[relay] only trust X-Real-Ip headers from configured trusted proxies (#6833)

The WS listener unconditionally trusted X-Real-Ip/X-Real-Port headers,
letting any client forge the source address the relay logs. Gate header
trust behind a trusted-proxy allowlist; ignore the headers unless the
immediate peer matches a configured prefix. Defaults to never trusting
the headers when the allowlist is empty.

## Describe your changes

## Issue ticket number and link

## Stack

<!-- branch-stack -->

### Checklist
- [x] Is it a bug fix
- [ ] Is a typo/documentation fix
- [ ] Is a feature enhancement
- [ ] It is a refactor
- [ ] Created tests that fail without the change (if possible)
- [ ] This change does **not** modify the public API, gRPC protocols,
functionality behavior, CLI / service flags, or introduce a new feature
— **OR** I have discussed it with the NetBird team beforehand (link the
issue / Slack thread in the description). See
[CONTRIBUTING.md](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#discuss-changes-with-the-netbird-team-first).

> By submitting this pull request, you confirm that you have read and
agree to the terms of the [Contributor License
Agreement](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/blob/main/CONTRIBUTOR_LICENSE_AGREEMENT.md).

## Documentation
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- [ ] I added/updated documentation for this change
- [x] Documentation is **not needed** for this change (explain why)

### Docs PR URL (required if "docs added" is checked)
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<!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai
-->
## Summary by CodeRabbit

* **New Features**
* Added `--trusted-proxies` to configure a comma-separated allowlist of
trusted upstream proxy IPs/CIDRs.
* **Behavior Changes**
* Relay WebSocket now uses `X-Real-Ip` / `X-Real-Port` only when the
immediate peer is from the configured trusted set; otherwise it falls
back to the direct remote address.
* Proxy client IP resolution is now consistent and honors
`X-Forwarded-For` only through trusted hops.
* **Operational**
  * Invalid `--trusted-proxies` values fail fast on startup.
<!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
This commit is contained in:
Zoltan Papp
2026-07-20 18:15:03 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent d64e9542eb
commit 724c6a06e6
17 changed files with 446 additions and 408 deletions

View File

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/embed"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy"
nbacme "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/acme"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/trustedproxy"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
)
@@ -209,7 +210,7 @@ func runServer(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid domain value %q: %w", proxyDomain, err)
}
parsedTrustedProxies, err := proxy.ParseTrustedProxies(trustedProxies)
parsedTrustedProxies, err := trustedproxy.Parse(trustedProxies)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid --trusted-proxies: %w", err)
}

View File

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/auth"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/types"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/trustedproxy"
)
const (
@@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ type denyBucket struct {
type Logger struct {
client gRPCClient
logger *log.Logger
trustedProxies []netip.Prefix
trustedProxies *trustedproxy.List
usageMux sync.Mutex
domainUsage map[string]*domainUsage
@@ -82,7 +83,7 @@ type Logger struct {
// NewLogger creates a new access log Logger. The trustedProxies parameter
// configures which upstream proxy IP ranges are trusted for extracting
// the real client IP from X-Forwarded-For headers.
func NewLogger(client gRPCClient, logger *log.Logger, trustedProxies []netip.Prefix) *Logger {
func NewLogger(client gRPCClient, logger *log.Logger, trustedProxies *trustedproxy.List) *Logger {
if logger == nil {
logger = log.StandardLogger()
}

View File

@@ -4,13 +4,13 @@ import (
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/proxy"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/trustedproxy"
)
// extractSourceIP resolves the real client IP from the request using trusted
// proxy configuration. When trustedProxies is non-empty and the direct
// connection is from a trusted source, it walks X-Forwarded-For right-to-left
// skipping trusted IPs. Otherwise it returns RemoteAddr directly.
func extractSourceIP(r *http.Request, trustedProxies []netip.Prefix) netip.Addr {
return proxy.ResolveClientIP(r.RemoteAddr, r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"), trustedProxies)
func extractSourceIP(r *http.Request, trustedProxies *trustedproxy.List) netip.Addr {
return trustedProxies.ResolveClientIP(r.RemoteAddr, r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"))
}

View File

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/roundtrip"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/types"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/web"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/trustedproxy"
)
type ReverseProxy struct {
@@ -29,10 +30,10 @@ type ReverseProxy struct {
// forwardedProto overrides the X-Forwarded-Proto header value.
// Valid values: "auto" (detect from TLS), "http", "https".
forwardedProto string
// trustedProxies is a list of IP prefixes for trusted upstream proxies.
// When the direct connection comes from a trusted proxy, forwarding
// headers are preserved and appended to instead of being stripped.
trustedProxies []netip.Prefix
// trustedProxies is the set of trusted upstream proxies. When the direct
// connection comes from a trusted proxy, forwarding headers are preserved
// and appended to instead of being stripped.
trustedProxies *trustedproxy.List
mappingsMux sync.RWMutex
mappings map[string]Mapping
logger *log.Logger
@@ -63,7 +64,7 @@ func WithMiddlewareManager(m *middleware.Manager) Option {
// between requested URLs and targets.
// The internal mappings can be modified using the AddMapping
// and RemoveMapping functions.
func NewReverseProxy(transport http.RoundTripper, forwardedProto string, trustedProxies []netip.Prefix, logger *log.Logger, opts ...Option) *ReverseProxy {
func NewReverseProxy(transport http.RoundTripper, forwardedProto string, trustedProxies *trustedproxy.List, logger *log.Logger, opts ...Option) *ReverseProxy {
if logger == nil {
logger = log.StandardLogger()
}
@@ -527,7 +528,7 @@ func (p *ReverseProxy) isSelfTargetLoop(r *http.Request, target *url.URL) bool {
if !types.IsOverlayOrigin(r.Context()) {
return false
}
srcIP := extractHostIP(r.RemoteAddr)
srcIP := trustedproxy.ExtractHostIP(r.RemoteAddr)
if !srcIP.IsValid() {
return false
}
@@ -578,9 +579,9 @@ func (p *ReverseProxy) rewriteFunc(target *url.URL, matchedPath string, passHost
stampNetBirdIdentity(r)
clientIP := extractHostIP(r.In.RemoteAddr)
clientIP := trustedproxy.ExtractHostIP(r.In.RemoteAddr)
if isTrustedAddr(clientIP, p.trustedProxies) {
if p.trustedProxies.Contains(clientIP) {
p.setTrustedForwardingHeaders(r, clientIP)
} else {
p.setUntrustedForwardingHeaders(r, clientIP)
@@ -664,7 +665,7 @@ func (p *ReverseProxy) setTrustedForwardingHeaders(r *httputil.ProxyRequest, cli
if realIP := r.In.Header.Get("X-Real-IP"); realIP != "" {
r.Out.Header.Set("X-Real-IP", realIP)
} else {
resolved := ResolveClientIP(r.In.RemoteAddr, r.In.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"), p.trustedProxies)
resolved := p.trustedProxies.ResolveClientIP(r.In.RemoteAddr, r.In.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"))
r.Out.Header.Set("X-Real-IP", resolved.String())
}

View File

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/roundtrip"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/types"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/web"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/trustedproxy"
)
func TestRewriteFunc_HostRewriting(t *testing.T) {
@@ -302,7 +303,7 @@ func TestExtractHostIP(t *testing.T) {
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, tt.expected, extractHostIP(tt.remoteAddr))
assert.Equal(t, tt.expected, trustedproxy.ExtractHostIP(tt.remoteAddr))
})
}
}
@@ -330,7 +331,7 @@ func TestExtractForwardedPort(t *testing.T) {
func TestRewriteFunc_TrustedProxy(t *testing.T) {
target, _ := url.Parse("http://backend.internal:8080")
trusted := []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8")}
trusted := trustedproxy.FromPrefixes([]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8")})
t.Run("appends to X-Forwarded-For", func(t *testing.T) {
p := &ReverseProxy{forwardedProto: "auto", trustedProxies: trusted}

View File

@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
package proxy
import (
"net/netip"
"strings"
)
// IsTrustedProxy checks if the given IP string falls within any of the trusted prefixes.
func IsTrustedProxy(ipStr string, trusted []netip.Prefix) bool {
addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(ipStr)
if err != nil || len(trusted) == 0 {
return false
}
return isTrustedAddr(addr.Unmap(), trusted)
}
// ResolveClientIP extracts the real client IP from X-Forwarded-For using the trusted proxy list.
// It walks the XFF chain right-to-left, skipping IPs that match trusted prefixes.
// The first untrusted IP is the real client.
//
// If the trusted list is empty or remoteAddr is not trusted, it returns the
// remoteAddr IP directly (ignoring any forwarding headers).
func ResolveClientIP(remoteAddr, xff string, trusted []netip.Prefix) netip.Addr {
remoteIP := extractHostIP(remoteAddr)
if len(trusted) == 0 || !isTrustedAddr(remoteIP, trusted) {
return remoteIP
}
if xff == "" {
return remoteIP
}
parts := strings.Split(xff, ",")
for i := len(parts) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
ip := strings.TrimSpace(parts[i])
if ip == "" {
continue
}
addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(ip)
if err != nil {
continue
}
addr = addr.Unmap()
if !isTrustedAddr(addr, trusted) {
return addr
}
}
// All IPs in XFF are trusted; return the leftmost as best guess.
if first := strings.TrimSpace(parts[0]); first != "" {
if addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(first); err == nil {
return addr.Unmap()
}
}
return remoteIP
}
// extractHostIP parses the IP from a host:port string and returns it unmapped.
func extractHostIP(hostPort string) netip.Addr {
if ap, err := netip.ParseAddrPort(hostPort); err == nil {
return ap.Addr().Unmap()
}
if addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(hostPort); err == nil {
return addr.Unmap()
}
return netip.Addr{}
}
// isTrustedAddr checks if the given address falls within any of the trusted prefixes.
func isTrustedAddr(addr netip.Addr, trusted []netip.Prefix) bool {
if !addr.IsValid() {
return false
}
for _, prefix := range trusted {
if prefix.Contains(addr) {
return true
}
}
return false
}

View File

@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
package proxy
import (
"net/netip"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
)
func TestIsTrustedProxy(t *testing.T) {
trusted := []netip.Prefix{
netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("192.168.1.0/24"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("fd00::/8"),
}
tests := []struct {
name string
ip string
trusted []netip.Prefix
want bool
}{
{"empty trusted list", "10.0.0.1", nil, false},
{"IP within /8 prefix", "10.1.2.3", trusted, true},
{"IP within /24 prefix", "192.168.1.100", trusted, true},
{"IP outside all prefixes", "203.0.113.50", trusted, false},
{"boundary IP just outside prefix", "192.168.2.1", trusted, false},
{"unparsable IP", "not-an-ip", trusted, false},
{"IPv6 in trusted range", "fd00::1", trusted, true},
{"IPv6 outside range", "2001:db8::1", trusted, false},
{"empty string", "", trusted, false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, tt.want, IsTrustedProxy(tt.ip, tt.trusted))
})
}
}
func TestResolveClientIP(t *testing.T) {
trusted := []netip.Prefix{
netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("172.16.0.0/12"),
}
tests := []struct {
name string
remoteAddr string
xff string
trusted []netip.Prefix
want netip.Addr
}{
{
name: "empty trusted list returns RemoteAddr",
remoteAddr: "203.0.113.50:9999",
xff: "1.2.3.4",
trusted: nil,
want: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.50"),
},
{
name: "untrusted RemoteAddr ignores XFF",
remoteAddr: "203.0.113.50:9999",
xff: "1.2.3.4, 10.0.0.1",
trusted: trusted,
want: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.50"),
},
{
name: "trusted RemoteAddr with single client in XFF",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:5000",
xff: "203.0.113.50",
trusted: trusted,
want: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.50"),
},
{
name: "trusted RemoteAddr walks past trusted entries in XFF",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:5000",
xff: "203.0.113.50, 10.0.0.2, 172.16.0.5",
trusted: trusted,
want: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.50"),
},
{
name: "trusted RemoteAddr with empty XFF falls back to RemoteAddr",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:5000",
xff: "",
trusted: trusted,
want: netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.1"),
},
{
name: "all XFF IPs trusted returns leftmost",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:5000",
xff: "10.0.0.2, 172.16.0.1, 10.0.0.3",
trusted: trusted,
want: netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.2"),
},
{
name: "XFF with whitespace",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:5000",
xff: " 203.0.113.50 , 10.0.0.2 ",
trusted: trusted,
want: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.50"),
},
{
name: "XFF with empty segments",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:5000",
xff: "203.0.113.50,,10.0.0.2",
trusted: trusted,
want: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.50"),
},
{
name: "multi-hop with mixed trust",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:5000",
xff: "8.8.8.8, 203.0.113.50, 172.16.0.1",
trusted: trusted,
want: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.50"),
},
{
name: "RemoteAddr without port",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1",
xff: "203.0.113.50",
trusted: trusted,
want: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.50"),
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, tt.want, ResolveClientIP(tt.remoteAddr, tt.xff, tt.trusted))
})
}
}

View File

@@ -2,13 +2,13 @@ package proxy
import (
"context"
"net/netip"
"time"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/embed"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/acme"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/trustedproxy"
)
// Config bundles every knob the proxy reads at construction time. It mirrors
@@ -83,9 +83,9 @@ type Config struct {
// ForwardedProto overrides the X-Forwarded-Proto value sent to
// backends. Valid values: "auto", "http", "https".
ForwardedProto string
// TrustedProxies is a list of IP prefixes for trusted upstream
// proxies that may set forwarding headers.
TrustedProxies []netip.Prefix
// TrustedProxies is the set of trusted upstream proxies that may set
// forwarding headers.
TrustedProxies *trustedproxy.List
// WireguardPort is the UDP port for the embedded NetBird tunnel.
// Zero asks the OS for a random port.
WireguardPort uint16

View File

@@ -10,12 +10,14 @@ import (
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/trustedproxy"
)
func TestWrapProxyProtocol_OverridesRemoteAddr(t *testing.T) {
srv := &Server{
Logger: log.StandardLogger(),
TrustedProxies: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("127.0.0.1/32")},
TrustedProxies: trustedproxy.FromPrefixes([]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("127.0.0.1/32")}),
ProxyProtocol: true,
}
@@ -66,7 +68,7 @@ func TestWrapProxyProtocol_OverridesRemoteAddr(t *testing.T) {
func TestProxyProtocolPolicy_TrustedRequires(t *testing.T) {
srv := &Server{
Logger: log.StandardLogger(),
TrustedProxies: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8")},
TrustedProxies: trustedproxy.FromPrefixes([]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8")}),
}
opts := proxyproto.ConnPolicyOptions{
@@ -80,7 +82,7 @@ func TestProxyProtocolPolicy_TrustedRequires(t *testing.T) {
func TestProxyProtocolPolicy_UntrustedIgnores(t *testing.T) {
srv := &Server{
Logger: log.StandardLogger(),
TrustedProxies: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8")},
TrustedProxies: trustedproxy.FromPrefixes([]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8")}),
}
opts := proxyproto.ConnPolicyOptions{
@@ -94,7 +96,7 @@ func TestProxyProtocolPolicy_UntrustedIgnores(t *testing.T) {
func TestProxyProtocolPolicy_InvalidIPRejects(t *testing.T) {
srv := &Server{
Logger: log.StandardLogger(),
TrustedProxies: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8")},
TrustedProxies: trustedproxy.FromPrefixes([]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8")}),
}
opts := proxyproto.ConnPolicyOptions{

View File

@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/web"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/trustedproxy"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util/embeddedroots"
)
@@ -79,19 +80,19 @@ type portRouter struct {
type Server struct {
ctx context.Context
mgmtClient proto.ProxyServiceClient
proxy *proxy.ReverseProxy
netbird *roundtrip.NetBird
acme *acme.Manager
mgmtClient proto.ProxyServiceClient
proxy *proxy.ReverseProxy
netbird *roundtrip.NetBird
acme *acme.Manager
staticCertWatcher *certwatch.Watcher
auth *auth.Middleware
http *http.Server
https *http.Server
debug *http.Server
healthServer *health.Server
healthChecker *health.Checker
meter *proxymetrics.Metrics
accessLog *accesslog.Logger
auth *auth.Middleware
http *http.Server
https *http.Server
debug *http.Server
healthServer *health.Server
healthChecker *health.Checker
meter *proxymetrics.Metrics
accessLog *accesslog.Logger
// middlewareManager drives per-target middleware dispatch. Always
// constructed during boot; an empty registry produces empty chains and
// the reverse-proxy stays on the no-capture fast path.
@@ -99,16 +100,16 @@ type Server struct {
// middlewareRegistry is the source of registered middleware factories.
// Concrete middlewares register themselves through init().
middlewareRegistry *middleware.Registry
mainRouter *nbtcp.Router
mainPort uint16
udpMu sync.Mutex
udpRelays map[types.ServiceID]*udprelay.Relay
udpRelayWg sync.WaitGroup
portMu sync.RWMutex
portRouters map[uint16]*portRouter
svcPorts map[types.ServiceID][]uint16
lastMappings map[types.ServiceID]*proto.ProxyMapping
portRouterWg sync.WaitGroup
mainRouter *nbtcp.Router
mainPort uint16
udpMu sync.Mutex
udpRelays map[types.ServiceID]*udprelay.Relay
udpRelayWg sync.WaitGroup
portMu sync.RWMutex
portRouters map[uint16]*portRouter
svcPorts map[types.ServiceID][]uint16
lastMappings map[types.ServiceID]*proto.ProxyMapping
portRouterWg sync.WaitGroup
// hijackTracker tracks hijacked connections (e.g. WebSocket upgrades)
// so they can be closed during graceful shutdown, since http.Server.Shutdown
@@ -192,10 +193,10 @@ type Server struct {
// ForwardedProto overrides the X-Forwarded-Proto value sent to backends.
// Valid values: "auto" (detect from TLS), "http", "https".
ForwardedProto string
// TrustedProxies is a list of IP prefixes for trusted upstream proxies.
// When set, forwarding headers from these sources are preserved and
// appended to instead of being stripped.
TrustedProxies []netip.Prefix
// TrustedProxies is the set of trusted upstream proxies. When set,
// forwarding headers from these sources are preserved and appended to
// instead of being stripped.
TrustedProxies *trustedproxy.List
// WireguardPort is the port for the NetBird tunnel interface. Use 0
// for a random OS-assigned port. A fixed port only works with
// single-account deployments; multiple accounts will fail to bind
@@ -718,7 +719,7 @@ func (s *Server) wrapProxyProtocol(ln net.Listener) net.Listener {
Listener: ln,
ReadHeaderTimeout: proxyProtoHeaderTimeout,
}
if len(s.TrustedProxies) > 0 {
if !s.TrustedProxies.Empty() {
ppListener.ConnPolicy = s.proxyProtocolPolicy
} else {
s.Logger.Warn("PROXY protocol enabled without trusted proxies; any source may send PROXY headers")
@@ -742,10 +743,8 @@ func (s *Server) proxyProtocolPolicy(opts proxyproto.ConnPolicyOptions) (proxypr
addr = addr.Unmap()
// called per accept
for _, prefix := range s.TrustedProxies {
if prefix.Contains(addr) {
return proxyproto.REQUIRE, nil
}
if s.TrustedProxies.Contains(addr) {
return proxyproto.REQUIRE, nil
}
return proxyproto.IGNORE, nil
}

View File

@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
package proxy
import (
"fmt"
"net/netip"
"strings"
)
// ParseTrustedProxies parses a comma-separated list of CIDR prefixes or bare IPs
// into a slice of netip.Prefix values suitable for trusted proxy configuration.
// Bare IPs are converted to single-host prefixes (/32 or /128).
func ParseTrustedProxies(raw string) ([]netip.Prefix, error) {
if raw == "" {
return nil, nil
}
parts := strings.Split(raw, ",")
prefixes := make([]netip.Prefix, 0, len(parts))
for _, part := range parts {
part = strings.TrimSpace(part)
if part == "" {
continue
}
prefix, err := netip.ParsePrefix(part)
if err == nil {
prefixes = append(prefixes, prefix)
continue
}
addr, addrErr := netip.ParseAddr(part)
if addrErr != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse trusted proxy %q: not a valid CIDR or IP: %w", part, addrErr)
}
bits := 32
if addr.Is6() {
bits = 128
}
prefixes = append(prefixes, netip.PrefixFrom(addr, bits))
}
return prefixes, nil
}

View File

@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
package proxy
import (
"net/netip"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestParseTrustedProxies(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
raw string
want []netip.Prefix
wantErr bool
}{
{
name: "empty string returns nil",
raw: "",
want: nil,
},
{
name: "single CIDR",
raw: "10.0.0.0/8",
want: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8")},
},
{
name: "single bare IPv4",
raw: "1.2.3.4",
want: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("1.2.3.4/32")},
},
{
name: "single bare IPv6",
raw: "::1",
want: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("::1/128")},
},
{
name: "comma-separated CIDRs",
raw: "10.0.0.0/8, 192.168.1.0/24",
want: []netip.Prefix{
netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("192.168.1.0/24"),
},
},
{
name: "mixed CIDRs and bare IPs",
raw: "10.0.0.0/8, 1.2.3.4, fd00::/8",
want: []netip.Prefix{
netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("1.2.3.4/32"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("fd00::/8"),
},
},
{
name: "whitespace around entries",
raw: " 10.0.0.0/8 , 192.168.0.0/16 ",
want: []netip.Prefix{
netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("192.168.0.0/16"),
},
},
{
name: "trailing comma produces no extra entry",
raw: "10.0.0.0/8,",
want: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8")},
},
{
name: "invalid entry",
raw: "not-an-ip",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "partially invalid",
raw: "10.0.0.0/8, garbage",
wantErr: true,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got, err := ParseTrustedProxies(tt.raw)
if tt.wantErr {
require.Error(t, err)
return
}
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, tt.want, got)
})
}
}

View File

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/metrics"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/relay/auth"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/stun"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/trustedproxy"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
)
@@ -45,6 +46,9 @@ type Config struct {
LogLevel string
LogFile string
HealthcheckListenAddress string
// TrustedProxies is a comma-separated list of upstream proxy CIDRs/IPs whose
// X-Real-Ip/X-Real-Port headers are trusted. Empty means never trust these headers.
TrustedProxies string
// STUN server configuration
EnableSTUN bool
STUNPorts []int
@@ -116,6 +120,7 @@ func init() {
rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&cobraConfig.LogLevel, "log-level", "info", "log level")
rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&cobraConfig.LogFile, "log-file", "console", "log file")
rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVarP(&cobraConfig.HealthcheckListenAddress, "health-listen-address", "H", ":9000", "listen address of healthcheck server")
rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&cobraConfig.TrustedProxies, "trusted-proxies", "", "comma-separated list of upstream proxy CIDRs or IPs whose X-Real-Ip/X-Real-Port headers are trusted; leave empty to always use the direct connection address")
rootCmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVar(&cobraConfig.EnableSTUN, "enable-stun", false, "enable embedded STUN server")
rootCmd.PersistentFlags().IntSliceVar(&cobraConfig.STUNPorts, "stun-ports", []int{3478}, "ports for the embedded STUN server (can be specified multiple times or comma-separated)")
rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&cobraConfig.STUNLogLevel, "stun-log-level", "info", "log level for STUN server (panic, fatal, error, warn, info, debug, trace)")
@@ -155,8 +160,15 @@ func execute(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
return fmt.Errorf("setup metrics: %v", err)
}
trustedProxies, err := trustedproxy.Parse(cobraConfig.TrustedProxies)
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("failed to parse trusted proxies: %s", err)
return fmt.Errorf("failed to parse trusted proxies: %s", err)
}
srvListenerCfg := server.ListenerConfig{
Address: cobraConfig.ListenAddress,
Address: cobraConfig.ListenAddress,
TrustedProxies: trustedProxies,
}
tlsConfig, tlsSupport, err := handleTLSConfig(cobraConfig)

View File

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/relay/protocol"
relaylistener "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/relay/server/listener"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/relay"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/trustedproxy"
)
const (
@@ -27,6 +28,9 @@ type Listener struct {
Address string
// TLSConfig is the TLS configuration for the server.
TLSConfig *tls.Config
// TrustedProxies is the set of upstream proxies whose X-Real-Ip/X-Real-Port
// headers are trusted. Headers from any other immediate peer are ignored.
TrustedProxies *trustedproxy.List
server *http.Server
acceptFn func(conn relaylistener.Conn)
@@ -75,7 +79,7 @@ func (l *Listener) Shutdown(ctx context.Context) error {
}
func (l *Listener) onAccept(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
connRemoteAddr := remoteAddr(r)
connRemoteAddr := remoteAddr(r, l.TrustedProxies)
acceptOptions := &websocket.AcceptOptions{
OriginPatterns: []string{"*"},
@@ -102,9 +106,17 @@ func (l *Listener) onAccept(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
l.acceptFn(conn)
}
func remoteAddr(r *http.Request) string {
if r.Header.Get("X-Real-Ip") == "" || r.Header.Get("X-Real-Port") == "" {
func remoteAddr(r *http.Request, trustedProxies *trustedproxy.List) string {
realIP := r.Header.Get("X-Real-Ip")
realPort := r.Header.Get("X-Real-Port")
if realIP == "" || realPort == "" {
return r.RemoteAddr
}
return net.JoinHostPort(r.Header.Get("X-Real-Ip"), r.Header.Get("X-Real-Port"))
if !trustedProxies.IsTrusted(r.RemoteAddr) {
log.Debugf("ignoring X-Real-Ip header from untrusted peer %s", r.RemoteAddr)
return r.RemoteAddr
}
return net.JoinHostPort(realIP, realPort)
}

View File

@@ -15,14 +15,17 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/relay/server/listener/quic"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/relay/server/listener/ws"
quictls "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/relay/tls"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/trustedproxy"
)
// ListenerConfig is the configuration for the listener.
// Address: the address to bind the listener to. It could be an address behind a reverse proxy.
// TLSConfig: the TLS configuration for the listener.
// TrustedProxies: upstream proxy prefixes whose forwarding headers (X-Real-Ip/X-Real-Port) are trusted.
type ListenerConfig struct {
Address string
TLSConfig *tls.Config
Address string
TLSConfig *tls.Config
TrustedProxies *trustedproxy.List
}
// Server is the main entry point for the relay server.
@@ -62,8 +65,9 @@ func NewServer(config Config) (*Server, error) {
// Listen starts the relay server.
func (r *Server) Listen(cfg ListenerConfig) error {
wSListener := &ws.Listener{
Address: cfg.Address,
TLSConfig: cfg.TLSConfig,
Address: cfg.Address,
TLSConfig: cfg.TLSConfig,
TrustedProxies: cfg.TrustedProxies,
}
r.listenerMux.Lock()

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
package trustedproxy
import (
"fmt"
"net/netip"
"strings"
)
// List holds a parsed set of trusted upstream proxy prefixes and answers trust
// questions against it. The zero value (and a nil *List) is a valid, empty list
// that never trusts any address, so callers can use it without a nil check.
type List struct {
prefixes []netip.Prefix
}
// Parse parses a comma-separated list of CIDR prefixes or bare IPs into a List.
// Bare IPs are converted to single-host prefixes (/32 or /128). An empty input
// yields an empty List that trusts nothing.
func Parse(raw string) (*List, error) {
if raw == "" {
return &List{}, nil
}
parts := strings.Split(raw, ",")
prefixes := make([]netip.Prefix, 0, len(parts))
for _, part := range parts {
part = strings.TrimSpace(part)
if part == "" {
continue
}
prefix, err := netip.ParsePrefix(part)
if err == nil {
prefixes = append(prefixes, prefix)
continue
}
addr, addrErr := netip.ParseAddr(part)
if addrErr != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse trusted proxy %q: not a valid CIDR or IP: %w", part, addrErr)
}
bits := 32
if addr.Is6() {
bits = 128
}
prefixes = append(prefixes, netip.PrefixFrom(addr, bits))
}
return &List{prefixes: prefixes}, nil
}
// FromPrefixes wraps an already-parsed set of prefixes in a List.
func FromPrefixes(prefixes []netip.Prefix) *List {
return &List{prefixes: prefixes}
}
// Empty reports whether the list contains no prefixes.
func (l *List) Empty() bool {
return l == nil || len(l.prefixes) == 0
}
// IsTrusted reports whether the given host:port or bare IP falls within the list.
func (l *List) IsTrusted(remoteAddr string) bool {
if l.Empty() {
return false
}
return l.Contains(ExtractHostIP(remoteAddr))
}
// Contains reports whether the given address falls within any trusted prefix.
func (l *List) Contains(addr netip.Addr) bool {
if l.Empty() || !addr.IsValid() {
return false
}
for _, prefix := range l.prefixes {
if prefix.Contains(addr) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// ResolveClientIP extracts the real client IP from X-Forwarded-For using the
// list. It walks the XFF chain right-to-left, skipping IPs that match trusted
// prefixes; the first untrusted IP is the real client. If the list is empty or
// remoteAddr is not trusted, it returns the remoteAddr IP directly, ignoring any
// forwarding headers.
func (l *List) ResolveClientIP(remoteAddr, xff string) netip.Addr {
remoteIP := ExtractHostIP(remoteAddr)
if l.Empty() || !l.Contains(remoteIP) {
return remoteIP
}
if xff == "" {
return remoteIP
}
parts := strings.Split(xff, ",")
for i := len(parts) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
ip := strings.TrimSpace(parts[i])
if ip == "" {
continue
}
addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(ip)
if err != nil {
continue
}
addr = addr.Unmap()
if !l.Contains(addr) {
return addr
}
}
if first := strings.TrimSpace(parts[0]); first != "" {
if addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(first); err == nil {
return addr.Unmap()
}
}
return remoteIP
}
// ExtractHostIP parses the IP from a host:port string and returns it unmapped.
func ExtractHostIP(hostPort string) netip.Addr {
if ap, err := netip.ParseAddrPort(hostPort); err == nil {
return ap.Addr().Unmap()
}
if addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(hostPort); err == nil {
return addr.Unmap()
}
return netip.Addr{}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
package trustedproxy
import (
"net/netip"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestParse(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
raw string
want []netip.Prefix
wantErr bool
}{
{
name: "empty string returns empty list",
raw: "",
want: nil,
},
{
name: "single CIDR",
raw: "10.0.0.0/8",
want: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8")},
},
{
name: "single bare IPv4",
raw: "1.2.3.4",
want: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("1.2.3.4/32")},
},
{
name: "single bare IPv6",
raw: "::1",
want: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("::1/128")},
},
{
name: "comma-separated CIDRs",
raw: "10.0.0.0/8, 192.168.1.0/24",
want: []netip.Prefix{
netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("192.168.1.0/24"),
},
},
{
name: "mixed CIDRs and bare IPs",
raw: "10.0.0.0/8, 1.2.3.4, fd00::/8",
want: []netip.Prefix{
netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("1.2.3.4/32"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("fd00::/8"),
},
},
{
name: "whitespace around entries",
raw: " 10.0.0.0/8 , 192.168.0.0/16 ",
want: []netip.Prefix{
netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("192.168.0.0/16"),
},
},
{
name: "trailing comma produces no extra entry",
raw: "10.0.0.0/8,",
want: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8")},
},
{
name: "invalid entry",
raw: "not-an-ip",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "partially invalid",
raw: "10.0.0.0/8, garbage",
wantErr: true,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got, err := Parse(tt.raw)
if tt.wantErr {
require.Error(t, err)
return
}
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, tt.want, got.prefixes)
})
}
}
func TestListIsTrusted(t *testing.T) {
list, err := Parse("10.0.0.0/8, 192.168.1.0/24, fd00::/8")
require.NoError(t, err)
tests := []struct {
name string
addr string
list *List
want bool
}{
{"nil list", "10.0.0.1", nil, false},
{"empty list", "10.0.0.1", &List{}, false},
{"IP within /8 prefix", "10.1.2.3", list, true},
{"IP within /24 prefix", "192.168.1.100", list, true},
{"IP outside all prefixes", "203.0.113.50", list, false},
{"boundary IP just outside prefix", "192.168.2.1", list, false},
{"unparsable IP", "not-an-ip", list, false},
{"IPv6 in trusted range", "fd00::1", list, true},
{"IPv6 outside range", "2001:db8::1", list, false},
{"empty string", "", list, false},
{"host:port within prefix", "10.1.2.3:9999", list, true},
{"host:port outside prefix", "203.0.113.50:9999", list, false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, tt.want, tt.list.IsTrusted(tt.addr))
})
}
}
func TestListResolveClientIP(t *testing.T) {
trusted, err := Parse("10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12")
require.NoError(t, err)
tests := []struct {
name string
remoteAddr string
xff string
list *List
want netip.Addr
}{
{
name: "empty list returns RemoteAddr",
remoteAddr: "203.0.113.50:9999",
xff: "1.2.3.4",
list: &List{},
want: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.50"),
},
{
name: "nil list returns RemoteAddr",
remoteAddr: "203.0.113.50:9999",
xff: "1.2.3.4",
list: nil,
want: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.50"),
},
{
name: "untrusted RemoteAddr ignores XFF",
remoteAddr: "203.0.113.50:9999",
xff: "1.2.3.4, 10.0.0.1",
list: trusted,
want: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.50"),
},
{
name: "trusted RemoteAddr with single client in XFF",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:5000",
xff: "203.0.113.50",
list: trusted,
want: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.50"),
},
{
name: "trusted RemoteAddr walks past trusted entries in XFF",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:5000",
xff: "203.0.113.50, 10.0.0.2, 172.16.0.5",
list: trusted,
want: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.50"),
},
{
name: "trusted RemoteAddr with empty XFF falls back to RemoteAddr",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:5000",
xff: "",
list: trusted,
want: netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.1"),
},
{
name: "all XFF IPs trusted returns leftmost",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:5000",
xff: "10.0.0.2, 172.16.0.1, 10.0.0.3",
list: trusted,
want: netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.2"),
},
{
name: "XFF with whitespace",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:5000",
xff: " 203.0.113.50 , 10.0.0.2 ",
list: trusted,
want: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.50"),
},
{
name: "XFF with empty segments",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:5000",
xff: "203.0.113.50,,10.0.0.2",
list: trusted,
want: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.50"),
},
{
name: "multi-hop with mixed trust",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:5000",
xff: "8.8.8.8, 203.0.113.50, 172.16.0.1",
list: trusted,
want: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.50"),
},
{
name: "RemoteAddr without port",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1",
xff: "203.0.113.50",
list: trusted,
want: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.50"),
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, tt.want, tt.list.ResolveClientIP(tt.remoteAddr, tt.xff))
})
}
}