Go mod tidy

agent-network/README.md

@@ -1,47 +1,16 @@
 # NetBird Agent Network
 
-Agent Network is NetBird's access control layer for AI agents and the people who run them. 
-It gives every agent a real identity, tied to an identity provider (IdP), and governs what it can reach: LLM APIs and 
-AI gateways it can call, and the internal resources it can access. Traffic flows only over the encrypted NetBird tunnel, 
-scoped by policy, with no API keys or other credentials to leak. It also gives you control over cost and token usage.
+Agent Network is NetBird's access control layer for AI agents and the people who run
+them. It gives every agent a real identity, tied to your identity provider (IdP), and
+governs what it can reach — the LLM APIs and AI gateways it can call, and the internal
+resources it can access. Traffic flows only over the encrypted NetBird tunnel, scoped by
+policy, with no API keys to leak.
 
-Because every LLM request passes through an
-identity-aware proxy, you can:
-
-- **Set spending and rate limits** per agent, per user, or per team — with hard caps
-  that stop requests once a budget is reached.
-- **Restrict models and providers** so agents can only call approved (and cost-appropriate)
-  endpoints, keeping expensive models off-limits unless explicitly allowed.
-- **Attribute usage** by tracking token consumption and cost per identity, group, or cost center so every
-  request is tied back to the agent and person responsible.
-- **Reuse your existing AI gateway** — point the proxy at a gateway you already run,
-  keeping its routing and config in place while it adds identity on top, so you skip
-  API key distribution.
-
-https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/44d18286-d8ab-49f8-a457-98ccd66f3268
-
-> **Beta.** Agent Network is in beta, but it's stable and already running in
-> production environments. It's fully open source and can be self-hosted on your own
-> infrastructure, with no vendor lock-in and no data leaving your environment.
+> **Beta.** Agent Network is open source and can be self-hosted on your own
+> infrastructure.
 
 ## How it works
 
-Say you have a simple use case: your Engineering or IT team needs access to Claude Code or Codex, and you want visibility into usage plus the ability to enforce budgets.
-How can you do that without creating a dedicated API key for every team?
-
-With Agent Network you get a private endpoint inside your network, for example: https://mirror.netbird.ai
-Teams configure their agents to point to that endpoint instead of using individual API keys directly. 
-
-This endpoint is only reachable when users are connected to your NetBird network and authenticated through your IdP. Otherwise, it is not accessible from the public internet.
-You can then use this private endpoint to configure your AI agents, whether that is Claude Code, Codex, or another tool.
-
-## Quickstart
-
-Full step-by-step setup:
-**https://docs.netbird.io/agent-network/quickstart**
-
-## Architecture 
-
 Agent Network is built on two existing NetBird capabilities:
 
 - **Overlay network** — the encrypted WireGuard mesh between peers.
@@ -53,9 +22,6 @@ LLM traffic is routed through the proxy's identity-aware pipeline, while interna
 resources (databases, internal APIs, self-hosted models) are reached directly over
 peer-to-peer WireGuard tunnels, governed by the same identities and access policies.
 
-<img width="4720" height="2218" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1afa5da1-4b82-4f8a-a7a8-f417efadf1eb" />
-
-
 ## Where the code lives
 
 There is no separate "agent-network" service — it reuses the reverse-proxy and management

client/android/client.go

@@ -247,9 +247,6 @@ func (c *Client) DebugBundle(platformFiles PlatformFiles, anonymize bool) (strin
 		deps.SyncResponse = resp
 
 		if e := cc.Engine(); e != nil {
-			deps.RefreshStatus = func() {
-				e.RunHealthProbes(context.Background(), true)
-			}
 			if cm := e.GetClientMetrics(); cm != nil {
 				deps.ClientMetrics = cm
 			}

client/android/profile_manager.go

@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ func (pm *ProfileManager) SwitchProfile(id string) error {
 // AddProfile creates a new profile
 func (pm *ProfileManager) AddProfile(profileName string) error {
 	// Use ServiceManager (creates profile in profiles/ directory)
-	profile, err := pm.serviceMgr.AddProfile(profileName, androidUsername, nil)
+	profile, err := pm.serviceMgr.AddProfile(profileName, androidUsername)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("failed to add profile: %w", err)
 	}

client/cmd/login.go

@@ -17,9 +17,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/auth"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
-	nbnet "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/net"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/server"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/system"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
 )
@@ -333,14 +331,6 @@ func doForegroundLogin(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, setupKey string,
 		return fmt.Errorf("read config file %s: %v", configFilePath, err)
 	}
 
-	// Mirror runInForegroundMode: recover residual state (DNS, firewall,
-	// ssh config, legacy routing) from a previous unclean shutdown and
-	// enable advanced routing before dialing management.
-	if err := server.RestoreResidualState(ctx, profilemanager.NewServiceManager(configFilePath).GetStatePath()); err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("failed to restore residual state: %v", err)
-	}
-	nbnet.Init()
-
 	err = foregroundLogin(ctx, cmd, config, setupKey, activeProf.ID)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("foreground login failed: %v", err)

client/cmd/owner.go

@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
-package cmd
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"time"
-
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
-)
-
-var ownerCmd = &cobra.Command{
-	Use:   "owner",
-	Short: "Manage who may control the active NetBird profile",
-	Long: `Manage the owners of the active profile's daemon control channel.
-
-Ownership is enforced per profile: an isolated profile can only be controlled by
-its owner principals (plus root/administrator). A new profile is automatically
-owned by its creator; an unowned profile is claimed by the first caller.`,
-}
-
-var ownerAddCmd = &cobra.Command{
-	Use:   "add <principal>",
-	Short: "Add an owner principal to the active profile",
-	Long: `Add an owner principal to the active profile. Principals are typed:
-  uid:1000               a Unix user ID
-  gid:1000               a Unix group ID
-  group:netbird-admins   a Unix group name (resolved via NSS/getent)
-  sid:S-1-5-21-...       a Windows user or group SID
-
-Requires root/administrator or an existing owner.`,
-	Args: cobra.ExactArgs(1),
-	RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
-		return withDaemon(cmd, func(ctx context.Context, c proto.DaemonServiceClient) error {
-			if _, err := c.AddOwner(ctx, &proto.AddOwnerRequest{Principal: args[0]}); err != nil {
-				return err
-			}
-			cmd.Printf("Added owner %q to the active profile\n", args[0])
-			return nil
-		})
-	},
-}
-
-var ownerResetCmd = &cobra.Command{
-	Use:   "reset",
-	Short: "Clear the active profile's owner list (root/administrator only)",
-	Long: `Clear the active profile's owner list, returning it to the unowned
-state. The next caller then claims ownership (trust-on-first-use). Requires
-root/administrator.`,
-	RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
-		return withDaemon(cmd, func(ctx context.Context, c proto.DaemonServiceClient) error {
-			if _, err := c.ResetOwner(ctx, &proto.ResetOwnerRequest{}); err != nil {
-				return err
-			}
-			cmd.Println("Owner list cleared; the next caller will claim ownership")
-			return nil
-		})
-	},
-}
-
-var ownerShareCmd = &cobra.Command{
-	Use:   "share",
-	Short: "Mark the active profile shared (any local user may control it)",
-	RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
-		return withDaemon(cmd, func(ctx context.Context, c proto.DaemonServiceClient) error {
-			if _, err := c.ShareProfile(ctx, &proto.ShareProfileRequest{Shared: true}); err != nil {
-				return err
-			}
-			cmd.Println("Active profile is now shared with all local users")
-			return nil
-		})
-	},
-}
-
-var ownerUnshareCmd = &cobra.Command{
-	Use:   "unshare",
-	Short: "Stop sharing the active profile (restrict to its owners)",
-	RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
-		return withDaemon(cmd, func(ctx context.Context, c proto.DaemonServiceClient) error {
-			if _, err := c.ShareProfile(ctx, &proto.ShareProfileRequest{Shared: false}); err != nil {
-				return err
-			}
-			cmd.Println("Active profile is no longer shared")
-			return nil
-		})
-	},
-}
-
-// withDaemon runs fn with a connected daemon client, handling setup and teardown.
-func withDaemon(cmd *cobra.Command, fn func(context.Context, proto.DaemonServiceClient) error) error {
-	SetFlagsFromEnvVars(rootCmd)
-	cmd.SetOut(cmd.OutOrStdout())
-	if err := util.InitLog(logLevel, util.LogConsole); err != nil {
-		log.Errorf("failed initializing log %v", err)
-		return err
-	}
-
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(cmd.Context(), 20*time.Second)
-	defer cancel()
-
-	conn, err := DialClientGRPCServer(ctx, daemonAddr)
-	if err != nil {
-		log.Errorf("failed to connect to service CLI interface %v", err)
-		return err
-	}
-	defer func() {
-		if cerr := conn.Close(); cerr != nil {
-			log.Debugf("close daemon connection: %v", cerr)
-		}
-	}()
-
-	return fn(ctx, proto.NewDaemonServiceClient(conn))
-}

client/cmd/root.go

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"io/fs"
-	"net"
 	"os"
 	"os/signal"
 	"path"
@@ -144,10 +143,10 @@ func init() {
 
 	defaultDaemonAddr := "unix:///var/run/netbird.sock"
 	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
-		defaultDaemonAddr = "npipe://netbird"
+		defaultDaemonAddr = "tcp://127.0.0.1:41731"
 	}
 
-	rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&daemonAddr, "daemon-addr", defaultDaemonAddr, "Daemon service address to serve CLI requests [unix|tcp|npipe]://[path|host:port|name]")
+	rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&daemonAddr, "daemon-addr", defaultDaemonAddr, "Daemon service address to serve CLI requests [unix|tcp]://[path|host:port]")
 	rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVarP(&managementURL, "management-url", "m", "", fmt.Sprintf("Management Service URL [http|https]://[host]:[port] (default \"%s\")", profilemanager.DefaultManagementURL))
 	rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&adminURL, "admin-url", "", fmt.Sprintf("Admin Panel URL [http|https]://[host]:[port] (default \"%s\")", profilemanager.DefaultAdminURL))
 	rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVarP(&logLevel, "log-level", "l", "info", "sets NetBird log level")
@@ -173,9 +172,6 @@ func init() {
 	rootCmd.AddCommand(profileCmd)
 	rootCmd.AddCommand(exposeCmd)
 
-	rootCmd.AddCommand(ownerCmd)
-	ownerCmd.AddCommand(ownerAddCmd, ownerResetCmd, ownerShareCmd, ownerUnshareCmd)
-
 	networksCMD.AddCommand(routesListCmd)
 	networksCMD.AddCommand(routesSelectCmd, routesDeselectCmd)
 
@@ -269,28 +265,16 @@ func FlagNameToEnvVar(cmdFlag string, prefix string) string {
 }
 
 // DialClientGRPCServer returns client connection to the daemon server.
-func DialClientGRPCServer(ctx context.Context, addr string, opts ...grpc.DialOption) (*grpc.ClientConn, error) {
+func DialClientGRPCServer(ctx context.Context, addr string) (*grpc.ClientConn, error) {
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, time.Second*10)
 	defer cancel()
 
-	opts = append([]grpc.DialOption{
+	return grpc.DialContext(
+		ctx,
+		strings.TrimPrefix(addr, "tcp://"),
 		grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials()),
-		grpc.WithBlock()}, opts...)
-
-	// The daemon reads the caller's kernel identity from the transport
-	// (SO_PEERCRED on a Unix socket, the client token on a Windows named pipe),
-	// so the client stays insecure. For npipe we install a context dialer since
-	// gRPC's resolver does not understand Windows named pipes.
-	target := strings.TrimPrefix(addr, "tcp://")
-	if strings.HasPrefix(addr, "npipe://") {
-		path := pipePath(strings.TrimPrefix(addr, "npipe://"))
-		opts = append(opts, grpc.WithContextDialer(func(dialCtx context.Context, _ string) (net.Conn, error) {
-			return dialNamedPipe(dialCtx, path)
-		}))
-		target = "passthrough:///netbird-daemon-pipe"
-	}
-
-	return grpc.DialContext(ctx, target, opts...)
+		grpc.WithBlock(),
+	)
 }
 
 // WithBackOff execute function in backoff cycle.

client/cmd/service_controller.go

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ package cmd
 import (
 	"context"
 	"fmt"
-	"runtime"
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/kardianos/service"
@@ -14,36 +13,12 @@ import (
 	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
 	"google.golang.org/grpc"
 
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/server"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/system"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
 )
 
-// daemonServerOptions installs peer-identity transport credentials and the
-// authorization interceptor on the daemon ipc. Identity is only available
-// over a Unix socket (SO_PEERCRED) or a Windows named pipe (client token).
-// Over TCP, or on platforms without a peer-credential primitive, the daemon
-// runs without per-caller authorization and warns (no interceptor, so it does
-// not deny everyone).
-func daemonServerOptions(network string, interceptor *ipcauth.Interceptor) []grpc.ServerOption {
-	creds := ipcauth.NewTransportCredentials()
-	if creds == nil {
-		log.Warnf("daemon ipc has no peer-identity primitive on %s, per-caller authorization is disabled", runtime.GOOS)
-		return nil
-	}
-	if network == "tcp" {
-		log.Warnf("daemon is listening on TCP (%s), peer identity cannot be authenticated over TCP, per-caller authorization is disabled", daemonAddr)
-		return nil
-	}
-	return []grpc.ServerOption{
-		grpc.Creds(creds),
-		grpc.ChainUnaryInterceptor(interceptor.UnaryServerInterceptor()),
-		grpc.ChainStreamInterceptor(interceptor.StreamServerInterceptor()),
-	}
-}
-
 func validateJSONSocketFlags() error {
 	if serviceCmd.PersistentFlags().Changed("json-socket") && !enableJSONSocket {
 		return fmt.Errorf("--json-socket requires --enable-json-socket to configure the daemon JSON gateway")
@@ -62,19 +37,8 @@ func (p *program) Start(svc service.Service) error {
 	// Collect static system and platform information
 	system.UpdateStaticInfoAsync()
 
-	network, _, err := parseListenAddress(daemonAddr)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("parse daemon address: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	// Owner-authorization interceptor. The ConfigAdapter is a lazy bridge: the
-	// gRPC server is built before the daemon server instance exists, so we set
-	// the real policy backend below once serverInstance is created.
-	ownerAdapter := &ipcauth.ConfigAdapter{}
-	authInterceptor := ipcauth.NewInterceptor(ownerAdapter, ipcauth.NewDefaultGroupResolver())
-
-	// in any case, even if configuration does not exist we run daemon to serve the CLI gRPC API.
-	p.serv = grpc.NewServer(daemonServerOptions(network, authInterceptor)...)
+	// in any case, even if configuration does not exists we run daemon to serve CLI gRPC API.
+	p.serv = grpc.NewServer()
 
 	daemonListener, err := listenOnAddress(daemonAddr)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -113,7 +77,6 @@ func (p *program) Start(svc service.Service) error {
 		if err := serverInstance.Start(); err != nil {
 			log.Fatalf("failed to start daemon: %v", err)
 		}
-		ownerAdapter.SetBackend(serverInstance)
 		proto.RegisterDaemonServiceServer(p.serv, serverInstance)
 
 		p.serverInstanceMu.Lock()
@@ -121,7 +84,6 @@ func (p *program) Start(svc service.Service) error {
 		p.serverInstanceMu.Unlock()
 
 		if jsonListener != nil {
-			log.Warnf("JSON gateway (--enable-json-socket) re-dials the daemon locally; the HTTP client's identity is forwarded so per-caller authorization still applies, but restrict access to %s appropriately", jsonSocket)
 			if err := p.startJSONGateway(jsonListener, daemonAddr); err != nil {
 				log.Fatalf("failed to start daemon JSON server: %v", err)
 			}

client/cmd/service_json_gateway.go

@@ -14,45 +14,16 @@ import (
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 	"google.golang.org/grpc"
 	"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials/insecure"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
 
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
 )
 
-// jsonPeerCtxKey keys the HTTP client's kernel identity in the request context.
-type jsonPeerCtxKey struct{}
-
-// jsonConnContext reads the connecting HTTP client's identity from the JSON
-// socket (peercred) and stashes it so it can be forwarded to the daemon. The
-// gateway re-dials the daemon as the daemon's own identity, so without this the
-// daemon would see every JSON request as privileged.
-func jsonConnContext(ctx context.Context, c net.Conn) context.Context {
-	id, err := ipcauth.PeerIdentity(c)
-	if err != nil {
-		log.Debugf("json gateway: cannot read HTTP client identity, requests won't carry it: %v", err)
-		return ctx
-	}
-	return context.WithValue(ctx, jsonPeerCtxKey{}, id)
-}
-
-// jsonForwardIdentity injects the stashed HTTP client identity as gRPC metadata
-// on the gateway's re-dial to the daemon. The daemon trusts it only because the
-// dial arrives as the daemon's own (self/privileged) identity.
-func jsonForwardIdentity(ctx context.Context, _ *http.Request) metadata.MD {
-	id, ok := ctx.Value(jsonPeerCtxKey{}).(ipcauth.Identity)
-	if !ok {
-		return nil
-	}
-	return ipcauth.ForwardIdentityMetadata(id)
-}
-
 func grpcGatewayEndpoint(addr string) string {
 	return strings.TrimPrefix(addr, "tcp://")
 }
 
 func (p *program) startJSONGateway(jsonListener *socketListener, daemonEndpoint string) error {
-	mux := runtime.NewServeMux(runtime.WithMetadata(jsonForwardIdentity))
+	mux := runtime.NewServeMux()
 	opts := []grpc.DialOption{grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials())}
 	if err := proto.RegisterDaemonServiceHandlerFromEndpoint(p.ctx, mux, grpcGatewayEndpoint(daemonEndpoint), opts); err != nil {
 		return err
@@ -64,7 +35,6 @@ func (p *program) startJSONGateway(jsonListener *socketListener, daemonEndpoint
 		BaseContext: func(net.Listener) context.Context {
 			return p.ctx
 		},
-		ConnContext: jsonConnContext,
 	}
 
 	p.jsonServMu.Lock()

client/cmd/service_pipe_other.go

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-//go:build !windows
-
-package cmd
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"fmt"
-	"net"
-	"runtime"
-)
-
-// listenNamedPipe is unsupported off Windows; named pipes are a Windows-only transport.
-func listenNamedPipe(string) (net.Listener, error) {
-	return nil, fmt.Errorf("named pipe daemon socket is only supported on Windows, not %s", runtime.GOOS)
-}
-
-// dialNamedPipe is unsupported off Windows.
-func dialNamedPipe(context.Context, string) (net.Conn, error) {
-	return nil, fmt.Errorf("named pipe daemon socket is only supported on Windows, not %s", runtime.GOOS)
-}

client/cmd/service_pipe_windows.go

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-//go:build windows
-
-package cmd
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"net"
-
-	"github.com/Microsoft/go-winio"
-	"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
-)
-
-// listenNamedPipe creates the daemon control named pipe with a permissive,
-// local-only SDDL. Any local caller may connect, on par with the Unix
-// socket's 0666, and the per-RPC interceptor authorizes. ListenPipe fails
-// if the pipe already exists (first-instance semantics), which prevents a
-// squatting process from pre-creating it.
-func listenNamedPipe(path string) (net.Listener, error) {
-	return winio.ListenPipe(path, &winio.PipeConfig{
-		SecurityDescriptor: ipcauth.DefaultPipeSDDL(),
-	})
-}
-
-// dialNamedPipe connects to the daemon ipc named pipe at SECURITY_IDENTIFICATION.
-func dialNamedPipe(ctx context.Context, path string) (net.Conn, error) {
-	access := uint32(windows.GENERIC_READ | windows.GENERIC_WRITE)
-	// winio's plain DialPipe connects at SECURITY_ANONYMOUS, under which the
-	// daemon cannot read the caller's token. Identification lets the daemon
-	// read its SID/groups without granting it the ability to act as the caller.
-	return winio.DialPipeAccessImpLevel(ctx, path, access, winio.PipeImpLevelIdentification)
-}

client/cmd/service_socket.go

@@ -26,15 +26,6 @@ func listenOnAddress(addr string) (*socketListener, error) {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
-	if network == "npipe" {
-		path := pipePath(address)
-		listener, err := listenNamedPipe(path)
-		if err != nil {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-		return &socketListener{Listener: listener, network: network, address: path}, nil
-	}
-
 	if network == "unix" {
 		removeStaleUnixSocket(address)
 	}
@@ -54,22 +45,13 @@ func parseListenAddress(addr string) (string, string, error) {
 	}
 
 	switch network {
-	case "unix", "tcp", "npipe":
+	case "unix", "tcp":
 		return network, address, nil
 	default:
 		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("unsupported daemon address protocol: %v", network)
 	}
 }
 
-// pipePath maps a daemon-addr npipe name ("npipe://netbird") to a Windows
-// named-pipe path (\\.\pipe\netbird).
-func pipePath(name string) string {
-	if strings.HasPrefix(name, `\\`) {
-		return name
-	}
-	return `\\.\pipe\` + name
-}
-
 func removeStaleUnixSocket(path string) {
 	stat, err := os.Lstat(path)
 	if err != nil {

client/cmd/up.go

@@ -22,8 +22,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
-	nbnet "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/net"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/server"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/system"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
@@ -56,7 +54,6 @@ var (
 	showQR             bool
 	profileName        string
 	configPath         string
-	claimOwner         bool
 
 	upCmd = &cobra.Command{
 		Use:   "up",
@@ -68,7 +65,6 @@ var (
 
 func init() {
 	upCmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVarP(&foregroundMode, "foreground-mode", "F", false, "start service in foreground")
-	upCmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVar(&claimOwner, "owner", false, "claim ownership of this profile for the current user, restricting daemon control of it to you and root/administrator")
 	upCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&interfaceName, interfaceNameFlag, iface.WgInterfaceDefault, "WireGuard interface name")
 	upCmd.PersistentFlags().Uint16Var(&wireguardPort, wireguardPortFlag, iface.DefaultWgPort, "WireGuard interface listening port")
 	upCmd.PersistentFlags().Uint16Var(&mtu, mtuFlag, iface.DefaultMTU, "Set MTU (Maximum Transmission Unit) for the WireGuard interface")
@@ -233,24 +229,6 @@ func runInForegroundMode(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, activeProf *pr
 
 	_, _ = profilemanager.UpdateOldManagementURL(ctx, config, configFilePath)
 
-	// Restore residual state left by a previous run that did not shut down
-	// cleanly, mirroring what the daemon does before connecting: it recovers
-	// DNS config (a stale resolv.conf takeover can make the management
-	// hostname unresolvable), firewall rules, ssh config and legacy routing.
-	// Route cleanup itself happens at engine start; nbnet.Init() below lets
-	// the management dial bypass a leftover fwmark rule until then.
-	// Foreground mode is particularly exposed in containers: a crashed
-	// container restarts inside the same (pod) network namespace, so stale
-	// state survives while the process does not.
-	if err := server.RestoreResidualState(ctx, profilemanager.NewServiceManager(configPath).GetStatePath()); err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("failed to restore residual state: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	// Enable advanced routing (as the daemon does on startup) so the
-	// management dial bypasses a leftover fwmark rule instead of being
-	// shunted into a stale routing table.
-	nbnet.Init()
-
 	err = foregroundLogin(ctx, cmd, config, providedSetupKey, activeProf.ID)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("foreground login failed: %v", err)
@@ -393,7 +371,6 @@ func doDaemonUp(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, client proto.DaemonServ
 	if _, err := client.Up(ctx, &proto.UpRequest{
 		ProfileName: &profileID,
 		Username:    &username,
-		ClaimOwner:  claimOwner,
 	}); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("call service up method: %v", err)
 	}

client/cmd/up_daemon_test.go

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ func TestUpDaemon(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	sm := profilemanager.ServiceManager{}
-	created, err := sm.AddProfile("test1", currUser.Username, nil)
+	created, err := sm.AddProfile("test1", currUser.Username)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("failed to add profile: %v", err)
 		return

client/firewall/uspfilter/filter.go

@@ -121,7 +121,6 @@ type Manager struct {
 	udpTracker     *conntrack.UDPTracker
 	icmpTracker    *conntrack.ICMPTracker
 	tcpTracker     *conntrack.TCPTracker
-	fragments      *fragmentTracker
 	forwarder      atomic.Pointer[forwarder.Forwarder]
 	pendingCapture atomic.Pointer[forwarder.PacketCapture]
 	logger         *nblog.Logger
@@ -184,41 +183,6 @@ func (d *decoder) decodePacket(data []byte) error {
 	}
 }
 
-// decodeTransport decodes the transport header of a first fragment (which
-// gopacket leaves undecoded) into the decoder and appends its layer type to
-// decoded, so the ACL pipeline can evaluate it like a normal packet. It returns
-// false if the protocol is unsupported or the header is truncated.
-func (d *decoder) decodeTransport(proto layers.IPProtocol, payload []byte) bool {
-	var l4 gopacket.DecodingLayer
-	var layerType gopacket.LayerType
-	var minLen int
-	switch proto {
-	case layers.IPProtocolTCP:
-		l4, layerType, minLen = &d.tcp, layers.LayerTypeTCP, 20
-	case layers.IPProtocolUDP:
-		l4, layerType, minLen = &d.udp, layers.LayerTypeUDP, 8
-	case layers.IPProtocolICMPv4:
-		l4, layerType, minLen = &d.icmp4, layers.LayerTypeICMPv4, 8
-	case layers.IPProtocolICMPv6:
-		l4, layerType, minLen = &d.icmp6, layers.LayerTypeICMPv6, 8
-	default:
-		return false
-	}
-
-	// Reject a fragment too small to hold the full transport header before
-	// decoding: it can't be ACL-evaluated (tiny-fragment attack), and skipping
-	// the decode avoids gopacket allocating an error on the drop path.
-	if len(payload) < minLen {
-		return false
-	}
-
-	if err := l4.DecodeFromBytes(payload, gopacket.NilDecodeFeedback); err != nil {
-		return false
-	}
-	d.decoded = append(d.decoded, layerType)
-	return true
-}
-
 // Create userspace firewall manager constructor
 func Create(iface common.IFaceMapper, disableServerRoutes bool, flowLogger nftypes.FlowLogger, mtu uint16) (*Manager, error) {
 	return create(iface, nil, disableServerRoutes, flowLogger, mtu)
@@ -322,8 +286,6 @@ func create(iface common.IFaceMapper, nativeFirewall firewall.Manager, disableSe
 	if err := m.localipmanager.UpdateLocalIPs(iface); err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("update local IPs: %w", err)
 	}
-	m.fragments = newFragmentTracker(m.logger)
-
 	if disableConntrack {
 		log.Info("conntrack is disabled")
 	} else {
@@ -337,7 +299,6 @@ func create(iface common.IFaceMapper, nativeFirewall firewall.Manager, disableSe
 		}
 	}
 	if err := iface.SetFilter(m); err != nil {
-		m.fragments.Close()
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("set filter: %w", err)
 	}
 	return m, nil
@@ -733,10 +694,6 @@ func (m *Manager) resetState() {
 		m.tcpTracker.Close()
 	}
 
-	if m.fragments != nil {
-		m.fragments.Close()
-	}
-
 	if fwder := m.forwarder.Load(); fwder != nil {
 		fwder.SetCapture(nil)
 		fwder.Stop()
@@ -1089,20 +1046,19 @@ func (m *Manager) filterInbound(packetData []byte, size int) bool {
 		return true
 	}
 
-	// gopacket does not decode the transport header of any IP fragment, so
-	// fragments take a dedicated path: the first fragment's header is decoded
-	// and ACL-evaluated here, and the remaining fragments inherit its verdict.
+	// TODO: pass fragments of routed packets to forwarder
 	if fragment {
-		return m.filterInboundFragment(d, srcIP, dstIP, size)
+		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
+			if d.decoded[0] == layers.LayerTypeIPv4 {
+				m.logger.Trace4("packet is a fragment: src=%v dst=%v id=%v flags=%v",
+					srcIP, dstIP, d.ip4.Id, d.ip4.Flags)
+			} else {
+				m.logger.Trace2("packet is an IPv6 fragment: src=%v dst=%v", srcIP, dstIP)
+			}
+		}
+		return false
 	}
 
-	return m.filterInboundDecoded(d, srcIP, dstIP, packetData, size)
-}
-
-// filterInboundDecoded runs the ACL, DNAT and conntrack pipeline on a fully
-// decoded (non-fragment) inbound packet. It returns true if the packet should
-// be dropped.
-func (m *Manager) filterInboundDecoded(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, packetData []byte, size int) bool {
 	// TODO: optimize port DNAT by caching matched rules in conntrack
 	if translated := m.translateInboundPortDNAT(packetData, d, srcIP, dstIP); translated {
 		// Re-decode after port DNAT translation to update port information
@@ -1133,226 +1089,33 @@ func (m *Manager) filterInboundDecoded(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, pack
 	return m.handleRoutedTraffic(d, srcIP, dstIP, packetData, size)
 }
 
-// fragmentMeta holds the reassembly identity and layout of an IP fragment,
-// extracted uniformly for IPv4 and IPv6.
-type fragmentMeta struct {
-	key fragmentKey
-	// offset is the fragment offset in 8-byte units (zero for the first
-	// fragment).
-	offset uint16
-	// moreFragments is the More Fragments bit. A first fragment with it unset is
-	// an IPv6 atomic fragment (a complete datagram, RFC 6946): it has no trailing
-	// fragments to inherit a verdict, so it must not be recorded.
-	moreFragments bool
-	proto         layers.IPProtocol
-	// l4payload is the fragmentable payload of this fragment. For the first
-	// fragment it starts with the transport header.
-	l4payload []byte
-	// headerEndOctets is the first fragment's payload length in 8-byte units:
-	// the smallest offset a trailing fragment may start at without overlapping
-	// the inspected transport header.
-	headerEndOctets uint16
-}
-
-// fragmentMetadata extracts the fragment identity and layout from a decoded IP
-// fragment. It returns false for fragments it can't interpret (e.g. an IPv6
-// fragment header shorter than 8 bytes), which are then dropped.
-func fragmentMetadata(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr) (fragmentMeta, bool) {
-	switch d.decoded[0] {
-	case layers.LayerTypeIPv4:
-		payload := d.ip4.Payload
-		return fragmentMeta{
-			key:             fragmentKey{srcIP: srcIP, dstIP: dstIP, id: uint32(d.ip4.Id), proto: uint8(d.ip4.Protocol)},
-			offset:          d.ip4.FragOffset,
-			moreFragments:   d.ip4.Flags&layers.IPv4MoreFragments != 0,
-			proto:           d.ip4.Protocol,
-			l4payload:       payload,
-			headerEndOctets: octets(len(payload)),
-		}, true
-
-	case layers.LayerTypeIPv6:
-		// IPv6 fragment extension header: 8 bytes, followed by the fragmentable
-		// payload. Layout: next header (1), reserved (1), offset+flags (2), id (4).
-		payload := d.ip6.Payload
-		if len(payload) < 8 {
-			return fragmentMeta{}, false
-		}
-		nextHeader := layers.IPProtocol(payload[0])
-		offsetFlags := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(payload[2:4])
-		id := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(payload[4:8])
-		l4 := payload[8:]
-		return fragmentMeta{
-			key:             fragmentKey{srcIP: srcIP, dstIP: dstIP, id: id, proto: uint8(nextHeader)},
-			offset:          offsetFlags >> 3,
-			moreFragments:   offsetFlags&1 != 0,
-			proto:           nextHeader,
-			l4payload:       l4,
-			headerEndOctets: octets(len(l4)),
-		}, true
-
-	default:
-		return fragmentMeta{}, false
-	}
-}
-
-// octets rounds a byte length up to whole 8-byte units, the granularity of the
-// IP fragment offset field.
-func octets(nbytes int) uint16 {
-	return uint16((nbytes + 7) / 8)
-}
-
-// filterInboundFragment decides the fate of an IP fragment. gopacket stops
-// decoding at the network layer for every fragment, so the first fragment's
-// transport header is decoded and ACL-evaluated here and its verdict recorded;
-// the remaining (headerless) fragments inherit that verdict. Anything that
-// cannot be tied to an allowed, non-overlapping first fragment is dropped.
-func (m *Manager) filterInboundFragment(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, size int) bool {
-	meta, ok := fragmentMetadata(d, srcIP, dstIP)
-	if !ok {
-		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
-			m.logger.Trace2("dropping unsupported fragment: src=%v dst=%v", srcIP, dstIP)
-		}
-		return true
-	}
-
-	if meta.offset != 0 {
-		return m.filterTrailingFragment(meta, srcIP, dstIP)
-	}
-
-	// A new first fragment supersedes any recorded verdict for this datagram, so
-	// a re-sent or overlapping offset-zero fragment can't inherit the old one.
-	m.fragments.poison(meta.key)
-
-	// First fragment: decode its transport header so the ACL can evaluate it. A
-	// decode failure means the fragment is too small to hold the full transport
-	// header (RFC 1858 §3 tiny-fragment attack); it can't be evaluated, so drop it.
-	if !d.decodeTransport(meta.proto, meta.l4payload) {
-		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
-			m.logger.Trace3("dropping first fragment without full L4 header: src=%v dst=%v id=%v",
-				srcIP, dstIP, meta.key.id)
-		}
-		return true
-	}
-
-	return m.filterFirstFragment(d, meta, srcIP, dstIP, size)
-}
-
-// filterTrailingFragment applies a recorded first-fragment verdict to a
-// non-first fragment.
-func (m *Manager) filterTrailingFragment(meta fragmentMeta, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr) bool {
-	switch m.fragments.verdict(meta.key, meta.offset) {
-	case fragmentAllow:
-		return false
-	case fragmentOverlap:
-		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
-			m.logger.Trace3("dropping overlapping fragment rewriting inspected header: src=%v dst=%v id=%v",
-				srcIP, dstIP, meta.key.id)
-		}
-		return true
-	default:
-		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
-			m.logger.Trace3("dropping fragment with no allowed first fragment: src=%v dst=%v id=%v",
-				srcIP, dstIP, meta.key.id)
-		}
-		return true
-	}
-}
-
-// filterFirstFragment runs the verdict part of the inbound pipeline on a first
-// fragment with its transport header decoded. It mirrors filterInboundDecoded
-// but skips DNAT (port rewriting on fragments is unsupported) and forwarder
-// injection (fragments are left to the stack to reassemble, not forwarded).
-// Allowed fragments have their verdict recorded so the datagram's trailing
-// fragments inherit it.
-func (m *Manager) filterFirstFragment(d *decoder, meta fragmentMeta, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, size int) bool {
-	if m.stateful && m.isValidTrackedConnection(d, srcIP, dstIP, size) {
-		m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
-		return false
-	}
-
-	if m.localipmanager.IsLocalIP(dstIP) {
-		ruleID, blocked := m.peerACLsBlock(srcIP, d, nil)
-		if blocked {
-			m.storeDropFlow("Dropping local first fragment (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
-				d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
-			return true
-		}
-		m.trackInbound(d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
-		m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
-		return false
-	}
-
-	if !m.routingEnabled.Load() {
-		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
-			m.logger.Trace2("Dropping routed fragment (routing disabled): src=%s dst=%s", srcIP, dstIP)
-		}
-		return true
-	}
-	if m.nativeRouter.Load() {
-		m.trackInbound(d, srcIP, dstIP, nil, size)
-		m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
-		return false
-	}
-
-	// TODO: pass fragments of routed packets to the forwarder; until then
-	// allowed routed fragments go to the native stack.
-	srcPort, dstPort := getPortsFromPacket(d)
-	ruleID, pass := m.routeACLsPass(srcIP, dstIP, d.decoded[1], srcPort, dstPort)
-	if !pass {
-		m.storeDropFlow("Dropping routed first fragment (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
-			d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
-		return true
-	}
-
-	m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
-	return false
-}
-
-// recordFirstFragment caches an allowed first fragment's verdict for its
-// trailing fragments to inherit. Atomic fragments (no More Fragments bit) are
-// complete datagrams with no trailing fragments, so they are not cached and
-// cannot exhaust the verdict table.
-func (m *Manager) recordFirstFragment(meta fragmentMeta) {
-	if !meta.moreFragments {
-		return
-	}
-	m.fragments.recordAllowed(meta.key, meta.headerEndOctets)
-}
-
-// storeDropFlow logs and records a netflow drop event for an inbound packet
-// denied by the ACLs. msg is the trace format taking rule id, protocol, source
-// and destination.
-func (m *Manager) storeDropFlow(msg string, d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, ruleID []byte, size int) {
-	pnum := getProtocolFromPacket(d)
-	srcPort, dstPort := getPortsFromPacket(d)
-
-	if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
-		m.logger.Trace6(msg, ruleID, pnum, srcIP, srcPort, dstIP, dstPort)
-	}
-
-	m.flowLogger.StoreEvent(nftypes.EventFields{
-		FlowID:     uuid.New(),
-		Type:       nftypes.TypeDrop,
-		RuleID:     ruleID,
-		Direction:  nftypes.Ingress,
-		Protocol:   pnum,
-		SourceIP:   srcIP,
-		DestIP:     dstIP,
-		SourcePort: srcPort,
-		DestPort:   dstPort,
-		// TODO: icmp type/code
-		RxPackets: 1,
-		RxBytes:   uint64(size),
-	})
-}
-
 // handleLocalTraffic handles local traffic.
 // If it returns true, the packet should be dropped.
 func (m *Manager) handleLocalTraffic(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, packetData []byte, size int) bool {
 	ruleID, blocked := m.peerACLsBlock(srcIP, d, packetData)
 	if blocked {
-		m.storeDropFlow("Dropping local packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
-			d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
+		pnum := getProtocolFromPacket(d)
+		srcPort, dstPort := getPortsFromPacket(d)
+
+		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
+			m.logger.Trace6("Dropping local packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
+				ruleID, pnum, srcIP, srcPort, dstIP, dstPort)
+		}
+
+		m.flowLogger.StoreEvent(nftypes.EventFields{
+			FlowID:     uuid.New(),
+			Type:       nftypes.TypeDrop,
+			RuleID:     ruleID,
+			Direction:  nftypes.Ingress,
+			Protocol:   pnum,
+			SourceIP:   srcIP,
+			DestIP:     dstIP,
+			SourcePort: srcPort,
+			DestPort:   dstPort,
+			// TODO: icmp type/code
+			RxPackets: 1,
+			RxBytes:   uint64(size),
+		})
 		return true
 	}
 
@@ -1405,8 +1168,27 @@ func (m *Manager) handleRoutedTraffic(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, packe
 
 	ruleID, pass := m.routeACLsPass(srcIP, dstIP, protoLayer, srcPort, dstPort)
 	if !pass {
-		m.storeDropFlow("Dropping routed packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
-			d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
+		proto := getProtocolFromPacket(d)
+
+		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
+			m.logger.Trace6("Dropping routed packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
+				ruleID, proto, srcIP, srcPort, dstIP, dstPort)
+		}
+
+		m.flowLogger.StoreEvent(nftypes.EventFields{
+			FlowID:     uuid.New(),
+			Type:       nftypes.TypeDrop,
+			RuleID:     ruleID,
+			Direction:  nftypes.Ingress,
+			Protocol:   proto,
+			SourceIP:   srcIP,
+			DestIP:     dstIP,
+			SourcePort: srcPort,
+			DestPort:   dstPort,
+			// TODO: icmp type/code
+			RxPackets: 1,
+			RxBytes:   uint64(size),
+		})
 		return true
 	}
 

client/firewall/uspfilter/forwarder/forwarder.go

@@ -5,9 +5,7 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"net"
 	"net/netip"
-	"os"
 	"runtime"
-	"strconv"
 	"sync"
 	"time"
 
@@ -33,11 +31,6 @@ const (
 	defaultMaxInFlight   = 1024
 	iosReceiveWindow     = 16384
 	iosMaxInFlight       = 256
-
-	// envForceTCPRACK overrides the platform default for gVisor's RACK loss
-	// detection. Set to a truthy value to force RACK on, or a falsy value to
-	// force it off, on any platform.
-	envForceTCPRACK = "NB_FORCE_TCP_RACK"
 )
 
 type Forwarder struct {
@@ -159,8 +152,6 @@ func New(iface common.IFaceMapper, logger *nblog.Logger, flowLogger nftypes.Flow
 		maxInFlight = iosMaxInFlight
 	}
 
-	configureTCPRecovery(s)
-
 	tcpForwarder := tcp.NewForwarder(s, receiveWindow, maxInFlight, f.handleTCP)
 	s.SetTransportProtocolHandler(tcp.ProtocolNumber, tcpForwarder.HandlePacket)
 
@@ -475,31 +466,3 @@ func probeRawICMP(network, addr string, logger *nblog.Logger) bool {
 	logger.Debug1("forwarder: raw %s socket access available", network)
 	return true
 }
-
-// configureTCPRecovery disables gVisor's RACK loss detection on Windows, where
-// it interacts poorly with the host and collapses throughput on routed TCP
-// connections (gVisor issue #9778). Other platforms keep the default. The
-// EnvForceTCPRACK environment variable overrides the platform default.
-func configureTCPRecovery(s *stack.Stack) {
-	disableRACK := runtime.GOOS == "windows"
-
-	if val := os.Getenv(envForceTCPRACK); val != "" {
-		force, err := strconv.ParseBool(val)
-		if err != nil {
-			log.Warnf("parse %s: %v", envForceTCPRACK, err)
-		} else {
-			disableRACK = !force
-		}
-	}
-
-	if !disableRACK {
-		return
-	}
-
-	opt := tcpip.TCPRecovery(0)
-	if err := s.SetTransportProtocolOption(tcp.ProtocolNumber, &opt); err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("disable TCP RACK loss detection: %v", err)
-		return
-	}
-	log.Info("forwarder: TCP RACK loss detection disabled")
-}

client/firewall/uspfilter/fragment.go

@@ -1,204 +0,0 @@
-package uspfilter
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"net/netip"
-	"os"
-	"strconv"
-	"sync"
-	"time"
-
-	nblog "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/uspfilter/log"
-)
-
-const (
-	// defaultFragmentTimeout bounds how long a first-fragment verdict is kept
-	// while the remaining fragments arrive. It mirrors the Linux IP reassembly
-	// timeout (net.ipv4.ipfrag_time).
-	defaultFragmentTimeout = 30 * time.Second
-	// fragmentCleanupInterval is how often expired verdicts are purged.
-	fragmentCleanupInterval = 10 * time.Second
-	// defaultMaxFragmentEntries caps the number of concurrently tracked
-	// fragmented datagrams. The table stays bounded because each datagram is a
-	// single small entry regardless of how many fragments it is split into, and
-	// the 13-bit IPv4 fragment-offset field limits any datagram to 64 KiB.
-	defaultMaxFragmentEntries = 16384
-
-	// EnvFragmentMaxEntries overrides defaultMaxFragmentEntries.
-	EnvFragmentMaxEntries = "NB_FRAGMENT_MAX_ENTRIES"
-)
-
-// fragmentVerdict is the decision for a trailing (headerless) fragment.
-type fragmentVerdict int
-
-const (
-	// fragmentDeny drops the fragment: no allowed first fragment is on record.
-	fragmentDeny fragmentVerdict = iota
-	// fragmentAllow passes the fragment: it belongs to an allowed datagram and
-	// does not overlap the already-inspected transport header.
-	fragmentAllow
-	// fragmentOverlap drops the fragment and poisons its datagram: it overlaps
-	// the transport header the ACL inspected (RFC 1858 §4, RFC 3128; RFC 5722
-	// requires discarding the whole datagram on overlap for IPv6).
-	fragmentOverlap
-)
-
-// fragmentKey identifies a fragmented datagram. It matches the RFC 791 / RFC
-// 8200 reassembly key: source, destination, protocol and identification. The id
-// is 32-bit to hold both the IPv4 (16-bit) and IPv6 (32-bit) identification.
-type fragmentKey struct {
-	srcIP netip.Addr
-	dstIP netip.Addr
-	id    uint32
-	proto uint8
-}
-
-// fragmentEntry records the verdict of an allowed first fragment.
-type fragmentEntry struct {
-	// headerEndOctets is the offset, in 8-byte units, at which the first
-	// fragment's payload ended. A trailing fragment starting before this
-	// overlaps bytes the ACL already inspected and is rejected.
-	headerEndOctets uint16
-	// recordedAt is when the first fragment was accepted. The verdict expires a
-	// fixed timeout later and is not refreshed, mirroring the kernel reassembly
-	// timer so a trailing-fragment flood can't keep a datagram alive.
-	recordedAt time.Time
-}
-
-// fragmentTracker records the ACL verdict of a datagram's first fragment so the
-// remaining fragments, which carry no L4 header, can inherit the decision
-// without reassembling the datagram. Only allowed first fragments are stored;
-// anything that cannot be tied to an allowed, non-overlapping first fragment is
-// dropped (fail closed).
-type fragmentTracker struct {
-	logger  *nblog.Logger
-	mutex   sync.Mutex
-	entries map[fragmentKey]fragmentEntry
-	timeout time.Duration
-	// maxEntries caps the table; atCapacity dedups the capacity warning until
-	// the table drains below the cap again.
-	maxEntries    int
-	atCapacity    bool
-	cleanupTicker *time.Ticker
-	cancel        context.CancelFunc
-}
-
-func newFragmentTracker(logger *nblog.Logger) *fragmentTracker {
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-	t := &fragmentTracker{
-		logger:        logger,
-		entries:       make(map[fragmentKey]fragmentEntry),
-		timeout:       defaultFragmentTimeout,
-		maxEntries:    fragmentMaxEntries(logger),
-		cleanupTicker: time.NewTicker(fragmentCleanupInterval),
-		cancel:        cancel,
-	}
-	go t.cleanupRoutine(ctx)
-	return t
-}
-
-func fragmentMaxEntries(logger *nblog.Logger) int {
-	v := os.Getenv(EnvFragmentMaxEntries)
-	if v == "" {
-		return defaultMaxFragmentEntries
-	}
-	n, err := strconv.Atoi(v)
-	if err != nil || n <= 0 {
-		logger.Warn2("invalid %s=%q, using default", EnvFragmentMaxEntries, v)
-		return defaultMaxFragmentEntries
-	}
-	return n
-}
-
-// recordAllowed stores the verdict of an allowed first fragment. headerEndOctets
-// is the first fragment's payload length in 8-byte units. When the table is full
-// the record is dropped, which fails closed: the datagram's trailing fragments
-// will be denied.
-func (t *fragmentTracker) recordAllowed(key fragmentKey, headerEndOctets uint16) {
-	t.mutex.Lock()
-	defer t.mutex.Unlock()
-
-	if t.entries == nil {
-		return
-	}
-	if _, ok := t.entries[key]; !ok && len(t.entries) >= t.maxEntries {
-		if !t.atCapacity {
-			t.atCapacity = true
-			t.logger.Warn2("fragment verdict table at capacity (%d/%d): trailing fragments of new datagrams will be dropped",
-				len(t.entries), t.maxEntries)
-		}
-		return
-	}
-	t.entries[key] = fragmentEntry{
-		headerEndOctets: headerEndOctets,
-		recordedAt:      time.Now(),
-	}
-}
-
-// poison drops any recorded verdict for a datagram, so its later fragments are
-// denied until a new allowed first fragment is recorded. Called on every
-// offset-zero fragment to defeat offset-zero overlap rewrites (RFC 3128).
-func (t *fragmentTracker) poison(key fragmentKey) {
-	t.mutex.Lock()
-	defer t.mutex.Unlock()
-	delete(t.entries, key)
-}
-
-// verdict decides the fate of a trailing fragment at fragOffsetOctets (the IPv4
-// fragment offset, in 8-byte units). A fragment overlapping the inspected
-// header poisons the datagram: the entry is removed so all further fragments of
-// that datagram are denied too.
-func (t *fragmentTracker) verdict(key fragmentKey, fragOffsetOctets uint16) fragmentVerdict {
-	t.mutex.Lock()
-	defer t.mutex.Unlock()
-
-	entry, ok := t.entries[key]
-	if !ok {
-		return fragmentDeny
-	}
-	if time.Since(entry.recordedAt) > t.timeout {
-		delete(t.entries, key)
-		return fragmentDeny
-	}
-	if fragOffsetOctets < entry.headerEndOctets {
-		delete(t.entries, key)
-		return fragmentOverlap
-	}
-	return fragmentAllow
-}
-
-func (t *fragmentTracker) cleanupRoutine(ctx context.Context) {
-	defer t.cleanupTicker.Stop()
-	for {
-		select {
-		case <-t.cleanupTicker.C:
-			t.cleanup()
-		case <-ctx.Done():
-			return
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func (t *fragmentTracker) cleanup() {
-	t.mutex.Lock()
-	defer t.mutex.Unlock()
-
-	for key, entry := range t.entries {
-		if time.Since(entry.recordedAt) > t.timeout {
-			delete(t.entries, key)
-		}
-	}
-
-	if len(t.entries) < t.maxEntries {
-		t.atCapacity = false
-	}
-}
-
-// Close stops the cleanup routine and releases resources.
-func (t *fragmentTracker) Close() {
-	t.cancel()
-
-	t.mutex.Lock()
-	t.entries = nil
-	t.mutex.Unlock()
-}

client/firewall/uspfilter/fragment_bench_test.go

@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
-package uspfilter
-
-import (
-	"encoding/binary"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// benchFilterInbound drives filterInbound over a fixed packet in a tight loop.
-// Packets are built once, outside the timed region, so the benchmark measures
-// only pipeline cost, which is what an attacker can amplify.
-func benchFilterInbound(b *testing.B, pkt []byte) {
-	b.Helper()
-	b.ReportAllocs()
-	b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkt)))
-	b.ResetTimer()
-	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
-		m := benchManager
-		m.filterInbound(pkt, len(pkt))
-	}
-}
-
-// benchManager is a package-level manager reused across fragment benchmarks so
-// setup cost stays out of the timed region.
-var benchManager *Manager
-
-func setupBenchManager(b *testing.B) *Manager {
-	b.Helper()
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(b)
-	allowUDP(b, m, 8080)
-	// Disable conntrack so the allowed-first-fragment path measures transport
-	// decode + ACL every iteration instead of matching the connection tracked
-	// on the first iteration.
-	m.stateful = false
-	benchManager = m
-	return m
-}
-
-// BenchmarkInbound_NormalPacket is the baseline: a full, non-fragmented UDP
-// packet that passes the ACL. Fragment paths should stay comparable to this.
-func BenchmarkInbound_NormalPacket(b *testing.B) {
-	setupBenchManager(b)
-	pkt := normalUDPPacket(b, 8080, 32)
-	benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
-}
-
-// BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentAllowed measures the first-fragment path:
-// transport decode + ACL evaluation + verdict record.
-func BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentAllowed(b *testing.B) {
-	setupBenchManager(b)
-	pkt := firstFragmentUDP(b, 0x2000, 8080, 32)
-	benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
-}
-
-// BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentAllowed measures the common trailing-fragment
-// path: a single map lookup after the first fragment is on record.
-func BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentAllowed(b *testing.B) {
-	m := setupBenchManager(b)
-	first := firstFragmentUDP(b, 0x3000, 8080, 32)
-	m.filterInbound(first, len(first))
-	pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x3000, 5, false, 24)
-	benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
-}
-
-// BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentNoFirst is the primary DoS vector: an
-// attacker floods trailing fragments with no first fragment on record. Each is
-// a map miss and must be cheap.
-func BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentNoFirst(b *testing.B) {
-	setupBenchManager(b)
-	pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x4000, 185, false, 40)
-	benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
-}
-
-// BenchmarkInbound_TinyFirstFragment measures the tiny-fragment drop path: a
-// first fragment too small to decode a transport header.
-func BenchmarkInbound_TinyFirstFragment(b *testing.B) {
-	setupBenchManager(b)
-	pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x5000, 0, true, 4)
-	benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
-}
-
-// BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentDistinctIDs is the worst case for the
-// verdict table: an attacker varies the datagram id on every packet so no first
-// fragment ever matches. Verdict lookups always miss and nothing is recorded,
-// so the table cannot grow. Each iteration rewrites the id field in place.
-func BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentDistinctIDs(b *testing.B) {
-	setupBenchManager(b)
-	pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x6000, 185, false, 40)
-	m := benchManager
-
-	b.ReportAllocs()
-	b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkt)))
-	b.ResetTimer()
-	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
-		// IPv4 identification field is at bytes 4:6.
-		binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], uint16(i))
-		m.filterInbound(pkt, len(pkt))
-	}
-}
-
-// BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentDistinctIDs measures sustained first-fragment
-// pressure with distinct ids: transport decode + ACL + verdict insert until the
-// table caps, exercising the map growth and capacity guard.
-func BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentDistinctIDs(b *testing.B) {
-	setupBenchManager(b)
-	pkt := firstFragmentUDP(b, 0x7000, 8080, 32)
-	m := benchManager
-
-	b.ReportAllocs()
-	b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkt)))
-	b.ResetTimer()
-	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
-		binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], uint16(i))
-		m.filterInbound(pkt, len(pkt))
-	}
-}

client/firewall/uspfilter/fragment_test.go

@@ -1,554 +0,0 @@
-package uspfilter
-
-import (
-	"encoding/binary"
-	"net"
-	"net/netip"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/google/gopacket"
-	"github.com/google/gopacket/layers"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-
-	fw "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
-	nbiface "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/device"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
-)
-
-const (
-	fragTestSrc   = "100.10.0.1"
-	fragTestDst   = "100.10.0.100"
-	fragTestSrcV6 = "fd00::1"
-	fragTestDstV6 = "fd00::100"
-)
-
-func newFragmentTestManager(tb testing.TB) *Manager {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ifaceMock := &IFaceMock{
-		SetFilterFunc: func(device.PacketFilter) error { return nil },
-		AddressFunc: func() wgaddr.Address {
-			return wgaddr.Address{
-				IP:      netip.MustParseAddr(fragTestDst),
-				Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("100.10.0.0/16"),
-				IPv6:    netip.MustParseAddr(fragTestDstV6),
-				IPv6Net: netip.MustParsePrefix("fd00::/64"),
-			}
-		},
-	}
-
-	m, err := Create(ifaceMock, false, flowLogger, nbiface.DefaultMTU)
-	require.NoError(tb, err)
-	require.NoError(tb, m.UpdateLocalIPs())
-	tb.Cleanup(func() { require.NoError(tb, m.Close(nil)) })
-	return m
-}
-
-// firstFragmentUDPTo builds the first fragment of a fragmented UDP datagram to
-// the given destination: it carries the full UDP header plus payloadLen bytes
-// of data, with the More Fragments flag set and offset zero.
-func firstFragmentUDPTo(tb testing.TB, dst string, id uint16, dstPort uint16, payloadLen int) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ip := &layers.IPv4{
-		Version:  4,
-		TTL:      64,
-		Id:       id,
-		Protocol: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
-		SrcIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
-		DstIP:    net.ParseIP(dst),
-		Flags:    layers.IPv4MoreFragments,
-	}
-	udp := &layers.UDP{SrcPort: 40000, DstPort: layers.UDPPort(dstPort)}
-	require.NoError(tb, udp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
-
-	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
-	opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
-	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, udp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, payloadLen))))
-	return buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-func firstFragmentUDP(tb testing.TB, id uint16, dstPort uint16, payloadLen int) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-	return firstFragmentUDPTo(tb, fragTestDst, id, dstPort, payloadLen)
-}
-
-// firstFragmentTCP builds the first fragment of a fragmented TCP datagram: the
-// full 20-byte TCP header plus 12 bytes of data, with the More Fragments flag
-// set and offset zero.
-func firstFragmentTCP(tb testing.TB, id uint16, dstPort uint16) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ip := &layers.IPv4{
-		Version:  4,
-		TTL:      64,
-		Id:       id,
-		Protocol: layers.IPProtocolTCP,
-		SrcIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
-		DstIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestDst),
-		Flags:    layers.IPv4MoreFragments,
-	}
-	tcp := &layers.TCP{SrcPort: 40000, DstPort: layers.TCPPort(dstPort), SYN: true, Window: 64240}
-	require.NoError(tb, tcp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
-
-	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
-	opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
-	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, tcp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, 12))))
-	return buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-// trailingFragmentTo builds a non-first fragment to the given destination: an
-// IPv4 header at the given fragment offset (in 8-byte units) carrying raw
-// payload and no L4 header.
-func trailingFragmentTo(tb testing.TB, dst string, proto layers.IPProtocol, id uint16, fragOffsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, payloadLen int) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ip := &layers.IPv4{
-		Version:    4,
-		TTL:        64,
-		Id:         id,
-		Protocol:   proto,
-		SrcIP:      net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
-		DstIP:      net.ParseIP(dst),
-		FragOffset: fragOffsetOctets,
-	}
-	if moreFragments {
-		ip.Flags = layers.IPv4MoreFragments
-	}
-
-	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
-	opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{FixLengths: true}
-	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, payloadLen))))
-	return buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-func trailingFragment(tb testing.TB, id uint16, fragOffsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, payloadLen int) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-	return trailingFragmentTo(tb, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolUDP, id, fragOffsetOctets, moreFragments, payloadLen)
-}
-
-// outboundUDPPacket builds a complete outbound UDP packet from the local
-// address, used to establish conntrack state for reply-direction tests.
-func outboundUDPPacket(tb testing.TB, srcPort, dstPort uint16) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ip := &layers.IPv4{
-		Version:  4,
-		TTL:      64,
-		Id:       1,
-		Protocol: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
-		SrcIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestDst),
-		DstIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
-	}
-	udp := &layers.UDP{SrcPort: layers.UDPPort(srcPort), DstPort: layers.UDPPort(dstPort)}
-	require.NoError(tb, udp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
-
-	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
-	opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
-	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, udp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, 16))))
-	return buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-// normalUDPPacket builds a complete, non-fragmented UDP packet for baseline
-// comparisons against the fragment paths.
-func normalUDPPacket(tb testing.TB, dstPort uint16, payloadLen int) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ip := &layers.IPv4{
-		Version:  4,
-		TTL:      64,
-		Id:       1,
-		Protocol: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
-		SrcIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
-		DstIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestDst),
-	}
-	udp := &layers.UDP{SrcPort: 40000, DstPort: layers.UDPPort(dstPort)}
-	require.NoError(tb, udp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
-
-	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
-	opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
-	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, udp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, payloadLen))))
-	return buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-func allowUDP(tb testing.TB, m *Manager, dstPort uint16) {
-	tb.Helper()
-	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolUDP, nil,
-		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{dstPort}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
-	require.NoError(tb, err)
-}
-
-// TestFragment_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped is the core bypass repro: a trailing
-// fragment with no allowed first fragment on record must be dropped. Before the
-// fix, filterInbound returned false (allow) for any fragment.
-func TestFragment_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-
-	frag := trailingFragment(t, 0x1234, 185, false, 40)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(frag, len(frag)),
-		"trailing fragment without an allowed first fragment must be dropped")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing verifies that once a first fragment
-// passes the ACL, its trailing fragments inherit the allow verdict.
-func TestFragment_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
-
-	// First fragment: UDP header (8) + 32 payload = 40 octets -> headerEnd = 5.
-	first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x2222, 8080, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
-		"allowed first fragment should pass and be recorded")
-
-	trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x2222, 5, false, 24)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment of an allowed datagram should pass")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_DeniedFirstDropsTrailing verifies that a first fragment blocked
-// by the ACL leaves no verdict, so its trailing fragments are dropped.
-func TestFragment_DeniedFirstDropsTrailing(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	// No accept rule: local traffic defaults to deny.
-
-	first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x3333, 9999, 32)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
-		"first fragment to a blocked port should be dropped by the ACL")
-
-	trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x3333, 5, false, 24)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment of a denied datagram must be dropped")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_OverlappingHeaderDropped covers the RFC 1858 §4 / RFC 3128
-// overlapping-fragment rewrite: a trailing fragment starting inside the range
-// the ACL already inspected is dropped and poisons the datagram. TCP is used so
-// the overlap lands on real header bytes (the flags at byte 13).
-func TestFragment_OverlappingHeaderDropped(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolTCP, nil,
-		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	// First fragment: TCP header (20) + 12 data = 32 bytes -> headerEnd = 4 octets.
-	first := firstFragmentTCP(t, 0x4444, 8080)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)))
-
-	// Overlapping fragment at offset 1 (byte 8) falls inside the inspected TCP
-	// header, so it could rewrite the flags or port on reassembly.
-	overlap := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x4444, 1, true, 32)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(overlap, len(overlap)),
-		"fragment overlapping the inspected header must be dropped")
-
-	// The datagram is now poisoned: a later, non-overlapping fragment is also
-	// dropped because the verdict was removed.
-	later := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x4444, 4, false, 24)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(later, len(later)),
-		"fragments after an overlap must be dropped (datagram poisoned)")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_OffsetZeroOverlapPoisons covers the RFC 3128 offset-zero rewrite:
-// an allowed first fragment followed by a denied offset-zero fragment for the
-// same datagram must not leave the earlier allow verdict in place.
-func TestFragment_OffsetZeroOverlapPoisons(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
-
-	allowed := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x5A5A, 8080, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(allowed, len(allowed)),
-		"allowed first fragment should pass and be recorded")
-
-	// A second offset-zero fragment to a denied port supersedes the datagram's
-	// verdict; it is dropped and must not leave the allow in place.
-	denied := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x5A5A, 9999, 32)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(denied, len(denied)),
-		"denied offset-zero fragment must be dropped")
-
-	trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x5A5A, 5, false, 24)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment must be denied after the datagram was poisoned")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_TinyFirstDropped covers the tiny-fragment attack: a first
-// fragment too small to contain the full transport header can't be
-// ACL-evaluated and must be dropped.
-func TestFragment_TinyFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
-
-	// IPv4 header + 4 raw bytes, MF set, offset 0: too small for the 8-byte UDP
-	// header, so it decodes to L3 only.
-	tiny := trailingFragment(t, 0x5555, 0, true, 4)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(tiny, len(tiny)),
-		"tiny first fragment without a full L4 header must be dropped")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_TCPFirstFragment verifies the TCP arm of the transport decode: a
-// first fragment carrying the full 20-byte TCP header is ACL-evaluated and its
-// trailing fragments inherit the verdict.
-func TestFragment_TCPFirstFragment(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolTCP, nil,
-		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	// TCP header (20) + 12 data = 32 bytes -> headerEnd = 4 octets.
-	first := firstFragmentTCP(t, 0x6666, 8080)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
-		"allowed TCP first fragment should pass and be recorded")
-
-	trailing := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x6666, 4, false, 24)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment of an allowed TCP datagram should pass")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_TCPTinyFirstDropped verifies the TCP minimum header length: 12
-// bytes would satisfy a UDP header but falls short of the 20-byte TCP header.
-func TestFragment_TCPTinyFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolTCP, nil,
-		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	tiny := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x7777, 0, true, 12)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(tiny, len(tiny)),
-		"first fragment shorter than the TCP header must be dropped")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_ConntrackAllowsFirstFragment verifies the conntrack branch: reply
-// fragments of an outbound-established UDP flow pass without any inbound rule.
-func TestFragment_ConntrackAllowsFirstFragment(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-
-	out := outboundUDPPacket(t, 12345, 40000)
-	require.False(t, m.filterOutbound(out, len(out)))
-
-	first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x8888, 12345, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
-		"reply first fragment should pass via conntrack")
-
-	trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x8888, 5, false, 24)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment of a tracked flow should pass")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_RoutingDisabledDropsFragment verifies routed first fragments are
-// dropped when routing is disabled.
-func TestFragment_RoutingDisabledDropsFragment(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	m.routingEnabled.Store(false)
-
-	first := firstFragmentUDPTo(t, "198.51.100.10", 0x9999, 8080, 32)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
-		"routed first fragment must be dropped when routing is disabled")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_RouteACL verifies the route-ACL branch: fragments to a non-local
-// destination follow the route rules, allowed datagrams pass their trailing
-// fragments and denied ones don't.
-func TestFragment_RouteACL(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	m.routingEnabled.Store(true)
-	m.nativeRouter.Store(false)
-
-	_, err := m.AddRouteFiltering(
-		[]byte("rt-1"),
-		[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("100.10.0.0/16")},
-		fw.Network{Prefix: netip.MustParsePrefix("198.51.100.0/24")},
-		fw.ProtocolUDP,
-		nil,
-		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}},
-		fw.ActionAccept,
-	)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	first := firstFragmentUDPTo(t, "198.51.100.10", 0xAAAA, 8080, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
-		"route-ACL-allowed first fragment should pass")
-	trailing := trailingFragmentTo(t, "198.51.100.10", layers.IPProtocolUDP, 0xAAAA, 5, false, 24)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment of an allowed routed datagram should pass")
-
-	denied := firstFragmentUDPTo(t, "198.51.100.10", 0xBBBB, 9999, 32)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(denied, len(denied)),
-		"route-ACL-denied first fragment must be dropped")
-	deniedTrailing := trailingFragmentTo(t, "198.51.100.10", layers.IPProtocolUDP, 0xBBBB, 5, false, 24)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(deniedTrailing, len(deniedTrailing)),
-		"trailing fragment of a denied routed datagram must be dropped")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_ExpiredVerdictDropsTrailing verifies a verdict older than the
-// tracker timeout no longer admits trailing fragments.
-func TestFragment_ExpiredVerdictDropsTrailing(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
-
-	first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0xCCCC, 8080, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)))
-
-	m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
-	for key, entry := range m.fragments.entries {
-		entry.recordedAt = time.Now().Add(-defaultFragmentTimeout - time.Second)
-		m.fragments.entries[key] = entry
-	}
-	m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
-
-	trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0xCCCC, 5, false, 24)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment after verdict expiry must be dropped")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_CapacityFailsClosed verifies the table cap: at capacity, new
-// datagram verdicts are not recorded (their trailing fragments are dropped)
-// while already-recorded datagrams keep working.
-func TestFragment_CapacityFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
-
-	m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
-	m.fragments.maxEntries = 1
-	m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
-
-	first1 := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x0101, 8080, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first1, len(first1)))
-
-	first2 := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x0202, 8080, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first2, len(first2)),
-		"first fragment itself still passes at capacity")
-
-	trailing2 := trailingFragment(t, 0x0202, 5, false, 24)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing2, len(trailing2)),
-		"trailing fragment of an unrecorded datagram must be dropped at capacity")
-
-	trailing1 := trailingFragment(t, 0x0101, 5, false, 24)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing1, len(trailing1)),
-		"already-recorded datagram should keep passing at capacity")
-}
-
-// v6FragmentHeader builds the 8-byte IPv6 fragment extension header for the
-// given inner protocol, offset (8-byte units), More Fragments bit and id.
-func v6FragmentHeader(proto layers.IPProtocol, offsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, id uint32) []byte {
-	offsetFlags := offsetOctets << 3
-	if moreFragments {
-		offsetFlags |= 1
-	}
-	hdr := make([]byte, 8)
-	hdr[0] = uint8(proto)
-	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[2:4], offsetFlags)
-	binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(hdr[4:8], id)
-	return hdr
-}
-
-func v6UDPHeader(dstPort uint16, dataLen int) []byte {
-	hdr := make([]byte, 8)
-	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[0:2], 40000)
-	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[2:4], dstPort)
-	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[4:6], uint16(8+dataLen))
-	return hdr
-}
-
-// firstFragmentUDPv6 builds the first fragment of a fragmented IPv6 UDP
-// datagram: fragment header (offset 0, More Fragments set) + full UDP header +
-// data.
-func firstFragmentUDPv6(tb testing.TB, id uint32, dstPort uint16, dataLen int) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-	return fragmentUDPv6(tb, id, dstPort, dataLen, true)
-}
-
-// fragmentUDPv6 builds an offset-zero IPv6 UDP fragment. With moreFragments
-// false it is an atomic fragment (a complete datagram, RFC 6946).
-func fragmentUDPv6(tb testing.TB, id uint32, dstPort uint16, dataLen int, moreFragments bool) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ip := &layers.IPv6{
-		Version:    6,
-		NextHeader: layers.IPProtocolIPv6Fragment,
-		HopLimit:   64,
-		SrcIP:      net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6),
-		DstIP:      net.ParseIP(fragTestDstV6),
-	}
-	payload := append(v6FragmentHeader(layers.IPProtocolUDP, 0, moreFragments, id), v6UDPHeader(dstPort, dataLen)...)
-	payload = append(payload, make([]byte, dataLen)...)
-
-	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
-	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, gopacket.SerializeOptions{FixLengths: true}, ip, gopacket.Payload(payload)))
-	return buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-// trailingFragmentV6 builds a non-first IPv6 fragment: fragment header at the
-// given offset carrying raw data and no transport header.
-func trailingFragmentV6(tb testing.TB, id uint32, offsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, dataLen int) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ip := &layers.IPv6{
-		Version:    6,
-		NextHeader: layers.IPProtocolIPv6Fragment,
-		HopLimit:   64,
-		SrcIP:      net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6),
-		DstIP:      net.ParseIP(fragTestDstV6),
-	}
-	payload := append(v6FragmentHeader(layers.IPProtocolUDP, offsetOctets, moreFragments, id), make([]byte, dataLen)...)
-
-	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
-	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, gopacket.SerializeOptions{FixLengths: true}, ip, gopacket.Payload(payload)))
-	return buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-// TestFragmentV6_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped verifies the IPv6 bypass is closed:
-// a trailing fragment with no allowed first fragment is dropped.
-func TestFragmentV6_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-
-	frag := trailingFragmentV6(t, 0xAABBCCDD, 100, false, 40)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(frag, len(frag)),
-		"IPv6 trailing fragment without an allowed first fragment must be dropped")
-}
-
-// TestFragmentV6_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing verifies IPv6 fragments are
-// evaluated like IPv4: an allowed first fragment lets its trailing fragments
-// through.
-func TestFragmentV6_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6), fw.ProtocolUDP, nil,
-		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	// First fragment: UDP header (8) + 32 data = 40 octets -> headerEnd = 5.
-	first := firstFragmentUDPv6(t, 0xAABBCCDD, 8080, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
-		"allowed IPv6 first fragment should pass and be recorded")
-
-	trailing := trailingFragmentV6(t, 0xAABBCCDD, 5, false, 24)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment of an allowed IPv6 datagram should pass")
-}
-
-// TestFragmentV6_AtomicNotCached verifies an IPv6 atomic fragment (fragment
-// header with offset 0 and no More Fragments, a complete datagram per RFC 6946)
-// is evaluated but not recorded, so a flood of allowed atomic fragments can't
-// exhaust the verdict table.
-func TestFragmentV6_AtomicNotCached(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6), fw.ProtocolUDP, nil,
-		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	atomic := fragmentUDPv6(t, 0xA70301C, 8080, 16, false)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(atomic, len(atomic)),
-		"allowed IPv6 atomic fragment should pass")
-
-	m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
-	n := len(m.fragments.entries)
-	m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
-	require.Zero(t, n, "atomic fragment must not create a verdict entry")
-
-	// A genuine fragmented datagram (More Fragments set) is still recorded.
-	first := fragmentUDPv6(t, 0xBEEF, 8080, 32, true)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)))
-	m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
-	n = len(m.fragments.entries)
-	m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
-	require.Equal(t, 1, n, "genuine first fragment must record a verdict")
-}

client/iface/netstack/env.go

@@ -3,31 +3,14 @@
 package netstack
 
 import (
-	"net"
+	"fmt"
 	"os"
 	"strconv"
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 )
 
-const (
-	EnvUseNetstackMode = "NB_USE_NETSTACK_MODE"
-
-	// EnvSocks5ListenerPort overrides the port the SOCKS5 proxy listens on.
-	EnvSocks5ListenerPort = "NB_SOCKS5_LISTENER_PORT"
-
-	// EnvSocks5ListenerAddress overrides the host/IP the SOCKS5 proxy binds to.
-	// The proxy is a bridge for local host applications into the userspace
-	// WireGuard netstack, so it binds to loopback by default. Override this only
-	// when the proxy must be reachable from other hosts (e.g. a container
-	// gateway); doing so exposes an unauthenticated SOCKS5 proxy on that
-	// address.
-	EnvSocks5ListenerAddress = "NB_SOCKS5_LISTENER_ADDRESS"
-
-	// defaultSocks5Host is the loopback address the SOCKS5 proxy binds to unless
-	// overridden via EnvSocks5ListenerAddress.
-	defaultSocks5Host = "127.0.0.1"
-)
+const EnvUseNetstackMode = "NB_USE_NETSTACK_MODE"
 
 // IsEnabled todo: move these function to cmd layer
 func IsEnabled() bool {
@@ -35,40 +18,24 @@ func IsEnabled() bool {
 }
 
 func ListenAddr() string {
-	return net.JoinHostPort(listenHost(), strconv.Itoa(listenPort()))
-}
-
-// listenHost returns the host/IP the SOCKS5 proxy binds to. It defaults to
-// loopback and only honors EnvSocks5ListenerAddress when it holds a valid IP.
-func listenHost() string {
-	addr := os.Getenv(EnvSocks5ListenerAddress)
-	if addr == "" {
-		return defaultSocks5Host
-	}
-	if net.ParseIP(addr) == nil {
-		log.Warnf("invalid socks5 listener address %q, falling back to default: %s", addr, defaultSocks5Host)
-		return defaultSocks5Host
-	}
-	return addr
-}
-
-// listenPort returns the port the SOCKS5 proxy binds to, defaulting to
-// DefaultSocks5Port when EnvSocks5ListenerPort is unset or invalid.
-func listenPort() int {
-	sPort := os.Getenv(EnvSocks5ListenerPort)
+	sPort := os.Getenv("NB_SOCKS5_LISTENER_PORT")
 	if sPort == "" {
-		return DefaultSocks5Port
+		return listenAddr(DefaultSocks5Port)
 	}
 
 	port, err := strconv.Atoi(sPort)
 	if err != nil {
 		log.Warnf("invalid socks5 listener port, unable to convert it to int, falling back to default: %d", DefaultSocks5Port)
-		return DefaultSocks5Port
+		return listenAddr(DefaultSocks5Port)
 	}
 	if port < 1 || port > 65535 {
 		log.Warnf("invalid socks5 listener port, it should be in the range 1-65535, falling back to default: %d", DefaultSocks5Port)
-		return DefaultSocks5Port
+		return listenAddr(DefaultSocks5Port)
 	}
 
-	return port
+	return listenAddr(port)
+}
+
+func listenAddr(port int) string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("0.0.0.0:%d", port)
 }

client/iface/netstack/env_test.go

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-//go:build !js
-
-package netstack
-
-import (
-	"net"
-	"strconv"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-func TestListenAddr_DefaultsToLoopback(t *testing.T) {
-	// No env overrides: must bind loopback, never all interfaces.
-	got := ListenAddr()
-	want := net.JoinHostPort("127.0.0.1", strconv.Itoa(DefaultSocks5Port))
-	if got != want {
-		t.Fatalf("ListenAddr() = %q, want %q", got, want)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestListenAddr_AddressOverride(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name string
-		env  string
-		want string
-	}{
-		{name: "valid override honored", env: "0.0.0.0", want: "0.0.0.0"},
-		{name: "valid specific ip honored", env: "10.0.0.5", want: "10.0.0.5"},
-		{name: "ipv6 loopback bracketed", env: "::1", want: "::1"},
-		{name: "invalid falls back to loopback", env: "not-an-ip", want: "127.0.0.1"},
-		{name: "empty falls back to loopback", env: "", want: "127.0.0.1"},
-	}
-	for _, tc := range tests {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			t.Setenv(EnvSocks5ListenerAddress, tc.env)
-			want := net.JoinHostPort(tc.want, strconv.Itoa(DefaultSocks5Port))
-			if got := ListenAddr(); got != want {
-				t.Fatalf("ListenAddr() = %q, want %q", got, want)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-func TestListenAddr_PortOverride(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name string
-		env  string
-		want int
-	}{
-		{name: "valid port honored", env: "1081", want: 1081},
-		{name: "non-numeric falls back", env: "abc", want: DefaultSocks5Port},
-		{name: "out of range falls back", env: "70000", want: DefaultSocks5Port},
-		{name: "zero falls back", env: "0", want: DefaultSocks5Port},
-	}
-	for _, tc := range tests {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			t.Setenv(EnvSocks5ListenerPort, tc.env)
-			want := net.JoinHostPort("127.0.0.1", strconv.Itoa(tc.want))
-			if got := ListenAddr(); got != want {
-				t.Fatalf("ListenAddr() = %q, want %q", got, want)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}

client/internal/auth/device_flow.go

@@ -259,18 +259,12 @@ func (d *DeviceAuthorizationFlow) WaitToken(ctx context.Context, info AuthFlowIn
 	ticker := time.NewTicker(interval)
 	defer ticker.Stop()
 
-	log.Infof("device flow: waiting for user authorization, polling token endpoint every %s, code expires in %s", interval, timeout)
-
-	start := time.Now()
-	polls := 0
-
 	for {
 		select {
 		case <-waitCtx.Done():
 			return TokenInfo{}, waitCtx.Err()
 		case <-ticker.C:
 
-			polls++
 			tokenResponse, err := d.requestToken(info)
 			if err != nil {
 				return TokenInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("parsing token response failed with error: %v", err)
@@ -278,12 +272,10 @@ func (d *DeviceAuthorizationFlow) WaitToken(ctx context.Context, info AuthFlowIn
 
 			if tokenResponse.Error != "" {
 				if tokenResponse.Error == "authorization_pending" {
-					log.Tracef("device flow: authorization still pending after poll %d", polls)
 					continue
 				} else if tokenResponse.Error == "slow_down" {
 					interval += (3 * time.Second)
 					ticker.Reset(interval)
-					log.Infof("device flow: IdP requested slow_down, polling interval increased to %s", interval)
 					continue
 				}
 
@@ -299,12 +291,11 @@ func (d *DeviceAuthorizationFlow) WaitToken(ctx context.Context, info AuthFlowIn
 				UseIDToken:   d.providerConfig.UseIDToken,
 			}
 
-			err = validateTokenAudience(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), d.providerConfig.Audience)
+			err = isValidAccessToken(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), d.providerConfig.Audience)
 			if err != nil {
 				return TokenInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("validate access token failed with error: %v", err)
 			}
 
-			log.Infof("device flow: user authorization confirmed after %d polls in %s", polls, time.Since(start).Round(time.Second))
 			return tokenInfo, err
 		}
 	}

client/internal/auth/pkce_flow.go

@@ -188,8 +188,6 @@ func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) WaitToken(ctx context.Context, info AuthFlowInfo
 	waitCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, timeout)
 	defer cancel()
 
-	log.Infof("pkce flow: waiting for authorization callback on %s, timeout %s", p.oAuthConfig.RedirectURL, timeout)
-
 	tokenChan := make(chan *oauth2.Token, 1)
 	errChan := make(chan error, 1)
 
@@ -223,7 +221,6 @@ func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) WaitToken(ctx context.Context, info AuthFlowInfo
 func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) startServer(server *http.Server, tokenChan chan<- *oauth2.Token, errChan chan<- error) {
 	mux := http.NewServeMux()
 	mux.HandleFunc("/", func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
-		log.Infof("pkce flow: received authorization callback from IdP")
 		cert := p.providerConfig.ClientCertPair
 		if cert != nil {
 			tr := &http.Transport{
@@ -274,18 +271,11 @@ func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) handleRequest(req *http.Request) (*oauth2.Token,
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("authentication failed: missing code")
 	}
 
-	exchangeStart := time.Now()
-	token, err := p.oAuthConfig.Exchange(
+	return p.oAuthConfig.Exchange(
 		req.Context(),
 		code,
 		oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_verifier", p.codeVerifier),
 	)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-
-	log.Infof("pkce flow: authorization code exchanged for token in %s", time.Since(exchangeStart).Round(time.Millisecond))
-	return token, nil
 }
 
 func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) parseOAuthToken(token *oauth2.Token) (TokenInfo, error) {
@@ -306,7 +296,7 @@ func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) parseOAuthToken(token *oauth2.Token) (TokenInfo,
 		audience = p.providerConfig.ClientID
 	}
 
-	if err := validateTokenAudience(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), audience); err != nil {
+	if err := isValidAccessToken(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), audience); err != nil {
 		return TokenInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("authentication failed: invalid access token - %w", err)
 	}
 
@@ -320,11 +310,6 @@ func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) parseOAuthToken(token *oauth2.Token) (TokenInfo,
 	return tokenInfo, nil
 }
 
-// parseEmailFromIDToken extracts the email (or name) claim from an ID token
-// without verifying its signature. The value is best-effort and used only as a
-// UX convenience (login hint prefill and display); it never drives an
-// authorization decision. The authoritative identity is established server-side
-// from the signature-verified token.
 func parseEmailFromIDToken(token string) (string, error) {
 	parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
 	if len(parts) < 2 {

client/internal/auth/sessionwatch/watcher.go

@@ -24,7 +24,11 @@ import (
 )
 
 const (
-	maxPastHorizon = 30 * 24 * time.Hour
+	// Skew tolerates a small clock difference between the management
+	// server and this peer before treating a deadline as "in the past".
+	// Slightly above typical NTP drift; tight enough that the UI doesn't
+	// paint a stale expiry as if it were valid.
+	Skew = 30 * time.Second
 
 	// maxDeadlineHorizon caps how far in the future an accepted deadline
 	// can sit. A timestamp beyond this is almost certainly a protocol
@@ -53,7 +57,7 @@ var (
 	ErrDeadlineTooFarFuture = errors.New("session deadline too far in the future")
 
 	// ErrDeadlineInPast is returned by Update when the supplied deadline
-	// is more than maxPastHorizon in the past.
+	// is more than Skew in the past.
 	ErrDeadlineInPast = errors.New("session deadline in the past")
 )
 
@@ -62,14 +66,15 @@ var (
 // for deadline change/clear, PublishEvent for the two warnings); tests pass
 // a fake recorder so the same surface is observable without an engine.
 //
-// While the watcher runs, it owns the deadline propagated to the recorder:
-// every set, clear and sanity-check rejection routes the value through
-// SetSessionExpiresAt, so the SubscribeStatus snapshot the UI reads can
-// never drift from the watcher's timer state. (SetSessionExpiresAt fans
-// out its own state-change notification, so no separate notify is needed.)
-// The recorder is server-scoped and outlives this engine-scoped watcher;
-// Close deliberately leaves the recorder value in place so transient engine
-// restarts don't blank it — the client run loop clears it on real teardown.
+// The watcher is the single owner of the deadline propagated to the
+// recorder: every set, clear, sanity-check rejection and Close routes the
+// value through SetSessionExpiresAt, so the SubscribeStatus snapshot the UI
+// reads can never drift from the watcher's timer state. (SetSessionExpiresAt
+// fans out its own state-change notification, so no separate notify is
+// needed.) The recorder is server-scoped and outlives this engine-scoped
+// watcher — without the Close-time clear a teardown (Down, or the Down+Up of
+// a profile switch) would leave the next session showing the previous one's
+// stale "expires in" value.
 //
 // PublishEvent's signature mirrors peer.Status.PublishEvent: the watcher
 // composes the metadata internally so the wire format (MetaSession*) is
@@ -130,13 +135,10 @@ func NewWithLeads(lead, final time.Duration, recorder StatusRecorder) *Watcher {
 // was disabled).
 //
 // Same-value updates are no-ops. A different non-zero value cancels any
-// pending timer, resets the "already fired" guards, and — when the
-// deadline lies in the future — arms fresh warning timers. A deadline
-// already in the past (within maxPastHorizon) is recorded as-is with no
-// timers: the session has expired and consumers render it that way.
+// pending timer, resets the "already fired" guard, and arms a new one.
 //
 // Returns one of the sentinel Err* values when the deadline fails the
-// sanity checks (pre-epoch, far future, or past beyond maxPastHorizon).
+// sanity checks (pre-epoch, far future, or in the past beyond Skew).
 // In every error case the watcher first clears its state so it stays
 // consistent with what the caller will push into its other sinks (e.g.
 // applySessionDeadline forces a zero deadline into the status recorder
@@ -161,7 +163,7 @@ func (w *Watcher) Update(deadline time.Time) error {
 	case deadline.After(now.Add(maxDeadlineHorizon)):
 		w.clearLocked()
 		return fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrDeadlineTooFarFuture, deadline)
-	case deadline.Before(now.Add(-maxPastHorizon)):
+	case deadline.Before(now.Add(-Skew)):
 		w.clearLocked()
 		return fmt.Errorf("%w: %v (now=%v)", ErrDeadlineInPast, deadline, now)
 	}
@@ -181,9 +183,7 @@ func (w *Watcher) Update(deadline time.Time) error {
 	w.finalFiredAt = time.Time{}
 	w.dismissedAt = time.Time{}
 
-	if deadline.After(now) {
-		w.armTimerLocked(deadline)
-	}
+	w.armTimerLocked(deadline)
 	recorder := w.recorder
 	w.mu.Unlock()
 	if recorder != nil {
@@ -227,25 +227,30 @@ func (w *Watcher) Dismiss() {
 	log.Infof("auth session final-warning dismissed for deadline %s", w.current.Format(time.RFC3339))
 }
 
-// Close stops any pending timer. Update calls after Close are ignored.
-// The recorder keeps its deadline: the watcher is engine-scoped and closes
-// on every engine restart (network change, sleep/wake, stream errors)
-// while the SSO deadline stays valid across those, so clearing here would
-// blank the UI's "expires in" row on every transient reconnect. The
-// client run loop clears the server-scoped recorder when it exits for
-// real (Down, profile switch, permanent login failure).
+// Close stops any pending timer and drops the deadline on the status
+// recorder. Update calls after Close are ignored. Clearing the recorder
+// here is what keeps a teardown (Down, or the Down+Up of a profile switch)
+// from leaving the next session showing this one's stale "expires in"
+// value — the recorder is server-scoped and outlives this engine-scoped
+// watcher, so nothing else drops the anchor on teardown.
 func (w *Watcher) Close() {
 	w.mu.Lock()
-	defer w.mu.Unlock()
 	if w.closed {
+		w.mu.Unlock()
 		return
 	}
 	w.closed = true
 	w.stopTimerLocked()
+	hadDeadline := !w.current.IsZero()
 	w.current = time.Time{}
 	w.firedAt = time.Time{}
 	w.finalFiredAt = time.Time{}
 	w.dismissedAt = time.Time{}
+	recorder := w.recorder
+	w.mu.Unlock()
+	if recorder != nil && hadDeadline {
+		recorder.SetSessionExpiresAt(time.Time{})
+	}
 }
 
 // clearLocked drops the tracked deadline and notifies the recorder so

client/internal/auth/sessionwatch/watcher_test.go

@@ -224,13 +224,11 @@ func TestNewDeadlineCancelsPriorTimer(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestRefreshAfterFireArmsNewWarning(t *testing.T) {
 	r := &fakeRecorder{}
-	lead := 150 * time.Millisecond
+	lead := 30 * time.Millisecond
 	w := newWatcher(lead, r)
 	defer w.Close()
 
-	// Warning fires ~20ms in; the deadline itself stays 150ms away so the
-	// replacement below lands well before it.
-	first := time.Now().Add(170 * time.Millisecond)
+	first := time.Now().Add(50 * time.Millisecond)
 	_ = w.Update(first)
 
 	// Wait for stateChange + warning of the first cycle.
@@ -308,29 +306,7 @@ func TestUpdateRejectsTooFarFuture(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestUpdateRecentPastRecordedAsExpired(t *testing.T) {
-	r := &fakeRecorder{}
-	w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
-	defer w.Close()
-
-	d := time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour)
-	if err := w.Update(d); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("recent-past Update should succeed, got %v", err)
-	}
-	if !w.Deadline().Equal(d) {
-		t.Fatalf("expected deadline to be recorded, got %v want %v", w.Deadline(), d)
-	}
-	if got := r.deadline(); !got.Equal(d) {
-		t.Fatalf("recorder deadline = %v, want %v", got, d)
-	}
-
-	time.Sleep(80 * time.Millisecond)
-	if n := countWhere(r.snapshot(), func(e event) bool { return e.kind == publish }); n != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("no warning events may fire for an already-past deadline, got %+v", r.snapshot())
-	}
-}
-
-func TestUpdateAncientPastRejected(t *testing.T) {
+func TestUpdateInPastClearsDeadline(t *testing.T) {
 	r := &fakeRecorder{}
 	w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
 	defer w.Close()
@@ -342,12 +318,12 @@ func TestUpdateAncientPastRejected(t *testing.T) {
 	// Drain the stateChange from the seed.
 	waitForEvents(t, r, 1)
 
-	err := w.Update(time.Now().Add(-31 * 24 * time.Hour))
+	err := w.Update(time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour))
 	if !errors.Is(err, ErrDeadlineInPast) {
 		t.Fatalf("want ErrDeadlineInPast, got %v", err)
 	}
 	if !w.Deadline().IsZero() {
-		t.Fatalf("rejected ancient-past update must clear the deadline, got %v", w.Deadline())
+		t.Fatalf("in-past update must clear the deadline, got %v", w.Deadline())
 	}
 	events := waitForEvents(t, r, 2)
 	if events[1].kind != stateChange {
@@ -355,25 +331,39 @@ func TestUpdateAncientPastRejected(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestUpdateWithinSkewAccepted(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &fakeRecorder{}
+	w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
+	defer w.Close()
+
+	// 5 seconds in the past is within the 30s Skew tolerance — accept it.
+	d := time.Now().Add(-5 * time.Second)
+	if err := w.Update(d); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("within-skew Update should succeed, got %v", err)
+	}
+	if !w.Deadline().Equal(d) {
+		t.Fatalf("expected deadline to be applied, got %v want %v", w.Deadline(), d)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestCloseSilencesUpdates(t *testing.T) {
 	r := &fakeRecorder{}
 	w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
 	w.Close()
 
-	if err := w.Update(time.Now().Add(time.Hour)); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Update after Close: want nil, got %v", err)
-	}
+	_ = w.Update(time.Now().Add(time.Hour))
+
+	time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond)
 	if got := r.snapshot(); len(got) != 0 {
 		t.Fatalf("expected no events after Close, got %+v", got)
 	}
 }
 
-// TestCloseKeepsRecorderDeadline pins the reconnect-flap fix: the watcher
-// closes on every engine restart (network change, sleep/wake) while the
-// SSO deadline stays valid across those, so Close must leave the
-// server-scoped recorder's value in place. The client run loop clears the
-// recorder when it exits for real.
-func TestCloseKeepsRecorderDeadline(t *testing.T) {
+// TestCloseClearsRecorderDeadline pins the profile-switch fix: a watcher
+// holding a live deadline must zero the recorder on Close so the next
+// engine's watcher (and the UI reading the shared server-scoped recorder)
+// doesn't start out showing the previous session's stale "expires in".
+func TestCloseClearsRecorderDeadline(t *testing.T) {
 	r := &fakeRecorder{}
 	w := newWatcher(time.Hour, r)
 
@@ -387,8 +377,8 @@ func TestCloseKeepsRecorderDeadline(t *testing.T) {
 
 	w.Close()
 
-	if got := r.deadline(); !got.Equal(d) {
-		t.Fatalf("recorder deadline after Close = %v, want %v", got, d)
+	if got := r.deadline(); !got.IsZero() {
+		t.Fatalf("recorder deadline after Close = %v, want zero", got)
 	}
 }
 

client/internal/auth/util.go

@@ -20,26 +20,14 @@ func randomBytesInHex(count int) (string, error) {
 	return hex.EncodeToString(buf), nil
 }
 
-// validateTokenAudience checks that the token is a well-formed JWT whose
-// audience claim matches the expected audience.
-//
-// It does NOT verify the token's cryptographic signature and therefore must not
-// be treated as an authenticity check. The token is obtained by the client
-// directly from the IdP token endpoint over TLS, and its signature is verified
-// server-side by the management server against the IdP's JWKS
-// (see shared/auth/jwt/validator.go). This function is only a client-side
-// sanity check that the returned token targets the expected audience.
-func validateTokenAudience(token string, audience string) error {
+// isValidAccessToken is a simple validation of the access token
+func isValidAccessToken(token string, audience string) error {
 	if token == "" {
 		return fmt.Errorf("token received is empty")
 	}
 
-	parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
-	if len(parts) != 3 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("token is not a well-formed JWT")
-	}
-
-	claimsString, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1])
+	encodedClaims := strings.Split(token, ".")[1]
+	claimsString, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(encodedClaims)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}

client/internal/auth/util_test.go

@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-package auth
-
-import (
-	"encoding/base64"
-	"encoding/json"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// makeJWT builds an unsigned JWT-shaped string (header.payload.signature) with
-// the given claims payload. The signature part is arbitrary because
-// validateTokenAudience intentionally does not verify it.
-func makeJWT(t *testing.T, claims map[string]interface{}) string {
-	t.Helper()
-	header := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(`{"alg":"RS256","typ":"JWT"}`))
-	payloadBytes, err := json.Marshal(claims)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("marshal claims: %v", err)
-	}
-	payload := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(payloadBytes)
-	return header + "." + payload + ".unverified-signature"
-}
-
-func TestValidateTokenAudience(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name     string
-		token    string
-		audience string
-		wantErr  bool
-	}{
-		{
-			name:     "empty token",
-			token:    "",
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "not a JWT - no dots",
-			token:    "notajwt",
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "not a JWT - two parts only",
-			token:    "header.payload",
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "matching string audience",
-			token:    makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": "netbird"}),
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  false,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "mismatching string audience",
-			token:    makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": "other"}),
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "matching audience in array",
-			token:    makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": []interface{}{"other", "netbird"}}),
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  false,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "mismatching audience array",
-			token:    makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": []interface{}{"a", "b"}}),
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "missing audience claim",
-			token:    makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"sub": "user"}),
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "invalid base64 payload",
-			token:    "header.!!!not-base64!!!.sig",
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  true,
-		},
-	}
-
-	for _, tc := range tests {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			err := validateTokenAudience(tc.token, tc.audience)
-			if tc.wantErr && err == nil {
-				t.Fatalf("expected error, got nil")
-			}
-			if !tc.wantErr && err != nil {
-				t.Fatalf("expected no error, got %v", err)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestValidateTokenAudienceNoPanic guards the regression where a non-empty
-// token without the JWT dot structure caused an index-out-of-range panic.
-func TestValidateTokenAudienceNoPanic(t *testing.T) {
-	inputs := []string{"a", ".", "a.", "aaaa", "no-dots-here"}
-	for _, in := range inputs {
-		if err := validateTokenAudience(in, "netbird"); err == nil {
-			t.Fatalf("expected error for malformed token %q, got nil", in)
-		}
-	}
-}

client/internal/conn_mgr.go

@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) UpdatedRemoteFeatureFlag(ctx context.Context, enabled bool) er
 			return nil
 		}
 
-		log.Infof("lazy connection manager is enabled by the management feature flag")
+		log.Warnf("lazy connection manager is enabled by management feature flag")
 		e.initLazyManager(ctx)
 		e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(true)
 		return e.addPeersToLazyConnManager()

client/internal/connect.go

@@ -257,10 +257,7 @@ func (c *ConnectClient) run(mobileDependency MobileDependency, runningChan chan
 		log.Errorf("failed to clean up temporary installer file: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	defer func() {
-		c.statusRecorder.SetSessionExpiresAt(time.Time{})
-		c.statusRecorder.ClientStop()
-	}()
+	defer c.statusRecorder.ClientStop()
 	operation := func() error {
 		// if context cancelled we not start new backoff cycle
 		if c.ctx.Err() != nil {

client/internal/debug/debug.go

@@ -480,6 +480,7 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addStatus() error {
 
 		fullStatus := g.statusRecorder.GetFullStatus()
 		protoFullStatus := nbstatus.ToProtoFullStatus(fullStatus)
+		protoFullStatus.Events = g.statusRecorder.GetEventHistory()
 		overview := nbstatus.ConvertToStatusOutputOverview(protoFullStatus, nbstatus.ConvertOptions{
 			Anonymize:     g.anonymize,
 			ProfileName:   profName,

client/internal/dns/service_listener.go

@@ -292,16 +292,18 @@ func (s *serviceViaListener) generateFreePort() (uint16, error) {
 		return customPort, nil
 	}
 
-	probeListener, err := net.ListenUDP("udp4", &net.UDPAddr{})
+	udpAddr := net.UDPAddrFromAddrPort(netip.MustParseAddrPort("0.0.0.0:0"))
+	probeListener, err := net.ListenUDP("udp", udpAddr)
 	if err != nil {
 		log.Debugf("failed to bind random port for DNS: %s", err)
 		return 0, err
 	}
 
-	port := uint16(probeListener.LocalAddr().(*net.UDPAddr).Port)
-	if err = probeListener.Close(); err != nil {
+	addrPort := netip.MustParseAddrPort(probeListener.LocalAddr().String()) // might panic if address is incorrect
+	err = probeListener.Close()
+	if err != nil {
 		log.Debugf("failed to free up DNS port: %s", err)
 		return 0, err
 	}
-	return port, nil
+	return addrPort.Port(), nil
 }

client/internal/engine.go

@@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ func (e *Engine) Start(netbirdConfig *mgmProto.NetbirdConfig, mgmtURL *url.URL)
 		} else {
 			log.Infof("running rosenpass in strict mode")
 		}
-		e.rpManager, err = rosenpass.NewManager(e.config.PreSharedKey, e.config.WgIfaceName, publicKey)
+		e.rpManager, err = rosenpass.NewManager(e.config.PreSharedKey, e.config.WgIfaceName)
 		if err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("create rosenpass manager: %w", err)
 		}
@@ -2605,14 +2605,13 @@ func (e *Engine) updateForwardRules(rules []*mgmProto.ForwardingRule) ([]firewal
 
 func (e *Engine) toExcludedLazyPeers(rules []firewallManager.ForwardRule, peers []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig) map[string]bool {
 	excludedPeers := make(map[string]bool)
-
-	// Ingress forward targets: inbound forwarded traffic is initiated remotely and
-	// cannot wake a lazy connection, so the peer routing the target must stay
-	// permanently connected. AllowedIPs are already parsed on the peer conn, so
-	// reuse those typed prefixes instead of re-parsing the network map strings.
 	for _, r := range rules {
+		ip := r.TranslatedAddress
 		for _, p := range peers {
-			if e.peerRoutesAddr(p, r.TranslatedAddress) {
+			for _, allowedIP := range p.GetAllowedIps() {
+				if allowedIP != ip.String() {
+					continue
+				}
 				log.Infof("exclude forwarder peer from lazy connection: %s", p.GetWgPubKey())
 				excludedPeers[p.GetWgPubKey()] = true
 			}
@@ -2622,27 +2621,6 @@ func (e *Engine) toExcludedLazyPeers(rules []firewallManager.ForwardRule, peers
 	return excludedPeers
 }
 
-// peerRoutesAddr reports whether the peer is a router for addr, matched against
-// the peer's already-parsed AllowedIPs from the store (the same typed value the
-// lazy manager consumes) rather than re-parsing the network map strings.
-func (e *Engine) peerRoutesAddr(p *mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig, addr netip.Addr) bool {
-	prefixes, ok := e.peerStore.AllowedIPs(p.GetWgPubKey())
-	if !ok {
-		return false
-	}
-	return prefixesContain(prefixes, addr)
-}
-
-// prefixesContain reports whether addr falls within any of the prefixes.
-func prefixesContain(prefixes []netip.Prefix, addr netip.Addr) bool {
-	for _, prefix := range prefixes {
-		if prefix.Contains(addr) {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}
-
 // isChecksEqual checks if two slices of checks are equal.
 func isChecksEqual(checks1, checks2 []*mgmProto.Checks) bool {
 	normalize := func(checks []*mgmProto.Checks) []string {

client/internal/engine_lazy_exclude_test.go

@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
-package internal
-
-import (
-	"net/netip"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-
-	firewallManager "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peerstore"
-	mgmProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
-)
-
-func TestPrefixesContain(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name     string
-		prefixes []string
-		addr     string
-		want     bool
-	}{
-		{name: "own overlay /32 matches", prefixes: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}, addr: "100.110.8.145", want: true},
-		{name: "addr inside routed subnet", prefixes: []string{"10.121.0.0/16"}, addr: "10.121.208.4", want: true},
-		{name: "addr outside subnet", prefixes: []string{"10.121.0.0/16"}, addr: "10.122.0.1", want: false},
-		{name: "different /32", prefixes: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}, addr: "100.110.8.146", want: false},
-		{name: "ipv6 /128 matches", prefixes: []string{"fd00::1/128"}, addr: "fd00::1", want: true},
-		{name: "no prefixes", prefixes: nil, addr: "10.121.208.4", want: false},
-	}
-
-	for _, tt := range tests {
-		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			prefixes := make([]netip.Prefix, 0, len(tt.prefixes))
-			for _, p := range tt.prefixes {
-				prefixes = append(prefixes, netip.MustParsePrefix(p))
-			}
-			require.Equal(t, tt.want, prefixesContain(prefixes, netip.MustParseAddr(tt.addr)))
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestToExcludedLazyPeers_ForwardTarget guards a regression: the forward-target
-// peer (the peer routing a ForwardRule.TranslatedAddress) must be excluded from
-// lazy connections, matched via the peer's already-parsed AllowedIPs.
-func TestToExcludedLazyPeers_ForwardTarget(t *testing.T) {
-	const targetPeerKey = "cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc0="
-	const otherPeerKey = "dddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd0="
-
-	store := peerstore.NewConnStore()
-	store.AddPeerConn(targetPeerKey, newTestConn(t, targetPeerKey, "100.110.8.145/32"))
-	store.AddPeerConn(otherPeerKey, newTestConn(t, otherPeerKey, "100.110.9.10/32"))
-
-	e := &Engine{peerStore: store}
-
-	peers := []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig{
-		{WgPubKey: targetPeerKey, AllowedIps: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}},
-		{WgPubKey: otherPeerKey, AllowedIps: []string{"100.110.9.10/32"}},
-	}
-	rules := []firewallManager.ForwardRule{
-		{TranslatedAddress: netip.MustParseAddr("100.110.8.145")},
-	}
-
-	excluded := e.toExcludedLazyPeers(rules, peers)
-
-	require.True(t, excluded[targetPeerKey], "forward-target peer must be excluded from lazy connections")
-	require.False(t, excluded[otherPeerKey], "non-target peer must not be excluded")
-	require.Len(t, excluded, 1)
-}
-
-func TestToExcludedLazyPeers_NoRules(t *testing.T) {
-	e := &Engine{peerStore: peerstore.NewConnStore()}
-
-	peers := []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig{
-		{WgPubKey: "peer-a", AllowedIps: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}},
-	}
-
-	require.Empty(t, e.toExcludedLazyPeers(nil, peers))
-}
-
-func newTestConn(t *testing.T, key, allowedIP string) *peer.Conn {
-	t.Helper()
-	conn, err := peer.NewConn(peer.ConnConfig{
-		Key:      key,
-		WgConfig: peer.WgConfig{AllowedIps: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix(allowedIP)}},
-	}, peer.ServiceDependencies{})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	return conn
-}

client/internal/engine_session_deadline_test.go

@@ -75,14 +75,4 @@ func TestApplySessionDeadline_ThreeState(t *testing.T) {
 		require.True(t, e.statusRecorder.GetSessionExpiresAt().IsZero(),
 			"invalid timestamp must clear the deadline")
 	})
-
-	t.Run("recently expired timestamp stays visible as expired", func(t *testing.T) {
-		e := newEngine()
-		expired := time.Now().Add(-5 * time.Minute).UTC().Truncate(time.Second)
-
-		e.ApplySessionDeadline(timestamppb.New(expired))
-
-		require.True(t, e.statusRecorder.GetSessionExpiresAt().Equal(expired),
-			"recently-expired deadline must stay on the recorder so consumers render it as expired")
-	})
 }

client/internal/ipcauth/authorize.go

@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"slices"
-	"strconv"
-)
-
-// Ownership is a profile's access policy: the typed owner principals plus the
-// opt-in shared flag.
-type Ownership struct {
-	Owners []string
-	Shared bool
-}
-
-// GroupResolver resolves a Unix caller's effective group IDs (primary +
-// supplementary, NSS-aware) and owner group names to GIDs. It is only consulted
-// for Unix `gid:`/`group:` owners; Windows uses the SIDs carried in the Identity.
-// A nil resolver disables group matching.
-type GroupResolver interface {
-	// CallerGIDs returns the set of group IDs the caller belongs to.
-	CallerGIDs(id Identity) map[uint32]struct{}
-	// GroupNameGID resolves a group name to its GID.
-	GroupNameGID(name string) (uint32, bool)
-}
-
-// Authorize reports whether the identity may control a profile with the given
-// ownership. Privileged callers (root / elevated-admin / LocalSystem) and shared
-// profiles are always allowed; otherwise the identity must match one of the
-// owner principals.
-func Authorize(o Ownership, id Identity, r GroupResolver) bool {
-	if id.IsPrivileged() {
-		return true
-	}
-	if o.Shared {
-		return true
-	}
-	for _, raw := range o.Owners {
-		p, ok := ParsePrincipal(raw)
-		if !ok {
-			continue
-		}
-		if principalMatches(p, id, r) {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}
-
-func principalMatches(p Principal, id Identity, r GroupResolver) bool {
-	switch p.Kind {
-	case KindUID:
-		if id.IsWindows() {
-			return false
-		}
-		uid, err := strconv.ParseUint(p.Value, 10, 32)
-		return err == nil && uint32(uid) == id.UID
-	case KindGID:
-		if id.IsWindows() {
-			return false
-		}
-		gid, err := strconv.ParseUint(p.Value, 10, 32)
-		return err == nil && callerHasGID(uint32(gid), id, r)
-	case KindGroup:
-		if id.IsWindows() || r == nil {
-			return false
-		}
-		gid, ok := r.GroupNameGID(p.Value)
-		return ok && callerHasGID(gid, id, r)
-	case KindSID:
-		if !id.IsWindows() {
-			return false
-		}
-		return id.SID == p.Value || slices.Contains(id.Groups, p.Value)
-	default:
-		return false
-	}
-}
-
-// callerHasGID reports whether gid is the caller's primary GID (from peercred,
-// no lookup) or one of their supplementary groups (NSS-resolved via r).
-func callerHasGID(gid uint32, id Identity, r GroupResolver) bool {
-	if id.GID == gid {
-		return true
-	}
-	if r == nil {
-		return false
-	}
-	_, ok := r.CallerGIDs(id)[gid]
-	return ok
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/creds_stub.go

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-//go:build !linux && !darwin && !freebsd && !windows
-
-package ipcauth
-
-import "google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
-
-// NewTransportCredentials returns nil on platforms without a peer-identity
-// primitive. The daemon falls back to insecure credentials and skips per-RPC
-// authorization (logging a warning), preserving pre-hardening behavior.
-func NewTransportCredentials() credentials.TransportCredentials {
-	return nil
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/creds_unix.go

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-//go:build linux || darwin || freebsd
-
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"net"
-
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
-)
-
-// NewTransportCredentials returns gRPC transport credentials that extract the
-// caller's kernel-authenticated identity from a Unix-socket connection and
-// expose it via IdentityFromContext. Non-nil on platforms with a
-// peer-credential primitive.
-func NewTransportCredentials() credentials.TransportCredentials {
-	return unixCreds{}
-}
-
-// unixCreds implements credentials.TransportCredentials over a Unix socket.
-// The server side reads SO_PEERCRED/LOCAL_PEERCRED during the handshake; the
-// client side is a no-op (the kernel supplies the peer identity to the server
-// without any client cooperation), so an ordinary insecure client still works.
-type unixCreds struct{}
-
-func (unixCreds) ClientHandshake(_ context.Context, _ string, conn net.Conn) (net.Conn, credentials.AuthInfo, error) {
-	return conn, AuthInfo{}, nil
-}
-
-// ServerHandshake extracts the peer identity and fails closed if it cannot be read.
-func (unixCreds) ServerHandshake(conn net.Conn) (net.Conn, credentials.AuthInfo, error) {
-	id, err := PeerIdentity(conn)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, nil, err
-	}
-	return conn, AuthInfo{
-		CommonAuthInfo: credentials.CommonAuthInfo{SecurityLevel: credentials.NoSecurity},
-		Identity:       id,
-	}, nil
-}
-
-func (unixCreds) Info() credentials.ProtocolInfo {
-	return credentials.ProtocolInfo{SecurityProtocol: "netbird-ipc-peercred"}
-}
-
-func (unixCreds) Clone() credentials.TransportCredentials { return unixCreds{} }
-
-func (unixCreds) OverrideServerName(string) error { return nil }

client/internal/ipcauth/creds_windows.go

@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
-//go:build windows
-
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"fmt"
-	"net"
-	"runtime"
-
-	"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
-)
-
-var (
-	modadvapi32                    = windows.NewLazySystemDLL("advapi32.dll")
-	procImpersonateNamedPipeClient = modadvapi32.NewProc("ImpersonateNamedPipeClient")
-)
-
-// DefaultPipeSDDL keeps the daemon control pipe open to any LOCAL caller, on par
-// with the Unix socket's 0666 mode.
-//
-//	D:P                 protected DACL, no inheritance
-//	(D;;GA;;;NU)        deny GENERIC_ALL to NETWORK (remote/SMB)
-//	(A;;GA;;;SY)        allow GENERIC_ALL to LocalSystem (the daemon itself)
-//	(A;;GA;;;WD)        allow GENERIC_ALL to Everyone (local, per-RPC ACL gates)
-func DefaultPipeSDDL() string {
-	return "D:P(D;;GA;;;NU)(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;GA;;;WD)"
-}
-
-// NewTransportCredentials returns gRPC transport credentials that derive the
-// caller's identity from the named-pipe client token.
-//
-// This requires the client to dial at SECURITY_IDENTIFICATION (see dialNamedPipe).
-func NewTransportCredentials() credentials.TransportCredentials {
-	return winpipeCreds{}
-}
-
-type winpipeCreds struct{}
-
-func (winpipeCreds) ClientHandshake(_ context.Context, _ string, conn net.Conn) (net.Conn, credentials.AuthInfo, error) {
-	return conn, AuthInfo{}, nil
-}
-
-// ServerHandshake extracts the connecting client's identity from the pipe. Fails
-// closed if the handle or token cannot be read.
-func (winpipeCreds) ServerHandshake(conn net.Conn) (net.Conn, credentials.AuthInfo, error) {
-	// go-winio's pipe connection embeds *win32File, which exposes Fd().
-	fdConn, ok := conn.(interface{ Fd() uintptr })
-	if !ok {
-		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("connection %T does not expose a pipe handle", conn)
-	}
-	handle := windows.Handle(fdConn.Fd())
-
-	id, err := pipeClientIdentity(handle)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, nil, err
-	}
-	return conn, AuthInfo{
-		CommonAuthInfo: credentials.CommonAuthInfo{SecurityLevel: credentials.NoSecurity},
-		Identity:       id,
-	}, nil
-}
-
-func (winpipeCreds) Info() credentials.ProtocolInfo {
-	return credentials.ProtocolInfo{SecurityProtocol: "netbird-ipc-peercred"}
-}
-
-func (winpipeCreds) Clone() credentials.TransportCredentials { return winpipeCreds{} }
-
-func (winpipeCreds) OverrideServerName(string) error { return nil }
-
-// pipeClientIdentity reads the connecting client's user SID, enabled group SIDs,
-// and elevation by impersonating the pipe client on this thread and reading the
-// impersonation token.
-func pipeClientIdentity(handle windows.Handle) (id Identity, err error) {
-	runtime.LockOSThread()
-	defer runtime.UnlockOSThread()
-
-	if err = impersonateNamedPipeClient(handle); err != nil {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("impersonate named pipe client: %w", err)
-	}
-	defer func() {
-		// Surface revert error if there are no other errors.
-		revErr := windows.RevertToSelf()
-		if err == nil {
-			err = revErr
-		}
-	}()
-
-	// openAsSelf=true: the token is opened using the daemon's process context
-	// (LocalSystem), not the impersonated client's, so the open always succeeds.
-	var token windows.Token
-	if err = windows.OpenThreadToken(windows.CurrentThread(), windows.TOKEN_QUERY, true, &token); err != nil {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("open thread token: %w", err)
-	}
-	defer token.Close()
-
-	tu, err := token.GetTokenUser()
-	if err != nil {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("get token user: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	tg, err := token.GetTokenGroups()
-	if err != nil {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("get token groups: %w", err)
-	}
-	var groups []string
-	for _, g := range tg.AllGroups() {
-		if g.Attributes&windows.SE_GROUP_ENABLED == 0 || g.Attributes&windows.SE_GROUP_USE_FOR_DENY_ONLY != 0 {
-			continue
-		}
-		groups = append(groups, g.Sid.String())
-	}
-
-	return Identity{
-		SID:      tu.User.Sid.String(),
-		Groups:   groups,
-		Elevated: token.IsElevated(),
-	}, nil
-}
-
-func impersonateNamedPipeClient(h windows.Handle) error {
-	r, _, e := procImpersonateNamedPipeClient.Call(uintptr(h))
-	if r == 0 {
-		return e
-	}
-	return nil
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/forward.go

@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"strconv"
-
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
-)
-
-// Metadata keys used by the local JSON gateway to forward the HTTP client's
-// identity to the daemon. Trusted by the interceptor ONLY when the gRPC peer is
-// itself the daemon (self/privileged) — i.e. the loopback gateway — so a direct
-// gRPC caller cannot forge them.
-const (
-	mdFwdUID = "x-netbird-fwd-uid"
-	mdFwdGID = "x-netbird-fwd-gid"
-)
-
-// ForwardIdentityMetadata encodes a Unix identity for the gateway to forward to
-// the daemon. Windows identities are not forwarded (the gateway cannot read a
-// pipe token for an HTTP client); nil is returned in that case.
-func ForwardIdentityMetadata(id Identity) metadata.MD {
-	if id.IsWindows() {
-		return nil
-	}
-	return metadata.Pairs(
-		mdFwdUID, strconv.FormatUint(uint64(id.UID), 10),
-		mdFwdGID, strconv.FormatUint(uint64(id.GID), 10),
-	)
-}
-
-// forwardedIdentity extracts a forwarded Unix identity from incoming gRPC
-// metadata, if present and well-formed.
-func forwardedIdentity(ctx context.Context) (Identity, bool) {
-	md, ok := metadata.FromIncomingContext(ctx)
-	if !ok {
-		return Identity{}, false
-	}
-	uidStr := mdFirst(md, mdFwdUID)
-	if uidStr == "" {
-		return Identity{}, false
-	}
-	uid, err := strconv.ParseUint(uidStr, 10, 32)
-	if err != nil {
-		return Identity{}, false
-	}
-	id := Identity{UID: uint32(uid)}
-	if g := mdFirst(md, mdFwdGID); g != "" {
-		if v, err := strconv.ParseUint(g, 10, 32); err == nil {
-			id.GID = uint32(v)
-		}
-	}
-	return id, true
-}
-
-func mdFirst(md metadata.MD, key string) string {
-	if v := md.Get(key); len(v) > 0 {
-		return v[0]
-	}
-	return ""
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/identity.go

@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
-// Package ipcauth provides the kernel-authenticated identity of a local IPC
-// (gRPC) caller and the transport credentials that surface it into the gRPC
-// context, so the daemon can authorize each RPC by caller identity.
-//
-// On Unix the identity is read from the kernel via SO_PEERCRED (Linux) or
-// LOCAL_PEERCRED (Darwin/FreeBSD). On Windows it is derived from the named-pipe
-// client token. Platforms without a peer-identity primitive get no credentials
-// and therefore no enforcement (the daemon logs a warning and stays open,
-// preserving today's behavior until the transport gains an identity primitive).
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"fmt"
-
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/peer"
-)
-
-// sidLocalSystem is the well-known Windows SID for the LocalSystem account.
-const sidLocalSystem = "S-1-5-18"
-
-// Identity is the kernel-authenticated identity of a local IPC caller. The zero
-// value is not a valid identity; obtain one via IdentityFromContext (which
-// reports presence) or PeerIdentity.
-type Identity struct {
-	// UID and GID are the caller's Unix user ID and primary group ID.
-	// Zero on Windows, where SID is authoritative instead.
-	UID uint32
-	GID uint32
-
-	// SID is the caller's Windows security identifier (empty on Unix).
-	SID string
-
-	// Groups holds the caller's Windows group SIDs, captured from the client
-	// token at handshake (empty on Unix, where supplementary group membership is
-	// resolved on demand via NSS/getent by the authorizer).
-	Groups []string
-
-	// Elevated reports whether the Windows client token is elevated (run as
-	// administrator). Always false on Unix, where privilege is uid==0.
-	Elevated bool
-}
-
-// IsWindows reports whether this identity is a Windows principal (SID-based)
-// rather than a Unix uid/gid principal.
-func (i Identity) IsWindows() bool {
-	return i.SID != ""
-}
-
-// IsPrivileged reports whether the caller is the platform's administrative
-// principal — Unix root (uid 0), or on Windows an elevated token or LocalSystem.
-// It deliberately requires actual elevation on Windows (a non-elevated member of
-// Administrators has a filtered token and is NOT privileged), mirroring "must
-// really be root" on Unix.
-func (i Identity) IsPrivileged() bool {
-	if i.IsWindows() {
-		return i.Elevated || i.SID == sidLocalSystem
-	}
-	return i.UID == 0
-}
-
-// String renders the identity for audit logs.
-func (i Identity) String() string {
-	if i.IsWindows() {
-		return fmt.Sprintf("sid=%s elevated=%t", i.SID, i.Elevated)
-	}
-	return fmt.Sprintf("uid=%d gid=%d", i.UID, i.GID)
-}
-
-// AuthInfo carries the peer Identity as a gRPC credentials.AuthInfo so the
-// interceptor can retrieve it from the request context via IdentityFromContext.
-type AuthInfo struct {
-	credentials.CommonAuthInfo
-	Identity Identity
-}
-
-// AuthType identifies the authentication scheme.
-func (AuthInfo) AuthType() string { return "netbird-ipc-peercred" }
-
-// IdentityFromContext extracts the caller's kernel-authenticated identity from
-// the gRPC peer context. The second return value is false when no IPC transport
-// credentials were negotiated (e.g. an unsupported platform, or a caller that
-// did not come through the daemon socket) — callers MUST fail closed in that case.
-func IdentityFromContext(ctx context.Context) (Identity, bool) {
-	p, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)
-	if !ok {
-		return Identity{}, false
-	}
-	info, ok := p.AuthInfo.(AuthInfo)
-	if !ok {
-		return Identity{}, false
-	}
-	return info.Identity, true
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/identity_test.go

@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/peer"
-)
-
-func TestIdentityFromContext_NoPeer(t *testing.T) {
-	_, ok := IdentityFromContext(context.Background())
-	assert.False(t, ok, "bare context must report no identity (fail closed)")
-}
-
-func TestIdentityFromContext_WrongAuthInfo(t *testing.T) {
-	ctx := peer.NewContext(context.Background(), &peer.Peer{})
-	_, ok := IdentityFromContext(ctx)
-	assert.False(t, ok, "peer without our AuthInfo must report no identity")
-}
-
-func TestIdentityFromContext_Present(t *testing.T) {
-	want := Identity{UID: 1000, GID: 1000}
-	ctx := peer.NewContext(context.Background(), &peer.Peer{
-		AuthInfo: AuthInfo{
-			CommonAuthInfo: credentials.CommonAuthInfo{SecurityLevel: credentials.NoSecurity},
-			Identity:       want,
-		},
-	})
-
-	got, ok := IdentityFromContext(ctx)
-	assert.True(t, ok)
-	assert.Equal(t, want, got)
-}
-
-func TestIdentity_IsPrivileged(t *testing.T) {
-	// Unix
-	assert.True(t, Identity{UID: 0}.IsPrivileged(), "root is privileged")
-	assert.False(t, Identity{UID: 1000}.IsPrivileged(), "non-root is not privileged")
-	// Windows
-	assert.True(t, Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-1-2-3-1001", Elevated: true}.IsPrivileged(), "elevated admin is privileged")
-	assert.True(t, Identity{SID: "S-1-5-18"}.IsPrivileged(), "LocalSystem is privileged")
-	assert.False(t, Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-1-2-3-1001"}.IsPrivileged(), "non-elevated admin is NOT privileged")
-}
-
-func TestIdentity_IsWindows(t *testing.T) {
-	assert.True(t, Identity{SID: "S-1-5-18"}.IsWindows())
-	assert.False(t, Identity{UID: 0}.IsWindows())
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/interceptor.go

@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"os"
-
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/status"
-)
-
-// Interceptor enforces per-RPC authorization on the daemon control channel,
-// keyed to the caller's kernel-authenticated identity. It is safe-by-default:
-// any RPC without a matching bypass is gated by the active profile's ownership,
-// and a caller without a readable identity is denied.
-type Interceptor struct {
-	policy   ProfilePolicy
-	resolver GroupResolver
-	// selfUID is the daemon's own effective UID. A caller whose UID matches it
-	// (rootless container / foreground daemon running as the invoking user) is
-	// allowed: it already has full control of the daemon process. -1 on Windows.
-	selfUID int
-}
-
-// NewInterceptor builds an interceptor over the given policy and group resolver.
-func NewInterceptor(policy ProfilePolicy, resolver GroupResolver) *Interceptor {
-	return &Interceptor{policy: policy, resolver: resolver, selfUID: os.Geteuid()}
-}
-
-// UnaryServerInterceptor authorizes each unary RPC before the handler runs.
-func (i *Interceptor) UnaryServerInterceptor() grpc.UnaryServerInterceptor {
-	return func(ctx context.Context, req any, info *grpc.UnaryServerInfo, handler grpc.UnaryHandler) (any, error) {
-		if err := i.authorize(ctx, info.FullMethod); err != nil {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-		return handler(ctx, req)
-	}
-}
-
-// StreamServerInterceptor authorizes each streaming RPC before the handler runs.
-func (i *Interceptor) StreamServerInterceptor() grpc.StreamServerInterceptor {
-	return func(srv any, ss grpc.ServerStream, info *grpc.StreamServerInfo, handler grpc.StreamHandler) error {
-		if err := i.authorize(ss.Context(), info.FullMethod); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-		return handler(srv, ss)
-	}
-}
-
-func (i *Interceptor) authorize(ctx context.Context, fullMethod string) error {
-	id, ok := IdentityFromContext(ctx)
-	if !ok {
-		log.Warnf("ipc authz: DENY %s — caller identity unavailable", fullMethod)
-		return status.Error(codes.PermissionDenied, "caller identity could not be verified on the daemon control channel")
-	}
-
-	if i.isSelfOrPrivileged(id) {
-		// The local JSON gateway connects as the daemon itself (self/privileged)
-		// and forwards the real HTTP client's identity. Trust it here — and only
-		// here, where the transport peer is already the daemon — then authorize
-		// as the forwarded client. A direct non-privileged caller never reaches
-		// this branch, so it cannot forge the forwarding metadata.
-		fwd, hasFwd := forwardedIdentity(ctx)
-		if !hasFwd {
-			i.auditAllow(id, fullMethod)
-			return nil
-		}
-		log.Infof("ipc authz: honoring gateway-forwarded identity %s", fwd)
-		id = fwd
-		if i.isSelfOrPrivileged(id) {
-			i.auditAllow(id, fullMethod)
-			return nil
-		}
-	}
-
-	// Per-user / per-target-profile RPCs authorize themselves in the handler.
-	if handlerAuthorizedMethods[fullMethod] {
-		return nil
-	}
-
-	o := i.policy.ActiveProfileOwnership()
-
-	// Trust-on-first-use: an unowned, non-shared profile is claimed by the first
-	// caller. The claim is atomic; if we lose the race we re-read and authorize.
-	if len(o.Owners) == 0 && !o.Shared {
-		claimed, err := i.policy.ClaimActiveProfileOwnerIfUnowned(id)
-		if err != nil {
-			log.Errorf("ipc authz: claim active profile for %s: %v", id, err)
-			return status.Error(codes.Internal, "failed to claim profile ownership")
-		}
-		if claimed {
-			log.Infof("ipc authz: %s claimed ownership of the active profile (trust-on-first-use)", id)
-			i.auditAllow(id, fullMethod)
-			return nil
-		}
-		o = i.policy.ActiveProfileOwnership()
-	}
-
-	if Authorize(o, id, i.resolver) {
-		i.auditAllow(id, fullMethod)
-		return nil
-	}
-
-	log.Warnf("ipc authz: DENY %s for %s — active profile owned by another principal", fullMethod, id)
-	return status.Errorf(codes.PermissionDenied,
-		"not authorized to control the active profile (caller %s); ask an owner or run as root/administrator", id)
-}
-
-// isSelfOrPrivileged reports whether the caller is the platform administrator
-// (root / elevated-admin / LocalSystem) or the daemon's own user.
-func (i *Interceptor) isSelfOrPrivileged(id Identity) bool {
-	if id.IsPrivileged() {
-		return true
-	}
-	// Daemon-self: only meaningful on Unix (Windows privilege is covered above).
-	return !id.IsWindows() && i.selfUID >= 0 && int(id.UID) == i.selfUID
-}
-
-func (i *Interceptor) auditAllow(id Identity, fullMethod string) {
-	if auditMethods[fullMethod] {
-		log.Infof("ipc authz: allow %s for %s", fullMethod, id)
-	}
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/interceptor_test.go

@@ -1,139 +0,0 @@
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"strconv"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/peer"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/status"
-)
-
-type mockPolicy struct {
-	o       Ownership
-	claimed bool
-}
-
-func (m *mockPolicy) ActiveProfileOwnership() Ownership { return m.o }
-
-// ClaimActiveProfileOwnerIfUnowned records a claim and marks the profile owned.
-func (m *mockPolicy) ClaimActiveProfileOwnerIfUnowned(id Identity) (bool, error) {
-	if len(m.o.Owners) == 0 && !m.o.Shared {
-		m.o.Owners = []string{OwnerPrincipalForIdentity(id)}
-		m.claimed = true
-		return true, nil
-	}
-	return false, nil
-}
-
-type mockResolver struct {
-	gids  map[uint32]struct{}
-	names map[string]uint32
-}
-
-func (m mockResolver) CallerGIDs(Identity) map[uint32]struct{} { return m.gids }
-func (m mockResolver) GroupNameGID(n string) (uint32, bool)    { g, ok := m.names[n]; return g, ok }
-
-func ctxWith(id Identity) context.Context {
-	return peer.NewContext(context.Background(), &peer.Peer{AuthInfo: AuthInfo{Identity: id}})
-}
-
-const (
-	up    = servicePath + "Up"
-	list  = servicePath + "ListProfiles"
-	unkwn = servicePath + "SomeFutureMethod"
-)
-
-func TestInterceptorAuthorize(t *testing.T) {
-	const selfUID = 4000
-
-	tests := []struct {
-		name     string
-		own      Ownership
-		resolver GroupResolver
-		ctx      context.Context
-		method   string
-		wantErr  bool
-	}{
-		{"no identity denies", Ownership{}, nil, context.Background(), up, true},
-		{"root allowed", Ownership{}, nil, ctxWith(Identity{UID: 0}), up, false},
-		{"daemon-self allowed", Ownership{}, nil, ctxWith(Identity{UID: selfUID}), up, false},
-		{"shared allows any", Ownership{Shared: true}, nil, ctxWith(Identity{UID: 1234}), up, false},
-		{"uid owner allowed", Ownership{Owners: []string{"uid:1000"}}, nil, ctxWith(Identity{UID: 1000}), up, false},
-		{"non-owner denied", Ownership{Owners: []string{"uid:1000"}}, nil, ctxWith(Identity{UID: 2000}), up, true},
-		{"handler-authorized bypass", Ownership{Owners: []string{"uid:1000"}}, nil, ctxWith(Identity{UID: 2000}), list, false},
-		{"unknown method gated", Ownership{Owners: []string{"uid:1000"}}, nil, ctxWith(Identity{UID: 2000}), unkwn, true},
-		{"primary gid owner", Ownership{Owners: []string{"gid:5000"}}, nil, ctxWith(Identity{UID: 2000, GID: 5000}), up, false},
-		{"group-name owner via resolver", Ownership{Owners: []string{"group:admins"}},
-			mockResolver{names: map[string]uint32{"admins": 5000}, gids: map[uint32]struct{}{5000: {}}},
-			ctxWith(Identity{UID: 2000, GID: 42}), up, false},
-		{"windows sid owner", Ownership{Owners: []string{"sid:S-1-5-21-9"}}, nil,
-			ctxWith(Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-9"}), up, false},
-		{"windows group-sid owner", Ownership{Owners: []string{"sid:S-1-5-32-544"}}, nil,
-			ctxWith(Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-1", Groups: []string{"S-1-5-32-544"}}), up, false},
-		{"windows elevated privileged", Ownership{}, nil,
-			ctxWith(Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-1", Elevated: true}), up, false},
-	}
-
-	for _, tt := range tests {
-		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			i := &Interceptor{policy: &mockPolicy{o: tt.own}, resolver: tt.resolver, selfUID: selfUID}
-			err := i.authorize(tt.ctx, tt.method)
-			if tt.wantErr {
-				assert.Error(t, err)
-				assert.Equal(t, codes.PermissionDenied, status.Code(err))
-			} else {
-				assert.NoError(t, err)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestInterceptorForwardedIdentity verifies the JSON-gateway trust model: a
-// self/privileged transport peer (the loopback gateway) may forward a real
-// client identity, but a non-privileged caller cannot forge it.
-func TestInterceptorForwardedIdentity(t *testing.T) {
-	const selfUID = 4000
-	owners := Ownership{Owners: []string{"uid:1000"}}
-
-	withFwd := func(peerUID, fwdUID uint32) context.Context {
-		ctx := ctxWith(Identity{UID: peerUID})
-		return metadata.NewIncomingContext(ctx, metadata.Pairs(mdFwdUID, itoa(fwdUID)))
-	}
-
-	// Gateway (peer == daemon-self) forwards a non-owner client → denied as that client.
-	i := &Interceptor{policy: &mockPolicy{o: owners}, selfUID: selfUID}
-	assert.Error(t, i.authorize(withFwd(selfUID, 2000), up))
-
-	// Gateway forwards the owner → allowed.
-	assert.NoError(t, i.authorize(withFwd(selfUID, 1000), up))
-
-	// A non-privileged direct caller's forwarded metadata is IGNORED (can't forge):
-	// caller uid 2000 forwarding uid:1000 is still treated as 2000 → denied.
-	assert.Error(t, i.authorize(withFwd(2000, 1000), up))
-}
-
-func itoa(u uint32) string {
-	return strconv.FormatUint(uint64(u), 10)
-}
-
-// TestInterceptorTOFU verifies an unowned, non-shared profile is claimed by the
-// first non-privileged caller, and a different caller is then denied.
-func TestInterceptorTOFU(t *testing.T) {
-	policy := &mockPolicy{o: Ownership{}} // unowned
-	i := &Interceptor{policy: policy, resolver: nil, selfUID: 4000}
-
-	// First caller (uid 1000) claims via TOFU.
-	err := i.authorize(ctxWith(Identity{UID: 1000}), up)
-	assert.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.True(t, policy.claimed, "first caller should claim ownership")
-	assert.Equal(t, []string{"uid:1000"}, policy.o.Owners)
-
-	// A different caller is now denied (profile owned by uid 1000).
-	err = i.authorize(ctxWith(Identity{UID: 2000}), up)
-	assert.Error(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, codes.PermissionDenied, status.Code(err))
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/peercred_bsd.go

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-//go:build darwin || freebsd
-
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"net"
-
-	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
-)
-
-// PeerIdentity reads the kernel-authenticated identity of the process on the
-// other end of a Unix socket connection via LOCAL_PEERCRED (xucred). xucred
-// carries the uid and primary group.
-func PeerIdentity(c net.Conn) (Identity, error) {
-	uc, ok := c.(*net.UnixConn)
-	if !ok {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("connection is not a unix socket: %T", c)
-	}
-	raw, err := uc.SyscallConn()
-	if err != nil {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("raw conn: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	var cred *unix.Xucred
-	var credErr error
-	if err := raw.Control(func(fd uintptr) {
-		cred, credErr = unix.GetsockoptXucred(int(fd), unix.SOL_LOCAL, unix.LOCAL_PEERCRED)
-	}); err != nil {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("getsockopt control: %w", err)
-	}
-	if credErr != nil {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("LOCAL_PEERCRED: %w", credErr)
-	}
-
-	id := Identity{UID: cred.Uid}
-	// Groups[0] is the effective (primary) GID; guard against an empty list.
-	if cred.Ngroups > 0 {
-		id.GID = cred.Groups[0]
-	}
-	return id, nil
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/peercred_linux.go

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-//go:build linux
-
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"net"
-
-	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
-)
-
-// PeerIdentity reads the kernel-authenticated identity of the process on the
-// other end of a Unix socket connection via SO_PEERCRED. The credentials are
-// captured by the kernel at connect() time and cannot be spoofed or changed for
-// the life of the connection.
-func PeerIdentity(c net.Conn) (Identity, error) {
-	uc, ok := c.(*net.UnixConn)
-	if !ok {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("connection is not a unix socket: %T", c)
-	}
-	raw, err := uc.SyscallConn()
-	if err != nil {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("raw conn: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	var cred *unix.Ucred
-	var credErr error
-	if err := raw.Control(func(fd uintptr) {
-		cred, credErr = unix.GetsockoptUcred(int(fd), unix.SOL_SOCKET, unix.SO_PEERCRED)
-	}); err != nil {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("getsockopt control: %w", err)
-	}
-	if credErr != nil {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("SO_PEERCRED: %w", credErr)
-	}
-
-	return Identity{
-		UID: cred.Uid,
-		GID: cred.Gid,
-	}, nil
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/peercred_stub.go

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-//go:build !linux && !darwin && !freebsd
-
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"net"
-	"runtime"
-)
-
-// PeerIdentity is unimplemented on platforms without a Unix-socket peer-credential
-// primitive. Windows derives identity from the named-pipe client token instead
-// (see the Windows transport credentials), so it never calls this.
-func PeerIdentity(net.Conn) (Identity, error) {
-	return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("peer credential check not supported on %s", runtime.GOOS)
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/peercred_unix_test.go

@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
-//go:build linux || darwin || freebsd
-
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"net"
-	"os"
-	"path/filepath"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials/insecure"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/health"
-	healthpb "google.golang.org/grpc/health/grpc_health_v1"
-)
-
-// TestPeerIdentity_MatchesCurrentProcess connects to a real Unix socket and
-// verifies the extracted UID/GID match the running process (both ends are us).
-func TestPeerIdentity_MatchesCurrentProcess(t *testing.T) {
-	sock := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "peer.sock")
-	ln, err := net.Listen("unix", sock)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = ln.Close() })
-
-	type result struct {
-		id  Identity
-		err error
-	}
-	done := make(chan result, 1)
-	go func() {
-		c, aerr := ln.Accept()
-		if aerr != nil {
-			done <- result{err: aerr}
-			return
-		}
-		defer func() { _ = c.Close() }()
-		id, ierr := PeerIdentity(c)
-		done <- result{id: id, err: ierr}
-	}()
-
-	client, err := net.Dial("unix", sock)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = client.Close() })
-
-	res := <-done
-	require.NoError(t, res.err)
-	assert.Equal(t, uint32(os.Getuid()), res.id.UID, "UID should match current process")
-	assert.Equal(t, uint32(os.Getgid()), res.id.GID, "primary GID should match current process")
-}
-
-// TestPeerIdentity_NonUnixConn rejects non-Unix connections (fail closed).
-func TestPeerIdentity_NonUnixConn(t *testing.T) {
-	ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = ln.Close() })
-
-	done := make(chan error, 1)
-	go func() {
-		c, aerr := ln.Accept()
-		if aerr != nil {
-			done <- aerr
-			return
-		}
-		defer func() { _ = c.Close() }()
-		_, ierr := PeerIdentity(c)
-		done <- ierr
-	}()
-
-	client, err := net.Dial("tcp", ln.Addr().String())
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = client.Close() })
-
-	assert.Error(t, <-done, "PeerIdentity must reject a non-Unix connection")
-}
-
-// TestGRPCRoundTrip_ServerCredsClientInsecure proves the transport contract end
-// to end: a gRPC server using the peercred transport credentials still serves a
-// plain insecure client (the CLI never changed), and the caller's kernel
-// identity reaches the handler via IdentityFromContext.
-func TestGRPCRoundTrip_ServerCredsClientInsecure(t *testing.T) {
-	sock := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "rt.sock")
-	ln, err := net.Listen("unix", sock)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	var gotUID uint32
-	var gotOK bool
-	srv := grpc.NewServer(
-		grpc.Creds(NewTransportCredentials()),
-		grpc.UnaryInterceptor(func(ctx context.Context, req any, _ *grpc.UnaryServerInfo, h grpc.UnaryHandler) (any, error) {
-			id, ok := IdentityFromContext(ctx)
-			gotUID, gotOK = id.UID, ok
-			return h(ctx, req)
-		}),
-	)
-	healthpb.RegisterHealthServer(srv, health.NewServer())
-	go func() { _ = srv.Serve(ln) }()
-	t.Cleanup(srv.Stop)
-
-	conn, err := grpc.NewClient("unix://"+sock, grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials()))
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = conn.Close() })
-
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
-	defer cancel()
-	_, err = healthpb.NewHealthClient(conn).Check(ctx, &healthpb.HealthCheckRequest{})
-	require.NoError(t, err, "insecure client must reach the peercred server")
-
-	assert.True(t, gotOK, "handler must see a peer identity")
-	assert.Equal(t, uint32(os.Getuid()), gotUID, "handler must see the caller's UID")
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/policy.go

@@ -1,92 +0,0 @@
-package ipcauth
-
-import "sync"
-
-const servicePath = "/daemon.DaemonService/"
-
-// ProfilePolicy exposes the active profile's ownership to the interceptor. The
-// daemon server implements it; ConfigAdapter bridges the gap because the gRPC
-// server (and its interceptor) is constructed before the server instance exists.
-type ProfilePolicy interface {
-	// ActiveProfileOwnership returns the active profile's ownership policy.
-	ActiveProfileOwnership() Ownership
-
-	// ClaimActiveProfileOwnerIfUnowned atomically claims the active profile for
-	// id when it has no owners and is not shared (trust-on-first-use), and
-	// reports whether id is now an owner. A false return means the profile was
-	// already owned/shared or another caller won the claim — the caller must
-	// re-read ownership and authorize normally.
-	ClaimActiveProfileOwnerIfUnowned(id Identity) (bool, error)
-}
-
-// handlerAuthorizedMethods bypass the active-profile gate: they are per-user or
-// per-target-profile operations whose handler does its own authorization (bound
-// to the caller identity). Peer identity is still required to reach them.
-var handlerAuthorizedMethods = map[string]bool{
-	servicePath + "AddProfile":       true,
-	servicePath + "ListProfiles":     true,
-	servicePath + "GetActiveProfile": true,
-	servicePath + "RemoveProfile":    true,
-	servicePath + "RenameProfile":    true,
-}
-
-// auditMethods are the Tier-C/H RPCs (threat model §3) whose successful
-// authorization is worth an audit log line. Denials are always logged.
-var auditMethods = map[string]bool{
-	servicePath + "GetConfig":          true,
-	servicePath + "SetConfig":          true,
-	servicePath + "Login":              true,
-	servicePath + "WaitSSOLogin":       true,
-	servicePath + "RequestJWTAuth":     true,
-	servicePath + "WaitJWTToken":       true,
-	servicePath + "StartCapture":       true,
-	servicePath + "StartBundleCapture": true,
-	servicePath + "DebugBundle":        true,
-	servicePath + "ExposeService":      true,
-	servicePath + "Up":                 true,
-	servicePath + "Down":               true,
-	servicePath + "SelectNetworks":     true,
-	servicePath + "DeselectNetworks":   true,
-	servicePath + "SwitchProfile":      true,
-	servicePath + "TriggerUpdate":      true,
-	servicePath + "Logout":             true,
-	servicePath + "CleanState":         true,
-	servicePath + "DeleteState":        true,
-}
-
-// ConfigAdapter is a ProfilePolicy whose backend is set lazily, once the daemon
-// server instance is created. Until then it reports an unowned profile
-// (Ownership zero value), so non-privileged callers are denied — fail closed.
-type ConfigAdapter struct {
-	mu      sync.RWMutex
-	backend ProfilePolicy
-}
-
-// SetBackend installs the real policy. Must be called before serving RPCs.
-func (a *ConfigAdapter) SetBackend(backend ProfilePolicy) {
-	a.mu.Lock()
-	defer a.mu.Unlock()
-	a.backend = backend
-}
-
-// ActiveProfileOwnership delegates to the backend, or reports an unowned profile
-// when no backend is set yet.
-func (a *ConfigAdapter) ActiveProfileOwnership() Ownership {
-	a.mu.RLock()
-	defer a.mu.RUnlock()
-	if a.backend == nil {
-		return Ownership{}
-	}
-	return a.backend.ActiveProfileOwnership()
-}
-
-// ClaimActiveProfileOwnerIfUnowned delegates to the backend. Before the backend
-// is set it cannot claim, so it reports not-owned (fail closed).
-func (a *ConfigAdapter) ClaimActiveProfileOwnerIfUnowned(id Identity) (bool, error) {
-	a.mu.RLock()
-	defer a.mu.RUnlock()
-	if a.backend == nil {
-		return false, nil
-	}
-	return a.backend.ClaimActiveProfileOwnerIfUnowned(id)
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/principal.go

@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"strconv"
-	"strings"
-)
-
-// PrincipalKind is the type of an owner principal.
-type PrincipalKind string
-
-const (
-	KindUID   PrincipalKind = "uid"   // Unix user ID
-	KindGID   PrincipalKind = "gid"   // Unix group ID
-	KindGroup PrincipalKind = "group" // Unix group name (NSS-resolved)
-	KindSID   PrincipalKind = "sid"   // Windows user or group SID
-)
-
-// Principal is a parsed owner entry from a profile's Owners list.
-type Principal struct {
-	Kind  PrincipalKind
-	Value string
-}
-
-// ParsePrincipal parses a "kind:value" owner string. Returns false for empty
-// values or unknown kinds so malformed entries are ignored rather than trusted.
-func ParsePrincipal(s string) (Principal, bool) {
-	kind, value, ok := strings.Cut(s, ":")
-	if !ok || value == "" {
-		return Principal{}, false
-	}
-	switch PrincipalKind(kind) {
-	case KindUID, KindGID, KindGroup, KindSID:
-		return Principal{Kind: PrincipalKind(kind), Value: value}, true
-	default:
-		return Principal{}, false
-	}
-}
-
-// UIDPrincipal builds the owner string for a Unix user ID.
-func UIDPrincipal(uid uint32) string {
-	return string(KindUID) + ":" + strconv.FormatUint(uint64(uid), 10)
-}
-
-// SIDPrincipal builds the owner string for a Windows SID.
-func SIDPrincipal(sid string) string { return string(KindSID) + ":" + sid }
-
-// OwnerPrincipalForIdentity returns the self-ownership principal for an identity:
-// the user's UID on Unix, or the user's SID on Windows. Used to auto-isolate a
-// new profile to its creator.
-func OwnerPrincipalForIdentity(id Identity) string {
-	if id.IsWindows() {
-		return SIDPrincipal(id.SID)
-	}
-	return UIDPrincipal(id.UID)
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/resolver_unix.go

@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
-//go:build !windows
-
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"strconv"
-	"sync"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/shell"
-)
-
-const groupCacheTTL = 30 * time.Second
-
-// NewDefaultGroupResolver returns an NSS-aware group resolver backed by
-// getent/`id -G` (via client/internal/shell), so `gid:`/`group:` owners resolve
-// correctly for LDAP/AD users under CGO_ENABLED=0. Results are cached briefly.
-func NewDefaultGroupResolver() GroupResolver {
-	return &nssResolver{byUID: make(map[uint32]gidCacheEntry)}
-}
-
-type gidCacheEntry struct {
-	gids map[uint32]struct{}
-	at   time.Time
-}
-
-type nssResolver struct {
-	mu    sync.Mutex
-	byUID map[uint32]gidCacheEntry
-}
-
-func (r *nssResolver) CallerGIDs(id Identity) map[uint32]struct{} {
-	r.mu.Lock()
-	defer r.mu.Unlock()
-
-	if e, ok := r.byUID[id.UID]; ok && time.Since(e.at) < groupCacheTTL {
-		return e.gids
-	}
-	gids := resolveGIDs(id.UID)
-	r.byUID[id.UID] = gidCacheEntry{gids: gids, at: time.Now()}
-	return gids
-}
-
-func resolveGIDs(uid uint32) map[uint32]struct{} {
-	out := make(map[uint32]struct{})
-	u, err := shell.GetUserFromGetent(strconv.FormatUint(uint64(uid), 10))
-	if err != nil {
-		return out
-	}
-	ids, err := shell.GroupIdsWithFallback(u)
-	if err != nil {
-		return out
-	}
-	for _, s := range ids {
-		if g, err := strconv.ParseUint(s, 10, 32); err == nil {
-			out[uint32(g)] = struct{}{}
-		}
-	}
-	return out
-}
-
-func (r *nssResolver) GroupNameGID(name string) (uint32, bool) {
-	g, err := shell.LookupGroupWithGetent(name)
-	if err != nil {
-		return 0, false
-	}
-	gid, err := strconv.ParseUint(g.Gid, 10, 32)
-	if err != nil {
-		return 0, false
-	}
-	return uint32(gid), true
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/resolver_windows.go

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-//go:build windows
-
-package ipcauth
-
-// NewDefaultGroupResolver returns nil on Windows: group authorization uses the
-// group SIDs carried in the client token (see the Windows transport
-// credentials), not NSS/getent.
-func NewDefaultGroupResolver() GroupResolver {
-	return nil
-}

client/internal/netflow/store/event_aggregation_test.go

@@ -175,9 +175,7 @@ func TestFlowAggregationOfUnknownProtocols(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestResetAggregationWindow(t *testing.T) {
-	now := time.Now()
-	nowFunc := func() time.Time { return now }
-	store := NewAggregatingMemoryStoreWithTimeFunc(nowFunc)
+	store := NewAggregatingMemoryStore()
 	store.StoreEvent(&types.Event{
 		ID:        uuid.New(),
 		Timestamp: time.Now(),
@@ -200,7 +198,6 @@ func TestResetAggregationWindow(t *testing.T) {
 		},
 	})
 
-	now = now.Add(1 * time.Second)
 	reset := store.ResetAggregationWindow()
 	previousEvents, ok := reset.(*AggregatingMemory)
 	assert.True(t, ok)

client/internal/netflow/store/memory.go

@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ type AggregatingMemory struct {
 	WindowStart time.Time
 	WindowEnd   time.Time
 	rnd         *v2.PCG
-	nowFunc     func() time.Time
 }
 
 func (m *Memory) StoreEvent(event *types.Event) {
@@ -63,19 +62,14 @@ func (m *Memory) DeleteEvents(ids []uuid.UUID) {
 }
 
 func NewAggregatingMemoryStore() *AggregatingMemory {
-	return NewAggregatingMemoryStoreWithTimeFunc(defaultNowFunc)
-}
-
-// used in tests when deterministic (less random) time intervals are required
-func NewAggregatingMemoryStoreWithTimeFunc(nowFunc func() time.Time) *AggregatingMemory {
-	return &AggregatingMemory{WindowStart: nowFunc(), Memory: Memory{events: make(map[uuid.UUID]*types.Event)}, nowFunc: nowFunc, rnd: v2.NewPCG(rand.Uint64(), rand.Uint64())}
+	return &AggregatingMemory{WindowStart: time.Now(), Memory: Memory{events: make(map[uuid.UUID]*types.Event)}, rnd: v2.NewPCG(rand.Uint64(), rand.Uint64())}
 }
 
 func (am *AggregatingMemory) ResetAggregationWindow() types.FlowEventAggregator {
 	am.mux.Lock()
 	defer am.mux.Unlock()
 
-	now := am.nowFunc()
+	now := time.Now()
 	toret := AggregatingMemory{WindowStart: am.WindowStart, WindowEnd: now, Memory: Memory{events: am.events}, rnd: v2.NewPCG(rand.Uint64(), rand.Uint64())}
 
 	am.events = make(map[uuid.UUID]*types.Event)
@@ -158,7 +152,3 @@ func (am *AggregatingMemory) GetAggregatedEvents() []*types.Event {
 
 	return slices.Collect(maps.Values(aggregated)) // could return an iterator instead here
 }
-
-func defaultNowFunc() time.Time {
-	return time.Now()
-}

client/internal/peer/conn.go

@@ -30,11 +30,6 @@ import (
 	relayClient "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/relay/client"
 )
 
-// wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold is the number of consecutive WireGuard
-// handshake timeouts after which the rosenpass state for the peer is
-// considered desynced and gets reset.
-const wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold = 3
-
 // MetricsRecorder is an interface for recording peer connection metrics
 type MetricsRecorder interface {
 	RecordConnectionStages(
@@ -123,9 +118,6 @@ type Conn struct {
 	wgWatcher       *WGWatcher
 	wgWatcherWg     sync.WaitGroup
 	wgWatcherCancel context.CancelFunc
-	// wgTimeouts counts consecutive WireGuard handshake timeouts without a
-	// successful handshake in between. Guarded by mu.
-	wgTimeouts int
 
 	// used to store the remote Rosenpass key for Relayed connection in case of connection update from ice
 	rosenpassRemoteKey []byte
@@ -203,6 +195,7 @@ func NewConn(config ConnConfig, services ServiceDependencies) (*Conn, error) {
 		statusICE:          worker.NewAtomicStatus(),
 		dumpState:          dumpState,
 		endpointUpdater:    NewEndpointUpdater(connLog, config.WgConfig, isController(config)),
+		wgWatcher:          NewWGWatcher(connLog, config.WgConfig.WgInterface, config.Key, dumpState),
 		metricsRecorder:    services.MetricsRecorder,
 	}
 
@@ -670,12 +663,11 @@ func (conn *Conn) onGuardEvent() {
 	}
 }
 
-func (conn *Conn) onWGDisconnected(watcherCtx context.Context) {
+func (conn *Conn) onWGDisconnected() {
 	conn.mu.Lock()
 	defer conn.mu.Unlock()
 
-	// watcherCtx guards against a stale watcher tearing down a connection that already superseded it.
-	if conn.ctx.Err() != nil || watcherCtx.Err() != nil {
+	if conn.ctx.Err() != nil {
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -691,29 +683,6 @@ func (conn *Conn) onWGDisconnected(watcherCtx context.Context) {
 	default:
 		conn.Log.Debugf("No active connection to close on WG timeout")
 	}
-
-	conn.escalateWGTimeoutLocked()
-}
-
-// escalateWGTimeoutLocked resets the peer's rosenpass state after repeated
-// handshake timeouts. With rosenpass enabled, persistent timeouts mean the
-// preshared keys have desynced; the renewal exchange runs over the dead
-// tunnel and cannot resync them. Reporting the peer disconnected drops its
-// rosenpass state, so the next connection configuration programs the
-// rendezvous key and the tunnel can bootstrap again. Callers must hold mu.
-func (conn *Conn) escalateWGTimeoutLocked() {
-	if conn.config.RosenpassConfig.PubKey == nil {
-		return
-	}
-
-	conn.wgTimeouts++
-	if conn.wgTimeouts < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold || conn.onDisconnected == nil {
-		return
-	}
-	conn.wgTimeouts = 0
-
-	conn.Log.Warnf("%d consecutive WireGuard handshake timeouts, resetting rosenpass state for peer", wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold)
-	conn.onDisconnected(conn.config.WgConfig.RemoteKey)
 }
 
 func (conn *Conn) updateRelayStatus(relayServerAddr string, rosenpassPubKey []byte, updateTime time.Time) {
@@ -833,39 +802,25 @@ func (conn *Conn) isConnectedOnAllWay() (status guard.ConnStatus) {
 	})
 }
 
-// enableWgWatcherIfNeeded starts a fresh watcher instance per connection attempt, so its
-// lifecycle stays bound to conn.mu and enable/disable can't race an old goroutine's shutdown.
-// Caller must hold conn.mu.
 func (conn *Conn) enableWgWatcherIfNeeded(enabledTime time.Time) {
-	if conn.wgWatcher != nil {
+	if !conn.wgWatcher.PrepareInitialHandshake() {
 		return
 	}
 
-	watcher := NewWGWatcher(conn.Log, conn.config.WgConfig.WgInterface, conn.config.Key, conn.dumpState)
-	watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
-
 	wgWatcherCtx, wgWatcherCancel := context.WithCancel(conn.ctx)
-	conn.wgWatcher = watcher
 	conn.wgWatcherCancel = wgWatcherCancel
-
 	conn.wgWatcherWg.Add(1)
 	go func() {
 		defer conn.wgWatcherWg.Done()
-		onDisconnected := func() { conn.onWGDisconnected(wgWatcherCtx) }
-		watcher.EnableWgWatcher(wgWatcherCtx, enabledTime, onDisconnected, conn.onWGHandshakeSuccess, conn.onWGCheckSuccess)
+		conn.wgWatcher.EnableWgWatcher(wgWatcherCtx, enabledTime, conn.onWGDisconnected, conn.onWGHandshakeSuccess)
 	}()
 }
 
-// disableWgWatcherIfNeeded cancels and drops the watcher once no transport is active. It never
-// waits for the goroutine: the timeout path reentrantly calls back here under conn.mu, so
-// blocking would deadlock. Caller must hold conn.mu.
 func (conn *Conn) disableWgWatcherIfNeeded() {
-	if conn.currentConnPriority != conntype.None || conn.wgWatcher == nil {
-		return
+	if conn.currentConnPriority == conntype.None && conn.wgWatcherCancel != nil {
+		conn.wgWatcherCancel()
+		conn.wgWatcherCancel = nil
 	}
-	conn.wgWatcherCancel()
-	conn.wgWatcher = nil
-	conn.wgWatcherCancel = nil
 }
 
 func (conn *Conn) newProxy(remoteConn net.Conn) (wgproxy.Proxy, error) {
@@ -888,9 +843,7 @@ func (conn *Conn) resetEndpoint() {
 		return
 	}
 	conn.Log.Infof("reset wg endpoint")
-	if conn.wgWatcher != nil {
-		conn.wgWatcher.Reset()
-	}
+	conn.wgWatcher.Reset()
 	if err := conn.endpointUpdater.RemoveEndpointAddress(); err != nil {
 		conn.Log.Warnf("failed to remove endpoint address before update: %v", err)
 	}
@@ -939,15 +892,6 @@ func (conn *Conn) onWGHandshakeSuccess(when time.Time) {
 	conn.recordConnectionMetrics()
 }
 
-// onWGCheckSuccess is called for every watcher check that observed a fresh
-// handshake, including handshakes of connections that were already up when
-// the watcher started.
-func (conn *Conn) onWGCheckSuccess() {
-	conn.mu.Lock()
-	conn.wgTimeouts = 0
-	conn.mu.Unlock()
-}
-
 // recordConnectionMetrics records connection stage timestamps as metrics
 func (conn *Conn) recordConnectionMetrics() {
 	if conn.metricsRecorder == nil {

client/internal/peer/conn_test.go

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import (
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface"
@@ -305,84 +304,3 @@ func TestConn_presharedKey_RosenpassManaged(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("expected non-nil presharedKey before Rosenpass manages PSK")
 	}
 }
-
-func newWGTimeoutTestConn(rosenpassEnabled bool, disconnected *[]string) *Conn {
-	cfg := ConnConfig{
-		Key:      "LLHf3Ma6z6mdLbriAJbqhX7+nM/B71lgw2+91q3LfhU=",
-		LocalKey: "RRHf3Ma6z6mdLbriAJbqhX7+nM/B71lgw2+91q3LfhU=",
-		WgConfig: WgConfig{RemoteKey: "LLHf3Ma6z6mdLbriAJbqhX7+nM/B71lgw2+91q3LfhU="},
-	}
-	if rosenpassEnabled {
-		cfg.RosenpassConfig = RosenpassConfig{PubKey: []byte("dummykey")}
-	}
-
-	conn := &Conn{
-		ctx:           context.Background(),
-		config:        cfg,
-		Log:           log.WithField("peer", cfg.Key),
-		metricsStages: &MetricsStages{},
-	}
-	conn.SetOnDisconnected(func(remotePeer string) {
-		*disconnected = append(*disconnected, remotePeer)
-	})
-	return conn
-}
-
-// TestConn_onWGDisconnected_EscalatesToRosenpassReset: repeated handshake
-// timeouts with rosenpass enabled mean the preshared keys have desynced. The
-// renewal exchange runs over the dead tunnel and cannot resync them, so after
-// wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold consecutive timeouts the conn must report the
-// peer disconnected, dropping its rosenpass state so the next configuration
-// programs the rendezvous key.
-func TestConn_onWGDisconnected_EscalatesToRosenpassReset(t *testing.T) {
-	var disconnected []string
-	conn := newWGTimeoutTestConn(true, &disconnected)
-
-	for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
-		conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
-	}
-	assert.Empty(t, disconnected, "escalation must not fire below the threshold")
-
-	conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
-	assert.Equal(t, []string{conn.config.WgConfig.RemoteKey}, disconnected,
-		"reaching the threshold must report the peer disconnected once")
-
-	for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
-		conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
-	}
-	assert.Len(t, disconnected, 1, "escalation must restart counting after firing")
-
-	conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
-	assert.Len(t, disconnected, 2, "continued timeouts must escalate again")
-}
-
-// TestConn_onWGDisconnected_CheckSuccessResetsEscalation: a successful
-// handshake between timeouts means the tunnel recovered; the counter must
-// start over.
-func TestConn_onWGDisconnected_CheckSuccessResetsEscalation(t *testing.T) {
-	var disconnected []string
-	conn := newWGTimeoutTestConn(true, &disconnected)
-
-	for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
-		conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
-	}
-	conn.onWGCheckSuccess()
-
-	for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
-		conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
-	}
-	assert.Empty(t, disconnected, "handshake success must reset the timeout count")
-}
-
-// TestConn_onWGDisconnected_NoEscalationWithoutRosenpass: without rosenpass
-// there is no per-peer key state to reset; repeated timeouts must not report
-// disconnects.
-func TestConn_onWGDisconnected_NoEscalationWithoutRosenpass(t *testing.T) {
-	var disconnected []string
-	conn := newWGTimeoutTestConn(false, &disconnected)
-
-	for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold*3; i++ {
-		conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
-	}
-	assert.Empty(t, disconnected, "escalation must be limited to rosenpass connections")
-}

client/internal/peer/status.go

@@ -813,14 +813,19 @@ func (d *Status) SetSessionExpiresAt(deadline time.Time) {
 }
 
 // GetSessionExpiresAt returns the most recently recorded SSO session deadline,
-// or the zero value when no deadline is tracked. A deadline in the past is
-// returned as-is: it means the session has expired, and consumers (tray row,
-// CLI status) render it as "expired" rather than hiding it — masking it as
-// "none" would blank the UI at the exact moment it should say the session
-// ended.
+// or the zero value when no deadline is tracked. A deadline that has already
+// slipped into the past reports as "none": once the session has expired it is
+// no longer a meaningful countdown, and the sessionwatch.Watcher does not
+// arm a timer at the deadline itself to clear it (only the two pre-expiry
+// warnings). Without this guard the UI would keep painting a stale
+// "expires in …" against a moment that has passed until the next login,
+// extend, or teardown rewrote the value.
 func (d *Status) GetSessionExpiresAt() time.Time {
 	d.mux.Lock()
 	defer d.mux.Unlock()
+	if !d.sessionExpiresAt.IsZero() && d.sessionExpiresAt.Before(time.Now()) {
+		return time.Time{}
+	}
 	return d.sessionExpiresAt
 }
 

client/internal/peer/wg_watcher.go

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package peer
 import (
 	"context"
 	"fmt"
+	"sync"
 	"time"
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
@@ -23,14 +24,14 @@ type WGInterfaceStater interface {
 	GetStats() (map[string]configurer.WGStats, error)
 }
 
-// WGWatcher is single-shot: one instance per connection attempt, run once, then discarded.
-// Lifecycle is owned by Conn under conn.mu, so it keeps no "enabled" state to go stale.
 type WGWatcher struct {
 	log           *log.Entry
 	wgIfaceStater WGInterfaceStater
 	peerKey       string
 	stateDump     *stateDump
 
+	enabled   bool
+	muEnabled sync.Mutex
 	// initialHandshake is not thread-safe; never call PrepareInitialHandshake and EnableWgWatcher concurrently.
 	initialHandshake time.Time
 
@@ -47,23 +48,36 @@ func NewWGWatcher(log *log.Entry, wgIfaceStater WGInterfaceStater, peerKey strin
 	}
 }
 
-// PrepareInitialHandshake reads the peer's current WireGuard handshake time. It must be
-// called before the peer is (re)configured on the WireGuard interface, so the captured
-// baseline reflects the state prior to this connection attempt instead of racing with
-// that configuration.
-func (w *WGWatcher) PrepareInitialHandshake() {
+// PrepareInitialHandshake reserves the watcher and reads the peer's current WireGuard
+// handshake time. It must be called before the peer is (re)configured on the WireGuard
+// interface, so the captured baseline reflects the state prior to this connection attempt
+// instead of racing with that configuration. Returns ok=false if the watcher is already
+// running, in which case EnableWgWatcher must not be called.
+func (w *WGWatcher) PrepareInitialHandshake() (ok bool) {
+	w.muEnabled.Lock()
+	if w.enabled {
+		w.muEnabled.Unlock()
+		return false
+	}
+
 	w.log.Debugf("enable WireGuard watcher")
+	w.enabled = true
+	w.muEnabled.Unlock()
+
 	handshake, _ := w.wgState()
 	w.initialHandshake = handshake
+	return true
 }
 
 // EnableWgWatcher runs the WireGuard watcher loop using the handshake baseline captured by
 // PrepareInitialHandshake. The watcher runs until ctx is cancelled. Caller is responsible
-// for context lifecycle management. onHandshakeSuccessFn is called only for the first
-// handshake observed by this run, onCheckSuccessFn for every check that observed a fresh
-// handshake, including the first.
-func (w *WGWatcher) EnableWgWatcher(ctx context.Context, enabledTime time.Time, onDisconnectedFn func(), onHandshakeSuccessFn func(when time.Time), onCheckSuccessFn func()) {
-	w.periodicHandshakeCheck(ctx, onDisconnectedFn, onHandshakeSuccessFn, onCheckSuccessFn, enabledTime, w.initialHandshake)
+// for context lifecycle management.
+func (w *WGWatcher) EnableWgWatcher(ctx context.Context, enabledTime time.Time, onDisconnectedFn func(), onHandshakeSuccessFn func(when time.Time)) {
+	w.periodicHandshakeCheck(ctx, onDisconnectedFn, onHandshakeSuccessFn, enabledTime, w.initialHandshake)
+
+	w.muEnabled.Lock()
+	w.enabled = false
+	w.muEnabled.Unlock()
 }
 
 // Reset signals the watcher that the WireGuard peer has been reset and a new
@@ -76,7 +90,7 @@ func (w *WGWatcher) Reset() {
 }
 
 // wgStateCheck help to check the state of the WireGuard handshake and relay connection
-func (w *WGWatcher) periodicHandshakeCheck(ctx context.Context, onDisconnectedFn func(), onHandshakeSuccessFn func(when time.Time), onCheckSuccessFn func(), enabledTime time.Time, initialHandshake time.Time) {
+func (w *WGWatcher) periodicHandshakeCheck(ctx context.Context, onDisconnectedFn func(), onHandshakeSuccessFn func(when time.Time), enabledTime time.Time, initialHandshake time.Time) {
 	w.log.Infof("WireGuard watcher started")
 
 	timer := time.NewTimer(wgHandshakeOvertime)
@@ -89,7 +103,6 @@ func (w *WGWatcher) periodicHandshakeCheck(ctx context.Context, onDisconnectedFn
 		case <-timer.C:
 			handshake, ok := w.handshakeCheck(lastHandshake)
 			if !ok {
-				// early ctx cancel check return
 				if ctx.Err() != nil {
 					return
 				}
@@ -104,10 +117,6 @@ func (w *WGWatcher) periodicHandshakeCheck(ctx context.Context, onDisconnectedFn
 				}
 			}
 
-			if onCheckSuccessFn != nil && ctx.Err() == nil {
-				onCheckSuccessFn()
-			}
-
 			lastHandshake = *handshake
 
 			resetTime := time.Until(handshake.Add(checkPeriod))
@@ -138,9 +147,9 @@ func (w *WGWatcher) handshakeCheck(lastHandshake time.Time) (*time.Time, bool) {
 
 	w.log.Tracef("previous handshake, handshake: %v, %v", lastHandshake, handshake)
 
-	// the current known handshake did not change
+	// the current know handshake did not change
 	if handshake.Equal(lastHandshake) {
-		w.log.Warnf("WireGuard handshake not updated: %v", handshake)
+		w.log.Warnf("WireGuard handshake timed out: %v", handshake)
 		return nil, false
 	}
 

client/internal/peer/wg_watcher_test.go

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
 	"time"
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/configurer"
 )
@@ -23,72 +24,6 @@ func (m *MocWgIface) disconnect() {
 	m.stop = true
 }
 
-type mockHandshakeStats struct {
-	mu        sync.Mutex
-	handshake time.Time
-}
-
-func (m *mockHandshakeStats) GetStats() (map[string]configurer.WGStats, error) {
-	m.mu.Lock()
-	defer m.mu.Unlock()
-	return map[string]configurer.WGStats{"": {LastHandshake: m.handshake}}, nil
-}
-
-func (m *mockHandshakeStats) advance() {
-	m.mu.Lock()
-	defer m.mu.Unlock()
-	m.handshake = time.Now()
-}
-
-// TestWGWatcher_CheckSuccessCallback: onCheckSuccessFn must fire for a fresh
-// handshake even when the watcher started with an existing handshake baseline,
-// the case where onHandshakeSuccessFn stays silent.
-func TestWGWatcher_CheckSuccessCallback(t *testing.T) {
-	// checkPeriod bounds how stale a handshake may be before the watcher treats it
-	// as a suspended-machine timeout. The first check fires after wgHandshakeOvertime,
-	// so keep checkPeriod well above any scheduling jitter to avoid a false timeout
-	// converting the expected success into a disconnect on a loaded runner.
-	checkPeriod = 1 * time.Minute
-	wgHandshakeOvertime = 1 * time.Second
-
-	mlog := log.WithField("peer", "tet")
-	// Use an old baseline so advance() yields a strictly newer handshake even on
-	// platforms with coarse clock resolution (Windows), where two time.Now() calls
-	// microseconds apart can return the same instant and read as a timed-out handshake.
-	stats := &mockHandshakeStats{handshake: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)}
-	watcher := NewWGWatcher(mlog, stats, "", newStateDump("peer", mlog, &Status{}))
-
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-	defer cancel()
-
-	watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
-
-	firstHandshake := make(chan struct{}, 1)
-	checkSuccess := make(chan struct{}, 1)
-	go watcher.EnableWgWatcher(ctx, time.Now(), func() {}, func(when time.Time) {
-		firstHandshake <- struct{}{}
-	}, func() {
-		select {
-		case checkSuccess <- struct{}{}:
-		default:
-		}
-	})
-
-	stats.advance()
-
-	select {
-	case <-checkSuccess:
-	case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
-		t.Errorf("timeout waiting for check success callback")
-	}
-
-	select {
-	case <-firstHandshake:
-		t.Errorf("first-handshake callback must not fire for a non-zero baseline")
-	default:
-	}
-}
-
 func TestWGWatcher_EnableWgWatcher(t *testing.T) {
 	checkPeriod = 5 * time.Second
 	wgHandshakeOvertime = 1 * time.Second
@@ -100,7 +35,8 @@ func TestWGWatcher_EnableWgWatcher(t *testing.T) {
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
 	defer cancel()
 
-	watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
+	ok := watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
+	require.True(t, ok, "watcher should not be enabled yet")
 
 	onDisconnected := make(chan struct{}, 1)
 	go watcher.EnableWgWatcher(ctx, time.Now(), func() {
@@ -108,7 +44,7 @@ func TestWGWatcher_EnableWgWatcher(t *testing.T) {
 		onDisconnected <- struct{}{}
 	}, func(when time.Time) {
 		mlog.Infof("onHandshakeSuccess: %v", when)
-	}, nil)
+	})
 
 	// wait for initial reading
 	time.Sleep(2 * time.Second)
@@ -130,13 +66,14 @@ func TestWGWatcher_ReEnable(t *testing.T) {
 	watcher := NewWGWatcher(mlog, mocWgIface, "", newStateDump("peer", mlog, &Status{}))
 
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-	watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
+	ok := watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
+	require.True(t, ok, "watcher should not be enabled yet")
 
 	wg := &sync.WaitGroup{}
 	wg.Add(1)
 	go func() {
 		defer wg.Done()
-		watcher.EnableWgWatcher(ctx, time.Now(), func() {}, func(when time.Time) {}, nil)
+		watcher.EnableWgWatcher(ctx, time.Now(), func() {}, func(when time.Time) {})
 	}()
 	cancel()
 
@@ -146,12 +83,13 @@ func TestWGWatcher_ReEnable(t *testing.T) {
 	ctx, cancel = context.WithCancel(context.Background())
 	defer cancel()
 
-	watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
+	ok = watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
+	require.True(t, ok, "watcher should be re-enabled after the previous run stopped")
 
 	onDisconnected := make(chan struct{}, 1)
 	go watcher.EnableWgWatcher(ctx, time.Now(), func() {
 		onDisconnected <- struct{}{}
-	}, func(when time.Time) {}, nil)
+	}, func(when time.Time) {})
 
 	time.Sleep(2 * time.Second)
 	mocWgIface.disconnect()

client/internal/profilemanager/config.go

@@ -102,11 +102,6 @@ type ConfigInput struct {
 	DNSLabels domain.List
 
 	MTU *uint16
-
-	// Owners replaces the profile's owner principal list when non-nil.
-	// Shared replaces the profile's shared flag when non-nil.
-	Owners []string
-	Shared *bool
 }
 
 // Config Configuration type
@@ -189,17 +184,6 @@ type Config struct {
 
 	MTU uint16
 
-	// Owners lists the principals allowed to control this profile over the local
-	// IPC, as typed strings: "uid:1000", "gid:1000", "group:netbird-admins"
-	// (Unix, NSS-resolved) or "sid:S-1-5-..." (Windows user or group SID). Empty
-	// with Shared=false means the profile is owned by nobody yet (privileged +
-	// daemon-self only, until claimed). Interpreted by client/internal/ipcauth.
-	Owners []string `json:"Owners,omitempty"`
-
-	// Shared, when true, lets any authenticated local caller control this profile
-	// (opt-in). Takes precedence over Owners.
-	Shared bool `json:"Shared,omitempty"`
-
 	// policy is the MDM policy that produced the currently-set values for
 	// any MDM-enforced fields. Set by applyMDMPolicy at the tail of apply()
 	// and reset on every apply() invocation. Never persisted to disk.
@@ -658,18 +642,6 @@ func (config *Config) apply(input ConfigInput) (updated bool, err error) {
 		updated = true
 	}
 
-	if input.Owners != nil && !slices.Equal(config.Owners, input.Owners) {
-		log.Infof("updating profile owners to %v", input.Owners)
-		config.Owners = input.Owners
-		updated = true
-	}
-
-	if input.Shared != nil && *input.Shared != config.Shared {
-		log.Infof("updating profile shared flag to %t", *input.Shared)
-		config.Shared = *input.Shared
-		updated = true
-	}
-
 	// MDM is the last override layer: any key present in the policy
 	// supersedes defaults, on-disk config, env vars and CLI input.
 	config.applyMDMPolicy(loadMDMPolicy())

client/internal/profilemanager/service.go

@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import (
 	"runtime"
 	"sort"
 	"strings"
-	"syscall"
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 
@@ -296,7 +295,7 @@ func (s *ServiceManager) DefaultProfilePath() string {
 // The returned Profile carries the freshly-generated ID so callers can
 // show it to the user (and so the gRPC AddProfileResponse can include
 // it).
-func (s *ServiceManager) AddProfile(displayName, username string, owners []string) (*Profile, error) {
+func (s *ServiceManager) AddProfile(displayName, username string) (*Profile, error) {
 	configDir, err := s.getConfigDir(username)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get config directory: %w", err)
@@ -318,9 +317,6 @@ func (s *ServiceManager) AddProfile(displayName, username string, owners []strin
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create new config: %w", err)
 	}
 	cfg.Name = displayName
-	// owners auto-isolates the new profile to its creator (nil = unowned, so the
-	// eventual first caller claims it via trust-on-first-use).
-	cfg.Owners = owners
 
 	if err := util.WriteJson(context.Background(), profPath, cfg); err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to write profile config: %w", err)
@@ -443,11 +439,7 @@ func (s *ServiceManager) GetStatePath() string {
 
 	activeProf, err := s.GetActiveProfileState()
 	if err != nil {
-		if errors.Is(err, syscall.ENOSYS) {
-			log.Debugf("active profile state unavailable on this platform: %v", err)
-		} else {
-			log.Warnf("failed to get active profile state: %v", err)
-		}
+		log.Warnf("failed to get active profile state: %v", err)
 		return defaultStatePath
 	}
 

client/internal/profilemanager/service_test.go

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ func withTestSM(t *testing.T, fn func(sm *ServiceManager, username string)) {
 
 func TestServiceProfile_ExactID(t *testing.T) {
 	withTestSM(t, func(sm *ServiceManager, username string) {
-		created, err := sm.AddProfile("work", username, nil)
+		created, err := sm.AddProfile("work", username)
 		require.NoError(t, err)
 
 		got, err := sm.ResolveProfile(created.ID.String(), username)
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ func TestServiceProfile_ExactID(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestServiceProfile_IDPrefix(t *testing.T) {
 	withTestSM(t, func(sm *ServiceManager, username string) {
-		created, err := sm.AddProfile("work", username, nil)
+		created, err := sm.AddProfile("work", username)
 		require.NoError(t, err)
 
 		prefix := created.ID[:4]
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ func TestServiceProfile_AmbiguousPrefix(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestServiceProfile_ExactNameUnique(t *testing.T) {
 	withTestSM(t, func(sm *ServiceManager, username string) {
-		_, err := sm.AddProfile("work", username, nil)
+		_, err := sm.AddProfile("work", username)
 		require.NoError(t, err)
 
 		got, err := sm.ResolveProfile("work", username)
@@ -86,9 +86,9 @@ func TestServiceProfile_ExactNameUnique(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestServiceProfile_AmbiguousName(t *testing.T) {
 	withTestSM(t, func(sm *ServiceManager, username string) {
-		_, err := sm.AddProfile("work", username, nil)
+		_, err := sm.AddProfile("work", username)
 		require.NoError(t, err)
-		_, err = sm.AddProfile("work", username, nil)
+		_, err = sm.AddProfile("work", username)
 		require.NoError(t, err)
 
 		_, err = sm.ResolveProfile("work", username)
@@ -133,10 +133,10 @@ func TestServiceProfile_LegacyFilenameCoexists(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestAddProfile_AllowsDuplicateWithFlag(t *testing.T) {
 	withTestSM(t, func(sm *ServiceManager, username string) {
-		first, err := sm.AddProfile("work", username, nil)
+		first, err := sm.AddProfile("work", username)
 		require.NoError(t, err)
 
-		second, err := sm.AddProfile("work", username, nil)
+		second, err := sm.AddProfile("work", username)
 		require.NoError(t, err)
 		assert.NotEqual(t, first.ID, second.ID)
 		assert.Equal(t, "work", second.Name)
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ func TestAddProfile_RejectsInvalidNames(t *testing.T) {
 			strings.Repeat("a", maxProfileNameLen+1), // too long
 		}
 		for _, name := range cases {
-			_, err := sm.AddProfile(name, username, nil)
+			_, err := sm.AddProfile(name, username)
 			assert.Error(t, err, "expected error for %q", name)
 		}
 	})
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ func TestIsValidProfileFilenameStem(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestRemoveProfile_DeletesStateFile(t *testing.T) {
 	withTestSM(t, func(sm *ServiceManager, username string) {
-		created, err := sm.AddProfile("work", username, nil)
+		created, err := sm.AddProfile("work", username)
 		require.NoError(t, err)
 
 		configDir, err := sm.getConfigDir(username)

client/internal/rosenpass/manager.go

@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ type rpServer interface {
 
 type Manager struct {
 	ifaceName    string
-	localWgKey   wgtypes.Key
 	spk          []byte
 	ssk          []byte
 	rpKeyHash    string
@@ -52,9 +51,8 @@ type Manager struct {
 	wgIface      PresharedKeySetter
 }
 
-// NewManager creates a new Rosenpass manager. localWgKey is the local
-// WireGuard public key, used to derive the per-peer rendezvous key.
-func NewManager(preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key, wgIfaceName string, localWgKey wgtypes.Key) (*Manager, error) {
+// NewManager creates a new Rosenpass manager
+func NewManager(preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key, wgIfaceName string) (*Manager, error) {
 	public, secret, err := rp.GenerateKeyPair()
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
@@ -64,7 +62,6 @@ func NewManager(preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key, wgIfaceName string, localWgKey wgtype
 	log.Tracef("generated new rosenpass key pair with public key %s", rpKeyHash)
 	return &Manager{
 		ifaceName:    wgIfaceName,
-		localWgKey:   localWgKey,
 		rpKeyHash:    rpKeyHash,
 		spk:          public,
 		ssk:          secret,
@@ -76,7 +73,7 @@ func NewManager(preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key, wgIfaceName string, localWgKey wgtype
 		// nil receiver in addPeer -> m.rpWgHandler.AddPeer. generateConfig will
 		// replace it with a fresh handler on each Run() to clear stale peer
 		// state from previous engine sessions.
-		rpWgHandler: NewNetbirdHandler((*[32]byte)(preSharedKey), localWgKey),
+		rpWgHandler: NewNetbirdHandler(),
 		lock:        sync.Mutex{},
 	}, nil
 }
@@ -164,7 +161,7 @@ func (m *Manager) generateConfig() (rp.Config, error) {
 	cfg.Peers = []rp.PeerConfig{}
 
 	m.lock.Lock()
-	m.rpWgHandler = NewNetbirdHandler(m.preSharedKey, m.localWgKey)
+	m.rpWgHandler = NewNetbirdHandler()
 	if m.wgIface != nil {
 		m.rpWgHandler.SetInterface(m.wgIface)
 	}

client/internal/rosenpass/manager_test.go

@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ func newTestManager(spkFirstByte byte, mock *mockServer) *Manager {
 		ssk:         make([]byte, 32),
 		rpKeyHash:   "test-hash",
 		rpPeerIDs:   make(map[string]*rp.PeerID),
-		rpWgHandler: NewNetbirdHandler(nil, wgtypes.Key{0x01}),
+		rpWgHandler: NewNetbirdHandler(),
 		server:      mock,
 	}
 }
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ func TestAddPeer_NilServer_ReturnsErrorNoCrash(t *testing.T) {
 // issue #4341 cannot occur in the window between NewManager and Run().
 func TestNewManager_PreInitializesHandler(t *testing.T) {
 	psk := wgtypes.Key{}
-	m, err := NewManager(&psk, "wt0", wgtypes.Key{0x01})
+	m, err := NewManager(&psk, "wt0")
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	require.NotNil(t, m.rpWgHandler, "rpWgHandler must be initialized in NewManager")
 }
@@ -329,10 +329,10 @@ func TestIsPresharedKeyInitialized_AddedButNotHandshaken_ReturnsFalse(t *testing
 	require.False(t, m.IsPresharedKeyInitialized(wgKey))
 }
 
-// --- NetbirdHandler.applyKey ----------------------------------------------
+// --- NetbirdHandler.outputKey ----------------------------------------------
 
-func TestHandler_ApplyKey_FirstCallUsesUpdateOnlyFalse(t *testing.T) {
-	h := NewNetbirdHandler(nil, wgtypes.Key{0x01})
+func TestHandler_OutputKey_FirstCallUsesUpdateOnlyFalse(t *testing.T) {
+	h := NewNetbirdHandler()
 	iface := &mockIface{}
 	h.SetInterface(iface)
 
@@ -348,8 +348,8 @@ func TestHandler_ApplyKey_FirstCallUsesUpdateOnlyFalse(t *testing.T) {
 	require.Equal(t, wgKey.String(), iface.calls[0].peerKey)
 }
 
-func TestHandler_ApplyKey_SubsequentCallsUseUpdateOnlyTrue(t *testing.T) {
-	h := NewNetbirdHandler(nil, wgtypes.Key{0x01})
+func TestHandler_OutputKey_SubsequentCallsUseUpdateOnlyTrue(t *testing.T) {
+	h := NewNetbirdHandler()
 	iface := &mockIface{}
 	h.SetInterface(iface)
 
@@ -364,8 +364,8 @@ func TestHandler_ApplyKey_SubsequentCallsUseUpdateOnlyTrue(t *testing.T) {
 	require.True(t, iface.calls[1].updateOnly, "subsequent rotations must use updateOnly=true")
 }
 
-func TestHandler_ApplyKey_NilInterface_NoCrashNoCall(t *testing.T) {
-	h := NewNetbirdHandler(nil, wgtypes.Key{0x01})
+func TestHandler_OutputKey_NilInterface_NoCrashNoCall(t *testing.T) {
+	h := NewNetbirdHandler()
 	// no SetInterface — iface remains nil
 	pid := rp.PeerID{0x03}
 	h.AddPeer(pid, "wt0", rp.Key(wgtypes.Key{}))
@@ -374,8 +374,8 @@ func TestHandler_ApplyKey_NilInterface_NoCrashNoCall(t *testing.T) {
 	h.HandshakeCompleted(pid, rp.Key{})
 }
 
-func TestHandler_ApplyKey_UnknownPeer_NoCall(t *testing.T) {
-	h := NewNetbirdHandler(nil, wgtypes.Key{0x01})
+func TestHandler_OutputKey_UnknownPeer_NoCall(t *testing.T) {
+	h := NewNetbirdHandler()
 	iface := &mockIface{}
 	h.SetInterface(iface)
 
@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ func TestHandler_ApplyKey_UnknownPeer_NoCall(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestHandler_RemovePeer_ClearsInitializedState(t *testing.T) {
-	h := NewNetbirdHandler(nil, wgtypes.Key{0x01})
+	h := NewNetbirdHandler()
 	iface := &mockIface{}
 	h.SetInterface(iface)
 
@@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ func TestHandler_RemovePeer_ClearsInitializedState(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestHandler_SetInterfaceAfterAddPeer_StillReceivesKey(t *testing.T) {
-	h := NewNetbirdHandler(nil, wgtypes.Key{0x01})
+	h := NewNetbirdHandler()
 	pid := rp.PeerID{0x05}
 	wgKey := wgtypes.Key{0xEE}
 	h.AddPeer(pid, "wt0", rp.Key(wgKey))

client/internal/rosenpass/netbird_handler.go

@@ -18,34 +18,19 @@ type PresharedKeySetter interface {
 type wireGuardPeer struct {
 	Interface string
 	PublicKey rp.Key
-	// initialized is true once a completed exchange has set a
-	// Rosenpass-managed PSK for this peer.
-	initialized bool
-	// chainKey is the key output by the last completed exchange, advanced by
-	// one ratchet step on expiry. Nil until the first exchange completes and
-	// after the peer has fallen back to the rendezvous key.
-	chainKey *wgtypes.Key
-	// expiries counts failed renewals since the last completed exchange.
-	expiries int
 }
 
 type NetbirdHandler struct {
-	mu    sync.Mutex
-	iface PresharedKeySetter
-	// preSharedKey is the account-level preshared key, used as the rendezvous
-	// key when set. Nil means the deterministic seed key is used instead.
-	preSharedKey *[32]byte
-	// localWgKey is the local WireGuard public key, one of the two inputs to
-	// the deterministic seed key.
-	localWgKey wgtypes.Key
-	peers      map[rp.PeerID]*wireGuardPeer
+	mu               sync.Mutex
+	iface            PresharedKeySetter
+	peers            map[rp.PeerID]wireGuardPeer
+	initializedPeers map[rp.PeerID]bool
 }
 
-func NewNetbirdHandler(preSharedKey *[32]byte, localWgKey wgtypes.Key) *NetbirdHandler {
+func NewNetbirdHandler() *NetbirdHandler {
 	return &NetbirdHandler{
-		preSharedKey: preSharedKey,
-		localWgKey:   localWgKey,
-		peers:        map[rp.PeerID]*wireGuardPeer{},
+		peers:            map[rp.PeerID]wireGuardPeer{},
+		initializedPeers: map[rp.PeerID]bool{},
 	}
 }
 
@@ -57,16 +42,10 @@ func (h *NetbirdHandler) SetInterface(iface PresharedKeySetter) {
 	h.iface = iface
 }
 
-// AddPeer registers a peer with the handler. Re-adding a known peer (every
-// reconnection does) keeps its key recovery state.
 func (h *NetbirdHandler) AddPeer(pid rp.PeerID, intf string, pk rp.Key) {
 	h.mu.Lock()
 	defer h.mu.Unlock()
-	if existing, ok := h.peers[pid]; ok && existing.PublicKey == pk {
-		existing.Interface = intf
-		return
-	}
-	h.peers[pid] = &wireGuardPeer{
+	h.peers[pid] = wireGuardPeer{
 		Interface: intf,
 		PublicKey: pk,
 	}
@@ -76,6 +55,7 @@ func (h *NetbirdHandler) RemovePeer(pid rp.PeerID) {
 	h.mu.Lock()
 	defer h.mu.Unlock()
 	delete(h.peers, pid)
+	delete(h.initializedPeers, pid)
 }
 
 // IsPeerInitialized returns true if Rosenpass has completed a handshake
@@ -83,120 +63,50 @@ func (h *NetbirdHandler) RemovePeer(pid rp.PeerID) {
 func (h *NetbirdHandler) IsPeerInitialized(pid rp.PeerID) bool {
 	h.mu.Lock()
 	defer h.mu.Unlock()
-	peer, ok := h.peers[pid]
-	return ok && peer.initialized
+	return h.initializedPeers[pid]
 }
 
-// HandshakeCompleted programs the freshly exchanged output key and resets the
-// peer's key recovery state.
 func (h *NetbirdHandler) HandshakeCompleted(pid rp.PeerID, key rp.Key) {
-	psk := wgtypes.Key(key)
-
-	h.mu.Lock()
-	defer h.mu.Unlock()
-
-	peer, ok := h.peers[pid]
-	if !ok {
-		return
-	}
-	if peer.expiries > 0 {
-		log.Infof("rosenpass exchange completed for peer %s after %d expired renewals", wgtypes.Key(peer.PublicKey), peer.expiries)
-	}
-	// chainKey tracks the shared exchange output regardless of the local write
-	// outcome, so both ends still converge on the next expiry.
-	peer.chainKey = &psk
-	peer.expiries = 0
-	if !h.applyKeyLocked(pid, psk, peer.initialized) {
-		return
-	}
-	peer.initialized = true
+	h.outputKey(rp.KeyOutputReasonStale, pid, key)
 }
 
-// HandshakeExpired replaces the expired key. The renewal exchange runs over
-// the tunnel keyed by the PSK itself, so the replacement must be derivable on
-// both ends without communication: the first expiry ratchets the last shared
-// key forward, repeated expiries (and expiries without a completed exchange)
-// fall back to the rendezvous key and drop the peer out of the initialized
-// state so connection reconfigurations reprogram the rendezvous key as well.
 func (h *NetbirdHandler) HandshakeExpired(pid rp.PeerID) {
+	key, _ := rp.GeneratePresharedKey()
+	h.outputKey(rp.KeyOutputReasonStale, pid, key)
+}
+
+func (h *NetbirdHandler) outputKey(_ rp.KeyOutputReason, pid rp.PeerID, psk rp.Key) {
 	h.mu.Lock()
-	defer h.mu.Unlock()
+	iface := h.iface
+	wg, ok := h.peers[pid]
+	isInitialized := h.initializedPeers[pid]
+	h.mu.Unlock()
 
-	peer, ok := h.peers[pid]
-	if !ok {
-		return
-	}
-
-	peer.expiries++
-
-	var psk wgtypes.Key
-	if peer.chainKey != nil && peer.expiries == 1 {
-		log.Infof("rosenpass key for peer %s expired without renewal, advancing to ratcheted key", wgtypes.Key(peer.PublicKey))
-		psk = RatchetKey(*peer.chainKey)
-		peer.chainKey = &psk
-	} else {
-		rendezvous, err := h.rendezvousKey(peer)
-		if err != nil {
-			// Fail closed: without a rendezvous key the expired key must
-			// still be rotated out, even if the replacement is unusable.
-			log.Errorf("failed to derive rendezvous key, replacing expired key with a random one: %v", err)
-			h.applyRandomKeyLocked(pid)
-			return
-		}
-		log.Warnf("rosenpass key for peer %s expired %d times without renewal, falling back to the rendezvous key", wgtypes.Key(peer.PublicKey), peer.expiries)
-		psk = rendezvous
-		peer.chainKey = nil
-		peer.initialized = false
-	}
-
-	h.applyKeyLocked(pid, psk, true)
-}
-
-// rendezvousKey returns the key both ends converge on without communication:
-// the account-level preshared key when configured, the deterministic seed key
-// otherwise. It mirrors the key that peer connections program when Rosenpass
-// does not manage the peer yet.
-func (h *NetbirdHandler) rendezvousKey(peer *wireGuardPeer) (wgtypes.Key, error) {
-	if h.preSharedKey != nil {
-		return *h.preSharedKey, nil
-	}
-
-	seed, err := DeterministicSeedKey(h.localWgKey.String(), wgtypes.Key(peer.PublicKey).String())
-	if err != nil {
-		return wgtypes.Key{}, err
-	}
-	return *seed, nil
-}
-
-// applyKeyLocked writes the preshared key for the peer to the WireGuard
-// interface and reports whether the write succeeded. Callers must hold h.mu
-// for the whole state-mutation-plus-write so that a concurrent completion and
-// expiry cannot reorder their writes relative to the in-memory chain key.
-func (h *NetbirdHandler) applyKeyLocked(pid rp.PeerID, psk wgtypes.Key, updateOnly bool) bool {
-	peer, ok := h.peers[pid]
-	if !ok {
-		return false
-	}
-
-	if h.iface == nil {
+	if iface == nil {
 		log.Warn("rosenpass: interface not set, cannot update preshared key")
-		return false
-	}
-
-	peerKey := wgtypes.Key(peer.PublicKey).String()
-	if err := h.iface.SetPresharedKey(peerKey, psk, updateOnly); err != nil {
-		log.Errorf("Failed to apply rosenpass key: %v", err)
-		return false
-	}
-
-	return true
-}
-
-func (h *NetbirdHandler) applyRandomKeyLocked(pid rp.PeerID) {
-	key, err := rp.GeneratePresharedKey()
-	if err != nil {
-		log.Errorf("failed to generate random preshared key: %v", err)
 		return
 	}
-	h.applyKeyLocked(pid, wgtypes.Key(key), true)
+
+	if !ok {
+		return
+	}
+
+	peerKey := wgtypes.Key(wg.PublicKey).String()
+	pskKey := wgtypes.Key(psk)
+
+	// Use updateOnly=true for later rotations (peer already has Rosenpass PSK)
+	// Use updateOnly=false for first rotation (peer has original/empty PSK)
+	if err := iface.SetPresharedKey(peerKey, pskKey, isInitialized); err != nil {
+		log.Errorf("Failed to apply rosenpass key: %v", err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	// Mark peer as isInitialized after the successful first rotation
+	if !isInitialized {
+		h.mu.Lock()
+		if _, exists := h.peers[pid]; exists {
+			h.initializedPeers[pid] = true
+		}
+		h.mu.Unlock()
+	}
 }

client/internal/rosenpass/netbird_handler_test.go

@@ -1,250 +0,0 @@
-package rosenpass
-
-import (
-	"testing"
-
-	rp "cunicu.li/go-rosenpass"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-	"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
-)
-
-// handlerTestLink wires two NetbirdHandlers as the two ends of a single
-// tunnel: handler A manages the rosenpass peer B and vice versa, the way two
-// NetBird clients see each other.
-type handlerTestLink struct {
-	handlerA, handlerB *NetbirdHandler
-	ifaceA, ifaceB     *mockIface
-	pidA, pidB         rp.PeerID
-	wgKeyA, wgKeyB     wgtypes.Key
-}
-
-func newHandlerTestLink(t *testing.T, preSharedKey *[32]byte) *handlerTestLink {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	link := &handlerTestLink{
-		ifaceA: &mockIface{},
-		ifaceB: &mockIface{},
-	}
-	link.pidA[0] = 0xaa
-	link.pidB[0] = 0xbb
-	link.wgKeyA[31] = 1
-	link.wgKeyB[31] = 2
-
-	link.handlerA = NewNetbirdHandler(preSharedKey, link.wgKeyA)
-	link.handlerB = NewNetbirdHandler(preSharedKey, link.wgKeyB)
-
-	link.handlerA.SetInterface(link.ifaceA)
-	link.handlerB.SetInterface(link.ifaceB)
-
-	link.handlerA.AddPeer(link.pidB, "wt0", rp.Key(link.wgKeyB))
-	link.handlerB.AddPeer(link.pidA, "wt0", rp.Key(link.wgKeyA))
-
-	return link
-}
-
-// complete simulates a completed rosenpass exchange: both ends derive the
-// same output key.
-func (l *handlerTestLink) complete(osk rp.Key) {
-	l.handlerA.HandshakeCompleted(l.pidB, osk)
-	l.handlerB.HandshakeCompleted(l.pidA, osk)
-}
-
-// expire simulates a failed key renewal on both ends.
-func (l *handlerTestLink) expire() {
-	l.handlerA.HandshakeExpired(l.pidB)
-	l.handlerB.HandshakeExpired(l.pidA)
-}
-
-func lastPSK(t *testing.T, m *mockIface) wgtypes.Key {
-	t.Helper()
-	m.mu.Lock()
-	defer m.mu.Unlock()
-	require.NotEmpty(t, m.calls, "expected at least one SetPresharedKey call")
-	return m.calls[len(m.calls)-1].psk
-}
-
-func TestHandshakeCompleted_SetsKeyAndInitializes(t *testing.T) {
-	link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
-
-	var osk rp.Key
-	osk[0] = 0x42
-	link.complete(osk)
-
-	require.Equal(t, wgtypes.Key(osk), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA), "completed exchange must program the osk")
-	require.False(t, link.ifaceA.calls[0].updateOnly, "first rotation must not be update-only")
-	require.True(t, link.handlerA.IsPeerInitialized(link.pidB), "peer must be initialized after first completed exchange")
-
-	link.complete(osk)
-	require.True(t, link.ifaceA.calls[1].updateOnly, "later rotations must be update-only")
-}
-
-// TestHandshakeExpired_BothSidesConverge encodes the core recovery invariant:
-// rosenpass renewals run over the tunnel that the PSK itself keys, so when a
-// renewal fails on both ends, both ends must fall back to the same key or the
-// tunnel can never handshake again.
-func TestHandshakeExpired_BothSidesConverge(t *testing.T) {
-	link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
-
-	var osk rp.Key
-	osk[0] = 0x42
-	link.complete(osk)
-
-	link.expire()
-	keyA := lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA)
-	keyB := lastPSK(t, link.ifaceB)
-	require.NotEqual(t, wgtypes.Key(osk), keyA, "expired key must be rotated out")
-	require.Equal(t, keyA, keyB, "both ends must converge on the same key after expiry")
-
-	link.expire()
-	require.Equal(t, lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceB),
-		"both ends must still converge after repeated expiries")
-}
-
-// TestHandshakeExpired_ExpiryWithoutCompletionConverges covers the bootstrap
-// case: the initial exchange never completed (the tunnel ran on the rendezvous
-// key), so an expiry must not replace the working key with an unrecoverable
-// one on either end.
-func TestHandshakeExpired_ExpiryWithoutCompletionConverges(t *testing.T) {
-	link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
-
-	link.expire()
-	require.Equal(t, lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceB),
-		"both ends must converge when the exchange never completed")
-}
-
-// TestHandshakeExpired_RepeatedExpiryClearsInitialized: once renewals keep
-// failing, the peer must drop out of the initialized state so the next
-// connection reconfiguration reprograms the rendezvous key instead of
-// preserving a poisoned rosenpass-managed key.
-func TestHandshakeExpired_RepeatedExpiryClearsInitialized(t *testing.T) {
-	link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
-
-	var osk rp.Key
-	osk[0] = 0x42
-	link.complete(osk)
-
-	link.expire()
-	link.expire()
-
-	require.False(t, link.handlerA.IsPeerInitialized(link.pidB),
-		"repeated expiries must clear the initialized state")
-	require.False(t, link.handlerB.IsPeerInitialized(link.pidA),
-		"repeated expiries must clear the initialized state")
-}
-
-// TestHandshakeCompleted_AfterExpiryRecovers: a completed exchange after a
-// desync must fully reset the recovery state.
-func TestHandshakeCompleted_AfterExpiryRecovers(t *testing.T) {
-	link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
-
-	var osk1, osk2 rp.Key
-	osk1[0] = 1
-	osk2[0] = 2
-
-	link.complete(osk1)
-	link.expire()
-	link.expire()
-
-	link.complete(osk2)
-	require.Equal(t, wgtypes.Key(osk2), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA), "new exchange must program the fresh osk")
-	require.True(t, link.handlerA.IsPeerInitialized(link.pidB), "peer must be initialized again after recovery")
-
-	link.expire()
-	require.Equal(t, lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceB),
-		"recovered link must converge again on the next expiry")
-	require.NotEqual(t, wgtypes.Key(osk2), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA), "expired key must be rotated out")
-}
-
-// TestHandshakeExpired_FirstExpiryRatchetsLastKey: the first expiry must
-// derive the replacement from the last shared key, so an attacker who only
-// blocks the renewal exchange gains nothing over the previous key.
-func TestHandshakeExpired_FirstExpiryRatchetsLastKey(t *testing.T) {
-	link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
-
-	var osk rp.Key
-	osk[0] = 0x42
-	link.complete(osk)
-
-	link.expire()
-	require.Equal(t, RatchetKey(wgtypes.Key(osk)), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA),
-		"first expiry must program the ratcheted key")
-	require.True(t, link.handlerA.IsPeerInitialized(link.pidB),
-		"ratchet step must keep the peer initialized so reconfigurations preserve the key")
-}
-
-// TestHandshakeExpired_RepeatedExpiryFallsBackToSeed: once the ratchet key
-// also fails, both ends must land on the same key that peer connections
-// program for uninitialized peers, so a reconnect completes the recovery.
-func TestHandshakeExpired_RepeatedExpiryFallsBackToSeed(t *testing.T) {
-	link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
-
-	var osk rp.Key
-	osk[0] = 0x42
-	link.complete(osk)
-
-	link.expire()
-	link.expire()
-
-	seed, err := DeterministicSeedKey(link.wgKeyA.String(), link.wgKeyB.String())
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.Equal(t, *seed, lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA), "repeated expiry must fall back to the seed key")
-	require.Equal(t, *seed, lastPSK(t, link.ifaceB), "repeated expiry must fall back to the seed key")
-}
-
-// TestHandshakeExpired_ConfiguredPSKUsedAsRendezvous: with an account-level
-// preshared key configured, the fallback must be that key, matching what peer
-// connections program for uninitialized peers.
-func TestHandshakeExpired_ConfiguredPSKUsedAsRendezvous(t *testing.T) {
-	psk := &[32]byte{0x77}
-	link := newHandlerTestLink(t, psk)
-
-	var osk rp.Key
-	osk[0] = 0x42
-	link.complete(osk)
-
-	link.expire()
-	link.expire()
-
-	require.Equal(t, wgtypes.Key(*psk), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA),
-		"fallback must be the configured preshared key")
-	require.Equal(t, wgtypes.Key(*psk), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceB),
-		"fallback must be the configured preshared key on both ends")
-}
-
-// TestHandshakeExpired_ExpiryWritesAreUpdateOnly: expiry replacements must
-// never create a WireGuard peer that connection management has removed.
-func TestHandshakeExpired_ExpiryWritesAreUpdateOnly(t *testing.T) {
-	link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
-
-	var osk rp.Key
-	osk[0] = 0x42
-	link.complete(osk)
-
-	link.expire()
-	link.expire()
-
-	for _, call := range link.ifaceA.calls[1:] {
-		require.True(t, call.updateOnly, "expiry writes must be update-only")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestAddPeer_ReAddKeepsRecoveryState: reconnections re-add the peer on every
-// OnConnected; that must not reset the expiry chain state.
-func TestAddPeer_ReAddKeepsRecoveryState(t *testing.T) {
-	link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
-
-	var osk rp.Key
-	osk[0] = 0x42
-	link.complete(osk)
-	link.expire()
-
-	link.handlerA.AddPeer(link.pidB, "wt0", rp.Key(link.wgKeyB))
-	require.True(t, link.handlerA.IsPeerInitialized(link.pidB),
-		"re-adding a known peer must keep its state")
-
-	link.expire()
-	seed, err := DeterministicSeedKey(link.wgKeyA.String(), link.wgKeyB.String())
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.Equal(t, *seed, lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA),
-		"second expiry after re-add must continue to the seed fallback")
-}

client/internal/rosenpass/seed.go

@@ -1,28 +1,11 @@
 package rosenpass
 
 import (
-	"crypto/sha256"
 	"fmt"
 
 	"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
 )
 
-// ratchetLabel domain-separates the expiry ratchet from other uses of the
-// rosenpass output key.
-const ratchetLabel = "netbird-rosenpass-expiry-ratchet"
-
-// RatchetKey derives the successor preshared key from the previous Rosenpass
-// output key. When a key expires without a completed renewal, both peers
-// advance their last shared key by one ratchet step: the expired key is
-// rotated out while both ends still converge on an identical, non-public
-// replacement without communicating.
-func RatchetKey(prev wgtypes.Key) wgtypes.Key {
-	input := make([]byte, 0, len(ratchetLabel)+len(prev))
-	input = append(input, ratchetLabel...)
-	input = append(input, prev[:]...)
-	return sha256.Sum256(input)
-}
-
 // DeterministicSeedKey derives a 32-byte WireGuard preshared key from a pair
 // of peer public keys. Both peers, given the same key pair, produce the same
 // output regardless of which side runs the function: the inputs are ordered

client/internal/routemanager/dynamic/route.go

@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ func (r *Route) startResolver(ctx context.Context) {
 }
 
 func (r *Route) update(ctx context.Context) error {
-	resolved, err := r.resolveDomains(ctx)
+	resolved, err := r.resolveDomains()
 	if err != nil {
 		if len(resolved) == 0 {
 			return fmt.Errorf("resolve domains: %w", err)
@@ -199,9 +199,9 @@ func (r *Route) update(ctx context.Context) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-func (r *Route) resolveDomains(ctx context.Context) (domainMap, error) {
+func (r *Route) resolveDomains() (domainMap, error) {
 	results := make(chan resolveResult)
-	go r.resolve(ctx, results)
+	go r.resolve(results)
 
 	resolved := domainMap{}
 	var merr *multierror.Error
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ func (r *Route) resolveDomains(ctx context.Context) (domainMap, error) {
 	return resolved, nberrors.FormatErrorOrNil(merr)
 }
 
-func (r *Route) resolve(ctx context.Context, results chan resolveResult) {
+func (r *Route) resolve(results chan resolveResult) {
 	var wg sync.WaitGroup
 
 	for _, d := range r.route.Domains {
@@ -225,10 +225,10 @@ func (r *Route) resolve(ctx context.Context, results chan resolveResult) {
 		go func(domain domain.Domain) {
 			defer wg.Done()
 
-			ips, err := r.getIPsFromResolver(ctx, domain)
+			ips, err := r.getIPsFromResolver(domain)
 			if err != nil {
 				log.Tracef("Failed to resolve domain %s with private resolver: %v", domain.SafeString(), err)
-				ips, err = lookupHostIPs(ctx, domain)
+				ips, err = net.LookupIP(domain.PunycodeString())
 				if err != nil {
 					results <- resolveResult{domain: domain, err: fmt.Errorf("resolve d %s: %w", domain.SafeString(), err)}
 					return
@@ -364,20 +364,6 @@ func determinePrefixChanges(oldPrefixes, newPrefixes []netip.Prefix) (toAdd, toR
 	return
 }
 
-// lookupHostIPs resolves d via the system resolver, honoring ctx cancellation.
-func lookupHostIPs(ctx context.Context, d domain.Domain) ([]net.IP, error) {
-	addrs, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, d.PunycodeString())
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-
-	ips := make([]net.IP, 0, len(addrs))
-	for _, addr := range addrs {
-		ips = append(ips, addr.IP)
-	}
-	return ips, nil
-}
-
 func combinePrefixes(oldPrefixes, removedPrefixes, addedPrefixes []netip.Prefix) []netip.Prefix {
 	prefixSet := make(map[netip.Prefix]struct{})
 	for _, prefix := range oldPrefixes {

client/internal/routemanager/dynamic/route_generic.go

@@ -3,12 +3,11 @@
 package dynamic
 
 import (
-	"context"
 	"net"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
 )
 
-func (r *Route) getIPsFromResolver(ctx context.Context, domain domain.Domain) ([]net.IP, error) {
-	return lookupHostIPs(ctx, domain)
+func (r *Route) getIPsFromResolver(domain domain.Domain) ([]net.IP, error) {
+	return net.LookupIP(domain.PunycodeString())
 }

client/internal/routemanager/dynamic/route_ios.go

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
 package dynamic
 
 import (
-	"context"
 	"fmt"
 	"net"
 	"time"
@@ -17,7 +16,7 @@ import (
 
 const dialTimeout = 10 * time.Second
 
-func (r *Route) getIPsFromResolver(ctx context.Context, domain domain.Domain) ([]net.IP, error) {
+func (r *Route) getIPsFromResolver(domain domain.Domain) ([]net.IP, error) {
 	privateClient, err := nbdns.GetClientPrivate(r.wgInterface, r.resolverAddr.Addr(), dialTimeout)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("error while creating private client: %s", err)
@@ -33,7 +32,7 @@ func (r *Route) getIPsFromResolver(ctx context.Context, domain domain.Domain) ([
 		msg := new(dns.Msg)
 		msg.SetQuestion(fqdn, qtype)
 
-		response, _, err := nbdns.ExchangeWithFallback(ctx, privateClient, msg, r.resolverAddr.String())
+		response, _, err := nbdns.ExchangeWithFallback(nil, privateClient, msg, r.resolverAddr.String())
 		if err != nil {
 			if queryErr == nil {
 				queryErr = fmt.Errorf("DNS query for %s (type %d) after %s: %w", domain.SafeString(), qtype, time.Since(startTime), err)

client/internal/routemanager/manager.go

@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ import (
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"sync/atomic"
-	"syscall"
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/google/uuid"
@@ -265,11 +264,7 @@ func (m *DefaultManager) initSelector() *routeselector.RouteSelector {
 
 	// restore selector state if it exists
 	if err := m.stateManager.LoadState(state); err != nil {
-		if errors.Is(err, syscall.ENOSYS) {
-			log.Debugf("route selector state unavailable on this platform: %v", err)
-		} else {
-			log.Warnf("failed to load state: %v", err)
-		}
+		log.Warnf("failed to load state: %v", err)
 		return routeselector.NewRouteSelector()
 	}
 

client/internal/shell/getent_cgo_unix.go

@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-//go:build cgo && !osusergo && !windows
-
-package shell
-
-import "os/user"
-
-// LookupWithGetent with CGO delegates directly to os/user.Lookup.
-// When CGO is enabled, os/user uses libc (getpwnam_r) which goes through
-// the NSS stack natively. If it fails, the user truly doesn't exist and
-// getent would also fail.
-func LookupWithGetent(username string) (*user.User, error) {
-	return user.Lookup(username)
-}
-
-// CurrentUserWithGetent with CGO delegates directly to os/user.Current.
-func CurrentUserWithGetent() (*user.User, error) {
-	return user.Current()
-}
-
-// LookupGroupWithGetent returns the resolved group from either a gid or groupname.
-func LookupGroupWithGetent(name string) (*user.Group, error) {
-	return user.LookupGroup(name)
-}
-
-// GroupIdsWithFallback with CGO delegates directly to user.GroupIds.
-// libc's getgrouplist handles NSS groups natively.
-func GroupIdsWithFallback(u *user.User) ([]string, error) {
-	return u.GroupIds()
-}

client/internal/shell/getent_windows.go

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-//go:build windows
-
-package shell
-
-import "os/user"
-
-// LookupWithGetent on Windows just delegates to os/user.Lookup.
-// Windows does not use NSS/getent; its user lookup works without CGO.
-func LookupWithGetent(username string) (*user.User, error) {
-	return user.Lookup(username)
-}
-
-// CurrentUserWithGetent on Windows just delegates to os/user.Current.
-func CurrentUserWithGetent() (*user.User, error) {
-	return user.Current()
-}
-
-// LookupGroupWithGetent on Windows just delegates to os/user.LookupGroup.
-func LookupGroupWithGetent(name string) (*user.Group, error) {
-	return user.LookupGroup(name)
-}
-
-// GetShellFromGetent is a no-op on Windows; shell resolution uses PowerShell detection.
-func GetShellFromGetent(_ string) string {
-	return ""
-}
-
-// GroupIdsWithFallback on Windows just delegates to u.GroupIds().
-func GroupIdsWithFallback(u *user.User) ([]string, error) {
-	return u.GroupIds()
-}

client/internal/statemanager/manager.go

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 package statemanager
 
 import (
-	"bytes"
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
@@ -306,11 +305,6 @@ func (m *Manager) loadStateFile(deleteCorrupt bool) (map[string]json.RawMessage,
 
 	var rawStates map[string]json.RawMessage
 	if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &rawStates); err != nil {
-		if len(bytes.TrimSpace(data)) == 0 {
-			log.Warnf("state file %s is empty (%d bytes)", m.filePath, len(data))
-		} else {
-			log.Warnf("state file %s has malformed content (%d bytes)", m.filePath, len(data))
-		}
 		m.handleCorruptedState(deleteCorrupt)
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("unmarshal states: %w", err)
 	}

client/ios/NetBirdSDK/client.go

@@ -233,9 +233,6 @@ func (c *Client) DebugBundle(anonymize bool) (string, error) {
 		deps.SyncResponse = resp
 
 		if e := cc.Engine(); e != nil {
-			deps.RefreshStatus = func() {
-				e.RunHealthProbes(context.Background(), true)
-			}
 			if cm := e.GetClientMetrics(); cm != nil {
 				deps.ClientMetrics = cm
 			}

client/ios/NetBirdSDK/login.go

@@ -44,25 +44,10 @@ type Auth struct {
 // NewAuth instantiate Auth struct and validate the management URL
 func NewAuth(cfgPath string, mgmURL string) (*Auth, error) {
 	inputCfg := profilemanager.ConfigInput{
-		ConfigPath:    cfgPath,
 		ManagementURL: mgmURL,
 	}
 
-	// Load the existing config when a config file is already present so an
-	// interactive re-login reuses the peer's persisted WireGuard private key
-	// (and thus its identity) instead of generating a fresh one. Generating a
-	// new key registers a brand-new peer on the management server on every
-	// re-auth (named after the fallback hostname). Only fall back to a fresh
-	// in-memory config for the first-time login when no config file exists yet.
-	// DirectUpdateOrCreateConfig uses non-atomic writes so it also works inside
-	// the tvOS App Group sandbox where atomic temp-file+rename is blocked.
-	var cfg *profilemanager.Config
-	var err error
-	if cfgPath != "" {
-		cfg, err = profilemanager.DirectUpdateOrCreateConfig(inputCfg)
-	} else {
-		cfg, err = profilemanager.CreateInMemoryConfig(inputCfg)
-	}
+	cfg, err := profilemanager.CreateInMemoryConfig(inputCfg)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}

client/mdm/canonical_loaders.go

@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ var allKeys = []string{
 	KeyDisableMetricsCollection,
 	KeyAllowServerSSH,
 	KeyDisableAutoConnect,
-	KeyDisableAutostart,
 	KeyPreSharedKey,
 	KeyRosenpassEnabled,
 	KeyRosenpassPermissive,

client/mdm/policy.go

@@ -20,10 +20,10 @@ import (
 // names (lowerCamelCase) so the daemon can map a Policy key directly to a
 // configuration field.
 const (
-	KeyManagementURL         = "managementURL"
-	KeyDisableUpdateSettings = "disableUpdateSettings"
-	KeyDisableProfiles       = "disableProfiles"
-	KeyDisableNetworks       = "disableNetworks"
+	KeyManagementURL            = "managementURL"
+	KeyDisableUpdateSettings    = "disableUpdateSettings"
+	KeyDisableProfiles          = "disableProfiles"
+	KeyDisableNetworks          = "disableNetworks"
 	// KeyDisableAdvancedView gates the advanced-view section in the
 	// upcoming UI revision. UI-only: NOT stored on Config, not
 	// applied by applyMDMPolicy, not rejectable via SetConfig. The
@@ -37,16 +37,10 @@ const (
 	KeyDisableMetricsCollection = "disableMetricsCollection"
 	KeyAllowServerSSH           = "allowServerSSH"
 	KeyDisableAutoConnect       = "disableAutoConnect"
-	// KeyDisableAutostart suppresses the GUI's fresh-install
-	// launch-on-login default and marks the Settings toggle as
-	// MDM-managed. UI-only: NOT stored on Config and not applied by
-	// applyMDMPolicy; the GUI reads it directly and it appears in
-	// GetConfigResponse.mDMManagedFields when set.
-	KeyDisableAutostart    = "disableAutostart"
-	KeyPreSharedKey        = "preSharedKey"
-	KeyRosenpassEnabled    = "rosenpassEnabled"
-	KeyRosenpassPermissive = "rosenpassPermissive"
-	KeyWireguardPort       = "wireguardPort"
+	KeyPreSharedKey             = "preSharedKey"
+	KeyRosenpassEnabled         = "rosenpassEnabled"
+	KeyRosenpassPermissive      = "rosenpassPermissive"
+	KeyWireguardPort            = "wireguardPort"
 
 	// Split tunnel is modeled as a single conceptual policy with two
 	// registry/plist values. KeySplitTunnelMode is the discriminator

client/proto/daemon.pb.gw.go

@@ -791,78 +791,6 @@ func local_request_DaemonService_GetActiveProfile_0(ctx context.Context, marshal
 	return msg, metadata, err
 }
 
-func request_DaemonService_AddOwner_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, client DaemonServiceClient, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
-	var (
-		protoReq AddOwnerRequest
-		metadata runtime.ServerMetadata
-	)
-	if err := marshaler.NewDecoder(req.Body).Decode(&protoReq); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
-		return nil, metadata, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "%v", err)
-	}
-	msg, err := client.AddOwner(ctx, &protoReq, grpc.Header(&metadata.HeaderMD), grpc.Trailer(&metadata.TrailerMD))
-	return msg, metadata, err
-}
-
-func local_request_DaemonService_AddOwner_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, server DaemonServiceServer, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
-	var (
-		protoReq AddOwnerRequest
-		metadata runtime.ServerMetadata
-	)
-	if err := marshaler.NewDecoder(req.Body).Decode(&protoReq); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
-		return nil, metadata, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "%v", err)
-	}
-	msg, err := server.AddOwner(ctx, &protoReq)
-	return msg, metadata, err
-}
-
-func request_DaemonService_ResetOwner_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, client DaemonServiceClient, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
-	var (
-		protoReq ResetOwnerRequest
-		metadata runtime.ServerMetadata
-	)
-	if err := marshaler.NewDecoder(req.Body).Decode(&protoReq); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
-		return nil, metadata, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "%v", err)
-	}
-	msg, err := client.ResetOwner(ctx, &protoReq, grpc.Header(&metadata.HeaderMD), grpc.Trailer(&metadata.TrailerMD))
-	return msg, metadata, err
-}
-
-func local_request_DaemonService_ResetOwner_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, server DaemonServiceServer, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
-	var (
-		protoReq ResetOwnerRequest
-		metadata runtime.ServerMetadata
-	)
-	if err := marshaler.NewDecoder(req.Body).Decode(&protoReq); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
-		return nil, metadata, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "%v", err)
-	}
-	msg, err := server.ResetOwner(ctx, &protoReq)
-	return msg, metadata, err
-}
-
-func request_DaemonService_ShareProfile_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, client DaemonServiceClient, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
-	var (
-		protoReq ShareProfileRequest
-		metadata runtime.ServerMetadata
-	)
-	if err := marshaler.NewDecoder(req.Body).Decode(&protoReq); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
-		return nil, metadata, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "%v", err)
-	}
-	msg, err := client.ShareProfile(ctx, &protoReq, grpc.Header(&metadata.HeaderMD), grpc.Trailer(&metadata.TrailerMD))
-	return msg, metadata, err
-}
-
-func local_request_DaemonService_ShareProfile_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, server DaemonServiceServer, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
-	var (
-		protoReq ShareProfileRequest
-		metadata runtime.ServerMetadata
-	)
-	if err := marshaler.NewDecoder(req.Body).Decode(&protoReq); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
-		return nil, metadata, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "%v", err)
-	}
-	msg, err := server.ShareProfile(ctx, &protoReq)
-	return msg, metadata, err
-}
-
 func request_DaemonService_Logout_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, client DaemonServiceClient, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
 	var (
 		protoReq LogoutRequest
@@ -1802,66 +1730,6 @@ func RegisterDaemonServiceHandlerServer(ctx context.Context, mux *runtime.ServeM
 		}
 		forward_DaemonService_GetActiveProfile_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
 	})
-	mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_AddOwner_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
-		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
-		defer cancel()
-		var stream runtime.ServerTransportStream
-		ctx = grpc.NewContextWithServerTransportStream(ctx, &stream)
-		inboundMarshaler, outboundMarshaler := runtime.MarshalerForRequest(mux, req)
-		annotatedContext, err := runtime.AnnotateIncomingContext(ctx, mux, req, "/daemon.DaemonService/AddOwner", runtime.WithHTTPPathPattern("/daemon.DaemonService/AddOwner"))
-		if err != nil {
-			runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
-			return
-		}
-		resp, md, err := local_request_DaemonService_AddOwner_0(annotatedContext, inboundMarshaler, server, req, pathParams)
-		md.HeaderMD, md.TrailerMD = metadata.Join(md.HeaderMD, stream.Header()), metadata.Join(md.TrailerMD, stream.Trailer())
-		annotatedContext = runtime.NewServerMetadataContext(annotatedContext, md)
-		if err != nil {
-			runtime.HTTPError(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
-			return
-		}
-		forward_DaemonService_AddOwner_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
-	})
-	mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_ResetOwner_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
-		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
-		defer cancel()
-		var stream runtime.ServerTransportStream
-		ctx = grpc.NewContextWithServerTransportStream(ctx, &stream)
-		inboundMarshaler, outboundMarshaler := runtime.MarshalerForRequest(mux, req)
-		annotatedContext, err := runtime.AnnotateIncomingContext(ctx, mux, req, "/daemon.DaemonService/ResetOwner", runtime.WithHTTPPathPattern("/daemon.DaemonService/ResetOwner"))
-		if err != nil {
-			runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
-			return
-		}
-		resp, md, err := local_request_DaemonService_ResetOwner_0(annotatedContext, inboundMarshaler, server, req, pathParams)
-		md.HeaderMD, md.TrailerMD = metadata.Join(md.HeaderMD, stream.Header()), metadata.Join(md.TrailerMD, stream.Trailer())
-		annotatedContext = runtime.NewServerMetadataContext(annotatedContext, md)
-		if err != nil {
-			runtime.HTTPError(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
-			return
-		}
-		forward_DaemonService_ResetOwner_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
-	})
-	mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_ShareProfile_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
-		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
-		defer cancel()
-		var stream runtime.ServerTransportStream
-		ctx = grpc.NewContextWithServerTransportStream(ctx, &stream)
-		inboundMarshaler, outboundMarshaler := runtime.MarshalerForRequest(mux, req)
-		annotatedContext, err := runtime.AnnotateIncomingContext(ctx, mux, req, "/daemon.DaemonService/ShareProfile", runtime.WithHTTPPathPattern("/daemon.DaemonService/ShareProfile"))
-		if err != nil {
-			runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
-			return
-		}
-		resp, md, err := local_request_DaemonService_ShareProfile_0(annotatedContext, inboundMarshaler, server, req, pathParams)
-		md.HeaderMD, md.TrailerMD = metadata.Join(md.HeaderMD, stream.Header()), metadata.Join(md.TrailerMD, stream.Trailer())
-		annotatedContext = runtime.NewServerMetadataContext(annotatedContext, md)
-		if err != nil {
-			runtime.HTTPError(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
-			return
-		}
-		forward_DaemonService_ShareProfile_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
-	})
 	mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_Logout_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
 		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
 		defer cancel()
@@ -2713,57 +2581,6 @@ func RegisterDaemonServiceHandlerClient(ctx context.Context, mux *runtime.ServeM
 		}
 		forward_DaemonService_GetActiveProfile_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
 	})
-	mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_AddOwner_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
-		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
-		defer cancel()
-		inboundMarshaler, outboundMarshaler := runtime.MarshalerForRequest(mux, req)
-		annotatedContext, err := runtime.AnnotateContext(ctx, mux, req, "/daemon.DaemonService/AddOwner", runtime.WithHTTPPathPattern("/daemon.DaemonService/AddOwner"))
-		if err != nil {
-			runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
-			return
-		}
-		resp, md, err := request_DaemonService_AddOwner_0(annotatedContext, inboundMarshaler, client, req, pathParams)
-		annotatedContext = runtime.NewServerMetadataContext(annotatedContext, md)
-		if err != nil {
-			runtime.HTTPError(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
-			return
-		}
-		forward_DaemonService_AddOwner_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
-	})
-	mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_ResetOwner_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
-		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
-		defer cancel()
-		inboundMarshaler, outboundMarshaler := runtime.MarshalerForRequest(mux, req)
-		annotatedContext, err := runtime.AnnotateContext(ctx, mux, req, "/daemon.DaemonService/ResetOwner", runtime.WithHTTPPathPattern("/daemon.DaemonService/ResetOwner"))
-		if err != nil {
-			runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
-			return
-		}
-		resp, md, err := request_DaemonService_ResetOwner_0(annotatedContext, inboundMarshaler, client, req, pathParams)
-		annotatedContext = runtime.NewServerMetadataContext(annotatedContext, md)
-		if err != nil {
-			runtime.HTTPError(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
-			return
-		}
-		forward_DaemonService_ResetOwner_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
-	})
-	mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_ShareProfile_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
-		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
-		defer cancel()
-		inboundMarshaler, outboundMarshaler := runtime.MarshalerForRequest(mux, req)
-		annotatedContext, err := runtime.AnnotateContext(ctx, mux, req, "/daemon.DaemonService/ShareProfile", runtime.WithHTTPPathPattern("/daemon.DaemonService/ShareProfile"))
-		if err != nil {
-			runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
-			return
-		}
-		resp, md, err := request_DaemonService_ShareProfile_0(annotatedContext, inboundMarshaler, client, req, pathParams)
-		annotatedContext = runtime.NewServerMetadataContext(annotatedContext, md)
-		if err != nil {
-			runtime.HTTPError(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
-			return
-		}
-		forward_DaemonService_ShareProfile_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
-	})
 	mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_Logout_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
 		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
 		defer cancel()
@@ -3038,9 +2855,6 @@ var (
 	pattern_DaemonService_RemoveProfile_0              = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "RemoveProfile"}, ""))
 	pattern_DaemonService_ListProfiles_0               = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "ListProfiles"}, ""))
 	pattern_DaemonService_GetActiveProfile_0           = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "GetActiveProfile"}, ""))
-	pattern_DaemonService_AddOwner_0                   = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "AddOwner"}, ""))
-	pattern_DaemonService_ResetOwner_0                 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "ResetOwner"}, ""))
-	pattern_DaemonService_ShareProfile_0               = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "ShareProfile"}, ""))
 	pattern_DaemonService_Logout_0                     = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "Logout"}, ""))
 	pattern_DaemonService_GetFeatures_0                = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "GetFeatures"}, ""))
 	pattern_DaemonService_TriggerUpdate_0              = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "TriggerUpdate"}, ""))
@@ -3090,9 +2904,6 @@ var (
 	forward_DaemonService_RemoveProfile_0              = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
 	forward_DaemonService_ListProfiles_0               = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
 	forward_DaemonService_GetActiveProfile_0           = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
-	forward_DaemonService_AddOwner_0                   = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
-	forward_DaemonService_ResetOwner_0                 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
-	forward_DaemonService_ShareProfile_0               = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
 	forward_DaemonService_Logout_0                     = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
 	forward_DaemonService_GetFeatures_0                = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
 	forward_DaemonService_TriggerUpdate_0              = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage

client/proto/daemon.proto

@@ -104,18 +104,6 @@ service DaemonService {
 
   rpc GetActiveProfile(GetActiveProfileRequest) returns (GetActiveProfileResponse) {}
 
-  // AddOwner adds a principal to the active profile's owner list. Requires the
-  // caller to be privileged (root/administrator) or an existing owner.
-  rpc AddOwner(AddOwnerRequest) returns (AddOwnerResponse) {}
-
-  // ResetOwner clears the active profile's owner list, returning it to the
-  // unowned state (next caller re-claims via trust-on-first-use). Privileged only.
-  rpc ResetOwner(ResetOwnerRequest) returns (ResetOwnerResponse) {}
-
-  // ShareProfile marks the active profile shared (any local caller) or unshared.
-  // Requires the caller to be an owner or privileged.
-  rpc ShareProfile(ShareProfileRequest) returns (ShareProfileResponse) {}
-
   // Logout disconnects from the network and deletes the peer from the management server
   rpc Logout(LogoutRequest) returns (LogoutResponse) {}
 
@@ -282,10 +270,6 @@ message UpRequest {
   // RPC blocks until the engine is running or gives up, which is the behaviour
   // needed by the CLI.
   bool async = 4;
-
-  // claimOwner, when true, claims ownership of the active profile for the
-  // calling user (adds their kernel principal to the profile's owner list).
-  bool claimOwner = 5;
 }
 
 message UpResponse {}
@@ -790,24 +774,6 @@ message AddProfileResponse {
   string id = 1;
 }
 
-message AddOwnerRequest {
-  // principal is a typed owner string: "uid:1000", "gid:1000",
-  // "group:netbird-admins" (Unix, NSS-resolved), or "sid:S-1-5-..." (Windows).
-  string principal = 1;
-}
-
-message AddOwnerResponse {}
-
-message ResetOwnerRequest {}
-
-message ResetOwnerResponse {}
-
-message ShareProfileRequest {
-  bool shared = 1;
-}
-
-message ShareProfileResponse {}
-
 message RenameProfileRequest {
   string username = 1;
   // handle: an exact ID, a unique ID prefix, or a unique display name.

client/proto/daemon_grpc.pb.go

@@ -51,9 +51,6 @@ const (
 	DaemonService_RemoveProfile_FullMethodName              = "/daemon.DaemonService/RemoveProfile"
 	DaemonService_ListProfiles_FullMethodName               = "/daemon.DaemonService/ListProfiles"
 	DaemonService_GetActiveProfile_FullMethodName           = "/daemon.DaemonService/GetActiveProfile"
-	DaemonService_AddOwner_FullMethodName                   = "/daemon.DaemonService/AddOwner"
-	DaemonService_ResetOwner_FullMethodName                 = "/daemon.DaemonService/ResetOwner"
-	DaemonService_ShareProfile_FullMethodName               = "/daemon.DaemonService/ShareProfile"
 	DaemonService_Logout_FullMethodName                     = "/daemon.DaemonService/Logout"
 	DaemonService_GetFeatures_FullMethodName                = "/daemon.DaemonService/GetFeatures"
 	DaemonService_TriggerUpdate_FullMethodName              = "/daemon.DaemonService/TriggerUpdate"
@@ -135,15 +132,6 @@ type DaemonServiceClient interface {
 	RemoveProfile(ctx context.Context, in *RemoveProfileRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*RemoveProfileResponse, error)
 	ListProfiles(ctx context.Context, in *ListProfilesRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*ListProfilesResponse, error)
 	GetActiveProfile(ctx context.Context, in *GetActiveProfileRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*GetActiveProfileResponse, error)
-	// AddOwner adds a principal to the active profile's owner list. Requires the
-	// caller to be privileged (root/administrator) or an existing owner.
-	AddOwner(ctx context.Context, in *AddOwnerRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*AddOwnerResponse, error)
-	// ResetOwner clears the active profile's owner list, returning it to the
-	// unowned state (next caller re-claims via trust-on-first-use). Privileged only.
-	ResetOwner(ctx context.Context, in *ResetOwnerRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*ResetOwnerResponse, error)
-	// ShareProfile marks the active profile shared (any local caller) or unshared.
-	// Requires the caller to be an owner or privileged.
-	ShareProfile(ctx context.Context, in *ShareProfileRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*ShareProfileResponse, error)
 	// Logout disconnects from the network and deletes the peer from the management server
 	Logout(ctx context.Context, in *LogoutRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*LogoutResponse, error)
 	GetFeatures(ctx context.Context, in *GetFeaturesRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*GetFeaturesResponse, error)
@@ -540,36 +528,6 @@ func (c *daemonServiceClient) GetActiveProfile(ctx context.Context, in *GetActiv
 	return out, nil
 }
 
-func (c *daemonServiceClient) AddOwner(ctx context.Context, in *AddOwnerRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*AddOwnerResponse, error) {
-	cOpts := append([]grpc.CallOption{grpc.StaticMethod()}, opts...)
-	out := new(AddOwnerResponse)
-	err := c.cc.Invoke(ctx, DaemonService_AddOwner_FullMethodName, in, out, cOpts...)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	return out, nil
-}
-
-func (c *daemonServiceClient) ResetOwner(ctx context.Context, in *ResetOwnerRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*ResetOwnerResponse, error) {
-	cOpts := append([]grpc.CallOption{grpc.StaticMethod()}, opts...)
-	out := new(ResetOwnerResponse)
-	err := c.cc.Invoke(ctx, DaemonService_ResetOwner_FullMethodName, in, out, cOpts...)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	return out, nil
-}
-
-func (c *daemonServiceClient) ShareProfile(ctx context.Context, in *ShareProfileRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*ShareProfileResponse, error) {
-	cOpts := append([]grpc.CallOption{grpc.StaticMethod()}, opts...)
-	out := new(ShareProfileResponse)
-	err := c.cc.Invoke(ctx, DaemonService_ShareProfile_FullMethodName, in, out, cOpts...)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	return out, nil
-}
-
 func (c *daemonServiceClient) Logout(ctx context.Context, in *LogoutRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*LogoutResponse, error) {
 	cOpts := append([]grpc.CallOption{grpc.StaticMethod()}, opts...)
 	out := new(LogoutResponse)
@@ -784,15 +742,6 @@ type DaemonServiceServer interface {
 	RemoveProfile(context.Context, *RemoveProfileRequest) (*RemoveProfileResponse, error)
 	ListProfiles(context.Context, *ListProfilesRequest) (*ListProfilesResponse, error)
 	GetActiveProfile(context.Context, *GetActiveProfileRequest) (*GetActiveProfileResponse, error)
-	// AddOwner adds a principal to the active profile's owner list. Requires the
-	// caller to be privileged (root/administrator) or an existing owner.
-	AddOwner(context.Context, *AddOwnerRequest) (*AddOwnerResponse, error)
-	// ResetOwner clears the active profile's owner list, returning it to the
-	// unowned state (next caller re-claims via trust-on-first-use). Privileged only.
-	ResetOwner(context.Context, *ResetOwnerRequest) (*ResetOwnerResponse, error)
-	// ShareProfile marks the active profile shared (any local caller) or unshared.
-	// Requires the caller to be an owner or privileged.
-	ShareProfile(context.Context, *ShareProfileRequest) (*ShareProfileResponse, error)
 	// Logout disconnects from the network and deletes the peer from the management server
 	Logout(context.Context, *LogoutRequest) (*LogoutResponse, error)
 	GetFeatures(context.Context, *GetFeaturesRequest) (*GetFeaturesResponse, error)
@@ -938,15 +887,6 @@ func (UnimplementedDaemonServiceServer) ListProfiles(context.Context, *ListProfi
 func (UnimplementedDaemonServiceServer) GetActiveProfile(context.Context, *GetActiveProfileRequest) (*GetActiveProfileResponse, error) {
 	return nil, status.Error(codes.Unimplemented, "method GetActiveProfile not implemented")
 }
-func (UnimplementedDaemonServiceServer) AddOwner(context.Context, *AddOwnerRequest) (*AddOwnerResponse, error) {
-	return nil, status.Error(codes.Unimplemented, "method AddOwner not implemented")
-}
-func (UnimplementedDaemonServiceServer) ResetOwner(context.Context, *ResetOwnerRequest) (*ResetOwnerResponse, error) {
-	return nil, status.Error(codes.Unimplemented, "method ResetOwner not implemented")
-}
-func (UnimplementedDaemonServiceServer) ShareProfile(context.Context, *ShareProfileRequest) (*ShareProfileResponse, error) {
-	return nil, status.Error(codes.Unimplemented, "method ShareProfile not implemented")
-}
 func (UnimplementedDaemonServiceServer) Logout(context.Context, *LogoutRequest) (*LogoutResponse, error) {
 	return nil, status.Error(codes.Unimplemented, "method Logout not implemented")
 }
@@ -1565,60 +1505,6 @@ func _DaemonService_GetActiveProfile_Handler(srv interface{}, ctx context.Contex
 	return interceptor(ctx, in, info, handler)
 }
 
-func _DaemonService_AddOwner_Handler(srv interface{}, ctx context.Context, dec func(interface{}) error, interceptor grpc.UnaryServerInterceptor) (interface{}, error) {
-	in := new(AddOwnerRequest)
-	if err := dec(in); err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	if interceptor == nil {
-		return srv.(DaemonServiceServer).AddOwner(ctx, in)
-	}
-	info := &grpc.UnaryServerInfo{
-		Server:     srv,
-		FullMethod: DaemonService_AddOwner_FullMethodName,
-	}
-	handler := func(ctx context.Context, req interface{}) (interface{}, error) {
-		return srv.(DaemonServiceServer).AddOwner(ctx, req.(*AddOwnerRequest))
-	}
-	return interceptor(ctx, in, info, handler)
-}
-
-func _DaemonService_ResetOwner_Handler(srv interface{}, ctx context.Context, dec func(interface{}) error, interceptor grpc.UnaryServerInterceptor) (interface{}, error) {
-	in := new(ResetOwnerRequest)
-	if err := dec(in); err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	if interceptor == nil {
-		return srv.(DaemonServiceServer).ResetOwner(ctx, in)
-	}
-	info := &grpc.UnaryServerInfo{
-		Server:     srv,
-		FullMethod: DaemonService_ResetOwner_FullMethodName,
-	}
-	handler := func(ctx context.Context, req interface{}) (interface{}, error) {
-		return srv.(DaemonServiceServer).ResetOwner(ctx, req.(*ResetOwnerRequest))
-	}
-	return interceptor(ctx, in, info, handler)
-}
-
-func _DaemonService_ShareProfile_Handler(srv interface{}, ctx context.Context, dec func(interface{}) error, interceptor grpc.UnaryServerInterceptor) (interface{}, error) {
-	in := new(ShareProfileRequest)
-	if err := dec(in); err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	if interceptor == nil {
-		return srv.(DaemonServiceServer).ShareProfile(ctx, in)
-	}
-	info := &grpc.UnaryServerInfo{
-		Server:     srv,
-		FullMethod: DaemonService_ShareProfile_FullMethodName,
-	}
-	handler := func(ctx context.Context, req interface{}) (interface{}, error) {
-		return srv.(DaemonServiceServer).ShareProfile(ctx, req.(*ShareProfileRequest))
-	}
-	return interceptor(ctx, in, info, handler)
-}
-
 func _DaemonService_Logout_Handler(srv interface{}, ctx context.Context, dec func(interface{}) error, interceptor grpc.UnaryServerInterceptor) (interface{}, error) {
 	in := new(LogoutRequest)
 	if err := dec(in); err != nil {
@@ -1987,18 +1873,6 @@ var DaemonService_ServiceDesc = grpc.ServiceDesc{
 			MethodName: "GetActiveProfile",
 			Handler:    _DaemonService_GetActiveProfile_Handler,
 		},
-		{
-			MethodName: "AddOwner",
-			Handler:    _DaemonService_AddOwner_Handler,
-		},
-		{
-			MethodName: "ResetOwner",
-			Handler:    _DaemonService_ResetOwner_Handler,
-		},
-		{
-			MethodName: "ShareProfile",
-			Handler:    _DaemonService_ShareProfile_Handler,
-		},
 		{
 			MethodName: "Logout",
 			Handler:    _DaemonService_Logout_Handler,

client/server/ownership.go

@@ -1,204 +0,0 @@
-package server
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"fmt"
-	"slices"
-
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
-	gstatus "google.golang.org/grpc/status"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
-)
-
-// The daemon Server implements ipcauth.ProfilePolicy so the gRPC interceptor can
-// authorize each RPC against the active profile's ownership.
-var _ ipcauth.ProfilePolicy = (*Server)(nil)
-
-// ActiveProfileOwnership returns the active profile's ownership policy. Reads
-// the in-memory active config (kept current by the handlers), falling back to
-// the on-disk active profile when the daemon hasn't loaded one yet.
-func (s *Server) ActiveProfileOwnership() ipcauth.Ownership {
-	s.mutex.Lock()
-	defer s.mutex.Unlock()
-
-	cfg := s.config
-	if cfg == nil {
-		loaded, err := s.loadActiveProfileConfigLocked()
-		if err != nil {
-			log.Warnf("ownership: cannot load active profile config, treating as unowned: %v", err)
-			return ipcauth.Ownership{}
-		}
-		cfg = loaded
-	}
-	return ipcauth.Ownership{Owners: cfg.Owners, Shared: cfg.Shared}
-}
-
-// ClaimActiveProfileOwnerIfUnowned atomically claims the active profile for id
-// when it has no owners and is not shared (trust-on-first-use). Returns whether
-// id is now an owner. Concurrent first-callers are serialized by s.mutex, so
-// exactly one wins the claim; the others get false and are authorized normally.
-func (s *Server) ClaimActiveProfileOwnerIfUnowned(id ipcauth.Identity) (bool, error) {
-	s.mutex.Lock()
-	defer s.mutex.Unlock()
-
-	cfg := s.config
-	if cfg == nil {
-		loaded, err := s.loadActiveProfileConfigLocked()
-		if err != nil {
-			return false, fmt.Errorf("load active profile config: %w", err)
-		}
-		cfg = loaded
-	}
-
-	if len(cfg.Owners) > 0 || cfg.Shared {
-		return false, nil // already owned or shared — someone won the race
-	}
-
-	cfg.Owners = []string{ipcauth.OwnerPrincipalForIdentity(id)}
-	if err := s.persistActiveProfileConfigLocked(cfg); err != nil {
-		cfg.Owners = nil // revert in-memory on persistence failure
-		return false, fmt.Errorf("persist claimed ownership: %w", err)
-	}
-	s.config = cfg
-	log.Infof("profile ownership claimed by %s (trust-on-first-use)", id)
-	return true, nil
-}
-
-// activeProfileConfigPathLocked resolves the active profile's config file path.
-func (s *Server) activeProfileConfigPathLocked() (string, error) {
-	activeProf, err := s.profileManager.GetActiveProfileState()
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("get active profile: %w", err)
-	}
-	path, err := activeProf.FilePath()
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("resolve active profile path: %w", err)
-	}
-	return path, nil
-}
-
-// loadActiveProfileConfigLocked reads the active profile's config from disk.
-func (s *Server) loadActiveProfileConfigLocked() (*profilemanager.Config, error) {
-	path, err := s.activeProfileConfigPathLocked()
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	return profilemanager.GetConfig(path)
-}
-
-// persistActiveProfileConfigLocked writes cfg to the active profile's config file.
-func (s *Server) persistActiveProfileConfigLocked(cfg *profilemanager.Config) error {
-	path, err := s.activeProfileConfigPathLocked()
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	return util.WriteJson(context.Background(), path, cfg)
-}
-
-// activeConfigLocked returns the in-memory active config, loading it from disk
-// if the daemon hasn't cached one. Caller must hold s.mutex.
-func (s *Server) activeConfigLocked() (*profilemanager.Config, error) {
-	if s.config != nil {
-		return s.config, nil
-	}
-	return s.loadActiveProfileConfigLocked()
-}
-
-// claimForCallerLocked adds the caller's principal to cfg (if absent) and
-// persists. No-op for privileged callers (they need no ownership entry). Caller
-// must hold s.mutex.
-func (s *Server) claimForCallerLocked(id ipcauth.Identity, cfg *profilemanager.Config) error {
-	if id.IsPrivileged() {
-		return nil
-	}
-	principal := ipcauth.OwnerPrincipalForIdentity(id)
-	if slices.Contains(cfg.Owners, principal) {
-		return nil
-	}
-	cfg.Owners = append(cfg.Owners, principal)
-	if err := s.persistActiveProfileConfigLocked(cfg); err != nil {
-		cfg.Owners = cfg.Owners[:len(cfg.Owners)-1] // revert on failure
-		return err
-	}
-	s.config = cfg
-	return nil
-}
-
-// AddOwner adds a principal to the active profile's owner list. The interceptor
-// has already confirmed the caller is an owner or privileged; the handler just
-// validates and persists.
-func (s *Server) AddOwner(_ context.Context, msg *proto.AddOwnerRequest) (*proto.AddOwnerResponse, error) {
-	principal := msg.GetPrincipal()
-	if _, ok := ipcauth.ParsePrincipal(principal); !ok {
-		return nil, gstatus.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "invalid owner principal %q (expected uid:/gid:/group:/sid:)", principal)
-	}
-
-	s.mutex.Lock()
-	defer s.mutex.Unlock()
-
-	cfg, err := s.activeConfigLocked()
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("load active profile config: %w", err)
-	}
-	if slices.Contains(cfg.Owners, principal) {
-		return &proto.AddOwnerResponse{}, nil
-	}
-	cfg.Owners = append(cfg.Owners, principal)
-	if err := s.persistActiveProfileConfigLocked(cfg); err != nil {
-		cfg.Owners = cfg.Owners[:len(cfg.Owners)-1]
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("persist owner: %w", err)
-	}
-	s.config = cfg
-	log.Infof("added owner %q to the active profile", principal)
-	return &proto.AddOwnerResponse{}, nil
-}
-
-// ResetOwner clears the active profile's owner list (and shared flag), returning
-// it to the unowned state so the next caller re-claims via trust-on-first-use.
-// Privileged-only, so co-owners cannot evict each other.
-func (s *Server) ResetOwner(ctx context.Context, _ *proto.ResetOwnerRequest) (*proto.ResetOwnerResponse, error) {
-	id, ok := ipcauth.IdentityFromContext(ctx)
-	if !ok || !id.IsPrivileged() {
-		return nil, gstatus.Error(codes.PermissionDenied, "reset-owner requires root/administrator")
-	}
-
-	s.mutex.Lock()
-	defer s.mutex.Unlock()
-
-	cfg, err := s.activeConfigLocked()
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("load active profile config: %w", err)
-	}
-	cfg.Owners = nil
-	cfg.Shared = false
-	if err := s.persistActiveProfileConfigLocked(cfg); err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("persist owner reset: %w", err)
-	}
-	s.config = cfg
-	log.Infof("active profile owner list reset; next caller will re-claim (trust-on-first-use)")
-	return &proto.ResetOwnerResponse{}, nil
-}
-
-// ShareProfile marks the active profile shared or unshared. The interceptor has
-// already confirmed the caller is an owner or privileged.
-func (s *Server) ShareProfile(_ context.Context, msg *proto.ShareProfileRequest) (*proto.ShareProfileResponse, error) {
-	s.mutex.Lock()
-	defer s.mutex.Unlock()
-
-	cfg, err := s.activeConfigLocked()
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("load active profile config: %w", err)
-	}
-	cfg.Shared = msg.GetShared()
-	if err := s.persistActiveProfileConfigLocked(cfg); err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("persist shared flag: %w", err)
-	}
-	s.config = cfg
-	log.Infof("active profile shared flag set to %t", msg.GetShared())
-	return &proto.ShareProfileResponse{}, nil
-}

client/server/profile_authz.go

@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-package server
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"runtime"
-	"strings"
-
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
-	gstatus "google.golang.org/grpc/status"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
-)
-
-// bindCallerUsername enforces that a non-privileged caller may only operate on
-// its OWN user's profiles. Profiles live in per-username directories, but the
-// username is a client-supplied gRPC field the server historically never
-// checked; binding it to the caller's kernel identity closes the "pass another
-// user's username" hole. Privileged callers (root / elevated-admin) may manage
-// any user's profiles.
-func (s *Server) bindCallerUsername(ctx context.Context, requested string) error {
-	if requested == "" {
-		return nil // handlers validate emptiness themselves; nothing to bind
-	}
-
-	id, ok := ipcauth.IdentityFromContext(ctx)
-	if !ok {
-		return gstatus.Error(codes.PermissionDenied, "caller identity could not be verified")
-	}
-	if id.IsPrivileged() {
-		return nil
-	}
-
-	caller, err := usernameForIdentity(id)
-	if err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("profile authz: resolve caller username for %s: %v", id, err)
-		return gstatus.Error(codes.PermissionDenied, "could not resolve caller identity to a username")
-	}
-	if !usernamesEqual(requested, caller) {
-		return gstatus.Errorf(codes.PermissionDenied,
-			"not authorized to operate on another user's profiles (caller %q requested %q)", caller, requested)
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// usernamesEqual compares usernames case-insensitively on Windows (domain
-// accounts) and exactly on Unix.
-func usernamesEqual(a, b string) bool {
-	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
-		return strings.EqualFold(a, b)
-	}
-	return a == b
-}

client/server/profile_authz_unix.go

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-//go:build !windows
-
-package server
-
-import (
-	"strconv"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/shell"
-)
-
-// usernameForIdentity resolves a Unix caller's UID to its username via NSS
-// (getent), so LDAP/AD users resolve correctly under CGO_ENABLED=0.
-func usernameForIdentity(id ipcauth.Identity) (string, error) {
-	u, err := shell.GetUserFromGetent(strconv.FormatUint(uint64(id.UID), 10))
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	return u.Username, nil
-}

client/server/profile_authz_windows.go

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-//go:build windows
-
-package server
-
-import (
-	"os/user"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
-)
-
-// usernameForIdentity resolves a Windows caller's SID to its account name.
-func usernameForIdentity(id ipcauth.Identity) (string, error) {
-	u, err := user.LookupId(id.SID)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	return u.Username, nil
-}

client/server/server.go

@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/auth"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/expose"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
 	sleephandler "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/sleep/handler"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/mdm"
@@ -182,7 +181,7 @@ func (s *Server) Start() error {
 		log.Warnf("failed to redirect stderr: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	if err := RestoreResidualState(s.rootCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
+	if err := restoreResidualState(s.rootCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
 		log.Warnf(errRestoreResidualState, err)
 	}
 
@@ -403,11 +402,6 @@ func (s *Server) SetConfig(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.SetConfigReques
 		}
 	}
 
-	// SSH root login / disabling SSH auth requires a privileged caller.
-	if err := requirePrivilegedForDangerousSSH(callerCtx, msg.EnableSSHRoot, msg.DisableSSHAuth); err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-
 	// MDM gate: refuse the whole request if any of its fields is enforced
 	// by the active MDM policy. The error carries an MDMManagedFields-
 	// Violation detail listing the offending key names. Non-conflicting
@@ -543,11 +537,6 @@ func (s *Server) Login(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.LoginRequest) (*pro
 		}
 	}
 
-	// SSH root login / disabling SSH auth requires a privileged caller.
-	if err := requirePrivilegedForDangerousSSH(callerCtx, msg.EnableSSHRoot, msg.DisableSSHAuth); err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-
 	s.mutex.Lock()
 	if s.actCancel != nil {
 		s.actCancel()
@@ -562,7 +551,7 @@ func (s *Server) Login(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.LoginRequest) (*pro
 	s.actCancel = cancel
 	s.mutex.Unlock()
 
-	if err := RestoreResidualState(s.rootCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
+	if err := restoreResidualState(s.rootCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
 		log.Warnf(errRestoreResidualState, err)
 	}
 
@@ -839,7 +828,6 @@ func (s *Server) WaitSSOLogin(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.WaitSSOLogin
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
-	log.Infof("SSO login flow finished, returning success to caller")
 	return &proto.WaitSSOLoginResponse{
 		Email: tokenInfo.Email,
 	}, nil
@@ -847,7 +835,6 @@ func (s *Server) WaitSSOLogin(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.WaitSSOLogin
 
 // Up starts engine work in the daemon.
 func (s *Server) Up(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.UpRequest) (*proto.UpResponse, error) {
-	log.Infof("up request received")
 	s.mutex.Lock()
 	// clientRunning is the daemon-intent flag (set by previous Up/Start, cleared
 	// by Down). connectionGoroutineRunning() reports whether the previous retry-loop
@@ -869,7 +856,7 @@ func (s *Server) Up(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.UpRequest) (*proto.UpR
 
 		return s.waitForUp(callerCtx)
 	}
-	if err := RestoreResidualState(callerCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
+	if err := restoreResidualState(callerCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
 		log.Warnf(errRestoreResidualState, err)
 	}
 
@@ -954,17 +941,6 @@ func (s *Server) Up(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.UpRequest) (*proto.UpR
 	}
 	s.config = config
 
-	// --owner: explicitly claim ownership of the active profile for the caller.
-	if msg != nil && msg.GetClaimOwner() {
-		if id, ok := ipcauth.IdentityFromContext(callerCtx); ok {
-			if err := s.claimForCallerLocked(id, s.config); err != nil {
-				s.mutex.Unlock()
-				log.Errorf("failed to claim profile ownership: %v", err)
-				return nil, fmt.Errorf("claim owner: %w", err)
-			}
-		}
-	}
-
 	s.statusRecorder.UpdateManagementAddress(s.config.ManagementURL.String())
 	s.statusRecorder.UpdateRosenpass(s.config.RosenpassEnabled, s.config.RosenpassPermissive)
 
@@ -1070,16 +1046,6 @@ func (s *Server) SwitchProfile(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.SwitchProfi
 	}
 
 	if msg != nil && msg.ProfileName != nil {
-		targetUsername := ""
-		if msg.Username != nil {
-			targetUsername = *msg.Username
-		}
-		// The interceptor already gated this against the CURRENT active profile;
-		// also bind the TARGET profile's username so a caller can't switch into
-		// another user's profile.
-		if err := s.bindCallerUsername(callerCtx, targetUsername); err != nil {
-			return nil, err
-		}
 		if _, err := s.switchProfileIfNeeded(*msg.ProfileName, msg.Username, activeProf); err != nil {
 			log.Errorf("failed to switch profile: %v", err)
 			return nil, err
@@ -1113,10 +1079,7 @@ func (s *Server) Down(ctx context.Context, _ *proto.DownRequest) (*proto.DownRes
 
 	if err := s.cleanupConnection(); err != nil {
 		s.mutex.Unlock()
-		if errors.Is(err, ErrServiceNotUp) {
-			log.Debugf("Down called while service not up: %v", err)
-			return nil, err
-		}
+		// todo review to update the status in case any type of error
 		log.Errorf("failed to shut down properly: %v", err)
 		return nil, err
 	}
@@ -1189,7 +1152,7 @@ func (s *Server) cleanupConnection() error {
 	// making the run loop the sole owner of engine shutdown.
 	if engine != nil {
 		if err := engine.Stop(); err != nil {
-			log.Errorf("failed to stop engine during cleanup: %v", err)
+			return err
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -2037,18 +2000,7 @@ func (s *Server) AddProfile(ctx context.Context, msg *proto.AddProfileRequest) (
 		return nil, gstatus.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "profile name and username must be provided")
 	}
 
-	if err := s.bindCallerUsername(ctx, msg.Username); err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-
-	// Auto-isolate the new profile to its creator. When root/admin creates it we
-	// leave it unowned so the intended user claims it via trust-on-first-use.
-	var initialOwners []string
-	if id, ok := ipcauth.IdentityFromContext(ctx); ok && !id.IsPrivileged() {
-		initialOwners = []string{ipcauth.OwnerPrincipalForIdentity(id)}
-	}
-
-	created, err := s.profileManager.AddProfile(msg.ProfileName, msg.Username, initialOwners)
+	created, err := s.profileManager.AddProfile(msg.ProfileName, msg.Username)
 	if err != nil {
 		log.Errorf("failed to create profile: %v", err)
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create profile: %w", err)
@@ -2071,10 +2023,6 @@ func (s *Server) RenameProfile(ctx context.Context, msg *proto.RenameProfileRequ
 		return nil, gstatus.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "profile name, username and new profile name must be provided")
 	}
 
-	if err := s.bindCallerUsername(ctx, msg.Username); err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-
 	resolved, err := s.resolveProfileHandle(msg.Handle, msg.Username)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
@@ -2104,10 +2052,6 @@ func (s *Server) RemoveProfile(ctx context.Context, msg *proto.RemoveProfileRequ
 		return nil, gstatus.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "profile name must be provided")
 	}
 
-	if err := s.bindCallerUsername(ctx, msg.Username); err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-
 	resolved, err := s.resolveProfileHandle(msg.ProfileName, msg.Username)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
@@ -2176,10 +2120,6 @@ func (s *Server) ListProfiles(ctx context.Context, msg *proto.ListProfilesReques
 		return nil, gstatus.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "username must be provided")
 	}
 
-	if err := s.bindCallerUsername(ctx, msg.Username); err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-
 	profiles, err := s.profileManager.ListProfiles(msg.Username)
 	if err != nil {
 		log.Errorf("failed to list profiles: %v", err)

client/server/ssh_gate.go

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-package server
-
-import (
-	"context"
-
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
-	gstatus "google.golang.org/grpc/status"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
-)
-
-// requirePrivilegedForDangerousSSH enforces admin permissions for SSH config.
-// Enabling SSH root login or disabling SSH authentication turns the
-// root/LocalSystem daemon's SSH server into an unauthenticated root shell
-// (local-to-remote-root escalation), so only a privileged caller  may set
-// these flags to true over the local IPC.
-func requirePrivilegedForDangerousSSH(ctx context.Context, enableSSHRoot, disableSSHAuth *bool) error {
-	dangerous := (enableSSHRoot != nil && *enableSSHRoot) || (disableSSHAuth != nil && *disableSSHAuth)
-	if !dangerous {
-		return nil
-	}
-
-	id, ok := ipcauth.IdentityFromContext(ctx)
-	if !ok {
-		log.Warnf("denying SSH root/no-auth config change: caller identity unavailable on this control channel")
-		return gstatus.Error(codes.PermissionDenied,
-			"enabling SSH root login or disabling SSH authentication requires root/administrator, but the caller identity could not be verified on this daemon control channel")
-	}
-	if !id.IsPrivileged() {
-		log.Warnf("denying SSH root/no-auth config change from non-privileged caller %s", id)
-		return gstatus.Errorf(codes.PermissionDenied,
-			"enabling SSH root login or disabling SSH authentication requires root/administrator (caller %s is not privileged); rerun as root/administrator", id)
-	}
-	return nil
-}

client/server/ssh_gate_test.go

@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-package server
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/peer"
-	gstatus "google.golang.org/grpc/status"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
-)
-
-func ctxWithIdentity(id ipcauth.Identity) context.Context {
-	return peer.NewContext(context.Background(), &peer.Peer{AuthInfo: ipcauth.AuthInfo{Identity: id}})
-}
-
-func boolPtr(b bool) *bool { return &b }
-
-func TestRequirePrivilegedForDangerousSSH(t *testing.T) {
-	root := ipcauth.Identity{UID: 0}
-	user := ipcauth.Identity{UID: 1000}
-
-	tests := []struct {
-		name           string
-		ctx            context.Context
-		enableSSHRoot  *bool
-		disableSSHAuth *bool
-		wantDenied     bool
-	}{
-		{"no flags, no identity", context.Background(), nil, nil, false},
-		{"flags false, non-priv", ctxWithIdentity(user), boolPtr(false), boolPtr(false), false},
-		{"enableSSHRoot by root", ctxWithIdentity(root), boolPtr(true), nil, false},
-		{"enableSSHRoot by non-priv", ctxWithIdentity(user), boolPtr(true), nil, true},
-		{"disableSSHAuth by non-priv", ctxWithIdentity(user), nil, boolPtr(true), true},
-		{"enableSSHRoot no identity (fail closed)", context.Background(), boolPtr(true), nil, true},
-		{"both by root", ctxWithIdentity(root), boolPtr(true), boolPtr(true), false},
-	}
-
-	for _, tt := range tests {
-		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			err := requirePrivilegedForDangerousSSH(tt.ctx, tt.enableSSHRoot, tt.disableSSHAuth)
-			if tt.wantDenied {
-				assert.Error(t, err)
-				assert.Equal(t, codes.PermissionDenied, gstatus.Code(err))
-			} else {
-				assert.NoError(t, err)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}

client/server/state.go

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ func (s *Server) CleanState(ctx context.Context, req *proto.CleanStateRequest) (
 
 	if req.All {
 		// Reuse existing cleanup logic for all states
-		if err := RestoreResidualState(ctx, statePath); err != nil {
+		if err := restoreResidualState(ctx, statePath); err != nil {
 			return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Internal, "failed to clean all states: %v", err)
 		}
 
@@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ func (s *Server) DeleteState(ctx context.Context, req *proto.DeleteStateRequest)
 	}, nil
 }
 
-// RestoreResidualState checks if the client was not shut down in a clean way and restores residual if required.
+// restoreResidualState checks if the client was not shut down in a clean way and restores residual if required.
 // Otherwise, we might not be able to connect to the management server to retrieve new config.
-func RestoreResidualState(ctx context.Context, statePath string) error {
+func restoreResidualState(ctx context.Context, statePath string) error {
 	if statePath == "" {
 		return nil
 	}

client/ssh/config/manager.go

@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ import (
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 
 	nbssh "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
 )
 
 const (
@@ -219,20 +218,11 @@ func (m *Manager) buildHostPatterns(peer PeerSSHInfo) []string {
 	if peer.IPv6.IsValid() {
 		hostPatterns = append(hostPatterns, peer.IPv6.String())
 	}
-	// Peer FQDNs and hostnames originate from remote peers, so they must be
-	// validated as plain DNS names before being embedded in the ssh_config
-	// "Match host" pattern list. This prevents injection of arbitrary
-	// ssh_config directives via embedded quotes, whitespace, newlines, the
-	// comma pattern separator, or the "*"/"?" pattern metacharacters.
-	if domain.IsValidDomainNoWildcard(peer.FQDN) {
+	if peer.FQDN != "" {
 		hostPatterns = append(hostPatterns, peer.FQDN)
-	} else if peer.FQDN != "" {
-		log.Warnf("skipping peer FQDN with invalid characters in SSH config: %q", peer.FQDN)
 	}
-	if peer.Hostname != peer.FQDN && domain.IsValidDomainNoWildcard(peer.Hostname) {
+	if peer.Hostname != "" && peer.Hostname != peer.FQDN {
 		hostPatterns = append(hostPatterns, peer.Hostname)
-	} else if peer.Hostname != "" && peer.Hostname != peer.FQDN {
-		log.Warnf("skipping peer hostname with invalid characters in SSH config: %q", peer.Hostname)
 	}
 	return hostPatterns
 }

client/ssh/config/manager_test.go

@@ -148,45 +148,6 @@ func TestManager_MatchHostFormat(t *testing.T) {
 		"should use Match host with comma-separated patterns")
 }
 
-func TestManager_HostPatternInjection(t *testing.T) {
-	tempDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "netbird-ssh-config-test")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	defer func() { assert.NoError(t, os.RemoveAll(tempDir)) }()
-
-	manager := &Manager{
-		sshConfigDir:  filepath.Join(tempDir, "ssh_config.d"),
-		sshConfigFile: "99-netbird.conf",
-	}
-
-	// A malicious peer FQDN/hostname attempts to break out of the Match host
-	// directive and inject arbitrary ssh_config (a ProxyCommand executing a
-	// command). It must be rejected, not written to the config.
-	peers := []PeerSSHInfo{
-		{
-			Hostname: "evil\"\n    ProxyCommand touch /tmp/pwned\nHost x",
-			IP:       netip.MustParseAddr("100.125.1.1"),
-			FQDN:     "evil\"\n    ProxyCommand touch /tmp/pwned\nHost x.nb.internal",
-		},
-		{Hostname: "peer2", IP: netip.MustParseAddr("100.125.1.2"), FQDN: "peer2.nb.internal"},
-	}
-
-	err = manager.SetupSSHClientConfig(peers)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	configPath := filepath.Join(manager.sshConfigDir, manager.sshConfigFile)
-	content, err := os.ReadFile(configPath)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	configStr := string(content)
-
-	assert.NotContains(t, configStr, "ProxyCommand touch /tmp/pwned",
-		"injected directive must not appear in generated config")
-	assert.NotContains(t, configStr, "evil",
-		"malicious pattern must be dropped entirely")
-	// The valid peer must still be present, on a single Match host line.
-	assert.Contains(t, configStr, "Match host \"100.125.1.1,100.125.1.2,peer2.nb.internal,peer2\"",
-		"valid peers must survive, injected patterns dropped")
-}
-
 func TestManager_ForcedSSHConfig(t *testing.T) {
 	// Set force environment variable
 	t.Setenv(EnvForceSSHConfig, "true")

client/ssh/server/command_execution_unix.go

@@ -20,8 +20,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/creack/pty"
 	"github.com/gliderlabs/ssh"
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-
-	shellutil "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/shell"
 )
 
 // ptyManager manages Pty file operations with thread safety
@@ -148,10 +146,10 @@ func (s *Server) createShellCommand(ctx context.Context, shell string, args []st
 
 // prepareCommandEnv prepares environment variables for command execution on Unix
 func (s *Server) prepareCommandEnv(_ *log.Entry, localUser *user.User, session ssh.Session) []string {
-	env := shellutil.PrepareUserEnv(localUser, shellutil.GetUserShell(localUser.Uid))
+	env := prepareUserEnv(localUser, getUserShell(localUser.Uid))
 	env = append(env, prepareSSHEnv(session)...)
 	for _, v := range session.Environ() {
-		if shellutil.AcceptEnv(v) {
+		if acceptEnv(v) {
 			env = append(env, v)
 		}
 	}

client/ssh/server/command_execution_windows.go

@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ import (
 	"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
 	"golang.org/x/sys/windows/registry"
 
-	shellutil "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/shell"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/server/winpty"
 )
 
@@ -248,10 +247,10 @@ func (s *Server) prepareCommandEnv(logger *log.Entry, localUser *user.User, sess
 	userEnv, err := s.getUserEnvironment(logger, username, domain)
 	if err != nil {
 		log.Debugf("failed to get user environment for %s\\%s, using fallback: %v", domain, username, err)
-		env := shellutil.PrepareUserEnv(localUser, shellutil.GetUserShell(localUser.Uid))
+		env := prepareUserEnv(localUser, getUserShell(localUser.Uid))
 		env = append(env, prepareSSHEnv(session)...)
 		for _, v := range session.Environ() {
-			if shellutil.AcceptEnv(v) {
+			if acceptEnv(v) {
 				env = append(env, v)
 			}
 		}
@@ -261,7 +260,7 @@ func (s *Server) prepareCommandEnv(logger *log.Entry, localUser *user.User, sess
 	env := userEnv
 	env = append(env, prepareSSHEnv(session)...)
 	for _, v := range session.Environ() {
-		if shellutil.AcceptEnv(v) {
+		if acceptEnv(v) {
 			env = append(env, v)
 		}
 	}
@@ -274,7 +273,7 @@ func (s *Server) handlePtyLogin(logger *log.Entry, session ssh.Session, privileg
 		return false
 	}
 
-	shell := shellutil.GetUserShell(privilegeResult.User.Uid)
+	shell := getUserShell(privilegeResult.User.Uid)
 	logger.Infof("starting interactive shell: %s", shell)
 
 	s.executeCommandWithPty(logger, session, nil, privilegeResult, ptyReq, nil)
@@ -385,7 +384,7 @@ func (s *Server) executeCommandWithPty(logger *log.Entry, session ssh.Session, _
 	}
 
 	username, domain := s.parseUsername(localUser.Username)
-	shell := shellutil.GetUserShell(localUser.Uid)
+	shell := getUserShell(localUser.Uid)
 
 	req := PtyExecutionRequest{
 		Shell:    shell,

client/ssh/server/getent_cgo_unix.go

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+//go:build cgo && !osusergo && !windows
+
+package server
+
+import "os/user"
+
+// lookupWithGetent with CGO delegates directly to os/user.Lookup.
+// When CGO is enabled, os/user uses libc (getpwnam_r) which goes through
+// the NSS stack natively. If it fails, the user truly doesn't exist and
+// getent would also fail.
+func lookupWithGetent(username string) (*user.User, error) {
+	return user.Lookup(username)
+}
+
+// currentUserWithGetent with CGO delegates directly to os/user.Current.
+func currentUserWithGetent() (*user.User, error) {
+	return user.Current()
+}
+
+// groupIdsWithFallback with CGO delegates directly to user.GroupIds.
+// libc's getgrouplist handles NSS groups natively.
+func groupIdsWithFallback(u *user.User) ([]string, error) {
+	return u.GroupIds()
+}

client/ssh/server/getent_nocgo_unix.go

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 //go:build (!cgo || osusergo) && !windows
 
-package shell
+package server
 
 import (
 	"os"
@@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ import (
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 )
 
-// LookupWithGetent looks up a user by name, falling back to getent if os/user fails.
+// lookupWithGetent looks up a user by name, falling back to getent if os/user fails.
 // Without CGO, os/user only reads /etc/passwd and misses NSS-provided users.
 // getent goes through the host's NSS stack.
-func LookupWithGetent(username string) (*user.User, error) {
+func lookupWithGetent(username string) (*user.User, error) {
 	u, err := user.Lookup(username)
 	if err == nil {
 		return u, nil
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ func LookupWithGetent(username string) (*user.User, error) {
 	stdErr := err
 	log.Debugf("os/user.Lookup(%q) failed, trying getent: %v", username, err)
 
-	u, _, getentErr := runGetentPasswd(username)
+	u, _, getentErr := runGetent(username)
 	if getentErr != nil {
 		log.Debugf("getent fallback for %q also failed: %v", username, getentErr)
 		return nil, stdErr
@@ -31,26 +31,8 @@ func LookupWithGetent(username string) (*user.User, error) {
 	return u, nil
 }
 
-// LookupGroupWithGetent returns the resolved group from either a gid or groupname,
-// falling back to getent if os/user fails (NSS groups under nocgo).
-func LookupGroupWithGetent(name string) (*user.Group, error) {
-	g, err := user.LookupGroup(name)
-	if err == nil {
-		return g, nil
-	}
-
-	stdErr := err
-	log.Debugf("os/user.LookupGroup(%q) failed, trying getent: %v", name, err)
-	g, getentErr := runGetentGroup(name)
-	if getentErr != nil {
-		log.Debugf("getent fallback for %q also failed: %v", name, getentErr)
-		return nil, stdErr
-	}
-	return g, nil
-}
-
-// CurrentUserWithGetent gets the current user, falling back to getent if os/user fails.
-func CurrentUserWithGetent() (*user.User, error) {
+// currentUserWithGetent gets the current user, falling back to getent if os/user fails.
+func currentUserWithGetent() (*user.User, error) {
 	u, err := user.Current()
 	if err == nil {
 		return u, nil
@@ -60,7 +42,7 @@ func CurrentUserWithGetent() (*user.User, error) {
 	uid := strconv.Itoa(os.Getuid())
 	log.Debugf("os/user.Current() failed, trying getent with UID %s: %v", uid, err)
 
-	u, _, getentErr := runGetentPasswd(uid)
+	u, _, getentErr := runGetent(uid)
 	if getentErr != nil {
 		return nil, stdErr
 	}
@@ -68,14 +50,14 @@ func CurrentUserWithGetent() (*user.User, error) {
 	return u, nil
 }
 
-// GroupIdsWithFallback gets group IDs for a user via the id command first,
+// groupIdsWithFallback gets group IDs for a user via the id command first,
 // falling back to user.GroupIds().
-// NOTE: unlike LookupWithGetent/CurrentUserWithGetent which try stdlib first,
+// NOTE: unlike lookupWithGetent/currentUserWithGetent which try stdlib first,
 // this intentionally tries `id -G` first because without CGO, user.GroupIds()
 // only reads /etc/group and silently returns incomplete results for NSS users
 // (no error, just missing groups). The id command goes through NSS and returns
 // the full set.
-func GroupIdsWithFallback(u *user.User) ([]string, error) {
+func groupIdsWithFallback(u *user.User) ([]string, error) {
 	ids, err := runIdGroups(u.Username)
 	if err == nil {
 		return ids, nil

client/ssh/server/getent_test.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package shell
+package server
 
 import (
 	"os/user"
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ func TestLookupWithGetent_CurrentUser(t *testing.T) {
 	current, err := user.Current()
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
-	u, err := LookupWithGetent(current.Username)
+	u, err := lookupWithGetent(current.Username)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	assert.Equal(t, current.Username, u.Username)
 	assert.Equal(t, current.Uid, u.Uid)
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ func TestLookupWithGetent_CurrentUser(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestLookupWithGetent_NonexistentUser(t *testing.T) {
-	_, err := LookupWithGetent("nonexistent_user_xyzzy_12345")
+	_, err := lookupWithGetent("nonexistent_user_xyzzy_12345")
 	require.Error(t, err, "should fail for nonexistent user")
 }
 
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ func TestCurrentUserWithGetent(t *testing.T) {
 	stdUser, err := user.Current()
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
-	u, err := CurrentUserWithGetent()
+	u, err := currentUserWithGetent()
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	assert.Equal(t, stdUser.Uid, u.Uid)
 	assert.Equal(t, stdUser.Username, u.Username)
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ func TestGroupIdsWithFallback_CurrentUser(t *testing.T) {
 	current, err := user.Current()
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
-	groups, err := GroupIdsWithFallback(current)
+	groups, err := groupIdsWithFallback(current)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	require.NotEmpty(t, groups, "current user should have at least one group")
 
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ func TestGroupIdsWithFallback_CurrentUser(t *testing.T) {
 func TestGetShellFromGetent_CurrentUser(t *testing.T) {
 	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
 		// Windows stub always returns empty, which is correct
-		shell := GetShellFromGetent("1000")
+		shell := getShellFromGetent("1000")
 		assert.Empty(t, shell, "Windows stub should return empty")
 		return
 	}
@@ -65,9 +65,9 @@ func TestGetShellFromGetent_CurrentUser(t *testing.T) {
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	// getent may not be available on all systems (e.g., macOS without Homebrew getent)
-	shell := GetShellFromGetent(current.Uid)
+	shell := getShellFromGetent(current.Uid)
 	if shell == "" {
-		t.Log("GetShellFromGetent returned empty, getent may not be available")
+		t.Log("getShellFromGetent returned empty, getent may not be available")
 		return
 	}
 	assert.True(t, shell[0] == '/', "shell should be an absolute path, got %q", shell)
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ func TestLookupWithGetent_RootUser(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Skip("no root user on Windows")
 	}
 
-	u, err := LookupWithGetent("root")
+	u, err := lookupWithGetent("root")
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Skip("root user not available on this system")
 	}
@@ -86,25 +86,25 @@ func TestLookupWithGetent_RootUser(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 // TestIntegration_FullLookupChain exercises the complete user lookup chain
-// against the real system, testing that all wrappers (LookupWithGetent,
-// CurrentUserWithGetent, GroupIdsWithFallback, GetShellFromGetent) produce
+// against the real system, testing that all wrappers (lookupWithGetent,
+// currentUserWithGetent, groupIdsWithFallback, getShellFromGetent) produce
 // consistent and correct results when composed together.
 func TestIntegration_FullLookupChain(t *testing.T) {
-	// Step 1: CurrentUserWithGetent must resolve the running user.
-	current, err := CurrentUserWithGetent()
-	require.NoError(t, err, "CurrentUserWithGetent must resolve the running user")
+	// Step 1: currentUserWithGetent must resolve the running user.
+	current, err := currentUserWithGetent()
+	require.NoError(t, err, "currentUserWithGetent must resolve the running user")
 	require.NotEmpty(t, current.Uid)
 	require.NotEmpty(t, current.Username)
 
-	// Step 2: LookupWithGetent by the same username must return matching identity.
-	byName, err := LookupWithGetent(current.Username)
+	// Step 2: lookupWithGetent by the same username must return matching identity.
+	byName, err := lookupWithGetent(current.Username)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	assert.Equal(t, current.Uid, byName.Uid, "lookup by name should return same UID")
 	assert.Equal(t, current.Gid, byName.Gid, "lookup by name should return same GID")
 	assert.Equal(t, current.HomeDir, byName.HomeDir, "lookup by name should return same home")
 
-	// Step 3: GroupIdsWithFallback must return at least the primary GID.
-	groups, err := GroupIdsWithFallback(current)
+	// Step 3: groupIdsWithFallback must return at least the primary GID.
+	groups, err := groupIdsWithFallback(current)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	require.NotEmpty(t, groups, "user must have at least one group")
 
@@ -120,10 +120,10 @@ func TestIntegration_FullLookupChain(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	assert.True(t, foundPrimary, "primary GID %s should appear in supplementary groups", current.Gid)
 
-	// Step 4: GetShellFromGetent should either return a valid shell path or empty
+	// Step 4: getShellFromGetent should either return a valid shell path or empty
 	// (empty is OK when getent is not available, e.g. macOS without Homebrew getent).
 	if runtime.GOOS != "windows" {
-		shell := GetShellFromGetent(current.Uid)
+		shell := getShellFromGetent(current.Uid)
 		if shell != "" {
 			assert.True(t, shell[0] == '/', "shell should be an absolute path, got %q", shell)
 		}
@@ -131,17 +131,17 @@ func TestIntegration_FullLookupChain(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 // TestIntegration_LookupAndGroupsConsistency verifies that a user resolved via
-// LookupWithGetent can have their groups resolved via GroupIdsWithFallback,
+// lookupWithGetent can have their groups resolved via groupIdsWithFallback,
 // testing the handoff between the two functions as used by the SSH server.
 func TestIntegration_LookupAndGroupsConsistency(t *testing.T) {
 	current, err := user.Current()
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	// Simulate the SSH server flow: lookup user, then get their groups.
-	resolved, err := LookupWithGetent(current.Username)
+	resolved, err := lookupWithGetent(current.Username)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
-	groups, err := GroupIdsWithFallback(resolved)
+	groups, err := groupIdsWithFallback(resolved)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	require.NotEmpty(t, groups, "resolved user must have groups")
 
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ func TestIntegration_LookupAndGroupsConsistency(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 // TestIntegration_ShellLookupChain tests the full shell resolution chain
-// (getShellFromPasswd -> GetShellFromGetent -> $SHELL -> default) on Unix.
+// (getShellFromPasswd -> getShellFromGetent -> $SHELL -> default) on Unix.
 func TestIntegration_ShellLookupChain(t *testing.T) {
 	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
 		t.Skip("Unix shell lookup not applicable on Windows")
@@ -165,8 +165,8 @@ func TestIntegration_ShellLookupChain(t *testing.T) {
 	current, err := user.Current()
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
-	// GetUserShell is the top-level function used by the SSH server.
-	shell := GetUserShell(current.Uid)
-	require.NotEmpty(t, shell, "GetUserShell must always return a shell")
+	// getUserShell is the top-level function used by the SSH server.
+	shell := getUserShell(current.Uid)
+	require.NotEmpty(t, shell, "getUserShell must always return a shell")
 	assert.True(t, shell[0] == '/', "shell should be an absolute path, got %q", shell)
 }

client/ssh/server/getent_unix.go

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 //go:build !windows
 
-package shell
+package server
 
 import (
 	"context"
@@ -14,26 +14,19 @@ import (
 
 const getentTimeout = 5 * time.Second
 
-// GetShellFromGetent gets a user's login shell via getent by UID.
+// getShellFromGetent gets a user's login shell via getent by UID.
 // This is needed even with CGO because getShellFromPasswd reads /etc/passwd
 // directly and won't find NSS-provided users there.
-func GetShellFromGetent(userID string) string {
-	_, shell, err := runGetentPasswd(userID)
+func getShellFromGetent(userID string) string {
+	_, shell, err := runGetent(userID)
 	if err != nil {
 		return ""
 	}
 	return shell
 }
 
-// GetUserFromGetent returns the resolved user from either a uid or username,
-// going through the host's NSS stack.
-func GetUserFromGetent(query string) (*user.User, error) {
-	u, _, err := runGetentPasswd(query)
-	return u, err
-}
-
-// runGetentPasswd executes `getent passwd <query>` and returns the user and login shell.
-func runGetentPasswd(query string) (*user.User, string, error) {
+// runGetent executes `getent passwd <query>` and returns the user and login shell.
+func runGetent(query string) (*user.User, string, error) {
 	if !validateGetentInput(query) {
 		return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("invalid getent input: %q", query)
 	}
@@ -49,24 +42,7 @@ func runGetentPasswd(query string) (*user.User, string, error) {
 	return parseGetentPasswd(string(out))
 }
 
-// runGetentGroup executes `getent group <query>` and returns the group.
-func runGetentGroup(query string) (*user.Group, error) {
-	if !validateGetentInput(query) {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid getent input: %q", query)
-	}
-
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), getentTimeout)
-	defer cancel()
-
-	out, err := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "getent", "group", query).Output()
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("getent group %s: %w", query, err)
-	}
-
-	return parseGetentGroup(string(out))
-}
-
-// parseGetentPasswd parses getent passwd output: "name:x:uid:gid:gecos:home:shell".
+// parseGetentPasswd parses getent passwd output: "name:x:uid:gid:gecos:home:shell"
 func parseGetentPasswd(output string) (*user.User, string, error) {
 	fields := strings.SplitN(strings.TrimSpace(output), ":", 8)
 	if len(fields) < 6 {
@@ -91,24 +67,9 @@ func parseGetentPasswd(output string) (*user.User, string, error) {
 	}, shell, nil
 }
 
-// parseGetentGroup parses getent group output: "group:x:gid:members".
-func parseGetentGroup(output string) (*user.Group, error) {
-	fields := strings.SplitN(strings.TrimSpace(output), ":", 8)
-	if len(fields) < 4 {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected getent output (need 4+ fields): %q", output)
-	}
-
-	if fields[0] == "" || fields[2] == "" {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing required fields in getent output: %q", output)
-	}
-
-	return &user.Group{Gid: fields[2], Name: fields[0]}, nil
-}
-
 // validateGetentInput checks that the input is safe to pass to getent or id.
 // Allows POSIX usernames, numeric UIDs, and common NSS extensions
-// (@ for Kerberos, $ for Samba, + for NIS compat). A leading hyphen is
-// rejected so the input can never be parsed as a command-line flag.
+// (@ for Kerberos, $ for Samba, + for NIS compat).
 func validateGetentInput(input string) bool {
 	maxLen := 32
 	if runtime.GOOS == "linux" {
@@ -119,10 +80,6 @@ func validateGetentInput(input string) bool {
 		return false
 	}
 
-	if input[0] == '-' {
-		return false
-	}
-
 	for _, r := range input {
 		if isAllowedGetentChar(r) {
 			continue

client/ssh/server/getent_unix_test.go

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 //go:build !windows
 
-package shell
+package server
 
 import (
 	"os/exec"
@@ -157,9 +157,6 @@ func TestValidateGetentInput(t *testing.T) {
 		{"numeric UID", "1001", true},
 		{"dots and underscores", "alice.bob_test", true},
 		{"hyphen", "alice-bob", true},
-		{"leading hyphen rejected", "-i", false},
-		{"leading double hyphen rejected", "--no-idn", false},
-		{"lone hyphen rejected", "-", false},
 		{"kerberos principal", "user@REALM", true},
 		{"samba machine account", "MACHINE$", true},
 		{"NIS compat", "+user", true},
@@ -198,7 +195,7 @@ func TestRunGetent_RootUser(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Skip("getent not available on this system")
 	}
 
-	u, shell, err := runGetentPasswd("root")
+	u, shell, err := runGetent("root")
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	assert.Equal(t, "root", u.Username)
 	assert.Equal(t, "0", u.Uid)
@@ -211,7 +208,7 @@ func TestRunGetent_ByUID(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Skip("getent not available on this system")
 	}
 
-	u, _, err := runGetentPasswd("0")
+	u, _, err := runGetent("0")
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	assert.Equal(t, "root", u.Username)
 	assert.Equal(t, "0", u.Uid)
@@ -222,15 +219,15 @@ func TestRunGetent_NonexistentUser(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Skip("getent not available on this system")
 	}
 
-	_, _, err := runGetentPasswd("nonexistent_user_xyzzy_12345")
+	_, _, err := runGetent("nonexistent_user_xyzzy_12345")
 	assert.Error(t, err)
 }
 
 func TestRunGetent_InvalidInput(t *testing.T) {
-	_, _, err := runGetentPasswd("")
+	_, _, err := runGetent("")
 	assert.Error(t, err)
 
-	_, _, err = runGetentPasswd("user\x00name")
+	_, _, err = runGetent("user\x00name")
 	assert.Error(t, err)
 }
 
@@ -239,7 +236,7 @@ func TestRunGetent_NotAvailable(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Skip("getent is available, can't test missing case")
 	}
 
-	_, _, err := runGetentPasswd("root")
+	_, _, err := runGetent("root")
 	assert.Error(t, err, "should fail when getent is not installed")
 }
 
@@ -286,7 +283,7 @@ func TestGetentResultsMatchStdlib(t *testing.T) {
 	current, err := user.Current()
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
-	getentUser, _, err := runGetentPasswd(current.Username)
+	getentUser, _, err := runGetent(current.Username)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	assert.Equal(t, current.Username, getentUser.Username, "username should match")
@@ -303,7 +300,7 @@ func TestGetentResultsMatchStdlib_ByUID(t *testing.T) {
 	current, err := user.Current()
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
-	getentUser, _, err := runGetentPasswd(current.Uid)
+	getentUser, _, err := runGetent(current.Uid)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	assert.Equal(t, current.Username, getentUser.Username, "username should match when looked up by UID")
@@ -359,7 +356,7 @@ func TestGetShellFromPasswd_CurrentUser(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.True(t, shell[0] == '/', "shell should be an absolute path, got %q", shell)
 
 	if _, err := exec.LookPath("getent"); err == nil {
-		_, getentShell, getentErr := runGetentPasswd(current.Uid)
+		_, getentShell, getentErr := runGetent(current.Uid)
 		if getentErr == nil && getentShell != "" {
 			assert.Equal(t, getentShell, shell, "shell from /etc/passwd should match getent")
 		}
@@ -403,7 +400,7 @@ func TestGetShellFromPasswd_MatchesGetentForKnownUsers(t *testing.T) {
 			continue
 		}
 
-		_, getentShell, err := runGetentPasswd(uid)
+		_, getentShell, err := runGetent(uid)
 		if err != nil {
 			continue
 		}

client/ssh/server/getent_windows.go

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+//go:build windows
+
+package server
+
+import "os/user"
+
+// lookupWithGetent on Windows just delegates to os/user.Lookup.
+// Windows does not use NSS/getent; its user lookup works without CGO.
+func lookupWithGetent(username string) (*user.User, error) {
+	return user.Lookup(username)
+}
+
+// currentUserWithGetent on Windows just delegates to os/user.Current.
+func currentUserWithGetent() (*user.User, error) {
+	return user.Current()
+}
+
+// getShellFromGetent is a no-op on Windows; shell resolution uses PowerShell detection.
+func getShellFromGetent(_ string) string {
+	return ""
+}
+
+// groupIdsWithFallback on Windows just delegates to u.GroupIds().
+func groupIdsWithFallback(u *user.User) ([]string, error) {
+	return u.GroupIds()
+}

client/ssh/server/shell.go

@@ -1,14 +1,17 @@
-package shell
+package server
 
 import (
 	"bufio"
 	"fmt"
+	"net"
 	"os"
 	"os/exec"
 	"os/user"
 	"runtime"
+	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 
+	"github.com/gliderlabs/ssh"
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 )
 
@@ -19,9 +22,9 @@ const (
 	powershellExe = "powershell.exe"
 )
 
-// GetUserShell returns the appropriate shell for the given user ID.
-// Handles all platform-specific logic and fallbacks consistently.
-func GetUserShell(userID string) string {
+// getUserShell returns the appropriate shell for the given user ID
+// Handles all platform-specific logic and fallbacks consistently
+func getUserShell(userID string) string {
 	switch runtime.GOOS {
 	case "windows":
 		return getWindowsUserShell()
@@ -53,7 +56,7 @@ func getUnixUserShell(userID string) string {
 		return shell
 	}
 
-	if shell := GetShellFromGetent(userID); shell != "" {
+	if shell := getShellFromGetent(userID); shell != "" {
 		return shell
 	}
 
@@ -64,7 +67,7 @@ func getUnixUserShell(userID string) string {
 	return defaultUnixShell
 }
 
-// getShellFromPasswd reads the shell from /etc/passwd for the given user ID.
+// getShellFromPasswd reads the shell from /etc/passwd for the given user ID
 func getShellFromPasswd(userID string) string {
 	file, err := os.Open("/etc/passwd")
 	if err != nil {
@@ -98,8 +101,8 @@ func getShellFromPasswd(userID string) string {
 	return ""
 }
 
-// PrepareUserEnv prepares environment variables for user execution.
-func PrepareUserEnv(user *user.User, shell string) []string {
+// prepareUserEnv prepares environment variables for user execution
+func prepareUserEnv(user *user.User, shell string) []string {
 	pathValue := "/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/local/games:/usr/games"
 	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
 		pathValue = `C:\Windows\System32;C:\Windows;C:\Windows\System32\Wbem;C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0`
@@ -114,9 +117,9 @@ func PrepareUserEnv(user *user.User, shell string) []string {
 	}
 }
 
-// AcceptEnv checks if an environment variable from an SSH client should be accepted.
-// This is a whitelist of variables that SSH clients can send to the server.
-func AcceptEnv(envVar string) bool {
+// acceptEnv checks if environment variable from SSH client should be accepted
+// This is a whitelist of variables that SSH clients can send to the server
+func acceptEnv(envVar string) bool {
 	varName := envVar
 	if idx := strings.Index(envVar, "="); idx != -1 {
 		varName = envVar[:idx]
@@ -153,3 +156,29 @@ func AcceptEnv(envVar string) bool {
 
 	return false
 }
+
+// prepareSSHEnv prepares SSH protocol-specific environment variables
+// These variables provide information about the SSH connection itself
+func prepareSSHEnv(session ssh.Session) []string {
+	remoteAddr := session.RemoteAddr()
+	localAddr := session.LocalAddr()
+
+	remoteHost, remotePort, err := net.SplitHostPort(remoteAddr.String())
+	if err != nil {
+		remoteHost = remoteAddr.String()
+		remotePort = "0"
+	}
+
+	localHost, localPort, err := net.SplitHostPort(localAddr.String())
+	if err != nil {
+		localHost = localAddr.String()
+		localPort = strconv.Itoa(InternalSSHPort)
+	}
+
+	return []string{
+		// SSH_CLIENT format: "client_ip client_port server_port"
+		fmt.Sprintf("SSH_CLIENT=%s %s %s", remoteHost, remotePort, localPort),
+		// SSH_CONNECTION format: "client_ip client_port server_ip server_port"
+		fmt.Sprintf("SSH_CONNECTION=%s %s %s %s", remoteHost, remotePort, localHost, localPort),
+	}
+}

client/ssh/server/ssh_env.go

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-package server
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"net"
-	"strconv"
-
-	"github.com/gliderlabs/ssh"
-)
-
-// prepareSSHEnv prepares SSH protocol-specific environment variables
-// These variables provide information about the SSH connection itself
-func prepareSSHEnv(session ssh.Session) []string {
-	remoteAddr := session.RemoteAddr()
-	localAddr := session.LocalAddr()
-
-	remoteHost, remotePort, err := net.SplitHostPort(remoteAddr.String())
-	if err != nil {
-		remoteHost = remoteAddr.String()
-		remotePort = "0"
-	}
-
-	localHost, localPort, err := net.SplitHostPort(localAddr.String())
-	if err != nil {
-		localHost = localAddr.String()
-		localPort = strconv.Itoa(InternalSSHPort)
-	}
-
-	return []string{
-		// SSH_CLIENT format: "client_ip client_port server_port"
-		fmt.Sprintf("SSH_CLIENT=%s %s %s", remoteHost, remotePort, localPort),
-		// SSH_CONNECTION format: "client_ip client_port server_ip server_port"
-		fmt.Sprintf("SSH_CONNECTION=%s %s %s %s", remoteHost, remotePort, localHost, localPort),
-	}
-}