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Author SHA1 Message Date
Riccardo Manfrin
46568f7af8 [client] Reconcile routed allowed IPs when a lazy connection goes idle (#6863)
## Describe your changes

Under lazy connections, when a routing peer goes idle its WireGuard peer
is torn down and re-created with a wake endpoint by
the activity listener, carrying only the overlay /32
(`peerCfg.AllowedIPs`). The routed subnet prefixes are dropped from
  the device on the Connected→Idle transition.

They are meant to be restored by the route watcher, which reacts to the
peer's status change and calls `recalculateRoutes` →
  `AddAllowedIP`. Two things prevent that from healing the peer:

- `AddAllowedIP` uses `update_only`, which is a silent no-op (no error)
when the peer does not exist. While the peer is
being torn down and re-armed with its wake endpoint, it is briefly
absent, so a re-add that lands in that window is lost.
- The allowed-IP refcounter only calls its add function on a prefix's
0→1 transition. The routed prefix stays referenced
across the idle cycle, so once the device entry is gone the refcounter
does not re-push it on its own, and nothing retries.

As a result, traffic to the routed subnet is black-holed while the peer
is idle. Because the wake endpoint only fires when a
packet matches the peer's AllowedIPs, a packet to the subnet is dropped
before reaching the wake endpoint, so it cannot
wake the peer. The peer only recovers when woken by other means (e.g. a
ping to its overlay IP).

  ## Approach

This change keeps the existing Connected→Idle transition as-is and
reconciles the AllowedIPs afterwards, avoiding any
additional locking on the transition path. The peer is torn down and
re-armed with its wake endpoint as today; the routed
prefixes are then re-applied from the route manager's allowed-IP
refcounter once the wake endpoint has been (re)armed.

A single add-only method, `ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs(peerKey)`, re-applies
every routed prefix currently tracked for the peer
in the refcounter (the authoritative store; it already covers static,
dynamic and dnsinterceptor routes). It runs whenever
the peer's wake endpoint is (re)created in the lazy manager — every
point where the activity listener builds it with the
  overlay /32 only:

- **initial registration** (`AddPeer`, cold start): the route manager
may have already pushed the peer's routes before the
wake endpoint existed, so those `AddAllowedIP` calls no-op'd; the
reconcile installs them on the freshly created wake
  endpoint.
- **the two paths into idle** (`DeactivatePeer` on a remote GOAWAY,
`onPeerInactivityTimedOut` on local inactivity): the
peer is torn down and re-armed, so the routed prefixes must be
re-applied.

In every case the routed prefixes end up on the wake endpoint, so
traffic to a routed subnet can wake the peer. Arming the
wake endpoint and reconciling are wrapped in a single
`armActivityListener` helper so the two always happen together.

New helper: `refcounter.Counter.KeysMatching(pred)` to enumerate a
peer's prefixes under the counter lock.

Note on scope: the reconcile restores what the refcounter tracks. All
routed AllowedIPs currently go through it, so this
covers the routed-prefix case; it does not attempt to reconcile
AllowedIPs installed outside the refcounter. The
Idle→Connected (wake) path does not need this: the peer is not removed
there (the listener close leaves it in place and only
the endpoint is updated), so a concurrent `AddAllowedIP` lands normally.

  ## Testing

Reproduced deterministically in a local dev setup (userspace client,
`NB_WG_KERNEL_DISABLED=true`, `B_LAZY_CONN_INACTIVITY_THRESHOLD=1`
inactivity threshold 1
min). A temporary 30s sleep in the tear-down → re-arm window widens the
race so the route watcher's async `AddAllowedIP`
reliably lands while the peer is absent and no-ops (the sleep is a test
aid, not part of the change):

- **without the reconcile:** after the peer goes idle, a ping to any
routed IP — both a pre-existing route and one added
  during the window — black-holes; the peer never wakes.
  - **with the reconcile:** the same ping wakes the peer and passes.

Added unit tests: `ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs` (re-applies all of a peer's
tracked prefixes, scoped to that peer) and
  `refcounter.Counter.KeysMatching`.

Note: `netbird status -d` is not a reliable signal for this —
`AddPeerStateRoute` records the route regardless of whether
the underlying `AddAllowedIP` no-op'd, so it reflects the route
manager's intent rather than device state. The reliable
  signal is functional (ping the subnet from idle).
  
  ## Checklist

  - [x] Is it a bug fix
  - [ ] Is a typo/documentation fix
  - [ ] Is a feature enhancement
  - [ ] It is a refactor
- [x] Created tests that fail without the change (unit tests for the
reconcile + `KeysMatching`)

  ## Documentation

- [x] Documentation is **not needed** for this change (internal client
behavior, no API / gRPC / CLI / flag change)

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<!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai
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## Summary by CodeRabbit

* **Bug Fixes**
* Routed IP assignments are automatically reconciled and restored
whenever a peer’s lazy wake endpoint is armed or re-armed.
* Routed allowed IPs are re-applied after inactivity transitions and
monitoring re-initialization.
* If reconciliation can’t be performed, the client safely skips it; if
reconciliation encounters issues, failures are logged without stopping
connection monitoring.
<!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
2026-07-23 18:40:54 +02:00
Riccardo Manfrin
3358138ccc [client] Fix flaky Test_ConnectPeers busy-loop handshake wait (#6871)
## Describe your changes

  `Test_ConnectPeers` in `client/iface` is flaky in CI, timing out with
  `waiting for peer handshake timeout after 30s`.

  The wait loop polled `getPeer()` in a tight busy-loop with no sleep
(a `select` with a `default` branch), pegging a CPU core. The peers run
  userspace WireGuard (stdnet transport), so the spin starved the
wireguard-go goroutines that actually process the handshake, making the
  30s wait flaky under CI load.

Poll on a 500ms ticker instead so the CPU is yielded between checks, and
  check the handshake state before waiting. Same logic, no busy-spin.

  ## Issue ticket number and link

  N/A — CI flakiness fix.

  ### Checklist
  - [x] Is it a bug fix
  - [ ] Is a typo/documentation fix
  - [ ] Is a feature enhancement
  - [ ] It is a refactor
  - [ ] Created tests that fail without the change (if possible)
- [x] This change does **not** modify the public API, gRPC protocols,
functionality behavior, CLI / service flags, or introduce a new feature

  ## Documentation

  - [x] Documentation is **not needed** for this change (test-only fix)

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## Summary by CodeRabbit

* **Tests**
* Improved peer connection test waiting behavior to avoid busy spinning.
* Added a timeout and periodic checks, with clearer failure handling
when a handshake does not complete.

<!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
2026-07-23 15:48:16 +02:00
Viktor Liu
6d15d0729a [client] Clear stale UDP checksum in eBPF XDP proxy after port rewrite (#6861) 2026-07-23 14:37:52 +02:00
Maycon Santos
0936918d24 [management, proxy] add Kimi (Moonshot AI) provider to Agent Network (#6853) 2026-07-23 13:32:32 +02:00
Bethuel Mmbaga
d4a4418969 [misc] Simplify enterprise bootstrap (#6869) 2026-07-23 12:41:13 +03:00
Pascal Fischer
31ed241a1a [management] component types (#6866) 2026-07-23 11:37:09 +02:00
Maycon Santos
178e6a8530 [misc] Probe the agent-network endpoint with a GET instead of getent (#6867)
## Describe your changes

Use http get to trigger lazy connections as e2e will have single proxy
and status checks would fail without proper lazy wake-up
2026-07-23 15:30:40 +09:00
Maycon Santos
96963b6751 [proxy] fix proxy multistage build (#6864) 2026-07-22 21:24:44 +02:00
Maycon Santos
9770814f39 [client] warm lazy connections from the DNS resolver (#6854)
## Describe your changes

Supersedes #6767 (same change, moved to an unprefixed branch; review
feedback from there is addressed here).

With lazy connections enabled, a peer is not dialed until on-demand
traffic arrives, so the first request to a peer resolved by name (e.g.
the agent-network reverse-proxy) races — or loses to — the WireGuard
handshake. Activation was previously reactive only: a data-path packet
or an inbound signal.

This adds a proactive, DNS-time trigger. When the local resolver answers
for an overlay name, it now warms the lazy connection to the peer(s) the
answer points at and waits briefly for one to connect before returning
the response — so by the time the client sends its first packet the
tunnel is already up.

- `dns/local`: new `PeerActivator` capability + `SetPeerActivator`
setter (mirrors the existing `PeerConnectivity`/`SetPeerConnectivity`
injection). `ServeDNS` warms on the pre-filter answer, so activating a
lazily-idle peer also lets it survive the disconnected-peer filter.
Warm-up is scoped to match-only (non-authoritative) zones — the
synthesized private-service zones and user-created zones — so plain
peer-name lookups in the account's authoritative peer zone never wake
idle peers. No-op when no activator is wired (lazy off) or the answer
carries no peer IPs. Budget is `NB_DNS_LAZY_WARMUP_TIMEOUT` (default 2s,
parsed once at construction, invalid values logged); on timeout the
answer is returned anyway (never SERVFAIL).
- The resolver-facing interfaces (`PeerActivator`, `PeerConnectivity`)
take `netip.Addr` instead of string IPs; record addresses are extracted
as `netip.Addr` (v4-mapped forms unmapped) and converted to string only
at the `peer.Status` boundary.
- `SetPeerActivator` is part of the `dns.Server` interface (no-op on the
mock), so the engine wires it without a type assertion.
- `client/internal`: a small engine-side adapter (`dnsPeerActivator`)
resolves answer IPs to peers via `Status.PeerStateByIP`, activates them
through `ConnMgr.ActivatePeer` (HA fan-out included), and polls
`PeerStateByIP` until one is connected. The activation dial is tied to
the engine's long-lived context so a handshake that outlasts the
per-query wait still completes in the background. `ConnMgr.ActivatePeer`
is safe for concurrent use (the lazy manager pointer is guarded by a
dedicated RWMutex and the manager is internally synchronized), so the
DNS path never contends with network-map processing on `syncMsgMux`.

Scope is overlay-only for free: the trigger lives in the local resolver,
which only answers for NetBird-managed names; public/upstream DNS is
unaffected. Already-connected peers short-circuit, so steady-state DNS
latency is unchanged.

## Issue ticket number and link

N/A — follow-up to the lazy-connection rollout; fixes the agent-network
cold-start observed in the e2e (proxy peer stuck disconnected until
traffic).

### Checklist
- [x] Is it a bug fix
- [ ] Is a typo/documentation fix
- [ ] Is a feature enhancement
- [ ] It is a refactor
- [x] Created tests that fail without the change (if possible)
- [x] This change does **not** modify the public API, gRPC protocols,
functionality behavior, CLI / service flags, or introduce a new feature
— **OR** I have discussed it with the NetBird team beforehand (link the
issue / Slack thread in the description). See
[CONTRIBUTING.md](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#discuss-changes-with-the-netbird-team-first).

> By submitting this pull request, you confirm that you have read and
agree to the terms of the [Contributor License
Agreement](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/blob/main/CONTRIBUTOR_LICENSE_AGREEMENT.md).

## Documentation
Select exactly one:

- [ ] I added/updated documentation for this change
- [x] Documentation is **not needed** for this change (explain why)

Internal client behavior; the only knob is the optional
`NB_DNS_LAZY_WARMUP_TIMEOUT` tuning env var with a safe default.

### Docs PR URL (required if "docs added" is checked)
Paste the PR link from https://github.com/netbirdio/docs here:

https://github.com/netbirdio/docs/pull/__

## Tests

- `dns/local`: warm-up invokes the activator with the answer's peer
address in match-only zones; authoritative-zone answers never trigger
warm-up; no-activator path unchanged; no-answer queries don't invoke the
activator; `NB_DNS_LAZY_WARMUP_TIMEOUT` parsing
(valid/invalid/non-positive); `extractRecordAddr` unmaps v4-mapped
record data.
- `client/internal`: `dnsPeerActivator` skips
connected/unknown/conn-less peers with no wait, returns as soon as a
pending peer connects, and releases the DNS response at the budget when
the peer stays idle; `ConnMgr.ActivatePeer` races the manager lifecycle
cleanly under `-race`.
- Agent-network e2e green on this change (with lazy connections
enabled): https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/actions/runs/29891467544
2026-07-22 18:47:48 +02:00
Nicolas Frati
b0c1ed31b8 [infrastructure] Add unified admin CLI for self-hosted helpers (#6507)
## Summary

Adds a unified `admin` CLI for self-hosted instance administrators in
both the management and combined binaries.

## User Management

### `admin user change-password`
- Changes a local embedded IdP user's password.
- Selects the user with `--email` or `--user-id`.
- Reads the new password from `--password` or `--password-file`.
- Clears the user's local authentication session so the new password is
required on the next login.
- **Alias:** `admin user set-password`.

### `admin user reset-mfa`
- Resets a local embedded IdP user's MFA enrollment.
- Selects the user with `--email` or `--user-id`.
- Clears TOTP/WebAuthn enrollment data and removes the local
authentication session.
- The user will re-enroll MFA on the next login.

## MFA Management

### `admin mfa status`
- Shows whether local MFA is enabled in the account settings.
- Checks the embedded IdP client configuration and reports whether MFA
is enabled there.

### `admin mfa enable`
- Enables local MFA for embedded IdP users.
- Updates embedded IdP clients and saves the account MFA setting.
- Records an audit event on a best-effort basis.

### `admin mfa disable`
- Disables local MFA for embedded IdP users.
- Updates embedded IdP clients and saves the account MFA setting.
- Records an audit event on a best-effort basis.

## Reverse Proxy Tokens

### `admin token create --name <name> [--expires-in <duration>]`
- Creates a reverse proxy access token.
- Prints the plaintext token once, along with the token ID.
- `--expires-in` supports values such as `24h`, `30d`, or `365d`. If
omitted, the token never expires.

### `admin token list`
- Lists reverse proxy access tokens.
- Shows the token ID, name, creation date, expiration, last-used time,
and revocation status.
- **Alias:** `admin token ls`.

### `admin token revoke <token-id>`
- Revokes a reverse proxy access token.
- Revoked tokens can no longer authenticate reverse proxy instances.

## Reverse Proxy Management

### `admin proxy disconnect-all`
- Lists registered reverse proxy instances and force-marks all connected
instances as disconnected.
- Useful for repairing stale proxy state after an unclean management
server shutdown.
- Prompts for confirmation by default.
- `--dry-run` previews the changes without applying them.
- `--force` skips the confirmation prompt.
- Live proxies may appear again after their next heartbeat, reconnect,
or re-registration.

## Compatibility Commands

### `token ...`
- Deprecated top-level compatibility path.
- Behaves the same as `admin token ...`.
- Retained so existing scripts using `token create`, `token list`, or
`token revoke` continue to work.

## Changes

- Adds reusable `management/cmd/admin` command package.
- Wires `admin` into `netbird-mgmt` and `combined`.
- Adds local user password reset with existing password strength
validation.
- Adds local MFA enrollment reset by clearing Dex TOTP/WebAuthn
credentials and local auth sessions.
- Adds local MFA enable/disable/status helpers for embedded IdP
deployments.
- Moves proxy access token commands under `admin token` for a single
admin-focused CLI entry point.
- Exports `server.ValidatePassword` for reuse by CLI helpers.

## Tests

```bash
go test ./management/cmd/...
go test ./management/cmd/admin ./management/cmd ./combined/cmd
go test ./management/server -run TestValidatePassword
```

Pre-push lint also passed.


### Checklist
- [ ] Is it a bug fix
- [ ] Is a typo/documentation fix
- [x] Is a feature enhancement
- [ ] It is a refactor
- [ ] Created tests that fail without the change (if possible)
- [ ] This change does **not** modify the public API, gRPC protocols,
functionality behavior, CLI / service flags, or introduce a new feature
— **OR** I have discussed it with the NetBird team beforehand (link the
issue / Slack thread in the description). See
[CONTRIBUTING.md](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#discuss-changes-with-the-netbird-team-first).

> By submitting this pull request, you confirm that you have read and
agree to the terms of the [Contributor License
Agreement](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/blob/main/CONTRIBUTOR_LICENSE_AGREEMENT.md).

## Documentation
Select exactly one:

- [x] I added/updated documentation for this change
- [ ] Documentation is **not needed** for this change (explain why)

### Docs PR URL (required if "docs added" is checked)
Paste the PR link from https://github.com/netbirdio/docs here:

https://github.com/netbirdio/docs/pull/832

<!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai
-->
## Summary by CodeRabbit

## Release Notes

* **New Features**
* Added self-hosted admin CLI commands for changing passwords, resetting
MFA (including WebAuthn), and managing embedded IdP client MFA
(enable/disable/status).
* Introduced a unified admin command entry point and improved
data-directory handling for embedded IdP storage.

* **Refactor**
* Centralized password strength validation into a shared exported
validator.

* **Tests**
* Added a comprehensive admin command test suite covering password
input, selectors, MFA reset, and client MFA state handling.
<!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
2026-07-22 18:47:19 +02:00
dmitri-netbird
8435682ac8 [client, management] offload client config generation to the client (#6711)
Signed-off-by: Dmitri Dolguikh <dmitri.external@netbird.io>
Co-authored-by: crn4 <vladimir@netbird.io>
Co-authored-by: pascal <pascal@netbird.io>
2026-07-22 18:20:27 +02:00
Zoltan Papp
ed682fad87 [client] Run pnpm install with --ignore-scripts in frontend CI (#6859)
Prevent dependency lifecycle scripts (preinstall/postinstall/prepare)
from executing during install in the UI frontend CI job, closing the
most common npm supply-chain vector at build time. The frontend build
does not rely on any dependency install scripts.

## Describe your changes

## Issue ticket number and link

## Stack

<!-- branch-stack -->

### Checklist
- [x] Is it a bug fix
- [ ] Is a typo/documentation fix
- [ ] Is a feature enhancement
- [ ] It is a refactor
- [ ] Created tests that fail without the change (if possible)
- [ ] This change does **not** modify the public API, gRPC protocols,
functionality behavior, CLI / service flags, or introduce a new feature
— **OR** I have discussed it with the NetBird team beforehand (link the
issue / Slack thread in the description). See
[CONTRIBUTING.md](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#discuss-changes-with-the-netbird-team-first).

> By submitting this pull request, you confirm that you have read and
agree to the terms of the [Contributor License
Agreement](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/blob/main/CONTRIBUTOR_LICENSE_AGREEMENT.md).

## Documentation
Select exactly one:

- [ ] I added/updated documentation for this change
- [x] Documentation is **not needed** for this change (explain why)

### Docs PR URL (required if "docs added" is checked)
Paste the PR link from https://github.com/netbirdio/docs here:

https://github.com/netbirdio/docs/pull/__

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## Summary by CodeRabbit

* **Chores**
* Updated the UI frontend installation workflow to skip package
installation scripts while preserving the locked dependency versions.

<!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
2026-07-22 16:01:33 +02:00
207 changed files with 13956 additions and 5765 deletions

View File

@@ -51,6 +51,9 @@ jobs:
# token (and URL, for gateways) is unset, so partial coverage is fine.
OPENAI_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.E2E_OPENAI_TOKEN }}
ANTHROPIC_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.E2E_ANTHROPIC_TOKEN }}
# Moonshot AI platform key (platform.kimi.ai); drives both Kimi wire
# shapes (OpenAI /v1 and Anthropic /anthropic) through kimi_api.
KIMI_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.E2E_KIMI_TOKEN }}
VERCEL_URL: ${{ secrets.E2E_VERCEL_URL }}
VERCEL_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.E2E_VERCEL_TOKEN }}
OPENROUTER_URL: ${{ secrets.E2E_OPENROUTER_URL }}

View File

@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ jobs:
${{ runner.os }}-pnpm-
- name: Install dependencies
run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile --ignore-scripts
- name: Generate Wails bindings
run: pnpm run bindings

View File

@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ jobs:
display_name: Linux
name: ${{ matrix.display_name }}
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
timeout-minutes: 15
timeout-minutes: 25
steps:
- name: Checkout code
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
@@ -79,4 +79,4 @@ jobs:
skip-cache: true
skip-save-cache: true
cache-invalidation-interval: 0
args: --timeout=12m
args: --timeout=20m

View File

@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ func (pm *ProfileManager) SwitchProfile(id string) error {
// AddProfile creates a new profile
func (pm *ProfileManager) AddProfile(profileName string) error {
// Use ServiceManager (creates profile in profiles/ directory)
profile, err := pm.serviceMgr.AddProfile(profileName, androidUsername, nil)
profile, err := pm.serviceMgr.AddProfile(profileName, androidUsername)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to add profile: %w", err)
}

View File

@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
package cmd
import (
"context"
"time"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
)
var ownerCmd = &cobra.Command{
Use: "owner",
Short: "Manage who may control the active NetBird profile",
Long: `Manage the owners of the active profile's daemon control channel.
Ownership is enforced per profile: an isolated profile can only be controlled by
its owner principals (plus root/administrator). A new profile is automatically
owned by its creator; an unowned profile is claimed by the first caller.`,
}
var ownerAddCmd = &cobra.Command{
Use: "add <principal>",
Short: "Add an owner principal to the active profile",
Long: `Add an owner principal to the active profile. Principals are typed:
uid:1000 a Unix user ID
gid:1000 a Unix group ID
group:netbird-admins a Unix group name (resolved via NSS/getent)
sid:S-1-5-21-... a Windows user or group SID
Requires root/administrator or an existing owner.`,
Args: cobra.ExactArgs(1),
RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
return withDaemon(cmd, func(ctx context.Context, c proto.DaemonServiceClient) error {
if _, err := c.AddOwner(ctx, &proto.AddOwnerRequest{Principal: args[0]}); err != nil {
return err
}
cmd.Printf("Added owner %q to the active profile\n", args[0])
return nil
})
},
}
var ownerResetCmd = &cobra.Command{
Use: "reset",
Short: "Clear the active profile's owner list (root/administrator only)",
Long: `Clear the active profile's owner list, returning it to the unowned
state. The next caller then claims ownership (trust-on-first-use). Requires
root/administrator.`,
RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
return withDaemon(cmd, func(ctx context.Context, c proto.DaemonServiceClient) error {
if _, err := c.ResetOwner(ctx, &proto.ResetOwnerRequest{}); err != nil {
return err
}
cmd.Println("Owner list cleared; the next caller will claim ownership")
return nil
})
},
}
var ownerShareCmd = &cobra.Command{
Use: "share",
Short: "Mark the active profile shared (any local user may control it)",
RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
return withDaemon(cmd, func(ctx context.Context, c proto.DaemonServiceClient) error {
if _, err := c.ShareProfile(ctx, &proto.ShareProfileRequest{Shared: true}); err != nil {
return err
}
cmd.Println("Active profile is now shared with all local users")
return nil
})
},
}
var ownerUnshareCmd = &cobra.Command{
Use: "unshare",
Short: "Stop sharing the active profile (restrict to its owners)",
RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
return withDaemon(cmd, func(ctx context.Context, c proto.DaemonServiceClient) error {
if _, err := c.ShareProfile(ctx, &proto.ShareProfileRequest{Shared: false}); err != nil {
return err
}
cmd.Println("Active profile is no longer shared")
return nil
})
},
}
// withDaemon runs fn with a connected daemon client, handling setup and teardown.
func withDaemon(cmd *cobra.Command, fn func(context.Context, proto.DaemonServiceClient) error) error {
SetFlagsFromEnvVars(rootCmd)
cmd.SetOut(cmd.OutOrStdout())
if err := util.InitLog(logLevel, util.LogConsole); err != nil {
log.Errorf("failed initializing log %v", err)
return err
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(cmd.Context(), 20*time.Second)
defer cancel()
conn, err := DialClientGRPCServer(ctx, daemonAddr)
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("failed to connect to service CLI interface %v", err)
return err
}
defer func() {
if cerr := conn.Close(); cerr != nil {
log.Debugf("close daemon connection: %v", cerr)
}
}()
return fn(ctx, proto.NewDaemonServiceClient(conn))
}

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
"fmt"
"io"
"io/fs"
"net"
"os"
"os/signal"
"path"
@@ -144,10 +143,10 @@ func init() {
defaultDaemonAddr := "unix:///var/run/netbird.sock"
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
defaultDaemonAddr = "npipe://netbird"
defaultDaemonAddr = "tcp://127.0.0.1:41731"
}
rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&daemonAddr, "daemon-addr", defaultDaemonAddr, "Daemon service address to serve CLI requests [unix|tcp|npipe]://[path|host:port|name]")
rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&daemonAddr, "daemon-addr", defaultDaemonAddr, "Daemon service address to serve CLI requests [unix|tcp]://[path|host:port]")
rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVarP(&managementURL, "management-url", "m", "", fmt.Sprintf("Management Service URL [http|https]://[host]:[port] (default \"%s\")", profilemanager.DefaultManagementURL))
rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&adminURL, "admin-url", "", fmt.Sprintf("Admin Panel URL [http|https]://[host]:[port] (default \"%s\")", profilemanager.DefaultAdminURL))
rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVarP(&logLevel, "log-level", "l", "info", "sets NetBird log level")
@@ -173,9 +172,6 @@ func init() {
rootCmd.AddCommand(profileCmd)
rootCmd.AddCommand(exposeCmd)
rootCmd.AddCommand(ownerCmd)
ownerCmd.AddCommand(ownerAddCmd, ownerResetCmd, ownerShareCmd, ownerUnshareCmd)
networksCMD.AddCommand(routesListCmd)
networksCMD.AddCommand(routesSelectCmd, routesDeselectCmd)
@@ -269,28 +265,16 @@ func FlagNameToEnvVar(cmdFlag string, prefix string) string {
}
// DialClientGRPCServer returns client connection to the daemon server.
func DialClientGRPCServer(ctx context.Context, addr string, opts ...grpc.DialOption) (*grpc.ClientConn, error) {
func DialClientGRPCServer(ctx context.Context, addr string) (*grpc.ClientConn, error) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, time.Second*10)
defer cancel()
opts = append([]grpc.DialOption{
return grpc.DialContext(
ctx,
strings.TrimPrefix(addr, "tcp://"),
grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials()),
grpc.WithBlock()}, opts...)
// The daemon reads the caller's kernel identity from the transport
// (SO_PEERCRED on a Unix socket, the client token on a Windows named pipe),
// so the client stays insecure. For npipe we install a context dialer since
// gRPC's resolver does not understand Windows named pipes.
target := strings.TrimPrefix(addr, "tcp://")
if strings.HasPrefix(addr, "npipe://") {
path := pipePath(strings.TrimPrefix(addr, "npipe://"))
opts = append(opts, grpc.WithContextDialer(func(dialCtx context.Context, _ string) (net.Conn, error) {
return dialNamedPipe(dialCtx, path)
}))
target = "passthrough:///netbird-daemon-pipe"
}
return grpc.DialContext(ctx, target, opts...)
grpc.WithBlock(),
)
}
// WithBackOff execute function in backoff cycle.

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ package cmd
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"runtime"
"time"
"github.com/kardianos/service"
@@ -14,36 +13,12 @@ import (
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"google.golang.org/grpc"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/server"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/system"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
)
// daemonServerOptions installs peer-identity transport credentials and the
// authorization interceptor on the daemon ipc. Identity is only available
// over a Unix socket (SO_PEERCRED) or a Windows named pipe (client token).
// Over TCP, or on platforms without a peer-credential primitive, the daemon
// runs without per-caller authorization and warns (no interceptor, so it does
// not deny everyone).
func daemonServerOptions(network string, interceptor *ipcauth.Interceptor) []grpc.ServerOption {
creds := ipcauth.NewTransportCredentials()
if creds == nil {
log.Warnf("daemon ipc has no peer-identity primitive on %s, per-caller authorization is disabled", runtime.GOOS)
return nil
}
if network == "tcp" {
log.Warnf("daemon is listening on TCP (%s), peer identity cannot be authenticated over TCP, per-caller authorization is disabled", daemonAddr)
return nil
}
return []grpc.ServerOption{
grpc.Creds(creds),
grpc.ChainUnaryInterceptor(interceptor.UnaryServerInterceptor()),
grpc.ChainStreamInterceptor(interceptor.StreamServerInterceptor()),
}
}
func validateJSONSocketFlags() error {
if serviceCmd.PersistentFlags().Changed("json-socket") && !enableJSONSocket {
return fmt.Errorf("--json-socket requires --enable-json-socket to configure the daemon JSON gateway")
@@ -62,19 +37,8 @@ func (p *program) Start(svc service.Service) error {
// Collect static system and platform information
system.UpdateStaticInfoAsync()
network, _, err := parseListenAddress(daemonAddr)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("parse daemon address: %w", err)
}
// Owner-authorization interceptor. The ConfigAdapter is a lazy bridge: the
// gRPC server is built before the daemon server instance exists, so we set
// the real policy backend below once serverInstance is created.
ownerAdapter := &ipcauth.ConfigAdapter{}
authInterceptor := ipcauth.NewInterceptor(ownerAdapter, ipcauth.NewDefaultGroupResolver())
// in any case, even if configuration does not exist we run daemon to serve the CLI gRPC API.
p.serv = grpc.NewServer(daemonServerOptions(network, authInterceptor)...)
// in any case, even if configuration does not exists we run daemon to serve CLI gRPC API.
p.serv = grpc.NewServer()
daemonListener, err := listenOnAddress(daemonAddr)
if err != nil {
@@ -113,7 +77,6 @@ func (p *program) Start(svc service.Service) error {
if err := serverInstance.Start(); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("failed to start daemon: %v", err)
}
ownerAdapter.SetBackend(serverInstance)
proto.RegisterDaemonServiceServer(p.serv, serverInstance)
p.serverInstanceMu.Lock()
@@ -121,7 +84,6 @@ func (p *program) Start(svc service.Service) error {
p.serverInstanceMu.Unlock()
if jsonListener != nil {
log.Warnf("JSON gateway (--enable-json-socket) re-dials the daemon locally; the HTTP client's identity is forwarded so per-caller authorization still applies, but restrict access to %s appropriately", jsonSocket)
if err := p.startJSONGateway(jsonListener, daemonAddr); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("failed to start daemon JSON server: %v", err)
}

View File

@@ -14,45 +14,16 @@ import (
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"google.golang.org/grpc"
"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials/insecure"
"google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
)
// jsonPeerCtxKey keys the HTTP client's kernel identity in the request context.
type jsonPeerCtxKey struct{}
// jsonConnContext reads the connecting HTTP client's identity from the JSON
// socket (peercred) and stashes it so it can be forwarded to the daemon. The
// gateway re-dials the daemon as the daemon's own identity, so without this the
// daemon would see every JSON request as privileged.
func jsonConnContext(ctx context.Context, c net.Conn) context.Context {
id, err := ipcauth.PeerIdentity(c)
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("json gateway: cannot read HTTP client identity, requests won't carry it: %v", err)
return ctx
}
return context.WithValue(ctx, jsonPeerCtxKey{}, id)
}
// jsonForwardIdentity injects the stashed HTTP client identity as gRPC metadata
// on the gateway's re-dial to the daemon. The daemon trusts it only because the
// dial arrives as the daemon's own (self/privileged) identity.
func jsonForwardIdentity(ctx context.Context, _ *http.Request) metadata.MD {
id, ok := ctx.Value(jsonPeerCtxKey{}).(ipcauth.Identity)
if !ok {
return nil
}
return ipcauth.ForwardIdentityMetadata(id)
}
func grpcGatewayEndpoint(addr string) string {
return strings.TrimPrefix(addr, "tcp://")
}
func (p *program) startJSONGateway(jsonListener *socketListener, daemonEndpoint string) error {
mux := runtime.NewServeMux(runtime.WithMetadata(jsonForwardIdentity))
mux := runtime.NewServeMux()
opts := []grpc.DialOption{grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials())}
if err := proto.RegisterDaemonServiceHandlerFromEndpoint(p.ctx, mux, grpcGatewayEndpoint(daemonEndpoint), opts); err != nil {
return err
@@ -64,7 +35,6 @@ func (p *program) startJSONGateway(jsonListener *socketListener, daemonEndpoint
BaseContext: func(net.Listener) context.Context {
return p.ctx
},
ConnContext: jsonConnContext,
}
p.jsonServMu.Lock()

View File

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
//go:build !windows
package cmd
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"net"
"runtime"
)
// listenNamedPipe is unsupported off Windows; named pipes are a Windows-only transport.
func listenNamedPipe(string) (net.Listener, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("named pipe daemon socket is only supported on Windows, not %s", runtime.GOOS)
}
// dialNamedPipe is unsupported off Windows.
func dialNamedPipe(context.Context, string) (net.Conn, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("named pipe daemon socket is only supported on Windows, not %s", runtime.GOOS)
}

View File

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
//go:build windows
package cmd
import (
"context"
"net"
"github.com/Microsoft/go-winio"
"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
)
// listenNamedPipe creates the daemon control named pipe with a permissive,
// local-only SDDL. Any local caller may connect, on par with the Unix
// socket's 0666, and the per-RPC interceptor authorizes. ListenPipe fails
// if the pipe already exists (first-instance semantics), which prevents a
// squatting process from pre-creating it.
func listenNamedPipe(path string) (net.Listener, error) {
return winio.ListenPipe(path, &winio.PipeConfig{
SecurityDescriptor: ipcauth.DefaultPipeSDDL(),
})
}
// dialNamedPipe connects to the daemon ipc named pipe at SECURITY_IDENTIFICATION.
func dialNamedPipe(ctx context.Context, path string) (net.Conn, error) {
access := uint32(windows.GENERIC_READ | windows.GENERIC_WRITE)
// winio's plain DialPipe connects at SECURITY_ANONYMOUS, under which the
// daemon cannot read the caller's token. Identification lets the daemon
// read its SID/groups without granting it the ability to act as the caller.
return winio.DialPipeAccessImpLevel(ctx, path, access, winio.PipeImpLevelIdentification)
}

View File

@@ -26,15 +26,6 @@ func listenOnAddress(addr string) (*socketListener, error) {
return nil, err
}
if network == "npipe" {
path := pipePath(address)
listener, err := listenNamedPipe(path)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &socketListener{Listener: listener, network: network, address: path}, nil
}
if network == "unix" {
removeStaleUnixSocket(address)
}
@@ -54,22 +45,13 @@ func parseListenAddress(addr string) (string, string, error) {
}
switch network {
case "unix", "tcp", "npipe":
case "unix", "tcp":
return network, address, nil
default:
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("unsupported daemon address protocol: %v", network)
}
}
// pipePath maps a daemon-addr npipe name ("npipe://netbird") to a Windows
// named-pipe path (\\.\pipe\netbird).
func pipePath(name string) string {
if strings.HasPrefix(name, `\\`) {
return name
}
return `\\.\pipe\` + name
}
func removeStaleUnixSocket(path string) {
stat, err := os.Lstat(path)
if err != nil {

View File

@@ -56,7 +56,6 @@ var (
showQR bool
profileName string
configPath string
claimOwner bool
upCmd = &cobra.Command{
Use: "up",
@@ -68,7 +67,6 @@ var (
func init() {
upCmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVarP(&foregroundMode, "foreground-mode", "F", false, "start service in foreground")
upCmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVar(&claimOwner, "owner", false, "claim ownership of this profile for the current user, restricting daemon control of it to you and root/administrator")
upCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&interfaceName, interfaceNameFlag, iface.WgInterfaceDefault, "WireGuard interface name")
upCmd.PersistentFlags().Uint16Var(&wireguardPort, wireguardPortFlag, iface.DefaultWgPort, "WireGuard interface listening port")
upCmd.PersistentFlags().Uint16Var(&mtu, mtuFlag, iface.DefaultMTU, "Set MTU (Maximum Transmission Unit) for the WireGuard interface")
@@ -393,7 +391,6 @@ func doDaemonUp(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, client proto.DaemonServ
if _, err := client.Up(ctx, &proto.UpRequest{
ProfileName: &profileID,
Username: &username,
ClaimOwner: claimOwner,
}); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("call service up method: %v", err)
}

View File

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ func TestUpDaemon(t *testing.T) {
}
sm := profilemanager.ServiceManager{}
created, err := sm.AddProfile("test1", currUser.Username, nil)
created, err := sm.AddProfile("test1", currUser.Username)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("failed to add profile: %v", err)
return

View File

@@ -569,17 +569,17 @@ func Test_ConnectPeers(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// todo: investigate why in some tests execution we need 30s
// The peers use userspace WireGuard (stdnet transport). A tight busy-loop
// here starves the wireguard-go goroutines that process the handshake, so
// poll on a ticker instead and yield the CPU between checks. WireGuard also
// only retries a lost handshake initiation every REKEY_TIMEOUT (5s), which
// is why the overall wait can occasionally stretch to tens of seconds.
timeout := 30 * time.Second
timeoutChannel := time.After(timeout)
ticker := time.NewTicker(500 * time.Millisecond)
defer ticker.Stop()
for {
select {
case <-timeoutChannel:
t.Fatalf("waiting for peer handshake timeout after %s", timeout.String())
default:
}
peer, gpErr := getPeer(peer1ifaceName, peer2Key.PublicKey().String())
if gpErr != nil {
t.Fatal(gpErr)
@@ -588,6 +588,12 @@ func Test_ConnectPeers(t *testing.T) {
t.Log("peers successfully handshake")
break
}
select {
case <-timeoutChannel:
t.Fatalf("waiting for peer handshake timeout after %s", timeout.String())
case <-ticker.C:
}
}
}

View File

@@ -351,6 +351,7 @@ func (a *Auth) setSystemInfoFlags(info *system.Info) {
a.config.BlockLANAccess,
a.config.BlockInbound,
a.config.DisableIPv6,
a.config.SyncMessageVersion,
a.config.EnableSSHRoot,
a.config.EnableSSHSFTP,
a.config.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding,

View File

@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ const (
// - Handling connection establishment based on peer signaling
//
// The implementation is not thread-safe; it is protected by engine.syncMsgMux.
// The only exception is ActivatePeer, which is safe for concurrent use so the
// DNS warm-up path can call it without contending on the engine mutex.
type ConnMgr struct {
peerStore *peerstore.Store
statusRecorder *peer.Status
@@ -42,12 +44,26 @@ type ConnMgr struct {
rosenpassEnabled bool
lazyConnMgr *manager.Manager
// lazyConnMgrMu guards the lazyConnMgr pointer for readers outside the
// engine loop (ActivatePeer). Writers hold it in addition to
// engine.syncMsgMux; all other reads stay under engine.syncMsgMux only.
lazyConnMgrMu sync.RWMutex
// reconcileRoutedIPs re-applies a peer's routed allowed IPs after its lazy wake endpoint is
// (re)armed (Mode A at arm time). Injected by the engine; nil disables the reconcile.
reconcileRoutedIPs func(peerKey string) error
wg sync.WaitGroup
lazyCtx context.Context
lazyCtxCancel context.CancelFunc
}
// SetRoutedIPsReconciler injects the callback used to re-apply a peer's routed allowed IPs when
// its lazy wake endpoint is (re)armed. Must be called before the lazy manager starts.
func (e *ConnMgr) SetRoutedIPsReconciler(fn func(peerKey string) error) {
e.reconcileRoutedIPs = fn
}
func NewConnMgr(engineConfig *EngineConfig, statusRecorder *peer.Status, peerStore *peerstore.Store, iface lazyconn.WGIface) *ConnMgr {
e := &ConnMgr{
peerStore: peerStore,
@@ -238,12 +254,20 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) RemovePeerConn(peerKey string) {
conn.Log.Infof("removed peer from lazy conn manager")
}
// ActivatePeer wakes an idle lazy connection. Unlike the rest of ConnMgr it is
// safe for concurrent use: the lazy manager pointer is read under lazyConnMgrMu
// and the manager itself is internally synchronized, so callers outside the
// engine loop (DNS warm-up) do not need engine.syncMsgMux.
func (e *ConnMgr) ActivatePeer(ctx context.Context, conn *peer.Conn) {
if !e.isStartedWithLazyMgr() {
e.lazyConnMgrMu.RLock()
lazyConnMgr := e.lazyConnMgr
started := lazyConnMgr != nil && e.lazyCtxCancel != nil
e.lazyConnMgrMu.RUnlock()
if !started {
return
}
if found := e.lazyConnMgr.ActivatePeer(conn.GetKey()); found {
if found := lazyConnMgr.ActivatePeer(conn.GetKey()); found {
if err := conn.Open(ctx); err != nil {
conn.Log.Errorf("failed to open connection: %v", err)
}
@@ -268,16 +292,22 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) Close() {
e.lazyCtxCancel()
e.wg.Wait()
e.lazyConnMgrMu.Lock()
e.lazyConnMgr = nil
e.lazyConnMgrMu.Unlock()
}
func (e *ConnMgr) initLazyManager(engineCtx context.Context) {
cfg := manager.Config{
InactivityThreshold: inactivityThresholdEnv(),
ReconcileAllowedIPs: e.reconcileRoutedIPs,
}
e.lazyConnMgr = manager.NewManager(cfg, engineCtx, e.peerStore, e.iface)
e.lazyConnMgrMu.Lock()
e.lazyConnMgr = manager.NewManager(cfg, engineCtx, e.peerStore, e.iface)
e.lazyCtx, e.lazyCtxCancel = context.WithCancel(engineCtx)
e.lazyConnMgrMu.Unlock()
e.wg.Add(1)
go func() {
@@ -316,7 +346,10 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) closeManager(ctx context.Context) {
e.lazyCtxCancel()
e.wg.Wait()
e.lazyConnMgrMu.Lock()
e.lazyConnMgr = nil
e.lazyConnMgrMu.Unlock()
for _, peerID := range e.peerStore.PeersPubKey() {
e.peerStore.PeerConnOpen(ctx, peerID)

View File

@@ -1,10 +1,21 @@
package internal
import (
"context"
"net"
"net/netip"
"os"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/lazyconn"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peerstore"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/monotime"
)
func TestResolveLazyForce(t *testing.T) {
@@ -38,3 +49,58 @@ func TestResolveLazyForce(t *testing.T) {
})
}
}
type mockLazyWGIface struct{}
func (mockLazyWGIface) RemovePeer(string) error { return nil }
func (mockLazyWGIface) UpdatePeer(string, []netip.Prefix, time.Duration, *net.UDPAddr, *wgtypes.Key) error {
return nil
}
func (mockLazyWGIface) IsUserspaceBind() bool { return false }
func (mockLazyWGIface) Address() wgaddr.Address { return wgaddr.Address{} }
func (mockLazyWGIface) LastActivities() map[string]monotime.Time { return nil }
func (mockLazyWGIface) MTU() uint16 { return 1280 }
// TestConnMgr_ActivatePeerConcurrentWithLifecycle exercises ActivatePeer from
// non-engine goroutines (the DNS warm-up path) racing the manager lifecycle,
// which stays on the engine loop. Run with -race: it fails if ActivatePeer
// still requires engine.syncMsgMux for safety.
func TestConnMgr_ActivatePeerConcurrentWithLifecycle(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(lazyconn.EnvLazyConn, "on")
status := peer.NewRecorder("https://mgm")
store := peerstore.NewConnStore()
connMgr := NewConnMgr(&EngineConfig{}, status, store, mockLazyWGIface{})
conn := newTestPeerConn(t, "peerA")
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
connMgr.Start(ctx)
done := make(chan struct{})
var wg sync.WaitGroup
for range 4 {
wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
for {
select {
case <-done:
return
default:
connMgr.ActivatePeer(ctx, conn)
}
}
}()
}
// Let the activators spin against the started manager, then tear it down
// underneath them and let them spin against the stopped manager.
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
connMgr.Close()
time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
close(done)
wg.Wait()
}

View File

@@ -621,6 +621,7 @@ func createEngineConfig(key wgtypes.Key, config *profilemanager.Config, peerConf
BlockLANAccess: config.BlockLANAccess,
BlockInbound: config.BlockInbound,
DisableIPv6: config.DisableIPv6,
SyncMessageVersion: config.SyncMessageVersion,
LazyConnection: lazyconn.ParseState(config.LazyConnection),
@@ -696,6 +697,7 @@ func loginToManagement(ctx context.Context, client mgm.Client, pubSSHKey []byte,
config.BlockLANAccess,
config.BlockInbound,
config.DisableIPv6,
config.SyncMessageVersion,
config.EnableSSHRoot,
config.EnableSSHSFTP,
config.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding,

View File

@@ -676,6 +676,7 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addCommonConfigFields(configContent *strings.Builder)
configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("BlockLANAccess: %v\n", g.internalConfig.BlockLANAccess))
configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("BlockInbound: %v\n", g.internalConfig.BlockInbound))
configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("DisableIPv6: %v\n", g.internalConfig.DisableIPv6))
configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("SyncMessageVersion: %v\n", g.internalConfig.SyncMessageVersion))
if g.internalConfig.DisableNotifications != nil {
configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("DisableNotifications: %v\n", *g.internalConfig.DisableNotifications))

View File

@@ -887,6 +887,8 @@ func TestAddConfig_AllFieldsCovered(t *testing.T) {
ClientCertKeyPath: "/tmp/key",
LazyConnection: "on",
MTU: 1280,
DisableIPv6: true,
SyncMessageVersion: func(v int) *int { return &v }(1),
}
for _, anonymize := range []bool{false, true} {

View File

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
"fmt"
"net"
"net/netip"
"os"
"slices"
"strings"
"sync"
@@ -36,7 +37,43 @@ type resolver interface {
// record is left alone (it points at something outside our mesh, e.g.
// a non-peer upstream).
type PeerConnectivity interface {
IsConnectedByIP(ip string) (known, connected bool)
IsConnectedByIP(ip netip.Addr) (known, connected bool)
}
// PeerActivator wakes lazy-connection peers on demand. The local resolver calls
// it with the tunnel IPs an answer points at, so a peer that is idle (lazily
// disconnected) starts connecting at DNS-resolution time rather than racing the
// client's first request packet. nil disables warm-up.
type PeerActivator interface {
// ActivatePeersByIP triggers wake-up for the peer(s) owning addrs and blocks
// until one is connected or ctx (a short per-query budget) expires. It is a
// fast no-op for unknown or already-connected addresses.
ActivatePeersByIP(ctx context.Context, addrs []netip.Addr)
}
const (
defaultLazyWarmupTimeout = 2 * time.Second
envLazyWarmupTimeout = "NB_DNS_LAZY_WARMUP_TIMEOUT"
)
// lazyWarmupTimeoutFromEnv returns the per-query budget for waking a
// lazy-connection peer a DNS answer points at. Tunable via
// NB_DNS_LAZY_WARMUP_TIMEOUT (a Go duration). Parsed once at construction time.
func lazyWarmupTimeoutFromEnv() time.Duration {
v := os.Getenv(envLazyWarmupTimeout)
if v == "" {
return defaultLazyWarmupTimeout
}
d, err := time.ParseDuration(v)
if err != nil {
log.Warnf("invalid %s value %q, using default %s: %v", envLazyWarmupTimeout, v, defaultLazyWarmupTimeout, err)
return defaultLazyWarmupTimeout
}
if d <= 0 {
log.Warnf("non-positive %s value %q, using default %s", envLazyWarmupTimeout, v, defaultLazyWarmupTimeout)
return defaultLazyWarmupTimeout
}
return d
}
type Resolver struct {
@@ -51,6 +88,12 @@ type Resolver struct {
// filter and preserves the legacy "return whatever is registered"
// behaviour for callers that never wire a status source.
peerConn PeerConnectivity
// peerActivator, when non-nil, is called at resolution time to warm the
// lazy connection to the peer(s) an answer points at. nil disables warm-up.
peerActivator PeerActivator
// warmupTimeout is the per-query budget for the lazy-connection warm-up
// wait, resolved from the environment once at construction time.
warmupTimeout time.Duration
ctx context.Context
cancel context.CancelFunc
@@ -59,11 +102,12 @@ type Resolver struct {
func NewResolver() *Resolver {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
return &Resolver{
records: make(map[dns.Question][]dns.RR),
domains: make(map[domain.Domain]struct{}),
zones: make(map[domain.Domain]bool),
ctx: ctx,
cancel: cancel,
records: make(map[dns.Question][]dns.RR),
domains: make(map[domain.Domain]struct{}),
zones: make(map[domain.Domain]bool),
warmupTimeout: lazyWarmupTimeoutFromEnv(),
ctx: ctx,
cancel: cancel,
}
}
@@ -76,6 +120,14 @@ func (d *Resolver) SetPeerConnectivity(p PeerConnectivity) {
d.peerConn = p
}
// SetPeerActivator wires the DNS-time lazy-connection warm-up. Pass nil to
// disable. Safe to call multiple times; the latest value wins.
func (d *Resolver) SetPeerActivator(a PeerActivator) {
d.mu.Lock()
defer d.mu.Unlock()
d.peerActivator = a
}
func (d *Resolver) MatchSubdomains() bool {
return true
}
@@ -122,6 +174,9 @@ func (d *Resolver) ServeDNS(w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg) {
replyMessage.RecursionAvailable = true
result := d.lookupRecords(logger, question)
// Warm before filtering: activation flips a lazily-idle target to connected,
// which then lets it survive the disconnected-peer filter below.
d.warmLazyPeers(question, result.records)
result.records = d.filterDisconnectedPeerAnswers(logger, question, result.records)
replyMessage.Authoritative = !result.hasExternalData
replyMessage.Answer = result.records
@@ -495,8 +550,8 @@ func (d *Resolver) filterDisconnectedPeerAnswers(logger *log.Entry, question dns
kept := make([]dns.RR, 0, len(records))
var dropped int
for _, rr := range records {
ip := extractRecordIP(rr)
if ip == "" {
ip, ok := extractRecordAddr(rr)
if !ok {
kept = append(kept, rr)
continue
}
@@ -518,22 +573,57 @@ func (d *Resolver) filterDisconnectedPeerAnswers(logger *log.Entry, question dns
return kept
}
// extractRecordIP returns the dotted-decimal / colon-hex IP carried by
// an A or AAAA record, or "" for any other record type.
func extractRecordIP(rr dns.RR) string {
// warmLazyPeers triggers lazy-connection wake-up for the peers a resolved
// answer points at and waits briefly for one to connect, so the caller's first
// request doesn't race the connection establishment. Warm-up is scoped to
// match-only (non-authoritative) zones — the synthesized private-service zones
// and user-created zones whose records point at specific peers. The account's
// peer zone is authoritative, so plain peer-name lookups never trigger warm-up;
// otherwise resolving any peer's name would wake its idle connection, defeating
// laziness mesh-wide. No-op when no activator is wired (lazy connections
// disabled) or the answer carries no peer IPs.
func (d *Resolver) warmLazyPeers(question dns.Question, records []dns.RR) {
if len(records) < 2 {
return
}
d.mu.RLock()
activator := d.peerActivator
var nonAuth, found bool
if activator != nil {
nonAuth, found = d.findZone(question.Name)
}
d.mu.RUnlock()
if activator == nil || !found || !nonAuth {
return
}
var addrs []netip.Addr
for _, rr := range records {
if addr, ok := extractRecordAddr(rr); ok {
addrs = append(addrs, addr)
}
}
if len(addrs) == 0 {
return
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(d.ctx, d.warmupTimeout)
defer cancel()
activator.ActivatePeersByIP(ctx, addrs)
}
// extractRecordAddr returns the IP address carried by an A or AAAA record.
// ok is false for any other record type or a record with no address.
func extractRecordAddr(rr dns.RR) (netip.Addr, bool) {
switch r := rr.(type) {
case *dns.A:
if r.A == nil {
return ""
}
return r.A.String()
addr, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(r.A)
return addr.Unmap(), ok
case *dns.AAAA:
if r.AAAA == nil {
return ""
}
return r.AAAA.String()
addr, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(r.AAAA)
return addr.Unmap(), ok
}
return ""
return netip.Addr{}, false
}
// Update replaces all zones and their records

View File

@@ -37,8 +37,8 @@ type mockPeerConnectivity struct {
byIP map[string]struct{ known, connected bool }
}
func (m mockPeerConnectivity) IsConnectedByIP(ip string) (known, connected bool) {
v, ok := m.byIP[ip]
func (m mockPeerConnectivity) IsConnectedByIP(ip netip.Addr) (known, connected bool) {
v, ok := m.byIP[ip.String()]
if !ok {
return false, false
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
package local
import (
"context"
"net"
"net/netip"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/miekg/dns"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns/test"
nbdns "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/dns"
)
// recordingActivator records the addresses it was asked to warm and returns
// immediately, so ServeDNS is not blocked by the test.
type recordingActivator struct {
mu sync.Mutex
called bool
addrs []netip.Addr
}
func (r *recordingActivator) ActivatePeersByIP(_ context.Context, addrs []netip.Addr) {
r.mu.Lock()
defer r.mu.Unlock()
r.called = true
r.addrs = append(r.addrs, addrs...)
}
func serveA(t *testing.T, resolver *Resolver, name string) *dns.Msg {
t.Helper()
var resp *dns.Msg
w := &test.MockResponseWriter{WriteMsgFunc: func(m *dns.Msg) error { resp = m; return nil }}
resolver.ServeDNS(w, new(dns.Msg).SetQuestion(name, dns.TypeA))
return resp
}
// serviceZone registers rec in a match-only (non-authoritative) zone, the shape
// the synthesized private-service zones arrive in.
func serviceZone(t *testing.T, resolver *Resolver, zone string, records ...nbdns.SimpleRecord) {
t.Helper()
resolver.Update([]nbdns.CustomZone{{
Domain: zone,
Records: records,
NonAuthoritative: true,
}})
}
func TestLocalResolver_WarmsLazyPeerOnResolve(t *testing.T) {
// Warm-up fires only for multi-record answers (the HA / round-robin shape of
// the synthesized private-service zones), so register two peer targets.
const name = "svc.proxy.netbird.cloud."
recs := []nbdns.SimpleRecord{
{Name: name, Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "100.64.0.7"},
{Name: name, Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "100.64.0.8"},
}
resolver := NewResolver()
serviceZone(t, resolver, "proxy.netbird.cloud", recs...)
act := &recordingActivator{}
resolver.SetPeerActivator(act)
resp := serveA(t, resolver, name)
require.NotNil(t, resp, "resolver must answer")
require.NotEmpty(t, resp.Answer, "answer must carry the A records")
act.mu.Lock()
defer act.mu.Unlock()
assert.True(t, act.called, "activator must be invoked for a multi-record service-zone answer")
assert.Contains(t, act.addrs, netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.7"), "activator must receive the first peer IP")
assert.Contains(t, act.addrs, netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.8"), "activator must receive the second peer IP")
}
func TestLocalResolver_NoWarmupForSingleRecord(t *testing.T) {
// A single-record answer does not trigger warm-up; the resolver only warms
// multi-record answers.
rec := nbdns.SimpleRecord{Name: "svc.proxy.netbird.cloud.", Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "100.64.0.7"}
resolver := NewResolver()
serviceZone(t, resolver, "proxy.netbird.cloud", rec)
act := &recordingActivator{}
resolver.SetPeerActivator(act)
resp := serveA(t, resolver, rec.Name)
require.NotNil(t, resp, "resolver must answer")
require.NotEmpty(t, resp.Answer, "answer must carry the A record")
act.mu.Lock()
defer act.mu.Unlock()
assert.False(t, act.called, "activator must not be invoked for a single-record answer")
}
func TestLocalResolver_NoActivatorNoWarmup(t *testing.T) {
// With no activator wired the resolver behaves exactly as before.
rec := nbdns.SimpleRecord{Name: "svc.proxy.netbird.cloud.", Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "100.64.0.7"}
resolver := NewResolver()
serviceZone(t, resolver, "proxy.netbird.cloud", rec)
resp := serveA(t, resolver, rec.Name)
require.NotNil(t, resp, "resolver must still answer without an activator")
require.NotEmpty(t, resp.Answer, "answer must carry the A record")
}
func TestLocalResolver_NoWarmupForMissingRecord(t *testing.T) {
// A query that resolves to nothing must not invoke the activator (no IPs).
resolver := NewResolver()
serviceZone(t, resolver, "proxy.netbird.cloud",
nbdns.SimpleRecord{Name: "svc.proxy.netbird.cloud.", Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "100.64.0.7"})
act := &recordingActivator{}
resolver.SetPeerActivator(act)
serveA(t, resolver, "absent.proxy.netbird.cloud.")
act.mu.Lock()
defer act.mu.Unlock()
assert.False(t, act.called, "activator must not be invoked when there is no answer")
}
func TestLocalResolver_NoWarmupInAuthoritativeZone(t *testing.T) {
// The account's peer zone is authoritative; resolving a peer's name there
// must not wake its lazy connection — warm-up is scoped to match-only
// (non-authoritative) zones such as the synthesized private-service zones.
// Use a multi-record answer so the authoritative-zone scoping is the only
// reason warm-up is skipped, not the single-record guard.
const name = "peer.netbird.cloud."
recs := []nbdns.SimpleRecord{
{Name: name, Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "100.64.0.9"},
{Name: name, Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "100.64.0.10"},
}
resolver := NewResolver()
resolver.Update([]nbdns.CustomZone{{
Domain: "netbird.cloud",
Records: recs,
}})
act := &recordingActivator{}
resolver.SetPeerActivator(act)
resp := serveA(t, resolver, name)
require.NotNil(t, resp, "resolver must answer")
require.NotEmpty(t, resp.Answer, "answer must carry the A records")
act.mu.Lock()
defer act.mu.Unlock()
assert.False(t, act.called, "activator must not be invoked for authoritative-zone answers")
}
func TestLazyWarmupTimeoutFromEnv(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
value string
envSet bool
want time.Duration
}{
{name: "unset uses default", want: defaultLazyWarmupTimeout},
{name: "valid overrides", value: "5s", envSet: true, want: 5 * time.Second},
{name: "invalid falls back", value: "not-a-duration", envSet: true, want: defaultLazyWarmupTimeout},
{name: "negative falls back", value: "-1s", envSet: true, want: defaultLazyWarmupTimeout},
{name: "zero falls back", value: "0s", envSet: true, want: defaultLazyWarmupTimeout},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
if tt.envSet {
t.Setenv(envLazyWarmupTimeout, tt.value)
}
assert.Equal(t, tt.want, lazyWarmupTimeoutFromEnv())
assert.Equal(t, tt.want, NewResolver().warmupTimeout, "constructor must resolve the timeout once")
})
}
}
func TestExtractRecordAddr(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("A record yields unmapped v4", func(t *testing.T) {
// net.ParseIP returns the 16-byte v4-in-v6 form, the same shape
// miekg/dns stores after parsing an A record; the extracted address
// must compare equal to a plain v4 netip.Addr.
addr, ok := extractRecordAddr(&dns.A{A: net.ParseIP("100.64.0.7")})
require.True(t, ok)
assert.True(t, addr.Is4())
assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.7"), addr)
})
t.Run("AAAA record yields v6", func(t *testing.T) {
addr, ok := extractRecordAddr(&dns.AAAA{AAAA: net.ParseIP("fd00::1")})
require.True(t, ok)
assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::1"), addr)
})
t.Run("A record without address", func(t *testing.T) {
_, ok := extractRecordAddr(&dns.A{})
assert.False(t, ok)
})
t.Run("non-address record", func(t *testing.T) {
_, ok := extractRecordAddr(&dns.CNAME{Target: "target.netbird.cloud."})
assert.False(t, ok)
})
}

View File

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
"github.com/miekg/dns"
dnsconfig "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns/config"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns/local"
nbdns "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/dns"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
@@ -92,6 +93,11 @@ func (m *MockServer) SetFirewall(Firewall) {
// Mock implementation - no-op
}
// SetPeerActivator mock implementation of SetPeerActivator from Server interface
func (m *MockServer) SetPeerActivator(local.PeerActivator) {
// Mock implementation - no-op
}
// BeginBatch mock implementation of BeginBatch from Server interface
func (m *MockServer) BeginBatch() {
// Mock implementation - no-op

View File

@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ type Server interface {
PopulateManagementDomain(mgmtURL *url.URL) error
SetRouteSources(selected, active func() route.HAMap)
SetFirewall(Firewall)
SetPeerActivator(local.PeerActivator)
}
type nsGroupsByDomain struct {
@@ -491,6 +492,13 @@ func (s *DefaultServer) SetFirewall(fw Firewall) {
}
}
// SetPeerActivator wires the DNS-time lazy-connection warm-up on the local
// resolver. Injected after the connection manager exists (it does not at
// DNS-server construction time). Pass nil to disable.
func (s *DefaultServer) SetPeerActivator(a local.PeerActivator) {
s.localResolver.SetPeerActivator(a)
}
// Stop stops the server
func (s *DefaultServer) Stop() {
s.ctxCancel()
@@ -1435,11 +1443,11 @@ type localPeerConnectivity struct {
// IsConnectedByIP looks the IP up in the peerstore and surfaces both
// the known and connected bits. Used by Resolver.filterDisconnectedPeerAnswers.
func (l localPeerConnectivity) IsConnectedByIP(ip string) (known, connected bool) {
func (l localPeerConnectivity) IsConnectedByIP(ip netip.Addr) (known, connected bool) {
if l.status == nil {
return false, false
}
state, ok := l.status.PeerStateByIP(ip)
state, ok := l.status.PeerStateByIP(ip.String())
if !ok {
return false, false
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
package internal
import (
"context"
"net/netip"
"time"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peerstore"
)
const dnsActivationPollInterval = 50 * time.Millisecond
// dnsPeerActivator wakes lazy-connection peers from the DNS resolution path. It
// implements dns/local.PeerActivator. DNS queries run on their own goroutines,
// so it only touches state that is safe for concurrent use — ConnMgr.ActivatePeer,
// peerstore.Store and peer.Status — and never takes the engine's syncMsgMux,
// keeping DNS resolution from contending with network-map processing.
type dnsPeerActivator struct {
connMgr *ConnMgr
peerStore *peerstore.Store
status *peer.Status
// ctx is the engine's long-lived context. The connection dial is tied to it
// (not the per-query DNS wait budget) so a handshake that outlasts the wait
// still completes in the background rather than being cancelled at the deadline.
ctx context.Context
}
// ActivatePeersByIP triggers wake-up for the peer(s) owning addrs and waits
// until one is connected or ctx (the per-query DNS wait budget) expires.
// Activation itself is tied to the engine's long-lived context so the dial
// survives a wait that times out. Unknown or already-connected addresses are
// skipped, so the steady-state (warm) path adds no latency.
func (a *dnsPeerActivator) ActivatePeersByIP(ctx context.Context, addrs []netip.Addr) {
if a == nil || a.connMgr == nil {
return
}
var pending []string
for _, addr := range addrs {
ip := addr.String()
st, ok := a.status.PeerStateByIP(ip)
if !ok || st.ConnStatus == peer.StatusConnected {
continue
}
conn, ok := a.peerStore.PeerConn(st.PubKey)
if !ok {
continue
}
a.connMgr.ActivatePeer(a.ctx, conn)
pending = append(pending, ip)
}
if len(pending) == 0 {
return
}
a.waitConnected(ctx, pending)
}
// waitConnected blocks until any of ips reports a connected peer or ctx expires.
func (a *dnsPeerActivator) waitConnected(ctx context.Context, ips []string) {
ticker := time.NewTicker(dnsActivationPollInterval)
defer ticker.Stop()
for {
for _, ip := range ips {
if st, ok := a.status.PeerStateByIP(ip); ok && st.ConnStatus == peer.StatusConnected {
return
}
}
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case <-ticker.C:
}
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
package internal
import (
"context"
"net/netip"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peerstore"
)
func newTestPeerConn(t *testing.T, key string) *peer.Conn {
t.Helper()
conn, err := peer.NewConn(peer.ConnConfig{
Key: key,
LocalKey: "local",
WgConfig: peer.WgConfig{
AllowedIps: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("100.64.0.1/32")},
},
}, peer.ServiceDependencies{})
require.NoError(t, err)
return conn
}
func newTestDNSPeerActivator(t *testing.T) (*dnsPeerActivator, *peer.Status, *peerstore.Store) {
t.Helper()
status := peer.NewRecorder("https://mgm")
store := peerstore.NewConnStore()
// ConnMgr without Start: the lazy manager is nil, so ActivatePeer is a
// no-op — these tests exercise the activator's skip/wait logic.
connMgr := NewConnMgr(&EngineConfig{}, status, store, nil)
return &dnsPeerActivator{
connMgr: connMgr,
peerStore: store,
status: status,
ctx: context.Background(),
}, status, store
}
func TestDNSPeerActivator_NilSafe(t *testing.T) {
var a *dnsPeerActivator
a.ActivatePeersByIP(context.Background(), []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1")})
}
// TestDNSPeerActivator_SkipsUnknownAndConnectedPeers verifies the steady-state
// (warm) path adds no latency: already-connected and unknown addresses never
// enter the wait loop.
func TestDNSPeerActivator_SkipsUnknownAndConnectedPeers(t *testing.T) {
a, status, store := newTestDNSPeerActivator(t)
require.NoError(t, status.AddPeer("peerA", "a.netbird.cloud", "100.64.0.1", "fd00::1"))
require.NoError(t, status.UpdatePeerState(peer.State{PubKey: "peerA", ConnStatus: peer.StatusConnected}))
store.AddPeerConn("peerA", newTestPeerConn(t, "peerA"))
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
start := time.Now()
a.ActivatePeersByIP(ctx, []netip.Addr{
netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1"), // known, connected -> skipped
netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::1"), // known via IPv6, connected -> skipped
netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.99"), // unknown -> skipped
})
require.Less(t, time.Since(start), time.Second, "no pending peer must mean no wait")
}
// TestDNSPeerActivator_WaitsForPendingPeerToConnect verifies the wait loop
// returns as soon as a pending peer reports connected, well before the
// per-query budget expires.
func TestDNSPeerActivator_WaitsForPendingPeerToConnect(t *testing.T) {
a, status, store := newTestDNSPeerActivator(t)
require.NoError(t, status.AddPeer("peerA", "a.netbird.cloud", "100.64.0.1", ""))
store.AddPeerConn("peerA", newTestPeerConn(t, "peerA"))
go func() {
time.Sleep(150 * time.Millisecond)
_ = status.UpdatePeerState(peer.State{PubKey: "peerA", ConnStatus: peer.StatusConnected})
}()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
start := time.Now()
a.ActivatePeersByIP(ctx, []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1")})
elapsed := time.Since(start)
require.GreaterOrEqual(t, elapsed, 100*time.Millisecond, "must wait for the pending peer")
require.Less(t, elapsed, 5*time.Second, "must return on connect, not at the deadline")
}
// TestDNSPeerActivator_ReturnsAtBudgetWhenPeerStaysIdle verifies a peer that
// never connects releases the DNS response at the per-query budget instead of
// blocking it indefinitely.
func TestDNSPeerActivator_ReturnsAtBudgetWhenPeerStaysIdle(t *testing.T) {
a, status, store := newTestDNSPeerActivator(t)
require.NoError(t, status.AddPeer("peerA", "a.netbird.cloud", "100.64.0.1", ""))
store.AddPeerConn("peerA", newTestPeerConn(t, "peerA"))
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 300*time.Millisecond)
defer cancel()
start := time.Now()
a.ActivatePeersByIP(ctx, []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1")})
elapsed := time.Since(start)
require.GreaterOrEqual(t, elapsed, 250*time.Millisecond, "must wait out the budget for a pending peer")
require.Less(t, elapsed, 5*time.Second, "must not block past the budget")
}
// TestDNSPeerActivator_NoWaitWithoutPeerConn verifies a known-but-idle peer
// with no connection object in the store is not waited on: there is nothing to
// activate, so waiting could only ever time out.
func TestDNSPeerActivator_NoWaitWithoutPeerConn(t *testing.T) {
a, status, _ := newTestDNSPeerActivator(t)
require.NoError(t, status.AddPeer("peerA", "a.netbird.cloud", "100.64.0.1", ""))
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
start := time.Now()
a.ActivatePeersByIP(ctx, []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1")})
require.Less(t, time.Since(start), time.Second, "peer without a conn must not be waited on")
}

View File

@@ -52,11 +52,14 @@ int xdp_dns_fwd(struct iphdr *ip, struct udphdr *udp) {
if (udp->dest == GENERAL_DNS_PORT && ip->daddr == dns_ip) {
udp->dest = dns_port;
// Clear the now-stale checksum; zero means "not computed" for IPv4.
udp->check = 0;
return XDP_PASS;
}
if (udp->source == dns_port && ip->saddr == dns_ip) {
udp->source = GENERAL_DNS_PORT;
udp->check = 0;
return XDP_PASS;
}

View File

@@ -50,5 +50,11 @@ int xdp_wg_proxy(struct iphdr *ip, struct udphdr *udp) {
__be16 new_dst_port = htons(proxy_port);
udp->dest = new_dst_port;
udp->source = new_src_port;
// The ports are covered by the UDP checksum. This is an IPv4 loopback hop
// and the payload is already integrity-protected, so clear the checksum (a
// zero UDP checksum means "not computed" for IPv4) rather than leave a
// stale value the kernel would drop as UDP_CSUM.
udp->check = 0;
return XDP_PASS;
}

View File

@@ -64,7 +64,10 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
mgm "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/client"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
sharedgrpc "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/grpc"
nbnetworkmap "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/networkmap"
mgmProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
types "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/types"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/netiputil"
auth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/relay/auth/hmac"
relayClient "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/relay/client"
@@ -147,6 +150,7 @@ type EngineConfig struct {
BlockLANAccess bool
BlockInbound bool
DisableIPv6 bool
SyncMessageVersion *int
// LazyConnection is the MDM-sourced lazy-connection override; StateUnset defers to
// the env var and management feature flag.
@@ -220,6 +224,13 @@ type Engine struct {
// networkSerial is the latest CurrentSerial (state ID) of the network sent by the Management service
networkSerial uint64
// latestComponents is the most-recent NetworkMapComponents decoded from
// a NetworkMapEnvelope (capability=3 peers only). Held alongside the
// NetworkMap that Calculate() produced from it so future incremental
// updates have a base to apply changes against. nil for legacy-format
// peers. Guarded by syncMsgMux.
latestComponents *types.NetworkMapComponents
networkMonitor *networkmonitor.NetworkMonitor
sshServer sshServer
@@ -652,8 +663,24 @@ func (e *Engine) Start(netbirdConfig *mgmProto.NetbirdConfig, mgmtURL *url.URL)
iceCfg := e.createICEConfig()
e.connMgr = NewConnMgr(e.config, e.statusRecorder, e.peerStore, wgIface)
e.connMgr.SetRoutedIPsReconciler(func(peerKey string) error {
if e.routeManager == nil {
return nil
}
return e.routeManager.ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs(peerKey)
})
e.connMgr.Start(e.ctx)
// Wire DNS-time lazy-connection warm-up now that the connection manager
// exists (it does not at DNS-server construction time). A DNS answer that
// points at an idle peer then wakes it before the client's first request.
e.dnsServer.SetPeerActivator(&dnsPeerActivator{
connMgr: e.connMgr,
peerStore: e.peerStore,
status: e.statusRecorder,
ctx: e.ctx,
})
e.srWatcher = guard.NewSRWatcher(e.signal, e.relayManager, e.mobileDep.IFaceDiscover, iceCfg)
e.srWatcher.Start(peer.IsForceRelayed())
@@ -963,8 +990,12 @@ func (e *Engine) handleSync(update *mgmProto.SyncResponse) error {
e.ApplySessionDeadline(update.GetSessionExpiresAt())
if update.NetworkMap != nil && update.NetworkMap.PeerConfig != nil {
e.handleAutoUpdateVersion(update.NetworkMap.PeerConfig.AutoUpdate)
// Envelope sync responses carry PeerConfig at the top level; legacy
// NetworkMap syncs carry it under NetworkMap.PeerConfig.
if pc := update.GetPeerConfig(); pc != nil {
e.handleAutoUpdateVersion(pc.GetAutoUpdate())
} else if nm := update.GetNetworkMap(); nm != nil && nm.GetPeerConfig() != nil {
e.handleAutoUpdateVersion(nm.GetPeerConfig().GetAutoUpdate())
}
done := e.phase("netbird_config")
@@ -974,12 +1005,47 @@ func (e *Engine) handleSync(update *mgmProto.SyncResponse) error {
return err
}
// Decode the network map from either the components envelope or the
// legacy proto.NetworkMap before the posture-check gating below, so the
// "is there a network map" decision covers both wire shapes.
var (
nm *mgmProto.NetworkMap
components *types.NetworkMapComponents
)
if version := update.GetVersion(); version == int32(sharedgrpc.ComponentNetworkMap) {
// Components-format peer: decode the envelope back to typed
// components, run Calculate() locally, and convert to the wire
// NetworkMap shape the rest of the engine consumes. Components are
// retained so future incremental updates can apply deltas instead
// of doing a full reconstruction.
envelope := update.GetNetworkMapEnvelope()
if envelope == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("received a SyncReponse indicating use of components network map, but components are missing")
}
localKey := e.config.WgPrivateKey.PublicKey().String()
dnsName := ""
if pc := update.GetPeerConfig(); pc != nil {
// PeerConfig.Fqdn = "<dns_label>.<dns_domain>" — extract the
// shared domain by stripping the peer's own label prefix. Falls
// back to empty if the FQDN doesn't have the expected shape.
dnsName = extractDNSDomainFromFQDN(pc.GetFqdn())
}
result, err := nbnetworkmap.EnvelopeToNetworkMap(e.ctx, envelope, localKey, dnsName)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("decode network map envelope: %w", err)
}
nm = result.NetworkMap
components = result.Components
} else {
nm = update.GetNetworkMap()
}
// Posture checks are bound to the network map presence:
// NetworkMap != nil, checks present -> apply the received checks
// NetworkMap != nil, checks nil -> posture checks were removed, clear them
// NetworkMap == nil -> config-only update (e.g. relay token rotation),
// leave the previously applied checks untouched
nm := update.GetNetworkMap()
if nm == nil {
return nil
}
@@ -992,6 +1058,14 @@ func (e *Engine) handleSync(update *mgmProto.SyncResponse) error {
}
done = e.phase("persist")
// Only retain the components view when the server sent the envelope
// path. A legacy proto.NetworkMap means components == nil; writing it
// here would clobber a previously-cached snapshot, breaking the
// incremental-delta base on a future envelope sync.
if components != nil {
e.latestComponents = components
}
e.persistSyncResponse(update)
done()
@@ -1005,6 +1079,19 @@ func (e *Engine) handleSync(update *mgmProto.SyncResponse) error {
return nil
}
// extractDNSDomainFromFQDN returns the trailing dotted domain part of the
// receiving peer's FQDN — the same value the management server fills as
// dnsName when it builds the legacy NetworkMap. "peer42.netbird.cloud" →
// "netbird.cloud". An empty string is returned for unrecognized formats.
func extractDNSDomainFromFQDN(fqdn string) string {
for i := 0; i < len(fqdn); i++ {
if fqdn[i] == '.' && i+1 < len(fqdn) {
return fqdn[i+1:]
}
}
return ""
}
// updateNetbirdConfig applies the management-provided NetBird configuration:
// STUN/TURN and relay servers, flow logging and DNS settings. A nil config is a no-op,
// which is the case for sync updates carrying only a network map.
@@ -1164,6 +1251,7 @@ func (e *Engine) applyInfoFlags(info *system.Info) {
e.config.BlockLANAccess,
e.config.BlockInbound,
e.config.DisableIPv6,
e.config.SyncMessageVersion,
e.config.EnableSSHRoot,
e.config.EnableSSHSFTP,
e.config.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding,
@@ -2032,6 +2120,7 @@ func (e *Engine) readInitialSettings() ([]*route.Route, *nbdns.Config, bool, err
e.config.BlockLANAccess,
e.config.BlockInbound,
e.config.DisableIPv6,
e.config.SyncMessageVersion,
e.config.EnableSSHRoot,
e.config.EnableSSHSFTP,
e.config.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding,

View File

@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
package ipcauth
import (
"slices"
"strconv"
)
// Ownership is a profile's access policy: the typed owner principals plus the
// opt-in shared flag.
type Ownership struct {
Owners []string
Shared bool
}
// GroupResolver resolves a Unix caller's effective group IDs (primary +
// supplementary, NSS-aware) and owner group names to GIDs. It is only consulted
// for Unix `gid:`/`group:` owners; Windows uses the SIDs carried in the Identity.
// A nil resolver disables group matching.
type GroupResolver interface {
// CallerGIDs returns the set of group IDs the caller belongs to.
CallerGIDs(id Identity) map[uint32]struct{}
// GroupNameGID resolves a group name to its GID.
GroupNameGID(name string) (uint32, bool)
}
// Authorize reports whether the identity may control a profile with the given
// ownership. Privileged callers (root / elevated-admin / LocalSystem) and shared
// profiles are always allowed; otherwise the identity must match one of the
// owner principals.
func Authorize(o Ownership, id Identity, r GroupResolver) bool {
if id.IsPrivileged() {
return true
}
if o.Shared {
return true
}
for _, raw := range o.Owners {
p, ok := ParsePrincipal(raw)
if !ok {
continue
}
if principalMatches(p, id, r) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func principalMatches(p Principal, id Identity, r GroupResolver) bool {
switch p.Kind {
case KindUID:
if id.IsWindows() {
return false
}
uid, err := strconv.ParseUint(p.Value, 10, 32)
return err == nil && uint32(uid) == id.UID
case KindGID:
if id.IsWindows() {
return false
}
gid, err := strconv.ParseUint(p.Value, 10, 32)
return err == nil && callerHasGID(uint32(gid), id, r)
case KindGroup:
if id.IsWindows() || r == nil {
return false
}
gid, ok := r.GroupNameGID(p.Value)
return ok && callerHasGID(gid, id, r)
case KindSID:
if !id.IsWindows() {
return false
}
return id.SID == p.Value || slices.Contains(id.Groups, p.Value)
default:
return false
}
}
// callerHasGID reports whether gid is the caller's primary GID (from peercred,
// no lookup) or one of their supplementary groups (NSS-resolved via r).
func callerHasGID(gid uint32, id Identity, r GroupResolver) bool {
if id.GID == gid {
return true
}
if r == nil {
return false
}
_, ok := r.CallerGIDs(id)[gid]
return ok
}

View File

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
//go:build !linux && !darwin && !freebsd && !windows
package ipcauth
import "google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
// NewTransportCredentials returns nil on platforms without a peer-identity
// primitive. The daemon falls back to insecure credentials and skips per-RPC
// authorization (logging a warning), preserving pre-hardening behavior.
func NewTransportCredentials() credentials.TransportCredentials {
return nil
}

View File

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
//go:build linux || darwin || freebsd
package ipcauth
import (
"context"
"net"
"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
)
// NewTransportCredentials returns gRPC transport credentials that extract the
// caller's kernel-authenticated identity from a Unix-socket connection and
// expose it via IdentityFromContext. Non-nil on platforms with a
// peer-credential primitive.
func NewTransportCredentials() credentials.TransportCredentials {
return unixCreds{}
}
// unixCreds implements credentials.TransportCredentials over a Unix socket.
// The server side reads SO_PEERCRED/LOCAL_PEERCRED during the handshake; the
// client side is a no-op (the kernel supplies the peer identity to the server
// without any client cooperation), so an ordinary insecure client still works.
type unixCreds struct{}
func (unixCreds) ClientHandshake(_ context.Context, _ string, conn net.Conn) (net.Conn, credentials.AuthInfo, error) {
return conn, AuthInfo{}, nil
}
// ServerHandshake extracts the peer identity and fails closed if it cannot be read.
func (unixCreds) ServerHandshake(conn net.Conn) (net.Conn, credentials.AuthInfo, error) {
id, err := PeerIdentity(conn)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
return conn, AuthInfo{
CommonAuthInfo: credentials.CommonAuthInfo{SecurityLevel: credentials.NoSecurity},
Identity: id,
}, nil
}
func (unixCreds) Info() credentials.ProtocolInfo {
return credentials.ProtocolInfo{SecurityProtocol: "netbird-ipc-peercred"}
}
func (unixCreds) Clone() credentials.TransportCredentials { return unixCreds{} }
func (unixCreds) OverrideServerName(string) error { return nil }

View File

@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
//go:build windows
package ipcauth
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"net"
"runtime"
"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
)
var (
modadvapi32 = windows.NewLazySystemDLL("advapi32.dll")
procImpersonateNamedPipeClient = modadvapi32.NewProc("ImpersonateNamedPipeClient")
)
// DefaultPipeSDDL keeps the daemon control pipe open to any LOCAL caller, on par
// with the Unix socket's 0666 mode.
//
// D:P protected DACL, no inheritance
// (D;;GA;;;NU) deny GENERIC_ALL to NETWORK (remote/SMB)
// (A;;GA;;;SY) allow GENERIC_ALL to LocalSystem (the daemon itself)
// (A;;GA;;;WD) allow GENERIC_ALL to Everyone (local, per-RPC ACL gates)
func DefaultPipeSDDL() string {
return "D:P(D;;GA;;;NU)(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;GA;;;WD)"
}
// NewTransportCredentials returns gRPC transport credentials that derive the
// caller's identity from the named-pipe client token.
//
// This requires the client to dial at SECURITY_IDENTIFICATION (see dialNamedPipe).
func NewTransportCredentials() credentials.TransportCredentials {
return winpipeCreds{}
}
type winpipeCreds struct{}
func (winpipeCreds) ClientHandshake(_ context.Context, _ string, conn net.Conn) (net.Conn, credentials.AuthInfo, error) {
return conn, AuthInfo{}, nil
}
// ServerHandshake extracts the connecting client's identity from the pipe. Fails
// closed if the handle or token cannot be read.
func (winpipeCreds) ServerHandshake(conn net.Conn) (net.Conn, credentials.AuthInfo, error) {
// go-winio's pipe connection embeds *win32File, which exposes Fd().
fdConn, ok := conn.(interface{ Fd() uintptr })
if !ok {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("connection %T does not expose a pipe handle", conn)
}
handle := windows.Handle(fdConn.Fd())
id, err := pipeClientIdentity(handle)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
return conn, AuthInfo{
CommonAuthInfo: credentials.CommonAuthInfo{SecurityLevel: credentials.NoSecurity},
Identity: id,
}, nil
}
func (winpipeCreds) Info() credentials.ProtocolInfo {
return credentials.ProtocolInfo{SecurityProtocol: "netbird-ipc-peercred"}
}
func (winpipeCreds) Clone() credentials.TransportCredentials { return winpipeCreds{} }
func (winpipeCreds) OverrideServerName(string) error { return nil }
// pipeClientIdentity reads the connecting client's user SID, enabled group SIDs,
// and elevation by impersonating the pipe client on this thread and reading the
// impersonation token.
func pipeClientIdentity(handle windows.Handle) (id Identity, err error) {
runtime.LockOSThread()
defer runtime.UnlockOSThread()
if err = impersonateNamedPipeClient(handle); err != nil {
return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("impersonate named pipe client: %w", err)
}
defer func() {
// Surface revert error if there are no other errors.
revErr := windows.RevertToSelf()
if err == nil {
err = revErr
}
}()
// openAsSelf=true: the token is opened using the daemon's process context
// (LocalSystem), not the impersonated client's, so the open always succeeds.
var token windows.Token
if err = windows.OpenThreadToken(windows.CurrentThread(), windows.TOKEN_QUERY, true, &token); err != nil {
return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("open thread token: %w", err)
}
defer token.Close()
tu, err := token.GetTokenUser()
if err != nil {
return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("get token user: %w", err)
}
tg, err := token.GetTokenGroups()
if err != nil {
return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("get token groups: %w", err)
}
var groups []string
for _, g := range tg.AllGroups() {
if g.Attributes&windows.SE_GROUP_ENABLED == 0 || g.Attributes&windows.SE_GROUP_USE_FOR_DENY_ONLY != 0 {
continue
}
groups = append(groups, g.Sid.String())
}
return Identity{
SID: tu.User.Sid.String(),
Groups: groups,
Elevated: token.IsElevated(),
}, nil
}
func impersonateNamedPipeClient(h windows.Handle) error {
r, _, e := procImpersonateNamedPipeClient.Call(uintptr(h))
if r == 0 {
return e
}
return nil
}

View File

@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
package ipcauth
import (
"context"
"strconv"
"google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
)
// Metadata keys used by the local JSON gateway to forward the HTTP client's
// identity to the daemon. Trusted by the interceptor ONLY when the gRPC peer is
// itself the daemon (self/privileged) — i.e. the loopback gateway — so a direct
// gRPC caller cannot forge them.
const (
mdFwdUID = "x-netbird-fwd-uid"
mdFwdGID = "x-netbird-fwd-gid"
)
// ForwardIdentityMetadata encodes a Unix identity for the gateway to forward to
// the daemon. Windows identities are not forwarded (the gateway cannot read a
// pipe token for an HTTP client); nil is returned in that case.
func ForwardIdentityMetadata(id Identity) metadata.MD {
if id.IsWindows() {
return nil
}
return metadata.Pairs(
mdFwdUID, strconv.FormatUint(uint64(id.UID), 10),
mdFwdGID, strconv.FormatUint(uint64(id.GID), 10),
)
}
// forwardedIdentity extracts a forwarded Unix identity from incoming gRPC
// metadata, if present and well-formed.
func forwardedIdentity(ctx context.Context) (Identity, bool) {
md, ok := metadata.FromIncomingContext(ctx)
if !ok {
return Identity{}, false
}
uidStr := mdFirst(md, mdFwdUID)
if uidStr == "" {
return Identity{}, false
}
uid, err := strconv.ParseUint(uidStr, 10, 32)
if err != nil {
return Identity{}, false
}
id := Identity{UID: uint32(uid)}
if g := mdFirst(md, mdFwdGID); g != "" {
if v, err := strconv.ParseUint(g, 10, 32); err == nil {
id.GID = uint32(v)
}
}
return id, true
}
func mdFirst(md metadata.MD, key string) string {
if v := md.Get(key); len(v) > 0 {
return v[0]
}
return ""
}

View File

@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
// Package ipcauth provides the kernel-authenticated identity of a local IPC
// (gRPC) caller and the transport credentials that surface it into the gRPC
// context, so the daemon can authorize each RPC by caller identity.
//
// On Unix the identity is read from the kernel via SO_PEERCRED (Linux) or
// LOCAL_PEERCRED (Darwin/FreeBSD). On Windows it is derived from the named-pipe
// client token. Platforms without a peer-identity primitive get no credentials
// and therefore no enforcement (the daemon logs a warning and stays open,
// preserving today's behavior until the transport gains an identity primitive).
package ipcauth
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
"google.golang.org/grpc/peer"
)
// sidLocalSystem is the well-known Windows SID for the LocalSystem account.
const sidLocalSystem = "S-1-5-18"
// Identity is the kernel-authenticated identity of a local IPC caller. The zero
// value is not a valid identity; obtain one via IdentityFromContext (which
// reports presence) or PeerIdentity.
type Identity struct {
// UID and GID are the caller's Unix user ID and primary group ID.
// Zero on Windows, where SID is authoritative instead.
UID uint32
GID uint32
// SID is the caller's Windows security identifier (empty on Unix).
SID string
// Groups holds the caller's Windows group SIDs, captured from the client
// token at handshake (empty on Unix, where supplementary group membership is
// resolved on demand via NSS/getent by the authorizer).
Groups []string
// Elevated reports whether the Windows client token is elevated (run as
// administrator). Always false on Unix, where privilege is uid==0.
Elevated bool
}
// IsWindows reports whether this identity is a Windows principal (SID-based)
// rather than a Unix uid/gid principal.
func (i Identity) IsWindows() bool {
return i.SID != ""
}
// IsPrivileged reports whether the caller is the platform's administrative
// principal — Unix root (uid 0), or on Windows an elevated token or LocalSystem.
// It deliberately requires actual elevation on Windows (a non-elevated member of
// Administrators has a filtered token and is NOT privileged), mirroring "must
// really be root" on Unix.
func (i Identity) IsPrivileged() bool {
if i.IsWindows() {
return i.Elevated || i.SID == sidLocalSystem
}
return i.UID == 0
}
// String renders the identity for audit logs.
func (i Identity) String() string {
if i.IsWindows() {
return fmt.Sprintf("sid=%s elevated=%t", i.SID, i.Elevated)
}
return fmt.Sprintf("uid=%d gid=%d", i.UID, i.GID)
}
// AuthInfo carries the peer Identity as a gRPC credentials.AuthInfo so the
// interceptor can retrieve it from the request context via IdentityFromContext.
type AuthInfo struct {
credentials.CommonAuthInfo
Identity Identity
}
// AuthType identifies the authentication scheme.
func (AuthInfo) AuthType() string { return "netbird-ipc-peercred" }
// IdentityFromContext extracts the caller's kernel-authenticated identity from
// the gRPC peer context. The second return value is false when no IPC transport
// credentials were negotiated (e.g. an unsupported platform, or a caller that
// did not come through the daemon socket) — callers MUST fail closed in that case.
func IdentityFromContext(ctx context.Context) (Identity, bool) {
p, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)
if !ok {
return Identity{}, false
}
info, ok := p.AuthInfo.(AuthInfo)
if !ok {
return Identity{}, false
}
return info.Identity, true
}

View File

@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
package ipcauth
import (
"context"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
"google.golang.org/grpc/peer"
)
func TestIdentityFromContext_NoPeer(t *testing.T) {
_, ok := IdentityFromContext(context.Background())
assert.False(t, ok, "bare context must report no identity (fail closed)")
}
func TestIdentityFromContext_WrongAuthInfo(t *testing.T) {
ctx := peer.NewContext(context.Background(), &peer.Peer{})
_, ok := IdentityFromContext(ctx)
assert.False(t, ok, "peer without our AuthInfo must report no identity")
}
func TestIdentityFromContext_Present(t *testing.T) {
want := Identity{UID: 1000, GID: 1000}
ctx := peer.NewContext(context.Background(), &peer.Peer{
AuthInfo: AuthInfo{
CommonAuthInfo: credentials.CommonAuthInfo{SecurityLevel: credentials.NoSecurity},
Identity: want,
},
})
got, ok := IdentityFromContext(ctx)
assert.True(t, ok)
assert.Equal(t, want, got)
}
func TestIdentity_IsPrivileged(t *testing.T) {
// Unix
assert.True(t, Identity{UID: 0}.IsPrivileged(), "root is privileged")
assert.False(t, Identity{UID: 1000}.IsPrivileged(), "non-root is not privileged")
// Windows
assert.True(t, Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-1-2-3-1001", Elevated: true}.IsPrivileged(), "elevated admin is privileged")
assert.True(t, Identity{SID: "S-1-5-18"}.IsPrivileged(), "LocalSystem is privileged")
assert.False(t, Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-1-2-3-1001"}.IsPrivileged(), "non-elevated admin is NOT privileged")
}
func TestIdentity_IsWindows(t *testing.T) {
assert.True(t, Identity{SID: "S-1-5-18"}.IsWindows())
assert.False(t, Identity{UID: 0}.IsWindows())
}

View File

@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
package ipcauth
import (
"context"
"os"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"google.golang.org/grpc"
"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
"google.golang.org/grpc/status"
)
// Interceptor enforces per-RPC authorization on the daemon control channel,
// keyed to the caller's kernel-authenticated identity. It is safe-by-default:
// any RPC without a matching bypass is gated by the active profile's ownership,
// and a caller without a readable identity is denied.
type Interceptor struct {
policy ProfilePolicy
resolver GroupResolver
// selfUID is the daemon's own effective UID. A caller whose UID matches it
// (rootless container / foreground daemon running as the invoking user) is
// allowed: it already has full control of the daemon process. -1 on Windows.
selfUID int
}
// NewInterceptor builds an interceptor over the given policy and group resolver.
func NewInterceptor(policy ProfilePolicy, resolver GroupResolver) *Interceptor {
return &Interceptor{policy: policy, resolver: resolver, selfUID: os.Geteuid()}
}
// UnaryServerInterceptor authorizes each unary RPC before the handler runs.
func (i *Interceptor) UnaryServerInterceptor() grpc.UnaryServerInterceptor {
return func(ctx context.Context, req any, info *grpc.UnaryServerInfo, handler grpc.UnaryHandler) (any, error) {
if err := i.authorize(ctx, info.FullMethod); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return handler(ctx, req)
}
}
// StreamServerInterceptor authorizes each streaming RPC before the handler runs.
func (i *Interceptor) StreamServerInterceptor() grpc.StreamServerInterceptor {
return func(srv any, ss grpc.ServerStream, info *grpc.StreamServerInfo, handler grpc.StreamHandler) error {
if err := i.authorize(ss.Context(), info.FullMethod); err != nil {
return err
}
return handler(srv, ss)
}
}
func (i *Interceptor) authorize(ctx context.Context, fullMethod string) error {
id, ok := IdentityFromContext(ctx)
if !ok {
log.Warnf("ipc authz: DENY %s — caller identity unavailable", fullMethod)
return status.Error(codes.PermissionDenied, "caller identity could not be verified on the daemon control channel")
}
if i.isSelfOrPrivileged(id) {
// The local JSON gateway connects as the daemon itself (self/privileged)
// and forwards the real HTTP client's identity. Trust it here — and only
// here, where the transport peer is already the daemon — then authorize
// as the forwarded client. A direct non-privileged caller never reaches
// this branch, so it cannot forge the forwarding metadata.
fwd, hasFwd := forwardedIdentity(ctx)
if !hasFwd {
i.auditAllow(id, fullMethod)
return nil
}
log.Infof("ipc authz: honoring gateway-forwarded identity %s", fwd)
id = fwd
if i.isSelfOrPrivileged(id) {
i.auditAllow(id, fullMethod)
return nil
}
}
// Per-user / per-target-profile RPCs authorize themselves in the handler.
if handlerAuthorizedMethods[fullMethod] {
return nil
}
o := i.policy.ActiveProfileOwnership()
// Trust-on-first-use: an unowned, non-shared profile is claimed by the first
// caller. The claim is atomic; if we lose the race we re-read and authorize.
if len(o.Owners) == 0 && !o.Shared {
claimed, err := i.policy.ClaimActiveProfileOwnerIfUnowned(id)
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("ipc authz: claim active profile for %s: %v", id, err)
return status.Error(codes.Internal, "failed to claim profile ownership")
}
if claimed {
log.Infof("ipc authz: %s claimed ownership of the active profile (trust-on-first-use)", id)
i.auditAllow(id, fullMethod)
return nil
}
o = i.policy.ActiveProfileOwnership()
}
if Authorize(o, id, i.resolver) {
i.auditAllow(id, fullMethod)
return nil
}
log.Warnf("ipc authz: DENY %s for %s — active profile owned by another principal", fullMethod, id)
return status.Errorf(codes.PermissionDenied,
"not authorized to control the active profile (caller %s); ask an owner or run as root/administrator", id)
}
// isSelfOrPrivileged reports whether the caller is the platform administrator
// (root / elevated-admin / LocalSystem) or the daemon's own user.
func (i *Interceptor) isSelfOrPrivileged(id Identity) bool {
if id.IsPrivileged() {
return true
}
// Daemon-self: only meaningful on Unix (Windows privilege is covered above).
return !id.IsWindows() && i.selfUID >= 0 && int(id.UID) == i.selfUID
}
func (i *Interceptor) auditAllow(id Identity, fullMethod string) {
if auditMethods[fullMethod] {
log.Infof("ipc authz: allow %s for %s", fullMethod, id)
}
}

View File

@@ -1,139 +0,0 @@
package ipcauth
import (
"context"
"strconv"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
"google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
"google.golang.org/grpc/peer"
"google.golang.org/grpc/status"
)
type mockPolicy struct {
o Ownership
claimed bool
}
func (m *mockPolicy) ActiveProfileOwnership() Ownership { return m.o }
// ClaimActiveProfileOwnerIfUnowned records a claim and marks the profile owned.
func (m *mockPolicy) ClaimActiveProfileOwnerIfUnowned(id Identity) (bool, error) {
if len(m.o.Owners) == 0 && !m.o.Shared {
m.o.Owners = []string{OwnerPrincipalForIdentity(id)}
m.claimed = true
return true, nil
}
return false, nil
}
type mockResolver struct {
gids map[uint32]struct{}
names map[string]uint32
}
func (m mockResolver) CallerGIDs(Identity) map[uint32]struct{} { return m.gids }
func (m mockResolver) GroupNameGID(n string) (uint32, bool) { g, ok := m.names[n]; return g, ok }
func ctxWith(id Identity) context.Context {
return peer.NewContext(context.Background(), &peer.Peer{AuthInfo: AuthInfo{Identity: id}})
}
const (
up = servicePath + "Up"
list = servicePath + "ListProfiles"
unkwn = servicePath + "SomeFutureMethod"
)
func TestInterceptorAuthorize(t *testing.T) {
const selfUID = 4000
tests := []struct {
name string
own Ownership
resolver GroupResolver
ctx context.Context
method string
wantErr bool
}{
{"no identity denies", Ownership{}, nil, context.Background(), up, true},
{"root allowed", Ownership{}, nil, ctxWith(Identity{UID: 0}), up, false},
{"daemon-self allowed", Ownership{}, nil, ctxWith(Identity{UID: selfUID}), up, false},
{"shared allows any", Ownership{Shared: true}, nil, ctxWith(Identity{UID: 1234}), up, false},
{"uid owner allowed", Ownership{Owners: []string{"uid:1000"}}, nil, ctxWith(Identity{UID: 1000}), up, false},
{"non-owner denied", Ownership{Owners: []string{"uid:1000"}}, nil, ctxWith(Identity{UID: 2000}), up, true},
{"handler-authorized bypass", Ownership{Owners: []string{"uid:1000"}}, nil, ctxWith(Identity{UID: 2000}), list, false},
{"unknown method gated", Ownership{Owners: []string{"uid:1000"}}, nil, ctxWith(Identity{UID: 2000}), unkwn, true},
{"primary gid owner", Ownership{Owners: []string{"gid:5000"}}, nil, ctxWith(Identity{UID: 2000, GID: 5000}), up, false},
{"group-name owner via resolver", Ownership{Owners: []string{"group:admins"}},
mockResolver{names: map[string]uint32{"admins": 5000}, gids: map[uint32]struct{}{5000: {}}},
ctxWith(Identity{UID: 2000, GID: 42}), up, false},
{"windows sid owner", Ownership{Owners: []string{"sid:S-1-5-21-9"}}, nil,
ctxWith(Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-9"}), up, false},
{"windows group-sid owner", Ownership{Owners: []string{"sid:S-1-5-32-544"}}, nil,
ctxWith(Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-1", Groups: []string{"S-1-5-32-544"}}), up, false},
{"windows elevated privileged", Ownership{}, nil,
ctxWith(Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-1", Elevated: true}), up, false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
i := &Interceptor{policy: &mockPolicy{o: tt.own}, resolver: tt.resolver, selfUID: selfUID}
err := i.authorize(tt.ctx, tt.method)
if tt.wantErr {
assert.Error(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, codes.PermissionDenied, status.Code(err))
} else {
assert.NoError(t, err)
}
})
}
}
// TestInterceptorForwardedIdentity verifies the JSON-gateway trust model: a
// self/privileged transport peer (the loopback gateway) may forward a real
// client identity, but a non-privileged caller cannot forge it.
func TestInterceptorForwardedIdentity(t *testing.T) {
const selfUID = 4000
owners := Ownership{Owners: []string{"uid:1000"}}
withFwd := func(peerUID, fwdUID uint32) context.Context {
ctx := ctxWith(Identity{UID: peerUID})
return metadata.NewIncomingContext(ctx, metadata.Pairs(mdFwdUID, itoa(fwdUID)))
}
// Gateway (peer == daemon-self) forwards a non-owner client → denied as that client.
i := &Interceptor{policy: &mockPolicy{o: owners}, selfUID: selfUID}
assert.Error(t, i.authorize(withFwd(selfUID, 2000), up))
// Gateway forwards the owner → allowed.
assert.NoError(t, i.authorize(withFwd(selfUID, 1000), up))
// A non-privileged direct caller's forwarded metadata is IGNORED (can't forge):
// caller uid 2000 forwarding uid:1000 is still treated as 2000 → denied.
assert.Error(t, i.authorize(withFwd(2000, 1000), up))
}
func itoa(u uint32) string {
return strconv.FormatUint(uint64(u), 10)
}
// TestInterceptorTOFU verifies an unowned, non-shared profile is claimed by the
// first non-privileged caller, and a different caller is then denied.
func TestInterceptorTOFU(t *testing.T) {
policy := &mockPolicy{o: Ownership{}} // unowned
i := &Interceptor{policy: policy, resolver: nil, selfUID: 4000}
// First caller (uid 1000) claims via TOFU.
err := i.authorize(ctxWith(Identity{UID: 1000}), up)
assert.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, policy.claimed, "first caller should claim ownership")
assert.Equal(t, []string{"uid:1000"}, policy.o.Owners)
// A different caller is now denied (profile owned by uid 1000).
err = i.authorize(ctxWith(Identity{UID: 2000}), up)
assert.Error(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, codes.PermissionDenied, status.Code(err))
}

View File

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
//go:build darwin || freebsd
package ipcauth
import (
"fmt"
"net"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
// PeerIdentity reads the kernel-authenticated identity of the process on the
// other end of a Unix socket connection via LOCAL_PEERCRED (xucred). xucred
// carries the uid and primary group.
func PeerIdentity(c net.Conn) (Identity, error) {
uc, ok := c.(*net.UnixConn)
if !ok {
return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("connection is not a unix socket: %T", c)
}
raw, err := uc.SyscallConn()
if err != nil {
return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("raw conn: %w", err)
}
var cred *unix.Xucred
var credErr error
if err := raw.Control(func(fd uintptr) {
cred, credErr = unix.GetsockoptXucred(int(fd), unix.SOL_LOCAL, unix.LOCAL_PEERCRED)
}); err != nil {
return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("getsockopt control: %w", err)
}
if credErr != nil {
return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("LOCAL_PEERCRED: %w", credErr)
}
id := Identity{UID: cred.Uid}
// Groups[0] is the effective (primary) GID; guard against an empty list.
if cred.Ngroups > 0 {
id.GID = cred.Groups[0]
}
return id, nil
}

View File

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
//go:build linux
package ipcauth
import (
"fmt"
"net"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
// PeerIdentity reads the kernel-authenticated identity of the process on the
// other end of a Unix socket connection via SO_PEERCRED. The credentials are
// captured by the kernel at connect() time and cannot be spoofed or changed for
// the life of the connection.
func PeerIdentity(c net.Conn) (Identity, error) {
uc, ok := c.(*net.UnixConn)
if !ok {
return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("connection is not a unix socket: %T", c)
}
raw, err := uc.SyscallConn()
if err != nil {
return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("raw conn: %w", err)
}
var cred *unix.Ucred
var credErr error
if err := raw.Control(func(fd uintptr) {
cred, credErr = unix.GetsockoptUcred(int(fd), unix.SOL_SOCKET, unix.SO_PEERCRED)
}); err != nil {
return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("getsockopt control: %w", err)
}
if credErr != nil {
return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("SO_PEERCRED: %w", credErr)
}
return Identity{
UID: cred.Uid,
GID: cred.Gid,
}, nil
}

View File

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
//go:build !linux && !darwin && !freebsd
package ipcauth
import (
"fmt"
"net"
"runtime"
)
// PeerIdentity is unimplemented on platforms without a Unix-socket peer-credential
// primitive. Windows derives identity from the named-pipe client token instead
// (see the Windows transport credentials), so it never calls this.
func PeerIdentity(net.Conn) (Identity, error) {
return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("peer credential check not supported on %s", runtime.GOOS)
}

View File

@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
//go:build linux || darwin || freebsd
package ipcauth
import (
"context"
"net"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"google.golang.org/grpc"
"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials/insecure"
"google.golang.org/grpc/health"
healthpb "google.golang.org/grpc/health/grpc_health_v1"
)
// TestPeerIdentity_MatchesCurrentProcess connects to a real Unix socket and
// verifies the extracted UID/GID match the running process (both ends are us).
func TestPeerIdentity_MatchesCurrentProcess(t *testing.T) {
sock := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "peer.sock")
ln, err := net.Listen("unix", sock)
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = ln.Close() })
type result struct {
id Identity
err error
}
done := make(chan result, 1)
go func() {
c, aerr := ln.Accept()
if aerr != nil {
done <- result{err: aerr}
return
}
defer func() { _ = c.Close() }()
id, ierr := PeerIdentity(c)
done <- result{id: id, err: ierr}
}()
client, err := net.Dial("unix", sock)
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = client.Close() })
res := <-done
require.NoError(t, res.err)
assert.Equal(t, uint32(os.Getuid()), res.id.UID, "UID should match current process")
assert.Equal(t, uint32(os.Getgid()), res.id.GID, "primary GID should match current process")
}
// TestPeerIdentity_NonUnixConn rejects non-Unix connections (fail closed).
func TestPeerIdentity_NonUnixConn(t *testing.T) {
ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = ln.Close() })
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
c, aerr := ln.Accept()
if aerr != nil {
done <- aerr
return
}
defer func() { _ = c.Close() }()
_, ierr := PeerIdentity(c)
done <- ierr
}()
client, err := net.Dial("tcp", ln.Addr().String())
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = client.Close() })
assert.Error(t, <-done, "PeerIdentity must reject a non-Unix connection")
}
// TestGRPCRoundTrip_ServerCredsClientInsecure proves the transport contract end
// to end: a gRPC server using the peercred transport credentials still serves a
// plain insecure client (the CLI never changed), and the caller's kernel
// identity reaches the handler via IdentityFromContext.
func TestGRPCRoundTrip_ServerCredsClientInsecure(t *testing.T) {
sock := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "rt.sock")
ln, err := net.Listen("unix", sock)
require.NoError(t, err)
var gotUID uint32
var gotOK bool
srv := grpc.NewServer(
grpc.Creds(NewTransportCredentials()),
grpc.UnaryInterceptor(func(ctx context.Context, req any, _ *grpc.UnaryServerInfo, h grpc.UnaryHandler) (any, error) {
id, ok := IdentityFromContext(ctx)
gotUID, gotOK = id.UID, ok
return h(ctx, req)
}),
)
healthpb.RegisterHealthServer(srv, health.NewServer())
go func() { _ = srv.Serve(ln) }()
t.Cleanup(srv.Stop)
conn, err := grpc.NewClient("unix://"+sock, grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials()))
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = conn.Close() })
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
_, err = healthpb.NewHealthClient(conn).Check(ctx, &healthpb.HealthCheckRequest{})
require.NoError(t, err, "insecure client must reach the peercred server")
assert.True(t, gotOK, "handler must see a peer identity")
assert.Equal(t, uint32(os.Getuid()), gotUID, "handler must see the caller's UID")
}

View File

@@ -1,92 +0,0 @@
package ipcauth
import "sync"
const servicePath = "/daemon.DaemonService/"
// ProfilePolicy exposes the active profile's ownership to the interceptor. The
// daemon server implements it; ConfigAdapter bridges the gap because the gRPC
// server (and its interceptor) is constructed before the server instance exists.
type ProfilePolicy interface {
// ActiveProfileOwnership returns the active profile's ownership policy.
ActiveProfileOwnership() Ownership
// ClaimActiveProfileOwnerIfUnowned atomically claims the active profile for
// id when it has no owners and is not shared (trust-on-first-use), and
// reports whether id is now an owner. A false return means the profile was
// already owned/shared or another caller won the claim — the caller must
// re-read ownership and authorize normally.
ClaimActiveProfileOwnerIfUnowned(id Identity) (bool, error)
}
// handlerAuthorizedMethods bypass the active-profile gate: they are per-user or
// per-target-profile operations whose handler does its own authorization (bound
// to the caller identity). Peer identity is still required to reach them.
var handlerAuthorizedMethods = map[string]bool{
servicePath + "AddProfile": true,
servicePath + "ListProfiles": true,
servicePath + "GetActiveProfile": true,
servicePath + "RemoveProfile": true,
servicePath + "RenameProfile": true,
}
// auditMethods are the Tier-C/H RPCs (threat model §3) whose successful
// authorization is worth an audit log line. Denials are always logged.
var auditMethods = map[string]bool{
servicePath + "GetConfig": true,
servicePath + "SetConfig": true,
servicePath + "Login": true,
servicePath + "WaitSSOLogin": true,
servicePath + "RequestJWTAuth": true,
servicePath + "WaitJWTToken": true,
servicePath + "StartCapture": true,
servicePath + "StartBundleCapture": true,
servicePath + "DebugBundle": true,
servicePath + "ExposeService": true,
servicePath + "Up": true,
servicePath + "Down": true,
servicePath + "SelectNetworks": true,
servicePath + "DeselectNetworks": true,
servicePath + "SwitchProfile": true,
servicePath + "TriggerUpdate": true,
servicePath + "Logout": true,
servicePath + "CleanState": true,
servicePath + "DeleteState": true,
}
// ConfigAdapter is a ProfilePolicy whose backend is set lazily, once the daemon
// server instance is created. Until then it reports an unowned profile
// (Ownership zero value), so non-privileged callers are denied — fail closed.
type ConfigAdapter struct {
mu sync.RWMutex
backend ProfilePolicy
}
// SetBackend installs the real policy. Must be called before serving RPCs.
func (a *ConfigAdapter) SetBackend(backend ProfilePolicy) {
a.mu.Lock()
defer a.mu.Unlock()
a.backend = backend
}
// ActiveProfileOwnership delegates to the backend, or reports an unowned profile
// when no backend is set yet.
func (a *ConfigAdapter) ActiveProfileOwnership() Ownership {
a.mu.RLock()
defer a.mu.RUnlock()
if a.backend == nil {
return Ownership{}
}
return a.backend.ActiveProfileOwnership()
}
// ClaimActiveProfileOwnerIfUnowned delegates to the backend. Before the backend
// is set it cannot claim, so it reports not-owned (fail closed).
func (a *ConfigAdapter) ClaimActiveProfileOwnerIfUnowned(id Identity) (bool, error) {
a.mu.RLock()
defer a.mu.RUnlock()
if a.backend == nil {
return false, nil
}
return a.backend.ClaimActiveProfileOwnerIfUnowned(id)
}

View File

@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
package ipcauth
import (
"strconv"
"strings"
)
// PrincipalKind is the type of an owner principal.
type PrincipalKind string
const (
KindUID PrincipalKind = "uid" // Unix user ID
KindGID PrincipalKind = "gid" // Unix group ID
KindGroup PrincipalKind = "group" // Unix group name (NSS-resolved)
KindSID PrincipalKind = "sid" // Windows user or group SID
)
// Principal is a parsed owner entry from a profile's Owners list.
type Principal struct {
Kind PrincipalKind
Value string
}
// ParsePrincipal parses a "kind:value" owner string. Returns false for empty
// values or unknown kinds so malformed entries are ignored rather than trusted.
func ParsePrincipal(s string) (Principal, bool) {
kind, value, ok := strings.Cut(s, ":")
if !ok || value == "" {
return Principal{}, false
}
switch PrincipalKind(kind) {
case KindUID, KindGID, KindGroup, KindSID:
return Principal{Kind: PrincipalKind(kind), Value: value}, true
default:
return Principal{}, false
}
}
// UIDPrincipal builds the owner string for a Unix user ID.
func UIDPrincipal(uid uint32) string {
return string(KindUID) + ":" + strconv.FormatUint(uint64(uid), 10)
}
// SIDPrincipal builds the owner string for a Windows SID.
func SIDPrincipal(sid string) string { return string(KindSID) + ":" + sid }
// OwnerPrincipalForIdentity returns the self-ownership principal for an identity:
// the user's UID on Unix, or the user's SID on Windows. Used to auto-isolate a
// new profile to its creator.
func OwnerPrincipalForIdentity(id Identity) string {
if id.IsWindows() {
return SIDPrincipal(id.SID)
}
return UIDPrincipal(id.UID)
}

View File

@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
//go:build !windows
package ipcauth
import (
"strconv"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/shell"
)
const groupCacheTTL = 30 * time.Second
// NewDefaultGroupResolver returns an NSS-aware group resolver backed by
// getent/`id -G` (via client/internal/shell), so `gid:`/`group:` owners resolve
// correctly for LDAP/AD users under CGO_ENABLED=0. Results are cached briefly.
func NewDefaultGroupResolver() GroupResolver {
return &nssResolver{byUID: make(map[uint32]gidCacheEntry)}
}
type gidCacheEntry struct {
gids map[uint32]struct{}
at time.Time
}
type nssResolver struct {
mu sync.Mutex
byUID map[uint32]gidCacheEntry
}
func (r *nssResolver) CallerGIDs(id Identity) map[uint32]struct{} {
r.mu.Lock()
defer r.mu.Unlock()
if e, ok := r.byUID[id.UID]; ok && time.Since(e.at) < groupCacheTTL {
return e.gids
}
gids := resolveGIDs(id.UID)
r.byUID[id.UID] = gidCacheEntry{gids: gids, at: time.Now()}
return gids
}
func resolveGIDs(uid uint32) map[uint32]struct{} {
out := make(map[uint32]struct{})
u, err := shell.GetUserFromGetent(strconv.FormatUint(uint64(uid), 10))
if err != nil {
return out
}
ids, err := shell.GroupIdsWithFallback(u)
if err != nil {
return out
}
for _, s := range ids {
if g, err := strconv.ParseUint(s, 10, 32); err == nil {
out[uint32(g)] = struct{}{}
}
}
return out
}
func (r *nssResolver) GroupNameGID(name string) (uint32, bool) {
g, err := shell.LookupGroupWithGetent(name)
if err != nil {
return 0, false
}
gid, err := strconv.ParseUint(g.Gid, 10, 32)
if err != nil {
return 0, false
}
return uint32(gid), true
}

View File

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
//go:build windows
package ipcauth
// NewDefaultGroupResolver returns nil on Windows: group authorization uses the
// group SIDs carried in the client token (see the Windows transport
// credentials), not NSS/getent.
func NewDefaultGroupResolver() GroupResolver {
return nil
}

View File

@@ -29,6 +29,11 @@ type managedPeer struct {
type Config struct {
InactivityThreshold *time.Duration
// ReconcileAllowedIPs re-applies a peer's routed allowed IPs after its wake endpoint is
// armed. The activity listener creates the wake peer with the overlay /32 only; without the
// routed prefixes WireGuard would not steer subnet-bound traffic to the wake endpoint, so an
// idle routing peer could never be woken by that traffic. Optional; nil disables the reconcile.
ReconcileAllowedIPs func(peerKey string) error
}
// Manager manages lazy connections
@@ -56,6 +61,9 @@ type Manager struct {
peerToHAGroups map[string][]route.HAUniqueID // peer ID -> HA groups they belong to
haGroupToPeers map[route.HAUniqueID][]string // HA group -> peer IDs in the group
routesMu sync.RWMutex
// reconcileAllowedIPs re-applies a peer's routed allowed IPs after its wake endpoint is armed.
reconcileAllowedIPs func(peerKey string) error
}
// NewManager creates a new lazy connection manager
@@ -73,6 +81,7 @@ func NewManager(config Config, engineCtx context.Context, peerStore *peerstore.S
activityManager: activity.NewManager(wgIface),
peerToHAGroups: make(map[string][]route.HAUniqueID),
haGroupToPeers: make(map[route.HAUniqueID][]string),
reconcileAllowedIPs: config.ReconcileAllowedIPs,
}
if wgIface.IsUserspaceBind() {
@@ -201,7 +210,7 @@ func (m *Manager) AddPeer(peerCfg lazyconn.PeerConfig) (bool, error) {
return false, nil
}
if err := m.activityManager.MonitorPeerActivity(peerCfg); err != nil {
if err := m.armActivityListener(peerCfg); err != nil {
return false, err
}
@@ -288,7 +297,7 @@ func (m *Manager) DeactivatePeer(peerID peerid.ConnID) {
m.inactivityManager.RemovePeer(mp.peerCfg.PublicKey)
if err := m.activityManager.MonitorPeerActivity(*mp.peerCfg); err != nil {
if err := m.armActivityListener(*mp.peerCfg); err != nil {
mp.peerCfg.Log.Errorf("failed to create activity monitor: %v", err)
return
}
@@ -465,6 +474,31 @@ func (m *Manager) close() {
}
// shouldDeferIdleForHA checks if peer should stay connected due to HA group requirements
// armRoutedAllowedIPs re-applies the peer's routed allowed IPs onto its freshly armed wake
// endpoint. The activity listener creates the wake peer with the overlay /32 only, so without
// this the routed prefixes would be missing and traffic to a routed subnet could not wake the
// idle routing peer. It is a no-op when no reconciler is configured.
// armActivityListener (re)arms the peer's wake endpoint via the activity manager and then
// re-applies its routed allowed IPs, so traffic to a routed subnet can wake an idle routing
// peer. The routed prefixes must be re-applied after the wake endpoint exists because the
// listener creates it with the overlay /32 only.
func (m *Manager) armActivityListener(peerCfg lazyconn.PeerConfig) error {
if err := m.activityManager.MonitorPeerActivity(peerCfg); err != nil {
return err
}
m.armRoutedAllowedIPs(&peerCfg)
return nil
}
func (m *Manager) armRoutedAllowedIPs(peerCfg *lazyconn.PeerConfig) {
if m.reconcileAllowedIPs == nil {
return
}
if err := m.reconcileAllowedIPs(peerCfg.PublicKey); err != nil {
peerCfg.Log.Errorf("failed to reconcile routed allowed IPs on wake endpoint: %v", err)
}
}
func (m *Manager) shouldDeferIdleForHA(inactivePeers map[string]struct{}, peerID string) bool {
m.routesMu.RLock()
defer m.routesMu.RUnlock()
@@ -577,7 +611,7 @@ func (m *Manager) onPeerInactivityTimedOut(peerIDs map[string]struct{}) {
mp.peerCfg.Log.Infof("start activity monitor")
if err := m.activityManager.MonitorPeerActivity(*mp.peerCfg); err != nil {
if err := m.armActivityListener(*mp.peerCfg); err != nil {
mp.peerCfg.Log.Errorf("failed to create activity monitor: %v", err)
continue
}

View File

@@ -96,17 +96,13 @@ type ConfigInput struct {
BlockLANAccess *bool
BlockInbound *bool
DisableIPv6 *bool
SyncMessageVersion *int
DisableNotifications *bool
DNSLabels domain.List
MTU *uint16
// Owners replaces the profile's owner principal list when non-nil.
// Shared replaces the profile's shared flag when non-nil.
Owners []string
Shared *bool
}
// Config Configuration type
@@ -142,6 +138,7 @@ type Config struct {
BlockLANAccess bool
BlockInbound bool
DisableIPv6 bool
SyncMessageVersion *int
DisableNotifications *bool
@@ -189,17 +186,6 @@ type Config struct {
MTU uint16
// Owners lists the principals allowed to control this profile over the local
// IPC, as typed strings: "uid:1000", "gid:1000", "group:netbird-admins"
// (Unix, NSS-resolved) or "sid:S-1-5-..." (Windows user or group SID). Empty
// with Shared=false means the profile is owned by nobody yet (privileged +
// daemon-self only, until claimed). Interpreted by client/internal/ipcauth.
Owners []string `json:"Owners,omitempty"`
// Shared, when true, lets any authenticated local caller control this profile
// (opt-in). Takes precedence over Owners.
Shared bool `json:"Shared,omitempty"`
// policy is the MDM policy that produced the currently-set values for
// any MDM-enforced fields. Set by applyMDMPolicy at the tail of apply()
// and reset on every apply() invocation. Never persisted to disk.
@@ -603,6 +589,12 @@ func (config *Config) apply(input ConfigInput) (updated bool, err error) {
updated = true
}
if input.SyncMessageVersion != nil && *input.SyncMessageVersion != *config.SyncMessageVersion {
log.Infof("setting SyncMessageVersion to %v", *input.SyncMessageVersion)
*config.SyncMessageVersion = *input.SyncMessageVersion
updated = true
}
if input.DisableNotifications != nil && (config.DisableNotifications == nil || *input.DisableNotifications != *config.DisableNotifications) {
if *input.DisableNotifications {
log.Infof("disabling notifications")
@@ -658,18 +650,6 @@ func (config *Config) apply(input ConfigInput) (updated bool, err error) {
updated = true
}
if input.Owners != nil && !slices.Equal(config.Owners, input.Owners) {
log.Infof("updating profile owners to %v", input.Owners)
config.Owners = input.Owners
updated = true
}
if input.Shared != nil && *input.Shared != config.Shared {
log.Infof("updating profile shared flag to %t", *input.Shared)
config.Shared = *input.Shared
updated = true
}
// MDM is the last override layer: any key present in the policy
// supersedes defaults, on-disk config, env vars and CLI input.
config.applyMDMPolicy(loadMDMPolicy())

View File

@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ func (s *ServiceManager) DefaultProfilePath() string {
// The returned Profile carries the freshly-generated ID so callers can
// show it to the user (and so the gRPC AddProfileResponse can include
// it).
func (s *ServiceManager) AddProfile(displayName, username string, owners []string) (*Profile, error) {
func (s *ServiceManager) AddProfile(displayName, username string) (*Profile, error) {
configDir, err := s.getConfigDir(username)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get config directory: %w", err)
@@ -318,9 +318,6 @@ func (s *ServiceManager) AddProfile(displayName, username string, owners []strin
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create new config: %w", err)
}
cfg.Name = displayName
// owners auto-isolates the new profile to its creator (nil = unowned, so the
// eventual first caller claims it via trust-on-first-use).
cfg.Owners = owners
if err := util.WriteJson(context.Background(), profPath, cfg); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to write profile config: %w", err)

View File

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ func withTestSM(t *testing.T, fn func(sm *ServiceManager, username string)) {
func TestServiceProfile_ExactID(t *testing.T) {
withTestSM(t, func(sm *ServiceManager, username string) {
created, err := sm.AddProfile("work", username, nil)
created, err := sm.AddProfile("work", username)
require.NoError(t, err)
got, err := sm.ResolveProfile(created.ID.String(), username)
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ func TestServiceProfile_ExactID(t *testing.T) {
func TestServiceProfile_IDPrefix(t *testing.T) {
withTestSM(t, func(sm *ServiceManager, username string) {
created, err := sm.AddProfile("work", username, nil)
created, err := sm.AddProfile("work", username)
require.NoError(t, err)
prefix := created.ID[:4]
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ func TestServiceProfile_AmbiguousPrefix(t *testing.T) {
func TestServiceProfile_ExactNameUnique(t *testing.T) {
withTestSM(t, func(sm *ServiceManager, username string) {
_, err := sm.AddProfile("work", username, nil)
_, err := sm.AddProfile("work", username)
require.NoError(t, err)
got, err := sm.ResolveProfile("work", username)
@@ -86,9 +86,9 @@ func TestServiceProfile_ExactNameUnique(t *testing.T) {
func TestServiceProfile_AmbiguousName(t *testing.T) {
withTestSM(t, func(sm *ServiceManager, username string) {
_, err := sm.AddProfile("work", username, nil)
_, err := sm.AddProfile("work", username)
require.NoError(t, err)
_, err = sm.AddProfile("work", username, nil)
_, err = sm.AddProfile("work", username)
require.NoError(t, err)
_, err = sm.ResolveProfile("work", username)
@@ -133,10 +133,10 @@ func TestServiceProfile_LegacyFilenameCoexists(t *testing.T) {
func TestAddProfile_AllowsDuplicateWithFlag(t *testing.T) {
withTestSM(t, func(sm *ServiceManager, username string) {
first, err := sm.AddProfile("work", username, nil)
first, err := sm.AddProfile("work", username)
require.NoError(t, err)
second, err := sm.AddProfile("work", username, nil)
second, err := sm.AddProfile("work", username)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.NotEqual(t, first.ID, second.ID)
assert.Equal(t, "work", second.Name)
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ func TestAddProfile_RejectsInvalidNames(t *testing.T) {
strings.Repeat("a", maxProfileNameLen+1), // too long
}
for _, name := range cases {
_, err := sm.AddProfile(name, username, nil)
_, err := sm.AddProfile(name, username)
assert.Error(t, err, "expected error for %q", name)
}
})
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ func TestIsValidProfileFilenameStem(t *testing.T) {
func TestRemoveProfile_DeletesStateFile(t *testing.T) {
withTestSM(t, func(sm *ServiceManager, username string) {
created, err := sm.AddProfile("work", username, nil)
created, err := sm.AddProfile("work", username)
require.NoError(t, err)
configDir, err := sm.getConfigDir(username)

View File

@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ type Manager interface {
InitialRouteRange() []string
SetFirewall(firewall.Manager) error
SetDNSForwarderPort(port uint16)
ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs(peerKey string) error
Stop(stateManager *statemanager.Manager)
}
@@ -232,6 +233,30 @@ func (m *DefaultManager) setupRefCounters(useNoop bool) {
)
}
// ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs re-applies every routed allowed IP currently tracked for the peer
// onto the WireGuard device. The allowed-IP refcounter only calls its AddFunc (which pushes to
// the device) on a prefix's 0->1 transition, so a peer whose device entry was rebuilt without a
// matching refcounter change — e.g. a lazy connection cycling through idle->wake, which recreates
// the WireGuard peer with the overlay /32 only — ends up missing routed prefixes the refcounter
// still considers installed, and nothing retries. Calling this when the peer's WireGuard entry is
// (re)created restores convergence. It is add-only and idempotent: AddAllowedIP is update-only, so
// prefixes are re-added to an existing peer and an absent peer is left untouched.
func (m *DefaultManager) ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs(peerKey string) error {
if m.allowedIPsRefCounter == nil {
return nil
}
return m.allowedIPsRefCounter.ReapplyMatching(
func(out string) bool { return out == peerKey },
func(prefix netip.Prefix) error {
if err := m.wgInterface.AddAllowedIP(peerKey, prefix); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("add allowed IP %s for peer %s: %w", prefix, peerKey, err)
}
return nil
},
)
}
// Init sets up the routing
func (m *DefaultManager) Init() error {
m.routeSelector = m.initSelector()

View File

@@ -112,6 +112,11 @@ func (m *MockManager) SetFirewall(firewall.Manager) error {
func (m *MockManager) SetDNSForwarderPort(port uint16) {
}
// ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs mock implementation of ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs from Manager interface
func (m *MockManager) ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs(peerKey string) error {
return nil
}
// Stop mock implementation of Stop from Manager interface
func (m *MockManager) Stop(stateManager *statemanager.Manager) {
if m.StopFunc != nil {

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
//go:build !windows
package routemanager
import (
"net"
"net/netip"
"sync"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/tun/netstack"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/device"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/routemanager/refcounter"
)
// reconcileWGMock is a minimal iface.WGIface that only records AddAllowedIP calls; every other
// method is an inert stub because ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs exercises none of them.
type reconcileWGMock struct {
mu sync.Mutex
adds map[string][]netip.Prefix
}
func (m *reconcileWGMock) AddAllowedIP(peerKey string, allowedIP netip.Prefix) error {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
if m.adds == nil {
m.adds = map[string][]netip.Prefix{}
}
m.adds[peerKey] = append(m.adds[peerKey], allowedIP)
return nil
}
func (m *reconcileWGMock) added(peerKey string) []netip.Prefix {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
return m.adds[peerKey]
}
func (m *reconcileWGMock) RemoveAllowedIP(string, netip.Prefix) error { return nil }
func (m *reconcileWGMock) Name() string { return "utun-test" }
func (m *reconcileWGMock) Address() wgaddr.Address { return wgaddr.Address{} }
func (m *reconcileWGMock) ToInterface() *net.Interface { return nil }
func (m *reconcileWGMock) IsUserspaceBind() bool { return false }
func (m *reconcileWGMock) GetFilter() device.PacketFilter { return nil }
func (m *reconcileWGMock) GetDevice() *device.FilteredDevice { return nil }
func (m *reconcileWGMock) GetNet() *netstack.Net { return nil }
// TestReconcilePeerAllowedIPs verifies the declarative reconcile re-applies every routed prefix
// tracked for the peer (self-heal, independent of refcount level) and stays scoped to that peer.
func TestReconcilePeerAllowedIPs(t *testing.T) {
wg := &reconcileWGMock{}
m := &DefaultManager{wgInterface: wg}
m.allowedIPsRefCounter = refcounter.New[netip.Prefix, string, string](
func(_ netip.Prefix, peerKey string) (string, error) { return peerKey, nil },
func(netip.Prefix, string) error { return nil },
)
peerA1 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/24")
peerA2 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.1.0.0/24")
peerB1 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.2.0.0/24")
for prefix, peer := range map[netip.Prefix]string{peerA1: "peerA", peerA2: "peerA", peerB1: "peerB"} {
_, err := m.allowedIPsRefCounter.Increment(prefix, peer)
require.NoError(t, err)
}
// Extra reference: reconcile must still re-apply the prefix even though its refcount never
// hit 0 again (the exact case the plain incremental path skips).
_, err := m.allowedIPsRefCounter.Increment(peerA1, "peerA")
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, m.ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs("peerA"))
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []netip.Prefix{peerA1, peerA2}, wg.added("peerA"),
"reconcile must re-apply all routed prefixes of the peer")
assert.Empty(t, wg.added("peerB"), "reconcile must not touch another peer's prefixes")
}
// TestReconcilePeerAllowedIPsNoCounter verifies reconcile is a safe no-op before the refcounter is
// set up.
func TestReconcilePeerAllowedIPsNoCounter(t *testing.T) {
wg := &reconcileWGMock{}
m := &DefaultManager{wgInterface: wg}
require.NoError(t, m.ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs("peerA"))
assert.Empty(t, wg.added("peerA"))
}

View File

@@ -94,6 +94,26 @@ func (rm *Counter[Key, I, O]) Get(key Key) (Ref[O], bool) {
return ref, ok
}
// ReapplyMatching calls apply for every key whose stored Out satisfies pred, holding the
// counter lock for the whole pass. Running apply under the lock keeps it atomic with respect
// to Increment/Decrement: a prefix dropped to zero is removed from the map (and had its
// RemoveFunc called) before this pass observes it, so a stale key can never be re-applied.
// pred and apply are invoked under the lock, so they must not call back into the counter.
func (rm *Counter[Key, I, O]) ReapplyMatching(pred func(out O) bool, apply func(key Key) error) error {
rm.mu.Lock()
defer rm.mu.Unlock()
var merr *multierror.Error
for key, ref := range rm.refCountMap {
if pred(ref.Out) {
if err := apply(key); err != nil {
merr = multierror.Append(merr, err)
}
}
}
return nberrors.FormatErrorOrNil(merr)
}
// Increment increments the reference count for the given key.
// If this is the first reference to the key, the AddFunc is called.
func (rm *Counter[Key, I, O]) Increment(key Key, in I) (Ref[O], error) {

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
package refcounter
import (
"net/netip"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// TestReapplyMatching verifies ReapplyMatching invokes apply for exactly the keys whose stored
// Out satisfies the predicate (no duplicates for multiply-referenced keys) — the primitive
// ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs relies on to re-apply a single peer's routed prefixes.
func TestReapplyMatching(t *testing.T) {
rc := New[netip.Prefix, string, string](
func(_ netip.Prefix, peerKey string) (string, error) { return peerKey, nil },
func(netip.Prefix, string) error { return nil },
)
peerA1 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/24")
peerA2 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.1.0.0/24")
peerB1 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.2.0.0/24")
for prefix, peer := range map[netip.Prefix]string{peerA1: "peerA", peerA2: "peerA", peerB1: "peerB"} {
_, err := rc.Increment(prefix, peer)
require.NoError(t, err)
}
// a second reference must not make the key applied twice
_, err := rc.Increment(peerA1, "peerA")
require.NoError(t, err)
var applied []netip.Prefix
err = rc.ReapplyMatching(
func(out string) bool { return out == "peerA" },
func(key netip.Prefix) error { applied = append(applied, key); return nil },
)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []netip.Prefix{peerA1, peerA2}, applied)
var none []netip.Prefix
err = rc.ReapplyMatching(
func(out string) bool { return out == "missing" },
func(key netip.Prefix) error { none = append(none, key); return nil },
)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, none)
}

View File

@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
//go:build cgo && !osusergo && !windows
package shell
import "os/user"
// LookupWithGetent with CGO delegates directly to os/user.Lookup.
// When CGO is enabled, os/user uses libc (getpwnam_r) which goes through
// the NSS stack natively. If it fails, the user truly doesn't exist and
// getent would also fail.
func LookupWithGetent(username string) (*user.User, error) {
return user.Lookup(username)
}
// CurrentUserWithGetent with CGO delegates directly to os/user.Current.
func CurrentUserWithGetent() (*user.User, error) {
return user.Current()
}
// LookupGroupWithGetent returns the resolved group from either a gid or groupname.
func LookupGroupWithGetent(name string) (*user.Group, error) {
return user.LookupGroup(name)
}
// GroupIdsWithFallback with CGO delegates directly to user.GroupIds.
// libc's getgrouplist handles NSS groups natively.
func GroupIdsWithFallback(u *user.User) ([]string, error) {
return u.GroupIds()
}

View File

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
//go:build windows
package shell
import "os/user"
// LookupWithGetent on Windows just delegates to os/user.Lookup.
// Windows does not use NSS/getent; its user lookup works without CGO.
func LookupWithGetent(username string) (*user.User, error) {
return user.Lookup(username)
}
// CurrentUserWithGetent on Windows just delegates to os/user.Current.
func CurrentUserWithGetent() (*user.User, error) {
return user.Current()
}
// LookupGroupWithGetent on Windows just delegates to os/user.LookupGroup.
func LookupGroupWithGetent(name string) (*user.Group, error) {
return user.LookupGroup(name)
}
// GetShellFromGetent is a no-op on Windows; shell resolution uses PowerShell detection.
func GetShellFromGetent(_ string) string {
return ""
}
// GroupIdsWithFallback on Windows just delegates to u.GroupIds().
func GroupIdsWithFallback(u *user.User) ([]string, error) {
return u.GroupIds()
}

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -791,78 +791,6 @@ func local_request_DaemonService_GetActiveProfile_0(ctx context.Context, marshal
return msg, metadata, err
}
func request_DaemonService_AddOwner_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, client DaemonServiceClient, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
var (
protoReq AddOwnerRequest
metadata runtime.ServerMetadata
)
if err := marshaler.NewDecoder(req.Body).Decode(&protoReq); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
return nil, metadata, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "%v", err)
}
msg, err := client.AddOwner(ctx, &protoReq, grpc.Header(&metadata.HeaderMD), grpc.Trailer(&metadata.TrailerMD))
return msg, metadata, err
}
func local_request_DaemonService_AddOwner_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, server DaemonServiceServer, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
var (
protoReq AddOwnerRequest
metadata runtime.ServerMetadata
)
if err := marshaler.NewDecoder(req.Body).Decode(&protoReq); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
return nil, metadata, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "%v", err)
}
msg, err := server.AddOwner(ctx, &protoReq)
return msg, metadata, err
}
func request_DaemonService_ResetOwner_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, client DaemonServiceClient, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
var (
protoReq ResetOwnerRequest
metadata runtime.ServerMetadata
)
if err := marshaler.NewDecoder(req.Body).Decode(&protoReq); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
return nil, metadata, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "%v", err)
}
msg, err := client.ResetOwner(ctx, &protoReq, grpc.Header(&metadata.HeaderMD), grpc.Trailer(&metadata.TrailerMD))
return msg, metadata, err
}
func local_request_DaemonService_ResetOwner_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, server DaemonServiceServer, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
var (
protoReq ResetOwnerRequest
metadata runtime.ServerMetadata
)
if err := marshaler.NewDecoder(req.Body).Decode(&protoReq); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
return nil, metadata, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "%v", err)
}
msg, err := server.ResetOwner(ctx, &protoReq)
return msg, metadata, err
}
func request_DaemonService_ShareProfile_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, client DaemonServiceClient, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
var (
protoReq ShareProfileRequest
metadata runtime.ServerMetadata
)
if err := marshaler.NewDecoder(req.Body).Decode(&protoReq); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
return nil, metadata, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "%v", err)
}
msg, err := client.ShareProfile(ctx, &protoReq, grpc.Header(&metadata.HeaderMD), grpc.Trailer(&metadata.TrailerMD))
return msg, metadata, err
}
func local_request_DaemonService_ShareProfile_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, server DaemonServiceServer, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
var (
protoReq ShareProfileRequest
metadata runtime.ServerMetadata
)
if err := marshaler.NewDecoder(req.Body).Decode(&protoReq); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
return nil, metadata, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "%v", err)
}
msg, err := server.ShareProfile(ctx, &protoReq)
return msg, metadata, err
}
func request_DaemonService_Logout_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, client DaemonServiceClient, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
var (
protoReq LogoutRequest
@@ -1802,66 +1730,6 @@ func RegisterDaemonServiceHandlerServer(ctx context.Context, mux *runtime.ServeM
}
forward_DaemonService_GetActiveProfile_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
})
mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_AddOwner_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
defer cancel()
var stream runtime.ServerTransportStream
ctx = grpc.NewContextWithServerTransportStream(ctx, &stream)
inboundMarshaler, outboundMarshaler := runtime.MarshalerForRequest(mux, req)
annotatedContext, err := runtime.AnnotateIncomingContext(ctx, mux, req, "/daemon.DaemonService/AddOwner", runtime.WithHTTPPathPattern("/daemon.DaemonService/AddOwner"))
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
resp, md, err := local_request_DaemonService_AddOwner_0(annotatedContext, inboundMarshaler, server, req, pathParams)
md.HeaderMD, md.TrailerMD = metadata.Join(md.HeaderMD, stream.Header()), metadata.Join(md.TrailerMD, stream.Trailer())
annotatedContext = runtime.NewServerMetadataContext(annotatedContext, md)
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
forward_DaemonService_AddOwner_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
})
mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_ResetOwner_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
defer cancel()
var stream runtime.ServerTransportStream
ctx = grpc.NewContextWithServerTransportStream(ctx, &stream)
inboundMarshaler, outboundMarshaler := runtime.MarshalerForRequest(mux, req)
annotatedContext, err := runtime.AnnotateIncomingContext(ctx, mux, req, "/daemon.DaemonService/ResetOwner", runtime.WithHTTPPathPattern("/daemon.DaemonService/ResetOwner"))
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
resp, md, err := local_request_DaemonService_ResetOwner_0(annotatedContext, inboundMarshaler, server, req, pathParams)
md.HeaderMD, md.TrailerMD = metadata.Join(md.HeaderMD, stream.Header()), metadata.Join(md.TrailerMD, stream.Trailer())
annotatedContext = runtime.NewServerMetadataContext(annotatedContext, md)
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
forward_DaemonService_ResetOwner_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
})
mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_ShareProfile_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
defer cancel()
var stream runtime.ServerTransportStream
ctx = grpc.NewContextWithServerTransportStream(ctx, &stream)
inboundMarshaler, outboundMarshaler := runtime.MarshalerForRequest(mux, req)
annotatedContext, err := runtime.AnnotateIncomingContext(ctx, mux, req, "/daemon.DaemonService/ShareProfile", runtime.WithHTTPPathPattern("/daemon.DaemonService/ShareProfile"))
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
resp, md, err := local_request_DaemonService_ShareProfile_0(annotatedContext, inboundMarshaler, server, req, pathParams)
md.HeaderMD, md.TrailerMD = metadata.Join(md.HeaderMD, stream.Header()), metadata.Join(md.TrailerMD, stream.Trailer())
annotatedContext = runtime.NewServerMetadataContext(annotatedContext, md)
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
forward_DaemonService_ShareProfile_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
})
mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_Logout_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
defer cancel()
@@ -2713,57 +2581,6 @@ func RegisterDaemonServiceHandlerClient(ctx context.Context, mux *runtime.ServeM
}
forward_DaemonService_GetActiveProfile_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
})
mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_AddOwner_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
defer cancel()
inboundMarshaler, outboundMarshaler := runtime.MarshalerForRequest(mux, req)
annotatedContext, err := runtime.AnnotateContext(ctx, mux, req, "/daemon.DaemonService/AddOwner", runtime.WithHTTPPathPattern("/daemon.DaemonService/AddOwner"))
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
resp, md, err := request_DaemonService_AddOwner_0(annotatedContext, inboundMarshaler, client, req, pathParams)
annotatedContext = runtime.NewServerMetadataContext(annotatedContext, md)
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
forward_DaemonService_AddOwner_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
})
mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_ResetOwner_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
defer cancel()
inboundMarshaler, outboundMarshaler := runtime.MarshalerForRequest(mux, req)
annotatedContext, err := runtime.AnnotateContext(ctx, mux, req, "/daemon.DaemonService/ResetOwner", runtime.WithHTTPPathPattern("/daemon.DaemonService/ResetOwner"))
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
resp, md, err := request_DaemonService_ResetOwner_0(annotatedContext, inboundMarshaler, client, req, pathParams)
annotatedContext = runtime.NewServerMetadataContext(annotatedContext, md)
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
forward_DaemonService_ResetOwner_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
})
mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_ShareProfile_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
defer cancel()
inboundMarshaler, outboundMarshaler := runtime.MarshalerForRequest(mux, req)
annotatedContext, err := runtime.AnnotateContext(ctx, mux, req, "/daemon.DaemonService/ShareProfile", runtime.WithHTTPPathPattern("/daemon.DaemonService/ShareProfile"))
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
resp, md, err := request_DaemonService_ShareProfile_0(annotatedContext, inboundMarshaler, client, req, pathParams)
annotatedContext = runtime.NewServerMetadataContext(annotatedContext, md)
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
forward_DaemonService_ShareProfile_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
})
mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_Logout_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
defer cancel()
@@ -3038,9 +2855,6 @@ var (
pattern_DaemonService_RemoveProfile_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "RemoveProfile"}, ""))
pattern_DaemonService_ListProfiles_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "ListProfiles"}, ""))
pattern_DaemonService_GetActiveProfile_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "GetActiveProfile"}, ""))
pattern_DaemonService_AddOwner_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "AddOwner"}, ""))
pattern_DaemonService_ResetOwner_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "ResetOwner"}, ""))
pattern_DaemonService_ShareProfile_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "ShareProfile"}, ""))
pattern_DaemonService_Logout_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "Logout"}, ""))
pattern_DaemonService_GetFeatures_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "GetFeatures"}, ""))
pattern_DaemonService_TriggerUpdate_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "TriggerUpdate"}, ""))
@@ -3090,9 +2904,6 @@ var (
forward_DaemonService_RemoveProfile_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
forward_DaemonService_ListProfiles_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
forward_DaemonService_GetActiveProfile_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
forward_DaemonService_AddOwner_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
forward_DaemonService_ResetOwner_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
forward_DaemonService_ShareProfile_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
forward_DaemonService_Logout_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
forward_DaemonService_GetFeatures_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
forward_DaemonService_TriggerUpdate_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage

View File

@@ -104,18 +104,6 @@ service DaemonService {
rpc GetActiveProfile(GetActiveProfileRequest) returns (GetActiveProfileResponse) {}
// AddOwner adds a principal to the active profile's owner list. Requires the
// caller to be privileged (root/administrator) or an existing owner.
rpc AddOwner(AddOwnerRequest) returns (AddOwnerResponse) {}
// ResetOwner clears the active profile's owner list, returning it to the
// unowned state (next caller re-claims via trust-on-first-use). Privileged only.
rpc ResetOwner(ResetOwnerRequest) returns (ResetOwnerResponse) {}
// ShareProfile marks the active profile shared (any local caller) or unshared.
// Requires the caller to be an owner or privileged.
rpc ShareProfile(ShareProfileRequest) returns (ShareProfileResponse) {}
// Logout disconnects from the network and deletes the peer from the management server
rpc Logout(LogoutRequest) returns (LogoutResponse) {}
@@ -282,10 +270,6 @@ message UpRequest {
// RPC blocks until the engine is running or gives up, which is the behaviour
// needed by the CLI.
bool async = 4;
// claimOwner, when true, claims ownership of the active profile for the
// calling user (adds their kernel principal to the profile's owner list).
bool claimOwner = 5;
}
message UpResponse {}
@@ -790,24 +774,6 @@ message AddProfileResponse {
string id = 1;
}
message AddOwnerRequest {
// principal is a typed owner string: "uid:1000", "gid:1000",
// "group:netbird-admins" (Unix, NSS-resolved), or "sid:S-1-5-..." (Windows).
string principal = 1;
}
message AddOwnerResponse {}
message ResetOwnerRequest {}
message ResetOwnerResponse {}
message ShareProfileRequest {
bool shared = 1;
}
message ShareProfileResponse {}
message RenameProfileRequest {
string username = 1;
// handle: an exact ID, a unique ID prefix, or a unique display name.

View File

@@ -51,9 +51,6 @@ const (
DaemonService_RemoveProfile_FullMethodName = "/daemon.DaemonService/RemoveProfile"
DaemonService_ListProfiles_FullMethodName = "/daemon.DaemonService/ListProfiles"
DaemonService_GetActiveProfile_FullMethodName = "/daemon.DaemonService/GetActiveProfile"
DaemonService_AddOwner_FullMethodName = "/daemon.DaemonService/AddOwner"
DaemonService_ResetOwner_FullMethodName = "/daemon.DaemonService/ResetOwner"
DaemonService_ShareProfile_FullMethodName = "/daemon.DaemonService/ShareProfile"
DaemonService_Logout_FullMethodName = "/daemon.DaemonService/Logout"
DaemonService_GetFeatures_FullMethodName = "/daemon.DaemonService/GetFeatures"
DaemonService_TriggerUpdate_FullMethodName = "/daemon.DaemonService/TriggerUpdate"
@@ -135,15 +132,6 @@ type DaemonServiceClient interface {
RemoveProfile(ctx context.Context, in *RemoveProfileRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*RemoveProfileResponse, error)
ListProfiles(ctx context.Context, in *ListProfilesRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*ListProfilesResponse, error)
GetActiveProfile(ctx context.Context, in *GetActiveProfileRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*GetActiveProfileResponse, error)
// AddOwner adds a principal to the active profile's owner list. Requires the
// caller to be privileged (root/administrator) or an existing owner.
AddOwner(ctx context.Context, in *AddOwnerRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*AddOwnerResponse, error)
// ResetOwner clears the active profile's owner list, returning it to the
// unowned state (next caller re-claims via trust-on-first-use). Privileged only.
ResetOwner(ctx context.Context, in *ResetOwnerRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*ResetOwnerResponse, error)
// ShareProfile marks the active profile shared (any local caller) or unshared.
// Requires the caller to be an owner or privileged.
ShareProfile(ctx context.Context, in *ShareProfileRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*ShareProfileResponse, error)
// Logout disconnects from the network and deletes the peer from the management server
Logout(ctx context.Context, in *LogoutRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*LogoutResponse, error)
GetFeatures(ctx context.Context, in *GetFeaturesRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*GetFeaturesResponse, error)
@@ -540,36 +528,6 @@ func (c *daemonServiceClient) GetActiveProfile(ctx context.Context, in *GetActiv
return out, nil
}
func (c *daemonServiceClient) AddOwner(ctx context.Context, in *AddOwnerRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*AddOwnerResponse, error) {
cOpts := append([]grpc.CallOption{grpc.StaticMethod()}, opts...)
out := new(AddOwnerResponse)
err := c.cc.Invoke(ctx, DaemonService_AddOwner_FullMethodName, in, out, cOpts...)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return out, nil
}
func (c *daemonServiceClient) ResetOwner(ctx context.Context, in *ResetOwnerRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*ResetOwnerResponse, error) {
cOpts := append([]grpc.CallOption{grpc.StaticMethod()}, opts...)
out := new(ResetOwnerResponse)
err := c.cc.Invoke(ctx, DaemonService_ResetOwner_FullMethodName, in, out, cOpts...)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return out, nil
}
func (c *daemonServiceClient) ShareProfile(ctx context.Context, in *ShareProfileRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*ShareProfileResponse, error) {
cOpts := append([]grpc.CallOption{grpc.StaticMethod()}, opts...)
out := new(ShareProfileResponse)
err := c.cc.Invoke(ctx, DaemonService_ShareProfile_FullMethodName, in, out, cOpts...)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return out, nil
}
func (c *daemonServiceClient) Logout(ctx context.Context, in *LogoutRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*LogoutResponse, error) {
cOpts := append([]grpc.CallOption{grpc.StaticMethod()}, opts...)
out := new(LogoutResponse)
@@ -784,15 +742,6 @@ type DaemonServiceServer interface {
RemoveProfile(context.Context, *RemoveProfileRequest) (*RemoveProfileResponse, error)
ListProfiles(context.Context, *ListProfilesRequest) (*ListProfilesResponse, error)
GetActiveProfile(context.Context, *GetActiveProfileRequest) (*GetActiveProfileResponse, error)
// AddOwner adds a principal to the active profile's owner list. Requires the
// caller to be privileged (root/administrator) or an existing owner.
AddOwner(context.Context, *AddOwnerRequest) (*AddOwnerResponse, error)
// ResetOwner clears the active profile's owner list, returning it to the
// unowned state (next caller re-claims via trust-on-first-use). Privileged only.
ResetOwner(context.Context, *ResetOwnerRequest) (*ResetOwnerResponse, error)
// ShareProfile marks the active profile shared (any local caller) or unshared.
// Requires the caller to be an owner or privileged.
ShareProfile(context.Context, *ShareProfileRequest) (*ShareProfileResponse, error)
// Logout disconnects from the network and deletes the peer from the management server
Logout(context.Context, *LogoutRequest) (*LogoutResponse, error)
GetFeatures(context.Context, *GetFeaturesRequest) (*GetFeaturesResponse, error)
@@ -938,15 +887,6 @@ func (UnimplementedDaemonServiceServer) ListProfiles(context.Context, *ListProfi
func (UnimplementedDaemonServiceServer) GetActiveProfile(context.Context, *GetActiveProfileRequest) (*GetActiveProfileResponse, error) {
return nil, status.Error(codes.Unimplemented, "method GetActiveProfile not implemented")
}
func (UnimplementedDaemonServiceServer) AddOwner(context.Context, *AddOwnerRequest) (*AddOwnerResponse, error) {
return nil, status.Error(codes.Unimplemented, "method AddOwner not implemented")
}
func (UnimplementedDaemonServiceServer) ResetOwner(context.Context, *ResetOwnerRequest) (*ResetOwnerResponse, error) {
return nil, status.Error(codes.Unimplemented, "method ResetOwner not implemented")
}
func (UnimplementedDaemonServiceServer) ShareProfile(context.Context, *ShareProfileRequest) (*ShareProfileResponse, error) {
return nil, status.Error(codes.Unimplemented, "method ShareProfile not implemented")
}
func (UnimplementedDaemonServiceServer) Logout(context.Context, *LogoutRequest) (*LogoutResponse, error) {
return nil, status.Error(codes.Unimplemented, "method Logout not implemented")
}
@@ -1565,60 +1505,6 @@ func _DaemonService_GetActiveProfile_Handler(srv interface{}, ctx context.Contex
return interceptor(ctx, in, info, handler)
}
func _DaemonService_AddOwner_Handler(srv interface{}, ctx context.Context, dec func(interface{}) error, interceptor grpc.UnaryServerInterceptor) (interface{}, error) {
in := new(AddOwnerRequest)
if err := dec(in); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if interceptor == nil {
return srv.(DaemonServiceServer).AddOwner(ctx, in)
}
info := &grpc.UnaryServerInfo{
Server: srv,
FullMethod: DaemonService_AddOwner_FullMethodName,
}
handler := func(ctx context.Context, req interface{}) (interface{}, error) {
return srv.(DaemonServiceServer).AddOwner(ctx, req.(*AddOwnerRequest))
}
return interceptor(ctx, in, info, handler)
}
func _DaemonService_ResetOwner_Handler(srv interface{}, ctx context.Context, dec func(interface{}) error, interceptor grpc.UnaryServerInterceptor) (interface{}, error) {
in := new(ResetOwnerRequest)
if err := dec(in); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if interceptor == nil {
return srv.(DaemonServiceServer).ResetOwner(ctx, in)
}
info := &grpc.UnaryServerInfo{
Server: srv,
FullMethod: DaemonService_ResetOwner_FullMethodName,
}
handler := func(ctx context.Context, req interface{}) (interface{}, error) {
return srv.(DaemonServiceServer).ResetOwner(ctx, req.(*ResetOwnerRequest))
}
return interceptor(ctx, in, info, handler)
}
func _DaemonService_ShareProfile_Handler(srv interface{}, ctx context.Context, dec func(interface{}) error, interceptor grpc.UnaryServerInterceptor) (interface{}, error) {
in := new(ShareProfileRequest)
if err := dec(in); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if interceptor == nil {
return srv.(DaemonServiceServer).ShareProfile(ctx, in)
}
info := &grpc.UnaryServerInfo{
Server: srv,
FullMethod: DaemonService_ShareProfile_FullMethodName,
}
handler := func(ctx context.Context, req interface{}) (interface{}, error) {
return srv.(DaemonServiceServer).ShareProfile(ctx, req.(*ShareProfileRequest))
}
return interceptor(ctx, in, info, handler)
}
func _DaemonService_Logout_Handler(srv interface{}, ctx context.Context, dec func(interface{}) error, interceptor grpc.UnaryServerInterceptor) (interface{}, error) {
in := new(LogoutRequest)
if err := dec(in); err != nil {
@@ -1987,18 +1873,6 @@ var DaemonService_ServiceDesc = grpc.ServiceDesc{
MethodName: "GetActiveProfile",
Handler: _DaemonService_GetActiveProfile_Handler,
},
{
MethodName: "AddOwner",
Handler: _DaemonService_AddOwner_Handler,
},
{
MethodName: "ResetOwner",
Handler: _DaemonService_ResetOwner_Handler,
},
{
MethodName: "ShareProfile",
Handler: _DaemonService_ShareProfile_Handler,
},
{
MethodName: "Logout",
Handler: _DaemonService_Logout_Handler,

View File

@@ -1,204 +0,0 @@
package server
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"slices"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
gstatus "google.golang.org/grpc/status"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
)
// The daemon Server implements ipcauth.ProfilePolicy so the gRPC interceptor can
// authorize each RPC against the active profile's ownership.
var _ ipcauth.ProfilePolicy = (*Server)(nil)
// ActiveProfileOwnership returns the active profile's ownership policy. Reads
// the in-memory active config (kept current by the handlers), falling back to
// the on-disk active profile when the daemon hasn't loaded one yet.
func (s *Server) ActiveProfileOwnership() ipcauth.Ownership {
s.mutex.Lock()
defer s.mutex.Unlock()
cfg := s.config
if cfg == nil {
loaded, err := s.loadActiveProfileConfigLocked()
if err != nil {
log.Warnf("ownership: cannot load active profile config, treating as unowned: %v", err)
return ipcauth.Ownership{}
}
cfg = loaded
}
return ipcauth.Ownership{Owners: cfg.Owners, Shared: cfg.Shared}
}
// ClaimActiveProfileOwnerIfUnowned atomically claims the active profile for id
// when it has no owners and is not shared (trust-on-first-use). Returns whether
// id is now an owner. Concurrent first-callers are serialized by s.mutex, so
// exactly one wins the claim; the others get false and are authorized normally.
func (s *Server) ClaimActiveProfileOwnerIfUnowned(id ipcauth.Identity) (bool, error) {
s.mutex.Lock()
defer s.mutex.Unlock()
cfg := s.config
if cfg == nil {
loaded, err := s.loadActiveProfileConfigLocked()
if err != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("load active profile config: %w", err)
}
cfg = loaded
}
if len(cfg.Owners) > 0 || cfg.Shared {
return false, nil // already owned or shared — someone won the race
}
cfg.Owners = []string{ipcauth.OwnerPrincipalForIdentity(id)}
if err := s.persistActiveProfileConfigLocked(cfg); err != nil {
cfg.Owners = nil // revert in-memory on persistence failure
return false, fmt.Errorf("persist claimed ownership: %w", err)
}
s.config = cfg
log.Infof("profile ownership claimed by %s (trust-on-first-use)", id)
return true, nil
}
// activeProfileConfigPathLocked resolves the active profile's config file path.
func (s *Server) activeProfileConfigPathLocked() (string, error) {
activeProf, err := s.profileManager.GetActiveProfileState()
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("get active profile: %w", err)
}
path, err := activeProf.FilePath()
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("resolve active profile path: %w", err)
}
return path, nil
}
// loadActiveProfileConfigLocked reads the active profile's config from disk.
func (s *Server) loadActiveProfileConfigLocked() (*profilemanager.Config, error) {
path, err := s.activeProfileConfigPathLocked()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return profilemanager.GetConfig(path)
}
// persistActiveProfileConfigLocked writes cfg to the active profile's config file.
func (s *Server) persistActiveProfileConfigLocked(cfg *profilemanager.Config) error {
path, err := s.activeProfileConfigPathLocked()
if err != nil {
return err
}
return util.WriteJson(context.Background(), path, cfg)
}
// activeConfigLocked returns the in-memory active config, loading it from disk
// if the daemon hasn't cached one. Caller must hold s.mutex.
func (s *Server) activeConfigLocked() (*profilemanager.Config, error) {
if s.config != nil {
return s.config, nil
}
return s.loadActiveProfileConfigLocked()
}
// claimForCallerLocked adds the caller's principal to cfg (if absent) and
// persists. No-op for privileged callers (they need no ownership entry). Caller
// must hold s.mutex.
func (s *Server) claimForCallerLocked(id ipcauth.Identity, cfg *profilemanager.Config) error {
if id.IsPrivileged() {
return nil
}
principal := ipcauth.OwnerPrincipalForIdentity(id)
if slices.Contains(cfg.Owners, principal) {
return nil
}
cfg.Owners = append(cfg.Owners, principal)
if err := s.persistActiveProfileConfigLocked(cfg); err != nil {
cfg.Owners = cfg.Owners[:len(cfg.Owners)-1] // revert on failure
return err
}
s.config = cfg
return nil
}
// AddOwner adds a principal to the active profile's owner list. The interceptor
// has already confirmed the caller is an owner or privileged; the handler just
// validates and persists.
func (s *Server) AddOwner(_ context.Context, msg *proto.AddOwnerRequest) (*proto.AddOwnerResponse, error) {
principal := msg.GetPrincipal()
if _, ok := ipcauth.ParsePrincipal(principal); !ok {
return nil, gstatus.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "invalid owner principal %q (expected uid:/gid:/group:/sid:)", principal)
}
s.mutex.Lock()
defer s.mutex.Unlock()
cfg, err := s.activeConfigLocked()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("load active profile config: %w", err)
}
if slices.Contains(cfg.Owners, principal) {
return &proto.AddOwnerResponse{}, nil
}
cfg.Owners = append(cfg.Owners, principal)
if err := s.persistActiveProfileConfigLocked(cfg); err != nil {
cfg.Owners = cfg.Owners[:len(cfg.Owners)-1]
return nil, fmt.Errorf("persist owner: %w", err)
}
s.config = cfg
log.Infof("added owner %q to the active profile", principal)
return &proto.AddOwnerResponse{}, nil
}
// ResetOwner clears the active profile's owner list (and shared flag), returning
// it to the unowned state so the next caller re-claims via trust-on-first-use.
// Privileged-only, so co-owners cannot evict each other.
func (s *Server) ResetOwner(ctx context.Context, _ *proto.ResetOwnerRequest) (*proto.ResetOwnerResponse, error) {
id, ok := ipcauth.IdentityFromContext(ctx)
if !ok || !id.IsPrivileged() {
return nil, gstatus.Error(codes.PermissionDenied, "reset-owner requires root/administrator")
}
s.mutex.Lock()
defer s.mutex.Unlock()
cfg, err := s.activeConfigLocked()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("load active profile config: %w", err)
}
cfg.Owners = nil
cfg.Shared = false
if err := s.persistActiveProfileConfigLocked(cfg); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("persist owner reset: %w", err)
}
s.config = cfg
log.Infof("active profile owner list reset; next caller will re-claim (trust-on-first-use)")
return &proto.ResetOwnerResponse{}, nil
}
// ShareProfile marks the active profile shared or unshared. The interceptor has
// already confirmed the caller is an owner or privileged.
func (s *Server) ShareProfile(_ context.Context, msg *proto.ShareProfileRequest) (*proto.ShareProfileResponse, error) {
s.mutex.Lock()
defer s.mutex.Unlock()
cfg, err := s.activeConfigLocked()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("load active profile config: %w", err)
}
cfg.Shared = msg.GetShared()
if err := s.persistActiveProfileConfigLocked(cfg); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("persist shared flag: %w", err)
}
s.config = cfg
log.Infof("active profile shared flag set to %t", msg.GetShared())
return &proto.ShareProfileResponse{}, nil
}

View File

@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
package server
import (
"context"
"runtime"
"strings"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
gstatus "google.golang.org/grpc/status"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
)
// bindCallerUsername enforces that a non-privileged caller may only operate on
// its OWN user's profiles. Profiles live in per-username directories, but the
// username is a client-supplied gRPC field the server historically never
// checked; binding it to the caller's kernel identity closes the "pass another
// user's username" hole. Privileged callers (root / elevated-admin) may manage
// any user's profiles.
func (s *Server) bindCallerUsername(ctx context.Context, requested string) error {
if requested == "" {
return nil // handlers validate emptiness themselves; nothing to bind
}
id, ok := ipcauth.IdentityFromContext(ctx)
if !ok {
return gstatus.Error(codes.PermissionDenied, "caller identity could not be verified")
}
if id.IsPrivileged() {
return nil
}
caller, err := usernameForIdentity(id)
if err != nil {
log.Warnf("profile authz: resolve caller username for %s: %v", id, err)
return gstatus.Error(codes.PermissionDenied, "could not resolve caller identity to a username")
}
if !usernamesEqual(requested, caller) {
return gstatus.Errorf(codes.PermissionDenied,
"not authorized to operate on another user's profiles (caller %q requested %q)", caller, requested)
}
return nil
}
// usernamesEqual compares usernames case-insensitively on Windows (domain
// accounts) and exactly on Unix.
func usernamesEqual(a, b string) bool {
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
return strings.EqualFold(a, b)
}
return a == b
}

View File

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
//go:build !windows
package server
import (
"strconv"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/shell"
)
// usernameForIdentity resolves a Unix caller's UID to its username via NSS
// (getent), so LDAP/AD users resolve correctly under CGO_ENABLED=0.
func usernameForIdentity(id ipcauth.Identity) (string, error) {
u, err := shell.GetUserFromGetent(strconv.FormatUint(uint64(id.UID), 10))
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return u.Username, nil
}

View File

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
//go:build windows
package server
import (
"os/user"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
)
// usernameForIdentity resolves a Windows caller's SID to its account name.
func usernameForIdentity(id ipcauth.Identity) (string, error) {
u, err := user.LookupId(id.SID)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return u.Username, nil
}

View File

@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/auth"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/expose"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
sleephandler "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/sleep/handler"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/mdm"
@@ -403,11 +402,6 @@ func (s *Server) SetConfig(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.SetConfigReques
}
}
// SSH root login / disabling SSH auth requires a privileged caller.
if err := requirePrivilegedForDangerousSSH(callerCtx, msg.EnableSSHRoot, msg.DisableSSHAuth); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// MDM gate: refuse the whole request if any of its fields is enforced
// by the active MDM policy. The error carries an MDMManagedFields-
// Violation detail listing the offending key names. Non-conflicting
@@ -543,11 +537,6 @@ func (s *Server) Login(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.LoginRequest) (*pro
}
}
// SSH root login / disabling SSH auth requires a privileged caller.
if err := requirePrivilegedForDangerousSSH(callerCtx, msg.EnableSSHRoot, msg.DisableSSHAuth); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
s.mutex.Lock()
if s.actCancel != nil {
s.actCancel()
@@ -954,17 +943,6 @@ func (s *Server) Up(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.UpRequest) (*proto.UpR
}
s.config = config
// --owner: explicitly claim ownership of the active profile for the caller.
if msg != nil && msg.GetClaimOwner() {
if id, ok := ipcauth.IdentityFromContext(callerCtx); ok {
if err := s.claimForCallerLocked(id, s.config); err != nil {
s.mutex.Unlock()
log.Errorf("failed to claim profile ownership: %v", err)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("claim owner: %w", err)
}
}
}
s.statusRecorder.UpdateManagementAddress(s.config.ManagementURL.String())
s.statusRecorder.UpdateRosenpass(s.config.RosenpassEnabled, s.config.RosenpassPermissive)
@@ -1070,16 +1048,6 @@ func (s *Server) SwitchProfile(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.SwitchProfi
}
if msg != nil && msg.ProfileName != nil {
targetUsername := ""
if msg.Username != nil {
targetUsername = *msg.Username
}
// The interceptor already gated this against the CURRENT active profile;
// also bind the TARGET profile's username so a caller can't switch into
// another user's profile.
if err := s.bindCallerUsername(callerCtx, targetUsername); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if _, err := s.switchProfileIfNeeded(*msg.ProfileName, msg.Username, activeProf); err != nil {
log.Errorf("failed to switch profile: %v", err)
return nil, err
@@ -2037,18 +2005,7 @@ func (s *Server) AddProfile(ctx context.Context, msg *proto.AddProfileRequest) (
return nil, gstatus.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "profile name and username must be provided")
}
if err := s.bindCallerUsername(ctx, msg.Username); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Auto-isolate the new profile to its creator. When root/admin creates it we
// leave it unowned so the intended user claims it via trust-on-first-use.
var initialOwners []string
if id, ok := ipcauth.IdentityFromContext(ctx); ok && !id.IsPrivileged() {
initialOwners = []string{ipcauth.OwnerPrincipalForIdentity(id)}
}
created, err := s.profileManager.AddProfile(msg.ProfileName, msg.Username, initialOwners)
created, err := s.profileManager.AddProfile(msg.ProfileName, msg.Username)
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("failed to create profile: %v", err)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create profile: %w", err)
@@ -2071,10 +2028,6 @@ func (s *Server) RenameProfile(ctx context.Context, msg *proto.RenameProfileRequ
return nil, gstatus.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "profile name, username and new profile name must be provided")
}
if err := s.bindCallerUsername(ctx, msg.Username); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
resolved, err := s.resolveProfileHandle(msg.Handle, msg.Username)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -2104,10 +2057,6 @@ func (s *Server) RemoveProfile(ctx context.Context, msg *proto.RemoveProfileRequ
return nil, gstatus.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "profile name must be provided")
}
if err := s.bindCallerUsername(ctx, msg.Username); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
resolved, err := s.resolveProfileHandle(msg.ProfileName, msg.Username)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -2176,10 +2125,6 @@ func (s *Server) ListProfiles(ctx context.Context, msg *proto.ListProfilesReques
return nil, gstatus.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "username must be provided")
}
if err := s.bindCallerUsername(ctx, msg.Username); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
profiles, err := s.profileManager.ListProfiles(msg.Username)
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("failed to list profiles: %v", err)

View File

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
package server
import (
"context"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
gstatus "google.golang.org/grpc/status"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
)
// requirePrivilegedForDangerousSSH enforces admin permissions for SSH config.
// Enabling SSH root login or disabling SSH authentication turns the
// root/LocalSystem daemon's SSH server into an unauthenticated root shell
// (local-to-remote-root escalation), so only a privileged caller may set
// these flags to true over the local IPC.
func requirePrivilegedForDangerousSSH(ctx context.Context, enableSSHRoot, disableSSHAuth *bool) error {
dangerous := (enableSSHRoot != nil && *enableSSHRoot) || (disableSSHAuth != nil && *disableSSHAuth)
if !dangerous {
return nil
}
id, ok := ipcauth.IdentityFromContext(ctx)
if !ok {
log.Warnf("denying SSH root/no-auth config change: caller identity unavailable on this control channel")
return gstatus.Error(codes.PermissionDenied,
"enabling SSH root login or disabling SSH authentication requires root/administrator, but the caller identity could not be verified on this daemon control channel")
}
if !id.IsPrivileged() {
log.Warnf("denying SSH root/no-auth config change from non-privileged caller %s", id)
return gstatus.Errorf(codes.PermissionDenied,
"enabling SSH root login or disabling SSH authentication requires root/administrator (caller %s is not privileged); rerun as root/administrator", id)
}
return nil
}

View File

@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
package server
import (
"context"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
"google.golang.org/grpc/peer"
gstatus "google.golang.org/grpc/status"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
)
func ctxWithIdentity(id ipcauth.Identity) context.Context {
return peer.NewContext(context.Background(), &peer.Peer{AuthInfo: ipcauth.AuthInfo{Identity: id}})
}
func boolPtr(b bool) *bool { return &b }
func TestRequirePrivilegedForDangerousSSH(t *testing.T) {
root := ipcauth.Identity{UID: 0}
user := ipcauth.Identity{UID: 1000}
tests := []struct {
name string
ctx context.Context
enableSSHRoot *bool
disableSSHAuth *bool
wantDenied bool
}{
{"no flags, no identity", context.Background(), nil, nil, false},
{"flags false, non-priv", ctxWithIdentity(user), boolPtr(false), boolPtr(false), false},
{"enableSSHRoot by root", ctxWithIdentity(root), boolPtr(true), nil, false},
{"enableSSHRoot by non-priv", ctxWithIdentity(user), boolPtr(true), nil, true},
{"disableSSHAuth by non-priv", ctxWithIdentity(user), nil, boolPtr(true), true},
{"enableSSHRoot no identity (fail closed)", context.Background(), boolPtr(true), nil, true},
{"both by root", ctxWithIdentity(root), boolPtr(true), boolPtr(true), false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
err := requirePrivilegedForDangerousSSH(tt.ctx, tt.enableSSHRoot, tt.disableSSHAuth)
if tt.wantDenied {
assert.Error(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, codes.PermissionDenied, gstatus.Code(err))
} else {
assert.NoError(t, err)
}
})
}
}

View File

@@ -20,8 +20,6 @@ import (
"github.com/creack/pty"
"github.com/gliderlabs/ssh"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
shellutil "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/shell"
)
// ptyManager manages Pty file operations with thread safety
@@ -148,10 +146,10 @@ func (s *Server) createShellCommand(ctx context.Context, shell string, args []st
// prepareCommandEnv prepares environment variables for command execution on Unix
func (s *Server) prepareCommandEnv(_ *log.Entry, localUser *user.User, session ssh.Session) []string {
env := shellutil.PrepareUserEnv(localUser, shellutil.GetUserShell(localUser.Uid))
env := prepareUserEnv(localUser, getUserShell(localUser.Uid))
env = append(env, prepareSSHEnv(session)...)
for _, v := range session.Environ() {
if shellutil.AcceptEnv(v) {
if acceptEnv(v) {
env = append(env, v)
}
}

View File

@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ import (
"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
"golang.org/x/sys/windows/registry"
shellutil "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/shell"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/server/winpty"
)
@@ -248,10 +247,10 @@ func (s *Server) prepareCommandEnv(logger *log.Entry, localUser *user.User, sess
userEnv, err := s.getUserEnvironment(logger, username, domain)
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("failed to get user environment for %s\\%s, using fallback: %v", domain, username, err)
env := shellutil.PrepareUserEnv(localUser, shellutil.GetUserShell(localUser.Uid))
env := prepareUserEnv(localUser, getUserShell(localUser.Uid))
env = append(env, prepareSSHEnv(session)...)
for _, v := range session.Environ() {
if shellutil.AcceptEnv(v) {
if acceptEnv(v) {
env = append(env, v)
}
}
@@ -261,7 +260,7 @@ func (s *Server) prepareCommandEnv(logger *log.Entry, localUser *user.User, sess
env := userEnv
env = append(env, prepareSSHEnv(session)...)
for _, v := range session.Environ() {
if shellutil.AcceptEnv(v) {
if acceptEnv(v) {
env = append(env, v)
}
}
@@ -274,7 +273,7 @@ func (s *Server) handlePtyLogin(logger *log.Entry, session ssh.Session, privileg
return false
}
shell := shellutil.GetUserShell(privilegeResult.User.Uid)
shell := getUserShell(privilegeResult.User.Uid)
logger.Infof("starting interactive shell: %s", shell)
s.executeCommandWithPty(logger, session, nil, privilegeResult, ptyReq, nil)
@@ -385,7 +384,7 @@ func (s *Server) executeCommandWithPty(logger *log.Entry, session ssh.Session, _
}
username, domain := s.parseUsername(localUser.Username)
shell := shellutil.GetUserShell(localUser.Uid)
shell := getUserShell(localUser.Uid)
req := PtyExecutionRequest{
Shell: shell,

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
//go:build cgo && !osusergo && !windows
package server
import "os/user"
// lookupWithGetent with CGO delegates directly to os/user.Lookup.
// When CGO is enabled, os/user uses libc (getpwnam_r) which goes through
// the NSS stack natively. If it fails, the user truly doesn't exist and
// getent would also fail.
func lookupWithGetent(username string) (*user.User, error) {
return user.Lookup(username)
}
// currentUserWithGetent with CGO delegates directly to os/user.Current.
func currentUserWithGetent() (*user.User, error) {
return user.Current()
}
// groupIdsWithFallback with CGO delegates directly to user.GroupIds.
// libc's getgrouplist handles NSS groups natively.
func groupIdsWithFallback(u *user.User) ([]string, error) {
return u.GroupIds()
}

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
//go:build (!cgo || osusergo) && !windows
package shell
package server
import (
"os"
@@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ import (
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
)
// LookupWithGetent looks up a user by name, falling back to getent if os/user fails.
// lookupWithGetent looks up a user by name, falling back to getent if os/user fails.
// Without CGO, os/user only reads /etc/passwd and misses NSS-provided users.
// getent goes through the host's NSS stack.
func LookupWithGetent(username string) (*user.User, error) {
func lookupWithGetent(username string) (*user.User, error) {
u, err := user.Lookup(username)
if err == nil {
return u, nil
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ func LookupWithGetent(username string) (*user.User, error) {
stdErr := err
log.Debugf("os/user.Lookup(%q) failed, trying getent: %v", username, err)
u, _, getentErr := runGetentPasswd(username)
u, _, getentErr := runGetent(username)
if getentErr != nil {
log.Debugf("getent fallback for %q also failed: %v", username, getentErr)
return nil, stdErr
@@ -31,26 +31,8 @@ func LookupWithGetent(username string) (*user.User, error) {
return u, nil
}
// LookupGroupWithGetent returns the resolved group from either a gid or groupname,
// falling back to getent if os/user fails (NSS groups under nocgo).
func LookupGroupWithGetent(name string) (*user.Group, error) {
g, err := user.LookupGroup(name)
if err == nil {
return g, nil
}
stdErr := err
log.Debugf("os/user.LookupGroup(%q) failed, trying getent: %v", name, err)
g, getentErr := runGetentGroup(name)
if getentErr != nil {
log.Debugf("getent fallback for %q also failed: %v", name, getentErr)
return nil, stdErr
}
return g, nil
}
// CurrentUserWithGetent gets the current user, falling back to getent if os/user fails.
func CurrentUserWithGetent() (*user.User, error) {
// currentUserWithGetent gets the current user, falling back to getent if os/user fails.
func currentUserWithGetent() (*user.User, error) {
u, err := user.Current()
if err == nil {
return u, nil
@@ -60,7 +42,7 @@ func CurrentUserWithGetent() (*user.User, error) {
uid := strconv.Itoa(os.Getuid())
log.Debugf("os/user.Current() failed, trying getent with UID %s: %v", uid, err)
u, _, getentErr := runGetentPasswd(uid)
u, _, getentErr := runGetent(uid)
if getentErr != nil {
return nil, stdErr
}
@@ -68,14 +50,14 @@ func CurrentUserWithGetent() (*user.User, error) {
return u, nil
}
// GroupIdsWithFallback gets group IDs for a user via the id command first,
// groupIdsWithFallback gets group IDs for a user via the id command first,
// falling back to user.GroupIds().
// NOTE: unlike LookupWithGetent/CurrentUserWithGetent which try stdlib first,
// NOTE: unlike lookupWithGetent/currentUserWithGetent which try stdlib first,
// this intentionally tries `id -G` first because without CGO, user.GroupIds()
// only reads /etc/group and silently returns incomplete results for NSS users
// (no error, just missing groups). The id command goes through NSS and returns
// the full set.
func GroupIdsWithFallback(u *user.User) ([]string, error) {
func groupIdsWithFallback(u *user.User) ([]string, error) {
ids, err := runIdGroups(u.Username)
if err == nil {
return ids, nil

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package shell
package server
import (
"os/user"
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ func TestLookupWithGetent_CurrentUser(t *testing.T) {
current, err := user.Current()
require.NoError(t, err)
u, err := LookupWithGetent(current.Username)
u, err := lookupWithGetent(current.Username)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, current.Username, u.Username)
assert.Equal(t, current.Uid, u.Uid)
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ func TestLookupWithGetent_CurrentUser(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestLookupWithGetent_NonexistentUser(t *testing.T) {
_, err := LookupWithGetent("nonexistent_user_xyzzy_12345")
_, err := lookupWithGetent("nonexistent_user_xyzzy_12345")
require.Error(t, err, "should fail for nonexistent user")
}
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ func TestCurrentUserWithGetent(t *testing.T) {
stdUser, err := user.Current()
require.NoError(t, err)
u, err := CurrentUserWithGetent()
u, err := currentUserWithGetent()
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, stdUser.Uid, u.Uid)
assert.Equal(t, stdUser.Username, u.Username)
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ func TestGroupIdsWithFallback_CurrentUser(t *testing.T) {
current, err := user.Current()
require.NoError(t, err)
groups, err := GroupIdsWithFallback(current)
groups, err := groupIdsWithFallback(current)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotEmpty(t, groups, "current user should have at least one group")
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ func TestGroupIdsWithFallback_CurrentUser(t *testing.T) {
func TestGetShellFromGetent_CurrentUser(t *testing.T) {
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
// Windows stub always returns empty, which is correct
shell := GetShellFromGetent("1000")
shell := getShellFromGetent("1000")
assert.Empty(t, shell, "Windows stub should return empty")
return
}
@@ -65,9 +65,9 @@ func TestGetShellFromGetent_CurrentUser(t *testing.T) {
require.NoError(t, err)
// getent may not be available on all systems (e.g., macOS without Homebrew getent)
shell := GetShellFromGetent(current.Uid)
shell := getShellFromGetent(current.Uid)
if shell == "" {
t.Log("GetShellFromGetent returned empty, getent may not be available")
t.Log("getShellFromGetent returned empty, getent may not be available")
return
}
assert.True(t, shell[0] == '/', "shell should be an absolute path, got %q", shell)
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ func TestLookupWithGetent_RootUser(t *testing.T) {
t.Skip("no root user on Windows")
}
u, err := LookupWithGetent("root")
u, err := lookupWithGetent("root")
if err != nil {
t.Skip("root user not available on this system")
}
@@ -86,25 +86,25 @@ func TestLookupWithGetent_RootUser(t *testing.T) {
}
// TestIntegration_FullLookupChain exercises the complete user lookup chain
// against the real system, testing that all wrappers (LookupWithGetent,
// CurrentUserWithGetent, GroupIdsWithFallback, GetShellFromGetent) produce
// against the real system, testing that all wrappers (lookupWithGetent,
// currentUserWithGetent, groupIdsWithFallback, getShellFromGetent) produce
// consistent and correct results when composed together.
func TestIntegration_FullLookupChain(t *testing.T) {
// Step 1: CurrentUserWithGetent must resolve the running user.
current, err := CurrentUserWithGetent()
require.NoError(t, err, "CurrentUserWithGetent must resolve the running user")
// Step 1: currentUserWithGetent must resolve the running user.
current, err := currentUserWithGetent()
require.NoError(t, err, "currentUserWithGetent must resolve the running user")
require.NotEmpty(t, current.Uid)
require.NotEmpty(t, current.Username)
// Step 2: LookupWithGetent by the same username must return matching identity.
byName, err := LookupWithGetent(current.Username)
// Step 2: lookupWithGetent by the same username must return matching identity.
byName, err := lookupWithGetent(current.Username)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, current.Uid, byName.Uid, "lookup by name should return same UID")
assert.Equal(t, current.Gid, byName.Gid, "lookup by name should return same GID")
assert.Equal(t, current.HomeDir, byName.HomeDir, "lookup by name should return same home")
// Step 3: GroupIdsWithFallback must return at least the primary GID.
groups, err := GroupIdsWithFallback(current)
// Step 3: groupIdsWithFallback must return at least the primary GID.
groups, err := groupIdsWithFallback(current)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotEmpty(t, groups, "user must have at least one group")
@@ -120,10 +120,10 @@ func TestIntegration_FullLookupChain(t *testing.T) {
}
assert.True(t, foundPrimary, "primary GID %s should appear in supplementary groups", current.Gid)
// Step 4: GetShellFromGetent should either return a valid shell path or empty
// Step 4: getShellFromGetent should either return a valid shell path or empty
// (empty is OK when getent is not available, e.g. macOS without Homebrew getent).
if runtime.GOOS != "windows" {
shell := GetShellFromGetent(current.Uid)
shell := getShellFromGetent(current.Uid)
if shell != "" {
assert.True(t, shell[0] == '/', "shell should be an absolute path, got %q", shell)
}
@@ -131,17 +131,17 @@ func TestIntegration_FullLookupChain(t *testing.T) {
}
// TestIntegration_LookupAndGroupsConsistency verifies that a user resolved via
// LookupWithGetent can have their groups resolved via GroupIdsWithFallback,
// lookupWithGetent can have their groups resolved via groupIdsWithFallback,
// testing the handoff between the two functions as used by the SSH server.
func TestIntegration_LookupAndGroupsConsistency(t *testing.T) {
current, err := user.Current()
require.NoError(t, err)
// Simulate the SSH server flow: lookup user, then get their groups.
resolved, err := LookupWithGetent(current.Username)
resolved, err := lookupWithGetent(current.Username)
require.NoError(t, err)
groups, err := GroupIdsWithFallback(resolved)
groups, err := groupIdsWithFallback(resolved)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotEmpty(t, groups, "resolved user must have groups")
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ func TestIntegration_LookupAndGroupsConsistency(t *testing.T) {
}
// TestIntegration_ShellLookupChain tests the full shell resolution chain
// (getShellFromPasswd -> GetShellFromGetent -> $SHELL -> default) on Unix.
// (getShellFromPasswd -> getShellFromGetent -> $SHELL -> default) on Unix.
func TestIntegration_ShellLookupChain(t *testing.T) {
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
t.Skip("Unix shell lookup not applicable on Windows")
@@ -165,8 +165,8 @@ func TestIntegration_ShellLookupChain(t *testing.T) {
current, err := user.Current()
require.NoError(t, err)
// GetUserShell is the top-level function used by the SSH server.
shell := GetUserShell(current.Uid)
require.NotEmpty(t, shell, "GetUserShell must always return a shell")
// getUserShell is the top-level function used by the SSH server.
shell := getUserShell(current.Uid)
require.NotEmpty(t, shell, "getUserShell must always return a shell")
assert.True(t, shell[0] == '/', "shell should be an absolute path, got %q", shell)
}

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
//go:build !windows
package shell
package server
import (
"context"
@@ -14,26 +14,19 @@ import (
const getentTimeout = 5 * time.Second
// GetShellFromGetent gets a user's login shell via getent by UID.
// getShellFromGetent gets a user's login shell via getent by UID.
// This is needed even with CGO because getShellFromPasswd reads /etc/passwd
// directly and won't find NSS-provided users there.
func GetShellFromGetent(userID string) string {
_, shell, err := runGetentPasswd(userID)
func getShellFromGetent(userID string) string {
_, shell, err := runGetent(userID)
if err != nil {
return ""
}
return shell
}
// GetUserFromGetent returns the resolved user from either a uid or username,
// going through the host's NSS stack.
func GetUserFromGetent(query string) (*user.User, error) {
u, _, err := runGetentPasswd(query)
return u, err
}
// runGetentPasswd executes `getent passwd <query>` and returns the user and login shell.
func runGetentPasswd(query string) (*user.User, string, error) {
// runGetent executes `getent passwd <query>` and returns the user and login shell.
func runGetent(query string) (*user.User, string, error) {
if !validateGetentInput(query) {
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("invalid getent input: %q", query)
}
@@ -49,24 +42,7 @@ func runGetentPasswd(query string) (*user.User, string, error) {
return parseGetentPasswd(string(out))
}
// runGetentGroup executes `getent group <query>` and returns the group.
func runGetentGroup(query string) (*user.Group, error) {
if !validateGetentInput(query) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid getent input: %q", query)
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), getentTimeout)
defer cancel()
out, err := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "getent", "group", query).Output()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("getent group %s: %w", query, err)
}
return parseGetentGroup(string(out))
}
// parseGetentPasswd parses getent passwd output: "name:x:uid:gid:gecos:home:shell".
// parseGetentPasswd parses getent passwd output: "name:x:uid:gid:gecos:home:shell"
func parseGetentPasswd(output string) (*user.User, string, error) {
fields := strings.SplitN(strings.TrimSpace(output), ":", 8)
if len(fields) < 6 {
@@ -91,20 +67,6 @@ func parseGetentPasswd(output string) (*user.User, string, error) {
}, shell, nil
}
// parseGetentGroup parses getent group output: "group:x:gid:members".
func parseGetentGroup(output string) (*user.Group, error) {
fields := strings.SplitN(strings.TrimSpace(output), ":", 8)
if len(fields) < 4 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected getent output (need 4+ fields): %q", output)
}
if fields[0] == "" || fields[2] == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing required fields in getent output: %q", output)
}
return &user.Group{Gid: fields[2], Name: fields[0]}, nil
}
// validateGetentInput checks that the input is safe to pass to getent or id.
// Allows POSIX usernames, numeric UIDs, and common NSS extensions
// (@ for Kerberos, $ for Samba, + for NIS compat). A leading hyphen is

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
//go:build !windows
package shell
package server
import (
"os/exec"
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ func TestRunGetent_RootUser(t *testing.T) {
t.Skip("getent not available on this system")
}
u, shell, err := runGetentPasswd("root")
u, shell, err := runGetent("root")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, "root", u.Username)
assert.Equal(t, "0", u.Uid)
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ func TestRunGetent_ByUID(t *testing.T) {
t.Skip("getent not available on this system")
}
u, _, err := runGetentPasswd("0")
u, _, err := runGetent("0")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, "root", u.Username)
assert.Equal(t, "0", u.Uid)
@@ -222,15 +222,15 @@ func TestRunGetent_NonexistentUser(t *testing.T) {
t.Skip("getent not available on this system")
}
_, _, err := runGetentPasswd("nonexistent_user_xyzzy_12345")
_, _, err := runGetent("nonexistent_user_xyzzy_12345")
assert.Error(t, err)
}
func TestRunGetent_InvalidInput(t *testing.T) {
_, _, err := runGetentPasswd("")
_, _, err := runGetent("")
assert.Error(t, err)
_, _, err = runGetentPasswd("user\x00name")
_, _, err = runGetent("user\x00name")
assert.Error(t, err)
}
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ func TestRunGetent_NotAvailable(t *testing.T) {
t.Skip("getent is available, can't test missing case")
}
_, _, err := runGetentPasswd("root")
_, _, err := runGetent("root")
assert.Error(t, err, "should fail when getent is not installed")
}
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ func TestGetentResultsMatchStdlib(t *testing.T) {
current, err := user.Current()
require.NoError(t, err)
getentUser, _, err := runGetentPasswd(current.Username)
getentUser, _, err := runGetent(current.Username)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, current.Username, getentUser.Username, "username should match")
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ func TestGetentResultsMatchStdlib_ByUID(t *testing.T) {
current, err := user.Current()
require.NoError(t, err)
getentUser, _, err := runGetentPasswd(current.Uid)
getentUser, _, err := runGetent(current.Uid)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, current.Username, getentUser.Username, "username should match when looked up by UID")
@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ func TestGetShellFromPasswd_CurrentUser(t *testing.T) {
assert.True(t, shell[0] == '/', "shell should be an absolute path, got %q", shell)
if _, err := exec.LookPath("getent"); err == nil {
_, getentShell, getentErr := runGetentPasswd(current.Uid)
_, getentShell, getentErr := runGetent(current.Uid)
if getentErr == nil && getentShell != "" {
assert.Equal(t, getentShell, shell, "shell from /etc/passwd should match getent")
}
@@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ func TestGetShellFromPasswd_MatchesGetentForKnownUsers(t *testing.T) {
continue
}
_, getentShell, err := runGetentPasswd(uid)
_, getentShell, err := runGetent(uid)
if err != nil {
continue
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
//go:build windows
package server
import "os/user"
// lookupWithGetent on Windows just delegates to os/user.Lookup.
// Windows does not use NSS/getent; its user lookup works without CGO.
func lookupWithGetent(username string) (*user.User, error) {
return user.Lookup(username)
}
// currentUserWithGetent on Windows just delegates to os/user.Current.
func currentUserWithGetent() (*user.User, error) {
return user.Current()
}
// getShellFromGetent is a no-op on Windows; shell resolution uses PowerShell detection.
func getShellFromGetent(_ string) string {
return ""
}
// groupIdsWithFallback on Windows just delegates to u.GroupIds().
func groupIdsWithFallback(u *user.User) ([]string, error) {
return u.GroupIds()
}

View File

@@ -1,14 +1,17 @@
package shell
package server
import (
"bufio"
"fmt"
"net"
"os"
"os/exec"
"os/user"
"runtime"
"strconv"
"strings"
"github.com/gliderlabs/ssh"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
)
@@ -19,9 +22,9 @@ const (
powershellExe = "powershell.exe"
)
// GetUserShell returns the appropriate shell for the given user ID.
// Handles all platform-specific logic and fallbacks consistently.
func GetUserShell(userID string) string {
// getUserShell returns the appropriate shell for the given user ID
// Handles all platform-specific logic and fallbacks consistently
func getUserShell(userID string) string {
switch runtime.GOOS {
case "windows":
return getWindowsUserShell()
@@ -53,7 +56,7 @@ func getUnixUserShell(userID string) string {
return shell
}
if shell := GetShellFromGetent(userID); shell != "" {
if shell := getShellFromGetent(userID); shell != "" {
return shell
}
@@ -64,7 +67,7 @@ func getUnixUserShell(userID string) string {
return defaultUnixShell
}
// getShellFromPasswd reads the shell from /etc/passwd for the given user ID.
// getShellFromPasswd reads the shell from /etc/passwd for the given user ID
func getShellFromPasswd(userID string) string {
file, err := os.Open("/etc/passwd")
if err != nil {
@@ -98,8 +101,8 @@ func getShellFromPasswd(userID string) string {
return ""
}
// PrepareUserEnv prepares environment variables for user execution.
func PrepareUserEnv(user *user.User, shell string) []string {
// prepareUserEnv prepares environment variables for user execution
func prepareUserEnv(user *user.User, shell string) []string {
pathValue := "/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/local/games:/usr/games"
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
pathValue = `C:\Windows\System32;C:\Windows;C:\Windows\System32\Wbem;C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0`
@@ -114,9 +117,9 @@ func PrepareUserEnv(user *user.User, shell string) []string {
}
}
// AcceptEnv checks if an environment variable from an SSH client should be accepted.
// This is a whitelist of variables that SSH clients can send to the server.
func AcceptEnv(envVar string) bool {
// acceptEnv checks if environment variable from SSH client should be accepted
// This is a whitelist of variables that SSH clients can send to the server
func acceptEnv(envVar string) bool {
varName := envVar
if idx := strings.Index(envVar, "="); idx != -1 {
varName = envVar[:idx]
@@ -153,3 +156,29 @@ func AcceptEnv(envVar string) bool {
return false
}
// prepareSSHEnv prepares SSH protocol-specific environment variables
// These variables provide information about the SSH connection itself
func prepareSSHEnv(session ssh.Session) []string {
remoteAddr := session.RemoteAddr()
localAddr := session.LocalAddr()
remoteHost, remotePort, err := net.SplitHostPort(remoteAddr.String())
if err != nil {
remoteHost = remoteAddr.String()
remotePort = "0"
}
localHost, localPort, err := net.SplitHostPort(localAddr.String())
if err != nil {
localHost = localAddr.String()
localPort = strconv.Itoa(InternalSSHPort)
}
return []string{
// SSH_CLIENT format: "client_ip client_port server_port"
fmt.Sprintf("SSH_CLIENT=%s %s %s", remoteHost, remotePort, localPort),
// SSH_CONNECTION format: "client_ip client_port server_ip server_port"
fmt.Sprintf("SSH_CONNECTION=%s %s %s %s", remoteHost, remotePort, localHost, localPort),
}
}

View File

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
package server
import (
"fmt"
"net"
"strconv"
"github.com/gliderlabs/ssh"
)
// prepareSSHEnv prepares SSH protocol-specific environment variables
// These variables provide information about the SSH connection itself
func prepareSSHEnv(session ssh.Session) []string {
remoteAddr := session.RemoteAddr()
localAddr := session.LocalAddr()
remoteHost, remotePort, err := net.SplitHostPort(remoteAddr.String())
if err != nil {
remoteHost = remoteAddr.String()
remotePort = "0"
}
localHost, localPort, err := net.SplitHostPort(localAddr.String())
if err != nil {
localHost = localAddr.String()
localPort = strconv.Itoa(InternalSSHPort)
}
return []string{
// SSH_CLIENT format: "client_ip client_port server_port"
fmt.Sprintf("SSH_CLIENT=%s %s %s", remoteHost, remotePort, localPort),
// SSH_CONNECTION format: "client_ip client_port server_ip server_port"
fmt.Sprintf("SSH_CONNECTION=%s %s %s %s", remoteHost, remotePort, localHost, localPort),
}
}

View File

@@ -9,8 +9,6 @@ import (
"strings"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
shellutil "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/shell"
)
var (
@@ -25,8 +23,8 @@ func isPlatformUnix() bool {
// Dependency injection variables for testing - allows mocking dynamic runtime checks
var (
getCurrentUser = shellutil.CurrentUserWithGetent
lookupUser = shellutil.LookupWithGetent
getCurrentUser = currentUserWithGetent
lookupUser = lookupWithGetent
getCurrentOS = func() string { return runtime.GOOS }
getIsProcessPrivileged = isCurrentProcessPrivileged

View File

@@ -16,8 +16,6 @@ import (
"github.com/gliderlabs/ssh"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
shellutil "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/shell"
)
// POSIX portable filename character set regex: [a-zA-Z0-9._-]
@@ -162,7 +160,7 @@ func (s *Server) parseUserCredentials(localUser *user.User) (uint32, uint32, []u
// getSupplementaryGroups retrieves supplementary group IDs for a user.
// Uses id/getent fallback for NSS users in CGO_ENABLED=0 builds.
func (s *Server) getSupplementaryGroups(u *user.User) ([]uint32, error) {
groupIDStrings, err := shellutil.GroupIdsWithFallback(u)
groupIDStrings, err := groupIdsWithFallback(u)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("get group IDs for user %s: %w", u.Username, err)
}
@@ -198,7 +196,7 @@ func (s *Server) createExecutorCommand(logger *log.Entry, session ssh.Session, l
GID: gid,
Groups: groups,
WorkingDir: localUser.HomeDir,
Shell: shellutil.GetUserShell(localUser.Uid),
Shell: getUserShell(localUser.Uid),
Command: session.RawCommand(),
PTY: hasPty,
}
@@ -230,7 +228,7 @@ func (s *Server) createPtyCommand(privilegeResult PrivilegeCheckResult, ptyReq s
func (s *Server) createDirectPtyCommand(session ssh.Session, localUser *user.User, ptyReq ssh.Pty) *exec.Cmd {
log.Debugf("creating direct Pty command for user %s (no user switching needed)", localUser.Username)
shell := shellutil.GetUserShell(localUser.Uid)
shell := getUserShell(localUser.Uid)
args := s.getShellCommandArgs(shell, session.RawCommand())
cmd := s.createShellCommand(session.Context(), shell, args)
@@ -247,12 +245,12 @@ func (s *Server) preparePtyEnv(localUser *user.User, ptyReq ssh.Pty, session ssh
termType = "xterm-256color"
}
env := shellutil.PrepareUserEnv(localUser, shellutil.GetUserShell(localUser.Uid))
env := prepareUserEnv(localUser, getUserShell(localUser.Uid))
env = append(env, prepareSSHEnv(session)...)
env = append(env, fmt.Sprintf("TERM=%s", termType))
for _, v := range session.Environ() {
if shellutil.AcceptEnv(v) {
if acceptEnv(v) {
env = append(env, v)
}
}

View File

@@ -13,8 +13,6 @@ import (
"github.com/gliderlabs/ssh"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
shellutil "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/shell"
)
// validateUsername validates Windows usernames according to SAM Account Name rules
@@ -106,7 +104,7 @@ func (s *Server) createExecutorCommand(logger *log.Entry, session ssh.Session, l
func (s *Server) createUserSwitchCommand(logger *log.Entry, session ssh.Session, localUser *user.User) (*exec.Cmd, func(), error) {
username, domain := s.parseUsername(localUser.Username)
shell := shellutil.GetUserShell(localUser.Uid)
shell := getUserShell(localUser.Uid)
rawCmd := session.RawCommand()
var command string

View File

@@ -79,13 +79,15 @@ type Info struct {
EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding bool
EnableSSHRemotePortForwarding bool
DisableSSHAuth bool
SyncMessageVersion *int
}
func (i *Info) SetFlags(
rosenpassEnabled, rosenpassPermissive bool,
serverSSHAllowed *bool,
disableClientRoutes, disableServerRoutes,
disableDNS, disableFirewall, blockLANAccess, blockInbound, disableIPv6 bool,
disableDNS, disableFirewall, blockLANAccess, blockInbound, disableIPv6 bool, syncMessageVersion *int,
enableSSHRoot, enableSSHSFTP, enableSSHLocalPortForwarding, enableSSHRemotePortForwarding *bool,
disableSSHAuth *bool,
) {
@@ -103,6 +105,8 @@ func (i *Info) SetFlags(
i.BlockInbound = blockInbound
i.DisableIPv6 = disableIPv6
i.SyncMessageVersion = syncMessageVersion
if enableSSHRoot != nil {
i.EnableSSHRoot = *enableSSHRoot
}

View File

@@ -6,4 +6,3 @@ frontend/bindings
frontend/.vite
build/linux/appimage/build
build/windows/nsis/MicrosoftEdgeWebview2Setup.exe
build/windows/frontend

View File

@@ -3,16 +3,16 @@
package main
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"runtime"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"google.golang.org/grpc"
"google.golang.org/grpc/backoff"
"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials/insecure"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/cmd"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ui/desktop"
)
@@ -36,7 +36,9 @@ func (c *Conn) Client() (proto.DaemonServiceClient, error) {
return c.client, nil
}
opts := []grpc.DialOption{
cc, err := grpc.NewClient(
strings.TrimPrefix(c.addr, "tcp://"),
grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials()),
grpc.WithUserAgent(desktop.GetUIUserAgent()),
// Cap reconnect backoff at 5s; gRPC's default 120s MaxDelay would
// leave the UI waiting 30-60s to notice a freshly-started daemon.
@@ -48,12 +50,6 @@ func (c *Conn) Client() (proto.DaemonServiceClient, error) {
MaxDelay: 5 * time.Second,
},
}),
}
cc, err := cmd.DialClientGRPCServer(
context.Background(),
c.addr,
opts...,
)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dial daemon: %w", err)
@@ -65,7 +61,7 @@ func (c *Conn) Client() (proto.DaemonServiceClient, error) {
// DaemonAddr returns the default daemon gRPC address: a Unix socket on Linux/macOS, TCP loopback on Windows.
func DaemonAddr() string {
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
return "npipe://netbird"
return "tcp://127.0.0.1:41731"
}
return "unix:///var/run/netbird.sock"
}

151
combined/cmd/admin.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
package cmd
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"github.com/dexidp/dex/storage"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/formatter/hook"
admincmd "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/cmd/admin"
tokencmd "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/cmd/token"
nbconfig "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/server/config"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/activity"
activitystore "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/activity/store"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/store"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
)
// newAdminCommands creates the admin command tree with combined-specific resource openers.
func newAdminCommands() *cobra.Command {
return admincmd.NewCommands(admincmd.Openers{
Resources: withAdminResources,
Store: withAdminStoreOnly,
IDP: withAdminIDPOnly,
})
}
func newLegacyTokenCommand() *cobra.Command {
cmd := tokencmd.NewCommands(tokencmd.StoreOpener(withAdminStoreOnly))
cmd.Deprecated = "use 'admin token' instead"
return cmd
}
// withAdminResources loads the combined YAML config, initializes stores, and calls fn.
func withAdminResources(cmd *cobra.Command, fn func(ctx context.Context, resources admincmd.Resources) error) error {
return withAdminConfig(cmd, func(ctx context.Context, cfg *CombinedConfig) error {
mgmtConfig, err := adminManagementConfig(cfg)
if err != nil {
return err
}
managementStore, err := openAdminStore(ctx, cfg)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer admincmd.CloseStore(ctx, managementStore)
idpStorage, idpStorageFile, err := admincmd.OpenIDPStorage(mgmtConfig)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer admincmd.CloseIDPStorage(idpStorage)
eventStore, esErr := openAdminEventStore(ctx, cfg, mgmtConfig)
if esErr != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(cmd.ErrOrStderr(), "Warning: audit events will not be recorded: %v\n", esErr)
}
if eventStore != nil {
defer func() {
if err := eventStore.Close(ctx); err != nil {
log.Debugf("close activity event store: %v", err)
}
}()
}
return fn(ctx, admincmd.Resources{Store: managementStore, IDPStorage: idpStorage, IDPStorageFile: idpStorageFile, EventStore: eventStore})
})
}
// withAdminStoreOnly opens only the management store for admin subcommands that do not
// need embedded IdP storage.
func withAdminStoreOnly(cmd *cobra.Command, fn func(ctx context.Context, s store.Store) error) error {
return withAdminConfig(cmd, func(ctx context.Context, cfg *CombinedConfig) error {
managementStore, err := openAdminStore(ctx, cfg)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer admincmd.CloseStore(ctx, managementStore)
return fn(ctx, managementStore)
})
}
func withAdminIDPOnly(cmd *cobra.Command, fn func(ctx context.Context, idpStorage storage.Storage, storageFile string) error) error {
return withAdminConfig(cmd, func(ctx context.Context, cfg *CombinedConfig) error {
mgmtConfig, err := adminManagementConfig(cfg)
if err != nil {
return err
}
idpStorage, idpStorageFile, err := admincmd.OpenIDPStorage(mgmtConfig)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer admincmd.CloseIDPStorage(idpStorage)
return fn(ctx, idpStorage, idpStorageFile)
})
}
func withAdminConfig(cmd *cobra.Command, fn func(ctx context.Context, cfg *CombinedConfig) error) error {
if err := util.InitLog("error", "console"); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("init log: %w", err)
}
ctx := context.WithValue(cmd.Context(), hook.ExecutionContextKey, hook.SystemSource) //nolint:staticcheck
cfg, err := LoadConfig(configPath)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("load config: %w", err)
}
cfg.ApplyAdminDefaults()
applyServerStoreEnv(cfg.Server.Store)
return fn(ctx, cfg)
}
func adminManagementConfig(cfg *CombinedConfig) (*nbconfig.Config, error) {
mgmtConfig, err := cfg.ToManagementConfig()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("create management config: %w", err)
}
return mgmtConfig, nil
}
func openAdminStore(ctx context.Context, cfg *CombinedConfig) (store.Store, error) {
managementStore, err := store.NewStore(ctx, types.Engine(cfg.Management.Store.Engine), cfg.Management.DataDir, nil, true)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("create store: %w", err)
}
return managementStore, nil
}
func openAdminEventStore(ctx context.Context, cfg *CombinedConfig, config *nbconfig.Config) (activity.Store, error) {
if config.DataStoreEncryptionKey == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("data store encryption key is not configured")
}
if err := applyActivityStoreEnv(cfg.Server.ActivityStore); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("configure activity event store: %w", err)
}
eventStore, err := activitystore.NewSqlStore(ctx, config.Datadir, config.DataStoreEncryptionKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("open activity event store: %w", err)
}
if eventStore == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("open activity event store: returned nil store")
}
return eventStore, nil
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
package cmd
import (
"context"
"os"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
nbconfig "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/server/config"
)
func TestApplyAdminDefaultsCopiesServerStoreWithoutExposedAddress(t *testing.T) {
cfg := DefaultConfig()
cfg.Server.ExposedAddress = ""
cfg.Server.DataDir = "/srv/netbird"
cfg.Server.Store = StoreConfig{
Engine: "postgres",
DSN: "postgres://user:pass@example.com/netbird",
}
cfg.ApplyAdminDefaults()
require.Equal(t, "/srv/netbird", cfg.Management.DataDir)
require.Equal(t, "postgres", cfg.Management.Store.Engine)
require.Equal(t, cfg.Server.Store.DSN, cfg.Management.Store.DSN)
}
func TestOpenAdminEventStoreMissingEncryptionKeyReturnsNilInterface(t *testing.T) {
eventStore, err := openAdminEventStore(context.Background(), &CombinedConfig{}, &nbconfig.Config{})
require.Error(t, err)
require.Contains(t, err.Error(), "encryption key")
require.Nil(t, eventStore)
}
func TestApplyServerStoreEnv(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_POSTGRES_DSN", "")
t.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_MYSQL_DSN", "")
t.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_SQLITE_FILE", "")
applyServerStoreEnv(StoreConfig{Engine: "postgres", DSN: "postgres-dsn", File: "store.db"})
require.Equal(t, "postgres-dsn", os.Getenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_POSTGRES_DSN"))
require.Equal(t, "store.db", os.Getenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_SQLITE_FILE"))
applyServerStoreEnv(StoreConfig{Engine: "mysql", DSN: "mysql-dsn"})
require.Equal(t, "mysql-dsn", os.Getenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_MYSQL_DSN"))
}

View File

@@ -6,8 +6,7 @@ import (
"net"
"net/netip"
"os"
"path"
"path/filepath"
filePath "path/filepath"
"strings"
"time"
@@ -74,6 +73,9 @@ type ServerConfig struct {
ActivityStore StoreConfig `yaml:"activityStore"`
AuthStore StoreConfig `yaml:"authStore"`
ReverseProxy ReverseProxyConfig `yaml:"reverseProxy"`
SupportedSyncMessageVersions *int `yaml:"supportedSyncMessageVersions,omitempty"`
PerAccountSupportedSyncMessageVersions map[string]int `yaml:"perAccountSupportedSyncMessageVersions,omitempty"`
}
// TLSConfig contains TLS/HTTPS settings
@@ -300,6 +302,19 @@ func (c *CombinedConfig) ApplySimplifiedDefaults() {
c.autoConfigureClientSettings(exposedProto, exposedHost, exposedHostPort, hasExternalStuns, hasExternalRelay, hasExternalSignal)
}
// ApplyAdminDefaults applies the management settings needed by admin commands even
// when the full server config is invalid and ApplySimplifiedDefaults cannot run.
func (c *CombinedConfig) ApplyAdminDefaults() {
if c.Management.DataDir == "" || c.Management.DataDir == "/var/lib/netbird/" {
c.Management.DataDir = c.Server.DataDir
}
if c.Management.Store.Engine == "" || c.Management.Store.Engine == "sqlite" {
if c.Server.Store.Engine != "" || c.Server.Store.File != "" || c.Server.Store.DSN != "" {
c.Management.Store = c.Server.Store
}
}
}
// applyRelayDefaults configures the relay service if no external relay is configured.
func (c *CombinedConfig) applyRelayDefaults(exposedProto, exposedHostPort string, hasExternalRelay, hasExternalStuns bool) {
if hasExternalRelay {
@@ -577,11 +592,11 @@ func (c *CombinedConfig) buildEmbeddedIdPConfig(mgmt ManagementConfig) (*idp.Emb
return nil, fmt.Errorf("authStore.dsn is required when authStore.engine is postgres")
}
} else {
authStorageFile = path.Join(mgmt.DataDir, "idp.db")
authStorageFile = filePath.Join(mgmt.DataDir, "idp.db")
if c.Server.AuthStore.File != "" {
authStorageFile = c.Server.AuthStore.File
if !filepath.IsAbs(authStorageFile) {
authStorageFile = filepath.Join(mgmt.DataDir, authStorageFile)
if !filePath.IsAbs(authStorageFile) {
authStorageFile = filePath.Join(mgmt.DataDir, authStorageFile)
}
}
}
@@ -696,16 +711,18 @@ func (c *CombinedConfig) ToManagementConfig() (*nbconfig.Config, error) {
httpConfig.AuthCallbackURL = callbackURL + types.ProxyCallbackEndpointFull
return &nbconfig.Config{
Stuns: stuns,
Relay: relayConfig,
Signal: signalConfig,
Datadir: mgmt.DataDir,
DataStoreEncryptionKey: mgmt.Store.EncryptionKey,
HttpConfig: httpConfig,
StoreConfig: storeConfig,
ReverseProxy: reverseProxy,
DisableDefaultPolicy: mgmt.DisableDefaultPolicy,
EmbeddedIdP: embeddedIdP,
Stuns: stuns,
Relay: relayConfig,
Signal: signalConfig,
Datadir: mgmt.DataDir,
DataStoreEncryptionKey: mgmt.Store.EncryptionKey,
HttpConfig: httpConfig,
StoreConfig: storeConfig,
ReverseProxy: reverseProxy,
DisableDefaultPolicy: mgmt.DisableDefaultPolicy,
EmbeddedIdP: embeddedIdP,
HighestSupportedSyncMessageVersion: c.Server.SupportedSyncMessageVersions,
PerAccountHighestSupportedSyncMessageVersion: c.Server.PerAccountSupportedSyncMessageVersions,
}, nil
}
@@ -729,7 +746,7 @@ func ApplyEmbeddedIdPConfig(ctx context.Context, cfg *nbconfig.Config, mgmtPort
cfg.EmbeddedIdP.Storage.Type = "sqlite3"
}
if cfg.EmbeddedIdP.Storage.Config.File == "" && cfg.Datadir != "" {
cfg.EmbeddedIdP.Storage.Config.File = path.Join(cfg.Datadir, "idp.db")
cfg.EmbeddedIdP.Storage.Config.File = filePath.Join(cfg.Datadir, "idp.db")
}
issuer := cfg.EmbeddedIdP.Issuer

View File

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ import (
relayServer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/relay/server"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/relay/server/listener"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/relay/server/listener/ws"
syncgrpc "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/grpc"
sharedMetrics "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/metrics"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/relay/auth"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/signal/proto"
@@ -64,7 +65,8 @@ func init() {
rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVarP(&configPath, "config", "c", "", "path to YAML configuration file (required)")
_ = rootCmd.MarkPersistentFlagRequired("config")
rootCmd.AddCommand(newTokenCommands())
rootCmd.AddCommand(newAdminCommands())
rootCmd.AddCommand(newLegacyTokenCommand())
}
func RootCmd() *cobra.Command {
@@ -122,6 +124,37 @@ func execute(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
}
// initializeConfig loads and validates the configuration, then initializes logging.
func applyServerStoreEnv(storeConfig StoreConfig) {
if dsn := storeConfig.DSN; dsn != "" {
switch strings.ToLower(storeConfig.Engine) {
case "postgres":
os.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_POSTGRES_DSN", dsn)
case "mysql":
os.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_MYSQL_DSN", dsn)
}
}
if file := storeConfig.File; file != "" {
os.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_SQLITE_FILE", file)
}
}
func applyActivityStoreEnv(storeConfig StoreConfig) error {
if engine := storeConfig.Engine; engine != "" {
engineLower := strings.ToLower(engine)
if engineLower == "postgres" && storeConfig.DSN == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("activityStore.dsn is required when activityStore.engine is postgres")
}
os.Setenv("NB_ACTIVITY_EVENT_STORE_ENGINE", engineLower)
if dsn := storeConfig.DSN; dsn != "" {
os.Setenv("NB_ACTIVITY_EVENT_POSTGRES_DSN", dsn)
}
}
if file := storeConfig.File; file != "" {
os.Setenv("NB_ACTIVITY_EVENT_SQLITE_FILE", file)
}
return nil
}
func initializeConfig() error {
var err error
config, err = LoadConfig(configPath)
@@ -137,30 +170,10 @@ func initializeConfig() error {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to initialize log: %w", err)
}
if dsn := config.Server.Store.DSN; dsn != "" {
switch strings.ToLower(config.Server.Store.Engine) {
case "postgres":
os.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_POSTGRES_DSN", dsn)
case "mysql":
os.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_MYSQL_DSN", dsn)
}
}
if file := config.Server.Store.File; file != "" {
os.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_SQLITE_FILE", file)
}
applyServerStoreEnv(config.Server.Store)
if engine := config.Server.ActivityStore.Engine; engine != "" {
engineLower := strings.ToLower(engine)
if engineLower == "postgres" && config.Server.ActivityStore.DSN == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("activityStore.dsn is required when activityStore.engine is postgres")
}
os.Setenv("NB_ACTIVITY_EVENT_STORE_ENGINE", engineLower)
if dsn := config.Server.ActivityStore.DSN; dsn != "" {
os.Setenv("NB_ACTIVITY_EVENT_POSTGRES_DSN", dsn)
}
}
if file := config.Server.ActivityStore.File; file != "" {
os.Setenv("NB_ACTIVITY_EVENT_SQLITE_FILE", file)
if err := applyActivityStoreEnv(config.Server.ActivityStore); err != nil {
return err
}
log.Infof("Starting combined NetBird server")
@@ -505,6 +518,16 @@ func createManagementServer(cfg *CombinedConfig, mgmtConfig *nbconfig.Config) (m
}
mgmtPort, _ := strconv.Atoi(portStr)
if err := syncgrpc.ValidateSyncMessageVersion(mgmtConfig.HighestSupportedSyncMessageVersion); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
for accountId, version := range mgmtConfig.PerAccountHighestSupportedSyncMessageVersion {
if err := syncgrpc.ValidateSyncMessageVersion(&version); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unrecognized sync message version in perAccountSupportedSyncMessageVersions for account %s %w", accountId, err)
}
}
mgmtSrv := newServer(
&mgmtServer.Config{
NbConfig: mgmtConfig,

View File

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
package cmd
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"os"
"strings"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/formatter/hook"
tokencmd "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/cmd/token"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/store"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
)
// newTokenCommands creates the token command tree with combined-specific store opener.
func newTokenCommands() *cobra.Command {
return tokencmd.NewCommands(withTokenStore)
}
// withTokenStore loads the combined YAML config, initializes the store, and calls fn.
func withTokenStore(cmd *cobra.Command, fn func(ctx context.Context, s store.Store) error) error {
if err := util.InitLog("error", "console"); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("init log: %w", err)
}
ctx := context.WithValue(cmd.Context(), hook.ExecutionContextKey, hook.SystemSource) //nolint:staticcheck
cfg, err := LoadConfig(configPath)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("load config: %w", err)
}
if dsn := cfg.Server.Store.DSN; dsn != "" {
switch strings.ToLower(cfg.Server.Store.Engine) {
case "postgres":
os.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_POSTGRES_DSN", dsn)
case "mysql":
os.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_MYSQL_DSN", dsn)
}
}
if file := cfg.Server.Store.File; file != "" {
os.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_SQLITE_FILE", file)
}
datadir := cfg.Management.DataDir
engine := types.Engine(cfg.Management.Store.Engine)
s, err := store.NewStore(ctx, engine, datadir, nil, true)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create store: %w", err)
}
defer func() {
if err := s.Close(ctx); err != nil {
log.Debugf("close store: %v", err)
}
}()
return fn(ctx, s)
}

View File

@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ type NameServerGroup struct {
ID string `gorm:"primaryKey"`
// AccountID is a reference to Account that this object belongs
AccountID string `gorm:"index"`
PublicID string `json:"-"`
// Name group name
Name string
// Description group description

View File

@@ -20,14 +20,15 @@ import (
// covers whatever credentials are present (source ~/.llm-keys locally / set the
// Actions secrets in CI).
type providerCase struct {
name string
catalogID string
upstream string
apiKey string
model string // body model (chat/messages) or path model@version (vertex)
kind string // harness.WireChat, harness.WireMessages, or harness.WireVertex
project string // vertex only: GCP project for the rawPredict path
region string // vertex only: GCP region for the rawPredict path
name string
catalogID string
upstream string
apiKey string
model string // body model (chat/messages) or path model@version (vertex)
kind string // harness.WireChat, harness.WireMessages, or harness.WireVertex
project string // vertex only: GCP project for the rawPredict path
region string // vertex only: GCP region for the rawPredict path
pathPrefix string // base-URL path prefix the agent carries (e.g. "/anthropic" for Kimi)
}
// availableProviders builds the matrix from the provider env vars that are set.
@@ -39,6 +40,24 @@ func availableProviders() []providerCase {
if k := os.Getenv("ANTHROPIC_TOKEN"); k != "" {
ps = append(ps, providerCase{name: "anthropic", catalogID: "anthropic_api", upstream: "https://api.anthropic.com", apiKey: k, model: "claude-haiku-4-5", kind: harness.WireMessages})
}
if k := os.Getenv("KIMI_TOKEN"); k != "" {
// Kimi (Moonshot AI) serves two body shapes from the same key: OpenAI
// Chat Completions on the bare host (/v1/...) and the Anthropic
// Messages API under the /anthropic path prefix (the endpoint
// Moonshot's Claude Code guide uses). The provider keeps the bare
// default upstream and the AGENT carries the /anthropic prefix in
// its base URL — exactly the documented Claude Code / Kimi CLI
// setup (ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=https://<endpoint>/anthropic) — so one
// provider serves both shapes and the prefix rides through to
// Moonshot. Run the Anthropic shape, the flagship Claude Code path;
// the OpenAI wire shape is covered live by the other chat-shaped
// matrix providers, and Kimi-over-chat passed with kimi-k3 before
// the single-model constraint surfaced (run #73 on the kimi feature
// branch). The platform serves this account exactly ONE model —
// kimi-k3 (kimi-k2-thinking and even kimi-latest return
// resource_not_found_error on both surfaces).
ps = append(ps, providerCase{name: "kimi", catalogID: "kimi_api", upstream: "https://api.moonshot.ai", apiKey: k, model: "kimi-k3", kind: harness.WireMessages, pathPrefix: "/anthropic"})
}
if k, u := os.Getenv("VERCEL_TOKEN"), os.Getenv("VERCEL_URL"); k != "" && u != "" {
ps = append(ps, providerCase{name: "vercel", catalogID: "vercel_ai_gateway", upstream: u, apiKey: k, model: "openai/gpt-4o-mini", kind: harness.WireChat})
}
@@ -84,14 +103,27 @@ func availableProviders() []providerCase {
}
}
// Bedrock: path-routed, bearer auth. Model is a cross-region inference
// profile id (distinct string from the first-party Anthropic case).
// Bedrock: path-routed, bearer auth. Model is the FULL cross-region
// inference-profile id exactly as AWS issues it — region-family prefix
// plus the date/version suffix. A bare or wrong-region id makes Bedrock
// reject the request with "The provided model identifier is invalid"
// before any inference runs. The proxy normalizes this id to the catalog
// key (anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5) for routing/pricing/allowlists.
// Defaults pair eu-central-1 with the eu.* profile; AWS_REGION overrides
// the region and the prefix follows its family.
if k := os.Getenv("AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK"); k != "" {
region := os.Getenv("AWS_REGION")
if region == "" {
region = "us-east-1"
region = "eu-central-1"
}
ps = append(ps, providerCase{name: "bedrock", catalogID: "bedrock_api", upstream: "https://bedrock-runtime." + region + ".amazonaws.com", apiKey: k, model: "us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5", kind: harness.WireBedrock})
// A valid Bedrock inference-profile id (region prefix + date + version),
// overridable per account. `global.` profiles can be invoked from any
// region; set AWS_BEDROCK_MODEL to match the enabled profile for the token.
model := os.Getenv("AWS_BEDROCK_MODEL")
if model == "" {
model = "global.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0"
}
ps = append(ps, providerCase{name: "bedrock", catalogID: "bedrock_api", upstream: "https://bedrock-runtime." + region + ".amazonaws.com", apiKey: k, model: model, kind: harness.WireBedrock})
}
return ps
}
@@ -108,8 +140,16 @@ func providerRequest(pc providerCase) api.AgentNetworkProviderRequest {
Enabled: ptr(true),
}
if pc.kind != harness.WireVertex {
// The router matches the normalized catalog id. Bedrock's request model
// travels as a region-prefixed inference-profile id in the URL path
// (us.anthropic...), which the router strips before matching, so register
// the normalized form here or routing fails as model_not_routable.
modelID := pc.model
if pc.kind == harness.WireBedrock {
modelID = catalogModel(pc)
}
req.Models = &[]api.AgentNetworkProviderModel{
{Id: pc.model, InputPer1k: 0.001, OutputPer1k: 0.002},
{Id: modelID, InputPer1k: 0.001, OutputPer1k: 0.002},
}
}
return req
@@ -201,11 +241,12 @@ func TestProvidersMatrix(t *testing.T) {
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = cl.Terminate(context.Background()) })
require.NoError(t, cl.WaitConnected(ctx, 90*time.Second), "client must connect to management")
// Probe first: the GET resolves the endpoint (DNS error fails) and its first packet wakes the lazy proxy peer, so WaitProxyPeer sees it connected; any HTTP status counts.
proxyIP, err := cl.ResolveProxyIP(ctx, settings.Endpoint)
require.NoError(t, err, "resolve agent-network endpoint to proxy IP")
if err := cl.WaitProxyPeer(ctx, 180*time.Second); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("client did not see the proxy peer: %v\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", err, px.Logs(context.Background()))
}
proxyIP, err := cl.ResolveProxyIP(ctx, settings.Endpoint)
require.NoError(t, err, "resolve agent-network endpoint to proxy IP")
for _, pc := range matrix {
pc := pc
@@ -230,7 +271,7 @@ func TestProvidersMatrix(t *testing.T) {
case harness.WireBedrock:
c, b, cerr = cl.Bedrock(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc.model, "Reply with exactly: pong", sessionID)
default:
c, b, cerr = cl.Chat(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc.kind, pc.model, "Reply with exactly: pong", sessionID)
c, b, cerr = cl.ChatPrefixed(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc.pathPrefix, pc.kind, pc.model, "Reply with exactly: pong", sessionID)
}
if cerr == nil {
code, body = c, b

View File

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ package agentnetwork
import (
"context"
"regexp"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
@@ -15,13 +16,29 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/api"
)
// bedrockRegionPrefixes and bedrockVersionSuffix mirror the proxy's Bedrock
// model normalization (region/inference-profile prefix + version suffix) so the
// provider is registered under the same catalog key the router matches against.
var (
bedrockRegionPrefixes = []string{"us.", "eu.", "apac.", "global."}
bedrockVersionSuffix = regexp.MustCompile(`-(\d{8}-)?v\d+(:\d+)?$`)
)
// catalogModel returns the normalized catalog id the proxy stamps for a
// path-routed provider's configured model — the form the guardrail allowlist is
// compared against (region prefix / @version stripped).
// path-routed provider's configured model — the form the router and guardrail
// allowlist compare against (Bedrock region prefix + version stripped, Vertex
// @version stripped).
func catalogModel(pc providerCase) string {
switch pc.kind {
case harness.WireBedrock:
return strings.TrimPrefix(pc.model, "us.")
m := pc.model
for _, p := range bedrockRegionPrefixes {
if strings.HasPrefix(m, p) {
m = m[len(p):]
break
}
}
return bedrockVersionSuffix.ReplaceAllString(m, "")
case harness.WireVertex:
return strings.SplitN(pc.model, "@", 2)[0]
default:
@@ -35,7 +52,9 @@ func catalogModel(pc providerCase) string {
func disallowedModel(pc providerCase) string {
switch pc.kind {
case harness.WireBedrock:
return "us.anthropic.claude-opus-4-8"
// Same profile prefix as the allowed model so only the model name
// differs; the guardrail must deny it before it reaches AWS.
return strings.SplitN(pc.model, ".", 2)[0] + ".anthropic.claude-opus-4-8"
case harness.WireVertex:
return "claude-opus-4-8@20250101"
default:
@@ -55,7 +74,7 @@ func sendModel(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, cl *harness.Client, endpoint,
case harness.WireVertex:
code, _, err = cl.Vertex(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, pc.project, pc.region, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
default:
code, _, err = cl.Chat(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, pc.kind, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
code, _, err = cl.ChatPrefixed(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, pc.pathPrefix, pc.kind, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
}
require.NoError(t, err, "request must reach the proxy for %s", pc.name)
return code
@@ -147,11 +166,12 @@ func TestModelAllowlistEnforced(t *testing.T) {
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = cl.Terminate(context.Background()) })
require.NoError(t, cl.WaitConnected(ctx, 90*time.Second), "client must connect to management")
// Probe first: the GET resolves the endpoint (DNS error fails) and its first packet wakes the lazy proxy peer, so WaitProxyPeer sees it connected; any HTTP status counts.
proxyIP, err := cl.ResolveProxyIP(ctx, settings.Endpoint)
require.NoError(t, err, "resolve agent-network endpoint to proxy IP")
if err := cl.WaitProxyPeer(ctx, 180*time.Second); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("client did not see the proxy peer: %v\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", err, px.Logs(context.Background()))
}
proxyIP, err := cl.ResolveProxyIP(ctx, settings.Endpoint)
require.NoError(t, err, "resolve agent-network endpoint to proxy IP")
for _, pc := range providers {
pc := pc

View File

@@ -104,11 +104,12 @@ func TestProviderSkipTLSVerification(t *testing.T) {
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = cl.Terminate(context.Background()) })
require.NoError(t, cl.WaitConnected(ctx, 90*time.Second), "client must connect to management")
// Probe first: the GET resolves the endpoint (DNS error fails) and its first packet wakes the lazy proxy peer, so WaitProxyPeer sees it connected; any HTTP status counts.
proxyIP, err := cl.ResolveProxyIP(ctx, settings.Endpoint)
require.NoError(t, err, "resolve endpoint to proxy IP")
if err := cl.WaitProxyPeer(ctx, 180*time.Second); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("client did not see the proxy peer: %v\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", err, px.Logs(context.Background()))
}
proxyIP, err := cl.ResolveProxyIP(ctx, settings.Endpoint)
require.NoError(t, err, "resolve endpoint to proxy IP")
// Positive: skip=true reaches the self-signed upstream. Retry to absorb
// tunnel/DNS jitter on the first call; success also proves the path works.

View File

@@ -106,11 +106,12 @@ func TestVLLMProvider(t *testing.T) {
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = cl.Terminate(context.Background()) })
require.NoError(t, cl.WaitConnected(ctx, 90*time.Second), "client must connect to management")
// Probe first: the GET resolves the endpoint (DNS error fails) and its first packet wakes the lazy proxy peer, so WaitProxyPeer sees it connected; any HTTP status counts.
proxyIP, err := cl.ResolveProxyIP(ctx, settings.Endpoint)
require.NoError(t, err, "resolve endpoint to proxy IP")
if err := cl.WaitProxyPeer(ctx, 180*time.Second); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("client did not see the proxy peer: %v\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", err, px.Logs(context.Background()))
}
proxyIP, err := cl.ResolveProxyIP(ctx, settings.Endpoint)
require.NoError(t, err, "resolve endpoint to proxy IP")
before, _ := srv.ListAccessLogs(ctx)
sessionID := "e2e-session-vllm"

View File

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ package harness
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"os/exec"
@@ -167,22 +168,54 @@ func (cl *Client) pollStatus(ctx context.Context, timeout time.Duration, want st
return fmt.Errorf("timed out waiting for %q; last status:\n%s", want, last)
}
// ResolveProxyIP resolves the agent-network endpoint to the proxy peer's
// NetBird IP from inside the client (via magic DNS).
const (
// curlExitCouldNotResolve is curl's exit code for a DNS resolution failure, distinct from connection-level failures.
curlExitCouldNotResolve = 6
// dnsProbeRetryWindow bounds DNS-failure retries: the synthesized zone lands a beat after management connects, so early NXDOMAIN is propagation; a zone still absent after this window is a real failure.
dnsProbeRetryWindow = 30 * time.Second
dnsProbeRetryInterval = 2 * time.Second
)
// ResolveProxyIP GETs https://<endpoint>/ from the client's netns: any HTTP status proves DNS + tunnel and wakes the lazy proxy peer; only DNS failures retry, within dnsProbeRetryWindow. Returns the connected IP for --resolve pinning.
func (cl *Client) ResolveProxyIP(ctx context.Context, endpoint string) (string, error) {
code, reader, err := cl.container.Exec(ctx, []string{"getent", "hosts", endpoint}, tcexec.Multiplexed())
if err != nil {
return "", err
args := []string{
"run", "--rm",
"--network", "container:" + cl.container.GetContainerID(),
curlImage,
"-ksS", "-o", "/dev/null",
"--connect-timeout", "30", "--max-time", "60",
"-w", "%{remote_ip}",
"https://" + endpoint + "/",
}
out, _ := io.ReadAll(reader)
if code != 0 {
return "", fmt.Errorf("getent hosts %s exited %d", endpoint, code)
deadline := time.Now().Add(dnsProbeRetryWindow)
for {
cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "docker", args...)
var stdout, stderr strings.Builder
cmd.Stdout = &stdout
cmd.Stderr = &stderr
err := cmd.Run()
if err == nil {
ip := strings.TrimSpace(stdout.String())
if ip == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("got an HTTP response from %s but no remote IP", endpoint)
}
return ip, nil
}
var exitErr *exec.ExitError
if !errors.As(err, &exitErr) || exitErr.ExitCode() != curlExitCouldNotResolve {
return "", fmt.Errorf("no HTTP response from %s: %w (%s)", endpoint, err, strings.TrimSpace(stderr.String()))
}
dnsErr := fmt.Errorf("DNS resolution failed for %s: %s", endpoint, strings.TrimSpace(stderr.String()))
if time.Until(deadline) < dnsProbeRetryInterval {
return "", dnsErr
}
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return "", fmt.Errorf("%w (%w)", dnsErr, ctx.Err())
case <-time.After(dnsProbeRetryInterval):
}
}
fields := strings.Fields(string(out))
if len(fields) == 0 {
return "", fmt.Errorf("no address for %s", endpoint)
}
return fields[0], nil
}
// Wire shapes for Chat.
@@ -206,6 +239,17 @@ const (
// the wire shape: WireChat (OpenAI) or WireMessages (Anthropic). A non-empty
// sessionID is sent as the universal x-session-id header the proxy records.
func (cl *Client) Chat(ctx context.Context, endpoint, proxyIP, kind, model, prompt, sessionID string) (int, string, error) {
return cl.ChatPrefixed(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, "", kind, model, prompt, sessionID)
}
// ChatPrefixed is Chat with a base-URL path prefix prepended to the wire
// path, mirroring agents whose base URL carries a shape-selecting prefix that
// rides through to the upstream — e.g. Claude Code against a Kimi provider
// sets ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=https://<endpoint>/anthropic so the proxy forwards
// /anthropic/v1/messages to Moonshot's Anthropic surface while the provider's
// upstream URL stays the bare https://api.moonshot.ai. Empty prefix is plain
// Chat.
func (cl *Client) ChatPrefixed(ctx context.Context, endpoint, proxyIP, pathPrefix, kind, model, prompt, sessionID string) (int, string, error) {
var path, body string
var headers []string
switch kind {
@@ -217,7 +261,7 @@ func (cl *Client) Chat(ctx context.Context, endpoint, proxyIP, kind, model, prom
path = "/v1/chat/completions"
body = fmt.Sprintf(`{"model":%q,"messages":[{"role":"user","content":%q}]}`, model, prompt)
}
return cl.post(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, path, body, withSessionID(headers, sessionID))
return cl.post(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, pathPrefix+path, body, withSessionID(headers, sessionID))
}
// Vertex issues an Anthropic-on-Vertex rawPredict POST over the tunnel. Unlike

2
go.mod
View File

@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ require (
require (
github.com/DeRuina/timberjack v1.4.2
github.com/Microsoft/go-winio v0.6.2
github.com/awnumar/memguard v0.23.0
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2 v1.38.3
github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/aws/protocol/eventstream v1.7.1
@@ -157,6 +156,7 @@ require (
github.com/Masterminds/goutils v1.1.1 // indirect
github.com/Masterminds/semver/v3 v3.4.0 // indirect
github.com/Masterminds/sprig/v3 v3.3.0 // indirect
github.com/Microsoft/go-winio v0.6.2 // indirect
github.com/adrg/xdg v0.5.3 // indirect
github.com/anmitsu/go-shlex v0.0.0-20200514113438-38f4b401e2be // indirect
github.com/apapsch/go-jsonmerge/v2 v2.0.0 // indirect

View File

@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ func (s *Storage) OpenStorage(logger *slog.Logger) (storage.Storage, error) {
if file == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("sqlite3 storage requires 'file' config")
}
return (&sql.SQLite3{File: file}).Open(logger)
return newSQLite3(file).Open(logger)
case "postgres":
dsn, _ := s.Config["dsn"].(string)
if dsn == "" {

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