[client] Make netbird up wait for the daemon to become ready

The CLI up path only tolerated a not-yet-ready daemon via a 10s blocking
dial, so "netbird service start" immediately followed by "netbird up"
(e.g. a container entrypoint) failed with a generic "daemon not running"
error. The container entrypoint worked around this with a shell poll loop
(status --check live) before running up.

Move the readiness wait into the CLI, mirroring how the GUI already dials:

- DialClientGRPCServer now uses grpc.NewClient with a tuned reconnect
  backoff and waits for the connection to reach READY (retrying on
  TRANSIENT_FAILURE) up to a 30s deadline, instead of grpc.DialContext +
  WithBlock with a hard 10s timeout.
- up now polls Status via waitForDaemonStatus, retrying while the RPC is
  Unavailable (socket up but service not yet registered).

Add an explicit daemon-ready signal so clients can wait deterministically
instead of heuristically:

- New optional StatusResponse.daemonReady field (field 5, wire-compatible
  with older GUIs/daemons which leave it unset). Regenerated with the
  pinned protoc v33.1 toolchain so no version churn leaks into the diff.
- The server sets ready once Start succeeds and the DaemonService is
  registered (SetReady, called from the service controller).
- waitForDaemonStatus waits for daemonReady=true (or an already-Connected
  status), with a bounded grace window so older daemons that never set the
  field are not blocked.

Simplify the container entrypoint accordingly: drop the readiness poll
loop (up now waits) and the now-dead NB_ENTRYPOINT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT env,
keeping only the daemon+up process glue and SIGTERM forwarding for clean
shutdown.

client/Dockerfile

@@ -17,8 +17,7 @@ ENV \
     NETBIRD_BIN="/usr/local/bin/netbird" \
     NB_LOG_FILE="console,/var/log/netbird/client.log" \
     NB_DAEMON_ADDR="unix:///var/run/netbird.sock" \
-    NB_ENABLE_CAPTURE="false" \
-    NB_ENTRYPOINT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT="30"
+    NB_ENABLE_CAPTURE="false"
 
 ENTRYPOINT [ "/usr/local/bin/netbird-entrypoint.sh" ]
 ARG TARGETPLATFORM

client/Dockerfile-rootless

@@ -23,8 +23,7 @@ ENV \
     NB_DAEMON_ADDR="unix:///var/lib/netbird/netbird.sock" \
     NB_LOG_FILE="console,/var/lib/netbird/client.log" \
     NB_DISABLE_DNS="true" \
-    NB_ENABLE_CAPTURE="false" \
-    NB_ENTRYPOINT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT="30"
+    NB_ENABLE_CAPTURE="false"
 
 ENTRYPOINT [ "/usr/local/bin/netbird-entrypoint.sh" ]
 ARG TARGETPLATFORM

client/cmd/dial_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"net"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"google.golang.org/grpc"
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/connectivity"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
+)
+
+// startUnixGRPCServer starts a bare gRPC server listening on a unix socket at path
+// and returns a stop function. No services are registered; the connectivity-state
+// wait only cares about the transport becoming READY.
+func startUnixGRPCServer(t *testing.T, path string) func() {
+	t.Helper()
+	lis, err := net.Listen("unix", path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("listen unix %s: %v", path, err)
+	}
+	srv := grpc.NewServer()
+	go func() { _ = srv.Serve(lis) }()
+	return srv.Stop
+}
+
+func TestDialClientGRPCServer_ConnectsWhenServing(t *testing.T) {
+	sock := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "nb.sock")
+	stop := startUnixGRPCServer(t, sock)
+	defer stop()
+
+	conn, err := dialClientGRPCServer(context.Background(), "unix://"+sock, 5*time.Second)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("expected connection, got error: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer conn.Close()
+
+	if state := conn.GetState(); state != connectivity.Ready {
+		t.Fatalf("expected READY, got %s", state)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestDialClientGRPCServer_WaitsForLateServer is the core regression test: the
+// daemon socket appears only after the dial has already started, mirroring
+// "netbird service start" immediately followed by "netbird up".
+func TestDialClientGRPCServer_WaitsForLateServer(t *testing.T) {
+	sock := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "nb.sock")
+
+	var stop func()
+	timer := time.AfterFunc(1*time.Second, func() {
+		stop = startUnixGRPCServer(t, sock)
+	})
+	defer timer.Stop()
+	defer func() {
+		if stop != nil {
+			stop()
+		}
+	}()
+
+	start := time.Now()
+	conn, err := dialClientGRPCServer(context.Background(), "unix://"+sock, 10*time.Second)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("expected connection after late server start, got error: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer conn.Close()
+
+	if elapsed := time.Since(start); elapsed < 500*time.Millisecond {
+		t.Fatalf("connected too fast (%s); server should not have been up yet", elapsed)
+	}
+	if state := conn.GetState(); state != connectivity.Ready {
+		t.Fatalf("expected READY, got %s", state)
+	}
+}
+
+// fakeStatusServer serves the Status RPC with a programmable response so we can
+// exercise waitForDaemonStatus without spinning up a real engine.
+type fakeStatusServer struct {
+	proto.UnimplementedDaemonServiceServer
+	resp func() *proto.StatusResponse
+}
+
+func (f *fakeStatusServer) Status(context.Context, *proto.StatusRequest) (*proto.StatusResponse, error) {
+	return f.resp(), nil
+}
+
+func startFakeStatusServer(t *testing.T, sock string, resp func() *proto.StatusResponse) func() {
+	t.Helper()
+	lis, err := net.Listen("unix", sock)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("listen unix %s: %v", sock, err)
+	}
+	srv := grpc.NewServer()
+	proto.RegisterDaemonServiceServer(srv, &fakeStatusServer{resp: resp})
+	go func() { _ = srv.Serve(lis) }()
+	return srv.Stop
+}
+
+func dialFake(t *testing.T, sock string) proto.DaemonServiceClient {
+	t.Helper()
+	conn, err := dialClientGRPCServer(context.Background(), "unix://"+sock, 5*time.Second)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("dial fake daemon: %v", err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { conn.Close() })
+	return proto.NewDaemonServiceClient(conn)
+}
+
+// New daemon that flips DaemonReady=true after a couple of polls: waitForDaemonStatus
+// must block until the flag is set, then return.
+func TestWaitForDaemonStatus_WaitsForDaemonReady(t *testing.T) {
+	sock := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "nb.sock")
+	var polls int32
+	stop := startFakeStatusServer(t, sock, func() *proto.StatusResponse {
+		n := atomic.AddInt32(&polls, 1)
+		return &proto.StatusResponse{
+			Status:      string(internal.StatusConnecting),
+			DaemonReady: n >= 3, // ready only from the 3rd poll on
+		}
+	})
+	defer stop()
+
+	client := dialFake(t, sock)
+	status, err := waitForDaemonStatus(context.Background(), client)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !status.GetDaemonReady() {
+		t.Fatalf("expected DaemonReady=true, got false")
+	}
+	if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&polls); got < 3 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected at least 3 polls before ready, got %d", got)
+	}
+}
+
+// Older daemon that never sets DaemonReady but reports a healthy (Connected)
+// status: waitForDaemonStatus must return promptly via the readiness fallback,
+// not block for the whole grace window.
+func TestWaitForDaemonStatus_OlderDaemonHealthyStatus(t *testing.T) {
+	sock := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "nb.sock")
+	stop := startFakeStatusServer(t, sock, func() *proto.StatusResponse {
+		return &proto.StatusResponse{Status: string(internal.StatusConnected)} // DaemonReady unset
+	})
+	defer stop()
+
+	client := dialFake(t, sock)
+	start := time.Now()
+	status, err := waitForDaemonStatus(context.Background(), client)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
+	}
+	if status.GetDaemonReady() {
+		t.Fatalf("expected DaemonReady=false from older daemon")
+	}
+	if elapsed := time.Since(start); elapsed > 2*time.Second {
+		t.Fatalf("returned too slowly (%s); healthy status should short-circuit the grace", elapsed)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDialClientGRPCServer_TimesOutWhenAbsent(t *testing.T) {
+	sock := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "never.sock")
+
+	start := time.Now()
+	conn, err := dialClientGRPCServer(context.Background(), "unix://"+sock, 1*time.Second)
+	if err == nil {
+		conn.Close()
+		t.Fatal("expected timeout error, got nil")
+	}
+	if elapsed := time.Since(start); elapsed < 900*time.Millisecond {
+		t.Fatalf("returned too early (%s); should have waited ~timeout", elapsed)
+	}
+}

client/cmd/root.go

@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ import (
 	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
 	"github.com/spf13/pflag"
 	"google.golang.org/grpc"
+	gbackoff "google.golang.org/grpc/backoff"
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/connectivity"
 	"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials/insecure"
 
 	daddr "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/daemonaddr"
@@ -264,17 +266,70 @@ func FlagNameToEnvVar(cmdFlag string, prefix string) string {
 	return prefix + upper
 }
 
-// DialClientGRPCServer returns client connection to the daemon server.
-func DialClientGRPCServer(ctx context.Context, addr string) (*grpc.ClientConn, error) {
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, time.Second*10)
-	defer cancel()
+// defaultDaemonDialTimeout is how long DialClientGRPCServer waits for the daemon
+// to become reachable. It is intentionally generous so that invoking the CLI
+// right after "netbird service start" (e.g. from a container entrypoint) tolerates
+// the window where the daemon has created its socket but is not yet serving.
+const defaultDaemonDialTimeout = 30 * time.Second
 
-	return grpc.DialContext(
-		ctx,
+// DialClientGRPCServer returns a client connection to the daemon server. It waits
+// for the daemon to become reachable, retrying with backoff until the connection
+// reports READY or defaultDaemonDialTimeout elapses. This handles the startup race
+// where the daemon socket exists (or is about to) before the gRPC server is serving.
+func DialClientGRPCServer(ctx context.Context, addr string) (*grpc.ClientConn, error) {
+	return dialClientGRPCServer(ctx, addr, defaultDaemonDialTimeout)
+}
+
+func dialClientGRPCServer(ctx context.Context, addr string, timeout time.Duration) (*grpc.ClientConn, error) {
+	conn, err := grpc.NewClient(
 		strings.TrimPrefix(addr, "tcp://"),
 		grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials()),
-		grpc.WithBlock(),
+		// Cap reconnect backoff at 5s; gRPC's default 120s MaxDelay would leave the
+		// CLI waiting far too long to notice a freshly-started daemon. Mirrors the GUI.
+		grpc.WithConnectParams(grpc.ConnectParams{
+			Backoff: gbackoff.Config{
+				BaseDelay:  1 * time.Second,
+				Multiplier: 1.6,
+				Jitter:     0.2,
+				MaxDelay:   5 * time.Second,
+			},
+		}),
 	)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("create daemon gRPC client: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	// grpc.NewClient is lazy: it does not connect until the first RPC or until we
+	// nudge it. Trigger connection attempts and wait until the channel reaches READY.
+	if err := waitForConnReady(ctx, conn, timeout); err != nil {
+		_ = conn.Close()
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return conn, nil
+}
+
+// waitForConnReady drives the gRPC channel out of IDLE and blocks until it becomes
+// READY, or until timeout/ctx expires. TRANSIENT_FAILURE (daemon not yet serving)
+// is treated as retryable so the caller keeps waiting within the deadline.
+func waitForConnReady(ctx context.Context, conn *grpc.ClientConn, timeout time.Duration) error {
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, timeout)
+	defer cancel()
+
+	for {
+		state := conn.GetState()
+		switch state {
+		case connectivity.Ready:
+			return nil
+		case connectivity.Idle:
+			// Kick the lazy channel into connecting.
+			conn.Connect()
+		}
+
+		if !conn.WaitForStateChange(ctx, state) {
+			// ctx expired while in `state`.
+			return fmt.Errorf("timed out after %s waiting for daemon to become ready (last state: %s)", timeout, state)
+		}
+	}
 }
 
 // WithBackOff execute function in backoff cycle.

client/cmd/service_controller.go

@@ -78,6 +78,10 @@ func (p *program) Start(svc service.Service) error {
 			log.Fatalf("failed to start daemon: %v", err)
 		}
 		proto.RegisterDaemonServiceServer(p.serv, serverInstance)
+		// The engine is started and the service is registered: from here on the
+		// daemon serves RPCs backed by a running engine. Report readiness so
+		// clients (e.g. netbird up) can wait deterministically.
+		serverInstance.SetReady()
 
 		p.serverInstanceMu.Lock()
 		p.serverInstance = serverInstance

client/cmd/up.go

@@ -295,9 +295,7 @@ func runInDaemonMode(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, pm *profilemanager
 
 	client := proto.NewDaemonServiceClient(conn)
 
-	status, err := client.Status(ctx, &proto.StatusRequest{
-		WaitForReady: func() *bool { b := true; return &b }(),
-	})
+	status, err := waitForDaemonStatus(ctx, client)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("unable to get daemon status: %v", err)
 	}
@@ -336,6 +334,79 @@ func runInDaemonMode(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, pm *profilemanager
 	return nil
 }
 
+// daemonStatusPollTimeout bounds how long we poll the Status RPC waiting for the
+// daemon to answer coherently. The transport is already READY at this point (see
+// DialClientGRPCServer), so this only covers the brief window where the gRPC server
+// is serving but the daemon engine is still starting up and the Status RPC races
+// against server.Start().
+const daemonStatusPollTimeout = 15 * time.Second
+
+// daemonReadyGrace bounds how long we keep polling once the daemon answers but
+// still reports DaemonReady=false. A freshly-started daemon flips it to true
+// within this window; an older daemon that never sets the field simply falls
+// through after the grace elapses, preserving backward compatibility.
+const daemonReadyGrace = 10 * time.Second
+
+// waitForDaemonStatus fetches the daemon status, waiting for the daemon to become
+// ready. It handles two startup races:
+//
+//  1. The gRPC server is not yet serving: Status fails with Unavailable — retry.
+//  2. The server serves but the engine is still starting: a DaemonReady-aware
+//     daemon reports DaemonReady=false until Start finishes; poll until it flips
+//     true (bounded by daemonReadyGrace). Older daemons never set DaemonReady, so
+//     we stop waiting on it after the grace and use the status as-is.
+//
+// It gives up after daemonStatusPollTimeout.
+func waitForDaemonStatus(ctx context.Context, client proto.DaemonServiceClient) (*proto.StatusResponse, error) {
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, daemonStatusPollTimeout)
+	defer cancel()
+
+	waitForReady := true
+	req := &proto.StatusRequest{WaitForReady: &waitForReady}
+
+	var lastErr error
+	var firstAnswer time.Time
+	for {
+		status, err := client.Status(ctx, req)
+		if err != nil {
+			lastErr = err
+			// Only retry while the daemon is not yet answering; surface real errors.
+			if s, ok := gstatus.FromError(err); !ok || s.Code() != codes.Unavailable {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+		} else {
+			// Daemon answered. Explicitly ready (DaemonReady-aware daemon), or
+			// already fully connected — either way, done. Connected is the only
+			// status unambiguous enough to short-circuit on: a DaemonReady-aware
+			// daemon sets the flag at startup, so trusting Connected here can only
+			// help an older daemon that never sets the flag, without overriding a
+			// new daemon that legitimately reports DaemonReady=false while starting.
+			if status.GetDaemonReady() || internal.StatusType(status.GetStatus()) == internal.StatusConnected {
+				return status, nil
+			}
+			// Answered but neither ready-flagged nor connected yet: give a
+			// DaemonReady-aware daemon a bounded window to finish starting, then
+			// fall through so an older daemon that never sets the flag isn't
+			// blocked here.
+			if firstAnswer.IsZero() {
+				firstAnswer = time.Now()
+			} else if time.Since(firstAnswer) >= daemonReadyGrace {
+				return status, nil
+			}
+			lastErr = nil
+		}
+
+		select {
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+			if lastErr != nil {
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("daemon did not become ready: %w", lastErr)
+			}
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("daemon did not become ready within %s", daemonStatusPollTimeout)
+		case <-time.After(500 * time.Millisecond):
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 func doDaemonUp(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, client proto.DaemonServiceClient, pm *profilemanager.ProfileManager, activeProf *profilemanager.Profile, customDNSAddressConverted []byte, username string) error {
 
 	providedSetupKey, err := getSetupKey()

client/firewall/uspfilter/filter.go

@@ -121,7 +121,6 @@ type Manager struct {
 	udpTracker     *conntrack.UDPTracker
 	icmpTracker    *conntrack.ICMPTracker
 	tcpTracker     *conntrack.TCPTracker
-	fragments      *fragmentTracker
 	forwarder      atomic.Pointer[forwarder.Forwarder]
 	pendingCapture atomic.Pointer[forwarder.PacketCapture]
 	logger         *nblog.Logger
@@ -184,41 +183,6 @@ func (d *decoder) decodePacket(data []byte) error {
 	}
 }
 
-// decodeTransport decodes the transport header of a first fragment (which
-// gopacket leaves undecoded) into the decoder and appends its layer type to
-// decoded, so the ACL pipeline can evaluate it like a normal packet. It returns
-// false if the protocol is unsupported or the header is truncated.
-func (d *decoder) decodeTransport(proto layers.IPProtocol, payload []byte) bool {
-	var l4 gopacket.DecodingLayer
-	var layerType gopacket.LayerType
-	var minLen int
-	switch proto {
-	case layers.IPProtocolTCP:
-		l4, layerType, minLen = &d.tcp, layers.LayerTypeTCP, 20
-	case layers.IPProtocolUDP:
-		l4, layerType, minLen = &d.udp, layers.LayerTypeUDP, 8
-	case layers.IPProtocolICMPv4:
-		l4, layerType, minLen = &d.icmp4, layers.LayerTypeICMPv4, 8
-	case layers.IPProtocolICMPv6:
-		l4, layerType, minLen = &d.icmp6, layers.LayerTypeICMPv6, 8
-	default:
-		return false
-	}
-
-	// Reject a fragment too small to hold the full transport header before
-	// decoding: it can't be ACL-evaluated (tiny-fragment attack), and skipping
-	// the decode avoids gopacket allocating an error on the drop path.
-	if len(payload) < minLen {
-		return false
-	}
-
-	if err := l4.DecodeFromBytes(payload, gopacket.NilDecodeFeedback); err != nil {
-		return false
-	}
-	d.decoded = append(d.decoded, layerType)
-	return true
-}
-
 // Create userspace firewall manager constructor
 func Create(iface common.IFaceMapper, disableServerRoutes bool, flowLogger nftypes.FlowLogger, mtu uint16) (*Manager, error) {
 	return create(iface, nil, disableServerRoutes, flowLogger, mtu)
@@ -322,8 +286,6 @@ func create(iface common.IFaceMapper, nativeFirewall firewall.Manager, disableSe
 	if err := m.localipmanager.UpdateLocalIPs(iface); err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("update local IPs: %w", err)
 	}
-	m.fragments = newFragmentTracker(m.logger)
-
 	if disableConntrack {
 		log.Info("conntrack is disabled")
 	} else {
@@ -337,7 +299,6 @@ func create(iface common.IFaceMapper, nativeFirewall firewall.Manager, disableSe
 		}
 	}
 	if err := iface.SetFilter(m); err != nil {
-		m.fragments.Close()
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("set filter: %w", err)
 	}
 	return m, nil
@@ -733,10 +694,6 @@ func (m *Manager) resetState() {
 		m.tcpTracker.Close()
 	}
 
-	if m.fragments != nil {
-		m.fragments.Close()
-	}
-
 	if fwder := m.forwarder.Load(); fwder != nil {
 		fwder.SetCapture(nil)
 		fwder.Stop()
@@ -1089,20 +1046,19 @@ func (m *Manager) filterInbound(packetData []byte, size int) bool {
 		return true
 	}
 
-	// gopacket does not decode the transport header of any IP fragment, so
-	// fragments take a dedicated path: the first fragment's header is decoded
-	// and ACL-evaluated here, and the remaining fragments inherit its verdict.
+	// TODO: pass fragments of routed packets to forwarder
 	if fragment {
-		return m.filterInboundFragment(d, srcIP, dstIP, size)
+		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
+			if d.decoded[0] == layers.LayerTypeIPv4 {
+				m.logger.Trace4("packet is a fragment: src=%v dst=%v id=%v flags=%v",
+					srcIP, dstIP, d.ip4.Id, d.ip4.Flags)
+			} else {
+				m.logger.Trace2("packet is an IPv6 fragment: src=%v dst=%v", srcIP, dstIP)
+			}
+		}
+		return false
 	}
 
-	return m.filterInboundDecoded(d, srcIP, dstIP, packetData, size)
-}
-
-// filterInboundDecoded runs the ACL, DNAT and conntrack pipeline on a fully
-// decoded (non-fragment) inbound packet. It returns true if the packet should
-// be dropped.
-func (m *Manager) filterInboundDecoded(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, packetData []byte, size int) bool {
 	// TODO: optimize port DNAT by caching matched rules in conntrack
 	if translated := m.translateInboundPortDNAT(packetData, d, srcIP, dstIP); translated {
 		// Re-decode after port DNAT translation to update port information
@@ -1133,226 +1089,33 @@ func (m *Manager) filterInboundDecoded(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, pack
 	return m.handleRoutedTraffic(d, srcIP, dstIP, packetData, size)
 }
 
-// fragmentMeta holds the reassembly identity and layout of an IP fragment,
-// extracted uniformly for IPv4 and IPv6.
-type fragmentMeta struct {
-	key fragmentKey
-	// offset is the fragment offset in 8-byte units (zero for the first
-	// fragment).
-	offset uint16
-	// moreFragments is the More Fragments bit. A first fragment with it unset is
-	// an IPv6 atomic fragment (a complete datagram, RFC 6946): it has no trailing
-	// fragments to inherit a verdict, so it must not be recorded.
-	moreFragments bool
-	proto         layers.IPProtocol
-	// l4payload is the fragmentable payload of this fragment. For the first
-	// fragment it starts with the transport header.
-	l4payload []byte
-	// headerEndOctets is the first fragment's payload length in 8-byte units:
-	// the smallest offset a trailing fragment may start at without overlapping
-	// the inspected transport header.
-	headerEndOctets uint16
-}
-
-// fragmentMetadata extracts the fragment identity and layout from a decoded IP
-// fragment. It returns false for fragments it can't interpret (e.g. an IPv6
-// fragment header shorter than 8 bytes), which are then dropped.
-func fragmentMetadata(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr) (fragmentMeta, bool) {
-	switch d.decoded[0] {
-	case layers.LayerTypeIPv4:
-		payload := d.ip4.Payload
-		return fragmentMeta{
-			key:             fragmentKey{srcIP: srcIP, dstIP: dstIP, id: uint32(d.ip4.Id), proto: uint8(d.ip4.Protocol)},
-			offset:          d.ip4.FragOffset,
-			moreFragments:   d.ip4.Flags&layers.IPv4MoreFragments != 0,
-			proto:           d.ip4.Protocol,
-			l4payload:       payload,
-			headerEndOctets: octets(len(payload)),
-		}, true
-
-	case layers.LayerTypeIPv6:
-		// IPv6 fragment extension header: 8 bytes, followed by the fragmentable
-		// payload. Layout: next header (1), reserved (1), offset+flags (2), id (4).
-		payload := d.ip6.Payload
-		if len(payload) < 8 {
-			return fragmentMeta{}, false
-		}
-		nextHeader := layers.IPProtocol(payload[0])
-		offsetFlags := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(payload[2:4])
-		id := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(payload[4:8])
-		l4 := payload[8:]
-		return fragmentMeta{
-			key:             fragmentKey{srcIP: srcIP, dstIP: dstIP, id: id, proto: uint8(nextHeader)},
-			offset:          offsetFlags >> 3,
-			moreFragments:   offsetFlags&1 != 0,
-			proto:           nextHeader,
-			l4payload:       l4,
-			headerEndOctets: octets(len(l4)),
-		}, true
-
-	default:
-		return fragmentMeta{}, false
-	}
-}
-
-// octets rounds a byte length up to whole 8-byte units, the granularity of the
-// IP fragment offset field.
-func octets(nbytes int) uint16 {
-	return uint16((nbytes + 7) / 8)
-}
-
-// filterInboundFragment decides the fate of an IP fragment. gopacket stops
-// decoding at the network layer for every fragment, so the first fragment's
-// transport header is decoded and ACL-evaluated here and its verdict recorded;
-// the remaining (headerless) fragments inherit that verdict. Anything that
-// cannot be tied to an allowed, non-overlapping first fragment is dropped.
-func (m *Manager) filterInboundFragment(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, size int) bool {
-	meta, ok := fragmentMetadata(d, srcIP, dstIP)
-	if !ok {
-		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
-			m.logger.Trace2("dropping unsupported fragment: src=%v dst=%v", srcIP, dstIP)
-		}
-		return true
-	}
-
-	if meta.offset != 0 {
-		return m.filterTrailingFragment(meta, srcIP, dstIP)
-	}
-
-	// A new first fragment supersedes any recorded verdict for this datagram, so
-	// a re-sent or overlapping offset-zero fragment can't inherit the old one.
-	m.fragments.poison(meta.key)
-
-	// First fragment: decode its transport header so the ACL can evaluate it. A
-	// decode failure means the fragment is too small to hold the full transport
-	// header (RFC 1858 §3 tiny-fragment attack); it can't be evaluated, so drop it.
-	if !d.decodeTransport(meta.proto, meta.l4payload) {
-		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
-			m.logger.Trace3("dropping first fragment without full L4 header: src=%v dst=%v id=%v",
-				srcIP, dstIP, meta.key.id)
-		}
-		return true
-	}
-
-	return m.filterFirstFragment(d, meta, srcIP, dstIP, size)
-}
-
-// filterTrailingFragment applies a recorded first-fragment verdict to a
-// non-first fragment.
-func (m *Manager) filterTrailingFragment(meta fragmentMeta, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr) bool {
-	switch m.fragments.verdict(meta.key, meta.offset) {
-	case fragmentAllow:
-		return false
-	case fragmentOverlap:
-		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
-			m.logger.Trace3("dropping overlapping fragment rewriting inspected header: src=%v dst=%v id=%v",
-				srcIP, dstIP, meta.key.id)
-		}
-		return true
-	default:
-		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
-			m.logger.Trace3("dropping fragment with no allowed first fragment: src=%v dst=%v id=%v",
-				srcIP, dstIP, meta.key.id)
-		}
-		return true
-	}
-}
-
-// filterFirstFragment runs the verdict part of the inbound pipeline on a first
-// fragment with its transport header decoded. It mirrors filterInboundDecoded
-// but skips DNAT (port rewriting on fragments is unsupported) and forwarder
-// injection (fragments are left to the stack to reassemble, not forwarded).
-// Allowed fragments have their verdict recorded so the datagram's trailing
-// fragments inherit it.
-func (m *Manager) filterFirstFragment(d *decoder, meta fragmentMeta, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, size int) bool {
-	if m.stateful && m.isValidTrackedConnection(d, srcIP, dstIP, size) {
-		m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
-		return false
-	}
-
-	if m.localipmanager.IsLocalIP(dstIP) {
-		ruleID, blocked := m.peerACLsBlock(srcIP, d, nil)
-		if blocked {
-			m.storeDropFlow("Dropping local first fragment (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
-				d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
-			return true
-		}
-		m.trackInbound(d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
-		m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
-		return false
-	}
-
-	if !m.routingEnabled.Load() {
-		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
-			m.logger.Trace2("Dropping routed fragment (routing disabled): src=%s dst=%s", srcIP, dstIP)
-		}
-		return true
-	}
-	if m.nativeRouter.Load() {
-		m.trackInbound(d, srcIP, dstIP, nil, size)
-		m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
-		return false
-	}
-
-	// TODO: pass fragments of routed packets to the forwarder; until then
-	// allowed routed fragments go to the native stack.
-	srcPort, dstPort := getPortsFromPacket(d)
-	ruleID, pass := m.routeACLsPass(srcIP, dstIP, d.decoded[1], srcPort, dstPort)
-	if !pass {
-		m.storeDropFlow("Dropping routed first fragment (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
-			d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
-		return true
-	}
-
-	m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
-	return false
-}
-
-// recordFirstFragment caches an allowed first fragment's verdict for its
-// trailing fragments to inherit. Atomic fragments (no More Fragments bit) are
-// complete datagrams with no trailing fragments, so they are not cached and
-// cannot exhaust the verdict table.
-func (m *Manager) recordFirstFragment(meta fragmentMeta) {
-	if !meta.moreFragments {
-		return
-	}
-	m.fragments.recordAllowed(meta.key, meta.headerEndOctets)
-}
-
-// storeDropFlow logs and records a netflow drop event for an inbound packet
-// denied by the ACLs. msg is the trace format taking rule id, protocol, source
-// and destination.
-func (m *Manager) storeDropFlow(msg string, d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, ruleID []byte, size int) {
-	pnum := getProtocolFromPacket(d)
-	srcPort, dstPort := getPortsFromPacket(d)
-
-	if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
-		m.logger.Trace6(msg, ruleID, pnum, srcIP, srcPort, dstIP, dstPort)
-	}
-
-	m.flowLogger.StoreEvent(nftypes.EventFields{
-		FlowID:     uuid.New(),
-		Type:       nftypes.TypeDrop,
-		RuleID:     ruleID,
-		Direction:  nftypes.Ingress,
-		Protocol:   pnum,
-		SourceIP:   srcIP,
-		DestIP:     dstIP,
-		SourcePort: srcPort,
-		DestPort:   dstPort,
-		// TODO: icmp type/code
-		RxPackets: 1,
-		RxBytes:   uint64(size),
-	})
-}
-
 // handleLocalTraffic handles local traffic.
 // If it returns true, the packet should be dropped.
 func (m *Manager) handleLocalTraffic(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, packetData []byte, size int) bool {
 	ruleID, blocked := m.peerACLsBlock(srcIP, d, packetData)
 	if blocked {
-		m.storeDropFlow("Dropping local packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
-			d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
+		pnum := getProtocolFromPacket(d)
+		srcPort, dstPort := getPortsFromPacket(d)
+
+		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
+			m.logger.Trace6("Dropping local packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
+				ruleID, pnum, srcIP, srcPort, dstIP, dstPort)
+		}
+
+		m.flowLogger.StoreEvent(nftypes.EventFields{
+			FlowID:     uuid.New(),
+			Type:       nftypes.TypeDrop,
+			RuleID:     ruleID,
+			Direction:  nftypes.Ingress,
+			Protocol:   pnum,
+			SourceIP:   srcIP,
+			DestIP:     dstIP,
+			SourcePort: srcPort,
+			DestPort:   dstPort,
+			// TODO: icmp type/code
+			RxPackets: 1,
+			RxBytes:   uint64(size),
+		})
 		return true
 	}
 
@@ -1405,8 +1168,27 @@ func (m *Manager) handleRoutedTraffic(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, packe
 
 	ruleID, pass := m.routeACLsPass(srcIP, dstIP, protoLayer, srcPort, dstPort)
 	if !pass {
-		m.storeDropFlow("Dropping routed packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
-			d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
+		proto := getProtocolFromPacket(d)
+
+		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
+			m.logger.Trace6("Dropping routed packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
+				ruleID, proto, srcIP, srcPort, dstIP, dstPort)
+		}
+
+		m.flowLogger.StoreEvent(nftypes.EventFields{
+			FlowID:     uuid.New(),
+			Type:       nftypes.TypeDrop,
+			RuleID:     ruleID,
+			Direction:  nftypes.Ingress,
+			Protocol:   proto,
+			SourceIP:   srcIP,
+			DestIP:     dstIP,
+			SourcePort: srcPort,
+			DestPort:   dstPort,
+			// TODO: icmp type/code
+			RxPackets: 1,
+			RxBytes:   uint64(size),
+		})
 		return true
 	}
 

client/firewall/uspfilter/forwarder/forwarder.go

@@ -5,9 +5,7 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"net"
 	"net/netip"
-	"os"
 	"runtime"
-	"strconv"
 	"sync"
 	"time"
 
@@ -33,11 +31,6 @@ const (
 	defaultMaxInFlight   = 1024
 	iosReceiveWindow     = 16384
 	iosMaxInFlight       = 256
-
-	// envForceTCPRACK overrides the platform default for gVisor's RACK loss
-	// detection. Set to a truthy value to force RACK on, or a falsy value to
-	// force it off, on any platform.
-	envForceTCPRACK = "NB_FORCE_TCP_RACK"
 )
 
 type Forwarder struct {
@@ -159,8 +152,6 @@ func New(iface common.IFaceMapper, logger *nblog.Logger, flowLogger nftypes.Flow
 		maxInFlight = iosMaxInFlight
 	}
 
-	configureTCPRecovery(s)
-
 	tcpForwarder := tcp.NewForwarder(s, receiveWindow, maxInFlight, f.handleTCP)
 	s.SetTransportProtocolHandler(tcp.ProtocolNumber, tcpForwarder.HandlePacket)
 
@@ -475,31 +466,3 @@ func probeRawICMP(network, addr string, logger *nblog.Logger) bool {
 	logger.Debug1("forwarder: raw %s socket access available", network)
 	return true
 }
-
-// configureTCPRecovery disables gVisor's RACK loss detection on Windows, where
-// it interacts poorly with the host and collapses throughput on routed TCP
-// connections (gVisor issue #9778). Other platforms keep the default. The
-// EnvForceTCPRACK environment variable overrides the platform default.
-func configureTCPRecovery(s *stack.Stack) {
-	disableRACK := runtime.GOOS == "windows"
-
-	if val := os.Getenv(envForceTCPRACK); val != "" {
-		force, err := strconv.ParseBool(val)
-		if err != nil {
-			log.Warnf("parse %s: %v", envForceTCPRACK, err)
-		} else {
-			disableRACK = !force
-		}
-	}
-
-	if !disableRACK {
-		return
-	}
-
-	opt := tcpip.TCPRecovery(0)
-	if err := s.SetTransportProtocolOption(tcp.ProtocolNumber, &opt); err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("disable TCP RACK loss detection: %v", err)
-		return
-	}
-	log.Info("forwarder: TCP RACK loss detection disabled")
-}

client/firewall/uspfilter/fragment.go

@@ -1,204 +0,0 @@
-package uspfilter
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"net/netip"
-	"os"
-	"strconv"
-	"sync"
-	"time"
-
-	nblog "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/uspfilter/log"
-)
-
-const (
-	// defaultFragmentTimeout bounds how long a first-fragment verdict is kept
-	// while the remaining fragments arrive. It mirrors the Linux IP reassembly
-	// timeout (net.ipv4.ipfrag_time).
-	defaultFragmentTimeout = 30 * time.Second
-	// fragmentCleanupInterval is how often expired verdicts are purged.
-	fragmentCleanupInterval = 10 * time.Second
-	// defaultMaxFragmentEntries caps the number of concurrently tracked
-	// fragmented datagrams. The table stays bounded because each datagram is a
-	// single small entry regardless of how many fragments it is split into, and
-	// the 13-bit IPv4 fragment-offset field limits any datagram to 64 KiB.
-	defaultMaxFragmentEntries = 16384
-
-	// EnvFragmentMaxEntries overrides defaultMaxFragmentEntries.
-	EnvFragmentMaxEntries = "NB_FRAGMENT_MAX_ENTRIES"
-)
-
-// fragmentVerdict is the decision for a trailing (headerless) fragment.
-type fragmentVerdict int
-
-const (
-	// fragmentDeny drops the fragment: no allowed first fragment is on record.
-	fragmentDeny fragmentVerdict = iota
-	// fragmentAllow passes the fragment: it belongs to an allowed datagram and
-	// does not overlap the already-inspected transport header.
-	fragmentAllow
-	// fragmentOverlap drops the fragment and poisons its datagram: it overlaps
-	// the transport header the ACL inspected (RFC 1858 §4, RFC 3128; RFC 5722
-	// requires discarding the whole datagram on overlap for IPv6).
-	fragmentOverlap
-)
-
-// fragmentKey identifies a fragmented datagram. It matches the RFC 791 / RFC
-// 8200 reassembly key: source, destination, protocol and identification. The id
-// is 32-bit to hold both the IPv4 (16-bit) and IPv6 (32-bit) identification.
-type fragmentKey struct {
-	srcIP netip.Addr
-	dstIP netip.Addr
-	id    uint32
-	proto uint8
-}
-
-// fragmentEntry records the verdict of an allowed first fragment.
-type fragmentEntry struct {
-	// headerEndOctets is the offset, in 8-byte units, at which the first
-	// fragment's payload ended. A trailing fragment starting before this
-	// overlaps bytes the ACL already inspected and is rejected.
-	headerEndOctets uint16
-	// recordedAt is when the first fragment was accepted. The verdict expires a
-	// fixed timeout later and is not refreshed, mirroring the kernel reassembly
-	// timer so a trailing-fragment flood can't keep a datagram alive.
-	recordedAt time.Time
-}
-
-// fragmentTracker records the ACL verdict of a datagram's first fragment so the
-// remaining fragments, which carry no L4 header, can inherit the decision
-// without reassembling the datagram. Only allowed first fragments are stored;
-// anything that cannot be tied to an allowed, non-overlapping first fragment is
-// dropped (fail closed).
-type fragmentTracker struct {
-	logger  *nblog.Logger
-	mutex   sync.Mutex
-	entries map[fragmentKey]fragmentEntry
-	timeout time.Duration
-	// maxEntries caps the table; atCapacity dedups the capacity warning until
-	// the table drains below the cap again.
-	maxEntries    int
-	atCapacity    bool
-	cleanupTicker *time.Ticker
-	cancel        context.CancelFunc
-}
-
-func newFragmentTracker(logger *nblog.Logger) *fragmentTracker {
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-	t := &fragmentTracker{
-		logger:        logger,
-		entries:       make(map[fragmentKey]fragmentEntry),
-		timeout:       defaultFragmentTimeout,
-		maxEntries:    fragmentMaxEntries(logger),
-		cleanupTicker: time.NewTicker(fragmentCleanupInterval),
-		cancel:        cancel,
-	}
-	go t.cleanupRoutine(ctx)
-	return t
-}
-
-func fragmentMaxEntries(logger *nblog.Logger) int {
-	v := os.Getenv(EnvFragmentMaxEntries)
-	if v == "" {
-		return defaultMaxFragmentEntries
-	}
-	n, err := strconv.Atoi(v)
-	if err != nil || n <= 0 {
-		logger.Warn2("invalid %s=%q, using default", EnvFragmentMaxEntries, v)
-		return defaultMaxFragmentEntries
-	}
-	return n
-}
-
-// recordAllowed stores the verdict of an allowed first fragment. headerEndOctets
-// is the first fragment's payload length in 8-byte units. When the table is full
-// the record is dropped, which fails closed: the datagram's trailing fragments
-// will be denied.
-func (t *fragmentTracker) recordAllowed(key fragmentKey, headerEndOctets uint16) {
-	t.mutex.Lock()
-	defer t.mutex.Unlock()
-
-	if t.entries == nil {
-		return
-	}
-	if _, ok := t.entries[key]; !ok && len(t.entries) >= t.maxEntries {
-		if !t.atCapacity {
-			t.atCapacity = true
-			t.logger.Warn2("fragment verdict table at capacity (%d/%d): trailing fragments of new datagrams will be dropped",
-				len(t.entries), t.maxEntries)
-		}
-		return
-	}
-	t.entries[key] = fragmentEntry{
-		headerEndOctets: headerEndOctets,
-		recordedAt:      time.Now(),
-	}
-}
-
-// poison drops any recorded verdict for a datagram, so its later fragments are
-// denied until a new allowed first fragment is recorded. Called on every
-// offset-zero fragment to defeat offset-zero overlap rewrites (RFC 3128).
-func (t *fragmentTracker) poison(key fragmentKey) {
-	t.mutex.Lock()
-	defer t.mutex.Unlock()
-	delete(t.entries, key)
-}
-
-// verdict decides the fate of a trailing fragment at fragOffsetOctets (the IPv4
-// fragment offset, in 8-byte units). A fragment overlapping the inspected
-// header poisons the datagram: the entry is removed so all further fragments of
-// that datagram are denied too.
-func (t *fragmentTracker) verdict(key fragmentKey, fragOffsetOctets uint16) fragmentVerdict {
-	t.mutex.Lock()
-	defer t.mutex.Unlock()
-
-	entry, ok := t.entries[key]
-	if !ok {
-		return fragmentDeny
-	}
-	if time.Since(entry.recordedAt) > t.timeout {
-		delete(t.entries, key)
-		return fragmentDeny
-	}
-	if fragOffsetOctets < entry.headerEndOctets {
-		delete(t.entries, key)
-		return fragmentOverlap
-	}
-	return fragmentAllow
-}
-
-func (t *fragmentTracker) cleanupRoutine(ctx context.Context) {
-	defer t.cleanupTicker.Stop()
-	for {
-		select {
-		case <-t.cleanupTicker.C:
-			t.cleanup()
-		case <-ctx.Done():
-			return
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func (t *fragmentTracker) cleanup() {
-	t.mutex.Lock()
-	defer t.mutex.Unlock()
-
-	for key, entry := range t.entries {
-		if time.Since(entry.recordedAt) > t.timeout {
-			delete(t.entries, key)
-		}
-	}
-
-	if len(t.entries) < t.maxEntries {
-		t.atCapacity = false
-	}
-}
-
-// Close stops the cleanup routine and releases resources.
-func (t *fragmentTracker) Close() {
-	t.cancel()
-
-	t.mutex.Lock()
-	t.entries = nil
-	t.mutex.Unlock()
-}

client/firewall/uspfilter/fragment_bench_test.go

@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
-package uspfilter
-
-import (
-	"encoding/binary"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// benchFilterInbound drives filterInbound over a fixed packet in a tight loop.
-// Packets are built once, outside the timed region, so the benchmark measures
-// only pipeline cost, which is what an attacker can amplify.
-func benchFilterInbound(b *testing.B, pkt []byte) {
-	b.Helper()
-	b.ReportAllocs()
-	b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkt)))
-	b.ResetTimer()
-	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
-		m := benchManager
-		m.filterInbound(pkt, len(pkt))
-	}
-}
-
-// benchManager is a package-level manager reused across fragment benchmarks so
-// setup cost stays out of the timed region.
-var benchManager *Manager
-
-func setupBenchManager(b *testing.B) *Manager {
-	b.Helper()
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(b)
-	allowUDP(b, m, 8080)
-	// Disable conntrack so the allowed-first-fragment path measures transport
-	// decode + ACL every iteration instead of matching the connection tracked
-	// on the first iteration.
-	m.stateful = false
-	benchManager = m
-	return m
-}
-
-// BenchmarkInbound_NormalPacket is the baseline: a full, non-fragmented UDP
-// packet that passes the ACL. Fragment paths should stay comparable to this.
-func BenchmarkInbound_NormalPacket(b *testing.B) {
-	setupBenchManager(b)
-	pkt := normalUDPPacket(b, 8080, 32)
-	benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
-}
-
-// BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentAllowed measures the first-fragment path:
-// transport decode + ACL evaluation + verdict record.
-func BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentAllowed(b *testing.B) {
-	setupBenchManager(b)
-	pkt := firstFragmentUDP(b, 0x2000, 8080, 32)
-	benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
-}
-
-// BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentAllowed measures the common trailing-fragment
-// path: a single map lookup after the first fragment is on record.
-func BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentAllowed(b *testing.B) {
-	m := setupBenchManager(b)
-	first := firstFragmentUDP(b, 0x3000, 8080, 32)
-	m.filterInbound(first, len(first))
-	pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x3000, 5, false, 24)
-	benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
-}
-
-// BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentNoFirst is the primary DoS vector: an
-// attacker floods trailing fragments with no first fragment on record. Each is
-// a map miss and must be cheap.
-func BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentNoFirst(b *testing.B) {
-	setupBenchManager(b)
-	pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x4000, 185, false, 40)
-	benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
-}
-
-// BenchmarkInbound_TinyFirstFragment measures the tiny-fragment drop path: a
-// first fragment too small to decode a transport header.
-func BenchmarkInbound_TinyFirstFragment(b *testing.B) {
-	setupBenchManager(b)
-	pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x5000, 0, true, 4)
-	benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
-}
-
-// BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentDistinctIDs is the worst case for the
-// verdict table: an attacker varies the datagram id on every packet so no first
-// fragment ever matches. Verdict lookups always miss and nothing is recorded,
-// so the table cannot grow. Each iteration rewrites the id field in place.
-func BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentDistinctIDs(b *testing.B) {
-	setupBenchManager(b)
-	pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x6000, 185, false, 40)
-	m := benchManager
-
-	b.ReportAllocs()
-	b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkt)))
-	b.ResetTimer()
-	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
-		// IPv4 identification field is at bytes 4:6.
-		binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], uint16(i))
-		m.filterInbound(pkt, len(pkt))
-	}
-}
-
-// BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentDistinctIDs measures sustained first-fragment
-// pressure with distinct ids: transport decode + ACL + verdict insert until the
-// table caps, exercising the map growth and capacity guard.
-func BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentDistinctIDs(b *testing.B) {
-	setupBenchManager(b)
-	pkt := firstFragmentUDP(b, 0x7000, 8080, 32)
-	m := benchManager
-
-	b.ReportAllocs()
-	b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkt)))
-	b.ResetTimer()
-	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
-		binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], uint16(i))
-		m.filterInbound(pkt, len(pkt))
-	}
-}

client/firewall/uspfilter/fragment_test.go

@@ -1,554 +0,0 @@
-package uspfilter
-
-import (
-	"encoding/binary"
-	"net"
-	"net/netip"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/google/gopacket"
-	"github.com/google/gopacket/layers"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-
-	fw "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
-	nbiface "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/device"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
-)
-
-const (
-	fragTestSrc   = "100.10.0.1"
-	fragTestDst   = "100.10.0.100"
-	fragTestSrcV6 = "fd00::1"
-	fragTestDstV6 = "fd00::100"
-)
-
-func newFragmentTestManager(tb testing.TB) *Manager {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ifaceMock := &IFaceMock{
-		SetFilterFunc: func(device.PacketFilter) error { return nil },
-		AddressFunc: func() wgaddr.Address {
-			return wgaddr.Address{
-				IP:      netip.MustParseAddr(fragTestDst),
-				Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("100.10.0.0/16"),
-				IPv6:    netip.MustParseAddr(fragTestDstV6),
-				IPv6Net: netip.MustParsePrefix("fd00::/64"),
-			}
-		},
-	}
-
-	m, err := Create(ifaceMock, false, flowLogger, nbiface.DefaultMTU)
-	require.NoError(tb, err)
-	require.NoError(tb, m.UpdateLocalIPs())
-	tb.Cleanup(func() { require.NoError(tb, m.Close(nil)) })
-	return m
-}
-
-// firstFragmentUDPTo builds the first fragment of a fragmented UDP datagram to
-// the given destination: it carries the full UDP header plus payloadLen bytes
-// of data, with the More Fragments flag set and offset zero.
-func firstFragmentUDPTo(tb testing.TB, dst string, id uint16, dstPort uint16, payloadLen int) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ip := &layers.IPv4{
-		Version:  4,
-		TTL:      64,
-		Id:       id,
-		Protocol: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
-		SrcIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
-		DstIP:    net.ParseIP(dst),
-		Flags:    layers.IPv4MoreFragments,
-	}
-	udp := &layers.UDP{SrcPort: 40000, DstPort: layers.UDPPort(dstPort)}
-	require.NoError(tb, udp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
-
-	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
-	opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
-	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, udp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, payloadLen))))
-	return buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-func firstFragmentUDP(tb testing.TB, id uint16, dstPort uint16, payloadLen int) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-	return firstFragmentUDPTo(tb, fragTestDst, id, dstPort, payloadLen)
-}
-
-// firstFragmentTCP builds the first fragment of a fragmented TCP datagram: the
-// full 20-byte TCP header plus 12 bytes of data, with the More Fragments flag
-// set and offset zero.
-func firstFragmentTCP(tb testing.TB, id uint16, dstPort uint16) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ip := &layers.IPv4{
-		Version:  4,
-		TTL:      64,
-		Id:       id,
-		Protocol: layers.IPProtocolTCP,
-		SrcIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
-		DstIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestDst),
-		Flags:    layers.IPv4MoreFragments,
-	}
-	tcp := &layers.TCP{SrcPort: 40000, DstPort: layers.TCPPort(dstPort), SYN: true, Window: 64240}
-	require.NoError(tb, tcp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
-
-	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
-	opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
-	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, tcp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, 12))))
-	return buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-// trailingFragmentTo builds a non-first fragment to the given destination: an
-// IPv4 header at the given fragment offset (in 8-byte units) carrying raw
-// payload and no L4 header.
-func trailingFragmentTo(tb testing.TB, dst string, proto layers.IPProtocol, id uint16, fragOffsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, payloadLen int) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ip := &layers.IPv4{
-		Version:    4,
-		TTL:        64,
-		Id:         id,
-		Protocol:   proto,
-		SrcIP:      net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
-		DstIP:      net.ParseIP(dst),
-		FragOffset: fragOffsetOctets,
-	}
-	if moreFragments {
-		ip.Flags = layers.IPv4MoreFragments
-	}
-
-	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
-	opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{FixLengths: true}
-	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, payloadLen))))
-	return buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-func trailingFragment(tb testing.TB, id uint16, fragOffsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, payloadLen int) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-	return trailingFragmentTo(tb, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolUDP, id, fragOffsetOctets, moreFragments, payloadLen)
-}
-
-// outboundUDPPacket builds a complete outbound UDP packet from the local
-// address, used to establish conntrack state for reply-direction tests.
-func outboundUDPPacket(tb testing.TB, srcPort, dstPort uint16) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ip := &layers.IPv4{
-		Version:  4,
-		TTL:      64,
-		Id:       1,
-		Protocol: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
-		SrcIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestDst),
-		DstIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
-	}
-	udp := &layers.UDP{SrcPort: layers.UDPPort(srcPort), DstPort: layers.UDPPort(dstPort)}
-	require.NoError(tb, udp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
-
-	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
-	opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
-	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, udp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, 16))))
-	return buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-// normalUDPPacket builds a complete, non-fragmented UDP packet for baseline
-// comparisons against the fragment paths.
-func normalUDPPacket(tb testing.TB, dstPort uint16, payloadLen int) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ip := &layers.IPv4{
-		Version:  4,
-		TTL:      64,
-		Id:       1,
-		Protocol: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
-		SrcIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
-		DstIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestDst),
-	}
-	udp := &layers.UDP{SrcPort: 40000, DstPort: layers.UDPPort(dstPort)}
-	require.NoError(tb, udp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
-
-	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
-	opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
-	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, udp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, payloadLen))))
-	return buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-func allowUDP(tb testing.TB, m *Manager, dstPort uint16) {
-	tb.Helper()
-	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolUDP, nil,
-		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{dstPort}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
-	require.NoError(tb, err)
-}
-
-// TestFragment_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped is the core bypass repro: a trailing
-// fragment with no allowed first fragment on record must be dropped. Before the
-// fix, filterInbound returned false (allow) for any fragment.
-func TestFragment_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-
-	frag := trailingFragment(t, 0x1234, 185, false, 40)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(frag, len(frag)),
-		"trailing fragment without an allowed first fragment must be dropped")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing verifies that once a first fragment
-// passes the ACL, its trailing fragments inherit the allow verdict.
-func TestFragment_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
-
-	// First fragment: UDP header (8) + 32 payload = 40 octets -> headerEnd = 5.
-	first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x2222, 8080, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
-		"allowed first fragment should pass and be recorded")
-
-	trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x2222, 5, false, 24)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment of an allowed datagram should pass")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_DeniedFirstDropsTrailing verifies that a first fragment blocked
-// by the ACL leaves no verdict, so its trailing fragments are dropped.
-func TestFragment_DeniedFirstDropsTrailing(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	// No accept rule: local traffic defaults to deny.
-
-	first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x3333, 9999, 32)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
-		"first fragment to a blocked port should be dropped by the ACL")
-
-	trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x3333, 5, false, 24)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment of a denied datagram must be dropped")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_OverlappingHeaderDropped covers the RFC 1858 §4 / RFC 3128
-// overlapping-fragment rewrite: a trailing fragment starting inside the range
-// the ACL already inspected is dropped and poisons the datagram. TCP is used so
-// the overlap lands on real header bytes (the flags at byte 13).
-func TestFragment_OverlappingHeaderDropped(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolTCP, nil,
-		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	// First fragment: TCP header (20) + 12 data = 32 bytes -> headerEnd = 4 octets.
-	first := firstFragmentTCP(t, 0x4444, 8080)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)))
-
-	// Overlapping fragment at offset 1 (byte 8) falls inside the inspected TCP
-	// header, so it could rewrite the flags or port on reassembly.
-	overlap := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x4444, 1, true, 32)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(overlap, len(overlap)),
-		"fragment overlapping the inspected header must be dropped")
-
-	// The datagram is now poisoned: a later, non-overlapping fragment is also
-	// dropped because the verdict was removed.
-	later := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x4444, 4, false, 24)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(later, len(later)),
-		"fragments after an overlap must be dropped (datagram poisoned)")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_OffsetZeroOverlapPoisons covers the RFC 3128 offset-zero rewrite:
-// an allowed first fragment followed by a denied offset-zero fragment for the
-// same datagram must not leave the earlier allow verdict in place.
-func TestFragment_OffsetZeroOverlapPoisons(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
-
-	allowed := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x5A5A, 8080, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(allowed, len(allowed)),
-		"allowed first fragment should pass and be recorded")
-
-	// A second offset-zero fragment to a denied port supersedes the datagram's
-	// verdict; it is dropped and must not leave the allow in place.
-	denied := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x5A5A, 9999, 32)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(denied, len(denied)),
-		"denied offset-zero fragment must be dropped")
-
-	trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x5A5A, 5, false, 24)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment must be denied after the datagram was poisoned")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_TinyFirstDropped covers the tiny-fragment attack: a first
-// fragment too small to contain the full transport header can't be
-// ACL-evaluated and must be dropped.
-func TestFragment_TinyFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
-
-	// IPv4 header + 4 raw bytes, MF set, offset 0: too small for the 8-byte UDP
-	// header, so it decodes to L3 only.
-	tiny := trailingFragment(t, 0x5555, 0, true, 4)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(tiny, len(tiny)),
-		"tiny first fragment without a full L4 header must be dropped")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_TCPFirstFragment verifies the TCP arm of the transport decode: a
-// first fragment carrying the full 20-byte TCP header is ACL-evaluated and its
-// trailing fragments inherit the verdict.
-func TestFragment_TCPFirstFragment(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolTCP, nil,
-		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	// TCP header (20) + 12 data = 32 bytes -> headerEnd = 4 octets.
-	first := firstFragmentTCP(t, 0x6666, 8080)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
-		"allowed TCP first fragment should pass and be recorded")
-
-	trailing := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x6666, 4, false, 24)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment of an allowed TCP datagram should pass")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_TCPTinyFirstDropped verifies the TCP minimum header length: 12
-// bytes would satisfy a UDP header but falls short of the 20-byte TCP header.
-func TestFragment_TCPTinyFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolTCP, nil,
-		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	tiny := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x7777, 0, true, 12)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(tiny, len(tiny)),
-		"first fragment shorter than the TCP header must be dropped")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_ConntrackAllowsFirstFragment verifies the conntrack branch: reply
-// fragments of an outbound-established UDP flow pass without any inbound rule.
-func TestFragment_ConntrackAllowsFirstFragment(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-
-	out := outboundUDPPacket(t, 12345, 40000)
-	require.False(t, m.filterOutbound(out, len(out)))
-
-	first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x8888, 12345, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
-		"reply first fragment should pass via conntrack")
-
-	trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x8888, 5, false, 24)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment of a tracked flow should pass")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_RoutingDisabledDropsFragment verifies routed first fragments are
-// dropped when routing is disabled.
-func TestFragment_RoutingDisabledDropsFragment(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	m.routingEnabled.Store(false)
-
-	first := firstFragmentUDPTo(t, "198.51.100.10", 0x9999, 8080, 32)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
-		"routed first fragment must be dropped when routing is disabled")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_RouteACL verifies the route-ACL branch: fragments to a non-local
-// destination follow the route rules, allowed datagrams pass their trailing
-// fragments and denied ones don't.
-func TestFragment_RouteACL(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	m.routingEnabled.Store(true)
-	m.nativeRouter.Store(false)
-
-	_, err := m.AddRouteFiltering(
-		[]byte("rt-1"),
-		[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("100.10.0.0/16")},
-		fw.Network{Prefix: netip.MustParsePrefix("198.51.100.0/24")},
-		fw.ProtocolUDP,
-		nil,
-		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}},
-		fw.ActionAccept,
-	)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	first := firstFragmentUDPTo(t, "198.51.100.10", 0xAAAA, 8080, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
-		"route-ACL-allowed first fragment should pass")
-	trailing := trailingFragmentTo(t, "198.51.100.10", layers.IPProtocolUDP, 0xAAAA, 5, false, 24)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment of an allowed routed datagram should pass")
-
-	denied := firstFragmentUDPTo(t, "198.51.100.10", 0xBBBB, 9999, 32)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(denied, len(denied)),
-		"route-ACL-denied first fragment must be dropped")
-	deniedTrailing := trailingFragmentTo(t, "198.51.100.10", layers.IPProtocolUDP, 0xBBBB, 5, false, 24)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(deniedTrailing, len(deniedTrailing)),
-		"trailing fragment of a denied routed datagram must be dropped")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_ExpiredVerdictDropsTrailing verifies a verdict older than the
-// tracker timeout no longer admits trailing fragments.
-func TestFragment_ExpiredVerdictDropsTrailing(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
-
-	first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0xCCCC, 8080, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)))
-
-	m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
-	for key, entry := range m.fragments.entries {
-		entry.recordedAt = time.Now().Add(-defaultFragmentTimeout - time.Second)
-		m.fragments.entries[key] = entry
-	}
-	m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
-
-	trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0xCCCC, 5, false, 24)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment after verdict expiry must be dropped")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_CapacityFailsClosed verifies the table cap: at capacity, new
-// datagram verdicts are not recorded (their trailing fragments are dropped)
-// while already-recorded datagrams keep working.
-func TestFragment_CapacityFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
-
-	m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
-	m.fragments.maxEntries = 1
-	m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
-
-	first1 := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x0101, 8080, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first1, len(first1)))
-
-	first2 := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x0202, 8080, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first2, len(first2)),
-		"first fragment itself still passes at capacity")
-
-	trailing2 := trailingFragment(t, 0x0202, 5, false, 24)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing2, len(trailing2)),
-		"trailing fragment of an unrecorded datagram must be dropped at capacity")
-
-	trailing1 := trailingFragment(t, 0x0101, 5, false, 24)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing1, len(trailing1)),
-		"already-recorded datagram should keep passing at capacity")
-}
-
-// v6FragmentHeader builds the 8-byte IPv6 fragment extension header for the
-// given inner protocol, offset (8-byte units), More Fragments bit and id.
-func v6FragmentHeader(proto layers.IPProtocol, offsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, id uint32) []byte {
-	offsetFlags := offsetOctets << 3
-	if moreFragments {
-		offsetFlags |= 1
-	}
-	hdr := make([]byte, 8)
-	hdr[0] = uint8(proto)
-	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[2:4], offsetFlags)
-	binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(hdr[4:8], id)
-	return hdr
-}
-
-func v6UDPHeader(dstPort uint16, dataLen int) []byte {
-	hdr := make([]byte, 8)
-	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[0:2], 40000)
-	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[2:4], dstPort)
-	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[4:6], uint16(8+dataLen))
-	return hdr
-}
-
-// firstFragmentUDPv6 builds the first fragment of a fragmented IPv6 UDP
-// datagram: fragment header (offset 0, More Fragments set) + full UDP header +
-// data.
-func firstFragmentUDPv6(tb testing.TB, id uint32, dstPort uint16, dataLen int) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-	return fragmentUDPv6(tb, id, dstPort, dataLen, true)
-}
-
-// fragmentUDPv6 builds an offset-zero IPv6 UDP fragment. With moreFragments
-// false it is an atomic fragment (a complete datagram, RFC 6946).
-func fragmentUDPv6(tb testing.TB, id uint32, dstPort uint16, dataLen int, moreFragments bool) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ip := &layers.IPv6{
-		Version:    6,
-		NextHeader: layers.IPProtocolIPv6Fragment,
-		HopLimit:   64,
-		SrcIP:      net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6),
-		DstIP:      net.ParseIP(fragTestDstV6),
-	}
-	payload := append(v6FragmentHeader(layers.IPProtocolUDP, 0, moreFragments, id), v6UDPHeader(dstPort, dataLen)...)
-	payload = append(payload, make([]byte, dataLen)...)
-
-	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
-	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, gopacket.SerializeOptions{FixLengths: true}, ip, gopacket.Payload(payload)))
-	return buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-// trailingFragmentV6 builds a non-first IPv6 fragment: fragment header at the
-// given offset carrying raw data and no transport header.
-func trailingFragmentV6(tb testing.TB, id uint32, offsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, dataLen int) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ip := &layers.IPv6{
-		Version:    6,
-		NextHeader: layers.IPProtocolIPv6Fragment,
-		HopLimit:   64,
-		SrcIP:      net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6),
-		DstIP:      net.ParseIP(fragTestDstV6),
-	}
-	payload := append(v6FragmentHeader(layers.IPProtocolUDP, offsetOctets, moreFragments, id), make([]byte, dataLen)...)
-
-	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
-	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, gopacket.SerializeOptions{FixLengths: true}, ip, gopacket.Payload(payload)))
-	return buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-// TestFragmentV6_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped verifies the IPv6 bypass is closed:
-// a trailing fragment with no allowed first fragment is dropped.
-func TestFragmentV6_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-
-	frag := trailingFragmentV6(t, 0xAABBCCDD, 100, false, 40)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(frag, len(frag)),
-		"IPv6 trailing fragment without an allowed first fragment must be dropped")
-}
-
-// TestFragmentV6_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing verifies IPv6 fragments are
-// evaluated like IPv4: an allowed first fragment lets its trailing fragments
-// through.
-func TestFragmentV6_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6), fw.ProtocolUDP, nil,
-		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	// First fragment: UDP header (8) + 32 data = 40 octets -> headerEnd = 5.
-	first := firstFragmentUDPv6(t, 0xAABBCCDD, 8080, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
-		"allowed IPv6 first fragment should pass and be recorded")
-
-	trailing := trailingFragmentV6(t, 0xAABBCCDD, 5, false, 24)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment of an allowed IPv6 datagram should pass")
-}
-
-// TestFragmentV6_AtomicNotCached verifies an IPv6 atomic fragment (fragment
-// header with offset 0 and no More Fragments, a complete datagram per RFC 6946)
-// is evaluated but not recorded, so a flood of allowed atomic fragments can't
-// exhaust the verdict table.
-func TestFragmentV6_AtomicNotCached(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6), fw.ProtocolUDP, nil,
-		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	atomic := fragmentUDPv6(t, 0xA70301C, 8080, 16, false)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(atomic, len(atomic)),
-		"allowed IPv6 atomic fragment should pass")
-
-	m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
-	n := len(m.fragments.entries)
-	m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
-	require.Zero(t, n, "atomic fragment must not create a verdict entry")
-
-	// A genuine fragmented datagram (More Fragments set) is still recorded.
-	first := fragmentUDPv6(t, 0xBEEF, 8080, 32, true)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)))
-	m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
-	n = len(m.fragments.entries)
-	m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
-	require.Equal(t, 1, n, "genuine first fragment must record a verdict")
-}

client/iface/configurer/common.go

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package configurer
 import (
 	"net"
 	"net/netip"
-	"time"
 
 	"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
 )
@@ -20,43 +19,6 @@ func buildPresharedKeyConfig(peerKey wgtypes.Key, psk wgtypes.Key, updateOnly bo
 	}
 }
 
-// buildIdlePeerEndpointConfig creates a config that removes and re-creates a peer in a
-// single transaction with the given allowed IPs, endpoint and disabled keepalive.
-func buildIdlePeerEndpointConfig(peerKey wgtypes.Key, allowedIPs []netip.Prefix, endpoint *net.UDPAddr) wgtypes.Config {
-	keepAlive := time.Duration(0)
-	return wgtypes.Config{
-		Peers: []wgtypes.PeerConfig{
-			{
-				PublicKey: peerKey,
-				Remove:    true,
-			},
-			{
-				PublicKey:                   peerKey,
-				AllowedIPs:                  prefixesToIPNets(allowedIPs),
-				Endpoint:                    endpoint,
-				PersistentKeepaliveInterval: &keepAlive,
-			},
-		},
-	}
-}
-
-// mergePrefixes returns the union of the two prefix lists, keeping the original order and
-// dropping duplicates.
-func mergePrefixes(current, base []netip.Prefix) []netip.Prefix {
-	merged := make([]netip.Prefix, 0, len(current)+len(base))
-	seen := make(map[netip.Prefix]struct{}, len(current)+len(base))
-	for _, group := range [][]netip.Prefix{current, base} {
-		for _, prefix := range group {
-			if _, ok := seen[prefix]; ok {
-				continue
-			}
-			seen[prefix] = struct{}{}
-			merged = append(merged, prefix)
-		}
-	}
-	return merged
-}
-
 func prefixesToIPNets(prefixes []netip.Prefix) []net.IPNet {
 	ipNets := make([]net.IPNet, len(prefixes))
 	for i, prefix := range prefixes {

client/iface/configurer/kernel_unix.go

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
 package configurer
 
 import (
-	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"net"
 	"net/netip"
@@ -146,39 +145,6 @@ func (c *KernelConfigurer) RemovePeer(peerKey string) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-// IdlePeerEndpoint re-creates the peer pointing at the lazy wake endpoint, dropping
-// handshake state while preserving the peer's currently installed allowed IPs.
-func (c *KernelConfigurer) IdlePeerEndpoint(peerKey string, allowedIPs []netip.Prefix, endpoint *net.UDPAddr) error {
-	peerKeyParsed, err := wgtypes.ParseKey(peerKey)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-
-	var current []netip.Prefix
-	existing, err := c.getPeer(c.deviceName, peerKey)
-	switch {
-	case errors.Is(err, ErrPeerNotFound):
-	case err != nil:
-		return fmt.Errorf("get peer: %w", err)
-	default:
-		for _, ipNet := range existing.AllowedIPs {
-			addr, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(ipNet.IP)
-			if !ok {
-				log.Warnf("failed to convert allowed IP %s of peer %s", ipNet.String(), peerKey)
-				continue
-			}
-			ones, _ := ipNet.Mask.Size()
-			current = append(current, netip.PrefixFrom(addr.Unmap(), ones))
-		}
-	}
-
-	config := buildIdlePeerEndpointConfig(peerKeyParsed, mergePrefixes(current, allowedIPs), endpoint)
-	if err := c.configure(config); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf(`received error "%w" while setting idle endpoint for peer %s on interface %s`, err, peerKey, c.deviceName)
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
 func (c *KernelConfigurer) AddAllowedIP(peerKey string, allowedIP netip.Prefix) error {
 	ipNet := net.IPNet{
 		IP:   allowedIP.Addr().AsSlice(),

client/iface/configurer/usp.go

@@ -210,64 +210,6 @@ func (c *WGUSPConfigurer) RemovePeer(peerKey string) error {
 	return ipcErr
 }
 
-// IdlePeerEndpoint re-creates the peer pointing at the lazy wake endpoint, dropping
-// handshake state while preserving the peer's currently installed allowed IPs.
-func (c *WGUSPConfigurer) IdlePeerEndpoint(peerKey string, allowedIPs []netip.Prefix, endpoint *net.UDPAddr) error {
-	peerKeyParsed, err := wgtypes.ParseKey(peerKey)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-
-	current, err := c.currentAllowedIPs(hex.EncodeToString(peerKeyParsed[:]))
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("get current allowed IPs: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	config := buildIdlePeerEndpointConfig(peerKeyParsed, mergePrefixes(current, allowedIPs), endpoint)
-	if err := c.device.IpcSet(toWgUserspaceString(config)); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("set idle peer endpoint: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	if endpoint != nil {
-		addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(endpoint.IP.String())
-		if err != nil {
-			return fmt.Errorf("parse endpoint address: %w", err)
-		}
-		c.activityRecorder.UpsertAddress(peerKey, netip.AddrPortFrom(addr.Unmap(), uint16(endpoint.Port)))
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// currentAllowedIPs returns the allowed IPs currently installed for the peer identified by
-// its hex-encoded public key. It returns an empty list when the peer does not exist.
-func (c *WGUSPConfigurer) currentAllowedIPs(hexKey string) ([]netip.Prefix, error) {
-	ipc, err := c.device.IpcGet()
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-
-	var prefixes []netip.Prefix
-	foundPeer := false
-	for _, line := range strings.Split(ipc, "\n") {
-		line = strings.TrimSpace(line)
-		if strings.HasPrefix(line, "public_key=") {
-			foundPeer = line == "public_key="+hexKey
-			continue
-		}
-		if !foundPeer || !strings.HasPrefix(line, "allowed_ip=") {
-			continue
-		}
-
-		prefix, err := netip.ParsePrefix(strings.TrimPrefix(line, "allowed_ip="))
-		if err != nil {
-			log.Warnf("failed to parse allowed IP %q: %v", line, err)
-			continue
-		}
-		prefixes = append(prefixes, prefix)
-	}
-	return prefixes, nil
-}
-
 func (c *WGUSPConfigurer) AddAllowedIP(peerKey string, allowedIP netip.Prefix) error {
 	ipNet := net.IPNet{
 		IP:   allowedIP.Addr().AsSlice(),

client/iface/configurer/usp_idle_test.go

@@ -1,158 +0,0 @@
-package configurer
-
-import (
-	"encoding/hex"
-	"net"
-	"net/netip"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-	wgconn "golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/conn"
-	"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/device"
-	"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/tun/netstack"
-	"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/bind"
-)
-
-// newTestConfigurer creates a configurer backed by an in-memory wireguard-go device.
-func newTestConfigurer(t *testing.T) *WGUSPConfigurer {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	tunDev, _, err := netstack.CreateNetTUN([]netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1")}, []netip.Addr{}, 1280)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	wgDev := device.NewDevice(tunDev, wgconn.NewDefaultBind(), device.NewLogger(device.LogLevelSilent, "[test] "))
-	t.Cleanup(wgDev.Close)
-
-	c := NewUSPConfigurerNoUAPI(wgDev, "utun-test", bind.NewActivityRecorder())
-
-	key, err := wgtypes.GeneratePrivateKey()
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.NoError(t, c.ConfigureInterface(key.String(), 0))
-
-	return c
-}
-
-// peerAllowedIPs returns the allowed IPs currently installed for the given peer.
-func peerAllowedIPs(t *testing.T, c *WGUSPConfigurer, pubKey string) []string {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	var ips []string
-	for _, line := range peerIpcLines(t, c, pubKey) {
-		if strings.HasPrefix(line, "allowed_ip=") {
-			ips = append(ips, strings.TrimPrefix(line, "allowed_ip="))
-		}
-	}
-	return ips
-}
-
-// peerEndpoint returns the endpoint currently installed for the given peer.
-func peerEndpoint(t *testing.T, c *WGUSPConfigurer, pubKey string) string {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	for _, line := range peerIpcLines(t, c, pubKey) {
-		if strings.HasPrefix(line, "endpoint=") {
-			return strings.TrimPrefix(line, "endpoint=")
-		}
-	}
-	return ""
-}
-
-// peerIpcLines returns the uapi config lines belonging to the given peer.
-func peerIpcLines(t *testing.T, c *WGUSPConfigurer, pubKey string) []string {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	key, err := wgtypes.ParseKey(pubKey)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	hexKey := hex.EncodeToString(key[:])
-
-	ipc, err := c.device.IpcGet()
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	var lines []string
-	inPeer := false
-	for _, line := range strings.Split(ipc, "\n") {
-		line = strings.TrimSpace(line)
-		if strings.HasPrefix(line, "public_key=") {
-			inPeer = line == "public_key="+hexKey
-			continue
-		}
-		if inPeer && line != "" {
-			lines = append(lines, line)
-		}
-	}
-	return lines
-}
-
-// TestUSPConfigurer_IdlePeerEndpointPreservesAllowedIPs verifies the invariant the lazy idle
-// transition relies on: IdlePeerEndpoint re-creates the peer (dropping handshake state via the
-// remove+add transaction) while keeping every installed allowed IP, including routed
-// prefixes added later by the route manager, and points the endpoint at the wake listener.
-func TestUSPConfigurer_IdlePeerEndpointPreservesAllowedIPs(t *testing.T) {
-	c := newTestConfigurer(t)
-
-	peerKey, err := wgtypes.GeneratePrivateKey()
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	pubKey := peerKey.PublicKey().String()
-
-	overlay := netip.MustParsePrefix("100.64.0.5/32")
-	routed := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.99.0.0/24")
-
-	realEndpoint := &net.UDPAddr{IP: net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1"), Port: 51821}
-	require.NoError(t, c.UpdatePeer(pubKey, []netip.Prefix{overlay}, 25*time.Second, realEndpoint, nil))
-	require.NoError(t, c.AddAllowedIP(pubKey, routed))
-
-	ips := peerAllowedIPs(t, c, pubKey)
-	require.Contains(t, ips, overlay.String(), "overlay prefix must be installed before the idle endpoint swap")
-	require.Contains(t, ips, routed.String(), "routed prefix must be installed before the idle endpoint swap")
-
-	wakeEndpoint := &net.UDPAddr{IP: net.ParseIP("127.2.0.5"), Port: 17473}
-	require.NoError(t, c.IdlePeerEndpoint(pubKey, []netip.Prefix{overlay}, wakeEndpoint))
-
-	ips = peerAllowedIPs(t, c, pubKey)
-	assert.Contains(t, ips, routed.String(), "routed prefix must survive the idle endpoint swap")
-	assert.Contains(t, ips, overlay.String(), "overlay prefix must survive the idle endpoint swap")
-	assert.Equal(t, "127.2.0.5:17473", peerEndpoint(t, c, pubKey), "endpoint must point at the wake listener after the idle endpoint swap")
-}
-
-// TestUSPConfigurer_IdlePeerEndpointCreatesMissingPeer verifies the cold-start arm path: when the
-// peer does not exist yet (never connected), IdlePeerEndpoint creates it with the given base
-// allowed IPs and the wake endpoint.
-func TestUSPConfigurer_IdlePeerEndpointCreatesMissingPeer(t *testing.T) {
-	c := newTestConfigurer(t)
-
-	peerKey, err := wgtypes.GeneratePrivateKey()
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	pubKey := peerKey.PublicKey().String()
-
-	overlay := netip.MustParsePrefix("100.64.0.5/32")
-	wakeEndpoint := &net.UDPAddr{IP: net.ParseIP("127.2.0.5"), Port: 17473}
-
-	require.NoError(t, c.IdlePeerEndpoint(pubKey, []netip.Prefix{overlay}, wakeEndpoint))
-
-	assert.Equal(t, []string{overlay.String()}, peerAllowedIPs(t, c, pubKey), "missing peer must be created with the base allowed IPs")
-	assert.Equal(t, "127.2.0.5:17473", peerEndpoint(t, c, pubKey), "missing peer must be created with the wake endpoint")
-}
-
-// TestUSPConfigurer_AddAllowedIPOnMissingPeerIsSilentNoOp documents the wireguard-go
-// behavior the removed-peer idle flow raced against: AddAllowedIP uses update_only,
-// which is a silent no-op when the peer does not exist. The idle transition must
-// therefore keep the WireGuard peer (Conn.Idle + IdlePeerEndpoint) instead of leaving a
-// window where the peer is absent.
-func TestUSPConfigurer_AddAllowedIPOnMissingPeerIsSilentNoOp(t *testing.T) {
-	c := newTestConfigurer(t)
-
-	peerKey, err := wgtypes.GeneratePrivateKey()
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	pubKey := peerKey.PublicKey().String()
-
-	routed := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.99.0.0/24")
-
-	require.NoError(t, c.AddAllowedIP(pubKey, routed), "update-only on a missing peer must not return an error")
-
-	assert.Empty(t, peerIpcLines(t, c, pubKey), "update-only call must not create the peer")
-}

client/iface/device/interface.go

@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ type WGConfigurer interface {
 	ConfigureInterface(privateKey string, port int) error
 	UpdatePeer(peerKey string, allowedIps []netip.Prefix, keepAlive time.Duration, endpoint *net.UDPAddr, preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key) error
 	RemovePeer(peerKey string) error
-	IdlePeerEndpoint(peerKey string, allowedIPs []netip.Prefix, endpoint *net.UDPAddr) error
 	AddAllowedIP(peerKey string, allowedIP netip.Prefix) error
 	RemoveAllowedIP(peerKey string, allowedIP netip.Prefix) error
 	SetPresharedKey(peerKey string, psk wgtypes.Key, updateOnly bool) error

client/iface/iface.go

@@ -184,19 +184,6 @@ func (w *WGIface) RemovePeer(peerKey string) error {
 	return w.configurer.RemovePeer(peerKey)
 }
 
-// IdlePeerEndpoint re-creates the peer pointing at the lazy wake endpoint, dropping
-// handshake state while preserving the peer's currently installed allowed IPs.
-func (w *WGIface) IdlePeerEndpoint(peerKey string, allowedIPs []netip.Prefix, endpoint *net.UDPAddr) error {
-	w.mu.Lock()
-	defer w.mu.Unlock()
-	if w.configurer == nil {
-		return ErrIfaceNotFound
-	}
-
-	log.Debugf("Resetting peer on interface %s: %s, endpoint %s", w.tun.DeviceName(), peerKey, endpoint)
-	return w.configurer.IdlePeerEndpoint(peerKey, allowedIPs, endpoint)
-}
-
 // AddAllowedIP adds a prefix to the allowed IPs list of peer
 func (w *WGIface) AddAllowedIP(peerKey string, allowedIP netip.Prefix) error {
 	w.mu.Lock()

client/iface/netstack/env.go

@@ -3,31 +3,14 @@
 package netstack
 
 import (
-	"net"
+	"fmt"
 	"os"
 	"strconv"
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 )
 
-const (
-	EnvUseNetstackMode = "NB_USE_NETSTACK_MODE"
-
-	// EnvSocks5ListenerPort overrides the port the SOCKS5 proxy listens on.
-	EnvSocks5ListenerPort = "NB_SOCKS5_LISTENER_PORT"
-
-	// EnvSocks5ListenerAddress overrides the host/IP the SOCKS5 proxy binds to.
-	// The proxy is a bridge for local host applications into the userspace
-	// WireGuard netstack, so it binds to loopback by default. Override this only
-	// when the proxy must be reachable from other hosts (e.g. a container
-	// gateway); doing so exposes an unauthenticated SOCKS5 proxy on that
-	// address.
-	EnvSocks5ListenerAddress = "NB_SOCKS5_LISTENER_ADDRESS"
-
-	// defaultSocks5Host is the loopback address the SOCKS5 proxy binds to unless
-	// overridden via EnvSocks5ListenerAddress.
-	defaultSocks5Host = "127.0.0.1"
-)
+const EnvUseNetstackMode = "NB_USE_NETSTACK_MODE"
 
 // IsEnabled todo: move these function to cmd layer
 func IsEnabled() bool {
@@ -35,40 +18,24 @@ func IsEnabled() bool {
 }
 
 func ListenAddr() string {
-	return net.JoinHostPort(listenHost(), strconv.Itoa(listenPort()))
-}
-
-// listenHost returns the host/IP the SOCKS5 proxy binds to. It defaults to
-// loopback and only honors EnvSocks5ListenerAddress when it holds a valid IP.
-func listenHost() string {
-	addr := os.Getenv(EnvSocks5ListenerAddress)
-	if addr == "" {
-		return defaultSocks5Host
-	}
-	if net.ParseIP(addr) == nil {
-		log.Warnf("invalid socks5 listener address %q, falling back to default: %s", addr, defaultSocks5Host)
-		return defaultSocks5Host
-	}
-	return addr
-}
-
-// listenPort returns the port the SOCKS5 proxy binds to, defaulting to
-// DefaultSocks5Port when EnvSocks5ListenerPort is unset or invalid.
-func listenPort() int {
-	sPort := os.Getenv(EnvSocks5ListenerPort)
+	sPort := os.Getenv("NB_SOCKS5_LISTENER_PORT")
 	if sPort == "" {
-		return DefaultSocks5Port
+		return listenAddr(DefaultSocks5Port)
 	}
 
 	port, err := strconv.Atoi(sPort)
 	if err != nil {
 		log.Warnf("invalid socks5 listener port, unable to convert it to int, falling back to default: %d", DefaultSocks5Port)
-		return DefaultSocks5Port
+		return listenAddr(DefaultSocks5Port)
 	}
 	if port < 1 || port > 65535 {
 		log.Warnf("invalid socks5 listener port, it should be in the range 1-65535, falling back to default: %d", DefaultSocks5Port)
-		return DefaultSocks5Port
+		return listenAddr(DefaultSocks5Port)
 	}
 
-	return port
+	return listenAddr(port)
+}
+
+func listenAddr(port int) string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("0.0.0.0:%d", port)
 }

client/iface/netstack/env_test.go

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-//go:build !js
-
-package netstack
-
-import (
-	"net"
-	"strconv"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-func TestListenAddr_DefaultsToLoopback(t *testing.T) {
-	// No env overrides: must bind loopback, never all interfaces.
-	got := ListenAddr()
-	want := net.JoinHostPort("127.0.0.1", strconv.Itoa(DefaultSocks5Port))
-	if got != want {
-		t.Fatalf("ListenAddr() = %q, want %q", got, want)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestListenAddr_AddressOverride(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name string
-		env  string
-		want string
-	}{
-		{name: "valid override honored", env: "0.0.0.0", want: "0.0.0.0"},
-		{name: "valid specific ip honored", env: "10.0.0.5", want: "10.0.0.5"},
-		{name: "ipv6 loopback bracketed", env: "::1", want: "::1"},
-		{name: "invalid falls back to loopback", env: "not-an-ip", want: "127.0.0.1"},
-		{name: "empty falls back to loopback", env: "", want: "127.0.0.1"},
-	}
-	for _, tc := range tests {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			t.Setenv(EnvSocks5ListenerAddress, tc.env)
-			want := net.JoinHostPort(tc.want, strconv.Itoa(DefaultSocks5Port))
-			if got := ListenAddr(); got != want {
-				t.Fatalf("ListenAddr() = %q, want %q", got, want)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-func TestListenAddr_PortOverride(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name string
-		env  string
-		want int
-	}{
-		{name: "valid port honored", env: "1081", want: 1081},
-		{name: "non-numeric falls back", env: "abc", want: DefaultSocks5Port},
-		{name: "out of range falls back", env: "70000", want: DefaultSocks5Port},
-		{name: "zero falls back", env: "0", want: DefaultSocks5Port},
-	}
-	for _, tc := range tests {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			t.Setenv(EnvSocks5ListenerPort, tc.env)
-			want := net.JoinHostPort("127.0.0.1", strconv.Itoa(tc.want))
-			if got := ListenAddr(); got != want {
-				t.Fatalf("ListenAddr() = %q, want %q", got, want)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}

client/internal/auth/device_flow.go

@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ func (d *DeviceAuthorizationFlow) WaitToken(ctx context.Context, info AuthFlowIn
 				UseIDToken:   d.providerConfig.UseIDToken,
 			}
 
-			err = validateTokenAudience(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), d.providerConfig.Audience)
+			err = isValidAccessToken(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), d.providerConfig.Audience)
 			if err != nil {
 				return TokenInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("validate access token failed with error: %v", err)
 			}

client/internal/auth/pkce_flow.go

@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) parseOAuthToken(token *oauth2.Token) (TokenInfo,
 		audience = p.providerConfig.ClientID
 	}
 
-	if err := validateTokenAudience(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), audience); err != nil {
+	if err := isValidAccessToken(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), audience); err != nil {
 		return TokenInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("authentication failed: invalid access token - %w", err)
 	}
 
@@ -320,11 +320,6 @@ func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) parseOAuthToken(token *oauth2.Token) (TokenInfo,
 	return tokenInfo, nil
 }
 
-// parseEmailFromIDToken extracts the email (or name) claim from an ID token
-// without verifying its signature. The value is best-effort and used only as a
-// UX convenience (login hint prefill and display); it never drives an
-// authorization decision. The authoritative identity is established server-side
-// from the signature-verified token.
 func parseEmailFromIDToken(token string) (string, error) {
 	parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
 	if len(parts) < 2 {

client/internal/auth/util.go

@@ -20,26 +20,14 @@ func randomBytesInHex(count int) (string, error) {
 	return hex.EncodeToString(buf), nil
 }
 
-// validateTokenAudience checks that the token is a well-formed JWT whose
-// audience claim matches the expected audience.
-//
-// It does NOT verify the token's cryptographic signature and therefore must not
-// be treated as an authenticity check. The token is obtained by the client
-// directly from the IdP token endpoint over TLS, and its signature is verified
-// server-side by the management server against the IdP's JWKS
-// (see shared/auth/jwt/validator.go). This function is only a client-side
-// sanity check that the returned token targets the expected audience.
-func validateTokenAudience(token string, audience string) error {
+// isValidAccessToken is a simple validation of the access token
+func isValidAccessToken(token string, audience string) error {
 	if token == "" {
 		return fmt.Errorf("token received is empty")
 	}
 
-	parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
-	if len(parts) != 3 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("token is not a well-formed JWT")
-	}
-
-	claimsString, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1])
+	encodedClaims := strings.Split(token, ".")[1]
+	claimsString, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(encodedClaims)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}

client/internal/auth/util_test.go

@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-package auth
-
-import (
-	"encoding/base64"
-	"encoding/json"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// makeJWT builds an unsigned JWT-shaped string (header.payload.signature) with
-// the given claims payload. The signature part is arbitrary because
-// validateTokenAudience intentionally does not verify it.
-func makeJWT(t *testing.T, claims map[string]interface{}) string {
-	t.Helper()
-	header := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(`{"alg":"RS256","typ":"JWT"}`))
-	payloadBytes, err := json.Marshal(claims)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("marshal claims: %v", err)
-	}
-	payload := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(payloadBytes)
-	return header + "." + payload + ".unverified-signature"
-}
-
-func TestValidateTokenAudience(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name     string
-		token    string
-		audience string
-		wantErr  bool
-	}{
-		{
-			name:     "empty token",
-			token:    "",
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "not a JWT - no dots",
-			token:    "notajwt",
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "not a JWT - two parts only",
-			token:    "header.payload",
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "matching string audience",
-			token:    makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": "netbird"}),
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  false,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "mismatching string audience",
-			token:    makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": "other"}),
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "matching audience in array",
-			token:    makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": []interface{}{"other", "netbird"}}),
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  false,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "mismatching audience array",
-			token:    makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": []interface{}{"a", "b"}}),
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "missing audience claim",
-			token:    makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"sub": "user"}),
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "invalid base64 payload",
-			token:    "header.!!!not-base64!!!.sig",
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  true,
-		},
-	}
-
-	for _, tc := range tests {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			err := validateTokenAudience(tc.token, tc.audience)
-			if tc.wantErr && err == nil {
-				t.Fatalf("expected error, got nil")
-			}
-			if !tc.wantErr && err != nil {
-				t.Fatalf("expected no error, got %v", err)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestValidateTokenAudienceNoPanic guards the regression where a non-empty
-// token without the JWT dot structure caused an index-out-of-range panic.
-func TestValidateTokenAudienceNoPanic(t *testing.T) {
-	inputs := []string{"a", ".", "a.", "aaaa", "no-dots-here"}
-	for _, in := range inputs {
-		if err := validateTokenAudience(in, "netbird"); err == nil {
-			t.Fatalf("expected error for malformed token %q, got nil", in)
-		}
-	}
-}

client/internal/conn_mgr.go

@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) RemovePeerConn(peerKey string) {
 	if !ok {
 		return
 	}
-	defer conn.Close()
+	defer conn.Close(false)
 
 	if !e.isStartedWithLazyMgr() {
 		return

client/internal/engine.go

@@ -1778,7 +1778,7 @@ func (e *Engine) addNewPeer(peerConfig *mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig) error {
 	}
 
 	if exists := e.connMgr.AddPeerConn(e.ctx, peerKey, conn); exists {
-		conn.Close()
+		conn.Close(false)
 		return fmt.Errorf("peer already exists: %s", peerKey)
 	}
 

client/internal/engine_test.go

@@ -53,7 +53,6 @@ type MockWGIface struct {
 	UpdateAddrFunc             func(newAddr wgaddr.Address) error
 	UpdatePeerFunc             func(peerKey string, allowedIps []netip.Prefix, keepAlive time.Duration, endpoint *net.UDPAddr, preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key) error
 	RemovePeerFunc             func(peerKey string) error
-	IdlePeerEndpointFunc       func(peerKey string, allowedIPs []netip.Prefix, endpoint *net.UDPAddr) error
 	AddAllowedIPFunc           func(peerKey string, allowedIP netip.Prefix) error
 	RemoveAllowedIPFunc        func(peerKey string, allowedIP netip.Prefix) error
 	CloseFunc                  func() error
@@ -125,13 +124,6 @@ func (m *MockWGIface) RemovePeer(peerKey string) error {
 	return m.RemovePeerFunc(peerKey)
 }
 
-func (m *MockWGIface) IdlePeerEndpoint(peerKey string, allowedIPs []netip.Prefix, endpoint *net.UDPAddr) error {
-	if m.IdlePeerEndpointFunc == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-	return m.IdlePeerEndpointFunc(peerKey, allowedIPs, endpoint)
-}
-
 func (m *MockWGIface) AddAllowedIP(peerKey string, allowedIP netip.Prefix) error {
 	return m.AddAllowedIPFunc(peerKey, allowedIP)
 }

client/internal/iface_common.go

@@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ type wgIfaceBase interface {
 	UpdatePeer(peerKey string, allowedIps []netip.Prefix, keepAlive time.Duration, endpoint *net.UDPAddr, preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key) error
 	RemoveEndpointAddress(key string) error
 	RemovePeer(peerKey string) error
-	IdlePeerEndpoint(peerKey string, allowedIPs []netip.Prefix, endpoint *net.UDPAddr) error
 	AddAllowedIP(peerKey string, allowedIP netip.Prefix) error
 	RemoveAllowedIP(peerKey string, allowedIP netip.Prefix) error
 	Close() error

client/internal/lazyconn/activity/listener_bind.go

@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ func (d *BindListener) setupLazyConn() error {
 		IP:   d.fakeIP.AsSlice(),
 		Port: lazyBindPort,
 	}
-	return d.wgIface.IdlePeerEndpoint(d.peerCfg.PublicKey, d.peerCfg.AllowedIPs, endpoint)
+	return d.wgIface.UpdatePeer(d.peerCfg.PublicKey, d.peerCfg.AllowedIPs, 0, endpoint, nil)
 }
 
 // ReadPackets blocks until activity is detected on the LazyConn or the listener is closed.

client/internal/lazyconn/activity/listener_bind_test.go

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/device"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
@@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ type MockWGIfaceBind struct {
 	endpointMgr *mockEndpointManager
 }
 
-func (m *MockWGIfaceBind) IdlePeerEndpoint(string, []netip.Prefix, *net.UDPAddr) error {
+func (m *MockWGIfaceBind) UpdatePeer(string, []netip.Prefix, time.Duration, *net.UDPAddr, *wgtypes.Key) error {
 	return nil
 }
 

client/internal/lazyconn/activity/listener_udp.go

@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ func (d *UDPListener) Close() {
 
 func (d *UDPListener) createEndpoint() error {
 	d.peerCfg.Log.Debugf("creating lazy endpoint: %s", d.endpoint.String())
-	return d.wgIface.IdlePeerEndpoint(d.peerCfg.PublicKey, d.peerCfg.AllowedIPs, d.endpoint)
+	return d.wgIface.UpdatePeer(d.peerCfg.PublicKey, d.peerCfg.AllowedIPs, 0, d.endpoint, nil)
 }
 
 func (d *UDPListener) newConn() (*net.UDPConn, error) {

client/internal/lazyconn/activity/manager.go

@@ -5,8 +5,10 @@ import (
 	"net"
 	"net/netip"
 	"sync"
+	"time"
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+	"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/lazyconn"
@@ -28,7 +30,7 @@ type Event struct {
 }
 
 type WgInterface interface {
-	IdlePeerEndpoint(peerKey string, allowedIPs []netip.Prefix, endpoint *net.UDPAddr) error
+	UpdatePeer(peerKey string, allowedIps []netip.Prefix, keepAlive time.Duration, endpoint *net.UDPAddr, preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key) error
 	IsUserspaceBind() bool
 	Address() wgaddr.Address
 	MTU() uint16

client/internal/lazyconn/activity/manager_test.go

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
 	"time"
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+	"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/lazyconn"
@@ -25,7 +26,7 @@ func (m *MocPeer) ConnID() peerid.ConnID {
 type MocWGIface struct {
 }
 
-func (m MocWGIface) IdlePeerEndpoint(string, []netip.Prefix, *net.UDPAddr) error {
+func (m MocWGIface) UpdatePeer(string, []netip.Prefix, time.Duration, *net.UDPAddr, *wgtypes.Key) error {
 	return nil
 }
 

client/internal/lazyconn/manager/manager.go

@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ func (m *Manager) DeactivatePeer(peerID peerid.ConnID) {
 		return
 	}
 
-	m.peerStore.PeerConnIdle(mp.peerCfg.PublicKey, false)
+	m.peerStore.PeerConnClose(mp.peerCfg.PublicKey)
 
 	mp.peerCfg.Log.Infof("start activity monitor")
 
@@ -569,7 +569,7 @@ func (m *Manager) onPeerInactivityTimedOut(peerIDs map[string]struct{}) {
 		mp.peerCfg.Log.Infof("connection timed out")
 
 		// this is blocking operation, potentially can be optimized
-		m.peerStore.PeerConnIdle(mp.peerCfg.PublicKey, true)
+		m.peerStore.PeerConnIdle(mp.peerCfg.PublicKey)
 
 		mp.expectedWatcher = watcherActivity
 

client/internal/lazyconn/wgiface.go

@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@ package lazyconn
 import (
 	"net"
 	"net/netip"
+	"time"
+
+	"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/monotime"
@@ -10,7 +13,7 @@ import (
 
 type WGIface interface {
 	RemovePeer(peerKey string) error
-	IdlePeerEndpoint(peerKey string, allowedIPs []netip.Prefix, endpoint *net.UDPAddr) error
+	UpdatePeer(peerKey string, allowedIps []netip.Prefix, keepAlive time.Duration, endpoint *net.UDPAddr, preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key) error
 	IsUserspaceBind() bool
 	Address() wgaddr.Address
 	LastActivities() map[string]monotime.Time

client/internal/peer/conn.go

@@ -285,20 +285,8 @@ func (conn *Conn) open(engineCtx context.Context, firstPacket []byte) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-// Close closes this peer Conn issuing a close event to the Conn closeCh and removes the WireGuard peer
-func (conn *Conn) Close() {
-	conn.close(false, true)
-}
-
-// Idle tears down the connection for the lazy idle state: transports and proxies are
-// closed but the WireGuard peer is kept, so its AllowedIPs (including routed prefixes
-// installed by the route manager) survive until the activity listener re-points the
-// endpoint at the wake listener.
-func (conn *Conn) Idle(signalToRemote bool) {
-	conn.close(signalToRemote, false)
-}
-
-func (conn *Conn) close(signalToRemote bool, removeWgPeer bool) {
+// Close closes this peer Conn issuing a close event to the Conn closeCh
+func (conn *Conn) Close(signalToRemote bool) {
 	conn.mu.Lock()
 	defer conn.wgWatcherWg.Wait()
 	defer conn.mu.Unlock()
@@ -341,12 +329,8 @@ func (conn *Conn) close(signalToRemote bool, removeWgPeer bool) {
 		conn.wgProxyICE = nil
 	}
 
-	if removeWgPeer {
-		if err := conn.endpointUpdater.RemoveWgPeer(); err != nil {
-			conn.Log.Errorf("failed to remove wg endpoint: %v", err)
-		}
-	} else {
-		conn.endpointUpdater.CancelPendingUpdates()
+	if err := conn.endpointUpdater.RemoveWgPeer(); err != nil {
+		conn.Log.Errorf("failed to remove wg endpoint: %v", err)
 	}
 
 	if conn.evalStatus() == StatusConnected && conn.onDisconnected != nil {

client/internal/peer/endpoint.go

@@ -65,16 +65,6 @@ func (e *EndpointUpdater) RemoveWgPeer() error {
 	return e.wgConfig.WgInterface.RemovePeer(e.wgConfig.RemoteKey)
 }
 
-// CancelPendingUpdates stops a scheduled delayed endpoint update without touching the
-// WireGuard peer. Used on the idle transition where the peer is kept so a pending
-// responder-side update cannot overwrite the wake endpoint later.
-func (e *EndpointUpdater) CancelPendingUpdates() {
-	e.mu.Lock()
-	defer e.mu.Unlock()
-
-	e.waitForCloseTheDelayedUpdate()
-}
-
 func (e *EndpointUpdater) RemoveEndpointAddress() error {
 	e.mu.Lock()
 	defer e.mu.Unlock()

client/internal/peer/endpoint_test.go

@@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
-package peer
-
-import (
-	"net"
-	"net/netip"
-	"sync"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-	"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/configurer"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgproxy"
-)
-
-type endpointTestWGIface struct {
-	mu          sync.Mutex
-	updateCalls int
-	removeCalls int
-}
-
-func (m *endpointTestWGIface) UpdatePeer(string, []netip.Prefix, time.Duration, *net.UDPAddr, *wgtypes.Key) error {
-	m.mu.Lock()
-	defer m.mu.Unlock()
-	m.updateCalls++
-	return nil
-}
-
-func (m *endpointTestWGIface) RemovePeer(string) error {
-	m.mu.Lock()
-	defer m.mu.Unlock()
-	m.removeCalls++
-	return nil
-}
-
-func (m *endpointTestWGIface) GetStats() (map[string]configurer.WGStats, error) {
-	return map[string]configurer.WGStats{}, nil
-}
-
-func (m *endpointTestWGIface) GetProxy() wgproxy.Proxy { return nil }
-
-func (m *endpointTestWGIface) Address() wgaddr.Address { return wgaddr.Address{} }
-
-func (m *endpointTestWGIface) RemoveEndpointAddress(string) error { return nil }
-
-func (m *endpointTestWGIface) counts() (updates, removes int) {
-	m.mu.Lock()
-	defer m.mu.Unlock()
-	return m.updateCalls, m.removeCalls
-}
-
-func newTestEndpointUpdater(iface *endpointTestWGIface, initiator bool) *EndpointUpdater {
-	cfg := WgConfig{
-		RemoteKey:   "remoteKey",
-		WgInterface: iface,
-		AllowedIps:  []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("100.64.0.5/32")},
-	}
-	return NewEndpointUpdater(log.WithField("peer", "test"), cfg, initiator)
-}
-
-// TestEndpointUpdater_CancelPendingUpdates ensures a scheduled responder-side delayed
-// update is stopped without removing the WireGuard peer, so an idle transition cannot
-// be overwritten later by a stale endpoint update.
-func TestEndpointUpdater_CancelPendingUpdates(t *testing.T) {
-	iface := &endpointTestWGIface{}
-	e := newTestEndpointUpdater(iface, false)
-
-	addr := &net.UDPAddr{IP: net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1"), Port: 51820}
-	require.NoError(t, e.ConfigureWGEndpoint(addr, nil))
-
-	updates, _ := iface.counts()
-	require.Equal(t, 1, updates, "responder must apply the immediate nil-endpoint update")
-
-	// CancelPendingUpdates waits for the delayed-update goroutine to exit, so the
-	// call counts below are final: the 5s fallback update can never fire anymore.
-	e.CancelPendingUpdates()
-
-	updates, removes := iface.counts()
-	assert.Equal(t, 1, updates, "delayed endpoint update must not fire after cancellation")
-	assert.Equal(t, 0, removes, "cancellation must not remove the WireGuard peer")
-}
-
-// TestEndpointUpdater_CancelPendingUpdatesNoPending ensures cancellation is a safe no-op
-// when no delayed update is scheduled (initiator path).
-func TestEndpointUpdater_CancelPendingUpdatesNoPending(t *testing.T) {
-	iface := &endpointTestWGIface{}
-	e := newTestEndpointUpdater(iface, true)
-
-	addr := &net.UDPAddr{IP: net.ParseIP("127.0.0.1"), Port: 51820}
-	require.NoError(t, e.ConfigureWGEndpoint(addr, nil))
-
-	e.CancelPendingUpdates()
-
-	updates, removes := iface.counts()
-	assert.Equal(t, 1, updates, "initiator applies exactly one direct update")
-	assert.Equal(t, 0, removes, "cancellation must not remove the WireGuard peer")
-}

client/internal/peerstore/store.go

@@ -108,10 +108,7 @@ func (s *Store) PeerConnOpenWithFirstPacket(ctx context.Context, pubKey string,
 	}
 }
 
-// PeerConnIdle transitions the peer connection to the lazy idle state, keeping the
-// WireGuard peer and its AllowedIPs in place. signalToRemote indicates whether the
-// remote peer should be notified (false when the remote initiated the idle via GOAWAY).
-func (s *Store) PeerConnIdle(pubKey string, signalToRemote bool) {
+func (s *Store) PeerConnIdle(pubKey string) {
 	s.peerConnsMu.RLock()
 	defer s.peerConnsMu.RUnlock()
 
@@ -119,7 +116,18 @@ func (s *Store) PeerConnIdle(pubKey string, signalToRemote bool) {
 	if !ok {
 		return
 	}
-	p.Idle(signalToRemote)
+	p.Close(true)
+}
+
+func (s *Store) PeerConnClose(pubKey string) {
+	s.peerConnsMu.RLock()
+	defer s.peerConnsMu.RUnlock()
+
+	p, ok := s.peerConns[pubKey]
+	if !ok {
+		return
+	}
+	p.Close(false)
 }
 
 func (s *Store) PeersPubKey() []string {

client/internal/statemanager/manager.go

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 package statemanager
 
 import (
-	"bytes"
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
@@ -306,11 +305,6 @@ func (m *Manager) loadStateFile(deleteCorrupt bool) (map[string]json.RawMessage,
 
 	var rawStates map[string]json.RawMessage
 	if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &rawStates); err != nil {
-		if len(bytes.TrimSpace(data)) == 0 {
-			log.Warnf("state file %s is empty (%d bytes)", m.filePath, len(data))
-		} else {
-			log.Warnf("state file %s has malformed content (%d bytes)", m.filePath, len(data))
-		}
 		m.handleCorruptedState(deleteCorrupt)
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("unmarshal states: %w", err)
 	}

client/netbird-entrypoint.sh

@@ -1,71 +1,27 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Runs the NetBird daemon and brings the connection up in one container process.
+#
+# A thin wrapper is needed (rather than a one-line ENTRYPOINT) for two reasons:
+#   1. Two processes must run: the daemon (`service run`, long-lived) and a
+#      one-shot `up` that brings the connection up.
+#   2. Signal handling: as PID 1 the wrapper must forward SIGTERM/SIGINT to the
+#      daemon so it tears down WireGuard and deregisters ephemeral peers on
+#      `docker stop`. Without this the daemon would be killed uncleanly.
+#
+# `netbird up` waits for the daemon to become ready on its own, so no readiness
+# poll is needed here.
 set -eEuo pipefail
 
-: ${NB_ENTRYPOINT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT:="30"}
 NETBIRD_BIN="${NETBIRD_BIN:-"netbird"}"
 export NB_LOG_FILE="${NB_LOG_FILE:-"console,/var/log/netbird/client.log"}"
-service_pids=()
 
-_log() {
-  # mimic Go logger's output for easier parsing
-  # 2025-04-15T21:32:00+08:00 INFO client/internal/config.go:495: setting notifications to disabled by default
-  printf "$(date -Isec) ${1} ${BASH_SOURCE[1]}:${BASH_LINENO[1]}: ${2}\n" "${@:3}" >&2
-}
+daemon=""
+cleanup() { [[ -n "${daemon}" ]] && kill -TERM "${daemon}" 2>/dev/null || true; }
+trap cleanup SIGTERM SIGINT EXIT
 
-info() {
-  _log INFO "$@"
-}
+"${NETBIRD_BIN}" service run &
+daemon=$!
 
-warn() {
-  _log WARN "$@"
-}
+"${NETBIRD_BIN}" up
 
-on_exit() {
-  info "Shutting down NetBird daemon..."
-  if test "${#service_pids[@]}" -gt 0; then
-    info "terminating service process IDs: ${service_pids[@]@Q}"
-    kill -TERM "${service_pids[@]}" 2>/dev/null || true
-    wait "${service_pids[@]}" 2>/dev/null || true
-  else
-    info "there are no service processes to terminate"
-  fi
-}
-
-wait_for_daemon_startup() {
-  local timeout="${1}"
-  if [[ "${timeout}" -eq 0 ]]; then
-    info "not waiting for daemon startup due to zero timeout."
-    return
-  fi
-
-  local deadline=$((SECONDS + timeout))
-  while [[ "${SECONDS}" -lt "${deadline}" ]]; do
-    if "${NETBIRD_BIN}" status --check live 2>/dev/null; then
-      return
-    fi
-    sleep 1
-  done
-
-  warn "daemon did not become responsive after ${timeout} seconds, exiting..."
-  exit 1
-}
-
-connect() {
-  info "running 'netbird up'..."
-  "${NETBIRD_BIN}" up
-  return $?
-}
-
-main() {
-  trap 'on_exit' SIGTERM SIGINT EXIT
-  "${NETBIRD_BIN}" service run &
-  service_pids+=("$!")
-  info "registered new service process 'netbird service run', currently running: ${service_pids[@]@Q}"
-
-  wait_for_daemon_startup "${NB_ENTRYPOINT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT}"
-  connect
-
-  wait "${service_pids[@]}"
-}
-
-main "$@"
+wait "${daemon}"

client/proto/daemon.pb.go

@@ -995,8 +995,13 @@ type StatusResponse struct {
 	// Unset when the peer is not SSO-registered or login expiration is disabled.
 	// The UI derives "warning active" from this value and its own clock.
 	SessionExpiresAt *timestamppb.Timestamp `protobuf:"bytes,4,opt,name=sessionExpiresAt,proto3" json:"sessionExpiresAt,omitempty"`
-	unknownFields    protoimpl.UnknownFields
-	sizeCache        protoimpl.SizeCache
+	// daemonReady reports whether the daemon has finished starting up and is
+	// serving RPCs backed by a running engine. Older daemons never set this
+	// (it defaults to false); clients must treat an unset value as "unknown"
+	// and fall back to their previous readiness heuristics for compatibility.
+	DaemonReady   bool `protobuf:"varint,5,opt,name=daemonReady,proto3" json:"daemonReady,omitempty"`
+	unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields
+	sizeCache     protoimpl.SizeCache
 }
 
 func (x *StatusResponse) Reset() {
@@ -1057,6 +1062,13 @@ func (x *StatusResponse) GetSessionExpiresAt() *timestamppb.Timestamp {
 	return nil
 }
 
+func (x *StatusResponse) GetDaemonReady() bool {
+	if x != nil {
+		return x.DaemonReady
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
 type DownRequest struct {
 	state         protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"`
 	unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields
@@ -7083,14 +7095,15 @@ const file_daemon_proto_rawDesc = "" +
 	"\x11getFullPeerStatus\x18\x01 \x01(\bR\x11getFullPeerStatus\x12(\n" +
 	"\x0fshouldRunProbes\x18\x02 \x01(\bR\x0fshouldRunProbes\x12'\n" +
 	"\fwaitForReady\x18\x03 \x01(\bH\x00R\fwaitForReady\x88\x01\x01B\x0f\n" +
-	"\r_waitForReady\"\xca\x01\n" +
+	"\r_waitForReady\"\xec\x01\n" +
 	"\x0eStatusResponse\x12\x16\n" +
 	"\x06status\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x06status\x122\n" +
 	"\n" +
 	"fullStatus\x18\x02 \x01(\v2\x12.daemon.FullStatusR\n" +
 	"fullStatus\x12$\n" +
 	"\rdaemonVersion\x18\x03 \x01(\tR\rdaemonVersion\x12F\n" +
-	"\x10sessionExpiresAt\x18\x04 \x01(\v2\x1a.google.protobuf.TimestampR\x10sessionExpiresAt\"\r\n" +
+	"\x10sessionExpiresAt\x18\x04 \x01(\v2\x1a.google.protobuf.TimestampR\x10sessionExpiresAt\x12 \n" +
+	"\vdaemonReady\x18\x05 \x01(\bR\vdaemonReady\"\r\n" +
 	"\vDownRequest\"\x0e\n" +
 	"\fDownResponse\"P\n" +
 	"\x10GetConfigRequest\x12 \n" +

client/proto/daemon.proto

@@ -291,6 +291,11 @@ message StatusResponse{
   // Unset when the peer is not SSO-registered or login expiration is disabled.
   // The UI derives "warning active" from this value and its own clock.
   google.protobuf.Timestamp sessionExpiresAt = 4;
+  // daemonReady reports whether the daemon has finished starting up and is
+  // serving RPCs backed by a running engine. Older daemons never set this
+  // (it defaults to false); clients must treat an unset value as "unknown"
+  // and fall back to their previous readiness heuristics for compatibility.
+  bool daemonReady = 5;
 }
 
 message DownRequest {}

client/server/server.go

@@ -104,6 +104,12 @@ type Server struct {
 	persistSyncResponse bool
 	isSessionActive     atomic.Bool
 
+	// ready is set once the daemon has finished startup and is serving RPCs
+	// backed by a running engine (see SetReady, called after Start succeeds and
+	// the service is registered). Reported via StatusResponse.DaemonReady so
+	// clients can wait deterministically instead of polling heuristically.
+	ready atomic.Bool
+
 	cpuProfileBuf *bytes.Buffer
 	cpuProfiling  bool
 
@@ -158,6 +164,14 @@ func New(ctx context.Context, logFile string, configFile string, profilesDisable
 	return s
 }
 
+// SetReady marks the daemon as fully started and serving RPCs. It is called by
+// the service controller once Start has succeeded and the DaemonService is
+// registered, so a subsequent Status RPC reports DaemonReady=true. Safe for
+// concurrent use.
+func (s *Server) SetReady() {
+	s.ready.Store(true)
+}
+
 func (s *Server) Start() error {
 	s.mutex.Lock()
 	defer s.mutex.Unlock()
@@ -1422,7 +1436,7 @@ func (s *Server) buildStatusResponse(ctx context.Context, msg *proto.StatusReque
 		s.isSessionActive.Store(false)
 	}
 
-	statusResponse := proto.StatusResponse{Status: string(status), DaemonVersion: version.NetbirdVersion()}
+	statusResponse := proto.StatusResponse{Status: string(status), DaemonVersion: version.NetbirdVersion(), DaemonReady: s.ready.Load()}
 
 	if deadline := s.statusRecorder.GetSessionExpiresAt(); !deadline.IsZero() {
 		statusResponse.SessionExpiresAt = timestamppb.New(deadline)

client/ssh/config/manager.go

@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ import (
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 
 	nbssh "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
 )
 
 const (
@@ -219,20 +218,11 @@ func (m *Manager) buildHostPatterns(peer PeerSSHInfo) []string {
 	if peer.IPv6.IsValid() {
 		hostPatterns = append(hostPatterns, peer.IPv6.String())
 	}
-	// Peer FQDNs and hostnames originate from remote peers, so they must be
-	// validated as plain DNS names before being embedded in the ssh_config
-	// "Match host" pattern list. This prevents injection of arbitrary
-	// ssh_config directives via embedded quotes, whitespace, newlines, the
-	// comma pattern separator, or the "*"/"?" pattern metacharacters.
-	if domain.IsValidDomainNoWildcard(peer.FQDN) {
+	if peer.FQDN != "" {
 		hostPatterns = append(hostPatterns, peer.FQDN)
-	} else if peer.FQDN != "" {
-		log.Warnf("skipping peer FQDN with invalid characters in SSH config: %q", peer.FQDN)
 	}
-	if peer.Hostname != peer.FQDN && domain.IsValidDomainNoWildcard(peer.Hostname) {
+	if peer.Hostname != "" && peer.Hostname != peer.FQDN {
 		hostPatterns = append(hostPatterns, peer.Hostname)
-	} else if peer.Hostname != "" && peer.Hostname != peer.FQDN {
-		log.Warnf("skipping peer hostname with invalid characters in SSH config: %q", peer.Hostname)
 	}
 	return hostPatterns
 }

client/ssh/config/manager_test.go

@@ -148,45 +148,6 @@ func TestManager_MatchHostFormat(t *testing.T) {
 		"should use Match host with comma-separated patterns")
 }
 
-func TestManager_HostPatternInjection(t *testing.T) {
-	tempDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "netbird-ssh-config-test")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	defer func() { assert.NoError(t, os.RemoveAll(tempDir)) }()
-
-	manager := &Manager{
-		sshConfigDir:  filepath.Join(tempDir, "ssh_config.d"),
-		sshConfigFile: "99-netbird.conf",
-	}
-
-	// A malicious peer FQDN/hostname attempts to break out of the Match host
-	// directive and inject arbitrary ssh_config (a ProxyCommand executing a
-	// command). It must be rejected, not written to the config.
-	peers := []PeerSSHInfo{
-		{
-			Hostname: "evil\"\n    ProxyCommand touch /tmp/pwned\nHost x",
-			IP:       netip.MustParseAddr("100.125.1.1"),
-			FQDN:     "evil\"\n    ProxyCommand touch /tmp/pwned\nHost x.nb.internal",
-		},
-		{Hostname: "peer2", IP: netip.MustParseAddr("100.125.1.2"), FQDN: "peer2.nb.internal"},
-	}
-
-	err = manager.SetupSSHClientConfig(peers)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	configPath := filepath.Join(manager.sshConfigDir, manager.sshConfigFile)
-	content, err := os.ReadFile(configPath)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	configStr := string(content)
-
-	assert.NotContains(t, configStr, "ProxyCommand touch /tmp/pwned",
-		"injected directive must not appear in generated config")
-	assert.NotContains(t, configStr, "evil",
-		"malicious pattern must be dropped entirely")
-	// The valid peer must still be present, on a single Match host line.
-	assert.Contains(t, configStr, "Match host \"100.125.1.1,100.125.1.2,peer2.nb.internal,peer2\"",
-		"valid peers must survive, injected patterns dropped")
-}
-
 func TestManager_ForcedSSHConfig(t *testing.T) {
 	// Set force environment variable
 	t.Setenv(EnvForceSSHConfig, "true")

client/ssh/server/getent_unix.go

@@ -69,8 +69,7 @@ func parseGetentPasswd(output string) (*user.User, string, error) {
 
 // validateGetentInput checks that the input is safe to pass to getent or id.
 // Allows POSIX usernames, numeric UIDs, and common NSS extensions
-// (@ for Kerberos, $ for Samba, + for NIS compat). A leading hyphen is
-// rejected so the input can never be parsed as a command-line flag.
+// (@ for Kerberos, $ for Samba, + for NIS compat).
 func validateGetentInput(input string) bool {
 	maxLen := 32
 	if runtime.GOOS == "linux" {
@@ -81,10 +80,6 @@ func validateGetentInput(input string) bool {
 		return false
 	}
 
-	if input[0] == '-' {
-		return false
-	}
-
 	for _, r := range input {
 		if isAllowedGetentChar(r) {
 			continue

client/ssh/server/getent_unix_test.go

@@ -157,9 +157,6 @@ func TestValidateGetentInput(t *testing.T) {
 		{"numeric UID", "1001", true},
 		{"dots and underscores", "alice.bob_test", true},
 		{"hyphen", "alice-bob", true},
-		{"leading hyphen rejected", "-i", false},
-		{"leading double hyphen rejected", "--no-idn", false},
-		{"lone hyphen rejected", "-", false},
 		{"kerberos principal", "user@REALM", true},
 		{"samba machine account", "MACHINE$", true},
 		{"NIS compat", "+user", true},

combined/cmd/config.go

@@ -145,7 +145,6 @@ type AuthConfig struct {
 	CLIRedirectURIs                 []string          `yaml:"cliRedirectURIs"`
 	Owner                           *AuthOwnerConfig  `yaml:"owner,omitempty"`
 	DashboardPostLogoutRedirectURIs []string          `yaml:"dashboardPostLogoutRedirectURIs"`
-	GrantTypes                      []string          `yaml:"grantTypes"`
 }
 
 // AuthStorageConfig contains auth storage settings
@@ -605,7 +604,6 @@ func (c *CombinedConfig) buildEmbeddedIdPConfig(mgmt ManagementConfig) (*idp.Emb
 		DashboardRedirectURIs:           mgmt.Auth.DashboardRedirectURIs,
 		CLIRedirectURIs:                 mgmt.Auth.CLIRedirectURIs,
 		DashboardPostLogoutRedirectURIs: mgmt.Auth.DashboardPostLogoutRedirectURIs,
-		GrantTypes:                      mgmt.Auth.GrantTypes,
 	}
 
 	if mgmt.Auth.Owner != nil && mgmt.Auth.Owner.Email != "" {

e2e/harness/Dockerfile.client

@@ -17,8 +17,7 @@ RUN apk add --no-cache bash ca-certificates ip6tables iproute2 iptables
 ENV NETBIRD_BIN="/usr/local/bin/netbird" \
     NB_LOG_FILE="console,/var/log/netbird/client.log" \
     NB_DAEMON_ADDR="unix:///var/run/netbird.sock" \
-    NB_ENABLE_CAPTURE="false" \
-    NB_ENTRYPOINT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT="30"
+    NB_ENABLE_CAPTURE="false"
 ENTRYPOINT [ "/usr/local/bin/netbird-entrypoint.sh" ]
 COPY client/netbird-entrypoint.sh /usr/local/bin/netbird-entrypoint.sh
 COPY --from=builder /out/netbird /usr/local/bin/netbird

go.mod

@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ replace github.com/cloudflare/circl => codeberg.org/cunicu/circl v0.0.0-20230801
 
 replace github.com/pion/ice/v4 => github.com/netbirdio/ice/v4 v4.0.0-20250908184934-6202be846b51
 
-replace github.com/dexidp/dex => github.com/netbirdio/dex v0.244.1-0.20260716205454-a163de3129e5
+replace github.com/dexidp/dex => github.com/netbirdio/dex v0.244.1-0.20260512110716-8d70ad8647c1
 
 replace github.com/dexidp/dex/api/v2 => github.com/netbirdio/dex/api/v2 v2.0.0-20260512110716-8d70ad8647c1
 

go.sum

@@ -476,8 +476,8 @@ github.com/morikuni/aec v1.0.0 h1:nP9CBfwrvYnBRgY6qfDQkygYDmYwOilePFkwzv4dU8A=
 github.com/morikuni/aec v1.0.0/go.mod h1:BbKIizmSmc5MMPqRYbxO4ZU0S0+P200+tUnFx7PXmsc=
 github.com/munnerz/goautoneg v0.0.0-20191010083416-a7dc8b61c822 h1:C3w9PqII01/Oq1c1nUAm88MOHcQC9l5mIlSMApZMrHA=
 github.com/munnerz/goautoneg v0.0.0-20191010083416-a7dc8b61c822/go.mod h1:+n7T8mK8HuQTcFwEeznm/DIxMOiR9yIdICNftLE1DvQ=
-github.com/netbirdio/dex v0.244.1-0.20260716205454-a163de3129e5 h1:3PwQv8aR46qN2u16+Dv6udnH3sbVKX5KrGwF35CKSI0=
-github.com/netbirdio/dex v0.244.1-0.20260716205454-a163de3129e5/go.mod h1:IHH+H8vK2GfqtIt5u/5OdPh18yk0oDHuj2vz5+Goetg=
+github.com/netbirdio/dex v0.244.1-0.20260512110716-8d70ad8647c1 h1:4TaYr9O4xX0D2kszeOLclTiCbA3eHq3xWV+9ILJbIYs=
+github.com/netbirdio/dex v0.244.1-0.20260512110716-8d70ad8647c1/go.mod h1:IHH+H8vK2GfqtIt5u/5OdPh18yk0oDHuj2vz5+Goetg=
 github.com/netbirdio/dex/api/v2 v2.0.0-20260512110716-8d70ad8647c1 h1:neE7z+FPUkldl3faK/Jt+hJK2L+1XfQ1W33TQhU9m88=
 github.com/netbirdio/dex/api/v2 v2.0.0-20260512110716-8d70ad8647c1/go.mod h1:awuTyT29CYALpEyET0S307EgNlPWrc7fFKRAyhsO45M=
 github.com/netbirdio/easyjson v0.9.0 h1:6Nw2lghSVuy8RSkAYDhDv1thBVEmfVbKZnV7T7Z6Aus=

idp/dex/config.go

@@ -613,10 +613,6 @@ func (c *YAMLConfig) ToServerConfig(stor storage.Storage, logger *slog.Logger) s
 		cfg.SupportedResponseTypes = c.OAuth2.ResponseTypes
 	}
 
-	if len(c.OAuth2.GrantTypes) > 0 {
-		cfg.AllowedGrantTypes = c.OAuth2.GrantTypes
-	}
-
 	// Apply expiry settings
 	if c.Expiry.IDTokens != "" {
 		if d, err := parseDuration(c.Expiry.IDTokens); err == nil {

idp/dex/provider.go

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/dexidp/dex/server/signer"
 	"github.com/dexidp/dex/storage"
 	"github.com/dexidp/dex/storage/sql"
-	"github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4"
+	jose "github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4"
 	"github.com/google/uuid"
 	"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
 	"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"

idp/dex/provider_test.go

@@ -595,90 +595,3 @@ enablePasswordDB: true
 	assert.True(t, cfg.ContinueOnConnectorFailure,
 		"buildDexConfig must set ContinueOnConnectorFailure to true so management starts even if an external IdP is down")
 }
-
-func TestToServerConfig_WiresGrantTypes(t *testing.T) {
-	tmpDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "dex-grants-*")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	defer os.RemoveAll(tmpDir)
-
-	stor := openTestStorage(t, tmpDir)
-	defer stor.Close()
-
-	logger := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stderr, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelError}))
-
-	grants := []string{"authorization_code", "refresh_token"}
-	cfg := &YAMLConfig{Issuer: "http://localhost:5599/oauth2", OAuth2: OAuth2{GrantTypes: grants}}
-	assert.Equal(t, grants, cfg.ToServerConfig(stor, logger).AllowedGrantTypes)
-
-	empty := &YAMLConfig{Issuer: "http://localhost:5599/oauth2"}
-	assert.Empty(t, empty.ToServerConfig(stor, logger).AllowedGrantTypes)
-}
-
-func newDeviceGuardProvider(t *testing.T, grantTypesYAML string) *Provider {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	tmpDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "dex-devguard-*")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.RemoveAll(tmpDir) })
-
-	yamlContent := `
-issuer: http://localhost:5599/oauth2
-storage:
-  type: sqlite3
-  config:
-    file: ` + filepath.Join(tmpDir, "dex.db") + `
-web:
-  http: 127.0.0.1:5599
-enablePasswordDB: true
-` + grantTypesYAML
-
-	configPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "config.yaml")
-	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(configPath, []byte(yamlContent), 0644))
-
-	yamlConfig, err := LoadConfig(configPath)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	provider, err := NewProviderFromYAML(context.Background(), yamlConfig)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = provider.Stop(context.Background()) })
-	return provider
-}
-
-func TestHandler_BlocksDeviceEndpointsWhenDeviceGrantDisabled(t *testing.T) {
-	provider := newDeviceGuardProvider(t, `
-oauth2:
-  grantTypes:
-    - authorization_code
-    - refresh_token
-`)
-
-	devicePaths := []string{
-		"/oauth2/device",
-		"/oauth2/device/code",
-		"/oauth2/device/token",
-		"/oauth2/device/auth/verify_code",
-		"/oauth2/device/callback",
-	}
-	for _, path := range devicePaths {
-		for _, method := range []string{http.MethodGet, http.MethodPost} {
-			req := httptest.NewRequest(method, path, nil)
-			rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
-			provider.Handler().ServeHTTP(rec, req)
-			assert.Equal(t, http.StatusNotFound, rec.Code, "%s %s must be blocked", method, path)
-		}
-	}
-
-	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/oauth2/.well-known/openid-configuration", nil)
-	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
-	provider.Handler().ServeHTTP(rec, req)
-	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code)
-}
-
-func TestHandler_AllowsDeviceEndpointsWhenGrantsDefault(t *testing.T) {
-	provider := newDeviceGuardProvider(t, "")
-
-	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/oauth2/device/code", nil)
-	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
-	provider.Handler().ServeHTTP(rec, req)
-	assert.NotEqual(t, http.StatusNotFound, rec.Code)
-}

management/server/account_test.go

@@ -4269,7 +4269,7 @@ func TestDefaultAccountManager_UpdateAccountSettings_NetworkRangePreserved(t *te
 	}
 
 	// Sanity: an actually different range still triggers reallocation.
-	newRange := netip.MustParsePrefix("100.60.0.0/16")
+	newRange := netip.MustParsePrefix("100.99.0.0/16")
 	_, err = manager.UpdateAccountSettings(ctx, account.Id, userID, &types.Settings{
 		PeerLoginExpirationEnabled: true,
 		PeerLoginExpiration:        types.DefaultPeerLoginExpiration,

management/server/idp/embedded.go

@@ -76,9 +76,6 @@ type EmbeddedIdPConfig struct {
 	DashboardPostLogoutRedirectURIs []string
 	// StaticConnectors are additional connectors to seed during initialization
 	StaticConnectors []dex.Connector
-	// GrantTypes restricts allowed OAuth2 grants; empty means all (Dex default). Omit the
-	// device_code grant to disable the device flow; keep authorization_code and refresh_token.
-	GrantTypes []string
 }
 
 // EmbeddedStorageConfig holds storage configuration for the embedded IdP.
@@ -178,7 +175,6 @@ func (c *EmbeddedIdPConfig) ToYAMLConfig() (*dex.YAMLConfig, error) {
 		},
 		OAuth2: dex.OAuth2{
 			SkipApprovalScreen: true,
-			GrantTypes:         c.GrantTypes,
 		},
 		Frontend: dex.Frontend{
 			Issuer: "NetBird",

management/server/store/sql_store.go

@@ -1606,8 +1606,7 @@ func (s *SqlStore) getAccount(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (*types.Acc
 			settings_routing_peer_dns_resolution_enabled, settings_dns_domain, settings_network_range,
 			settings_network_range_v6, settings_ipv6_enabled_groups, settings_lazy_connection_enabled,
 			settings_local_mfa_enabled, settings_metrics_push_enabled, settings_agent_network_only,
-			settings_dashboard_features, settings_auto_update_version, settings_auto_update_always,
-			settings_peer_expose_enabled, settings_peer_expose_groups,
+			settings_dashboard_features,
 			-- Embedded ExtraSettings
 			settings_extra_peer_approval_enabled, settings_extra_user_approval_required,
 			settings_extra_integrated_validator, settings_extra_integrated_validator_groups
@@ -1633,10 +1632,6 @@ func (s *SqlStore) getAccount(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (*types.Acc
 		sMetricsPushEnabled              sql.NullBool
 		sAgentNetworkOnly                sql.NullBool
 		sDashboardFeatures               sql.NullString
-		autoUpdateVersion                sql.NullString
-		autoUpdateAlways                 sql.NullBool
-		peerExposeEnabled                sql.NullBool
-		peerExposeGroups                 sql.NullString
 		sExtraPeerApprovalEnabled        sql.NullBool
 		sExtraUserApprovalRequired       sql.NullBool
 		sExtraIntegratedValidator        sql.NullString
@@ -1660,8 +1655,7 @@ func (s *SqlStore) getAccount(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (*types.Acc
 		&sRoutingPeerDNSResolutionEnabled, &sDNSDomain, &sNetworkRange,
 		&sNetworkRangeV6, &sIPv6EnabledGroups, &sLazyConnectionEnabled,
 		&sLocalMFAEnabled, &sMetricsPushEnabled, &sAgentNetworkOnly,
-		&sDashboardFeatures, &autoUpdateVersion, &autoUpdateAlways,
-		&peerExposeEnabled, &peerExposeGroups,
+		&sDashboardFeatures,
 		&sExtraPeerApprovalEnabled, &sExtraUserApprovalRequired,
 		&sExtraIntegratedValidator, &sExtraIntegratedValidatorGroups,
 	)
@@ -1753,18 +1747,6 @@ func (s *SqlStore) getAccount(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (*types.Acc
 	if sIPv6EnabledGroups.Valid {
 		_ = json.Unmarshal([]byte(sIPv6EnabledGroups.String), &account.Settings.IPv6EnabledGroups)
 	}
-	if autoUpdateAlways.Valid {
-		account.Settings.AutoUpdateAlways = autoUpdateAlways.Bool
-	}
-	if autoUpdateVersion.Valid {
-		account.Settings.AutoUpdateVersion = autoUpdateVersion.String
-	}
-	if peerExposeEnabled.Valid {
-		account.Settings.PeerExposeEnabled = peerExposeEnabled.Bool
-	}
-	if peerExposeGroups.Valid {
-		_ = json.Unmarshal([]byte(peerExposeGroups.String), &account.Settings.PeerExposeGroups)
-	}
 
 	if sExtraPeerApprovalEnabled.Valid {
 		account.Settings.Extra.PeerApprovalEnabled = sExtraPeerApprovalEnabled.Bool

management/server/store/sql_store_test.go

@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import (
 	"net"
 	"net/netip"
 	"os"
-	"reflect"
 	"runtime"
 	"sort"
 	"sync"
@@ -35,7 +34,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/util"
 	nbroute "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/status"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/testing_helpers"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util/crypt"
 )
 
@@ -298,53 +296,6 @@ func Test_SaveAccount(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 }
 
-func Test_AccountSettings_SaveAndRetrieve(t *testing.T) {
-	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
-		t.Skip("The SQLite store is not properly supported by Windows yet")
-	}
-
-	populateFields := testing_helpers.NewPopulateFields().WithCustomFieldSetter(
-		reflect.PointerTo(reflect.TypeOf(types.ExtraSettings{})), func(this *testing_helpers.PopulateFields, field reflect.Value) (int, error) {
-			es := types.ExtraSettings{}
-			reflectedEs := reflect.ValueOf(&es).Elem()
-			n, err := this.PopulateAll(reflectedEs)
-			if err != nil {
-				return n, err
-			}
-			field.Set(reflectedEs.Addr())
-			return n, nil
-		}).WithCustomFieldSetter(
-		reflect.PointerTo(reflect.TypeOf(types.DashboardFeatures{})), func(this *testing_helpers.PopulateFields, field reflect.Value) (int, error) {
-			t := true
-			df := types.DashboardFeatures{AgentNetwork: &t}
-			reflectedDf := reflect.ValueOf(&df).Elem()
-			field.Set(reflectedDf.Addr())
-			return 1, nil
-		}).WithSkippedTag("gorm", "-")
-
-	runTestForAllEngines(t, "", func(t *testing.T, store Store) {
-		account := newAccountWithId(context.Background(), "account_id", "testuser", "")
-		setupKey, _ := types.GenerateDefaultSetupKey()
-		account.SetupKeys[setupKey.Key] = setupKey
-
-		settings := types.Settings{}
-		numOfExportedFields, err := populateFields.PopulateAll(reflect.ValueOf(&settings).Elem())
-		assert.NoError(t, err)
-		assert.Equal(t, 27, numOfExportedFields)
-		account.Settings = &settings
-
-		err = store.SaveAccount(context.Background(), account)
-		assert.NoError(t, err)
-
-		accountFromDb, err := store.GetAccount(context.Background(), account.Id)
-		assert.NoError(t, err)
-		assert.NotNil(t, accountFromDb)
-		assert.NotNil(t, accountFromDb.Settings)
-
-		assert.True(t, reflect.DeepEqual(&settings, accountFromDb.Settings), "created settings and settings retrieved from the db should match")
-	})
-}
-
 func TestSqlite_DeleteAccount(t *testing.T) {
 	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
 		t.Skip("The SQLite store is not properly supported by Windows yet")

relay/server/listener/quic/listener.go

@@ -51,10 +51,7 @@ func (l *Listener) Listen(acceptFn func(conn relaylistener.Conn)) error {
 
 		log.Infof("QUIC client connected from: %s", session.RemoteAddr())
 		conn := NewConn(session)
-		// Run the accept handler (which performs the pre-auth handshake) in its
-		// own goroutine so a slow or stalled handshake cannot block accepting
-		// further connections.
-		go acceptFn(conn)
+		acceptFn(conn)
 	}
 }
 

shared/testing_helpers/populate_fields.go

@@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
-package testing_helpers
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"net/netip"
-	"reflect"
-)
-
-type PopulateFields struct {
-	CustomFieldSetters map[reflect.Type]func(this *PopulateFields, field reflect.Value) (int, error)
-	TagsToSkip         map[string]string
-}
-
-func NewPopulateFields() *PopulateFields {
-	return &PopulateFields{CustomFieldSetters: defaultCustomFieldSetters(), TagsToSkip: make(map[string]string)}
-}
-
-func (p *PopulateFields) WithCustomFieldSetter(t reflect.Type, f func(this *PopulateFields, field reflect.Value) (int, error)) *PopulateFields {
-	p.CustomFieldSetters[t] = f
-	return p
-}
-
-func (p *PopulateFields) WithSkippedTag(tag, value string) *PopulateFields {
-	p.TagsToSkip[tag] = value
-	return p
-}
-
-func (p *PopulateFields) PopulateAll(v reflect.Value) (int, error) {
-	typ := v.Type()
-	totalExportedFields := 0
-	for i := 0; i < typ.NumField(); i++ {
-		f := typ.Field(i)
-		if f.PkgPath != "" { // unexported
-			continue
-		}
-
-		if p.skippedTagPresent(f.Tag) {
-			continue
-		}
-
-		numOfExportedFields, err := p.setNonZero(v.Field(i))
-		totalExportedFields += numOfExportedFields
-		if err != nil {
-			return totalExportedFields, err
-		}
-	}
-	return totalExportedFields, nil
-}
-
-// setNonZero assigns a deterministic non-zero value to a field based on its kind,
-// recursing into nested structs and populating one element of slice fields.
-func (p *PopulateFields) setNonZero(field reflect.Value) (int, error) {
-	if f, ok := p.CustomFieldSetters[field.Type()]; ok {
-		return f(p, field)
-	}
-
-	switch field.Kind() {
-	case reflect.String:
-		field.SetString("non-zero")
-	case reflect.Bool:
-		field.SetBool(true)
-	case reflect.Int, reflect.Int8, reflect.Int16, reflect.Int32, reflect.Int64:
-		field.SetInt(7)
-	case reflect.Uint, reflect.Uint8, reflect.Uint16, reflect.Uint32, reflect.Uint64:
-		field.SetUint(7)
-	case reflect.Float32, reflect.Float64:
-		field.SetFloat(7)
-	case reflect.Struct:
-		n, err := p.PopulateAll(field)
-		return n + 1, err
-	case reflect.Slice:
-		s := reflect.MakeSlice(field.Type(), 1, 1)
-		_, err := p.setNonZero(s.Index(0))
-		if err != nil {
-			return 0, err
-		}
-		field.Set(s)
-	default:
-		return 0, fmt.Errorf("unhandled field kind %s; extend setNonZero", field.Kind())
-	}
-
-	return 1, nil
-}
-
-func defaultCustomFieldSetters() map[reflect.Type]func(this *PopulateFields, field reflect.Value) (int, error) {
-	return map[reflect.Type]func(this *PopulateFields, field reflect.Value) (int, error){
-		reflect.TypeOf(netip.Prefix{}): func(_ *PopulateFields, field reflect.Value) (int, error) {
-			field.Set(reflect.ValueOf(netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/24")))
-			return 1, nil
-		},
-	}
-}
-
-func (p *PopulateFields) skippedTagPresent(t reflect.StructTag) bool {
-	for tag, value := range p.TagsToSkip {
-		if v := t.Get(tag); v == value {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}