams(t *testing.T) {
 func TestApplyServiceParams_OnlyUnchangedFlags(t *testing.T) {
 	origLogLevel := logLevel
 	origDaemonAddr := daemonAddr
+	origJSONSocket := jsonSocket
+	origEnableJSONSocket := enableJSONSocket
 	origManagementURL := managementURL
 	origConfigPath := configPath
 	origLogFiles := logFiles
@@ -151,6 +165,8 @@ func TestApplyServiceParams_OnlyUnchangedFlags(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Cleanup(func() {
 		logLevel = origLogLevel
 		daemonAddr = origDaemonAddr
+		jsonSocket = origJSONSocket
+		enableJSONSocket = origEnableJSONSocket
 		managementURL = origManagementURL
 		configPath = origConfigPath
 		logFiles = origLogFiles
@@ -162,6 +178,8 @@ func TestApplyServiceParams_OnlyUnchangedFlags(t *testing.T) {
 	// Reset all flags to defaults.
 	logLevel = "info"
 	daemonAddr = "unix:///var/run/netbird.sock"
+	jsonSocket = defaultJSONSocket
+	enableJSONSocket = false
 	managementURL = ""
 	configPath = "/etc/netbird/config.json"
 	logFiles = []string{"/var/log/netbird/client.log"}
@@ -184,6 +202,8 @@ func TestApplyServiceParams_OnlyUnchangedFlags(t *testing.T) {
 	saved := &serviceParams{
 		LogLevel:              "debug",
 		DaemonAddr:            "tcp://127.0.0.1:5555",
+		JSONSocket:            "tcp://127.0.0.1:8080",
+		EnableJSONSocket:      true,
 		ManagementURL:         "https://saved.example.com",
 		ConfigPath:            "/saved/config.json",
 		LogFiles:              []string{"/saved/client.log"},
@@ -201,6 +221,8 @@ func TestApplyServiceParams_OnlyUnchangedFlags(t *testing.T) {
 
 	// All other fields were not Changed, so they should use saved values.
 	assert.Equal(t, "tcp://127.0.0.1:5555", daemonAddr)
+	assert.Equal(t, "tcp://127.0.0.1:8080", jsonSocket)
+	assert.True(t, enableJSONSocket)
 	assert.Equal(t, "https://saved.example.com", managementURL)
 	assert.Equal(t, "/saved/config.json", configPath)
 	assert.Equal(t, []string{"/saved/client.log"}, logFiles)
@@ -212,14 +234,17 @@ func TestApplyServiceParams_OnlyUnchangedFlags(t *testing.T) {
 func TestApplyServiceParams_BooleanRevertToFalse(t *testing.T) {
 	origProfilesDisabled := profilesDisabled
 	origUpdateSettingsDisabled := updateSettingsDisabled
+	origEnableJSONSocket := enableJSONSocket
 	t.Cleanup(func() {
 		profilesDisabled = origProfilesDisabled
 		updateSettingsDisabled = origUpdateSettingsDisabled
+		enableJSONSocket = origEnableJSONSocket
 	})
 
 	// Simulate current state where booleans are true (e.g. set by previous install).
 	profilesDisabled = true
 	updateSettingsDisabled = true
+	enableJSONSocket = true
 
 	// Reset Changed state so flags appear unset.
 	serviceCmd.PersistentFlags().VisitAll(func(f *pflag.Flag) {
@@ -238,6 +263,7 @@ func TestApplyServiceParams_BooleanRevertToFalse(t *testing.T) {
 
 	assert.False(t, profilesDisabled, "saved false should override current true")
 	assert.False(t, updateSettingsDisabled, "saved false should override current true")
+	assert.False(t, enableJSONSocket, "saved false should override current true")
 }
 
 func TestApplyServiceParams_ClearManagementURL(t *testing.T) {
@@ -530,6 +556,7 @@ func fieldToGlobalVar(field string) string {
 	m := map[string]string{
 		"LogLevel":              "logLevel",
 		"DaemonAddr":            "daemonAddr",
+		"JSONSocket":            "jsonSocket",
 		"ManagementURL":         "managementURL",
 		"ConfigPath":            "configPath",
 		"LogFiles":              "logFiles",
@@ -537,6 +564,7 @@ func fieldToGlobalVar(field string) string {
 		"DisableUpdateSettings": "updateSettingsDisabled",
 		"EnableCapture":         "captureEnabled",
 		"DisableNetworks":       "networksDisabled",
+		"EnableJSONSocket":      "enableJSONSocket",
 		"ServiceEnvVars":        "serviceEnvVars",
 	}
 	if v, ok := m[field]; ok {

client/cmd/service_socket.go

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+//go:build !ios && !android
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"net"
+	"os"
+	"strings"
+	"syscall"
+	"time"
+
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+)
+
+type socketListener struct {
+	net.Listener
+	network string
+	address string
+}
+
+func listenOnAddress(addr string) (*socketListener, error) {
+	network, address, err := parseListenAddress(addr)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	if network == "unix" {
+		removeStaleUnixSocket(address)
+	}
+
+	listener, err := net.Listen(network, address)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	return &socketListener{Listener: listener, network: network, address: address}, nil
+}
+
+func parseListenAddress(addr string) (string, string, error) {
+	network, address, ok := strings.Cut(addr, "://")
+	if !ok || network == "" || address == "" {
+		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("address must be in [unix|tcp]://[path|host:port] format: %q", addr)
+	}
+
+	switch network {
+	case "unix", "tcp":
+		return network, address, nil
+	default:
+		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("unsupported daemon address protocol: %v", network)
+	}
+}
+
+func removeStaleUnixSocket(path string) {
+	stat, err := os.Lstat(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+			log.Debugf("stat socket file: %v", err)
+		}
+		return
+	}
+
+	if stat.Mode()&os.ModeSocket == 0 {
+		return
+	}
+
+	if !isStaleUnixSocket(path) {
+		return
+	}
+
+	if err := os.Remove(path); err != nil {
+		log.Debugf("remove socket file: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func isStaleUnixSocket(path string) bool {
+	conn, err := net.DialTimeout("unix", path, 100*time.Millisecond)
+	if err == nil {
+		if closeErr := conn.Close(); closeErr != nil {
+			log.Debugf("close unix socket probe: %v", closeErr)
+		}
+		return false
+	}
+
+	if os.IsNotExist(err) || os.IsPermission(err) || os.IsTimeout(err) {
+		log.Debugf("not removing unix socket %s after probe error: %v", path, err)
+		return false
+	}
+
+	return errors.Is(err, syscall.ECONNREFUSED)
+}
+
+func removeStaleUnixSocketForAddress(addr string) {
+	network, address, err := parseListenAddress(addr)
+	if err != nil || network != "unix" {
+		return
+	}
+	removeStaleUnixSocket(address)
+}
+
+func (l *socketListener) chmodUnixSocket(description string) error {
+	if l == nil || l.network != "unix" {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	if err := os.Chmod(l.address, 0666); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("failed setting %s permissions for %s: %w", description, l.address, err)
+	}
+	return nil
+}

client/cmd/up.go

@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
+	nbnet "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/net"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/server"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/system"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
@@ -229,6 +231,24 @@ func runInForegroundMode(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, activeProf *pr
 
 	_, _ = profilemanager.UpdateOldManagementURL(ctx, config, configFilePath)
 
+	// Restore residual state left by a previous run that did not shut down
+	// cleanly, mirroring what the daemon does before connecting: it recovers
+	// DNS config (a stale resolv.conf takeover can make the management
+	// hostname unresolvable), firewall rules, ssh config and legacy routing.
+	// Route cleanup itself happens at engine start; nbnet.Init() below lets
+	// the management dial bypass a leftover fwmark rule until then.
+	// Foreground mode is particularly exposed in containers: a crashed
+	// container restarts inside the same (pod) network namespace, so stale
+	// state survives while the process does not.
+	if err := server.RestoreResidualState(ctx, profilemanager.NewServiceManager(configPath).GetStatePath()); err != nil {
+		log.Warnf("failed to restore residual state: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Enable advanced routing (as the daemon does on startup) so the
+	// management dial bypasses a leftover fwmark rule instead of being
+	// shunted into a stale routing table.
+	nbnet.Init()
+
 	err = foregroundLogin(ctx, cmd, config, providedSetupKey, activeProf.ID)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("foreground login failed: %v", err)
@@ -479,10 +499,6 @@ func setupSetConfigReq(customDNSAddressConverted []byte, cmd *cobra.Command, pro
 		req.DisableIpv6 = &disableIPv6
 	}
 
-	if cmd.Flag(enableLazyConnectionFlag).Changed {
-		req.LazyConnectionEnabled = &lazyConnEnabled
-	}
-
 	return &req
 }
 
@@ -600,9 +616,6 @@ func setupConfig(customDNSAddressConverted []byte, cmd *cobra.Command, configFil
 		ic.DisableIPv6 = &disableIPv6
 	}
 
-	if cmd.Flag(enableLazyConnectionFlag).Changed {
-		ic.LazyConnectionEnabled = &lazyConnEnabled
-	}
 	return &ic, nil
 }
 
@@ -718,9 +731,6 @@ func setupLoginRequest(providedSetupKey string, customDNSAddressConverted []byte
 		loginRequest.DisableIpv6 = &disableIPv6
 	}
 
-	if cmd.Flag(enableLazyConnectionFlag).Changed {
-		loginRequest.LazyConnectionEnabled = &lazyConnEnabled
-	}
 	return &loginRequest, nil
 }
 

client/firewall/uspfilter/filter.go

@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ type Manager struct {
 	udpTracker     *conntrack.UDPTracker
 	icmpTracker    *conntrack.ICMPTracker
 	tcpTracker     *conntrack.TCPTracker
+	fragments      *fragmentTracker
 	forwarder      atomic.Pointer[forwarder.Forwarder]
 	pendingCapture atomic.Pointer[forwarder.PacketCapture]
 	logger         *nblog.Logger
@@ -183,6 +184,41 @@ func (d *decoder) decodePacket(data []byte) error {
 	}
 }
 
+// decodeTransport decodes the transport header of a first fragment (which
+// gopacket leaves undecoded) into the decoder and appends its layer type to
+// decoded, so the ACL pipeline can evaluate it like a normal packet. It returns
+// false if the protocol is unsupported or the header is truncated.
+func (d *decoder) decodeTransport(proto layers.IPProtocol, payload []byte) bool {
+	var l4 gopacket.DecodingLayer
+	var layerType gopacket.LayerType
+	var minLen int
+	switch proto {
+	case layers.IPProtocolTCP:
+		l4, layerType, minLen = &d.tcp, layers.LayerTypeTCP, 20
+	case layers.IPProtocolUDP:
+		l4, layerType, minLen = &d.udp, layers.LayerTypeUDP, 8
+	case layers.IPProtocolICMPv4:
+		l4, layerType, minLen = &d.icmp4, layers.LayerTypeICMPv4, 8
+	case layers.IPProtocolICMPv6:
+		l4, layerType, minLen = &d.icmp6, layers.LayerTypeICMPv6, 8
+	default:
+		return false
+	}
+
+	// Reject a fragment too small to hold the full transport header before
+	// decoding: it can't be ACL-evaluated (tiny-fragment attack), and skipping
+	// the decode avoids gopacket allocating an error on the drop path.
+	if len(payload) < minLen {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	if err := l4.DecodeFromBytes(payload, gopacket.NilDecodeFeedback); err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	d.decoded = append(d.decoded, layerType)
+	return true
+}
+
 // Create userspace firewall manager constructor
 func Create(iface common.IFaceMapper, disableServerRoutes bool, flowLogger nftypes.FlowLogger, mtu uint16) (*Manager, error) {
 	return create(iface, nil, disableServerRoutes, flowLogger, mtu)
@@ -286,6 +322,8 @@ func create(iface common.IFaceMapper, nativeFirewall firewall.Manager, disableSe
 	if err := m.localipmanager.UpdateLocalIPs(iface); err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("update local IPs: %w", err)
 	}
+	m.fragments = newFragmentTracker(m.logger)
+
 	if disableConntrack {
 		log.Info("conntrack is disabled")
 	} else {
@@ -299,6 +337,7 @@ func create(iface common.IFaceMapper, nativeFirewall firewall.Manager, disableSe
 		}
 	}
 	if err := iface.SetFilter(m); err != nil {
+		m.fragments.Close()
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("set filter: %w", err)
 	}
 	return m, nil
@@ -694,6 +733,10 @@ func (m *Manager) resetState() {
 		m.tcpTracker.Close()
 	}
 
+	if m.fragments != nil {
+		m.fragments.Close()
+	}
+
 	if fwder := m.forwarder.Load(); fwder != nil {
 		fwder.SetCapture(nil)
 		fwder.Stop()
@@ -1046,19 +1089,20 @@ func (m *Manager) filterInbound(packetData []byte, size int) bool {
 		return true
 	}
 
-	// TODO: pass fragments of routed packets to forwarder
+	// gopacket does not decode the transport header of any IP fragment, so
+	// fragments take a dedicated path: the first fragment's header is decoded
+	// and ACL-evaluated here, and the remaining fragments inherit its verdict.
 	if fragment {
-		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
-			if d.decoded[0] == layers.LayerTypeIPv4 {
-				m.logger.Trace4("packet is a fragment: src=%v dst=%v id=%v flags=%v",
-					srcIP, dstIP, d.ip4.Id, d.ip4.Flags)
-			} else {
-				m.logger.Trace2("packet is an IPv6 fragment: src=%v dst=%v", srcIP, dstIP)
-			}
-		}
-		return false
+		return m.filterInboundFragment(d, srcIP, dstIP, size)
 	}
 
+	return m.filterInboundDecoded(d, srcIP, dstIP, packetData, size)
+}
+
+// filterInboundDecoded runs the ACL, DNAT and conntrack pipeline on a fully
+// decoded (non-fragment) inbound packet. It returns true if the packet should
+// be dropped.
+func (m *Manager) filterInboundDecoded(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, packetData []byte, size int) bool {
 	// TODO: optimize port DNAT by caching matched rules in conntrack
 	if translated := m.translateInboundPortDNAT(packetData, d, srcIP, dstIP); translated {
 		// Re-decode after port DNAT translation to update port information
@@ -1089,33 +1133,226 @@ func (m *Manager) filterInbound(packetData []byte, size int) bool {
 	return m.handleRoutedTraffic(d, srcIP, dstIP, packetData, size)
 }
 
+// fragmentMeta holds the reassembly identity and layout of an IP fragment,
+// extracted uniformly for IPv4 and IPv6.
+type fragmentMeta struct {
+	key fragmentKey
+	// offset is the fragment offset in 8-byte units (zero for the first
+	// fragment).
+	offset uint16
+	// moreFragments is the More Fragments bit. A first fragment with it unset is
+	// an IPv6 atomic fragment (a complete datagram, RFC 6946): it has no trailing
+	// fragments to inherit a verdict, so it must not be recorded.
+	moreFragments bool
+	proto         layers.IPProtocol
+	// l4payload is the fragmentable payload of this fragment. For the first
+	// fragment it starts with the transport header.
+	l4payload []byte
+	// headerEndOctets is the first fragment's payload length in 8-byte units:
+	// the smallest offset a trailing fragment may start at without overlapping
+	// the inspected transport header.
+	headerEndOctets uint16
+}
+
+// fragmentMetadata extracts the fragment identity and layout from a decoded IP
+// fragment. It returns false for fragments it can't interpret (e.g. an IPv6
+// fragment header shorter than 8 bytes), which are then dropped.
+func fragmentMetadata(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr) (fragmentMeta, bool) {
+	switch d.decoded[0] {
+	case layers.LayerTypeIPv4:
+		payload := d.ip4.Payload
+		return fragmentMeta{
+			key:             fragmentKey{srcIP: srcIP, dstIP: dstIP, id: uint32(d.ip4.Id), proto: uint8(d.ip4.Protocol)},
+			offset:          d.ip4.FragOffset,
+			moreFragments:   d.ip4.Flags&layers.IPv4MoreFragments != 0,
+			proto:           d.ip4.Protocol,
+			l4payload:       payload,
+			headerEndOctets: octets(len(payload)),
+		}, true
+
+	case layers.LayerTypeIPv6:
+		// IPv6 fragment extension header: 8 bytes, followed by the fragmentable
+		// payload. Layout: next header (1), reserved (1), offset+flags (2), id (4).
+		payload := d.ip6.Payload
+		if len(payload) < 8 {
+			return fragmentMeta{}, false
+		}
+		nextHeader := layers.IPProtocol(payload[0])
+		offsetFlags := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(payload[2:4])
+		id := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(payload[4:8])
+		l4 := payload[8:]
+		return fragmentMeta{
+			key:             fragmentKey{srcIP: srcIP, dstIP: dstIP, id: id, proto: uint8(nextHeader)},
+			offset:          offsetFlags >> 3,
+			moreFragments:   offsetFlags&1 != 0,
+			proto:           nextHeader,
+			l4payload:       l4,
+			headerEndOctets: octets(len(l4)),
+		}, true
+
+	default:
+		return fragmentMeta{}, false
+	}
+}
+
+// octets rounds a byte length up to whole 8-byte units, the granularity of the
+// IP fragment offset field.
+func octets(nbytes int) uint16 {
+	return uint16((nbytes + 7) / 8)
+}
+
+// filterInboundFragment decides the fate of an IP fragment. gopacket stops
+// decoding at the network layer for every fragment, so the first fragment's
+// transport header is decoded and ACL-evaluated here and its verdict recorded;
+// the remaining (headerless) fragments inherit that verdict. Anything that
+// cannot be tied to an allowed, non-overlapping first fragment is dropped.
+func (m *Manager) filterInboundFragment(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, size int) bool {
+	meta, ok := fragmentMetadata(d, srcIP, dstIP)
+	if !ok {
+		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
+			m.logger.Trace2("dropping unsupported fragment: src=%v dst=%v", srcIP, dstIP)
+		}
+		return true
+	}
+
+	if meta.offset != 0 {
+		return m.filterTrailingFragment(meta, srcIP, dstIP)
+	}
+
+	// A new first fragment supersedes any recorded verdict for this datagram, so
+	// a re-sent or overlapping offset-zero fragment can't inherit the old one.
+	m.fragments.poison(meta.key)
+
+	// First fragment: decode its transport header so the ACL can evaluate it. A
+	// decode failure means the fragment is too small to hold the full transport
+	// header (RFC 1858 §3 tiny-fragment attack); it can't be evaluated, so drop it.
+	if !d.decodeTransport(meta.proto, meta.l4payload) {
+		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
+			m.logger.Trace3("dropping first fragment without full L4 header: src=%v dst=%v id=%v",
+				srcIP, dstIP, meta.key.id)
+		}
+		return true
+	}
+
+	return m.filterFirstFragment(d, meta, srcIP, dstIP, size)
+}
+
+// filterTrailingFragment applies a recorded first-fragment verdict to a
+// non-first fragment.
+func (m *Manager) filterTrailingFragment(meta fragmentMeta, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr) bool {
+	switch m.fragments.verdict(meta.key, meta.offset) {
+	case fragmentAllow:
+		return false
+	case fragmentOverlap:
+		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
+			m.logger.Trace3("dropping overlapping fragment rewriting inspected header: src=%v dst=%v id=%v",
+				srcIP, dstIP, meta.key.id)
+		}
+		return true
+	default:
+		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
+			m.logger.Trace3("dropping fragment with no allowed first fragment: src=%v dst=%v id=%v",
+				srcIP, dstIP, meta.key.id)
+		}
+		return true
+	}
+}
+
+// filterFirstFragment runs the verdict part of the inbound pipeline on a first
+// fragment with its transport header decoded. It mirrors filterInboundDecoded
+// but skips DNAT (port rewriting on fragments is unsupported) and forwarder
+// injection (fragments are left to the stack to reassemble, not forwarded).
+// Allowed fragments have their verdict recorded so the datagram's trailing
+// fragments inherit it.
+func (m *Manager) filterFirstFragment(d *decoder, meta fragmentMeta, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, size int) bool {
+	if m.stateful && m.isValidTrackedConnection(d, srcIP, dstIP, size) {
+		m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
+		return false
+	}
+
+	if m.localipmanager.IsLocalIP(dstIP) {
+		ruleID, blocked := m.peerACLsBlock(srcIP, d, nil)
+		if blocked {
+			m.storeDropFlow("Dropping local first fragment (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
+				d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
+			return true
+		}
+		m.trackInbound(d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
+		m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
+		return false
+	}
+
+	if !m.routingEnabled.Load() {
+		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
+			m.logger.Trace2("Dropping routed fragment (routing disabled): src=%s dst=%s", srcIP, dstIP)
+		}
+		return true
+	}
+	if m.nativeRouter.Load() {
+		m.trackInbound(d, srcIP, dstIP, nil, size)
+		m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
+		return false
+	}
+
+	// TODO: pass fragments of routed packets to the forwarder; until then
+	// allowed routed fragments go to the native stack.
+	srcPort, dstPort := getPortsFromPacket(d)
+	ruleID, pass := m.routeACLsPass(srcIP, dstIP, d.decoded[1], srcPort, dstPort)
+	if !pass {
+		m.storeDropFlow("Dropping routed first fragment (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
+			d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
+		return true
+	}
+
+	m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
+	return false
+}
+
+// recordFirstFragment caches an allowed first fragment's verdict for its
+// trailing fragments to inherit. Atomic fragments (no More Fragments bit) are
+// complete datagrams with no trailing fragments, so they are not cached and
+// cannot exhaust the verdict table.
+func (m *Manager) recordFirstFragment(meta fragmentMeta) {
+	if !meta.moreFragments {
+		return
+	}
+	m.fragments.recordAllowed(meta.key, meta.headerEndOctets)
+}
+
+// storeDropFlow logs and records a netflow drop event for an inbound packet
+// denied by the ACLs. msg is the trace format taking rule id, protocol, source
+// and destination.
+func (m *Manager) storeDropFlow(msg string, d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, ruleID []byte, size int) {
+	pnum := getProtocolFromPacket(d)
+	srcPort, dstPort := getPortsFromPacket(d)
+
+	if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
+		m.logger.Trace6(msg, ruleID, pnum, srcIP, srcPort, dstIP, dstPort)
+	}
+
+	m.flowLogger.StoreEvent(nftypes.EventFields{
+		FlowID:     uuid.New(),
+		Type:       nftypes.TypeDrop,
+		RuleID:     ruleID,
+		Direction:  nftypes.Ingress,
+		Protocol:   pnum,
+		SourceIP:   srcIP,
+		DestIP:     dstIP,
+		SourcePort: srcPort,
+		DestPort:   dstPort,
+		// TODO: icmp type/code
+		RxPackets: 1,
+		RxBytes:   uint64(size),
+	})
+}
+
 // handleLocalTraffic handles local traffic.
 // If it returns true, the packet should be dropped.
 func (m *Manager) handleLocalTraffic(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, packetData []byte, size int) bool {
 	ruleID, blocked := m.peerACLsBlock(srcIP, d, packetData)
 	if blocked {
-		pnum := getProtocolFromPacket(d)
-		srcPort, dstPort := getPortsFromPacket(d)
-
-		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
-			m.logger.Trace6("Dropping local packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
-				ruleID, pnum, srcIP, srcPort, dstIP, dstPort)
-		}
-
-		m.flowLogger.StoreEvent(nftypes.EventFields{
-			FlowID:     uuid.New(),
-			Type:       nftypes.TypeDrop,
-			RuleID:     ruleID,
-			Direction:  nftypes.Ingress,
-			Protocol:   pnum,
-			SourceIP:   srcIP,
-			DestIP:     dstIP,
-			SourcePort: srcPort,
-			DestPort:   dstPort,
-			// TODO: icmp type/code
-			RxPackets: 1,
-			RxBytes:   uint64(size),
-		})
+		m.storeDropFlow("Dropping local packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
+			d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
 		return true
 	}
 
@@ -1168,27 +1405,8 @@ func (m *Manager) handleRoutedTraffic(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, packe
 
 	ruleID, pass := m.routeACLsPass(srcIP, dstIP, protoLayer, srcPort, dstPort)
 	if !pass {
-		proto := getProtocolFromPacket(d)
-
-		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
-			m.logger.Trace6("Dropping routed packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
-				ruleID, proto, srcIP, srcPort, dstIP, dstPort)
-		}
-
-		m.flowLogger.StoreEvent(nftypes.EventFields{
-			FlowID:     uuid.New(),
-			Type:       nftypes.TypeDrop,
-			RuleID:     ruleID,
-			Direction:  nftypes.Ingress,
-			Protocol:   proto,
-			SourceIP:   srcIP,
-			DestIP:     dstIP,
-			SourcePort: srcPort,
-			DestPort:   dstPort,
-			// TODO: icmp type/code
-			RxPackets: 1,
-			RxBytes:   uint64(size),
-		})
+		m.storeDropFlow("Dropping routed packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
+			d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
 		return true
 	}
 

client/firewall/uspfilter/forwarder/forwarder.go

@@ -5,7 +5,9 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"net"
 	"net/netip"
+	"os"
 	"runtime"
+	"strconv"
 	"sync"
 	"time"
 
@@ -31,6 +33,11 @@ const (
 	defaultMaxInFlight   = 1024
 	iosReceiveWindow     = 16384
 	iosMaxInFlight       = 256
+
+	// envForceTCPRACK overrides the platform default for gVisor's RACK loss
+	// detection. Set to a truthy value to force RACK on, or a falsy value to
+	// force it off, on any platform.
+	envForceTCPRACK = "NB_FORCE_TCP_RACK"
 )
 
 type Forwarder struct {
@@ -152,6 +159,8 @@ func New(iface common.IFaceMapper, logger *nblog.Logger, flowLogger nftypes.Flow
 		maxInFlight = iosMaxInFlight
 	}
 
+	configureTCPRecovery(s)
+
 	tcpForwarder := tcp.NewForwarder(s, receiveWindow, maxInFlight, f.handleTCP)
 	s.SetTransportProtocolHandler(tcp.ProtocolNumber, tcpForwarder.HandlePacket)
 
@@ -466,3 +475,31 @@ func probeRawICMP(network, addr string, logger *nblog.Logger) bool {
 	logger.Debug1("forwarder: raw %s socket access available", network)
 	return true
 }
+
+// configureTCPRecovery disables gVisor's RACK loss detection on Windows, where
+// it interacts poorly with the host and collapses throughput on routed TCP
+// connections (gVisor issue #9778). Other platforms keep the default. The
+// EnvForceTCPRACK environment variable overrides the platform default.
+func configureTCPRecovery(s *stack.Stack) {
+	disableRACK := runtime.GOOS == "windows"
+
+	if val := os.Getenv(envForceTCPRACK); val != "" {
+		force, err := strconv.ParseBool(val)
+		if err != nil {
+			log.Warnf("parse %s: %v", envForceTCPRACK, err)
+		} else {
+			disableRACK = !force
+		}
+	}
+
+	if !disableRACK {
+		return
+	}
+
+	opt := tcpip.TCPRecovery(0)
+	if err := s.SetTransportProtocolOption(tcp.ProtocolNumber, &opt); err != nil {
+		log.Warnf("disable TCP RACK loss detection: %v", err)
+		return
+	}
+	log.Info("forwarder: TCP RACK loss detection disabled")
+}

client/firewall/uspfilter/fragment.go

@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+package uspfilter
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"net/netip"
+	"os"
+	"strconv"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+
+	nblog "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/uspfilter/log"
+)
+
+const (
+	// defaultFragmentTimeout bounds how long a first-fragment verdict is kept
+	// while the remaining fragments arrive. It mirrors the Linux IP reassembly
+	// timeout (net.ipv4.ipfrag_time).
+	defaultFragmentTimeout = 30 * time.Second
+	// fragmentCleanupInterval is how often expired verdicts are purged.
+	fragmentCleanupInterval = 10 * time.Second
+	// defaultMaxFragmentEntries caps the number of concurrently tracked
+	// fragmented datagrams. The table stays bounded because each datagram is a
+	// single small entry regardless of how many fragments it is split into, and
+	// the 13-bit IPv4 fragment-offset field limits any datagram to 64 KiB.
+	defaultMaxFragmentEntries = 16384
+
+	// EnvFragmentMaxEntries overrides defaultMaxFragmentEntries.
+	EnvFragmentMaxEntries = "NB_FRAGMENT_MAX_ENTRIES"
+)
+
+// fragmentVerdict is the decision for a trailing (headerless) fragment.
+type fragmentVerdict int
+
+const (
+	// fragmentDeny drops the fragment: no allowed first fragment is on record.
+	fragmentDeny fragmentVerdict = iota
+	// fragmentAllow passes the fragment: it belongs to an allowed datagram and
+	// does not overlap the already-inspected transport header.
+	fragmentAllow
+	// fragmentOverlap drops the fragment and poisons its datagram: it overlaps
+	// the transport header the ACL inspected (RFC 1858 §4, RFC 3128; RFC 5722
+	// requires discarding the whole datagram on overlap for IPv6).
+	fragmentOverlap
+)
+
+// fragmentKey identifies a fragmented datagram. It matches the RFC 791 / RFC
+// 8200 reassembly key: source, destination, protocol and identification. The id
+// is 32-bit to hold both the IPv4 (16-bit) and IPv6 (32-bit) identification.
+type fragmentKey struct {
+	srcIP netip.Addr
+	dstIP netip.Addr
+	id    uint32
+	proto uint8
+}
+
+// fragmentEntry records the verdict of an allowed first fragment.
+type fragmentEntry struct {
+	// headerEndOctets is the offset, in 8-byte units, at which the first
+	// fragment's payload ended. A trailing fragment starting before this
+	// overlaps bytes the ACL already inspected and is rejected.
+	headerEndOctets uint16
+	// recordedAt is when the first fragment was accepted. The verdict expires a
+	// fixed timeout later and is not refreshed, mirroring the kernel reassembly
+	// timer so a trailing-fragment flood can't keep a datagram alive.
+	recordedAt time.Time
+}
+
+// fragmentTracker records the ACL verdict of a datagram's first fragment so the
+// remaining fragments, which carry no L4 header, can inherit the decision
+// without reassembling the datagram. Only allowed first fragments are stored;
+// anything that cannot be tied to an allowed, non-overlapping first fragment is
+// dropped (fail closed).
+type fragmentTracker struct {
+	logger  *nblog.Logger
+	mutex   sync.Mutex
+	entries map[fragmentKey]fragmentEntry
+	timeout time.Duration
+	// maxEntries caps the table; atCapacity dedups the capacity warning until
+	// the table drains below the cap again.
+	maxEntries    int
+	atCapacity    bool
+	cleanupTicker *time.Ticker
+	cancel        context.CancelFunc
+}
+
+func newFragmentTracker(logger *nblog.Logger) *fragmentTracker {
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	t := &fragmentTracker{
+		logger:        logger,
+		entries:       make(map[fragmentKey]fragmentEntry),
+		timeout:       defaultFragmentTimeout,
+		maxEntries:    fragmentMaxEntries(logger),
+		cleanupTicker: time.NewTicker(fragmentCleanupInterval),
+		cancel:        cancel,
+	}
+	go t.cleanupRoutine(ctx)
+	return t
+}
+
+func fragmentMaxEntries(logger *nblog.Logger) int {
+	v := os.Getenv(EnvFragmentMaxEntries)
+	if v == "" {
+		return defaultMaxFragmentEntries
+	}
+	n, err := strconv.Atoi(v)
+	if err != nil || n <= 0 {
+		logger.Warn2("invalid %s=%q, using default", EnvFragmentMaxEntries, v)
+		return defaultMaxFragmentEntries
+	}
+	return n
+}
+
+// recordAllowed stores the verdict of an allowed first fragment. headerEndOctets
+// is the first fragment's payload length in 8-byte units. When the table is full
+// the record is dropped, which fails closed: the datagram's trailing fragments
+// will be denied.
+func (t *fragmentTracker) recordAllowed(key fragmentKey, headerEndOctets uint16) {
+	t.mutex.Lock()
+	defer t.mutex.Unlock()
+
+	if t.entries == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	if _, ok := t.entries[key]; !ok && len(t.entries) >= t.maxEntries {
+		if !t.atCapacity {
+			t.atCapacity = true
+			t.logger.Warn2("fragment verdict table at capacity (%d/%d): trailing fragments of new datagrams will be dropped",
+				len(t.entries), t.maxEntries)
+		}
+		return
+	}
+	t.entries[key] = fragmentEntry{
+		headerEndOctets: headerEndOctets,
+		recordedAt:      time.Now(),
+	}
+}
+
+// poison drops any recorded verdict for a datagram, so its later fragments are
+// denied until a new allowed first fragment is recorded. Called on every
+// offset-zero fragment to defeat offset-zero overlap rewrites (RFC 3128).
+func (t *fragmentTracker) poison(key fragmentKey) {
+	t.mutex.Lock()
+	defer t.mutex.Unlock()
+	delete(t.entries, key)
+}
+
+// verdict decides the fate of a trailing fragment at fragOffsetOctets (the IPv4
+// fragment offset, in 8-byte units). A fragment overlapping the inspected
+// header poisons the datagram: the entry is removed so all further fragments of
+// that datagram are denied too.
+func (t *fragmentTracker) verdict(key fragmentKey, fragOffsetOctets uint16) fragmentVerdict {
+	t.mutex.Lock()
+	defer t.mutex.Unlock()
+
+	entry, ok := t.entries[key]
+	if !ok {
+		return fragmentDeny
+	}
+	if time.Since(entry.recordedAt) > t.timeout {
+		delete(t.entries, key)
+		return fragmentDeny
+	}
+	if fragOffsetOctets < entry.headerEndOctets {
+		delete(t.entries, key)
+		return fragmentOverlap
+	}
+	return fragmentAllow
+}
+
+func (t *fragmentTracker) cleanupRoutine(ctx context.Context) {
+	defer t.cleanupTicker.Stop()
+	for {
+		select {
+		case <-t.cleanupTicker.C:
+			t.cleanup()
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+			return
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func (t *fragmentTracker) cleanup() {
+	t.mutex.Lock()
+	defer t.mutex.Unlock()
+
+	for key, entry := range t.entries {
+		if time.Since(entry.recordedAt) > t.timeout {
+			delete(t.entries, key)
+		}
+	}
+
+	if len(t.entries) < t.maxEntries {
+		t.atCapacity = false
+	}
+}
+
+// Close stops the cleanup routine and releases resources.
+func (t *fragmentTracker) Close() {
+	t.cancel()
+
+	t.mutex.Lock()
+	t.entries = nil
+	t.mutex.Unlock()
+}

client/firewall/uspfilter/fragment_bench_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+package uspfilter
+
+import (
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// benchFilterInbound drives filterInbound over a fixed packet in a tight loop.
+// Packets are built once, outside the timed region, so the benchmark measures
+// only pipeline cost, which is what an attacker can amplify.
+func benchFilterInbound(b *testing.B, pkt []byte) {
+	b.Helper()
+	b.ReportAllocs()
+	b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkt)))
+	b.ResetTimer()
+	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+		m := benchManager
+		m.filterInbound(pkt, len(pkt))
+	}
+}
+
+// benchManager is a package-level manager reused across fragment benchmarks so
+// setup cost stays out of the timed region.
+var benchManager *Manager
+
+func setupBenchManager(b *testing.B) *Manager {
+	b.Helper()
+	m := newFragmentTestManager(b)
+	allowUDP(b, m, 8080)
+	// Disable conntrack so the allowed-first-fragment path measures transport
+	// decode + ACL every iteration instead of matching the connection tracked
+	// on the first iteration.
+	m.stateful = false
+	benchManager = m
+	return m
+}
+
+// BenchmarkInbound_NormalPacket is the baseline: a full, non-fragmented UDP
+// packet that passes the ACL. Fragment paths should stay comparable to this.
+func BenchmarkInbound_NormalPacket(b *testing.B) {
+	setupBenchManager(b)
+	pkt := normalUDPPacket(b, 8080, 32)
+	benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
+}
+
+// BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentAllowed measures the first-fragment path:
+// transport decode + ACL evaluation + verdict record.
+func BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentAllowed(b *testing.B) {
+	setupBenchManager(b)
+	pkt := firstFragmentUDP(b, 0x2000, 8080, 32)
+	benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
+}
+
+// BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentAllowed measures the common trailing-fragment
+// path: a single map lookup after the first fragment is on record.
+func BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentAllowed(b *testing.B) {
+	m := setupBenchManager(b)
+	first := firstFragmentUDP(b, 0x3000, 8080, 32)
+	m.filterInbound(first, len(first))
+	pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x3000, 5, false, 24)
+	benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
+}
+
+// BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentNoFirst is the primary DoS vector: an
+// attacker floods trailing fragments with no first fragment on record. Each is
+// a map miss and must be cheap.
+func BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentNoFirst(b *testing.B) {
+	setupBenchManager(b)
+	pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x4000, 185, false, 40)
+	benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
+}
+
+// BenchmarkInbound_TinyFirstFragment measures the tiny-fragment drop path: a
+// first fragment too small to decode a transport header.
+func BenchmarkInbound_TinyFirstFragment(b *testing.B) {
+	setupBenchManager(b)
+	pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x5000, 0, true, 4)
+	benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
+}
+
+// BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentDistinctIDs is the worst case for the
+// verdict table: an attacker varies the datagram id on every packet so no first
+// fragment ever matches. Verdict lookups always miss and nothing is recorded,
+// so the table cannot grow. Each iteration rewrites the id field in place.
+func BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentDistinctIDs(b *testing.B) {
+	setupBenchManager(b)
+	pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x6000, 185, false, 40)
+	m := benchManager
+
+	b.ReportAllocs()
+	b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkt)))
+	b.ResetTimer()
+	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+		// IPv4 identification field is at bytes 4:6.
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], uint16(i))
+		m.filterInbound(pkt, len(pkt))
+	}
+}
+
+// BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentDistinctIDs measures sustained first-fragment
+// pressure with distinct ids: transport decode + ACL + verdict insert until the
+// table caps, exercising the map growth and capacity guard.
+func BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentDistinctIDs(b *testing.B) {
+	setupBenchManager(b)
+	pkt := firstFragmentUDP(b, 0x7000, 8080, 32)
+	m := benchManager
+
+	b.ReportAllocs()
+	b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkt)))
+	b.ResetTimer()
+	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
+		binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], uint16(i))
+		m.filterInbound(pkt, len(pkt))
+	}
+}

client/firewall/uspfilter/fragment_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,554 @@
+package uspfilter
+
+import (
+	"encoding/binary"
+	"net"
+	"net/netip"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/google/gopacket"
+	"github.com/google/gopacket/layers"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	fw "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
+	nbiface "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/device"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
+)
+
+const (
+	fragTestSrc   = "100.10.0.1"
+	fragTestDst   = "100.10.0.100"
+	fragTestSrcV6 = "fd00::1"
+	fragTestDstV6 = "fd00::100"
+)
+
+func newFragmentTestManager(tb testing.TB) *Manager {
+	tb.Helper()
+
+	ifaceMock := &IFaceMock{
+		SetFilterFunc: func(device.PacketFilter) error { return nil },
+		AddressFunc: func() wgaddr.Address {
+			return wgaddr.Address{
+				IP:      netip.MustParseAddr(fragTestDst),
+				Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("100.10.0.0/16"),
+				IPv6:    netip.MustParseAddr(fragTestDstV6),
+				IPv6Net: netip.MustParsePrefix("fd00::/64"),
+			}
+		},
+	}
+
+	m, err := Create(ifaceMock, false, flowLogger, nbiface.DefaultMTU)
+	require.NoError(tb, err)
+	require.NoError(tb, m.UpdateLocalIPs())
+	tb.Cleanup(func() { require.NoError(tb, m.Close(nil)) })
+	return m
+}
+
+// firstFragmentUDPTo builds the first fragment of a fragmented UDP datagram to
+// the given destination: it carries the full UDP header plus payloadLen bytes
+// of data, with the More Fragments flag set and offset zero.
+func firstFragmentUDPTo(tb testing.TB, dst string, id uint16, dstPort uint16, payloadLen int) []byte {
+	tb.Helper()
+
+	ip := &layers.IPv4{
+		Version:  4,
+		TTL:      64,
+		Id:       id,
+		Protocol: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
+		SrcIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
+		DstIP:    net.ParseIP(dst),
+		Flags:    layers.IPv4MoreFragments,
+	}
+	udp := &layers.UDP{SrcPort: 40000, DstPort: layers.UDPPort(dstPort)}
+	require.NoError(tb, udp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
+
+	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
+	opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
+	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, udp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, payloadLen))))
+	return buf.Bytes()
+}
+
+func firstFragmentUDP(tb testing.TB, id uint16, dstPort uint16, payloadLen int) []byte {
+	tb.Helper()
+	return firstFragmentUDPTo(tb, fragTestDst, id, dstPort, payloadLen)
+}
+
+// firstFragmentTCP builds the first fragment of a fragmented TCP datagram: the
+// full 20-byte TCP header plus 12 bytes of data, with the More Fragments flag
+// set and offset zero.
+func firstFragmentTCP(tb testing.TB, id uint16, dstPort uint16) []byte {
+	tb.Helper()
+
+	ip := &layers.IPv4{
+		Version:  4,
+		TTL:      64,
+		Id:       id,
+		Protocol: layers.IPProtocolTCP,
+		SrcIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
+		DstIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestDst),
+		Flags:    layers.IPv4MoreFragments,
+	}
+	tcp := &layers.TCP{SrcPort: 40000, DstPort: layers.TCPPort(dstPort), SYN: true, Window: 64240}
+	require.NoError(tb, tcp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
+
+	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
+	opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
+	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, tcp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, 12))))
+	return buf.Bytes()
+}
+
+// trailingFragmentTo builds a non-first fragment to the given destination: an
+// IPv4 header at the given fragment offset (in 8-byte units) carrying raw
+// payload and no L4 header.
+func trailingFragmentTo(tb testing.TB, dst string, proto layers.IPProtocol, id uint16, fragOffsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, payloadLen int) []byte {
+	tb.Helper()
+
+	ip := &layers.IPv4{
+		Version:    4,
+		TTL:        64,
+		Id:         id,
+		Protocol:   proto,
+		SrcIP:      net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
+		DstIP:      net.ParseIP(dst),
+		FragOffset: fragOffsetOctets,
+	}
+	if moreFragments {
+		ip.Flags = layers.IPv4MoreFragments
+	}
+
+	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
+	opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{FixLengths: true}
+	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, payloadLen))))
+	return buf.Bytes()
+}
+
+func trailingFragment(tb testing.TB, id uint16, fragOffsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, payloadLen int) []byte {
+	tb.Helper()
+	return trailingFragmentTo(tb, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolUDP, id, fragOffsetOctets, moreFragments, payloadLen)
+}
+
+// outboundUDPPacket builds a complete outbound UDP packet from the local
+// address, used to establish conntrack state for reply-direction tests.
+func outboundUDPPacket(tb testing.TB, srcPort, dstPort uint16) []byte {
+	tb.Helper()
+
+	ip := &layers.IPv4{
+		Version:  4,
+		TTL:      64,
+		Id:       1,
+		Protocol: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
+		SrcIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestDst),
+		DstIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
+	}
+	udp := &layers.UDP{SrcPort: layers.UDPPort(srcPort), DstPort: layers.UDPPort(dstPort)}
+	require.NoError(tb, udp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
+
+	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
+	opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
+	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, udp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, 16))))
+	return buf.Bytes()
+}
+
+// normalUDPPacket builds a complete, non-fragmented UDP packet for baseline
+// comparisons against the fragment paths.
+func normalUDPPacket(tb testing.TB, dstPort uint16, payloadLen int) []byte {
+	tb.Helper()
+
+	ip := &layers.IPv4{
+		Version:  4,
+		TTL:      64,
+		Id:       1,
+		Protocol: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
+		SrcIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
+		DstIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestDst),
+	}
+	udp := &layers.UDP{SrcPort: 40000, DstPort: layers.UDPPort(dstPort)}
+	require.NoError(tb, udp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
+
+	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
+	opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
+	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, udp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, payloadLen))))
+	return buf.Bytes()
+}
+
+func allowUDP(tb testing.TB, m *Manager, dstPort uint16) {
+	tb.Helper()
+	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolUDP, nil,
+		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{dstPort}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
+	require.NoError(tb, err)
+}
+
+// TestFragment_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped is the core bypass repro: a trailing
+// fragment with no allowed first fragment on record must be dropped. Before the
+// fix, filterInbound returned false (allow) for any fragment.
+func TestFragment_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
+
+	frag := trailingFragment(t, 0x1234, 185, false, 40)
+	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(frag, len(frag)),
+		"trailing fragment without an allowed first fragment must be dropped")
+}
+
+// TestFragment_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing verifies that once a first fragment
+// passes the ACL, its trailing fragments inherit the allow verdict.
+func TestFragment_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
+	allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
+
+	// First fragment: UDP header (8) + 32 payload = 40 octets -> headerEnd = 5.
+	first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x2222, 8080, 32)
+	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
+		"allowed first fragment should pass and be recorded")
+
+	trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x2222, 5, false, 24)
+	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
+		"trailing fragment of an allowed datagram should pass")
+}
+
+// TestFragment_DeniedFirstDropsTrailing verifies that a first fragment blocked
+// by the ACL leaves no verdict, so its trailing fragments are dropped.
+func TestFragment_DeniedFirstDropsTrailing(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
+	// No accept rule: local traffic defaults to deny.
+
+	first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x3333, 9999, 32)
+	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
+		"first fragment to a blocked port should be dropped by the ACL")
+
+	trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x3333, 5, false, 24)
+	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
+		"trailing fragment of a denied datagram must be dropped")
+}
+
+// TestFragment_OverlappingHeaderDropped covers the RFC 1858 §4 / RFC 3128
+// overlapping-fragment rewrite: a trailing fragment starting inside the range
+// the ACL already inspected is dropped and poisons the datagram. TCP is used so
+// the overlap lands on real header bytes (the flags at byte 13).
+func TestFragment_OverlappingHeaderDropped(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
+	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolTCP, nil,
+		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	// First fragment: TCP header (20) + 12 data = 32 bytes -> headerEnd = 4 octets.
+	first := firstFragmentTCP(t, 0x4444, 8080)
+	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)))
+
+	// Overlapping fragment at offset 1 (byte 8) falls inside the inspected TCP
+	// header, so it could rewrite the flags or port on reassembly.
+	overlap := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x4444, 1, true, 32)
+	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(overlap, len(overlap)),
+		"fragment overlapping the inspected header must be dropped")
+
+	// The datagram is now poisoned: a later, non-overlapping fragment is also
+	// dropped because the verdict was removed.
+	later := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x4444, 4, false, 24)
+	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(later, len(later)),
+		"fragments after an overlap must be dropped (datagram poisoned)")
+}
+
+// TestFragment_OffsetZeroOverlapPoisons covers the RFC 3128 offset-zero rewrite:
+// an allowed first fragment followed by a denied offset-zero fragment for the
+// same datagram must not leave the earlier allow verdict in place.
+func TestFragment_OffsetZeroOverlapPoisons(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
+	allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
+
+	allowed := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x5A5A, 8080, 32)
+	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(allowed, len(allowed)),
+		"allowed first fragment should pass and be recorded")
+
+	// A second offset-zero fragment to a denied port supersedes the datagram's
+	// verdict; it is dropped and must not leave the allow in place.
+	denied := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x5A5A, 9999, 32)
+	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(denied, len(denied)),
+		"denied offset-zero fragment must be dropped")
+
+	trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x5A5A, 5, false, 24)
+	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
+		"trailing fragment must be denied after the datagram was poisoned")
+}
+
+// TestFragment_TinyFirstDropped covers the tiny-fragment attack: a first
+// fragment too small to contain the full transport header can't be
+// ACL-evaluated and must be dropped.
+func TestFragment_TinyFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
+	allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
+
+	// IPv4 header + 4 raw bytes, MF set, offset 0: too small for the 8-byte UDP
+	// header, so it decodes to L3 only.
+	tiny := trailingFragment(t, 0x5555, 0, true, 4)
+	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(tiny, len(tiny)),
+		"tiny first fragment without a full L4 header must be dropped")
+}
+
+// TestFragment_TCPFirstFragment verifies the TCP arm of the transport decode: a
+// first fragment carrying the full 20-byte TCP header is ACL-evaluated and its
+// trailing fragments inherit the verdict.
+func TestFragment_TCPFirstFragment(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
+	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolTCP, nil,
+		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	// TCP header (20) + 12 data = 32 bytes -> headerEnd = 4 octets.
+	first := firstFragmentTCP(t, 0x6666, 8080)
+	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
+		"allowed TCP first fragment should pass and be recorded")
+
+	trailing := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x6666, 4, false, 24)
+	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
+		"trailing fragment of an allowed TCP datagram should pass")
+}
+
+// TestFragment_TCPTinyFirstDropped verifies the TCP minimum header length: 12
+// bytes would satisfy a UDP header but falls short of the 20-byte TCP header.
+func TestFragment_TCPTinyFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
+	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolTCP, nil,
+		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	tiny := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x7777, 0, true, 12)
+	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(tiny, len(tiny)),
+		"first fragment shorter than the TCP header must be dropped")
+}
+
+// TestFragment_ConntrackAllowsFirstFragment verifies the conntrack branch: reply
+// fragments of an outbound-established UDP flow pass without any inbound rule.
+func TestFragment_ConntrackAllowsFirstFragment(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
+
+	out := outboundUDPPacket(t, 12345, 40000)
+	require.False(t, m.filterOutbound(out, len(out)))
+
+	first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x8888, 12345, 32)
+	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
+		"reply first fragment should pass via conntrack")
+
+	trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x8888, 5, false, 24)
+	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
+		"trailing fragment of a tracked flow should pass")
+}
+
+// TestFragment_RoutingDisabledDropsFragment verifies routed first fragments are
+// dropped when routing is disabled.
+func TestFragment_RoutingDisabledDropsFragment(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
+	m.routingEnabled.Store(false)
+
+	first := firstFragmentUDPTo(t, "198.51.100.10", 0x9999, 8080, 32)
+	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
+		"routed first fragment must be dropped when routing is disabled")
+}
+
+// TestFragment_RouteACL verifies the route-ACL branch: fragments to a non-local
+// destination follow the route rules, allowed datagrams pass their trailing
+// fragments and denied ones don't.
+func TestFragment_RouteACL(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
+	m.routingEnabled.Store(true)
+	m.nativeRouter.Store(false)
+
+	_, err := m.AddRouteFiltering(
+		[]byte("rt-1"),
+		[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("100.10.0.0/16")},
+		fw.Network{Prefix: netip.MustParsePrefix("198.51.100.0/24")},
+		fw.ProtocolUDP,
+		nil,
+		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}},
+		fw.ActionAccept,
+	)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	first := firstFragmentUDPTo(t, "198.51.100.10", 0xAAAA, 8080, 32)
+	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
+		"route-ACL-allowed first fragment should pass")
+	trailing := trailingFragmentTo(t, "198.51.100.10", layers.IPProtocolUDP, 0xAAAA, 5, false, 24)
+	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
+		"trailing fragment of an allowed routed datagram should pass")
+
+	denied := firstFragmentUDPTo(t, "198.51.100.10", 0xBBBB, 9999, 32)
+	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(denied, len(denied)),
+		"route-ACL-denied first fragment must be dropped")
+	deniedTrailing := trailingFragmentTo(t, "198.51.100.10", layers.IPProtocolUDP, 0xBBBB, 5, false, 24)
+	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(deniedTrailing, len(deniedTrailing)),
+		"trailing fragment of a denied routed datagram must be dropped")
+}
+
+// TestFragment_ExpiredVerdictDropsTrailing verifies a verdict older than the
+// tracker timeout no longer admits trailing fragments.
+func TestFragment_ExpiredVerdictDropsTrailing(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
+	allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
+
+	first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0xCCCC, 8080, 32)
+	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)))
+
+	m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
+	for key, entry := range m.fragments.entries {
+		entry.recordedAt = time.Now().Add(-defaultFragmentTimeout - time.Second)
+		m.fragments.entries[key] = entry
+	}
+	m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
+
+	trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0xCCCC, 5, false, 24)
+	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
+		"trailing fragment after verdict expiry must be dropped")
+}
+
+// TestFragment_CapacityFailsClosed verifies the table cap: at capacity, new
+// datagram verdicts are not recorded (their trailing fragments are dropped)
+// while already-recorded datagrams keep working.
+func TestFragment_CapacityFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
+	allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
+
+	m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
+	m.fragments.maxEntries = 1
+	m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
+
+	first1 := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x0101, 8080, 32)
+	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first1, len(first1)))
+
+	first2 := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x0202, 8080, 32)
+	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first2, len(first2)),
+		"first fragment itself still passes at capacity")
+
+	trailing2 := trailingFragment(t, 0x0202, 5, false, 24)
+	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing2, len(trailing2)),
+		"trailing fragment of an unrecorded datagram must be dropped at capacity")
+
+	trailing1 := trailingFragment(t, 0x0101, 5, false, 24)
+	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing1, len(trailing1)),
+		"already-recorded datagram should keep passing at capacity")
+}
+
+// v6FragmentHeader builds the 8-byte IPv6 fragment extension header for the
+// given inner protocol, offset (8-byte units), More Fragments bit and id.
+func v6FragmentHeader(proto layers.IPProtocol, offsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, id uint32) []byte {
+	offsetFlags := offsetOctets << 3
+	if moreFragments {
+		offsetFlags |= 1
+	}
+	hdr := make([]byte, 8)
+	hdr[0] = uint8(proto)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[2:4], offsetFlags)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(hdr[4:8], id)
+	return hdr
+}
+
+func v6UDPHeader(dstPort uint16, dataLen int) []byte {
+	hdr := make([]byte, 8)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[0:2], 40000)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[2:4], dstPort)
+	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[4:6], uint16(8+dataLen))
+	return hdr
+}
+
+// firstFragmentUDPv6 builds the first fragment of a fragmented IPv6 UDP
+// datagram: fragment header (offset 0, More Fragments set) + full UDP header +
+// data.
+func firstFragmentUDPv6(tb testing.TB, id uint32, dstPort uint16, dataLen int) []byte {
+	tb.Helper()
+	return fragmentUDPv6(tb, id, dstPort, dataLen, true)
+}
+
+// fragmentUDPv6 builds an offset-zero IPv6 UDP fragment. With moreFragments
+// false it is an atomic fragment (a complete datagram, RFC 6946).
+func fragmentUDPv6(tb testing.TB, id uint32, dstPort uint16, dataLen int, moreFragments bool) []byte {
+	tb.Helper()
+
+	ip := &layers.IPv6{
+		Version:    6,
+		NextHeader: layers.IPProtocolIPv6Fragment,
+		HopLimit:   64,
+		SrcIP:      net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6),
+		DstIP:      net.ParseIP(fragTestDstV6),
+	}
+	payload := append(v6FragmentHeader(layers.IPProtocolUDP, 0, moreFragments, id), v6UDPHeader(dstPort, dataLen)...)
+	payload = append(payload, make([]byte, dataLen)...)
+
+	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
+	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, gopacket.SerializeOptions{FixLengths: true}, ip, gopacket.Payload(payload)))
+	return buf.Bytes()
+}
+
+// trailingFragmentV6 builds a non-first IPv6 fragment: fragment header at the
+// given offset carrying raw data and no transport header.
+func trailingFragmentV6(tb testing.TB, id uint32, offsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, dataLen int) []byte {
+	tb.Helper()
+
+	ip := &layers.IPv6{
+		Version:    6,
+		NextHeader: layers.IPProtocolIPv6Fragment,
+		HopLimit:   64,
+		SrcIP:      net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6),
+		DstIP:      net.ParseIP(fragTestDstV6),
+	}
+	payload := append(v6FragmentHeader(layers.IPProtocolUDP, offsetOctets, moreFragments, id), make([]byte, dataLen)...)
+
+	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
+	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, gopacket.SerializeOptions{FixLengths: true}, ip, gopacket.Payload(payload)))
+	return buf.Bytes()
+}
+
+// TestFragmentV6_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped verifies the IPv6 bypass is closed:
+// a trailing fragment with no allowed first fragment is dropped.
+func TestFragmentV6_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
+
+	frag := trailingFragmentV6(t, 0xAABBCCDD, 100, false, 40)
+	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(frag, len(frag)),
+		"IPv6 trailing fragment without an allowed first fragment must be dropped")
+}
+
+// TestFragmentV6_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing verifies IPv6 fragments are
+// evaluated like IPv4: an allowed first fragment lets its trailing fragments
+// through.
+func TestFragmentV6_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
+	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6), fw.ProtocolUDP, nil,
+		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	// First fragment: UDP header (8) + 32 data = 40 octets -> headerEnd = 5.
+	first := firstFragmentUDPv6(t, 0xAABBCCDD, 8080, 32)
+	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
+		"allowed IPv6 first fragment should pass and be recorded")
+
+	trailing := trailingFragmentV6(t, 0xAABBCCDD, 5, false, 24)
+	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
+		"trailing fragment of an allowed IPv6 datagram should pass")
+}
+
+// TestFragmentV6_AtomicNotCached verifies an IPv6 atomic fragment (fragment
+// header with offset 0 and no More Fragments, a complete datagram per RFC 6946)
+// is evaluated but not recorded, so a flood of allowed atomic fragments can't
+// exhaust the verdict table.
+func TestFragmentV6_AtomicNotCached(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
+	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6), fw.ProtocolUDP, nil,
+		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	atomic := fragmentUDPv6(t, 0xA70301C, 8080, 16, false)
+	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(atomic, len(atomic)),
+		"allowed IPv6 atomic fragment should pass")
+
+	m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
+	n := len(m.fragments.entries)
+	m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
+	require.Zero(t, n, "atomic fragment must not create a verdict entry")
+
+	// A genuine fragmented datagram (More Fragments set) is still recorded.
+	first := fragmentUDPv6(t, 0xBEEF, 8080, 32, true)
+	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)))
+	m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
+	n = len(m.fragments.entries)
+	m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
+	require.Equal(t, 1, n, "genuine first fragment must record a verdict")
+}

client/iface/configurer/kernel_unix.go

@@ -17,12 +17,15 @@ import (
 
 type KernelConfigurer struct {
 	deviceName string
+	statsCache *statsCache
 }
 
 func NewKernelConfigurer(deviceName string) *KernelConfigurer {
-	return &KernelConfigurer{
+	c := &KernelConfigurer{
 		deviceName: deviceName,
 	}
+	c.statsCache = newStatsCache(statsCacheTTL, c.fetchStats)
+	return c
 }
 
 func (c *KernelConfigurer) ConfigureInterface(privateKey string, port int) error {
@@ -246,12 +249,6 @@ func (c *KernelConfigurer) configure(config wgtypes.Config) error {
 		}
 	}()
 
-	// validate if device with name exists
-	_, err = wg.Device(c.deviceName)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-
 	return wg.ConfigureDevice(c.deviceName, config)
 }
 
@@ -300,6 +297,14 @@ func (c *KernelConfigurer) FullStats() (*Stats, error) {
 }
 
 func (c *KernelConfigurer) GetStats() (map[string]WGStats, error) {
+	return c.statsCache.get()
+}
+
+func (c *KernelConfigurer) LastActivities() map[string]monotime.Time {
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (c *KernelConfigurer) fetchStats() (map[string]WGStats, error) {
 	stats := make(map[string]WGStats)
 	wg, err := wgctrl.New()
 	if err != nil {
@@ -326,7 +331,3 @@ func (c *KernelConfigurer) GetStats() (map[string]WGStats, error) {
 	}
 	return stats, nil
 }
-
-func (c *KernelConfigurer) LastActivities() map[string]monotime.Time {
-	return nil
-}

client/iface/configurer/stats_cache.go

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+package configurer
+
+import (
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+
+	"golang.org/x/sync/singleflight"
+)
+
+const statsCacheTTL = 1 * time.Second
+
+type statsCache struct {
+	ttl   time.Duration
+	fetch func() (map[string]WGStats, error)
+
+	mu       sync.RWMutex
+	value    map[string]WGStats
+	expireAt time.Time
+
+	sf singleflight.Group
+}
+
+func newStatsCache(ttl time.Duration, fetch func() (map[string]WGStats, error)) *statsCache {
+	return &statsCache{ttl: ttl, fetch: fetch}
+}
+
+func (c *statsCache) get() (map[string]WGStats, error) {
+	c.mu.RLock()
+	if c.value != nil && time.Now().Before(c.expireAt) {
+		value := c.value
+		c.mu.RUnlock()
+		return value, nil
+	}
+	c.mu.RUnlock()
+
+	value, err, _ := c.sf.Do("stats", func() (interface{}, error) {
+		res, err := c.fetch()
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+
+		c.mu.Lock()
+		c.value = res
+		c.expireAt = time.Now().Add(c.ttl)
+		c.mu.Unlock()
+		return res, nil
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return value.(map[string]WGStats), nil
+}

client/iface/configurer/stats_cache_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+package configurer
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+func TestStatsCache_CachesWithinTTL(t *testing.T) {
+	var calls atomic.Int64
+	c := newStatsCache(50*time.Millisecond, func() (map[string]WGStats, error) {
+		calls.Add(1)
+		return map[string]WGStats{"p": {}}, nil
+	})
+
+	for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
+		_, err := c.get()
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+	}
+	require.Equal(t, int64(1), calls.Load(), "within TTL only one underlying fetch")
+
+	time.Sleep(60 * time.Millisecond)
+	_, err := c.get()
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(2), calls.Load(), "after TTL expiry a fresh fetch happens")
+}
+
+func TestStatsCache_SingleFlight(t *testing.T) {
+	var calls atomic.Int64
+	release := make(chan struct{})
+	c := newStatsCache(time.Minute, func() (map[string]WGStats, error) {
+		calls.Add(1)
+		<-release
+		return map[string]WGStats{}, nil
+	})
+
+	const n = 50
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	wg.Add(n)
+	for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
+		go func() {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			_, _ = c.get()
+		}()
+	}
+	time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond)
+	close(release)
+	wg.Wait()
+
+	require.Equal(t, int64(1), calls.Load(), "concurrent misses collapse into one fetch")
+}
+
+func TestStatsCache_ErrorNotCached(t *testing.T) {
+	var calls atomic.Int64
+	wantErr := errors.New("dump failed")
+	c := newStatsCache(time.Minute, func() (map[string]WGStats, error) {
+		calls.Add(1)
+		return nil, wantErr
+	})
+
+	_, err := c.get()
+	require.ErrorIs(t, err, wantErr)
+	_, err = c.get()
+	require.ErrorIs(t, err, wantErr)
+	require.Equal(t, int64(2), calls.Load(), "errors are not cached; each call retries")
+}

client/iface/configurer/usp.go

@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ type WGUSPConfigurer struct {
 	device           *device.Device
 	deviceName       string
 	activityRecorder *bind.ActivityRecorder
+	statsCache       *statsCache
 
 	uapiListener net.Listener
 }
@@ -50,16 +51,19 @@ func NewUSPConfigurer(device *device.Device, deviceName string, activityRecorder
 		deviceName:       deviceName,
 		activityRecorder: activityRecorder,
 	}
+	wgCfg.statsCache = newStatsCache(statsCacheTTL, wgCfg.fetchStats)
 	wgCfg.startUAPI()
 	return wgCfg
 }
 
 func NewUSPConfigurerNoUAPI(device *device.Device, deviceName string, activityRecorder *bind.ActivityRecorder) *WGUSPConfigurer {
-	return &WGUSPConfigurer{
+	wgCfg := &WGUSPConfigurer{
 		device:           device,
 		deviceName:       deviceName,
 		activityRecorder: activityRecorder,
 	}
+	wgCfg.statsCache = newStatsCache(statsCacheTTL, wgCfg.fetchStats)
+	return wgCfg
 }
 
 func (c *WGUSPConfigurer) ConfigureInterface(privateKey string, port int) error {
@@ -348,6 +352,10 @@ func (t *WGUSPConfigurer) Close() {
 }
 
 func (t *WGUSPConfigurer) GetStats() (map[string]WGStats, error) {
+	return t.statsCache.get()
+}
+
+func (t *WGUSPConfigurer) fetchStats() (map[string]WGStats, error) {
 	ipc, err := t.device.IpcGet()
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("ipc get: %w", err)

client/iface/netstack/env.go

@@ -3,14 +3,31 @@
 package netstack
 
 import (
-	"fmt"
+	"net"
 	"os"
 	"strconv"
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 )
 
-const EnvUseNetstackMode = "NB_USE_NETSTACK_MODE"
+const (
+	EnvUseNetstackMode = "NB_USE_NETSTACK_MODE"
+
+	// EnvSocks5ListenerPort overrides the port the SOCKS5 proxy listens on.
+	EnvSocks5ListenerPort = "NB_SOCKS5_LISTENER_PORT"
+
+	// EnvSocks5ListenerAddress overrides the host/IP the SOCKS5 proxy binds to.
+	// The proxy is a bridge for local host applications into the userspace
+	// WireGuard netstack, so it binds to loopback by default. Override this only
+	// when the proxy must be reachable from other hosts (e.g. a container
+	// gateway); doing so exposes an unauthenticated SOCKS5 proxy on that
+	// address.
+	EnvSocks5ListenerAddress = "NB_SOCKS5_LISTENER_ADDRESS"
+
+	// defaultSocks5Host is the loopback address the SOCKS5 proxy binds to unless
+	// overridden via EnvSocks5ListenerAddress.
+	defaultSocks5Host = "127.0.0.1"
+)
 
 // IsEnabled todo: move these function to cmd layer
 func IsEnabled() bool {
@@ -18,24 +35,40 @@ func IsEnabled() bool {
 }
 
 func ListenAddr() string {
-	sPort := os.Getenv("NB_SOCKS5_LISTENER_PORT")
+	return net.JoinHostPort(listenHost(), strconv.Itoa(listenPort()))
+}
+
+// listenHost returns the host/IP the SOCKS5 proxy binds to. It defaults to
+// loopback and only honors EnvSocks5ListenerAddress when it holds a valid IP.
+func listenHost() string {
+	addr := os.Getenv(EnvSocks5ListenerAddress)
+	if addr == "" {
+		return defaultSocks5Host
+	}
+	if net.ParseIP(addr) == nil {
+		log.Warnf("invalid socks5 listener address %q, falling back to default: %s", addr, defaultSocks5Host)
+		return defaultSocks5Host
+	}
+	return addr
+}
+
+// listenPort returns the port the SOCKS5 proxy binds to, defaulting to
+// DefaultSocks5Port when EnvSocks5ListenerPort is unset or invalid.
+func listenPort() int {
+	sPort := os.Getenv(EnvSocks5ListenerPort)
 	if sPort == "" {
-		return listenAddr(DefaultSocks5Port)
+		return DefaultSocks5Port
 	}
 
 	port, err := strconv.Atoi(sPort)
 	if err != nil {
 		log.Warnf("invalid socks5 listener port, unable to convert it to int, falling back to default: %d", DefaultSocks5Port)
-		return listenAddr(DefaultSocks5Port)
+		return DefaultSocks5Port
 	}
 	if port < 1 || port > 65535 {
 		log.Warnf("invalid socks5 listener port, it should be in the range 1-65535, falling back to default: %d", DefaultSocks5Port)
-		return listenAddr(DefaultSocks5Port)
+		return DefaultSocks5Port
 	}
 
-	return listenAddr(port)
-}
-
-func listenAddr(port int) string {
-	return fmt.Sprintf("0.0.0.0:%d", port)
+	return port
 }

client/iface/netstack/env_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+//go:build !js
+
+package netstack
+
+import (
+	"net"
+	"strconv"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestListenAddr_DefaultsToLoopback(t *testing.T) {
+	// No env overrides: must bind loopback, never all interfaces.
+	got := ListenAddr()
+	want := net.JoinHostPort("127.0.0.1", strconv.Itoa(DefaultSocks5Port))
+	if got != want {
+		t.Fatalf("ListenAddr() = %q, want %q", got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestListenAddr_AddressOverride(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name string
+		env  string
+		want string
+	}{
+		{name: "valid override honored", env: "0.0.0.0", want: "0.0.0.0"},
+		{name: "valid specific ip honored", env: "10.0.0.5", want: "10.0.0.5"},
+		{name: "ipv6 loopback bracketed", env: "::1", want: "::1"},
+		{name: "invalid falls back to loopback", env: "not-an-ip", want: "127.0.0.1"},
+		{name: "empty falls back to loopback", env: "", want: "127.0.0.1"},
+	}
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Setenv(EnvSocks5ListenerAddress, tc.env)
+			want := net.JoinHostPort(tc.want, strconv.Itoa(DefaultSocks5Port))
+			if got := ListenAddr(); got != want {
+				t.Fatalf("ListenAddr() = %q, want %q", got, want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestListenAddr_PortOverride(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name string
+		env  string
+		want int
+	}{
+		{name: "valid port honored", env: "1081", want: 1081},
+		{name: "non-numeric falls back", env: "abc", want: DefaultSocks5Port},
+		{name: "out of range falls back", env: "70000", want: DefaultSocks5Port},
+		{name: "zero falls back", env: "0", want: DefaultSocks5Port},
+	}
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Setenv(EnvSocks5ListenerPort, tc.env)
+			want := net.JoinHostPort("127.0.0.1", strconv.Itoa(tc.want))
+			if got := ListenAddr(); got != want {
+				t.Fatalf("ListenAddr() = %q, want %q", got, want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

client/internal/auth/auth.go

@@ -351,7 +351,6 @@ func (a *Auth) setSystemInfoFlags(info *system.Info) {
 		a.config.BlockLANAccess,
 		a.config.BlockInbound,
 		a.config.DisableIPv6,
-		a.config.LazyConnectionEnabled,
 		a.config.EnableSSHRoot,
 		a.config.EnableSSHSFTP,
 		a.config.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding,

client/internal/auth/device_flow.go

@@ -259,12 +259,18 @@ func (d *DeviceAuthorizationFlow) WaitToken(ctx context.Context, info AuthFlowIn
 	ticker := time.NewTicker(interval)
 	defer ticker.Stop()
 
+	log.Infof("device flow: waiting for user authorization, polling token endpoint every %s, code expires in %s", interval, timeout)
+
+	start := time.Now()
+	polls := 0
+
 	for {
 		select {
 		case <-waitCtx.Done():
 			return TokenInfo{}, waitCtx.Err()
 		case <-ticker.C:
 
+			polls++
 			tokenResponse, err := d.requestToken(info)
 			if err != nil {
 				return TokenInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("parsing token response failed with error: %v", err)
@@ -272,10 +278,12 @@ func (d *DeviceAuthorizationFlow) WaitToken(ctx context.Context, info AuthFlowIn
 
 			if tokenResponse.Error != "" {
 				if tokenResponse.Error == "authorization_pending" {
+					log.Tracef("device flow: authorization still pending after poll %d", polls)
 					continue
 				} else if tokenResponse.Error == "slow_down" {
 					interval += (3 * time.Second)
 					ticker.Reset(interval)
+					log.Infof("device flow: IdP requested slow_down, polling interval increased to %s", interval)
 					continue
 				}
 
@@ -291,11 +299,12 @@ func (d *DeviceAuthorizationFlow) WaitToken(ctx context.Context, info AuthFlowIn
 				UseIDToken:   d.providerConfig.UseIDToken,
 			}
 
-			err = isValidAccessToken(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), d.providerConfig.Audience)
+			err = validateTokenAudience(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), d.providerConfig.Audience)
 			if err != nil {
 				return TokenInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("validate access token failed with error: %v", err)
 			}
 
+			log.Infof("device flow: user authorization confirmed after %d polls in %s", polls, time.Since(start).Round(time.Second))
 			return tokenInfo, err
 		}
 	}

client/internal/auth/pkce_flow.go

@@ -188,6 +188,8 @@ func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) WaitToken(ctx context.Context, info AuthFlowInfo
 	waitCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, timeout)
 	defer cancel()
 
+	log.Infof("pkce flow: waiting for authorization callback on %s, timeout %s", p.oAuthConfig.RedirectURL, timeout)
+
 	tokenChan := make(chan *oauth2.Token, 1)
 	errChan := make(chan error, 1)
 
@@ -221,6 +223,7 @@ func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) WaitToken(ctx context.Context, info AuthFlowInfo
 func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) startServer(server *http.Server, tokenChan chan<- *oauth2.Token, errChan chan<- error) {
 	mux := http.NewServeMux()
 	mux.HandleFunc("/", func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
+		log.Infof("pkce flow: received authorization callback from IdP")
 		cert := p.providerConfig.ClientCertPair
 		if cert != nil {
 			tr := &http.Transport{
@@ -271,11 +274,18 @@ func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) handleRequest(req *http.Request) (*oauth2.Token,
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("authentication failed: missing code")
 	}
 
-	return p.oAuthConfig.Exchange(
+	exchangeStart := time.Now()
+	token, err := p.oAuthConfig.Exchange(
 		req.Context(),
 		code,
 		oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_verifier", p.codeVerifier),
 	)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	log.Infof("pkce flow: authorization code exchanged for token in %s", time.Since(exchangeStart).Round(time.Millisecond))
+	return token, nil
 }
 
 func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) parseOAuthToken(token *oauth2.Token) (TokenInfo, error) {
@@ -296,7 +306,7 @@ func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) parseOAuthToken(token *oauth2.Token) (TokenInfo,
 		audience = p.providerConfig.ClientID
 	}
 
-	if err := isValidAccessToken(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), audience); err != nil {
+	if err := validateTokenAudience(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), audience); err != nil {
 		return TokenInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("authentication failed: invalid access token - %w", err)
 	}
 
@@ -310,6 +320,11 @@ func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) parseOAuthToken(token *oauth2.Token) (TokenInfo,
 	return tokenInfo, nil
 }
 
+// parseEmailFromIDToken extracts the email (or name) claim from an ID token
+// without verifying its signature. The value is best-effort and used only as a
+// UX convenience (login hint prefill and display); it never drives an
+// authorization decision. The authoritative identity is established server-side
+// from the signature-verified token.
 func parseEmailFromIDToken(token string) (string, error) {
 	parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
 	if len(parts) < 2 {

client/internal/auth/sessionwatch/watcher.go

@@ -24,11 +24,7 @@ import (
 )
 
 const (
-	// Skew tolerates a small clock difference between the management
-	// server and this peer before treating a deadline as "in the past".
-	// Slightly above typical NTP drift; tight enough that the UI doesn't
-	// paint a stale expiry as if it were valid.
-	Skew = 30 * time.Second
+	maxPastHorizon = 30 * 24 * time.Hour
 
 	// maxDeadlineHorizon caps how far in the future an accepted deadline
 	// can sit. A timestamp beyond this is almost certainly a protocol
@@ -57,7 +53,7 @@ var (
 	ErrDeadlineTooFarFuture = errors.New("session deadline too far in the future")
 
 	// ErrDeadlineInPast is returned by Update when the supplied deadline
-	// is more than Skew in the past.
+	// is more than maxPastHorizon in the past.
 	ErrDeadlineInPast = errors.New("session deadline in the past")
 )
 
@@ -66,15 +62,14 @@ var (
 // for deadline change/clear, PublishEvent for the two warnings); tests pass
 // a fake recorder so the same surface is observable without an engine.
 //
-// The watcher is the single owner of the deadline propagated to the
-// recorder: every set, clear, sanity-check rejection and Close routes the
-// value through SetSessionExpiresAt, so the SubscribeStatus snapshot the UI
-// reads can never drift from the watcher's timer state. (SetSessionExpiresAt
-// fans out its own state-change notification, so no separate notify is
-// needed.) The recorder is server-scoped and outlives this engine-scoped
-// watcher — without the Close-time clear a teardown (Down, or the Down+Up of
-// a profile switch) would leave the next session showing the previous one's
-// stale "expires in" value.
+// While the watcher runs, it owns the deadline propagated to the recorder:
+// every set, clear and sanity-check rejection routes the value through
+// SetSessionExpiresAt, so the SubscribeStatus snapshot the UI reads can
+// never drift from the watcher's timer state. (SetSessionExpiresAt fans
+// out its own state-change notification, so no separate notify is needed.)
+// The recorder is server-scoped and outlives this engine-scoped watcher;
+// Close deliberately leaves the recorder value in place so transient engine
+// restarts don't blank it — the client run loop clears it on real teardown.
 //
 // PublishEvent's signature mirrors peer.Status.PublishEvent: the watcher
 // composes the metadata internally so the wire format (MetaSession*) is
@@ -135,10 +130,13 @@ func NewWithLeads(lead, final time.Duration, recorder StatusRecorder) *Watcher {
 // was disabled).
 //
 // Same-value updates are no-ops. A different non-zero value cancels any
-// pending timer, resets the "already fired" guard, and arms a new one.
+// pending timer, resets the "already fired" guards, and — when the
+// deadline lies in the future — arms fresh warning timers. A deadline
+// already in the past (within maxPastHorizon) is recorded as-is with no
+// timers: the session has expired and consumers render it that way.
 //
 // Returns one of the sentinel Err* values when the deadline fails the
-// sanity checks (pre-epoch, far future, or in the past beyond Skew).
+// sanity checks (pre-epoch, far future, or past beyond maxPastHorizon).
 // In every error case the watcher first clears its state so it stays
 // consistent with what the caller will push into its other sinks (e.g.
 // applySessionDeadline forces a zero deadline into the status recorder
@@ -163,7 +161,7 @@ func (w *Watcher) Update(deadline time.Time) error {
 	case deadline.After(now.Add(maxDeadlineHorizon)):
 		w.clearLocked()
 		return fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrDeadlineTooFarFuture, deadline)
-	case deadline.Before(now.Add(-Skew)):
+	case deadline.Before(now.Add(-maxPastHorizon)):
 		w.clearLocked()
 		return fmt.Errorf("%w: %v (now=%v)", ErrDeadlineInPast, deadline, now)
 	}
@@ -183,7 +181,9 @@ func (w *Watcher) Update(deadline time.Time) error {
 	w.finalFiredAt = time.Time{}
 	w.dismissedAt = time.Time{}
 
-	w.armTimerLocked(deadline)
+	if deadline.After(now) {
+		w.armTimerLocked(deadline)
+	}
 	recorder := w.recorder
 	w.mu.Unlock()
 	if recorder != nil {
@@ -227,30 +227,25 @@ func (w *Watcher) Dismiss() {
 	log.Infof("auth session final-warning dismissed for deadline %s", w.current.Format(time.RFC3339))
 }
 
-// Close stops any pending timer and drops the deadline on the status
-// recorder. Update calls after Close are ignored. Clearing the recorder
-// here is what keeps a teardown (Down, or the Down+Up of a profile switch)
-// from leaving the next session showing this one's stale "expires in"
-// value — the recorder is server-scoped and outlives this engine-scoped
-// watcher, so nothing else drops the anchor on teardown.
+// Close stops any pending timer. Update calls after Close are ignored.
+// The recorder keeps its deadline: the watcher is engine-scoped and closes
+// on every engine restart (network change, sleep/wake, stream errors)
+// while the SSO deadline stays valid across those, so clearing here would
+// blank the UI's "expires in" row on every transient reconnect. The
+// client run loop clears the server-scoped recorder when it exits for
+// real (Down, profile switch, permanent login failure).
 func (w *Watcher) Close() {
 	w.mu.Lock()
+	defer w.mu.Unlock()
 	if w.closed {
-		w.mu.Unlock()
 		return
 	}
 	w.closed = true
 	w.stopTimerLocked()
-	hadDeadline := !w.current.IsZero()
 	w.current = time.Time{}
 	w.firedAt = time.Time{}
 	w.finalFiredAt = time.Time{}
 	w.dismissedAt = time.Time{}
-	recorder := w.recorder
-	w.mu.Unlock()
-	if recorder != nil && hadDeadline {
-		recorder.SetSessionExpiresAt(time.Time{})
-	}
 }
 
 // clearLocked drops the tracked deadline and notifies the recorder so

client/internal/auth/sessionwatch/watcher_test.go

@@ -224,11 +224,13 @@ func TestNewDeadlineCancelsPriorTimer(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestRefreshAfterFireArmsNewWarning(t *testing.T) {
 	r := &fakeRecorder{}
-	lead := 30 * time.Millisecond
+	lead := 150 * time.Millisecond
 	w := newWatcher(lead, r)
 	defer w.Close()
 
-	first := time.Now().Add(50 * time.Millisecond)
+	// Warning fires ~20ms in; the deadline itself stays 150ms away so the
+	// replacement below lands well before it.
+	first := time.Now().Add(170 * time.Millisecond)
 	_ = w.Update(first)
 
 	// Wait for stateChange + warning of the first cycle.
@@ -306,7 +308,29 @@ func TestUpdateRejectsTooFarFuture(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestUpdateInPastClearsDeadline(t *testing.T) {
+func TestUpdateRecentPastRecordedAsExpired(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &fakeRecorder{}
+	w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
+	defer w.Close()
+
+	d := time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour)
+	if err := w.Update(d); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("recent-past Update should succeed, got %v", err)
+	}
+	if !w.Deadline().Equal(d) {
+		t.Fatalf("expected deadline to be recorded, got %v want %v", w.Deadline(), d)
+	}
+	if got := r.deadline(); !got.Equal(d) {
+		t.Fatalf("recorder deadline = %v, want %v", got, d)
+	}
+
+	time.Sleep(80 * time.Millisecond)
+	if n := countWhere(r.snapshot(), func(e event) bool { return e.kind == publish }); n != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("no warning events may fire for an already-past deadline, got %+v", r.snapshot())
+	}
+}
+
+func TestUpdateAncientPastRejected(t *testing.T) {
 	r := &fakeRecorder{}
 	w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
 	defer w.Close()
@@ -318,12 +342,12 @@ func TestUpdateInPastClearsDeadline(t *testing.T) {
 	// Drain the stateChange from the seed.
 	waitForEvents(t, r, 1)
 
-	err := w.Update(time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour))
+	err := w.Update(time.Now().Add(-31 * 24 * time.Hour))
 	if !errors.Is(err, ErrDeadlineInPast) {
 		t.Fatalf("want ErrDeadlineInPast, got %v", err)
 	}
 	if !w.Deadline().IsZero() {
-		t.Fatalf("in-past update must clear the deadline, got %v", w.Deadline())
+		t.Fatalf("rejected ancient-past update must clear the deadline, got %v", w.Deadline())
 	}
 	events := waitForEvents(t, r, 2)
 	if events[1].kind != stateChange {
@@ -331,21 +355,6 @@ func TestUpdateInPastClearsDeadline(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestUpdateWithinSkewAccepted(t *testing.T) {
-	r := &fakeRecorder{}
-	w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
-	defer w.Close()
-
-	// 5 seconds in the past is within the 30s Skew tolerance — accept it.
-	d := time.Now().Add(-5 * time.Second)
-	if err := w.Update(d); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("within-skew Update should succeed, got %v", err)
-	}
-	if !w.Deadline().Equal(d) {
-		t.Fatalf("expected deadline to be applied, got %v want %v", w.Deadline(), d)
-	}
-}
-
 func TestCloseSilencesUpdates(t *testing.T) {
 	r := &fakeRecorder{}
 	w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
@@ -359,11 +368,12 @@ func TestCloseSilencesUpdates(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-// TestCloseClearsRecorderDeadline pins the profile-switch fix: a watcher
-// holding a live deadline must zero the recorder on Close so the next
-// engine's watcher (and the UI reading the shared server-scoped recorder)
-// doesn't start out showing the previous session's stale "expires in".
-func TestCloseClearsRecorderDeadline(t *testing.T) {
+// TestCloseKeepsRecorderDeadline pins the reconnect-flap fix: the watcher
+// closes on every engine restart (network change, sleep/wake) while the
+// SSO deadline stays valid across those, so Close must leave the
+// server-scoped recorder's value in place. The client run loop clears the
+// recorder when it exits for real.
+func TestCloseKeepsRecorderDeadline(t *testing.T) {
 	r := &fakeRecorder{}
 	w := newWatcher(time.Hour, r)
 
@@ -377,8 +387,8 @@ func TestCloseClearsRecorderDeadline(t *testing.T) {
 
 	w.Close()
 
-	if got := r.deadline(); !got.IsZero() {
-		t.Fatalf("recorder deadline after Close = %v, want zero", got)
+	if got := r.deadline(); !got.Equal(d) {
+		t.Fatalf("recorder deadline after Close = %v, want %v", got, d)
 	}
 }
 

client/internal/auth/util.go

@@ -20,14 +20,26 @@ func randomBytesInHex(count int) (string, error) {
 	return hex.EncodeToString(buf), nil
 }
 
-// isValidAccessToken is a simple validation of the access token
-func isValidAccessToken(token string, audience string) error {
+// validateTokenAudience checks that the token is a well-formed JWT whose
+// audience claim matches the expected audience.
+//
+// It does NOT verify the token's cryptographic signature and therefore must not
+// be treated as an authenticity check. The token is obtained by the client
+// directly from the IdP token endpoint over TLS, and its signature is verified
+// server-side by the management server against the IdP's JWKS
+// (see shared/auth/jwt/validator.go). This function is only a client-side
+// sanity check that the returned token targets the expected audience.
+func validateTokenAudience(token string, audience string) error {
 	if token == "" {
 		return fmt.Errorf("token received is empty")
 	}
 
-	encodedClaims := strings.Split(token, ".")[1]
-	claimsString, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(encodedClaims)
+	parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
+	if len(parts) != 3 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("token is not a well-formed JWT")
+	}
+
+	claimsString, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1])
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}

client/internal/auth/util_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+package auth
+
+import (
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// makeJWT builds an unsigned JWT-shaped string (header.payload.signature) with
+// the given claims payload. The signature part is arbitrary because
+// validateTokenAudience intentionally does not verify it.
+func makeJWT(t *testing.T, claims map[string]interface{}) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	header := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(`{"alg":"RS256","typ":"JWT"}`))
+	payloadBytes, err := json.Marshal(claims)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("marshal claims: %v", err)
+	}
+	payload := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(payloadBytes)
+	return header + "." + payload + ".unverified-signature"
+}
+
+func TestValidateTokenAudience(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name     string
+		token    string
+		audience string
+		wantErr  bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name:     "empty token",
+			token:    "",
+			audience: "netbird",
+			wantErr:  true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "not a JWT - no dots",
+			token:    "notajwt",
+			audience: "netbird",
+			wantErr:  true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "not a JWT - two parts only",
+			token:    "header.payload",
+			audience: "netbird",
+			wantErr:  true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "matching string audience",
+			token:    makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": "netbird"}),
+			audience: "netbird",
+			wantErr:  false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "mismatching string audience",
+			token:    makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": "other"}),
+			audience: "netbird",
+			wantErr:  true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "matching audience in array",
+			token:    makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": []interface{}{"other", "netbird"}}),
+			audience: "netbird",
+			wantErr:  false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "mismatching audience array",
+			token:    makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": []interface{}{"a", "b"}}),
+			audience: "netbird",
+			wantErr:  true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "missing audience claim",
+			token:    makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"sub": "user"}),
+			audience: "netbird",
+			wantErr:  true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:     "invalid base64 payload",
+			token:    "header.!!!not-base64!!!.sig",
+			audience: "netbird",
+			wantErr:  true,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			err := validateTokenAudience(tc.token, tc.audience)
+			if tc.wantErr && err == nil {
+				t.Fatalf("expected error, got nil")
+			}
+			if !tc.wantErr && err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("expected no error, got %v", err)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestValidateTokenAudienceNoPanic guards the regression where a non-empty
+// token without the JWT dot structure caused an index-out-of-range panic.
+func TestValidateTokenAudienceNoPanic(t *testing.T) {
+	inputs := []string{"a", ".", "a.", "aaaa", "no-dots-here"}
+	for _, in := range inputs {
+		if err := validateTokenAudience(in, "netbird"); err == nil {
+			t.Fatalf("expected error for malformed token %q, got nil", in)
+		}
+	}
+}

client/internal/conn_mgr.go

@@ -16,6 +16,16 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
 )
 
+// lazyForce is the resolved local decision for lazy connections, layered above the
+// management feature flag. lazyForceNone defers to management.
+type lazyForce int
+
+const (
+	lazyForceNone lazyForce = iota
+	lazyForceOn
+	lazyForceOff
+)
+
 // ConnMgr coordinates both lazy connections (established on-demand) and permanent peer connections.
 //
 // The connection manager is responsible for:
@@ -28,7 +38,7 @@ type ConnMgr struct {
 	peerStore        *peerstore.Store
 	statusRecorder   *peer.Status
 	iface            lazyconn.WGIface
-	enabledLocally   bool
+	force            lazyForce
 	rosenpassEnabled bool
 
 	lazyConnMgr *manager.Manager
@@ -43,28 +53,34 @@ func NewConnMgr(engineConfig *EngineConfig, statusRecorder *peer.Status, peerSto
 		peerStore:        peerStore,
 		statusRecorder:   statusRecorder,
 		iface:            iface,
+		force:            resolveLazyForce(engineConfig.LazyConnection),
 		rosenpassEnabled: engineConfig.RosenpassEnabled,
 	}
-	if engineConfig.LazyConnectionEnabled || lazyconn.IsLazyConnEnabledByEnv() {
-		e.enabledLocally = true
-	}
 	return e
 }
 
-// Start initializes the connection manager and starts the lazy connection manager if enabled by env var or cmd line option.
+// Start initializes the connection manager. It starts the lazy connection manager when a
+// local override forces it on; with no local override it waits for the management feature flag.
 func (e *ConnMgr) Start(ctx context.Context) {
 	if e.lazyConnMgr != nil {
 		log.Errorf("lazy connection manager is already started")
 		return
 	}
 
-	if !e.enabledLocally {
-		log.Infof("lazy connection manager is disabled")
+	switch e.force {
+	case lazyForceOff:
+		log.Infof("lazy connection manager is disabled by local override (%s or MDM policy)", lazyconn.EnvLazyConn)
+		e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(false)
+		return
+	case lazyForceNone:
+		log.Infof("lazy connection manager is managed by the management feature flag")
+		e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(false)
 		return
 	}
 
 	if e.rosenpassEnabled {
 		log.Warnf("rosenpass connection manager is enabled, lazy connection manager will not be started")
+		e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(false)
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -76,8 +92,8 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) Start(ctx context.Context) {
 // If enabled, it initializes the lazy connection manager and start it. Do not need to call Start() again.
 // If disabled, then it closes the lazy connection manager and open the connections to all peers.
 func (e *ConnMgr) UpdatedRemoteFeatureFlag(ctx context.Context, enabled bool) error {
-	// do not disable lazy connection manager if it was enabled by env var
-	if e.enabledLocally {
+	// a local override (NB_LAZY_CONN or local config) takes precedence over management
+	if e.force != lazyForceNone {
 		return nil
 	}
 
@@ -89,15 +105,17 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) UpdatedRemoteFeatureFlag(ctx context.Context, enabled bool) er
 
 		if e.rosenpassEnabled {
 			log.Infof("rosenpass connection manager is enabled, lazy connection manager will not be started")
+			e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(false)
 			return nil
 		}
 
-		log.Warnf("lazy connection manager is enabled by management feature flag")
+		log.Infof("lazy connection manager is enabled by the management feature flag")
 		e.initLazyManager(ctx)
 		e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(true)
 		return e.addPeersToLazyConnManager()
 	} else {
 		if e.lazyConnMgr == nil {
+			e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(false)
 			return nil
 		}
 		log.Infof("lazy connection manager is disabled by management feature flag")
@@ -107,37 +125,6 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) UpdatedRemoteFeatureFlag(ctx context.Context, enabled bool) er
 	}
 }
 
-// SetLocalLazyConn applies a local lazy connection override (UI / CLI / env).
-// While enabledLocally is true, UpdatedRemoteFeatureFlag (management sync) is a
-// no-op, so the local setting wins until it is turned off again.
-func (e *ConnMgr) SetLocalLazyConn(ctx context.Context, enabled bool) error {
-	e.enabledLocally = enabled
-
-	if enabled {
-		if e.lazyConnMgr != nil {
-			return nil
-		}
-
-		if e.rosenpassEnabled {
-			log.Warnf("rosenpass connection manager is enabled, lazy connection manager will not be started")
-			return nil
-		}
-
-		log.Infof("lazy connection manager is enabled locally")
-		e.initLazyManager(ctx)
-		e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(true)
-		return e.addPeersToLazyConnManager()
-	}
-
-	if e.lazyConnMgr == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-	log.Infof("lazy connection manager is disabled locally")
-	e.closeManager(ctx)
-	e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(false)
-	return nil
-}
-
 // UpdateRouteHAMap updates the route HA mappings in the lazy connection manager
 func (e *ConnMgr) UpdateRouteHAMap(haMap route.HAMap) {
 	if !e.isStartedWithLazyMgr() {
@@ -340,6 +327,25 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) isStartedWithLazyMgr() bool {
 	return e.lazyConnMgr != nil && e.lazyCtxCancel != nil
 }
 
+// resolveLazyForce determines the local override. NB_LAZY_CONN takes precedence; when it
+// is unset the MDM policy override (mdmState) applies. Either wins in both directions over
+// the management feature flag; StateUnset for both defers to management.
+func resolveLazyForce(mdmState lazyconn.State) lazyForce {
+	state := lazyconn.EnvState()
+	if state == lazyconn.StateUnset {
+		state = mdmState
+	}
+
+	switch state {
+	case lazyconn.StateOn:
+		return lazyForceOn
+	case lazyconn.StateOff:
+		return lazyForceOff
+	default:
+		return lazyForceNone
+	}
+}
+
 func inactivityThresholdEnv() *time.Duration {
 	envValue := os.Getenv(lazyconn.EnvInactivityThreshold)
 	if envValue == "" {

client/internal/conn_mgr_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+package internal
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/lazyconn"
+)
+
+func TestResolveLazyForce(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name   string
+		env    string
+		envSet bool
+		mdm    lazyconn.State
+		want   lazyForce
+	}{
+		{name: "env unset, mdm unset -> defer to management", mdm: lazyconn.StateUnset, want: lazyForceNone},
+		{name: "env on -> force on", env: "on", envSet: true, mdm: lazyconn.StateUnset, want: lazyForceOn},
+		{name: "env off -> force off", env: "off", envSet: true, mdm: lazyconn.StateUnset, want: lazyForceOff},
+		{name: "env unset, mdm on -> force on", mdm: lazyconn.StateOn, want: lazyForceOn},
+		{name: "env unset, mdm off -> force off", mdm: lazyconn.StateOff, want: lazyForceOff},
+		{name: "env on beats mdm off", env: "on", envSet: true, mdm: lazyconn.StateOff, want: lazyForceOn},
+		{name: "env off beats mdm on", env: "off", envSet: true, mdm: lazyconn.StateOn, want: lazyForceOff},
+		{name: "unrecognized env, mdm on -> mdm wins", env: "auto", envSet: true, mdm: lazyconn.StateOn, want: lazyForceOn},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Setenv(lazyconn.EnvLazyConn, tt.env)
+			if !tt.envSet {
+				os.Unsetenv(lazyconn.EnvLazyConn)
+			}
+
+			if got := resolveLazyForce(tt.mdm); got != tt.want {
+				t.Fatalf("resolveLazyForce(%v) = %v, want %v", tt.mdm, got, tt.want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

client/internal/connect.go

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/device"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/netstack"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/lazyconn"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/listener"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/metrics"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
@@ -256,7 +257,10 @@ func (c *ConnectClient) run(mobileDependency MobileDependency, runningChan chan
 		log.Errorf("failed to clean up temporary installer file: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	defer c.statusRecorder.ClientStop()
+	defer func() {
+		c.statusRecorder.SetSessionExpiresAt(time.Time{})
+		c.statusRecorder.ClientStop()
+	}()
 	operation := func() error {
 		// if context cancelled we not start new backoff cycle
 		if c.ctx.Err() != nil {
@@ -618,7 +622,7 @@ func createEngineConfig(key wgtypes.Key, config *profilemanager.Config, peerConf
 		BlockInbound:        config.BlockInbound,
 		DisableIPv6:         config.DisableIPv6,
 
-		LazyConnectionEnabled: config.LazyConnectionEnabled,
+		LazyConnection: lazyconn.ParseState(config.LazyConnection),
 
 		MTU:     selectMTU(config.MTU, peerConfig.Mtu),
 		LogPath: logPath,
@@ -692,7 +696,6 @@ func loginToManagement(ctx context.Context, client mgm.Client, pubSSHKey []byte,
 		config.BlockLANAccess,
 		config.BlockInbound,
 		config.DisableIPv6,
-		config.LazyConnectionEnabled,
 		config.EnableSSHRoot,
 		config.EnableSSHSFTP,
 		config.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding,

client/internal/debug/debug.go

@@ -480,7 +480,6 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addStatus() error {
 
 		fullStatus := g.statusRecorder.GetFullStatus()
 		protoFullStatus := nbstatus.ToProtoFullStatus(fullStatus)
-		protoFullStatus.Events = g.statusRecorder.GetEventHistory()
 		overview := nbstatus.ConvertToStatusOutputOverview(protoFullStatus, nbstatus.ConvertOptions{
 			Anonymize:     g.anonymize,
 			ProfileName:   profName,
@@ -695,7 +694,7 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addCommonConfigFields(configContent *strings.Builder)
 		configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("ClientCertKeyPath: %s\n", g.internalConfig.ClientCertKeyPath))
 	}
 
-	configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("LazyConnectionEnabled: %v\n", g.internalConfig.LazyConnectionEnabled))
+	configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("LazyConnection: %q\n", g.internalConfig.LazyConnection))
 	configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("MTU: %d\n", g.internalConfig.MTU))
 }
 

client/internal/debug/debug_test.go

@@ -885,7 +885,7 @@ func TestAddConfig_AllFieldsCovered(t *testing.T) {
 		DNSRouteInterval:              5 * time.Second,
 		ClientCertPath:                "/tmp/cert",
 		ClientCertKeyPath:             "/tmp/key",
-		LazyConnectionEnabled:         true,
+		LazyConnection:                "on",
 		MTU:                           1280,
 	}
 

client/internal/dns/service_listener.go

@@ -292,18 +292,16 @@ func (s *serviceViaListener) generateFreePort() (uint16, error) {
 		return customPort, nil
 	}
 
-	udpAddr := net.UDPAddrFromAddrPort(netip.MustParseAddrPort("0.0.0.0:0"))
-	probeListener, err := net.ListenUDP("udp", udpAddr)
+	probeListener, err := net.ListenUDP("udp4", &net.UDPAddr{})
 	if err != nil {
 		log.Debugf("failed to bind random port for DNS: %s", err)
 		return 0, err
 	}
 
-	addrPort := netip.MustParseAddrPort(probeListener.LocalAddr().String()) // might panic if address is incorrect
-	err = probeListener.Close()
-	if err != nil {
+	port := uint16(probeListener.LocalAddr().(*net.UDPAddr).Port)
+	if err = probeListener.Close(); err != nil {
 		log.Debugf("failed to free up DNS port: %s", err)
 		return 0, err
 	}
-	return addrPort.Port(), nil
+	return port, nil
 }

client/internal/engine.go

@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dnsfwd"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/expose"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ingressgw"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/lazyconn"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/metrics"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/netflow"
 	nftypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/netflow/types"
@@ -147,7 +148,9 @@ type EngineConfig struct {
 	BlockInbound        bool
 	DisableIPv6         bool
 
-	LazyConnectionEnabled bool
+	// LazyConnection is the MDM-sourced lazy-connection override; StateUnset defers to
+	// the env var and management feature flag.
+	LazyConnection lazyconn.State
 
 	MTU uint16
 
@@ -548,7 +551,7 @@ func (e *Engine) Start(netbirdConfig *mgmProto.NetbirdConfig, mgmtURL *url.URL)
 		} else {
 			log.Infof("running rosenpass in strict mode")
 		}
-		e.rpManager, err = rosenpass.NewManager(e.config.PreSharedKey, e.config.WgIfaceName)
+		e.rpManager, err = rosenpass.NewManager(e.config.PreSharedKey, e.config.WgIfaceName, publicKey)
 		if err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("create rosenpass manager: %w", err)
 		}
@@ -1161,7 +1164,6 @@ func (e *Engine) applyInfoFlags(info *system.Info) {
 		e.config.BlockLANAccess,
 		e.config.BlockInbound,
 		e.config.DisableIPv6,
-		e.config.LazyConnectionEnabled,
 		e.config.EnableSSHRoot,
 		e.config.EnableSSHSFTP,
 		e.config.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding,
@@ -2030,7 +2032,6 @@ func (e *Engine) readInitialSettings() ([]*route.Route, *nbdns.Config, bool, err
 		e.config.BlockLANAccess,
 		e.config.BlockInbound,
 		e.config.DisableIPv6,
-		e.config.LazyConnectionEnabled,
 		e.config.EnableSSHRoot,
 		e.config.EnableSSHSFTP,
 		e.config.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding,
@@ -2604,13 +2605,14 @@ func (e *Engine) updateForwardRules(rules []*mgmProto.ForwardingRule) ([]firewal
 
 func (e *Engine) toExcludedLazyPeers(rules []firewallManager.ForwardRule, peers []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig) map[string]bool {
 	excludedPeers := make(map[string]bool)
+
+	// Ingress forward targets: inbound forwarded traffic is initiated remotely and
+	// cannot wake a lazy connection, so the peer routing the target must stay
+	// permanently connected. AllowedIPs are already parsed on the peer conn, so
+	// reuse those typed prefixes instead of re-parsing the network map strings.
 	for _, r := range rules {
-		ip := r.TranslatedAddress
 		for _, p := range peers {
-			for _, allowedIP := range p.GetAllowedIps() {
-				if allowedIP != ip.String() {
-					continue
-				}
+			if e.peerRoutesAddr(p, r.TranslatedAddress) {
 				log.Infof("exclude forwarder peer from lazy connection: %s", p.GetWgPubKey())
 				excludedPeers[p.GetWgPubKey()] = true
 			}
@@ -2620,6 +2622,27 @@ func (e *Engine) toExcludedLazyPeers(rules []firewallManager.ForwardRule, peers
 	return excludedPeers
 }
 
+// peerRoutesAddr reports whether the peer is a router for addr, matched against
+// the peer's already-parsed AllowedIPs from the store (the same typed value the
+// lazy manager consumes) rather than re-parsing the network map strings.
+func (e *Engine) peerRoutesAddr(p *mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig, addr netip.Addr) bool {
+	prefixes, ok := e.peerStore.AllowedIPs(p.GetWgPubKey())
+	if !ok {
+		return false
+	}
+	return prefixesContain(prefixes, addr)
+}
+
+// prefixesContain reports whether addr falls within any of the prefixes.
+func prefixesContain(prefixes []netip.Prefix, addr netip.Addr) bool {
+	for _, prefix := range prefixes {
+		if prefix.Contains(addr) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
 // isChecksEqual checks if two slices of checks are equal.
 func isChecksEqual(checks1, checks2 []*mgmProto.Checks) bool {
 	normalize := func(checks []*mgmProto.Checks) []string {

client/internal/engine_lazy_exclude_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+package internal
+
+import (
+	"net/netip"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	firewallManager "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peerstore"
+	mgmProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
+)
+
+func TestPrefixesContain(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name     string
+		prefixes []string
+		addr     string
+		want     bool
+	}{
+		{name: "own overlay /32 matches", prefixes: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}, addr: "100.110.8.145", want: true},
+		{name: "addr inside routed subnet", prefixes: []string{"10.121.0.0/16"}, addr: "10.121.208.4", want: true},
+		{name: "addr outside subnet", prefixes: []string{"10.121.0.0/16"}, addr: "10.122.0.1", want: false},
+		{name: "different /32", prefixes: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}, addr: "100.110.8.146", want: false},
+		{name: "ipv6 /128 matches", prefixes: []string{"fd00::1/128"}, addr: "fd00::1", want: true},
+		{name: "no prefixes", prefixes: nil, addr: "10.121.208.4", want: false},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			prefixes := make([]netip.Prefix, 0, len(tt.prefixes))
+			for _, p := range tt.prefixes {
+				prefixes = append(prefixes, netip.MustParsePrefix(p))
+			}
+			require.Equal(t, tt.want, prefixesContain(prefixes, netip.MustParseAddr(tt.addr)))
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestToExcludedLazyPeers_ForwardTarget guards a regression: the forward-target
+// peer (the peer routing a ForwardRule.TranslatedAddress) must be excluded from
+// lazy connections, matched via the peer's already-parsed AllowedIPs.
+func TestToExcludedLazyPeers_ForwardTarget(t *testing.T) {
+	const targetPeerKey = "cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc0="
+	const otherPeerKey = "dddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd0="
+
+	store := peerstore.NewConnStore()
+	store.AddPeerConn(targetPeerKey, newTestConn(t, targetPeerKey, "100.110.8.145/32"))
+	store.AddPeerConn(otherPeerKey, newTestConn(t, otherPeerKey, "100.110.9.10/32"))
+
+	e := &Engine{peerStore: store}
+
+	peers := []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig{
+		{WgPubKey: targetPeerKey, AllowedIps: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}},
+		{WgPubKey: otherPeerKey, AllowedIps: []string{"100.110.9.10/32"}},
+	}
+	rules := []firewallManager.ForwardRule{
+		{TranslatedAddress: netip.MustParseAddr("100.110.8.145")},
+	}
+
+	excluded := e.toExcludedLazyPeers(rules, peers)
+
+	require.True(t, excluded[targetPeerKey], "forward-target peer must be excluded from lazy connections")
+	require.False(t, excluded[otherPeerKey], "non-target peer must not be excluded")
+	require.Len(t, excluded, 1)
+}
+
+func TestToExcludedLazyPeers_NoRules(t *testing.T) {
+	e := &Engine{peerStore: peerstore.NewConnStore()}
+
+	peers := []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig{
+		{WgPubKey: "peer-a", AllowedIps: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}},
+	}
+
+	require.Empty(t, e.toExcludedLazyPeers(nil, peers))
+}
+
+func newTestConn(t *testing.T, key, allowedIP string) *peer.Conn {
+	t.Helper()
+	conn, err := peer.NewConn(peer.ConnConfig{
+		Key:      key,
+		WgConfig: peer.WgConfig{AllowedIps: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix(allowedIP)}},
+	}, peer.ServiceDependencies{})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	return conn
+}

client/internal/engine_lazyconn.go

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-package internal
-
-import (
-	"errors"
-)
-
-// SetLazyConnEnabled applies a local lazy connection override to the running
-// engine. It pins the setting like an env/CLI flag, so a later management sync
-// cannot override it. syncMsgMux guards ConnMgr, which is not thread-safe.
-func (e *Engine) SetLazyConnEnabled(enabled bool) error {
-	e.syncMsgMux.Lock()
-	defer e.syncMsgMux.Unlock()
-
-	if e.connMgr == nil {
-		return errors.New("connection manager is not initialised")
-	}
-
-	return e.connMgr.SetLocalLazyConn(e.ctx, enabled)
-}

client/internal/engine_session_deadline_test.go

@@ -75,4 +75,14 @@ func TestApplySessionDeadline_ThreeState(t *testing.T) {
 		require.True(t, e.statusRecorder.GetSessionExpiresAt().IsZero(),
 			"invalid timestamp must clear the deadline")
 	})
+
+	t.Run("recently expired timestamp stays visible as expired", func(t *testing.T) {
+		e := newEngine()
+		expired := time.Now().Add(-5 * time.Minute).UTC().Truncate(time.Second)
+
+		e.ApplySessionDeadline(timestamppb.New(expired))
+
+		require.True(t, e.statusRecorder.GetSessionExpiresAt().Equal(expired),
+			"recently-expired deadline must stay on the recorder so consumers render it as expired")
+	})
 }

client/internal/lazyconn/env.go

@@ -3,24 +3,57 @@ package lazyconn
 import (
 	"os"
 	"strconv"
+	"strings"
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 )
 
 const (
-	EnvEnableLazyConn      = "NB_ENABLE_EXPERIMENTAL_LAZY_CONN"
+	EnvLazyConn            = "NB_LAZY_CONN"
 	EnvInactivityThreshold = "NB_LAZY_CONN_INACTIVITY_THRESHOLD"
 )
 
-func IsLazyConnEnabledByEnv() bool {
-	val := os.Getenv(EnvEnableLazyConn)
-	if val == "" {
-		return false
-	}
-	enabled, err := strconv.ParseBool(val)
-	if err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("failed to parse %s: %v", EnvEnableLazyConn, err)
-		return false
-	}
-	return enabled
+// State is the tri-state local override for lazy connections read from the environment.
+type State int
+
+const (
+	// StateUnset means no local override; defer to the management feature flag.
+	StateUnset State = iota
+	// StateOn forces lazy connections on, overriding management.
+	StateOn
+	// StateOff forces lazy connections off, overriding management.
+	StateOff
+)
+
+// EnvState reads NB_LAZY_CONN and returns the local override state.
+func EnvState() State {
+	return ParseState(os.Getenv(EnvLazyConn))
+}
+
+// ParseState interprets a lazy-connection override value (from the environment or an MDM
+// policy). It accepts the on/off aliases plus any value strconv.ParseBool understands
+// (true/false/1/0). An empty or unrecognized value returns StateUnset so that the
+// management feature flag remains in control.
+func ParseState(raw string) State {
+	if raw == "" {
+		return StateUnset
+	}
+
+	normalized := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(raw))
+	switch normalized {
+	case "on":
+		return StateOn
+	case "off":
+		return StateOff
+	}
+
+	enabled, err := strconv.ParseBool(normalized)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Warnf("failed to parse lazy connection value %q (from %s env or MDM policy): %v", raw, EnvLazyConn, err)
+		return StateUnset
+	}
+	if enabled {
+		return StateOn
+	}
+	return StateOff
 }

client/internal/lazyconn/env_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+package lazyconn
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestEnvState(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		value string
+		set   bool
+		want  State
+	}{
+		{set: false, want: StateUnset},
+		{value: "", set: true, want: StateUnset},
+		{value: "on", set: true, want: StateOn},
+		{value: "ON", set: true, want: StateOn},
+		{value: "true", set: true, want: StateOn},
+		{value: "1", set: true, want: StateOn},
+		{value: " on ", set: true, want: StateOn},
+		{value: "off", set: true, want: StateOff},
+		{value: "OFF", set: true, want: StateOff},
+		{value: "false", set: true, want: StateOff},
+		{value: "0", set: true, want: StateOff},
+		{value: "auto", set: true, want: StateUnset},
+		{value: "garbage", set: true, want: StateUnset},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		name := tt.value
+		if !tt.set {
+			name = "unset"
+		}
+		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Setenv(EnvLazyConn, tt.value)
+			if !tt.set {
+				os.Unsetenv(EnvLazyConn)
+			}
+
+			if got := EnvState(); got != tt.want {
+				t.Fatalf("EnvState() = %v, want %v", got, tt.want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

client/internal/netflow/logger/logger.go

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ type Logger struct {
 	wgIfaceNetV6       netip.Prefix
 	dnsCollection      atomic.Bool
 	exitNodeCollection atomic.Bool
-	Store              types.Store
+	Store              types.AggregatingStore
 }
 
 func New(statusRecorder *peer.Status, wgIfaceIPNet, wgIfaceIPNetV6 netip.Prefix) *Logger {
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ func New(statusRecorder *peer.Status, wgIfaceIPNet, wgIfaceIPNetV6 netip.Prefix)
 		statusRecorder: statusRecorder,
 		wgIfaceNet:     wgIfaceIPNet,
 		wgIfaceNetV6:   wgIfaceIPNetV6,
-		Store:          store.NewMemoryStore(),
+		Store:          store.NewAggregatingMemoryStore(),
 	}
 }
 
@@ -125,6 +125,10 @@ func (l *Logger) stop() {
 	l.mux.Unlock()
 }
 
+func (l *Logger) ResetAggregationWindow() types.FlowEventAggregator {
+	return l.Store.ResetAggregationWindow()
+}
+
 func (l *Logger) GetEvents() []*types.Event {
 	return l.Store.GetEvents()
 }

client/internal/netflow/manager.go

@@ -9,12 +9,14 @@ import (
 	"sync"
 	"time"
 
+	"github.com/cenkalti/backoff/v4"
 	"github.com/google/uuid"
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 	"google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/netflow/conntrack"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/netflow/logger"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/netflow/store"
 	nftypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/netflow/types"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/flow/client"
@@ -23,14 +25,16 @@ import (
 
 // Manager handles netflow tracking and logging
 type Manager struct {
-	mux            sync.Mutex
-	shutdownWg     sync.WaitGroup
-	logger         nftypes.FlowLogger
-	flowConfig     *nftypes.FlowConfig
-	conntrack      nftypes.ConnTracker
-	receiverClient *client.GRPCClient
-	publicKey      []byte
-	cancel         context.CancelFunc
+	mux               sync.Mutex
+	shutdownWg        sync.WaitGroup
+	logger            nftypes.FlowLogger
+	flowConfig        *nftypes.FlowConfig
+	conntrack         nftypes.ConnTracker
+	receiverClient    *client.GRPCClient
+	eventsWithoutAcks nftypes.Store
+	publicKey         []byte
+	cancel            context.CancelFunc
+	retryInterval     time.Duration
 }
 
 // NewManager creates a new netflow manager
@@ -48,9 +52,11 @@ func NewManager(iface nftypes.IFaceMapper, publicKey []byte, statusRecorder *pee
 	}
 
 	return &Manager{
-		logger:    flowLogger,
-		conntrack: ct,
-		publicKey: publicKey,
+		logger:            flowLogger,
+		conntrack:         ct,
+		publicKey:         publicKey,
+		retryInterval:     time.Second,
+		eventsWithoutAcks: store.NewMemoryStore(),
 	}
 }
 
@@ -66,6 +72,7 @@ func (m *Manager) needsNewClient(previous *nftypes.FlowConfig) bool {
 }
 
 // enableFlow starts components for flow tracking
+// must be called under m.mux lock
 func (m *Manager) enableFlow(previous *nftypes.FlowConfig) error {
 	// first make sender ready so events don't pile up
 	if m.needsNewClient(previous) {
@@ -85,6 +92,7 @@ func (m *Manager) enableFlow(previous *nftypes.FlowConfig) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
+// must be called under m.mux lock
 func (m *Manager) resetClient() error {
 	if m.receiverClient != nil {
 		if err := m.receiverClient.Close(); err != nil {
@@ -107,14 +115,19 @@ func (m *Manager) resetClient() error {
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
 	m.cancel = cancel
 
-	m.shutdownWg.Add(2)
+	m.shutdownWg.Add(3)
+	flowConfigInterval := m.flowConfig.Interval
 	go func() {
 		defer m.shutdownWg.Done()
-		m.receiveACKs(ctx, flowClient)
+		m.receiveACKs(ctx, flowClient, flowConfigInterval)
 	}()
 	go func() {
 		defer m.shutdownWg.Done()
-		m.startSender(ctx)
+		m.startSender(ctx, flowConfigInterval)
+	}()
+	go func() {
+		defer m.shutdownWg.Done()
+		m.startRetries(ctx, flowConfigInterval)
 	}()
 
 	return nil
@@ -198,8 +211,8 @@ func (m *Manager) GetLogger() nftypes.FlowLogger {
 	return m.logger
 }
 
-func (m *Manager) startSender(ctx context.Context) {
-	ticker := time.NewTicker(m.flowConfig.Interval)
+func (m *Manager) startSender(ctx context.Context, flowConfigInterval time.Duration) {
+	ticker := time.NewTicker(flowConfigInterval)
 	defer ticker.Stop()
 
 	for {
@@ -207,27 +220,29 @@ func (m *Manager) startSender(ctx context.Context) {
 		case <-ctx.Done():
 			return
 		case <-ticker.C:
-			events := m.logger.GetEvents()
+			collectedEvents := m.logger.ResetAggregationWindow()
+			events := collectedEvents.GetAggregatedEvents()
 			for _, event := range events {
+				m.eventsWithoutAcks.StoreEvent(event)
 				if err := m.send(event); err != nil {
 					log.Errorf("failed to send flow event to server: %v", err)
-					continue
+				} else {
+					log.Tracef("sent flow event: %s", event.ID)
 				}
-				log.Tracef("sent flow event: %s", event.ID)
 			}
 		}
 	}
 }
 
-func (m *Manager) receiveACKs(ctx context.Context, client *client.GRPCClient) {
-	err := client.Receive(ctx, m.flowConfig.Interval, func(ack *proto.FlowEventAck) error {
+func (m *Manager) receiveACKs(ctx context.Context, client *client.GRPCClient, flowConfigInterval time.Duration) {
+	err := client.Receive(ctx, flowConfigInterval, func(ack *proto.FlowEventAck) error {
 		id, err := uuid.FromBytes(ack.EventId)
 		if err != nil {
 			log.Warnf("failed to convert ack event id to uuid: %v", err)
 			return nil
 		}
 		log.Tracef("received flow event ack: %s", id)
-		m.logger.DeleteEvents([]uuid.UUID{id})
+		m.eventsWithoutAcks.DeleteEvents([]uuid.UUID{id})
 		return nil
 	})
 
@@ -236,6 +251,51 @@ func (m *Manager) receiveACKs(ctx context.Context, client *client.GRPCClient) {
 	}
 }
 
+// We effectively never drop events (see MaxInterval), which makes eventsWithoutAcks unbounded.
+// We may want to limit the max size of the store, and start dropping oldest events when the threshold is reached.
+func (m *Manager) startRetries(ctx context.Context, flowConfigInterval time.Duration) {
+	timer := time.NewTimer(m.retryInterval)
+	retryBackoff := backoff.WithContext(&backoff.ExponentialBackOff{
+		InitialInterval:     1 * time.Second,
+		RandomizationFactor: 0.5,
+		Multiplier:          1.7,
+		MaxInterval:         flowConfigInterval / 2,
+		MaxElapsedTime:      3 * 30 * 24 * time.Hour, // 3 months
+		Stop:                backoff.Stop,
+		Clock:               backoff.SystemClock,
+	}, ctx)
+	defer timer.Stop()
+
+	for {
+		select {
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+			return
+		case <-timer.C:
+			resetBackoff := true
+			for _, e := range m.eventsWithoutAcks.GetEvents() {
+				if e.Timestamp.Add(time.Second).After(time.Now()) {
+					// grace period on retries to avoid early retries
+					// do not retry if the event is less than 1 sec old
+					continue
+				}
+				if err := m.send(e); err != nil {
+					if nextBackoff := retryBackoff.NextBackOff(); nextBackoff != backoff.Stop {
+						timer = time.NewTimer(nextBackoff)
+						resetBackoff = false
+					} else {
+						resetBackoff = true // we exhausted retries, reset retry loop
+					}
+					break
+				}
+			}
+			if resetBackoff { // use regular retry interval in absence of network errors
+				retryBackoff.Reset()
+				timer = time.NewTimer(m.retryInterval)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 func (m *Manager) send(event *nftypes.Event) error {
 	m.mux.Lock()
 	client := m.receiverClient
@@ -250,9 +310,11 @@ func (m *Manager) send(event *nftypes.Event) error {
 
 func toProtoEvent(publicKey []byte, event *nftypes.Event) *proto.FlowEvent {
 	protoEvent := &proto.FlowEvent{
-		EventId:   event.ID[:],
-		Timestamp: timestamppb.New(event.Timestamp),
-		PublicKey: publicKey,
+		EventId:     event.ID[:],
+		Timestamp:   timestamppb.New(event.Timestamp),
+		PublicKey:   publicKey,
+		WindowStart: timestamppb.New(event.WindowStart),
+		WindowEnd:   timestamppb.New(event.WindowEnd),
 		FlowFields: &proto.FlowFields{
 			FlowId:           event.FlowID[:],
 			RuleId:           event.RuleID,
@@ -267,6 +329,9 @@ func toProtoEvent(publicKey []byte, event *nftypes.Event) *proto.FlowEvent {
 			TxBytes:          event.TxBytes,
 			SourceResourceId: event.SourceResourceID,
 			DestResourceId:   event.DestResourceID,
+			NumOfStarts:      event.NumOfStarts,
+			NumOfEnds:        event.NumOfEnds,
+			NumOfDrops:       event.NumOfDrops,
 		},
 	}
 

client/internal/netflow/manager_integration_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,291 @@
+package netflow
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"net"
+	"net/netip"
+	"slices"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/google/uuid"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/netflow/types"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/flow/proto"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	"google.golang.org/grpc"
+)
+
+type testServer struct {
+	proto.UnimplementedFlowServiceServer
+	events         chan *proto.FlowEvent
+	acks           chan *proto.FlowEventAck
+	grpcSrv        *grpc.Server
+	addr           string
+	handlerDone    chan struct{} // signaled each time Events() exits
+	handlerStarted chan struct{} // signaled each time Events() begins
+}
+
+func newTestServer(t *testing.T) *testServer {
+	listener, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	s := &testServer{
+		events:         make(chan *proto.FlowEvent, 100),
+		acks:           make(chan *proto.FlowEventAck, 100),
+		grpcSrv:        grpc.NewServer(),
+		addr:           listener.Addr().String(),
+		handlerDone:    make(chan struct{}, 10),
+		handlerStarted: make(chan struct{}, 10),
+	}
+
+	proto.RegisterFlowServiceServer(s.grpcSrv, s)
+
+	go func() {
+		if err := s.grpcSrv.Serve(listener); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, grpc.ErrServerStopped) {
+			t.Logf("server error: %v", err)
+		}
+	}()
+
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		s.grpcSrv.Stop()
+	})
+
+	return s
+}
+
+func (s *testServer) Events(stream proto.FlowService_EventsServer) error {
+	defer func() {
+		select {
+		case s.handlerDone <- struct{}{}:
+		default:
+		}
+	}()
+
+	err := stream.Send(&proto.FlowEventAck{IsInitiator: true})
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	select {
+	case s.handlerStarted <- struct{}{}:
+	default:
+	}
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(stream.Context())
+	defer cancel()
+
+	go func() {
+		defer cancel()
+		for {
+			event, err := stream.Recv()
+			if err != nil {
+				return
+			}
+
+			if !event.IsInitiator {
+				select {
+				case s.events <- event:
+				case <-ctx.Done():
+					return
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}()
+
+	for {
+		select {
+		case ack := <-s.acks:
+			if err := stream.Send(ack); err != nil {
+				return err
+			}
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+			return ctx.Err()
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestSendEventReceiveAck(t *testing.T) {
+	_, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
+	t.Cleanup(cancel)
+
+	server := newTestServer(t)
+	manager := createManager(t, server.addr, 60*time.Second) // set high to prevent retries in this test
+	defer manager.Close()
+
+	assert.Eventually(t, func() bool {
+		select {
+		case <-server.handlerStarted:
+			return true
+		default:
+			return false
+		}
+	}, 3*time.Second, 100*time.Millisecond)
+
+	event1 := types.EventFields{
+		FlowID:    uuid.New(),
+		Type:      types.TypeStart,
+		Direction: types.Ingress,
+		DestIP:    ipAddr("172.16.1.2"),
+		DestPort:  2345,
+		Protocol:  6,
+	}
+	manager.logger.StoreEvent(event1)
+	event2 := types.EventFields{
+		FlowID:    uuid.New(),
+		Type:      types.TypeStart,
+		Direction: types.Ingress,
+		DestIP:    ipAddr("172.16.1.1"),
+		DestPort:  1234,
+		Protocol:  6,
+	}
+	manager.logger.StoreEvent(event2)
+
+	// verify the server received logged events
+	serverSideEvents := make([]*proto.FlowEvent, 0)
+	assert.Eventually(t, func() bool {
+		select {
+		case event := <-server.events:
+			serverSideEvents = append(serverSideEvents, event)
+			if len(serverSideEvents) == 2 {
+				return true
+			}
+		default:
+			if len(serverSideEvents) == 2 {
+				return true
+			}
+		}
+		return false
+	}, 5*time.Second, 100*time.Millisecond)
+
+	serverSideFlowIds := make([]uuid.UUID, 0, 2)
+	slices.Values(serverSideEvents)(func(e *proto.FlowEvent) bool {
+		id, err := uuid.FromBytes(e.FlowFields.FlowId)
+		assert.NoError(t, err)
+		serverSideFlowIds = append(serverSideFlowIds, id)
+		return true
+	})
+	assert.ElementsMatch(t, []uuid.UUID{event1.FlowID, event2.FlowID}, serverSideFlowIds)
+
+	// verify the manager tracks un-acked events
+	unackedEvents := manager.eventsWithoutAcks.GetEvents()
+	assert.Len(t, unackedEvents, 2)
+	flowIds := make([]uuid.UUID, 0)
+	slices.Values(unackedEvents)(func(e *types.Event) bool {
+		flowIds = append(flowIds, e.FlowID)
+		return true
+	})
+	assert.ElementsMatch(t, flowIds, []uuid.UUID{event1.FlowID, event2.FlowID})
+}
+
+// verify handling of retries:
+//   - unacked events are retried
+//   - when acks arrive, events are removed from the un-acked event tracker
+func TestRetryEvents(t *testing.T) {
+	_, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
+	t.Cleanup(cancel)
+
+	server := newTestServer(t)
+	manager := createManager(t, server.addr, time.Second) // set low to start retries sooner
+	defer manager.Close()
+
+	assert.Eventually(t, func() bool {
+		select {
+		case <-server.handlerStarted:
+			return true
+		default:
+			return false
+		}
+	}, 3*time.Second, 100*time.Millisecond)
+
+	event1 := types.EventFields{
+		FlowID:    uuid.New(),
+		Type:      types.TypeStart,
+		Direction: types.Ingress,
+		DestIP:    ipAddr("172.16.1.2"),
+		DestPort:  2345,
+		Protocol:  6,
+	}
+	manager.logger.StoreEvent(event1)
+	event2 := types.EventFields{
+		FlowID:    uuid.New(),
+		Type:      types.TypeStart,
+		Direction: types.Ingress,
+		DestIP:    ipAddr("172.16.1.1"),
+		DestPort:  1234,
+		Protocol:  6,
+	}
+	manager.logger.StoreEvent(event2)
+
+	// verify the server received retries of logged events
+	serverSideEvents := make([]*proto.FlowEvent, 0)
+	func() {
+		c := time.After(2500 * time.Millisecond)
+		for {
+			select {
+			case event := <-server.events:
+				serverSideEvents = append(serverSideEvents, event)
+			case <-c:
+				return
+			}
+		}
+	}()
+	assert.True(t, len(serverSideEvents) > 2) // must see retries
+
+	uniqueServerSideEvents := make(map[uuid.UUID]*proto.FlowEvent)
+	slices.Values(serverSideEvents)(func(e *proto.FlowEvent) bool {
+		id, err := uuid.FromBytes(e.FlowFields.FlowId)
+		assert.NoError(t, err)
+		uniqueServerSideEvents[id] = e
+		return true
+	})
+	assert.Contains(t, uniqueServerSideEvents, event1.FlowID)
+	assert.Contains(t, uniqueServerSideEvents, event2.FlowID)
+
+	// ack events
+	server.acks <- &proto.FlowEventAck{EventId: uniqueServerSideEvents[event1.FlowID].EventId}
+	server.acks <- &proto.FlowEventAck{EventId: uniqueServerSideEvents[event2.FlowID].EventId}
+
+	assert.EventuallyWithT(t, func(c *assert.CollectT) {
+		unackedEvents := manager.eventsWithoutAcks.GetEvents()
+		assert.Empty(c, unackedEvents)
+
+	}, 3*time.Second, 100*time.Millisecond)
+}
+
+func createManager(t *testing.T, serverAddr string, retryInterval time.Duration) *Manager {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	mockIFace := &mockIFaceMapper{
+		address: wgaddr.Address{
+			Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("192.168.1.1/32"),
+		},
+		isUserspaceBind: true,
+	}
+
+	publicKey := []byte("test-public-key")
+	manager := NewManager(mockIFace, publicKey, nil)
+	manager.retryInterval = retryInterval
+
+	initialConfig := &types.FlowConfig{
+		Enabled:        true,
+		URL:            fmt.Sprintf("http://%s", serverAddr),
+		TokenPayload:   "initial-payload",
+		TokenSignature: "initial-signature",
+		Interval:       500 * time.Millisecond,
+	}
+
+	err := manager.Update(initialConfig)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	return manager
+}
+
+func ipAddr(a string) netip.Addr {
+	addr, _ := netip.ParseAddr(a)
+	return addr
+}

client/internal/netflow/store/event_aggregation_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,365 @@
+package store
+
+import (
+	"math/rand"
+	"net/netip"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/google/uuid"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/netflow/types"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+)
+
+var random = rand.New(rand.NewSource(time.Now().UnixNano()))
+
+func TestFlowAggregation(t *testing.T) {
+	var protocols = []types.Protocol{types.ICMP, types.ICMPv6, types.TCP, types.UDP}
+	var tests = []struct {
+		description string
+		addresses   [][]netip.Addr
+		dstPort     uint16
+		eventTypes  []types.Type
+	}{
+		{
+			description: "start and stop",
+			addresses:   [][]netip.Addr{{netip.MustParseAddr("1.1.1.1"), netip.MustParseAddr("2.2.2.2")}, {netip.MustParseAddr("3.3.3.3"), netip.MustParseAddr("2.2.2.2")}},
+			dstPort:     uint16(random.Uint32() >> 16),
+			eventTypes:  []types.Type{types.TypeStart, types.TypeEnd},
+		},
+		{
+			description: "start and drop",
+			addresses:   [][]netip.Addr{{netip.MustParseAddr("1.1.1.1"), netip.MustParseAddr("2.2.2.2")}, {netip.MustParseAddr("3.3.3.3"), netip.MustParseAddr("2.2.2.2")}},
+			dstPort:     uint16(random.Uint32() >> 16),
+			eventTypes:  []types.Type{types.TypeStart, types.TypeDrop},
+		},
+		{
+			description: "start only",
+			addresses:   [][]netip.Addr{{netip.MustParseAddr("1.1.1.1"), netip.MustParseAddr("2.2.2.2")}, {netip.MustParseAddr("3.3.3.3"), netip.MustParseAddr("2.2.2.2")}},
+			dstPort:     uint16(random.Uint32() >> 16),
+			eventTypes:  []types.Type{types.TypeStart},
+		},
+		{
+			description: "drop only",
+			addresses:   [][]netip.Addr{{netip.MustParseAddr("1.1.1.1"), netip.MustParseAddr("2.2.2.2")}, {netip.MustParseAddr("3.3.3.3"), netip.MustParseAddr("2.2.2.2")}},
+			dstPort:     uint16(random.Uint32() >> 16),
+			eventTypes:  []types.Type{types.TypeDrop},
+		}}
+
+	for _, protocol := range protocols {
+		for _, tt := range tests {
+			t.Run(tt.description+" "+protocol.String(), func(t *testing.T) {
+				store := NewAggregatingMemoryStore()
+				store.WindowEnd = time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
+
+				allExpected := make([]*types.Event, 0)
+
+				for _, srcAndDst := range tt.addresses {
+					inEvents, expected := generateEvents(srcAndDst[0], srcAndDst[1], tt.dstPort, tt.eventTypes, protocol, types.Ingress, 0, store.WindowStart, store.WindowEnd)
+					for _, e := range inEvents {
+						store.StoreEvent(e)
+					}
+					allExpected = append(allExpected, expected)
+				}
+
+				events := store.GetAggregatedEvents()
+				assert.ElementsMatch(t, events, allExpected)
+			})
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIcmpEventAggregation(t *testing.T) {
+	var protocols = []types.Protocol{types.ICMP, types.ICMPv6}
+	var icmpTypes = []uint8{1, 2, 3}
+
+	var tests = []struct {
+		description string
+		addresses   [][]netip.Addr
+		eventTypes  []types.Type
+	}{
+		{
+			description: "start and stop",
+			addresses:   [][]netip.Addr{{netip.MustParseAddr("1.1.1.1"), netip.MustParseAddr("2.2.2.2")}},
+			eventTypes:  []types.Type{types.TypeStart, types.TypeEnd},
+		},
+		{
+			description: "start and drop",
+			addresses:   [][]netip.Addr{{netip.MustParseAddr("1.1.1.1"), netip.MustParseAddr("2.2.2.2")}},
+			eventTypes:  []types.Type{types.TypeStart, types.TypeDrop},
+		},
+		{
+			description: "start only",
+			addresses:   [][]netip.Addr{{netip.MustParseAddr("1.1.1.1"), netip.MustParseAddr("2.2.2.2")}},
+			eventTypes:  []types.Type{types.TypeStart},
+		},
+		{
+			description: "drop only",
+			addresses:   [][]netip.Addr{{netip.MustParseAddr("1.1.1.1"), netip.MustParseAddr("2.2.2.2")}},
+			eventTypes:  []types.Type{types.TypeDrop},
+		}}
+
+	for _, protocol := range protocols {
+		for _, tt := range tests {
+			t.Run(tt.description+" "+protocol.String(), func(t *testing.T) {
+				store := NewAggregatingMemoryStore()
+				store.WindowEnd = time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
+
+				allExpected := make([]*types.Event, 0)
+				for _, icmpType := range icmpTypes {
+					events, expected := generateEvents(tt.addresses[0][0], tt.addresses[0][1], 0, tt.eventTypes, protocol, types.Ingress, icmpType, store.WindowStart, store.WindowEnd)
+					for _, e := range events {
+						store.StoreEvent(e)
+					}
+					allExpected = append(allExpected, expected)
+				}
+				aggregatedEvents := store.GetAggregatedEvents()
+				assert.Len(t, aggregatedEvents, len(allExpected))
+				assert.ElementsMatch(t, aggregatedEvents, allExpected)
+			})
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestFlowAggregationOfUnknownProtocols(t *testing.T) {
+	var tests = []struct {
+		description string
+		addresses   [][]netip.Addr
+		dstPort     uint16
+		eventTypes  []types.Type
+	}{
+		{
+			description: "start and stop",
+			addresses:   [][]netip.Addr{{netip.MustParseAddr("1.1.1.1"), netip.MustParseAddr("2.2.2.2")}, {netip.MustParseAddr("3.3.3.3"), netip.MustParseAddr("2.2.2.2")}},
+			dstPort:     uint16(random.Uint32() >> 16),
+			eventTypes:  []types.Type{types.TypeStart, types.TypeEnd},
+		},
+		{
+			description: "start and drop",
+			addresses:   [][]netip.Addr{{netip.MustParseAddr("1.1.1.1"), netip.MustParseAddr("2.2.2.2")}, {netip.MustParseAddr("3.3.3.3"), netip.MustParseAddr("2.2.2.2")}},
+			dstPort:     uint16(random.Uint32() >> 16),
+			eventTypes:  []types.Type{types.TypeStart, types.TypeDrop},
+		},
+		{
+			description: "start only",
+			addresses:   [][]netip.Addr{{netip.MustParseAddr("1.1.1.1"), netip.MustParseAddr("2.2.2.2")}, {netip.MustParseAddr("3.3.3.3"), netip.MustParseAddr("2.2.2.2")}},
+			dstPort:     uint16(random.Uint32() >> 16),
+			eventTypes:  []types.Type{types.TypeStart},
+		},
+		{
+			description: "drop only",
+			addresses:   [][]netip.Addr{{netip.MustParseAddr("1.1.1.1"), netip.MustParseAddr("2.2.2.2")}, {netip.MustParseAddr("3.3.3.3"), netip.MustParseAddr("2.2.2.2")}},
+			dstPort:     uint16(random.Uint32() >> 16),
+			eventTypes:  []types.Type{types.TypeDrop},
+		}}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.description+" "+types.ProtocolUnknown.String(), func(t *testing.T) {
+			store := NewAggregatingMemoryStore()
+			store.WindowEnd = time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
+
+			allExpected := make([]*types.Event, 0)
+
+			for _, srcAndDst := range tt.addresses {
+				inEvents, expected := generateEventsForUnknownProtocol(srcAndDst[0], srcAndDst[1], tt.dstPort, tt.eventTypes, types.ProtocolUnknown, types.Ingress, store.WindowStart, store.WindowEnd)
+				for _, e := range inEvents {
+					store.StoreEvent(e)
+				}
+				allExpected = append(allExpected, expected...)
+			}
+
+			events := store.GetAggregatedEvents()
+			assert.ElementsMatch(t, events, allExpected)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResetAggregationWindow(t *testing.T) {
+	now := time.Now()
+	nowFunc := func() time.Time { return now }
+	store := NewAggregatingMemoryStoreWithTimeFunc(nowFunc)
+	store.StoreEvent(&types.Event{
+		ID:        uuid.New(),
+		Timestamp: time.Now(),
+		EventFields: types.EventFields{
+			FlowID:           uuid.New(),
+			Type:             types.TypeStart,
+			Protocol:         types.TCP,
+			RuleID:           []byte("rule-id-1"),
+			Direction:        types.Ingress,
+			SourceIP:         netip.MustParseAddr("1.1.1.1"),
+			SourcePort:       1234,
+			DestIP:           netip.MustParseAddr("2.2.2.2"),
+			DestPort:         5678,
+			SourceResourceID: []byte("source-resource-id"),
+			DestResourceID:   []byte("dest-resource-id"),
+			RxPackets:        random.Uint64(),
+			TxPackets:        random.Uint64(),
+			RxBytes:          random.Uint64(),
+			TxBytes:          random.Uint64(),
+		},
+	})
+
+	now = now.Add(1 * time.Second)
+	reset := store.ResetAggregationWindow()
+	previousEvents, ok := reset.(*AggregatingMemory)
+	assert.True(t, ok)
+	assert.NotEqual(t, previousEvents.WindowStart, store.WindowStart)
+	assert.Equal(t, previousEvents.WindowEnd, store.WindowStart)
+	assert.NotEmpty(t, previousEvents.events)
+	assert.Empty(t, store.events)
+}
+
+func generateEvents(srcIp, dstIp netip.Addr, dstPort uint16, eventTypes []types.Type, protocol types.Protocol,
+	direction types.Direction, icmpType uint8, windowStart, windowEnd time.Time) ([]*types.Event, *types.Event) {
+	var rxPackets, txPackets, rxBytes, txBytes uint64
+	inEvents := make([]*types.Event, 0)
+	ts := time.Now()
+	flowId := uuid.New()
+	srcPort := uint16(random.Uint32() >> 16)
+
+	for idx, eventType := range eventTypes {
+		e := &types.Event{
+			ID:        uuid.New(),
+			Timestamp: ts.Add(time.Duration(idx) * time.Second),
+			EventFields: types.EventFields{
+				FlowID:           flowId,
+				Type:             eventType,
+				Protocol:         protocol,
+				RuleID:           []byte("rule-id-1"),
+				Direction:        direction,
+				SourceIP:         srcIp,
+				SourcePort:       srcPort,
+				DestIP:           dstIp,
+				DestPort:         dstPort,
+				SourceResourceID: []byte("source-resource-id"),
+				DestResourceID:   []byte("dest-resource-id"),
+				RxPackets:        random.Uint64(),
+				TxPackets:        random.Uint64(),
+				RxBytes:          random.Uint64(),
+				TxBytes:          random.Uint64(),
+			}}
+		rxBytes += e.RxBytes
+		txBytes += e.TxBytes
+		rxPackets += e.RxPackets
+		txPackets += e.TxPackets
+		inEvents = append(inEvents, e)
+		if protocol == types.ICMP || protocol == types.ICMPv6 {
+			e.ICMPType = icmpType
+		}
+	}
+
+	var start, end, drop uint64
+	for _, eventType := range eventTypes {
+		switch eventType {
+		case types.TypeStart:
+			start += 1
+		case types.TypeDrop:
+			drop += 1
+		case types.TypeEnd:
+			end += 1
+		}
+	}
+	aggregatedEvent := &types.Event{
+		ID:          inEvents[0].ID,
+		Timestamp:   inEvents[0].Timestamp,
+		WindowStart: windowStart,
+		WindowEnd:   windowEnd,
+		EventFields: types.EventFields{
+			FlowID:           flowId,
+			Type:             types.TypeUnknown,
+			Protocol:         inEvents[0].Protocol,
+			RuleID:           []byte("rule-id-1"),
+			Direction:        inEvents[0].Direction,
+			SourceIP:         srcIp,
+			SourcePort:       srcPort,
+			DestIP:           dstIp,
+			DestPort:         dstPort,
+			SourceResourceID: []byte("source-resource-id"),
+			DestResourceID:   []byte("dest-resource-id"),
+			RxPackets:        rxPackets,
+			TxPackets:        txPackets,
+			RxBytes:          rxBytes,
+			TxBytes:          txBytes,
+			NumOfStarts:      start,
+			NumOfEnds:        end,
+			NumOfDrops:       drop,
+		}}
+	if protocol == types.ICMP || protocol == types.ICMPv6 {
+		aggregatedEvent.ICMPType = icmpType
+	}
+
+	return inEvents, aggregatedEvent
+}
+
+func generateEventsForUnknownProtocol(srcIp, dstIp netip.Addr, dstPort uint16, eventTypes []types.Type, protocol types.Protocol,
+	direction types.Direction, windowStart, windowEnd time.Time) ([]*types.Event, []*types.Event) {
+	inEvents := make([]*types.Event, 0)
+	expectedEvents := make([]*types.Event, 0)
+
+	ts := time.Now()
+	flowId := uuid.New()
+	srcPort := uint16(random.Uint32() >> 16)
+
+	for idx, eventType := range eventTypes {
+		e := &types.Event{
+			ID:        uuid.New(),
+			Timestamp: ts.Add(time.Duration(idx) * time.Second),
+			EventFields: types.EventFields{
+				FlowID:           flowId,
+				Type:             eventType,
+				Protocol:         protocol,
+				RuleID:           []byte("rule-id-1"),
+				Direction:        direction,
+				SourceIP:         srcIp,
+				SourcePort:       srcPort,
+				DestIP:           dstIp,
+				DestPort:         dstPort,
+				SourceResourceID: []byte("source-resource-id"),
+				DestResourceID:   []byte("dest-resource-id"),
+				RxPackets:        random.Uint64(),
+				TxPackets:        random.Uint64(),
+				RxBytes:          random.Uint64(),
+				TxBytes:          random.Uint64(),
+			}}
+		inEvents = append(inEvents, e)
+
+		var start, end, drop uint64
+		switch eventType {
+		case types.TypeStart:
+			start = 1
+		case types.TypeDrop:
+			drop = 1
+		case types.TypeEnd:
+			end = 1
+		}
+
+		expectedEvents = append(expectedEvents, &types.Event{
+			ID:          e.ID,
+			Timestamp:   e.Timestamp,
+			WindowStart: windowStart,
+			WindowEnd:   windowEnd,
+			EventFields: types.EventFields{
+				FlowID:           flowId,
+				Type:             types.TypeUnknown,
+				Protocol:         e.Protocol,
+				RuleID:           []byte("rule-id-1"),
+				Direction:        e.Direction,
+				SourceIP:         srcIp,
+				SourcePort:       srcPort,
+				DestIP:           dstIp,
+				DestPort:         dstPort,
+				SourceResourceID: []byte("source-resource-id"),
+				DestResourceID:   []byte("dest-resource-id"),
+				RxPackets:        e.RxPackets,
+				TxPackets:        e.TxPackets,
+				RxBytes:          e.RxBytes,
+				TxBytes:          e.TxBytes,
+				NumOfStarts:      start,
+				NumOfEnds:        end,
+				NumOfDrops:       drop,
+			}})
+	}
+
+	return inEvents, expectedEvents
+}

client/internal/netflow/store/memory.go

@@ -1,10 +1,15 @@
 package store
 
 import (
+	"maps"
+	"math/rand"
+	v2 "math/rand/v2"
+	"net/netip"
+	"slices"
 	"sync"
+	"time"
 
 	"github.com/google/uuid"
-
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/netflow/types"
 )
 
@@ -19,6 +24,14 @@ type Memory struct {
 	events map[uuid.UUID]*types.Event
 }
 
+type AggregatingMemory struct {
+	Memory
+	WindowStart time.Time
+	WindowEnd   time.Time
+	rnd         *v2.PCG
+	nowFunc     func() time.Time
+}
+
 func (m *Memory) StoreEvent(event *types.Event) {
 	m.mux.Lock()
 	defer m.mux.Unlock()
@@ -48,3 +61,104 @@ func (m *Memory) DeleteEvents(ids []uuid.UUID) {
 		delete(m.events, id)
 	}
 }
+
+func NewAggregatingMemoryStore() *AggregatingMemory {
+	return NewAggregatingMemoryStoreWithTimeFunc(defaultNowFunc)
+}
+
+// used in tests when deterministic (less random) time intervals are required
+func NewAggregatingMemoryStoreWithTimeFunc(nowFunc func() time.Time) *AggregatingMemory {
+	return &AggregatingMemory{WindowStart: nowFunc(), Memory: Memory{events: make(map[uuid.UUID]*types.Event)}, nowFunc: nowFunc, rnd: v2.NewPCG(rand.Uint64(), rand.Uint64())}
+}
+
+func (am *AggregatingMemory) ResetAggregationWindow() types.FlowEventAggregator {
+	am.mux.Lock()
+	defer am.mux.Unlock()
+
+	now := am.nowFunc()
+	toret := AggregatingMemory{WindowStart: am.WindowStart, WindowEnd: now, Memory: Memory{events: am.events}, rnd: v2.NewPCG(rand.Uint64(), rand.Uint64())}
+
+	am.events = make(map[uuid.UUID]*types.Event)
+	am.WindowStart = now
+
+	return &toret
+}
+
+type aggregationKey struct {
+	srcAddr   netip.Addr
+	destAddr  netip.Addr
+	destPort  uint16
+	direction int
+	protocol  uint8
+	icmpType  uint8
+	unique    uint64 // used to prevent aggregation on non icmp/udp/tcp events
+}
+
+func (am *AggregatingMemory) GetAggregatedEvents() []*types.Event {
+	am.mux.Lock()
+	defer am.mux.Unlock()
+
+	aggregated := make(map[aggregationKey]*types.Event)
+	for _, v := range am.events {
+		lookupKey := aggregationKey{srcAddr: v.SourceIP, destAddr: v.DestIP, destPort: v.DestPort, direction: int(v.Direction), protocol: uint8(v.Protocol), icmpType: v.ICMPType}
+		if _, ok := aggregated[lookupKey]; !ok {
+			event := v.Clone()
+
+			switch event.Type {
+			case types.TypeStart:
+				event.NumOfStarts += 1
+			case types.TypeDrop:
+				event.NumOfDrops += 1
+			case types.TypeEnd:
+				event.NumOfEnds += 1
+			}
+			event.Type = types.TypeUnknown
+
+			// Please note that ICMPCode field isn't propagated by the manager (see flow/proto/flow.pb.go, FlowFields struct)
+			// so the field value in an icmp event in the "aggregated" doesn't matter
+
+			event.WindowStart = am.WindowStart
+			event.WindowEnd = am.WindowEnd
+
+			if event.Protocol != types.ICMP && event.Protocol != types.ICMPv6 && event.Protocol != types.UDP && event.Protocol != types.TCP {
+				lookupKey.unique = am.rnd.Uint64() // to make the lookup key unique so we don't aggregate on it
+			}
+
+			aggregated[lookupKey] = event
+			continue
+		}
+
+		aggregatedEvent := aggregated[lookupKey]
+		if aggregatedEvent.Protocol != types.ICMP && aggregatedEvent.Protocol != types.ICMPv6 && aggregatedEvent.Protocol != types.UDP && aggregatedEvent.Protocol != types.TCP {
+			continue // we don't aggregate this type of events; shouldn't ever get here
+		}
+
+		// track the number of connections, duration?, open and close events?
+		aggregatedEvent.RxBytes += v.RxBytes
+		aggregatedEvent.RxPackets += v.RxPackets
+		aggregatedEvent.TxBytes += v.TxBytes
+		aggregatedEvent.TxPackets += v.TxPackets
+		switch v.Type {
+		case types.TypeStart:
+			aggregatedEvent.NumOfStarts += 1
+		case types.TypeDrop:
+			aggregatedEvent.NumOfDrops += 1
+		case types.TypeEnd:
+			aggregatedEvent.NumOfEnds += 1
+		}
+		if aggregatedEvent.Timestamp.Compare(v.Timestamp) > 0 {
+			aggregatedEvent.Timestamp = v.Timestamp
+			aggregatedEvent.ID = v.ID
+			aggregatedEvent.SourcePort = v.SourcePort
+		}
+		if len(aggregatedEvent.RuleID) == 0 && len(v.RuleID) != 0 {
+			aggregatedEvent.RuleID = slices.Clone(v.RuleID)
+		}
+	}
+
+	return slices.Collect(maps.Values(aggregated)) // could return an iterator instead here
+}
+
+func defaultNowFunc() time.Time {
+	return time.Now()
+}

client/internal/netflow/types/types.go

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package types
 
 import (
 	"net/netip"
+	"slices"
 	"strconv"
 	"time"
 
@@ -69,8 +70,10 @@ const (
 )
 
 type Event struct {
-	ID        uuid.UUID
-	Timestamp time.Time
+	ID          uuid.UUID
+	Timestamp   time.Time
+	WindowStart time.Time
+	WindowEnd   time.Time
 	EventFields
 }
 
@@ -92,6 +95,17 @@ type EventFields struct {
 	TxPackets        uint64
 	RxBytes          uint64
 	TxBytes          uint64
+	NumOfStarts      uint64
+	NumOfEnds        uint64
+	NumOfDrops       uint64
+}
+
+func (e *Event) Clone() *Event {
+	toret := *e
+	toret.RuleID = slices.Clone(e.RuleID)
+	toret.SourceResourceID = slices.Clone(e.SourceResourceID)
+	toret.DestResourceID = slices.Clone(e.DestResourceID)
+	return &toret
 }
 
 type FlowConfig struct {
@@ -114,13 +128,15 @@ type FlowManager interface {
 	GetLogger() FlowLogger
 }
 
+type FlowEventAggregator interface {
+	ResetAggregationWindow() FlowEventAggregator
+	GetAggregatedEvents() []*Event
+}
+
 type FlowLogger interface {
+	ResetAggregationWindow() FlowEventAggregator
 	// StoreEvent stores a flow event
 	StoreEvent(flowEvent EventFields)
-	// GetEvents returns all stored events
-	GetEvents() []*Event
-	// DeleteEvents deletes events from the store
-	DeleteEvents([]uuid.UUID)
 	// Close closes the logger
 	Close()
 	// Enable enables the flow logger receiver
@@ -140,6 +156,11 @@ type Store interface {
 	Close()
 }
 
+type AggregatingStore interface {
+	FlowEventAggregator
+	Store
+}
+
 // ConnTracker defines the interface for connection tracking functionality
 type ConnTracker interface {
 	// Start begins tracking connections by listening for conntrack events.

client/internal/peer/conn.go

@@ -30,6 +30,11 @@ import (
 	relayClient "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/relay/client"
 )
 
+// wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold is the number of consecutive WireGuard
+// handshake timeouts after which the rosenpass state for the peer is
+// considered desynced and gets reset.
+const wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold = 3
+
 // MetricsRecorder is an interface for recording peer connection metrics
 type MetricsRecorder interface {
 	RecordConnectionStages(
@@ -118,6 +123,9 @@ type Conn struct {
 	wgWatcher       *WGWatcher
 	wgWatcherWg     sync.WaitGroup
 	wgWatcherCancel context.CancelFunc
+	// wgTimeouts counts consecutive WireGuard handshake timeouts without a
+	// successful handshake in between. Guarded by mu.
+	wgTimeouts int
 
 	// used to store the remote Rosenpass key for Relayed connection in case of connection update from ice
 	rosenpassRemoteKey []byte
@@ -195,7 +203,6 @@ func NewConn(config ConnConfig, services ServiceDependencies) (*Conn, error) {
 		statusICE:          worker.NewAtomicStatus(),
 		dumpState:          dumpState,
 		endpointUpdater:    NewEndpointUpdater(connLog, config.WgConfig, isController(config)),
-		wgWatcher:          NewWGWatcher(connLog, config.WgConfig.WgInterface, config.Key, dumpState),
 		metricsRecorder:    services.MetricsRecorder,
 	}
 
@@ -663,11 +670,12 @@ func (conn *Conn) onGuardEvent() {
 	}
 }
 
-func (conn *Conn) onWGDisconnected() {
+func (conn *Conn) onWGDisconnected(watcherCtx context.Context) {
 	conn.mu.Lock()
 	defer conn.mu.Unlock()
 
-	if conn.ctx.Err() != nil {
+	// watcherCtx guards against a stale watcher tearing down a connection that already superseded it.
+	if conn.ctx.Err() != nil || watcherCtx.Err() != nil {
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -683,6 +691,29 @@ func (conn *Conn) onWGDisconnected() {
 	default:
 		conn.Log.Debugf("No active connection to close on WG timeout")
 	}
+
+	conn.escalateWGTimeoutLocked()
+}
+
+// escalateWGTimeoutLocked resets the peer's rosenpass state after repeated
+// handshake timeouts. With rosenpass enabled, persistent timeouts mean the
+// preshared keys have desynced; the renewal exchange runs over the dead
+// tunnel and cannot resync them. Reporting the peer disconnected drops its
+// rosenpass state, so the next connection configuration programs the
+// rendezvous key and the tunnel can bootstrap again. Callers must hold mu.
+func (conn *Conn) escalateWGTimeoutLocked() {
+	if conn.config.RosenpassConfig.PubKey == nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	conn.wgTimeouts++
+	if conn.wgTimeouts < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold || conn.onDisconnected == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	conn.wgTimeouts = 0
+
+	conn.Log.Warnf("%d consecutive WireGuard handshake timeouts, resetting rosenpass state for peer", wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold)
+	conn.onDisconnected(conn.config.WgConfig.RemoteKey)
 }
 
 func (conn *Conn) updateRelayStatus(relayServerAddr string, rosenpassPubKey []byte, updateTime time.Time) {
@@ -802,25 +833,39 @@ func (conn *Conn) isConnectedOnAllWay() (status guard.ConnStatus) {
 	})
 }
 
+// enableWgWatcherIfNeeded starts a fresh watcher instance per connection attempt, so its
+// lifecycle stays bound to conn.mu and enable/disable can't race an old goroutine's shutdown.
+// Caller must hold conn.mu.
 func (conn *Conn) enableWgWatcherIfNeeded(enabledTime time.Time) {
-	if !conn.wgWatcher.PrepareInitialHandshake() {
+	if conn.wgWatcher != nil {
 		return
 	}
 
+	watcher := NewWGWatcher(conn.Log, conn.config.WgConfig.WgInterface, conn.config.Key, conn.dumpState)
+	watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
+
 	wgWatcherCtx, wgWatcherCancel := context.WithCancel(conn.ctx)
+	conn.wgWatcher = watcher
 	conn.wgWatcherCancel = wgWatcherCancel
+
 	conn.wgWatcherWg.Add(1)
 	go func() {
 		defer conn.wgWatcherWg.Done()
-		conn.wgWatcher.EnableWgWatcher(wgWatcherCtx, enabledTime, conn.onWGDisconnected, conn.onWGHandshakeSuccess)
+		onDisconnected := func() { conn.onWGDisconnected(wgWatcherCtx) }
+		watcher.EnableWgWatcher(wgWatcherCtx, enabledTime, onDisconnected, conn.onWGHandshakeSuccess, conn.onWGCheckSuccess)
 	}()
 }
 
+// disableWgWatcherIfNeeded cancels and drops the watcher once no transport is active. It never
+// waits for the goroutine: the timeout path reentrantly calls back here under conn.mu, so
+// blocking would deadlock. Caller must hold conn.mu.
 func (conn *Conn) disableWgWatcherIfNeeded() {
-	if conn.currentConnPriority == conntype.None && conn.wgWatcherCancel != nil {
-		conn.wgWatcherCancel()
-		conn.wgWatcherCancel = nil
+	if conn.currentConnPriority != conntype.None || conn.wgWatcher == nil {
+		return
 	}
+	conn.wgWatcherCancel()
+	conn.wgWatcher = nil
+	conn.wgWatcherCancel = nil
 }
 
 func (conn *Conn) newProxy(remoteConn net.Conn) (wgproxy.Proxy, error) {
@@ -843,7 +888,9 @@ func (conn *Conn) resetEndpoint() {
 		return
 	}
 	conn.Log.Infof("reset wg endpoint")
-	conn.wgWatcher.Reset()
+	if conn.wgWatcher != nil {
+		conn.wgWatcher.Reset()
+	}
 	if err := conn.endpointUpdater.RemoveEndpointAddress(); err != nil {
 		conn.Log.Warnf("failed to remove endpoint address before update: %v", err)
 	}
@@ -892,6 +939,15 @@ func (conn *Conn) onWGHandshakeSuccess(when time.Time) {
 	conn.recordConnectionMetrics()
 }
 
+// onWGCheckSuccess is called for every watcher check that observed a fresh
+// handshake, including handshakes of connections that were already up when
+// the watcher started.
+func (conn *Conn) onWGCheckSuccess() {
+	conn.mu.Lock()
+	conn.wgTimeouts = 0
+	conn.mu.Unlock()
+}
+
 // recordConnectionMetrics records connection stage timestamps as metrics
 func (conn *Conn) recordConnectionMetrics() {
 	if conn.metricsRecorder == nil {

client/internal/peer/conn_test.go

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface"
@@ -304,3 +305,84 @@ func TestConn_presharedKey_RosenpassManaged(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("expected non-nil presharedKey before Rosenpass manages PSK")
 	}
 }
+
+func newWGTimeoutTestConn(rosenpassEnabled bool, disconnected *[]string) *Conn {
+	cfg := ConnConfig{
+		Key:      "LLHf3Ma6z6mdLbriAJbqhX7+nM/B71lgw2+91q3LfhU=",
+		LocalKey: "RRHf3Ma6z6mdLbriAJbqhX7+nM/B71lgw2+91q3LfhU=",
+		WgConfig: WgConfig{RemoteKey: "LLHf3Ma6z6mdLbriAJbqhX7+nM/B71lgw2+91q3LfhU="},
+	}
+	if rosenpassEnabled {
+		cfg.RosenpassConfig = RosenpassConfig{PubKey: []byte("dummykey")}
+	}
+
+	conn := &Conn{
+		ctx:           context.Background(),
+		config:        cfg,
+		Log:           log.WithField("peer", cfg.Key),
+		metricsStages: &MetricsStages{},
+	}
+	conn.SetOnDisconnected(func(remotePeer string) {
+		*disconnected = append(*disconnected, remotePeer)
+	})
+	return conn
+}
+
+// TestConn_onWGDisconnected_EscalatesToRosenpassReset: repeated handshake
+// timeouts with rosenpass enabled mean the preshared keys have desynced. The
+// renewal exchange runs over the dead tunnel and cannot resync them, so after
+// wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold consecutive timeouts the conn must report the
+// peer disconnected, dropping its rosenpass state so the next configuration
+// programs the rendezvous key.
+func TestConn_onWGDisconnected_EscalatesToRosenpassReset(t *testing.T) {
+	var disconnected []string
+	conn := newWGTimeoutTestConn(true, &disconnected)
+
+	for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
+		conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
+	}
+	assert.Empty(t, disconnected, "escalation must not fire below the threshold")
+
+	conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
+	assert.Equal(t, []string{conn.config.WgConfig.RemoteKey}, disconnected,
+		"reaching the threshold must report the peer disconnected once")
+
+	for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
+		conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
+	}
+	assert.Len(t, disconnected, 1, "escalation must restart counting after firing")
+
+	conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
+	assert.Len(t, disconnected, 2, "continued timeouts must escalate again")
+}
+
+// TestConn_onWGDisconnected_CheckSuccessResetsEscalation: a successful
+// handshake between timeouts means the tunnel recovered; the counter must
+// start over.
+func TestConn_onWGDisconnected_CheckSuccessResetsEscalation(t *testing.T) {
+	var disconnected []string
+	conn := newWGTimeoutTestConn(true, &disconnected)
+
+	for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
+		conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
+	}
+	conn.onWGCheckSuccess()
+
+	for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
+		conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
+	}
+	assert.Empty(t, disconnected, "handshake success must reset the timeout count")
+}
+
+// TestConn_onWGDisconnected_NoEscalationWithoutRosenpass: without rosenpass
+// there is no per-peer key state to reset; repeated timeouts must not report
+// disconnects.
+func TestConn_onWGDisconnected_NoEscalationWithoutRosenpass(t *testing.T) {
+	var disconnected []string
+	conn := newWGTimeoutTestConn(false, &disconnected)
+
+	for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold*3; i++ {
+		conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
+	}
+	assert.Empty(t, disconnected, "escalation must be limited to rosenpass connections")
+}

client/internal/peer/guard/guard.go

@@ -85,7 +85,11 @@ func (g *Guard) reconnectLoopWithRetry(ctx context.Context, callback func()) {
 	defer g.srWatcher.RemoveListener(srReconnectedChan)
 
 	ticker := g.initialTicker(ctx)
-	defer ticker.Stop()
+	defer func() {
+		// If backoff.Ticker.send is blocked, context.Done will not close the Ticker goroutine.
+		// We have to explicitly call Stop, even if we use backoff.WithContext.
+		ticker.Stop()
+	}()
 
 	tickerChannel := ticker.C
 

client/internal/peer/guard/guard_leak_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+package guard
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"runtime"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/ice"
+)
+
+func newTestGuard(status connStatusFunc) *Guard {
+	srw := NewSRWatcher(nil, nil, nil, ice.Config{})
+	return NewGuard(log.WithField("test", "guard"), status, 50*time.Millisecond, srw)
+}
+
+// countBackoffTickerGoroutines returns how many goroutines are currently sitting
+// in backoff/v4.(*Ticker).run (a ticker goroutine that has not exited).
+func countBackoffTickerGoroutines() int {
+	buf := make([]byte, 1<<25) // 32MB
+	n := runtime.Stack(buf, true)
+	return strings.Count(string(buf[:n]), "backoff/v4.(*Ticker).run")
+}
+
+// TestGuard_ReconnectTicker_NoGoroutineLeakOnShutdown reproduces a observed
+// leak: after a shutdown burst, ticker run/send goroutines stay parked
+// forever even though every reconnect loop has exited.
+func TestGuard_ReconnectTicker_NoGoroutineLeakOnShutdown(t *testing.T) {
+	before := countBackoffTickerGoroutines()
+
+	const peers = 6000
+	cancels := make([]context.CancelFunc, 0, peers)
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+
+	// A status check slower than the tick cadence. This models the real
+	// isConnectedOnAllWay/callback doing work: while the loop is busy in the
+	// handler, the ticker fires the next tick and parks in send(), because
+	// send() never selects on ctx.
+	slowStatus := func() ConnStatus {
+		time.Sleep(70 * time.Millisecond)
+		return ConnStatusConnected
+	}
+
+	for range peers {
+		g := newTestGuard(slowStatus)
+		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+		cancels = append(cancels, cancel)
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func() {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			g.Start(ctx, func() {})
+		}()
+		// Force the live ticker to be a newReconnectTicker.
+		g.SetRelayedConnDisconnected()
+	}
+
+	// Let the replacement tickers get past their 800ms initial interval, so
+	// many are parked in send() waiting on the (slow) consumer when we tear
+	// everything down.
+	time.Sleep(1500 * time.Millisecond)
+
+	// Shutdown burst: cancel every peer at once, like engine teardown.
+	for _, c := range cancels {
+		c()
+	}
+
+	// Every reconnect loop must return
+	waitCh := make(chan struct{})
+	go func() { wg.Wait(); close(waitCh) }()
+	select {
+	case <-waitCh:
+	case <-time.After(30 * time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("not all reconnect loops returned after ctx cancel")
+	}
+
+	// Give any correctly-stopped ticker goroutines time to unwind.
+	for range 50 {
+		runtime.Gosched()
+		time.Sleep(10 * time.Millisecond)
+	}
+
+	leaked := countBackoffTickerGoroutines() - before
+	t.Logf("backoff Ticker.run goroutines still parked after teardown of %d peers: %d", peers, leaked)
+	if leaked > 0 {
+		t.Errorf("LEAK: %d backoff ticker goroutines parked after all reconnect loops exited "+
+			"(defer ticker.Stop() stops the initial ticker, not the live replacement)", leaked)
+	}
+}

client/internal/peer/status.go

@@ -813,19 +813,14 @@ func (d *Status) SetSessionExpiresAt(deadline time.Time) {
 }
 
 // GetSessionExpiresAt returns the most recently recorded SSO session deadline,
-// or the zero value when no deadline is tracked. A deadline that has already
-// slipped into the past reports as "none": once the session has expired it is
-// no longer a meaningful countdown, and the sessionwatch.Watcher does not
-// arm a timer at the deadline itself to clear it (only the two pre-expiry
-// warnings). Without this guard the UI would keep painting a stale
-// "expires in …" against a moment that has passed until the next login,
-// extend, or teardown rewrote the value.
+// or the zero value when no deadline is tracked. A deadline in the past is
+// returned as-is: it means the session has expired, and consumers (tray row,
+// CLI status) render it as "expired" rather than hiding it — masking it as
+// "none" would blank the UI at the exact moment it should say the session
+// ended.
 func (d *Status) GetSessionExpiresAt() time.Time {
 	d.mux.Lock()
 	defer d.mux.Unlock()
-	if !d.sessionExpiresAt.IsZero() && d.sessionExpiresAt.Before(time.Now()) {
-		return time.Time{}
-	}
 	return d.sessionExpiresAt
 }
 

client/internal/peer/wg_watcher.go

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package peer
 import (
 	"context"
 	"fmt"
-	"sync"
 	"time"
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
@@ -24,14 +23,14 @@ type WGInterfaceStater interface {
 	GetStats() (map[string]configurer.WGStats, error)
 }
 
+// WGWatcher is single-shot: one instance per connection attempt, run once, then discarded.
+// Lifecycle is owned by Conn under conn.mu, so it keeps no "enabled" state to go stale.
 type WGWatcher struct {
 	log           *log.Entry
 	wgIfaceStater WGInterfaceStater
 	peerKey       string
 	stateDump     *stateDump
 
-	enabled   bool
-	muEnabled sync.Mutex
 	// initialHandshake is not thread-safe; never call PrepareInitialHandshake and EnableWgWatcher concurrently.
 	initialHandshake time.Time
 
@@ -48,36 +47,23 @@ func NewWGWatcher(log *log.Entry, wgIfaceStater WGInterfaceStater, peerKey strin
 	}
 }
 
-// PrepareInitialHandshake reserves the watcher and reads the peer's current WireGuard
-// handshake time. It must be called before the peer is (re)configured on the WireGuard
-// interface, so the captured baseline reflects the state prior to this connection attempt
-// instead of racing with that configuration. Returns ok=false if the watcher is already
-// running, in which case EnableWgWatcher must not be called.
-func (w *WGWatcher) PrepareInitialHandshake() (ok bool) {
-	w.muEnabled.Lock()
-	if w.enabled {
-		w.muEnabled.Unlock()
-		return false
-	}
-
+// PrepareInitialHandshake reads the peer's current WireGuard handshake time. It must be
+// called before the peer is (re)configured on the WireGuard interface, so the captured
+// baseline reflects the state prior to this connection attempt instead of racing with
+// that configuration.
+func (w *WGWatcher) PrepareInitialHandshake() {
 	w.log.Debugf("enable WireGuard watcher")
-	w.enabled = true
-	w.muEnabled.Unlock()
-
 	handshake, _ := w.wgState()
 	w.initialHandshake = handshake
-	return true
 }
 
 // EnableWgWatcher runs the WireGuard watcher loop using the handshake baseline captured by
 // PrepareInitialHandshake. The watcher runs until ctx is cancelled. Caller is responsible
-// for context lifecycle management.
-func (w *WGWatcher) EnableWgWatcher(ctx context.Context, enabledTime time.Time, onDisconnectedFn func(), onHandshakeSuccessFn func(when time.Time)) {
-	w.periodicHandshakeCheck(ctx, onDisconnectedFn, onHandshakeSuccessFn, enabledTime, w.initialHandshake)
-
-	w.muEnabled.Lock()
-	w.enabled = false
-	w.muEnabled.Unlock()
+// for context lifecycle management. onHandshakeSuccessFn is called only for the first
+// handshake observed by this run, onCheckSuccessFn for every check that observed a fresh
+// handshake, including the first.
+func (w *WGWatcher) EnableWgWatcher(ctx context.Context, enabledTime time.Time, onDisconnectedFn func(), onHandshakeSuccessFn func(when time.Time), onCheckSuccessFn func()) {
+	w.periodicHandshakeCheck(ctx, onDisconnectedFn, onHandshakeSuccessFn, onCheckSuccessFn, enabledTime, w.initialHandshake)
 }
 
 // Reset signals the watcher that the WireGuard peer has been reset and a new
@@ -90,7 +76,7 @@ func (w *WGWatcher) Reset() {
 }
 
 // wgStateCheck help to check the state of the WireGuard handshake and relay connection
-func (w *WGWatcher) periodicHandshakeCheck(ctx context.Context, onDisconnectedFn func(), onHandshakeSuccessFn func(when time.Time), enabledTime time.Time, initialHandshake time.Time) {
+func (w *WGWatcher) periodicHandshakeCheck(ctx context.Context, onDisconnectedFn func(), onHandshakeSuccessFn func(when time.Time), onCheckSuccessFn func(), enabledTime time.Time, initialHandshake time.Time) {
 	w.log.Infof("WireGuard watcher started")
 
 	timer := time.NewTimer(wgHandshakeOvertime)
@@ -103,6 +89,7 @@ func (w *WGWatcher) periodicHandshakeCheck(ctx context.Context, onDisconnectedFn
 		case <-timer.C:
 			handshake, ok := w.handshakeCheck(lastHandshake)
 			if !ok {
+				// early ctx cancel check return
 				if ctx.Err() != nil {
 					return
 				}
@@ -117,6 +104,10 @@ func (w *WGWatcher) periodicHandshakeCheck(ctx context.Context, onDisconnectedFn
 				}
 			}
 
+			if onCheckSuccessFn != nil && ctx.Err() == nil {
+				onCheckSuccessFn()
+			}
+
 			lastHandshake = *handshake
 
 			resetTime := time.Until(handshake.Add(checkPeriod))
@@ -147,9 +138,9 @@ func (w *WGWatcher) handshakeCheck(lastHandshake time.Time) (*time.Time, bool) {
 
 	w.log.Tracef("previous handshake, handshake: %v, %v", lastHandshake, handshake)
 
-	// the current know handshake did not change
+	// the current known handshake did not change
 	if handshake.Equal(lastHandshake) {
-		w.log.Warnf("WireGuard handshake timed out: %v", handshake)
+		w.log.Warnf("WireGuard handshake not updated: %v", handshake)
 		return nil, false
 	}
 

client/internal/peer/wg_watcher_test.go

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import (
 	"time"
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/configurer"
 )
@@ -24,6 +23,72 @@ func (m *MocWgIface) disconnect() {
 	m.stop = true
 }
 
+type mockHandshakeStats struct {
+	mu        sync.Mutex
+	handshake time.Time
+}
+
+func (m *mockHandshakeStats) GetStats() (map[string]configurer.WGStats, error) {
+	m.mu.Lock()
+	defer m.mu.Unlock()
+	return map[string]configurer.WGStats{"": {LastHandshake: m.handshake}}, nil
+}
+
+func (m *mockHandshakeStats) advance() {
+	m.mu.Lock()
+	defer m.mu.Unlock()
+	m.handshake = time.Now()
+}
+
+// TestWGWatcher_CheckSuccessCallback: onCheckSuccessFn must fire for a fresh
+// handshake even when the watcher started with an existing handshake baseline,
+// the case where onHandshakeSuccessFn stays silent.
+func TestWGWatcher_CheckSuccessCallback(t *testing.T) {
+	// checkPeriod bounds how stale a handshake may be before the watcher treats it
+	// as a suspended-machine timeout. The first check fires after wgHandshakeOvertime,
+	// so keep checkPeriod well above any scheduling jitter to avoid a false timeout
+	// converting the expected success into a disconnect on a loaded runner.
+	checkPeriod = 1 * time.Minute
+	wgHandshakeOvertime = 1 * time.Second
+
+	mlog := log.WithField("peer", "tet")
+	// Use an old baseline so advance() yields a strictly newer handshake even on
+	// platforms with coarse clock resolution (Windows), where two time.Now() calls
+	// microseconds apart can return the same instant and read as a timed-out handshake.
+	stats := &mockHandshakeStats{handshake: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)}
+	watcher := NewWGWatcher(mlog, stats, "", newStateDump("peer", mlog, &Status{}))
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	defer cancel()
+
+	watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
+
+	firstHandshake := make(chan struct{}, 1)
+	checkSuccess := make(chan struct{}, 1)
+	go watcher.EnableWgWatcher(ctx, time.Now(), func() {}, func(when time.Time) {
+		firstHandshake <- struct{}{}
+	}, func() {
+		select {
+		case checkSuccess <- struct{}{}:
+		default:
+		}
+	})
+
+	stats.advance()
+
+	select {
+	case <-checkSuccess:
+	case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
+		t.Errorf("timeout waiting for check success callback")
+	}
+
+	select {
+	case <-firstHandshake:
+		t.Errorf("first-handshake callback must not fire for a non-zero baseline")
+	default:
+	}
+}
+
 func TestWGWatcher_EnableWgWatcher(t *testing.T) {
 	checkPeriod = 5 * time.Second
 	wgHandshakeOvertime = 1 * time.Second
@@ -35,8 +100,7 @@ func TestWGWatcher_EnableWgWatcher(t *testing.T) {
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
 	defer cancel()
 
-	ok := watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
-	require.True(t, ok, "watcher should not be enabled yet")
+	watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
 
 	onDisconnected := make(chan struct{}, 1)
 	go watcher.EnableWgWatcher(ctx, time.Now(), func() {
@@ -44,7 +108,7 @@ func TestWGWatcher_EnableWgWatcher(t *testing.T) {
 		onDisconnected <- struct{}{}
 	}, func(when time.Time) {
 		mlog.Infof("onHandshakeSuccess: %v", when)
-	})
+	}, nil)
 
 	// wait for initial reading
 	time.Sleep(2 * time.Second)
@@ -66,14 +130,13 @@ func TestWGWatcher_ReEnable(t *testing.T) {
 	watcher := NewWGWatcher(mlog, mocWgIface, "", newStateDump("peer", mlog, &Status{}))
 
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-	ok := watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
-	require.True(t, ok, "watcher should not be enabled yet")
+	watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
 
 	wg := &sync.WaitGroup{}
 	wg.Add(1)
 	go func() {
 		defer wg.Done()
-		watcher.EnableWgWatcher(ctx, time.Now(), func() {}, func(when time.Time) {})
+		watcher.EnableWgWatcher(ctx, time.Now(), func() {}, func(when time.Time) {}, nil)
 	}()
 	cancel()
 
@@ -83,13 +146,12 @@ func TestWGWatcher_ReEnable(t *testing.T) {
 	ctx, cancel = context.WithCancel(context.Background())
 	defer cancel()
 
-	ok = watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
-	require.True(t, ok, "watcher should be re-enabled after the previous run stopped")
+	watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
 
 	onDisconnected := make(chan struct{}, 1)
 	go watcher.EnableWgWatcher(ctx, time.Now(), func() {
 		onDisconnected <- struct{}{}
-	}, func(when time.Time) {})
+	}, func(when time.Time) {}, nil)
 
 	time.Sleep(2 * time.Second)
 	mocWgIface.disconnect()

client/internal/profilemanager/config.go

@@ -101,8 +101,6 @@ type ConfigInput struct {
 
 	DNSLabels domain.List
 
-	LazyConnectionEnabled *bool
-
 	MTU *uint16
 }
 
@@ -180,7 +178,9 @@ type Config struct {
 
 	ClientCertKeyPair *tls.Certificate `json:"-"`
 
-	LazyConnectionEnabled bool
+	// LazyConnection is the MDM-managed lazy-connection override ("on"/"off"/"").
+	// Runtime-only: re-derived from MDM policy on each load, never persisted.
+	LazyConnection string `json:"-"`
 
 	MTU uint16
 
@@ -632,12 +632,6 @@ func (config *Config) apply(input ConfigInput) (updated bool, err error) {
 		updated = true
 	}
 
-	if input.LazyConnectionEnabled != nil && *input.LazyConnectionEnabled != config.LazyConnectionEnabled {
-		log.Infof("switching lazy connection to %t", *input.LazyConnectionEnabled)
-		config.LazyConnectionEnabled = *input.LazyConnectionEnabled
-		updated = true
-	}
-
 	if input.MTU != nil && *input.MTU != config.MTU {
 		log.Infof("updating MTU to %d (old value %d)", *input.MTU, config.MTU)
 		config.MTU = *input.MTU
@@ -728,6 +722,15 @@ func (config *Config) applyMDMPolicy(policy *mdm.Policy) {
 			log.Warnf("MDM wireguard port %d out of range [1,65535]; keeping previous value", v)
 		}
 	}
+
+	if v, ok := policy.GetBool(mdm.KeyLazyConnection); ok {
+		state := "off"
+		if v {
+			state = "on"
+		}
+		config.LazyConnection = state
+		logApplied(mdm.KeyLazyConnection, state)
+	}
 }
 
 // parseURL parses and validates the URL for the named service. The URL

client/internal/profilemanager/config_mdm_test.go

@@ -130,6 +130,37 @@ func TestApply_MDMBoolKeysOverrideOnDiskValue(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.True(t, cfg.Policy().HasKey(mdm.KeyRosenpassEnabled))
 }
 
+func TestApply_MDMLazyConnection(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		name string
+		raw  any
+		want string
+	}{
+		{"native true", true, "on"},
+		{"native false", false, "off"},
+		{"string on", "on", "on"},
+		{"string off", "off", "off"},
+		{"string yes", "yes", "on"},
+		{"string no", "no", "off"},
+	}
+	for _, c := range cases {
+		t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			withMDMPolicy(t, mdm.NewPolicy(map[string]any{
+				mdm.KeyLazyConnection: c.raw,
+			}))
+
+			cfg, err := UpdateOrCreateConfig(ConfigInput{
+				ConfigPath: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json"),
+			})
+			require.NoError(t, err)
+			require.NotNil(t, cfg)
+
+			assert.Equal(t, c.want, cfg.LazyConnection)
+			assert.True(t, cfg.Policy().HasKey(mdm.KeyLazyConnection))
+		})
+	}
+}
+
 func TestApply_MDMPreSharedKeyRedactionSentinelRejected(t *testing.T) {
 	const maskSentinel = "**********"
 

client/internal/profilemanager/service.go

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
 	"runtime"
 	"sort"
 	"strings"
+	"syscall"
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 
@@ -439,7 +440,11 @@ func (s *ServiceManager) GetStatePath() string {
 
 	activeProf, err := s.GetActiveProfileState()
 	if err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("failed to get active profile state: %v", err)
+		if errors.Is(err, syscall.ENOSYS) {
+			log.Debugf("active profile state unavailable on this platform: %v", err)
+		} else {
+			log.Warnf("failed to get active profile state: %v", err)
+		}
 		return defaultStatePath
 	}
 

client/internal/rosenpass/manager.go

@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ type rpServer interface {
 
 type Manager struct {
 	ifaceName    string
+	localWgKey   wgtypes.Key
 	spk          []byte
 	ssk          []byte
 	rpKeyHash    string
@@ -51,8 +52,9 @@ type Manager struct {
 	wgIface      PresharedKeySetter
 }
 
-// NewManager creates a new Rosenpass manager
-func NewManager(preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key, wgIfaceName string) (*Manager, error) {
+// NewManager creates a new Rosenpass manager. localWgKey is the local
+// WireGuard public key, used to derive the per-peer rendezvous key.
+func NewManager(preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key, wgIfaceName string, localWgKey wgtypes.Key) (*Manager, error) {
 	public, secret, err := rp.GenerateKeyPair()
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
@@ -62,6 +64,7 @@ func NewManager(preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key, wgIfaceName string) (*Manager, error)
 	log.Tracef("generated new rosenpass key pair with public key %s", rpKeyHash)
 	return &Manager{
 		ifaceName:    wgIfaceName,
+		localWgKey:   localWgKey,
 		rpKeyHash:    rpKeyHash,
 		spk:          public,
 		ssk:          secret,
@@ -73,7 +76,7 @@ func NewManager(preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key, wgIfaceName string) (*Manager, error)
 		// nil receiver in addPeer -> m.rpWgHandler.AddPeer. generateConfig will
 		// replace it with a fresh handler on each Run() to clear stale peer
 		// state from previous engine sessions.
-		rpWgHandler: NewNetbirdHandler(),
+		rpWgHandler: NewNetbirdHandler((*[32]byte)(preSharedKey), localWgKey),
 		lock:        sync.Mutex{},
 	}, nil
 }
@@ -161,7 +164,7 @@ func (m *Manager) generateConfig() (rp.Config, error) {
 	cfg.Peers = []rp.PeerConfig{}
 
 	m.lock.Lock()
-	m.rpWgHandler = NewNetbirdHandler()
+	m.rpWgHandler = NewNetbirdHandler(m.preSharedKey, m.localWgKey)
 	if m.wgIface != nil {
 		m.rpWgHandler.SetInterface(m.wgIface)
 	}

client/internal/rosenpass/manager_test.go

@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ func newTestManager(spkFirstByte byte, mock *mockServer) *Manager {
 		ssk:         make([]byte, 32),
 		rpKeyHash:   "test-hash",
 		rpPeerIDs:   make(map[string]*rp.PeerID),
-		rpWgHandler: NewNetbirdHandler(),
+		rpWgHandler: NewNetbirdHandler(nil, wgtypes.Key{0x01}),
 		server:      mock,
 	}
 }
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ func TestAddPeer_NilServer_ReturnsErrorNoCrash(t *testing.T) {
 // issue #4341 cannot occur in the window between NewManager and Run().
 func TestNewManager_PreInitializesHandler(t *testing.T) {
 	psk := wgtypes.Key{}
-	m, err := NewManager(&psk, "wt0")
+	m, err := NewManager(&psk, "wt0", wgtypes.Key{0x01})
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	require.NotNil(t, m.rpWgHandler, "rpWgHandler must be initialized in NewManager")
 }
@@ -329,10 +329,10 @@ func TestIsPresharedKeyInitialized_AddedButNotHandshaken_ReturnsFalse(t *testing
 	require.False(t, m.IsPresharedKeyInitialized(wgKey))
 }
 
-// --- NetbirdHandler.outputKey ----------------------------------------------
+// --- NetbirdHandler.applyKey ----------------------------------------------
 
-func TestHandler_OutputKey_FirstCallUsesUpdateOnlyFalse(t *testing.T) {
-	h := NewNetbirdHandler()
+func TestHandler_ApplyKey_FirstCallUsesUpdateOnlyFalse(t *testing.T) {
+	h := NewNetbirdHandler(nil, wgtypes.Key{0x01})
 	iface := &mockIface{}
 	h.SetInterface(iface)
 
@@ -348,8 +348,8 @@ func TestHandler_OutputKey_FirstCallUsesUpdateOnlyFalse(t *testing.T) {
 	require.Equal(t, wgKey.String(), iface.calls[0].peerKey)
 }
 
-func TestHandler_OutputKey_SubsequentCallsUseUpdateOnlyTrue(t *testing.T) {
-	h := NewNetbirdHandler()
+func TestHandler_ApplyKey_SubsequentCallsUseUpdateOnlyTrue(t *testing.T) {
+	h := NewNetbirdHandler(nil, wgtypes.Key{0x01})
 	iface := &mockIface{}
 	h.SetInterface(iface)
 
@@ -364,8 +364,8 @@ func TestHandler_OutputKey_SubsequentCallsUseUpdateOnlyTrue(t *testing.T) {
 	require.True(t, iface.calls[1].updateOnly, "subsequent rotations must use updateOnly=true")
 }
 
-func TestHandler_OutputKey_NilInterface_NoCrashNoCall(t *testing.T) {
-	h := NewNetbirdHandler()
+func TestHandler_ApplyKey_NilInterface_NoCrashNoCall(t *testing.T) {
+	h := NewNetbirdHandler(nil, wgtypes.Key{0x01})
 	// no SetInterface — iface remains nil
 	pid := rp.PeerID{0x03}
 	h.AddPeer(pid, "wt0", rp.Key(wgtypes.Key{}))
@@ -374,8 +374,8 @@ func TestHandler_OutputKey_NilInterface_NoCrashNoCall(t *testing.T) {
 	h.HandshakeCompleted(pid, rp.Key{})
 }
 
-func TestHandler_OutputKey_UnknownPeer_NoCall(t *testing.T) {
-	h := NewNetbirdHandler()
+func TestHandler_ApplyKey_UnknownPeer_NoCall(t *testing.T) {
+	h := NewNetbirdHandler(nil, wgtypes.Key{0x01})
 	iface := &mockIface{}
 	h.SetInterface(iface)
 
@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ func TestHandler_OutputKey_UnknownPeer_NoCall(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestHandler_RemovePeer_ClearsInitializedState(t *testing.T) {
-	h := NewNetbirdHandler()
+	h := NewNetbirdHandler(nil, wgtypes.Key{0x01})
 	iface := &mockIface{}
 	h.SetInterface(iface)
 
@@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ func TestHandler_RemovePeer_ClearsInitializedState(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestHandler_SetInterfaceAfterAddPeer_StillReceivesKey(t *testing.T) {
-	h := NewNetbirdHandler()
+	h := NewNetbirdHandler(nil, wgtypes.Key{0x01})
 	pid := rp.PeerID{0x05}
 	wgKey := wgtypes.Key{0xEE}
 	h.AddPeer(pid, "wt0", rp.Key(wgKey))

client/internal/rosenpass/netbird_handler.go

@@ -18,19 +18,34 @@ type PresharedKeySetter interface {
 type wireGuardPeer struct {
 	Interface string
 	PublicKey rp.Key
+	// initialized is true once a completed exchange has set a
+	// Rosenpass-managed PSK for this peer.
+	initialized bool
+	// chainKey is the key output by the last completed exchange, advanced by
+	// one ratchet step on expiry. Nil until the first exchange completes and
+	// after the peer has fallen back to the rendezvous key.
+	chainKey *wgtypes.Key
+	// expiries counts failed renewals since the last completed exchange.
+	expiries int
 }
 
 type NetbirdHandler struct {
-	mu               sync.Mutex
-	iface            PresharedKeySetter
-	peers            map[rp.PeerID]wireGuardPeer
-	initializedPeers map[rp.PeerID]bool
+	mu    sync.Mutex
+	iface PresharedKeySetter
+	// preSharedKey is the account-level preshared key, used as the rendezvous
+	// key when set. Nil means the deterministic seed key is used instead.
+	preSharedKey *[32]byte
+	// localWgKey is the local WireGuard public key, one of the two inputs to
+	// the deterministic seed key.
+	localWgKey wgtypes.Key
+	peers      map[rp.PeerID]*wireGuardPeer
 }
 
-func NewNetbirdHandler() *NetbirdHandler {
+func NewNetbirdHandler(preSharedKey *[32]byte, localWgKey wgtypes.Key) *NetbirdHandler {
 	return &NetbirdHandler{
-		peers:            map[rp.PeerID]wireGuardPeer{},
-		initializedPeers: map[rp.PeerID]bool{},
+		preSharedKey: preSharedKey,
+		localWgKey:   localWgKey,
+		peers:        map[rp.PeerID]*wireGuardPeer{},
 	}
 }
 
@@ -42,10 +57,16 @@ func (h *NetbirdHandler) SetInterface(iface PresharedKeySetter) {
 	h.iface = iface
 }
 
+// AddPeer registers a peer with the handler. Re-adding a known peer (every
+// reconnection does) keeps its key recovery state.
 func (h *NetbirdHandler) AddPeer(pid rp.PeerID, intf string, pk rp.Key) {
 	h.mu.Lock()
 	defer h.mu.Unlock()
-	h.peers[pid] = wireGuardPeer{
+	if existing, ok := h.peers[pid]; ok && existing.PublicKey == pk {
+		existing.Interface = intf
+		return
+	}
+	h.peers[pid] = &wireGuardPeer{
 		Interface: intf,
 		PublicKey: pk,
 	}
@@ -55,7 +76,6 @@ func (h *NetbirdHandler) RemovePeer(pid rp.PeerID) {
 	h.mu.Lock()
 	defer h.mu.Unlock()
 	delete(h.peers, pid)
-	delete(h.initializedPeers, pid)
 }
 
 // IsPeerInitialized returns true if Rosenpass has completed a handshake
@@ -63,50 +83,120 @@ func (h *NetbirdHandler) RemovePeer(pid rp.PeerID) {
 func (h *NetbirdHandler) IsPeerInitialized(pid rp.PeerID) bool {
 	h.mu.Lock()
 	defer h.mu.Unlock()
-	return h.initializedPeers[pid]
+	peer, ok := h.peers[pid]
+	return ok && peer.initialized
 }
 
+// HandshakeCompleted programs the freshly exchanged output key and resets the
+// peer's key recovery state.
 func (h *NetbirdHandler) HandshakeCompleted(pid rp.PeerID, key rp.Key) {
-	h.outputKey(rp.KeyOutputReasonStale, pid, key)
-}
+	psk := wgtypes.Key(key)
 
-func (h *NetbirdHandler) HandshakeExpired(pid rp.PeerID) {
-	key, _ := rp.GeneratePresharedKey()
-	h.outputKey(rp.KeyOutputReasonStale, pid, key)
-}
-
-func (h *NetbirdHandler) outputKey(_ rp.KeyOutputReason, pid rp.PeerID, psk rp.Key) {
 	h.mu.Lock()
-	iface := h.iface
-	wg, ok := h.peers[pid]
-	isInitialized := h.initializedPeers[pid]
-	h.mu.Unlock()
+	defer h.mu.Unlock()
 
-	if iface == nil {
-		log.Warn("rosenpass: interface not set, cannot update preshared key")
+	peer, ok := h.peers[pid]
+	if !ok {
 		return
 	}
+	if peer.expiries > 0 {
+		log.Infof("rosenpass exchange completed for peer %s after %d expired renewals", wgtypes.Key(peer.PublicKey), peer.expiries)
+	}
+	// chainKey tracks the shared exchange output regardless of the local write
+	// outcome, so both ends still converge on the next expiry.
+	peer.chainKey = &psk
+	peer.expiries = 0
+	if !h.applyKeyLocked(pid, psk, peer.initialized) {
+		return
+	}
+	peer.initialized = true
+}
 
+// HandshakeExpired replaces the expired key. The renewal exchange runs over
+// the tunnel keyed by the PSK itself, so the replacement must be derivable on
+// both ends without communication: the first expiry ratchets the last shared
+// key forward, repeated expiries (and expiries without a completed exchange)
+// fall back to the rendezvous key and drop the peer out of the initialized
+// state so connection reconfigurations reprogram the rendezvous key as well.
+func (h *NetbirdHandler) HandshakeExpired(pid rp.PeerID) {
+	h.mu.Lock()
+	defer h.mu.Unlock()
+
+	peer, ok := h.peers[pid]
 	if !ok {
 		return
 	}
 
-	peerKey := wgtypes.Key(wg.PublicKey).String()
-	pskKey := wgtypes.Key(psk)
+	peer.expiries++
 
-	// Use updateOnly=true for later rotations (peer already has Rosenpass PSK)
-	// Use updateOnly=false for first rotation (peer has original/empty PSK)
-	if err := iface.SetPresharedKey(peerKey, pskKey, isInitialized); err != nil {
+	var psk wgtypes.Key
+	if peer.chainKey != nil && peer.expiries == 1 {
+		log.Infof("rosenpass key for peer %s expired without renewal, advancing to ratcheted key", wgtypes.Key(peer.PublicKey))
+		psk = RatchetKey(*peer.chainKey)
+		peer.chainKey = &psk
+	} else {
+		rendezvous, err := h.rendezvousKey(peer)
+		if err != nil {
+			// Fail closed: without a rendezvous key the expired key must
+			// still be rotated out, even if the replacement is unusable.
+			log.Errorf("failed to derive rendezvous key, replacing expired key with a random one: %v", err)
+			h.applyRandomKeyLocked(pid)
+			return
+		}
+		log.Warnf("rosenpass key for peer %s expired %d times without renewal, falling back to the rendezvous key", wgtypes.Key(peer.PublicKey), peer.expiries)
+		psk = rendezvous
+		peer.chainKey = nil
+		peer.initialized = false
+	}
+
+	h.applyKeyLocked(pid, psk, true)
+}
+
+// rendezvousKey returns the key both ends converge on without communication:
+// the account-level preshared key when configured, the deterministic seed key
+// otherwise. It mirrors the key that peer connections program when Rosenpass
+// does not manage the peer yet.
+func (h *NetbirdHandler) rendezvousKey(peer *wireGuardPeer) (wgtypes.Key, error) {
+	if h.preSharedKey != nil {
+		return *h.preSharedKey, nil
+	}
+
+	seed, err := DeterministicSeedKey(h.localWgKey.String(), wgtypes.Key(peer.PublicKey).String())
+	if err != nil {
+		return wgtypes.Key{}, err
+	}
+	return *seed, nil
+}
+
+// applyKeyLocked writes the preshared key for the peer to the WireGuard
+// interface and reports whether the write succeeded. Callers must hold h.mu
+// for the whole state-mutation-plus-write so that a concurrent completion and
+// expiry cannot reorder their writes relative to the in-memory chain key.
+func (h *NetbirdHandler) applyKeyLocked(pid rp.PeerID, psk wgtypes.Key, updateOnly bool) bool {
+	peer, ok := h.peers[pid]
+	if !ok {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	if h.iface == nil {
+		log.Warn("rosenpass: interface not set, cannot update preshared key")
+		return false
+	}
+
+	peerKey := wgtypes.Key(peer.PublicKey).String()
+	if err := h.iface.SetPresharedKey(peerKey, psk, updateOnly); err != nil {
 		log.Errorf("Failed to apply rosenpass key: %v", err)
+		return false
+	}
+
+	return true
+}
+
+func (h *NetbirdHandler) applyRandomKeyLocked(pid rp.PeerID) {
+	key, err := rp.GeneratePresharedKey()
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Errorf("failed to generate random preshared key: %v", err)
 		return
 	}
-
-	// Mark peer as isInitialized after the successful first rotation
-	if !isInitialized {
-		h.mu.Lock()
-		if _, exists := h.peers[pid]; exists {
-			h.initializedPeers[pid] = true
-		}
-		h.mu.Unlock()
-	}
+	h.applyKeyLocked(pid, wgtypes.Key(key), true)
 }

client/internal/rosenpass/netbird_handler_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+package rosenpass
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	rp "cunicu.li/go-rosenpass"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
+)
+
+// handlerTestLink wires two NetbirdHandlers as the two ends of a single
+// tunnel: handler A manages the rosenpass peer B and vice versa, the way two
+// NetBird clients see each other.
+type handlerTestLink struct {
+	handlerA, handlerB *NetbirdHandler
+	ifaceA, ifaceB     *mockIface
+	pidA, pidB         rp.PeerID
+	wgKeyA, wgKeyB     wgtypes.Key
+}
+
+func newHandlerTestLink(t *testing.T, preSharedKey *[32]byte) *handlerTestLink {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	link := &handlerTestLink{
+		ifaceA: &mockIface{},
+		ifaceB: &mockIface{},
+	}
+	link.pidA[0] = 0xaa
+	link.pidB[0] = 0xbb
+	link.wgKeyA[31] = 1
+	link.wgKeyB[31] = 2
+
+	link.handlerA = NewNetbirdHandler(preSharedKey, link.wgKeyA)
+	link.handlerB = NewNetbirdHandler(preSharedKey, link.wgKeyB)
+
+	link.handlerA.SetInterface(link.ifaceA)
+	link.handlerB.SetInterface(link.ifaceB)
+
+	link.handlerA.AddPeer(link.pidB, "wt0", rp.Key(link.wgKeyB))
+	link.handlerB.AddPeer(link.pidA, "wt0", rp.Key(link.wgKeyA))
+
+	return link
+}
+
+// complete simulates a completed rosenpass exchange: both ends derive the
+// same output key.
+func (l *handlerTestLink) complete(osk rp.Key) {
+	l.handlerA.HandshakeCompleted(l.pidB, osk)
+	l.handlerB.HandshakeCompleted(l.pidA, osk)
+}
+
+// expire simulates a failed key renewal on both ends.
+func (l *handlerTestLink) expire() {
+	l.handlerA.HandshakeExpired(l.pidB)
+	l.handlerB.HandshakeExpired(l.pidA)
+}
+
+func lastPSK(t *testing.T, m *mockIface) wgtypes.Key {
+	t.Helper()
+	m.mu.Lock()
+	defer m.mu.Unlock()
+	require.NotEmpty(t, m.calls, "expected at least one SetPresharedKey call")
+	return m.calls[len(m.calls)-1].psk
+}
+
+func TestHandshakeCompleted_SetsKeyAndInitializes(t *testing.T) {
+	link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
+
+	var osk rp.Key
+	osk[0] = 0x42
+	link.complete(osk)
+
+	require.Equal(t, wgtypes.Key(osk), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA), "completed exchange must program the osk")
+	require.False(t, link.ifaceA.calls[0].updateOnly, "first rotation must not be update-only")
+	require.True(t, link.handlerA.IsPeerInitialized(link.pidB), "peer must be initialized after first completed exchange")
+
+	link.complete(osk)
+	require.True(t, link.ifaceA.calls[1].updateOnly, "later rotations must be update-only")
+}
+
+// TestHandshakeExpired_BothSidesConverge encodes the core recovery invariant:
+// rosenpass renewals run over the tunnel that the PSK itself keys, so when a
+// renewal fails on both ends, both ends must fall back to the same key or the
+// tunnel can never handshake again.
+func TestHandshakeExpired_BothSidesConverge(t *testing.T) {
+	link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
+
+	var osk rp.Key
+	osk[0] = 0x42
+	link.complete(osk)
+
+	link.expire()
+	keyA := lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA)
+	keyB := lastPSK(t, link.ifaceB)
+	require.NotEqual(t, wgtypes.Key(osk), keyA, "expired key must be rotated out")
+	require.Equal(t, keyA, keyB, "both ends must converge on the same key after expiry")
+
+	link.expire()
+	require.Equal(t, lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceB),
+		"both ends must still converge after repeated expiries")
+}
+
+// TestHandshakeExpired_ExpiryWithoutCompletionConverges covers the bootstrap
+// case: the initial exchange never completed (the tunnel ran on the rendezvous
+// key), so an expiry must not replace the working key with an unrecoverable
+// one on either end.
+func TestHandshakeExpired_ExpiryWithoutCompletionConverges(t *testing.T) {
+	link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
+
+	link.expire()
+	require.Equal(t, lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceB),
+		"both ends must converge when the exchange never completed")
+}
+
+// TestHandshakeExpired_RepeatedExpiryClearsInitialized: once renewals keep
+// failing, the peer must drop out of the initialized state so the next
+// connection reconfiguration reprograms the rendezvous key instead of
+// preserving a poisoned rosenpass-managed key.
+func TestHandshakeExpired_RepeatedExpiryClearsInitialized(t *testing.T) {
+	link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
+
+	var osk rp.Key
+	osk[0] = 0x42
+	link.complete(osk)
+
+	link.expire()
+	link.expire()
+
+	require.False(t, link.handlerA.IsPeerInitialized(link.pidB),
+		"repeated expiries must clear the initialized state")
+	require.False(t, link.handlerB.IsPeerInitialized(link.pidA),
+		"repeated expiries must clear the initialized state")
+}
+
+// TestHandshakeCompleted_AfterExpiryRecovers: a completed exchange after a
+// desync must fully reset the recovery state.
+func TestHandshakeCompleted_AfterExpiryRecovers(t *testing.T) {
+	link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
+
+	var osk1, osk2 rp.Key
+	osk1[0] = 1
+	osk2[0] = 2
+
+	link.complete(osk1)
+	link.expire()
+	link.expire()
+
+	link.complete(osk2)
+	require.Equal(t, wgtypes.Key(osk2), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA), "new exchange must program the fresh osk")
+	require.True(t, link.handlerA.IsPeerInitialized(link.pidB), "peer must be initialized again after recovery")
+
+	link.expire()
+	require.Equal(t, lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceB),
+		"recovered link must converge again on the next expiry")
+	require.NotEqual(t, wgtypes.Key(osk2), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA), "expired key must be rotated out")
+}
+
+// TestHandshakeExpired_FirstExpiryRatchetsLastKey: the first expiry must
+// derive the replacement from the last shared key, so an attacker who only
+// blocks the renewal exchange gains nothing over the previous key.
+func TestHandshakeExpired_FirstExpiryRatchetsLastKey(t *testing.T) {
+	link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
+
+	var osk rp.Key
+	osk[0] = 0x42
+	link.complete(osk)
+
+	link.expire()
+	require.Equal(t, RatchetKey(wgtypes.Key(osk)), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA),
+		"first expiry must program the ratcheted key")
+	require.True(t, link.handlerA.IsPeerInitialized(link.pidB),
+		"ratchet step must keep the peer initialized so reconfigurations preserve the key")
+}
+
+// TestHandshakeExpired_RepeatedExpiryFallsBackToSeed: once the ratchet key
+// also fails, both ends must land on the same key that peer connections
+// program for uninitialized peers, so a reconnect completes the recovery.
+func TestHandshakeExpired_RepeatedExpiryFallsBackToSeed(t *testing.T) {
+	link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
+
+	var osk rp.Key
+	osk[0] = 0x42
+	link.complete(osk)
+
+	link.expire()
+	link.expire()
+
+	seed, err := DeterministicSeedKey(link.wgKeyA.String(), link.wgKeyB.String())
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, *seed, lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA), "repeated expiry must fall back to the seed key")
+	require.Equal(t, *seed, lastPSK(t, link.ifaceB), "repeated expiry must fall back to the seed key")
+}
+
+// TestHandshakeExpired_ConfiguredPSKUsedAsRendezvous: with an account-level
+// preshared key configured, the fallback must be that key, matching what peer
+// connections program for uninitialized peers.
+func TestHandshakeExpired_ConfiguredPSKUsedAsRendezvous(t *testing.T) {
+	psk := &[32]byte{0x77}
+	link := newHandlerTestLink(t, psk)
+
+	var osk rp.Key
+	osk[0] = 0x42
+	link.complete(osk)
+
+	link.expire()
+	link.expire()
+
+	require.Equal(t, wgtypes.Key(*psk), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA),
+		"fallback must be the configured preshared key")
+	require.Equal(t, wgtypes.Key(*psk), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceB),
+		"fallback must be the configured preshared key on both ends")
+}
+
+// TestHandshakeExpired_ExpiryWritesAreUpdateOnly: expiry replacements must
+// never create a WireGuard peer that connection management has removed.
+func TestHandshakeExpired_ExpiryWritesAreUpdateOnly(t *testing.T) {
+	link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
+
+	var osk rp.Key
+	osk[0] = 0x42
+	link.complete(osk)
+
+	link.expire()
+	link.expire()
+
+	for _, call := range link.ifaceA.calls[1:] {
+		require.True(t, call.updateOnly, "expiry writes must be update-only")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestAddPeer_ReAddKeepsRecoveryState: reconnections re-add the peer on every
+// OnConnected; that must not reset the expiry chain state.
+func TestAddPeer_ReAddKeepsRecoveryState(t *testing.T) {
+	link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
+
+	var osk rp.Key
+	osk[0] = 0x42
+	link.complete(osk)
+	link.expire()
+
+	link.handlerA.AddPeer(link.pidB, "wt0", rp.Key(link.wgKeyB))
+	require.True(t, link.handlerA.IsPeerInitialized(link.pidB),
+		"re-adding a known peer must keep its state")
+
+	link.expire()
+	seed, err := DeterministicSeedKey(link.wgKeyA.String(), link.wgKeyB.String())
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, *seed, lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA),
+		"second expiry after re-add must continue to the seed fallback")
+}

client/internal/rosenpass/seed.go

@@ -1,11 +1,28 @@
 package rosenpass
 
 import (
+	"crypto/sha256"
 	"fmt"
 
 	"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
 )
 
+// ratchetLabel domain-separates the expiry ratchet from other uses of the
+// rosenpass output key.
+const ratchetLabel = "netbird-rosenpass-expiry-ratchet"
+
+// RatchetKey derives the successor preshared key from the previous Rosenpass
+// output key. When a key expires without a completed renewal, both peers
+// advance their last shared key by one ratchet step: the expired key is
+// rotated out while both ends still converge on an identical, non-public
+// replacement without communicating.
+func RatchetKey(prev wgtypes.Key) wgtypes.Key {
+	input := make([]byte, 0, len(ratchetLabel)+len(prev))
+	input = append(input, ratchetLabel...)
+	input = append(input, prev[:]...)
+	return sha256.Sum256(input)
+}
+
 // DeterministicSeedKey derives a 32-byte WireGuard preshared key from a pair
 // of peer public keys. Both peers, given the same key pair, produce the same
 // output regardless of which side runs the function: the inputs are ordered

client/internal/routemanager/manager.go

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import (
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"sync/atomic"
+	"syscall"
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/google/uuid"
@@ -264,7 +265,11 @@ func (m *DefaultManager) initSelector() *routeselector.RouteSelector {
 
 	// restore selector state if it exists
 	if err := m.stateManager.LoadState(state); err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("failed to load state: %v", err)
+		if errors.Is(err, syscall.ENOSYS) {
+			log.Debugf("route selector state unavailable on this platform: %v", err)
+		} else {
+			log.Warnf("failed to load state: %v", err)
+		}
 		return routeselector.NewRouteSelector()
 	}
 

client/internal/statemanager/manager.go

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 package statemanager
 
 import (
+	"bytes"
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
@@ -305,6 +306,11 @@ func (m *Manager) loadStateFile(deleteCorrupt bool) (map[string]json.RawMessage,
 
 	var rawStates map[string]json.RawMessage
 	if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &rawStates); err != nil {
+		if len(bytes.TrimSpace(data)) == 0 {
+			log.Warnf("state file %s is empty (%d bytes)", m.filePath, len(data))
+		} else {
+			log.Warnf("state file %s has malformed content (%d bytes)", m.filePath, len(data))
+		}
 		m.handleCorruptedState(deleteCorrupt)
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("unmarshal states: %w", err)
 	}

client/ios/NetBirdSDK/env_list.go

@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ func GetEnvKeyNBForceRelay() string {
 
 // GetEnvKeyNBLazyConn Exports the environment variable for the iOS client
 func GetEnvKeyNBLazyConn() string {
-	return lazyconn.EnvEnableLazyConn
+	return lazyconn.EnvLazyConn
 }
 
 // GetEnvKeyNBInactivityThreshold Exports the environment variable for the iOS client

client/ios/NetBirdSDK/login.go

@@ -44,10 +44,25 @@ type Auth struct {
 // NewAuth instantiate Auth struct and validate the management URL
 func NewAuth(cfgPath string, mgmURL string) (*Auth, error) {
 	inputCfg := profilemanager.ConfigInput{
+		ConfigPath:    cfgPath,
 		ManagementURL: mgmURL,
 	}
 
-	cfg, err := profilemanager.CreateInMemoryConfig(inputCfg)
+	// Load the existing config when a config file is already present so an
+	// interactive re-login reuses the peer's persisted WireGuard private key
+	// (and thus its identity) instead of generating a fresh one. Generating a
+	// new key registers a brand-new peer on the management server on every
+	// re-auth (named after the fallback hostname). Only fall back to a fresh
+	// in-memory config for the first-time login when no config file exists yet.
+	// DirectUpdateOrCreateConfig uses non-atomic writes so it also works inside
+	// the tvOS App Group sandbox where atomic temp-file+rename is blocked.
+	var cfg *profilemanager.Config
+	var err error
+	if cfgPath != "" {
+		cfg, err = profilemanager.DirectUpdateOrCreateConfig(inputCfg)
+	} else {
+		cfg, err = profilemanager.CreateInMemoryConfig(inputCfg)
+	}
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}

client/mdm/canonical_loaders.go

@@ -22,12 +22,14 @@ var allKeys = []string{
 	KeyDisableMetricsCollection,
 	KeyAllowServerSSH,
 	KeyDisableAutoConnect,
+	KeyDisableAutostart,
 	KeyPreSharedKey,
 	KeyRosenpassEnabled,
 	KeyRosenpassPermissive,
 	KeyWireguardPort,
 	KeySplitTunnelMode,
 	KeySplitTunnelApps,
+	KeyLazyConnection,
 }
 
 // canonicalKey maps the lowercase form of a managed-config value name to

client/mdm/policy.go

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ package mdm
 import (
 	"sort"
 	"strconv"
+	"strings"
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 )
@@ -19,10 +20,10 @@ import (
 // names (lowerCamelCase) so the daemon can map a Policy key directly to a
 // configuration field.
 const (
-	KeyManagementURL            = "managementURL"
-	KeyDisableUpdateSettings    = "disableUpdateSettings"
-	KeyDisableProfiles          = "disableProfiles"
-	KeyDisableNetworks          = "disableNetworks"
+	KeyManagementURL         = "managementURL"
+	KeyDisableUpdateSettings = "disableUpdateSettings"
+	KeyDisableProfiles       = "disableProfiles"
+	KeyDisableNetworks       = "disableNetworks"
 	// KeyDisableAdvancedView gates the advanced-view section in the
 	// upcoming UI revision. UI-only: NOT stored on Config, not
 	// applied by applyMDMPolicy, not rejectable via SetConfig. The
@@ -36,10 +37,16 @@ const (
 	KeyDisableMetricsCollection = "disableMetricsCollection"
 	KeyAllowServerSSH           = "allowServerSSH"
 	KeyDisableAutoConnect       = "disableAutoConnect"
-	KeyPreSharedKey             = "preSharedKey"
-	KeyRosenpassEnabled         = "rosenpassEnabled"
-	KeyRosenpassPermissive      = "rosenpassPermissive"
-	KeyWireguardPort            = "wireguardPort"
+	// KeyDisableAutostart suppresses the GUI's fresh-install
+	// launch-on-login default and marks the Settings toggle as
+	// MDM-managed. UI-only: NOT stored on Config and not applied by
+	// applyMDMPolicy; the GUI reads it directly and it appears in
+	// GetConfigResponse.mDMManagedFields when set.
+	KeyDisableAutostart    = "disableAutostart"
+	KeyPreSharedKey        = "preSharedKey"
+	KeyRosenpassEnabled    = "rosenpassEnabled"
+	KeyRosenpassPermissive = "rosenpassPermissive"
+	KeyWireguardPort       = "wireguardPort"
 
 	// Split tunnel is modeled as a single conceptual policy with two
 	// registry/plist values. KeySplitTunnelMode is the discriminator
@@ -48,6 +55,11 @@ const (
 	// construction — only one mode can be set at a time.
 	KeySplitTunnelMode = "splitTunnelMode"
 	KeySplitTunnelApps = "splitTunnelApps"
+
+	// KeyLazyConnection forces the lazy-connection feature on or off, overriding
+	// the management feature flag. Read as a bool (native bool, or on/off,
+	// true/false, 1/0, yes/no); absent = defer to management.
+	KeyLazyConnection = "lazyConnection"
 )
 
 // Split-tunnel mode literals (KeySplitTunnelMode values).
@@ -69,12 +81,13 @@ var boolStringLiterals = map[string]bool{
 	"true":  true,
 	"1":     true,
 	"yes":   true,
+	"on":    true,
 	"false": false,
 	"0":     false,
 	"no":    false,
+	"off":   false,
 }
 
-
 // Policy holds MDM-managed settings read from the platform source. A nil or
 // empty Policy means no enforcement is active.
 type Policy struct {
@@ -157,7 +170,8 @@ func (p *Policy) GetString(key string) (string, bool) {
 }
 
 // GetBool returns the managed value for key coerced to bool, and whether the
-// key was set. Accepts native bool and string literals "true"/"false"/"1"/"0".
+// key was set. Accepts native bool and string literals (true/false, 1/0,
+// yes/no, on/off), case-insensitively and trimmed of surrounding whitespace.
 func (p *Policy) GetBool(key string) (bool, bool) {
 	if p == nil {
 		return false, false
@@ -170,7 +184,7 @@ func (p *Policy) GetBool(key string) (bool, bool) {
 	case bool:
 		return t, true
 	case string:
-		b, known := boolStringLiterals[t]
+		b, known := boolStringLiterals[strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(t))]
 		return b, known
 	case int:
 		return t != 0, true

client/mdm/policy_test.go

@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ func TestPolicy_Empty(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestPolicy_HasKey(t *testing.T) {
 	p := NewPolicy(map[string]any{
-		KeyManagementURL:    "https://corp.example.com",
-		KeyDisableProfiles:  true,
+		KeyManagementURL:   "https://corp.example.com",
+		KeyDisableProfiles: true,
 	})
 	assert.False(t, p.IsEmpty())
 	assert.True(t, p.HasKey(KeyManagementURL))
@@ -53,8 +53,8 @@ func TestPolicy_ManagedKeysSorted(t *testing.T) {
 func TestPolicy_GetString(t *testing.T) {
 	p := NewPolicy(map[string]any{
 		KeyManagementURL:   "https://corp.example.com",
-		KeyDisableProfiles: true,            // wrong type for GetString
-		KeyPreSharedKey:        "",              // empty rejected
+		KeyDisableProfiles: true, // wrong type for GetString
+		KeyPreSharedKey:    "",   // empty rejected
 	})
 	v, ok := p.GetString(KeyManagementURL)
 	assert.True(t, ok)
@@ -85,6 +85,11 @@ func TestPolicy_GetBool(t *testing.T) {
 		{"string 0", "0", false, true},
 		{"string yes", "yes", true, true},
 		{"string no", "no", false, true},
+		{"string on", "on", true, true},
+		{"string off", "off", false, true},
+		{"mixed case On", "On", true, true},
+		{"upper TRUE", "TRUE", true, true},
+		{"padded yes", "  yes  ", true, true},
 		{"int nonzero", 1, true, true},
 		{"int zero", 0, false, true},
 		{"int64 nonzero", int64(2), true, true},

client/proto/daemon_gateway_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+package proto
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"net"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	gatewayruntime "github.com/grpc-ecosystem/grpc-gateway/v2/runtime"
+	"google.golang.org/grpc"
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials/insecure"
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/test/bufconn"
+)
+
+func TestGatewayServerRoutesCoverDaemonRPCs(t *testing.T) {
+	mux := gatewayruntime.NewServeMux()
+	if err := RegisterDaemonServiceHandlerServer(context.Background(), mux, UnimplementedDaemonServiceServer{}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("register daemon gateway server handlers: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	assertAllDaemonGatewayRoutesRegistered(t, mux)
+}
+
+func TestGatewayClientRoutesCoverDaemonRPCs(t *testing.T) {
+	listener := bufconn.Listen(1024 * 1024)
+	server := grpc.NewServer()
+	RegisterDaemonServiceServer(server, UnimplementedDaemonServiceServer{})
+	go func() {
+		if err := server.Serve(listener); err != nil && err != grpc.ErrServerStopped {
+			t.Errorf("serve bufconn gRPC server: %v", err)
+		}
+	}()
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		server.Stop()
+		_ = listener.Close()
+	})
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	defer cancel()
+
+	mux := gatewayruntime.NewServeMux()
+	opts := []grpc.DialOption{
+		grpc.WithContextDialer(func(context.Context, string) (net.Conn, error) {
+			return listener.Dial()
+		}),
+		grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials()),
+	}
+	if err := RegisterDaemonServiceHandlerFromEndpoint(ctx, mux, "passthrough:///bufnet", opts); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("register daemon gateway client handlers: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	assertAllDaemonGatewayRoutesRegistered(t, mux)
+}
+
+func assertAllDaemonGatewayRoutesRegistered(t *testing.T, mux http.Handler) {
+	t.Helper()
+	for _, method := range DaemonService_ServiceDesc.Methods {
+		assertGatewayRouteRegistered(t, mux, method.MethodName)
+	}
+	for _, stream := range DaemonService_ServiceDesc.Streams {
+		assertGatewayRouteRegistered(t, mux, stream.StreamName)
+	}
+}
+
+func assertGatewayRouteRegistered(t *testing.T, mux http.Handler, methodName string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	path := "/daemon.DaemonService/" + methodName
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, path, strings.NewReader("{}"))
+	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	res := httptest.NewRecorder()
+
+	mux.ServeHTTP(res, req)
+
+	if res.Code == http.StatusNotFound {
+		t.Fatalf("gateway route for %s is not registered", methodName)
+	}
+}

client/proto/generate.sh

@@ -12,5 +12,11 @@ script_path=$(dirname "$(realpath "$0")")
 cd "$script_path"
 go install google.golang.org/protobuf/cmd/protoc-gen-go@v1.36.6
 go install google.golang.org/grpc/cmd/protoc-gen-go-grpc@v1.6.1
-protoc -I ./ ./daemon.proto --go_out=../ --go-grpc_out=../ --experimental_allow_proto3_optional
+go install github.com/grpc-ecosystem/grpc-gateway/v2/protoc-gen-grpc-gateway@v2.26.3
+protoc -I ./ ./daemon.proto \
+  --go_out=../ \
+  --go-grpc_out=../ \
+  --grpc-gateway_out=../ \
+  --grpc-gateway_opt=generate_unbound_methods=true \
+  --experimental_allow_proto3_optional
 cd "$old_pwd"

client/server/mdm.go

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package server
 import (
 	"context"
 	"fmt"
+	"net/url"
 	"time"
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
@@ -155,7 +156,6 @@ func (s *Server) restartEngineForMDMLocked() error {
 	s.config = config
 	s.statusRecorder.UpdateManagementAddress(config.ManagementURL.String())
 	s.statusRecorder.UpdateRosenpass(config.RosenpassEnabled, config.RosenpassPermissive)
-	s.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(config.LazyConnectionEnabled)
 
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(s.rootCtx)
 	s.actCancel = cancel
@@ -185,6 +185,37 @@ func conflictBool(key string, p *bool) conflictCheck {
 	}
 }
 
+func canonicalURL(s string) string {
+	u, err := url.ParseRequestURI(s)
+	if err != nil {
+		return s
+	}
+	if u.Port() == "" {
+		switch u.Scheme {
+		case "https":
+			u.Host += ":443"
+		case "http":
+			u.Host += ":80"
+		}
+	}
+	return u.String()
+}
+
+// conflictURL is conflictString for URL-typed keys: both sides are
+// normalized via canonicalURL before comparison.
+func conflictURL(key, got string) conflictCheck {
+	return conflictCheck{
+		key: key,
+		check: func(pol *mdm.Policy) bool {
+			if got == "" {
+				return true
+			}
+			want, ok := pol.GetString(key)
+			return ok && canonicalURL(want) == canonicalURL(got)
+		},
+	}
+}
+
 // conflictString builds a conflictCheck for a string MDM key. An empty
 // `got` is treated as "field not set" (no override requested); otherwise
 // the check returns true only when the policy contains the key and its
@@ -260,7 +291,7 @@ func mdmManagedFieldConflicts(msg *proto.SetConfigRequest, policy *mdm.Policy) [
 	}
 
 	return resolveConflicts(policy, []conflictCheck{
-		conflictString(mdm.KeyManagementURL, msg.ManagementUrl),
+		conflictURL(mdm.KeyManagementURL, msg.ManagementUrl),
 		conflictString(mdm.KeyPreSharedKey, pskGot),
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyRosenpassEnabled, msg.RosenpassEnabled),
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyRosenpassPermissive, msg.RosenpassPermissive),
@@ -308,7 +339,6 @@ func setConfigRequestHasConfigOverrides(msg *proto.SetConfigRequest) bool {
 		msg.DisableFirewall != nil ||
 		msg.BlockLanAccess != nil ||
 		msg.DisableNotifications != nil ||
-		msg.LazyConnectionEnabled != nil ||
 		msg.BlockInbound != nil ||
 		msg.DisableIpv6 != nil ||
 		msg.EnableSSHRoot != nil ||
@@ -351,7 +381,6 @@ func loginRequestHasConfigOverrides(msg *proto.LoginRequest) bool {
 		msg.BlockLanAccess != nil ||
 		msg.DisableNotifications != nil ||
 		len(msg.DnsLabels) > 0 || msg.CleanDNSLabels ||
-		msg.LazyConnectionEnabled != nil ||
 		msg.BlockInbound != nil
 }
 
@@ -383,7 +412,7 @@ func loginRequestMDMConflicts(msg *proto.LoginRequest, policy *mdm.Policy) []str
 	}
 
 	return resolveConflicts(policy, []conflictCheck{
-		conflictString(mdm.KeyManagementURL, msg.ManagementUrl),
+		conflictURL(mdm.KeyManagementURL, msg.ManagementUrl),
 		conflictString(mdm.KeyPreSharedKey, pskGot),
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyRosenpassEnabled, msg.RosenpassEnabled),
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyRosenpassPermissive, msg.RosenpassPermissive),

client/server/server.go

@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ func (s *Server) Start() error {
 		log.Warnf("failed to redirect stderr: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	if err := restoreResidualState(s.rootCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
+	if err := RestoreResidualState(s.rootCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
 		log.Warnf(errRestoreResidualState, err)
 	}
 
@@ -238,7 +238,6 @@ func (s *Server) Start() error {
 
 	s.statusRecorder.UpdateManagementAddress(config.ManagementURL.String())
 	s.statusRecorder.UpdateRosenpass(config.RosenpassEnabled, config.RosenpassPermissive)
-	s.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(config.LazyConnectionEnabled)
 
 	if s.sessionWatcher == nil {
 		s.sessionWatcher = internal.NewSessionWatcher(s.rootCtx, s.statusRecorder)
@@ -422,16 +421,6 @@ func (s *Server) SetConfig(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.SetConfigReques
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to update profile config: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	// Apply the lazy connection toggle to the running engine so it takes
-	// effect without a down/up. s.mutex is already held.
-	if msg.LazyConnectionEnabled != nil && s.connectClient != nil {
-		if engine := s.connectClient.Engine(); engine != nil {
-			if err := engine.SetLazyConnEnabled(msg.GetLazyConnectionEnabled()); err != nil {
-				log.Errorf("failed to apply lazy connection change at runtime: %v", err)
-			}
-		}
-	}
-
 	return &proto.SetConfigResponse{}, nil
 }
 
@@ -510,7 +499,6 @@ func (s *Server) setConfigInputFromRequest(msg *proto.SetConfigRequest) (profile
 	config.DisableFirewall = msg.DisableFirewall
 	config.BlockLANAccess = msg.BlockLanAccess
 	config.DisableNotifications = msg.DisableNotifications
-	config.LazyConnectionEnabled = msg.LazyConnectionEnabled
 	config.BlockInbound = msg.BlockInbound
 	config.DisableIPv6 = msg.DisableIpv6
 	config.EnableSSHRoot = msg.EnableSSHRoot
@@ -563,7 +551,7 @@ func (s *Server) Login(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.LoginRequest) (*pro
 	s.actCancel = cancel
 	s.mutex.Unlock()
 
-	if err := restoreResidualState(s.rootCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
+	if err := RestoreResidualState(s.rootCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
 		log.Warnf(errRestoreResidualState, err)
 	}
 
@@ -840,6 +828,7 @@ func (s *Server) WaitSSOLogin(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.WaitSSOLogin
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
+	log.Infof("SSO login flow finished, returning success to caller")
 	return &proto.WaitSSOLoginResponse{
 		Email: tokenInfo.Email,
 	}, nil
@@ -847,6 +836,7 @@ func (s *Server) WaitSSOLogin(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.WaitSSOLogin
 
 // Up starts engine work in the daemon.
 func (s *Server) Up(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.UpRequest) (*proto.UpResponse, error) {
+	log.Infof("up request received")
 	s.mutex.Lock()
 	// clientRunning is the daemon-intent flag (set by previous Up/Start, cleared
 	// by Down). connectionGoroutineRunning() reports whether the previous retry-loop
@@ -868,7 +858,7 @@ func (s *Server) Up(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.UpRequest) (*proto.UpR
 
 		return s.waitForUp(callerCtx)
 	}
-	if err := restoreResidualState(callerCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
+	if err := RestoreResidualState(callerCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
 		log.Warnf(errRestoreResidualState, err)
 	}
 
@@ -1981,7 +1971,6 @@ func (s *Server) GetConfig(ctx context.Context, req *proto.GetConfigRequest) (*p
 		ServerSSHAllowed:              *cfg.ServerSSHAllowed,
 		RosenpassEnabled:              cfg.RosenpassEnabled,
 		RosenpassPermissive:           cfg.RosenpassPermissive,
-		LazyConnectionEnabled:         cfg.LazyConnectionEnabled,
 		BlockInbound:                  cfg.BlockInbound,
 		DisableNotifications:          disableNotifications,
 		NetworkMonitor:                networkMonitor,

client/server/setconfig_mdm_test.go

@@ -181,6 +181,43 @@ func TestSetConfig_MDMAllow_NonManagedFields(t *testing.T) {
 	require.NotNil(t, resp)
 }
 
+// TestSetConfig_MDMAllow_ManagementURLPortNormalized covers the
+// regression from discussion #6483: MDM URL without explicit port vs
+// UI echo with the parseURL-appended default port must be treated as
+// a no-op echo, not a conflict.
+func TestSetConfig_MDMAllow_ManagementURLPortNormalized(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name      string
+		mdmURL    string
+		submitURL string
+	}{
+		{"policy_no_port_submit_with_443", "https://netbird.corp.example", "https://netbird.corp.example:443"},
+		{"policy_with_443_submit_no_port", "https://netbird.corp.example:443", "https://netbird.corp.example"},
+		{"http_policy_no_port_submit_with_80", "http://netbird.corp.example", "http://netbird.corp.example:80"},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			withMDMPolicy(t, mdm.NewPolicy(map[string]any{
+				mdm.KeyManagementURL: tc.mdmURL,
+			}))
+
+			s, ctx, profName, username, _ := setupServerWithProfile(t)
+
+			rosenpassEnabled := true
+			resp, err := s.SetConfig(ctx, &proto.SetConfigRequest{
+				ProfileName:      profName,
+				Username:         username,
+				ManagementUrl:    tc.submitURL,
+				RosenpassEnabled: &rosenpassEnabled,
+			})
+
+			require.NoError(t, err, "port-normalized URL echo must not trip MDM conflict gate")
+			require.NotNil(t, resp)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
 func TestSetConfig_MDMEmpty_NoEnforcement(t *testing.T) {
 	// No MDM policy active: any field can be written.
 	withMDMPolicy(t, mdm.NewPolicy(nil))

client/server/setconfig_test.go

@@ -69,43 +69,41 @@ func TestSetConfig_AllFieldsSaved(t *testing.T) {
 	disableFirewall := true
 	blockLANAccess := true
 	disableNotifications := true
-	lazyConnectionEnabled := true
 	blockInbound := true
 	disableIPv6 := true
 	mtu := int64(1280)
 	sshJWTCacheTTL := int32(300)
 
 	req := &proto.SetConfigRequest{
-		ProfileName:           profName,
-		Username:              currUser.Username,
-		ManagementUrl:         "https://new-api.netbird.io:443",
-		AdminURL:              "https://new-admin.netbird.io",
-		RosenpassEnabled:      &rosenpassEnabled,
-		RosenpassPermissive:   &rosenpassPermissive,
-		ServerSSHAllowed:      &serverSSHAllowed,
-		InterfaceName:         &interfaceName,
-		WireguardPort:         &wireguardPort,
-		OptionalPreSharedKey:  &preSharedKey,
-		DisableAutoConnect:    &disableAutoConnect,
-		NetworkMonitor:        &networkMonitor,
-		DisableClientRoutes:   &disableClientRoutes,
-		DisableServerRoutes:   &disableServerRoutes,
-		DisableDns:            &disableDNS,
-		DisableFirewall:       &disableFirewall,
-		BlockLanAccess:        &blockLANAccess,
-		DisableNotifications:  &disableNotifications,
-		LazyConnectionEnabled: &lazyConnectionEnabled,
-		BlockInbound:          &blockInbound,
-		DisableIpv6:           &disableIPv6,
-		NatExternalIPs:        []string{"1.2.3.4", "5.6.7.8"},
-		CleanNATExternalIPs:   false,
-		CustomDNSAddress:      []byte("1.1.1.1:53"),
-		ExtraIFaceBlacklist:   []string{"eth1", "eth2"},
-		DnsLabels:             []string{"label1", "label2"},
-		CleanDNSLabels:        false,
-		DnsRouteInterval:      durationpb.New(2 * time.Minute),
-		Mtu:                   &mtu,
-		SshJWTCacheTTL:        &sshJWTCacheTTL,
+		ProfileName:          profName,
+		Username:             currUser.Username,
+		ManagementUrl:        "https://new-api.netbird.io:443",
+		AdminURL:             "https://new-admin.netbird.io",
+		RosenpassEnabled:     &rosenpassEnabled,
+		RosenpassPermissive:  &rosenpassPermissive,
+		ServerSSHAllowed:     &serverSSHAllowed,
+		InterfaceName:        &interfaceName,
+		WireguardPort:        &wireguardPort,
+		OptionalPreSharedKey: &preSharedKey,
+		DisableAutoConnect:   &disableAutoConnect,
+		NetworkMonitor:       &networkMonitor,
+		DisableClientRoutes:  &disableClientRoutes,
+		DisableServerRoutes:  &disableServerRoutes,
+		DisableDns:           &disableDNS,
+		DisableFirewall:      &disableFirewall,
+		BlockLanAccess:       &blockLANAccess,
+		DisableNotifications: &disableNotifications,
+		BlockInbound:         &blockInbound,
+		DisableIpv6:          &disableIPv6,
+		NatExternalIPs:       []string{"1.2.3.4", "5.6.7.8"},
+		CleanNATExternalIPs:  false,
+		CustomDNSAddress:     []byte("1.1.1.1:53"),
+		ExtraIFaceBlacklist:  []string{"eth1", "eth2"},
+		DnsLabels:            []string{"label1", "label2"},
+		CleanDNSLabels:       false,
+		DnsRouteInterval:     durationpb.New(2 * time.Minute),
+		Mtu:                  &mtu,
+		SshJWTCacheTTL:       &sshJWTCacheTTL,
 	}
 
 	_, err = s.SetConfig(ctx, req)
@@ -140,7 +138,6 @@ func TestSetConfig_AllFieldsSaved(t *testing.T) {
 	require.Equal(t, blockLANAccess, cfg.BlockLANAccess)
 	require.NotNil(t, cfg.DisableNotifications)
 	require.Equal(t, disableNotifications, *cfg.DisableNotifications)
-	require.Equal(t, lazyConnectionEnabled, cfg.LazyConnectionEnabled)
 	require.Equal(t, blockInbound, cfg.BlockInbound)
 	require.Equal(t, disableIPv6, cfg.DisableIPv6)
 	require.Equal(t, []string{"1.2.3.4", "5.6.7.8"}, cfg.NATExternalIPs)
@@ -164,13 +161,14 @@ func verifyAllFieldsCovered(t *testing.T, req *proto.SetConfigRequest) {
 	t.Helper()
 
 	metadataFields := map[string]bool{
-		"state":               true, // protobuf internal
-		"sizeCache":           true, // protobuf internal
-		"unknownFields":       true, // protobuf internal
-		"Username":            true, // metadata
-		"ProfileName":         true, // metadata
-		"CleanNATExternalIPs": true, // control flag for clearing
-		"CleanDNSLabels":      true, // control flag for clearing
+		"state":                 true, // protobuf internal
+		"sizeCache":             true, // protobuf internal
+		"unknownFields":         true, // protobuf internal
+		"Username":              true, // metadata
+		"ProfileName":           true, // metadata
+		"CleanNATExternalIPs":   true, // control flag for clearing
+		"CleanDNSLabels":        true, // control flag for clearing
+		"LazyConnectionEnabled": true, // deprecated: proto field retained for compat, no longer applied
 	}
 
 	expectedFields := map[string]bool{
@@ -190,7 +188,6 @@ func verifyAllFieldsCovered(t *testing.T, req *proto.SetConfigRequest) {
 		"DisableFirewall":               true,
 		"BlockLanAccess":                true,
 		"DisableNotifications":          true,
-		"LazyConnectionEnabled":         true,
 		"BlockInbound":                  true,
 		"DisableIpv6":                   true,
 		"NatExternalIPs":                true,
@@ -252,7 +249,6 @@ func TestCLIFlags_MappedToSetConfig(t *testing.T) {
 		"block-lan-access":                  "BlockLanAccess",
 		"block-inbound":                     "BlockInbound",
 		"disable-ipv6":                      "DisableIpv6",
-		"enable-lazy-connection":            "LazyConnectionEnabled",
 		"external-ip-map":                   "NatExternalIPs",
 		"dns-resolver-address":              "CustomDNSAddress",
 		"extra-iface-blacklist":             "ExtraIFaceBlacklist",
@@ -269,7 +265,8 @@ func TestCLIFlags_MappedToSetConfig(t *testing.T) {
 
 	// SetConfigRequest fields that don't have CLI flags (settable only via UI or other means).
 	fieldsWithoutCLIFlags := map[string]bool{
-		"DisableNotifications": true, // Only settable via UI
+		"DisableNotifications":  true, // Only settable via UI
+		"LazyConnectionEnabled": true, // deprecated: no longer settable (managed by server + NB_LAZY_CONN)
 	}
 
 	// Get all SetConfigRequest fields to verify our map is complete.

client/server/state.go

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ func (s *Server) CleanState(ctx context.Context, req *proto.CleanStateRequest) (
 
 	if req.All {
 		// Reuse existing cleanup logic for all states
-		if err := restoreResidualState(ctx, statePath); err != nil {
+		if err := RestoreResidualState(ctx, statePath); err != nil {
 			return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Internal, "failed to clean all states: %v", err)
 		}
 
@@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ func (s *Server) DeleteState(ctx context.Context, req *proto.DeleteStateRequest)
 	}, nil
 }
 
-// restoreResidualState checks if the client was not shut down in a clean way and restores residual if required.
+// RestoreResidualState checks if the client was not shut down in a clean way and restores residual if required.
 // Otherwise, we might not be able to connect to the management server to retrieve new config.
-func restoreResidualState(ctx context.Context, statePath string) error {
+func RestoreResidualState(ctx context.Context, statePath string) error {
 	if statePath == "" {
 		return nil
 	}

client/ssh/config/manager.go

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import (
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 
 	nbssh "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
 )
 
 const (
@@ -218,11 +219,20 @@ func (m *Manager) buildHostPatterns(peer PeerSSHInfo) []string {
 	if peer.IPv6.IsValid() {
 		hostPatterns = append(hostPatterns, peer.IPv6.String())
 	}
-	if peer.FQDN != "" {
+	// Peer FQDNs and hostnames originate from remote peers, so they must be
+	// validated as plain DNS names before being embedded in the ssh_config
+	// "Match host" pattern list. This prevents injection of arbitrary
+	// ssh_config directives via embedded quotes, whitespace, newlines, the
+	// comma pattern separator, or the "*"/"?" pattern metacharacters.
+	if domain.IsValidDomainNoWildcard(peer.FQDN) {
 		hostPatterns = append(hostPatterns, peer.FQDN)
+	} else if peer.FQDN != "" {
+		log.Warnf("skipping peer FQDN with invalid characters in SSH config: %q", peer.FQDN)
 	}
-	if peer.Hostname != "" && peer.Hostname != peer.FQDN {
+	if peer.Hostname != peer.FQDN && domain.IsValidDomainNoWildcard(peer.Hostname) {
 		hostPatterns = append(hostPatterns, peer.Hostname)
+	} else if peer.Hostname != "" && peer.Hostname != peer.FQDN {
+		log.Warnf("skipping peer hostname with invalid characters in SSH config: %q", peer.Hostname)
 	}
 	return hostPatterns
 }

client/ssh/config/manager_test.go

@@ -148,6 +148,45 @@ func TestManager_MatchHostFormat(t *testing.T) {
 		"should use Match host with comma-separated patterns")
 }
 
+func TestManager_HostPatternInjection(t *testing.T) {
+	tempDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "netbird-ssh-config-test")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	defer func() { assert.NoError(t, os.RemoveAll(tempDir)) }()
+
+	manager := &Manager{
+		sshConfigDir:  filepath.Join(tempDir, "ssh_config.d"),
+		sshConfigFile: "99-netbird.conf",
+	}
+
+	// A malicious peer FQDN/hostname attempts to break out of the Match host
+	// directive and inject arbitrary ssh_config (a ProxyCommand executing a
+	// command). It must be rejected, not written to the config.
+	peers := []PeerSSHInfo{
+		{
+			Hostname: "evil\"\n    ProxyCommand touch /tmp/pwned\nHost x",
+			IP:       netip.MustParseAddr("100.125.1.1"),
+			FQDN:     "evil\"\n    ProxyCommand touch /tmp/pwned\nHost x.nb.internal",
+		},
+		{Hostname: "peer2", IP: netip.MustParseAddr("100.125.1.2"), FQDN: "peer2.nb.internal"},
+	}
+
+	err = manager.SetupSSHClientConfig(peers)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	configPath := filepath.Join(manager.sshConfigDir, manager.sshConfigFile)
+	content, err := os.ReadFile(configPath)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	configStr := string(content)
+
+	assert.NotContains(t, configStr, "ProxyCommand touch /tmp/pwned",
+		"injected directive must not appear in generated config")
+	assert.NotContains(t, configStr, "evil",
+		"malicious pattern must be dropped entirely")
+	// The valid peer must still be present, on a single Match host line.
+	assert.Contains(t, configStr, "Match host \"100.125.1.1,100.125.1.2,peer2.nb.internal,peer2\"",
+		"valid peers must survive, injected patterns dropped")
+}
+
 func TestManager_ForcedSSHConfig(t *testing.T) {
 	// Set force environment variable
 	t.Setenv(EnvForceSSHConfig, "true")

client/ssh/server/getent_unix.go

@@ -69,7 +69,8 @@ func parseGetentPasswd(output string) (*user.User, string, error) {
 
 // validateGetentInput checks that the input is safe to pass to getent or id.
 // Allows POSIX usernames, numeric UIDs, and common NSS extensions
-// (@ for Kerberos, $ for Samba, + for NIS compat).
+// (@ for Kerberos, $ for Samba, + for NIS compat). A leading hyphen is
+// rejected so the input can never be parsed as a command-line flag.
 func validateGetentInput(input string) bool {
 	maxLen := 32
 	if runtime.GOOS == "linux" {
@@ -80,6 +81,10 @@ func validateGetentInput(input string) bool {
 		return false
 	}
 
+	if input[0] == '-' {
+		return false
+	}
+
 	for _, r := range input {
 		if isAllowedGetentChar(r) {
 			continue

client/ssh/server/getent_unix_test.go

@@ -157,6 +157,9 @@ func TestValidateGetentInput(t *testing.T) {
 		{"numeric UID", "1001", true},
 		{"dots and underscores", "alice.bob_test", true},
 		{"hyphen", "alice-bob", true},
+		{"leading hyphen rejected", "-i", false},
+		{"leading double hyphen rejected", "--no-idn", false},
+		{"lone hyphen rejected", "-", false},
 		{"kerberos principal", "user@REALM", true},
 		{"samba machine account", "MACHINE$", true},
 		{"NIS compat", "+user", true},

client/status/status.go

@@ -746,6 +746,8 @@ func ToProtoFullStatus(fullStatus peer.FullStatus) *proto.FullStatus {
 		pbFullStatus.DnsServers = append(pbFullStatus.DnsServers, pbDnsState)
 	}
 
+	pbFullStatus.Events = fullStatus.Events
+
 	return &pbFullStatus
 }
 

client/system/info.go

@@ -74,8 +74,6 @@ type Info struct {
 	BlockInbound        bool
 	DisableIPv6         bool
 
-	LazyConnectionEnabled bool
-
 	EnableSSHRoot                 bool
 	EnableSSHSFTP                 bool
 	EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding  bool
@@ -87,7 +85,7 @@ func (i *Info) SetFlags(
 	rosenpassEnabled, rosenpassPermissive bool,
 	serverSSHAllowed *bool,
 	disableClientRoutes, disableServerRoutes,
-	disableDNS, disableFirewall, blockLANAccess, blockInbound, disableIPv6, lazyConnectionEnabled bool,
+	disableDNS, disableFirewall, blockLANAccess, blockInbound, disableIPv6 bool,
 	enableSSHRoot, enableSSHSFTP, enableSSHLocalPortForwarding, enableSSHRemotePortForwarding *bool,
 	disableSSHAuth *bool,
 ) {
@@ -105,8 +103,6 @@ func (i *Info) SetFlags(
 	i.BlockInbound = blockInbound
 	i.DisableIPv6 = disableIPv6
 
-	i.LazyConnectionEnabled = lazyConnectionEnabled
-
 	if enableSSHRoot != nil {
 		i.EnableSSHRoot = *enableSSHRoot
 	}

client/system/process.go

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import (
 	"os"
 	"slices"
 
-	"github.com/shirou/gopsutil/v3/process"
+	"github.com/shirou/gopsutil/v4/process"
 )
 
 // getRunningProcesses returns a list of running process paths. The context bounds the work:

client/system/process_test.go

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"testing"
 
-	"github.com/shirou/gopsutil/v3/process"
+	"github.com/shirou/gopsutil/v4/process"
 )
 
 func Benchmark_getRunningProcesses(b *testing.B) {

client/test/json-socket-docker.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -eEuo pipefail
+
+usage() {
+  cat <<'EOF'
+Usage: client/test/json-socket-docker.sh [tcp|unix|both]
+
+Builds the NetBird client Docker image from the local source tree, starts
+`netbird service run` in a container with --enable-json-socket, and verifies
+that the HTTP/JSON daemon gateway responds to Status requests.
+
+Modes:
+  tcp   Validate tcp://0.0.0.0:8080 via a published localhost port (default)
+  unix  Validate unix:///sock/netbird-http.sock via a bind-mounted socket dir
+  both  Run both validations
+
+Environment:
+  CONTAINER_RUNTIME  docker or podman. Auto-detected if unset.
+  IMAGE              Image tag to build. Default: netbird-json-socket-test:local
+  TARGETARCH         Go/Docker target arch. Default: `go env GOARCH`
+  PLATFORM           Docker platform. Default: linux/$TARGETARCH
+  WAIT_TIMEOUT       Seconds to wait for the JSON socket. Default: 30
+EOF
+}
+
+if [[ "${1:-}" == "-h" || "${1:-}" == "--help" ]]; then
+  usage
+  exit 0
+fi
+
+MODE="${1:-tcp}"
+case "${MODE}" in
+  tcp|unix|both) ;;
+  *)
+    usage >&2
+    echo "invalid mode: ${MODE}" >&2
+    exit 2
+    ;;
+esac
+
+RUNTIME="${CONTAINER_RUNTIME:-}"
+if [[ -z "${RUNTIME}" ]]; then
+  if command -v docker >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    RUNTIME=docker
+  elif command -v podman >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    RUNTIME=podman
+  else
+    echo "docker or podman is required" >&2
+    exit 127
+  fi
+fi
+if ! command -v "${RUNTIME}" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  echo "container runtime not found: ${RUNTIME}" >&2
+  exit 127
+fi
+
+if ! command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  echo "curl is required" >&2
+  exit 127
+fi
+
+ROOT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/../.." && pwd)"
+IMAGE="${IMAGE:-netbird-json-socket-test:local}"
+TARGETARCH="${TARGETARCH:-$(go env GOARCH)}"
+PLATFORM="${PLATFORM:-linux/${TARGETARCH}}"
+WAIT_TIMEOUT="${WAIT_TIMEOUT:-30}"
+TMP_DIR="$(mktemp -d)"
+CONTAINERS=()
+
+cleanup() {
+  local status=$?
+  for container in "${CONTAINERS[@]:-}"; do
+    "${RUNTIME}" rm -f "${container}" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+  done
+  rm -rf "${TMP_DIR}"
+  exit "${status}"
+}
+trap cleanup EXIT
+
+build_image() {
+  echo "==> Building Linux ${TARGETARCH} netbird binary"
+  mkdir -p "${TMP_DIR}/context/client"
+  cp "${ROOT_DIR}/client/Dockerfile" "${TMP_DIR}/context/Dockerfile"
+  cp "${ROOT_DIR}/client/netbird-entrypoint.sh" "${TMP_DIR}/context/client/netbird-entrypoint.sh"
+
+  (cd "${ROOT_DIR}" && CGO_ENABLED=0 GOOS=linux GOARCH="${TARGETARCH}" go build -o "${TMP_DIR}/context/netbird" ./client)
+
+  echo "==> Building ${IMAGE} for ${PLATFORM}"
+  "${RUNTIME}" build \
+    --platform "${PLATFORM}" \
+    --build-arg NETBIRD_BINARY=netbird \
+    -t "${IMAGE}" \
+    -f "${TMP_DIR}/context/Dockerfile" \
+    "${TMP_DIR}/context"
+}
+
+pick_port() {
+  python3 - <<'PY'
+import socket
+sock = socket.socket()
+sock.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
+print(sock.getsockname()[1])
+sock.close()
+PY
+}
+
+assert_status_json() {
+  local response_file="$1"
+  if command -v python3 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    python3 - "${response_file}" <<'PY'
+import json
+import sys
+with open(sys.argv[1], encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+    data = json.load(fh)
+if not data.get("status"):
+    raise SystemExit("missing non-empty status field")
+if "daemonVersion" not in data:
+    raise SystemExit("missing daemonVersion field")
+print(f"status={data['status']} daemonVersion={data['daemonVersion']}")
+PY
+  else
+    grep -q '"status"' "${response_file}"
+    grep -q '"daemonVersion"' "${response_file}"
+    cat "${response_file}"
+  fi
+}
+
+container_logs() {
+  local container="$1"
+  echo "---- ${container} logs ----" >&2
+  "${RUNTIME}" logs "${container}" >&2 || true
+  echo "--------------------------" >&2
+}
+
+wait_for_http_status() {
+  local container="$1"
+  local response="${TMP_DIR}/${container}.json"
+  local curl_err="${TMP_DIR}/${container}.curl.err"
+  shift
+  local deadline=$((SECONDS + WAIT_TIMEOUT))
+
+  while (( SECONDS < deadline )); do
+    if curl -fsS "$@" \
+      -X POST \
+      -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
+      -d '{}' \
+      -o "${response}" \
+      2>"${curl_err}"; then
+      assert_status_json "${response}"
+      return 0
+    fi
+
+    if ! "${RUNTIME}" ps --format '{{.Names}}' | grep -Fxq "${container}"; then
+      echo "container exited before JSON socket became ready" >&2
+      container_logs "${container}"
+      return 1
+    fi
+    sleep 1
+  done
+
+  echo "timed out waiting for JSON socket after ${WAIT_TIMEOUT}s" >&2
+  cat "${curl_err}" >&2 || true
+  container_logs "${container}"
+  return 1
+}
+
+run_netbird_container() {
+  local container="$1"
+  local json_socket="$2"
+  shift 2
+
+  CONTAINERS+=("${container}")
+  "${RUNTIME}" run --rm -d \
+    --name "${container}" \
+    -e NB_STATE_DIR=/tmp/netbird-state \
+    --entrypoint /usr/local/bin/netbird \
+    "$@" \
+    "${IMAGE}" \
+    --log-file console \
+    --daemon-addr unix:///tmp/netbird.sock \
+    service run \
+    --enable-json-socket \
+    --json-socket "${json_socket}" >/dev/null
+}
+
+run_tcp_test() {
+  local port container
+  port="$(pick_port)"
+  container="nb-json-socket-tcp-$RANDOM-$RANDOM"
+
+  echo "==> Validating TCP JSON socket on 127.0.0.1:${port}"
+  run_netbird_container "${container}" "tcp://0.0.0.0:8080" -p "127.0.0.1:${port}:8080"
+  wait_for_http_status "${container}" "http://127.0.0.1:${port}/daemon.DaemonService/Status"
+}
+
+run_unix_test() {
+  local sock_dir sock_path container
+  sock_dir="${TMP_DIR}/sock"
+  sock_path="${sock_dir}/netbird-http.sock"
+  container="nb-json-socket-unix-$RANDOM-$RANDOM"
+  mkdir -p "${sock_dir}"
+
+  echo "==> Validating Unix JSON socket at ${sock_path}"
+  run_netbird_container "${container}" "unix:///sock/netbird-http.sock" -v "${sock_dir}:/sock"
+  wait_for_http_status "${container}" --unix-socket "${sock_path}" "http://unix/daemon.DaemonService/Status"
+}
+
+build_image
+
+case "${MODE}" in
+  tcp)
+    run_tcp_test
+    ;;
+  unix)
+    run_unix_test
+    ;;
+  both)
+    run_tcp_test
+    run_unix_test
+    ;;
+esac
+
+echo "==> Docker JSON socket validation passed (${MODE})"

client/ui/autostart_default.go

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+//go:build !android && !ios && !freebsd && !js
+
+package main
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/mdm"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ui/preferences"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ui/services"
+)
+
+// autostartDefaultState carries the guard inputs of the one-time autostart
+// default decision so the decision itself stays a pure, testable function.
+type autostartDefaultState struct {
+	supported    bool
+	mdmDisabled  bool
+	priorInstall bool
+}
+
+// shouldEnableAutostartDefault applies the first-run guards in order and
+// returns whether autostart may be enabled, plus the reason when it may not.
+func shouldEnableAutostartDefault(s autostartDefaultState) (bool, string) {
+	switch {
+	case !s.supported:
+		return false, "autostart not supported on this platform"
+	case s.mdmDisabled:
+		return false, "autostart disabled by MDM policy"
+	case s.priorInstall:
+		return false, "existing NetBird installation"
+	}
+	return true, ""
+}
+
+// autostartDisabledByMDM reports whether the MDM policy manages the
+// disableAutostart key in a way that must suppress the default. An
+// unparseable managed value is treated as disabled to stay on the safe side.
+func autostartDisabledByMDM(policy *mdm.Policy) bool {
+	if !policy.HasKey(mdm.KeyDisableAutostart) {
+		return false
+	}
+	disabled, ok := policy.GetBool(mdm.KeyDisableAutostart)
+	return !ok || disabled
+}
+
+// netbirdFootprintExists reports whether the machine already carries NetBird
+// daemon config or state, meaning this is not a genuinely fresh install. It is
+// the update-safety gate for the autostart default: upgrading users always
+// have a footprint, so an update can never trigger a login-item write.
+func netbirdFootprintExists() bool {
+	candidates := []string{
+		profilemanager.DefaultConfigPath,
+		filepath.Join(profilemanager.DefaultConfigPathDir, "config.json"),
+		filepath.Join(profilemanager.DefaultConfigPathDir, "state.json"),
+	}
+	for _, path := range candidates {
+		if path != "" && fileExists(path) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// applyAutostartDefault runs the one-time launch-on-login default for genuinely
+// fresh installs. The autostartInitialized marker is persisted before any
+// enable attempt so a crash mid-flow degrades to "never enabled" instead of
+// retrying login-item writes on every launch. A user's later disable in
+// Settings is never overridden: the marker guarantees at-most-once, ever.
+func applyAutostartDefault(ctx context.Context, autostart *services.Autostart, prefs *preferences.Store, prefsFileExisted bool) {
+	priorFootprint := netbirdFootprintExists() || prefsFileExisted
+
+	if prefs.Get().AutostartInitialized {
+		return
+	}
+	if err := prefs.SetAutostartInitialized(true); err != nil {
+		log.Warnf("persist autostart marker, skipping autostart default: %v", err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	state := autostartDefaultState{
+		supported:    autostart.Supported(ctx),
+		mdmDisabled:  autostartDisabledByMDM(mdm.LoadPolicy()),
+		priorInstall: priorFootprint,
+	}
+	enable, reason := shouldEnableAutostartDefault(state)
+	if !enable {
+		log.Debugf("skipping autostart default: %s", reason)
+		return
+	}
+
+	if err := autostart.SetEnabled(ctx, true); err != nil {
+		log.Warnf("enable autostart on fresh install: %v", err)
+		return
+	}
+	log.Info("autostart enabled by default on fresh install")
+}
+
+// fileExists reports whether path exists.
+func fileExists(path string) bool {
+	_, err := os.Stat(path)
+	return err == nil
+}

client/ui/autostart_default_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+//go:build !android && !ios && !freebsd && !js
+
+package main
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/mdm"
+)
+
+func TestShouldEnableAutostartDefault(t *testing.T) {
+	allPass := autostartDefaultState{
+		supported:    true,
+		mdmDisabled:  false,
+		priorInstall: false,
+	}
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name       string
+		mutate     func(*autostartDefaultState)
+		wantEnable bool
+		wantReason string
+	}{
+		{
+			name:       "fresh install with all guards passing enables",
+			mutate:     func(*autostartDefaultState) {},
+			wantEnable: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:       "unsupported platform skips",
+			mutate:     func(s *autostartDefaultState) { s.supported = false },
+			wantReason: "autostart not supported on this platform",
+		},
+		{
+			name:       "MDM disable skips",
+			mutate:     func(s *autostartDefaultState) { s.mdmDisabled = true },
+			wantReason: "autostart disabled by MDM policy",
+		},
+		{
+			name:       "existing installation (upgrade) skips",
+			mutate:     func(s *autostartDefaultState) { s.priorInstall = true },
+			wantReason: "existing NetBird installation",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "unsupported wins over every other guard",
+			mutate: func(s *autostartDefaultState) {
+				s.supported = false
+				s.mdmDisabled = true
+				s.priorInstall = true
+			},
+			wantReason: "autostart not supported on this platform",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "MDM disable wins over prior install",
+			mutate: func(s *autostartDefaultState) {
+				s.mdmDisabled = true
+				s.priorInstall = true
+			},
+			wantReason: "autostart disabled by MDM policy",
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			state := allPass
+			tc.mutate(&state)
+			enable, reason := shouldEnableAutostartDefault(state)
+			assert.Equal(t, tc.wantEnable, enable, "enable decision should match for state %+v", state)
+			assert.Equal(t, tc.wantReason, reason, "skip reason should identify the failing guard")
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAutostartDisabledByMDM(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name   string
+		values map[string]any
+		want   bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name:   "empty policy does not disable",
+			values: nil,
+			want:   false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:   "unrelated managed keys do not disable",
+			values: map[string]any{mdm.KeyDisableAutoConnect: true},
+			want:   false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:   "disableAutostart true disables",
+			values: map[string]any{mdm.KeyDisableAutostart: true},
+			want:   true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:   "disableAutostart registry DWORD 1 disables",
+			values: map[string]any{mdm.KeyDisableAutostart: int64(1)},
+			want:   true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:   "disableAutostart string true disables",
+			values: map[string]any{mdm.KeyDisableAutostart: "true"},
+			want:   true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:   "disableAutostart explicit false allows",
+			values: map[string]any{mdm.KeyDisableAutostart: false},
+			want:   false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:   "unparseable managed value is treated as disabled",
+			values: map[string]any{mdm.KeyDisableAutostart: "not-a-bool"},
+			want:   true,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			got := autostartDisabledByMDM(mdm.NewPolicy(tc.values))
+			assert.Equal(t, tc.want, got, "MDM disable decision should match for values %v", tc.values)
+		})
+	}
+}

client/ui/frontend/src/app.tsx

@@ -16,10 +16,13 @@ import LoginWaitingForBrowserDialog from "@/modules/login/LoginWaitingForBrowser
 import { initI18n } from "@/lib/i18n";
 import { initPlatform } from "@/lib/platform";
 import { initLogForwarding } from "@/lib/logs";
+import { initStallWatch } from "@/lib/stallwatch";
 
 // Must run first so even init-time logs reach the Go log pipeline.
 initLogForwarding();
 
+initStallWatch();
+
 welcome();
 
 Promise.all([

client/ui/frontend/src/lib/connection.ts

@@ -51,7 +51,14 @@ async function runSsoLogin(
     if (uri) await openBrowserLoginUri(uri);
 
     const cancelPromise = buildSsoCancelPromise(state, signal);
-    const waitPromise = Connection.WaitSSOLogin({ userCode: result.userCode, hostname: "" });
+    // Combine wait + up in Go so the connection comes up the moment SSO
+    // completes. During SSO the tray window is hidden and the webview is
+    // suspended, so a frontend-driven Up (a promise continuation) would not
+    // fire until the user woke the window (e.g. hovering the tray icon).
+    const waitPromise = Connection.WaitSSOLoginAndUp(
+        { userCode: result.userCode, hostname: "" },
+        { profileName: "", username: "" },
+    );
 
     try {
         await Promise.race([waitPromise, cancelPromise]);
@@ -89,13 +96,13 @@ export async function startConnection(onSettled?: () => void, signal?: AbortSign
         if (signal?.aborted) state.cancelled = true;
 
         if (!state.cancelled && result.needsSsoLogin) {
+            // runSsoLogin brings the connection up in Go once SSO completes.
             await runSsoLogin(result, state, signal);
-        }
-
-        if (!state.cancelled && signal?.aborted) state.cancelled = true;
-
-        if (!state.cancelled) {
-            await Connection.Up({ profileName: "", username: "" });
+        } else {
+            if (!state.cancelled && signal?.aborted) state.cancelled = true;
+            if (!state.cancelled) {
+                await Connection.Up({ profileName: "", username: "" });
+            }
         }
     } catch (e) {
         WindowManager.CloseBrowserLogin().catch(console.error);

client/ui/frontend/src/lib/stallwatch.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+// Detects webview suspension (macOS App Nap / hidden-window timer throttling).
+// While the webview is suspended no JS runs at all, so detection happens on
+// resume: a 1s interval measures wall-clock drift and reports how long timers
+// were frozen. Silent unless a stall actually occurred; a stalled webview is
+// what delays promise continuations such as the WaitSSOLogin → Up handoff.
+
+const INTERVAL_MS = 1000;
+const STALL_THRESHOLD_MS = 5000;
+const REPORT_COOLDOWN_MS = 60_000;
+
+let started = false;
+
+export function initStallWatch() {
+    if (started) return;
+    started = true;
+
+    let last = Date.now();
+    let lastReport = 0;
+    setInterval(() => {
+        const now = Date.now();
+        const stall = now - last - INTERVAL_MS;
+        last = now;
+        if (stall < STALL_THRESHOLD_MS) return;
+        if (now - lastReport < REPORT_COOLDOWN_MS) return;
+        lastReport = now;
+        console.warn(
+            `webview timers were suspended for ${(stall / 1000).toFixed(1)}s ` +
+                `(App Nap / hidden-window throttling); pending UI work ran late`,
+        );
+    }, INTERVAL_MS);
+}

client/ui/frontend/src/modules/settings/SettingsNetwork.tsx

@@ -12,12 +12,6 @@ export function SettingsNetwork() {
     return (
         <>
             <SectionGroup title={t("settings.network.section.connectivity")}>
-                <FancyToggleSwitch
-                    value={config.lazyConnectionEnabled}
-                    onChange={(v) => setField("lazyConnectionEnabled", v)}
-                    label={t("settings.network.lazy.label")}
-                    helpText={t("settings.network.lazy.help")}
-                />
                 <FancyToggleSwitch
                     value={config.networkMonitor}
                     onChange={(v) => setField("networkMonitor", v)}

client/ui/i18n/locales/_index.json

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
         {"code": "fr", "displayName": "Français", "englishName": "French"},
         {"code": "it", "displayName": "Italiano", "englishName": "Italian"},
         {"code": "pt", "displayName": "Português", "englishName": "Portuguese"},
-        {"code": "zh-CN", "displayName": "简体中文", "englishName": "Simplified Chinese"}
+        {"code": "zh-CN", "displayName": "简体中文", "englishName": "Simplified Chinese"},
+        {"code": "ja", "displayName": "日本語", "englishName": "Japanese"}
     ]
 }

client/ui/i18n/locales/de/common.json

@@ -599,12 +599,6 @@
     "settings.network.section.routingDns": {
         "message": "Routing & DNS"
     },
-    "settings.network.lazy.label": {
-        "message": "Lazy-Verbindungen"
-    },
-    "settings.network.lazy.help": {
-        "message": "Statt durchgehend aktive Verbindungen zu halten, aktiviert NetBird sie bei Bedarf anhand von Aktivität oder Signalisierung."
-    },
     "settings.network.monitor.label": {
         "message": "Bei Netzwerkwechsel neu verbinden"
     },

client/ui/i18n/locales/en/common.json

@@ -799,14 +799,6 @@
         "message": "Routing & DNS",
         "description": "Section heading for routing and DNS options. 'DNS' is an acronym — keep it."
     },
-    "settings.network.lazy.label": {
-        "message": "Lazy Connections",
-        "description": "Toggle label: Lazy Connections (on-demand connections)."
-    },
-    "settings.network.lazy.help": {
-        "message": "Instead of maintaining always-on connections, NetBird activates them on-demand based on activity or signaling.",
-        "description": "Helper text for lazy connections."
-    },
     "settings.network.monitor.label": {
         "message": "Reconnect on Network Change",
         "description": "Toggle label: reconnect automatically on network change."