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Author SHA1 Message Date
Zoltán Papp
0738734b6e [client] Force interactive login when extending the auth session
A session extend must be answered from the account the peer is registered
under. With a silent PKCE flow (DisablePromptLogin or max_age=0) the IdP
answers from whatever session it already holds, which need not be the
peer's account when several are signed in; the token then fails the
user match in ExtendAuthSession with no way to pick another account.

Mark the PKCE flow request as a session extend so the management server
can force prompt=login for it, overriding the configured silent flow.
2026-08-15 10:33:50 +02:00
23 changed files with 882 additions and 863 deletions

View File

@@ -199,7 +199,15 @@ type loginHintSetter interface {
}
func (a *Auth) foregroundGetTokenInfo(authClient *auth.Auth, urlOpener URLOpener, isAndroidTV bool) (*auth.TokenInfo, error) {
oAuthFlow, err := authClient.GetOAuthFlow(a.ctx, isAndroidTV)
return a.foregroundGetTokenInfoFlow(authClient, urlOpener, isAndroidTV, false)
}
// foregroundGetTokenInfoFlow runs the interactive flow. sessionExtend tells the
// server the token will renew this peer's session rather than log a peer in, so
// it can rule out a silent authorization the IdP could answer from an unrelated
// account. See PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest.
func (a *Auth) foregroundGetTokenInfoFlow(authClient *auth.Auth, urlOpener URLOpener, isAndroidTV bool, sessionExtend bool) (*auth.TokenInfo, error) {
oAuthFlow, err := authClient.GetOAuthFlow(a.ctx, isAndroidTV, sessionExtend)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get OAuth flow: %v", err)
}

View File

@@ -293,11 +293,13 @@ func (c *Client) extendAuthSession(ctx context.Context, urlOpener URLOpener, isA
}
defer authClient.Close()
// Passing the config path makes the flow pick up the login_hint: an extend
// renews the session of the account already signed in, so it must not stop to
// offer a choice.
// Passing the config path makes the flow pick up the login_hint. That alone
// cannot keep the IdP on this profile's account though — a hint is only a
// suggestion, and a silent authorization is answered from whatever session the
// IdP already has, which need not be this peer's when several accounts are
// signed in. Marking the flow as an extend lets the server rule that out.
a := NewAuthWithConfig(ctx, cfg, cfgPath)
tokenInfo, err := a.foregroundGetTokenInfo(authClient, urlOpener, isAndroidTV)
tokenInfo, err := a.foregroundGetTokenInfoFlow(authClient, urlOpener, isAndroidTV, true)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("interactive sso login failed: %v", err)
}

View File

@@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ func foregroundGetTokenInfo(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, config *pro
hint = profileState.Email
}
oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, config, util.HasGraphicalSession(), false, hint)
oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, config, util.HasGraphicalSession(), false, hint, false)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}

View File

@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ func (a *Auth) IsSSOSupported(ctx context.Context) (bool, error) {
err := a.withRetry(ctx, func(client *mgm.GrpcClient) error {
// Try PKCE flow first
_, err := a.getPKCEFlow(client)
_, err := a.getPKCEFlow(client, false)
if err == nil {
supportsSSO = true
return nil
@@ -138,7 +138,11 @@ func (a *Auth) IsSSOSupported(ctx context.Context) (bool, error) {
// GetOAuthFlow returns an OAuth flow (PKCE or Device) using the existing management connection
// This avoids creating a new connection to the management server
func (a *Auth) GetOAuthFlow(ctx context.Context, forceDeviceAuth bool) (OAuthFlow, error) {
//
// sessionExtend marks the flow as renewing an existing peer's session rather than
// logging one in; the server needs it to rule out a silent authorization that the
// IdP could answer from another account. See PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest.
func (a *Auth) GetOAuthFlow(ctx context.Context, forceDeviceAuth bool, sessionExtend bool) (OAuthFlow, error) {
var flow OAuthFlow
var err error
@@ -149,7 +153,7 @@ func (a *Auth) GetOAuthFlow(ctx context.Context, forceDeviceAuth bool) (OAuthFlo
}
// Try PKCE flow first
flow, err = a.getPKCEFlow(client)
flow, err = a.getPKCEFlow(client, sessionExtend)
if err != nil {
// If PKCE not supported, try Device flow
if s, ok := status.FromError(err); ok && (s.Code() == codes.NotFound || s.Code() == codes.Unimplemented) {
@@ -229,8 +233,8 @@ func (a *Auth) Login(ctx context.Context, setupKey string, jwtToken string) (err
}
// getPKCEFlow retrieves PKCE authorization flow configuration and creates a flow instance
func (a *Auth) getPKCEFlow(client *mgm.GrpcClient) (*PKCEAuthorizationFlow, error) {
protoFlow, err := client.GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow()
func (a *Auth) getPKCEFlow(client *mgm.GrpcClient, sessionExtend bool) (*PKCEAuthorizationFlow, error) {
protoFlow, err := client.GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow(sessionExtend)
if err != nil {
if s, ok := status.FromError(err); ok && s.Code() == codes.NotFound {
log.Warnf("server couldn't find pkce flow, contact admin: %v", err)

View File

@@ -70,12 +70,15 @@ func shouldUseDeviceFlow(force bool, isUnixDesktopClient bool) bool {
//
// On Linux distros without desktop environment support, it only tries to initialize the Device Code Flow
// forceDeviceCodeFlow can be used to skip PKCE and go directly to Device Code Flow (e.g., for Android TV)
func NewOAuthFlow(ctx context.Context, config *profilemanager.Config, isUnixDesktopClient bool, forceDeviceCodeFlow bool, hint string) (OAuthFlow, error) {
//
// sessionExtend marks the flow as renewing an existing peer's session rather than
// logging one in; see PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest for what the server makes of it.
func NewOAuthFlow(ctx context.Context, config *profilemanager.Config, isUnixDesktopClient bool, forceDeviceCodeFlow bool, hint string, sessionExtend bool) (OAuthFlow, error) {
if shouldUseDeviceFlow(forceDeviceCodeFlow, isUnixDesktopClient) {
return authenticateWithDeviceCodeFlow(ctx, config, hint)
}
pkceFlow, err := authenticateWithPKCEFlow(ctx, config, hint)
pkceFlow, err := authenticateWithPKCEFlow(ctx, config, hint, sessionExtend)
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("failed to initialize pkce authentication with error: %v\n", err)
log.Debug("falling back to device code flow")
@@ -85,14 +88,14 @@ func NewOAuthFlow(ctx context.Context, config *profilemanager.Config, isUnixDesk
}
// authenticateWithPKCEFlow initializes the Proof Key for Code Exchange flow auth flow
func authenticateWithPKCEFlow(ctx context.Context, config *profilemanager.Config, hint string) (OAuthFlow, error) {
func authenticateWithPKCEFlow(ctx context.Context, config *profilemanager.Config, hint string, sessionExtend bool) (OAuthFlow, error) {
authClient, err := NewAuth(ctx, config.PrivateKey, config.ManagementURL, config)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create auth client: %v", err)
}
defer authClient.Close()
pkceFlowInfo, err := authClient.getPKCEFlow(authClient.client)
pkceFlowInfo, err := authClient.getPKCEFlow(authClient.client, sessionExtend)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("getting pkce authorization flow info failed with error: %v", err)
}

View File

@@ -87,10 +87,9 @@ func (pm *ProfileManager) SetActiveProfileState(state *ProfileState) error {
// RemoveProfileState deletes the per-profile state file (which holds the
// account email used for the SSO login hint and the UI display). Called after
// profile removal; logout keeps the file so the next login can pass the email
// as the login_hint. The state file only stores the email, so deleting it is
// equivalent to clearing it; the next SSO login recreates it. A missing file
// is not an error.
// a successful logout so a logged-out profile no longer shows a stale account
// email. The state file only stores the email, so deleting it is equivalent to
// clearing it; the next SSO login recreates it. A missing file is not an error.
func (pm *ProfileManager) RemoveProfileState(profileName string) error {
configDir, err := getConfigDir()
if err != nil {

View File

@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
//go:build windows
package systemops
import (
"math"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
)
func TestSortRouteCandidates(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
candidates []candidateRoute
wantOrder []uint32
}{
{
name: "longest prefix wins over metrics",
candidates: []candidateRoute{
{interfaceIndex: 1, prefixLength: 0, routeMetric: 0, interfaceMetric: 5},
{interfaceIndex: 2, prefixLength: 24, routeMetric: 100, interfaceMetric: 50},
},
wantOrder: []uint32{2, 1},
},
{
// Windows ranks equal-length prefixes by route metric + interface metric,
// so a higher route metric on a low metric interface can still win.
name: "combined metric beats route metric alone",
candidates: []candidateRoute{
{interfaceIndex: 8, prefixLength: 0, routeMetric: 0, interfaceMetric: 100},
{interfaceIndex: 5, prefixLength: 0, routeMetric: 10, interfaceMetric: 5},
},
wantOrder: []uint32{5, 8},
},
{
name: "lower combined metric wins",
candidates: []candidateRoute{
{interfaceIndex: 5, prefixLength: 0, routeMetric: 300, interfaceMetric: 5},
{interfaceIndex: 8, prefixLength: 0, routeMetric: 0, interfaceMetric: 100},
},
wantOrder: []uint32{8, 5},
},
{
name: "equal combined metric falls back to route metric",
candidates: []candidateRoute{
{interfaceIndex: 1, prefixLength: 0, routeMetric: 20, interfaceMetric: 10},
{interfaceIndex: 2, prefixLength: 0, routeMetric: 5, interfaceMetric: 25},
},
wantOrder: []uint32{2, 1},
},
{
// The metrics are uint32 on the Windows side, so the sum must not wrap.
name: "combined metric beyond the uint32 range",
candidates: []candidateRoute{
{interfaceIndex: 1, prefixLength: 0, routeMetric: math.MaxUint32, interfaceMetric: 5},
{interfaceIndex: 2, prefixLength: 0, routeMetric: math.MaxUint32 - 10, interfaceMetric: 5},
},
wantOrder: []uint32{2, 1},
},
{
name: "unknown interface metric ranks on route metric only",
candidates: []candidateRoute{
{interfaceIndex: 1, prefixLength: 0, routeMetric: 30, interfaceMetric: -1},
{interfaceIndex: 2, prefixLength: 0, routeMetric: 5, interfaceMetric: 10},
},
wantOrder: []uint32{2, 1},
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
sortRouteCandidates(tt.candidates)
got := make([]uint32, 0, len(tt.candidates))
for _, c := range tt.candidates {
got = append(got, c.interfaceIndex)
}
assert.Equal(t, tt.wantOrder, got)
})
}
}

View File

@@ -882,40 +882,26 @@ func getInterfaceMetric(interfaceIndex uint32, family int16) int {
return int(ipInterfaceRow.Metric)
}
// sortRouteCandidates sorts route candidates by priority: prefix length -> combined metric -> route metric.
// Windows prefers the longest matching prefix and, among prefixes of the same length, the lowest metric, see
// https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/customize/desktop/unattend/microsoft-windows-tcpip-interfaces-interface-routes-route-metric
// sortRouteCandidates sorts route candidates by priority: prefix length -> route metric -> interface metric
func sortRouteCandidates(candidates []candidateRoute) {
sort.Slice(candidates, func(i, j int) bool {
if candidates[i].prefixLength != candidates[j].prefixLength {
return candidates[i].prefixLength > candidates[j].prefixLength
}
mi, mj := combinedMetric(candidates[i]), combinedMetric(candidates[j])
if mi != mj {
return mi < mj
if candidates[i].routeMetric != candidates[j].routeMetric {
return candidates[i].routeMetric < candidates[j].routeMetric
}
return candidates[i].routeMetric < candidates[j].routeMetric
return candidates[i].interfaceMetric < candidates[j].interfaceMetric
})
}
// combinedMetric returns the effective metric Windows uses to rank routes with an equal prefix length:
// the sum of the route metric and the metric of the interface the route is on, see
// https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/networking/technologies/network-subsystem/net-sub-interface-metric
// An unknown interface metric contributes nothing.
func combinedMetric(candidate candidateRoute) uint64 {
if candidate.interfaceMetric < 0 {
return uint64(candidate.routeMetric)
}
return uint64(candidate.routeMetric) + uint64(candidate.interfaceMetric)
}
// GetBestInterface finds the best interface for reaching a destination,
// excluding the VPN interface to avoid routing loops.
//
// Route selection priority:
// 1. Longest prefix match (most specific route)
// 2. Lowest combined metric (route metric + interface metric)
// 3. Lowest route metric.
// 2. Lowest route metric
// 3. Lowest interface metric
func GetBestInterface(dest netip.Addr, vpnIntf string) (*net.Interface, error) {
var skipInterfaceIndex int
if vpnIntf != "" {
@@ -939,6 +925,7 @@ func GetBestInterface(dest netip.Addr, vpnIntf string) (*net.Interface, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("no route to %s", dest)
}
// Sort routes: prefix length -> route metric -> interface metric
sortRouteCandidates(candidates)
for _, candidate := range candidates {

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ package systemops
import (
"errors"
"net"
"net/netip"
"syscall"
"testing"
@@ -30,7 +29,6 @@ func ensureIPv6DefaultRoute(t *testing.T) {
}
if err := netlink.RouteAdd(route); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, syscall.EEXIST) {
requireUsableIPv6Nexthop(t)
return
}
t.Skipf("install IPv6 fallback default route: %v", err)
@@ -40,36 +38,4 @@ func ensureIPv6DefaultRoute(t *testing.T) {
t.Logf("delete IPv6 fallback default route: %v", err)
}
})
requireUsableIPv6Nexthop(t)
}
// requireUsableIPv6Nexthop skips the test unless the resolved IPv6 default
// nexthop can actually carry a route. Installing the default route succeeding
// does not imply the kernel accepts it as a nexthop for a concrete prefix.
func requireUsableIPv6Nexthop(t *testing.T) {
t.Helper()
nexthop, err := GetNextHop(netip.IPv6Unspecified())
if err != nil {
t.Skipf("resolve IPv6 default nexthop: %v", err)
}
probe := &netlink.Route{
Scope: netlink.SCOPE_UNIVERSE,
Table: syscall.RT_TABLE_MAIN,
Family: netlink.FAMILY_V6,
Dst: &net.IPNet{IP: net.ParseIP("100::64"), Mask: net.CIDRMask(128, 128)},
}
require.NoError(t, addNextHop(nexthop, probe), "build IPv6 probe route")
switch err := netlink.RouteAdd(probe); {
case err == nil:
if err := netlink.RouteDel(probe); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, syscall.ESRCH) {
t.Logf("delete IPv6 probe route: %v", err)
}
case errors.Is(err, syscall.EEXIST):
default:
t.Skipf("IPv6 nexthop %s unusable for route installation: %v", nexthop, err)
}
}

View File

@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ func (c *Client) LoginForMobile() string {
return fmt.Sprintf("failed to load config: %v", err)
}
oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, cfg, false, false, "")
oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, cfg, false, false, "", false)
if err != nil {
return err.Error()
}

View File

@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ func (a *Auth) login(urlOpener URLOpener, forceDeviceAuth bool, deviceName strin
const authInfoRequestTimeout = 30 * time.Second
func (a *Auth) foregroundGetTokenInfo(authClient *auth.Auth, urlOpener URLOpener, forceDeviceAuth bool) (*auth.TokenInfo, error) {
oAuthFlow, err := authClient.GetOAuthFlow(a.ctx, forceDeviceAuth)
oAuthFlow, err := authClient.GetOAuthFlow(a.ctx, forceDeviceAuth, false)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get OAuth flow: %v", err)
}

View File

@@ -679,7 +679,7 @@ func (s *Server) Login(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.LoginRequest) (*pro
if msg.Hint != nil {
hint = *msg.Hint
}
oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, config, msg.IsUnixDesktopClient, false, hint)
oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, config, msg.IsUnixDesktopClient, false, hint, false)
if err != nil {
state.Set(internal.StatusLoginFailed)
return nil, err
@@ -1724,7 +1724,7 @@ func (s *Server) RequestJWTAuth(
}
// the daemon has no graphical session of its own, only the caller can answer this
oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, config, msg.GetHasGraphicalSession(), false, hint)
oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, config, msg.GetHasGraphicalSession(), false, hint, false)
if err != nil {
return nil, gstatus.Errorf(codes.Internal, "failed to create OAuth flow: %v", err)
}
@@ -1828,7 +1828,7 @@ func (s *Server) RequestExtendAuthSession(
}
// the daemon has no graphical session of its own, only the caller can answer this
oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, config, msg.GetHasGraphicalSession(), false, hint)
oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, config, msg.GetHasGraphicalSession(), false, hint, true)
if err != nil {
return nil, gstatus.Errorf(codes.Internal, "failed to create OAuth flow: %v", err)
}

View File

@@ -6,11 +6,9 @@ import (
"context"
"time"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
gstatus "google.golang.org/grpc/status"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
)
@@ -62,19 +60,9 @@ func (s *Session) RequestExtend(ctx context.Context, p ExtendStartParams) (Exten
// a request from the UI implies a graphical session, which the daemon cannot detect itself
req := &proto.RequestExtendAuthSessionRequest{HasGraphicalSession: true}
hint := p.Hint
if hint == "" {
pm := profilemanager.NewProfileManager()
if active, perr := pm.GetActiveProfile(); perr != nil {
log.Debugf("failed to get active profile for login hint: %v", perr)
} else if state, serr := pm.GetProfileState(active.ID); serr != nil {
log.Debugf("failed to get profile state for login hint: %v", serr)
} else {
hint = state.Email
}
}
if hint != "" {
req.Hint = &hint
if p.Hint != "" {
h := p.Hint
req.Hint = &h
}
resp, err := cli.RequestExtendAuthSession(ctx, req)

View File

@@ -123,16 +123,8 @@ func (s *Connection) Login(ctx context.Context, p LoginParams) (LoginResult, err
if p.PreSharedKey != "" {
req.OptionalPreSharedKey = ptrStr(p.PreSharedKey)
}
hint := p.Hint
if hint == "" && profileID != "" {
if state, serr := profilemanager.NewProfileManager().GetProfileState(profilemanager.ID(profileID)); serr == nil {
hint = state.Email
} else {
log.Debugf("failed to get profile state for login hint: %v", serr)
}
}
if hint != "" {
req.Hint = ptrStr(hint)
if p.Hint != "" {
req.Hint = ptrStr(p.Hint)
}
resp, err := cli.Login(ctx, req)
@@ -236,6 +228,16 @@ func (s *Connection) Logout(ctx context.Context, p LogoutParams) error {
return s.classifyDaemonError(err)
}
// The daemon runs as root and can't reach the user-owned per-profile state
// file holding the account email (see Profiles.List), so clear the stale
// email here; the next SSO login recreates it.
if p.ProfileName != "" {
if err := profilemanager.NewProfileManager().RemoveProfileState(p.ProfileName); err != nil {
// Non-fatal: the logout itself succeeded.
log.Warnf("failed to remove profile state for %s: %v", p.ProfileName, err)
}
}
return nil
}
@@ -259,7 +261,7 @@ func (s *Connection) waitSSOLogin(ctx context.Context, p WaitSSOParams) (string,
// Persist the account email the same way the CLI does after its own
// WaitSSOLogin: the daemon returns it but cannot store it, since it runs as
// root and the per-profile state file is user-owned (see Profiles.List).
// root and the per-profile state file is user-owned (see Logout below).
// Without this the profile has no email, so Profiles.List shows no account
// and later logins and session extends go out without a login_hint —
// leaving the IdP to guess which account was meant.

View File

@@ -162,9 +162,8 @@ func (s *Profiles) Remove(ctx context.Context, p ProfileRef) error {
}
// The daemon deletes what it owns but runs as root, so it leaves the
// user-owned state file holding the account email behind. Logout keeps the
// email on purpose so later logins can pass it as the login_hint; profile
// removal is what deletes it. Legacy profiles are keyed by name rather than by a
// user-owned state file holding the account email behind (same split as
// Connection.Logout). Legacy profiles are keyed by name rather than by a
// generated ID, so a recreated profile of the same name would inherit the
// deleted one's email and offer it as the login_hint.
//

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
package grpc
import (
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/client/common"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
)
func TestApplySessionExtendFlowPolicy(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
flow *proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow
sessionExtend bool
disablePromptLogin bool
loginFlag uint32
}{
{
name: "extend forces prompt=login over a silent flow",
flow: &proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow{
ProviderConfig: &proto.ProviderConfig{
DisablePromptLogin: true,
LoginFlag: uint32(common.LoginFlagMaxAge0),
},
},
sessionExtend: true,
disablePromptLogin: false,
loginFlag: uint32(common.LoginFlagPromptLogin),
},
{
name: "extend replaces max_age=0 so login_hint is honoured",
flow: &proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow{
ProviderConfig: &proto.ProviderConfig{
DisablePromptLogin: false,
LoginFlag: uint32(common.LoginFlagMaxAge0),
},
},
sessionExtend: true,
disablePromptLogin: false,
loginFlag: uint32(common.LoginFlagPromptLogin),
},
{
name: "login keeps the configured flow untouched",
flow: &proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow{
ProviderConfig: &proto.ProviderConfig{
DisablePromptLogin: true,
LoginFlag: uint32(common.LoginFlagMaxAge0),
},
},
sessionExtend: false,
disablePromptLogin: true,
loginFlag: uint32(common.LoginFlagMaxAge0),
},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
applySessionExtendFlowPolicy(tc.flow, tc.sessionExtend)
cfg := tc.flow.GetProviderConfig()
assert.Equal(t, tc.disablePromptLogin, cfg.GetDisablePromptLogin())
assert.Equal(t, tc.loginFlag, cfg.GetLoginFlag())
})
}
}
// A provider config is not guaranteed to be present on the response; clearing
// the flag must not panic when the validator returned an empty flow.
func TestApplySessionExtendFlowPolicyWithoutProviderConfig(t *testing.T) {
assert.NotPanics(t, func() {
applySessionExtendFlowPolicy(&proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow{}, true)
applySessionExtendFlowPolicy(nil, true)
})
}

View File

@@ -1180,7 +1180,8 @@ func (s *Server) GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow(ctx context.Context, req *proto.Encryp
return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Internal, "failed to get server key")
}
err = encryption.DecryptMessage(peerKey, key, req.Body, &proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest{})
flowReq := &proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest{}
err = encryption.DecryptMessage(peerKey, key, req.Body, flowReq)
if err != nil {
errMSG := fmt.Sprintf("error while decrypting peer's message with Wireguard public key %s.", req.WgPubKey)
log.WithContext(ctx).Warn(errMSG)
@@ -1224,6 +1225,7 @@ func (s *Server) GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow(ctx context.Context, req *proto.Encryp
}
flowInfoResp := s.integratedPeerValidator.ValidateFlowResponse(ctx, peerKey.String(), initInfoFlow)
applySessionExtendFlowPolicy(flowInfoResp, flowReq.GetSessionExtend())
encryptedResp, err := encryption.EncryptMessage(peerKey, key, flowInfoResp)
if err != nil {
@@ -1236,6 +1238,32 @@ func (s *Server) GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow(ctx context.Context, req *proto.Encryp
}, nil
}
// applySessionExtendFlowPolicy forces a prompt=login flow for a session extend.
//
// An extend renews the session of one specific peer, so its token has to come
// from the account that peer is registered under. A flow that does not prompt
// leaves the choice to the IdP, which answers a silent authorization from any
// session it already holds — not necessarily this peer's account when several
// are signed in, and login_hint is a suggestion the IdP may ignore. The token
// then fails the jwt.UserID == peer.UserID check in ExtendAuthSession, and the
// user is given no opportunity to pick a different account.
//
// LoginFlagPromptLogin rather than max_age=0: both re-authenticate, but with
// prompt=login the IdP honours login_hint and offers the peer's own account,
// whereas max_age=0 leaves the user to find it among every account signed in.
//
// Called after ValidateFlowResponse so that a per-peer override cannot reinstate
// the silent flow for an extend.
func applySessionExtendFlowPolicy(flow *proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow, sessionExtend bool) {
if !sessionExtend {
return
}
if cfg := flow.GetProviderConfig(); cfg != nil {
cfg.DisablePromptLogin = false
cfg.LoginFlag = uint32(common.LoginFlagPromptLogin)
}
}
// SyncMeta endpoint is used to synchronize peer's system metadata and notifies the connected,
// peer's under the same account of any updates.
func (s *Server) SyncMeta(ctx context.Context, req *proto.EncryptedMessage) (*proto.Empty, error) {

View File

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ type Client interface {
// is not eligible for session extension.
ExtendAuthSession(sysInfo *system.Info, jwtToken string) (*proto.ExtendAuthSessionResponse, error)
GetDeviceAuthorizationFlow() (*proto.DeviceAuthorizationFlow, error)
GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow() (*proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow, error)
GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow(sessionExtend bool) (*proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow, error)
GetServerURL() string
// IsHealthy returns the current connection status without blocking.
// Used by the engine to monitor connectivity in the background.

View File

@@ -595,7 +595,12 @@ func Test_GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow(t *testing.T) {
},
}
var gotRequest mgmtProto.PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest
mgmtMockServer.GetPKCEAuthorizationFlowFunc = func(ctx context.Context, req *mgmtProto.EncryptedMessage) (*mgmtProto.EncryptedMessage, error) {
if err := encryption.DecryptMessage(client.key.PublicKey(), serverKey, req.Body, &gotRequest); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
encryptedResp, err := encryption.EncryptMessage(client.key.PublicKey(), serverKey, expectedFlowInfo)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -608,11 +613,13 @@ func Test_GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow(t *testing.T) {
}, nil
}
flowInfo, err := client.GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow()
flowInfo, err := client.GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow(true)
if err != nil {
t.Error("error while retrieving pkce auth flow information")
}
assert.True(t, gotRequest.GetSessionExtend(), "session extend should reach the server")
assert.Equal(t, expectedFlowInfo.ProviderConfig.ClientID, flowInfo.ProviderConfig.ClientID, "provider configured client ID should match")
assert.Equal(t, expectedFlowInfo.ProviderConfig.ClientSecret, flowInfo.ProviderConfig.ClientSecret, "provider configured client secret should match") //nolint:staticcheck
}

View File

@@ -701,7 +701,11 @@ func (c *GrpcClient) GetDeviceAuthorizationFlow() (*proto.DeviceAuthorizationFlo
// GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow returns a pkce authorization flow information.
// It also takes care of encrypting and decrypting messages.
func (c *GrpcClient) GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow() (*proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow, error) {
//
// sessionExtend tells the server the flow will renew an existing peer's session
// rather than log one in, so it can rule out a configuration that would let the
// IdP answer from an unrelated account. See PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest.
func (c *GrpcClient) GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow(sessionExtend bool) (*proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow, error) {
if !c.ready() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("no connection to management in order to get pkce authorization flow")
}
@@ -714,7 +718,7 @@ func (c *GrpcClient) GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow() (*proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow, e
mgmCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(c.ctx, time.Second*2)
defer cancel()
message := &proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest{}
message := &proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest{SessionExtend: sessionExtend}
encryptedMSG, err := encryption.EncryptMessage(*serverKey, c.key, message)
if err != nil {
return nil, err

View File

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ type MockClient struct {
LoginFunc func(info *system.Info, sshKey []byte, dnsLabels domain.List) (*proto.LoginResponse, error)
ExtendAuthSessionFunc func(info *system.Info, jwtToken string) (*proto.ExtendAuthSessionResponse, error)
GetDeviceAuthorizationFlowFunc func() (*proto.DeviceAuthorizationFlow, error)
GetPKCEAuthorizationFlowFunc func() (*proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow, error)
GetPKCEAuthorizationFlowFunc func(sessionExtend bool) (*proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow, error)
GetServerURLFunc func() string
HealthCheckFunc func() error
SyncMetaFunc func(sysInfo *system.Info) error
@@ -80,11 +80,11 @@ func (m *MockClient) GetDeviceAuthorizationFlow() (*proto.DeviceAuthorizationFlo
return m.GetDeviceAuthorizationFlowFunc()
}
func (m *MockClient) GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow() (*proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow, error) {
func (m *MockClient) GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow(sessionExtend bool) (*proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow, error) {
if m.GetPKCEAuthorizationFlowFunc == nil {
return nil, nil
}
return m.GetPKCEAuthorizationFlowFunc()
return m.GetPKCEAuthorizationFlowFunc(sessionExtend)
}
func (m *MockClient) HealthCheck() error {

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -530,8 +530,18 @@ message DeviceAuthorizationFlow {
}
}
// PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest empty struct for future expansion
message PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest {}
// PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest asks for the PKCE flow configuration to use for
// an upcoming authorization request.
message PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest {
// SessionExtend indicates the flow will renew the SSO session of a peer that
// is already registered, rather than log in or register one. An extend is
// bound to the account that peer belongs to, so the server must not answer it
// with a configuration that lets the IdP reply from whatever session is
// already active: with several accounts signed in at the IdP that need not be
// the peer's own, and the resulting token is rejected as a peer/user mismatch
// with no way for the user to correct it.
bool SessionExtend = 1;
}
// PKCEAuthorizationFlow represents Authorization Code Flow information
// that can be used by the client to login initiate a Oauth 2.0 authorization code grant flow