[client] Move metrics saver into its own metricsstages package

Relocate MetricsStages (per-connection metric stage timestamps) out of
the peer package into client/internal/peer/metricsstages.

CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ task dev
 Pass daemon flags after `--`:
 
 ```
-task dev -- --daemon-addr=npipe://netbird
+task dev -- --daemon-addr=tcp://127.0.0.1:41731
 ```
 
 Production build (frontend assets embedded into the binary, output in `client/ui/bin/`):

client/android/client.go

@@ -247,9 +247,6 @@ func (c *Client) DebugBundle(platformFiles PlatformFiles, anonymize bool) (strin
 		deps.SyncResponse = resp
 
 		if e := cc.Engine(); e != nil {
-			deps.RefreshStatus = func() {
-				e.RunHealthProbes(context.Background(), true)
-			}
 			if cm := e.GetClientMetrics(); cm != nil {
 				deps.ClientMetrics = cm
 			}

client/android/profile_manager.go

@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ func (pm *ProfileManager) SwitchProfile(id string) error {
 // AddProfile creates a new profile
 func (pm *ProfileManager) AddProfile(profileName string) error {
 	// Use ServiceManager (creates profile in profiles/ directory)
-	profile, err := pm.serviceMgr.AddProfile(profileName, androidUsername, nil)
+	profile, err := pm.serviceMgr.AddProfile(profileName, androidUsername)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("failed to add profile: %w", err)
 	}

client/cmd/elevate.go

@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-package cmd
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"os"
-
-	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
-)
-
-// SetSSHConfigCmdName is the hidden subcommand an elevated process runs to apply
-// the privileged SSH settings.
-const SetSSHConfigCmdName = "set-ssh-config"
-
-// sshConfigElevated is set by runInDaemonMode once the dangerous SSH settings
-// have been applied by an elevated helper, so the (unprivileged) up flow does
-// not re-send them and re-trip the daemon gate.
-var sshConfigElevated bool
-
-// wantsDangerousSSH reports whether this invocation is trying to ENABLE SSH root
-// login or DISABLE SSH authentication.
-func wantsDangerousSSH(cmd *cobra.Command) bool {
-	return (cmd.Flags().Changed(enableSSHRootFlag) && enableSSHRoot) ||
-		(cmd.Flags().Changed(disableSSHAuthFlag) && disableSSHAuth)
-}
-
-// buildSetSSHConfigArgs builds the argument list for an elevated
-// `netbird set-ssh-config` invocation.
-func buildSetSSHConfigArgs(profileName, username string, enableSSHRoot, disableSSHAuth *bool, daemonAddr string) []string {
-	args := []string{SetSSHConfigCmdName}
-	if profileName != "" {
-		args = append(args, "--profile", profileName)
-	}
-	if username != "" {
-		args = append(args, "--username", username)
-	}
-	if enableSSHRoot != nil && *enableSSHRoot {
-		args = append(args, "--"+enableSSHRootFlag)
-	}
-	if disableSSHAuth != nil && *disableSSHAuth {
-		args = append(args, "--"+disableSSHAuthFlag)
-	}
-	if daemonAddr != "" {
-		args = append(args, "--daemon-addr", daemonAddr)
-	}
-	return args
-}
-
-// ElevateSSHConfig re-runs the current executable's `set-ssh-config` command with
-// root/administrator privileges via the platform's prompt (pkexec/UAC/osascript),
-// so the elevated process connects to the daemon with a privileged identity and
-// the daemon's requirePrivilegedForDangerousSSH gate passes.
-func ElevateSSHConfig(profileName, username string, enableSSHRoot, disableSSHAuth *bool) error {
-	exe, err := os.Executable()
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("locate executable for elevation: %w", err)
-	}
-	return runElevated(exe, buildSetSSHConfigArgs(profileName, username, enableSSHRoot, disableSSHAuth, daemonAddr))
-}

client/cmd/elevate_darwin.go

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-//go:build darwin
-
-package cmd
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"os"
-)
-
-// isProcessPrivileged reports whether the current process runs as root.
-func isProcessPrivileged() bool { return os.Geteuid() == 0 }
-
-// TODO(ssh-elevation): implement the osascript admin prompt.
-func runElevated(_ string, _ []string) error {
-	return fmt.Errorf("automatic privilege elevation is not yet implemented on macOS, re-run with sudo")
-}

client/cmd/elevate_linux.go

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-//go:build linux
-
-package cmd
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"os"
-	"os/exec"
-	"strings"
-)
-
-// isProcessPrivileged reports whether the current process runs as root.
-func isProcessPrivileged() bool { return os.Geteuid() == 0 }
-
-// runElevated re-runs exe with args as root. On a graphical session it uses
-// pkexec, which drives the desktop's polkit authentication agent (GUI prompt).
-func runElevated(exe string, args []string) error {
-	if !hasGraphicalSession() {
-		return fmt.Errorf("cannot request privilege elevation without a graphical session. re-run as root: sudo %s %s", exe, strings.Join(args, " "))
-	}
-	pkexec, err := exec.LookPath("pkexec")
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("pkexec not found for privilege elevation, re-run as root: sudo %s %s", exe, strings.Join(args, " "))
-	}
-
-	c := exec.Command(pkexec, append([]string{exe}, args...)...)
-	c.Stdin, c.Stdout, c.Stderr = os.Stdin, os.Stdout, os.Stderr
-	if err := c.Run(); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("elevated %s failed (elevation cancelled or denied?): %w", SetSSHConfigCmdName, err)
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// hasGraphicalSession heuristically reports whether a desktop session is present
-// that polkit can prompt in.
-func hasGraphicalSession() bool {
-	return os.Getenv("DISPLAY") != "" || os.Getenv("WAYLAND_DISPLAY") != ""
-}

client/cmd/elevate_other.go

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-//go:build !linux && !darwin && !windows
-
-package cmd
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"os"
-	"strings"
-)
-
-// isProcessPrivileged reports whether the current process runs as root.
-func isProcessPrivileged() bool { return os.Geteuid() == 0 }
-
-// runElevated has no automatic elevation mechanism on these platforms
-func runElevated(exe string, args []string) error {
-	return fmt.Errorf("automatic privilege elevation is not supported on this platform, re-run as root: sudo %s %s", exe, strings.Join(args, " "))
-}

client/cmd/elevate_test.go

@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
-//go:build !ios && !android
-
-package cmd
-
-import (
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-)
-
-func TestBuildSetSSHConfigArgs(t *testing.T) {
-	tr, fa := true, false
-
-	t.Run("enable root only, with daemon-addr", func(t *testing.T) {
-		got := buildSetSSHConfigArgs("prof", "alice", &tr, nil, "unix:///x.sock")
-		assert.Equal(t, []string{
-			SetSSHConfigCmdName, "--profile", "prof", "--username", "alice",
-			"--" + enableSSHRootFlag, "--daemon-addr", "unix:///x.sock",
-		}, got)
-	})
-
-	t.Run("disable auth only, no daemon-addr", func(t *testing.T) {
-		got := buildSetSSHConfigArgs("prof", "alice", nil, &tr, "")
-		assert.Equal(t, []string{
-			SetSSHConfigCmdName, "--profile", "prof", "--username", "alice",
-			"--" + disableSSHAuthFlag,
-		}, got)
-	})
-
-	t.Run("false pointers omit the flags", func(t *testing.T) {
-		got := buildSetSSHConfigArgs("", "", &fa, &fa, "")
-		assert.Equal(t, []string{SetSSHConfigCmdName}, got)
-	})
-
-	t.Run("both enabled", func(t *testing.T) {
-		got := buildSetSSHConfigArgs("p", "u", &tr, &tr, "")
-		assert.Equal(t, []string{
-			SetSSHConfigCmdName, "--profile", "p", "--username", "u",
-			"--" + enableSSHRootFlag, "--" + disableSSHAuthFlag,
-		}, got)
-	})
-}
-
-func TestBuildSetSSHConfigRequest(t *testing.T) {
-	tr := true
-
-	req := buildSetSSHConfigRequest("p", "u", &tr, nil)
-	assert.Equal(t, "p", req.ProfileName)
-	assert.Equal(t, "u", req.Username)
-	if assert.NotNil(t, req.EnableSSHRoot) {
-		assert.True(t, *req.EnableSSHRoot)
-	}
-	assert.Nil(t, req.DisableSSHAuth, "an unset flag must leave the daemon value untouched")
-}
-
-func TestWantsDangerousSSH(t *testing.T) {
-	origRoot, origAuth := enableSSHRoot, disableSSHAuth
-	t.Cleanup(func() { enableSSHRoot, disableSSHAuth = origRoot, origAuth })
-
-	newCmd := func() *cobra.Command {
-		enableSSHRoot, disableSSHAuth = false, false
-		c := &cobra.Command{Use: "x"}
-		c.Flags().BoolVar(&enableSSHRoot, enableSSHRootFlag, false, "")
-		c.Flags().BoolVar(&disableSSHAuth, disableSSHAuthFlag, false, "")
-		return c
-	}
-
-	// wantsDangerousSSH fires only in the privileged direction.
-	t.Run("enable root true is dangerous", func(t *testing.T) {
-		c := newCmd()
-		require.NoError(t, c.Flags().Set(enableSSHRootFlag, "true"))
-		assert.True(t, wantsDangerousSSH(c))
-	})
-
-	t.Run("enable root false is not dangerous", func(t *testing.T) {
-		c := newCmd()
-		require.NoError(t, c.Flags().Set(enableSSHRootFlag, "false"))
-		assert.False(t, wantsDangerousSSH(c))
-	})
-
-	t.Run("disable auth true is dangerous", func(t *testing.T) {
-		c := newCmd()
-		require.NoError(t, c.Flags().Set(disableSSHAuthFlag, "true"))
-		assert.True(t, wantsDangerousSSH(c))
-	})
-
-	t.Run("disable auth false is not dangerous", func(t *testing.T) {
-		c := newCmd()
-		require.NoError(t, c.Flags().Set(disableSSHAuthFlag, "false"))
-		assert.False(t, wantsDangerousSSH(c))
-	})
-
-	t.Run("nothing changed is not dangerous", func(t *testing.T) {
-		c := newCmd()
-		assert.False(t, wantsDangerousSSH(c))
-	})
-}

client/cmd/elevate_windows.go

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-//go:build windows
-
-package cmd
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-
-	"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
-)
-
-// isProcessPrivileged reports whether the current process token is elevated
-// (running as administrator / LocalSystem).
-func isProcessPrivileged() bool {
-	return windows.GetCurrentProcessToken().IsElevated()
-}
-
-// runElevated should re-run exe with args elevated via a UAC prompt
-// (ShellExecuteEx with the "runas" verb).
-//
-// TODO(ssh-elevation): implement ShellExecuteEx("runas") + wait for the child.
-func runElevated(_ string, _ []string) error {
-	return fmt.Errorf("automatic privilege elevation is not yet implemented on Windows, re-run netbird as administrator")
-}

client/cmd/login.go

@@ -17,9 +17,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/auth"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
-	nbnet "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/net"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/server"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/system"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
 )
@@ -333,14 +331,6 @@ func doForegroundLogin(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, setupKey string,
 		return fmt.Errorf("read config file %s: %v", configFilePath, err)
 	}
 
-	// Mirror runInForegroundMode: recover residual state (DNS, firewall,
-	// ssh config, legacy routing) from a previous unclean shutdown and
-	// enable advanced routing before dialing management.
-	if err := server.RestoreResidualState(ctx, profilemanager.NewServiceManager(configFilePath).GetStatePath()); err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("failed to restore residual state: %v", err)
-	}
-	nbnet.Init()
-
 	err = foregroundLogin(ctx, cmd, config, setupKey, activeProf.ID)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("foreground login failed: %v", err)

client/cmd/owner.go

@@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
-package cmd
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"time"
-
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
-)
-
-var ownerCmd = &cobra.Command{
-	Use:   "owner",
-	Short: "Manage who may control the NetBird daemon",
-	Long: `Manage the daemon-wide owners.
-
-Owners are enforced on the daemon and stored in the service parameters. All owners
-may control the daemon and use the shared default profile (plus root/administrator),
-every other profile stays isolated to the user that created it. An unowned daemon
-is claimed by the first caller (trust-on-first-use).`,
-}
-
-var ownerAddCmd = &cobra.Command{
-	Use:   "add <principal>",
-	Short: "Add a daemon owner principal",
-	Long: `Add a daemon-wide owner principal. Principals are typed:
-  uid:1000               a Unix user ID
-  gid:1000               a Unix group ID
-  group:netbird-admins   a Unix group name (resolved via NSS/getent)
-  sid:S-1-5-21-...       a Windows user or group SID
-
-Requires root/administrator or an existing owner.`,
-	Args: cobra.ExactArgs(1),
-	RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
-		return withDaemon(cmd, func(ctx context.Context, c proto.DaemonServiceClient) error {
-			if _, err := c.AddOwner(ctx, &proto.AddOwnerRequest{Principal: args[0]}); err != nil {
-				return err
-			}
-			cmd.Printf("Added daemon owner %q\n", args[0])
-			return nil
-		})
-	},
-}
-
-var ownerResetCmd = &cobra.Command{
-	Use:   "reset",
-	Short: "Clear the daemon owner list (root/administrator only)",
-	Long: `Clear the daemon-wide owner list, returning the daemon to the unowned
-state. The next caller then claims ownership (trust-on-first-use). Requires
-root/administrator.`,
-	RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
-		return withDaemon(cmd, func(ctx context.Context, c proto.DaemonServiceClient) error {
-			if _, err := c.ResetOwner(ctx, &proto.ResetOwnerRequest{}); err != nil {
-				return err
-			}
-			cmd.Println("Daemon owner list cleared, the next caller will claim ownership")
-			return nil
-		})
-	},
-}
-
-var ownerShareCmd = &cobra.Command{
-	Use:   "share",
-	Short: "Mark the daemon shared (any local user may control it)",
-	RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
-		return withDaemon(cmd, func(ctx context.Context, c proto.DaemonServiceClient) error {
-			if _, err := c.ShareProfile(ctx, &proto.ShareProfileRequest{Shared: true}); err != nil {
-				return err
-			}
-			cmd.Println("Daemon is now shared with all local users")
-			return nil
-		})
-	},
-}
-
-var ownerUnshareCmd = &cobra.Command{
-	Use:   "unshare",
-	Short: "Stop sharing the daemon (restrict to its owners)",
-	RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
-		return withDaemon(cmd, func(ctx context.Context, c proto.DaemonServiceClient) error {
-			if _, err := c.ShareProfile(ctx, &proto.ShareProfileRequest{Shared: false}); err != nil {
-				return err
-			}
-			cmd.Println("Daemon is no longer shared")
-			return nil
-		})
-	},
-}
-
-// withDaemon runs fn with a connected daemon client, handling setup and teardown.
-func withDaemon(cmd *cobra.Command, fn func(context.Context, proto.DaemonServiceClient) error) error {
-	SetFlagsFromEnvVars(rootCmd)
-	cmd.SetOut(cmd.OutOrStdout())
-	if err := util.InitLog(logLevel, util.LogConsole); err != nil {
-		log.Errorf("failed initializing log %v", err)
-		return err
-	}
-
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(cmd.Context(), 20*time.Second)
-	defer cancel()
-
-	conn, err := DialClientGRPCServer(ctx, daemonAddr)
-	if err != nil {
-		log.Errorf("failed to connect to service CLI interface %v", err)
-		return err
-	}
-	defer func() {
-		if cerr := conn.Close(); cerr != nil {
-			log.Debugf("close daemon connection: %v", cerr)
-		}
-	}()
-
-	return fn(ctx, proto.NewDaemonServiceClient(conn))
-}

client/cmd/profile.go

@@ -117,12 +117,10 @@ func listProfilesFunc(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
 	} else {
 		fmt.Fprintln(tw, "NAME\tACTIVE")
 	}
-	anyActive := false
 	for _, profile := range resp.Profiles {
 		marker := ""
 		if profile.IsActive {
 			marker = "✓"
-			anyActive = true
 		}
 		name := profilemanager.StripCtrlChars(profile.Name)
 		id := profilemanager.ID(profile.Id)
@@ -132,19 +130,7 @@ func listProfilesFunc(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
 			fmt.Fprintf(tw, "%s\t%s\n", name, marker)
 		}
 	}
-	if err := tw.Flush(); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-
-	// None of the caller's profiles is active: another user may hold the daemon.
-	// Surface it so the empty ACTIVE column is not mistaken for "nothing active".
-	if !anyActive {
-		if active, aerr := daemonClient.GetActiveProfile(cmd.Context(), &proto.GetActiveProfileRequest{}); aerr == nil && active.GetUsername() != "" && !usernamesMatch(active.GetUsername(), currUser.Username) {
-			cmd.Printf("\nActive profile belongs to another user: %s (user %s)\n",
-				profilemanager.StripCtrlChars(active.GetProfileName()), active.GetUsername())
-		}
-	}
-	return nil
+	return tw.Flush()
 }
 
 func addProfileFunc(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {

client/cmd/root.go

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"io/fs"
-	"net"
 	"os"
 	"os/signal"
 	"path"
@@ -144,10 +143,10 @@ func init() {
 
 	defaultDaemonAddr := "unix:///var/run/netbird.sock"
 	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
-		defaultDaemonAddr = windowsPipeDaemonAddr
+		defaultDaemonAddr = "tcp://127.0.0.1:41731"
 	}
 
-	rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&daemonAddr, "daemon-addr", defaultDaemonAddr, "Daemon service address to serve CLI requests [unix|tcp|npipe]://[path|host:port|name]")
+	rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&daemonAddr, "daemon-addr", defaultDaemonAddr, "Daemon service address to serve CLI requests [unix|tcp]://[path|host:port]")
 	rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVarP(&managementURL, "management-url", "m", "", fmt.Sprintf("Management Service URL [http|https]://[host]:[port] (default \"%s\")", profilemanager.DefaultManagementURL))
 	rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&adminURL, "admin-url", "", fmt.Sprintf("Admin Panel URL [http|https]://[host]:[port] (default \"%s\")", profilemanager.DefaultAdminURL))
 	rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVarP(&logLevel, "log-level", "l", "info", "sets NetBird log level")
@@ -173,11 +172,6 @@ func init() {
 	rootCmd.AddCommand(profileCmd)
 	rootCmd.AddCommand(exposeCmd)
 
-	rootCmd.AddCommand(ownerCmd)
-	ownerCmd.AddCommand(ownerAddCmd, ownerResetCmd, ownerShareCmd, ownerUnshareCmd)
-
-	rootCmd.AddCommand(setSSHConfigCmd)
-
 	networksCMD.AddCommand(routesListCmd)
 	networksCMD.AddCommand(routesSelectCmd, routesDeselectCmd)
 
@@ -270,32 +264,17 @@ func FlagNameToEnvVar(cmdFlag string, prefix string) string {
 	return prefix + upper
 }
 
-// daemonDialTarget returns the gRPC dial target and base options for the daemon
-// address, handling the npipe scheme (Windows named pipe, via a context dialer)
-// and unix/tcp.
-func daemonDialTarget(addr string) (string, []grpc.DialOption) {
-	opts := []grpc.DialOption{grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials())}
-	target := strings.TrimPrefix(addr, "tcp://")
-	if strings.HasPrefix(addr, "npipe://") {
-		path := pipePath(strings.TrimPrefix(addr, "npipe://"))
-		opts = append(opts, grpc.WithContextDialer(func(dialCtx context.Context, _ string) (net.Conn, error) {
-			return dialNamedPipe(dialCtx, path)
-		}))
-		target = "passthrough:///netbird-daemon-pipe"
-	}
-	return target, opts
-}
-
 // DialClientGRPCServer returns client connection to the daemon server.
-func DialClientGRPCServer(ctx context.Context, addr string, opts ...grpc.DialOption) (*grpc.ClientConn, error) {
+func DialClientGRPCServer(ctx context.Context, addr string) (*grpc.ClientConn, error) {
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, time.Second*10)
 	defer cancel()
 
-	target, dialOpts := daemonDialTarget(addr)
-	dialOpts = append(dialOpts, grpc.WithBlock())
-	dialOpts = append(dialOpts, opts...)
-
-	return grpc.DialContext(ctx, target, dialOpts...)
+	return grpc.DialContext(
+		ctx,
+		strings.TrimPrefix(addr, "tcp://"),
+		grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials()),
+		grpc.WithBlock(),
+	)
 }
 
 // WithBackOff execute function in backoff cycle.

client/cmd/service.go

@@ -30,12 +30,6 @@ var (
 	serviceEnvVars   []string
 	jsonSocket       string
 	enableJSONSocket bool
-	// owners seeds the daemon-wide owner set at install time (--owner). At runtime
-	// the daemon reads and writes owners in service.json directly.
-	owners []string
-	// daemonShared carries the persisted daemon shared flag across
-	// install/reconfigure round-trips (set at runtime via `netbird owner share`).
-	daemonShared bool
 )
 
 type program struct {
@@ -60,8 +54,7 @@ func init() {
 	serviceCmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVar(&captureEnabled, "enable-capture", false, "Enables packet capture via 'netbird debug capture'. To persist, use: netbird service install --enable-capture")
 	serviceCmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVar(&networksDisabled, "disable-networks", false, "Disables network selection. If enabled, the client will not allow listing, selecting, or deselecting networks. To persist, use: netbird service install --disable-networks")
 	serviceCmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVar(&enableJSONSocket, "enable-json-socket", false, "Enables the HTTP/JSON API socket served by grpc-gateway. To persist, use: netbird service install --enable-json-socket")
-	serviceCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&jsonSocket, "json-socket", defaultJSONSocket, "HTTP/JSON API socket address [unix|tcp|npipe]://[path|host:port|name]. Requires --enable-json-socket to serve. To persist, use: netbird service install --enable-json-socket --json-socket")
-	serviceCmd.PersistentFlags().StringSliceVar(&owners, "owner", nil, "Principal(s) allowed to control the daemon and its default profile: uid:1000, gid:1000, group:netbird-admins (NSS), or sid:S-1-5-... (Windows). Repeatable. Other profiles stay isolated per user. To persist: netbird service install --owner uid:1000")
+	serviceCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&jsonSocket, "json-socket", defaultJSONSocket, "HTTP/JSON API socket address [unix|tcp]://[path|host:port]. Requires --enable-json-socket to serve. To persist, use: netbird service install --enable-json-socket --json-socket")
 
 	rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVarP(&serviceName, "service", "s", defaultServiceName, "Netbird system service name")
 	serviceEnvDesc := `Sets extra environment variables for the service. ` +

client/cmd/service_controller.go

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ package cmd
 import (
 	"context"
 	"fmt"
-	"runtime"
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/kardianos/service"
@@ -14,32 +13,12 @@ import (
 	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
 	"google.golang.org/grpc"
 
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/server"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/system"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
 )
 
-// daemonServerOptions installs peer-identity transport credentials and the
-// authorization interceptor on the daemon ipc if supported.
-func daemonServerOptions(network string, interceptor *ipcauth.Interceptor) []grpc.ServerOption {
-	creds := ipcauth.NewTransportCredentials()
-	if creds == nil {
-		log.Warnf("daemon ipc has no peer-identity primitive on %s, per-caller authorization is disabled", runtime.GOOS)
-		return nil
-	}
-	if network == "tcp" {
-		log.Warnf("daemon is listening on TCP (%s), peer identity cannot be authenticated over TCP, per-caller authorization is disabled", daemonAddr)
-		return nil
-	}
-	return []grpc.ServerOption{
-		grpc.Creds(creds),
-		grpc.ChainUnaryInterceptor(interceptor.UnaryServerInterceptor()),
-		grpc.ChainStreamInterceptor(interceptor.StreamServerInterceptor()),
-	}
-}
-
 func validateJSONSocketFlags() error {
 	if serviceCmd.PersistentFlags().Changed("json-socket") && !enableJSONSocket {
 		return fmt.Errorf("--json-socket requires --enable-json-socket to configure the daemon JSON gateway")
@@ -58,28 +37,8 @@ func (p *program) Start(svc service.Service) error {
 	// Collect static system and platform information
 	system.UpdateStaticInfoAsync()
 
-	// A daemon installed before named-pipe support uses the old loopback-TCP
-	// address as the daemon address. We migrate to a named pipe so an
-	// upgraded daemon enforces per-caller authorization instead of silently
-	// running on identity-less TCP.
-	if migrated, ok := migrateLegacyDaemonAddr(daemonAddr); ok {
-		log.Infof("legacy daemon address %q predates named-pipe support. listening on %q so per-caller authorization is enforced", daemonAddr, migrated)
-		daemonAddr = migrated
-	}
-
-	network, _, err := parseListenAddress(daemonAddr)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("parse daemon address: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	// Owner-authorization interceptor. The ConfigAdapter is a lazy bridge: the
-	// gRPC server is built before the daemon server instance exists, so we set
-	// the real policy backend below once serverInstance is created.
-	ownerAdapter := &ipcauth.ConfigAdapter{}
-	authInterceptor := ipcauth.NewInterceptor(ownerAdapter, ipcauth.NewDefaultGroupResolver())
-
-	// in any case, even if configuration does not exist we run daemon to serve the CLI gRPC API.
-	p.serv = grpc.NewServer(daemonServerOptions(network, authInterceptor)...)
+	// in any case, even if configuration does not exists we run daemon to serve CLI gRPC API.
+	p.serv = grpc.NewServer()
 
 	daemonListener, err := listenOnAddress(daemonAddr)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -115,13 +74,9 @@ func (p *program) Start(svc service.Service) error {
 		}
 
 		serverInstance := server.New(p.ctx, util.FindFirstLogPath(logFiles), configPath, profilesDisabled, updateSettingsDisabled, captureEnabled, networksDisabled)
-		// Daemon-wide owners live in service.json (governs the default profile and
-		// daemon access), wire persistence before serving so owner add / TOFU work.
-		serverInstance.SetDaemonOwnerStore(daemonOwnerStore{})
 		if err := serverInstance.Start(); err != nil {
 			log.Fatalf("failed to start daemon: %v", err)
 		}
-		ownerAdapter.SetBackend(serverInstance)
 		proto.RegisterDaemonServiceServer(p.serv, serverInstance)
 
 		p.serverInstanceMu.Lock()
@@ -129,7 +84,6 @@ func (p *program) Start(svc service.Service) error {
 		p.serverInstanceMu.Unlock()
 
 		if jsonListener != nil {
-			log.Warnf("JSON gateway (--enable-json-socket) re-dials the daemon locally. The HTTP client's identity is forwarded so per-caller authorization still applies, but restrict access to %s appropriately", jsonSocket)
 			if err := p.startJSONGateway(jsonListener, daemonAddr); err != nil {
 				log.Fatalf("failed to start daemon JSON server: %v", err)
 			}

client/cmd/service_json_gateway.go

@@ -5,62 +5,27 @@ package cmd
 import (
 	"context"
 	"errors"
-	"fmt"
 	"net"
 	"net/http"
+	"strings"
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/grpc-ecosystem/grpc-gateway/v2/runtime"
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 	"google.golang.org/grpc"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials/insecure"
 
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
 )
 
-// jsonPeerCtxKey keys the HTTP client's kernel identity in the request context.
-type jsonPeerCtxKey struct{}
-
-// jsonConnContext reads the connecting HTTP client's identity from the JSON
-// socket and stashes it so it can be forwarded to the daemon. The gateway
-// re-dials the daemon as the daemon's own identity, so without this the
-// daemon would see every JSON request as privileged.
-func jsonConnContext(ctx context.Context, c net.Conn) context.Context {
-	id, err := ipcauth.ConnIdentity(c)
-	if err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("json gateway: cannot read HTTP client identity, requests won't carry it: %v", err)
-		return ctx
-	}
-	return context.WithValue(ctx, jsonPeerCtxKey{}, id)
-}
-
-// jsonForwardIdentity injects the stashed HTTP client identity as gRPC metadata
-// on the gateway's re-dial to the daemon. The daemon trusts it only because the
-// dial arrives as the daemon's own (self/privileged) identity.
-func jsonForwardIdentity(ctx context.Context, _ *http.Request) metadata.MD {
-	id, ok := ctx.Value(jsonPeerCtxKey{}).(ipcauth.Identity)
-	if !ok {
-		return nil
-	}
-	return ipcauth.ForwardIdentityMetadata(id)
+func grpcGatewayEndpoint(addr string) string {
+	return strings.TrimPrefix(addr, "tcp://")
 }
 
 func (p *program) startJSONGateway(jsonListener *socketListener, daemonEndpoint string) error {
-	if jsonListener.network == "tcp" {
-		log.Warnf("json daemon is listening on TCP (%s), peer identity cannot be authenticated over TCP, per-caller authorization is disabled", daemonAddr)
-	}
-
-	mux := runtime.NewServeMux(runtime.WithMetadata(jsonForwardIdentity))
-
-	// Lazy client to the daemon, npipe-aware (grpc.NewClient does not connect
-	// until the first request, so this does not block startup before Serve).
-	target, opts := daemonDialTarget(daemonEndpoint)
-	conn, err := grpc.NewClient(target, opts...)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("create daemon client for JSON gateway: %w", err)
-	}
-	if err := proto.RegisterDaemonServiceHandler(p.ctx, mux, conn); err != nil {
+	mux := runtime.NewServeMux()
+	opts := []grpc.DialOption{grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials())}
+	if err := proto.RegisterDaemonServiceHandlerFromEndpoint(p.ctx, mux, grpcGatewayEndpoint(daemonEndpoint), opts); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
 
@@ -70,7 +35,6 @@ func (p *program) startJSONGateway(jsonListener *socketListener, daemonEndpoint
 		BaseContext: func(net.Listener) context.Context {
 			return p.ctx
 		},
-		ConnContext: jsonConnContext,
 	}
 
 	p.jsonServMu.Lock()

client/cmd/service_params.go

@@ -33,15 +33,6 @@ type serviceParams struct {
 	DisableNetworks       bool              `json:"disable_networks,omitempty"`
 	EnableJSONSocket      bool              `json:"enable_json_socket,omitempty"`
 	ServiceEnvVars        map[string]string `json:"service_env_vars,omitempty"`
-	// Owners lists the principals allowed to control this profile over the local
-	// IPC, as typed strings: "uid:1000", "gid:1000", "group:netbird-admins"
-	// (Unix, NSS-resolved) or "sid:S-1-5-..." (Windows user or group SID). Empty
-	// with Shared=false means the profile is owned by nobody yet, until claimed
-	Owners []string `json:"owners,omitempty"`
-
-	// Shared, when true, lets any authenticated local caller control this profile
-	// (opt-in). Takes precedence over Owners.
-	Shared bool `json:"shared,omitempty"`
 }
 
 // serviceParamsPath returns the path to the service params file.
@@ -49,38 +40,6 @@ func serviceParamsPath() string {
 	return filepath.Join(configs.StateDir, serviceParamsFile)
 }
 
-// daemonOwnerStore persists the daemon-wide owner set in service.json. It
-// implements server.DaemonOwnerStore so the daemon can read owners at startup and
-// mutate them at runtime (owner add, reset, share, TOFU claim) without server
-// importing cmd. Load-modify-write preserves the other service.json fields.
-type daemonOwnerStore struct{}
-
-func (daemonOwnerStore) Load() ([]string, bool, error) {
-	params, err := loadServiceParams()
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, false, err
-	}
-	if params == nil {
-		return nil, false, nil
-	}
-	return params.Owners, params.Shared, nil
-}
-
-func (daemonOwnerStore) Save(owners []string, shared bool) error {
-	params, err := loadServiceParams()
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	if params == nil {
-		// No service.json yet (daemon started without `service install`). Seed it
-		// from the running daemon's current parameters so the file stays complete.
-		params = currentServiceParams()
-	}
-	params.Owners = owners
-	params.Shared = shared
-	return saveServiceParams(params)
-}
-
 // loadServiceParams reads saved service parameters from disk.
 // Returns nil with no error if the file does not exist.
 func loadServiceParams() (*serviceParams, error) {
@@ -127,8 +86,6 @@ func currentServiceParams() *serviceParams {
 		EnableCapture:         captureEnabled,
 		DisableNetworks:       networksDisabled,
 		EnableJSONSocket:      enableJSONSocket,
-		Owners:                owners,
-		Shared:                daemonShared,
 	}
 
 	if len(serviceEnvVars) > 0 {
@@ -168,10 +125,6 @@ func applyServiceParams(cmd *cobra.Command, params *serviceParams) {
 
 	if !rootCmd.PersistentFlags().Changed("daemon-addr") && params.DaemonAddr != "" {
 		daemonAddr = params.DaemonAddr
-		if migrated, ok := migrateLegacyDaemonAddr(daemonAddr); ok {
-			cmd.Printf("Migrating saved daemon address %q to %q so per-caller authorization can be enforced\n", daemonAddr, migrated)
-			daemonAddr = migrated
-		}
 	}
 
 	if !serviceCmd.PersistentFlags().Changed("json-socket") && params.JSONSocket != "" {
@@ -212,14 +165,6 @@ func applyServiceParams(cmd *cobra.Command, params *serviceParams) {
 		networksDisabled = params.DisableNetworks
 	}
 
-	// Carry the daemon-wide owner set forward across install/reconfigure so a
-	// runtime owner add or TOFU claim in service.json is not clobbered. --owner
-	// overrides.
-	if !serviceCmd.PersistentFlags().Changed("owner") && len(params.Owners) > 0 {
-		owners = params.Owners
-	}
-	daemonShared = params.Shared
-
 	applyServiceEnvParams(cmd, params)
 }
 

client/cmd/service_params_test.go

@@ -431,15 +431,9 @@ func TestServiceParams_BuildArgsCoversAllFlags(t *testing.T) {
 	installerFile, err := parser.ParseFile(fset, "service_installer.go", nil, 0)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
-	// Fields that are handled outside of buildServiceArguments.
-	//   - ServiceEnvVars flows through newSVCConfig() EnvVars, not CLI args.
-	//   - Owners/Shared are daemon-wide ownership persisted in service.json and
-	//     read+mutated by the daemon at runtime (owner add / TOFU claim); they are
-	//     deliberately NOT baked into the run args so runtime changes are not lost.
+	// Fields that are handled outside of buildServiceArguments (env vars go through newSVCConfig).
 	fieldsNotInArgs := map[string]bool{
 		"ServiceEnvVars": true,
-		"Owners":         true,
-		"Shared":         true,
 	}
 
 	buildFields := extractFuncGlobalRefs(t, installerFile, "buildServiceArguments")

client/cmd/service_pipe_other.go

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-//go:build !windows
-
-package cmd
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"fmt"
-	"net"
-	"runtime"
-)
-
-// listenNamedPipe is unsupported off Windows; named pipes are a Windows-only transport.
-func listenNamedPipe(string) (net.Listener, error) {
-	return nil, fmt.Errorf("named pipe daemon socket is only supported on Windows, not %s", runtime.GOOS)
-}
-
-// dialNamedPipe is unsupported off Windows.
-func dialNamedPipe(context.Context, string) (net.Conn, error) {
-	return nil, fmt.Errorf("named pipe daemon socket is only supported on Windows, not %s", runtime.GOOS)
-}

client/cmd/service_pipe_windows.go

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-//go:build windows
-
-package cmd
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"net"
-
-	"github.com/Microsoft/go-winio"
-	"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
-)
-
-// listenNamedPipe creates the daemon control named pipe with a permissive,
-// local-only SDDL. Any local caller may connect, like Unix socket with 0666.
-func listenNamedPipe(path string) (net.Listener, error) {
-	return winio.ListenPipe(path, &winio.PipeConfig{
-		SecurityDescriptor: ipcauth.DefaultPipeSDDL(),
-	})
-}
-
-// dialNamedPipe connects to the daemon ipc named pipe at SECURITY_IDENTIFICATION.
-func dialNamedPipe(ctx context.Context, path string) (net.Conn, error) {
-	access := uint32(windows.GENERIC_READ | windows.GENERIC_WRITE)
-	// winio's plain DialPipe connects at SECURITY_ANONYMOUS, under which the
-	// daemon cannot read the caller's token. Identification lets the daemon
-	// read its SID/groups without granting it the ability to act as the caller.
-	return winio.DialPipeAccessImpLevel(ctx, path, access, winio.PipeImpLevelIdentification)
-}

client/cmd/service_socket.go

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"net"
 	"os"
-	"runtime"
 	"strings"
 	"syscall"
 	"time"
@@ -15,30 +14,6 @@ import (
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 )
 
-const (
-	windowsPipeDaemonAddr = "npipe://netbird"
-
-	// legacyWindowsDaemonAddr is the loopback-TCP address the Windows daemon used
-	// before named-pipe support.
-	legacyWindowsDaemonAddr = "tcp://127.0.0.1:41731"
-)
-
-// migrateLegacyDaemonAddr upgrades the pre-named-pipe Windows daemon address to
-// the pipe. Existing installs persist daemon addr, so on upgrade the daemon
-// would otherwise keep listening on TCP and silently run without IPC
-// authorization. Only the exact legacy default is rewritten, while a
-// deliberately-chosen custom TCP address is left alone.
-func migrateLegacyDaemonAddr(addr string) (string, bool) {
-	return migrateLegacyDaemonAddrForOS(runtime.GOOS, addr)
-}
-
-func migrateLegacyDaemonAddrForOS(goos, addr string) (string, bool) {
-	if goos == "windows" && addr == legacyWindowsDaemonAddr {
-		return windowsPipeDaemonAddr, true
-	}
-	return addr, false
-}
-
 type socketListener struct {
 	net.Listener
 	network string
@@ -51,15 +26,6 @@ func listenOnAddress(addr string) (*socketListener, error) {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
-	if network == "npipe" {
-		path := pipePath(address)
-		listener, err := listenNamedPipe(path)
-		if err != nil {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-		return &socketListener{Listener: listener, network: network, address: path}, nil
-	}
-
 	if network == "unix" {
 		removeStaleUnixSocket(address)
 	}
@@ -75,26 +41,17 @@ func listenOnAddress(addr string) (*socketListener, error) {
 func parseListenAddress(addr string) (string, string, error) {
 	network, address, ok := strings.Cut(addr, "://")
 	if !ok || network == "" || address == "" {
-		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("address must be in [unix|tcp|npipe]://[path|host:port|name] format: %q", addr)
+		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("address must be in [unix|tcp]://[path|host:port] format: %q", addr)
 	}
 
 	switch network {
-	case "unix", "tcp", "npipe":
+	case "unix", "tcp":
 		return network, address, nil
 	default:
 		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("unsupported daemon address protocol: %v", network)
 	}
 }
 
-// pipePath maps a daemon-addr npipe name ("npipe://netbird") to a Windows
-// named-pipe path (\\.\pipe\netbird).
-func pipePath(name string) string {
-	if strings.HasPrefix(name, `\\`) {
-		return name
-	}
-	return `\\.\pipe\` + name
-}
-
 func removeStaleUnixSocket(path string) {
 	stat, err := os.Lstat(path)
 	if err != nil {

client/cmd/service_socket_test.go

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-//go:build !ios && !android
-
-package cmd
-
-import (
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-)
-
-func TestMigrateLegacyDaemonAddrForOS(t *testing.T) {
-	cases := []struct {
-		name    string
-		goos    string
-		addr    string
-		want    string
-		migrate bool
-	}{
-		{
-			name:    "windows legacy tcp migrates to pipe",
-			goos:    "windows",
-			addr:    legacyWindowsDaemonAddr,
-			want:    windowsPipeDaemonAddr,
-			migrate: true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:    "windows pipe already migrated stays",
-			goos:    "windows",
-			addr:    windowsPipeDaemonAddr,
-			want:    windowsPipeDaemonAddr,
-			migrate: false,
-		},
-		{
-			name:    "windows custom tcp left alone",
-			goos:    "windows",
-			addr:    "tcp://127.0.0.1:9999",
-			want:    "tcp://127.0.0.1:9999",
-			migrate: false,
-		},
-		{
-			name:    "linux legacy-looking tcp not migrated",
-			goos:    "linux",
-			addr:    legacyWindowsDaemonAddr,
-			want:    legacyWindowsDaemonAddr,
-			migrate: false,
-		},
-		{
-			name:    "linux unix socket untouched",
-			goos:    "linux",
-			addr:    "unix:///var/run/netbird.sock",
-			want:    "unix:///var/run/netbird.sock",
-			migrate: false,
-		},
-	}
-
-	for _, tc := range cases {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			got, ok := migrateLegacyDaemonAddrForOS(tc.goos, tc.addr)
-			assert.Equal(t, tc.want, got)
-			assert.Equal(t, tc.migrate, ok)
-		})
-	}
-}

client/cmd/ssh_config_cmd.go

@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
-package cmd
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
-)
-
-var (
-	setSSHConfigProfile     string
-	setSSHConfigUsername    string
-	setSSHConfigEnableRoot  bool
-	setSSHConfigDisableAuth bool
-)
-
-// setSSHConfigCmd applies the privileged SSH settings (enable root login /
-// disable auth) to a profile over the daemon IPC. Hidden because users
-// interact via `netbird up` / the UI, not directly.
-var setSSHConfigCmd = &cobra.Command{
-	Use:    SetSSHConfigCmdName,
-	Short:  "Apply privileged SSH settings to a profile (internal elevation target)",
-	Hidden: true,
-	RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
-		ctx := internal.CtxInitState(cmd.Context())
-
-		conn, err := DialClientGRPCServer(ctx, daemonAddr)
-		if err != nil {
-			return fmt.Errorf("connect to daemon: %w", err)
-		}
-		defer func() {
-			if cerr := conn.Close(); cerr != nil {
-				log.Warnf("failed closing daemon gRPC client connection: %v", cerr)
-			}
-		}()
-
-		var enableRoot, disableAuth *bool
-		if cmd.Flags().Changed(enableSSHRootFlag) {
-			enableRoot = &setSSHConfigEnableRoot
-		}
-		if cmd.Flags().Changed(disableSSHAuthFlag) {
-			disableAuth = &setSSHConfigDisableAuth
-		}
-
-		req := buildSetSSHConfigRequest(setSSHConfigProfile, setSSHConfigUsername, enableRoot, disableAuth)
-		if _, err := proto.NewDaemonServiceClient(conn).SetConfig(ctx, req); err != nil {
-			return fmt.Errorf("apply SSH config: %w", err)
-		}
-		return nil
-	},
-}
-
-// buildSetSSHConfigRequest builds a minimal SetConfigRequest that touches only
-// the SSH fields that were provided (nil pointers leave the daemon's stored
-// value untouched, matching setupSetConfigReq's pointer semantics).
-func buildSetSSHConfigRequest(profileName, username string, enableSSHRoot, disableSSHAuth *bool) *proto.SetConfigRequest {
-	return &proto.SetConfigRequest{
-		ProfileName:    profileName,
-		Username:       username,
-		EnableSSHRoot:  enableSSHRoot,
-		DisableSSHAuth: disableSSHAuth,
-	}
-}
-
-func init() {
-	setSSHConfigCmd.Flags().StringVar(&setSSHConfigProfile, "profile", "", "profile name to apply the SSH settings to")
-	setSSHConfigCmd.Flags().StringVar(&setSSHConfigUsername, "username", "", "owning username of the profile")
-	setSSHConfigCmd.Flags().BoolVar(&setSSHConfigEnableRoot, enableSSHRootFlag, false, "enable root login for the SSH server")
-	setSSHConfigCmd.Flags().BoolVar(&setSSHConfigDisableAuth, disableSSHAuthFlag, false, "disable SSH authentication")
-}

client/cmd/status.go

@@ -5,8 +5,6 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"net"
 	"net/netip"
-	"os/user"
-	"runtime"
 	"strings"
 	"time"
 
@@ -174,9 +172,10 @@ func getStatus(ctx context.Context, fullPeerStatus bool, shouldRunProbes bool) (
 	return resp, nil
 }
 
-// getActiveProfileName asks the daemon for the active profile's display name,
-// annotated with the owning user when the active profile belongs to someone else.
-// Returns an empty string on any error so status output degrades gracefully.
+// getActiveProfileName asks the daemon for the active profile's display
+// name. The daemon runs as root and can read the per-user profile files to
+// resolve the ID to its human-readable name. Returns an empty string on any
+// error so status output degrades gracefully.
 func getActiveProfileName(ctx context.Context) string {
 	conn, err := DialClientGRPCServer(ctx, daemonAddr)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -189,22 +188,7 @@ func getActiveProfileName(ctx context.Context) string {
 		return ""
 	}
 
-	name := resp.GetProfileName()
-	if owner := resp.GetUsername(); owner != "" {
-		if curr, uerr := user.Current(); uerr != nil || !usernamesMatch(owner, curr.Username) {
-			name = fmt.Sprintf("%s (user %s)", name, owner)
-		}
-	}
-	return name
-}
-
-// usernamesMatch compares usernames case-insensitively on Windows (domain
-// accounts) and exactly elsewhere.
-func usernamesMatch(a, b string) bool {
-	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
-		return strings.EqualFold(a, b)
-	}
-	return a == b
+	return resp.GetProfileName()
 }
 
 func parseFilters() error {

client/cmd/up.go

@@ -21,9 +21,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
-	nbnet "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/net"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/server"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/system"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
@@ -56,7 +54,6 @@ var (
 	showQR             bool
 	profileName        string
 	configPath         string
-	claimOwner         bool
 
 	upCmd = &cobra.Command{
 		Use:   "up",
@@ -68,7 +65,6 @@ var (
 
 func init() {
 	upCmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVarP(&foregroundMode, "foreground-mode", "F", false, "start service in foreground")
-	upCmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVar(&claimOwner, "owner", false, "claim ownership of this profile for the current user, restricting daemon control of it to you and root/administrator")
 	upCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&interfaceName, interfaceNameFlag, iface.WgInterfaceDefault, "WireGuard interface name")
 	upCmd.PersistentFlags().Uint16Var(&wireguardPort, wireguardPortFlag, iface.DefaultWgPort, "WireGuard interface listening port")
 	upCmd.PersistentFlags().Uint16Var(&mtu, mtuFlag, iface.DefaultMTU, "Set MTU (Maximum Transmission Unit) for the WireGuard interface")
@@ -233,24 +229,6 @@ func runInForegroundMode(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, activeProf *pr
 
 	_, _ = profilemanager.UpdateOldManagementURL(ctx, config, configFilePath)
 
-	// Restore residual state left by a previous run that did not shut down
-	// cleanly, mirroring what the daemon does before connecting: it recovers
-	// DNS config (a stale resolv.conf takeover can make the management
-	// hostname unresolvable), firewall rules, ssh config and legacy routing.
-	// Route cleanup itself happens at engine start; nbnet.Init() below lets
-	// the management dial bypass a leftover fwmark rule until then.
-	// Foreground mode is particularly exposed in containers: a crashed
-	// container restarts inside the same (pod) network namespace, so stale
-	// state survives while the process does not.
-	if err := server.RestoreResidualState(ctx, profilemanager.NewServiceManager(configPath).GetStatePath()); err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("failed to restore residual state: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	// Enable advanced routing (as the daemon does on startup) so the
-	// management dial bypasses a leftover fwmark rule instead of being
-	// shunted into a stale routing table.
-	nbnet.Init()
-
 	err = foregroundLogin(ctx, cmd, config, providedSetupKey, activeProf.ID)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("foreground login failed: %v", err)
@@ -321,24 +299,6 @@ func runInDaemonMode(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, pm *profilemanager
 		return fmt.Errorf("get current user: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	// Enabling SSH root login / disabling SSH auth is a privileged change the
-	// daemon rejects from a non-privileged caller. Offer to elevate (polkit/UAC/
-	// osascript) so an elevated helper applies just those settings.
-	if wantsDangerousSSH(cmd) && !isProcessPrivileged() {
-		cmd.Println("Enabling SSH root login / disabling SSH authentication requires administrator privileges, requesting elevation...")
-		var enableRoot, disableAuth *bool
-		if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRootFlag).Changed {
-			enableRoot = &enableSSHRoot
-		}
-		if cmd.Flag(disableSSHAuthFlag).Changed {
-			disableAuth = &disableSSHAuth
-		}
-		if err := ElevateSSHConfig(activeProf.ID.String(), username.Username, enableRoot, disableAuth); err != nil {
-			return fmt.Errorf("apply privileged SSH settings: %w", err)
-		}
-		sshConfigElevated = true
-	}
-
 	// set the new config
 	req := setupSetConfigReq(customDNSAddressConverted, cmd, activeProf.ID.String(), username.Username)
 	if _, err := client.SetConfig(ctx, req); err != nil {
@@ -411,7 +371,6 @@ func doDaemonUp(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, client proto.DaemonServ
 	if _, err := client.Up(ctx, &proto.UpRequest{
 		ProfileName: &profileID,
 		Username:    &username,
-		ClaimOwner:  claimOwner,
 	}); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("call service up method: %v", err)
 	}
@@ -442,7 +401,7 @@ func setupSetConfigReq(customDNSAddressConverted []byte, cmd *cobra.Command, pro
 	if cmd.Flag(serverSSHAllowedFlag).Changed {
 		req.ServerSSHAllowed = &serverSSHAllowed
 	}
-	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRootFlag).Changed && !sshConfigElevated {
+	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRootFlag).Changed {
 		req.EnableSSHRoot = &enableSSHRoot
 	}
 	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHSFTPFlag).Changed {
@@ -454,7 +413,7 @@ func setupSetConfigReq(customDNSAddressConverted []byte, cmd *cobra.Command, pro
 	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRemotePortForwardFlag).Changed {
 		req.EnableSSHRemotePortForwarding = &enableSSHRemotePortForward
 	}
-	if cmd.Flag(disableSSHAuthFlag).Changed && !sshConfigElevated {
+	if cmd.Flag(disableSSHAuthFlag).Changed {
 		req.DisableSSHAuth = &disableSSHAuth
 	}
 	if cmd.Flag(sshJWTCacheTTLFlag).Changed {
@@ -670,7 +629,7 @@ func setupLoginRequest(providedSetupKey string, customDNSAddressConverted []byte
 		loginRequest.ServerSSHAllowed = &serverSSHAllowed
 	}
 
-	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRootFlag).Changed && !sshConfigElevated {
+	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRootFlag).Changed {
 		loginRequest.EnableSSHRoot = &enableSSHRoot
 	}
 
@@ -686,7 +645,7 @@ func setupLoginRequest(providedSetupKey string, customDNSAddressConverted []byte
 		loginRequest.EnableSSHRemotePortForwarding = &enableSSHRemotePortForward
 	}
 
-	if cmd.Flag(disableSSHAuthFlag).Changed && !sshConfigElevated {
+	if cmd.Flag(disableSSHAuthFlag).Changed {
 		loginRequest.DisableSSHAuth = &disableSSHAuth
 	}
 

client/cmd/up_daemon_test.go

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ func TestUpDaemon(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	sm := profilemanager.ServiceManager{}
-	created, err := sm.AddProfile("test1", currUser.Username, nil)
+	created, err := sm.AddProfile("test1", currUser.Username)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("failed to add profile: %v", err)
 		return

client/firewall/uspfilter/filter.go

@@ -121,7 +121,6 @@ type Manager struct {
 	udpTracker     *conntrack.UDPTracker
 	icmpTracker    *conntrack.ICMPTracker
 	tcpTracker     *conntrack.TCPTracker
-	fragments      *fragmentTracker
 	forwarder      atomic.Pointer[forwarder.Forwarder]
 	pendingCapture atomic.Pointer[forwarder.PacketCapture]
 	logger         *nblog.Logger
@@ -184,41 +183,6 @@ func (d *decoder) decodePacket(data []byte) error {
 	}
 }
 
-// decodeTransport decodes the transport header of a first fragment (which
-// gopacket leaves undecoded) into the decoder and appends its layer type to
-// decoded, so the ACL pipeline can evaluate it like a normal packet. It returns
-// false if the protocol is unsupported or the header is truncated.
-func (d *decoder) decodeTransport(proto layers.IPProtocol, payload []byte) bool {
-	var l4 gopacket.DecodingLayer
-	var layerType gopacket.LayerType
-	var minLen int
-	switch proto {
-	case layers.IPProtocolTCP:
-		l4, layerType, minLen = &d.tcp, layers.LayerTypeTCP, 20
-	case layers.IPProtocolUDP:
-		l4, layerType, minLen = &d.udp, layers.LayerTypeUDP, 8
-	case layers.IPProtocolICMPv4:
-		l4, layerType, minLen = &d.icmp4, layers.LayerTypeICMPv4, 8
-	case layers.IPProtocolICMPv6:
-		l4, layerType, minLen = &d.icmp6, layers.LayerTypeICMPv6, 8
-	default:
-		return false
-	}
-
-	// Reject a fragment too small to hold the full transport header before
-	// decoding: it can't be ACL-evaluated (tiny-fragment attack), and skipping
-	// the decode avoids gopacket allocating an error on the drop path.
-	if len(payload) < minLen {
-		return false
-	}
-
-	if err := l4.DecodeFromBytes(payload, gopacket.NilDecodeFeedback); err != nil {
-		return false
-	}
-	d.decoded = append(d.decoded, layerType)
-	return true
-}
-
 // Create userspace firewall manager constructor
 func Create(iface common.IFaceMapper, disableServerRoutes bool, flowLogger nftypes.FlowLogger, mtu uint16) (*Manager, error) {
 	return create(iface, nil, disableServerRoutes, flowLogger, mtu)
@@ -322,8 +286,6 @@ func create(iface common.IFaceMapper, nativeFirewall firewall.Manager, disableSe
 	if err := m.localipmanager.UpdateLocalIPs(iface); err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("update local IPs: %w", err)
 	}
-	m.fragments = newFragmentTracker(m.logger)
-
 	if disableConntrack {
 		log.Info("conntrack is disabled")
 	} else {
@@ -337,7 +299,6 @@ func create(iface common.IFaceMapper, nativeFirewall firewall.Manager, disableSe
 		}
 	}
 	if err := iface.SetFilter(m); err != nil {
-		m.fragments.Close()
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("set filter: %w", err)
 	}
 	return m, nil
@@ -733,10 +694,6 @@ func (m *Manager) resetState() {
 		m.tcpTracker.Close()
 	}
 
-	if m.fragments != nil {
-		m.fragments.Close()
-	}
-
 	if fwder := m.forwarder.Load(); fwder != nil {
 		fwder.SetCapture(nil)
 		fwder.Stop()
@@ -1089,20 +1046,19 @@ func (m *Manager) filterInbound(packetData []byte, size int) bool {
 		return true
 	}
 
-	// gopacket does not decode the transport header of any IP fragment, so
-	// fragments take a dedicated path: the first fragment's header is decoded
-	// and ACL-evaluated here, and the remaining fragments inherit its verdict.
+	// TODO: pass fragments of routed packets to forwarder
 	if fragment {
-		return m.filterInboundFragment(d, srcIP, dstIP, size)
+		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
+			if d.decoded[0] == layers.LayerTypeIPv4 {
+				m.logger.Trace4("packet is a fragment: src=%v dst=%v id=%v flags=%v",
+					srcIP, dstIP, d.ip4.Id, d.ip4.Flags)
+			} else {
+				m.logger.Trace2("packet is an IPv6 fragment: src=%v dst=%v", srcIP, dstIP)
+			}
+		}
+		return false
 	}
 
-	return m.filterInboundDecoded(d, srcIP, dstIP, packetData, size)
-}
-
-// filterInboundDecoded runs the ACL, DNAT and conntrack pipeline on a fully
-// decoded (non-fragment) inbound packet. It returns true if the packet should
-// be dropped.
-func (m *Manager) filterInboundDecoded(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, packetData []byte, size int) bool {
 	// TODO: optimize port DNAT by caching matched rules in conntrack
 	if translated := m.translateInboundPortDNAT(packetData, d, srcIP, dstIP); translated {
 		// Re-decode after port DNAT translation to update port information
@@ -1133,226 +1089,33 @@ func (m *Manager) filterInboundDecoded(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, pack
 	return m.handleRoutedTraffic(d, srcIP, dstIP, packetData, size)
 }
 
-// fragmentMeta holds the reassembly identity and layout of an IP fragment,
-// extracted uniformly for IPv4 and IPv6.
-type fragmentMeta struct {
-	key fragmentKey
-	// offset is the fragment offset in 8-byte units (zero for the first
-	// fragment).
-	offset uint16
-	// moreFragments is the More Fragments bit. A first fragment with it unset is
-	// an IPv6 atomic fragment (a complete datagram, RFC 6946): it has no trailing
-	// fragments to inherit a verdict, so it must not be recorded.
-	moreFragments bool
-	proto         layers.IPProtocol
-	// l4payload is the fragmentable payload of this fragment. For the first
-	// fragment it starts with the transport header.
-	l4payload []byte
-	// headerEndOctets is the first fragment's payload length in 8-byte units:
-	// the smallest offset a trailing fragment may start at without overlapping
-	// the inspected transport header.
-	headerEndOctets uint16
-}
-
-// fragmentMetadata extracts the fragment identity and layout from a decoded IP
-// fragment. It returns false for fragments it can't interpret (e.g. an IPv6
-// fragment header shorter than 8 bytes), which are then dropped.
-func fragmentMetadata(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr) (fragmentMeta, bool) {
-	switch d.decoded[0] {
-	case layers.LayerTypeIPv4:
-		payload := d.ip4.Payload
-		return fragmentMeta{
-			key:             fragmentKey{srcIP: srcIP, dstIP: dstIP, id: uint32(d.ip4.Id), proto: uint8(d.ip4.Protocol)},
-			offset:          d.ip4.FragOffset,
-			moreFragments:   d.ip4.Flags&layers.IPv4MoreFragments != 0,
-			proto:           d.ip4.Protocol,
-			l4payload:       payload,
-			headerEndOctets: octets(len(payload)),
-		}, true
-
-	case layers.LayerTypeIPv6:
-		// IPv6 fragment extension header: 8 bytes, followed by the fragmentable
-		// payload. Layout: next header (1), reserved (1), offset+flags (2), id (4).
-		payload := d.ip6.Payload
-		if len(payload) < 8 {
-			return fragmentMeta{}, false
-		}
-		nextHeader := layers.IPProtocol(payload[0])
-		offsetFlags := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(payload[2:4])
-		id := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(payload[4:8])
-		l4 := payload[8:]
-		return fragmentMeta{
-			key:             fragmentKey{srcIP: srcIP, dstIP: dstIP, id: id, proto: uint8(nextHeader)},
-			offset:          offsetFlags >> 3,
-			moreFragments:   offsetFlags&1 != 0,
-			proto:           nextHeader,
-			l4payload:       l4,
-			headerEndOctets: octets(len(l4)),
-		}, true
-
-	default:
-		return fragmentMeta{}, false
-	}
-}
-
-// octets rounds a byte length up to whole 8-byte units, the granularity of the
-// IP fragment offset field.
-func octets(nbytes int) uint16 {
-	return uint16((nbytes + 7) / 8)
-}
-
-// filterInboundFragment decides the fate of an IP fragment. gopacket stops
-// decoding at the network layer for every fragment, so the first fragment's
-// transport header is decoded and ACL-evaluated here and its verdict recorded;
-// the remaining (headerless) fragments inherit that verdict. Anything that
-// cannot be tied to an allowed, non-overlapping first fragment is dropped.
-func (m *Manager) filterInboundFragment(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, size int) bool {
-	meta, ok := fragmentMetadata(d, srcIP, dstIP)
-	if !ok {
-		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
-			m.logger.Trace2("dropping unsupported fragment: src=%v dst=%v", srcIP, dstIP)
-		}
-		return true
-	}
-
-	if meta.offset != 0 {
-		return m.filterTrailingFragment(meta, srcIP, dstIP)
-	}
-
-	// A new first fragment supersedes any recorded verdict for this datagram, so
-	// a re-sent or overlapping offset-zero fragment can't inherit the old one.
-	m.fragments.poison(meta.key)
-
-	// First fragment: decode its transport header so the ACL can evaluate it. A
-	// decode failure means the fragment is too small to hold the full transport
-	// header (RFC 1858 §3 tiny-fragment attack); it can't be evaluated, so drop it.
-	if !d.decodeTransport(meta.proto, meta.l4payload) {
-		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
-			m.logger.Trace3("dropping first fragment without full L4 header: src=%v dst=%v id=%v",
-				srcIP, dstIP, meta.key.id)
-		}
-		return true
-	}
-
-	return m.filterFirstFragment(d, meta, srcIP, dstIP, size)
-}
-
-// filterTrailingFragment applies a recorded first-fragment verdict to a
-// non-first fragment.
-func (m *Manager) filterTrailingFragment(meta fragmentMeta, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr) bool {
-	switch m.fragments.verdict(meta.key, meta.offset) {
-	case fragmentAllow:
-		return false
-	case fragmentOverlap:
-		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
-			m.logger.Trace3("dropping overlapping fragment rewriting inspected header: src=%v dst=%v id=%v",
-				srcIP, dstIP, meta.key.id)
-		}
-		return true
-	default:
-		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
-			m.logger.Trace3("dropping fragment with no allowed first fragment: src=%v dst=%v id=%v",
-				srcIP, dstIP, meta.key.id)
-		}
-		return true
-	}
-}
-
-// filterFirstFragment runs the verdict part of the inbound pipeline on a first
-// fragment with its transport header decoded. It mirrors filterInboundDecoded
-// but skips DNAT (port rewriting on fragments is unsupported) and forwarder
-// injection (fragments are left to the stack to reassemble, not forwarded).
-// Allowed fragments have their verdict recorded so the datagram's trailing
-// fragments inherit it.
-func (m *Manager) filterFirstFragment(d *decoder, meta fragmentMeta, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, size int) bool {
-	if m.stateful && m.isValidTrackedConnection(d, srcIP, dstIP, size) {
-		m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
-		return false
-	}
-
-	if m.localipmanager.IsLocalIP(dstIP) {
-		ruleID, blocked := m.peerACLsBlock(srcIP, d, nil)
-		if blocked {
-			m.storeDropFlow("Dropping local first fragment (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
-				d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
-			return true
-		}
-		m.trackInbound(d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
-		m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
-		return false
-	}
-
-	if !m.routingEnabled.Load() {
-		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
-			m.logger.Trace2("Dropping routed fragment (routing disabled): src=%s dst=%s", srcIP, dstIP)
-		}
-		return true
-	}
-	if m.nativeRouter.Load() {
-		m.trackInbound(d, srcIP, dstIP, nil, size)
-		m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
-		return false
-	}
-
-	// TODO: pass fragments of routed packets to the forwarder; until then
-	// allowed routed fragments go to the native stack.
-	srcPort, dstPort := getPortsFromPacket(d)
-	ruleID, pass := m.routeACLsPass(srcIP, dstIP, d.decoded[1], srcPort, dstPort)
-	if !pass {
-		m.storeDropFlow("Dropping routed first fragment (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
-			d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
-		return true
-	}
-
-	m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
-	return false
-}
-
-// recordFirstFragment caches an allowed first fragment's verdict for its
-// trailing fragments to inherit. Atomic fragments (no More Fragments bit) are
-// complete datagrams with no trailing fragments, so they are not cached and
-// cannot exhaust the verdict table.
-func (m *Manager) recordFirstFragment(meta fragmentMeta) {
-	if !meta.moreFragments {
-		return
-	}
-	m.fragments.recordAllowed(meta.key, meta.headerEndOctets)
-}
-
-// storeDropFlow logs and records a netflow drop event for an inbound packet
-// denied by the ACLs. msg is the trace format taking rule id, protocol, source
-// and destination.
-func (m *Manager) storeDropFlow(msg string, d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, ruleID []byte, size int) {
-	pnum := getProtocolFromPacket(d)
-	srcPort, dstPort := getPortsFromPacket(d)
-
-	if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
-		m.logger.Trace6(msg, ruleID, pnum, srcIP, srcPort, dstIP, dstPort)
-	}
-
-	m.flowLogger.StoreEvent(nftypes.EventFields{
-		FlowID:     uuid.New(),
-		Type:       nftypes.TypeDrop,
-		RuleID:     ruleID,
-		Direction:  nftypes.Ingress,
-		Protocol:   pnum,
-		SourceIP:   srcIP,
-		DestIP:     dstIP,
-		SourcePort: srcPort,
-		DestPort:   dstPort,
-		// TODO: icmp type/code
-		RxPackets: 1,
-		RxBytes:   uint64(size),
-	})
-}
-
 // handleLocalTraffic handles local traffic.
 // If it returns true, the packet should be dropped.
 func (m *Manager) handleLocalTraffic(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, packetData []byte, size int) bool {
 	ruleID, blocked := m.peerACLsBlock(srcIP, d, packetData)
 	if blocked {
-		m.storeDropFlow("Dropping local packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
-			d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
+		pnum := getProtocolFromPacket(d)
+		srcPort, dstPort := getPortsFromPacket(d)
+
+		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
+			m.logger.Trace6("Dropping local packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
+				ruleID, pnum, srcIP, srcPort, dstIP, dstPort)
+		}
+
+		m.flowLogger.StoreEvent(nftypes.EventFields{
+			FlowID:     uuid.New(),
+			Type:       nftypes.TypeDrop,
+			RuleID:     ruleID,
+			Direction:  nftypes.Ingress,
+			Protocol:   pnum,
+			SourceIP:   srcIP,
+			DestIP:     dstIP,
+			SourcePort: srcPort,
+			DestPort:   dstPort,
+			// TODO: icmp type/code
+			RxPackets: 1,
+			RxBytes:   uint64(size),
+		})
 		return true
 	}
 
@@ -1405,8 +1168,27 @@ func (m *Manager) handleRoutedTraffic(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, packe
 
 	ruleID, pass := m.routeACLsPass(srcIP, dstIP, protoLayer, srcPort, dstPort)
 	if !pass {
-		m.storeDropFlow("Dropping routed packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
-			d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
+		proto := getProtocolFromPacket(d)
+
+		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
+			m.logger.Trace6("Dropping routed packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
+				ruleID, proto, srcIP, srcPort, dstIP, dstPort)
+		}
+
+		m.flowLogger.StoreEvent(nftypes.EventFields{
+			FlowID:     uuid.New(),
+			Type:       nftypes.TypeDrop,
+			RuleID:     ruleID,
+			Direction:  nftypes.Ingress,
+			Protocol:   proto,
+			SourceIP:   srcIP,
+			DestIP:     dstIP,
+			SourcePort: srcPort,
+			DestPort:   dstPort,
+			// TODO: icmp type/code
+			RxPackets: 1,
+			RxBytes:   uint64(size),
+		})
 		return true
 	}
 

client/firewall/uspfilter/forwarder/forwarder.go

@@ -5,9 +5,7 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"net"
 	"net/netip"
-	"os"
 	"runtime"
-	"strconv"
 	"sync"
 	"time"
 
@@ -33,11 +31,6 @@ const (
 	defaultMaxInFlight   = 1024
 	iosReceiveWindow     = 16384
 	iosMaxInFlight       = 256
-
-	// envForceTCPRACK overrides the platform default for gVisor's RACK loss
-	// detection. Set to a truthy value to force RACK on, or a falsy value to
-	// force it off, on any platform.
-	envForceTCPRACK = "NB_FORCE_TCP_RACK"
 )
 
 type Forwarder struct {
@@ -159,8 +152,6 @@ func New(iface common.IFaceMapper, logger *nblog.Logger, flowLogger nftypes.Flow
 		maxInFlight = iosMaxInFlight
 	}
 
-	configureTCPRecovery(s)
-
 	tcpForwarder := tcp.NewForwarder(s, receiveWindow, maxInFlight, f.handleTCP)
 	s.SetTransportProtocolHandler(tcp.ProtocolNumber, tcpForwarder.HandlePacket)
 
@@ -475,31 +466,3 @@ func probeRawICMP(network, addr string, logger *nblog.Logger) bool {
 	logger.Debug1("forwarder: raw %s socket access available", network)
 	return true
 }
-
-// configureTCPRecovery disables gVisor's RACK loss detection on Windows, where
-// it interacts poorly with the host and collapses throughput on routed TCP
-// connections (gVisor issue #9778). Other platforms keep the default. The
-// EnvForceTCPRACK environment variable overrides the platform default.
-func configureTCPRecovery(s *stack.Stack) {
-	disableRACK := runtime.GOOS == "windows"
-
-	if val := os.Getenv(envForceTCPRACK); val != "" {
-		force, err := strconv.ParseBool(val)
-		if err != nil {
-			log.Warnf("parse %s: %v", envForceTCPRACK, err)
-		} else {
-			disableRACK = !force
-		}
-	}
-
-	if !disableRACK {
-		return
-	}
-
-	opt := tcpip.TCPRecovery(0)
-	if err := s.SetTransportProtocolOption(tcp.ProtocolNumber, &opt); err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("disable TCP RACK loss detection: %v", err)
-		return
-	}
-	log.Info("forwarder: TCP RACK loss detection disabled")
-}

client/firewall/uspfilter/fragment.go

@@ -1,204 +0,0 @@
-package uspfilter
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"net/netip"
-	"os"
-	"strconv"
-	"sync"
-	"time"
-
-	nblog "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/uspfilter/log"
-)
-
-const (
-	// defaultFragmentTimeout bounds how long a first-fragment verdict is kept
-	// while the remaining fragments arrive. It mirrors the Linux IP reassembly
-	// timeout (net.ipv4.ipfrag_time).
-	defaultFragmentTimeout = 30 * time.Second
-	// fragmentCleanupInterval is how often expired verdicts are purged.
-	fragmentCleanupInterval = 10 * time.Second
-	// defaultMaxFragmentEntries caps the number of concurrently tracked
-	// fragmented datagrams. The table stays bounded because each datagram is a
-	// single small entry regardless of how many fragments it is split into, and
-	// the 13-bit IPv4 fragment-offset field limits any datagram to 64 KiB.
-	defaultMaxFragmentEntries = 16384
-
-	// EnvFragmentMaxEntries overrides defaultMaxFragmentEntries.
-	EnvFragmentMaxEntries = "NB_FRAGMENT_MAX_ENTRIES"
-)
-
-// fragmentVerdict is the decision for a trailing (headerless) fragment.
-type fragmentVerdict int
-
-const (
-	// fragmentDeny drops the fragment: no allowed first fragment is on record.
-	fragmentDeny fragmentVerdict = iota
-	// fragmentAllow passes the fragment: it belongs to an allowed datagram and
-	// does not overlap the already-inspected transport header.
-	fragmentAllow
-	// fragmentOverlap drops the fragment and poisons its datagram: it overlaps
-	// the transport header the ACL inspected (RFC 1858 §4, RFC 3128; RFC 5722
-	// requires discarding the whole datagram on overlap for IPv6).
-	fragmentOverlap
-)
-
-// fragmentKey identifies a fragmented datagram. It matches the RFC 791 / RFC
-// 8200 reassembly key: source, destination, protocol and identification. The id
-// is 32-bit to hold both the IPv4 (16-bit) and IPv6 (32-bit) identification.
-type fragmentKey struct {
-	srcIP netip.Addr
-	dstIP netip.Addr
-	id    uint32
-	proto uint8
-}
-
-// fragmentEntry records the verdict of an allowed first fragment.
-type fragmentEntry struct {
-	// headerEndOctets is the offset, in 8-byte units, at which the first
-	// fragment's payload ended. A trailing fragment starting before this
-	// overlaps bytes the ACL already inspected and is rejected.
-	headerEndOctets uint16
-	// recordedAt is when the first fragment was accepted. The verdict expires a
-	// fixed timeout later and is not refreshed, mirroring the kernel reassembly
-	// timer so a trailing-fragment flood can't keep a datagram alive.
-	recordedAt time.Time
-}
-
-// fragmentTracker records the ACL verdict of a datagram's first fragment so the
-// remaining fragments, which carry no L4 header, can inherit the decision
-// without reassembling the datagram. Only allowed first fragments are stored;
-// anything that cannot be tied to an allowed, non-overlapping first fragment is
-// dropped (fail closed).
-type fragmentTracker struct {
-	logger  *nblog.Logger
-	mutex   sync.Mutex
-	entries map[fragmentKey]fragmentEntry
-	timeout time.Duration
-	// maxEntries caps the table; atCapacity dedups the capacity warning until
-	// the table drains below the cap again.
-	maxEntries    int
-	atCapacity    bool
-	cleanupTicker *time.Ticker
-	cancel        context.CancelFunc
-}
-
-func newFragmentTracker(logger *nblog.Logger) *fragmentTracker {
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-	t := &fragmentTracker{
-		logger:        logger,
-		entries:       make(map[fragmentKey]fragmentEntry),
-		timeout:       defaultFragmentTimeout,
-		maxEntries:    fragmentMaxEntries(logger),
-		cleanupTicker: time.NewTicker(fragmentCleanupInterval),
-		cancel:        cancel,
-	}
-	go t.cleanupRoutine(ctx)
-	return t
-}
-
-func fragmentMaxEntries(logger *nblog.Logger) int {
-	v := os.Getenv(EnvFragmentMaxEntries)
-	if v == "" {
-		return defaultMaxFragmentEntries
-	}
-	n, err := strconv.Atoi(v)
-	if err != nil || n <= 0 {
-		logger.Warn2("invalid %s=%q, using default", EnvFragmentMaxEntries, v)
-		return defaultMaxFragmentEntries
-	}
-	return n
-}
-
-// recordAllowed stores the verdict of an allowed first fragment. headerEndOctets
-// is the first fragment's payload length in 8-byte units. When the table is full
-// the record is dropped, which fails closed: the datagram's trailing fragments
-// will be denied.
-func (t *fragmentTracker) recordAllowed(key fragmentKey, headerEndOctets uint16) {
-	t.mutex.Lock()
-	defer t.mutex.Unlock()
-
-	if t.entries == nil {
-		return
-	}
-	if _, ok := t.entries[key]; !ok && len(t.entries) >= t.maxEntries {
-		if !t.atCapacity {
-			t.atCapacity = true
-			t.logger.Warn2("fragment verdict table at capacity (%d/%d): trailing fragments of new datagrams will be dropped",
-				len(t.entries), t.maxEntries)
-		}
-		return
-	}
-	t.entries[key] = fragmentEntry{
-		headerEndOctets: headerEndOctets,
-		recordedAt:      time.Now(),
-	}
-}
-
-// poison drops any recorded verdict for a datagram, so its later fragments are
-// denied until a new allowed first fragment is recorded. Called on every
-// offset-zero fragment to defeat offset-zero overlap rewrites (RFC 3128).
-func (t *fragmentTracker) poison(key fragmentKey) {
-	t.mutex.Lock()
-	defer t.mutex.Unlock()
-	delete(t.entries, key)
-}
-
-// verdict decides the fate of a trailing fragment at fragOffsetOctets (the IPv4
-// fragment offset, in 8-byte units). A fragment overlapping the inspected
-// header poisons the datagram: the entry is removed so all further fragments of
-// that datagram are denied too.
-func (t *fragmentTracker) verdict(key fragmentKey, fragOffsetOctets uint16) fragmentVerdict {
-	t.mutex.Lock()
-	defer t.mutex.Unlock()
-
-	entry, ok := t.entries[key]
-	if !ok {
-		return fragmentDeny
-	}
-	if time.Since(entry.recordedAt) > t.timeout {
-		delete(t.entries, key)
-		return fragmentDeny
-	}
-	if fragOffsetOctets < entry.headerEndOctets {
-		delete(t.entries, key)
-		return fragmentOverlap
-	}
-	return fragmentAllow
-}
-
-func (t *fragmentTracker) cleanupRoutine(ctx context.Context) {
-	defer t.cleanupTicker.Stop()
-	for {
-		select {
-		case <-t.cleanupTicker.C:
-			t.cleanup()
-		case <-ctx.Done():
-			return
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func (t *fragmentTracker) cleanup() {
-	t.mutex.Lock()
-	defer t.mutex.Unlock()
-
-	for key, entry := range t.entries {
-		if time.Since(entry.recordedAt) > t.timeout {
-			delete(t.entries, key)
-		}
-	}
-
-	if len(t.entries) < t.maxEntries {
-		t.atCapacity = false
-	}
-}
-
-// Close stops the cleanup routine and releases resources.
-func (t *fragmentTracker) Close() {
-	t.cancel()
-
-	t.mutex.Lock()
-	t.entries = nil
-	t.mutex.Unlock()
-}

client/firewall/uspfilter/fragment_bench_test.go

@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
-package uspfilter
-
-import (
-	"encoding/binary"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// benchFilterInbound drives filterInbound over a fixed packet in a tight loop.
-// Packets are built once, outside the timed region, so the benchmark measures
-// only pipeline cost, which is what an attacker can amplify.
-func benchFilterInbound(b *testing.B, pkt []byte) {
-	b.Helper()
-	b.ReportAllocs()
-	b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkt)))
-	b.ResetTimer()
-	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
-		m := benchManager
-		m.filterInbound(pkt, len(pkt))
-	}
-}
-
-// benchManager is a package-level manager reused across fragment benchmarks so
-// setup cost stays out of the timed region.
-var benchManager *Manager
-
-func setupBenchManager(b *testing.B) *Manager {
-	b.Helper()
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(b)
-	allowUDP(b, m, 8080)
-	// Disable conntrack so the allowed-first-fragment path measures transport
-	// decode + ACL every iteration instead of matching the connection tracked
-	// on the first iteration.
-	m.stateful = false
-	benchManager = m
-	return m
-}
-
-// BenchmarkInbound_NormalPacket is the baseline: a full, non-fragmented UDP
-// packet that passes the ACL. Fragment paths should stay comparable to this.
-func BenchmarkInbound_NormalPacket(b *testing.B) {
-	setupBenchManager(b)
-	pkt := normalUDPPacket(b, 8080, 32)
-	benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
-}
-
-// BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentAllowed measures the first-fragment path:
-// transport decode + ACL evaluation + verdict record.
-func BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentAllowed(b *testing.B) {
-	setupBenchManager(b)
-	pkt := firstFragmentUDP(b, 0x2000, 8080, 32)
-	benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
-}
-
-// BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentAllowed measures the common trailing-fragment
-// path: a single map lookup after the first fragment is on record.
-func BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentAllowed(b *testing.B) {
-	m := setupBenchManager(b)
-	first := firstFragmentUDP(b, 0x3000, 8080, 32)
-	m.filterInbound(first, len(first))
-	pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x3000, 5, false, 24)
-	benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
-}
-
-// BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentNoFirst is the primary DoS vector: an
-// attacker floods trailing fragments with no first fragment on record. Each is
-// a map miss and must be cheap.
-func BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentNoFirst(b *testing.B) {
-	setupBenchManager(b)
-	pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x4000, 185, false, 40)
-	benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
-}
-
-// BenchmarkInbound_TinyFirstFragment measures the tiny-fragment drop path: a
-// first fragment too small to decode a transport header.
-func BenchmarkInbound_TinyFirstFragment(b *testing.B) {
-	setupBenchManager(b)
-	pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x5000, 0, true, 4)
-	benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
-}
-
-// BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentDistinctIDs is the worst case for the
-// verdict table: an attacker varies the datagram id on every packet so no first
-// fragment ever matches. Verdict lookups always miss and nothing is recorded,
-// so the table cannot grow. Each iteration rewrites the id field in place.
-func BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentDistinctIDs(b *testing.B) {
-	setupBenchManager(b)
-	pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x6000, 185, false, 40)
-	m := benchManager
-
-	b.ReportAllocs()
-	b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkt)))
-	b.ResetTimer()
-	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
-		// IPv4 identification field is at bytes 4:6.
-		binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], uint16(i))
-		m.filterInbound(pkt, len(pkt))
-	}
-}
-
-// BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentDistinctIDs measures sustained first-fragment
-// pressure with distinct ids: transport decode + ACL + verdict insert until the
-// table caps, exercising the map growth and capacity guard.
-func BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentDistinctIDs(b *testing.B) {
-	setupBenchManager(b)
-	pkt := firstFragmentUDP(b, 0x7000, 8080, 32)
-	m := benchManager
-
-	b.ReportAllocs()
-	b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkt)))
-	b.ResetTimer()
-	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
-		binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], uint16(i))
-		m.filterInbound(pkt, len(pkt))
-	}
-}

client/firewall/uspfilter/fragment_test.go

@@ -1,554 +0,0 @@
-package uspfilter
-
-import (
-	"encoding/binary"
-	"net"
-	"net/netip"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/google/gopacket"
-	"github.com/google/gopacket/layers"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-
-	fw "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
-	nbiface "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/device"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
-)
-
-const (
-	fragTestSrc   = "100.10.0.1"
-	fragTestDst   = "100.10.0.100"
-	fragTestSrcV6 = "fd00::1"
-	fragTestDstV6 = "fd00::100"
-)
-
-func newFragmentTestManager(tb testing.TB) *Manager {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ifaceMock := &IFaceMock{
-		SetFilterFunc: func(device.PacketFilter) error { return nil },
-		AddressFunc: func() wgaddr.Address {
-			return wgaddr.Address{
-				IP:      netip.MustParseAddr(fragTestDst),
-				Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("100.10.0.0/16"),
-				IPv6:    netip.MustParseAddr(fragTestDstV6),
-				IPv6Net: netip.MustParsePrefix("fd00::/64"),
-			}
-		},
-	}
-
-	m, err := Create(ifaceMock, false, flowLogger, nbiface.DefaultMTU)
-	require.NoError(tb, err)
-	require.NoError(tb, m.UpdateLocalIPs())
-	tb.Cleanup(func() { require.NoError(tb, m.Close(nil)) })
-	return m
-}
-
-// firstFragmentUDPTo builds the first fragment of a fragmented UDP datagram to
-// the given destination: it carries the full UDP header plus payloadLen bytes
-// of data, with the More Fragments flag set and offset zero.
-func firstFragmentUDPTo(tb testing.TB, dst string, id uint16, dstPort uint16, payloadLen int) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ip := &layers.IPv4{
-		Version:  4,
-		TTL:      64,
-		Id:       id,
-		Protocol: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
-		SrcIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
-		DstIP:    net.ParseIP(dst),
-		Flags:    layers.IPv4MoreFragments,
-	}
-	udp := &layers.UDP{SrcPort: 40000, DstPort: layers.UDPPort(dstPort)}
-	require.NoError(tb, udp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
-
-	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
-	opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
-	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, udp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, payloadLen))))
-	return buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-func firstFragmentUDP(tb testing.TB, id uint16, dstPort uint16, payloadLen int) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-	return firstFragmentUDPTo(tb, fragTestDst, id, dstPort, payloadLen)
-}
-
-// firstFragmentTCP builds the first fragment of a fragmented TCP datagram: the
-// full 20-byte TCP header plus 12 bytes of data, with the More Fragments flag
-// set and offset zero.
-func firstFragmentTCP(tb testing.TB, id uint16, dstPort uint16) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ip := &layers.IPv4{
-		Version:  4,
-		TTL:      64,
-		Id:       id,
-		Protocol: layers.IPProtocolTCP,
-		SrcIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
-		DstIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestDst),
-		Flags:    layers.IPv4MoreFragments,
-	}
-	tcp := &layers.TCP{SrcPort: 40000, DstPort: layers.TCPPort(dstPort), SYN: true, Window: 64240}
-	require.NoError(tb, tcp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
-
-	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
-	opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
-	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, tcp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, 12))))
-	return buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-// trailingFragmentTo builds a non-first fragment to the given destination: an
-// IPv4 header at the given fragment offset (in 8-byte units) carrying raw
-// payload and no L4 header.
-func trailingFragmentTo(tb testing.TB, dst string, proto layers.IPProtocol, id uint16, fragOffsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, payloadLen int) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ip := &layers.IPv4{
-		Version:    4,
-		TTL:        64,
-		Id:         id,
-		Protocol:   proto,
-		SrcIP:      net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
-		DstIP:      net.ParseIP(dst),
-		FragOffset: fragOffsetOctets,
-	}
-	if moreFragments {
-		ip.Flags = layers.IPv4MoreFragments
-	}
-
-	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
-	opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{FixLengths: true}
-	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, payloadLen))))
-	return buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-func trailingFragment(tb testing.TB, id uint16, fragOffsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, payloadLen int) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-	return trailingFragmentTo(tb, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolUDP, id, fragOffsetOctets, moreFragments, payloadLen)
-}
-
-// outboundUDPPacket builds a complete outbound UDP packet from the local
-// address, used to establish conntrack state for reply-direction tests.
-func outboundUDPPacket(tb testing.TB, srcPort, dstPort uint16) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ip := &layers.IPv4{
-		Version:  4,
-		TTL:      64,
-		Id:       1,
-		Protocol: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
-		SrcIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestDst),
-		DstIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
-	}
-	udp := &layers.UDP{SrcPort: layers.UDPPort(srcPort), DstPort: layers.UDPPort(dstPort)}
-	require.NoError(tb, udp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
-
-	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
-	opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
-	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, udp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, 16))))
-	return buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-// normalUDPPacket builds a complete, non-fragmented UDP packet for baseline
-// comparisons against the fragment paths.
-func normalUDPPacket(tb testing.TB, dstPort uint16, payloadLen int) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ip := &layers.IPv4{
-		Version:  4,
-		TTL:      64,
-		Id:       1,
-		Protocol: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
-		SrcIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
-		DstIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestDst),
-	}
-	udp := &layers.UDP{SrcPort: 40000, DstPort: layers.UDPPort(dstPort)}
-	require.NoError(tb, udp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
-
-	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
-	opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
-	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, udp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, payloadLen))))
-	return buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-func allowUDP(tb testing.TB, m *Manager, dstPort uint16) {
-	tb.Helper()
-	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolUDP, nil,
-		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{dstPort}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
-	require.NoError(tb, err)
-}
-
-// TestFragment_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped is the core bypass repro: a trailing
-// fragment with no allowed first fragment on record must be dropped. Before the
-// fix, filterInbound returned false (allow) for any fragment.
-func TestFragment_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-
-	frag := trailingFragment(t, 0x1234, 185, false, 40)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(frag, len(frag)),
-		"trailing fragment without an allowed first fragment must be dropped")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing verifies that once a first fragment
-// passes the ACL, its trailing fragments inherit the allow verdict.
-func TestFragment_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
-
-	// First fragment: UDP header (8) + 32 payload = 40 octets -> headerEnd = 5.
-	first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x2222, 8080, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
-		"allowed first fragment should pass and be recorded")
-
-	trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x2222, 5, false, 24)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment of an allowed datagram should pass")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_DeniedFirstDropsTrailing verifies that a first fragment blocked
-// by the ACL leaves no verdict, so its trailing fragments are dropped.
-func TestFragment_DeniedFirstDropsTrailing(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	// No accept rule: local traffic defaults to deny.
-
-	first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x3333, 9999, 32)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
-		"first fragment to a blocked port should be dropped by the ACL")
-
-	trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x3333, 5, false, 24)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment of a denied datagram must be dropped")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_OverlappingHeaderDropped covers the RFC 1858 §4 / RFC 3128
-// overlapping-fragment rewrite: a trailing fragment starting inside the range
-// the ACL already inspected is dropped and poisons the datagram. TCP is used so
-// the overlap lands on real header bytes (the flags at byte 13).
-func TestFragment_OverlappingHeaderDropped(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolTCP, nil,
-		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	// First fragment: TCP header (20) + 12 data = 32 bytes -> headerEnd = 4 octets.
-	first := firstFragmentTCP(t, 0x4444, 8080)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)))
-
-	// Overlapping fragment at offset 1 (byte 8) falls inside the inspected TCP
-	// header, so it could rewrite the flags or port on reassembly.
-	overlap := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x4444, 1, true, 32)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(overlap, len(overlap)),
-		"fragment overlapping the inspected header must be dropped")
-
-	// The datagram is now poisoned: a later, non-overlapping fragment is also
-	// dropped because the verdict was removed.
-	later := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x4444, 4, false, 24)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(later, len(later)),
-		"fragments after an overlap must be dropped (datagram poisoned)")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_OffsetZeroOverlapPoisons covers the RFC 3128 offset-zero rewrite:
-// an allowed first fragment followed by a denied offset-zero fragment for the
-// same datagram must not leave the earlier allow verdict in place.
-func TestFragment_OffsetZeroOverlapPoisons(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
-
-	allowed := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x5A5A, 8080, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(allowed, len(allowed)),
-		"allowed first fragment should pass and be recorded")
-
-	// A second offset-zero fragment to a denied port supersedes the datagram's
-	// verdict; it is dropped and must not leave the allow in place.
-	denied := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x5A5A, 9999, 32)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(denied, len(denied)),
-		"denied offset-zero fragment must be dropped")
-
-	trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x5A5A, 5, false, 24)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment must be denied after the datagram was poisoned")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_TinyFirstDropped covers the tiny-fragment attack: a first
-// fragment too small to contain the full transport header can't be
-// ACL-evaluated and must be dropped.
-func TestFragment_TinyFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
-
-	// IPv4 header + 4 raw bytes, MF set, offset 0: too small for the 8-byte UDP
-	// header, so it decodes to L3 only.
-	tiny := trailingFragment(t, 0x5555, 0, true, 4)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(tiny, len(tiny)),
-		"tiny first fragment without a full L4 header must be dropped")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_TCPFirstFragment verifies the TCP arm of the transport decode: a
-// first fragment carrying the full 20-byte TCP header is ACL-evaluated and its
-// trailing fragments inherit the verdict.
-func TestFragment_TCPFirstFragment(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolTCP, nil,
-		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	// TCP header (20) + 12 data = 32 bytes -> headerEnd = 4 octets.
-	first := firstFragmentTCP(t, 0x6666, 8080)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
-		"allowed TCP first fragment should pass and be recorded")
-
-	trailing := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x6666, 4, false, 24)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment of an allowed TCP datagram should pass")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_TCPTinyFirstDropped verifies the TCP minimum header length: 12
-// bytes would satisfy a UDP header but falls short of the 20-byte TCP header.
-func TestFragment_TCPTinyFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolTCP, nil,
-		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	tiny := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x7777, 0, true, 12)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(tiny, len(tiny)),
-		"first fragment shorter than the TCP header must be dropped")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_ConntrackAllowsFirstFragment verifies the conntrack branch: reply
-// fragments of an outbound-established UDP flow pass without any inbound rule.
-func TestFragment_ConntrackAllowsFirstFragment(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-
-	out := outboundUDPPacket(t, 12345, 40000)
-	require.False(t, m.filterOutbound(out, len(out)))
-
-	first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x8888, 12345, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
-		"reply first fragment should pass via conntrack")
-
-	trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x8888, 5, false, 24)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment of a tracked flow should pass")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_RoutingDisabledDropsFragment verifies routed first fragments are
-// dropped when routing is disabled.
-func TestFragment_RoutingDisabledDropsFragment(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	m.routingEnabled.Store(false)
-
-	first := firstFragmentUDPTo(t, "198.51.100.10", 0x9999, 8080, 32)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
-		"routed first fragment must be dropped when routing is disabled")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_RouteACL verifies the route-ACL branch: fragments to a non-local
-// destination follow the route rules, allowed datagrams pass their trailing
-// fragments and denied ones don't.
-func TestFragment_RouteACL(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	m.routingEnabled.Store(true)
-	m.nativeRouter.Store(false)
-
-	_, err := m.AddRouteFiltering(
-		[]byte("rt-1"),
-		[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("100.10.0.0/16")},
-		fw.Network{Prefix: netip.MustParsePrefix("198.51.100.0/24")},
-		fw.ProtocolUDP,
-		nil,
-		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}},
-		fw.ActionAccept,
-	)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	first := firstFragmentUDPTo(t, "198.51.100.10", 0xAAAA, 8080, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
-		"route-ACL-allowed first fragment should pass")
-	trailing := trailingFragmentTo(t, "198.51.100.10", layers.IPProtocolUDP, 0xAAAA, 5, false, 24)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment of an allowed routed datagram should pass")
-
-	denied := firstFragmentUDPTo(t, "198.51.100.10", 0xBBBB, 9999, 32)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(denied, len(denied)),
-		"route-ACL-denied first fragment must be dropped")
-	deniedTrailing := trailingFragmentTo(t, "198.51.100.10", layers.IPProtocolUDP, 0xBBBB, 5, false, 24)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(deniedTrailing, len(deniedTrailing)),
-		"trailing fragment of a denied routed datagram must be dropped")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_ExpiredVerdictDropsTrailing verifies a verdict older than the
-// tracker timeout no longer admits trailing fragments.
-func TestFragment_ExpiredVerdictDropsTrailing(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
-
-	first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0xCCCC, 8080, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)))
-
-	m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
-	for key, entry := range m.fragments.entries {
-		entry.recordedAt = time.Now().Add(-defaultFragmentTimeout - time.Second)
-		m.fragments.entries[key] = entry
-	}
-	m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
-
-	trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0xCCCC, 5, false, 24)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment after verdict expiry must be dropped")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_CapacityFailsClosed verifies the table cap: at capacity, new
-// datagram verdicts are not recorded (their trailing fragments are dropped)
-// while already-recorded datagrams keep working.
-func TestFragment_CapacityFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
-
-	m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
-	m.fragments.maxEntries = 1
-	m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
-
-	first1 := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x0101, 8080, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first1, len(first1)))
-
-	first2 := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x0202, 8080, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first2, len(first2)),
-		"first fragment itself still passes at capacity")
-
-	trailing2 := trailingFragment(t, 0x0202, 5, false, 24)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing2, len(trailing2)),
-		"trailing fragment of an unrecorded datagram must be dropped at capacity")
-
-	trailing1 := trailingFragment(t, 0x0101, 5, false, 24)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing1, len(trailing1)),
-		"already-recorded datagram should keep passing at capacity")
-}
-
-// v6FragmentHeader builds the 8-byte IPv6 fragment extension header for the
-// given inner protocol, offset (8-byte units), More Fragments bit and id.
-func v6FragmentHeader(proto layers.IPProtocol, offsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, id uint32) []byte {
-	offsetFlags := offsetOctets << 3
-	if moreFragments {
-		offsetFlags |= 1
-	}
-	hdr := make([]byte, 8)
-	hdr[0] = uint8(proto)
-	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[2:4], offsetFlags)
-	binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(hdr[4:8], id)
-	return hdr
-}
-
-func v6UDPHeader(dstPort uint16, dataLen int) []byte {
-	hdr := make([]byte, 8)
-	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[0:2], 40000)
-	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[2:4], dstPort)
-	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[4:6], uint16(8+dataLen))
-	return hdr
-}
-
-// firstFragmentUDPv6 builds the first fragment of a fragmented IPv6 UDP
-// datagram: fragment header (offset 0, More Fragments set) + full UDP header +
-// data.
-func firstFragmentUDPv6(tb testing.TB, id uint32, dstPort uint16, dataLen int) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-	return fragmentUDPv6(tb, id, dstPort, dataLen, true)
-}
-
-// fragmentUDPv6 builds an offset-zero IPv6 UDP fragment. With moreFragments
-// false it is an atomic fragment (a complete datagram, RFC 6946).
-func fragmentUDPv6(tb testing.TB, id uint32, dstPort uint16, dataLen int, moreFragments bool) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ip := &layers.IPv6{
-		Version:    6,
-		NextHeader: layers.IPProtocolIPv6Fragment,
-		HopLimit:   64,
-		SrcIP:      net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6),
-		DstIP:      net.ParseIP(fragTestDstV6),
-	}
-	payload := append(v6FragmentHeader(layers.IPProtocolUDP, 0, moreFragments, id), v6UDPHeader(dstPort, dataLen)...)
-	payload = append(payload, make([]byte, dataLen)...)
-
-	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
-	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, gopacket.SerializeOptions{FixLengths: true}, ip, gopacket.Payload(payload)))
-	return buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-// trailingFragmentV6 builds a non-first IPv6 fragment: fragment header at the
-// given offset carrying raw data and no transport header.
-func trailingFragmentV6(tb testing.TB, id uint32, offsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, dataLen int) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ip := &layers.IPv6{
-		Version:    6,
-		NextHeader: layers.IPProtocolIPv6Fragment,
-		HopLimit:   64,
-		SrcIP:      net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6),
-		DstIP:      net.ParseIP(fragTestDstV6),
-	}
-	payload := append(v6FragmentHeader(layers.IPProtocolUDP, offsetOctets, moreFragments, id), make([]byte, dataLen)...)
-
-	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
-	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, gopacket.SerializeOptions{FixLengths: true}, ip, gopacket.Payload(payload)))
-	return buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-// TestFragmentV6_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped verifies the IPv6 bypass is closed:
-// a trailing fragment with no allowed first fragment is dropped.
-func TestFragmentV6_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-
-	frag := trailingFragmentV6(t, 0xAABBCCDD, 100, false, 40)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(frag, len(frag)),
-		"IPv6 trailing fragment without an allowed first fragment must be dropped")
-}
-
-// TestFragmentV6_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing verifies IPv6 fragments are
-// evaluated like IPv4: an allowed first fragment lets its trailing fragments
-// through.
-func TestFragmentV6_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6), fw.ProtocolUDP, nil,
-		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	// First fragment: UDP header (8) + 32 data = 40 octets -> headerEnd = 5.
-	first := firstFragmentUDPv6(t, 0xAABBCCDD, 8080, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
-		"allowed IPv6 first fragment should pass and be recorded")
-
-	trailing := trailingFragmentV6(t, 0xAABBCCDD, 5, false, 24)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment of an allowed IPv6 datagram should pass")
-}
-
-// TestFragmentV6_AtomicNotCached verifies an IPv6 atomic fragment (fragment
-// header with offset 0 and no More Fragments, a complete datagram per RFC 6946)
-// is evaluated but not recorded, so a flood of allowed atomic fragments can't
-// exhaust the verdict table.
-func TestFragmentV6_AtomicNotCached(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6), fw.ProtocolUDP, nil,
-		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	atomic := fragmentUDPv6(t, 0xA70301C, 8080, 16, false)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(atomic, len(atomic)),
-		"allowed IPv6 atomic fragment should pass")
-
-	m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
-	n := len(m.fragments.entries)
-	m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
-	require.Zero(t, n, "atomic fragment must not create a verdict entry")
-
-	// A genuine fragmented datagram (More Fragments set) is still recorded.
-	first := fragmentUDPv6(t, 0xBEEF, 8080, 32, true)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)))
-	m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
-	n = len(m.fragments.entries)
-	m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
-	require.Equal(t, 1, n, "genuine first fragment must record a verdict")
-}

client/iface/netstack/env.go

@@ -3,31 +3,14 @@
 package netstack
 
 import (
-	"net"
+	"fmt"
 	"os"
 	"strconv"
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 )
 
-const (
-	EnvUseNetstackMode = "NB_USE_NETSTACK_MODE"
-
-	// EnvSocks5ListenerPort overrides the port the SOCKS5 proxy listens on.
-	EnvSocks5ListenerPort = "NB_SOCKS5_LISTENER_PORT"
-
-	// EnvSocks5ListenerAddress overrides the host/IP the SOCKS5 proxy binds to.
-	// The proxy is a bridge for local host applications into the userspace
-	// WireGuard netstack, so it binds to loopback by default. Override this only
-	// when the proxy must be reachable from other hosts (e.g. a container
-	// gateway); doing so exposes an unauthenticated SOCKS5 proxy on that
-	// address.
-	EnvSocks5ListenerAddress = "NB_SOCKS5_LISTENER_ADDRESS"
-
-	// defaultSocks5Host is the loopback address the SOCKS5 proxy binds to unless
-	// overridden via EnvSocks5ListenerAddress.
-	defaultSocks5Host = "127.0.0.1"
-)
+const EnvUseNetstackMode = "NB_USE_NETSTACK_MODE"
 
 // IsEnabled todo: move these function to cmd layer
 func IsEnabled() bool {
@@ -35,40 +18,24 @@ func IsEnabled() bool {
 }
 
 func ListenAddr() string {
-	return net.JoinHostPort(listenHost(), strconv.Itoa(listenPort()))
-}
-
-// listenHost returns the host/IP the SOCKS5 proxy binds to. It defaults to
-// loopback and only honors EnvSocks5ListenerAddress when it holds a valid IP.
-func listenHost() string {
-	addr := os.Getenv(EnvSocks5ListenerAddress)
-	if addr == "" {
-		return defaultSocks5Host
-	}
-	if net.ParseIP(addr) == nil {
-		log.Warnf("invalid socks5 listener address %q, falling back to default: %s", addr, defaultSocks5Host)
-		return defaultSocks5Host
-	}
-	return addr
-}
-
-// listenPort returns the port the SOCKS5 proxy binds to, defaulting to
-// DefaultSocks5Port when EnvSocks5ListenerPort is unset or invalid.
-func listenPort() int {
-	sPort := os.Getenv(EnvSocks5ListenerPort)
+	sPort := os.Getenv("NB_SOCKS5_LISTENER_PORT")
 	if sPort == "" {
-		return DefaultSocks5Port
+		return listenAddr(DefaultSocks5Port)
 	}
 
 	port, err := strconv.Atoi(sPort)
 	if err != nil {
 		log.Warnf("invalid socks5 listener port, unable to convert it to int, falling back to default: %d", DefaultSocks5Port)
-		return DefaultSocks5Port
+		return listenAddr(DefaultSocks5Port)
 	}
 	if port < 1 || port > 65535 {
 		log.Warnf("invalid socks5 listener port, it should be in the range 1-65535, falling back to default: %d", DefaultSocks5Port)
-		return DefaultSocks5Port
+		return listenAddr(DefaultSocks5Port)
 	}
 
-	return port
+	return listenAddr(port)
+}
+
+func listenAddr(port int) string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("0.0.0.0:%d", port)
 }

client/iface/netstack/env_test.go

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-//go:build !js
-
-package netstack
-
-import (
-	"net"
-	"strconv"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-func TestListenAddr_DefaultsToLoopback(t *testing.T) {
-	// No env overrides: must bind loopback, never all interfaces.
-	got := ListenAddr()
-	want := net.JoinHostPort("127.0.0.1", strconv.Itoa(DefaultSocks5Port))
-	if got != want {
-		t.Fatalf("ListenAddr() = %q, want %q", got, want)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestListenAddr_AddressOverride(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name string
-		env  string
-		want string
-	}{
-		{name: "valid override honored", env: "0.0.0.0", want: "0.0.0.0"},
-		{name: "valid specific ip honored", env: "10.0.0.5", want: "10.0.0.5"},
-		{name: "ipv6 loopback bracketed", env: "::1", want: "::1"},
-		{name: "invalid falls back to loopback", env: "not-an-ip", want: "127.0.0.1"},
-		{name: "empty falls back to loopback", env: "", want: "127.0.0.1"},
-	}
-	for _, tc := range tests {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			t.Setenv(EnvSocks5ListenerAddress, tc.env)
-			want := net.JoinHostPort(tc.want, strconv.Itoa(DefaultSocks5Port))
-			if got := ListenAddr(); got != want {
-				t.Fatalf("ListenAddr() = %q, want %q", got, want)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-func TestListenAddr_PortOverride(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name string
-		env  string
-		want int
-	}{
-		{name: "valid port honored", env: "1081", want: 1081},
-		{name: "non-numeric falls back", env: "abc", want: DefaultSocks5Port},
-		{name: "out of range falls back", env: "70000", want: DefaultSocks5Port},
-		{name: "zero falls back", env: "0", want: DefaultSocks5Port},
-	}
-	for _, tc := range tests {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			t.Setenv(EnvSocks5ListenerPort, tc.env)
-			want := net.JoinHostPort("127.0.0.1", strconv.Itoa(tc.want))
-			if got := ListenAddr(); got != want {
-				t.Fatalf("ListenAddr() = %q, want %q", got, want)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}

client/internal/auth/device_flow.go

@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ func (d *DeviceAuthorizationFlow) WaitToken(ctx context.Context, info AuthFlowIn
 				UseIDToken:   d.providerConfig.UseIDToken,
 			}
 
-			err = validateTokenAudience(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), d.providerConfig.Audience)
+			err = isValidAccessToken(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), d.providerConfig.Audience)
 			if err != nil {
 				return TokenInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("validate access token failed with error: %v", err)
 			}

client/internal/auth/pkce_flow.go

@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) parseOAuthToken(token *oauth2.Token) (TokenInfo,
 		audience = p.providerConfig.ClientID
 	}
 
-	if err := validateTokenAudience(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), audience); err != nil {
+	if err := isValidAccessToken(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), audience); err != nil {
 		return TokenInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("authentication failed: invalid access token - %w", err)
 	}
 
@@ -320,11 +320,6 @@ func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) parseOAuthToken(token *oauth2.Token) (TokenInfo,
 	return tokenInfo, nil
 }
 
-// parseEmailFromIDToken extracts the email (or name) claim from an ID token
-// without verifying its signature. The value is best-effort and used only as a
-// UX convenience (login hint prefill and display); it never drives an
-// authorization decision. The authoritative identity is established server-side
-// from the signature-verified token.
 func parseEmailFromIDToken(token string) (string, error) {
 	parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
 	if len(parts) < 2 {

client/internal/auth/sessionwatch/watcher.go

@@ -24,7 +24,11 @@ import (
 )
 
 const (
-	maxPastHorizon = 30 * 24 * time.Hour
+	// Skew tolerates a small clock difference between the management
+	// server and this peer before treating a deadline as "in the past".
+	// Slightly above typical NTP drift; tight enough that the UI doesn't
+	// paint a stale expiry as if it were valid.
+	Skew = 30 * time.Second
 
 	// maxDeadlineHorizon caps how far in the future an accepted deadline
 	// can sit. A timestamp beyond this is almost certainly a protocol
@@ -53,7 +57,7 @@ var (
 	ErrDeadlineTooFarFuture = errors.New("session deadline too far in the future")
 
 	// ErrDeadlineInPast is returned by Update when the supplied deadline
-	// is more than maxPastHorizon in the past.
+	// is more than Skew in the past.
 	ErrDeadlineInPast = errors.New("session deadline in the past")
 )
 
@@ -62,14 +66,15 @@ var (
 // for deadline change/clear, PublishEvent for the two warnings); tests pass
 // a fake recorder so the same surface is observable without an engine.
 //
-// While the watcher runs, it owns the deadline propagated to the recorder:
-// every set, clear and sanity-check rejection routes the value through
-// SetSessionExpiresAt, so the SubscribeStatus snapshot the UI reads can
-// never drift from the watcher's timer state. (SetSessionExpiresAt fans
-// out its own state-change notification, so no separate notify is needed.)
-// The recorder is server-scoped and outlives this engine-scoped watcher;
-// Close deliberately leaves the recorder value in place so transient engine
-// restarts don't blank it — the client run loop clears it on real teardown.
+// The watcher is the single owner of the deadline propagated to the
+// recorder: every set, clear, sanity-check rejection and Close routes the
+// value through SetSessionExpiresAt, so the SubscribeStatus snapshot the UI
+// reads can never drift from the watcher's timer state. (SetSessionExpiresAt
+// fans out its own state-change notification, so no separate notify is
+// needed.) The recorder is server-scoped and outlives this engine-scoped
+// watcher — without the Close-time clear a teardown (Down, or the Down+Up of
+// a profile switch) would leave the next session showing the previous one's
+// stale "expires in" value.
 //
 // PublishEvent's signature mirrors peer.Status.PublishEvent: the watcher
 // composes the metadata internally so the wire format (MetaSession*) is
@@ -130,13 +135,10 @@ func NewWithLeads(lead, final time.Duration, recorder StatusRecorder) *Watcher {
 // was disabled).
 //
 // Same-value updates are no-ops. A different non-zero value cancels any
-// pending timer, resets the "already fired" guards, and — when the
-// deadline lies in the future — arms fresh warning timers. A deadline
-// already in the past (within maxPastHorizon) is recorded as-is with no
-// timers: the session has expired and consumers render it that way.
+// pending timer, resets the "already fired" guard, and arms a new one.
 //
 // Returns one of the sentinel Err* values when the deadline fails the
-// sanity checks (pre-epoch, far future, or past beyond maxPastHorizon).
+// sanity checks (pre-epoch, far future, or in the past beyond Skew).
 // In every error case the watcher first clears its state so it stays
 // consistent with what the caller will push into its other sinks (e.g.
 // applySessionDeadline forces a zero deadline into the status recorder
@@ -161,7 +163,7 @@ func (w *Watcher) Update(deadline time.Time) error {
 	case deadline.After(now.Add(maxDeadlineHorizon)):
 		w.clearLocked()
 		return fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrDeadlineTooFarFuture, deadline)
-	case deadline.Before(now.Add(-maxPastHorizon)):
+	case deadline.Before(now.Add(-Skew)):
 		w.clearLocked()
 		return fmt.Errorf("%w: %v (now=%v)", ErrDeadlineInPast, deadline, now)
 	}
@@ -181,9 +183,7 @@ func (w *Watcher) Update(deadline time.Time) error {
 	w.finalFiredAt = time.Time{}
 	w.dismissedAt = time.Time{}
 
-	if deadline.After(now) {
-		w.armTimerLocked(deadline)
-	}
+	w.armTimerLocked(deadline)
 	recorder := w.recorder
 	w.mu.Unlock()
 	if recorder != nil {
@@ -227,25 +227,30 @@ func (w *Watcher) Dismiss() {
 	log.Infof("auth session final-warning dismissed for deadline %s", w.current.Format(time.RFC3339))
 }
 
-// Close stops any pending timer. Update calls after Close are ignored.
-// The recorder keeps its deadline: the watcher is engine-scoped and closes
-// on every engine restart (network change, sleep/wake, stream errors)
-// while the SSO deadline stays valid across those, so clearing here would
-// blank the UI's "expires in" row on every transient reconnect. The
-// client run loop clears the server-scoped recorder when it exits for
-// real (Down, profile switch, permanent login failure).
+// Close stops any pending timer and drops the deadline on the status
+// recorder. Update calls after Close are ignored. Clearing the recorder
+// here is what keeps a teardown (Down, or the Down+Up of a profile switch)
+// from leaving the next session showing this one's stale "expires in"
+// value — the recorder is server-scoped and outlives this engine-scoped
+// watcher, so nothing else drops the anchor on teardown.
 func (w *Watcher) Close() {
 	w.mu.Lock()
-	defer w.mu.Unlock()
 	if w.closed {
+		w.mu.Unlock()
 		return
 	}
 	w.closed = true
 	w.stopTimerLocked()
+	hadDeadline := !w.current.IsZero()
 	w.current = time.Time{}
 	w.firedAt = time.Time{}
 	w.finalFiredAt = time.Time{}
 	w.dismissedAt = time.Time{}
+	recorder := w.recorder
+	w.mu.Unlock()
+	if recorder != nil && hadDeadline {
+		recorder.SetSessionExpiresAt(time.Time{})
+	}
 }
 
 // clearLocked drops the tracked deadline and notifies the recorder so

client/internal/auth/sessionwatch/watcher_test.go

@@ -224,13 +224,11 @@ func TestNewDeadlineCancelsPriorTimer(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestRefreshAfterFireArmsNewWarning(t *testing.T) {
 	r := &fakeRecorder{}
-	lead := 150 * time.Millisecond
+	lead := 30 * time.Millisecond
 	w := newWatcher(lead, r)
 	defer w.Close()
 
-	// Warning fires ~20ms in; the deadline itself stays 150ms away so the
-	// replacement below lands well before it.
-	first := time.Now().Add(170 * time.Millisecond)
+	first := time.Now().Add(50 * time.Millisecond)
 	_ = w.Update(first)
 
 	// Wait for stateChange + warning of the first cycle.
@@ -308,29 +306,7 @@ func TestUpdateRejectsTooFarFuture(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestUpdateRecentPastRecordedAsExpired(t *testing.T) {
-	r := &fakeRecorder{}
-	w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
-	defer w.Close()
-
-	d := time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour)
-	if err := w.Update(d); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("recent-past Update should succeed, got %v", err)
-	}
-	if !w.Deadline().Equal(d) {
-		t.Fatalf("expected deadline to be recorded, got %v want %v", w.Deadline(), d)
-	}
-	if got := r.deadline(); !got.Equal(d) {
-		t.Fatalf("recorder deadline = %v, want %v", got, d)
-	}
-
-	time.Sleep(80 * time.Millisecond)
-	if n := countWhere(r.snapshot(), func(e event) bool { return e.kind == publish }); n != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("no warning events may fire for an already-past deadline, got %+v", r.snapshot())
-	}
-}
-
-func TestUpdateAncientPastRejected(t *testing.T) {
+func TestUpdateInPastClearsDeadline(t *testing.T) {
 	r := &fakeRecorder{}
 	w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
 	defer w.Close()
@@ -342,12 +318,12 @@ func TestUpdateAncientPastRejected(t *testing.T) {
 	// Drain the stateChange from the seed.
 	waitForEvents(t, r, 1)
 
-	err := w.Update(time.Now().Add(-31 * 24 * time.Hour))
+	err := w.Update(time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour))
 	if !errors.Is(err, ErrDeadlineInPast) {
 		t.Fatalf("want ErrDeadlineInPast, got %v", err)
 	}
 	if !w.Deadline().IsZero() {
-		t.Fatalf("rejected ancient-past update must clear the deadline, got %v", w.Deadline())
+		t.Fatalf("in-past update must clear the deadline, got %v", w.Deadline())
 	}
 	events := waitForEvents(t, r, 2)
 	if events[1].kind != stateChange {
@@ -355,25 +331,39 @@ func TestUpdateAncientPastRejected(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestUpdateWithinSkewAccepted(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &fakeRecorder{}
+	w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
+	defer w.Close()
+
+	// 5 seconds in the past is within the 30s Skew tolerance — accept it.
+	d := time.Now().Add(-5 * time.Second)
+	if err := w.Update(d); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("within-skew Update should succeed, got %v", err)
+	}
+	if !w.Deadline().Equal(d) {
+		t.Fatalf("expected deadline to be applied, got %v want %v", w.Deadline(), d)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestCloseSilencesUpdates(t *testing.T) {
 	r := &fakeRecorder{}
 	w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
 	w.Close()
 
-	if err := w.Update(time.Now().Add(time.Hour)); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Update after Close: want nil, got %v", err)
-	}
+	_ = w.Update(time.Now().Add(time.Hour))
+
+	time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond)
 	if got := r.snapshot(); len(got) != 0 {
 		t.Fatalf("expected no events after Close, got %+v", got)
 	}
 }
 
-// TestCloseKeepsRecorderDeadline pins the reconnect-flap fix: the watcher
-// closes on every engine restart (network change, sleep/wake) while the
-// SSO deadline stays valid across those, so Close must leave the
-// server-scoped recorder's value in place. The client run loop clears the
-// recorder when it exits for real.
-func TestCloseKeepsRecorderDeadline(t *testing.T) {
+// TestCloseClearsRecorderDeadline pins the profile-switch fix: a watcher
+// holding a live deadline must zero the recorder on Close so the next
+// engine's watcher (and the UI reading the shared server-scoped recorder)
+// doesn't start out showing the previous session's stale "expires in".
+func TestCloseClearsRecorderDeadline(t *testing.T) {
 	r := &fakeRecorder{}
 	w := newWatcher(time.Hour, r)
 
@@ -387,8 +377,8 @@ func TestCloseKeepsRecorderDeadline(t *testing.T) {
 
 	w.Close()
 
-	if got := r.deadline(); !got.Equal(d) {
-		t.Fatalf("recorder deadline after Close = %v, want %v", got, d)
+	if got := r.deadline(); !got.IsZero() {
+		t.Fatalf("recorder deadline after Close = %v, want zero", got)
 	}
 }
 

client/internal/auth/util.go

@@ -20,26 +20,14 @@ func randomBytesInHex(count int) (string, error) {
 	return hex.EncodeToString(buf), nil
 }
 
-// validateTokenAudience checks that the token is a well-formed JWT whose
-// audience claim matches the expected audience.
-//
-// It does NOT verify the token's cryptographic signature and therefore must not
-// be treated as an authenticity check. The token is obtained by the client
-// directly from the IdP token endpoint over TLS, and its signature is verified
-// server-side by the management server against the IdP's JWKS
-// (see shared/auth/jwt/validator.go). This function is only a client-side
-// sanity check that the returned token targets the expected audience.
-func validateTokenAudience(token string, audience string) error {
+// isValidAccessToken is a simple validation of the access token
+func isValidAccessToken(token string, audience string) error {
 	if token == "" {
 		return fmt.Errorf("token received is empty")
 	}
 
-	parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
-	if len(parts) != 3 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("token is not a well-formed JWT")
-	}
-
-	claimsString, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1])
+	encodedClaims := strings.Split(token, ".")[1]
+	claimsString, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(encodedClaims)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}

client/internal/auth/util_test.go

@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-package auth
-
-import (
-	"encoding/base64"
-	"encoding/json"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// makeJWT builds an unsigned JWT-shaped string (header.payload.signature) with
-// the given claims payload. The signature part is arbitrary because
-// validateTokenAudience intentionally does not verify it.
-func makeJWT(t *testing.T, claims map[string]interface{}) string {
-	t.Helper()
-	header := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(`{"alg":"RS256","typ":"JWT"}`))
-	payloadBytes, err := json.Marshal(claims)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("marshal claims: %v", err)
-	}
-	payload := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(payloadBytes)
-	return header + "." + payload + ".unverified-signature"
-}
-
-func TestValidateTokenAudience(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name     string
-		token    string
-		audience string
-		wantErr  bool
-	}{
-		{
-			name:     "empty token",
-			token:    "",
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "not a JWT - no dots",
-			token:    "notajwt",
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "not a JWT - two parts only",
-			token:    "header.payload",
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "matching string audience",
-			token:    makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": "netbird"}),
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  false,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "mismatching string audience",
-			token:    makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": "other"}),
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "matching audience in array",
-			token:    makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": []interface{}{"other", "netbird"}}),
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  false,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "mismatching audience array",
-			token:    makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": []interface{}{"a", "b"}}),
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "missing audience claim",
-			token:    makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"sub": "user"}),
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "invalid base64 payload",
-			token:    "header.!!!not-base64!!!.sig",
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  true,
-		},
-	}
-
-	for _, tc := range tests {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			err := validateTokenAudience(tc.token, tc.audience)
-			if tc.wantErr && err == nil {
-				t.Fatalf("expected error, got nil")
-			}
-			if !tc.wantErr && err != nil {
-				t.Fatalf("expected no error, got %v", err)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestValidateTokenAudienceNoPanic guards the regression where a non-empty
-// token without the JWT dot structure caused an index-out-of-range panic.
-func TestValidateTokenAudienceNoPanic(t *testing.T) {
-	inputs := []string{"a", ".", "a.", "aaaa", "no-dots-here"}
-	for _, in := range inputs {
-		if err := validateTokenAudience(in, "netbird"); err == nil {
-			t.Fatalf("expected error for malformed token %q, got nil", in)
-		}
-	}
-}

client/internal/connect.go

@@ -257,10 +257,7 @@ func (c *ConnectClient) run(mobileDependency MobileDependency, runningChan chan
 		log.Errorf("failed to clean up temporary installer file: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	defer func() {
-		c.statusRecorder.SetSessionExpiresAt(time.Time{})
-		c.statusRecorder.ClientStop()
-	}()
+	defer c.statusRecorder.ClientStop()
 	operation := func() error {
 		// if context cancelled we not start new backoff cycle
 		if c.ctx.Err() != nil {

client/internal/debug/debug.go

@@ -480,6 +480,7 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addStatus() error {
 
 		fullStatus := g.statusRecorder.GetFullStatus()
 		protoFullStatus := nbstatus.ToProtoFullStatus(fullStatus)
+		protoFullStatus.Events = g.statusRecorder.GetEventHistory()
 		overview := nbstatus.ConvertToStatusOutputOverview(protoFullStatus, nbstatus.ConvertOptions{
 			Anonymize:     g.anonymize,
 			ProfileName:   profName,

client/internal/dns/service_listener.go

@@ -292,16 +292,18 @@ func (s *serviceViaListener) generateFreePort() (uint16, error) {
 		return customPort, nil
 	}
 
-	probeListener, err := net.ListenUDP("udp4", &net.UDPAddr{})
+	udpAddr := net.UDPAddrFromAddrPort(netip.MustParseAddrPort("0.0.0.0:0"))
+	probeListener, err := net.ListenUDP("udp", udpAddr)
 	if err != nil {
 		log.Debugf("failed to bind random port for DNS: %s", err)
 		return 0, err
 	}
 
-	port := uint16(probeListener.LocalAddr().(*net.UDPAddr).Port)
-	if err = probeListener.Close(); err != nil {
+	addrPort := netip.MustParseAddrPort(probeListener.LocalAddr().String()) // might panic if address is incorrect
+	err = probeListener.Close()
+	if err != nil {
 		log.Debugf("failed to free up DNS port: %s", err)
 		return 0, err
 	}
-	return port, nil
+	return addrPort.Port(), nil
 }

client/internal/engine.go

@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/guard"
 	icemaker "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/ice"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/signaling"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peerstore"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/portforward"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
@@ -182,7 +183,7 @@ type EngineServices struct {
 type Engine struct {
 	// signal is a Signal Service client
 	signal   signal.Client
-	signaler *peer.Signaler
+	signaler *signaling.Signaler
 	// mgmClient is a Management Service client
 	mgmClient mgm.Client
 	// peerConns is a map that holds all the peers that are known to this peer
@@ -318,7 +319,7 @@ func NewEngine(
 		ctx:                ctx,
 		cancel:             cancel,
 		signal:             services.SignalClient,
-		signaler:           peer.NewSignaler(services.SignalClient, config.WgPrivateKey),
+		signaler:           signaling.NewSignaler(services.SignalClient, config.WgPrivateKey),
 		mgmClient:          services.MgmClient,
 		relayManager:       services.RelayManager,
 		peerStore:          peerstore.NewConnStore(),
@@ -2605,14 +2606,13 @@ func (e *Engine) updateForwardRules(rules []*mgmProto.ForwardingRule) ([]firewal
 
 func (e *Engine) toExcludedLazyPeers(rules []firewallManager.ForwardRule, peers []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig) map[string]bool {
 	excludedPeers := make(map[string]bool)
-
-	// Ingress forward targets: inbound forwarded traffic is initiated remotely and
-	// cannot wake a lazy connection, so the peer routing the target must stay
-	// permanently connected. AllowedIPs are already parsed on the peer conn, so
-	// reuse those typed prefixes instead of re-parsing the network map strings.
 	for _, r := range rules {
+		ip := r.TranslatedAddress
 		for _, p := range peers {
-			if e.peerRoutesAddr(p, r.TranslatedAddress) {
+			for _, allowedIP := range p.GetAllowedIps() {
+				if allowedIP != ip.String() {
+					continue
+				}
 				log.Infof("exclude forwarder peer from lazy connection: %s", p.GetWgPubKey())
 				excludedPeers[p.GetWgPubKey()] = true
 			}
@@ -2622,27 +2622,6 @@ func (e *Engine) toExcludedLazyPeers(rules []firewallManager.ForwardRule, peers
 	return excludedPeers
 }
 
-// peerRoutesAddr reports whether the peer is a router for addr, matched against
-// the peer's already-parsed AllowedIPs from the store (the same typed value the
-// lazy manager consumes) rather than re-parsing the network map strings.
-func (e *Engine) peerRoutesAddr(p *mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig, addr netip.Addr) bool {
-	prefixes, ok := e.peerStore.AllowedIPs(p.GetWgPubKey())
-	if !ok {
-		return false
-	}
-	return prefixesContain(prefixes, addr)
-}
-
-// prefixesContain reports whether addr falls within any of the prefixes.
-func prefixesContain(prefixes []netip.Prefix, addr netip.Addr) bool {
-	for _, prefix := range prefixes {
-		if prefix.Contains(addr) {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}
-
 // isChecksEqual checks if two slices of checks are equal.
 func isChecksEqual(checks1, checks2 []*mgmProto.Checks) bool {
 	normalize := func(checks []*mgmProto.Checks) []string {
@@ -2769,7 +2748,7 @@ func createFile(path string) error {
 	return file.Close()
 }
 
-func convertToOfferAnswer(msg *sProto.Message) (*peer.OfferAnswer, error) {
+func convertToOfferAnswer(msg *sProto.Message) (*signaling.OfferAnswer, error) {
 	remoteCred, err := signal.UnMarshalCredential(msg)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
@@ -2785,9 +2764,9 @@ func convertToOfferAnswer(msg *sProto.Message) (*peer.OfferAnswer, error) {
 	}
 
 	// Handle optional SessionID
-	var sessionID *peer.ICESessionID
+	var sessionID *icemaker.SessionID
 	if sessionBytes := msg.GetBody().GetSessionId(); sessionBytes != nil {
-		if id, err := peer.ICESessionIDFromBytes(sessionBytes); err != nil {
+		if id, err := icemaker.SessionIDFromBytes(sessionBytes); err != nil {
 			log.Warnf("Invalid session ID in message: %v", err)
 			sessionID = nil // Set to nil if conversion fails
 		} else {
@@ -2797,8 +2776,8 @@ func convertToOfferAnswer(msg *sProto.Message) (*peer.OfferAnswer, error) {
 
 	relayIP := decodeRelayIP(msg.GetBody().GetRelayServerIP())
 
-	offerAnswer := peer.OfferAnswer{
-		IceCredentials: peer.IceCredentials{
+	offerAnswer := signaling.OfferAnswer{
+		IceCredentials: signaling.IceCredentials{
 			UFrag: remoteCred.UFrag,
 			Pwd:   remoteCred.Pwd,
 		},

client/internal/engine_lazy_exclude_test.go

@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
-package internal
-
-import (
-	"net/netip"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-
-	firewallManager "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peerstore"
-	mgmProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
-)
-
-func TestPrefixesContain(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name     string
-		prefixes []string
-		addr     string
-		want     bool
-	}{
-		{name: "own overlay /32 matches", prefixes: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}, addr: "100.110.8.145", want: true},
-		{name: "addr inside routed subnet", prefixes: []string{"10.121.0.0/16"}, addr: "10.121.208.4", want: true},
-		{name: "addr outside subnet", prefixes: []string{"10.121.0.0/16"}, addr: "10.122.0.1", want: false},
-		{name: "different /32", prefixes: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}, addr: "100.110.8.146", want: false},
-		{name: "ipv6 /128 matches", prefixes: []string{"fd00::1/128"}, addr: "fd00::1", want: true},
-		{name: "no prefixes", prefixes: nil, addr: "10.121.208.4", want: false},
-	}
-
-	for _, tt := range tests {
-		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			prefixes := make([]netip.Prefix, 0, len(tt.prefixes))
-			for _, p := range tt.prefixes {
-				prefixes = append(prefixes, netip.MustParsePrefix(p))
-			}
-			require.Equal(t, tt.want, prefixesContain(prefixes, netip.MustParseAddr(tt.addr)))
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestToExcludedLazyPeers_ForwardTarget guards a regression: the forward-target
-// peer (the peer routing a ForwardRule.TranslatedAddress) must be excluded from
-// lazy connections, matched via the peer's already-parsed AllowedIPs.
-func TestToExcludedLazyPeers_ForwardTarget(t *testing.T) {
-	const targetPeerKey = "cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc0="
-	const otherPeerKey = "dddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd0="
-
-	store := peerstore.NewConnStore()
-	store.AddPeerConn(targetPeerKey, newTestConn(t, targetPeerKey, "100.110.8.145/32"))
-	store.AddPeerConn(otherPeerKey, newTestConn(t, otherPeerKey, "100.110.9.10/32"))
-
-	e := &Engine{peerStore: store}
-
-	peers := []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig{
-		{WgPubKey: targetPeerKey, AllowedIps: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}},
-		{WgPubKey: otherPeerKey, AllowedIps: []string{"100.110.9.10/32"}},
-	}
-	rules := []firewallManager.ForwardRule{
-		{TranslatedAddress: netip.MustParseAddr("100.110.8.145")},
-	}
-
-	excluded := e.toExcludedLazyPeers(rules, peers)
-
-	require.True(t, excluded[targetPeerKey], "forward-target peer must be excluded from lazy connections")
-	require.False(t, excluded[otherPeerKey], "non-target peer must not be excluded")
-	require.Len(t, excluded, 1)
-}
-
-func TestToExcludedLazyPeers_NoRules(t *testing.T) {
-	e := &Engine{peerStore: peerstore.NewConnStore()}
-
-	peers := []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig{
-		{WgPubKey: "peer-a", AllowedIps: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}},
-	}
-
-	require.Empty(t, e.toExcludedLazyPeers(nil, peers))
-}
-
-func newTestConn(t *testing.T, key, allowedIP string) *peer.Conn {
-	t.Helper()
-	conn, err := peer.NewConn(peer.ConnConfig{
-		Key:      key,
-		WgConfig: peer.WgConfig{AllowedIps: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix(allowedIP)}},
-	}, peer.ServiceDependencies{})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	return conn
-}

client/internal/engine_session_deadline_test.go

@@ -75,14 +75,4 @@ func TestApplySessionDeadline_ThreeState(t *testing.T) {
 		require.True(t, e.statusRecorder.GetSessionExpiresAt().IsZero(),
 			"invalid timestamp must clear the deadline")
 	})
-
-	t.Run("recently expired timestamp stays visible as expired", func(t *testing.T) {
-		e := newEngine()
-		expired := time.Now().Add(-5 * time.Minute).UTC().Truncate(time.Second)
-
-		e.ApplySessionDeadline(timestamppb.New(expired))
-
-		require.True(t, e.statusRecorder.GetSessionExpiresAt().Equal(expired),
-			"recently-expired deadline must stay on the recorder so consumers render it as expired")
-	})
 }

client/internal/ipcauth/authorize.go

@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"slices"
-	"strconv"
-)
-
-// Ownership is a profile's access policy: the typed owner principals plus the
-// opt-in shared flag.
-type Ownership struct {
-	Owners []string
-	Shared bool
-}
-
-// GroupResolver resolves a Unix caller's effective group IDs and owner group
-// names to GIDs. A nil resolver disables group matching.
-type GroupResolver interface {
-	// CallerGIDs returns the set of group IDs the caller belongs to.
-	CallerGIDs(id Identity) map[uint32]struct{}
-	// GroupNameGID resolves a group name to its GID.
-	GroupNameGID(name string) (uint32, bool)
-}
-
-// Authorize reports whether the identity may control a profile with the given
-// ownership. Privileged callers and shared profiles are always allowed.
-func Authorize(o Ownership, id Identity, r GroupResolver) bool {
-	if id.IsPrivileged() {
-		return true
-	}
-	if o.Shared {
-		return true
-	}
-	for _, raw := range o.Owners {
-		p, ok := ParsePrincipal(raw)
-		if !ok {
-			continue
-		}
-		if principalMatches(p, id, r) {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}
-
-func principalMatches(p Principal, id Identity, r GroupResolver) bool {
-	switch p.Kind {
-	case KindUID:
-		if id.IsWindows() {
-			return false
-		}
-		uid, err := strconv.ParseUint(p.Value, 10, 32)
-		return err == nil && uint32(uid) == id.UID
-	case KindGID:
-		if id.IsWindows() {
-			return false
-		}
-		gid, err := strconv.ParseUint(p.Value, 10, 32)
-		return err == nil && callerHasGID(uint32(gid), id, r)
-	case KindGroup:
-		if id.IsWindows() || r == nil {
-			return false
-		}
-		gid, ok := r.GroupNameGID(p.Value)
-		return ok && callerHasGID(gid, id, r)
-	case KindSID:
-		if !id.IsWindows() {
-			return false
-		}
-		return id.SID == p.Value || slices.Contains(id.Groups, p.Value)
-	default:
-		return false
-	}
-}
-
-func callerHasGID(gid uint32, id Identity, r GroupResolver) bool {
-	if id.GID == gid {
-		return true
-	}
-	if r == nil {
-		return false
-	}
-	_, ok := r.CallerGIDs(id)[gid]
-	return ok
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/creds_stub.go

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-//go:build !linux && !darwin && !freebsd && !windows
-
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"net"
-	"runtime"
-
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
-)
-
-// NewTransportCredentials returns nil on platforms without a peer-identity
-// primitive.
-func NewTransportCredentials() credentials.TransportCredentials {
-	return nil
-}
-
-// ConnIdentity is unsupported on platforms without a peer-identity primitive.
-func ConnIdentity(net.Conn) (Identity, error) {
-	return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("peer identity not supported on %s", runtime.GOOS)
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/creds_unix.go

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-//go:build linux || darwin || freebsd
-
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"net"
-
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
-)
-
-// NewTransportCredentials returns gRPC transport credentials that extract the
-// caller's kernel-authenticated identity from a Unix-socket connection and
-// expose it via IdentityFromContext. Non-nil on platforms with a
-// peer-credential primitive.
-func NewTransportCredentials() credentials.TransportCredentials {
-	return unixCreds{}
-}
-
-type unixCreds struct{}
-
-func (unixCreds) ClientHandshake(_ context.Context, _ string, conn net.Conn) (net.Conn, credentials.AuthInfo, error) {
-	return conn, AuthInfo{}, nil
-}
-
-// ConnIdentity extracts the caller's identity from an accepted local IPC
-// connection. On Unix it reads peer credentials from the socket. It is shared
-// by the gRPC transport credentials and the JSON gateway (which forwards it).
-func ConnIdentity(conn net.Conn) (Identity, error) {
-	return PeerIdentity(conn)
-}
-
-// ServerHandshake extracts the peer identity and fails closed if it cannot be read.
-func (unixCreds) ServerHandshake(conn net.Conn) (net.Conn, credentials.AuthInfo, error) {
-	id, err := ConnIdentity(conn)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, nil, err
-	}
-	return conn, AuthInfo{
-		CommonAuthInfo: credentials.CommonAuthInfo{SecurityLevel: credentials.NoSecurity},
-		Identity:       id,
-	}, nil
-}
-
-func (unixCreds) Info() credentials.ProtocolInfo {
-	return credentials.ProtocolInfo{SecurityProtocol: AuthInfo{}.AuthType()}
-}
-
-func (unixCreds) Clone() credentials.TransportCredentials { return unixCreds{} }
-
-func (unixCreds) OverrideServerName(string) error { return nil }

client/internal/ipcauth/creds_windows.go

@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
-//go:build windows
-
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"fmt"
-	"net"
-	"runtime"
-
-	"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
-)
-
-var (
-	modadvapi32                    = windows.NewLazySystemDLL("advapi32.dll")
-	procImpersonateNamedPipeClient = modadvapi32.NewProc("ImpersonateNamedPipeClient")
-)
-
-// DefaultPipeSDDL keeps the daemon control pipe open to any LOCAL caller,
-// like Unix socket with 0666 permissions.
-//
-//	D:P                 protected DACL, no inheritance
-//	(D;;GA;;;NU)        deny GENERIC_ALL to NETWORK (remote/SMB)
-//	(A;;GA;;;SY)        allow GENERIC_ALL to LocalSystem (the daemon itself)
-//	(A;;GA;;;WD)        allow GENERIC_ALL to Everyone (local, per-RPC ACL gates)
-func DefaultPipeSDDL() string {
-	return "D:P(D;;GA;;;NU)(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;GA;;;WD)"
-}
-
-// NewTransportCredentials returns gRPC transport credentials that derive the
-// caller's identity from the named-pipe client token.
-//
-// This requires the client to dial at SECURITY_IDENTIFICATION (see dialNamedPipe).
-func NewTransportCredentials() credentials.TransportCredentials {
-	return winpipeCreds{}
-}
-
-type winpipeCreds struct{}
-
-func (winpipeCreds) ClientHandshake(_ context.Context, _ string, conn net.Conn) (net.Conn, credentials.AuthInfo, error) {
-	return conn, AuthInfo{}, nil
-}
-
-// ConnIdentity extracts the caller's identity from an accepted named-pipe
-// connection by impersonating the pipe client and reading its token. It is
-// shared by the gRPC transport credentials and the JSON gateway (which forwards
-// it). Requires the client to have connected at SECURITY_IDENTIFICATION.
-func ConnIdentity(conn net.Conn) (Identity, error) {
-	// go-winio's pipe connection embeds *win32File, which exposes Fd().
-	fdConn, ok := conn.(interface{ Fd() uintptr })
-	if !ok {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("connection %T does not expose a pipe handle", conn)
-	}
-	return pipeClientIdentity(windows.Handle(fdConn.Fd()))
-}
-
-// ServerHandshake extracts the connecting client's identity from the pipe. Fails
-// closed if the handle or token cannot be read.
-func (winpipeCreds) ServerHandshake(conn net.Conn) (net.Conn, credentials.AuthInfo, error) {
-	id, err := ConnIdentity(conn)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, nil, err
-	}
-	return conn, AuthInfo{
-		CommonAuthInfo: credentials.CommonAuthInfo{SecurityLevel: credentials.NoSecurity},
-		Identity:       id,
-	}, nil
-}
-
-func (winpipeCreds) Info() credentials.ProtocolInfo {
-	return credentials.ProtocolInfo{SecurityProtocol: AuthInfo{}.AuthType()}
-}
-
-func (winpipeCreds) Clone() credentials.TransportCredentials { return winpipeCreds{} }
-
-func (winpipeCreds) OverrideServerName(string) error { return nil }
-
-// pipeClientIdentity reads the connecting client's user SID, enabled group SIDs,
-// and elevation by impersonating the pipe client on this thread and reading the
-// impersonation token.
-func pipeClientIdentity(handle windows.Handle) (id Identity, err error) {
-	runtime.LockOSThread()
-	defer runtime.UnlockOSThread()
-
-	if err = impersonateNamedPipeClient(handle); err != nil {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("impersonate named pipe client: %w", err)
-	}
-	defer func() {
-		// Surface revert error if there are no other errors.
-		revErr := windows.RevertToSelf()
-		if err == nil {
-			err = revErr
-		}
-	}()
-
-	// openAsSelf=true: the token is opened using the daemon's process context
-	// (LocalSystem), not the impersonated client's, so the open always succeeds.
-	var token windows.Token
-	if err = windows.OpenThreadToken(windows.CurrentThread(), windows.TOKEN_QUERY, true, &token); err != nil {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("open thread token: %w", err)
-	}
-	defer token.Close()
-
-	tu, err := token.GetTokenUser()
-	if err != nil {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("get token user: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	tg, err := token.GetTokenGroups()
-	if err != nil {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("get token groups: %w", err)
-	}
-	var groups []string
-	for _, g := range tg.AllGroups() {
-		if g.Attributes&windows.SE_GROUP_ENABLED == 0 || g.Attributes&windows.SE_GROUP_USE_FOR_DENY_ONLY != 0 {
-			continue
-		}
-		groups = append(groups, g.Sid.String())
-	}
-
-	return Identity{
-		SID:      tu.User.Sid.String(),
-		Groups:   groups,
-		Elevated: token.IsElevated(),
-	}, nil
-}
-
-func impersonateNamedPipeClient(h windows.Handle) error {
-	r, _, e := procImpersonateNamedPipeClient.Call(uintptr(h))
-	if r == 0 {
-		return e
-	}
-	return nil
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/forward.go

@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"strconv"
-
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
-)
-
-// Metadata keys used by the local JSON gateway to forward the HTTP client's
-// identity to the daemon.
-const (
-	mdFwdUID      = "x-netbird-fwd-uid"      // Unix
-	mdFwdGID      = "x-netbird-fwd-gid"      // Unix
-	mdFwdSID      = "x-netbird-fwd-sid"      // Windows user SID
-	mdFwdGroup    = "x-netbird-fwd-group"    // Windows group SID (repeated)
-	mdFwdElevated = "x-netbird-fwd-elevated" // Windows, "1" if elevated
-)
-
-// ForwardIdentityMetadata encodes an identity for the gateway to forward to the
-// daemon.
-func ForwardIdentityMetadata(id Identity) metadata.MD {
-	if id.IsWindows() {
-		md := metadata.MD{}
-		md.Set(mdFwdSID, id.SID)
-		if len(id.Groups) > 0 {
-			md.Set(mdFwdGroup, id.Groups...)
-		}
-		if id.Elevated {
-			md.Set(mdFwdElevated, "1")
-		}
-		return md
-	}
-	return metadata.Pairs(
-		mdFwdUID, strconv.FormatUint(uint64(id.UID), 10),
-		mdFwdGID, strconv.FormatUint(uint64(id.GID), 10),
-	)
-}
-
-// forwardedIdentity extracts a forwarded identity from incoming gRPC metadata
-func forwardedIdentity(ctx context.Context) (Identity, bool) {
-	md, ok := metadata.FromIncomingContext(ctx)
-	if !ok {
-		return Identity{}, false
-	}
-
-	if sid := mdFirst(md, mdFwdSID); sid != "" {
-		return Identity{
-			SID:      sid,
-			Groups:   md.Get(mdFwdGroup),
-			Elevated: mdFirst(md, mdFwdElevated) == "1",
-		}, true
-	}
-
-	uidStr := mdFirst(md, mdFwdUID)
-	if uidStr == "" {
-		return Identity{}, false
-	}
-	uid, err := strconv.ParseUint(uidStr, 10, 32)
-	if err != nil {
-		return Identity{}, false
-	}
-	id := Identity{UID: uint32(uid)}
-	if g := mdFirst(md, mdFwdGID); g != "" {
-		if v, err := strconv.ParseUint(g, 10, 32); err == nil {
-			id.GID = uint32(v)
-		}
-	}
-	return id, true
-}
-
-func mdFirst(md metadata.MD, key string) string {
-	if v := md.Get(key); len(v) > 0 {
-		return v[0]
-	}
-	return ""
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/forward_test.go

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
-)
-
-func TestForwardIdentityRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
-	cases := []struct {
-		name string
-		id   Identity
-	}{
-		{"unix uid/gid", Identity{UID: 1000, GID: 1000}},
-		{"windows sid+groups+elevated", Identity{
-			SID:      "S-1-5-21-1-2-3-1001",
-			Groups:   []string{"S-1-5-32-544", "S-1-1-0"},
-			Elevated: true,
-		}},
-		{"windows sid only", Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-9"}},
-	}
-	for _, tc := range cases {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			ctx := metadata.NewIncomingContext(context.Background(), ForwardIdentityMetadata(tc.id))
-			got, ok := forwardedIdentity(ctx)
-			assert.True(t, ok)
-			assert.Equal(t, tc.id, got)
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-func TestForwardedIdentity_None(t *testing.T) {
-	_, ok := forwardedIdentity(context.Background())
-	assert.False(t, ok, "no metadata, no forwarded identity")
-
-	ctx := metadata.NewIncomingContext(context.Background(), metadata.Pairs("other", "x"))
-	_, ok = forwardedIdentity(ctx)
-	assert.False(t, ok)
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/identity.go

@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
-// Package ipcauth provides the kernel-authenticated identity of a local IPC
-// (gRPC) caller and the transport credentials that surface it into the gRPC
-// context, so the daemon can authorize each RPC by caller identity.
-//
-// On Unix the identity is read from the kernel via SO_PEERCRED (Linux) or
-// LOCAL_PEERCRED (Darwin/FreeBSD). On Windows it is derived from the named-pipe
-// client token. Platforms without a peer-identity primitive get no credentials
-// and therefore no enforcement.
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"fmt"
-
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/peer"
-)
-
-// sidLocalSystem is the well-known Windows SID for the LocalSystem account.
-const sidLocalSystem = "S-1-5-18"
-
-// Identity is the kernel-authenticated identity of a local IPC caller. The zero
-// value is not a valid identity.
-type Identity struct {
-	// UID and GID are the caller's Unix user ID and primary group ID.
-	// Zero on Windows, where SID is authoritative instead.
-	UID uint32
-	GID uint32
-
-	// SID is the caller's Windows security identifier (empty on Unix).
-	SID string
-
-	// Groups holds the caller's Windows group SIDs, captured from the client
-	// token at handshake (empty on Unix, where supplementary group membership is
-	// resolved on demand via NSS/getent by the authorizer).
-	Groups []string
-
-	// Elevated reports whether the Windows client token is elevated (run as
-	// administrator). Always false on Unix, where privilege is uid==0.
-	Elevated bool
-}
-
-// IsWindows reports whether this identity is a Windows principal (SID-based)
-// rather than a Unix uid/gid principal.
-func (i Identity) IsWindows() bool {
-	return i.SID != ""
-}
-
-// IsPrivileged reports whether the caller is the platform's administrative
-// principal.
-func (i Identity) IsPrivileged() bool {
-	if i.IsWindows() {
-		return i.Elevated || i.SID == sidLocalSystem
-	}
-	return i.UID == 0
-}
-
-// String renders the identity for audit logs.
-func (i Identity) String() string {
-	if i.IsWindows() {
-		return fmt.Sprintf("sid=%s elevated=%t", i.SID, i.Elevated)
-	}
-	return fmt.Sprintf("uid=%d gid=%d", i.UID, i.GID)
-}
-
-// AuthInfo carries the peer Identity as a gRPC credentials.AuthInfo so the
-// interceptor can retrieve it from the request context via IdentityFromContext.
-type AuthInfo struct {
-	credentials.CommonAuthInfo
-	Identity Identity
-}
-
-// AuthType identifies the authentication scheme.
-func (AuthInfo) AuthType() string { return "netbird-ipc-peercred" }
-
-// IdentityFromContext extracts the caller's kernel-authenticated identity from
-// the gRPC peer context. The second return value is false when no IPC transport
-// credentials were negotiated, callers MUST fail closed in that case.
-func IdentityFromContext(ctx context.Context) (Identity, bool) {
-	p, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)
-	if !ok {
-		return Identity{}, false
-	}
-	info, ok := p.AuthInfo.(AuthInfo)
-	if !ok {
-		return Identity{}, false
-	}
-	return info.Identity, true
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/identity_test.go

@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/peer"
-)
-
-func TestIdentityFromContext_NoPeer(t *testing.T) {
-	_, ok := IdentityFromContext(context.Background())
-	assert.False(t, ok, "bare context must report no identity (fail closed)")
-}
-
-func TestIdentityFromContext_WrongAuthInfo(t *testing.T) {
-	ctx := peer.NewContext(context.Background(), &peer.Peer{})
-	_, ok := IdentityFromContext(ctx)
-	assert.False(t, ok, "peer without our AuthInfo must report no identity")
-}
-
-func TestIdentityFromContext_Present(t *testing.T) {
-	want := Identity{UID: 1000, GID: 1000}
-	ctx := peer.NewContext(context.Background(), &peer.Peer{
-		AuthInfo: AuthInfo{
-			CommonAuthInfo: credentials.CommonAuthInfo{SecurityLevel: credentials.NoSecurity},
-			Identity:       want,
-		},
-	})
-
-	got, ok := IdentityFromContext(ctx)
-	assert.True(t, ok)
-	assert.Equal(t, want, got)
-}
-
-func TestIdentity_IsPrivileged(t *testing.T) {
-	// Unix
-	assert.True(t, Identity{UID: 0}.IsPrivileged(), "root is privileged")
-	assert.False(t, Identity{UID: 1000}.IsPrivileged(), "non-root is not privileged")
-	// Windows
-	assert.True(t, Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-1-2-3-1001", Elevated: true}.IsPrivileged(), "elevated admin is privileged")
-	assert.True(t, Identity{SID: "S-1-5-18"}.IsPrivileged(), "LocalSystem is privileged")
-	assert.False(t, Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-1-2-3-1001"}.IsPrivileged(), "non-elevated admin is NOT privileged")
-}
-
-func TestIdentity_IsWindows(t *testing.T) {
-	assert.True(t, Identity{SID: "S-1-5-18"}.IsWindows())
-	assert.False(t, Identity{UID: 0}.IsWindows())
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/interceptor.go

@@ -1,152 +0,0 @@
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"os"
-
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/status"
-)
-
-// Interceptor enforces per-RPC authorization on the daemon IPC, keyed to
-// the caller's kernel-authenticated identity. It is safe-by-default:
-// any RPC without a matching bypass is gated by the active profile's ownership,
-// and a caller without a readable identity is denied.
-type Interceptor struct {
-	policy   ProfilePolicy
-	resolver GroupResolver
-	// selfUID is the daemon's own effective UID. -1 on Windows.
-	selfUID int
-}
-
-// NewInterceptor builds an interceptor over the given policy and group resolver.
-func NewInterceptor(policy ProfilePolicy, resolver GroupResolver) *Interceptor {
-	return &Interceptor{policy: policy, resolver: resolver, selfUID: os.Geteuid()}
-}
-
-// UnaryServerInterceptor authorizes each unary RPC before the handler runs.
-func (i *Interceptor) UnaryServerInterceptor() grpc.UnaryServerInterceptor {
-	return func(ctx context.Context, req any, info *grpc.UnaryServerInfo, handler grpc.UnaryHandler) (any, error) {
-		if err := i.authorize(ctx, info.FullMethod); err != nil {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-		return handler(ctx, req)
-	}
-}
-
-// StreamServerInterceptor authorizes each streaming RPC before the handler runs.
-func (i *Interceptor) StreamServerInterceptor() grpc.StreamServerInterceptor {
-	return func(srv any, ss grpc.ServerStream, info *grpc.StreamServerInfo, handler grpc.StreamHandler) error {
-		if err := i.authorize(ss.Context(), info.FullMethod); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		return handler(srv, ss)
-	}
-}
-
-// authorize decides each RPC from the caller's identity, first match wins:
-//
-//  0. no identity                    DENY
-//  1. self / privileged / forwarded  ALLOW (root, elevated, daemon-self, JSON gateway)
-//  2. in ownersAuthorizedMethods     owner tier   (gate on DaemonOwnership)
-//  3. in handlerAuthorizedMethods    profile tier (bypass, handler decides)
-//  4. everything else                default tier (gate on ActiveProfileOwnership)
-func (i *Interceptor) authorize(ctx context.Context, fullMethod string) error {
-	id, ok := IdentityFromContext(ctx)
-	if !ok {
-		log.Warnf("ipc authz: DENY %s. caller identity unavailable", fullMethod)
-		return status.Error(codes.PermissionDenied, "caller identity could not be verified on the daemon control channel")
-	}
-
-	if i.isSelfOrPrivileged(id) {
-		// The local JSON gateway connects as the daemon itself (self/privileged)
-		// and forwards the real HTTP client's identity. Trust it here, where
-		// the transport peer is already the daemon, then authorize as the
-		// forwarded client. A direct non-privileged caller never reaches this
-		// branch, so it cannot forge the forwarding metadata.
-		fwd, hasFwd := forwardedIdentity(ctx)
-		if !hasFwd {
-			i.auditAllow(id, fullMethod)
-			return nil
-		}
-		log.Infof("ipc authz: gateway-forwarded identity %s", fwd)
-		id = fwd
-		if i.isSelfOrPrivileged(id) {
-			i.auditAllow(id, fullMethod)
-			return nil
-		}
-	}
-
-	// Owner tier: daemon-level RPCs (Add, Down, Status) require a daemon-wide owner.
-	if ownersAuthorizedMethods[fullMethod] {
-		allowed, err := i.authorizeOwnership(id, i.policy.DaemonOwnership, i.policy.ClaimDaemonOwnerIfUnowned)
-		if err != nil {
-			log.Errorf("ipc authz: claim daemon owner for %s: %v", id, err)
-			return status.Error(codes.Internal, "failed to claim daemon ownership")
-		}
-		if allowed {
-			i.auditAllow(id, fullMethod)
-			return nil
-		}
-		log.Warnf("ipc authz: DENY %s for %s. not a daemon owner", fullMethod, id)
-		return status.Errorf(codes.PermissionDenied,
-			"not authorized (caller %s is not a daemon owner). ask an owner or run as root/administrator", id)
-	}
-
-	// Profile tier: the handler self-authorizes against the target profile.
-	if handlerAuthorizedMethods[fullMethod] {
-		i.auditAllow(id, fullMethod)
-		return nil
-	}
-
-	// Default: gated on the active profile's ownership.
-	allowed, err := i.authorizeOwnership(id, i.policy.ActiveProfileOwnership, i.policy.ClaimActiveProfileOwnerIfUnowned)
-	if err != nil {
-		log.Errorf("ipc authz: claim active profile for %s: %v", id, err)
-		return status.Error(codes.Internal, "failed to claim profile ownership")
-	}
-	if allowed {
-		i.auditAllow(id, fullMethod)
-		return nil
-	}
-
-	log.Warnf("ipc authz: DENY %s for %s. active profile owned by another principal", fullMethod, id)
-	return status.Errorf(codes.PermissionDenied,
-		"not authorized to control the active profile (caller %s). ask an owner or run as root/administrator", id)
-}
-
-// authorizeOwnership authorizes id against an ownership set, claiming it via
-// trust-on-first-use when it is unowned and unshared. The claim is atomic, so on
-// a lost race it re-reads and authorizes normally.
-func (i *Interceptor) authorizeOwnership(id Identity, get func() Ownership, claim func(Identity) (bool, error)) (bool, error) {
-	o := get()
-	if len(o.Owners) == 0 && !o.Shared {
-		claimed, err := claim(id)
-		if err != nil {
-			return false, err
-		}
-		if claimed {
-			return true, nil
-		}
-		o = get()
-	}
-	return Authorize(o, id, i.resolver), nil
-}
-
-// isSelfOrPrivileged reports whether the caller is the platform administrator
-// (root / elevated-admin / LocalSystem) or the daemon's own user.
-func (i *Interceptor) isSelfOrPrivileged(id Identity) bool {
-	if id.IsPrivileged() {
-		return true
-	}
-	// Daemon-self: only meaningful on Unix (Windows privilege is covered above).
-	return !id.IsWindows() && i.selfUID >= 0 && int(id.UID) == i.selfUID
-}
-
-func (i *Interceptor) auditAllow(id Identity, fullMethod string) {
-	if auditMethods[fullMethod] {
-		log.Infof("ipc authz: allow %s for %s", fullMethod, id)
-	}
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/interceptor_test.go

@@ -1,176 +0,0 @@
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"strconv"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/peer"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/status"
-)
-
-type mockPolicy struct {
-	o             Ownership // active profile ownership
-	daemon        Ownership // daemon-wide ownership
-	claimed       bool
-	daemonClaimed bool
-}
-
-func (m *mockPolicy) ActiveProfileOwnership() Ownership { return m.o }
-
-// ClaimActiveProfileOwnerIfUnowned records a claim and marks the profile owned.
-func (m *mockPolicy) ClaimActiveProfileOwnerIfUnowned(id Identity) (bool, error) {
-	if len(m.o.Owners) == 0 && !m.o.Shared {
-		m.o.Owners = []string{OwnerPrincipalForIdentity(id)}
-		m.claimed = true
-		return true, nil
-	}
-	return false, nil
-}
-
-func (m *mockPolicy) DaemonOwnership() Ownership { return m.daemon }
-
-// ClaimDaemonOwnerIfUnowned records a daemon claim and marks the daemon owned.
-func (m *mockPolicy) ClaimDaemonOwnerIfUnowned(id Identity) (bool, error) {
-	if len(m.daemon.Owners) == 0 && !m.daemon.Shared {
-		m.daemon.Owners = []string{OwnerPrincipalForIdentity(id)}
-		m.daemonClaimed = true
-		return true, nil
-	}
-	return false, nil
-}
-
-type mockResolver struct {
-	gids  map[uint32]struct{}
-	names map[string]uint32
-}
-
-func (m mockResolver) CallerGIDs(Identity) map[uint32]struct{} { return m.gids }
-func (m mockResolver) GroupNameGID(n string) (uint32, bool)    { g, ok := m.names[n]; return g, ok }
-
-func ctxWith(id Identity) context.Context {
-	return peer.NewContext(context.Background(), &peer.Peer{AuthInfo: AuthInfo{Identity: id}})
-}
-
-const (
-	up       = servicePath + "Up"
-	list     = servicePath + "ListProfiles"
-	unkwn    = servicePath + "SomeFutureMethod"
-	down     = servicePath + "Down"
-	statusm  = servicePath + "Status"
-	addp     = servicePath + "AddProfile"
-	switchp  = servicePath + "SwitchProfile"
-	addowner = servicePath + "AddOwner"
-	sharep   = servicePath + "ShareProfile"
-)
-
-func TestInterceptorAuthorize(t *testing.T) {
-	const selfUID = 4000
-
-	tests := []struct {
-		name     string
-		own      Ownership // active profile ownership
-		daemon   Ownership // daemon-wide ownership
-		resolver GroupResolver
-		ctx      context.Context
-		method   string
-		wantErr  bool
-	}{
-		// Default gate (active profile ownership).
-		{"no identity denies", Ownership{}, Ownership{}, nil, context.Background(), up, true},
-		{"root allowed", Ownership{}, Ownership{}, nil, ctxWith(Identity{UID: 0}), up, false},
-		{"daemon-self allowed", Ownership{}, Ownership{}, nil, ctxWith(Identity{UID: selfUID}), up, false},
-		{"shared allows any", Ownership{Shared: true}, Ownership{}, nil, ctxWith(Identity{UID: 1234}), up, false},
-		{"uid owner allowed", Ownership{Owners: []string{"uid:1000"}}, Ownership{}, nil, ctxWith(Identity{UID: 1000}), up, false},
-		{"non-owner denied", Ownership{Owners: []string{"uid:1000"}}, Ownership{Owners: []string{"uid:1000"}}, nil, ctxWith(Identity{UID: 2000}), up, true},
-		{"unknown method gated", Ownership{Owners: []string{"uid:1000"}}, Ownership{}, nil, ctxWith(Identity{UID: 2000}), unkwn, true},
-		{"primary gid owner", Ownership{Owners: []string{"gid:5000"}}, Ownership{}, nil, ctxWith(Identity{UID: 2000, GID: 5000}), up, false},
-		{"group-name owner via resolver", Ownership{Owners: []string{"group:admins"}}, Ownership{},
-			mockResolver{names: map[string]uint32{"admins": 5000}, gids: map[uint32]struct{}{5000: {}}},
-			ctxWith(Identity{UID: 2000, GID: 42}), up, false},
-		{"windows sid owner", Ownership{Owners: []string{"sid:S-1-5-21-9"}}, Ownership{}, nil,
-			ctxWith(Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-9"}), up, false},
-		{"windows group-sid owner", Ownership{Owners: []string{"sid:S-1-5-32-544"}}, Ownership{}, nil,
-			ctxWith(Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-1", Groups: []string{"S-1-5-32-544"}}), up, false},
-		{"windows elevated privileged", Ownership{}, Ownership{}, nil,
-			ctxWith(Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-1", Elevated: true}), up, false},
-
-		// Profile tier (handler self-authorizes, bypass).
-		{"list bypasses gate", Ownership{Owners: []string{"uid:1000"}}, Ownership{}, nil, ctxWith(Identity{UID: 2000}), list, false},
-		{"switch-profile bypasses gate", Ownership{Owners: []string{"uid:1000"}}, Ownership{}, nil, ctxWith(Identity{UID: 2000}), switchp, false},
-
-		// Owner tier (daemon-wide ownership), independent of the active profile.
-		{"down by daemon owner allowed", Ownership{Owners: []string{"uid:9"}}, Ownership{Owners: []string{"uid:1000"}}, nil, ctxWith(Identity{UID: 1000}), down, false},
-		{"down by non-owner denied", Ownership{}, Ownership{Owners: []string{"uid:1000"}}, nil, ctxWith(Identity{UID: 2000}), down, true},
-		{"status by non-owner denied", Ownership{}, Ownership{Owners: []string{"uid:1000"}}, nil, ctxWith(Identity{UID: 2000}), statusm, true},
-		{"add by daemon owner allowed", Ownership{}, Ownership{Owners: []string{"uid:1000"}}, nil, ctxWith(Identity{UID: 1000}), addp, false},
-		{"add by non-owner denied", Ownership{}, Ownership{Owners: []string{"uid:1000"}}, nil, ctxWith(Identity{UID: 2000}), addp, true},
-		{"owner-tier TOFU claims unowned daemon", Ownership{}, Ownership{}, nil, ctxWith(Identity{UID: 2000}), down, false},
-
-		// Owner-set mutations gate on daemon ownership, not the active profile.
-		{"add-owner by daemon owner allowed", Ownership{Owners: []string{"uid:9"}}, Ownership{Owners: []string{"uid:1000"}}, nil, ctxWith(Identity{UID: 1000}), addowner, false},
-		{"add-owner by active-profile owner (non daemon owner) denied", Ownership{Owners: []string{"uid:2000"}}, Ownership{Owners: []string{"uid:1000"}}, nil, ctxWith(Identity{UID: 2000}), addowner, true},
-		{"share by active-profile owner (non daemon owner) denied", Ownership{Owners: []string{"uid:2000"}}, Ownership{Owners: []string{"uid:1000"}}, nil, ctxWith(Identity{UID: 2000}), sharep, true},
-	}
-
-	for _, tt := range tests {
-		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			i := &Interceptor{policy: &mockPolicy{o: tt.own, daemon: tt.daemon}, resolver: tt.resolver, selfUID: selfUID}
-			err := i.authorize(tt.ctx, tt.method)
-			if tt.wantErr {
-				assert.Error(t, err)
-				assert.Equal(t, codes.PermissionDenied, status.Code(err))
-			} else {
-				assert.NoError(t, err)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestInterceptorForwardedIdentity verifies the JSON-gateway trust model: a
-// self/privileged transport peer (the loopback gateway) may forward a real
-// client identity, but a non-privileged caller cannot forge it.
-func TestInterceptorForwardedIdentity(t *testing.T) {
-	const selfUID = 4000
-	owners := Ownership{Owners: []string{"uid:1000"}}
-
-	withFwd := func(peerUID, fwdUID uint32) context.Context {
-		ctx := ctxWith(Identity{UID: peerUID})
-		return metadata.NewIncomingContext(ctx, metadata.Pairs(mdFwdUID, itoa(fwdUID)))
-	}
-
-	// Gateway forwards a non-owner client: denied as that client.
-	i := &Interceptor{policy: &mockPolicy{o: owners}, selfUID: selfUID}
-	assert.Error(t, i.authorize(withFwd(selfUID, 2000), up))
-
-	// Gateway forwards the owner: allowed.
-	assert.NoError(t, i.authorize(withFwd(selfUID, 1000), up))
-
-	// A non-privileged direct caller's forwarded metadata: denied
-	assert.Error(t, i.authorize(withFwd(2000, 1000), up))
-}
-
-func itoa(u uint32) string {
-	return strconv.FormatUint(uint64(u), 10)
-}
-
-// TestInterceptorTOFU verifies an unowned, non-shared profile is claimed by the
-// first non-privileged caller, and a different caller is then denied.
-func TestInterceptorTOFU(t *testing.T) {
-	policy := &mockPolicy{o: Ownership{}} // unowned
-	i := &Interceptor{policy: policy, resolver: nil, selfUID: 4000}
-
-	// First caller (uid 1000) claims via TOFU.
-	err := i.authorize(ctxWith(Identity{UID: 1000}), up)
-	assert.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.True(t, policy.claimed, "first caller should claim ownership")
-	assert.Equal(t, []string{"uid:1000"}, policy.o.Owners)
-
-	// A different caller is now denied (profile owned by uid 1000).
-	err = i.authorize(ctxWith(Identity{UID: 2000}), up)
-	assert.Error(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, codes.PermissionDenied, status.Code(err))
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/peercred_bsd.go

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-//go:build darwin || freebsd
-
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"net"
-
-	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
-)
-
-// PeerIdentity reads the kernel-authenticated identity of the process on the
-// other end of a Unix socket connection via LOCAL_PEERCRED (xucred). xucred
-// carries the uid and primary group.
-func PeerIdentity(c net.Conn) (Identity, error) {
-	uc, ok := c.(*net.UnixConn)
-	if !ok {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("connection is not a unix socket: %T", c)
-	}
-	raw, err := uc.SyscallConn()
-	if err != nil {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("raw conn: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	var cred *unix.Xucred
-	var credErr error
-	if err := raw.Control(func(fd uintptr) {
-		cred, credErr = unix.GetsockoptXucred(int(fd), unix.SOL_LOCAL, unix.LOCAL_PEERCRED)
-	}); err != nil {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("getsockopt control: %w", err)
-	}
-	if credErr != nil {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("LOCAL_PEERCRED: %w", credErr)
-	}
-
-	id := Identity{UID: cred.Uid}
-	// Groups[0] is the effective (primary) GID; guard against an empty list.
-	if cred.Ngroups > 0 {
-		id.GID = cred.Groups[0]
-	}
-	return id, nil
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/peercred_linux.go

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-//go:build linux
-
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"net"
-
-	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
-)
-
-// PeerIdentity reads the kernel-authenticated identity of the process on the
-// other end of a Unix socket connection via SO_PEERCRED. The credentials are
-// captured by the kernel at connect() time and cannot be spoofed or changed for
-// the life of the connection.
-func PeerIdentity(c net.Conn) (Identity, error) {
-	uc, ok := c.(*net.UnixConn)
-	if !ok {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("connection is not a unix socket: %T", c)
-	}
-	raw, err := uc.SyscallConn()
-	if err != nil {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("raw conn: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	var cred *unix.Ucred
-	var credErr error
-	if err := raw.Control(func(fd uintptr) {
-		cred, credErr = unix.GetsockoptUcred(int(fd), unix.SOL_SOCKET, unix.SO_PEERCRED)
-	}); err != nil {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("getsockopt control: %w", err)
-	}
-	if credErr != nil {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("SO_PEERCRED: %w", credErr)
-	}
-
-	return Identity{
-		UID: cred.Uid,
-		GID: cred.Gid,
-	}, nil
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/peercred_stub.go

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-//go:build !linux && !darwin && !freebsd
-
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"net"
-	"runtime"
-)
-
-// PeerIdentity is unimplemented on platforms without a Unix-socket peer-credential
-// primitive. Windows derives identity from the named-pipe client token instead
-// (see the Windows transport credentials), so it never calls this.
-func PeerIdentity(net.Conn) (Identity, error) {
-	return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("peer credential check not supported on %s", runtime.GOOS)
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/peercred_unix_test.go

@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
-//go:build linux || darwin || freebsd
-
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"net"
-	"os"
-	"path/filepath"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials/insecure"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/health"
-	healthpb "google.golang.org/grpc/health/grpc_health_v1"
-)
-
-// TestPeerIdentity_MatchesCurrentProcess connects to a real Unix socket and
-// verifies the extracted UID/GID match the running process (both ends are us).
-func TestPeerIdentity_MatchesCurrentProcess(t *testing.T) {
-	sock := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "peer.sock")
-	ln, err := net.Listen("unix", sock)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = ln.Close() })
-
-	type result struct {
-		id  Identity
-		err error
-	}
-	done := make(chan result, 1)
-	go func() {
-		c, aerr := ln.Accept()
-		if aerr != nil {
-			done <- result{err: aerr}
-			return
-		}
-		defer func() { _ = c.Close() }()
-		id, ierr := PeerIdentity(c)
-		done <- result{id: id, err: ierr}
-	}()
-
-	client, err := net.Dial("unix", sock)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = client.Close() })
-
-	res := <-done
-	require.NoError(t, res.err)
-	assert.Equal(t, uint32(os.Getuid()), res.id.UID, "UID should match current process")
-	assert.Equal(t, uint32(os.Getgid()), res.id.GID, "primary GID should match current process")
-}
-
-// TestPeerIdentity_NonUnixConn rejects non-Unix connections (fail closed).
-func TestPeerIdentity_NonUnixConn(t *testing.T) {
-	ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = ln.Close() })
-
-	done := make(chan error, 1)
-	go func() {
-		c, aerr := ln.Accept()
-		if aerr != nil {
-			done <- aerr
-			return
-		}
-		defer func() { _ = c.Close() }()
-		_, ierr := PeerIdentity(c)
-		done <- ierr
-	}()
-
-	client, err := net.Dial("tcp", ln.Addr().String())
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = client.Close() })
-
-	assert.Error(t, <-done, "PeerIdentity must reject a non-Unix connection")
-}
-
-// TestGRPCRoundTrip_ServerCredsClientInsecure proves the transport contract end
-// to end: a gRPC server using the peercred transport credentials still serves a
-// plain insecure client (the CLI never changed), and the caller's kernel
-// identity reaches the handler via IdentityFromContext.
-func TestGRPCRoundTrip_ServerCredsClientInsecure(t *testing.T) {
-	sock := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "rt.sock")
-	ln, err := net.Listen("unix", sock)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	var gotUID uint32
-	var gotOK bool
-	srv := grpc.NewServer(
-		grpc.Creds(NewTransportCredentials()),
-		grpc.UnaryInterceptor(func(ctx context.Context, req any, _ *grpc.UnaryServerInfo, h grpc.UnaryHandler) (any, error) {
-			id, ok := IdentityFromContext(ctx)
-			gotUID, gotOK = id.UID, ok
-			return h(ctx, req)
-		}),
-	)
-	healthpb.RegisterHealthServer(srv, health.NewServer())
-	go func() { _ = srv.Serve(ln) }()
-	t.Cleanup(srv.Stop)
-
-	conn, err := grpc.NewClient("unix://"+sock, grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials()))
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = conn.Close() })
-
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
-	defer cancel()
-	_, err = healthpb.NewHealthClient(conn).Check(ctx, &healthpb.HealthCheckRequest{})
-	require.NoError(t, err, "insecure client must reach the peercred server")
-
-	assert.True(t, gotOK, "handler must see a peer identity")
-	assert.Equal(t, uint32(os.Getuid()), gotUID, "handler must see the caller's UID")
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/policy.go

@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
-package ipcauth
-
-import "sync"
-
-const servicePath = "/daemon.DaemonService/"
-
-// ProfilePolicy exposes ownership to the interceptor. The daemon server
-// implements it. ConfigAdapter bridges the gap because the gRPC server (and its
-// interceptor) is constructed before the server instance exists.
-type ProfilePolicy interface {
-	// ActiveProfileOwnership returns the active profile's ownership policy.
-	ActiveProfileOwnership() Ownership
-
-	// ClaimActiveProfileOwnerIfUnowned atomically claims the active profile for
-	// id when it has no owners and is not shared (trust-on-first-use), and
-	// reports whether id is now an owner. A false return means the profile was
-	// already owned or shared or another caller won the claim.
-	ClaimActiveProfileOwnerIfUnowned(id Identity) (bool, error)
-
-	// DaemonOwnership returns the daemon-wide ownership policy that governs the
-	// owner-tier RPCs and the default profile.
-	DaemonOwnership() Ownership
-
-	// ClaimDaemonOwnerIfUnowned atomically claims daemon-wide ownership for id
-	// when the daemon is unowned and not shared (trust-on-first-use).
-	ClaimDaemonOwnerIfUnowned(id Identity) (bool, error)
-}
-
-// ownersAuthorizedMethods gate on the daemon-wide owner set (or root): daemon-level
-// ops independent of any profile. The owner-set mutations (AddOwner, ShareProfile,
-// ResetOwner) must gate here, not on the active profile, else a per-profile owner
-// could escalate via `owner add`. ResetOwner also requires root in its handler.
-var ownersAuthorizedMethods = map[string]bool{
-	servicePath + "AddProfile":   true,
-	servicePath + "Down":         true,
-	servicePath + "Status":       true,
-	servicePath + "AddOwner":     true,
-	servicePath + "ShareProfile": true,
-	servicePath + "ResetOwner":   true,
-}
-
-// handlerAuthorizedMethods bypass the ownership gate (identity still required)
-// and let the handler authorize. GetActiveProfile bypasses only to return
-// public metadata any local user may read.
-var handlerAuthorizedMethods = map[string]bool{
-	servicePath + "ListProfiles":     true,
-	servicePath + "RemoveProfile":    true,
-	servicePath + "RenameProfile":    true,
-	servicePath + "SwitchProfile":    true,
-	servicePath + "GetActiveProfile": true,
-}
-
-// auditMethods are worth an audit log line. Denials are always logged.
-var auditMethods = map[string]bool{
-	servicePath + "GetConfig":          true,
-	servicePath + "SetConfig":          true,
-	servicePath + "Login":              true,
-	servicePath + "WaitSSOLogin":       true,
-	servicePath + "RequestJWTAuth":     true,
-	servicePath + "WaitJWTToken":       true,
-	servicePath + "StartCapture":       true,
-	servicePath + "StartBundleCapture": true,
-	servicePath + "DebugBundle":        true,
-	servicePath + "ExposeService":      true,
-	servicePath + "Up":                 true,
-	servicePath + "Down":               true,
-	servicePath + "SelectNetworks":     true,
-	servicePath + "DeselectNetworks":   true,
-	servicePath + "SwitchProfile":      true,
-	servicePath + "TriggerUpdate":      true,
-	servicePath + "Logout":             true,
-	servicePath + "CleanState":         true,
-	servicePath + "DeleteState":        true,
-	servicePath + "AddOwner":           true,
-	servicePath + "ResetOwner":         true,
-	servicePath + "ShareProfile":       true,
-}
-
-// ConfigAdapter is a ProfilePolicy whose backend is set lazily, once the daemon
-// server instance is created. Until then it reports an unowned profile
-// (Ownership zero value), so non-privileged callers are denied.
-type ConfigAdapter struct {
-	mu      sync.RWMutex
-	backend ProfilePolicy
-}
-
-// SetBackend installs the real policy. Must be called before serving RPCs.
-func (a *ConfigAdapter) SetBackend(backend ProfilePolicy) {
-	a.mu.Lock()
-	defer a.mu.Unlock()
-	a.backend = backend
-}
-
-// ActiveProfileOwnership delegates to the backend, or reports an unowned profile
-// when no backend is set yet.
-func (a *ConfigAdapter) ActiveProfileOwnership() Ownership {
-	a.mu.RLock()
-	defer a.mu.RUnlock()
-	if a.backend == nil {
-		return Ownership{}
-	}
-	return a.backend.ActiveProfileOwnership()
-}
-
-// ClaimActiveProfileOwnerIfUnowned delegates to the backend. Before the backend
-// is set it cannot claim, so it reports not-owned (fail closed).
-func (a *ConfigAdapter) ClaimActiveProfileOwnerIfUnowned(id Identity) (bool, error) {
-	a.mu.RLock()
-	defer a.mu.RUnlock()
-	if a.backend == nil {
-		return false, nil
-	}
-	return a.backend.ClaimActiveProfileOwnerIfUnowned(id)
-}
-
-// DaemonOwnership delegates to the backend, reporting unowned when none is set.
-func (a *ConfigAdapter) DaemonOwnership() Ownership {
-	a.mu.RLock()
-	defer a.mu.RUnlock()
-	if a.backend == nil {
-		return Ownership{}
-	}
-	return a.backend.DaemonOwnership()
-}
-
-// ClaimDaemonOwnerIfUnowned delegates to the backend. Before the backend is set
-// it cannot claim, so it reports not-owned (fail closed).
-func (a *ConfigAdapter) ClaimDaemonOwnerIfUnowned(id Identity) (bool, error) {
-	a.mu.RLock()
-	defer a.mu.RUnlock()
-	if a.backend == nil {
-		return false, nil
-	}
-	return a.backend.ClaimDaemonOwnerIfUnowned(id)
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/principal.go

@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"strconv"
-	"strings"
-)
-
-// PrincipalKind is the type of an owner principal.
-type PrincipalKind string
-
-const (
-	KindUID   PrincipalKind = "uid"   // Unix user ID
-	KindGID   PrincipalKind = "gid"   // Unix group ID
-	KindGroup PrincipalKind = "group" // Unix group name (NSS-resolved)
-	KindSID   PrincipalKind = "sid"   // Windows user or group SID
-)
-
-// Principal is a parsed owner entry from a profile's Owners list.
-type Principal struct {
-	Kind  PrincipalKind
-	Value string
-}
-
-// ParsePrincipal parses a "kind:value" owner string. Returns false for empty
-// values or unknown kinds so malformed entries are ignored rather than trusted.
-func ParsePrincipal(s string) (Principal, bool) {
-	kind, value, ok := strings.Cut(s, ":")
-	if !ok || value == "" {
-		return Principal{}, false
-	}
-	switch PrincipalKind(kind) {
-	case KindUID, KindGID, KindGroup, KindSID:
-		return Principal{Kind: PrincipalKind(kind), Value: value}, true
-	default:
-		return Principal{}, false
-	}
-}
-
-// UIDPrincipal builds the owner string for a Unix user ID.
-func UIDPrincipal(uid uint32) string {
-	return string(KindUID) + ":" + strconv.FormatUint(uint64(uid), 10)
-}
-
-// SIDPrincipal builds the owner string for a Windows SID.
-func SIDPrincipal(sid string) string { return string(KindSID) + ":" + sid }
-
-// OwnerPrincipalForIdentity returns the self-ownership principal for an identity:
-// the user's UID on Unix, or the user's SID on Windows.
-func OwnerPrincipalForIdentity(id Identity) string {
-	if id.IsWindows() {
-		return SIDPrincipal(id.SID)
-	}
-	return UIDPrincipal(id.UID)
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/resolver_unix.go

@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
-//go:build !windows
-
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"strconv"
-	"sync"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/shell"
-)
-
-const groupCacheTTL = 30 * time.Second
-
-// NewDefaultGroupResolver returns an NSS-aware group resolver, owners resolve
-// correctly for LDAP/AD users under CGO_ENABLED=0. Results are cached briefly.
-func NewDefaultGroupResolver() GroupResolver {
-	return &nssResolver{byUID: make(map[uint32]gidCacheEntry)}
-}
-
-type gidCacheEntry struct {
-	gids map[uint32]struct{}
-	at   time.Time
-}
-
-type nssResolver struct {
-	mu    sync.Mutex
-	byUID map[uint32]gidCacheEntry
-}
-
-func (r *nssResolver) CallerGIDs(id Identity) map[uint32]struct{} {
-	r.mu.Lock()
-	defer r.mu.Unlock()
-
-	if e, ok := r.byUID[id.UID]; ok && time.Since(e.at) < groupCacheTTL {
-		return e.gids
-	}
-	gids := resolveGIDs(id.UID)
-	r.byUID[id.UID] = gidCacheEntry{gids: gids, at: time.Now()}
-	return gids
-}
-
-func resolveGIDs(uid uint32) map[uint32]struct{} {
-	out := make(map[uint32]struct{})
-	u, err := shell.GetUserFromGetent(strconv.FormatUint(uint64(uid), 10))
-	if err != nil {
-		return out
-	}
-	ids, err := shell.GroupIdsWithFallback(u)
-	if err != nil {
-		return out
-	}
-	for _, s := range ids {
-		if g, err := strconv.ParseUint(s, 10, 32); err == nil {
-			out[uint32(g)] = struct{}{}
-		}
-	}
-	return out
-}
-
-func (r *nssResolver) GroupNameGID(name string) (uint32, bool) {
-	g, err := shell.LookupGroupWithGetent(name)
-	if err != nil {
-		return 0, false
-	}
-	gid, err := strconv.ParseUint(g.Gid, 10, 32)
-	if err != nil {
-		return 0, false
-	}
-	return uint32(gid), true
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/resolver_windows.go

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-//go:build windows
-
-package ipcauth
-
-// NewDefaultGroupResolver returns nil on Windows: group authorization uses the
-// group SIDs carried in the client token (see the Windows transport
-// credentials).
-func NewDefaultGroupResolver() GroupResolver {
-	return nil
-}

client/internal/peer/conn_status.go

@@ -1,18 +1,5 @@
 package peer
 
-import (
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-)
-
-const (
-	// StatusIdle indicate the peer is in disconnected state
-	StatusIdle ConnStatus = iota
-	// StatusConnecting indicate the peer is in connecting state
-	StatusConnecting
-	// StatusConnected indicate the peer is in connected state
-	StatusConnected
-)
-
 // connStatusInputs is the primitive-valued snapshot of the state that drives the
 // tri-state connection classification. Extracted so the decision logic can be unit-tested
 // without constructing full Worker/Handshaker objects.
@@ -21,24 +8,7 @@ type connStatusInputs struct {
 	peerUsesRelay       bool // remote peer advertises relay support AND local has relay
 	relayConnected      bool // statusRelay reports Connected (independent of whether peer uses relay)
 	remoteSupportsICE   bool // remote peer sent ICE credentials
-	iceWorkerCreated    bool // local WorkerICE exists (false in force-relay mode)
+	iceWorkerCreated    bool // local ICE worker exists (false in force-relay mode)
 	iceStatusConnecting bool // statusICE is anything other than Disconnected
 	iceInProgress       bool // a negotiation is currently in flight
 }
-
-// ConnStatus describe the status of a peer's connection
-type ConnStatus int32
-
-func (s ConnStatus) String() string {
-	switch s {
-	case StatusConnecting:
-		return "Connecting"
-	case StatusConnected:
-		return "Connected"
-	case StatusIdle:
-		return "Idle"
-	default:
-		log.Errorf("unknown status: %d", s)
-		return "INVALID_PEER_CONNECTION_STATUS"
-	}
-}

client/internal/peer/conn_test.go

@@ -3,28 +3,33 @@ package peer
 import (
 	"context"
 	"fmt"
+	"net/netip"
 	"os"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/dispatcher"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/guard"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/ice"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/metricsstages"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/signaling"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/status"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/stdnet"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
 )
 
-var testDispatcher = dispatcher.NewConnectionDispatcher()
-
 var connConf = ConnConfig{
 	Key:         "LLHf3Ma6z6mdLbriAJbqhX7+nM/B71lgw2+91q3LfhU=",
 	LocalKey:    "RRHf3Ma6z6mdLbriAJbqhX7+nM/B71lgw2+91q3LfhU=",
 	Timeout:     time.Second,
 	LocalWgPort: 51820,
+	WgConfig: WgConfig{
+		AllowedIps: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("100.64.0.1/32")},
+	},
 	ICEConfig: ice.Config{
 		InterfaceBlackList: nil,
 	},
@@ -52,92 +57,37 @@ func TestConn_GetKey(t *testing.T) {
 	swWatcher := guard.NewSRWatcher(nil, nil, nil, connConf.ICEConfig)
 
 	sd := ServiceDependencies{
-		SrWatcher:          swWatcher,
-		PeerConnDispatcher: testDispatcher,
+		SrWatcher: swWatcher,
 	}
 	conn, err := NewConn(connConf, sd)
-	if err != nil {
-		return
-	}
+	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	got := conn.GetKey()
 
 	assert.Equal(t, got, connConf.Key, "they should be equal")
 }
 
-func TestConn_OnRemoteOffer(t *testing.T) {
+// TestConn_DiscardMessagesWhenNotOpened: signal messages posted to a not yet
+// opened connection must be discarded without blocking or panicking.
+func TestConn_DiscardMessagesWhenNotOpened(t *testing.T) {
 	swWatcher := guard.NewSRWatcher(nil, nil, nil, connConf.ICEConfig)
 	sd := ServiceDependencies{
-		StatusRecorder:     NewRecorder("https://mgm"),
-		SrWatcher:          swWatcher,
-		PeerConnDispatcher: testDispatcher,
+		StatusRecorder: status.NewRecorder("https://mgm"),
+		SrWatcher:      swWatcher,
 	}
 	conn, err := NewConn(connConf, sd)
-	if err != nil {
-		return
-	}
+	require.NoError(t, err)
 
-	onNewOfferChan := make(chan struct{})
-
-	conn.handshaker.AddRelayListener(func(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) {
-		onNewOfferChan <- struct{}{}
-	})
-
-	conn.OnRemoteOffer(OfferAnswer{
-		IceCredentials: IceCredentials{
+	offerAnswer := signaling.OfferAnswer{
+		IceCredentials: signaling.IceCredentials{
 			UFrag: "test",
 			Pwd:   "test",
 		},
-		WgListenPort: 0,
-		Version:      "",
-	})
-
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
-	defer cancel()
-
-	select {
-	case <-onNewOfferChan:
-		// success
-	case <-ctx.Done():
-		t.Error("expected to receive a new offer notification, but timed out")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestConn_OnRemoteAnswer(t *testing.T) {
-	swWatcher := guard.NewSRWatcher(nil, nil, nil, connConf.ICEConfig)
-	sd := ServiceDependencies{
-		StatusRecorder:     NewRecorder("https://mgm"),
-		SrWatcher:          swWatcher,
-		PeerConnDispatcher: testDispatcher,
-	}
-	conn, err := NewConn(connConf, sd)
-	if err != nil {
-		return
-	}
-
-	onNewOfferChan := make(chan struct{})
-
-	conn.handshaker.AddRelayListener(func(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) {
-		onNewOfferChan <- struct{}{}
-	})
-
-	conn.OnRemoteAnswer(OfferAnswer{
-		IceCredentials: IceCredentials{
-			UFrag: "test",
-			Pwd:   "test",
-		},
-		WgListenPort: 0,
-		Version:      "",
-	})
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
-	defer cancel()
-
-	select {
-	case <-onNewOfferChan:
-		// success
-	case <-ctx.Done():
-		t.Error("expected to receive a new offer notification, but timed out")
 	}
+	conn.OnRemoteOffer(offerAnswer)
+	conn.OnRemoteAnswer(offerAnswer)
+	conn.OnRemoteCandidate(nil, nil)
+	conn.Close(false)
 }
 
 func TestConn_presharedKey(t *testing.T) {
@@ -320,7 +270,7 @@ func newWGTimeoutTestConn(rosenpassEnabled bool, disconnected *[]string) *Conn {
 		ctx:           context.Background(),
 		config:        cfg,
 		Log:           log.WithField("peer", cfg.Key),
-		metricsStages: &MetricsStages{},
+		metricsStages: &metricsstages.MetricsStages{},
 	}
 	conn.SetOnDisconnected(func(remotePeer string) {
 		*disconnected = append(*disconnected, remotePeer)
@@ -339,20 +289,20 @@ func TestConn_onWGDisconnected_EscalatesToRosenpassReset(t *testing.T) {
 	conn := newWGTimeoutTestConn(true, &disconnected)
 
 	for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
-		conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
+		conn.handleWGTimeout()
 	}
 	assert.Empty(t, disconnected, "escalation must not fire below the threshold")
 
-	conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
+	conn.handleWGTimeout()
 	assert.Equal(t, []string{conn.config.WgConfig.RemoteKey}, disconnected,
 		"reaching the threshold must report the peer disconnected once")
 
 	for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
-		conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
+		conn.handleWGTimeout()
 	}
 	assert.Len(t, disconnected, 1, "escalation must restart counting after firing")
 
-	conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
+	conn.handleWGTimeout()
 	assert.Len(t, disconnected, 2, "continued timeouts must escalate again")
 }
 
@@ -364,12 +314,12 @@ func TestConn_onWGDisconnected_CheckSuccessResetsEscalation(t *testing.T) {
 	conn := newWGTimeoutTestConn(true, &disconnected)
 
 	for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
-		conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
+		conn.handleWGTimeout()
 	}
-	conn.onWGCheckSuccess()
+	conn.handleWGCheckSuccess()
 
 	for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
-		conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
+		conn.handleWGTimeout()
 	}
 	assert.Empty(t, disconnected, "handshake success must reset the timeout count")
 }
@@ -382,7 +332,7 @@ func TestConn_onWGDisconnected_NoEscalationWithoutRosenpass(t *testing.T) {
 	conn := newWGTimeoutTestConn(false, &disconnected)
 
 	for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold*3; i++ {
-		conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
+		conn.handleWGTimeout()
 	}
 	assert.Empty(t, disconnected, "escalation must be limited to rosenpass connections")
 }

client/internal/peer/dispatcher/dispatcher.go

@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-package dispatcher
-
-import (
-	"sync"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/id"
-)
-
-type ConnectionListener struct {
-	OnConnected    func(peerID id.ConnID)
-	OnDisconnected func(peerID id.ConnID)
-}
-
-type ConnectionDispatcher struct {
-	listeners map[*ConnectionListener]struct{}
-	mu        sync.Mutex
-}
-
-func NewConnectionDispatcher() *ConnectionDispatcher {
-	return &ConnectionDispatcher{
-		listeners: make(map[*ConnectionListener]struct{}),
-	}
-}
-
-func (e *ConnectionDispatcher) AddListener(listener *ConnectionListener) {
-	e.mu.Lock()
-	defer e.mu.Unlock()
-	e.listeners[listener] = struct{}{}
-}
-
-func (e *ConnectionDispatcher) RemoveListener(listener *ConnectionListener) {
-	e.mu.Lock()
-	defer e.mu.Unlock()
-
-	delete(e.listeners, listener)
-}
-
-func (e *ConnectionDispatcher) NotifyConnected(peerConnID id.ConnID) {
-	e.mu.Lock()
-	defer e.mu.Unlock()
-	for listener := range e.listeners {
-		listener.OnConnected(peerConnID)
-	}
-}
-
-func (e *ConnectionDispatcher) NotifyDisconnected(peerConnID id.ConnID) {
-	e.mu.Lock()
-	defer e.mu.Unlock()
-	for listener := range e.listeners {
-		listener.OnDisconnected(peerConnID)
-	}
-}

client/internal/peer/event.go

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+package peer
+
+import (
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/pion/ice/v4"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/signaling"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/worker"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
+)
+
+// event is a message processed by the Conn event loop. All mutable Conn state
+// is owned by that loop; producers deliver events through the mailbox and
+// never mutate Conn state directly.
+type event any
+
+// evClose asks the event loop to tear down the connection. done is closed
+// once the teardown finished.
+type evClose struct {
+	signalToRemote bool
+	done           chan struct{}
+}
+
+type evRemoteOffer struct {
+	offer signaling.OfferAnswer
+}
+
+type evRemoteAnswer struct {
+	answer signaling.OfferAnswer
+}
+
+type evRemoteCandidate struct {
+	candidate ice.Candidate
+	haRoutes  route.HAMap
+}
+
+type evICEReady struct {
+	priority worker.ConnPriority
+	info     worker.ICEConnInfo
+}
+
+type evICEDown struct {
+	sessionChanged bool
+}
+
+type evRelayReady struct {
+	info worker.RelayConnInfo
+}
+
+type evRelayDown struct{}
+
+// evRelayDialDone reports that the relay dial helper goroutine finished,
+// successfully or not, so the loop may dispatch a pending offer.
+type evRelayDialDone struct{}
+
+type evWGTimeout struct{}
+
+// evWGHandshake reports the first WireGuard handshake of the current watcher run.
+type evWGHandshake struct {
+	when time.Time
+}
+
+// evWGCheckOK reports a watcher check that observed a fresh handshake,
+// including handshakes of connections that were already up.
+type evWGCheckOK struct{}
+
+// evGuardTick asks the loop to send a new offer to restore connectivity.
+type evGuardTick struct{}

client/internal/peer/guard/ice_monitor.go

@@ -21,8 +21,6 @@ const (
 )
 
 type ICEMonitor struct {
-	ReconnectCh chan struct{}
-
 	iFaceDiscover stdnet.ExternalIFaceDiscover
 	iceConfig     icemaker.Config
 	tickerPeriod  time.Duration
@@ -34,7 +32,6 @@ type ICEMonitor struct {
 func NewICEMonitor(iFaceDiscover stdnet.ExternalIFaceDiscover, config icemaker.Config, period time.Duration) *ICEMonitor {
 	log.Debugf("prepare ICE monitor with period: %s", period)
 	cm := &ICEMonitor{
-		ReconnectCh:   make(chan struct{}, 1),
 		iFaceDiscover: iFaceDiscover,
 		iceConfig:     config,
 		tickerPeriod:  period,

client/internal/peer/handshaker.go

@@ -1,246 +0,0 @@
-package peer
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"errors"
-	"net/netip"
-	"sync"
-	"sync/atomic"
-
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/version"
-)
-
-var (
-	ErrSignalIsNotReady = errors.New("signal is not ready")
-)
-
-// IceCredentials ICE protocol credentials struct
-type IceCredentials struct {
-	UFrag string
-	Pwd   string
-}
-
-// OfferAnswer represents a session establishment offer or answer
-type OfferAnswer struct {
-	IceCredentials IceCredentials
-	// WgListenPort is a remote WireGuard listen port.
-	// This field is used when establishing a direct WireGuard connection without any proxy.
-	// We can set the remote peer's endpoint with this port.
-	WgListenPort int
-
-	// Version of NetBird Agent
-	Version string
-	// RosenpassPubKey is the Rosenpass public key of the remote peer when receiving this message
-	// This value is the local Rosenpass server public key when sending the message
-	RosenpassPubKey []byte
-	// RosenpassAddr is the Rosenpass server address (IP:port) of the remote peer when receiving this message
-	// This value is the local Rosenpass server address when sending the message
-	RosenpassAddr string
-
-	// relay server address
-	RelaySrvAddress string
-	// RelaySrvIP is the IP the remote peer is connected to on its
-	// relay server. Used as a dial target if DNS for RelaySrvAddress
-	// fails. Zero value if the peer did not advertise an IP.
-	RelaySrvIP netip.Addr
-	// SessionID is the unique identifier of the session, used to discard old messages
-	SessionID *ICESessionID
-}
-
-func (o *OfferAnswer) hasICECredentials() bool {
-	return o.IceCredentials.UFrag != "" && o.IceCredentials.Pwd != ""
-}
-
-type Handshaker struct {
-	mu            sync.Mutex
-	log           *log.Entry
-	config        ConnConfig
-	signaler      *Signaler
-	ice           *WorkerICE
-	relay         *WorkerRelay
-	metricsStages *MetricsStages
-	// relayListener is not blocking because the listener is using a goroutine to process the messages
-	// and it will only keep the latest message if multiple offers are received in a short time
-	// this is to avoid blocking the handshaker if the listener is doing some heavy processing
-	// and also to avoid processing old offers if multiple offers are received in a short time
-	// the listener will always process the latest offer
-	relayListener *AsyncOfferListener
-	iceListener   func(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer)
-
-	// remoteICESupported tracks whether the remote peer includes ICE credentials in its offers/answers.
-	// When false, the local side skips ICE listener dispatch and suppresses ICE credentials in responses.
-	remoteICESupported atomic.Bool
-
-	// remoteOffersCh is a channel used to wait for remote credentials to proceed with the connection
-	remoteOffersCh chan OfferAnswer
-	// remoteAnswerCh is a channel used to wait for remote credentials answer (confirmation of our offer) to proceed with the connection
-	remoteAnswerCh chan OfferAnswer
-}
-
-func NewHandshaker(log *log.Entry, config ConnConfig, signaler *Signaler, ice *WorkerICE, relay *WorkerRelay, metricsStages *MetricsStages) *Handshaker {
-	h := &Handshaker{
-		log:            log,
-		config:         config,
-		signaler:       signaler,
-		ice:            ice,
-		relay:          relay,
-		metricsStages:  metricsStages,
-		remoteOffersCh: make(chan OfferAnswer),
-		remoteAnswerCh: make(chan OfferAnswer),
-	}
-	// assume remote supports ICE until we learn otherwise from received offers
-	h.remoteICESupported.Store(ice != nil)
-	return h
-}
-
-func (h *Handshaker) RemoteICESupported() bool {
-	return h.remoteICESupported.Load()
-}
-
-func (h *Handshaker) AddRelayListener(offer func(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer)) {
-	h.relayListener = NewAsyncOfferListener(offer)
-}
-
-func (h *Handshaker) AddICEListener(offer func(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer)) {
-	h.iceListener = offer
-}
-
-func (h *Handshaker) Listen(ctx context.Context) {
-	for {
-		select {
-		case remoteOfferAnswer := <-h.remoteOffersCh:
-			h.log.Infof("received offer, running version %s, remote WireGuard listen port %d, session id: %s, remote ICE supported: %t", remoteOfferAnswer.Version, remoteOfferAnswer.WgListenPort, remoteOfferAnswer.SessionIDString(), remoteOfferAnswer.hasICECredentials())
-
-			// Record signaling received for reconnection attempts
-			if h.metricsStages != nil {
-				h.metricsStages.RecordSignalingReceived()
-			}
-
-			h.updateRemoteICEState(&remoteOfferAnswer)
-
-			if h.relayListener != nil {
-				h.relayListener.Notify(&remoteOfferAnswer)
-			}
-
-			if h.iceListener != nil && h.RemoteICESupported() {
-				h.iceListener(&remoteOfferAnswer)
-			}
-
-			if err := h.sendAnswer(); err != nil {
-				h.log.Errorf("failed to send remote offer confirmation: %s", err)
-				continue
-			}
-		case remoteOfferAnswer := <-h.remoteAnswerCh:
-			h.log.Infof("received answer, running version %s, remote WireGuard listen port %d, session id: %s, remote ICE supported: %t", remoteOfferAnswer.Version, remoteOfferAnswer.WgListenPort, remoteOfferAnswer.SessionIDString(), remoteOfferAnswer.hasICECredentials())
-
-			// Record signaling received for reconnection attempts
-			if h.metricsStages != nil {
-				h.metricsStages.RecordSignalingReceived()
-			}
-
-			h.updateRemoteICEState(&remoteOfferAnswer)
-
-			if h.relayListener != nil {
-				h.relayListener.Notify(&remoteOfferAnswer)
-			}
-
-			if h.iceListener != nil && h.RemoteICESupported() {
-				h.iceListener(&remoteOfferAnswer)
-			}
-		case <-ctx.Done():
-			h.log.Infof("stop listening for remote offers and answers")
-			return
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func (h *Handshaker) SendOffer() error {
-	h.mu.Lock()
-	defer h.mu.Unlock()
-	return h.sendOffer()
-}
-
-// OnRemoteOffer handles an offer from the remote peer and returns true if the message was accepted, false otherwise
-// doesn't block, discards the message if connection wasn't ready
-func (h *Handshaker) OnRemoteOffer(offer OfferAnswer) {
-	select {
-	case h.remoteOffersCh <- offer:
-		return
-	default:
-		h.log.Warnf("skipping remote offer message because receiver not ready")
-		// connection might not be ready yet to receive so we ignore the message
-		return
-	}
-}
-
-// OnRemoteAnswer handles an offer from the remote peer and returns true if the message was accepted, false otherwise
-// doesn't block, discards the message if connection wasn't ready
-func (h *Handshaker) OnRemoteAnswer(answer OfferAnswer) {
-	select {
-	case h.remoteAnswerCh <- answer:
-		return
-	default:
-		// connection might not be ready yet to receive so we ignore the message
-		h.log.Warnf("skipping remote answer message because receiver not ready")
-		return
-	}
-}
-
-// sendOffer prepares local user credentials and signals them to the remote peer
-func (h *Handshaker) sendOffer() error {
-	if !h.signaler.Ready() {
-		return ErrSignalIsNotReady
-	}
-
-	offer := h.buildOfferAnswer()
-	h.log.Debugf("sending offer with serial: %s", offer.SessionIDString())
-
-	return h.signaler.SignalOffer(offer, h.config.Key)
-}
-
-func (h *Handshaker) sendAnswer() error {
-	answer := h.buildOfferAnswer()
-	h.log.Debugf("sending answer with serial: %s", answer.SessionIDString())
-
-	return h.signaler.SignalAnswer(answer, h.config.Key)
-}
-
-func (h *Handshaker) buildOfferAnswer() OfferAnswer {
-	answer := OfferAnswer{
-		WgListenPort:    h.config.LocalWgPort,
-		Version:         version.NetbirdVersion(),
-		RosenpassPubKey: h.config.RosenpassConfig.PubKey,
-		RosenpassAddr:   h.config.RosenpassConfig.Addr,
-	}
-
-	if h.ice != nil && h.RemoteICESupported() {
-		uFrag, pwd := h.ice.GetLocalUserCredentials()
-		sid := h.ice.SessionID()
-		answer.IceCredentials = IceCredentials{uFrag, pwd}
-		answer.SessionID = &sid
-	}
-
-	if addr, ip, err := h.relay.RelayInstanceAddress(); err == nil {
-		answer.RelaySrvAddress = addr
-		answer.RelaySrvIP = ip
-	}
-
-	return answer
-}
-
-func (h *Handshaker) updateRemoteICEState(offer *OfferAnswer) {
-	hasICE := offer.hasICECredentials()
-	prev := h.remoteICESupported.Swap(hasICE)
-	if prev != hasICE {
-		if hasICE {
-			h.log.Infof("remote peer started sending ICE credentials")
-		} else {
-			h.log.Infof("remote peer stopped sending ICE credentials")
-			if h.ice != nil {
-				h.ice.Close()
-			}
-		}
-	}
-}

client/internal/peer/handshaker_listener.go

@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
-package peer
-
-import (
-	"sync"
-)
-
-type callbackFunc func(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer)
-
-func (oa *OfferAnswer) SessionIDString() string {
-	if oa.SessionID == nil {
-		return "unknown"
-	}
-	return oa.SessionID.String()
-}
-
-type AsyncOfferListener struct {
-	fn      callbackFunc
-	running bool
-	latest  *OfferAnswer
-	mu      sync.Mutex
-}
-
-func NewAsyncOfferListener(fn callbackFunc) *AsyncOfferListener {
-	return &AsyncOfferListener{
-		fn: fn,
-	}
-}
-
-func (o *AsyncOfferListener) Notify(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) {
-	o.mu.Lock()
-	defer o.mu.Unlock()
-
-	// Store the latest offer
-	o.latest = remoteOfferAnswer
-
-	// If already running, the running goroutine will pick up this latest value
-	if o.running {
-		return
-	}
-
-	// Start processing
-	o.running = true
-
-	// Process in a goroutine to avoid blocking the caller
-	go func(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) {
-		for {
-			o.fn(remoteOfferAnswer)
-
-			o.mu.Lock()
-			if o.latest == nil {
-				// No more work to do
-				o.running = false
-				o.mu.Unlock()
-				return
-			}
-			remoteOfferAnswer = o.latest
-			// Clear the latest to mark it as being processed
-			o.latest = nil
-			o.mu.Unlock()
-		}
-	}(remoteOfferAnswer)
-}

client/internal/peer/handshaker_listener_test.go

@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-package peer
-
-import (
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-)
-
-func Test_newOfferListener(t *testing.T) {
-	dummyOfferAnswer := &OfferAnswer{}
-	runChan := make(chan struct{}, 10)
-
-	longRunningFn := func(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) {
-		time.Sleep(1 * time.Second)
-		runChan <- struct{}{}
-	}
-
-	hl := NewAsyncOfferListener(longRunningFn)
-
-	hl.Notify(dummyOfferAnswer)
-	hl.Notify(dummyOfferAnswer)
-	hl.Notify(dummyOfferAnswer)
-
-	// Wait for exactly 2 callbacks
-	for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
-		select {
-		case <-runChan:
-		case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
-			t.Fatal("Timeout waiting for callback")
-		}
-	}
-
-	// Verify no additional callbacks happen
-	select {
-	case <-runChan:
-		t.Fatal("Unexpected additional callback")
-	case <-time.After(100 * time.Millisecond):
-		t.Log("Correctly received exactly 2 callbacks")
-	}
-}

client/internal/peer/ice/session_id.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package peer
+package ice
 
 import (
 	"crypto/rand"
@@ -9,26 +9,26 @@ import (
 
 const sessionIDSize = 5
 
-type ICESessionID string
+type SessionID string
 
-// NewICESessionID generates a new session ID for distinguishing sessions
-func NewICESessionID() (ICESessionID, error) {
+// NewSessionID generates a new session ID for distinguishing sessions
+func NewSessionID() (SessionID, error) {
 	b := make([]byte, sessionIDSize)
 	if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, b); err != nil {
 		return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to generate session ID: %w", err)
 	}
-	return ICESessionID(hex.EncodeToString(b)), nil
+	return SessionID(hex.EncodeToString(b)), nil
 }
 
-func ICESessionIDFromBytes(b []byte) (ICESessionID, error) {
+func SessionIDFromBytes(b []byte) (SessionID, error) {
 	if len(b) != sessionIDSize {
 		return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid session ID length: %d", len(b))
 	}
-	return ICESessionID(hex.EncodeToString(b)), nil
+	return SessionID(hex.EncodeToString(b)), nil
 }
 
 // Bytes returns the raw bytes of the session ID for protobuf serialization
-func (id ICESessionID) Bytes() ([]byte, error) {
+func (id SessionID) Bytes() ([]byte, error) {
 	if len(id) == 0 {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("ICE session ID is empty")
 	}
@@ -42,6 +42,6 @@ func (id ICESessionID) Bytes() ([]byte, error) {
 	return b, nil
 }
 
-func (id ICESessionID) String() string {
+func (id SessionID) String() string {
 	return string(id)
 }

client/internal/peer/iface.go

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-package peer
-
-import (
-	"net"
-	"net/netip"
-	"time"
-
-	"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/configurer"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgproxy"
-)
-
-type WGIface interface {
-	UpdatePeer(peerKey string, allowedIps []netip.Prefix, keepAlive time.Duration, endpoint *net.UDPAddr, preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key) error
-	RemovePeer(peerKey string) error
-	GetStats() (map[string]configurer.WGStats, error)
-	GetProxy() wgproxy.Proxy
-	Address() wgaddr.Address
-	RemoveEndpointAddress(key string) error
-}

client/internal/peer/listener.go

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-package peer
-
-// Listener is a callback type about the NetBird network connection state
-type Listener interface {
-	OnConnected()
-	OnDisconnected()
-	OnConnecting()
-	OnDisconnecting()
-	OnAddressChanged(string, string)
-	OnPeersListChanged(int)
-}

client/internal/peer/mailbox.go

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+package peer
+
+import (
+	"sync"
+)
+
+// maxQueuedCandidates bounds the remote candidate queue; on overflow the
+// oldest candidate is dropped. Lost candidates are recovered by the next
+// offer exchange triggered by the guard.
+const maxQueuedCandidates = 128
+
+// mailbox is the coalescing inbox of the Conn event loop. Posting never
+// blocks. Per message kind either the latest value wins (offer, answer,
+// guard tick), the values queue in bounded FIFO order (candidates) or in
+// unbounded FIFO order (lifecycle and transport state changes, which are
+// low-volume and must not be lost). A new offer flushes the queued
+// candidates because they belong to the superseded session.
+type mailbox struct {
+	mu     sync.Mutex
+	closed bool
+
+	lifecycle  []event
+	transport  []event
+	offer      *evRemoteOffer
+	answer     *evRemoteAnswer
+	candidates []evRemoteCandidate
+	guardTick  bool
+
+	wake chan struct{}
+}
+
+func newMailbox() *mailbox {
+	return &mailbox{
+		wake: make(chan struct{}, 1),
+	}
+}
+
+// post stores the event and wakes the loop. It reports false if the mailbox
+// is already closed and the event was not accepted.
+func (m *mailbox) post(ev event) bool {
+	m.mu.Lock()
+	if m.closed {
+		m.mu.Unlock()
+		return false
+	}
+
+	switch e := ev.(type) {
+	case evClose:
+		m.lifecycle = append(m.lifecycle, e)
+	case evRemoteOffer:
+		m.offer = &e
+		m.candidates = nil
+	case evRemoteAnswer:
+		m.answer = &e
+	case evRemoteCandidate:
+		if len(m.candidates) >= maxQueuedCandidates {
+			m.candidates = m.candidates[1:]
+		}
+		m.candidates = append(m.candidates, e)
+	case evGuardTick:
+		m.guardTick = true
+	default:
+		m.transport = append(m.transport, ev)
+	}
+	m.mu.Unlock()
+
+	select {
+	case m.wake <- struct{}{}:
+	default:
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+// drain returns the pending events in processing order: lifecycle first,
+// then transport state changes, the coalesced offer and answer, the queued
+// candidates and finally the guard tick.
+func (m *mailbox) drain() []event {
+	m.mu.Lock()
+	defer m.mu.Unlock()
+	return m.drainLocked()
+}
+
+// closeAndDrain marks the mailbox closed so further posts are rejected and
+// returns the events that were still pending.
+func (m *mailbox) closeAndDrain() []event {
+	m.mu.Lock()
+	defer m.mu.Unlock()
+	m.closed = true
+	return m.drainLocked()
+}
+
+func (m *mailbox) drainLocked() []event {
+	evs := make([]event, 0, len(m.lifecycle)+len(m.transport)+len(m.candidates)+3)
+	evs = append(evs, m.lifecycle...)
+	evs = append(evs, m.transport...)
+	if m.offer != nil {
+		evs = append(evs, *m.offer)
+	}
+	if m.answer != nil {
+		evs = append(evs, *m.answer)
+	}
+	for _, c := range m.candidates {
+		evs = append(evs, c)
+	}
+	if m.guardTick {
+		evs = append(evs, evGuardTick{})
+	}
+
+	m.lifecycle = nil
+	m.transport = nil
+	m.offer = nil
+	m.answer = nil
+	m.candidates = nil
+	m.guardTick = false
+	return evs
+}

client/internal/peer/mailbox_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+package peer
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/signaling"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+func TestMailbox_OfferCoalescing(t *testing.T) {
+	mb := newMailbox()
+
+	require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteOffer{offer: signaling.OfferAnswer{WgListenPort: 1}}))
+	require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteOffer{offer: signaling.OfferAnswer{WgListenPort: 2}}))
+	require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteOffer{offer: signaling.OfferAnswer{WgListenPort: 3}}))
+
+	evs := mb.drain()
+	require.Len(t, evs, 1, "consecutive offers must coalesce to a single event")
+	offer, ok := evs[0].(evRemoteOffer)
+	require.True(t, ok, "coalesced event must be an offer")
+	assert.Equal(t, 3, offer.offer.WgListenPort, "the newest offer must win")
+}
+
+func TestMailbox_OfferFlushesCandidates(t *testing.T) {
+	mb := newMailbox()
+
+	require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteCandidate{}))
+	require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteCandidate{}))
+	require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteOffer{offer: signaling.OfferAnswer{}}))
+
+	evs := mb.drain()
+	require.Len(t, evs, 1, "candidates of the superseded session must be flushed")
+	_, ok := evs[0].(evRemoteOffer)
+	assert.True(t, ok, "only the offer must remain after the flush")
+}
+
+func TestMailbox_CandidatesKeepOrderAfterOffer(t *testing.T) {
+	mb := newMailbox()
+
+	require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteOffer{offer: signaling.OfferAnswer{}}))
+	require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteCandidate{haRoutes: nil}))
+	require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteCandidate{haRoutes: nil}))
+
+	evs := mb.drain()
+	require.Len(t, evs, 3)
+	_, ok := evs[0].(evRemoteOffer)
+	assert.True(t, ok, "offer must be processed before the candidates")
+	for _, ev := range evs[1:] {
+		_, ok := ev.(evRemoteCandidate)
+		assert.True(t, ok, "candidates posted after the offer must survive")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestMailbox_CandidateQueueBounded(t *testing.T) {
+	mb := newMailbox()
+
+	for i := 0; i < maxQueuedCandidates+10; i++ {
+		require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteCandidate{}))
+	}
+
+	evs := mb.drain()
+	assert.Len(t, evs, maxQueuedCandidates, "candidate queue must stay bounded")
+}
+
+func TestMailbox_DrainOrder(t *testing.T) {
+	mb := newMailbox()
+
+	require.True(t, mb.post(evGuardTick{}))
+	require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteAnswer{answer: signaling.OfferAnswer{}}))
+	require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteOffer{offer: signaling.OfferAnswer{}}))
+	require.True(t, mb.post(evRelayDown{}))
+	require.True(t, mb.post(evICEDown{sessionChanged: true}))
+	require.True(t, mb.post(evClose{}))
+
+	evs := mb.drain()
+	require.Len(t, evs, 6)
+
+	_, ok := evs[0].(evClose)
+	assert.True(t, ok, "lifecycle events must come first")
+	_, ok = evs[1].(evRelayDown)
+	assert.True(t, ok, "transport events must keep FIFO order")
+	_, ok = evs[2].(evICEDown)
+	assert.True(t, ok, "transport events must keep FIFO order")
+	_, ok = evs[3].(evRemoteOffer)
+	assert.True(t, ok, "offer must come after transport events")
+	_, ok = evs[4].(evRemoteAnswer)
+	assert.True(t, ok, "answer must come after the offer")
+	_, ok = evs[5].(evGuardTick)
+	assert.True(t, ok, "guard tick must come last")
+}
+
+func TestMailbox_GuardTickCoalesced(t *testing.T) {
+	mb := newMailbox()
+
+	require.True(t, mb.post(evGuardTick{}))
+	require.True(t, mb.post(evGuardTick{}))
+	require.True(t, mb.post(evGuardTick{}))
+
+	evs := mb.drain()
+	assert.Len(t, evs, 1, "guard ticks must coalesce to a single event")
+}
+
+func TestMailbox_PostAfterCloseRejected(t *testing.T) {
+	mb := newMailbox()
+
+	require.True(t, mb.post(evRelayDown{}))
+	leftovers := mb.closeAndDrain()
+	assert.Len(t, leftovers, 1, "pending events must be returned on close")
+
+	assert.False(t, mb.post(evRelayDown{}), "posts must be rejected after close")
+	assert.Empty(t, mb.drain(), "no events must remain after close")
+}
+
+func TestMailbox_WakeSignal(t *testing.T) {
+	mb := newMailbox()
+
+	require.True(t, mb.post(evRelayDown{}))
+	require.True(t, mb.post(evGuardTick{}))
+
+	select {
+	case <-mb.wake:
+	default:
+		t.Fatal("wake signal must be pending after posts")
+	}
+
+	assert.Len(t, mb.drain(), 2, "a single wake must deliver all pending events")
+}

client/internal/peer/metricsstages/metrics_saver.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package peer
+package metricsstages
 
 import (
 	"sync"

client/internal/peer/metricsstages/metrics_saver_test.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package peer
+package metricsstages
 
 import (
 	"testing"

client/internal/peer/signaling/handshaker.go

@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+package signaling
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"net/netip"
+	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
+
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+
+	icemaker "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/ice"
+	relayClient "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/relay/client"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/version"
+)
+
+var (
+	ErrSignalIsNotReady = errors.New("signal is not ready")
+)
+
+// IceCredentials ICE protocol credentials struct
+type IceCredentials struct {
+	UFrag string
+	Pwd   string
+}
+
+// OfferAnswer represents a session establishment offer or answer
+type OfferAnswer struct {
+	IceCredentials IceCredentials
+	// WgListenPort is a remote WireGuard listen port.
+	// This field is used when establishing a direct WireGuard connection without any proxy.
+	// We can set the remote peer's endpoint with this port.
+	WgListenPort int
+
+	// Version of NetBird Agent
+	Version string
+	// RosenpassPubKey is the Rosenpass public key of the remote peer when receiving this message
+	// This value is the local Rosenpass server public key when sending the message
+	RosenpassPubKey []byte
+	// RosenpassAddr is the Rosenpass server address (IP:port) of the remote peer when receiving this message
+	// This value is the local Rosenpass server address when sending the message
+	RosenpassAddr string
+
+	// relay server address
+	RelaySrvAddress string
+	// RelaySrvIP is the IP the remote peer is connected to on its
+	// relay server. Used as a dial target if DNS for RelaySrvAddress
+	// fails. Zero value if the peer did not advertise an IP.
+	RelaySrvIP netip.Addr
+	// SessionID is the unique identifier of the session, used to discard old messages
+	SessionID *icemaker.SessionID
+}
+
+func (o *OfferAnswer) HasICECredentials() bool {
+	return o.IceCredentials.UFrag != "" && o.IceCredentials.Pwd != ""
+}
+
+func (o *OfferAnswer) SessionIDString() string {
+	if o.SessionID == nil {
+		return "unknown"
+	}
+	return o.SessionID.String()
+}
+
+// Config carries the peer-specific values the Handshaker embeds into offers
+// and answers.
+type Config struct {
+	Key             string
+	LocalWgPort     int
+	RosenpassPubKey []byte
+	RosenpassAddr   string
+}
+
+// Credentials are the local ICE credentials and session id the Handshaker embeds in offers.
+type Credentials struct {
+	UFrag     string
+	Pwd       string
+	SessionID icemaker.SessionID
+}
+
+// ICEWorker is the subset of the ICE worker the Handshaker needs to build offers.
+type ICEWorker interface {
+	Credentials() Credentials
+	Close()
+}
+
+// Handshaker keeps the signaling protocol logic: building and sending offers
+// and answers and tracking whether the remote peer supports ICE. Incoming
+// message processing is driven by the Conn event loop.
+type Handshaker struct {
+	mu           sync.Mutex
+	log          *log.Entry
+	config       Config
+	signaler     *Signaler
+	ice          ICEWorker
+	relayManager *relayClient.Manager
+
+	// remoteICESupported tracks whether the remote peer includes ICE credentials in its offers/answers.
+	// When false, the local side skips ICE dispatch and suppresses ICE credentials in responses.
+	remoteICESupported atomic.Bool
+}
+
+func NewHandshaker(log *log.Entry, config Config, signaler *Signaler, ice ICEWorker, relayManager *relayClient.Manager) *Handshaker {
+	h := &Handshaker{
+		log:          log,
+		config:       config,
+		signaler:     signaler,
+		ice:          ice,
+		relayManager: relayManager,
+	}
+	// assume remote supports ICE until we learn otherwise from received offers
+	h.remoteICESupported.Store(ice != nil)
+	return h
+}
+
+func (h *Handshaker) RemoteICESupported() bool {
+	return h.remoteICESupported.Load()
+}
+
+func (h *Handshaker) SendOffer() error {
+	h.mu.Lock()
+	defer h.mu.Unlock()
+	return h.sendOffer()
+}
+
+func (h *Handshaker) SendAnswer() error {
+	h.mu.Lock()
+	defer h.mu.Unlock()
+	return h.sendAnswer()
+}
+
+// sendOffer prepares local user credentials and signals them to the remote peer
+func (h *Handshaker) sendOffer() error {
+	if !h.signaler.Ready() {
+		return ErrSignalIsNotReady
+	}
+
+	offer := h.buildOfferAnswer()
+	h.log.Debugf("sending offer with serial: %s", offer.SessionIDString())
+
+	return h.signaler.SignalOffer(offer, h.config.Key)
+}
+
+func (h *Handshaker) sendAnswer() error {
+	answer := h.buildOfferAnswer()
+	h.log.Debugf("sending answer with serial: %s", answer.SessionIDString())
+
+	return h.signaler.SignalAnswer(answer, h.config.Key)
+}
+
+func (h *Handshaker) buildOfferAnswer() OfferAnswer {
+	answer := OfferAnswer{
+		WgListenPort:    h.config.LocalWgPort,
+		Version:         version.NetbirdVersion(),
+		RosenpassPubKey: h.config.RosenpassPubKey,
+		RosenpassAddr:   h.config.RosenpassAddr,
+	}
+
+	if h.ice != nil && h.RemoteICESupported() {
+		creds := h.ice.Credentials()
+		answer.IceCredentials = IceCredentials{creds.UFrag, creds.Pwd}
+		sid := creds.SessionID
+		answer.SessionID = &sid
+	}
+
+	if addr, ip, err := h.relayManager.RelayInstanceAddress(); err == nil {
+		answer.RelaySrvAddress = addr
+		answer.RelaySrvIP = ip
+	}
+
+	return answer
+}
+
+// UpdateRemoteICEState refreshes the remote ICE support flag from a received
+// offer or answer and closes the ICE worker when the remote peer stopped
+// sending ICE credentials. Runs on the Conn event loop.
+func (h *Handshaker) UpdateRemoteICEState(offer *OfferAnswer) {
+	hasICE := offer.HasICECredentials()
+	prev := h.remoteICESupported.Swap(hasICE)
+	if prev != hasICE {
+		if hasICE {
+			h.log.Infof("remote peer started sending ICE credentials")
+		} else {
+			h.log.Infof("remote peer stopped sending ICE credentials")
+			if h.ice != nil {
+				h.ice.Close()
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}

client/internal/peer/signaling/signaler.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package peer
+package signaling
 
 import (
 	"github.com/pion/ice/v4"

client/internal/peer/state_dump/state_dump.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package peer
+package state_dump
 
 import (
 	"context"
@@ -6,11 +6,13 @@ import (
 	"time"
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/status"
 )
 
-type stateDump struct {
+type StateDump struct {
 	log    *log.Entry
-	status *Status
+	status *status.Recorder
 	key    string
 
 	sentOffer       int
@@ -26,15 +28,15 @@ type stateDump struct {
 	mu sync.Mutex
 }
 
-func newStateDump(key string, log *log.Entry, statusRecorder *Status) *stateDump {
-	return &stateDump{
+func NewStateDump(key string, log *log.Entry, statusRecorder *status.Recorder) *StateDump {
+	return &StateDump{
 		log:    log,
 		status: statusRecorder,
 		key:    key,
 	}
 }
 
-func (s *stateDump) Start(ctx context.Context) {
+func (s *StateDump) Start(ctx context.Context) {
 	ticker := time.NewTicker(10 * time.Minute)
 	defer ticker.Stop()
 
@@ -48,25 +50,25 @@ func (s *stateDump) Start(ctx context.Context) {
 	}
 }
 
-func (s *stateDump) RemoteOffer() {
+func (s *StateDump) RemoteOffer() {
 	s.mu.Lock()
 	defer s.mu.Unlock()
 	s.remoteOffer++
 }
 
-func (s *stateDump) RemoteCandidate() {
+func (s *StateDump) RemoteCandidate() {
 	s.mu.Lock()
 	defer s.mu.Unlock()
 	s.remoteCandidate++
 }
 
-func (s *stateDump) SendOffer() {
+func (s *StateDump) SendOffer() {
 	s.mu.Lock()
 	defer s.mu.Unlock()
 	s.sentOffer++
 }
 
-func (s *stateDump) dumpState() {
+func (s *StateDump) dumpState() {
 	s.mu.Lock()
 	defer s.mu.Unlock()
 
@@ -80,41 +82,41 @@ func (s *stateDump) dumpState() {
 		status, s.sentOffer, s.remoteOffer, s.remoteAnswer, s.remoteCandidate, s.p2pConnected, s.switchToRelay, s.wgCheckSuccess, s.relayConnected, s.localProxies)
 }
 
-func (s *stateDump) RemoteAnswer() {
+func (s *StateDump) RemoteAnswer() {
 	s.mu.Lock()
 	defer s.mu.Unlock()
 	s.remoteAnswer++
 }
 
-func (s *stateDump) P2PConnected() {
+func (s *StateDump) P2PConnected() {
 	s.mu.Lock()
 	defer s.mu.Unlock()
 
 	s.p2pConnected++
 }
 
-func (s *stateDump) SwitchToRelay() {
+func (s *StateDump) SwitchToRelay() {
 	s.mu.Lock()
 	defer s.mu.Unlock()
 
 	s.switchToRelay++
 }
 
-func (s *stateDump) WGcheckSuccess() {
+func (s *StateDump) WGcheckSuccess() {
 	s.mu.Lock()
 	defer s.mu.Unlock()
 
 	s.wgCheckSuccess++
 }
 
-func (s *stateDump) RelayConnected() {
+func (s *StateDump) RelayConnected() {
 	s.mu.Lock()
 	defer s.mu.Unlock()
 
 	s.relayConnected++
 }
 
-func (s *stateDump) NewLocalProxy() {
+func (s *StateDump) NewLocalProxy() {
 	s.mu.Lock()
 	defer s.mu.Unlock()
 

client/internal/peer/status/conn_status.go

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+package status
+
+import (
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+)
+
+const (
+	// StatusIdle indicate the peer is in disconnected state
+	StatusIdle ConnStatus = iota
+	// StatusConnecting indicate the peer is in connecting state
+	StatusConnecting
+	// StatusConnected indicate the peer is in connected state
+	StatusConnected
+)
+
+// ConnStatus describe the status of a peer's connection
+type ConnStatus int32
+
+func (s ConnStatus) String() string {
+	switch s {
+	case StatusConnecting:
+		return "Connecting"
+	case StatusConnected:
+		return "Connected"
+	case StatusIdle:
+		return "Idle"
+	default:
+		log.Errorf("unknown status: %d", s)
+		return "INVALID_PEER_CONNECTION_STATUS"
+	}
+}

client/internal/peer/status/conn_status_test.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package peer
+package status
 
 import (
 	"testing"

client/internal/peer/status/events.go

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+package status
+
+import (
+	"slices"
+	"sync"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
+)
+
+type EventQueue struct {
+	maxSize int
+	events  []*proto.SystemEvent
+	mutex   sync.RWMutex
+}
+
+func NewEventQueue(size int) *EventQueue {
+	return &EventQueue{
+		maxSize: size,
+		events:  make([]*proto.SystemEvent, 0, size),
+	}
+}
+
+func (q *EventQueue) Add(event *proto.SystemEvent) {
+	q.mutex.Lock()
+	defer q.mutex.Unlock()
+
+	q.events = append(q.events, event)
+
+	if len(q.events) > q.maxSize {
+		q.events = q.events[len(q.events)-q.maxSize:]
+	}
+}
+
+func (q *EventQueue) GetAll() []*proto.SystemEvent {
+	q.mutex.RLock()
+	defer q.mutex.RUnlock()
+
+	return slices.Clone(q.events)
+}
+
+type EventSubscription struct {
+	id     string
+	events chan *proto.SystemEvent
+}
+
+func (s *EventSubscription) Events() <-chan *proto.SystemEvent {
+	return s.events
+}

client/internal/peer/status/full_status.go

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+package status
+
+import (
+	"golang.org/x/exp/maps"
+	"google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/durationpb"
+	"google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/relay"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
+)
+
+// FullStatus contains the full state held by the Recorder instance
+type FullStatus struct {
+	Peers                 []State
+	ManagementState       ManagementState
+	SignalState           SignalState
+	LocalPeerState        LocalPeerState
+	RosenpassState        RosenpassState
+	Relays                []relay.ProbeResult
+	NSGroupStates         []NSGroupState
+	NumOfForwardingRules  int
+	LazyConnectionEnabled bool
+	Events                []*proto.SystemEvent
+}
+
+// ToProto converts FullStatus to proto.FullStatus.
+func (fs FullStatus) ToProto() *proto.FullStatus {
+	pbFullStatus := proto.FullStatus{
+		ManagementState: &proto.ManagementState{},
+		SignalState:     &proto.SignalState{},
+		LocalPeerState:  &proto.LocalPeerState{},
+		Peers:           []*proto.PeerState{},
+	}
+
+	pbFullStatus.ManagementState.URL = fs.ManagementState.URL
+	pbFullStatus.ManagementState.Connected = fs.ManagementState.Connected
+	if err := fs.ManagementState.Error; err != nil {
+		pbFullStatus.ManagementState.Error = err.Error()
+	}
+
+	pbFullStatus.SignalState.URL = fs.SignalState.URL
+	pbFullStatus.SignalState.Connected = fs.SignalState.Connected
+	if err := fs.SignalState.Error; err != nil {
+		pbFullStatus.SignalState.Error = err.Error()
+	}
+
+	pbFullStatus.LocalPeerState.IP = fs.LocalPeerState.IP
+	pbFullStatus.LocalPeerState.Ipv6 = fs.LocalPeerState.IPv6
+	pbFullStatus.LocalPeerState.PubKey = fs.LocalPeerState.PubKey
+	pbFullStatus.LocalPeerState.KernelInterface = fs.LocalPeerState.KernelInterface
+	pbFullStatus.LocalPeerState.Fqdn = fs.LocalPeerState.FQDN
+	pbFullStatus.LocalPeerState.WgPort = int32(fs.LocalPeerState.WgPort)
+	pbFullStatus.LocalPeerState.RosenpassPermissive = fs.RosenpassState.Permissive
+	pbFullStatus.LocalPeerState.RosenpassEnabled = fs.RosenpassState.Enabled
+	pbFullStatus.NumberOfForwardingRules = int32(fs.NumOfForwardingRules)
+	pbFullStatus.LazyConnectionEnabled = fs.LazyConnectionEnabled
+
+	pbFullStatus.LocalPeerState.Networks = maps.Keys(fs.LocalPeerState.Routes)
+
+	for _, peerState := range fs.Peers {
+		networks := maps.Keys(peerState.GetRoutes())
+
+		pbPeerState := &proto.PeerState{
+			IP:                         peerState.IP,
+			Ipv6:                       peerState.IPv6,
+			PubKey:                     peerState.PubKey,
+			ConnStatus:                 peerState.ConnStatus.String(),
+			ConnStatusUpdate:           timestamppb.New(peerState.ConnStatusUpdate),
+			Relayed:                    peerState.Relayed,
+			LocalIceCandidateType:      peerState.LocalIceCandidateType,
+			RemoteIceCandidateType:     peerState.RemoteIceCandidateType,
+			LocalIceCandidateEndpoint:  peerState.LocalIceCandidateEndpoint,
+			RemoteIceCandidateEndpoint: peerState.RemoteIceCandidateEndpoint,
+			RelayAddress:               peerState.RelayServerAddress,
+			Fqdn:                       peerState.FQDN,
+			LastWireguardHandshake:     timestamppb.New(peerState.LastWireguardHandshake),
+			BytesRx:                    peerState.BytesRx,
+			BytesTx:                    peerState.BytesTx,
+			RosenpassEnabled:           peerState.RosenpassEnabled,
+			Networks:                   networks,
+			Latency:                    durationpb.New(peerState.Latency),
+			SshHostKey:                 peerState.SSHHostKey,
+		}
+		pbFullStatus.Peers = append(pbFullStatus.Peers, pbPeerState)
+	}
+
+	for _, relayState := range fs.Relays {
+		pbRelayState := &proto.RelayState{
+			URI:       relayState.URI,
+			Available: relayState.Err == nil,
+			Transport: relayState.Transport,
+		}
+		if err := relayState.Err; err != nil {
+			pbRelayState.Error = err.Error()
+		}
+		pbFullStatus.Relays = append(pbFullStatus.Relays, pbRelayState)
+	}
+
+	for _, dnsState := range fs.NSGroupStates {
+		var err string
+		if dnsState.Error != nil {
+			err = dnsState.Error.Error()
+		}
+
+		var servers []string
+		for _, server := range dnsState.Servers {
+			servers = append(servers, server.String())
+		}
+
+		pbDnsState := &proto.NSGroupState{
+			Servers: servers,
+			Domains: dnsState.Domains,
+			Enabled: dnsState.Enabled,
+			Error:   err,
+		}
+		pbFullStatus.DnsServers = append(pbFullStatus.DnsServers, pbDnsState)
+	}
+
+	pbFullStatus.Events = fs.Events
+
+	return &pbFullStatus
+}

client/internal/peer/status/notifier.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package peer
+package status
 
 import (
 	"sync"
@@ -11,6 +11,16 @@ const (
 	stateDisconnecting
 )
 
+// Listener is a callback type about the NetBird network connection state
+type Listener interface {
+	OnConnected()
+	OnDisconnected()
+	OnConnecting()
+	OnDisconnecting()
+	OnAddressChanged(string, string)
+	OnPeersListChanged(int)
+}
+
 type notifier struct {
 	serverStateLock    sync.Mutex
 	listenersLock      sync.Mutex

client/internal/peer/status/notifier_test.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package peer
+package status
 
 import (
 	"sync"

client/internal/peer/status/peer_state.go

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+package status
+
+import (
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+
+	"golang.org/x/exp/maps"
+)
+
+// State contains the latest state of a peer
+type State struct {
+	Mux                        *sync.RWMutex
+	IP                         string
+	IPv6                       string
+	PubKey                     string
+	FQDN                       string
+	ConnStatus                 ConnStatus
+	ConnStatusUpdate           time.Time
+	Relayed                    bool
+	LocalIceCandidateType      string
+	RemoteIceCandidateType     string
+	LocalIceCandidateEndpoint  string
+	RemoteIceCandidateEndpoint string
+	RelayServerAddress         string
+	LastWireguardHandshake     time.Time
+	BytesTx                    int64
+	BytesRx                    int64
+	Latency                    time.Duration
+	RosenpassEnabled           bool
+	SSHHostKey                 []byte
+	routes                     map[string]struct{}
+}
+
+// AddRoute add a single route to routes map
+func (s *State) AddRoute(network string) {
+	s.Mux.Lock()
+	defer s.Mux.Unlock()
+	if s.routes == nil {
+		s.routes = make(map[string]struct{})
+	}
+	s.routes[network] = struct{}{}
+}
+
+// SetRoutes set state routes
+func (s *State) SetRoutes(routes map[string]struct{}) {
+	s.Mux.Lock()
+	defer s.Mux.Unlock()
+	s.routes = routes
+}
+
+// DeleteRoute removes a route from the network amp
+func (s *State) DeleteRoute(network string) {
+	s.Mux.Lock()
+	defer s.Mux.Unlock()
+	delete(s.routes, network)
+}
+
+// GetRoutes return routes map
+func (s *State) GetRoutes() map[string]struct{} {
+	s.Mux.RLock()
+	defer s.Mux.RUnlock()
+	return maps.Clone(s.routes)
+}

client/internal/peer/status/recorder_test.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package peer
+package status
 
 import (
 	"context"

client/internal/peer/status/route.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package peer
+package status
 
 import (
 	"net/netip"

client/internal/peer/status_alias.go

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+package peer
+
+import "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/status"
+
+// Transitional aliases re-exporting the peer status recorder from its own
+// package. Callers are being migrated to reference the status package
+// directly; these aliases will be removed once the migration completes.
+type (
+	Status                   = status.Recorder
+	State                    = status.State
+	ConnStatus               = status.ConnStatus
+	FullStatus               = status.FullStatus
+	RouterState              = status.RouterState
+	LocalPeerState           = status.LocalPeerState
+	SignalState              = status.SignalState
+	ManagementState          = status.ManagementState
+	RosenpassState           = status.RosenpassState
+	NSGroupState             = status.NSGroupState
+	ResolvedDomainInfo       = status.ResolvedDomainInfo
+	StatusChangeSubscription = status.StatusChangeSubscription
+	EventQueue               = status.EventQueue
+	EventSubscription        = status.EventSubscription
+	WGIfaceStatus            = status.WGIfaceStatus
+	Listener                 = status.Listener
+	EventListener            = status.EventListener
+)
+
+const (
+	StatusIdle       = status.StatusIdle
+	StatusConnecting = status.StatusConnecting
+	StatusConnected  = status.StatusConnected
+)
+
+var (
+	NewRecorder = status.NewRecorder
+)

client/internal/peer/wg_watcher/wg_watcher.go

@@ -1,13 +1,15 @@
-package peer
+package wg_watcher
 
 import (
 	"context"
 	"fmt"
+	"sync"
 	"time"
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/configurer"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/state_dump"
 )
 
 const (
@@ -23,21 +25,21 @@ type WGInterfaceStater interface {
 	GetStats() (map[string]configurer.WGStats, error)
 }
 
-// WGWatcher is single-shot: one instance per connection attempt, run once, then discarded.
-// Lifecycle is owned by Conn under conn.mu, so it keeps no "enabled" state to go stale.
 type WGWatcher struct {
 	log           *log.Entry
 	wgIfaceStater WGInterfaceStater
 	peerKey       string
-	stateDump     *stateDump
+	stateDump     *state_dump.StateDump
 
+	enabled   bool
+	muEnabled sync.Mutex
 	// initialHandshake is not thread-safe; never call PrepareInitialHandshake and EnableWgWatcher concurrently.
 	initialHandshake time.Time
 
 	resetCh chan struct{}
 }
 
-func NewWGWatcher(log *log.Entry, wgIfaceStater WGInterfaceStater, peerKey string, stateDump *stateDump) *WGWatcher {
+func NewWGWatcher(log *log.Entry, wgIfaceStater WGInterfaceStater, peerKey string, stateDump *state_dump.StateDump) *WGWatcher {
 	return &WGWatcher{
 		log:           log,
 		wgIfaceStater: wgIfaceStater,
@@ -47,14 +49,25 @@ func NewWGWatcher(log *log.Entry, wgIfaceStater WGInterfaceStater, peerKey strin
 	}
 }
 
-// PrepareInitialHandshake reads the peer's current WireGuard handshake time. It must be
-// called before the peer is (re)configured on the WireGuard interface, so the captured
-// baseline reflects the state prior to this connection attempt instead of racing with
-// that configuration.
-func (w *WGWatcher) PrepareInitialHandshake() {
+// PrepareInitialHandshake reserves the watcher and reads the peer's current WireGuard
+// handshake time. It must be called before the peer is (re)configured on the WireGuard
+// interface, so the captured baseline reflects the state prior to this connection attempt
+// instead of racing with that configuration. Returns ok=false if the watcher is already
+// running, in which case EnableWgWatcher must not be called.
+func (w *WGWatcher) PrepareInitialHandshake() (ok bool) {
+	w.muEnabled.Lock()
+	if w.enabled {
+		w.muEnabled.Unlock()
+		return false
+	}
+
 	w.log.Debugf("enable WireGuard watcher")
+	w.enabled = true
+	w.muEnabled.Unlock()
+
 	handshake, _ := w.wgState()
 	w.initialHandshake = handshake
+	return true
 }
 
 // EnableWgWatcher runs the WireGuard watcher loop using the handshake baseline captured by
@@ -64,6 +77,10 @@ func (w *WGWatcher) PrepareInitialHandshake() {
 // handshake, including the first.
 func (w *WGWatcher) EnableWgWatcher(ctx context.Context, enabledTime time.Time, onDisconnectedFn func(), onHandshakeSuccessFn func(when time.Time), onCheckSuccessFn func()) {
 	w.periodicHandshakeCheck(ctx, onDisconnectedFn, onHandshakeSuccessFn, onCheckSuccessFn, enabledTime, w.initialHandshake)
+
+	w.muEnabled.Lock()
+	w.enabled = false
+	w.muEnabled.Unlock()
 }
 
 // Reset signals the watcher that the WireGuard peer has been reset and a new
@@ -89,7 +106,6 @@ func (w *WGWatcher) periodicHandshakeCheck(ctx context.Context, onDisconnectedFn
 		case <-timer.C:
 			handshake, ok := w.handshakeCheck(lastHandshake)
 			if !ok {
-				// early ctx cancel check return
 				if ctx.Err() != nil {
 					return
 				}
@@ -138,9 +154,9 @@ func (w *WGWatcher) handshakeCheck(lastHandshake time.Time) (*time.Time, bool) {
 
 	w.log.Tracef("previous handshake, handshake: %v, %v", lastHandshake, handshake)
 
-	// the current known handshake did not change
+	// the current know handshake did not change
 	if handshake.Equal(lastHandshake) {
-		w.log.Warnf("WireGuard handshake not updated: %v", handshake)
+		w.log.Warnf("WireGuard handshake timed out: %v", handshake)
 		return nil, false
 	}
 

client/internal/peer/wg_watcher/wg_watcher_test.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package peer
+package wg_watcher
 
 import (
 	"context"
@@ -7,8 +7,11 @@ import (
 	"time"
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/configurer"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/state_dump"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/status"
 )
 
 type MocWgIface struct {
@@ -56,23 +59,27 @@ func TestWGWatcher_CheckSuccessCallback(t *testing.T) {
 	// platforms with coarse clock resolution (Windows), where two time.Now() calls
 	// microseconds apart can return the same instant and read as a timed-out handshake.
 	stats := &mockHandshakeStats{handshake: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)}
-	watcher := NewWGWatcher(mlog, stats, "", newStateDump("peer", mlog, &Status{}))
+	watcher := NewWGWatcher(mlog, stats, "", state_dump.NewStateDump("peer", mlog, &status.Recorder{}))
 
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
 	defer cancel()
 
-	watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
+	require.True(t, watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake())
 
 	firstHandshake := make(chan struct{}, 1)
 	checkSuccess := make(chan struct{}, 1)
-	go watcher.EnableWgWatcher(ctx, time.Now(), func() {}, func(when time.Time) {
-		firstHandshake <- struct{}{}
-	}, func() {
-		select {
-		case checkSuccess <- struct{}{}:
-		default:
-		}
-	})
+	watcherDone := make(chan struct{})
+	go func() {
+		defer close(watcherDone)
+		watcher.EnableWgWatcher(ctx, time.Now(), func() {}, func(when time.Time) {
+			firstHandshake <- struct{}{}
+		}, func() {
+			select {
+			case checkSuccess <- struct{}{}:
+			default:
+			}
+		})
+	}()
 
 	stats.advance()
 
@@ -87,6 +94,11 @@ func TestWGWatcher_CheckSuccessCallback(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("first-handshake callback must not fire for a non-zero baseline")
 	default:
 	}
+
+	// Wait for the watcher goroutine to exit so it cannot race with other
+	// tests mutating the package-level check timing variables.
+	cancel()
+	<-watcherDone
 }
 
 func TestWGWatcher_EnableWgWatcher(t *testing.T) {
@@ -95,12 +107,13 @@ func TestWGWatcher_EnableWgWatcher(t *testing.T) {
 
 	mlog := log.WithField("peer", "tet")
 	mocWgIface := &MocWgIface{}
-	watcher := NewWGWatcher(mlog, mocWgIface, "", newStateDump("peer", mlog, &Status{}))
+	watcher := NewWGWatcher(mlog, mocWgIface, "", state_dump.NewStateDump("peer", mlog, &status.Recorder{}))
 
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
 	defer cancel()
 
-	watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
+	ok := watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
+	require.True(t, ok, "watcher should not be enabled yet")
 
 	onDisconnected := make(chan struct{}, 1)
 	go watcher.EnableWgWatcher(ctx, time.Now(), func() {
@@ -127,10 +140,11 @@ func TestWGWatcher_ReEnable(t *testing.T) {
 
 	mlog := log.WithField("peer", "tet")
 	mocWgIface := &MocWgIface{}
-	watcher := NewWGWatcher(mlog, mocWgIface, "", newStateDump("peer", mlog, &Status{}))
+	watcher := NewWGWatcher(mlog, mocWgIface, "", state_dump.NewStateDump("peer", mlog, &status.Recorder{}))
 
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-	watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
+	ok := watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
+	require.True(t, ok, "watcher should not be enabled yet")
 
 	wg := &sync.WaitGroup{}
 	wg.Add(1)
@@ -146,7 +160,8 @@ func TestWGWatcher_ReEnable(t *testing.T) {
 	ctx, cancel = context.WithCancel(context.Background())
 	defer cancel()
 
-	watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
+	ok = watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
+	require.True(t, ok, "watcher should be re-enabled after the previous run stopped")
 
 	onDisconnected := make(chan struct{}, 1)
 	go watcher.EnableWgWatcher(ctx, time.Now(), func() {

client/internal/peer/worker/priority.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package conntype
+package worker
 
 import (
 	"fmt"

client/internal/peer/worker/worker_ice.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package peer
+package worker
 
 import (
 	"context"
@@ -13,8 +13,9 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/udpmux"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/conntype"
 	icemaker "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/ice"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/signaling"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/status"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/portforward"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/stdnet"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
@@ -32,57 +33,68 @@ type ICEConnInfo struct {
 	RelayedOnLocal             bool
 }
 
-type WorkerICE struct {
-	ctx               context.Context
-	log               *log.Entry
-	config            ConnConfig
-	conn              *Conn
-	signaler          *Signaler
-	iFaceDiscover     stdnet.ExternalIFaceDiscover
-	statusRecorder    *Status
-	hasRelayOnLocally bool
+type ICEDependencies struct {
+	Signaler           *signaling.Signaler
+	IFaceDiscover      stdnet.ExternalIFaceDiscover
+	StatusRecorder     *status.Recorder
+	PortForwardManager *portforward.Manager
+}
+
+type ICE struct {
+	log                *log.Entry
+	key                string
+	iceConfig          icemaker.Config
+	isController       bool
+	onConnReady        func(priority ConnPriority, iceConnInfo ICEConnInfo)
+	onStatusDisconnect func(sessionChanged bool)
+	signaler           *signaling.Signaler
+	iFaceDiscover      stdnet.ExternalIFaceDiscover
+	statusRecorder     *status.Recorder
+	portForwardManager *portforward.Manager
+	hasRelayOnLocally  bool
 
 	agent             *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent
 	agentDialerCancel context.CancelFunc
 	agentConnecting   bool      // while it is true, drop all incoming offers
 	lastSuccess       time.Time // with this avoid the too frequent ICE agent recreation
+	// connectedAgent is the agent whose connection was last reported ready; guarded by muxAgent
+	connectedAgent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent
 	// remoteSessionID represents the peer's session identifier from the latest remote offer.
-	remoteSessionID ICESessionID
+	remoteSessionID icemaker.SessionID
 	// sessionID is used to track the current session ID of the ICE agent
 	// increase by one when disconnecting the agent
 	// with it the remote peer can discard the already deprecated offer/answer
 	// Without it the remote peer may recreate a workable ICE connection
-	sessionID            ICESessionID
+	sessionID            icemaker.SessionID
 	remoteSessionChanged bool
 	muxAgent             sync.Mutex
 
 	localUfrag string
 	localPwd   string
 
-	// we record the last known state of the ICE agent to avoid duplicate on disconnected events
-	lastKnownState ice.ConnectionState
-
 	// portForwardAttempted tracks if we've already tried port forwarding this session
 	portForwardAttempted bool
 }
 
-func NewWorkerICE(ctx context.Context, log *log.Entry, config ConnConfig, conn *Conn, signaler *Signaler, ifaceDiscover stdnet.ExternalIFaceDiscover, statusRecorder *Status, hasRelayOnLocally bool) (*WorkerICE, error) {
-	sessionID, err := NewICESessionID()
+func NewICE(log *log.Entry, key string, iceConfig icemaker.Config, isController bool, onConnReady func(ConnPriority, ICEConnInfo), onStatusDisconnect func(bool), services ICEDependencies, hasRelayOnLocally bool) (*ICE, error) {
+	sessionID, err := icemaker.NewSessionID()
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
-	w := &WorkerICE{
-		ctx:               ctx,
-		log:               log,
-		config:            config,
-		conn:              conn,
-		signaler:          signaler,
-		iFaceDiscover:     ifaceDiscover,
-		statusRecorder:    statusRecorder,
-		hasRelayOnLocally: hasRelayOnLocally,
-		lastKnownState:    ice.ConnectionStateDisconnected,
-		sessionID:         sessionID,
+	w := &ICE{
+		log:                log,
+		key:                key,
+		iceConfig:          iceConfig,
+		isController:       isController,
+		onConnReady:        onConnReady,
+		onStatusDisconnect: onStatusDisconnect,
+		signaler:           services.Signaler,
+		iFaceDiscover:      services.IFaceDiscover,
+		statusRecorder:     services.StatusRecorder,
+		portForwardManager: services.PortForwardManager,
+		hasRelayOnLocally:  hasRelayOnLocally,
+		sessionID:          sessionID,
 	}
 
 	localUfrag, localPwd, err := icemaker.GenerateICECredentials()
@@ -94,7 +106,7 @@ func NewWorkerICE(ctx context.Context, log *log.Entry, config ConnConfig, conn *
 	return w, nil
 }
 
-func (w *WorkerICE) OnNewOffer(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) {
+func (w *ICE) OnNewOffer(ctx context.Context, remoteOfferAnswer *signaling.OfferAnswer) {
 	w.log.Debugf("OnNewOffer for ICE, serial: %s", remoteOfferAnswer.SessionIDString())
 	w.muxAgent.Lock()
 	defer w.muxAgent.Unlock()
@@ -118,7 +130,7 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) OnNewOffer(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) {
 			}
 		}
 
-		sessionID, err := NewICESessionID()
+		sessionID, err := icemaker.NewSessionID()
 		if err != nil {
 			w.log.Errorf("failed to create new session ID: %s", err)
 		}
@@ -136,8 +148,8 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) OnNewOffer(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) {
 	if remoteOfferAnswer.SessionID != nil {
 		w.log.Debugf("recreate ICE agent: %s / %s", w.sessionID, *remoteOfferAnswer.SessionID)
 	}
-	dialerCtx, dialerCancel := context.WithCancel(w.ctx)
-	agent, err := w.reCreateAgent(dialerCancel, preferredCandidateTypes)
+	dialerCtx, dialerCancel := context.WithCancel(ctx)
+	agent, err := w.reCreateAgent(ctx, dialerCancel, preferredCandidateTypes)
 	if err != nil {
 		w.log.Errorf("failed to recreate ICE Agent: %s", err)
 		return
@@ -151,14 +163,14 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) OnNewOffer(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) {
 		w.remoteSessionID = ""
 	}
 
-	go w.connect(dialerCtx, agent, remoteOfferAnswer)
+	go w.connect(dialerCtx, dialerCancel, agent, remoteOfferAnswer)
 }
 
 // OnRemoteCandidate Handles ICE connection Candidate provided by the remote peer.
-func (w *WorkerICE) OnRemoteCandidate(candidate ice.Candidate, haRoutes route.HAMap) {
+func (w *ICE) OnRemoteCandidate(candidate ice.Candidate, haRoutes route.HAMap) {
 	w.muxAgent.Lock()
 	defer w.muxAgent.Unlock()
-	w.log.Debugf("OnRemoteCandidate from peer %s -> %s", w.config.Key, candidate.String())
+	w.log.Debugf("OnRemoteCandidate from peer %s -> %s", w.key, candidate.String())
 	if w.agent == nil {
 		w.log.Warnf("ICE Agent is not initialized yet")
 		return
@@ -185,18 +197,24 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) OnRemoteCandidate(candidate ice.Candidate, haRoutes route.HA
 	}
 }
 
-func (w *WorkerICE) GetLocalUserCredentials() (frag string, pwd string) {
-	return w.localUfrag, w.localPwd
+func (w *ICE) Credentials() signaling.Credentials {
+	w.muxAgent.Lock()
+	defer w.muxAgent.Unlock()
+	return signaling.Credentials{
+		UFrag:     w.localUfrag,
+		Pwd:       w.localPwd,
+		SessionID: w.sessionID,
+	}
 }
 
-func (w *WorkerICE) InProgress() bool {
+func (w *ICE) InProgress() bool {
 	w.muxAgent.Lock()
 	defer w.muxAgent.Unlock()
 
 	return w.agentConnecting
 }
 
-func (w *WorkerICE) Close() {
+func (w *ICE) Close() {
 	w.muxAgent.Lock()
 	defer w.muxAgent.Unlock()
 
@@ -212,10 +230,10 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) Close() {
 	w.agent = nil
 }
 
-func (w *WorkerICE) reCreateAgent(dialerCancel context.CancelFunc, candidates []ice.CandidateType) (*icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, error) {
+func (w *ICE) reCreateAgent(ctx context.Context, dialerCancel context.CancelFunc, candidates []ice.CandidateType) (*icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, error) {
 	w.portForwardAttempted = false
 
-	agent, err := icemaker.NewAgent(w.ctx, w.iFaceDiscover, w.config.ICEConfig, candidates, w.localUfrag, w.localPwd)
+	agent, err := icemaker.NewAgent(ctx, w.iFaceDiscover, w.iceConfig, candidates, w.localUfrag, w.localPwd)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("create agent: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -237,7 +255,7 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) reCreateAgent(dialerCancel context.CancelFunc, candidates []
 	return agent, nil
 }
 
-func (w *WorkerICE) SessionID() ICESessionID {
+func (w *ICE) getSessionID() icemaker.SessionID {
 	w.muxAgent.Lock()
 	defer w.muxAgent.Unlock()
 
@@ -247,11 +265,11 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) SessionID() ICESessionID {
 // will block until connection succeeded
 // but it won't release if ICE Agent went into Disconnected or Failed state,
 // so we have to cancel it with the provided context once agent detected a broken connection
-func (w *WorkerICE) connect(ctx context.Context, agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) {
+func (w *ICE) connect(ctx context.Context, dialerCancel context.CancelFunc, agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, remoteOfferAnswer *signaling.OfferAnswer) {
 	w.log.Debugf("gather candidates")
 	if err := agent.GatherCandidates(); err != nil {
 		w.log.Warnf("failed to gather candidates: %s", err)
-		w.closeAgent(agent, w.agentDialerCancel)
+		w.closeAgent(agent, dialerCancel)
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -259,19 +277,19 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) connect(ctx context.Context, agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent
 	remoteConn, err := w.turnAgentDial(ctx, agent, remoteOfferAnswer)
 	if err != nil {
 		w.log.Debugf("failed to dial the remote peer: %s", err)
-		w.closeAgent(agent, w.agentDialerCancel)
+		w.closeAgent(agent, dialerCancel)
 		return
 	}
 	w.log.Debugf("agent dial succeeded")
 
 	pair, err := agent.GetSelectedCandidatePair()
 	if err != nil {
-		w.closeAgent(agent, w.agentDialerCancel)
+		w.closeAgent(agent, dialerCancel)
 		return
 	}
 	if pair == nil {
 		w.log.Warnf("selected candidate pair is nil, cannot proceed")
-		w.closeAgent(agent, w.agentDialerCancel)
+		w.closeAgent(agent, dialerCancel)
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -299,17 +317,22 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) connect(ctx context.Context, agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent
 	}
 	w.log.Debugf("on ICE conn is ready to use")
 
-	w.log.Infof("connection succeeded with offer session: %s", remoteOfferAnswer.SessionIDString())
 	w.muxAgent.Lock()
+	if w.agent != agent {
+		w.muxAgent.Unlock()
+		w.log.Debugf("agent has been replaced during connect, dropping obsolete connection")
+		return
+	}
 	w.agentConnecting = false
 	w.lastSuccess = time.Now()
+	w.connectedAgent = agent
 	w.muxAgent.Unlock()
 
-	// todo: the potential problem is a race between the onConnectionStateChange
-	w.conn.onICEConnectionIsReady(selectedPriority(pair), ci)
+	w.log.Infof("connection succeeded with offer session: %s", remoteOfferAnswer.SessionIDString())
+	w.onConnReady(selectedPriority(pair), ci)
 }
 
-func (w *WorkerICE) closeAgent(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, cancel context.CancelFunc) bool {
+func (w *ICE) closeAgent(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, cancel context.CancelFunc) bool {
 	cancel()
 	if err := agent.Close(); err != nil {
 		w.log.Warnf("failed to close ICE agent: %s", err)
@@ -323,7 +346,7 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) closeAgent(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, cancel context.C
 
 	if w.agent == agent {
 		// consider to remove from here and move to the OnNewOffer
-		sessionID, err := NewICESessionID()
+		sessionID, err := icemaker.NewSessionID()
 		if err != nil {
 			w.log.Errorf("failed to create new session ID: %s", err)
 		}
@@ -335,7 +358,7 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) closeAgent(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, cancel context.C
 	return sessionChanged
 }
 
-func (w *WorkerICE) punchRemoteWGPort(pair *ice.CandidatePair, remoteWgPort int) {
+func (w *ICE) punchRemoteWGPort(pair *ice.CandidatePair, remoteWgPort int) {
 	// wait local endpoint configuration
 	time.Sleep(time.Second)
 	addr, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", net.JoinHostPort(pair.Remote.Address(), strconv.Itoa(remoteWgPort)))
@@ -344,7 +367,7 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) punchRemoteWGPort(pair *ice.CandidatePair, remoteWgPort int)
 		return
 	}
 
-	mux, ok := w.config.ICEConfig.UDPMuxSrflx.(*udpmux.UniversalUDPMuxDefault)
+	mux, ok := w.iceConfig.UDPMuxSrflx.(*udpmux.UniversalUDPMuxDefault)
 	if !ok {
 		w.log.Warn("invalid udp mux conversion")
 		return
@@ -357,7 +380,7 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) punchRemoteWGPort(pair *ice.CandidatePair, remoteWgPort int)
 
 // onICECandidate is a callback attached to an ICE Agent to receive new local connection candidates
 // and then signals them to the remote peer
-func (w *WorkerICE) onICECandidate(candidate ice.Candidate) {
+func (w *ICE) onICECandidate(candidate ice.Candidate) {
 	// nil means candidate gathering has been ended
 	if candidate == nil {
 		return
@@ -366,9 +389,9 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) onICECandidate(candidate ice.Candidate) {
 	// TODO: reported port is incorrect for CandidateTypeHost, makes understanding ICE use via logs confusing as port is ignored
 	w.log.Debugf("discovered local candidate %s", candidate.String())
 	go func() {
-		err := w.signaler.SignalICECandidate(candidate, w.config.Key)
+		err := w.signaler.SignalICECandidate(candidate, w.key)
 		if err != nil {
-			w.log.Errorf("failed signaling candidate to the remote peer %s %s", w.config.Key, err)
+			w.log.Errorf("failed signaling candidate to the remote peer %s %s", w.key, err)
 		}
 	}()
 
@@ -378,8 +401,8 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) onICECandidate(candidate ice.Candidate) {
 }
 
 // injectPortForwardedCandidate signals an additional candidate using the pre-created port mapping.
-func (w *WorkerICE) injectPortForwardedCandidate(srflxCandidate ice.Candidate) {
-	pfManager := w.conn.portForwardManager
+func (w *ICE) injectPortForwardedCandidate(srflxCandidate ice.Candidate) {
+	pfManager := w.portForwardManager
 	if pfManager == nil {
 		return
 	}
@@ -407,7 +430,7 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) injectPortForwardedCandidate(srflxCandidate ice.Candidate) {
 		forwardedCandidate.String(), mapping.InternalPort, mapping.ExternalPort, mapping.NATType, forwardedCandidate.Priority())
 
 	go func() {
-		if err := w.signaler.SignalICECandidate(forwardedCandidate, w.config.Key); err != nil {
+		if err := w.signaler.SignalICECandidate(forwardedCandidate, w.key); err != nil {
 			w.log.Errorf("signal port-forwarded candidate: %v", err)
 		}
 	}()
@@ -415,7 +438,7 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) injectPortForwardedCandidate(srflxCandidate ice.Candidate) {
 
 // createForwardedCandidate creates a new server reflexive candidate with the forwarded port.
 // It uses the NAT gateway's external IP with the forwarded port.
-func (w *WorkerICE) createForwardedCandidate(srflxCandidate ice.Candidate, mapping *portforward.Mapping) (ice.Candidate, error) {
+func (w *ICE) createForwardedCandidate(srflxCandidate ice.Candidate, mapping *portforward.Mapping) (ice.Candidate, error) {
 	var externalIP string
 	if mapping.ExternalIP != nil && !mapping.ExternalIP.IsUnspecified() {
 		externalIP = mapping.ExternalIP.String()
@@ -460,9 +483,9 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) createForwardedCandidate(srflxCandidate ice.Candidate, mappi
 	return candidate, nil
 }
 
-func (w *WorkerICE) onICESelectedCandidatePair(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, c1, c2 ice.Candidate) {
+func (w *ICE) onICESelectedCandidatePair(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, c1, c2 ice.Candidate) {
 	w.log.Debugf("selected candidate pair [local <-> remote] -> [%s <-> %s], peer %s", c1.String(), c2.String(),
-		w.config.Key)
+		w.key)
 
 	pairStat, ok := agent.GetSelectedCandidatePairStats()
 	if !ok {
@@ -471,14 +494,14 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) onICESelectedCandidatePair(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent,
 	}
 
 	duration := time.Duration(pairStat.CurrentRoundTripTime * float64(time.Second))
-	if err := w.statusRecorder.UpdateLatency(w.config.Key, duration); err != nil {
+	if err := w.statusRecorder.UpdateLatency(w.key, duration); err != nil {
 		w.log.Debugf("failed to update latency for peer: %s", err)
 		return
 	}
 }
 
-func (w *WorkerICE) logSuccessfulPaths(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent) {
-	sessionID := w.SessionID()
+func (w *ICE) logSuccessfulPaths(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent) {
+	sessionID := w.getSessionID()
 	stats := agent.GetCandidatePairsStats()
 	localCandidates, _ := agent.GetLocalCandidates()
 	remoteCandidates, _ := agent.GetRemoteCandidates()
@@ -508,32 +531,44 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) logSuccessfulPaths(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent) {
 	}
 }
 
-func (w *WorkerICE) onConnectionStateChange(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, dialerCancel context.CancelFunc) func(ice.ConnectionState) {
+func (w *ICE) onConnectionStateChange(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, dialerCancel context.CancelFunc) func(ice.ConnectionState) {
+	// per-agent state; pion delivers callbacks of one agent sequentially
+	var connected bool
 	return func(state ice.ConnectionState) {
 		w.log.Debugf("ICE ConnectionState has changed to %s", state.String())
 		switch state {
 		case ice.ConnectionStateConnected:
-			w.lastKnownState = ice.ConnectionStateConnected
+			connected = true
 			w.logSuccessfulPaths(agent)
-			return
 		case ice.ConnectionStateFailed, ice.ConnectionStateDisconnected, ice.ConnectionStateClosed:
 			// ice.ConnectionStateClosed happens when we recreate the agent. For the P2P to TURN switch important to
 			// notify the conn.onICEStateDisconnected changes to update the current used priority
 
 			sessionChanged := w.closeAgent(agent, dialerCancel)
 
-			if w.lastKnownState == ice.ConnectionStateConnected {
-				w.lastKnownState = ice.ConnectionStateDisconnected
-				w.conn.onICEStateDisconnected(sessionChanged)
+			if !connected {
+				return
 			}
-		default:
-			return
+			connected = false
+
+			w.muxAgent.Lock()
+			stale := w.connectedAgent != agent
+			if !stale {
+				w.connectedAgent = nil
+			}
+			w.muxAgent.Unlock()
+
+			if stale {
+				w.log.Debugf("suppress disconnected event of replaced ICE agent")
+				return
+			}
+			w.onStatusDisconnect(sessionChanged)
 		}
 	}
 }
 
-func (w *WorkerICE) turnAgentDial(ctx context.Context, agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) (*ice.Conn, error) {
-	if isController(w.config) {
+func (w *ICE) turnAgentDial(ctx context.Context, agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, remoteOfferAnswer *signaling.OfferAnswer) (*ice.Conn, error) {
+	if w.isController {
 		return agent.Dial(ctx, remoteOfferAnswer.IceCredentials.UFrag, remoteOfferAnswer.IceCredentials.Pwd)
 	} else {
 		return agent.Accept(ctx, remoteOfferAnswer.IceCredentials.UFrag, remoteOfferAnswer.IceCredentials.Pwd)
@@ -595,10 +630,10 @@ func isRelayed(pair *ice.CandidatePair) bool {
 	return false
 }
 
-func selectedPriority(pair *ice.CandidatePair) conntype.ConnPriority {
+func selectedPriority(pair *ice.CandidatePair) ConnPriority {
 	if isRelayed(pair) {
-		return conntype.ICETurn
+		return ICETurn
 	} else {
-		return conntype.ICEP2P
+		return ICEP2P
 	}
 }

client/internal/peer/worker/worker_relay.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package peer
+package worker
 
 import (
 	"context"
@@ -10,22 +10,23 @@ import (
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/signaling"
 	relayClient "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/relay/client"
 )
 
 type RelayConnInfo struct {
-	relayedConn     net.Conn
-	rosenpassPubKey []byte
-	rosenpassAddr   string
+	RelayedConn     net.Conn
+	RosenpassPubKey []byte
+	RosenpassAddr   string
 }
 
 type WorkerRelay struct {
-	peerCtx      context.Context
-	log          *log.Entry
-	isController bool
-	config       ConnConfig
-	conn         *Conn
-	relayManager *relayClient.Manager
+	log            *log.Entry
+	key            string
+	isController   bool
+	onConnReady    func(RelayConnInfo)
+	onDisconnected func()
+	relayManager   *relayClient.Manager
 
 	relayedConn net.Conn
 	relayLock   sync.Mutex
@@ -33,19 +34,19 @@ type WorkerRelay struct {
 	relaySupportedOnRemotePeer atomic.Bool
 }
 
-func NewWorkerRelay(ctx context.Context, log *log.Entry, ctrl bool, config ConnConfig, conn *Conn, relayManager *relayClient.Manager) *WorkerRelay {
+func NewWorkerRelay(log *log.Entry, key string, isController bool, onConnReady func(RelayConnInfo), onDisconnected func(), relayManager *relayClient.Manager) *WorkerRelay {
 	r := &WorkerRelay{
-		peerCtx:      ctx,
-		log:          log,
-		isController: ctrl,
-		config:       config,
-		conn:         conn,
-		relayManager: relayManager,
+		log:            log,
+		key:            key,
+		isController:   isController,
+		onConnReady:    onConnReady,
+		onDisconnected: onDisconnected,
+		relayManager:   relayManager,
 	}
 	return r
 }
 
-func (w *WorkerRelay) OnNewOffer(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) {
+func (w *WorkerRelay) OnNewOffer(ctx context.Context, remoteOfferAnswer *signaling.OfferAnswer) {
 	if !w.isRelaySupported(remoteOfferAnswer) {
 		w.log.Infof("Relay is not supported by remote peer")
 		w.relaySupportedOnRemotePeer.Store(false)
@@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ func (w *WorkerRelay) OnNewOffer(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) {
 		serverIP = remoteOfferAnswer.RelaySrvIP
 	}
 
-	relayedConn, err := w.relayManager.OpenConn(w.peerCtx, srv, w.config.Key, serverIP)
+	relayedConn, err := w.relayManager.OpenConn(ctx, srv, w.key, serverIP)
 	if err != nil {
 		if errors.Is(err, relayClient.ErrConnAlreadyExists) {
 			w.log.Debugf("handled offer by reusing existing relay connection")
@@ -88,10 +89,10 @@ func (w *WorkerRelay) OnNewOffer(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) {
 	}
 
 	w.log.Debugf("peer conn opened via Relay: %s", srv)
-	go w.conn.onRelayConnectionIsReady(RelayConnInfo{
-		relayedConn:     relayedConn,
-		rosenpassPubKey: remoteOfferAnswer.RosenpassPubKey,
-		rosenpassAddr:   remoteOfferAnswer.RosenpassAddr,
+	w.onConnReady(RelayConnInfo{
+		RelayedConn:     relayedConn,
+		RosenpassPubKey: remoteOfferAnswer.RosenpassPubKey,
+		RosenpassAddr:   remoteOfferAnswer.RosenpassAddr,
 	})
 }
 
@@ -119,7 +120,7 @@ func (w *WorkerRelay) CloseConn() {
 	}
 }
 
-func (w *WorkerRelay) isRelaySupported(answer *OfferAnswer) bool {
+func (w *WorkerRelay) isRelaySupported(answer *signaling.OfferAnswer) bool {
 	if !w.relayManager.HasRelayAddress() {
 		return false
 	}
@@ -134,5 +135,5 @@ func (w *WorkerRelay) preferredRelayServer(myRelayAddress, remoteRelayAddress st
 }
 
 func (w *WorkerRelay) onRelayClientDisconnected() {
-	go w.conn.onRelayDisconnected()
+	w.onDisconnected()
 }

client/internal/peer/worker_status.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package worker
+package peer
 
 import (
 	"sync/atomic"
@@ -7,17 +7,17 @@ import (
 )
 
 const (
-	StatusDisconnected Status = iota
-	StatusConnected
+	WorkerStatusDisconnected WorkerStatus = iota
+	WorkerStatusConnected
 )
 
-type Status int32
+type WorkerStatus int32
 
-func (s Status) String() string {
+func (s WorkerStatus) String() string {
 	switch s {
-	case StatusDisconnected:
+	case WorkerStatusDisconnected:
 		return "Disconnected"
-	case StatusConnected:
+	case WorkerStatusConnected:
 		return "Connected"
 	default:
 		log.Errorf("unknown status: %d", s)
@@ -37,16 +37,16 @@ func NewAtomicStatus() *AtomicWorkerStatus {
 }
 
 // Get returns the current connection status
-func (acs *AtomicWorkerStatus) Get() Status {
-	return Status(acs.status.Load())
+func (acs *AtomicWorkerStatus) Get() WorkerStatus {
+	return WorkerStatus(acs.status.Load())
 }
 
 func (acs *AtomicWorkerStatus) SetConnected() {
-	acs.status.Store(int32(StatusConnected))
+	acs.status.Store(int32(WorkerStatusConnected))
 }
 
 func (acs *AtomicWorkerStatus) SetDisconnected() {
-	acs.status.Store(int32(StatusDisconnected))
+	acs.status.Store(int32(WorkerStatusDisconnected))
 }
 
 // String returns the string representation of the current status

client/internal/profilemanager/config.go

@@ -102,11 +102,6 @@ type ConfigInput struct {
 	DNSLabels domain.List
 
 	MTU *uint16
-
-	// Owners replaces the profile's owner principal list when non-nil.
-	// Shared replaces the profile's shared flag when non-nil.
-	Owners []string
-	Shared *bool
 }
 
 // Config Configuration type
@@ -189,16 +184,6 @@ type Config struct {
 
 	MTU uint16
 
-	// Owners lists the principals allowed to control this profile over the local
-	// IPC, as typed strings: "uid:1000", "gid:1000", "group:netbird-admins"
-	// (Unix, NSS-resolved) or "sid:S-1-5-..." (Windows user or group SID). Empty
-	// with Shared=false means the profile is owned by nobody yet, until claimed
-	Owners []string `json:"Owners,omitempty"`
-
-	// Shared, when true, lets any authenticated local caller control this profile
-	// (opt-in). Takes precedence over Owners.
-	Shared bool `json:"Shared,omitempty"`
-
 	// policy is the MDM policy that produced the currently-set values for
 	// any MDM-enforced fields. Set by applyMDMPolicy at the tail of apply()
 	// and reset on every apply() invocation. Never persisted to disk.
@@ -657,18 +642,6 @@ func (config *Config) apply(input ConfigInput) (updated bool, err error) {
 		updated = true
 	}
 
-	if input.Owners != nil && !slices.Equal(config.Owners, input.Owners) {
-		log.Infof("updating profile owners to %v", input.Owners)
-		config.Owners = input.Owners
-		updated = true
-	}
-
-	if input.Shared != nil && *input.Shared != config.Shared {
-		log.Infof("updating profile shared flag to %t", *input.Shared)
-		config.Shared = *input.Shared
-		updated = true
-	}
-
 	// MDM is the last override layer: any key present in the policy
 	// supersedes defaults, on-disk config, env vars and CLI input.
 	config.applyMDMPolicy(loadMDMPolicy())