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Author SHA1 Message Date
Zoltán Papp
0738734b6e [client] Force interactive login when extending the auth session
A session extend must be answered from the account the peer is registered
under. With a silent PKCE flow (DisablePromptLogin or max_age=0) the IdP
answers from whatever session it already holds, which need not be the
peer's account when several are signed in; the token then fails the
user match in ExtendAuthSession with no way to pick another account.

Mark the PKCE flow request as a session extend so the management server
can force prompt=login for it, overriding the configured silent flow.
2026-08-15 10:33:50 +02:00
26 changed files with 1006 additions and 1678 deletions

View File

@@ -191,49 +191,48 @@ func (a *Auth) login(urlOpener URLOpener, isAndroidTV bool) error {
return nil
}
// loginHintSetter is implemented by both concrete flows (PKCE and device code)
// but absent from the OAuthFlow interface, hence the assertion below — the same
// way internal/auth wires it in authenticateWithPKCEFlow.
type loginHintSetter interface {
SetLoginHint(hint string)
}
func (a *Auth) foregroundGetTokenInfo(authClient *auth.Auth, urlOpener URLOpener, isAndroidTV bool) (*auth.TokenInfo, error) {
oAuthFlow, err := authClient.GetOAuthFlow(a.ctx, isAndroidTV, profileLoginHint(a.cfgPath))
return a.foregroundGetTokenInfoFlow(authClient, urlOpener, isAndroidTV, false)
}
// foregroundGetTokenInfoFlow runs the interactive flow. sessionExtend tells the
// server the token will renew this peer's session rather than log a peer in, so
// it can rule out a silent authorization the IdP could answer from an unrelated
// account. See PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest.
func (a *Auth) foregroundGetTokenInfoFlow(authClient *auth.Auth, urlOpener URLOpener, isAndroidTV bool, sessionExtend bool) (*auth.TokenInfo, error) {
oAuthFlow, err := authClient.GetOAuthFlow(a.ctx, isAndroidTV, sessionExtend)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get OAuth flow: %v", err)
}
return runOAuthFlow(a.ctx, oAuthFlow, urlOpener, nil)
}
// profileLoginHint returns the stored account email for the profile at cfgPath.
// An empty hint is deliberate, not a fallback: a fresh profile leaves the
// choice to the IdP. Switching accounts is done by switching or removing
// profiles, not by logging out — logout keeps the email.
func profileLoginHint(cfgPath string) string {
if cfgPath == "" {
return ""
// An empty hint is deliberate, not a fallback: a fresh profile leaves the
// choice to the IdP. Switching accounts is done by switching or removing
// profiles, not by logging out — logout keeps the email.
if a.cfgPath != "" {
if hint := readProfileEmail(a.cfgPath); hint != "" {
if setter, ok := oAuthFlow.(loginHintSetter); ok {
setter.SetLoginHint(hint)
}
}
}
return readProfileEmail(cfgPath)
}
// runOAuthFlow drives an already acquired OAuth flow to a token: requests the
// flow info, presents the verification URL through the opener and waits for
// the browser round-trip. Open is called synchronously — it is what marks the
// surface as opened on the client side, and a fast token's OnLoginSuccess is
// a no-op until it has, so the dismissal would be dropped rather than
// delayed. Openers must therefore not block: they post their UI work and
// return. onWaiting, when set, runs after the URL is shown, right before the
// blocking wait.
func runOAuthFlow(ctx context.Context, flow auth.OAuthFlow, urlOpener URLOpener, onWaiting func()) (*auth.TokenInfo, error) {
flowInfo, err := flow.RequestAuthInfo(ctx)
flowInfo, err := oAuthFlow.RequestAuthInfo(context.TODO())
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("request auth info: %w", err)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("getting a request OAuth flow info failed: %v", err)
}
urlOpener.Open(flowInfo.VerificationURIComplete, flowInfo.UserCode)
go urlOpener.Open(flowInfo.VerificationURIComplete, flowInfo.UserCode)
if onWaiting != nil {
onWaiting()
}
tokenInfo, err := flow.WaitToken(ctx, flowInfo)
tokenInfo, err := oAuthFlow.WaitToken(a.ctx, flowInfo)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("wait for token: %w", err)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("waiting for browser login failed: %v", err)
}
return &tokenInfo, nil

View File

@@ -293,11 +293,13 @@ func (c *Client) extendAuthSession(ctx context.Context, urlOpener URLOpener, isA
}
defer authClient.Close()
// Passing the config path makes the flow pick up the login_hint: an extend
// renews the session of the account already signed in, so it must not stop to
// offer a choice.
// Passing the config path makes the flow pick up the login_hint. That alone
// cannot keep the IdP on this profile's account though — a hint is only a
// suggestion, and a silent authorization is answered from whatever session the
// IdP already has, which need not be this peer's when several accounts are
// signed in. Marking the flow as an extend lets the server rule that out.
a := NewAuthWithConfig(ctx, cfg, cfgPath)
tokenInfo, err := a.foregroundGetTokenInfo(authClient, urlOpener, isAndroidTV)
tokenInfo, err := a.foregroundGetTokenInfoFlow(authClient, urlOpener, isAndroidTV, true)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("interactive sso login failed: %v", err)
}

View File

@@ -1,752 +0,0 @@
//go:build android
package android
import (
"bufio"
"bytes"
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"os"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
gossh "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/knownhosts"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/auth"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
nbssh "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/detection"
)
const (
sshDialTimeout = 30 * time.Second
sshDetectionTimeout = 5 * time.Second
)
// PasswordRequiredMarker tells Java to prompt for a password and retry. It is
// a string because gomobile flattens errors to their message, so a sentinel
// value would not survive the binding.
const PasswordRequiredMarker = "netbird-ssh-password-required"
// HostKeyUnknownMarker tells Java to show the fingerprint and, on confirmation,
// retry with TrustHostKey set. The presented fingerprint is appended after the
// marker so the prompt can display it and the retry can guard against a key
// that changed between the two connects. Only regular (non-NetBird) servers
// reach this: NetBird peers verify against the registry.
const HostKeyUnknownMarker = "netbird-ssh-hostkey-unknown"
var (
errPasswordRequired = errors.New(PasswordRequiredMarker)
errClientClosed = errors.New("ssh client closed")
)
// errHostKeyUnknown carries the presented fingerprint so Connect can build the
// marker message the Java side parses.
type errHostKeyUnknown struct {
fingerprint string
}
func (e *errHostKeyUnknown) Error() string {
return HostKeyUnknownMarker + ":" + e.fingerprint
}
// SSHTerminalListener receives SSH session events. It is implemented in Java.
//
// All callbacks are invoked from goroutines and may run concurrently with each
// other; the implementation must be safe to call from any thread.
type SSHTerminalListener interface {
OnConnected()
OnData(data []byte)
OnClose(reason string)
OnError(message string)
}
// SSHClient is a NetBird-aware SSH client exposed to Java via gomobile.
//
// It dials through the running NetBird tunnel and runs a standard SSH session
// on top with PTY enabled. Host-key verification uses the NetBird-provided
// peer SSH host keys, identical to the desktop client.
type SSHClient struct {
nb *Client
mu sync.Mutex
listener SSHTerminalListener
urlOpener URLOpener
sshClient *gossh.Client
session *gossh.Session
stdin io.WriteCloser
closed bool
// gen identifies the current connection attempt. Connect and Close bump it,
// so an in-flight dial or a reader left over from a previous connection
// finds itself stale and stays silent instead of publishing OnConnected or
// OnClose for a connection the caller already abandoned.
gen uint64
dialCancel context.CancelFunc
// knownHostsPath is the TOFU store for regular SSH servers. Java supplies a
// per-profile path, since an overlay IP is a different host under a
// different profile. Empty until set: without it a regular server cannot be
// verified and Connect refuses one.
knownHostsPath string
// trustHostKey carries the fingerprint the user confirmed on a previous
// attempt, so the retry accepts exactly that key and persists it.
trustHostKey string
}
// NewSSHClient creates a new SSH client bound to the running NetBird Client.
func NewSSHClient(c *Client) *SSHClient {
return &SSHClient{nb: c}
}
// SetListener registers the Java listener. Must be called before Connect to
// receive any events.
func (s *SSHClient) SetListener(l SSHTerminalListener) {
s.mu.Lock()
s.listener = l
s.mu.Unlock()
}
// SetURLOpener registers the Java URL opener used to display the device-code
// authorization page in a Custom Tabs window when the target peer requires
// JWT authentication. Must be set before Connect to be effective.
func (s *SSHClient) SetURLOpener(opener URLOpener) {
s.mu.Lock()
s.urlOpener = opener
s.mu.Unlock()
}
// SetKnownHostsPath points the TOFU host-key store at a per-profile file. Must
// be set before connecting to a regular SSH server; without it such a server
// cannot be verified and Connect refuses one.
func (s *SSHClient) SetKnownHostsPath(path string) {
s.mu.Lock()
s.knownHostsPath = path
s.mu.Unlock()
}
// TrustHostKey records the fingerprint the user confirmed for a regular server,
// so the next Connect accepts that exact key and adds it to the known-hosts
// store. Passing a fingerprint that no longer matches makes the connect fail
// rather than trust a key that changed since the prompt.
func (s *SSHClient) TrustHostKey(fingerprint string) {
s.mu.Lock()
s.trustHostKey = fingerprint
s.mu.Unlock()
}
// Connect dials the SSH server through the NetBird tunnel and performs the
// SSH handshake. It auto-detects the server type via SSH banner inspection
// and selects the appropriate authentication path:
//
// - NetBird-SSH server requiring JWT: launches the OAuth 2.0 device-code
// flow, opens the verification URL through the registered URLOpener, and
// uses the resulting token as the SSH password. Host-key verification
// uses the NetBird peer registry.
// - NetBird-SSH server without JWT: authenticates with the NetBird SSH
// private key. Host-key verification uses the NetBird peer registry.
// - Regular SSH server (e.g. OpenSSH): authenticates with the NetBird key
// first (so a user-installed NetBird public key works), then falls back
// to the supplied password if non-empty. Host-key verification is
// trust-on-first-use against the per-profile known-hosts store.
//
// The password parameter is only consulted for regular SSH servers.
func (s *SSHClient) Connect(host string, port int, user, password string) error {
if port < 1 || port > 65535 {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid port: %d", port)
}
cfg, cfgPath, cc := s.nb.authSnapshot()
if cc == nil {
return errors.New("netbird client not running")
}
if cfg == nil {
return errors.New("netbird config not loaded")
}
engine := cc.Engine()
if engine == nil {
return errors.New("netbird engine not available")
}
s.mu.Lock()
s.gen++
gen := s.gen
s.mu.Unlock()
serverType := detectServerType(host, port)
log.Debugf("SSH server type: %s", serverType)
authMethods, hostKeyCallback, err := s.buildAuth(cfg, cfgPath, engine, serverType, password)
if err != nil {
return err
}
clientConfig := &gossh.ClientConfig{
User: user,
Auth: authMethods,
HostKeyCallback: hostKeyCallback,
Timeout: sshDialTimeout,
}
err = s.dialAndHandshake(gen, host, port, clientConfig)
// An unknown host key is a prompt, not a failure: return the marker intact
// (rootCause would unwrap it) so Java can show the fingerprint and retry.
var unknownHost *errHostKeyUnknown
if errors.As(err, &unknownHost) {
return errors.New(unknownHost.Error())
}
// A regular server may still accept a password, so let the caller ask for
// one instead of failing. NetBird servers never use a password, so a
// failure there is genuine.
if err != nil && serverType != detection.ServerTypeNetBirdJWT &&
serverType != detection.ServerTypeNetBirdNoJWT && isAuthFailure(err) &&
passwordCouldHelp(err, password != "") {
return errPasswordRequired
}
if err != nil {
return rootCause(err)
}
return nil
}
// StartSession requests a PTY and starts an interactive shell. Output from
// the session is forwarded to the listener via OnData.
func (s *SSHClient) StartSession(cols, rows int) error {
err := s.startSession(cols, rows)
if err != nil {
log.Infof("SSH: start session failed: %v", err)
return rootCause(err)
}
return nil
}
// Write sends data to the SSH session stdin.
func (s *SSHClient) Write(data []byte) error {
s.mu.Lock()
stdin := s.stdin
s.mu.Unlock()
if stdin == nil {
return errors.New("ssh session not started")
}
if _, err := stdin.Write(data); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write stdin: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// Resize updates the PTY window size.
func (s *SSHClient) Resize(cols, rows int) error {
s.mu.Lock()
session := s.session
s.mu.Unlock()
if session == nil {
return errors.New("ssh session not started")
}
return session.WindowChange(rows, cols)
}
// Reset makes a closed client usable for another Connect: Close leaves the
// one-shot guard set, and clearing it lets the same client back a reconnect.
func (s *SSHClient) Reset() {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
s.closed = false
}
// Close terminates the SSH session and underlying connection. Safe to call
// multiple times.
func (s *SSHClient) Close() error {
s.mu.Lock()
s.gen++
if s.dialCancel != nil {
s.dialCancel()
s.dialCancel = nil
}
sshClient := s.sshClient
session := s.session
stdin := s.stdin
s.sshClient = nil
s.session = nil
s.stdin = nil
notify := !s.closed
s.closed = true
listener := s.listener
s.mu.Unlock()
if stdin != nil {
if err := stdin.Close(); err != nil {
log.Debugf("ssh: stdin close: %v", err)
}
}
if session != nil {
if err := session.Close(); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
log.Debugf("ssh: session close: %v", err)
}
}
var firstErr error
if sshClient != nil {
if err := sshClient.Close(); err != nil {
firstErr = err
}
}
if notify && listener != nil {
listener.OnClose("closed by client")
}
return firstErr
}
func (s *SSHClient) startSession(cols, rows int) error {
log.Debugf("SSH: starting session %dx%d", cols, rows)
s.mu.Lock()
sshClient := s.sshClient
gen := s.gen
s.mu.Unlock()
if sshClient == nil {
return errors.New("ssh client not connected")
}
pty, err := nbssh.StartPTYSession(sshClient, cols, rows)
if err != nil {
return err
}
s.mu.Lock()
if gen != s.gen {
s.mu.Unlock()
closeQuiet(pty.Session, "stale session")
return errClientClosed
}
s.session = pty.Session
s.stdin = pty.Stdin
s.mu.Unlock()
readerDone := make(chan string, 2)
go func() { readerDone <- s.readLoop(pty.Stdout, "stdout") }()
go func() { readerDone <- s.readLoop(pty.Stderr, "stderr") }()
go func() {
reason := <-readerDone
if second := <-readerDone; reason == "" {
reason = second
}
s.notifyClose(gen, reason)
}()
log.Debug("SSH: session started, shell running")
return nil
}
func (s *SSHClient) buildAuth(cfg *profilemanager.Config, cfgPath string, engine *internal.Engine,
serverType detection.ServerType, password string) ([]gossh.AuthMethod, gossh.HostKeyCallback, error) {
switch serverType {
case detection.ServerTypeNetBirdJWT:
token, err := s.requestJWTToken(cfg, cfgPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("jwt: %w", err)
}
auths := []gossh.AuthMethod{gossh.Password(token)}
return auths, nbssh.CreateHostKeyCallback(nbssh.PeerKeyLookup(engine.GetPeerSSHKey)), nil
case detection.ServerTypeNetBirdNoJWT:
if cfg.SSHKey == "" {
return nil, nil, errors.New("no NetBird SSH key available")
}
signer, err := gossh.ParsePrivateKey([]byte(cfg.SSHKey))
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("parse netbird ssh key: %w", err)
}
auths := []gossh.AuthMethod{gossh.PublicKeys(signer)}
return auths, nbssh.CreateHostKeyCallback(nbssh.PeerKeyLookup(engine.GetPeerSSHKey)), nil
case detection.ServerTypeRegular:
var auths []gossh.AuthMethod
if cfg.SSHKey != "" {
if signer, err := gossh.ParsePrivateKey([]byte(cfg.SSHKey)); err == nil {
auths = append(auths, gossh.PublicKeys(signer))
} else {
log.Debugf("ssh: parse netbird key for regular auth: %v", err)
}
}
if password != "" {
pw := password
auths = append(auths, gossh.Password(pw))
auths = append(auths, gossh.KeyboardInteractive(func(_, _ string, questions []string, _ []bool) ([]string, error) {
answers := make([]string, len(questions))
for i := range questions {
answers[i] = pw
}
return answers, nil
}))
}
if len(auths) == 0 {
// Nothing to offer at all: ask for a password rather than failing,
// so the caller can retry once the user supplies one.
return nil, nil, errPasswordRequired
}
callback, err := s.tofuHostKeyCallback()
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
return auths, callback, nil
default:
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported SSH server type: %v", serverType)
}
}
// tofuHostKeyCallback verifies a regular server's host key against the
// per-profile known-hosts file. An unknown host returns errHostKeyUnknown so
// Java can show the fingerprint and, once confirmed, retry with the key
// trusted; a changed key is rejected outright, as OpenSSH does. When the user
// has confirmed a fingerprint, the callback accepts exactly that key and
// appends it to the store.
func (s *SSHClient) tofuHostKeyCallback() (gossh.HostKeyCallback, error) {
s.mu.Lock()
path := s.knownHostsPath
trusted := s.trustHostKey
s.mu.Unlock()
if path == "" {
return nil, errors.New("no known-hosts store configured for regular SSH")
}
if err := ensureFileExists(path); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("prepare known-hosts store: %w", err)
}
known, err := knownhosts.New(path)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("load known-hosts store: %w", err)
}
return func(hostname string, remote net.Addr, key gossh.PublicKey) error {
err := known(hostname, remote, key)
if err == nil {
return nil
}
var keyErr *knownhosts.KeyError
if !errors.As(err, &keyErr) {
return err
}
// Want holds the keys already stored for this host: non-empty means the
// presented key replaced a known one, which TOFU must never accept
// silently.
if len(keyErr.Want) > 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("SSH host key changed for %s (possible attack)", hostname)
}
fingerprint := gossh.FingerprintSHA256(key)
if trusted == "" {
return &errHostKeyUnknown{fingerprint: fingerprint}
}
if trusted != fingerprint {
return fmt.Errorf("SSH host key changed since it was confirmed for %s", hostname)
}
if err := appendKnownHost(path, hostname, remote, key); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("persist trusted host key: %w", err)
}
// The confirmation is spent: now that the key is stored, a later
// reconnect must verify against the file, not re-accept this fingerprint.
s.mu.Lock()
s.trustHostKey = ""
s.mu.Unlock()
return nil
}, nil
}
func (s *SSHClient) requestJWTToken(cfg *profilemanager.Config, cfgPath string) (string, error) {
s.mu.Lock()
urlOpener := s.urlOpener
s.mu.Unlock()
if urlOpener == nil {
return "", errors.New("URL opener not configured for JWT auth")
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Minute)
defer cancel()
flow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, cfg, false, true, profileLoginHint(cfgPath))
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("create oauth flow: %w", err)
}
// The status callback covers the browser round-trip, which would
// otherwise leave the terminal blank.
tokenInfo, err := runOAuthFlow(ctx, flow, urlOpener, func() {
s.notifyStatus("Waiting for browser authentication...")
})
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
token := tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse()
if token == "" {
return "", errors.New("empty token returned by IdP")
}
// Tells the client the browser round-trip is over so it can dismiss the
// surface it opened, the same way the login and session-extend flows do.
// Without it the Custom Tab stays in front of the terminal even though the
// token has already been collected.
urlOpener.OnLoginSuccess()
return token, nil
}
func (s *SSHClient) dialAndHandshake(gen uint64, host string, port int, clientConfig *gossh.ClientConfig) error {
addr := net.JoinHostPort(host, strconv.Itoa(port))
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), sshDialTimeout)
defer cancel()
s.mu.Lock()
if gen != s.gen {
s.mu.Unlock()
return errClientClosed
}
s.dialCancel = cancel
s.mu.Unlock()
var dialer net.Dialer
conn, err := dialer.DialContext(ctx, "tcp", addr)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("dial %s: %w", addr, err)
}
client, err := nbssh.Handshake(ctx, conn, addr, clientConfig)
if err != nil {
return err
}
s.mu.Lock()
if gen != s.gen {
s.mu.Unlock()
closeQuiet(client, "stale ssh client")
return errClientClosed
}
s.sshClient = client
listener := s.listener
s.mu.Unlock()
if listener != nil {
listener.OnConnected()
}
return nil
}
func (s *SSHClient) readLoop(r io.Reader, name string) string {
buf := make([]byte, 4096)
for {
n, err := r.Read(buf)
if n > 0 {
s.mu.Lock()
listener := s.listener
s.mu.Unlock()
if listener != nil {
chunk := make([]byte, n)
copy(chunk, buf[:n])
listener.OnData(chunk)
}
}
if err != nil {
// EOF is a normal shell exit, so report it without a reason.
if errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
return ""
}
log.Debugf("ssh %s read: %v", name, err)
return rootCause(err).Error()
}
}
}
// notifyStatus writes a progress line to the terminal through the normal
// output path, so long steps are visible while nothing else is arriving.
func (s *SSHClient) notifyStatus(text string) {
s.mu.Lock()
listener := s.listener
s.mu.Unlock()
if listener != nil {
listener.OnData([]byte("\r\n\x1b[33m" + text + "\x1b[0m\r\n"))
}
}
func (s *SSHClient) notifyClose(gen uint64, reason string) {
s.mu.Lock()
if gen != s.gen || s.closed {
s.mu.Unlock()
return
}
s.closed = true
listener := s.listener
s.mu.Unlock()
if listener != nil {
listener.OnClose(reason)
}
}
// RemoveKnownHost deletes every known_hosts entry for host:port from the store,
// so a host trusted for a session that is being deleted does not linger. Java
// calls this only once no session targets that host, so a shared host stays
// trusted. Missing file or entry is not an error: the goal state is "absent".
func RemoveKnownHost(path, host string, port int) error {
target := knownhosts.Normalize(net.JoinHostPort(host, strconv.Itoa(port)))
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
return nil
}
return err
}
var kept []string
changed := false
scanner := bufio.NewScanner(bytes.NewReader(data))
for scanner.Scan() {
line := scanner.Text()
if knownHostsLineMatches(line, target) {
changed = true
continue
}
kept = append(kept, line)
}
if err := scanner.Err(); err != nil {
return err
}
if !changed {
return nil
}
out := strings.Join(kept, "\n")
if len(kept) > 0 {
out += "\n"
}
return os.WriteFile(path, []byte(out), 0o600)
}
func closeQuiet(c io.Closer, label string) {
if c == nil {
return
}
if err := c.Close(); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
log.Debugf("ssh: close %s: %v", label, err)
}
}
func detectServerType(host string, port int) detection.ServerType {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), sshDetectionTimeout)
defer cancel()
dialer := &net.Dialer{}
serverType, err := detection.DetectSSHServerType(ctx, dialer, host, port)
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("ssh: server detection failed: %v (assuming regular SSH)", err)
return detection.ServerTypeRegular
}
return serverType
}
// rootCause returns the innermost error of a %w chain, so the terminal shows
// "i/o timeout" rather than every layer that added context on the way up.
func rootCause(err error) error {
for {
// A joined error has no single root, so keep it as-is.
if _, ok := err.(interface{ Unwrap() []error }); ok {
return err
}
next := errors.Unwrap(err)
if next == nil {
return err
}
err = next
}
}
// ensureFileExists creates an empty known-hosts file when none exists yet, so
// knownhosts.New has something to parse on the first connection to any host.
func ensureFileExists(path string) error {
f, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_CREATE|os.O_WRONLY, 0o600)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return f.Close()
}
// appendKnownHost adds the confirmed key to the store in the standard
// known_hosts format, so it verifies silently on later connections and can be
// inspected or edited like any OpenSSH known_hosts file.
func appendKnownHost(path, hostname string, remote net.Addr, key gossh.PublicKey) error {
addresses := []string{knownhosts.Normalize(hostname)}
if remote != nil {
if normalized := knownhosts.Normalize(remote.String()); normalized != addresses[0] {
addresses = append(addresses, normalized)
}
}
line := knownhosts.Line(addresses, key)
f, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_APPEND|os.O_WRONLY, 0o600)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer func() {
if cerr := f.Close(); cerr != nil {
log.Debugf("ssh: close known-hosts after append: %v", cerr)
}
}()
_, err = f.WriteString(line + "\n")
return err
}
// knownHostsLineMatches reports whether a known_hosts line's address list
// contains the normalized target. Comment and blank lines never match.
func knownHostsLineMatches(line, target string) bool {
trimmed := strings.TrimSpace(line)
if trimmed == "" || strings.HasPrefix(trimmed, "#") {
return false
}
fields := strings.Fields(trimmed)
if len(fields) == 0 {
return false
}
for _, addr := range strings.Split(fields[0], ",") {
if addr == target {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// isAuthFailure distinguishes credential rejection from dial, timeout and
// host-key errors, which retrying with a password would not fix.
func isAuthFailure(err error) bool {
if errors.Is(err, errPasswordRequired) {
return true
}
var partial *gossh.PartialSuccessError
if errors.As(err, &partial) {
return true
}
return strings.Contains(err.Error(), "unable to authenticate")
}
// passwordCouldHelp reports whether prompting for a password again can change
// the outcome. gossh lists a method under "attempted methods" only when the
// server offered it, so a supplied password that was never attempted means the
// server does not accept passwords and the real error should surface instead.
func passwordCouldHelp(err error, passwordOffered bool) bool {
if !passwordOffered {
return true
}
msg := err.Error()
return strings.Contains(msg, "password") || strings.Contains(msg, "keyboard-interactive")
}

View File

@@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ func foregroundGetTokenInfo(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, config *pro
hint = profileState.Email
}
oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, config, util.HasGraphicalSession(), false, hint)
oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, config, util.HasGraphicalSession(), false, hint, false)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}

View File

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/auth"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
nbssh "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh"
sshcommon "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/system"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
mgmProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
@@ -521,7 +521,12 @@ func (c *Client) VerifySSHHostKey(peerAddress string, key []byte) error {
return err
}
return nbssh.PeerKeyLookup(engine.GetPeerSSHKey).VerifySSHHostKey(peerAddress, key)
storedKey, found := engine.GetPeerSSHKey(peerAddress)
if !found {
return sshcommon.ErrPeerNotFound
}
return sshcommon.VerifyHostKey(storedKey, key, peerAddress)
}
// SetPerformance retunes a running Client. Only PreallocatedBuffersPerPool

View File

@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ func (a *Auth) IsSSOSupported(ctx context.Context) (bool, error) {
err := a.withRetry(ctx, func(client *mgm.GrpcClient) error {
// Try PKCE flow first
_, err := a.getPKCEFlow(client)
_, err := a.getPKCEFlow(client, false)
if err == nil {
supportsSSO = true
return nil
@@ -138,37 +138,30 @@ func (a *Auth) IsSSOSupported(ctx context.Context) (bool, error) {
// GetOAuthFlow returns an OAuth flow (PKCE or Device) using the existing management connection
// This avoids creating a new connection to the management server
func (a *Auth) GetOAuthFlow(ctx context.Context, forceDeviceAuth bool, hint string) (OAuthFlow, error) {
//
// sessionExtend marks the flow as renewing an existing peer's session rather than
// logging one in; the server needs it to rule out a silent authorization that the
// IdP could answer from another account. See PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest.
func (a *Auth) GetOAuthFlow(ctx context.Context, forceDeviceAuth bool, sessionExtend bool) (OAuthFlow, error) {
var flow OAuthFlow
var err error
err := a.withRetry(ctx, func(client *mgm.GrpcClient) error {
err = a.withRetry(ctx, func(client *mgm.GrpcClient) error {
if forceDeviceAuth {
deviceFlow, err := a.getDeviceFlow(client)
if err != nil {
return err
}
deviceFlow.SetLoginHint(hint)
flow = deviceFlow
return nil
flow, err = a.getDeviceFlow(client)
return err
}
// Try PKCE flow first
pkceFlow, err := a.getPKCEFlow(client)
flow, err = a.getPKCEFlow(client, sessionExtend)
if err != nil {
// If PKCE not supported, try Device flow
if s, ok := status.FromError(err); ok && (s.Code() == codes.NotFound || s.Code() == codes.Unimplemented) {
deviceFlow, err := a.getDeviceFlow(client)
if err != nil {
return err
}
deviceFlow.SetLoginHint(hint)
flow = deviceFlow
return nil
flow, err = a.getDeviceFlow(client)
return err
}
return err
}
pkceFlow.SetLoginHint(hint)
flow = pkceFlow
return nil
})
@@ -240,8 +233,8 @@ func (a *Auth) Login(ctx context.Context, setupKey string, jwtToken string) (err
}
// getPKCEFlow retrieves PKCE authorization flow configuration and creates a flow instance
func (a *Auth) getPKCEFlow(client *mgm.GrpcClient) (*PKCEAuthorizationFlow, error) {
protoFlow, err := client.GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow()
func (a *Auth) getPKCEFlow(client *mgm.GrpcClient, sessionExtend bool) (*PKCEAuthorizationFlow, error) {
protoFlow, err := client.GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow(sessionExtend)
if err != nil {
if s, ok := status.FromError(err); ok && s.Code() == codes.NotFound {
log.Warnf("server couldn't find pkce flow, contact admin: %v", err)

View File

@@ -70,12 +70,15 @@ func shouldUseDeviceFlow(force bool, isUnixDesktopClient bool) bool {
//
// On Linux distros without desktop environment support, it only tries to initialize the Device Code Flow
// forceDeviceCodeFlow can be used to skip PKCE and go directly to Device Code Flow (e.g., for Android TV)
func NewOAuthFlow(ctx context.Context, config *profilemanager.Config, isUnixDesktopClient bool, forceDeviceCodeFlow bool, hint string) (OAuthFlow, error) {
//
// sessionExtend marks the flow as renewing an existing peer's session rather than
// logging one in; see PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest for what the server makes of it.
func NewOAuthFlow(ctx context.Context, config *profilemanager.Config, isUnixDesktopClient bool, forceDeviceCodeFlow bool, hint string, sessionExtend bool) (OAuthFlow, error) {
if shouldUseDeviceFlow(forceDeviceCodeFlow, isUnixDesktopClient) {
return authenticateWithDeviceCodeFlow(ctx, config, hint)
}
pkceFlow, err := authenticateWithPKCEFlow(ctx, config, hint)
pkceFlow, err := authenticateWithPKCEFlow(ctx, config, hint, sessionExtend)
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("failed to initialize pkce authentication with error: %v\n", err)
log.Debug("falling back to device code flow")
@@ -85,19 +88,21 @@ func NewOAuthFlow(ctx context.Context, config *profilemanager.Config, isUnixDesk
}
// authenticateWithPKCEFlow initializes the Proof Key for Code Exchange flow auth flow
func authenticateWithPKCEFlow(ctx context.Context, config *profilemanager.Config, hint string) (OAuthFlow, error) {
func authenticateWithPKCEFlow(ctx context.Context, config *profilemanager.Config, hint string, sessionExtend bool) (OAuthFlow, error) {
authClient, err := NewAuth(ctx, config.PrivateKey, config.ManagementURL, config)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create auth client: %v", err)
}
defer authClient.Close()
pkceFlowInfo, err := authClient.getPKCEFlow(authClient.client)
pkceFlowInfo, err := authClient.getPKCEFlow(authClient.client, sessionExtend)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("getting pkce authorization flow info failed with error: %v", err)
}
pkceFlowInfo.SetLoginHint(hint)
if hint != "" {
pkceFlowInfo.SetLoginHint(hint)
}
return pkceFlowInfo, nil
}
@@ -125,7 +130,9 @@ func authenticateWithDeviceCodeFlow(ctx context.Context, config *profilemanager.
}
}
deviceFlowInfo.SetLoginHint(hint)
if hint != "" {
deviceFlowInfo.SetLoginHint(hint)
}
return deviceFlowInfo, nil
}

View File

@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ func (c *Client) LoginForMobile() string {
return fmt.Sprintf("failed to load config: %v", err)
}
oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, cfg, false, false, "")
oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, cfg, false, false, "", false)
if err != nil {
return err.Error()
}

View File

@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ func (a *Auth) login(urlOpener URLOpener, forceDeviceAuth bool, deviceName strin
const authInfoRequestTimeout = 30 * time.Second
func (a *Auth) foregroundGetTokenInfo(authClient *auth.Auth, urlOpener URLOpener, forceDeviceAuth bool) (*auth.TokenInfo, error) {
oAuthFlow, err := authClient.GetOAuthFlow(a.ctx, forceDeviceAuth, "")
oAuthFlow, err := authClient.GetOAuthFlow(a.ctx, forceDeviceAuth, false)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get OAuth flow: %v", err)
}

View File

@@ -679,7 +679,7 @@ func (s *Server) Login(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.LoginRequest) (*pro
if msg.Hint != nil {
hint = *msg.Hint
}
oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, config, msg.IsUnixDesktopClient, false, hint)
oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, config, msg.IsUnixDesktopClient, false, hint, false)
if err != nil {
state.Set(internal.StatusLoginFailed)
return nil, err
@@ -1724,7 +1724,7 @@ func (s *Server) RequestJWTAuth(
}
// the daemon has no graphical session of its own, only the caller can answer this
oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, config, msg.GetHasGraphicalSession(), false, hint)
oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, config, msg.GetHasGraphicalSession(), false, hint, false)
if err != nil {
return nil, gstatus.Errorf(codes.Internal, "failed to create OAuth flow: %v", err)
}
@@ -1828,7 +1828,7 @@ func (s *Server) RequestExtendAuthSession(
}
// the daemon has no graphical session of its own, only the caller can answer this
oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, config, msg.GetHasGraphicalSession(), false, hint)
oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, config, msg.GetHasGraphicalSession(), false, hint, true)
if err != nil {
return nil, gstatus.Errorf(codes.Internal, "failed to create OAuth flow: %v", err)
}

View File

@@ -313,23 +313,21 @@ func Dial(ctx context.Context, addr, user string, opts DialOptions) (*Client, er
// dialSSH establishes an SSH connection without JWT authentication
func dialSSH(ctx context.Context, network, addr string, config *ssh.ClientConfig) (*Client, error) {
if config.Timeout > 0 {
var cancel context.CancelFunc
ctx, cancel = context.WithTimeout(ctx, config.Timeout)
defer cancel()
}
dialer := &net.Dialer{}
conn, err := dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, addr)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("dial %s: %w", addr, err)
}
client, err := nbssh.Handshake(ctx, conn, addr, config)
clientConn, chans, reqs, err := ssh.NewClientConn(conn, addr, config)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
if closeErr := conn.Close(); closeErr != nil {
log.Debugf("connection close after handshake failure: %v", closeErr)
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh handshake: %w", err)
}
client := ssh.NewClient(clientConn, chans, reqs)
return &Client{
client: client,
}, nil

View File

@@ -12,8 +12,6 @@ import (
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
"golang.org/x/term"
nbssh "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh"
)
func (c *Client) setupTerminalMode(ctx context.Context, session *ssh.Session) error {
@@ -84,7 +82,37 @@ func (c *Client) setupTerminal(session *ssh.Session, fd int) error {
return fmt.Errorf("get terminal size: %w", err)
}
modes := nbssh.DefaultTerminalModes
modes := ssh.TerminalModes{
ssh.ECHO: 1,
ssh.TTY_OP_ISPEED: 14400,
ssh.TTY_OP_OSPEED: 14400,
// Ctrl+C
ssh.VINTR: 3,
// Ctrl+\
ssh.VQUIT: 28,
// Backspace
ssh.VERASE: 127,
// Ctrl+U
ssh.VKILL: 21,
// Ctrl+D
ssh.VEOF: 4,
ssh.VEOL: 0,
ssh.VEOL2: 0,
// Ctrl+Q
ssh.VSTART: 17,
// Ctrl+S
ssh.VSTOP: 19,
// Ctrl+Z
ssh.VSUSP: 26,
// Ctrl+O
ssh.VDISCARD: 15,
// Ctrl+R
ssh.VREPRINT: 18,
// Ctrl+W
ssh.VWERASE: 23,
// Ctrl+V
ssh.VLNEXT: 22,
}
terminal := os.Getenv("TERM")
if terminal == "" {

View File

@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@ import (
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
nbssh "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh"
)
const (
@@ -82,14 +80,28 @@ func (c *Client) setupTerminalMode(_ context.Context, session *ssh.Session) erro
w, h := c.getWindowsConsoleSize()
modes := ssh.TerminalModes{
ssh.ICRNL: 1,
ssh.OPOST: 1,
ssh.ONLCR: 1,
ssh.ISIG: 1,
ssh.ICANON: 1,
}
for mode, value := range nbssh.DefaultTerminalModes {
modes[mode] = value
ssh.ECHO: 1,
ssh.TTY_OP_ISPEED: 14400,
ssh.TTY_OP_OSPEED: 14400,
ssh.ICRNL: 1,
ssh.OPOST: 1,
ssh.ONLCR: 1,
ssh.ISIG: 1,
ssh.ICANON: 1,
ssh.VINTR: 3, // Ctrl+C
ssh.VQUIT: 28, // Ctrl+\
ssh.VERASE: 127, // Backspace
ssh.VKILL: 21, // Ctrl+U
ssh.VEOF: 4, // Ctrl+D
ssh.VEOL: 0,
ssh.VEOL2: 0,
ssh.VSTART: 17, // Ctrl+Q
ssh.VSTOP: 19, // Ctrl+S
ssh.VSUSP: 26, // Ctrl+Z
ssh.VDISCARD: 15, // Ctrl+O
ssh.VWERASE: 23, // Ctrl+W
ssh.VLNEXT: 22, // Ctrl+V
ssh.VREPRINT: 18, // Ctrl+R
}
if err := session.RequestPty("xterm-256color", h, w, modes); err != nil {

View File

@@ -35,19 +35,6 @@ type HostKeyVerifier interface {
VerifySSHHostKey(peerAddress string, key []byte) error
}
// PeerKeyLookup returns the stored SSH host key for a peer address.
type PeerKeyLookup func(peerAddress string) ([]byte, bool)
// VerifySSHHostKey implements HostKeyVerifier by looking up the stored key
// and comparing it against the presented key.
func (l PeerKeyLookup) VerifySSHHostKey(peerAddress string, presentedKey []byte) error {
storedKey, found := l(peerAddress)
if !found {
return ErrPeerNotFound
}
return VerifyHostKey(storedKey, presentedKey, peerAddress)
}
// DaemonHostKeyVerifier implements HostKeyVerifier using the NetBird daemon
type DaemonHostKeyVerifier struct {
client proto.DaemonServiceClient

View File

@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
package ssh
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"time"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
)
// Handshake runs the SSH client handshake on an already dialed conn and
// returns the resulting client. Dialing bounds only the TCP establishment;
// without a deadline on the socket a peer that accepts and then goes silent
// blocks the handshake forever, so the context deadline is applied to conn
// for the duration of the handshake. conn is closed on any error.
func Handshake(ctx context.Context, conn net.Conn, addr string, config *ssh.ClientConfig) (*ssh.Client, error) {
if deadline, ok := ctx.Deadline(); ok {
if err := conn.SetDeadline(deadline); err != nil {
closeHandshake(conn, "conn after deadline error")
return nil, fmt.Errorf("set handshake deadline: %w", err)
}
}
sshConn, chans, reqs, err := ssh.NewClientConn(conn, addr, config)
if err != nil {
closeHandshake(conn, "conn after handshake error")
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh handshake: %w", err)
}
if err := conn.SetDeadline(time.Time{}); err != nil {
closeHandshake(sshConn, "ssh conn after deadline clear error")
return nil, fmt.Errorf("clear handshake deadline: %w", err)
}
return ssh.NewClient(sshConn, chans, reqs), nil
}
func closeHandshake(c io.Closer, label string) {
if err := c.Close(); err != nil {
log.Debugf("ssh: close %s: %v", label, err)
}
}

View File

@@ -610,10 +610,13 @@ func (p *SSHProxy) dialBackend(ctx context.Context, addr, user, jwtToken string)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("connect to server: %w", err)
}
handshakeCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, sshHandshakeTimeout)
defer cancel()
clientConn, chans, reqs, err := cryptossh.NewClientConn(conn, addr, config)
if err != nil {
_ = conn.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("SSH handshake: %w", err)
}
return nbssh.Handshake(handshakeCtx, conn, addr, config)
return cryptossh.NewClient(clientConn, chans, reqs), nil
}
func (p *SSHProxy) verifyHostKey(hostname string, remote net.Addr, key cryptossh.PublicKey) error {

View File

@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
package ssh
import (
"fmt"
"io"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
)
// DefaultTerminalModes are the PTY modes used by the interactive terminal clients.
var DefaultTerminalModes = ssh.TerminalModes{
ssh.ECHO: 1,
ssh.TTY_OP_ISPEED: 14400,
ssh.TTY_OP_OSPEED: 14400,
ssh.VINTR: 3, // Ctrl+C
ssh.VQUIT: 28, // Ctrl+\
ssh.VERASE: 127, // Backspace
ssh.VKILL: 21, // Ctrl+U
ssh.VEOF: 4, // Ctrl+D
ssh.VEOL: 0,
ssh.VEOL2: 0,
ssh.VSTART: 17, // Ctrl+Q
ssh.VSTOP: 19, // Ctrl+S
ssh.VSUSP: 26, // Ctrl+Z
ssh.VDISCARD: 15, // Ctrl+O
ssh.VREPRINT: 18, // Ctrl+R
ssh.VWERASE: 23, // Ctrl+W
ssh.VLNEXT: 22, // Ctrl+V
}
// PTYSession is an interactive shell session with a PTY and its I/O pipes.
type PTYSession struct {
Session *ssh.Session
Stdin io.WriteCloser
Stdout io.Reader
Stderr io.Reader
}
// StartPTYSession opens a session on the client, requests an xterm-256color PTY
// with the default terminal modes, wires up the I/O pipes and starts a shell.
// The session is closed on any error.
func StartPTYSession(client *ssh.Client, cols, rows int) (*PTYSession, error) {
session, err := client.NewSession()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("new session: %w", err)
}
pty, err := setupPTYSession(session, cols, rows)
if err != nil {
if closeErr := session.Close(); closeErr != nil {
log.Debugf("ssh: session close after setup error: %v", closeErr)
}
return nil, err
}
return pty, nil
}
// setupPTYSession requests the PTY, opens the pipes and starts the shell on an
// already created session.
func setupPTYSession(session *ssh.Session, cols, rows int) (*PTYSession, error) {
if err := session.RequestPty("xterm-256color", rows, cols, DefaultTerminalModes); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("request pty: %w", err)
}
stdin, err := session.StdinPipe()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("stdin pipe: %w", err)
}
stdout, err := session.StdoutPipe()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("stdout pipe: %w", err)
}
stderr, err := session.StderrPipe()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("stderr pipe: %w", err)
}
if err := session.Shell(); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("start shell: %w", err)
}
return &PTYSession{Session: session, Stdin: stdin, Stdout: stdout, Stderr: stderr}, nil
}

View File

@@ -80,12 +80,13 @@ func (c *Client) Connect(host string, port int, username, jwtToken string, ipVer
return fmt.Errorf("dial %s: %w", addr, err)
}
sshClient, err := nbssh.Handshake(ctx, conn, addr, config)
sshConn, chans, reqs, err := ssh.NewClientConn(conn, addr, config)
if err != nil {
return err
closeWithLog(conn, "connection after handshake error")
return fmt.Errorf("SSH handshake: %w", err)
}
c.sshClient = sshClient
c.sshClient = ssh.NewClient(sshConn, chans, reqs)
logrus.Infof("SSH: Connected to %s", addr)
return nil
@@ -118,26 +119,57 @@ func (c *Client) getAuthMethods(jwtToken string) ([]ssh.AuthMethod, error) {
return []ssh.AuthMethod{ssh.PublicKeys(signer)}, nil
}
// StartSession starts an SSH session with PTY. It holds the client lock for
// the whole startup so Close cannot tear the client down mid-setup and the
// new session cannot be installed into an already closed client.
// StartSession starts an SSH session with PTY
func (c *Client) StartSession(cols, rows int) error {
c.mu.Lock()
defer c.mu.Unlock()
if c.sshClient == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("SSH client not connected")
}
pty, err := nbssh.StartPTYSession(c.sshClient, cols, rows)
session, err := c.sshClient.NewSession()
if err != nil {
return err
return fmt.Errorf("create session: %w", err)
}
c.session = pty.Session
c.stdin = pty.Stdin
c.stdout = pty.Stdout
c.stderr = pty.Stderr
c.mu.Lock()
defer c.mu.Unlock()
c.session = session
modes := ssh.TerminalModes{
ssh.ECHO: 1,
ssh.TTY_OP_ISPEED: 14400,
ssh.TTY_OP_OSPEED: 14400,
ssh.VINTR: 3,
ssh.VQUIT: 28,
ssh.VERASE: 127,
}
if err := session.RequestPty("xterm-256color", rows, cols, modes); err != nil {
closeWithLog(session, "session after PTY error")
return fmt.Errorf("PTY request: %w", err)
}
c.stdin, err = session.StdinPipe()
if err != nil {
closeWithLog(session, "session after stdin error")
return fmt.Errorf("get stdin: %w", err)
}
c.stdout, err = session.StdoutPipe()
if err != nil {
closeWithLog(session, "session after stdout error")
return fmt.Errorf("get stdout: %w", err)
}
c.stderr, err = session.StderrPipe()
if err != nil {
closeWithLog(session, "session after stderr error")
return fmt.Errorf("get stderr: %w", err)
}
if err := session.Shell(); err != nil {
closeWithLog(session, "session after shell error")
return fmt.Errorf("start shell: %w", err)
}
logrus.Info("SSH: Session started with PTY")
return nil

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
package grpc
import (
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/client/common"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
)
func TestApplySessionExtendFlowPolicy(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
flow *proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow
sessionExtend bool
disablePromptLogin bool
loginFlag uint32
}{
{
name: "extend forces prompt=login over a silent flow",
flow: &proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow{
ProviderConfig: &proto.ProviderConfig{
DisablePromptLogin: true,
LoginFlag: uint32(common.LoginFlagMaxAge0),
},
},
sessionExtend: true,
disablePromptLogin: false,
loginFlag: uint32(common.LoginFlagPromptLogin),
},
{
name: "extend replaces max_age=0 so login_hint is honoured",
flow: &proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow{
ProviderConfig: &proto.ProviderConfig{
DisablePromptLogin: false,
LoginFlag: uint32(common.LoginFlagMaxAge0),
},
},
sessionExtend: true,
disablePromptLogin: false,
loginFlag: uint32(common.LoginFlagPromptLogin),
},
{
name: "login keeps the configured flow untouched",
flow: &proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow{
ProviderConfig: &proto.ProviderConfig{
DisablePromptLogin: true,
LoginFlag: uint32(common.LoginFlagMaxAge0),
},
},
sessionExtend: false,
disablePromptLogin: true,
loginFlag: uint32(common.LoginFlagMaxAge0),
},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
applySessionExtendFlowPolicy(tc.flow, tc.sessionExtend)
cfg := tc.flow.GetProviderConfig()
assert.Equal(t, tc.disablePromptLogin, cfg.GetDisablePromptLogin())
assert.Equal(t, tc.loginFlag, cfg.GetLoginFlag())
})
}
}
// A provider config is not guaranteed to be present on the response; clearing
// the flag must not panic when the validator returned an empty flow.
func TestApplySessionExtendFlowPolicyWithoutProviderConfig(t *testing.T) {
assert.NotPanics(t, func() {
applySessionExtendFlowPolicy(&proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow{}, true)
applySessionExtendFlowPolicy(nil, true)
})
}

View File

@@ -1180,7 +1180,8 @@ func (s *Server) GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow(ctx context.Context, req *proto.Encryp
return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Internal, "failed to get server key")
}
err = encryption.DecryptMessage(peerKey, key, req.Body, &proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest{})
flowReq := &proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest{}
err = encryption.DecryptMessage(peerKey, key, req.Body, flowReq)
if err != nil {
errMSG := fmt.Sprintf("error while decrypting peer's message with Wireguard public key %s.", req.WgPubKey)
log.WithContext(ctx).Warn(errMSG)
@@ -1224,6 +1225,7 @@ func (s *Server) GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow(ctx context.Context, req *proto.Encryp
}
flowInfoResp := s.integratedPeerValidator.ValidateFlowResponse(ctx, peerKey.String(), initInfoFlow)
applySessionExtendFlowPolicy(flowInfoResp, flowReq.GetSessionExtend())
encryptedResp, err := encryption.EncryptMessage(peerKey, key, flowInfoResp)
if err != nil {
@@ -1236,6 +1238,32 @@ func (s *Server) GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow(ctx context.Context, req *proto.Encryp
}, nil
}
// applySessionExtendFlowPolicy forces a prompt=login flow for a session extend.
//
// An extend renews the session of one specific peer, so its token has to come
// from the account that peer is registered under. A flow that does not prompt
// leaves the choice to the IdP, which answers a silent authorization from any
// session it already holds — not necessarily this peer's account when several
// are signed in, and login_hint is a suggestion the IdP may ignore. The token
// then fails the jwt.UserID == peer.UserID check in ExtendAuthSession, and the
// user is given no opportunity to pick a different account.
//
// LoginFlagPromptLogin rather than max_age=0: both re-authenticate, but with
// prompt=login the IdP honours login_hint and offers the peer's own account,
// whereas max_age=0 leaves the user to find it among every account signed in.
//
// Called after ValidateFlowResponse so that a per-peer override cannot reinstate
// the silent flow for an extend.
func applySessionExtendFlowPolicy(flow *proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow, sessionExtend bool) {
if !sessionExtend {
return
}
if cfg := flow.GetProviderConfig(); cfg != nil {
cfg.DisablePromptLogin = false
cfg.LoginFlag = uint32(common.LoginFlagPromptLogin)
}
}
// SyncMeta endpoint is used to synchronize peer's system metadata and notifies the connected,
// peer's under the same account of any updates.
func (s *Server) SyncMeta(ctx context.Context, req *proto.EncryptedMessage) (*proto.Empty, error) {

View File

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ type Client interface {
// is not eligible for session extension.
ExtendAuthSession(sysInfo *system.Info, jwtToken string) (*proto.ExtendAuthSessionResponse, error)
GetDeviceAuthorizationFlow() (*proto.DeviceAuthorizationFlow, error)
GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow() (*proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow, error)
GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow(sessionExtend bool) (*proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow, error)
GetServerURL() string
// IsHealthy returns the current connection status without blocking.
// Used by the engine to monitor connectivity in the background.

View File

@@ -595,7 +595,12 @@ func Test_GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow(t *testing.T) {
},
}
var gotRequest mgmtProto.PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest
mgmtMockServer.GetPKCEAuthorizationFlowFunc = func(ctx context.Context, req *mgmtProto.EncryptedMessage) (*mgmtProto.EncryptedMessage, error) {
if err := encryption.DecryptMessage(client.key.PublicKey(), serverKey, req.Body, &gotRequest); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
encryptedResp, err := encryption.EncryptMessage(client.key.PublicKey(), serverKey, expectedFlowInfo)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -608,11 +613,13 @@ func Test_GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow(t *testing.T) {
}, nil
}
flowInfo, err := client.GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow()
flowInfo, err := client.GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow(true)
if err != nil {
t.Error("error while retrieving pkce auth flow information")
}
assert.True(t, gotRequest.GetSessionExtend(), "session extend should reach the server")
assert.Equal(t, expectedFlowInfo.ProviderConfig.ClientID, flowInfo.ProviderConfig.ClientID, "provider configured client ID should match")
assert.Equal(t, expectedFlowInfo.ProviderConfig.ClientSecret, flowInfo.ProviderConfig.ClientSecret, "provider configured client secret should match") //nolint:staticcheck
}

View File

@@ -701,7 +701,11 @@ func (c *GrpcClient) GetDeviceAuthorizationFlow() (*proto.DeviceAuthorizationFlo
// GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow returns a pkce authorization flow information.
// It also takes care of encrypting and decrypting messages.
func (c *GrpcClient) GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow() (*proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow, error) {
//
// sessionExtend tells the server the flow will renew an existing peer's session
// rather than log one in, so it can rule out a configuration that would let the
// IdP answer from an unrelated account. See PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest.
func (c *GrpcClient) GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow(sessionExtend bool) (*proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow, error) {
if !c.ready() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("no connection to management in order to get pkce authorization flow")
}
@@ -714,7 +718,7 @@ func (c *GrpcClient) GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow() (*proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow, e
mgmCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(c.ctx, time.Second*2)
defer cancel()
message := &proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest{}
message := &proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest{SessionExtend: sessionExtend}
encryptedMSG, err := encryption.EncryptMessage(*serverKey, c.key, message)
if err != nil {
return nil, err

View File

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ type MockClient struct {
LoginFunc func(info *system.Info, sshKey []byte, dnsLabels domain.List) (*proto.LoginResponse, error)
ExtendAuthSessionFunc func(info *system.Info, jwtToken string) (*proto.ExtendAuthSessionResponse, error)
GetDeviceAuthorizationFlowFunc func() (*proto.DeviceAuthorizationFlow, error)
GetPKCEAuthorizationFlowFunc func() (*proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow, error)
GetPKCEAuthorizationFlowFunc func(sessionExtend bool) (*proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow, error)
GetServerURLFunc func() string
HealthCheckFunc func() error
SyncMetaFunc func(sysInfo *system.Info) error
@@ -80,11 +80,11 @@ func (m *MockClient) GetDeviceAuthorizationFlow() (*proto.DeviceAuthorizationFlo
return m.GetDeviceAuthorizationFlowFunc()
}
func (m *MockClient) GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow() (*proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow, error) {
func (m *MockClient) GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow(sessionExtend bool) (*proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow, error) {
if m.GetPKCEAuthorizationFlowFunc == nil {
return nil, nil
}
return m.GetPKCEAuthorizationFlowFunc()
return m.GetPKCEAuthorizationFlowFunc(sessionExtend)
}
func (m *MockClient) HealthCheck() error {

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -530,8 +530,18 @@ message DeviceAuthorizationFlow {
}
}
// PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest empty struct for future expansion
message PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest {}
// PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest asks for the PKCE flow configuration to use for
// an upcoming authorization request.
message PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest {
// SessionExtend indicates the flow will renew the SSO session of a peer that
// is already registered, rather than log in or register one. An extend is
// bound to the account that peer belongs to, so the server must not answer it
// with a configuration that lets the IdP reply from whatever session is
// already active: with several accounts signed in at the IdP that need not be
// the peer's own, and the resulting token is rejected as a peer/user mismatch
// with no way for the user to correct it.
bool SessionExtend = 1;
}
// PKCEAuthorizationFlow represents Authorization Code Flow information
// that can be used by the client to login initiate a Oauth 2.0 authorization code grant flow