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13 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Zoltan Papp
753925032a [client] Move metrics saver into its own metricsstages package
Relocate MetricsStages (per-connection metric stage timestamps) out of
the peer package into client/internal/peer/metricsstages.
2026-07-11 20:15:30 +02:00
Zoltan Papp
9be5f238da [client] Trim WGIface to the methods peer uses and inline it into conn.go
Drop the unused Address() method from WGIface (only ice.Candidate.Address
was ever called, never the wg interface), and move the interface next to
its sole user WgConfig in conn.go, removing iface.go.
2026-07-11 20:09:59 +02:00
Zoltan Papp
791e8b33ae [client] Move ICE and relay workers into the worker package
Relocate WorkerICE (renamed worker.ICE) and WorkerRelay plus ConnPriority
into client/internal/peer/worker. To break the peer<->worker cycle the
workers no longer take *Conn or ConnConfig: callbacks are passed as plain
functions (Conn's unexported methods as method values), and each worker
receives only the fields it needs (key, ICE config, isController) plus a
small services struct. Context is passed to OnNewOffer instead of stored.

Move the worker connection-status helper the other way, out of the worker
package into peer as worker_status.go (WorkerStatus / AtomicWorkerStatus),
since only Conn uses it.
2026-07-11 20:06:46 +02:00
Zoltan Papp
917e85f648 [client] Extract Handshaker and Signaler into a signaling package
Move the signaling protocol out of the peer package into
client/internal/peer/signaling: OfferAnswer, IceCredentials, Handshaker
and Signaler. Break the peer<->signaling cycle by giving the Handshaker
a plain Config and an ICEWorker interface instead of *Conn/*WorkerICE,
and by passing the relay manager directly rather than the relay worker.
Combine the ICE worker's local-credentials and session-id accessors into
a single Credentials() returning a Credentials struct.

Move the ICE session id to the ice package as ice.SessionID, since it
identifies an ICE agent session and is minted there alongside
GenerateICECredentials; signaling only carries it.
2026-07-11 19:09:07 +02:00
Zoltan Papp
9e75d5c732 [client] Decouple ICE and relay workers from Conn via interfaces
WorkerICE and WorkerRelay took a concrete *Conn back-pointer. Replace it
with small callback interfaces (iceCallbacks, relayCallbacks) covering
only the methods each worker invokes on the connection. WorkerICE also
receives its portForwardManager as an explicit parameter instead of
reaching into conn.portForwardManager.
2026-07-11 18:29:26 +02:00
Zoltan Papp
1afc9bcac7 [client] Merge conntype package into peer
The conntype package held only ConnPriority and its constants and was
imported solely by peer. Move it into the peer package as priority.go
and drop the conntype. qualifier from conn.go, event.go and worker_ice.go.
2026-07-11 15:24:54 +02:00
Zoltan Papp
78f3165e85 [client] Extract WGWatcher into its own wg_watcher package
Move the WireGuard handshake watcher out of the peer package into
client/internal/peer/wg_watcher. The test stays an internal test since
it drives the unexported checkPeriod. Update conn.go to reference the
watcher through the package.
2026-07-11 15:17:16 +02:00
Zoltan Papp
4d76fd3c80 [client] Extract stateDump into its own state_dump package
Move the debug state dumper out of the peer package into
client/internal/peer/state_dump with an exported StateDump type and
NewStateDump constructor. Update conn.go, wg_watcher.go and the watcher
test to reference it through the package.
2026-07-11 15:14:22 +02:00
Zoltan Papp
07ffbc9424 [client] Extract peer status recorder into its own package
Move the Status recorder and its state types out of the peer package
into client/internal/peer/status, split by struct across recorder.go,
peer_state.go, full_status.go, events.go, notifier.go and route.go
instead of one 1600-line file. Rename the type Status -> Recorder
(NewRecorder already implied it; avoids status.Status stutter). Split
conn_status.go: the ConnStatus type and its constants move to the status
package, connStatusInputs stays with the peer event loop.

The peer package references the status package directly; a transitional
status_alias.go re-exports the moved symbols for the ~50 external callers
still using peer.Status/State/ConnStatus, to be removed once they are
migrated.
2026-07-11 15:09:45 +02:00
Zoltan Papp
467b2a1712 [client] Deduplicate peer state update methods in Status
The five UpdatePeer* methods repeated the same lock/copy/snapshot/notify
boilerplate. Extract a shared updatePeer helper taking a router-notify
predicate and a mutate closure; each method now only declares which
fields it copies. Replace the repeated inline peer-not-found error with
an errPeerNotExists sentinel.
2026-07-11 14:30:37 +02:00
Zoltan Papp
cb4088484e [client] Suppress ICE events from replaced agents
Track connection state per agent generation instead of the shared
lastKnownState field, which was written from concurrent agent callbacks
without a lock. The connect goroutine now drops the connection if the
agent was replaced during dialing, and a replaced agent's late
disconnected callback no longer reaches the conn after its successor
already reported ready. Only the agent whose connection was last
reported ready may report it down.
2026-07-11 14:22:58 +02:00
Zoltan Papp
7620599961 [client] Fix ICE dialer cancel race in WorkerICE.connect
The connect goroutine read the agentDialerCancel field without holding
muxAgent, racing with OnNewOffer replacing it for a new session. On
failure paths the stale read could cancel the new session's dialer
instead of its own. Pass the cancel func of the owning session as a
parameter, like the dialer context.
2026-07-11 13:37:59 +02:00
Zoltan Papp
5f98524e02 [client] Refactor peer Conn to a single-owner event loop
Replace the mutex-guarded callback model of peer.Conn with a per-peer
event loop that exclusively owns all mutable connection state. External
callers and transport workers post typed events into a non-blocking,
coalescing mailbox instead of contending on conn.mu:

- offers/answers coalesce to the newest message, a new offer flushes
  queued candidates of the superseded session
- candidates are applied in arrival order from a bounded FIFO
- transport state changes are never dropped
- the blocking relay dial runs on a helper goroutine with a single dial
  in flight; signaling I/O (offer/answer sends) runs off the loop

conn.mu now only guards the open/close lifecycle. Close posts a close
event and waits for the loop teardown; the loop also tears down on
engine context cancellation and releases resources of unprocessed
events.

Delete the Handshaker listener machinery (Listen loop, unbuffered
drop-on-busy channels, AsyncOfferListener with its double-processing of
the first offer), the never-wired dispatcher package and the unused
ICEMonitor.ReconnectCh. Fix a goroutine leak in the WG watcher test
that raced with tests mutating the package-level check timing vars.
2026-07-11 13:30:06 +02:00
123 changed files with 2218 additions and 4948 deletions

View File

@@ -17,9 +17,7 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/auth"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
nbnet "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/net"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/server"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/system"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
)
@@ -333,14 +331,6 @@ func doForegroundLogin(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, setupKey string,
return fmt.Errorf("read config file %s: %v", configFilePath, err)
}
// Mirror runInForegroundMode: recover residual state (DNS, firewall,
// ssh config, legacy routing) from a previous unclean shutdown and
// enable advanced routing before dialing management.
if err := server.RestoreResidualState(ctx, profilemanager.NewServiceManager(configFilePath).GetStatePath()); err != nil {
log.Warnf("failed to restore residual state: %v", err)
}
nbnet.Init()
err = foregroundLogin(ctx, cmd, config, setupKey, activeProf.ID)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("foreground login failed: %v", err)

View File

@@ -22,8 +22,6 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
nbnet "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/net"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/server"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/system"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
@@ -231,24 +229,6 @@ func runInForegroundMode(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, activeProf *pr
_, _ = profilemanager.UpdateOldManagementURL(ctx, config, configFilePath)
// Restore residual state left by a previous run that did not shut down
// cleanly, mirroring what the daemon does before connecting: it recovers
// DNS config (a stale resolv.conf takeover can make the management
// hostname unresolvable), firewall rules, ssh config and legacy routing.
// Route cleanup itself happens at engine start; nbnet.Init() below lets
// the management dial bypass a leftover fwmark rule until then.
// Foreground mode is particularly exposed in containers: a crashed
// container restarts inside the same (pod) network namespace, so stale
// state survives while the process does not.
if err := server.RestoreResidualState(ctx, profilemanager.NewServiceManager(configPath).GetStatePath()); err != nil {
log.Warnf("failed to restore residual state: %v", err)
}
// Enable advanced routing (as the daemon does on startup) so the
// management dial bypasses a leftover fwmark rule instead of being
// shunted into a stale routing table.
nbnet.Init()
err = foregroundLogin(ctx, cmd, config, providedSetupKey, activeProf.ID)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("foreground login failed: %v", err)

View File

@@ -121,7 +121,6 @@ type Manager struct {
udpTracker *conntrack.UDPTracker
icmpTracker *conntrack.ICMPTracker
tcpTracker *conntrack.TCPTracker
fragments *fragmentTracker
forwarder atomic.Pointer[forwarder.Forwarder]
pendingCapture atomic.Pointer[forwarder.PacketCapture]
logger *nblog.Logger
@@ -184,41 +183,6 @@ func (d *decoder) decodePacket(data []byte) error {
}
}
// decodeTransport decodes the transport header of a first fragment (which
// gopacket leaves undecoded) into the decoder and appends its layer type to
// decoded, so the ACL pipeline can evaluate it like a normal packet. It returns
// false if the protocol is unsupported or the header is truncated.
func (d *decoder) decodeTransport(proto layers.IPProtocol, payload []byte) bool {
var l4 gopacket.DecodingLayer
var layerType gopacket.LayerType
var minLen int
switch proto {
case layers.IPProtocolTCP:
l4, layerType, minLen = &d.tcp, layers.LayerTypeTCP, 20
case layers.IPProtocolUDP:
l4, layerType, minLen = &d.udp, layers.LayerTypeUDP, 8
case layers.IPProtocolICMPv4:
l4, layerType, minLen = &d.icmp4, layers.LayerTypeICMPv4, 8
case layers.IPProtocolICMPv6:
l4, layerType, minLen = &d.icmp6, layers.LayerTypeICMPv6, 8
default:
return false
}
// Reject a fragment too small to hold the full transport header before
// decoding: it can't be ACL-evaluated (tiny-fragment attack), and skipping
// the decode avoids gopacket allocating an error on the drop path.
if len(payload) < minLen {
return false
}
if err := l4.DecodeFromBytes(payload, gopacket.NilDecodeFeedback); err != nil {
return false
}
d.decoded = append(d.decoded, layerType)
return true
}
// Create userspace firewall manager constructor
func Create(iface common.IFaceMapper, disableServerRoutes bool, flowLogger nftypes.FlowLogger, mtu uint16) (*Manager, error) {
return create(iface, nil, disableServerRoutes, flowLogger, mtu)
@@ -322,8 +286,6 @@ func create(iface common.IFaceMapper, nativeFirewall firewall.Manager, disableSe
if err := m.localipmanager.UpdateLocalIPs(iface); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("update local IPs: %w", err)
}
m.fragments = newFragmentTracker(m.logger)
if disableConntrack {
log.Info("conntrack is disabled")
} else {
@@ -337,7 +299,6 @@ func create(iface common.IFaceMapper, nativeFirewall firewall.Manager, disableSe
}
}
if err := iface.SetFilter(m); err != nil {
m.fragments.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("set filter: %w", err)
}
return m, nil
@@ -733,10 +694,6 @@ func (m *Manager) resetState() {
m.tcpTracker.Close()
}
if m.fragments != nil {
m.fragments.Close()
}
if fwder := m.forwarder.Load(); fwder != nil {
fwder.SetCapture(nil)
fwder.Stop()
@@ -1089,20 +1046,19 @@ func (m *Manager) filterInbound(packetData []byte, size int) bool {
return true
}
// gopacket does not decode the transport header of any IP fragment, so
// fragments take a dedicated path: the first fragment's header is decoded
// and ACL-evaluated here, and the remaining fragments inherit its verdict.
// TODO: pass fragments of routed packets to forwarder
if fragment {
return m.filterInboundFragment(d, srcIP, dstIP, size)
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
if d.decoded[0] == layers.LayerTypeIPv4 {
m.logger.Trace4("packet is a fragment: src=%v dst=%v id=%v flags=%v",
srcIP, dstIP, d.ip4.Id, d.ip4.Flags)
} else {
m.logger.Trace2("packet is an IPv6 fragment: src=%v dst=%v", srcIP, dstIP)
}
}
return false
}
return m.filterInboundDecoded(d, srcIP, dstIP, packetData, size)
}
// filterInboundDecoded runs the ACL, DNAT and conntrack pipeline on a fully
// decoded (non-fragment) inbound packet. It returns true if the packet should
// be dropped.
func (m *Manager) filterInboundDecoded(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, packetData []byte, size int) bool {
// TODO: optimize port DNAT by caching matched rules in conntrack
if translated := m.translateInboundPortDNAT(packetData, d, srcIP, dstIP); translated {
// Re-decode after port DNAT translation to update port information
@@ -1133,226 +1089,33 @@ func (m *Manager) filterInboundDecoded(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, pack
return m.handleRoutedTraffic(d, srcIP, dstIP, packetData, size)
}
// fragmentMeta holds the reassembly identity and layout of an IP fragment,
// extracted uniformly for IPv4 and IPv6.
type fragmentMeta struct {
key fragmentKey
// offset is the fragment offset in 8-byte units (zero for the first
// fragment).
offset uint16
// moreFragments is the More Fragments bit. A first fragment with it unset is
// an IPv6 atomic fragment (a complete datagram, RFC 6946): it has no trailing
// fragments to inherit a verdict, so it must not be recorded.
moreFragments bool
proto layers.IPProtocol
// l4payload is the fragmentable payload of this fragment. For the first
// fragment it starts with the transport header.
l4payload []byte
// headerEndOctets is the first fragment's payload length in 8-byte units:
// the smallest offset a trailing fragment may start at without overlapping
// the inspected transport header.
headerEndOctets uint16
}
// fragmentMetadata extracts the fragment identity and layout from a decoded IP
// fragment. It returns false for fragments it can't interpret (e.g. an IPv6
// fragment header shorter than 8 bytes), which are then dropped.
func fragmentMetadata(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr) (fragmentMeta, bool) {
switch d.decoded[0] {
case layers.LayerTypeIPv4:
payload := d.ip4.Payload
return fragmentMeta{
key: fragmentKey{srcIP: srcIP, dstIP: dstIP, id: uint32(d.ip4.Id), proto: uint8(d.ip4.Protocol)},
offset: d.ip4.FragOffset,
moreFragments: d.ip4.Flags&layers.IPv4MoreFragments != 0,
proto: d.ip4.Protocol,
l4payload: payload,
headerEndOctets: octets(len(payload)),
}, true
case layers.LayerTypeIPv6:
// IPv6 fragment extension header: 8 bytes, followed by the fragmentable
// payload. Layout: next header (1), reserved (1), offset+flags (2), id (4).
payload := d.ip6.Payload
if len(payload) < 8 {
return fragmentMeta{}, false
}
nextHeader := layers.IPProtocol(payload[0])
offsetFlags := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(payload[2:4])
id := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(payload[4:8])
l4 := payload[8:]
return fragmentMeta{
key: fragmentKey{srcIP: srcIP, dstIP: dstIP, id: id, proto: uint8(nextHeader)},
offset: offsetFlags >> 3,
moreFragments: offsetFlags&1 != 0,
proto: nextHeader,
l4payload: l4,
headerEndOctets: octets(len(l4)),
}, true
default:
return fragmentMeta{}, false
}
}
// octets rounds a byte length up to whole 8-byte units, the granularity of the
// IP fragment offset field.
func octets(nbytes int) uint16 {
return uint16((nbytes + 7) / 8)
}
// filterInboundFragment decides the fate of an IP fragment. gopacket stops
// decoding at the network layer for every fragment, so the first fragment's
// transport header is decoded and ACL-evaluated here and its verdict recorded;
// the remaining (headerless) fragments inherit that verdict. Anything that
// cannot be tied to an allowed, non-overlapping first fragment is dropped.
func (m *Manager) filterInboundFragment(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, size int) bool {
meta, ok := fragmentMetadata(d, srcIP, dstIP)
if !ok {
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
m.logger.Trace2("dropping unsupported fragment: src=%v dst=%v", srcIP, dstIP)
}
return true
}
if meta.offset != 0 {
return m.filterTrailingFragment(meta, srcIP, dstIP)
}
// A new first fragment supersedes any recorded verdict for this datagram, so
// a re-sent or overlapping offset-zero fragment can't inherit the old one.
m.fragments.poison(meta.key)
// First fragment: decode its transport header so the ACL can evaluate it. A
// decode failure means the fragment is too small to hold the full transport
// header (RFC 1858 §3 tiny-fragment attack); it can't be evaluated, so drop it.
if !d.decodeTransport(meta.proto, meta.l4payload) {
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
m.logger.Trace3("dropping first fragment without full L4 header: src=%v dst=%v id=%v",
srcIP, dstIP, meta.key.id)
}
return true
}
return m.filterFirstFragment(d, meta, srcIP, dstIP, size)
}
// filterTrailingFragment applies a recorded first-fragment verdict to a
// non-first fragment.
func (m *Manager) filterTrailingFragment(meta fragmentMeta, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr) bool {
switch m.fragments.verdict(meta.key, meta.offset) {
case fragmentAllow:
return false
case fragmentOverlap:
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
m.logger.Trace3("dropping overlapping fragment rewriting inspected header: src=%v dst=%v id=%v",
srcIP, dstIP, meta.key.id)
}
return true
default:
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
m.logger.Trace3("dropping fragment with no allowed first fragment: src=%v dst=%v id=%v",
srcIP, dstIP, meta.key.id)
}
return true
}
}
// filterFirstFragment runs the verdict part of the inbound pipeline on a first
// fragment with its transport header decoded. It mirrors filterInboundDecoded
// but skips DNAT (port rewriting on fragments is unsupported) and forwarder
// injection (fragments are left to the stack to reassemble, not forwarded).
// Allowed fragments have their verdict recorded so the datagram's trailing
// fragments inherit it.
func (m *Manager) filterFirstFragment(d *decoder, meta fragmentMeta, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, size int) bool {
if m.stateful && m.isValidTrackedConnection(d, srcIP, dstIP, size) {
m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
return false
}
if m.localipmanager.IsLocalIP(dstIP) {
ruleID, blocked := m.peerACLsBlock(srcIP, d, nil)
if blocked {
m.storeDropFlow("Dropping local first fragment (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
return true
}
m.trackInbound(d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
return false
}
if !m.routingEnabled.Load() {
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
m.logger.Trace2("Dropping routed fragment (routing disabled): src=%s dst=%s", srcIP, dstIP)
}
return true
}
if m.nativeRouter.Load() {
m.trackInbound(d, srcIP, dstIP, nil, size)
m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
return false
}
// TODO: pass fragments of routed packets to the forwarder; until then
// allowed routed fragments go to the native stack.
srcPort, dstPort := getPortsFromPacket(d)
ruleID, pass := m.routeACLsPass(srcIP, dstIP, d.decoded[1], srcPort, dstPort)
if !pass {
m.storeDropFlow("Dropping routed first fragment (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
return true
}
m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
return false
}
// recordFirstFragment caches an allowed first fragment's verdict for its
// trailing fragments to inherit. Atomic fragments (no More Fragments bit) are
// complete datagrams with no trailing fragments, so they are not cached and
// cannot exhaust the verdict table.
func (m *Manager) recordFirstFragment(meta fragmentMeta) {
if !meta.moreFragments {
return
}
m.fragments.recordAllowed(meta.key, meta.headerEndOctets)
}
// storeDropFlow logs and records a netflow drop event for an inbound packet
// denied by the ACLs. msg is the trace format taking rule id, protocol, source
// and destination.
func (m *Manager) storeDropFlow(msg string, d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, ruleID []byte, size int) {
pnum := getProtocolFromPacket(d)
srcPort, dstPort := getPortsFromPacket(d)
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
m.logger.Trace6(msg, ruleID, pnum, srcIP, srcPort, dstIP, dstPort)
}
m.flowLogger.StoreEvent(nftypes.EventFields{
FlowID: uuid.New(),
Type: nftypes.TypeDrop,
RuleID: ruleID,
Direction: nftypes.Ingress,
Protocol: pnum,
SourceIP: srcIP,
DestIP: dstIP,
SourcePort: srcPort,
DestPort: dstPort,
// TODO: icmp type/code
RxPackets: 1,
RxBytes: uint64(size),
})
}
// handleLocalTraffic handles local traffic.
// If it returns true, the packet should be dropped.
func (m *Manager) handleLocalTraffic(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, packetData []byte, size int) bool {
ruleID, blocked := m.peerACLsBlock(srcIP, d, packetData)
if blocked {
m.storeDropFlow("Dropping local packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
pnum := getProtocolFromPacket(d)
srcPort, dstPort := getPortsFromPacket(d)
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
m.logger.Trace6("Dropping local packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
ruleID, pnum, srcIP, srcPort, dstIP, dstPort)
}
m.flowLogger.StoreEvent(nftypes.EventFields{
FlowID: uuid.New(),
Type: nftypes.TypeDrop,
RuleID: ruleID,
Direction: nftypes.Ingress,
Protocol: pnum,
SourceIP: srcIP,
DestIP: dstIP,
SourcePort: srcPort,
DestPort: dstPort,
// TODO: icmp type/code
RxPackets: 1,
RxBytes: uint64(size),
})
return true
}
@@ -1405,8 +1168,27 @@ func (m *Manager) handleRoutedTraffic(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, packe
ruleID, pass := m.routeACLsPass(srcIP, dstIP, protoLayer, srcPort, dstPort)
if !pass {
m.storeDropFlow("Dropping routed packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
proto := getProtocolFromPacket(d)
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
m.logger.Trace6("Dropping routed packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
ruleID, proto, srcIP, srcPort, dstIP, dstPort)
}
m.flowLogger.StoreEvent(nftypes.EventFields{
FlowID: uuid.New(),
Type: nftypes.TypeDrop,
RuleID: ruleID,
Direction: nftypes.Ingress,
Protocol: proto,
SourceIP: srcIP,
DestIP: dstIP,
SourcePort: srcPort,
DestPort: dstPort,
// TODO: icmp type/code
RxPackets: 1,
RxBytes: uint64(size),
})
return true
}

View File

@@ -5,9 +5,7 @@ import (
"fmt"
"net"
"net/netip"
"os"
"runtime"
"strconv"
"sync"
"time"
@@ -33,11 +31,6 @@ const (
defaultMaxInFlight = 1024
iosReceiveWindow = 16384
iosMaxInFlight = 256
// envForceTCPRACK overrides the platform default for gVisor's RACK loss
// detection. Set to a truthy value to force RACK on, or a falsy value to
// force it off, on any platform.
envForceTCPRACK = "NB_FORCE_TCP_RACK"
)
type Forwarder struct {
@@ -159,8 +152,6 @@ func New(iface common.IFaceMapper, logger *nblog.Logger, flowLogger nftypes.Flow
maxInFlight = iosMaxInFlight
}
configureTCPRecovery(s)
tcpForwarder := tcp.NewForwarder(s, receiveWindow, maxInFlight, f.handleTCP)
s.SetTransportProtocolHandler(tcp.ProtocolNumber, tcpForwarder.HandlePacket)
@@ -475,31 +466,3 @@ func probeRawICMP(network, addr string, logger *nblog.Logger) bool {
logger.Debug1("forwarder: raw %s socket access available", network)
return true
}
// configureTCPRecovery disables gVisor's RACK loss detection on Windows, where
// it interacts poorly with the host and collapses throughput on routed TCP
// connections (gVisor issue #9778). Other platforms keep the default. The
// EnvForceTCPRACK environment variable overrides the platform default.
func configureTCPRecovery(s *stack.Stack) {
disableRACK := runtime.GOOS == "windows"
if val := os.Getenv(envForceTCPRACK); val != "" {
force, err := strconv.ParseBool(val)
if err != nil {
log.Warnf("parse %s: %v", envForceTCPRACK, err)
} else {
disableRACK = !force
}
}
if !disableRACK {
return
}
opt := tcpip.TCPRecovery(0)
if err := s.SetTransportProtocolOption(tcp.ProtocolNumber, &opt); err != nil {
log.Warnf("disable TCP RACK loss detection: %v", err)
return
}
log.Info("forwarder: TCP RACK loss detection disabled")
}

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@@ -1,204 +0,0 @@
package uspfilter
import (
"context"
"net/netip"
"os"
"strconv"
"sync"
"time"
nblog "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/uspfilter/log"
)
const (
// defaultFragmentTimeout bounds how long a first-fragment verdict is kept
// while the remaining fragments arrive. It mirrors the Linux IP reassembly
// timeout (net.ipv4.ipfrag_time).
defaultFragmentTimeout = 30 * time.Second
// fragmentCleanupInterval is how often expired verdicts are purged.
fragmentCleanupInterval = 10 * time.Second
// defaultMaxFragmentEntries caps the number of concurrently tracked
// fragmented datagrams. The table stays bounded because each datagram is a
// single small entry regardless of how many fragments it is split into, and
// the 13-bit IPv4 fragment-offset field limits any datagram to 64 KiB.
defaultMaxFragmentEntries = 16384
// EnvFragmentMaxEntries overrides defaultMaxFragmentEntries.
EnvFragmentMaxEntries = "NB_FRAGMENT_MAX_ENTRIES"
)
// fragmentVerdict is the decision for a trailing (headerless) fragment.
type fragmentVerdict int
const (
// fragmentDeny drops the fragment: no allowed first fragment is on record.
fragmentDeny fragmentVerdict = iota
// fragmentAllow passes the fragment: it belongs to an allowed datagram and
// does not overlap the already-inspected transport header.
fragmentAllow
// fragmentOverlap drops the fragment and poisons its datagram: it overlaps
// the transport header the ACL inspected (RFC 1858 §4, RFC 3128; RFC 5722
// requires discarding the whole datagram on overlap for IPv6).
fragmentOverlap
)
// fragmentKey identifies a fragmented datagram. It matches the RFC 791 / RFC
// 8200 reassembly key: source, destination, protocol and identification. The id
// is 32-bit to hold both the IPv4 (16-bit) and IPv6 (32-bit) identification.
type fragmentKey struct {
srcIP netip.Addr
dstIP netip.Addr
id uint32
proto uint8
}
// fragmentEntry records the verdict of an allowed first fragment.
type fragmentEntry struct {
// headerEndOctets is the offset, in 8-byte units, at which the first
// fragment's payload ended. A trailing fragment starting before this
// overlaps bytes the ACL already inspected and is rejected.
headerEndOctets uint16
// recordedAt is when the first fragment was accepted. The verdict expires a
// fixed timeout later and is not refreshed, mirroring the kernel reassembly
// timer so a trailing-fragment flood can't keep a datagram alive.
recordedAt time.Time
}
// fragmentTracker records the ACL verdict of a datagram's first fragment so the
// remaining fragments, which carry no L4 header, can inherit the decision
// without reassembling the datagram. Only allowed first fragments are stored;
// anything that cannot be tied to an allowed, non-overlapping first fragment is
// dropped (fail closed).
type fragmentTracker struct {
logger *nblog.Logger
mutex sync.Mutex
entries map[fragmentKey]fragmentEntry
timeout time.Duration
// maxEntries caps the table; atCapacity dedups the capacity warning until
// the table drains below the cap again.
maxEntries int
atCapacity bool
cleanupTicker *time.Ticker
cancel context.CancelFunc
}
func newFragmentTracker(logger *nblog.Logger) *fragmentTracker {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
t := &fragmentTracker{
logger: logger,
entries: make(map[fragmentKey]fragmentEntry),
timeout: defaultFragmentTimeout,
maxEntries: fragmentMaxEntries(logger),
cleanupTicker: time.NewTicker(fragmentCleanupInterval),
cancel: cancel,
}
go t.cleanupRoutine(ctx)
return t
}
func fragmentMaxEntries(logger *nblog.Logger) int {
v := os.Getenv(EnvFragmentMaxEntries)
if v == "" {
return defaultMaxFragmentEntries
}
n, err := strconv.Atoi(v)
if err != nil || n <= 0 {
logger.Warn2("invalid %s=%q, using default", EnvFragmentMaxEntries, v)
return defaultMaxFragmentEntries
}
return n
}
// recordAllowed stores the verdict of an allowed first fragment. headerEndOctets
// is the first fragment's payload length in 8-byte units. When the table is full
// the record is dropped, which fails closed: the datagram's trailing fragments
// will be denied.
func (t *fragmentTracker) recordAllowed(key fragmentKey, headerEndOctets uint16) {
t.mutex.Lock()
defer t.mutex.Unlock()
if t.entries == nil {
return
}
if _, ok := t.entries[key]; !ok && len(t.entries) >= t.maxEntries {
if !t.atCapacity {
t.atCapacity = true
t.logger.Warn2("fragment verdict table at capacity (%d/%d): trailing fragments of new datagrams will be dropped",
len(t.entries), t.maxEntries)
}
return
}
t.entries[key] = fragmentEntry{
headerEndOctets: headerEndOctets,
recordedAt: time.Now(),
}
}
// poison drops any recorded verdict for a datagram, so its later fragments are
// denied until a new allowed first fragment is recorded. Called on every
// offset-zero fragment to defeat offset-zero overlap rewrites (RFC 3128).
func (t *fragmentTracker) poison(key fragmentKey) {
t.mutex.Lock()
defer t.mutex.Unlock()
delete(t.entries, key)
}
// verdict decides the fate of a trailing fragment at fragOffsetOctets (the IPv4
// fragment offset, in 8-byte units). A fragment overlapping the inspected
// header poisons the datagram: the entry is removed so all further fragments of
// that datagram are denied too.
func (t *fragmentTracker) verdict(key fragmentKey, fragOffsetOctets uint16) fragmentVerdict {
t.mutex.Lock()
defer t.mutex.Unlock()
entry, ok := t.entries[key]
if !ok {
return fragmentDeny
}
if time.Since(entry.recordedAt) > t.timeout {
delete(t.entries, key)
return fragmentDeny
}
if fragOffsetOctets < entry.headerEndOctets {
delete(t.entries, key)
return fragmentOverlap
}
return fragmentAllow
}
func (t *fragmentTracker) cleanupRoutine(ctx context.Context) {
defer t.cleanupTicker.Stop()
for {
select {
case <-t.cleanupTicker.C:
t.cleanup()
case <-ctx.Done():
return
}
}
}
func (t *fragmentTracker) cleanup() {
t.mutex.Lock()
defer t.mutex.Unlock()
for key, entry := range t.entries {
if time.Since(entry.recordedAt) > t.timeout {
delete(t.entries, key)
}
}
if len(t.entries) < t.maxEntries {
t.atCapacity = false
}
}
// Close stops the cleanup routine and releases resources.
func (t *fragmentTracker) Close() {
t.cancel()
t.mutex.Lock()
t.entries = nil
t.mutex.Unlock()
}

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@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
package uspfilter
import (
"encoding/binary"
"testing"
)
// benchFilterInbound drives filterInbound over a fixed packet in a tight loop.
// Packets are built once, outside the timed region, so the benchmark measures
// only pipeline cost, which is what an attacker can amplify.
func benchFilterInbound(b *testing.B, pkt []byte) {
b.Helper()
b.ReportAllocs()
b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkt)))
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
m := benchManager
m.filterInbound(pkt, len(pkt))
}
}
// benchManager is a package-level manager reused across fragment benchmarks so
// setup cost stays out of the timed region.
var benchManager *Manager
func setupBenchManager(b *testing.B) *Manager {
b.Helper()
m := newFragmentTestManager(b)
allowUDP(b, m, 8080)
// Disable conntrack so the allowed-first-fragment path measures transport
// decode + ACL every iteration instead of matching the connection tracked
// on the first iteration.
m.stateful = false
benchManager = m
return m
}
// BenchmarkInbound_NormalPacket is the baseline: a full, non-fragmented UDP
// packet that passes the ACL. Fragment paths should stay comparable to this.
func BenchmarkInbound_NormalPacket(b *testing.B) {
setupBenchManager(b)
pkt := normalUDPPacket(b, 8080, 32)
benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
}
// BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentAllowed measures the first-fragment path:
// transport decode + ACL evaluation + verdict record.
func BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentAllowed(b *testing.B) {
setupBenchManager(b)
pkt := firstFragmentUDP(b, 0x2000, 8080, 32)
benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
}
// BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentAllowed measures the common trailing-fragment
// path: a single map lookup after the first fragment is on record.
func BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentAllowed(b *testing.B) {
m := setupBenchManager(b)
first := firstFragmentUDP(b, 0x3000, 8080, 32)
m.filterInbound(first, len(first))
pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x3000, 5, false, 24)
benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
}
// BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentNoFirst is the primary DoS vector: an
// attacker floods trailing fragments with no first fragment on record. Each is
// a map miss and must be cheap.
func BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentNoFirst(b *testing.B) {
setupBenchManager(b)
pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x4000, 185, false, 40)
benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
}
// BenchmarkInbound_TinyFirstFragment measures the tiny-fragment drop path: a
// first fragment too small to decode a transport header.
func BenchmarkInbound_TinyFirstFragment(b *testing.B) {
setupBenchManager(b)
pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x5000, 0, true, 4)
benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
}
// BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentDistinctIDs is the worst case for the
// verdict table: an attacker varies the datagram id on every packet so no first
// fragment ever matches. Verdict lookups always miss and nothing is recorded,
// so the table cannot grow. Each iteration rewrites the id field in place.
func BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentDistinctIDs(b *testing.B) {
setupBenchManager(b)
pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x6000, 185, false, 40)
m := benchManager
b.ReportAllocs()
b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkt)))
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
// IPv4 identification field is at bytes 4:6.
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], uint16(i))
m.filterInbound(pkt, len(pkt))
}
}
// BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentDistinctIDs measures sustained first-fragment
// pressure with distinct ids: transport decode + ACL + verdict insert until the
// table caps, exercising the map growth and capacity guard.
func BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentDistinctIDs(b *testing.B) {
setupBenchManager(b)
pkt := firstFragmentUDP(b, 0x7000, 8080, 32)
m := benchManager
b.ReportAllocs()
b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkt)))
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], uint16(i))
m.filterInbound(pkt, len(pkt))
}
}

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@@ -1,554 +0,0 @@
package uspfilter
import (
"encoding/binary"
"net"
"net/netip"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/google/gopacket"
"github.com/google/gopacket/layers"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
fw "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
nbiface "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/device"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
)
const (
fragTestSrc = "100.10.0.1"
fragTestDst = "100.10.0.100"
fragTestSrcV6 = "fd00::1"
fragTestDstV6 = "fd00::100"
)
func newFragmentTestManager(tb testing.TB) *Manager {
tb.Helper()
ifaceMock := &IFaceMock{
SetFilterFunc: func(device.PacketFilter) error { return nil },
AddressFunc: func() wgaddr.Address {
return wgaddr.Address{
IP: netip.MustParseAddr(fragTestDst),
Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("100.10.0.0/16"),
IPv6: netip.MustParseAddr(fragTestDstV6),
IPv6Net: netip.MustParsePrefix("fd00::/64"),
}
},
}
m, err := Create(ifaceMock, false, flowLogger, nbiface.DefaultMTU)
require.NoError(tb, err)
require.NoError(tb, m.UpdateLocalIPs())
tb.Cleanup(func() { require.NoError(tb, m.Close(nil)) })
return m
}
// firstFragmentUDPTo builds the first fragment of a fragmented UDP datagram to
// the given destination: it carries the full UDP header plus payloadLen bytes
// of data, with the More Fragments flag set and offset zero.
func firstFragmentUDPTo(tb testing.TB, dst string, id uint16, dstPort uint16, payloadLen int) []byte {
tb.Helper()
ip := &layers.IPv4{
Version: 4,
TTL: 64,
Id: id,
Protocol: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
SrcIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
DstIP: net.ParseIP(dst),
Flags: layers.IPv4MoreFragments,
}
udp := &layers.UDP{SrcPort: 40000, DstPort: layers.UDPPort(dstPort)}
require.NoError(tb, udp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, udp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, payloadLen))))
return buf.Bytes()
}
func firstFragmentUDP(tb testing.TB, id uint16, dstPort uint16, payloadLen int) []byte {
tb.Helper()
return firstFragmentUDPTo(tb, fragTestDst, id, dstPort, payloadLen)
}
// firstFragmentTCP builds the first fragment of a fragmented TCP datagram: the
// full 20-byte TCP header plus 12 bytes of data, with the More Fragments flag
// set and offset zero.
func firstFragmentTCP(tb testing.TB, id uint16, dstPort uint16) []byte {
tb.Helper()
ip := &layers.IPv4{
Version: 4,
TTL: 64,
Id: id,
Protocol: layers.IPProtocolTCP,
SrcIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
DstIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestDst),
Flags: layers.IPv4MoreFragments,
}
tcp := &layers.TCP{SrcPort: 40000, DstPort: layers.TCPPort(dstPort), SYN: true, Window: 64240}
require.NoError(tb, tcp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, tcp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, 12))))
return buf.Bytes()
}
// trailingFragmentTo builds a non-first fragment to the given destination: an
// IPv4 header at the given fragment offset (in 8-byte units) carrying raw
// payload and no L4 header.
func trailingFragmentTo(tb testing.TB, dst string, proto layers.IPProtocol, id uint16, fragOffsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, payloadLen int) []byte {
tb.Helper()
ip := &layers.IPv4{
Version: 4,
TTL: 64,
Id: id,
Protocol: proto,
SrcIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
DstIP: net.ParseIP(dst),
FragOffset: fragOffsetOctets,
}
if moreFragments {
ip.Flags = layers.IPv4MoreFragments
}
buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{FixLengths: true}
require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, payloadLen))))
return buf.Bytes()
}
func trailingFragment(tb testing.TB, id uint16, fragOffsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, payloadLen int) []byte {
tb.Helper()
return trailingFragmentTo(tb, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolUDP, id, fragOffsetOctets, moreFragments, payloadLen)
}
// outboundUDPPacket builds a complete outbound UDP packet from the local
// address, used to establish conntrack state for reply-direction tests.
func outboundUDPPacket(tb testing.TB, srcPort, dstPort uint16) []byte {
tb.Helper()
ip := &layers.IPv4{
Version: 4,
TTL: 64,
Id: 1,
Protocol: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
SrcIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestDst),
DstIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
}
udp := &layers.UDP{SrcPort: layers.UDPPort(srcPort), DstPort: layers.UDPPort(dstPort)}
require.NoError(tb, udp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, udp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, 16))))
return buf.Bytes()
}
// normalUDPPacket builds a complete, non-fragmented UDP packet for baseline
// comparisons against the fragment paths.
func normalUDPPacket(tb testing.TB, dstPort uint16, payloadLen int) []byte {
tb.Helper()
ip := &layers.IPv4{
Version: 4,
TTL: 64,
Id: 1,
Protocol: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
SrcIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
DstIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestDst),
}
udp := &layers.UDP{SrcPort: 40000, DstPort: layers.UDPPort(dstPort)}
require.NoError(tb, udp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, udp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, payloadLen))))
return buf.Bytes()
}
func allowUDP(tb testing.TB, m *Manager, dstPort uint16) {
tb.Helper()
_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolUDP, nil,
&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{dstPort}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
require.NoError(tb, err)
}
// TestFragment_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped is the core bypass repro: a trailing
// fragment with no allowed first fragment on record must be dropped. Before the
// fix, filterInbound returned false (allow) for any fragment.
func TestFragment_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
frag := trailingFragment(t, 0x1234, 185, false, 40)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(frag, len(frag)),
"trailing fragment without an allowed first fragment must be dropped")
}
// TestFragment_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing verifies that once a first fragment
// passes the ACL, its trailing fragments inherit the allow verdict.
func TestFragment_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
// First fragment: UDP header (8) + 32 payload = 40 octets -> headerEnd = 5.
first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x2222, 8080, 32)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
"allowed first fragment should pass and be recorded")
trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x2222, 5, false, 24)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
"trailing fragment of an allowed datagram should pass")
}
// TestFragment_DeniedFirstDropsTrailing verifies that a first fragment blocked
// by the ACL leaves no verdict, so its trailing fragments are dropped.
func TestFragment_DeniedFirstDropsTrailing(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
// No accept rule: local traffic defaults to deny.
first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x3333, 9999, 32)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
"first fragment to a blocked port should be dropped by the ACL")
trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x3333, 5, false, 24)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
"trailing fragment of a denied datagram must be dropped")
}
// TestFragment_OverlappingHeaderDropped covers the RFC 1858 §4 / RFC 3128
// overlapping-fragment rewrite: a trailing fragment starting inside the range
// the ACL already inspected is dropped and poisons the datagram. TCP is used so
// the overlap lands on real header bytes (the flags at byte 13).
func TestFragment_OverlappingHeaderDropped(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolTCP, nil,
&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
require.NoError(t, err)
// First fragment: TCP header (20) + 12 data = 32 bytes -> headerEnd = 4 octets.
first := firstFragmentTCP(t, 0x4444, 8080)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)))
// Overlapping fragment at offset 1 (byte 8) falls inside the inspected TCP
// header, so it could rewrite the flags or port on reassembly.
overlap := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x4444, 1, true, 32)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(overlap, len(overlap)),
"fragment overlapping the inspected header must be dropped")
// The datagram is now poisoned: a later, non-overlapping fragment is also
// dropped because the verdict was removed.
later := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x4444, 4, false, 24)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(later, len(later)),
"fragments after an overlap must be dropped (datagram poisoned)")
}
// TestFragment_OffsetZeroOverlapPoisons covers the RFC 3128 offset-zero rewrite:
// an allowed first fragment followed by a denied offset-zero fragment for the
// same datagram must not leave the earlier allow verdict in place.
func TestFragment_OffsetZeroOverlapPoisons(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
allowed := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x5A5A, 8080, 32)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(allowed, len(allowed)),
"allowed first fragment should pass and be recorded")
// A second offset-zero fragment to a denied port supersedes the datagram's
// verdict; it is dropped and must not leave the allow in place.
denied := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x5A5A, 9999, 32)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(denied, len(denied)),
"denied offset-zero fragment must be dropped")
trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x5A5A, 5, false, 24)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
"trailing fragment must be denied after the datagram was poisoned")
}
// TestFragment_TinyFirstDropped covers the tiny-fragment attack: a first
// fragment too small to contain the full transport header can't be
// ACL-evaluated and must be dropped.
func TestFragment_TinyFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
// IPv4 header + 4 raw bytes, MF set, offset 0: too small for the 8-byte UDP
// header, so it decodes to L3 only.
tiny := trailingFragment(t, 0x5555, 0, true, 4)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(tiny, len(tiny)),
"tiny first fragment without a full L4 header must be dropped")
}
// TestFragment_TCPFirstFragment verifies the TCP arm of the transport decode: a
// first fragment carrying the full 20-byte TCP header is ACL-evaluated and its
// trailing fragments inherit the verdict.
func TestFragment_TCPFirstFragment(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolTCP, nil,
&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
require.NoError(t, err)
// TCP header (20) + 12 data = 32 bytes -> headerEnd = 4 octets.
first := firstFragmentTCP(t, 0x6666, 8080)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
"allowed TCP first fragment should pass and be recorded")
trailing := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x6666, 4, false, 24)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
"trailing fragment of an allowed TCP datagram should pass")
}
// TestFragment_TCPTinyFirstDropped verifies the TCP minimum header length: 12
// bytes would satisfy a UDP header but falls short of the 20-byte TCP header.
func TestFragment_TCPTinyFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolTCP, nil,
&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
require.NoError(t, err)
tiny := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x7777, 0, true, 12)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(tiny, len(tiny)),
"first fragment shorter than the TCP header must be dropped")
}
// TestFragment_ConntrackAllowsFirstFragment verifies the conntrack branch: reply
// fragments of an outbound-established UDP flow pass without any inbound rule.
func TestFragment_ConntrackAllowsFirstFragment(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
out := outboundUDPPacket(t, 12345, 40000)
require.False(t, m.filterOutbound(out, len(out)))
first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x8888, 12345, 32)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
"reply first fragment should pass via conntrack")
trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x8888, 5, false, 24)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
"trailing fragment of a tracked flow should pass")
}
// TestFragment_RoutingDisabledDropsFragment verifies routed first fragments are
// dropped when routing is disabled.
func TestFragment_RoutingDisabledDropsFragment(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
m.routingEnabled.Store(false)
first := firstFragmentUDPTo(t, "198.51.100.10", 0x9999, 8080, 32)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
"routed first fragment must be dropped when routing is disabled")
}
// TestFragment_RouteACL verifies the route-ACL branch: fragments to a non-local
// destination follow the route rules, allowed datagrams pass their trailing
// fragments and denied ones don't.
func TestFragment_RouteACL(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
m.routingEnabled.Store(true)
m.nativeRouter.Store(false)
_, err := m.AddRouteFiltering(
[]byte("rt-1"),
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("100.10.0.0/16")},
fw.Network{Prefix: netip.MustParsePrefix("198.51.100.0/24")},
fw.ProtocolUDP,
nil,
&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}},
fw.ActionAccept,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
first := firstFragmentUDPTo(t, "198.51.100.10", 0xAAAA, 8080, 32)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
"route-ACL-allowed first fragment should pass")
trailing := trailingFragmentTo(t, "198.51.100.10", layers.IPProtocolUDP, 0xAAAA, 5, false, 24)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
"trailing fragment of an allowed routed datagram should pass")
denied := firstFragmentUDPTo(t, "198.51.100.10", 0xBBBB, 9999, 32)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(denied, len(denied)),
"route-ACL-denied first fragment must be dropped")
deniedTrailing := trailingFragmentTo(t, "198.51.100.10", layers.IPProtocolUDP, 0xBBBB, 5, false, 24)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(deniedTrailing, len(deniedTrailing)),
"trailing fragment of a denied routed datagram must be dropped")
}
// TestFragment_ExpiredVerdictDropsTrailing verifies a verdict older than the
// tracker timeout no longer admits trailing fragments.
func TestFragment_ExpiredVerdictDropsTrailing(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0xCCCC, 8080, 32)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)))
m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
for key, entry := range m.fragments.entries {
entry.recordedAt = time.Now().Add(-defaultFragmentTimeout - time.Second)
m.fragments.entries[key] = entry
}
m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0xCCCC, 5, false, 24)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
"trailing fragment after verdict expiry must be dropped")
}
// TestFragment_CapacityFailsClosed verifies the table cap: at capacity, new
// datagram verdicts are not recorded (their trailing fragments are dropped)
// while already-recorded datagrams keep working.
func TestFragment_CapacityFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
m.fragments.maxEntries = 1
m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
first1 := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x0101, 8080, 32)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first1, len(first1)))
first2 := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x0202, 8080, 32)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first2, len(first2)),
"first fragment itself still passes at capacity")
trailing2 := trailingFragment(t, 0x0202, 5, false, 24)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing2, len(trailing2)),
"trailing fragment of an unrecorded datagram must be dropped at capacity")
trailing1 := trailingFragment(t, 0x0101, 5, false, 24)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing1, len(trailing1)),
"already-recorded datagram should keep passing at capacity")
}
// v6FragmentHeader builds the 8-byte IPv6 fragment extension header for the
// given inner protocol, offset (8-byte units), More Fragments bit and id.
func v6FragmentHeader(proto layers.IPProtocol, offsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, id uint32) []byte {
offsetFlags := offsetOctets << 3
if moreFragments {
offsetFlags |= 1
}
hdr := make([]byte, 8)
hdr[0] = uint8(proto)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[2:4], offsetFlags)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(hdr[4:8], id)
return hdr
}
func v6UDPHeader(dstPort uint16, dataLen int) []byte {
hdr := make([]byte, 8)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[0:2], 40000)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[2:4], dstPort)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[4:6], uint16(8+dataLen))
return hdr
}
// firstFragmentUDPv6 builds the first fragment of a fragmented IPv6 UDP
// datagram: fragment header (offset 0, More Fragments set) + full UDP header +
// data.
func firstFragmentUDPv6(tb testing.TB, id uint32, dstPort uint16, dataLen int) []byte {
tb.Helper()
return fragmentUDPv6(tb, id, dstPort, dataLen, true)
}
// fragmentUDPv6 builds an offset-zero IPv6 UDP fragment. With moreFragments
// false it is an atomic fragment (a complete datagram, RFC 6946).
func fragmentUDPv6(tb testing.TB, id uint32, dstPort uint16, dataLen int, moreFragments bool) []byte {
tb.Helper()
ip := &layers.IPv6{
Version: 6,
NextHeader: layers.IPProtocolIPv6Fragment,
HopLimit: 64,
SrcIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6),
DstIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestDstV6),
}
payload := append(v6FragmentHeader(layers.IPProtocolUDP, 0, moreFragments, id), v6UDPHeader(dstPort, dataLen)...)
payload = append(payload, make([]byte, dataLen)...)
buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, gopacket.SerializeOptions{FixLengths: true}, ip, gopacket.Payload(payload)))
return buf.Bytes()
}
// trailingFragmentV6 builds a non-first IPv6 fragment: fragment header at the
// given offset carrying raw data and no transport header.
func trailingFragmentV6(tb testing.TB, id uint32, offsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, dataLen int) []byte {
tb.Helper()
ip := &layers.IPv6{
Version: 6,
NextHeader: layers.IPProtocolIPv6Fragment,
HopLimit: 64,
SrcIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6),
DstIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestDstV6),
}
payload := append(v6FragmentHeader(layers.IPProtocolUDP, offsetOctets, moreFragments, id), make([]byte, dataLen)...)
buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, gopacket.SerializeOptions{FixLengths: true}, ip, gopacket.Payload(payload)))
return buf.Bytes()
}
// TestFragmentV6_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped verifies the IPv6 bypass is closed:
// a trailing fragment with no allowed first fragment is dropped.
func TestFragmentV6_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
frag := trailingFragmentV6(t, 0xAABBCCDD, 100, false, 40)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(frag, len(frag)),
"IPv6 trailing fragment without an allowed first fragment must be dropped")
}
// TestFragmentV6_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing verifies IPv6 fragments are
// evaluated like IPv4: an allowed first fragment lets its trailing fragments
// through.
func TestFragmentV6_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6), fw.ProtocolUDP, nil,
&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
require.NoError(t, err)
// First fragment: UDP header (8) + 32 data = 40 octets -> headerEnd = 5.
first := firstFragmentUDPv6(t, 0xAABBCCDD, 8080, 32)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
"allowed IPv6 first fragment should pass and be recorded")
trailing := trailingFragmentV6(t, 0xAABBCCDD, 5, false, 24)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
"trailing fragment of an allowed IPv6 datagram should pass")
}
// TestFragmentV6_AtomicNotCached verifies an IPv6 atomic fragment (fragment
// header with offset 0 and no More Fragments, a complete datagram per RFC 6946)
// is evaluated but not recorded, so a flood of allowed atomic fragments can't
// exhaust the verdict table.
func TestFragmentV6_AtomicNotCached(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6), fw.ProtocolUDP, nil,
&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
require.NoError(t, err)
atomic := fragmentUDPv6(t, 0xA70301C, 8080, 16, false)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(atomic, len(atomic)),
"allowed IPv6 atomic fragment should pass")
m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
n := len(m.fragments.entries)
m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
require.Zero(t, n, "atomic fragment must not create a verdict entry")
// A genuine fragmented datagram (More Fragments set) is still recorded.
first := fragmentUDPv6(t, 0xBEEF, 8080, 32, true)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)))
m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
n = len(m.fragments.entries)
m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
require.Equal(t, 1, n, "genuine first fragment must record a verdict")
}

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package configurer
import (
"net"
"net/netip"
"time"
"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
)
@@ -20,43 +19,6 @@ func buildPresharedKeyConfig(peerKey wgtypes.Key, psk wgtypes.Key, updateOnly bo
}
}
// buildIdlePeerEndpointConfig creates a config that removes and re-creates a peer in a
// single transaction with the given allowed IPs, endpoint and disabled keepalive.
func buildIdlePeerEndpointConfig(peerKey wgtypes.Key, allowedIPs []netip.Prefix, endpoint *net.UDPAddr) wgtypes.Config {
keepAlive := time.Duration(0)
return wgtypes.Config{
Peers: []wgtypes.PeerConfig{
{
PublicKey: peerKey,
Remove: true,
},
{
PublicKey: peerKey,
AllowedIPs: prefixesToIPNets(allowedIPs),
Endpoint: endpoint,
PersistentKeepaliveInterval: &keepAlive,
},
},
}
}
// mergePrefixes returns the union of the two prefix lists, keeping the original order and
// dropping duplicates.
func mergePrefixes(current, base []netip.Prefix) []netip.Prefix {
merged := make([]netip.Prefix, 0, len(current)+len(base))
seen := make(map[netip.Prefix]struct{}, len(current)+len(base))
for _, group := range [][]netip.Prefix{current, base} {
for _, prefix := range group {
if _, ok := seen[prefix]; ok {
continue
}
seen[prefix] = struct{}{}
merged = append(merged, prefix)
}
}
return merged
}
func prefixesToIPNets(prefixes []netip.Prefix) []net.IPNet {
ipNets := make([]net.IPNet, len(prefixes))
for i, prefix := range prefixes {

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
package configurer
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/netip"
@@ -146,39 +145,6 @@ func (c *KernelConfigurer) RemovePeer(peerKey string) error {
return nil
}
// IdlePeerEndpoint re-creates the peer pointing at the lazy wake endpoint, dropping
// handshake state while preserving the peer's currently installed allowed IPs.
func (c *KernelConfigurer) IdlePeerEndpoint(peerKey string, allowedIPs []netip.Prefix, endpoint *net.UDPAddr) error {
peerKeyParsed, err := wgtypes.ParseKey(peerKey)
if err != nil {
return err
}
var current []netip.Prefix
existing, err := c.getPeer(c.deviceName, peerKey)
switch {
case errors.Is(err, ErrPeerNotFound):
case err != nil:
return fmt.Errorf("get peer: %w", err)
default:
for _, ipNet := range existing.AllowedIPs {
addr, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(ipNet.IP)
if !ok {
log.Warnf("failed to convert allowed IP %s of peer %s", ipNet.String(), peerKey)
continue
}
ones, _ := ipNet.Mask.Size()
current = append(current, netip.PrefixFrom(addr.Unmap(), ones))
}
}
config := buildIdlePeerEndpointConfig(peerKeyParsed, mergePrefixes(current, allowedIPs), endpoint)
if err := c.configure(config); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(`received error "%w" while setting idle endpoint for peer %s on interface %s`, err, peerKey, c.deviceName)
}
return nil
}
func (c *KernelConfigurer) AddAllowedIP(peerKey string, allowedIP netip.Prefix) error {
ipNet := net.IPNet{
IP: allowedIP.Addr().AsSlice(),

View File

@@ -210,64 +210,6 @@ func (c *WGUSPConfigurer) RemovePeer(peerKey string) error {
return ipcErr
}
// IdlePeerEndpoint re-creates the peer pointing at the lazy wake endpoint, dropping
// handshake state while preserving the peer's currently installed allowed IPs.
func (c *WGUSPConfigurer) IdlePeerEndpoint(peerKey string, allowedIPs []netip.Prefix, endpoint *net.UDPAddr) error {
peerKeyParsed, err := wgtypes.ParseKey(peerKey)
if err != nil {
return err
}
current, err := c.currentAllowedIPs(hex.EncodeToString(peerKeyParsed[:]))
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("get current allowed IPs: %w", err)
}
config := buildIdlePeerEndpointConfig(peerKeyParsed, mergePrefixes(current, allowedIPs), endpoint)
if err := c.device.IpcSet(toWgUserspaceString(config)); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("set idle peer endpoint: %w", err)
}
if endpoint != nil {
addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(endpoint.IP.String())
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("parse endpoint address: %w", err)
}
c.activityRecorder.UpsertAddress(peerKey, netip.AddrPortFrom(addr.Unmap(), uint16(endpoint.Port)))
}
return nil
}
// currentAllowedIPs returns the allowed IPs currently installed for the peer identified by
// its hex-encoded public key. It returns an empty list when the peer does not exist.
func (c *WGUSPConfigurer) currentAllowedIPs(hexKey string) ([]netip.Prefix, error) {
ipc, err := c.device.IpcGet()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var prefixes []netip.Prefix
foundPeer := false
for _, line := range strings.Split(ipc, "\n") {
line = strings.TrimSpace(line)
if strings.HasPrefix(line, "public_key=") {
foundPeer = line == "public_key="+hexKey
continue
}
if !foundPeer || !strings.HasPrefix(line, "allowed_ip=") {
continue
}
prefix, err := netip.ParsePrefix(strings.TrimPrefix(line, "allowed_ip="))
if err != nil {
log.Warnf("failed to parse allowed IP %q: %v", line, err)
continue
}
prefixes = append(prefixes, prefix)
}
return prefixes, nil
}
func (c *WGUSPConfigurer) AddAllowedIP(peerKey string, allowedIP netip.Prefix) error {
ipNet := net.IPNet{
IP: allowedIP.Addr().AsSlice(),

View File

@@ -1,158 +0,0 @@
package configurer
import (
"encoding/hex"
"net"
"net/netip"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
wgconn "golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/conn"
"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/device"
"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/tun/netstack"
"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/bind"
)
// newTestConfigurer creates a configurer backed by an in-memory wireguard-go device.
func newTestConfigurer(t *testing.T) *WGUSPConfigurer {
t.Helper()
tunDev, _, err := netstack.CreateNetTUN([]netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1")}, []netip.Addr{}, 1280)
require.NoError(t, err)
wgDev := device.NewDevice(tunDev, wgconn.NewDefaultBind(), device.NewLogger(device.LogLevelSilent, "[test] "))
t.Cleanup(wgDev.Close)
c := NewUSPConfigurerNoUAPI(wgDev, "utun-test", bind.NewActivityRecorder())
key, err := wgtypes.GeneratePrivateKey()
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, c.ConfigureInterface(key.String(), 0))
return c
}
// peerAllowedIPs returns the allowed IPs currently installed for the given peer.
func peerAllowedIPs(t *testing.T, c *WGUSPConfigurer, pubKey string) []string {
t.Helper()
var ips []string
for _, line := range peerIpcLines(t, c, pubKey) {
if strings.HasPrefix(line, "allowed_ip=") {
ips = append(ips, strings.TrimPrefix(line, "allowed_ip="))
}
}
return ips
}
// peerEndpoint returns the endpoint currently installed for the given peer.
func peerEndpoint(t *testing.T, c *WGUSPConfigurer, pubKey string) string {
t.Helper()
for _, line := range peerIpcLines(t, c, pubKey) {
if strings.HasPrefix(line, "endpoint=") {
return strings.TrimPrefix(line, "endpoint=")
}
}
return ""
}
// peerIpcLines returns the uapi config lines belonging to the given peer.
func peerIpcLines(t *testing.T, c *WGUSPConfigurer, pubKey string) []string {
t.Helper()
key, err := wgtypes.ParseKey(pubKey)
require.NoError(t, err)
hexKey := hex.EncodeToString(key[:])
ipc, err := c.device.IpcGet()
require.NoError(t, err)
var lines []string
inPeer := false
for _, line := range strings.Split(ipc, "\n") {
line = strings.TrimSpace(line)
if strings.HasPrefix(line, "public_key=") {
inPeer = line == "public_key="+hexKey
continue
}
if inPeer && line != "" {
lines = append(lines, line)
}
}
return lines
}
// TestUSPConfigurer_IdlePeerEndpointPreservesAllowedIPs verifies the invariant the lazy idle
// transition relies on: IdlePeerEndpoint re-creates the peer (dropping handshake state via the
// remove+add transaction) while keeping every installed allowed IP, including routed
// prefixes added later by the route manager, and points the endpoint at the wake listener.
func TestUSPConfigurer_IdlePeerEndpointPreservesAllowedIPs(t *testing.T) {
c := newTestConfigurer(t)
peerKey, err := wgtypes.GeneratePrivateKey()
require.NoError(t, err)
pubKey := peerKey.PublicKey().String()
overlay := netip.MustParsePrefix("100.64.0.5/32")
routed := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.99.0.0/24")
realEndpoint := &net.UDPAddr{IP: net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1"), Port: 51821}
require.NoError(t, c.UpdatePeer(pubKey, []netip.Prefix{overlay}, 25*time.Second, realEndpoint, nil))
require.NoError(t, c.AddAllowedIP(pubKey, routed))
ips := peerAllowedIPs(t, c, pubKey)
require.Contains(t, ips, overlay.String(), "overlay prefix must be installed before the idle endpoint swap")
require.Contains(t, ips, routed.String(), "routed prefix must be installed before the idle endpoint swap")
wakeEndpoint := &net.UDPAddr{IP: net.ParseIP("127.2.0.5"), Port: 17473}
require.NoError(t, c.IdlePeerEndpoint(pubKey, []netip.Prefix{overlay}, wakeEndpoint))
ips = peerAllowedIPs(t, c, pubKey)
assert.Contains(t, ips, routed.String(), "routed prefix must survive the idle endpoint swap")
assert.Contains(t, ips, overlay.String(), "overlay prefix must survive the idle endpoint swap")
assert.Equal(t, "127.2.0.5:17473", peerEndpoint(t, c, pubKey), "endpoint must point at the wake listener after the idle endpoint swap")
}
// TestUSPConfigurer_IdlePeerEndpointCreatesMissingPeer verifies the cold-start arm path: when the
// peer does not exist yet (never connected), IdlePeerEndpoint creates it with the given base
// allowed IPs and the wake endpoint.
func TestUSPConfigurer_IdlePeerEndpointCreatesMissingPeer(t *testing.T) {
c := newTestConfigurer(t)
peerKey, err := wgtypes.GeneratePrivateKey()
require.NoError(t, err)
pubKey := peerKey.PublicKey().String()
overlay := netip.MustParsePrefix("100.64.0.5/32")
wakeEndpoint := &net.UDPAddr{IP: net.ParseIP("127.2.0.5"), Port: 17473}
require.NoError(t, c.IdlePeerEndpoint(pubKey, []netip.Prefix{overlay}, wakeEndpoint))
assert.Equal(t, []string{overlay.String()}, peerAllowedIPs(t, c, pubKey), "missing peer must be created with the base allowed IPs")
assert.Equal(t, "127.2.0.5:17473", peerEndpoint(t, c, pubKey), "missing peer must be created with the wake endpoint")
}
// TestUSPConfigurer_AddAllowedIPOnMissingPeerIsSilentNoOp documents the wireguard-go
// behavior the removed-peer idle flow raced against: AddAllowedIP uses update_only,
// which is a silent no-op when the peer does not exist. The idle transition must
// therefore keep the WireGuard peer (Conn.Idle + IdlePeerEndpoint) instead of leaving a
// window where the peer is absent.
func TestUSPConfigurer_AddAllowedIPOnMissingPeerIsSilentNoOp(t *testing.T) {
c := newTestConfigurer(t)
peerKey, err := wgtypes.GeneratePrivateKey()
require.NoError(t, err)
pubKey := peerKey.PublicKey().String()
routed := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.99.0.0/24")
require.NoError(t, c.AddAllowedIP(pubKey, routed), "update-only on a missing peer must not return an error")
assert.Empty(t, peerIpcLines(t, c, pubKey), "update-only call must not create the peer")
}

View File

@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ type WGConfigurer interface {
ConfigureInterface(privateKey string, port int) error
UpdatePeer(peerKey string, allowedIps []netip.Prefix, keepAlive time.Duration, endpoint *net.UDPAddr, preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key) error
RemovePeer(peerKey string) error
IdlePeerEndpoint(peerKey string, allowedIPs []netip.Prefix, endpoint *net.UDPAddr) error
AddAllowedIP(peerKey string, allowedIP netip.Prefix) error
RemoveAllowedIP(peerKey string, allowedIP netip.Prefix) error
SetPresharedKey(peerKey string, psk wgtypes.Key, updateOnly bool) error

View File

@@ -184,19 +184,6 @@ func (w *WGIface) RemovePeer(peerKey string) error {
return w.configurer.RemovePeer(peerKey)
}
// IdlePeerEndpoint re-creates the peer pointing at the lazy wake endpoint, dropping
// handshake state while preserving the peer's currently installed allowed IPs.
func (w *WGIface) IdlePeerEndpoint(peerKey string, allowedIPs []netip.Prefix, endpoint *net.UDPAddr) error {
w.mu.Lock()
defer w.mu.Unlock()
if w.configurer == nil {
return ErrIfaceNotFound
}
log.Debugf("Resetting peer on interface %s: %s, endpoint %s", w.tun.DeviceName(), peerKey, endpoint)
return w.configurer.IdlePeerEndpoint(peerKey, allowedIPs, endpoint)
}
// AddAllowedIP adds a prefix to the allowed IPs list of peer
func (w *WGIface) AddAllowedIP(peerKey string, allowedIP netip.Prefix) error {
w.mu.Lock()

View File

@@ -3,31 +3,14 @@
package netstack
import (
"net"
"fmt"
"os"
"strconv"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
)
const (
EnvUseNetstackMode = "NB_USE_NETSTACK_MODE"
// EnvSocks5ListenerPort overrides the port the SOCKS5 proxy listens on.
EnvSocks5ListenerPort = "NB_SOCKS5_LISTENER_PORT"
// EnvSocks5ListenerAddress overrides the host/IP the SOCKS5 proxy binds to.
// The proxy is a bridge for local host applications into the userspace
// WireGuard netstack, so it binds to loopback by default. Override this only
// when the proxy must be reachable from other hosts (e.g. a container
// gateway); doing so exposes an unauthenticated SOCKS5 proxy on that
// address.
EnvSocks5ListenerAddress = "NB_SOCKS5_LISTENER_ADDRESS"
// defaultSocks5Host is the loopback address the SOCKS5 proxy binds to unless
// overridden via EnvSocks5ListenerAddress.
defaultSocks5Host = "127.0.0.1"
)
const EnvUseNetstackMode = "NB_USE_NETSTACK_MODE"
// IsEnabled todo: move these function to cmd layer
func IsEnabled() bool {
@@ -35,40 +18,24 @@ func IsEnabled() bool {
}
func ListenAddr() string {
return net.JoinHostPort(listenHost(), strconv.Itoa(listenPort()))
}
// listenHost returns the host/IP the SOCKS5 proxy binds to. It defaults to
// loopback and only honors EnvSocks5ListenerAddress when it holds a valid IP.
func listenHost() string {
addr := os.Getenv(EnvSocks5ListenerAddress)
if addr == "" {
return defaultSocks5Host
}
if net.ParseIP(addr) == nil {
log.Warnf("invalid socks5 listener address %q, falling back to default: %s", addr, defaultSocks5Host)
return defaultSocks5Host
}
return addr
}
// listenPort returns the port the SOCKS5 proxy binds to, defaulting to
// DefaultSocks5Port when EnvSocks5ListenerPort is unset or invalid.
func listenPort() int {
sPort := os.Getenv(EnvSocks5ListenerPort)
sPort := os.Getenv("NB_SOCKS5_LISTENER_PORT")
if sPort == "" {
return DefaultSocks5Port
return listenAddr(DefaultSocks5Port)
}
port, err := strconv.Atoi(sPort)
if err != nil {
log.Warnf("invalid socks5 listener port, unable to convert it to int, falling back to default: %d", DefaultSocks5Port)
return DefaultSocks5Port
return listenAddr(DefaultSocks5Port)
}
if port < 1 || port > 65535 {
log.Warnf("invalid socks5 listener port, it should be in the range 1-65535, falling back to default: %d", DefaultSocks5Port)
return DefaultSocks5Port
return listenAddr(DefaultSocks5Port)
}
return port
return listenAddr(port)
}
func listenAddr(port int) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("0.0.0.0:%d", port)
}

View File

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
//go:build !js
package netstack
import (
"net"
"strconv"
"testing"
)
func TestListenAddr_DefaultsToLoopback(t *testing.T) {
// No env overrides: must bind loopback, never all interfaces.
got := ListenAddr()
want := net.JoinHostPort("127.0.0.1", strconv.Itoa(DefaultSocks5Port))
if got != want {
t.Fatalf("ListenAddr() = %q, want %q", got, want)
}
}
func TestListenAddr_AddressOverride(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
env string
want string
}{
{name: "valid override honored", env: "0.0.0.0", want: "0.0.0.0"},
{name: "valid specific ip honored", env: "10.0.0.5", want: "10.0.0.5"},
{name: "ipv6 loopback bracketed", env: "::1", want: "::1"},
{name: "invalid falls back to loopback", env: "not-an-ip", want: "127.0.0.1"},
{name: "empty falls back to loopback", env: "", want: "127.0.0.1"},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(EnvSocks5ListenerAddress, tc.env)
want := net.JoinHostPort(tc.want, strconv.Itoa(DefaultSocks5Port))
if got := ListenAddr(); got != want {
t.Fatalf("ListenAddr() = %q, want %q", got, want)
}
})
}
}
func TestListenAddr_PortOverride(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
env string
want int
}{
{name: "valid port honored", env: "1081", want: 1081},
{name: "non-numeric falls back", env: "abc", want: DefaultSocks5Port},
{name: "out of range falls back", env: "70000", want: DefaultSocks5Port},
{name: "zero falls back", env: "0", want: DefaultSocks5Port},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(EnvSocks5ListenerPort, tc.env)
want := net.JoinHostPort("127.0.0.1", strconv.Itoa(tc.want))
if got := ListenAddr(); got != want {
t.Fatalf("ListenAddr() = %q, want %q", got, want)
}
})
}
}

View File

@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ func (d *DeviceAuthorizationFlow) WaitToken(ctx context.Context, info AuthFlowIn
UseIDToken: d.providerConfig.UseIDToken,
}
err = validateTokenAudience(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), d.providerConfig.Audience)
err = isValidAccessToken(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), d.providerConfig.Audience)
if err != nil {
return TokenInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("validate access token failed with error: %v", err)
}

View File

@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) parseOAuthToken(token *oauth2.Token) (TokenInfo,
audience = p.providerConfig.ClientID
}
if err := validateTokenAudience(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), audience); err != nil {
if err := isValidAccessToken(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), audience); err != nil {
return TokenInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("authentication failed: invalid access token - %w", err)
}
@@ -320,11 +320,6 @@ func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) parseOAuthToken(token *oauth2.Token) (TokenInfo,
return tokenInfo, nil
}
// parseEmailFromIDToken extracts the email (or name) claim from an ID token
// without verifying its signature. The value is best-effort and used only as a
// UX convenience (login hint prefill and display); it never drives an
// authorization decision. The authoritative identity is established server-side
// from the signature-verified token.
func parseEmailFromIDToken(token string) (string, error) {
parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
if len(parts) < 2 {

View File

@@ -20,26 +20,14 @@ func randomBytesInHex(count int) (string, error) {
return hex.EncodeToString(buf), nil
}
// validateTokenAudience checks that the token is a well-formed JWT whose
// audience claim matches the expected audience.
//
// It does NOT verify the token's cryptographic signature and therefore must not
// be treated as an authenticity check. The token is obtained by the client
// directly from the IdP token endpoint over TLS, and its signature is verified
// server-side by the management server against the IdP's JWKS
// (see shared/auth/jwt/validator.go). This function is only a client-side
// sanity check that the returned token targets the expected audience.
func validateTokenAudience(token string, audience string) error {
// isValidAccessToken is a simple validation of the access token
func isValidAccessToken(token string, audience string) error {
if token == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("token received is empty")
}
parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
if len(parts) != 3 {
return fmt.Errorf("token is not a well-formed JWT")
}
claimsString, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1])
encodedClaims := strings.Split(token, ".")[1]
claimsString, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(encodedClaims)
if err != nil {
return err
}

View File

@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
package auth
import (
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"testing"
)
// makeJWT builds an unsigned JWT-shaped string (header.payload.signature) with
// the given claims payload. The signature part is arbitrary because
// validateTokenAudience intentionally does not verify it.
func makeJWT(t *testing.T, claims map[string]interface{}) string {
t.Helper()
header := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(`{"alg":"RS256","typ":"JWT"}`))
payloadBytes, err := json.Marshal(claims)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("marshal claims: %v", err)
}
payload := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(payloadBytes)
return header + "." + payload + ".unverified-signature"
}
func TestValidateTokenAudience(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
token string
audience string
wantErr bool
}{
{
name: "empty token",
token: "",
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "not a JWT - no dots",
token: "notajwt",
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "not a JWT - two parts only",
token: "header.payload",
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "matching string audience",
token: makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": "netbird"}),
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: false,
},
{
name: "mismatching string audience",
token: makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": "other"}),
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "matching audience in array",
token: makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": []interface{}{"other", "netbird"}}),
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: false,
},
{
name: "mismatching audience array",
token: makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": []interface{}{"a", "b"}}),
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "missing audience claim",
token: makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"sub": "user"}),
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "invalid base64 payload",
token: "header.!!!not-base64!!!.sig",
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: true,
},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
err := validateTokenAudience(tc.token, tc.audience)
if tc.wantErr && err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected error, got nil")
}
if !tc.wantErr && err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected no error, got %v", err)
}
})
}
}
// TestValidateTokenAudienceNoPanic guards the regression where a non-empty
// token without the JWT dot structure caused an index-out-of-range panic.
func TestValidateTokenAudienceNoPanic(t *testing.T) {
inputs := []string{"a", ".", "a.", "aaaa", "no-dots-here"}
for _, in := range inputs {
if err := validateTokenAudience(in, "netbird"); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected error for malformed token %q, got nil", in)
}
}
}

View File

@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) RemovePeerConn(peerKey string) {
if !ok {
return
}
defer conn.Close()
defer conn.Close(false)
if !e.isStartedWithLazyMgr() {
return

View File

@@ -480,6 +480,7 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addStatus() error {
fullStatus := g.statusRecorder.GetFullStatus()
protoFullStatus := nbstatus.ToProtoFullStatus(fullStatus)
protoFullStatus.Events = g.statusRecorder.GetEventHistory()
overview := nbstatus.ConvertToStatusOutputOverview(protoFullStatus, nbstatus.ConvertOptions{
Anonymize: g.anonymize,
ProfileName: profName,

View File

@@ -292,16 +292,18 @@ func (s *serviceViaListener) generateFreePort() (uint16, error) {
return customPort, nil
}
probeListener, err := net.ListenUDP("udp4", &net.UDPAddr{})
udpAddr := net.UDPAddrFromAddrPort(netip.MustParseAddrPort("0.0.0.0:0"))
probeListener, err := net.ListenUDP("udp", udpAddr)
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("failed to bind random port for DNS: %s", err)
return 0, err
}
port := uint16(probeListener.LocalAddr().(*net.UDPAddr).Port)
if err = probeListener.Close(); err != nil {
addrPort := netip.MustParseAddrPort(probeListener.LocalAddr().String()) // might panic if address is incorrect
err = probeListener.Close()
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("failed to free up DNS port: %s", err)
return 0, err
}
return port, nil
return addrPort.Port(), nil
}

View File

@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/guard"
icemaker "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/ice"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/signaling"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peerstore"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/portforward"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
@@ -182,7 +183,7 @@ type EngineServices struct {
type Engine struct {
// signal is a Signal Service client
signal signal.Client
signaler *peer.Signaler
signaler *signaling.Signaler
// mgmClient is a Management Service client
mgmClient mgm.Client
// peerConns is a map that holds all the peers that are known to this peer
@@ -318,7 +319,7 @@ func NewEngine(
ctx: ctx,
cancel: cancel,
signal: services.SignalClient,
signaler: peer.NewSignaler(services.SignalClient, config.WgPrivateKey),
signaler: signaling.NewSignaler(services.SignalClient, config.WgPrivateKey),
mgmClient: services.MgmClient,
relayManager: services.RelayManager,
peerStore: peerstore.NewConnStore(),
@@ -1778,7 +1779,7 @@ func (e *Engine) addNewPeer(peerConfig *mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig) error {
}
if exists := e.connMgr.AddPeerConn(e.ctx, peerKey, conn); exists {
conn.Close()
conn.Close(false)
return fmt.Errorf("peer already exists: %s", peerKey)
}
@@ -2605,14 +2606,13 @@ func (e *Engine) updateForwardRules(rules []*mgmProto.ForwardingRule) ([]firewal
func (e *Engine) toExcludedLazyPeers(rules []firewallManager.ForwardRule, peers []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig) map[string]bool {
excludedPeers := make(map[string]bool)
// Ingress forward targets: inbound forwarded traffic is initiated remotely and
// cannot wake a lazy connection, so the peer routing the target must stay
// permanently connected. AllowedIPs are already parsed on the peer conn, so
// reuse those typed prefixes instead of re-parsing the network map strings.
for _, r := range rules {
ip := r.TranslatedAddress
for _, p := range peers {
if e.peerRoutesAddr(p, r.TranslatedAddress) {
for _, allowedIP := range p.GetAllowedIps() {
if allowedIP != ip.String() {
continue
}
log.Infof("exclude forwarder peer from lazy connection: %s", p.GetWgPubKey())
excludedPeers[p.GetWgPubKey()] = true
}
@@ -2622,27 +2622,6 @@ func (e *Engine) toExcludedLazyPeers(rules []firewallManager.ForwardRule, peers
return excludedPeers
}
// peerRoutesAddr reports whether the peer is a router for addr, matched against
// the peer's already-parsed AllowedIPs from the store (the same typed value the
// lazy manager consumes) rather than re-parsing the network map strings.
func (e *Engine) peerRoutesAddr(p *mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig, addr netip.Addr) bool {
prefixes, ok := e.peerStore.AllowedIPs(p.GetWgPubKey())
if !ok {
return false
}
return prefixesContain(prefixes, addr)
}
// prefixesContain reports whether addr falls within any of the prefixes.
func prefixesContain(prefixes []netip.Prefix, addr netip.Addr) bool {
for _, prefix := range prefixes {
if prefix.Contains(addr) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// isChecksEqual checks if two slices of checks are equal.
func isChecksEqual(checks1, checks2 []*mgmProto.Checks) bool {
normalize := func(checks []*mgmProto.Checks) []string {
@@ -2769,7 +2748,7 @@ func createFile(path string) error {
return file.Close()
}
func convertToOfferAnswer(msg *sProto.Message) (*peer.OfferAnswer, error) {
func convertToOfferAnswer(msg *sProto.Message) (*signaling.OfferAnswer, error) {
remoteCred, err := signal.UnMarshalCredential(msg)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -2785,9 +2764,9 @@ func convertToOfferAnswer(msg *sProto.Message) (*peer.OfferAnswer, error) {
}
// Handle optional SessionID
var sessionID *peer.ICESessionID
var sessionID *icemaker.SessionID
if sessionBytes := msg.GetBody().GetSessionId(); sessionBytes != nil {
if id, err := peer.ICESessionIDFromBytes(sessionBytes); err != nil {
if id, err := icemaker.SessionIDFromBytes(sessionBytes); err != nil {
log.Warnf("Invalid session ID in message: %v", err)
sessionID = nil // Set to nil if conversion fails
} else {
@@ -2797,8 +2776,8 @@ func convertToOfferAnswer(msg *sProto.Message) (*peer.OfferAnswer, error) {
relayIP := decodeRelayIP(msg.GetBody().GetRelayServerIP())
offerAnswer := peer.OfferAnswer{
IceCredentials: peer.IceCredentials{
offerAnswer := signaling.OfferAnswer{
IceCredentials: signaling.IceCredentials{
UFrag: remoteCred.UFrag,
Pwd: remoteCred.Pwd,
},

View File

@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
package internal
import (
"net/netip"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
firewallManager "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peerstore"
mgmProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
)
func TestPrefixesContain(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
prefixes []string
addr string
want bool
}{
{name: "own overlay /32 matches", prefixes: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}, addr: "100.110.8.145", want: true},
{name: "addr inside routed subnet", prefixes: []string{"10.121.0.0/16"}, addr: "10.121.208.4", want: true},
{name: "addr outside subnet", prefixes: []string{"10.121.0.0/16"}, addr: "10.122.0.1", want: false},
{name: "different /32", prefixes: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}, addr: "100.110.8.146", want: false},
{name: "ipv6 /128 matches", prefixes: []string{"fd00::1/128"}, addr: "fd00::1", want: true},
{name: "no prefixes", prefixes: nil, addr: "10.121.208.4", want: false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
prefixes := make([]netip.Prefix, 0, len(tt.prefixes))
for _, p := range tt.prefixes {
prefixes = append(prefixes, netip.MustParsePrefix(p))
}
require.Equal(t, tt.want, prefixesContain(prefixes, netip.MustParseAddr(tt.addr)))
})
}
}
// TestToExcludedLazyPeers_ForwardTarget guards a regression: the forward-target
// peer (the peer routing a ForwardRule.TranslatedAddress) must be excluded from
// lazy connections, matched via the peer's already-parsed AllowedIPs.
func TestToExcludedLazyPeers_ForwardTarget(t *testing.T) {
const targetPeerKey = "cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc0="
const otherPeerKey = "dddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd0="
store := peerstore.NewConnStore()
store.AddPeerConn(targetPeerKey, newTestConn(t, targetPeerKey, "100.110.8.145/32"))
store.AddPeerConn(otherPeerKey, newTestConn(t, otherPeerKey, "100.110.9.10/32"))
e := &Engine{peerStore: store}
peers := []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig{
{WgPubKey: targetPeerKey, AllowedIps: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}},
{WgPubKey: otherPeerKey, AllowedIps: []string{"100.110.9.10/32"}},
}
rules := []firewallManager.ForwardRule{
{TranslatedAddress: netip.MustParseAddr("100.110.8.145")},
}
excluded := e.toExcludedLazyPeers(rules, peers)
require.True(t, excluded[targetPeerKey], "forward-target peer must be excluded from lazy connections")
require.False(t, excluded[otherPeerKey], "non-target peer must not be excluded")
require.Len(t, excluded, 1)
}
func TestToExcludedLazyPeers_NoRules(t *testing.T) {
e := &Engine{peerStore: peerstore.NewConnStore()}
peers := []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig{
{WgPubKey: "peer-a", AllowedIps: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}},
}
require.Empty(t, e.toExcludedLazyPeers(nil, peers))
}
func newTestConn(t *testing.T, key, allowedIP string) *peer.Conn {
t.Helper()
conn, err := peer.NewConn(peer.ConnConfig{
Key: key,
WgConfig: peer.WgConfig{AllowedIps: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix(allowedIP)}},
}, peer.ServiceDependencies{})
require.NoError(t, err)
return conn
}

View File

@@ -53,7 +53,6 @@ type MockWGIface struct {
UpdateAddrFunc func(newAddr wgaddr.Address) error
UpdatePeerFunc func(peerKey string, allowedIps []netip.Prefix, keepAlive time.Duration, endpoint *net.UDPAddr, preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key) error
RemovePeerFunc func(peerKey string) error
IdlePeerEndpointFunc func(peerKey string, allowedIPs []netip.Prefix, endpoint *net.UDPAddr) error
AddAllowedIPFunc func(peerKey string, allowedIP netip.Prefix) error
RemoveAllowedIPFunc func(peerKey string, allowedIP netip.Prefix) error
CloseFunc func() error
@@ -125,13 +124,6 @@ func (m *MockWGIface) RemovePeer(peerKey string) error {
return m.RemovePeerFunc(peerKey)
}
func (m *MockWGIface) IdlePeerEndpoint(peerKey string, allowedIPs []netip.Prefix, endpoint *net.UDPAddr) error {
if m.IdlePeerEndpointFunc == nil {
return nil
}
return m.IdlePeerEndpointFunc(peerKey, allowedIPs, endpoint)
}
func (m *MockWGIface) AddAllowedIP(peerKey string, allowedIP netip.Prefix) error {
return m.AddAllowedIPFunc(peerKey, allowedIP)
}

View File

@@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ type wgIfaceBase interface {
UpdatePeer(peerKey string, allowedIps []netip.Prefix, keepAlive time.Duration, endpoint *net.UDPAddr, preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key) error
RemoveEndpointAddress(key string) error
RemovePeer(peerKey string) error
IdlePeerEndpoint(peerKey string, allowedIPs []netip.Prefix, endpoint *net.UDPAddr) error
AddAllowedIP(peerKey string, allowedIP netip.Prefix) error
RemoveAllowedIP(peerKey string, allowedIP netip.Prefix) error
Close() error

View File

@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ func (d *BindListener) setupLazyConn() error {
IP: d.fakeIP.AsSlice(),
Port: lazyBindPort,
}
return d.wgIface.IdlePeerEndpoint(d.peerCfg.PublicKey, d.peerCfg.AllowedIPs, endpoint)
return d.wgIface.UpdatePeer(d.peerCfg.PublicKey, d.peerCfg.AllowedIPs, 0, endpoint, nil)
}
// ReadPackets blocks until activity is detected on the LazyConn or the listener is closed.

View File

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/device"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
@@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ type MockWGIfaceBind struct {
endpointMgr *mockEndpointManager
}
func (m *MockWGIfaceBind) IdlePeerEndpoint(string, []netip.Prefix, *net.UDPAddr) error {
func (m *MockWGIfaceBind) UpdatePeer(string, []netip.Prefix, time.Duration, *net.UDPAddr, *wgtypes.Key) error {
return nil
}

View File

@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ func (d *UDPListener) Close() {
func (d *UDPListener) createEndpoint() error {
d.peerCfg.Log.Debugf("creating lazy endpoint: %s", d.endpoint.String())
return d.wgIface.IdlePeerEndpoint(d.peerCfg.PublicKey, d.peerCfg.AllowedIPs, d.endpoint)
return d.wgIface.UpdatePeer(d.peerCfg.PublicKey, d.peerCfg.AllowedIPs, 0, d.endpoint, nil)
}
func (d *UDPListener) newConn() (*net.UDPConn, error) {

View File

@@ -5,8 +5,10 @@ import (
"net"
"net/netip"
"sync"
"time"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/lazyconn"
@@ -28,7 +30,7 @@ type Event struct {
}
type WgInterface interface {
IdlePeerEndpoint(peerKey string, allowedIPs []netip.Prefix, endpoint *net.UDPAddr) error
UpdatePeer(peerKey string, allowedIps []netip.Prefix, keepAlive time.Duration, endpoint *net.UDPAddr, preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key) error
IsUserspaceBind() bool
Address() wgaddr.Address
MTU() uint16

View File

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
"time"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/lazyconn"
@@ -25,7 +26,7 @@ func (m *MocPeer) ConnID() peerid.ConnID {
type MocWGIface struct {
}
func (m MocWGIface) IdlePeerEndpoint(string, []netip.Prefix, *net.UDPAddr) error {
func (m MocWGIface) UpdatePeer(string, []netip.Prefix, time.Duration, *net.UDPAddr, *wgtypes.Key) error {
return nil
}

View File

@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ func (m *Manager) DeactivatePeer(peerID peerid.ConnID) {
return
}
m.peerStore.PeerConnIdle(mp.peerCfg.PublicKey, false)
m.peerStore.PeerConnClose(mp.peerCfg.PublicKey)
mp.peerCfg.Log.Infof("start activity monitor")
@@ -569,7 +569,7 @@ func (m *Manager) onPeerInactivityTimedOut(peerIDs map[string]struct{}) {
mp.peerCfg.Log.Infof("connection timed out")
// this is blocking operation, potentially can be optimized
m.peerStore.PeerConnIdle(mp.peerCfg.PublicKey, true)
m.peerStore.PeerConnIdle(mp.peerCfg.PublicKey)
mp.expectedWatcher = watcherActivity

View File

@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@ package lazyconn
import (
"net"
"net/netip"
"time"
"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/monotime"
@@ -10,7 +13,7 @@ import (
type WGIface interface {
RemovePeer(peerKey string) error
IdlePeerEndpoint(peerKey string, allowedIPs []netip.Prefix, endpoint *net.UDPAddr) error
UpdatePeer(peerKey string, allowedIps []netip.Prefix, keepAlive time.Duration, endpoint *net.UDPAddr, preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key) error
IsUserspaceBind() bool
Address() wgaddr.Address
LastActivities() map[string]monotime.Time

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -1,18 +1,5 @@
package peer
import (
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
)
const (
// StatusIdle indicate the peer is in disconnected state
StatusIdle ConnStatus = iota
// StatusConnecting indicate the peer is in connecting state
StatusConnecting
// StatusConnected indicate the peer is in connected state
StatusConnected
)
// connStatusInputs is the primitive-valued snapshot of the state that drives the
// tri-state connection classification. Extracted so the decision logic can be unit-tested
// without constructing full Worker/Handshaker objects.
@@ -21,24 +8,7 @@ type connStatusInputs struct {
peerUsesRelay bool // remote peer advertises relay support AND local has relay
relayConnected bool // statusRelay reports Connected (independent of whether peer uses relay)
remoteSupportsICE bool // remote peer sent ICE credentials
iceWorkerCreated bool // local WorkerICE exists (false in force-relay mode)
iceWorkerCreated bool // local ICE worker exists (false in force-relay mode)
iceStatusConnecting bool // statusICE is anything other than Disconnected
iceInProgress bool // a negotiation is currently in flight
}
// ConnStatus describe the status of a peer's connection
type ConnStatus int32
func (s ConnStatus) String() string {
switch s {
case StatusConnecting:
return "Connecting"
case StatusConnected:
return "Connected"
case StatusIdle:
return "Idle"
default:
log.Errorf("unknown status: %d", s)
return "INVALID_PEER_CONNECTION_STATUS"
}
}

View File

@@ -3,28 +3,33 @@ package peer
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"net/netip"
"os"
"testing"
"time"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/dispatcher"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/guard"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/ice"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/metricsstages"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/signaling"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/status"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/stdnet"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
)
var testDispatcher = dispatcher.NewConnectionDispatcher()
var connConf = ConnConfig{
Key: "LLHf3Ma6z6mdLbriAJbqhX7+nM/B71lgw2+91q3LfhU=",
LocalKey: "RRHf3Ma6z6mdLbriAJbqhX7+nM/B71lgw2+91q3LfhU=",
Timeout: time.Second,
LocalWgPort: 51820,
WgConfig: WgConfig{
AllowedIps: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("100.64.0.1/32")},
},
ICEConfig: ice.Config{
InterfaceBlackList: nil,
},
@@ -52,92 +57,37 @@ func TestConn_GetKey(t *testing.T) {
swWatcher := guard.NewSRWatcher(nil, nil, nil, connConf.ICEConfig)
sd := ServiceDependencies{
SrWatcher: swWatcher,
PeerConnDispatcher: testDispatcher,
SrWatcher: swWatcher,
}
conn, err := NewConn(connConf, sd)
if err != nil {
return
}
require.NoError(t, err)
got := conn.GetKey()
assert.Equal(t, got, connConf.Key, "they should be equal")
}
func TestConn_OnRemoteOffer(t *testing.T) {
// TestConn_DiscardMessagesWhenNotOpened: signal messages posted to a not yet
// opened connection must be discarded without blocking or panicking.
func TestConn_DiscardMessagesWhenNotOpened(t *testing.T) {
swWatcher := guard.NewSRWatcher(nil, nil, nil, connConf.ICEConfig)
sd := ServiceDependencies{
StatusRecorder: NewRecorder("https://mgm"),
SrWatcher: swWatcher,
PeerConnDispatcher: testDispatcher,
StatusRecorder: status.NewRecorder("https://mgm"),
SrWatcher: swWatcher,
}
conn, err := NewConn(connConf, sd)
if err != nil {
return
}
require.NoError(t, err)
onNewOfferChan := make(chan struct{})
conn.handshaker.AddRelayListener(func(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) {
onNewOfferChan <- struct{}{}
})
conn.OnRemoteOffer(OfferAnswer{
IceCredentials: IceCredentials{
offerAnswer := signaling.OfferAnswer{
IceCredentials: signaling.IceCredentials{
UFrag: "test",
Pwd: "test",
},
WgListenPort: 0,
Version: "",
})
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
select {
case <-onNewOfferChan:
// success
case <-ctx.Done():
t.Error("expected to receive a new offer notification, but timed out")
}
}
func TestConn_OnRemoteAnswer(t *testing.T) {
swWatcher := guard.NewSRWatcher(nil, nil, nil, connConf.ICEConfig)
sd := ServiceDependencies{
StatusRecorder: NewRecorder("https://mgm"),
SrWatcher: swWatcher,
PeerConnDispatcher: testDispatcher,
}
conn, err := NewConn(connConf, sd)
if err != nil {
return
}
onNewOfferChan := make(chan struct{})
conn.handshaker.AddRelayListener(func(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) {
onNewOfferChan <- struct{}{}
})
conn.OnRemoteAnswer(OfferAnswer{
IceCredentials: IceCredentials{
UFrag: "test",
Pwd: "test",
},
WgListenPort: 0,
Version: "",
})
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
select {
case <-onNewOfferChan:
// success
case <-ctx.Done():
t.Error("expected to receive a new offer notification, but timed out")
}
conn.OnRemoteOffer(offerAnswer)
conn.OnRemoteAnswer(offerAnswer)
conn.OnRemoteCandidate(nil, nil)
conn.Close(false)
}
func TestConn_presharedKey(t *testing.T) {
@@ -320,7 +270,7 @@ func newWGTimeoutTestConn(rosenpassEnabled bool, disconnected *[]string) *Conn {
ctx: context.Background(),
config: cfg,
Log: log.WithField("peer", cfg.Key),
metricsStages: &MetricsStages{},
metricsStages: &metricsstages.MetricsStages{},
}
conn.SetOnDisconnected(func(remotePeer string) {
*disconnected = append(*disconnected, remotePeer)
@@ -339,20 +289,20 @@ func TestConn_onWGDisconnected_EscalatesToRosenpassReset(t *testing.T) {
conn := newWGTimeoutTestConn(true, &disconnected)
for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
conn.handleWGTimeout()
}
assert.Empty(t, disconnected, "escalation must not fire below the threshold")
conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
conn.handleWGTimeout()
assert.Equal(t, []string{conn.config.WgConfig.RemoteKey}, disconnected,
"reaching the threshold must report the peer disconnected once")
for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
conn.handleWGTimeout()
}
assert.Len(t, disconnected, 1, "escalation must restart counting after firing")
conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
conn.handleWGTimeout()
assert.Len(t, disconnected, 2, "continued timeouts must escalate again")
}
@@ -364,12 +314,12 @@ func TestConn_onWGDisconnected_CheckSuccessResetsEscalation(t *testing.T) {
conn := newWGTimeoutTestConn(true, &disconnected)
for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
conn.handleWGTimeout()
}
conn.onWGCheckSuccess()
conn.handleWGCheckSuccess()
for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
conn.handleWGTimeout()
}
assert.Empty(t, disconnected, "handshake success must reset the timeout count")
}
@@ -382,7 +332,7 @@ func TestConn_onWGDisconnected_NoEscalationWithoutRosenpass(t *testing.T) {
conn := newWGTimeoutTestConn(false, &disconnected)
for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold*3; i++ {
conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
conn.handleWGTimeout()
}
assert.Empty(t, disconnected, "escalation must be limited to rosenpass connections")
}

View File

@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
package dispatcher
import (
"sync"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/id"
)
type ConnectionListener struct {
OnConnected func(peerID id.ConnID)
OnDisconnected func(peerID id.ConnID)
}
type ConnectionDispatcher struct {
listeners map[*ConnectionListener]struct{}
mu sync.Mutex
}
func NewConnectionDispatcher() *ConnectionDispatcher {
return &ConnectionDispatcher{
listeners: make(map[*ConnectionListener]struct{}),
}
}
func (e *ConnectionDispatcher) AddListener(listener *ConnectionListener) {
e.mu.Lock()
defer e.mu.Unlock()
e.listeners[listener] = struct{}{}
}
func (e *ConnectionDispatcher) RemoveListener(listener *ConnectionListener) {
e.mu.Lock()
defer e.mu.Unlock()
delete(e.listeners, listener)
}
func (e *ConnectionDispatcher) NotifyConnected(peerConnID id.ConnID) {
e.mu.Lock()
defer e.mu.Unlock()
for listener := range e.listeners {
listener.OnConnected(peerConnID)
}
}
func (e *ConnectionDispatcher) NotifyDisconnected(peerConnID id.ConnID) {
e.mu.Lock()
defer e.mu.Unlock()
for listener := range e.listeners {
listener.OnDisconnected(peerConnID)
}
}

View File

@@ -65,16 +65,6 @@ func (e *EndpointUpdater) RemoveWgPeer() error {
return e.wgConfig.WgInterface.RemovePeer(e.wgConfig.RemoteKey)
}
// CancelPendingUpdates stops a scheduled delayed endpoint update without touching the
// WireGuard peer. Used on the idle transition where the peer is kept so a pending
// responder-side update cannot overwrite the wake endpoint later.
func (e *EndpointUpdater) CancelPendingUpdates() {
e.mu.Lock()
defer e.mu.Unlock()
e.waitForCloseTheDelayedUpdate()
}
func (e *EndpointUpdater) RemoveEndpointAddress() error {
e.mu.Lock()
defer e.mu.Unlock()

View File

@@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
package peer
import (
"net"
"net/netip"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/configurer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgproxy"
)
type endpointTestWGIface struct {
mu sync.Mutex
updateCalls int
removeCalls int
}
func (m *endpointTestWGIface) UpdatePeer(string, []netip.Prefix, time.Duration, *net.UDPAddr, *wgtypes.Key) error {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
m.updateCalls++
return nil
}
func (m *endpointTestWGIface) RemovePeer(string) error {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
m.removeCalls++
return nil
}
func (m *endpointTestWGIface) GetStats() (map[string]configurer.WGStats, error) {
return map[string]configurer.WGStats{}, nil
}
func (m *endpointTestWGIface) GetProxy() wgproxy.Proxy { return nil }
func (m *endpointTestWGIface) Address() wgaddr.Address { return wgaddr.Address{} }
func (m *endpointTestWGIface) RemoveEndpointAddress(string) error { return nil }
func (m *endpointTestWGIface) counts() (updates, removes int) {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
return m.updateCalls, m.removeCalls
}
func newTestEndpointUpdater(iface *endpointTestWGIface, initiator bool) *EndpointUpdater {
cfg := WgConfig{
RemoteKey: "remoteKey",
WgInterface: iface,
AllowedIps: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("100.64.0.5/32")},
}
return NewEndpointUpdater(log.WithField("peer", "test"), cfg, initiator)
}
// TestEndpointUpdater_CancelPendingUpdates ensures a scheduled responder-side delayed
// update is stopped without removing the WireGuard peer, so an idle transition cannot
// be overwritten later by a stale endpoint update.
func TestEndpointUpdater_CancelPendingUpdates(t *testing.T) {
iface := &endpointTestWGIface{}
e := newTestEndpointUpdater(iface, false)
addr := &net.UDPAddr{IP: net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1"), Port: 51820}
require.NoError(t, e.ConfigureWGEndpoint(addr, nil))
updates, _ := iface.counts()
require.Equal(t, 1, updates, "responder must apply the immediate nil-endpoint update")
// CancelPendingUpdates waits for the delayed-update goroutine to exit, so the
// call counts below are final: the 5s fallback update can never fire anymore.
e.CancelPendingUpdates()
updates, removes := iface.counts()
assert.Equal(t, 1, updates, "delayed endpoint update must not fire after cancellation")
assert.Equal(t, 0, removes, "cancellation must not remove the WireGuard peer")
}
// TestEndpointUpdater_CancelPendingUpdatesNoPending ensures cancellation is a safe no-op
// when no delayed update is scheduled (initiator path).
func TestEndpointUpdater_CancelPendingUpdatesNoPending(t *testing.T) {
iface := &endpointTestWGIface{}
e := newTestEndpointUpdater(iface, true)
addr := &net.UDPAddr{IP: net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1"), Port: 51820}
require.NoError(t, e.ConfigureWGEndpoint(addr, nil))
e.CancelPendingUpdates()
updates, removes := iface.counts()
assert.Equal(t, 1, updates, "initiator applies exactly one direct update")
assert.Equal(t, 0, removes, "cancellation must not remove the WireGuard peer")
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
package peer
import (
"time"
"github.com/pion/ice/v4"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/signaling"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/worker"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
)
// event is a message processed by the Conn event loop. All mutable Conn state
// is owned by that loop; producers deliver events through the mailbox and
// never mutate Conn state directly.
type event any
// evClose asks the event loop to tear down the connection. done is closed
// once the teardown finished.
type evClose struct {
signalToRemote bool
done chan struct{}
}
type evRemoteOffer struct {
offer signaling.OfferAnswer
}
type evRemoteAnswer struct {
answer signaling.OfferAnswer
}
type evRemoteCandidate struct {
candidate ice.Candidate
haRoutes route.HAMap
}
type evICEReady struct {
priority worker.ConnPriority
info worker.ICEConnInfo
}
type evICEDown struct {
sessionChanged bool
}
type evRelayReady struct {
info worker.RelayConnInfo
}
type evRelayDown struct{}
// evRelayDialDone reports that the relay dial helper goroutine finished,
// successfully or not, so the loop may dispatch a pending offer.
type evRelayDialDone struct{}
type evWGTimeout struct{}
// evWGHandshake reports the first WireGuard handshake of the current watcher run.
type evWGHandshake struct {
when time.Time
}
// evWGCheckOK reports a watcher check that observed a fresh handshake,
// including handshakes of connections that were already up.
type evWGCheckOK struct{}
// evGuardTick asks the loop to send a new offer to restore connectivity.
type evGuardTick struct{}

View File

@@ -21,8 +21,6 @@ const (
)
type ICEMonitor struct {
ReconnectCh chan struct{}
iFaceDiscover stdnet.ExternalIFaceDiscover
iceConfig icemaker.Config
tickerPeriod time.Duration
@@ -34,7 +32,6 @@ type ICEMonitor struct {
func NewICEMonitor(iFaceDiscover stdnet.ExternalIFaceDiscover, config icemaker.Config, period time.Duration) *ICEMonitor {
log.Debugf("prepare ICE monitor with period: %s", period)
cm := &ICEMonitor{
ReconnectCh: make(chan struct{}, 1),
iFaceDiscover: iFaceDiscover,
iceConfig: config,
tickerPeriod: period,

View File

@@ -1,246 +0,0 @@
package peer
import (
"context"
"errors"
"net/netip"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/version"
)
var (
ErrSignalIsNotReady = errors.New("signal is not ready")
)
// IceCredentials ICE protocol credentials struct
type IceCredentials struct {
UFrag string
Pwd string
}
// OfferAnswer represents a session establishment offer or answer
type OfferAnswer struct {
IceCredentials IceCredentials
// WgListenPort is a remote WireGuard listen port.
// This field is used when establishing a direct WireGuard connection without any proxy.
// We can set the remote peer's endpoint with this port.
WgListenPort int
// Version of NetBird Agent
Version string
// RosenpassPubKey is the Rosenpass public key of the remote peer when receiving this message
// This value is the local Rosenpass server public key when sending the message
RosenpassPubKey []byte
// RosenpassAddr is the Rosenpass server address (IP:port) of the remote peer when receiving this message
// This value is the local Rosenpass server address when sending the message
RosenpassAddr string
// relay server address
RelaySrvAddress string
// RelaySrvIP is the IP the remote peer is connected to on its
// relay server. Used as a dial target if DNS for RelaySrvAddress
// fails. Zero value if the peer did not advertise an IP.
RelaySrvIP netip.Addr
// SessionID is the unique identifier of the session, used to discard old messages
SessionID *ICESessionID
}
func (o *OfferAnswer) hasICECredentials() bool {
return o.IceCredentials.UFrag != "" && o.IceCredentials.Pwd != ""
}
type Handshaker struct {
mu sync.Mutex
log *log.Entry
config ConnConfig
signaler *Signaler
ice *WorkerICE
relay *WorkerRelay
metricsStages *MetricsStages
// relayListener is not blocking because the listener is using a goroutine to process the messages
// and it will only keep the latest message if multiple offers are received in a short time
// this is to avoid blocking the handshaker if the listener is doing some heavy processing
// and also to avoid processing old offers if multiple offers are received in a short time
// the listener will always process the latest offer
relayListener *AsyncOfferListener
iceListener func(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer)
// remoteICESupported tracks whether the remote peer includes ICE credentials in its offers/answers.
// When false, the local side skips ICE listener dispatch and suppresses ICE credentials in responses.
remoteICESupported atomic.Bool
// remoteOffersCh is a channel used to wait for remote credentials to proceed with the connection
remoteOffersCh chan OfferAnswer
// remoteAnswerCh is a channel used to wait for remote credentials answer (confirmation of our offer) to proceed with the connection
remoteAnswerCh chan OfferAnswer
}
func NewHandshaker(log *log.Entry, config ConnConfig, signaler *Signaler, ice *WorkerICE, relay *WorkerRelay, metricsStages *MetricsStages) *Handshaker {
h := &Handshaker{
log: log,
config: config,
signaler: signaler,
ice: ice,
relay: relay,
metricsStages: metricsStages,
remoteOffersCh: make(chan OfferAnswer),
remoteAnswerCh: make(chan OfferAnswer),
}
// assume remote supports ICE until we learn otherwise from received offers
h.remoteICESupported.Store(ice != nil)
return h
}
func (h *Handshaker) RemoteICESupported() bool {
return h.remoteICESupported.Load()
}
func (h *Handshaker) AddRelayListener(offer func(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer)) {
h.relayListener = NewAsyncOfferListener(offer)
}
func (h *Handshaker) AddICEListener(offer func(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer)) {
h.iceListener = offer
}
func (h *Handshaker) Listen(ctx context.Context) {
for {
select {
case remoteOfferAnswer := <-h.remoteOffersCh:
h.log.Infof("received offer, running version %s, remote WireGuard listen port %d, session id: %s, remote ICE supported: %t", remoteOfferAnswer.Version, remoteOfferAnswer.WgListenPort, remoteOfferAnswer.SessionIDString(), remoteOfferAnswer.hasICECredentials())
// Record signaling received for reconnection attempts
if h.metricsStages != nil {
h.metricsStages.RecordSignalingReceived()
}
h.updateRemoteICEState(&remoteOfferAnswer)
if h.relayListener != nil {
h.relayListener.Notify(&remoteOfferAnswer)
}
if h.iceListener != nil && h.RemoteICESupported() {
h.iceListener(&remoteOfferAnswer)
}
if err := h.sendAnswer(); err != nil {
h.log.Errorf("failed to send remote offer confirmation: %s", err)
continue
}
case remoteOfferAnswer := <-h.remoteAnswerCh:
h.log.Infof("received answer, running version %s, remote WireGuard listen port %d, session id: %s, remote ICE supported: %t", remoteOfferAnswer.Version, remoteOfferAnswer.WgListenPort, remoteOfferAnswer.SessionIDString(), remoteOfferAnswer.hasICECredentials())
// Record signaling received for reconnection attempts
if h.metricsStages != nil {
h.metricsStages.RecordSignalingReceived()
}
h.updateRemoteICEState(&remoteOfferAnswer)
if h.relayListener != nil {
h.relayListener.Notify(&remoteOfferAnswer)
}
if h.iceListener != nil && h.RemoteICESupported() {
h.iceListener(&remoteOfferAnswer)
}
case <-ctx.Done():
h.log.Infof("stop listening for remote offers and answers")
return
}
}
}
func (h *Handshaker) SendOffer() error {
h.mu.Lock()
defer h.mu.Unlock()
return h.sendOffer()
}
// OnRemoteOffer handles an offer from the remote peer and returns true if the message was accepted, false otherwise
// doesn't block, discards the message if connection wasn't ready
func (h *Handshaker) OnRemoteOffer(offer OfferAnswer) {
select {
case h.remoteOffersCh <- offer:
return
default:
h.log.Warnf("skipping remote offer message because receiver not ready")
// connection might not be ready yet to receive so we ignore the message
return
}
}
// OnRemoteAnswer handles an offer from the remote peer and returns true if the message was accepted, false otherwise
// doesn't block, discards the message if connection wasn't ready
func (h *Handshaker) OnRemoteAnswer(answer OfferAnswer) {
select {
case h.remoteAnswerCh <- answer:
return
default:
// connection might not be ready yet to receive so we ignore the message
h.log.Warnf("skipping remote answer message because receiver not ready")
return
}
}
// sendOffer prepares local user credentials and signals them to the remote peer
func (h *Handshaker) sendOffer() error {
if !h.signaler.Ready() {
return ErrSignalIsNotReady
}
offer := h.buildOfferAnswer()
h.log.Debugf("sending offer with serial: %s", offer.SessionIDString())
return h.signaler.SignalOffer(offer, h.config.Key)
}
func (h *Handshaker) sendAnswer() error {
answer := h.buildOfferAnswer()
h.log.Debugf("sending answer with serial: %s", answer.SessionIDString())
return h.signaler.SignalAnswer(answer, h.config.Key)
}
func (h *Handshaker) buildOfferAnswer() OfferAnswer {
answer := OfferAnswer{
WgListenPort: h.config.LocalWgPort,
Version: version.NetbirdVersion(),
RosenpassPubKey: h.config.RosenpassConfig.PubKey,
RosenpassAddr: h.config.RosenpassConfig.Addr,
}
if h.ice != nil && h.RemoteICESupported() {
uFrag, pwd := h.ice.GetLocalUserCredentials()
sid := h.ice.SessionID()
answer.IceCredentials = IceCredentials{uFrag, pwd}
answer.SessionID = &sid
}
if addr, ip, err := h.relay.RelayInstanceAddress(); err == nil {
answer.RelaySrvAddress = addr
answer.RelaySrvIP = ip
}
return answer
}
func (h *Handshaker) updateRemoteICEState(offer *OfferAnswer) {
hasICE := offer.hasICECredentials()
prev := h.remoteICESupported.Swap(hasICE)
if prev != hasICE {
if hasICE {
h.log.Infof("remote peer started sending ICE credentials")
} else {
h.log.Infof("remote peer stopped sending ICE credentials")
if h.ice != nil {
h.ice.Close()
}
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
package peer
import (
"sync"
)
type callbackFunc func(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer)
func (oa *OfferAnswer) SessionIDString() string {
if oa.SessionID == nil {
return "unknown"
}
return oa.SessionID.String()
}
type AsyncOfferListener struct {
fn callbackFunc
running bool
latest *OfferAnswer
mu sync.Mutex
}
func NewAsyncOfferListener(fn callbackFunc) *AsyncOfferListener {
return &AsyncOfferListener{
fn: fn,
}
}
func (o *AsyncOfferListener) Notify(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) {
o.mu.Lock()
defer o.mu.Unlock()
// Store the latest offer
o.latest = remoteOfferAnswer
// If already running, the running goroutine will pick up this latest value
if o.running {
return
}
// Start processing
o.running = true
// Process in a goroutine to avoid blocking the caller
go func(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) {
for {
o.fn(remoteOfferAnswer)
o.mu.Lock()
if o.latest == nil {
// No more work to do
o.running = false
o.mu.Unlock()
return
}
remoteOfferAnswer = o.latest
// Clear the latest to mark it as being processed
o.latest = nil
o.mu.Unlock()
}
}(remoteOfferAnswer)
}

View File

@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
package peer
import (
"testing"
"time"
)
func Test_newOfferListener(t *testing.T) {
dummyOfferAnswer := &OfferAnswer{}
runChan := make(chan struct{}, 10)
longRunningFn := func(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) {
time.Sleep(1 * time.Second)
runChan <- struct{}{}
}
hl := NewAsyncOfferListener(longRunningFn)
hl.Notify(dummyOfferAnswer)
hl.Notify(dummyOfferAnswer)
hl.Notify(dummyOfferAnswer)
// Wait for exactly 2 callbacks
for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
select {
case <-runChan:
case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("Timeout waiting for callback")
}
}
// Verify no additional callbacks happen
select {
case <-runChan:
t.Fatal("Unexpected additional callback")
case <-time.After(100 * time.Millisecond):
t.Log("Correctly received exactly 2 callbacks")
}
}

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package peer
package ice
import (
"crypto/rand"
@@ -9,26 +9,26 @@ import (
const sessionIDSize = 5
type ICESessionID string
type SessionID string
// NewICESessionID generates a new session ID for distinguishing sessions
func NewICESessionID() (ICESessionID, error) {
// NewSessionID generates a new session ID for distinguishing sessions
func NewSessionID() (SessionID, error) {
b := make([]byte, sessionIDSize)
if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, b); err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to generate session ID: %w", err)
}
return ICESessionID(hex.EncodeToString(b)), nil
return SessionID(hex.EncodeToString(b)), nil
}
func ICESessionIDFromBytes(b []byte) (ICESessionID, error) {
func SessionIDFromBytes(b []byte) (SessionID, error) {
if len(b) != sessionIDSize {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid session ID length: %d", len(b))
}
return ICESessionID(hex.EncodeToString(b)), nil
return SessionID(hex.EncodeToString(b)), nil
}
// Bytes returns the raw bytes of the session ID for protobuf serialization
func (id ICESessionID) Bytes() ([]byte, error) {
func (id SessionID) Bytes() ([]byte, error) {
if len(id) == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ICE session ID is empty")
}
@@ -42,6 +42,6 @@ func (id ICESessionID) Bytes() ([]byte, error) {
return b, nil
}
func (id ICESessionID) String() string {
func (id SessionID) String() string {
return string(id)
}

View File

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
package peer
import (
"net"
"net/netip"
"time"
"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/configurer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgproxy"
)
type WGIface interface {
UpdatePeer(peerKey string, allowedIps []netip.Prefix, keepAlive time.Duration, endpoint *net.UDPAddr, preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key) error
RemovePeer(peerKey string) error
GetStats() (map[string]configurer.WGStats, error)
GetProxy() wgproxy.Proxy
Address() wgaddr.Address
RemoveEndpointAddress(key string) error
}

View File

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
package peer
// Listener is a callback type about the NetBird network connection state
type Listener interface {
OnConnected()
OnDisconnected()
OnConnecting()
OnDisconnecting()
OnAddressChanged(string, string)
OnPeersListChanged(int)
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
package peer
import (
"sync"
)
// maxQueuedCandidates bounds the remote candidate queue; on overflow the
// oldest candidate is dropped. Lost candidates are recovered by the next
// offer exchange triggered by the guard.
const maxQueuedCandidates = 128
// mailbox is the coalescing inbox of the Conn event loop. Posting never
// blocks. Per message kind either the latest value wins (offer, answer,
// guard tick), the values queue in bounded FIFO order (candidates) or in
// unbounded FIFO order (lifecycle and transport state changes, which are
// low-volume and must not be lost). A new offer flushes the queued
// candidates because they belong to the superseded session.
type mailbox struct {
mu sync.Mutex
closed bool
lifecycle []event
transport []event
offer *evRemoteOffer
answer *evRemoteAnswer
candidates []evRemoteCandidate
guardTick bool
wake chan struct{}
}
func newMailbox() *mailbox {
return &mailbox{
wake: make(chan struct{}, 1),
}
}
// post stores the event and wakes the loop. It reports false if the mailbox
// is already closed and the event was not accepted.
func (m *mailbox) post(ev event) bool {
m.mu.Lock()
if m.closed {
m.mu.Unlock()
return false
}
switch e := ev.(type) {
case evClose:
m.lifecycle = append(m.lifecycle, e)
case evRemoteOffer:
m.offer = &e
m.candidates = nil
case evRemoteAnswer:
m.answer = &e
case evRemoteCandidate:
if len(m.candidates) >= maxQueuedCandidates {
m.candidates = m.candidates[1:]
}
m.candidates = append(m.candidates, e)
case evGuardTick:
m.guardTick = true
default:
m.transport = append(m.transport, ev)
}
m.mu.Unlock()
select {
case m.wake <- struct{}{}:
default:
}
return true
}
// drain returns the pending events in processing order: lifecycle first,
// then transport state changes, the coalesced offer and answer, the queued
// candidates and finally the guard tick.
func (m *mailbox) drain() []event {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
return m.drainLocked()
}
// closeAndDrain marks the mailbox closed so further posts are rejected and
// returns the events that were still pending.
func (m *mailbox) closeAndDrain() []event {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
m.closed = true
return m.drainLocked()
}
func (m *mailbox) drainLocked() []event {
evs := make([]event, 0, len(m.lifecycle)+len(m.transport)+len(m.candidates)+3)
evs = append(evs, m.lifecycle...)
evs = append(evs, m.transport...)
if m.offer != nil {
evs = append(evs, *m.offer)
}
if m.answer != nil {
evs = append(evs, *m.answer)
}
for _, c := range m.candidates {
evs = append(evs, c)
}
if m.guardTick {
evs = append(evs, evGuardTick{})
}
m.lifecycle = nil
m.transport = nil
m.offer = nil
m.answer = nil
m.candidates = nil
m.guardTick = false
return evs
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
package peer
import (
"testing"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/signaling"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestMailbox_OfferCoalescing(t *testing.T) {
mb := newMailbox()
require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteOffer{offer: signaling.OfferAnswer{WgListenPort: 1}}))
require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteOffer{offer: signaling.OfferAnswer{WgListenPort: 2}}))
require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteOffer{offer: signaling.OfferAnswer{WgListenPort: 3}}))
evs := mb.drain()
require.Len(t, evs, 1, "consecutive offers must coalesce to a single event")
offer, ok := evs[0].(evRemoteOffer)
require.True(t, ok, "coalesced event must be an offer")
assert.Equal(t, 3, offer.offer.WgListenPort, "the newest offer must win")
}
func TestMailbox_OfferFlushesCandidates(t *testing.T) {
mb := newMailbox()
require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteCandidate{}))
require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteCandidate{}))
require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteOffer{offer: signaling.OfferAnswer{}}))
evs := mb.drain()
require.Len(t, evs, 1, "candidates of the superseded session must be flushed")
_, ok := evs[0].(evRemoteOffer)
assert.True(t, ok, "only the offer must remain after the flush")
}
func TestMailbox_CandidatesKeepOrderAfterOffer(t *testing.T) {
mb := newMailbox()
require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteOffer{offer: signaling.OfferAnswer{}}))
require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteCandidate{haRoutes: nil}))
require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteCandidate{haRoutes: nil}))
evs := mb.drain()
require.Len(t, evs, 3)
_, ok := evs[0].(evRemoteOffer)
assert.True(t, ok, "offer must be processed before the candidates")
for _, ev := range evs[1:] {
_, ok := ev.(evRemoteCandidate)
assert.True(t, ok, "candidates posted after the offer must survive")
}
}
func TestMailbox_CandidateQueueBounded(t *testing.T) {
mb := newMailbox()
for i := 0; i < maxQueuedCandidates+10; i++ {
require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteCandidate{}))
}
evs := mb.drain()
assert.Len(t, evs, maxQueuedCandidates, "candidate queue must stay bounded")
}
func TestMailbox_DrainOrder(t *testing.T) {
mb := newMailbox()
require.True(t, mb.post(evGuardTick{}))
require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteAnswer{answer: signaling.OfferAnswer{}}))
require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteOffer{offer: signaling.OfferAnswer{}}))
require.True(t, mb.post(evRelayDown{}))
require.True(t, mb.post(evICEDown{sessionChanged: true}))
require.True(t, mb.post(evClose{}))
evs := mb.drain()
require.Len(t, evs, 6)
_, ok := evs[0].(evClose)
assert.True(t, ok, "lifecycle events must come first")
_, ok = evs[1].(evRelayDown)
assert.True(t, ok, "transport events must keep FIFO order")
_, ok = evs[2].(evICEDown)
assert.True(t, ok, "transport events must keep FIFO order")
_, ok = evs[3].(evRemoteOffer)
assert.True(t, ok, "offer must come after transport events")
_, ok = evs[4].(evRemoteAnswer)
assert.True(t, ok, "answer must come after the offer")
_, ok = evs[5].(evGuardTick)
assert.True(t, ok, "guard tick must come last")
}
func TestMailbox_GuardTickCoalesced(t *testing.T) {
mb := newMailbox()
require.True(t, mb.post(evGuardTick{}))
require.True(t, mb.post(evGuardTick{}))
require.True(t, mb.post(evGuardTick{}))
evs := mb.drain()
assert.Len(t, evs, 1, "guard ticks must coalesce to a single event")
}
func TestMailbox_PostAfterCloseRejected(t *testing.T) {
mb := newMailbox()
require.True(t, mb.post(evRelayDown{}))
leftovers := mb.closeAndDrain()
assert.Len(t, leftovers, 1, "pending events must be returned on close")
assert.False(t, mb.post(evRelayDown{}), "posts must be rejected after close")
assert.Empty(t, mb.drain(), "no events must remain after close")
}
func TestMailbox_WakeSignal(t *testing.T) {
mb := newMailbox()
require.True(t, mb.post(evRelayDown{}))
require.True(t, mb.post(evGuardTick{}))
select {
case <-mb.wake:
default:
t.Fatal("wake signal must be pending after posts")
}
assert.Len(t, mb.drain(), 2, "a single wake must deliver all pending events")
}

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package peer
package metricsstages
import (
"sync"

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package peer
package metricsstages
import (
"testing"

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
package signaling
import (
"errors"
"net/netip"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
icemaker "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/ice"
relayClient "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/relay/client"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/version"
)
var (
ErrSignalIsNotReady = errors.New("signal is not ready")
)
// IceCredentials ICE protocol credentials struct
type IceCredentials struct {
UFrag string
Pwd string
}
// OfferAnswer represents a session establishment offer or answer
type OfferAnswer struct {
IceCredentials IceCredentials
// WgListenPort is a remote WireGuard listen port.
// This field is used when establishing a direct WireGuard connection without any proxy.
// We can set the remote peer's endpoint with this port.
WgListenPort int
// Version of NetBird Agent
Version string
// RosenpassPubKey is the Rosenpass public key of the remote peer when receiving this message
// This value is the local Rosenpass server public key when sending the message
RosenpassPubKey []byte
// RosenpassAddr is the Rosenpass server address (IP:port) of the remote peer when receiving this message
// This value is the local Rosenpass server address when sending the message
RosenpassAddr string
// relay server address
RelaySrvAddress string
// RelaySrvIP is the IP the remote peer is connected to on its
// relay server. Used as a dial target if DNS for RelaySrvAddress
// fails. Zero value if the peer did not advertise an IP.
RelaySrvIP netip.Addr
// SessionID is the unique identifier of the session, used to discard old messages
SessionID *icemaker.SessionID
}
func (o *OfferAnswer) HasICECredentials() bool {
return o.IceCredentials.UFrag != "" && o.IceCredentials.Pwd != ""
}
func (o *OfferAnswer) SessionIDString() string {
if o.SessionID == nil {
return "unknown"
}
return o.SessionID.String()
}
// Config carries the peer-specific values the Handshaker embeds into offers
// and answers.
type Config struct {
Key string
LocalWgPort int
RosenpassPubKey []byte
RosenpassAddr string
}
// Credentials are the local ICE credentials and session id the Handshaker embeds in offers.
type Credentials struct {
UFrag string
Pwd string
SessionID icemaker.SessionID
}
// ICEWorker is the subset of the ICE worker the Handshaker needs to build offers.
type ICEWorker interface {
Credentials() Credentials
Close()
}
// Handshaker keeps the signaling protocol logic: building and sending offers
// and answers and tracking whether the remote peer supports ICE. Incoming
// message processing is driven by the Conn event loop.
type Handshaker struct {
mu sync.Mutex
log *log.Entry
config Config
signaler *Signaler
ice ICEWorker
relayManager *relayClient.Manager
// remoteICESupported tracks whether the remote peer includes ICE credentials in its offers/answers.
// When false, the local side skips ICE dispatch and suppresses ICE credentials in responses.
remoteICESupported atomic.Bool
}
func NewHandshaker(log *log.Entry, config Config, signaler *Signaler, ice ICEWorker, relayManager *relayClient.Manager) *Handshaker {
h := &Handshaker{
log: log,
config: config,
signaler: signaler,
ice: ice,
relayManager: relayManager,
}
// assume remote supports ICE until we learn otherwise from received offers
h.remoteICESupported.Store(ice != nil)
return h
}
func (h *Handshaker) RemoteICESupported() bool {
return h.remoteICESupported.Load()
}
func (h *Handshaker) SendOffer() error {
h.mu.Lock()
defer h.mu.Unlock()
return h.sendOffer()
}
func (h *Handshaker) SendAnswer() error {
h.mu.Lock()
defer h.mu.Unlock()
return h.sendAnswer()
}
// sendOffer prepares local user credentials and signals them to the remote peer
func (h *Handshaker) sendOffer() error {
if !h.signaler.Ready() {
return ErrSignalIsNotReady
}
offer := h.buildOfferAnswer()
h.log.Debugf("sending offer with serial: %s", offer.SessionIDString())
return h.signaler.SignalOffer(offer, h.config.Key)
}
func (h *Handshaker) sendAnswer() error {
answer := h.buildOfferAnswer()
h.log.Debugf("sending answer with serial: %s", answer.SessionIDString())
return h.signaler.SignalAnswer(answer, h.config.Key)
}
func (h *Handshaker) buildOfferAnswer() OfferAnswer {
answer := OfferAnswer{
WgListenPort: h.config.LocalWgPort,
Version: version.NetbirdVersion(),
RosenpassPubKey: h.config.RosenpassPubKey,
RosenpassAddr: h.config.RosenpassAddr,
}
if h.ice != nil && h.RemoteICESupported() {
creds := h.ice.Credentials()
answer.IceCredentials = IceCredentials{creds.UFrag, creds.Pwd}
sid := creds.SessionID
answer.SessionID = &sid
}
if addr, ip, err := h.relayManager.RelayInstanceAddress(); err == nil {
answer.RelaySrvAddress = addr
answer.RelaySrvIP = ip
}
return answer
}
// UpdateRemoteICEState refreshes the remote ICE support flag from a received
// offer or answer and closes the ICE worker when the remote peer stopped
// sending ICE credentials. Runs on the Conn event loop.
func (h *Handshaker) UpdateRemoteICEState(offer *OfferAnswer) {
hasICE := offer.HasICECredentials()
prev := h.remoteICESupported.Swap(hasICE)
if prev != hasICE {
if hasICE {
h.log.Infof("remote peer started sending ICE credentials")
} else {
h.log.Infof("remote peer stopped sending ICE credentials")
if h.ice != nil {
h.ice.Close()
}
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package peer
package signaling
import (
"github.com/pion/ice/v4"

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package peer
package state_dump
import (
"context"
@@ -6,11 +6,13 @@ import (
"time"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/status"
)
type stateDump struct {
type StateDump struct {
log *log.Entry
status *Status
status *status.Recorder
key string
sentOffer int
@@ -26,15 +28,15 @@ type stateDump struct {
mu sync.Mutex
}
func newStateDump(key string, log *log.Entry, statusRecorder *Status) *stateDump {
return &stateDump{
func NewStateDump(key string, log *log.Entry, statusRecorder *status.Recorder) *StateDump {
return &StateDump{
log: log,
status: statusRecorder,
key: key,
}
}
func (s *stateDump) Start(ctx context.Context) {
func (s *StateDump) Start(ctx context.Context) {
ticker := time.NewTicker(10 * time.Minute)
defer ticker.Stop()
@@ -48,25 +50,25 @@ func (s *stateDump) Start(ctx context.Context) {
}
}
func (s *stateDump) RemoteOffer() {
func (s *StateDump) RemoteOffer() {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
s.remoteOffer++
}
func (s *stateDump) RemoteCandidate() {
func (s *StateDump) RemoteCandidate() {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
s.remoteCandidate++
}
func (s *stateDump) SendOffer() {
func (s *StateDump) SendOffer() {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
s.sentOffer++
}
func (s *stateDump) dumpState() {
func (s *StateDump) dumpState() {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
@@ -80,41 +82,41 @@ func (s *stateDump) dumpState() {
status, s.sentOffer, s.remoteOffer, s.remoteAnswer, s.remoteCandidate, s.p2pConnected, s.switchToRelay, s.wgCheckSuccess, s.relayConnected, s.localProxies)
}
func (s *stateDump) RemoteAnswer() {
func (s *StateDump) RemoteAnswer() {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
s.remoteAnswer++
}
func (s *stateDump) P2PConnected() {
func (s *StateDump) P2PConnected() {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
s.p2pConnected++
}
func (s *stateDump) SwitchToRelay() {
func (s *StateDump) SwitchToRelay() {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
s.switchToRelay++
}
func (s *stateDump) WGcheckSuccess() {
func (s *StateDump) WGcheckSuccess() {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
s.wgCheckSuccess++
}
func (s *stateDump) RelayConnected() {
func (s *StateDump) RelayConnected() {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
s.relayConnected++
}
func (s *stateDump) NewLocalProxy() {
func (s *StateDump) NewLocalProxy() {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
package status
import (
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
)
const (
// StatusIdle indicate the peer is in disconnected state
StatusIdle ConnStatus = iota
// StatusConnecting indicate the peer is in connecting state
StatusConnecting
// StatusConnected indicate the peer is in connected state
StatusConnected
)
// ConnStatus describe the status of a peer's connection
type ConnStatus int32
func (s ConnStatus) String() string {
switch s {
case StatusConnecting:
return "Connecting"
case StatusConnected:
return "Connected"
case StatusIdle:
return "Idle"
default:
log.Errorf("unknown status: %d", s)
return "INVALID_PEER_CONNECTION_STATUS"
}
}

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package peer
package status
import (
"testing"

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
package status
import (
"slices"
"sync"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
)
type EventQueue struct {
maxSize int
events []*proto.SystemEvent
mutex sync.RWMutex
}
func NewEventQueue(size int) *EventQueue {
return &EventQueue{
maxSize: size,
events: make([]*proto.SystemEvent, 0, size),
}
}
func (q *EventQueue) Add(event *proto.SystemEvent) {
q.mutex.Lock()
defer q.mutex.Unlock()
q.events = append(q.events, event)
if len(q.events) > q.maxSize {
q.events = q.events[len(q.events)-q.maxSize:]
}
}
func (q *EventQueue) GetAll() []*proto.SystemEvent {
q.mutex.RLock()
defer q.mutex.RUnlock()
return slices.Clone(q.events)
}
type EventSubscription struct {
id string
events chan *proto.SystemEvent
}
func (s *EventSubscription) Events() <-chan *proto.SystemEvent {
return s.events
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
package status
import (
"golang.org/x/exp/maps"
"google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/durationpb"
"google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/relay"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
)
// FullStatus contains the full state held by the Recorder instance
type FullStatus struct {
Peers []State
ManagementState ManagementState
SignalState SignalState
LocalPeerState LocalPeerState
RosenpassState RosenpassState
Relays []relay.ProbeResult
NSGroupStates []NSGroupState
NumOfForwardingRules int
LazyConnectionEnabled bool
Events []*proto.SystemEvent
}
// ToProto converts FullStatus to proto.FullStatus.
func (fs FullStatus) ToProto() *proto.FullStatus {
pbFullStatus := proto.FullStatus{
ManagementState: &proto.ManagementState{},
SignalState: &proto.SignalState{},
LocalPeerState: &proto.LocalPeerState{},
Peers: []*proto.PeerState{},
}
pbFullStatus.ManagementState.URL = fs.ManagementState.URL
pbFullStatus.ManagementState.Connected = fs.ManagementState.Connected
if err := fs.ManagementState.Error; err != nil {
pbFullStatus.ManagementState.Error = err.Error()
}
pbFullStatus.SignalState.URL = fs.SignalState.URL
pbFullStatus.SignalState.Connected = fs.SignalState.Connected
if err := fs.SignalState.Error; err != nil {
pbFullStatus.SignalState.Error = err.Error()
}
pbFullStatus.LocalPeerState.IP = fs.LocalPeerState.IP
pbFullStatus.LocalPeerState.Ipv6 = fs.LocalPeerState.IPv6
pbFullStatus.LocalPeerState.PubKey = fs.LocalPeerState.PubKey
pbFullStatus.LocalPeerState.KernelInterface = fs.LocalPeerState.KernelInterface
pbFullStatus.LocalPeerState.Fqdn = fs.LocalPeerState.FQDN
pbFullStatus.LocalPeerState.WgPort = int32(fs.LocalPeerState.WgPort)
pbFullStatus.LocalPeerState.RosenpassPermissive = fs.RosenpassState.Permissive
pbFullStatus.LocalPeerState.RosenpassEnabled = fs.RosenpassState.Enabled
pbFullStatus.NumberOfForwardingRules = int32(fs.NumOfForwardingRules)
pbFullStatus.LazyConnectionEnabled = fs.LazyConnectionEnabled
pbFullStatus.LocalPeerState.Networks = maps.Keys(fs.LocalPeerState.Routes)
for _, peerState := range fs.Peers {
networks := maps.Keys(peerState.GetRoutes())
pbPeerState := &proto.PeerState{
IP: peerState.IP,
Ipv6: peerState.IPv6,
PubKey: peerState.PubKey,
ConnStatus: peerState.ConnStatus.String(),
ConnStatusUpdate: timestamppb.New(peerState.ConnStatusUpdate),
Relayed: peerState.Relayed,
LocalIceCandidateType: peerState.LocalIceCandidateType,
RemoteIceCandidateType: peerState.RemoteIceCandidateType,
LocalIceCandidateEndpoint: peerState.LocalIceCandidateEndpoint,
RemoteIceCandidateEndpoint: peerState.RemoteIceCandidateEndpoint,
RelayAddress: peerState.RelayServerAddress,
Fqdn: peerState.FQDN,
LastWireguardHandshake: timestamppb.New(peerState.LastWireguardHandshake),
BytesRx: peerState.BytesRx,
BytesTx: peerState.BytesTx,
RosenpassEnabled: peerState.RosenpassEnabled,
Networks: networks,
Latency: durationpb.New(peerState.Latency),
SshHostKey: peerState.SSHHostKey,
}
pbFullStatus.Peers = append(pbFullStatus.Peers, pbPeerState)
}
for _, relayState := range fs.Relays {
pbRelayState := &proto.RelayState{
URI: relayState.URI,
Available: relayState.Err == nil,
Transport: relayState.Transport,
}
if err := relayState.Err; err != nil {
pbRelayState.Error = err.Error()
}
pbFullStatus.Relays = append(pbFullStatus.Relays, pbRelayState)
}
for _, dnsState := range fs.NSGroupStates {
var err string
if dnsState.Error != nil {
err = dnsState.Error.Error()
}
var servers []string
for _, server := range dnsState.Servers {
servers = append(servers, server.String())
}
pbDnsState := &proto.NSGroupState{
Servers: servers,
Domains: dnsState.Domains,
Enabled: dnsState.Enabled,
Error: err,
}
pbFullStatus.DnsServers = append(pbFullStatus.DnsServers, pbDnsState)
}
pbFullStatus.Events = fs.Events
return &pbFullStatus
}

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package peer
package status
import (
"sync"
@@ -11,6 +11,16 @@ const (
stateDisconnecting
)
// Listener is a callback type about the NetBird network connection state
type Listener interface {
OnConnected()
OnDisconnected()
OnConnecting()
OnDisconnecting()
OnAddressChanged(string, string)
OnPeersListChanged(int)
}
type notifier struct {
serverStateLock sync.Mutex
listenersLock sync.Mutex

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package peer
package status
import (
"sync"

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
package status
import (
"sync"
"time"
"golang.org/x/exp/maps"
)
// State contains the latest state of a peer
type State struct {
Mux *sync.RWMutex
IP string
IPv6 string
PubKey string
FQDN string
ConnStatus ConnStatus
ConnStatusUpdate time.Time
Relayed bool
LocalIceCandidateType string
RemoteIceCandidateType string
LocalIceCandidateEndpoint string
RemoteIceCandidateEndpoint string
RelayServerAddress string
LastWireguardHandshake time.Time
BytesTx int64
BytesRx int64
Latency time.Duration
RosenpassEnabled bool
SSHHostKey []byte
routes map[string]struct{}
}
// AddRoute add a single route to routes map
func (s *State) AddRoute(network string) {
s.Mux.Lock()
defer s.Mux.Unlock()
if s.routes == nil {
s.routes = make(map[string]struct{})
}
s.routes[network] = struct{}{}
}
// SetRoutes set state routes
func (s *State) SetRoutes(routes map[string]struct{}) {
s.Mux.Lock()
defer s.Mux.Unlock()
s.routes = routes
}
// DeleteRoute removes a route from the network amp
func (s *State) DeleteRoute(network string) {
s.Mux.Lock()
defer s.Mux.Unlock()
delete(s.routes, network)
}
// GetRoutes return routes map
func (s *State) GetRoutes() map[string]struct{} {
s.Mux.RLock()
defer s.Mux.RUnlock()
return maps.Clone(s.routes)
}

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package peer
package status
import (
"context"

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package peer
package status
import (
"net/netip"

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
package peer
import "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/status"
// Transitional aliases re-exporting the peer status recorder from its own
// package. Callers are being migrated to reference the status package
// directly; these aliases will be removed once the migration completes.
type (
Status = status.Recorder
State = status.State
ConnStatus = status.ConnStatus
FullStatus = status.FullStatus
RouterState = status.RouterState
LocalPeerState = status.LocalPeerState
SignalState = status.SignalState
ManagementState = status.ManagementState
RosenpassState = status.RosenpassState
NSGroupState = status.NSGroupState
ResolvedDomainInfo = status.ResolvedDomainInfo
StatusChangeSubscription = status.StatusChangeSubscription
EventQueue = status.EventQueue
EventSubscription = status.EventSubscription
WGIfaceStatus = status.WGIfaceStatus
Listener = status.Listener
EventListener = status.EventListener
)
const (
StatusIdle = status.StatusIdle
StatusConnecting = status.StatusConnecting
StatusConnected = status.StatusConnected
)
var (
NewRecorder = status.NewRecorder
)

View File

@@ -1,13 +1,15 @@
package peer
package wg_watcher
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"sync"
"time"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/configurer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/state_dump"
)
const (
@@ -23,21 +25,21 @@ type WGInterfaceStater interface {
GetStats() (map[string]configurer.WGStats, error)
}
// WGWatcher is single-shot: one instance per connection attempt, run once, then discarded.
// Lifecycle is owned by Conn under conn.mu, so it keeps no "enabled" state to go stale.
type WGWatcher struct {
log *log.Entry
wgIfaceStater WGInterfaceStater
peerKey string
stateDump *stateDump
stateDump *state_dump.StateDump
enabled bool
muEnabled sync.Mutex
// initialHandshake is not thread-safe; never call PrepareInitialHandshake and EnableWgWatcher concurrently.
initialHandshake time.Time
resetCh chan struct{}
}
func NewWGWatcher(log *log.Entry, wgIfaceStater WGInterfaceStater, peerKey string, stateDump *stateDump) *WGWatcher {
func NewWGWatcher(log *log.Entry, wgIfaceStater WGInterfaceStater, peerKey string, stateDump *state_dump.StateDump) *WGWatcher {
return &WGWatcher{
log: log,
wgIfaceStater: wgIfaceStater,
@@ -47,14 +49,25 @@ func NewWGWatcher(log *log.Entry, wgIfaceStater WGInterfaceStater, peerKey strin
}
}
// PrepareInitialHandshake reads the peer's current WireGuard handshake time. It must be
// called before the peer is (re)configured on the WireGuard interface, so the captured
// baseline reflects the state prior to this connection attempt instead of racing with
// that configuration.
func (w *WGWatcher) PrepareInitialHandshake() {
// PrepareInitialHandshake reserves the watcher and reads the peer's current WireGuard
// handshake time. It must be called before the peer is (re)configured on the WireGuard
// interface, so the captured baseline reflects the state prior to this connection attempt
// instead of racing with that configuration. Returns ok=false if the watcher is already
// running, in which case EnableWgWatcher must not be called.
func (w *WGWatcher) PrepareInitialHandshake() (ok bool) {
w.muEnabled.Lock()
if w.enabled {
w.muEnabled.Unlock()
return false
}
w.log.Debugf("enable WireGuard watcher")
w.enabled = true
w.muEnabled.Unlock()
handshake, _ := w.wgState()
w.initialHandshake = handshake
return true
}
// EnableWgWatcher runs the WireGuard watcher loop using the handshake baseline captured by
@@ -64,6 +77,10 @@ func (w *WGWatcher) PrepareInitialHandshake() {
// handshake, including the first.
func (w *WGWatcher) EnableWgWatcher(ctx context.Context, enabledTime time.Time, onDisconnectedFn func(), onHandshakeSuccessFn func(when time.Time), onCheckSuccessFn func()) {
w.periodicHandshakeCheck(ctx, onDisconnectedFn, onHandshakeSuccessFn, onCheckSuccessFn, enabledTime, w.initialHandshake)
w.muEnabled.Lock()
w.enabled = false
w.muEnabled.Unlock()
}
// Reset signals the watcher that the WireGuard peer has been reset and a new
@@ -89,7 +106,6 @@ func (w *WGWatcher) periodicHandshakeCheck(ctx context.Context, onDisconnectedFn
case <-timer.C:
handshake, ok := w.handshakeCheck(lastHandshake)
if !ok {
// early ctx cancel check return
if ctx.Err() != nil {
return
}
@@ -138,9 +154,9 @@ func (w *WGWatcher) handshakeCheck(lastHandshake time.Time) (*time.Time, bool) {
w.log.Tracef("previous handshake, handshake: %v, %v", lastHandshake, handshake)
// the current known handshake did not change
// the current know handshake did not change
if handshake.Equal(lastHandshake) {
w.log.Warnf("WireGuard handshake not updated: %v", handshake)
w.log.Warnf("WireGuard handshake timed out: %v", handshake)
return nil, false
}

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package peer
package wg_watcher
import (
"context"
@@ -7,8 +7,11 @@ import (
"time"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/configurer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/state_dump"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/status"
)
type MocWgIface struct {
@@ -56,23 +59,27 @@ func TestWGWatcher_CheckSuccessCallback(t *testing.T) {
// platforms with coarse clock resolution (Windows), where two time.Now() calls
// microseconds apart can return the same instant and read as a timed-out handshake.
stats := &mockHandshakeStats{handshake: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)}
watcher := NewWGWatcher(mlog, stats, "", newStateDump("peer", mlog, &Status{}))
watcher := NewWGWatcher(mlog, stats, "", state_dump.NewStateDump("peer", mlog, &status.Recorder{}))
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
require.True(t, watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake())
firstHandshake := make(chan struct{}, 1)
checkSuccess := make(chan struct{}, 1)
go watcher.EnableWgWatcher(ctx, time.Now(), func() {}, func(when time.Time) {
firstHandshake <- struct{}{}
}, func() {
select {
case checkSuccess <- struct{}{}:
default:
}
})
watcherDone := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
defer close(watcherDone)
watcher.EnableWgWatcher(ctx, time.Now(), func() {}, func(when time.Time) {
firstHandshake <- struct{}{}
}, func() {
select {
case checkSuccess <- struct{}{}:
default:
}
})
}()
stats.advance()
@@ -87,6 +94,11 @@ func TestWGWatcher_CheckSuccessCallback(t *testing.T) {
t.Errorf("first-handshake callback must not fire for a non-zero baseline")
default:
}
// Wait for the watcher goroutine to exit so it cannot race with other
// tests mutating the package-level check timing variables.
cancel()
<-watcherDone
}
func TestWGWatcher_EnableWgWatcher(t *testing.T) {
@@ -95,12 +107,13 @@ func TestWGWatcher_EnableWgWatcher(t *testing.T) {
mlog := log.WithField("peer", "tet")
mocWgIface := &MocWgIface{}
watcher := NewWGWatcher(mlog, mocWgIface, "", newStateDump("peer", mlog, &Status{}))
watcher := NewWGWatcher(mlog, mocWgIface, "", state_dump.NewStateDump("peer", mlog, &status.Recorder{}))
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
ok := watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
require.True(t, ok, "watcher should not be enabled yet")
onDisconnected := make(chan struct{}, 1)
go watcher.EnableWgWatcher(ctx, time.Now(), func() {
@@ -127,10 +140,11 @@ func TestWGWatcher_ReEnable(t *testing.T) {
mlog := log.WithField("peer", "tet")
mocWgIface := &MocWgIface{}
watcher := NewWGWatcher(mlog, mocWgIface, "", newStateDump("peer", mlog, &Status{}))
watcher := NewWGWatcher(mlog, mocWgIface, "", state_dump.NewStateDump("peer", mlog, &status.Recorder{}))
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
ok := watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
require.True(t, ok, "watcher should not be enabled yet")
wg := &sync.WaitGroup{}
wg.Add(1)
@@ -146,7 +160,8 @@ func TestWGWatcher_ReEnable(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel = context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
ok = watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
require.True(t, ok, "watcher should be re-enabled after the previous run stopped")
onDisconnected := make(chan struct{}, 1)
go watcher.EnableWgWatcher(ctx, time.Now(), func() {

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package conntype
package worker
import (
"fmt"

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package peer
package worker
import (
"context"
@@ -13,8 +13,9 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/udpmux"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/conntype"
icemaker "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/ice"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/signaling"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/status"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/portforward"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/stdnet"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
@@ -32,57 +33,68 @@ type ICEConnInfo struct {
RelayedOnLocal bool
}
type WorkerICE struct {
ctx context.Context
log *log.Entry
config ConnConfig
conn *Conn
signaler *Signaler
iFaceDiscover stdnet.ExternalIFaceDiscover
statusRecorder *Status
hasRelayOnLocally bool
type ICEDependencies struct {
Signaler *signaling.Signaler
IFaceDiscover stdnet.ExternalIFaceDiscover
StatusRecorder *status.Recorder
PortForwardManager *portforward.Manager
}
type ICE struct {
log *log.Entry
key string
iceConfig icemaker.Config
isController bool
onConnReady func(priority ConnPriority, iceConnInfo ICEConnInfo)
onStatusDisconnect func(sessionChanged bool)
signaler *signaling.Signaler
iFaceDiscover stdnet.ExternalIFaceDiscover
statusRecorder *status.Recorder
portForwardManager *portforward.Manager
hasRelayOnLocally bool
agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent
agentDialerCancel context.CancelFunc
agentConnecting bool // while it is true, drop all incoming offers
lastSuccess time.Time // with this avoid the too frequent ICE agent recreation
// connectedAgent is the agent whose connection was last reported ready; guarded by muxAgent
connectedAgent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent
// remoteSessionID represents the peer's session identifier from the latest remote offer.
remoteSessionID ICESessionID
remoteSessionID icemaker.SessionID
// sessionID is used to track the current session ID of the ICE agent
// increase by one when disconnecting the agent
// with it the remote peer can discard the already deprecated offer/answer
// Without it the remote peer may recreate a workable ICE connection
sessionID ICESessionID
sessionID icemaker.SessionID
remoteSessionChanged bool
muxAgent sync.Mutex
localUfrag string
localPwd string
// we record the last known state of the ICE agent to avoid duplicate on disconnected events
lastKnownState ice.ConnectionState
// portForwardAttempted tracks if we've already tried port forwarding this session
portForwardAttempted bool
}
func NewWorkerICE(ctx context.Context, log *log.Entry, config ConnConfig, conn *Conn, signaler *Signaler, ifaceDiscover stdnet.ExternalIFaceDiscover, statusRecorder *Status, hasRelayOnLocally bool) (*WorkerICE, error) {
sessionID, err := NewICESessionID()
func NewICE(log *log.Entry, key string, iceConfig icemaker.Config, isController bool, onConnReady func(ConnPriority, ICEConnInfo), onStatusDisconnect func(bool), services ICEDependencies, hasRelayOnLocally bool) (*ICE, error) {
sessionID, err := icemaker.NewSessionID()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
w := &WorkerICE{
ctx: ctx,
log: log,
config: config,
conn: conn,
signaler: signaler,
iFaceDiscover: ifaceDiscover,
statusRecorder: statusRecorder,
hasRelayOnLocally: hasRelayOnLocally,
lastKnownState: ice.ConnectionStateDisconnected,
sessionID: sessionID,
w := &ICE{
log: log,
key: key,
iceConfig: iceConfig,
isController: isController,
onConnReady: onConnReady,
onStatusDisconnect: onStatusDisconnect,
signaler: services.Signaler,
iFaceDiscover: services.IFaceDiscover,
statusRecorder: services.StatusRecorder,
portForwardManager: services.PortForwardManager,
hasRelayOnLocally: hasRelayOnLocally,
sessionID: sessionID,
}
localUfrag, localPwd, err := icemaker.GenerateICECredentials()
@@ -94,7 +106,7 @@ func NewWorkerICE(ctx context.Context, log *log.Entry, config ConnConfig, conn *
return w, nil
}
func (w *WorkerICE) OnNewOffer(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) {
func (w *ICE) OnNewOffer(ctx context.Context, remoteOfferAnswer *signaling.OfferAnswer) {
w.log.Debugf("OnNewOffer for ICE, serial: %s", remoteOfferAnswer.SessionIDString())
w.muxAgent.Lock()
defer w.muxAgent.Unlock()
@@ -118,7 +130,7 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) OnNewOffer(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) {
}
}
sessionID, err := NewICESessionID()
sessionID, err := icemaker.NewSessionID()
if err != nil {
w.log.Errorf("failed to create new session ID: %s", err)
}
@@ -136,8 +148,8 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) OnNewOffer(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) {
if remoteOfferAnswer.SessionID != nil {
w.log.Debugf("recreate ICE agent: %s / %s", w.sessionID, *remoteOfferAnswer.SessionID)
}
dialerCtx, dialerCancel := context.WithCancel(w.ctx)
agent, err := w.reCreateAgent(dialerCancel, preferredCandidateTypes)
dialerCtx, dialerCancel := context.WithCancel(ctx)
agent, err := w.reCreateAgent(ctx, dialerCancel, preferredCandidateTypes)
if err != nil {
w.log.Errorf("failed to recreate ICE Agent: %s", err)
return
@@ -151,14 +163,14 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) OnNewOffer(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) {
w.remoteSessionID = ""
}
go w.connect(dialerCtx, agent, remoteOfferAnswer)
go w.connect(dialerCtx, dialerCancel, agent, remoteOfferAnswer)
}
// OnRemoteCandidate Handles ICE connection Candidate provided by the remote peer.
func (w *WorkerICE) OnRemoteCandidate(candidate ice.Candidate, haRoutes route.HAMap) {
func (w *ICE) OnRemoteCandidate(candidate ice.Candidate, haRoutes route.HAMap) {
w.muxAgent.Lock()
defer w.muxAgent.Unlock()
w.log.Debugf("OnRemoteCandidate from peer %s -> %s", w.config.Key, candidate.String())
w.log.Debugf("OnRemoteCandidate from peer %s -> %s", w.key, candidate.String())
if w.agent == nil {
w.log.Warnf("ICE Agent is not initialized yet")
return
@@ -185,18 +197,24 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) OnRemoteCandidate(candidate ice.Candidate, haRoutes route.HA
}
}
func (w *WorkerICE) GetLocalUserCredentials() (frag string, pwd string) {
return w.localUfrag, w.localPwd
func (w *ICE) Credentials() signaling.Credentials {
w.muxAgent.Lock()
defer w.muxAgent.Unlock()
return signaling.Credentials{
UFrag: w.localUfrag,
Pwd: w.localPwd,
SessionID: w.sessionID,
}
}
func (w *WorkerICE) InProgress() bool {
func (w *ICE) InProgress() bool {
w.muxAgent.Lock()
defer w.muxAgent.Unlock()
return w.agentConnecting
}
func (w *WorkerICE) Close() {
func (w *ICE) Close() {
w.muxAgent.Lock()
defer w.muxAgent.Unlock()
@@ -212,10 +230,10 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) Close() {
w.agent = nil
}
func (w *WorkerICE) reCreateAgent(dialerCancel context.CancelFunc, candidates []ice.CandidateType) (*icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, error) {
func (w *ICE) reCreateAgent(ctx context.Context, dialerCancel context.CancelFunc, candidates []ice.CandidateType) (*icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, error) {
w.portForwardAttempted = false
agent, err := icemaker.NewAgent(w.ctx, w.iFaceDiscover, w.config.ICEConfig, candidates, w.localUfrag, w.localPwd)
agent, err := icemaker.NewAgent(ctx, w.iFaceDiscover, w.iceConfig, candidates, w.localUfrag, w.localPwd)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("create agent: %w", err)
}
@@ -237,7 +255,7 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) reCreateAgent(dialerCancel context.CancelFunc, candidates []
return agent, nil
}
func (w *WorkerICE) SessionID() ICESessionID {
func (w *ICE) getSessionID() icemaker.SessionID {
w.muxAgent.Lock()
defer w.muxAgent.Unlock()
@@ -247,11 +265,11 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) SessionID() ICESessionID {
// will block until connection succeeded
// but it won't release if ICE Agent went into Disconnected or Failed state,
// so we have to cancel it with the provided context once agent detected a broken connection
func (w *WorkerICE) connect(ctx context.Context, agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) {
func (w *ICE) connect(ctx context.Context, dialerCancel context.CancelFunc, agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, remoteOfferAnswer *signaling.OfferAnswer) {
w.log.Debugf("gather candidates")
if err := agent.GatherCandidates(); err != nil {
w.log.Warnf("failed to gather candidates: %s", err)
w.closeAgent(agent, w.agentDialerCancel)
w.closeAgent(agent, dialerCancel)
return
}
@@ -259,19 +277,19 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) connect(ctx context.Context, agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent
remoteConn, err := w.turnAgentDial(ctx, agent, remoteOfferAnswer)
if err != nil {
w.log.Debugf("failed to dial the remote peer: %s", err)
w.closeAgent(agent, w.agentDialerCancel)
w.closeAgent(agent, dialerCancel)
return
}
w.log.Debugf("agent dial succeeded")
pair, err := agent.GetSelectedCandidatePair()
if err != nil {
w.closeAgent(agent, w.agentDialerCancel)
w.closeAgent(agent, dialerCancel)
return
}
if pair == nil {
w.log.Warnf("selected candidate pair is nil, cannot proceed")
w.closeAgent(agent, w.agentDialerCancel)
w.closeAgent(agent, dialerCancel)
return
}
@@ -299,17 +317,22 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) connect(ctx context.Context, agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent
}
w.log.Debugf("on ICE conn is ready to use")
w.log.Infof("connection succeeded with offer session: %s", remoteOfferAnswer.SessionIDString())
w.muxAgent.Lock()
if w.agent != agent {
w.muxAgent.Unlock()
w.log.Debugf("agent has been replaced during connect, dropping obsolete connection")
return
}
w.agentConnecting = false
w.lastSuccess = time.Now()
w.connectedAgent = agent
w.muxAgent.Unlock()
// todo: the potential problem is a race between the onConnectionStateChange
w.conn.onICEConnectionIsReady(selectedPriority(pair), ci)
w.log.Infof("connection succeeded with offer session: %s", remoteOfferAnswer.SessionIDString())
w.onConnReady(selectedPriority(pair), ci)
}
func (w *WorkerICE) closeAgent(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, cancel context.CancelFunc) bool {
func (w *ICE) closeAgent(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, cancel context.CancelFunc) bool {
cancel()
if err := agent.Close(); err != nil {
w.log.Warnf("failed to close ICE agent: %s", err)
@@ -323,7 +346,7 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) closeAgent(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, cancel context.C
if w.agent == agent {
// consider to remove from here and move to the OnNewOffer
sessionID, err := NewICESessionID()
sessionID, err := icemaker.NewSessionID()
if err != nil {
w.log.Errorf("failed to create new session ID: %s", err)
}
@@ -335,7 +358,7 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) closeAgent(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, cancel context.C
return sessionChanged
}
func (w *WorkerICE) punchRemoteWGPort(pair *ice.CandidatePair, remoteWgPort int) {
func (w *ICE) punchRemoteWGPort(pair *ice.CandidatePair, remoteWgPort int) {
// wait local endpoint configuration
time.Sleep(time.Second)
addr, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", net.JoinHostPort(pair.Remote.Address(), strconv.Itoa(remoteWgPort)))
@@ -344,7 +367,7 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) punchRemoteWGPort(pair *ice.CandidatePair, remoteWgPort int)
return
}
mux, ok := w.config.ICEConfig.UDPMuxSrflx.(*udpmux.UniversalUDPMuxDefault)
mux, ok := w.iceConfig.UDPMuxSrflx.(*udpmux.UniversalUDPMuxDefault)
if !ok {
w.log.Warn("invalid udp mux conversion")
return
@@ -357,7 +380,7 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) punchRemoteWGPort(pair *ice.CandidatePair, remoteWgPort int)
// onICECandidate is a callback attached to an ICE Agent to receive new local connection candidates
// and then signals them to the remote peer
func (w *WorkerICE) onICECandidate(candidate ice.Candidate) {
func (w *ICE) onICECandidate(candidate ice.Candidate) {
// nil means candidate gathering has been ended
if candidate == nil {
return
@@ -366,9 +389,9 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) onICECandidate(candidate ice.Candidate) {
// TODO: reported port is incorrect for CandidateTypeHost, makes understanding ICE use via logs confusing as port is ignored
w.log.Debugf("discovered local candidate %s", candidate.String())
go func() {
err := w.signaler.SignalICECandidate(candidate, w.config.Key)
err := w.signaler.SignalICECandidate(candidate, w.key)
if err != nil {
w.log.Errorf("failed signaling candidate to the remote peer %s %s", w.config.Key, err)
w.log.Errorf("failed signaling candidate to the remote peer %s %s", w.key, err)
}
}()
@@ -378,8 +401,8 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) onICECandidate(candidate ice.Candidate) {
}
// injectPortForwardedCandidate signals an additional candidate using the pre-created port mapping.
func (w *WorkerICE) injectPortForwardedCandidate(srflxCandidate ice.Candidate) {
pfManager := w.conn.portForwardManager
func (w *ICE) injectPortForwardedCandidate(srflxCandidate ice.Candidate) {
pfManager := w.portForwardManager
if pfManager == nil {
return
}
@@ -407,7 +430,7 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) injectPortForwardedCandidate(srflxCandidate ice.Candidate) {
forwardedCandidate.String(), mapping.InternalPort, mapping.ExternalPort, mapping.NATType, forwardedCandidate.Priority())
go func() {
if err := w.signaler.SignalICECandidate(forwardedCandidate, w.config.Key); err != nil {
if err := w.signaler.SignalICECandidate(forwardedCandidate, w.key); err != nil {
w.log.Errorf("signal port-forwarded candidate: %v", err)
}
}()
@@ -415,7 +438,7 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) injectPortForwardedCandidate(srflxCandidate ice.Candidate) {
// createForwardedCandidate creates a new server reflexive candidate with the forwarded port.
// It uses the NAT gateway's external IP with the forwarded port.
func (w *WorkerICE) createForwardedCandidate(srflxCandidate ice.Candidate, mapping *portforward.Mapping) (ice.Candidate, error) {
func (w *ICE) createForwardedCandidate(srflxCandidate ice.Candidate, mapping *portforward.Mapping) (ice.Candidate, error) {
var externalIP string
if mapping.ExternalIP != nil && !mapping.ExternalIP.IsUnspecified() {
externalIP = mapping.ExternalIP.String()
@@ -460,9 +483,9 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) createForwardedCandidate(srflxCandidate ice.Candidate, mappi
return candidate, nil
}
func (w *WorkerICE) onICESelectedCandidatePair(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, c1, c2 ice.Candidate) {
func (w *ICE) onICESelectedCandidatePair(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, c1, c2 ice.Candidate) {
w.log.Debugf("selected candidate pair [local <-> remote] -> [%s <-> %s], peer %s", c1.String(), c2.String(),
w.config.Key)
w.key)
pairStat, ok := agent.GetSelectedCandidatePairStats()
if !ok {
@@ -471,14 +494,14 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) onICESelectedCandidatePair(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent,
}
duration := time.Duration(pairStat.CurrentRoundTripTime * float64(time.Second))
if err := w.statusRecorder.UpdateLatency(w.config.Key, duration); err != nil {
if err := w.statusRecorder.UpdateLatency(w.key, duration); err != nil {
w.log.Debugf("failed to update latency for peer: %s", err)
return
}
}
func (w *WorkerICE) logSuccessfulPaths(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent) {
sessionID := w.SessionID()
func (w *ICE) logSuccessfulPaths(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent) {
sessionID := w.getSessionID()
stats := agent.GetCandidatePairsStats()
localCandidates, _ := agent.GetLocalCandidates()
remoteCandidates, _ := agent.GetRemoteCandidates()
@@ -508,32 +531,44 @@ func (w *WorkerICE) logSuccessfulPaths(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent) {
}
}
func (w *WorkerICE) onConnectionStateChange(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, dialerCancel context.CancelFunc) func(ice.ConnectionState) {
func (w *ICE) onConnectionStateChange(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, dialerCancel context.CancelFunc) func(ice.ConnectionState) {
// per-agent state; pion delivers callbacks of one agent sequentially
var connected bool
return func(state ice.ConnectionState) {
w.log.Debugf("ICE ConnectionState has changed to %s", state.String())
switch state {
case ice.ConnectionStateConnected:
w.lastKnownState = ice.ConnectionStateConnected
connected = true
w.logSuccessfulPaths(agent)
return
case ice.ConnectionStateFailed, ice.ConnectionStateDisconnected, ice.ConnectionStateClosed:
// ice.ConnectionStateClosed happens when we recreate the agent. For the P2P to TURN switch important to
// notify the conn.onICEStateDisconnected changes to update the current used priority
sessionChanged := w.closeAgent(agent, dialerCancel)
if w.lastKnownState == ice.ConnectionStateConnected {
w.lastKnownState = ice.ConnectionStateDisconnected
w.conn.onICEStateDisconnected(sessionChanged)
if !connected {
return
}
default:
return
connected = false
w.muxAgent.Lock()
stale := w.connectedAgent != agent
if !stale {
w.connectedAgent = nil
}
w.muxAgent.Unlock()
if stale {
w.log.Debugf("suppress disconnected event of replaced ICE agent")
return
}
w.onStatusDisconnect(sessionChanged)
}
}
}
func (w *WorkerICE) turnAgentDial(ctx context.Context, agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) (*ice.Conn, error) {
if isController(w.config) {
func (w *ICE) turnAgentDial(ctx context.Context, agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, remoteOfferAnswer *signaling.OfferAnswer) (*ice.Conn, error) {
if w.isController {
return agent.Dial(ctx, remoteOfferAnswer.IceCredentials.UFrag, remoteOfferAnswer.IceCredentials.Pwd)
} else {
return agent.Accept(ctx, remoteOfferAnswer.IceCredentials.UFrag, remoteOfferAnswer.IceCredentials.Pwd)
@@ -595,10 +630,10 @@ func isRelayed(pair *ice.CandidatePair) bool {
return false
}
func selectedPriority(pair *ice.CandidatePair) conntype.ConnPriority {
func selectedPriority(pair *ice.CandidatePair) ConnPriority {
if isRelayed(pair) {
return conntype.ICETurn
return ICETurn
} else {
return conntype.ICEP2P
return ICEP2P
}
}

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package peer
package worker
import (
"context"
@@ -10,22 +10,23 @@ import (
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/signaling"
relayClient "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/relay/client"
)
type RelayConnInfo struct {
relayedConn net.Conn
rosenpassPubKey []byte
rosenpassAddr string
RelayedConn net.Conn
RosenpassPubKey []byte
RosenpassAddr string
}
type WorkerRelay struct {
peerCtx context.Context
log *log.Entry
isController bool
config ConnConfig
conn *Conn
relayManager *relayClient.Manager
log *log.Entry
key string
isController bool
onConnReady func(RelayConnInfo)
onDisconnected func()
relayManager *relayClient.Manager
relayedConn net.Conn
relayLock sync.Mutex
@@ -33,19 +34,19 @@ type WorkerRelay struct {
relaySupportedOnRemotePeer atomic.Bool
}
func NewWorkerRelay(ctx context.Context, log *log.Entry, ctrl bool, config ConnConfig, conn *Conn, relayManager *relayClient.Manager) *WorkerRelay {
func NewWorkerRelay(log *log.Entry, key string, isController bool, onConnReady func(RelayConnInfo), onDisconnected func(), relayManager *relayClient.Manager) *WorkerRelay {
r := &WorkerRelay{
peerCtx: ctx,
log: log,
isController: ctrl,
config: config,
conn: conn,
relayManager: relayManager,
log: log,
key: key,
isController: isController,
onConnReady: onConnReady,
onDisconnected: onDisconnected,
relayManager: relayManager,
}
return r
}
func (w *WorkerRelay) OnNewOffer(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) {
func (w *WorkerRelay) OnNewOffer(ctx context.Context, remoteOfferAnswer *signaling.OfferAnswer) {
if !w.isRelaySupported(remoteOfferAnswer) {
w.log.Infof("Relay is not supported by remote peer")
w.relaySupportedOnRemotePeer.Store(false)
@@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ func (w *WorkerRelay) OnNewOffer(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) {
serverIP = remoteOfferAnswer.RelaySrvIP
}
relayedConn, err := w.relayManager.OpenConn(w.peerCtx, srv, w.config.Key, serverIP)
relayedConn, err := w.relayManager.OpenConn(ctx, srv, w.key, serverIP)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, relayClient.ErrConnAlreadyExists) {
w.log.Debugf("handled offer by reusing existing relay connection")
@@ -88,10 +89,10 @@ func (w *WorkerRelay) OnNewOffer(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) {
}
w.log.Debugf("peer conn opened via Relay: %s", srv)
go w.conn.onRelayConnectionIsReady(RelayConnInfo{
relayedConn: relayedConn,
rosenpassPubKey: remoteOfferAnswer.RosenpassPubKey,
rosenpassAddr: remoteOfferAnswer.RosenpassAddr,
w.onConnReady(RelayConnInfo{
RelayedConn: relayedConn,
RosenpassPubKey: remoteOfferAnswer.RosenpassPubKey,
RosenpassAddr: remoteOfferAnswer.RosenpassAddr,
})
}
@@ -119,7 +120,7 @@ func (w *WorkerRelay) CloseConn() {
}
}
func (w *WorkerRelay) isRelaySupported(answer *OfferAnswer) bool {
func (w *WorkerRelay) isRelaySupported(answer *signaling.OfferAnswer) bool {
if !w.relayManager.HasRelayAddress() {
return false
}
@@ -134,5 +135,5 @@ func (w *WorkerRelay) preferredRelayServer(myRelayAddress, remoteRelayAddress st
}
func (w *WorkerRelay) onRelayClientDisconnected() {
go w.conn.onRelayDisconnected()
w.onDisconnected()
}

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package worker
package peer
import (
"sync/atomic"
@@ -7,17 +7,17 @@ import (
)
const (
StatusDisconnected Status = iota
StatusConnected
WorkerStatusDisconnected WorkerStatus = iota
WorkerStatusConnected
)
type Status int32
type WorkerStatus int32
func (s Status) String() string {
func (s WorkerStatus) String() string {
switch s {
case StatusDisconnected:
case WorkerStatusDisconnected:
return "Disconnected"
case StatusConnected:
case WorkerStatusConnected:
return "Connected"
default:
log.Errorf("unknown status: %d", s)
@@ -37,16 +37,16 @@ func NewAtomicStatus() *AtomicWorkerStatus {
}
// Get returns the current connection status
func (acs *AtomicWorkerStatus) Get() Status {
return Status(acs.status.Load())
func (acs *AtomicWorkerStatus) Get() WorkerStatus {
return WorkerStatus(acs.status.Load())
}
func (acs *AtomicWorkerStatus) SetConnected() {
acs.status.Store(int32(StatusConnected))
acs.status.Store(int32(WorkerStatusConnected))
}
func (acs *AtomicWorkerStatus) SetDisconnected() {
acs.status.Store(int32(StatusDisconnected))
acs.status.Store(int32(WorkerStatusDisconnected))
}
// String returns the string representation of the current status

View File

@@ -108,10 +108,7 @@ func (s *Store) PeerConnOpenWithFirstPacket(ctx context.Context, pubKey string,
}
}
// PeerConnIdle transitions the peer connection to the lazy idle state, keeping the
// WireGuard peer and its AllowedIPs in place. signalToRemote indicates whether the
// remote peer should be notified (false when the remote initiated the idle via GOAWAY).
func (s *Store) PeerConnIdle(pubKey string, signalToRemote bool) {
func (s *Store) PeerConnIdle(pubKey string) {
s.peerConnsMu.RLock()
defer s.peerConnsMu.RUnlock()
@@ -119,7 +116,18 @@ func (s *Store) PeerConnIdle(pubKey string, signalToRemote bool) {
if !ok {
return
}
p.Idle(signalToRemote)
p.Close(true)
}
func (s *Store) PeerConnClose(pubKey string) {
s.peerConnsMu.RLock()
defer s.peerConnsMu.RUnlock()
p, ok := s.peerConns[pubKey]
if !ok {
return
}
p.Close(false)
}
func (s *Store) PeersPubKey() []string {

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
package statemanager
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
@@ -306,11 +305,6 @@ func (m *Manager) loadStateFile(deleteCorrupt bool) (map[string]json.RawMessage,
var rawStates map[string]json.RawMessage
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &rawStates); err != nil {
if len(bytes.TrimSpace(data)) == 0 {
log.Warnf("state file %s is empty (%d bytes)", m.filePath, len(data))
} else {
log.Warnf("state file %s has malformed content (%d bytes)", m.filePath, len(data))
}
m.handleCorruptedState(deleteCorrupt)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unmarshal states: %w", err)
}

View File

@@ -44,25 +44,10 @@ type Auth struct {
// NewAuth instantiate Auth struct and validate the management URL
func NewAuth(cfgPath string, mgmURL string) (*Auth, error) {
inputCfg := profilemanager.ConfigInput{
ConfigPath: cfgPath,
ManagementURL: mgmURL,
}
// Load the existing config when a config file is already present so an
// interactive re-login reuses the peer's persisted WireGuard private key
// (and thus its identity) instead of generating a fresh one. Generating a
// new key registers a brand-new peer on the management server on every
// re-auth (named after the fallback hostname). Only fall back to a fresh
// in-memory config for the first-time login when no config file exists yet.
// DirectUpdateOrCreateConfig uses non-atomic writes so it also works inside
// the tvOS App Group sandbox where atomic temp-file+rename is blocked.
var cfg *profilemanager.Config
var err error
if cfgPath != "" {
cfg, err = profilemanager.DirectUpdateOrCreateConfig(inputCfg)
} else {
cfg, err = profilemanager.CreateInMemoryConfig(inputCfg)
}
cfg, err := profilemanager.CreateInMemoryConfig(inputCfg)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}

View File

@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ var allKeys = []string{
KeyDisableMetricsCollection,
KeyAllowServerSSH,
KeyDisableAutoConnect,
KeyDisableAutostart,
KeyPreSharedKey,
KeyRosenpassEnabled,
KeyRosenpassPermissive,

View File

@@ -20,10 +20,10 @@ import (
// names (lowerCamelCase) so the daemon can map a Policy key directly to a
// configuration field.
const (
KeyManagementURL = "managementURL"
KeyDisableUpdateSettings = "disableUpdateSettings"
KeyDisableProfiles = "disableProfiles"
KeyDisableNetworks = "disableNetworks"
KeyManagementURL = "managementURL"
KeyDisableUpdateSettings = "disableUpdateSettings"
KeyDisableProfiles = "disableProfiles"
KeyDisableNetworks = "disableNetworks"
// KeyDisableAdvancedView gates the advanced-view section in the
// upcoming UI revision. UI-only: NOT stored on Config, not
// applied by applyMDMPolicy, not rejectable via SetConfig. The
@@ -37,16 +37,10 @@ const (
KeyDisableMetricsCollection = "disableMetricsCollection"
KeyAllowServerSSH = "allowServerSSH"
KeyDisableAutoConnect = "disableAutoConnect"
// KeyDisableAutostart suppresses the GUI's fresh-install
// launch-on-login default and marks the Settings toggle as
// MDM-managed. UI-only: NOT stored on Config and not applied by
// applyMDMPolicy; the GUI reads it directly and it appears in
// GetConfigResponse.mDMManagedFields when set.
KeyDisableAutostart = "disableAutostart"
KeyPreSharedKey = "preSharedKey"
KeyRosenpassEnabled = "rosenpassEnabled"
KeyRosenpassPermissive = "rosenpassPermissive"
KeyWireguardPort = "wireguardPort"
KeyPreSharedKey = "preSharedKey"
KeyRosenpassEnabled = "rosenpassEnabled"
KeyRosenpassPermissive = "rosenpassPermissive"
KeyWireguardPort = "wireguardPort"
// Split tunnel is modeled as a single conceptual policy with two
// registry/plist values. KeySplitTunnelMode is the discriminator

View File

@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ func (s *Server) Start() error {
log.Warnf("failed to redirect stderr: %v", err)
}
if err := RestoreResidualState(s.rootCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
if err := restoreResidualState(s.rootCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
log.Warnf(errRestoreResidualState, err)
}
@@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ func (s *Server) Login(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.LoginRequest) (*pro
s.actCancel = cancel
s.mutex.Unlock()
if err := RestoreResidualState(s.rootCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
if err := restoreResidualState(s.rootCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
log.Warnf(errRestoreResidualState, err)
}
@@ -858,7 +858,7 @@ func (s *Server) Up(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.UpRequest) (*proto.UpR
return s.waitForUp(callerCtx)
}
if err := RestoreResidualState(callerCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
if err := restoreResidualState(callerCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
log.Warnf(errRestoreResidualState, err)
}

View File

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ func (s *Server) CleanState(ctx context.Context, req *proto.CleanStateRequest) (
if req.All {
// Reuse existing cleanup logic for all states
if err := RestoreResidualState(ctx, statePath); err != nil {
if err := restoreResidualState(ctx, statePath); err != nil {
return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Internal, "failed to clean all states: %v", err)
}
@@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ func (s *Server) DeleteState(ctx context.Context, req *proto.DeleteStateRequest)
}, nil
}
// RestoreResidualState checks if the client was not shut down in a clean way and restores residual if required.
// restoreResidualState checks if the client was not shut down in a clean way and restores residual if required.
// Otherwise, we might not be able to connect to the management server to retrieve new config.
func RestoreResidualState(ctx context.Context, statePath string) error {
func restoreResidualState(ctx context.Context, statePath string) error {
if statePath == "" {
return nil
}

View File

@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ import (
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
nbssh "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
)
const (
@@ -219,20 +218,11 @@ func (m *Manager) buildHostPatterns(peer PeerSSHInfo) []string {
if peer.IPv6.IsValid() {
hostPatterns = append(hostPatterns, peer.IPv6.String())
}
// Peer FQDNs and hostnames originate from remote peers, so they must be
// validated as plain DNS names before being embedded in the ssh_config
// "Match host" pattern list. This prevents injection of arbitrary
// ssh_config directives via embedded quotes, whitespace, newlines, the
// comma pattern separator, or the "*"/"?" pattern metacharacters.
if domain.IsValidDomainNoWildcard(peer.FQDN) {
if peer.FQDN != "" {
hostPatterns = append(hostPatterns, peer.FQDN)
} else if peer.FQDN != "" {
log.Warnf("skipping peer FQDN with invalid characters in SSH config: %q", peer.FQDN)
}
if peer.Hostname != peer.FQDN && domain.IsValidDomainNoWildcard(peer.Hostname) {
if peer.Hostname != "" && peer.Hostname != peer.FQDN {
hostPatterns = append(hostPatterns, peer.Hostname)
} else if peer.Hostname != "" && peer.Hostname != peer.FQDN {
log.Warnf("skipping peer hostname with invalid characters in SSH config: %q", peer.Hostname)
}
return hostPatterns
}

View File

@@ -148,45 +148,6 @@ func TestManager_MatchHostFormat(t *testing.T) {
"should use Match host with comma-separated patterns")
}
func TestManager_HostPatternInjection(t *testing.T) {
tempDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "netbird-ssh-config-test")
require.NoError(t, err)
defer func() { assert.NoError(t, os.RemoveAll(tempDir)) }()
manager := &Manager{
sshConfigDir: filepath.Join(tempDir, "ssh_config.d"),
sshConfigFile: "99-netbird.conf",
}
// A malicious peer FQDN/hostname attempts to break out of the Match host
// directive and inject arbitrary ssh_config (a ProxyCommand executing a
// command). It must be rejected, not written to the config.
peers := []PeerSSHInfo{
{
Hostname: "evil\"\n ProxyCommand touch /tmp/pwned\nHost x",
IP: netip.MustParseAddr("100.125.1.1"),
FQDN: "evil\"\n ProxyCommand touch /tmp/pwned\nHost x.nb.internal",
},
{Hostname: "peer2", IP: netip.MustParseAddr("100.125.1.2"), FQDN: "peer2.nb.internal"},
}
err = manager.SetupSSHClientConfig(peers)
require.NoError(t, err)
configPath := filepath.Join(manager.sshConfigDir, manager.sshConfigFile)
content, err := os.ReadFile(configPath)
require.NoError(t, err)
configStr := string(content)
assert.NotContains(t, configStr, "ProxyCommand touch /tmp/pwned",
"injected directive must not appear in generated config")
assert.NotContains(t, configStr, "evil",
"malicious pattern must be dropped entirely")
// The valid peer must still be present, on a single Match host line.
assert.Contains(t, configStr, "Match host \"100.125.1.1,100.125.1.2,peer2.nb.internal,peer2\"",
"valid peers must survive, injected patterns dropped")
}
func TestManager_ForcedSSHConfig(t *testing.T) {
// Set force environment variable
t.Setenv(EnvForceSSHConfig, "true")

View File

@@ -69,8 +69,7 @@ func parseGetentPasswd(output string) (*user.User, string, error) {
// validateGetentInput checks that the input is safe to pass to getent or id.
// Allows POSIX usernames, numeric UIDs, and common NSS extensions
// (@ for Kerberos, $ for Samba, + for NIS compat). A leading hyphen is
// rejected so the input can never be parsed as a command-line flag.
// (@ for Kerberos, $ for Samba, + for NIS compat).
func validateGetentInput(input string) bool {
maxLen := 32
if runtime.GOOS == "linux" {
@@ -81,10 +80,6 @@ func validateGetentInput(input string) bool {
return false
}
if input[0] == '-' {
return false
}
for _, r := range input {
if isAllowedGetentChar(r) {
continue

View File

@@ -157,9 +157,6 @@ func TestValidateGetentInput(t *testing.T) {
{"numeric UID", "1001", true},
{"dots and underscores", "alice.bob_test", true},
{"hyphen", "alice-bob", true},
{"leading hyphen rejected", "-i", false},
{"leading double hyphen rejected", "--no-idn", false},
{"lone hyphen rejected", "-", false},
{"kerberos principal", "user@REALM", true},
{"samba machine account", "MACHINE$", true},
{"NIS compat", "+user", true},

View File

@@ -746,8 +746,6 @@ func ToProtoFullStatus(fullStatus peer.FullStatus) *proto.FullStatus {
pbFullStatus.DnsServers = append(pbFullStatus.DnsServers, pbDnsState)
}
pbFullStatus.Events = fullStatus.Events
return &pbFullStatus
}

View File

@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
//go:build !android && !ios && !freebsd && !js
package main
import (
"context"
"os"
"path/filepath"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/mdm"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ui/preferences"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ui/services"
)
// autostartDefaultState carries the guard inputs of the one-time autostart
// default decision so the decision itself stays a pure, testable function.
type autostartDefaultState struct {
supported bool
mdmDisabled bool
priorInstall bool
}
// shouldEnableAutostartDefault applies the first-run guards in order and
// returns whether autostart may be enabled, plus the reason when it may not.
func shouldEnableAutostartDefault(s autostartDefaultState) (bool, string) {
switch {
case !s.supported:
return false, "autostart not supported on this platform"
case s.mdmDisabled:
return false, "autostart disabled by MDM policy"
case s.priorInstall:
return false, "existing NetBird installation"
}
return true, ""
}
// autostartDisabledByMDM reports whether the MDM policy manages the
// disableAutostart key in a way that must suppress the default. An
// unparseable managed value is treated as disabled to stay on the safe side.
func autostartDisabledByMDM(policy *mdm.Policy) bool {
if !policy.HasKey(mdm.KeyDisableAutostart) {
return false
}
disabled, ok := policy.GetBool(mdm.KeyDisableAutostart)
return !ok || disabled
}
// netbirdFootprintExists reports whether the machine already carries NetBird
// daemon config or state, meaning this is not a genuinely fresh install. It is
// the update-safety gate for the autostart default: upgrading users always
// have a footprint, so an update can never trigger a login-item write.
func netbirdFootprintExists() bool {
candidates := []string{
profilemanager.DefaultConfigPath,
filepath.Join(profilemanager.DefaultConfigPathDir, "config.json"),
filepath.Join(profilemanager.DefaultConfigPathDir, "state.json"),
}
for _, path := range candidates {
if path != "" && fileExists(path) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// applyAutostartDefault runs the one-time launch-on-login default for genuinely
// fresh installs. The autostartInitialized marker is persisted before any
// enable attempt so a crash mid-flow degrades to "never enabled" instead of
// retrying login-item writes on every launch. A user's later disable in
// Settings is never overridden: the marker guarantees at-most-once, ever.
func applyAutostartDefault(ctx context.Context, autostart *services.Autostart, prefs *preferences.Store, prefsFileExisted bool) {
priorFootprint := netbirdFootprintExists() || prefsFileExisted
if prefs.Get().AutostartInitialized {
return
}
if err := prefs.SetAutostartInitialized(true); err != nil {
log.Warnf("persist autostart marker, skipping autostart default: %v", err)
return
}
state := autostartDefaultState{
supported: autostart.Supported(ctx),
mdmDisabled: autostartDisabledByMDM(mdm.LoadPolicy()),
priorInstall: priorFootprint,
}
enable, reason := shouldEnableAutostartDefault(state)
if !enable {
log.Debugf("skipping autostart default: %s", reason)
return
}
if err := autostart.SetEnabled(ctx, true); err != nil {
log.Warnf("enable autostart on fresh install: %v", err)
return
}
log.Info("autostart enabled by default on fresh install")
}
// fileExists reports whether path exists.
func fileExists(path string) bool {
_, err := os.Stat(path)
return err == nil
}

View File

@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
//go:build !android && !ios && !freebsd && !js
package main
import (
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/mdm"
)
func TestShouldEnableAutostartDefault(t *testing.T) {
allPass := autostartDefaultState{
supported: true,
mdmDisabled: false,
priorInstall: false,
}
tests := []struct {
name string
mutate func(*autostartDefaultState)
wantEnable bool
wantReason string
}{
{
name: "fresh install with all guards passing enables",
mutate: func(*autostartDefaultState) {},
wantEnable: true,
},
{
name: "unsupported platform skips",
mutate: func(s *autostartDefaultState) { s.supported = false },
wantReason: "autostart not supported on this platform",
},
{
name: "MDM disable skips",
mutate: func(s *autostartDefaultState) { s.mdmDisabled = true },
wantReason: "autostart disabled by MDM policy",
},
{
name: "existing installation (upgrade) skips",
mutate: func(s *autostartDefaultState) { s.priorInstall = true },
wantReason: "existing NetBird installation",
},
{
name: "unsupported wins over every other guard",
mutate: func(s *autostartDefaultState) {
s.supported = false
s.mdmDisabled = true
s.priorInstall = true
},
wantReason: "autostart not supported on this platform",
},
{
name: "MDM disable wins over prior install",
mutate: func(s *autostartDefaultState) {
s.mdmDisabled = true
s.priorInstall = true
},
wantReason: "autostart disabled by MDM policy",
},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
state := allPass
tc.mutate(&state)
enable, reason := shouldEnableAutostartDefault(state)
assert.Equal(t, tc.wantEnable, enable, "enable decision should match for state %+v", state)
assert.Equal(t, tc.wantReason, reason, "skip reason should identify the failing guard")
})
}
}
func TestAutostartDisabledByMDM(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
values map[string]any
want bool
}{
{
name: "empty policy does not disable",
values: nil,
want: false,
},
{
name: "unrelated managed keys do not disable",
values: map[string]any{mdm.KeyDisableAutoConnect: true},
want: false,
},
{
name: "disableAutostart true disables",
values: map[string]any{mdm.KeyDisableAutostart: true},
want: true,
},
{
name: "disableAutostart registry DWORD 1 disables",
values: map[string]any{mdm.KeyDisableAutostart: int64(1)},
want: true,
},
{
name: "disableAutostart string true disables",
values: map[string]any{mdm.KeyDisableAutostart: "true"},
want: true,
},
{
name: "disableAutostart explicit false allows",
values: map[string]any{mdm.KeyDisableAutostart: false},
want: false,
},
{
name: "unparseable managed value is treated as disabled",
values: map[string]any{mdm.KeyDisableAutostart: "not-a-bool"},
want: true,
},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := autostartDisabledByMDM(mdm.NewPolicy(tc.values))
assert.Equal(t, tc.want, got, "MDM disable decision should match for values %v", tc.values)
})
}
}

View File

@@ -51,14 +51,7 @@ async function runSsoLogin(
if (uri) await openBrowserLoginUri(uri);
const cancelPromise = buildSsoCancelPromise(state, signal);
// Combine wait + up in Go so the connection comes up the moment SSO
// completes. During SSO the tray window is hidden and the webview is
// suspended, so a frontend-driven Up (a promise continuation) would not
// fire until the user woke the window (e.g. hovering the tray icon).
const waitPromise = Connection.WaitSSOLoginAndUp(
{ userCode: result.userCode, hostname: "" },
{ profileName: "", username: "" },
);
const waitPromise = Connection.WaitSSOLogin({ userCode: result.userCode, hostname: "" });
try {
await Promise.race([waitPromise, cancelPromise]);
@@ -96,13 +89,13 @@ export async function startConnection(onSettled?: () => void, signal?: AbortSign
if (signal?.aborted) state.cancelled = true;
if (!state.cancelled && result.needsSsoLogin) {
// runSsoLogin brings the connection up in Go once SSO completes.
await runSsoLogin(result, state, signal);
} else {
if (!state.cancelled && signal?.aborted) state.cancelled = true;
if (!state.cancelled) {
await Connection.Up({ profileName: "", username: "" });
}
}
if (!state.cancelled && signal?.aborted) state.cancelled = true;
if (!state.cancelled) {
await Connection.Up({ profileName: "", username: "" });
}
} catch (e) {
WindowManager.CloseBrowserLogin().catch(console.error);

View File

@@ -197,9 +197,6 @@ func main() {
// daemon may keep the main window from showing, so the OS toast is the
// only reliable signal the user gets.
go notifyIfDaemonOutdated(compat, notifier, localizer)
// One-time launch-on-login default for fresh installs; gated by the
// NetBird footprint check, MDM policy, and the persisted marker.
go applyAutostartDefault(context.Background(), services.NewAutostart(app.Autostart), prefStore, prefStore.ExistedAtLoad())
})
if err := app.Run(); err != nil {

View File

@@ -54,10 +54,6 @@ type UIPreferences struct {
Language i18n.LanguageCode `json:"language"`
ViewMode ViewMode `json:"viewMode"`
OnboardingCompleted bool `json:"onboardingCompleted"`
// AutostartInitialized records that the one-time autostart default
// decision has run for this OS user. It only ever transitions to true
// and is never reset, so the default-on flow runs at most once, ever.
AutostartInitialized bool `json:"autostartInitialized"`
}
// LanguageValidator rejects SetLanguage inputs with no shipped bundle.
@@ -76,9 +72,8 @@ type Emitter interface {
type Store struct {
path string
mu sync.RWMutex
current UIPreferences
existedAtLoad bool
mu sync.RWMutex
current UIPreferences
subsMu sync.Mutex
subs []chan UIPreferences
@@ -162,27 +157,6 @@ func (s *Store) SetOnboardingCompleted(done bool) error {
return nil
}
// SetAutostartInitialized persists the one-time autostart decision marker.
// No-op if unchanged.
func (s *Store) SetAutostartInitialized(done bool) error {
s.mu.Lock()
if s.current.AutostartInitialized == done {
s.mu.Unlock()
return nil
}
next := s.current
next.AutostartInitialized = done
if err := s.persistLocked(next); err != nil {
s.mu.Unlock()
return fmt.Errorf("persist preferences: %w", err)
}
s.current = next
s.mu.Unlock()
s.broadcast(next)
return nil
}
// SetLanguage validates, persists, and broadcasts. No-op if unchanged.
func (s *Store) SetLanguage(lang i18n.LanguageCode) error {
if lang == "" {
@@ -232,29 +206,13 @@ func (s *Store) Subscribe() (<-chan UIPreferences, func()) {
return ch, unsubscribe
}
// ExistedAtLoad reports whether the backing preferences file was present on
// disk when the store loaded. It distinguishes a user who ran a prior GUI
// version from a brand-new OS user with no preferences yet.
func (s *Store) ExistedAtLoad() bool {
s.mu.RLock()
defer s.mu.RUnlock()
return s.existedAtLoad
}
// load reads the file into current. A missing file is not an error (the
// in-memory default stands); malformed contents return an error.
func (s *Store) load() error {
if _, err := os.Stat(s.path); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
return nil
}
return fmt.Errorf("stat preferences: %w", err)
if _, err := os.Stat(s.path); errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
return nil
}
s.mu.Lock()
s.existedAtLoad = true
s.mu.Unlock()
var loaded UIPreferences
if _, err := util.ReadJson(s.path, &loaded); err != nil {
return err

View File

@@ -215,46 +215,6 @@ func TestStore_FileShapeIsJSON(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, i18n.LanguageCode("hu"), parsed.Language)
}
func TestStore_SetAutostartInitializedPersistsAcrossReload(t *testing.T) {
withTempConfigDir(t)
emitter := &recordingEmitter{}
s, err := NewStore(nil, emitter)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, s.Get().AutostartInitialized, "marker must default to false when no file is on disk")
require.NoError(t, s.SetAutostartInitialized(true))
assert.True(t, s.Get().AutostartInitialized, "Get should reflect the persisted marker")
require.Len(t, emitter.calledWith(EventPreferencesChanged), 1, "first marker write should broadcast")
// Re-setting the same value must be a no-op: no disk write, no broadcast.
require.NoError(t, s.SetAutostartInitialized(true))
assert.Len(t, emitter.calledWith(EventPreferencesChanged), 1, "idempotent marker write should not broadcast again")
// A fresh Store (new GUI launch) must see the marker so the autostart
// default decision never runs twice.
reloaded, err := NewStore(nil, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, reloaded.Get().AutostartInitialized, "marker must survive a reload from disk")
}
func TestStore_ExistedAtLoad(t *testing.T) {
withTempConfigDir(t)
// Brand-new OS user: no preferences file on disk yet.
fresh, err := NewStore(nil, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, fresh.ExistedAtLoad(), "ExistedAtLoad must be false when no file is on disk")
// Persisting a value writes the file to disk.
require.NoError(t, fresh.SetLanguage("en"))
// A subsequent GUI launch reopens the now-present file.
reopened, err := NewStore(nil, nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, reopened.ExistedAtLoad(), "ExistedAtLoad must be true after the store has persisted and is reopened")
}
func TestStore_ErrUnsupportedSentinel(t *testing.T) {
// Verifies callers can match on the sentinel error rather than parsing
// strings — protects against accidental %v -> %w changes that would

View File

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ type LoginResult struct {
VerificationURIComplete string `json:"verificationUriComplete"`
}
// WaitSSOParams are the inputs to waitSSOLogin.
// WaitSSOParams are the inputs to WaitSSOLogin.
type WaitSSOParams struct {
UserCode string `json:"userCode"`
Hostname string `json:"hostname"`
@@ -125,6 +125,23 @@ func (s *Connection) Login(ctx context.Context, p LoginParams) (LoginResult, err
}, nil
}
func (s *Connection) WaitSSOLogin(ctx context.Context, p WaitSSOParams) (string, error) {
cli, err := s.conn.Client()
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
log.Infof("waiting for SSO login to complete")
resp, err := cli.WaitSSOLogin(ctx, &proto.WaitSSOLoginRequest{
UserCode: p.UserCode,
Hostname: p.Hostname,
})
if err != nil {
return "", s.classifyDaemonError(err)
}
log.Infof("SSO login completed, daemon reported success")
return resp.GetEmail(), nil
}
func (s *Connection) Up(ctx context.Context, p UpParams) error {
cli, err := s.conn.Client()
if err != nil {
@@ -145,27 +162,6 @@ func (s *Connection) Up(ctx context.Context, p UpParams) error {
return nil
}
// WaitSSOLoginAndUp blocks until the SSO login completes and then brings the
// connection up, both from the Go side. Keeping the post-login Up here rather
// than as a frontend continuation is deliberate: during SSO the tray window is
// hidden and the webview is suspended (macOS App Nap / hidden-window timer
// throttling), so a frontend-driven Up would not run until the user woke the
// window (e.g. by hovering the tray icon). Doing it in Go connects the moment
// the daemon reports SSO success. Returns the authenticated user's email.
func (s *Connection) WaitSSOLoginAndUp(ctx context.Context, wait WaitSSOParams, up UpParams) (string, error) {
email, err := s.waitSSOLogin(ctx, wait)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
return "", err
}
if err := s.Up(ctx, up); err != nil {
return "", err
}
return email, nil
}
func (s *Connection) Down(ctx context.Context) error {
cli, err := s.conn.Client()
if err != nil {
@@ -225,26 +221,6 @@ func (s *Connection) Logout(ctx context.Context, p LogoutParams) error {
return nil
}
// waitSSOLogin blocks until the daemon reports the SSO login result and returns
// the authenticated user's email. It is unexported because the frontend drives
// SSO through the exported WaitSSOLoginAndUp.
func (s *Connection) waitSSOLogin(ctx context.Context, p WaitSSOParams) (string, error) {
cli, err := s.conn.Client()
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
log.Infof("waiting for SSO login to complete")
resp, err := cli.WaitSSOLogin(ctx, &proto.WaitSSOLoginRequest{
UserCode: p.UserCode,
Hostname: p.Hostname,
})
if err != nil {
return "", s.classifyDaemonError(err)
}
log.Infof("SSO login completed, daemon reported success")
return resp.GetEmail(), nil
}
// classifyDaemonError maps a gRPC error to a localised ClientError.
func (s *Connection) classifyDaemonError(err error) *ClientError {
return s.classifier.classify(err)

View File

@@ -20,12 +20,11 @@ type MDMFields struct {
DisableServerRoutes bool `json:"disableServerRoutes"`
AllowServerSSH *bool `json:"allowServerSSH"`
DisableAutoConnect bool `json:"disableAutoConnect"`
DisableAutostart bool `json:"disableAutostart"`
BlockInbound bool `json:"blockInbound"`
DisableMetricsCollection bool `json:"disableMetricsCollection"`
SplitTunnelMode bool `json:"splitTunnelMode"`
SplitTunnelApps bool `json:"splitTunnelApps"`
DisableAdvancedView bool `json:"disableAdvancedView"`
DisableAdvancedView bool `json:"disableAdvancedView"`
}
type Features struct {

View File

@@ -145,7 +145,6 @@ type AuthConfig struct {
CLIRedirectURIs []string `yaml:"cliRedirectURIs"`
Owner *AuthOwnerConfig `yaml:"owner,omitempty"`
DashboardPostLogoutRedirectURIs []string `yaml:"dashboardPostLogoutRedirectURIs"`
GrantTypes []string `yaml:"grantTypes"`
}
// AuthStorageConfig contains auth storage settings
@@ -605,7 +604,6 @@ func (c *CombinedConfig) buildEmbeddedIdPConfig(mgmt ManagementConfig) (*idp.Emb
DashboardRedirectURIs: mgmt.Auth.DashboardRedirectURIs,
CLIRedirectURIs: mgmt.Auth.CLIRedirectURIs,
DashboardPostLogoutRedirectURIs: mgmt.Auth.DashboardPostLogoutRedirectURIs,
GrantTypes: mgmt.Auth.GrantTypes,
}
if mgmt.Auth.Owner != nil && mgmt.Auth.Owner.Email != "" {

View File

@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ func availableProviders() []providerCase {
if region == "" {
region = "us-east-1"
}
ps = append(ps, providerCase{name: "bedrock", catalogID: "bedrock_api", upstream: "https://bedrock-runtime." + region + ".amazonaws.com", apiKey: k, model: "us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5", kind: harness.WireBedrock})
ps = append(ps, providerCase{name: "bedrock", catalogID: "bedrock_api", upstream: "https://bedrock-runtime." + region + ".amazonaws.com", apiKey: k, model: "us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5", kind: harness.WireMessages})
}
return ps
}
@@ -224,12 +224,9 @@ func TestProvidersMatrix(t *testing.T) {
var c int
var b string
var cerr error
switch pc.kind {
case harness.WireVertex:
if pc.kind == harness.WireVertex {
c, b, cerr = cl.Vertex(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc.project, pc.region, pc.model, "Reply with exactly: pong", sessionID)
case harness.WireBedrock:
c, b, cerr = cl.Bedrock(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc.model, "Reply with exactly: pong", sessionID)
default:
} else {
c, b, cerr = cl.Chat(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc.kind, pc.model, "Reply with exactly: pong", sessionID)
}
if cerr == nil {

View File

@@ -1,168 +0,0 @@
//go:build e2e
package agentnetwork
import (
"context"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/e2e/harness"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/api"
)
// catalogModel returns the normalized catalog id the proxy stamps for a
// path-routed provider's configured model — the form the guardrail allowlist is
// compared against (region prefix / @version stripped).
func catalogModel(pc providerCase) string {
switch pc.kind {
case harness.WireBedrock:
return strings.TrimPrefix(pc.model, "us.")
case harness.WireVertex:
return strings.SplitN(pc.model, "@", 2)[0]
default:
return pc.model
}
}
// disallowedModel returns a valid-shaped model id for the provider that is NOT
// the configured/allowed one, so the guardrail must reject it before the
// request ever reaches the upstream.
func disallowedModel(pc providerCase) string {
switch pc.kind {
case harness.WireBedrock:
return "us.anthropic.claude-opus-4-8"
case harness.WireVertex:
return "claude-opus-4-8@20250101"
default:
return "unlisted-model"
}
}
// sendModel drives one request for the given model through the provider's native
// wire shape and returns the HTTP status.
func sendModel(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, cl *harness.Client, endpoint, proxyIP string, pc providerCase, model string) int {
t.Helper()
var code int
var err error
switch pc.kind {
case harness.WireBedrock:
code, _, err = cl.Bedrock(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
case harness.WireVertex:
code, _, err = cl.Vertex(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, pc.project, pc.region, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
default:
code, _, err = cl.Chat(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, pc.kind, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
}
require.NoError(t, err, "request must reach the proxy for %s", pc.name)
return code
}
// TestModelAllowlistEnforced provisions a Model Allowlist guardrail limiting each
// path-routed provider (Bedrock, Vertex) to its configured model, then drives
// requests over the tunnel: the allowed model returns 200 while a model outside
// the allowlist is denied 403 by the guardrail before it reaches the upstream.
// This is the coverage missing for #6751 — the model for these providers travels
// in the URL path, and the allowlist must be enforced there.
func TestModelAllowlistEnforced(t *testing.T) {
var providers []providerCase
for _, pc := range availableProviders() {
if pc.kind == harness.WireBedrock || pc.kind == harness.WireVertex {
providers = append(providers, pc)
}
}
if len(providers) == 0 {
t.Skip("no path-routed provider keys set (AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK / GOOGLE_VERTEX_*); source ~/.llm-keys")
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 20*time.Minute)
defer cancel()
grp, err := srv.API().Groups.Create(ctx, api.PostApiGroupsJSONRequestBody{Name: "e2e-allowlist"})
require.NoError(t, err, "create group")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.API().Groups.Delete(context.Background(), grp.Id) })
ephemeral := false
sk, err := srv.API().SetupKeys.Create(ctx, api.PostApiSetupKeysJSONRequestBody{
Name: "e2e-allowlist-client",
Type: "reusable",
ExpiresIn: 86400,
UsageLimit: 0,
AutoGroups: []string{grp.Id},
Ephemeral: &ephemeral,
})
require.NoError(t, err, "mint setup key")
// Providers with their configured (allowed) models; the first bootstraps the cluster.
ids := make([]string, 0, len(providers))
allowed := make([]string, 0, len(providers))
for i, pc := range providers {
req := providerRequest(pc)
if i == 0 {
req.BootstrapCluster = ptr(harness.AgentNetworkCluster)
}
prov, perr := srv.CreateProvider(ctx, req)
require.NoError(t, perr, "create provider %s", pc.name)
id := prov.Id
ids = append(ids, id)
allowed = append(allowed, catalogModel(pc))
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteProvider(context.Background(), id) })
}
// Guardrail allowlisting exactly the configured models.
var gr api.AgentNetworkGuardrailRequest
gr.Name = "e2e-allowlist"
gr.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Enabled = true
gr.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Models = allowed
guard, err := srv.CreateGuardrail(ctx, gr)
require.NoError(t, err, "create guardrail")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteGuardrail(context.Background(), guard.Id) })
enabled := true
pol, err := srv.CreatePolicy(ctx, api.AgentNetworkPolicyRequest{
Name: "e2e-allowlist",
Enabled: &enabled,
SourceGroups: []string{grp.Id},
DestinationProviderIds: ids,
GuardrailIds: &[]string{guard.Id},
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create policy")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeletePolicy(context.Background(), pol.Id) })
settings, err := srv.GetSettings(ctx)
require.NoError(t, err, "read settings for endpoint")
require.NotEmpty(t, settings.Endpoint, "agent-network endpoint must be assigned")
proxyToken, err := srv.CreateProxyTokenCLI(ctx, "e2e-proxy-allowlist")
require.NoError(t, err, "mint proxy token via CLI")
px, err := harness.StartProxy(ctx, srv, proxyToken)
require.NoError(t, err, "start proxy")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = px.Terminate(context.Background()) })
cl, err := harness.StartClient(ctx, srv, sk.Key)
require.NoError(t, err, "start client")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = cl.Terminate(context.Background()) })
require.NoError(t, cl.WaitConnected(ctx, 90*time.Second), "client must connect to management")
if err := cl.WaitProxyPeer(ctx, 180*time.Second); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("client did not see the proxy peer: %v\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", err, px.Logs(context.Background()))
}
proxyIP, err := cl.ResolveProxyIP(ctx, settings.Endpoint)
require.NoError(t, err, "resolve agent-network endpoint to proxy IP")
for _, pc := range providers {
pc := pc
t.Run(pc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// The admin's allowlisted model is served end to end.
assert.Equal(t, 200, sendModel(ctx, t, cl, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc, pc.model),
"allowlisted model must be permitted for %s", pc.name)
// A model outside the allowlist is rejected by the guardrail (before
// the upstream), regardless of whether it is a real catalog model.
assert.Equal(t, 403, sendModel(ctx, t, cl, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc, disallowedModel(pc)),
"model outside the allowlist must be denied for %s", pc.name)
})
}
}

View File

@@ -107,17 +107,6 @@ func (c *Combined) DeletePolicy(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
return anDelete(ctx, c, "/api/agent-network/policies/"+id)
}
// CreateGuardrail creates an agent-network guardrail (e.g. a model allowlist)
// that can then be attached to a policy via its GuardrailIds.
func (c *Combined) CreateGuardrail(ctx context.Context, req api.AgentNetworkGuardrailRequest) (api.AgentNetworkGuardrail, error) {
return anRequest[api.AgentNetworkGuardrail](ctx, c, http.MethodPost, "/api/agent-network/guardrails", req)
}
// DeleteGuardrail removes a guardrail by id.
func (c *Combined) DeleteGuardrail(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
return anDelete(ctx, c, "/api/agent-network/guardrails/"+id)
}
// GetSettings returns the account's agent-network settings row. It exists only
// after the first provider create bootstraps it.
func (c *Combined) GetSettings(ctx context.Context) (api.AgentNetworkSettings, error) {

View File

@@ -194,11 +194,6 @@ const (
// WireVertex is the Anthropic-on-Vertex rawPredict shape: the client posts
// the full Vertex model path and the proxy mints the SA OAuth token.
WireVertex = "vertex"
// WireBedrock is the native AWS Bedrock InvokeModel shape: the model id
// travels in the URL path (/model/{id}/invoke), not the body, so the proxy
// routes by path. This is what a Bedrock SDK client sends and the shape the
// model-allowlist guardrail must enforce.
WireBedrock = "bedrock"
)
// Chat issues a chat-completion POST to the agent-network endpoint over the
@@ -231,17 +226,6 @@ func (cl *Client) Vertex(ctx context.Context, endpoint, proxyIP, project, region
return cl.post(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, path, body, withSessionID(nil, sessionID))
}
// Bedrock issues a native AWS Bedrock InvokeModel POST over the tunnel. The
// model id is carried in the request path (/model/{id}/invoke), so the proxy
// routes by path; the body uses the bedrock anthropic_version rather than a
// model field. A non-empty sessionID is sent as the universal x-session-id
// header the proxy records.
func (cl *Client) Bedrock(ctx context.Context, endpoint, proxyIP, model, prompt, sessionID string) (int, string, error) {
path := "/model/" + model + "/invoke"
body := fmt.Sprintf(`{"anthropic_version":"bedrock-2023-05-31","max_tokens":64,"messages":[{"role":"user","content":%q}]}`, prompt)
return cl.post(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, path, body, withSessionID(nil, sessionID))
}
// withSessionID appends the x-session-id header when sessionID is non-empty.
func withSessionID(headers []string, sessionID string) []string {
if sessionID == "" {

2
go.mod
View File

@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ replace github.com/cloudflare/circl => codeberg.org/cunicu/circl v0.0.0-20230801
replace github.com/pion/ice/v4 => github.com/netbirdio/ice/v4 v4.0.0-20250908184934-6202be846b51
replace github.com/dexidp/dex => github.com/netbirdio/dex v0.244.1-0.20260716205454-a163de3129e5
replace github.com/dexidp/dex => github.com/netbirdio/dex v0.244.1-0.20260512110716-8d70ad8647c1
replace github.com/dexidp/dex/api/v2 => github.com/netbirdio/dex/api/v2 v2.0.0-20260512110716-8d70ad8647c1

4
go.sum
View File

@@ -476,8 +476,8 @@ github.com/morikuni/aec v1.0.0 h1:nP9CBfwrvYnBRgY6qfDQkygYDmYwOilePFkwzv4dU8A=
github.com/morikuni/aec v1.0.0/go.mod h1:BbKIizmSmc5MMPqRYbxO4ZU0S0+P200+tUnFx7PXmsc=
github.com/munnerz/goautoneg v0.0.0-20191010083416-a7dc8b61c822 h1:C3w9PqII01/Oq1c1nUAm88MOHcQC9l5mIlSMApZMrHA=
github.com/munnerz/goautoneg v0.0.0-20191010083416-a7dc8b61c822/go.mod h1:+n7T8mK8HuQTcFwEeznm/DIxMOiR9yIdICNftLE1DvQ=
github.com/netbirdio/dex v0.244.1-0.20260716205454-a163de3129e5 h1:3PwQv8aR46qN2u16+Dv6udnH3sbVKX5KrGwF35CKSI0=
github.com/netbirdio/dex v0.244.1-0.20260716205454-a163de3129e5/go.mod h1:IHH+H8vK2GfqtIt5u/5OdPh18yk0oDHuj2vz5+Goetg=
github.com/netbirdio/dex v0.244.1-0.20260512110716-8d70ad8647c1 h1:4TaYr9O4xX0D2kszeOLclTiCbA3eHq3xWV+9ILJbIYs=
github.com/netbirdio/dex v0.244.1-0.20260512110716-8d70ad8647c1/go.mod h1:IHH+H8vK2GfqtIt5u/5OdPh18yk0oDHuj2vz5+Goetg=
github.com/netbirdio/dex/api/v2 v2.0.0-20260512110716-8d70ad8647c1 h1:neE7z+FPUkldl3faK/Jt+hJK2L+1XfQ1W33TQhU9m88=
github.com/netbirdio/dex/api/v2 v2.0.0-20260512110716-8d70ad8647c1/go.mod h1:awuTyT29CYALpEyET0S307EgNlPWrc7fFKRAyhsO45M=
github.com/netbirdio/easyjson v0.9.0 h1:6Nw2lghSVuy8RSkAYDhDv1thBVEmfVbKZnV7T7Z6Aus=

View File

@@ -613,10 +613,6 @@ func (c *YAMLConfig) ToServerConfig(stor storage.Storage, logger *slog.Logger) s
cfg.SupportedResponseTypes = c.OAuth2.ResponseTypes
}
if len(c.OAuth2.GrantTypes) > 0 {
cfg.AllowedGrantTypes = c.OAuth2.GrantTypes
}
// Apply expiry settings
if c.Expiry.IDTokens != "" {
if d, err := parseDuration(c.Expiry.IDTokens); err == nil {

View File

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ import (
"github.com/dexidp/dex/server/signer"
"github.com/dexidp/dex/storage"
"github.com/dexidp/dex/storage/sql"
"github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4"
jose "github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"

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