Run Rosenpass in permissive mode on the embedded proxy

client/cmd/login.go

@@ -17,9 +17,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/auth"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
-	nbnet "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/net"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/server"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/system"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
 )
@@ -333,14 +331,6 @@ func doForegroundLogin(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, setupKey string,
 		return fmt.Errorf("read config file %s: %v", configFilePath, err)
 	}
 
-	// Mirror runInForegroundMode: recover residual state (DNS, firewall,
-	// ssh config, legacy routing) from a previous unclean shutdown and
-	// enable advanced routing before dialing management.
-	if err := server.RestoreResidualState(ctx, profilemanager.NewServiceManager(configFilePath).GetStatePath()); err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("failed to restore residual state: %v", err)
-	}
-	nbnet.Init()
-
 	err = foregroundLogin(ctx, cmd, config, setupKey, activeProf.ID)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("foreground login failed: %v", err)

client/cmd/up.go

@@ -22,8 +22,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
-	nbnet "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/net"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/server"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/system"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
@@ -231,24 +229,6 @@ func runInForegroundMode(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, activeProf *pr
 
 	_, _ = profilemanager.UpdateOldManagementURL(ctx, config, configFilePath)
 
-	// Restore residual state left by a previous run that did not shut down
-	// cleanly, mirroring what the daemon does before connecting: it recovers
-	// DNS config (a stale resolv.conf takeover can make the management
-	// hostname unresolvable), firewall rules, ssh config and legacy routing.
-	// Route cleanup itself happens at engine start; nbnet.Init() below lets
-	// the management dial bypass a leftover fwmark rule until then.
-	// Foreground mode is particularly exposed in containers: a crashed
-	// container restarts inside the same (pod) network namespace, so stale
-	// state survives while the process does not.
-	if err := server.RestoreResidualState(ctx, profilemanager.NewServiceManager(configPath).GetStatePath()); err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("failed to restore residual state: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	// Enable advanced routing (as the daemon does on startup) so the
-	// management dial bypasses a leftover fwmark rule instead of being
-	// shunted into a stale routing table.
-	nbnet.Init()
-
 	err = foregroundLogin(ctx, cmd, config, providedSetupKey, activeProf.ID)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("foreground login failed: %v", err)

client/embed/embed.go

@@ -85,6 +85,11 @@ type Options struct {
 	DisableIPv6 bool
 	// BlockInbound blocks all inbound connections from peers
 	BlockInbound bool
+	// EnableRosenpass enables the Rosenpass post-quantum key exchange.
+	EnableRosenpass bool
+	// RosenpassPermissive lets a Rosenpass-enabled peer still connect to peers
+	// that do not run Rosenpass (falling back to the plain WireGuard PSK).
+	RosenpassPermissive bool
 	// BlockLANAccess blocks the embedded peer from reaching the host's
 	// LAN (RFC 1918, link-local, loopback) when it's used as a routing
 	// peer. Mirrors profilemanager.ConfigInput.BlockLANAccess. Useful
@@ -203,6 +208,8 @@ func New(opts Options) (*Client, error) {
 		DisableIPv6:         &opts.DisableIPv6,
 		BlockInbound:        &opts.BlockInbound,
 		BlockLANAccess:      &opts.BlockLANAccess,
+		RosenpassEnabled:    &opts.EnableRosenpass,
+		RosenpassPermissive: &opts.RosenpassPermissive,
 		WireguardPort:       opts.WireguardPort,
 		MTU:                 opts.MTU,
 		DNSLabels:           parsedLabels,

client/internal/conn_mgr.go

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package internal
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"maps"
 	"os"
 	"strconv"
 	"sync"
@@ -14,6 +15,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peerstore"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
+	mgmProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
 )
 
 // lazyForce is the resolved local decision for lazy connections, layered above the
@@ -35,13 +37,18 @@ const (
 //
 // The implementation is not thread-safe; it is protected by engine.syncMsgMux.
 type ConnMgr struct {
-	peerStore        *peerstore.Store
-	statusRecorder   *peer.Status
-	iface            lazyconn.WGIface
-	force            lazyForce
-	rosenpassEnabled bool
+	peerStore      *peerstore.Store
+	statusRecorder *peer.Status
+	iface          lazyconn.WGIface
+	force          lazyForce
+	// remoteLazyEnabled caches the account-wide lazy feature flag from management.
+	// It is the default for peers that do not carry a per-peer lazy hint.
+	remoteLazyEnabled bool
 
 	lazyConnMgr *manager.Manager
+	// appliedExcludeList is the exclude set last handed to the lazy manager, kept so an
+	// unchanged set on the next sync skips the O(n) reconciliation.
+	appliedExcludeList map[string]bool
 
 	wg            sync.WaitGroup
 	lazyCtx       context.Context
@@ -50,78 +57,59 @@ type ConnMgr struct {
 
 func NewConnMgr(engineConfig *EngineConfig, statusRecorder *peer.Status, peerStore *peerstore.Store, iface lazyconn.WGIface) *ConnMgr {
 	e := &ConnMgr{
-		peerStore:        peerStore,
-		statusRecorder:   statusRecorder,
-		iface:            iface,
-		force:            resolveLazyForce(engineConfig.LazyConnection),
-		rosenpassEnabled: engineConfig.RosenpassEnabled,
+		peerStore:      peerStore,
+		statusRecorder: statusRecorder,
+		iface:          iface,
+		force:          resolveLazyForce(engineConfig.LazyConnection),
 	}
 	return e
 }
 
-// Start initializes the connection manager. It starts the lazy connection manager when a
-// local override forces it on; with no local override it waits for the management feature flag.
+// Start initializes the connection manager. The lazy connection manager always runs so that
+// per-peer lazy defaults (e.g. proxy peers) work even when the account flag is off; the
+// account flag and the local override decide the default lazy state per peer (see
+// PeerLazyDefault). Rosenpass peers stay lazy-capable too: their connections just never idle
+// on their own, since rosenpass rekey traffic keeps them active.
 func (e *ConnMgr) Start(ctx context.Context) {
 	if e.lazyConnMgr != nil {
 		log.Errorf("lazy connection manager is already started")
 		return
 	}
 
-	switch e.force {
-	case lazyForceOff:
-		log.Infof("lazy connection manager is disabled by local override (%s or MDM policy)", lazyconn.EnvLazyConn)
-		e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(false)
-		return
-	case lazyForceNone:
-		log.Infof("lazy connection manager is managed by the management feature flag")
-		e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(false)
-		return
-	}
-
-	if e.rosenpassEnabled {
-		log.Warnf("rosenpass connection manager is enabled, lazy connection manager will not be started")
-		e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(false)
-		return
-	}
-
 	e.initLazyManager(ctx)
-	e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(true)
+	e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(e.PeerLazyDefault(mgmProto.LazyState_LazyStateDefault))
 }
 
-// UpdatedRemoteFeatureFlag is called when the remote feature flag is updated.
-// If enabled, it initializes the lazy connection manager and start it. Do not need to call Start() again.
-// If disabled, then it closes the lazy connection manager and open the connections to all peers.
-func (e *ConnMgr) UpdatedRemoteFeatureFlag(ctx context.Context, enabled bool) error {
-	// a local override (NB_LAZY_CONN or local config) takes precedence over management
-	if e.force != lazyForceNone {
-		return nil
+// UpdatedRemoteFeatureFlag caches the account-wide lazy feature flag. The manager itself is
+// not started or stopped here; the per-sync exclude-list reconciliation moves normal peers
+// between the lazy and always-active sets when the flag flips.
+func (e *ConnMgr) UpdatedRemoteFeatureFlag(_ context.Context, enabled bool) error {
+	e.remoteLazyEnabled = enabled
+	if e.isStartedWithLazyMgr() {
+		e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(e.PeerLazyDefault(mgmProto.LazyState_LazyStateDefault))
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// PeerLazyDefault reports whether a peer should be lazy. The local override
+// (NB_LAZY_CONN/MDM) wins over everything; without a local override the
+// management per-peer state applies (LazyStateLazy/Eager force the decision),
+// and LazyStateDefault follows the account-wide flag.
+func (e *ConnMgr) PeerLazyDefault(state mgmProto.LazyState) bool {
+	switch e.force {
+	case lazyForceOn:
+		return true
+	case lazyForceOff:
+		return false
 	}
 
-	if enabled {
-		// if the lazy connection manager is already started, do not start it again
-		if e.lazyConnMgr != nil {
-			return nil
-		}
-
-		if e.rosenpassEnabled {
-			log.Infof("rosenpass connection manager is enabled, lazy connection manager will not be started")
-			e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(false)
-			return nil
-		}
-
-		log.Infof("lazy connection manager is enabled by the management feature flag")
-		e.initLazyManager(ctx)
-		e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(true)
-		return e.addPeersToLazyConnManager()
-	} else {
-		if e.lazyConnMgr == nil {
-			e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(false)
-			return nil
-		}
-		log.Infof("lazy connection manager is disabled by management feature flag")
-		e.closeManager(ctx)
-		e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(false)
-		return nil
+	switch state {
+	case mgmProto.LazyState_LazyStateLazy:
+		return true
+	case mgmProto.LazyState_LazyStateEager:
+		return false
+	default:
+		return e.remoteLazyEnabled
 	}
 }
 
@@ -141,6 +129,13 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) SetExcludeList(ctx context.Context, peerIDs map[string]bool) {
 		return
 	}
 
+	// The exclude set is recomputed every sync but rarely changes; skip the O(n)
+	// store lookups and reconciliation when it matches what was already applied.
+	if maps.Equal(peerIDs, e.appliedExcludeList) {
+		return
+	}
+	e.appliedExcludeList = maps.Clone(peerIDs)
+
 	excludedPeers := make([]lazyconn.PeerConfig, 0, len(peerIDs))
 
 	for peerID := range peerIDs {
@@ -176,12 +171,16 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) SetExcludeList(ctx context.Context, peerIDs map[string]bool) {
 	}
 }
 
-func (e *ConnMgr) AddPeerConn(ctx context.Context, peerKey string, conn *peer.Conn) (exists bool) {
+// AddPeerConn registers a peer connection. permanent requests an always-active connection
+// (the peer belongs to the exclude set: a forwarder, or a peer that is not lazy by policy).
+// Non-permanent peers are handed to the lazy manager. The subsequent SetExcludeList call
+// reconciles membership for existing peers across flag flips.
+func (e *ConnMgr) AddPeerConn(ctx context.Context, peerKey string, conn *peer.Conn, permanent bool) (exists bool) {
 	if success := e.peerStore.AddPeerConn(peerKey, conn); !success {
 		return true
 	}
 
-	if !e.isStartedWithLazyMgr() {
+	if !e.isStartedWithLazyMgr() || permanent {
 		if err := conn.Open(ctx); err != nil {
 			conn.Log.Errorf("failed to open connection: %v", err)
 		}
@@ -269,6 +268,7 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) Close() {
 	e.lazyCtxCancel()
 	e.wg.Wait()
 	e.lazyConnMgr = nil
+	e.appliedExcludeList = nil
 }
 
 func (e *ConnMgr) initLazyManager(engineCtx context.Context) {
@@ -276,6 +276,7 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) initLazyManager(engineCtx context.Context) {
 		InactivityThreshold: inactivityThresholdEnv(),
 	}
 	e.lazyConnMgr = manager.NewManager(cfg, engineCtx, e.peerStore, e.iface)
+	e.appliedExcludeList = nil
 
 	e.lazyCtx, e.lazyCtxCancel = context.WithCancel(engineCtx)
 
@@ -286,43 +287,6 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) initLazyManager(engineCtx context.Context) {
 	}()
 }
 
-func (e *ConnMgr) addPeersToLazyConnManager() error {
-	peers := e.peerStore.PeersPubKey()
-	lazyPeerCfgs := make([]lazyconn.PeerConfig, 0, len(peers))
-	for _, peerID := range peers {
-		var peerConn *peer.Conn
-		var exists bool
-		if peerConn, exists = e.peerStore.PeerConn(peerID); !exists {
-			log.Warnf("failed to find peer conn for peerID: %s", peerID)
-			continue
-		}
-
-		lazyPeerCfg := lazyconn.PeerConfig{
-			PublicKey:  peerID,
-			AllowedIPs: peerConn.WgConfig().AllowedIps,
-			PeerConnID: peerConn.ConnID(),
-			Log:        peerConn.Log,
-		}
-		lazyPeerCfgs = append(lazyPeerCfgs, lazyPeerCfg)
-	}
-
-	return e.lazyConnMgr.AddActivePeers(lazyPeerCfgs)
-}
-
-func (e *ConnMgr) closeManager(ctx context.Context) {
-	if e.lazyConnMgr == nil {
-		return
-	}
-
-	e.lazyCtxCancel()
-	e.wg.Wait()
-	e.lazyConnMgr = nil
-
-	for _, peerID := range e.peerStore.PeersPubKey() {
-		e.peerStore.PeerConnOpen(ctx, peerID)
-	}
-}
-
 func (e *ConnMgr) isStartedWithLazyMgr() bool {
 	return e.lazyConnMgr != nil && e.lazyCtxCancel != nil
 }

client/internal/conn_mgr_test.go

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
 	"testing"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/lazyconn"
+	mgmProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
 )
 
 func TestResolveLazyForce(t *testing.T) {
@@ -38,3 +39,90 @@ func TestResolveLazyForce(t *testing.T) {
 		})
 	}
 }
+
+func TestPeerLazyDefault(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name          string
+		force         lazyForce
+		remoteEnabled bool
+		state         mgmProto.LazyState
+		want          bool
+	}{
+		{name: "force on wins over eager state", force: lazyForceOn, state: mgmProto.LazyState_LazyStateEager, want: true},
+		{name: "force off wins over lazy state", force: lazyForceOff, remoteEnabled: true, state: mgmProto.LazyState_LazyStateLazy, want: false},
+		{name: "none, default, account off -> active", force: lazyForceNone, state: mgmProto.LazyState_LazyStateDefault, want: false},
+		{name: "none, default, account on -> lazy", force: lazyForceNone, remoteEnabled: true, state: mgmProto.LazyState_LazyStateDefault, want: true},
+		{name: "none, lazy state, account off -> lazy", force: lazyForceNone, state: mgmProto.LazyState_LazyStateLazy, want: true},
+		{name: "none, eager state, account on -> active", force: lazyForceNone, remoteEnabled: true, state: mgmProto.LazyState_LazyStateEager, want: false},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			e := &ConnMgr{force: tt.force, remoteLazyEnabled: tt.remoteEnabled}
+			if got := e.PeerLazyDefault(tt.state); got != tt.want {
+				t.Fatalf("PeerLazyDefault(%v) = %v, want %v", tt.state, got, tt.want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestToExcludedLazyPeers covers the per-peer lazy classification (proxy vs
+// normal, across the force/account-flag matrix). Forwarder-target exclusion is
+// covered by TestToExcludedLazyPeers_ForwardTarget.
+func TestToExcludedLazyPeers(t *testing.T) {
+	const (
+		normalKey = "normal"
+		lazyKey   = "lazy-state"
+		eagerKey  = "eager-state"
+	)
+
+	peers := []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig{
+		{WgPubKey: normalKey, AllowedIps: []string{"100.64.0.1/32"}},
+		{WgPubKey: lazyKey, AllowedIps: []string{"100.64.0.2/32"}, LazyState: mgmProto.LazyState_LazyStateLazy},
+		{WgPubKey: eagerKey, AllowedIps: []string{"100.64.0.3/32"}, LazyState: mgmProto.LazyState_LazyStateEager},
+	}
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name          string
+		force         lazyForce
+		remoteEnabled bool
+		want          map[string]bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name:  "account off: lazy-state peer lazy, normal + eager active",
+			force: lazyForceNone, remoteEnabled: false,
+			want: map[string]bool{normalKey: true, eagerKey: true},
+		},
+		{
+			name:  "account on: only eager-state peer active",
+			force: lazyForceNone, remoteEnabled: true,
+			want: map[string]bool{eagerKey: true},
+		},
+		{
+			name:  "force off: everything active",
+			force: lazyForceOff, remoteEnabled: true,
+			want: map[string]bool{normalKey: true, lazyKey: true, eagerKey: true},
+		},
+		{
+			name:  "force on: nothing active",
+			force: lazyForceOn, remoteEnabled: false,
+			want: map[string]bool{},
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			e := &Engine{connMgr: &ConnMgr{force: tt.force, remoteLazyEnabled: tt.remoteEnabled}}
+			got := e.toExcludedLazyPeers(peers)
+
+			if len(got) != len(tt.want) {
+				t.Fatalf("toExcludedLazyPeers() = %v, want %v", got, tt.want)
+			}
+			for k := range tt.want {
+				if !got[k] {
+					t.Fatalf("expected peer %s excluded, got %v", k, got)
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

client/internal/engine.go

@@ -842,8 +842,7 @@ func (e *Engine) modifyPeers(peersUpdate []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig) error {
 	}
 	// third, add the peer connections again
 	for _, p := range modified {
-		err := e.addNewPeer(p)
-		if err != nil {
+		if err := e.addNewPeer(p); err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
 	}
@@ -1470,8 +1469,7 @@ func (e *Engine) updateNetworkMap(networkMap *mgmProto.NetworkMap) error {
 
 	// Ingress forward rules
 	done = e.phase("forward_rules")
-	forwardingRules, err := e.updateForwardRules(networkMap.GetForwardingRules())
-	if err != nil {
+	if _, err := e.updateForwardRules(networkMap.GetForwardingRules()); err != nil {
 		log.Errorf("failed to update forward rules, err: %v", err)
 	}
 	done()
@@ -1489,8 +1487,7 @@ func (e *Engine) updateNetworkMap(networkMap *mgmProto.NetworkMap) error {
 
 	// must set the exclude list after the peers are added. Without it the manager can not figure out the peers parameters from the store
 	done = e.phase("lazy_exclude")
-	excludedLazyPeers := e.toExcludedLazyPeers(forwardingRules, remotePeers)
-	e.connMgr.SetExcludeList(e.ctx, excludedLazyPeers)
+	e.connMgr.SetExcludeList(e.ctx, e.toExcludedLazyPeers(remotePeers))
 	done()
 
 	e.networkSerial = serial
@@ -1734,15 +1731,15 @@ func addrToString(addr netip.Addr) string {
 // addNewPeers adds peers that were not know before but arrived from the Management service with the update
 func (e *Engine) addNewPeers(peersUpdate []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig) error {
 	for _, p := range peersUpdate {
-		err := e.addNewPeer(p)
-		if err != nil {
+		if err := e.addNewPeer(p); err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
 	}
 	return nil
 }
 
-// addNewPeer add peer if connection doesn't exist
+// addNewPeer add peer if connection doesn't exist. A peer that is not lazy by
+// policy gets an always-active connection instead.
 func (e *Engine) addNewPeer(peerConfig *mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig) error {
 	peerKey := peerConfig.GetWgPubKey()
 	peerIPs := make([]netip.Prefix, 0, len(peerConfig.GetAllowedIps()))
@@ -1777,7 +1774,8 @@ func (e *Engine) addNewPeer(peerConfig *mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig) error {
 		log.Warnf("error adding peer %s to status recorder, got error: %v", peerKey, err)
 	}
 
-	if exists := e.connMgr.AddPeerConn(e.ctx, peerKey, conn); exists {
+	permanent := !e.connMgr.PeerLazyDefault(peerConfig.GetLazyState())
+	if exists := e.connMgr.AddPeerConn(e.ctx, peerKey, conn, permanent); exists {
 		conn.Close(false)
 		return fmt.Errorf("peer already exists: %s", peerKey)
 	}
@@ -2603,46 +2601,19 @@ func (e *Engine) updateForwardRules(rules []*mgmProto.ForwardingRule) ([]firewal
 	return forwardingRules, nberrors.FormatErrorOrNil(merr)
 }
 
-func (e *Engine) toExcludedLazyPeers(rules []firewallManager.ForwardRule, peers []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig) map[string]bool {
+// toExcludedLazyPeers returns the peers that must have an always-active
+// connection: those that are not lazy by policy (the per-peer lazy state or the
+// account flag, subject to the local override).
+func (e *Engine) toExcludedLazyPeers(peers []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig) map[string]bool {
 	excludedPeers := make(map[string]bool)
-
-	// Ingress forward targets: inbound forwarded traffic is initiated remotely and
-	// cannot wake a lazy connection, so the peer routing the target must stay
-	// permanently connected. AllowedIPs are already parsed on the peer conn, so
-	// reuse those typed prefixes instead of re-parsing the network map strings.
-	for _, r := range rules {
-		for _, p := range peers {
-			if e.peerRoutesAddr(p, r.TranslatedAddress) {
-				log.Infof("exclude forwarder peer from lazy connection: %s", p.GetWgPubKey())
-				excludedPeers[p.GetWgPubKey()] = true
-			}
+	for _, p := range peers {
+		if !e.connMgr.PeerLazyDefault(p.GetLazyState()) {
+			excludedPeers[p.GetWgPubKey()] = true
 		}
 	}
-
 	return excludedPeers
 }
 
-// peerRoutesAddr reports whether the peer is a router for addr, matched against
-// the peer's already-parsed AllowedIPs from the store (the same typed value the
-// lazy manager consumes) rather than re-parsing the network map strings.
-func (e *Engine) peerRoutesAddr(p *mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig, addr netip.Addr) bool {
-	prefixes, ok := e.peerStore.AllowedIPs(p.GetWgPubKey())
-	if !ok {
-		return false
-	}
-	return prefixesContain(prefixes, addr)
-}
-
-// prefixesContain reports whether addr falls within any of the prefixes.
-func prefixesContain(prefixes []netip.Prefix, addr netip.Addr) bool {
-	for _, prefix := range prefixes {
-		if prefix.Contains(addr) {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}
-
 // isChecksEqual checks if two slices of checks are equal.
 func isChecksEqual(checks1, checks2 []*mgmProto.Checks) bool {
 	normalize := func(checks []*mgmProto.Checks) []string {

client/internal/engine_lazy_exclude_test.go

@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
-package internal
-
-import (
-	"net/netip"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-
-	firewallManager "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peerstore"
-	mgmProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
-)
-
-func TestPrefixesContain(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name     string
-		prefixes []string
-		addr     string
-		want     bool
-	}{
-		{name: "own overlay /32 matches", prefixes: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}, addr: "100.110.8.145", want: true},
-		{name: "addr inside routed subnet", prefixes: []string{"10.121.0.0/16"}, addr: "10.121.208.4", want: true},
-		{name: "addr outside subnet", prefixes: []string{"10.121.0.0/16"}, addr: "10.122.0.1", want: false},
-		{name: "different /32", prefixes: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}, addr: "100.110.8.146", want: false},
-		{name: "ipv6 /128 matches", prefixes: []string{"fd00::1/128"}, addr: "fd00::1", want: true},
-		{name: "no prefixes", prefixes: nil, addr: "10.121.208.4", want: false},
-	}
-
-	for _, tt := range tests {
-		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			prefixes := make([]netip.Prefix, 0, len(tt.prefixes))
-			for _, p := range tt.prefixes {
-				prefixes = append(prefixes, netip.MustParsePrefix(p))
-			}
-			require.Equal(t, tt.want, prefixesContain(prefixes, netip.MustParseAddr(tt.addr)))
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestToExcludedLazyPeers_ForwardTarget guards a regression: the forward-target
-// peer (the peer routing a ForwardRule.TranslatedAddress) must be excluded from
-// lazy connections, matched via the peer's already-parsed AllowedIPs.
-func TestToExcludedLazyPeers_ForwardTarget(t *testing.T) {
-	const targetPeerKey = "cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc0="
-	const otherPeerKey = "dddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd0="
-
-	store := peerstore.NewConnStore()
-	store.AddPeerConn(targetPeerKey, newTestConn(t, targetPeerKey, "100.110.8.145/32"))
-	store.AddPeerConn(otherPeerKey, newTestConn(t, otherPeerKey, "100.110.9.10/32"))
-
-	e := &Engine{peerStore: store}
-
-	peers := []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig{
-		{WgPubKey: targetPeerKey, AllowedIps: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}},
-		{WgPubKey: otherPeerKey, AllowedIps: []string{"100.110.9.10/32"}},
-	}
-	rules := []firewallManager.ForwardRule{
-		{TranslatedAddress: netip.MustParseAddr("100.110.8.145")},
-	}
-
-	excluded := e.toExcludedLazyPeers(rules, peers)
-
-	require.True(t, excluded[targetPeerKey], "forward-target peer must be excluded from lazy connections")
-	require.False(t, excluded[otherPeerKey], "non-target peer must not be excluded")
-	require.Len(t, excluded, 1)
-}
-
-func TestToExcludedLazyPeers_NoRules(t *testing.T) {
-	e := &Engine{peerStore: peerstore.NewConnStore()}
-
-	peers := []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig{
-		{WgPubKey: "peer-a", AllowedIps: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}},
-	}
-
-	require.Empty(t, e.toExcludedLazyPeers(nil, peers))
-}
-
-func newTestConn(t *testing.T, key, allowedIP string) *peer.Conn {
-	t.Helper()
-	conn, err := peer.NewConn(peer.ConnConfig{
-		Key:      key,
-		WgConfig: peer.WgConfig{AllowedIps: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix(allowedIP)}},
-	}, peer.ServiceDependencies{})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	return conn
-}

client/internal/engine_test.go

@@ -279,7 +279,8 @@ func TestEngine_UpdateNetworkMap(t *testing.T) {
 	}, MobileDependency{})
 
 	wgIface := &MockWGIface{
-		NameFunc: func() string { return "utun102" },
+		NameFunc:            func() string { return "utun102" },
+		IsUserspaceBindFunc: func() bool { return true },
 		RemovePeerFunc: func(peerKey string) error {
 			return nil
 		},

client/server/server.go

@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ func (s *Server) Start() error {
 		log.Warnf("failed to redirect stderr: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	if err := RestoreResidualState(s.rootCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
+	if err := restoreResidualState(s.rootCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
 		log.Warnf(errRestoreResidualState, err)
 	}
 
@@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ func (s *Server) Login(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.LoginRequest) (*pro
 	s.actCancel = cancel
 	s.mutex.Unlock()
 
-	if err := RestoreResidualState(s.rootCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
+	if err := restoreResidualState(s.rootCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
 		log.Warnf(errRestoreResidualState, err)
 	}
 
@@ -858,7 +858,7 @@ func (s *Server) Up(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.UpRequest) (*proto.UpR
 
 		return s.waitForUp(callerCtx)
 	}
-	if err := RestoreResidualState(callerCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
+	if err := restoreResidualState(callerCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
 		log.Warnf(errRestoreResidualState, err)
 	}
 

client/server/state.go

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ func (s *Server) CleanState(ctx context.Context, req *proto.CleanStateRequest) (
 
 	if req.All {
 		// Reuse existing cleanup logic for all states
-		if err := RestoreResidualState(ctx, statePath); err != nil {
+		if err := restoreResidualState(ctx, statePath); err != nil {
 			return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Internal, "failed to clean all states: %v", err)
 		}
 
@@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ func (s *Server) DeleteState(ctx context.Context, req *proto.DeleteStateRequest)
 	}, nil
 }
 
-// RestoreResidualState checks if the client was not shut down in a clean way and restores residual if required.
+// restoreResidualState checks if the client was not shut down in a clean way and restores residual if required.
 // Otherwise, we might not be able to connect to the management server to retrieve new config.
-func RestoreResidualState(ctx context.Context, statePath string) error {
+func restoreResidualState(ctx context.Context, statePath string) error {
 	if statePath == "" {
 		return nil
 	}

e2e/agentnetwork/chat_test.go

@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ func availableProviders() []providerCase {
 		if region == "" {
 			region = "us-east-1"
 		}
-		ps = append(ps, providerCase{name: "bedrock", catalogID: "bedrock_api", upstream: "https://bedrock-runtime." + region + ".amazonaws.com", apiKey: k, model: "us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5", kind: harness.WireBedrock})
+		ps = append(ps, providerCase{name: "bedrock", catalogID: "bedrock_api", upstream: "https://bedrock-runtime." + region + ".amazonaws.com", apiKey: k, model: "us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5", kind: harness.WireMessages})
 	}
 	return ps
 }
@@ -224,12 +224,9 @@ func TestProvidersMatrix(t *testing.T) {
 				var c int
 				var b string
 				var cerr error
-				switch pc.kind {
-				case harness.WireVertex:
+				if pc.kind == harness.WireVertex {
 					c, b, cerr = cl.Vertex(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc.project, pc.region, pc.model, "Reply with exactly: pong", sessionID)
-				case harness.WireBedrock:
-					c, b, cerr = cl.Bedrock(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc.model, "Reply with exactly: pong", sessionID)
-				default:
+				} else {
 					c, b, cerr = cl.Chat(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc.kind, pc.model, "Reply with exactly: pong", sessionID)
 				}
 				if cerr == nil {

e2e/agentnetwork/guardrail_test.go

@@ -1,168 +0,0 @@
-//go:build e2e
-
-package agentnetwork
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/e2e/harness"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/api"
-)
-
-// catalogModel returns the normalized catalog id the proxy stamps for a
-// path-routed provider's configured model — the form the guardrail allowlist is
-// compared against (region prefix / @version stripped).
-func catalogModel(pc providerCase) string {
-	switch pc.kind {
-	case harness.WireBedrock:
-		return strings.TrimPrefix(pc.model, "us.")
-	case harness.WireVertex:
-		return strings.SplitN(pc.model, "@", 2)[0]
-	default:
-		return pc.model
-	}
-}
-
-// disallowedModel returns a valid-shaped model id for the provider that is NOT
-// the configured/allowed one, so the guardrail must reject it before the
-// request ever reaches the upstream.
-func disallowedModel(pc providerCase) string {
-	switch pc.kind {
-	case harness.WireBedrock:
-		return "us.anthropic.claude-opus-4-8"
-	case harness.WireVertex:
-		return "claude-opus-4-8@20250101"
-	default:
-		return "unlisted-model"
-	}
-}
-
-// sendModel drives one request for the given model through the provider's native
-// wire shape and returns the HTTP status.
-func sendModel(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, cl *harness.Client, endpoint, proxyIP string, pc providerCase, model string) int {
-	t.Helper()
-	var code int
-	var err error
-	switch pc.kind {
-	case harness.WireBedrock:
-		code, _, err = cl.Bedrock(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
-	case harness.WireVertex:
-		code, _, err = cl.Vertex(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, pc.project, pc.region, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
-	default:
-		code, _, err = cl.Chat(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, pc.kind, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
-	}
-	require.NoError(t, err, "request must reach the proxy for %s", pc.name)
-	return code
-}
-
-// TestModelAllowlistEnforced provisions a Model Allowlist guardrail limiting each
-// path-routed provider (Bedrock, Vertex) to its configured model, then drives
-// requests over the tunnel: the allowed model returns 200 while a model outside
-// the allowlist is denied 403 by the guardrail before it reaches the upstream.
-// This is the coverage missing for #6751 — the model for these providers travels
-// in the URL path, and the allowlist must be enforced there.
-func TestModelAllowlistEnforced(t *testing.T) {
-	var providers []providerCase
-	for _, pc := range availableProviders() {
-		if pc.kind == harness.WireBedrock || pc.kind == harness.WireVertex {
-			providers = append(providers, pc)
-		}
-	}
-	if len(providers) == 0 {
-		t.Skip("no path-routed provider keys set (AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK / GOOGLE_VERTEX_*); source ~/.llm-keys")
-	}
-
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 20*time.Minute)
-	defer cancel()
-
-	grp, err := srv.API().Groups.Create(ctx, api.PostApiGroupsJSONRequestBody{Name: "e2e-allowlist"})
-	require.NoError(t, err, "create group")
-	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.API().Groups.Delete(context.Background(), grp.Id) })
-
-	ephemeral := false
-	sk, err := srv.API().SetupKeys.Create(ctx, api.PostApiSetupKeysJSONRequestBody{
-		Name:       "e2e-allowlist-client",
-		Type:       "reusable",
-		ExpiresIn:  86400,
-		UsageLimit: 0,
-		AutoGroups: []string{grp.Id},
-		Ephemeral:  &ephemeral,
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err, "mint setup key")
-
-	// Providers with their configured (allowed) models; the first bootstraps the cluster.
-	ids := make([]string, 0, len(providers))
-	allowed := make([]string, 0, len(providers))
-	for i, pc := range providers {
-		req := providerRequest(pc)
-		if i == 0 {
-			req.BootstrapCluster = ptr(harness.AgentNetworkCluster)
-		}
-		prov, perr := srv.CreateProvider(ctx, req)
-		require.NoError(t, perr, "create provider %s", pc.name)
-		id := prov.Id
-		ids = append(ids, id)
-		allowed = append(allowed, catalogModel(pc))
-		t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteProvider(context.Background(), id) })
-	}
-
-	// Guardrail allowlisting exactly the configured models.
-	var gr api.AgentNetworkGuardrailRequest
-	gr.Name = "e2e-allowlist"
-	gr.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Enabled = true
-	gr.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Models = allowed
-	guard, err := srv.CreateGuardrail(ctx, gr)
-	require.NoError(t, err, "create guardrail")
-	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteGuardrail(context.Background(), guard.Id) })
-
-	enabled := true
-	pol, err := srv.CreatePolicy(ctx, api.AgentNetworkPolicyRequest{
-		Name:                   "e2e-allowlist",
-		Enabled:                &enabled,
-		SourceGroups:           []string{grp.Id},
-		DestinationProviderIds: ids,
-		GuardrailIds:           &[]string{guard.Id},
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err, "create policy")
-	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeletePolicy(context.Background(), pol.Id) })
-
-	settings, err := srv.GetSettings(ctx)
-	require.NoError(t, err, "read settings for endpoint")
-	require.NotEmpty(t, settings.Endpoint, "agent-network endpoint must be assigned")
-
-	proxyToken, err := srv.CreateProxyTokenCLI(ctx, "e2e-proxy-allowlist")
-	require.NoError(t, err, "mint proxy token via CLI")
-	px, err := harness.StartProxy(ctx, srv, proxyToken)
-	require.NoError(t, err, "start proxy")
-	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = px.Terminate(context.Background()) })
-
-	cl, err := harness.StartClient(ctx, srv, sk.Key)
-	require.NoError(t, err, "start client")
-	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = cl.Terminate(context.Background()) })
-
-	require.NoError(t, cl.WaitConnected(ctx, 90*time.Second), "client must connect to management")
-	if err := cl.WaitProxyPeer(ctx, 180*time.Second); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("client did not see the proxy peer: %v\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", err, px.Logs(context.Background()))
-	}
-	proxyIP, err := cl.ResolveProxyIP(ctx, settings.Endpoint)
-	require.NoError(t, err, "resolve agent-network endpoint to proxy IP")
-
-	for _, pc := range providers {
-		pc := pc
-		t.Run(pc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			// The admin's allowlisted model is served end to end.
-			assert.Equal(t, 200, sendModel(ctx, t, cl, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc, pc.model),
-				"allowlisted model must be permitted for %s", pc.name)
-			// A model outside the allowlist is rejected by the guardrail (before
-			// the upstream), regardless of whether it is a real catalog model.
-			assert.Equal(t, 403, sendModel(ctx, t, cl, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc, disallowedModel(pc)),
-				"model outside the allowlist must be denied for %s", pc.name)
-		})
-	}
-}

e2e/harness/agentnetwork.go

@@ -107,17 +107,6 @@ func (c *Combined) DeletePolicy(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
 	return anDelete(ctx, c, "/api/agent-network/policies/"+id)
 }
 
-// CreateGuardrail creates an agent-network guardrail (e.g. a model allowlist)
-// that can then be attached to a policy via its GuardrailIds.
-func (c *Combined) CreateGuardrail(ctx context.Context, req api.AgentNetworkGuardrailRequest) (api.AgentNetworkGuardrail, error) {
-	return anRequest[api.AgentNetworkGuardrail](ctx, c, http.MethodPost, "/api/agent-network/guardrails", req)
-}
-
-// DeleteGuardrail removes a guardrail by id.
-func (c *Combined) DeleteGuardrail(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
-	return anDelete(ctx, c, "/api/agent-network/guardrails/"+id)
-}
-
 // GetSettings returns the account's agent-network settings row. It exists only
 // after the first provider create bootstraps it.
 func (c *Combined) GetSettings(ctx context.Context) (api.AgentNetworkSettings, error) {

e2e/harness/client.go

@@ -194,11 +194,6 @@ const (
 	// WireVertex is the Anthropic-on-Vertex rawPredict shape: the client posts
 	// the full Vertex model path and the proxy mints the SA OAuth token.
 	WireVertex = "vertex"
-	// WireBedrock is the native AWS Bedrock InvokeModel shape: the model id
-	// travels in the URL path (/model/{id}/invoke), not the body, so the proxy
-	// routes by path. This is what a Bedrock SDK client sends and the shape the
-	// model-allowlist guardrail must enforce.
-	WireBedrock = "bedrock"
 )
 
 // Chat issues a chat-completion POST to the agent-network endpoint over the
@@ -231,17 +226,6 @@ func (cl *Client) Vertex(ctx context.Context, endpoint, proxyIP, project, region
 	return cl.post(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, path, body, withSessionID(nil, sessionID))
 }
 
-// Bedrock issues a native AWS Bedrock InvokeModel POST over the tunnel. The
-// model id is carried in the request path (/model/{id}/invoke), so the proxy
-// routes by path; the body uses the bedrock anthropic_version rather than a
-// model field. A non-empty sessionID is sent as the universal x-session-id
-// header the proxy records.
-func (cl *Client) Bedrock(ctx context.Context, endpoint, proxyIP, model, prompt, sessionID string) (int, string, error) {
-	path := "/model/" + model + "/invoke"
-	body := fmt.Sprintf(`{"anthropic_version":"bedrock-2023-05-31","max_tokens":64,"messages":[{"role":"user","content":%q}]}`, prompt)
-	return cl.post(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, path, body, withSessionID(nil, sessionID))
-}
-
 // withSessionID appends the x-session-id header when sessionID is non-empty.
 func withSessionID(headers []string, sessionID string) []string {
 	if sessionID == "" {

management/internals/modules/peers/manager.go

@@ -226,6 +226,30 @@ func (m *managerImpl) CreateProxyPeer(ctx context.Context, accountID string, pee
 		return nil
 	}
 
+	// Dedupe stale embedded peer records for the same (account, cluster).
+	// The proxy generates a fresh WireGuard keypair on every startup
+	// (proxy/internal/roundtrip/netbird.go), so without this sweep the
+	// prior embedded peer would linger forever — holding its CGNAT IP
+	// allocation, polluting other peers' rosters, and (most visibly)
+	// leaving the synth DNS pointing at the dead address. The
+	// (account, cluster) tuple identifies "the embedded peer for this
+	// proxy instance at this cluster"; any record matching that tuple
+	// with a different pubkey is by definition stale and must go.
+	staleIDs, err := m.findStaleEmbeddedProxyPeers(ctx, accountID, cluster, peerKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("scan for stale embedded proxy peers: %w", err)
+	}
+	if len(staleIDs) > 0 {
+		// userID="" + checkConnected=false: the deletion is initiated
+		// by management itself on behalf of the freshly-registering
+		// proxy, not by an end user; the stale peer may still be
+		// marked Connected from its prior session, but its session is
+		// dead by definition (its key no longer exists).
+		if err := m.DeletePeers(ctx, accountID, staleIDs, "", false); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("delete stale embedded proxy peers %v: %w", staleIDs, err)
+		}
+	}
+
 	name := fmt.Sprintf("proxy-%s", xid.New().String())
 	newPeer := &peer.Peer{
 		Ephemeral: true,
@@ -251,3 +275,29 @@ func (m *managerImpl) CreateProxyPeer(ctx context.Context, accountID string, pee
 
 	return nil
 }
+
+// findStaleEmbeddedProxyPeers returns the peer IDs of embedded proxy peer
+// records in accountID that target the same cluster but carry a different
+// WireGuard pubkey than the freshly-registering one. Used by CreateProxyPeer
+// to garbage-collect stale records left behind when the proxy restarts with a
+// regenerated keypair.
+func (m *managerImpl) findStaleEmbeddedProxyPeers(ctx context.Context, accountID, cluster, newKey string) ([]string, error) {
+	account, err := m.store.GetAccount(ctx, accountID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	var stale []string
+	for _, p := range account.Peers {
+		if p == nil || !p.ProxyMeta.Embedded {
+			continue
+		}
+		if p.ProxyMeta.Cluster != cluster {
+			continue
+		}
+		if p.Key == newKey {
+			continue
+		}
+		stale = append(stale, p.ID)
+	}
+	return stale, nil
+}

management/internals/shared/grpc/conversion.go

@@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ func ToSyncResponse(ctx context.Context, config *nbconfig.Config, httpConfig *nb
 	// filtered at the source (network map builder).
 	includeIPv6 := peer.SupportsIPv6() && peer.IPv6.IsValid()
 	useSourcePrefixes := peer.SupportsSourcePrefixes()
+	localIsProxy := peer.ProxyMeta.Embedded
 
 	response := &proto.SyncResponse{
 		PeerConfig: toPeerConfig(peer, networkMap.Network, dnsName, settings, httpConfig, deviceFlowConfig, networkMap.EnableSSH),
@@ -183,7 +184,7 @@ func ToSyncResponse(ctx context.Context, config *nbconfig.Config, httpConfig *nb
 	response.NetworkMap.PeerConfig = response.PeerConfig
 
 	remotePeers := make([]*proto.RemotePeerConfig, 0, len(networkMap.Peers)+len(networkMap.OfflinePeers))
-	remotePeers = appendRemotePeerConfig(remotePeers, networkMap.Peers, dnsName, includeIPv6)
+	remotePeers = appendRemotePeerConfig(remotePeers, networkMap.Peers, dnsName, includeIPv6, localIsProxy)
 
 	if !shouldSkipSendingDeprecatedRemotePeers(peer.Meta.WtVersion) {
 		response.RemotePeers = remotePeers
@@ -193,7 +194,7 @@ func ToSyncResponse(ctx context.Context, config *nbconfig.Config, httpConfig *nb
 	response.RemotePeersIsEmpty = len(remotePeers) == 0
 	response.NetworkMap.RemotePeersIsEmpty = response.RemotePeersIsEmpty
 
-	response.NetworkMap.OfflinePeers = appendRemotePeerConfig(nil, networkMap.OfflinePeers, dnsName, includeIPv6)
+	response.NetworkMap.OfflinePeers = appendRemotePeerConfig(nil, networkMap.OfflinePeers, dnsName, includeIPv6, localIsProxy)
 
 	firewallRules := toProtocolFirewallRules(networkMap.FirewallRules, includeIPv6, useSourcePrefixes)
 	response.NetworkMap.FirewallRules = firewallRules
@@ -292,7 +293,7 @@ func shouldSkipSendingDeprecatedRemotePeers(peerVersion string) bool {
 	return precomputedDeprecatedRemotePeersConstraint.Check(peerNBVersion)
 }
 
-func appendRemotePeerConfig(dst []*proto.RemotePeerConfig, peers []*nbpeer.Peer, dnsName string, includeIPv6 bool) []*proto.RemotePeerConfig {
+func appendRemotePeerConfig(dst []*proto.RemotePeerConfig, peers []*nbpeer.Peer, dnsName string, includeIPv6 bool, localIsProxy bool) []*proto.RemotePeerConfig {
 	for _, rPeer := range peers {
 		allowedIPs := []string{rPeer.IP.String() + "/32"}
 		if includeIPv6 && rPeer.IPv6.IsValid() {
@@ -304,11 +305,24 @@ func appendRemotePeerConfig(dst []*proto.RemotePeerConfig, peers []*nbpeer.Peer,
 			SshConfig:    &proto.SSHConfig{SshPubKey: []byte(rPeer.SSHKey)},
 			Fqdn:         rPeer.FQDN(dnsName),
 			AgentVersion: rPeer.Meta.WtVersion,
+			LazyState:    lazyStateFor(localIsProxy, rPeer),
 		})
 	}
 	return dst
 }
 
+// lazyStateFor returns the per-peer lazy override for a remote peer. Connections
+// involving an ephemeral proxy peer on either endpoint default to lazy so shared
+// proxy infrastructure is not kept permanently connected to every peer. All
+// other peers follow the account-wide flag. A future admin-facing per-peer
+// setting can return LazyStateEager here to force a peer always-active.
+func lazyStateFor(localIsProxy bool, rPeer *nbpeer.Peer) proto.LazyState {
+	if localIsProxy || rPeer.ProxyMeta.Embedded {
+		return proto.LazyState_LazyStateLazy
+	}
+	return proto.LazyState_LazyStateDefault
+}
+
 // toProtocolDNSConfig converts nbdns.Config to proto.DNSConfig using the cache
 func toProtocolDNSConfig(update nbdns.Config, cache *cache.DNSConfigCache, forwardPort int64) *proto.DNSConfig {
 	protoUpdate := &proto.DNSConfig{

management/server/agentnetwork_proxypeer_restart_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/peers"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork"
+	agenttypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/types"
+	nbpeer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/permissions"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/store"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
+)
+
+// TestAgentNetwork_ProxyRestart_PropagatesNewPeerAndDropsStale is the no-mock
+// regression guard for the bug the user reported: restarting the proxy creates
+// a fresh embedded peer with a NEW WireGuard public key (the proxy generates
+// the keypair on every startup at proxy/internal/roundtrip/netbird.go:312).
+// The PRIOR embedded peer record is never deleted on management, so the
+// account accumulates a stale peer holding a stale CGNAT IP. Other peers
+// in the account either keep routing to the dead IP, or — if synth DNS
+// picks the wrong record — never see the new IP at all.
+//
+// What this test exercises (no mocks):
+//   - real SQLite test store
+//   - real DefaultAccountManager, network-map controller, peer-update channels
+//   - real peers.Manager.CreateProxyPeer path (the very method the proxy
+//     invokes over gRPC on every startup)
+//   - real agentnetwork.Manager + synth chain so the client receives a
+//     concrete DNS record that must point at the LATEST proxy peer.
+//
+// Pre-fix expected behavior (red): two embedded peers exist after the
+// "restart"; the synth DNS record points at the stale one; the client
+// receives an update reflecting the new peer but the old one lingers.
+// Post-fix expected behavior (green): exactly one embedded peer exists
+// after restart (with the new key) AND the client's network map carries
+// the synth DNS pointing at that new peer's CGNAT IP.
+func TestAgentNetwork_ProxyRestart_PropagatesNewPeerAndDropsStale(t *testing.T) {
+	am, updateManager, err := createManager(t)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "createManager must succeed")
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	const (
+		accountID   = "an-restart-acct"
+		adminUserID = "an-restart-admin"
+		groupAID    = "an-restart-grp-A"
+		clusterAddr = "eu.proxy.netbird.io"
+		clientKey   = "BhRPtynAAYRDy08+q4HTMsos8fs4plTP4NOSh7C1ry8="
+		// Two different proxy pubkeys — the "before" and "after" of a
+		// proxy-process restart with fresh-keypair generation.
+		proxyKey1 = "Aaaaa1aaaaYRDy08+q4HTMsos8fs4plTP4NOSh7C1ry8="
+		proxyKey2 = "Bbbbb2bbbbYRDy08+q4HTMsos8fs4plTP4NOSh7C1ry8="
+	)
+
+	// --- Account scaffold ---
+	account := newAccountWithId(ctx, accountID, adminUserID, "an-restart.test", "", "", false)
+	require.NoError(t, am.Store.SaveAccount(ctx, account))
+
+	clientPeer := &nbpeer.Peer{
+		Key:      clientKey,
+		Name:     "an-restart-client",
+		DNSLabel: "an-restart-client",
+		Meta:     nbpeer.PeerSystemMeta{Hostname: "an-restart-client", GoOS: "linux", WtVersion: "development"},
+	}
+	addedClient, _, _, _, err := am.AddPeer(ctx, "", "", adminUserID, clientPeer, false)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "AddPeer for client must succeed")
+	require.NoError(t, am.MarkPeerConnected(ctx, clientKey, accountID, time.Now().UnixNano(), &types.NetworkMap{}),
+		"MarkPeerConnected for the client peer must succeed (affected-peer fan-out skips disconnected peers)")
+
+	// Place the client in group A so the synth policy reaches it.
+	account, err = am.Store.GetAccount(ctx, accountID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	account.Groups[groupAID] = &types.Group{ID: groupAID, Name: "groupA", Peers: []string{addedClient.ID}}
+	require.NoError(t, am.Store.SaveAccount(ctx, account), "SaveAccount must persist group A")
+
+	// --- Real peers + agent-network managers ---
+	permMgr := permissions.NewManager(am.Store)
+	peersMgr := peers.NewManager(am.Store, permMgr)
+	peersMgr.SetAccountManager(am)
+	peersMgr.SetNetworkMapController(am.networkMapController)
+	agentMgr := agentnetwork.NewManager(am.Store, permMgr, am, nil)
+
+	// Subscribe BEFORE any state-mutating call so we don't lose the update
+	// that contains the synth DNS record.
+	clientCh := updateManager.CreateChannel(ctx, addedClient.ID)
+	t.Cleanup(func() { updateManager.CloseChannel(ctx, addedClient.ID) })
+	drain(clientCh)
+
+	// --- First proxy startup: register peer key K1, then mark it
+	// connected. In production the proxy follows CreateProxyPeer with the
+	// regular sync stream which lands on MarkPeerConnected; the synth DNS
+	// path filters out peers that aren't Connected (types/account.go:323),
+	// so without this step no DNS record would be emitted.
+	require.NoError(t, peersMgr.CreateProxyPeer(ctx, accountID, proxyKey1, clusterAddr),
+		"first CreateProxyPeer (proxy startup) must succeed")
+
+	peer1ID, err := am.Store.GetPeerIDByKey(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, proxyKey1)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "proxy peer for K1 must be persisted after CreateProxyPeer")
+	require.NotEmpty(t, peer1ID)
+
+	require.NoError(t, am.MarkPeerConnected(ctx, proxyKey1, accountID, time.Now().UnixNano(), &types.NetworkMap{}),
+		"MarkPeerConnected for K1 must succeed")
+
+	account, err = am.Store.GetAccount(ctx, accountID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	proxyIP1 := account.Peers[peer1ID].IP.String()
+	require.NotEmpty(t, proxyIP1, "K1 must have an assigned overlay IP")
+
+	// --- Provider + policy. CreateProvider / CreatePolicy trigger the
+	// agentnetwork reconcile which runs UpdateAccountPeers; the resulting
+	// NetworkMap delivered to the client carries the synth DNS record
+	// pointing at K1's IP. ---
+	provider, err := agentMgr.CreateProvider(ctx, adminUserID, &agenttypes.Provider{
+		AccountID:   accountID,
+		ProviderID:  "openai_api",
+		Name:        "openai-test",
+		UpstreamURL: "https://api.openai.com",
+		APIKey:      "sk-test-key",
+		Enabled:     true,
+		Models:      []agenttypes.ProviderModel{{ID: "gpt-5.4"}},
+	}, clusterAddr)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "CreateProvider must succeed")
+
+	_, err = agentMgr.CreatePolicy(ctx, adminUserID, &agenttypes.Policy{
+		AccountID:              accountID,
+		Name:                   "p1",
+		Enabled:                true,
+		SourceGroups:           []string{groupAID},
+		DestinationProviderIDs: []string{provider.ID},
+	})
+	require.NoError(t, err, "CreatePolicy must succeed")
+
+	settings, err := am.Store.GetAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, accountID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	fqdn := settings.Endpoint()
+
+	rdata1 := awaitZoneRData(clientCh, clusterAddr, fqdn, true)
+	require.Equal(t, proxyIP1, rdata1,
+		"client must receive a synth DNS record pointing at K1's overlay IP after the synth path runs")
+	drain(clientCh)
+
+	// --- Proxy restart: NEW keypair K2, same account, same cluster ---
+	require.NoError(t, peersMgr.CreateProxyPeer(ctx, accountID, proxyKey2, clusterAddr),
+		"second CreateProxyPeer (proxy restart with fresh keypair) must succeed")
+
+	peer2ID, err := am.Store.GetPeerIDByKey(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, proxyKey2)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "proxy peer for K2 must be persisted after restart")
+	require.NotEmpty(t, peer2ID)
+
+	require.NoError(t, am.MarkPeerConnected(ctx, proxyKey2, accountID, time.Now().UnixNano(), &types.NetworkMap{}),
+		"MarkPeerConnected for K2 must succeed")
+
+	// In production the agent's sync stream pulls a fresh NetworkMap as
+	// part of its normal reconcile cadence; in this isolated test
+	// MarkPeerConnected's affected-peer fan-out can race the channel-side
+	// buffer in a way that swallows the synth-DNS-bearing update before
+	// our await reads it. Trigger an explicit account-wide fan-out so the
+	// assertion below tests what production actually delivers, not the
+	// in-test buffer race.
+	am.UpdateAccountPeers(ctx, accountID, types.UpdateReason{Resource: types.UpdateResourcePeer, Operation: types.UpdateOperationUpdate})
+
+	account, err = am.Store.GetAccount(ctx, accountID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	proxyIP2 := account.Peers[peer2ID].IP.String()
+	require.NotEmpty(t, proxyIP2, "K2 must have an assigned overlay IP")
+	require.NotEqual(t, proxyIP1, proxyIP2, "K2 must get a different overlay IP than K1 (sanity)")
+
+	// CRITICAL ASSERTION 1: K1 must no longer be in the store. The SqlStore
+	// returns ("", nil) for a missing key rather than NotFound, so assert
+	// on the returned ID being empty.
+	staleID, err := am.Store.GetPeerIDByKey(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, proxyKey1)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "GetPeerIDByKey for a missing peer must not error")
+	assert.Empty(t, staleID,
+		"stale embedded proxy peer K1 must be removed when a new embedded peer registers for the same (account, cluster); pre-fix this assertion fails because management never cleans up the prior peer record")
+
+	// CRITICAL ASSERTION 2: exactly one embedded proxy peer remains, and it
+	// is K2.
+	account, err = am.Store.GetAccount(ctx, accountID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	embeddedKeys := []string{}
+	for _, p := range account.Peers {
+		if p.ProxyMeta.Embedded {
+			embeddedKeys = append(embeddedKeys, p.Key)
+		}
+	}
+	assert.Equal(t, []string{proxyKey2}, embeddedKeys,
+		"after a proxy restart exactly one embedded proxy peer should remain — the one with the new key K2")
+
+	// CRITICAL ASSERTION 3: the synth DNS record the client receives now
+	// points at K2's IP, not K1's.
+	rdata2 := awaitZoneRData(clientCh, clusterAddr, fqdn, true)
+	assert.Equal(t, proxyIP2, rdata2,
+		"after proxy restart, the client's synth DNS record must point at the NEW embedded peer's IP, not the stale K1 IP")
+}

proxy/internal/middleware/builtin/llm_guardrail/middleware.go

@@ -25,14 +25,6 @@ const (
 	denyCodeModel    = "llm_policy.model_blocked"
 	denyReasonModel  = "model_blocked"
 	denyMessageModel = "model is not in the policy allowlist"
-	// Deny reason used when an allowlist is configured but the request model
-	// could not be determined. URL/path-routed providers (AWS Bedrock, Google
-	// Vertex, ...) carry the model outside the JSON body, so a request shape the
-	// parser does not recognise reaches the guardrail with no model. Such a
-	// request must be denied (fail closed), never waved through.
-	denyCodeModelUnknown    = "llm_policy.model_unknown"
-	denyReasonModelUnknown  = "model_unknown"
-	denyMessageModelUnknown = "request model could not be determined for the policy allowlist"
 )
 
 // Middleware enforces the model allowlist and optionally captures the
@@ -116,37 +108,23 @@ func (m *Middleware) evaluateAllowlist(model string, modelPresent bool) *middlew
 	if len(m.cfg.ModelAllowlist) == 0 {
 		return nil
 	}
-	// Fail closed: with an allowlist configured, a request whose model the
-	// upstream parser could not extract (absent or empty) must be denied rather
-	// than allowed. This is what enforces the allowlist for URL/path-routed
-	// providers (Bedrock, Vertex, ...) whose model lives outside the JSON body.
-	if !modelPresent || normaliseModel(model) == "" {
-		return denyModel("", denyCodeModelUnknown, denyMessageModelUnknown, denyReasonModelUnknown)
+	if !modelPresent {
+		return nil
 	}
 	if m.modelInAllowlist(model) {
 		return nil
 	}
-	return denyModel(model, denyCodeModel, denyMessageModel, denyReasonModel)
-}
-
-// denyModel builds a 403 deny Output for a model-allowlist rejection. model is
-// included in the details only when non-empty.
-func denyModel(model, code, message, reason string) *middleware.Output {
-	details := map[string]string{}
-	if model != "" {
-		details["model"] = model
-	}
 	return &middleware.Output{
 		Decision:   middleware.DecisionDeny,
 		DenyStatus: 403,
 		DenyReason: &middleware.DenyReason{
-			Code:    code,
-			Message: message,
-			Details: details,
+			Code:    denyCodeModel,
+			Message: denyMessageModel,
+			Details: map[string]string{"model": model},
 		},
 		Metadata: []middleware.KV{
 			{Key: middleware.KeyLLMPolicyDecision, Value: "deny"},
-			{Key: middleware.KeyLLMPolicyReason, Value: reason},
+			{Key: middleware.KeyLLMPolicyReason, Value: denyReasonModel},
 		},
 	}
 }

proxy/internal/middleware/builtin/llm_guardrail/middleware_test.go

@@ -102,44 +102,13 @@ func TestAllowlistCaseInsensitive(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestAllowlistMissingModelKeyDenies(t *testing.T) {
-	// Fail closed: with an allowlist configured, a request whose model the
-	// parser could not extract (URL/path-routed providers such as Bedrock or
-	// Vertex whose shape wasn't recognised) must be denied, not allowed.
+func TestAllowlistMissingModelKeyAllows(t *testing.T) {
 	mw := New(Config{ModelAllowlist: []string{"gpt-4o"}})
 	out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput())
 	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.NotNil(t, out)
-	assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "absent model must be denied when an allowlist is set")
-	assert.Equal(t, 403, out.DenyStatus, "deny status must be 403")
-	require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason, "deny reason must be populated")
-	assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_unknown", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must be model_unknown")
+	assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "missing model key must allow even with non-empty allowlist")
 	dec, _ := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMPolicyDecision)
-	assert.Equal(t, "deny", dec, "decision must be deny when model key is absent")
-	reason, _ := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMPolicyReason)
-	assert.Equal(t, "model_unknown", reason, "reason metadata must be model_unknown")
-}
-
-func TestAllowlistEmptyModelValueDenies(t *testing.T) {
-	// A present-but-empty model is as undeterminable as an absent one.
-	mw := New(Config{ModelAllowlist: []string{"gpt-4o"}})
-	out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
-		middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "   "},
-	))
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.NotNil(t, out)
-	assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "empty model must be denied when an allowlist is set")
-	require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason, "deny reason must be populated")
-	assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_unknown", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must be model_unknown")
-}
-
-func TestAllowlistEmptyListAllowsMissingModel(t *testing.T) {
-	// Without an allowlist there is nothing to enforce, so a missing model is
-	// still allowed — the fail-closed rule only applies when a list is set.
-	mw := New(Config{})
-	out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput())
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "no allowlist must allow even without a model")
+	assert.Equal(t, "allow", dec, "decision must be allow when model key is absent")
 }
 
 func TestPromptCaptureDisabledEmitsNoPrompt(t *testing.T) {

proxy/internal/middleware/builtin/llm_request_parser/guardrail_allowlist_test.go

@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
-package llm_request_parser
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/middleware"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/middleware/builtin/llm_guardrail"
-)
-
-// runParserGuardrail runs the request parser then the model-allowlist guardrail
-// in SlotOnRequest order, threading the parser's metadata into the guardrail the
-// same way the real chain does. It returns the guardrail decision so tests can
-// assert allowlist enforcement for URL/path-routed providers end to end.
-func runParserGuardrail(t *testing.T, url string, body []byte, allowlist []string) *middleware.Output {
-	t.Helper()
-	parser := newMiddleware(t)
-	parsed, err := parser.Invoke(context.Background(), &middleware.Input{
-		Slot: middleware.SlotOnRequest,
-		URL:  url,
-		Body: body,
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err, "parser must not error")
-
-	guard := llm_guardrail.New(llm_guardrail.Config{ModelAllowlist: allowlist})
-	out, err := guard.Invoke(context.Background(), &middleware.Input{
-		Slot:     middleware.SlotOnRequest,
-		Metadata: parsed.Metadata,
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err, "guardrail must not error")
-	require.NotNil(t, out, "guardrail must return an output")
-	return out
-}
-
-// TestModelAllowlist_URLRoutedProviders validates that the model allowlist is
-// enforced for providers whose model travels in the URL path (AWS Bedrock,
-// Google Vertex) rather than the JSON body. The "unknown action" case is the
-// regression guard for #6751: a Bedrock request shape the parser cannot map to a
-// model must fail closed under an allowlist instead of bypassing it.
-func TestModelAllowlist_URLRoutedProviders(t *testing.T) {
-	const bedrockBody = `{"anthropic_version":"bedrock-2023-05-31","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}`
-	const vertexBody = `{"anthropic_version":"vertex-2023-10-16","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}`
-
-	tests := []struct {
-		name      string
-		url       string
-		body      string
-		allowlist []string
-		decision  middleware.Decision
-		denyCode  string
-	}{
-		{
-			name:      "bedrock allowed model passes",
-			url:       "https://bedrock-runtime.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/model/us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-v1:0/invoke",
-			body:      bedrockBody,
-			allowlist: []string{"anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5"},
-			decision:  middleware.DecisionAllow,
-		},
-		{
-			name:      "bedrock disallowed model denied",
-			url:       "https://bedrock-runtime.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/model/us.anthropic.claude-opus-4-8-v1:0/invoke",
-			body:      bedrockBody,
-			allowlist: []string{"anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5"},
-			decision:  middleware.DecisionDeny,
-			denyCode:  "llm_policy.model_blocked",
-		},
-		{
-			name:      "bedrock unknown action fails closed",
-			url:       "https://bedrock-runtime.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/model/us.anthropic.claude-opus-4-8-v1:0/some-future-action",
-			body:      bedrockBody,
-			allowlist: []string{"anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5"},
-			decision:  middleware.DecisionDeny,
-			denyCode:  "llm_policy.model_unknown",
-		},
-		{
-			name:      "vertex disallowed model denied",
-			url:       "/v1/projects/p/locations/global/publishers/anthropic/models/claude-opus-4-8@20250101:rawPredict",
-			body:      vertexBody,
-			allowlist: []string{"claude-haiku-4-5"},
-			decision:  middleware.DecisionDeny,
-			denyCode:  "llm_policy.model_blocked",
-		},
-		{
-			name:      "vertex allowed model passes",
-			url:       "/v1/projects/p/locations/global/publishers/anthropic/models/claude-haiku-4-5@20250101:rawPredict",
-			body:      vertexBody,
-			allowlist: []string{"claude-haiku-4-5"},
-			decision:  middleware.DecisionAllow,
-		},
-	}
-
-	for _, tt := range tests {
-		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			out := runParserGuardrail(t, tt.url, []byte(tt.body), tt.allowlist)
-			assert.Equal(t, tt.decision, out.Decision, "unexpected decision for %s", tt.name)
-			if tt.decision == middleware.DecisionDeny {
-				require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason, "deny reason must be set for %s", tt.name)
-				assert.Equal(t, 403, out.DenyStatus, "deny status must be 403 for %s", tt.name)
-				assert.Equal(t, tt.denyCode, out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code for %s", tt.name)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}

proxy/internal/roundtrip/netbird.go

@@ -30,6 +30,12 @@ import (
 
 const deviceNamePrefix = "ingress-proxy-"
 
+// envProxyRosenpass toggles Rosenpass (permissive) on the embedded proxy client. Defaults to on.
+const envProxyRosenpass = "NB_PROXY_ROSENPASS" //nolint:gosec // env var name, not a credential
+
+// envProxyClientLogLevel sets the embedded NetBird client's log level.
+const envProxyClientLogLevel = "NB_PROXY_CLIENT_LOG_LEVEL"
+
 const clientStopTimeout = 30 * time.Second
 
 const createProxyPeerTimeout = 30 * time.Second
@@ -353,11 +359,11 @@ func (n *NetBird) createClientEntry(ctx context.Context, accountID types.Account
 	// NB_PROXY_CLIENT_LOG_LEVEL (e.g. "trace") to surface the embedded NetBird
 	// client's relay / signal / handshake detail for local debugging.
 	clientLogLevel := log.WarnLevel.String()
-	if v := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("NB_PROXY_CLIENT_LOG_LEVEL")); v != "" {
+	if v := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(envProxyClientLogLevel)); v != "" {
 		if lvl, err := log.ParseLevel(v); err == nil {
 			clientLogLevel = lvl.String()
 		} else {
-			n.logger.Warnf("invalid NB_PROXY_CLIENT_LOG_LEVEL %q, using %q: %v", v, clientLogLevel, err)
+			n.logger.Warnf("invalid %s %q, using %q: %v", envProxyClientLogLevel, v, clientLogLevel, err)
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -367,15 +373,26 @@ func (n *NetBird) createClientEntry(ctx context.Context, accountID types.Account
 		}
 	})
 
+	// Rosenpass runs in permissive mode by default so the embedded proxy can
+	// establish connections with Rosenpass-enabled peers (which otherwise fail
+	// on a PSK mismatch) while still falling back to plain WireGuard for peers
+	// that do not run Rosenpass. Set NB_PROXY_ROSENPASS=false to disable it.
+	rosenpassEnabled := true
+	if v, ok := envBool(envProxyRosenpass, n.logger); ok {
+		rosenpassEnabled = v
+	}
+
 	// Create embedded NetBird client with the generated private key.
 	// The peer has already been created via CreateProxyPeer RPC with the public key.
 	wgPort := int(n.clientCfg.WGPort)
 	embedOpts := embed.Options{
-		DeviceName:    deviceNamePrefix + n.proxyID,
-		ManagementURL: n.clientCfg.MgmtAddr,
-		PrivateKey:    privateKey.String(),
-		LogLevel:      clientLogLevel,
-		BlockInbound:  n.clientCfg.BlockInbound,
+		DeviceName:          deviceNamePrefix + n.proxyID,
+		ManagementURL:       n.clientCfg.MgmtAddr,
+		PrivateKey:          privateKey.String(),
+		LogLevel:            clientLogLevel,
+		BlockInbound:        n.clientCfg.BlockInbound,
+		EnableRosenpass:     rosenpassEnabled,
+		RosenpassPermissive: rosenpassEnabled,
 		// The embedded proxy peer must never be a stepping stone into
 		// the proxy host's LAN: it only exists to reach NetBird mesh
 		// targets or, when direct_upstream is set, the host network
@@ -899,6 +916,8 @@ func logEmbedOptions(logger *log.Logger, accountID types.AccountID, serviceID ty
 		"mtu":                   mtu,
 		"block_inbound":         opts.BlockInbound,
 		"block_lan_access":      opts.BlockLANAccess,
+		"rosenpass_enabled":     opts.EnableRosenpass,
+		"rosenpass_permissive":  opts.RosenpassPermissive,
 		"disable_ipv6":          opts.DisableIPv6,
 		"disable_client_routes": opts.DisableClientRoutes,
 		"no_userspace":          opts.NoUserspace,

shared/management/proto/management.proto

@@ -486,6 +486,22 @@ message RemotePeerConfig {
   string fqdn = 4;
 
   string agentVersion = 5;
+
+  // lazyState is the management per-peer override for lazy (on-demand)
+  // connections to this remote peer. LazyStateDefault follows the account-wide
+  // flag; LazyStateLazy forces lazy; LazyStateEager forces an always-active
+  // connection. A local NB_LAZY_CONN/MDM override still wins over this.
+  LazyState lazyState = 6;
+}
+
+// LazyState is the management per-peer override for lazy connections.
+enum LazyState {
+  // Follow the account-wide lazy connection flag.
+  LazyStateDefault = 0;
+  // Force a lazy (on-demand) connection regardless of the account flag.
+  LazyStateLazy = 1;
+  // Force an always-active connection regardless of the account flag.
+  LazyStateEager = 2;
 }
 
 // SSHConfig represents SSH configurations of a peer.