Compare commits

..

1 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Maycon Santos
001fda5393 Add Linux ARM64 UI build 2026-07-27 18:13:44 +02:00
81 changed files with 2183 additions and 4283 deletions

View File

@@ -249,35 +249,78 @@ jobs:
docker compose exec management ls -l /var/lib/netbird/ | grep -i GeoLite2-City_[0-9]*.mmdb
docker compose exec management ls -l /var/lib/netbird/ | grep -i geonames_[0-9]*.db
test-legacy-getting-started-scripts:
test-getting-started-script:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Install jq
run: sudo apt-get install -y jq
- name: Checkout code
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Verify Dex retirement notice
run: |
if infrastructure_files/getting-started-with-dex.sh >stdout.txt 2>stderr.txt; then
echo "Expected the retired Dex installer to fail"
exit 1
fi
test ! -s stdout.txt
grep -Fq "Dex support is not deprecated." stderr.txt
grep -Fq "https://docs.netbird.io/selfhosted/selfhosted-quickstart" stderr.txt
grep -Fq "https://docs.netbird.io/selfhosted/identity-providers/local" stderr.txt
grep -Fq "removed in NetBird v0.80" stderr.txt
- name: run script with Zitadel PostgreSQL
run: NETBIRD_DOMAIN=use-ip bash -x infrastructure_files/getting-started-with-zitadel.sh
- name: Verify Zitadel retirement notice
- name: test Caddy file gen postgres
run: test -f Caddyfile
- name: test docker-compose file gen postgres
run: test -f docker-compose.yml
- name: test management.json file gen postgres
run: test -f management.json
- name: test turnserver.conf file gen postgres
run: |
if bash infrastructure_files/getting-started-with-zitadel.sh >stdout.txt 2>stderr.txt; then
echo "Expected the retired Zitadel installer to fail"
exit 1
fi
test ! -s stdout.txt
grep -Fq "Zitadel support and existing Zitadel deployments are not deprecated." stderr.txt
grep -Fq "https://docs.netbird.io/selfhosted/selfhosted-quickstart" stderr.txt
grep -Fq "https://docs.netbird.io/selfhosted/identity-providers/zitadel" stderr.txt
grep -Fq "https://docs.netbird.io/selfhosted/selfhosted-guide" stderr.txt
grep -Fq "removed in NetBird v0.80" stderr.txt
set -x
test -f turnserver.conf
grep external-ip turnserver.conf
- name: test zitadel.env file gen postgres
run: test -f zitadel.env
- name: test dashboard.env file gen postgres
run: test -f dashboard.env
- name: test relay.env file gen postgres
run: test -f relay.env
- name: test zdb.env file gen postgres
run: test -f zdb.env
- name: Postgres run cleanup
run: |
docker compose down --volumes --rmi all
rm -rf docker-compose.yml Caddyfile zitadel.env dashboard.env machinekey/zitadel-admin-sa.token turnserver.conf management.json zdb.env
- name: run script with Zitadel CockroachDB
run: bash -x infrastructure_files/getting-started-with-zitadel.sh
env:
NETBIRD_DOMAIN: use-ip
ZITADEL_DATABASE: cockroach
- name: test Caddy file gen CockroachDB
run: test -f Caddyfile
- name: test docker-compose file gen CockroachDB
run: test -f docker-compose.yml
- name: test management.json file gen CockroachDB
run: test -f management.json
- name: test turnserver.conf file gen CockroachDB
run: |
set -x
test -f turnserver.conf
grep external-ip turnserver.conf
- name: test zitadel.env file gen CockroachDB
run: test -f zitadel.env
- name: test dashboard.env file gen CockroachDB
run: test -f dashboard.env
- name: test relay.env file gen CockroachDB
run: test -f relay.env

View File

@@ -21,11 +21,10 @@ builds:
- linux
goarch:
- amd64
- arm64
ldflags:
- -s -w -X github.com/netbirdio/netbird/version.version={{.Version}} -X main.commit={{.Commit}} -X main.date={{.CommitDate}} -X main.builtBy=goreleaser
mod_timestamp: "{{ .CommitTimestamp }}"
tags:
- production
- id: netbird-ui-windows-amd64
dir: client/ui
@@ -41,8 +40,6 @@ builds:
- -s -w -X github.com/netbirdio/netbird/version.version={{.Version}} -X main.commit={{.Commit}} -X main.date={{.CommitDate}} -X main.builtBy=goreleaser
- -H windowsgui
mod_timestamp: "{{ .CommitTimestamp }}"
tags:
- production
- id: netbird-ui-windows-arm64
dir: client/ui
@@ -59,8 +56,6 @@ builds:
- -s -w -X github.com/netbirdio/netbird/version.version={{.Version}} -X main.commit={{.Commit}} -X main.date={{.CommitDate}} -X main.builtBy=goreleaser
- -H windowsgui
mod_timestamp: "{{ .CommitTimestamp }}"
tags:
- production
archives:
- id: linux-arch

View File

@@ -29,8 +29,6 @@ builds:
ldflags:
- -s -w -X github.com/netbirdio/netbird/version.version={{.Version}} -X main.commit={{.Commit}} -X main.date={{.CommitDate}} -X main.builtBy=goreleaser
mod_timestamp: "{{ .CommitTimestamp }}"
tags:
- production
universal_binaries:
- id: netbird-ui-darwin

View File

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import (
"fmt"
"os"
"slices"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
@@ -300,13 +299,6 @@ func (c *Client) SetInfoLogLevel() {
// PeersList return with the list of the PeerInfos
func (c *Client) PeersList() *PeerInfoArray {
// The recorder only caches transfer counters and handshake times; nothing
// refreshes them on its own, so without this they read as zero. The desktop
// daemon does the same before serving a full peer status.
if err := c.recorder.RefreshWireGuardStats(); err != nil {
log.Debugf("failed to refresh WireGuard stats: %v", err)
}
fullStatus := c.recorder.GetFullStatus()
peerInfos := make([]PeerInfo, len(fullStatus.Peers))
@@ -317,20 +309,6 @@ func (c *Client) PeersList() *PeerInfoArray {
FQDN: p.FQDN,
ConnStatus: int(p.ConnStatus),
Routes: PeerRoutes{routes: maps.Keys(p.GetRoutes())},
PubKey: p.PubKey,
Latency: formatDuration(p.Latency),
LatencyMs: p.Latency.Milliseconds(),
BytesRx: p.BytesRx,
BytesTx: p.BytesTx,
ConnStatusUpdate: formatTime(p.ConnStatusUpdate),
Relayed: p.Relayed,
RosenpassEnabled: p.RosenpassEnabled,
LastWireguardHandshake: formatTime(p.LastWireguardHandshake),
LocalIceCandidateType: p.LocalIceCandidateType,
RemoteIceCandidateType: p.RemoteIceCandidateType,
LocalIceCandidateEndpoint: p.LocalIceCandidateEndpoint,
RemoteIceCandidateEndpoint: p.RemoteIceCandidateEndpoint,
}
peerInfos[n] = pi
}
@@ -461,6 +439,10 @@ func (c *Client) RemoveConnectionListener() {
c.recorder.RemoveConnectionListener()
}
func (c *Client) toggleRoute(command routeCommand) error {
return command.toggleRoute()
}
func (c *Client) getRouteManager() (routemanager.Manager, error) {
client := c.getConnectClient()
if client == nil {
@@ -480,22 +462,22 @@ func (c *Client) getRouteManager() (routemanager.Manager, error) {
return manager, nil
}
func (c *Client) SelectRoute(id string) error {
func (c *Client) SelectRoute(route string) error {
manager, err := c.getRouteManager()
if err != nil {
return err
}
return manager.SelectRoutes([]route.NetID{route.NetID(id)}, true)
return c.toggleRoute(selectRouteCommand{route: route, manager: manager})
}
func (c *Client) DeselectRoute(id string) error {
func (c *Client) DeselectRoute(route string) error {
manager, err := c.getRouteManager()
if err != nil {
return err
}
return manager.DeselectRoutes([]route.NetID{route.NetID(id)})
return c.toggleRoute(deselectRouteCommand{route: route, manager: manager})
}
// getNetworkDomainsFromRoute extracts domains from a route and enriches each domain
@@ -530,28 +512,3 @@ func exportEnvList(list *EnvList) {
}
}
}
// formatDuration renders a duration for display, trimming the fractional part
// to two digits so latencies read as "12.34ms" rather than "12.345678ms".
func formatDuration(d time.Duration) string {
ds := d.String()
dotIndex := strings.Index(ds, ".")
if dotIndex == -1 {
return ds
}
endIndex := min(dotIndex+3, len(ds))
// Skip the remaining digits so only the unit suffix is appended back.
unitStart := endIndex
for unitStart < len(ds) && ds[unitStart] >= '0' && ds[unitStart] <= '9' {
unitStart++
}
return ds[:endIndex] + ds[unitStart:]
}
// formatTime renders a timestamp in UTC using a fixed layout. The zero time is
// passed through as-is so the UI can recognise it and show "never" instead.
func formatTime(t time.Time) string {
return t.UTC().Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05")
}

View File

@@ -12,30 +12,12 @@ const (
)
// PeerInfo describe information about the peers. It designed for the UI usage
//
// The fields below ConnStatus back the peer detail screen. Durations and times
// are pre-formatted into strings so the UI does not have to know Go's layouts;
// Latency is additionally exposed as LatencyMs for colour coding.
type PeerInfo struct {
IP string
IPv6 string
FQDN string
ConnStatus int
Routes PeerRoutes
PubKey string
Latency string
LatencyMs int64
BytesRx int64
BytesTx int64
ConnStatusUpdate string
Relayed bool
RosenpassEnabled bool
LastWireguardHandshake string
LocalIceCandidateType string
RemoteIceCandidateType string
LocalIceCandidateEndpoint string
RemoteIceCandidateEndpoint string
}
func (p *PeerInfo) GetPeerRoutes() *PeerRoutes {

View File

@@ -189,19 +189,6 @@ func (pm *ProfileManager) LogoutProfile(id string) error {
return nil
}
// RenameProfile changes a profile's display name. The profile ID, and therefore
// its on-disk filename, is left untouched: only the "name" field of the config
// is rewritten. This works for the default profile too, whose config lives in
// netbird.cfg rather than under profiles/.
func (pm *ProfileManager) RenameProfile(id string, newName string) error {
if err := pm.serviceMgr.RenameProfile(profilemanager.ID(id), androidUsername, newName); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to rename profile: %w", err)
}
log.Infof("renamed profile %s to: %s", id, newName)
return nil
}
// RemoveProfile deletes a profile
func (pm *ProfileManager) RemoveProfile(id string) error {
// Use ServiceManager (removes profile from profiles/ directory)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
//go:build android
package android
import (
"fmt"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"golang.org/x/exp/maps"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/routemanager"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
)
func executeRouteToggle(id string, manager routemanager.Manager,
operationName string,
routeOperation func(routes []route.NetID, allRoutes []route.NetID) error) error {
netID := route.NetID(id)
routes := []route.NetID{netID}
routesMap := manager.GetClientRoutesWithNetID()
routes = route.ExpandV6ExitPairs(routes, routesMap)
log.Debugf("%s with ids: %v", operationName, routes)
if err := routeOperation(routes, maps.Keys(routesMap)); err != nil {
log.Debugf("error when %s: %s", operationName, err)
return fmt.Errorf("error %s: %w", operationName, err)
}
manager.TriggerSelection(manager.GetClientRoutes())
return nil
}
type routeCommand interface {
toggleRoute() error
}
type selectRouteCommand struct {
route string
manager routemanager.Manager
}
func (s selectRouteCommand) toggleRoute() error {
routeSelector := s.manager.GetRouteSelector()
if routeSelector == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("no route selector available")
}
routeOperation := func(routes []route.NetID, allRoutes []route.NetID) error {
return routeSelector.SelectRoutes(routes, true, allRoutes)
}
return executeRouteToggle(s.route, s.manager, "selecting route", routeOperation)
}
type deselectRouteCommand struct {
route string
manager routemanager.Manager
}
func (d deselectRouteCommand) toggleRoute() error {
routeSelector := d.manager.GetRouteSelector()
if routeSelector == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("no route selector available")
}
return executeRouteToggle(d.route, d.manager, "deselecting route", routeSelector.DeselectRoutes)
}

View File

@@ -385,20 +385,11 @@ func inactivityThresholdEnv() *time.Duration {
return nil
}
// Documented format: a Go duration such as "30m" or "1h".
if d, err := time.ParseDuration(envValue); err == nil {
if d <= 0 {
return nil
}
return &d
parsedMinutes, err := strconv.Atoi(envValue)
if err != nil || parsedMinutes <= 0 {
return nil
}
// Backwards compatibility: a bare integer used to be interpreted as minutes.
if parsedMinutes, err := strconv.Atoi(envValue); err == nil && parsedMinutes > 0 {
d := time.Duration(parsedMinutes) * time.Minute
return &d
}
log.Warnf("invalid %s value %q: expected a Go duration such as 30m or 1h", lazyconn.EnvInactivityThreshold, envValue)
return nil
d := time.Duration(parsedMinutes) * time.Minute
return &d
}

View File

@@ -104,38 +104,3 @@ func TestConnMgr_ActivatePeerConcurrentWithLifecycle(t *testing.T) {
close(done)
wg.Wait()
}
func TestInactivityThresholdEnv(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
val string
want *time.Duration
}{
{name: "unset", val: "", want: nil},
{name: "go duration minutes", val: "30m", want: durPtr(30 * time.Minute)},
{name: "go duration hours", val: "1h", want: durPtr(time.Hour)},
{name: "go duration seconds", val: "90s", want: durPtr(90 * time.Second)},
{name: "bare integer is minutes (backwards compat)", val: "5", want: durPtr(5 * time.Minute)},
{name: "zero duration", val: "0s", want: nil},
{name: "zero integer", val: "0", want: nil},
{name: "negative duration", val: "-5m", want: nil},
{name: "garbage", val: "abc", want: nil},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(lazyconn.EnvInactivityThreshold, tc.val)
got := inactivityThresholdEnv()
switch {
case tc.want == nil && got != nil:
t.Fatalf("want nil, got %v", *got)
case tc.want != nil && got == nil:
t.Fatalf("want %v, got nil", *tc.want)
case tc.want != nil && *got != *tc.want:
t.Fatalf("want %v, got %v", *tc.want, *got)
}
})
}
}
func durPtr(d time.Duration) *time.Duration { return &d }

View File

@@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/statemanager"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/stdnet"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/tunnelnotifier"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/updater"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/updater/installer"
nbnet "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/net"
@@ -137,13 +136,10 @@ func (c *ConnectClient) RunOniOS(
// Set GC percent to 5% to reduce memory usage as iOS only allows 50MB of memory for the extension.
debug.SetGCPercent(5)
notifier := tunnelnotifier.New(networkChangeListener, dnsManager)
defer notifier.Close()
mobileDependency := MobileDependency{
FileDescriptor: fileDescriptor,
NetworkChangeListener: notifier,
DnsManager: notifier,
NetworkChangeListener: networkChangeListener,
DnsManager: dnsManager,
StateFilePath: stateFilePath,
TempDir: cacheDir,
}

View File

@@ -11,14 +11,12 @@ import (
// MobileDependency collect all dependencies for mobile platform
type MobileDependency struct {
// Android and iOS
NetworkChangeListener listener.NetworkChangeListener
// Android only
TunAdapter device.TunAdapter
IFaceDiscover stdnet.ExternalIFaceDiscover
HostDNSAddresses []netip.AddrPort
DnsReadyListener dns.ReadyListener
TunAdapter device.TunAdapter
IFaceDiscover stdnet.ExternalIFaceDiscover
NetworkChangeListener listener.NetworkChangeListener
HostDNSAddresses []netip.AddrPort
DnsReadyListener dns.ReadyListener
// iOS only
DnsManager dns.IosDnsManager

View File

@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ func (d *DnsInterceptor) RemoveRoute() error {
// AllowedIPs should use real IPs
if d.currentPeerKey != "" {
if _, err := d.allowedIPsRefcounter.Decrement(prefix, d.currentPeerKey); err != nil {
if _, err := d.allowedIPsRefcounter.Decrement(prefix); err != nil {
merr = multierror.Append(merr, fmt.Errorf("remove allowed IP %s: %v", prefix, err))
}
}
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ func (d *DnsInterceptor) removeAllowedIP(realPrefix netip.Prefix) error {
}
// AllowedIPs use real IPs
if _, err := d.allowedIPsRefcounter.Decrement(realPrefix, d.currentPeerKey); err != nil {
if _, err := d.allowedIPsRefcounter.Decrement(realPrefix); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("remove allowed IP %s: %v", realPrefix, err)
}
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ func (d *DnsInterceptor) RemoveAllowedIPs() error {
for _, prefixes := range d.interceptedDomains {
for _, prefix := range prefixes {
// AllowedIPs use real IPs
if _, err := d.allowedIPsRefcounter.Decrement(prefix, d.currentPeerKey); err != nil {
if _, err := d.allowedIPsRefcounter.Decrement(prefix); err != nil {
merr = multierror.Append(merr, fmt.Errorf("remove allowed IP %s: %v", prefix, err))
}
}

View File

@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ func (r *Route) RemoveAllowedIPs() error {
var merr *multierror.Error
for _, domainPrefixes := range r.dynamicDomains {
for _, prefix := range domainPrefixes {
if _, err := r.allowedIPsRefcounter.Decrement(prefix, r.currentPeerKey); err != nil {
if _, err := r.allowedIPsRefcounter.Decrement(prefix); err != nil {
merr = multierror.Append(merr, fmt.Errorf("remove allowed IP %s: %w", prefix, err))
}
}
@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ func (r *Route) removeRoutes(prefixes []netip.Prefix) ([]netip.Prefix, error) {
merr = multierror.Append(merr, fmt.Errorf("remove dynamic route for IP %s: %w", prefix, err))
}
if r.currentPeerKey != "" {
if _, err := r.allowedIPsRefcounter.Decrement(prefix, r.currentPeerKey); err != nil {
if _, err := r.allowedIPsRefcounter.Decrement(prefix); err != nil {
merr = multierror.Append(merr, fmt.Errorf("remove allowed IP %s: %w", prefix, err))
}
}

View File

@@ -52,10 +52,6 @@ type Manager interface {
UpdateRoutes(updateSerial uint64, serverRoutes map[route.ID]*route.Route, clientRoutes route.HAMap, useNewDNSRoute bool) error
ClassifyRoutes(newRoutes []*route.Route) (map[route.ID]*route.Route, route.HAMap)
TriggerSelection(route.HAMap)
SelectRoutes(ids []route.NetID, appendRoute bool) error
DeselectRoutes(ids []route.NetID) error
SelectAllRoutes()
DeselectAllRoutes()
GetRouteSelector() *routeselector.RouteSelector
GetClientRoutes() route.HAMap
GetSelectedClientRoutes() route.HAMap
@@ -220,7 +216,7 @@ func (m *DefaultManager) setupRefCounters(useNoop bool) {
)
}
m.allowedIPsRefCounter = refcounter.NewAllowedIPs(
m.allowedIPsRefCounter = refcounter.New(
func(prefix netip.Prefix, peerKey string) (string, error) {
// save peerKey to use it in the remove function
return peerKey, m.wgInterface.AddAllowedIP(peerKey, prefix)
@@ -804,7 +800,7 @@ func (m *DefaultManager) collectExitNodeInfo(clientRoutes route.HAMap) exitNodeI
var info exitNodeInfo
for haID, routes := range clientRoutes {
if !isExitNodeRoutes(routes) {
if !m.isExitNodeRoute(routes) {
continue
}
@@ -824,6 +820,13 @@ func (m *DefaultManager) collectExitNodeInfo(clientRoutes route.HAMap) exitNodeI
return info
}
func (m *DefaultManager) isExitNodeRoute(routes []*route.Route) bool {
if len(routes) == 0 {
return false
}
return route.IsV4DefaultRoute(routes[0].Network) || route.IsV6DefaultRoute(routes[0].Network)
}
func (m *DefaultManager) categorizeUserSelection(netID route.NetID, info *exitNodeInfo) {
if m.routeSelector.IsSelected(netID) {
info.userSelected = append(info.userSelected, netID)

View File

@@ -16,8 +16,6 @@ type MockManager struct {
ClassifyRoutesFunc func(routes []*route.Route) (map[route.ID]*route.Route, route.HAMap)
UpdateRoutesFunc func(updateSerial uint64, serverRoutes map[route.ID]*route.Route, clientRoutes route.HAMap, useNewDNSRoute bool) error
TriggerSelectionFunc func(haMap route.HAMap)
SelectRoutesFunc func(ids []route.NetID, appendRoute bool) error
DeselectRoutesFunc func(ids []route.NetID) error
GetRouteSelectorFunc func() *routeselector.RouteSelector
GetClientRoutesFunc func() route.HAMap
GetSelectedClientRoutesFunc func() route.HAMap
@@ -57,30 +55,6 @@ func (m *MockManager) TriggerSelection(networks route.HAMap) {
}
}
// SelectRoutes mock implementation of SelectRoutes from Manager interface
func (m *MockManager) SelectRoutes(ids []route.NetID, appendRoute bool) error {
if m.SelectRoutesFunc != nil {
return m.SelectRoutesFunc(ids, appendRoute)
}
return nil
}
// DeselectRoutes mock implementation of DeselectRoutes from Manager interface
func (m *MockManager) DeselectRoutes(ids []route.NetID) error {
if m.DeselectRoutesFunc != nil {
return m.DeselectRoutesFunc(ids)
}
return nil
}
// SelectAllRoutes mock implementation of SelectAllRoutes from Manager interface
func (m *MockManager) SelectAllRoutes() {
}
// DeselectAllRoutes mock implementation of DeselectAllRoutes from Manager interface
func (m *MockManager) DeselectAllRoutes() {
}
// GetRouteSelector mock implementation of GetRouteSelector from Manager interface
func (m *MockManager) GetRouteSelector() *routeselector.RouteSelector {
if m.GetRouteSelectorFunc != nil {

View File

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
package notifier
import (
"container/list"
"net/netip"
"slices"
"sort"
@@ -15,12 +16,20 @@ import (
type Notifier struct {
mu sync.Mutex
cond *sync.Cond
currentPrefixes []string
listener listener.NetworkChangeListener
queue *list.List
closed bool
}
func NewNotifier() *Notifier {
return &Notifier{}
n := &Notifier{
queue: list.New(),
}
n.cond = sync.NewCond(&n.mu)
go n.deliverLoop()
return n
}
func (n *Notifier) SetListener(listener listener.NetworkChangeListener) {
@@ -50,19 +59,44 @@ func (n *Notifier) OnNewPrefixes(prefixes []netip.Prefix) {
sort.Strings(newNets)
n.mu.Lock()
defer n.mu.Unlock()
if slices.Equal(n.currentPrefixes, newNets) {
n.mu.Unlock()
return
}
n.currentPrefixes = newNets
if n.listener != nil {
n.listener.OnNetworkChanged(strings.Join(n.currentPrefixes, ","))
}
routes := strings.Join(n.currentPrefixes, ",")
n.queue.PushBack(routes)
n.cond.Signal()
n.mu.Unlock()
}
func (n *Notifier) Close() {
n.mu.Lock()
n.closed = true
n.cond.Signal()
n.mu.Unlock()
}
func (n *Notifier) GetInitialRouteRanges() []string {
return nil
}
func (n *Notifier) deliverLoop() {
for {
n.mu.Lock()
for n.queue.Len() == 0 && !n.closed {
n.cond.Wait()
}
if n.closed && n.queue.Len() == 0 {
n.mu.Unlock()
return
}
routes := n.queue.Remove(n.queue.Front()).(string)
l := n.listener
n.mu.Unlock()
if l != nil {
l.OnNetworkChanged(routes)
}
}
}

View File

@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ func (m *reconcileWGMock) GetNet() *netstack.Net { return n
func TestReconcilePeerAllowedIPs(t *testing.T) {
wg := &reconcileWGMock{}
m := &DefaultManager{wgInterface: wg}
m.allowedIPsRefCounter = refcounter.NewAllowedIPs(
m.allowedIPsRefCounter = refcounter.New[netip.Prefix, string, string](
func(_ netip.Prefix, peerKey string) (string, error) { return peerKey, nil },
func(netip.Prefix, string) error { return nil },
)

View File

@@ -1,206 +0,0 @@
package refcounter
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/netip"
"sort"
"sync"
"github.com/hashicorp/go-multierror"
nberrors "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/errors"
)
// allowedIPsEntry holds the per-peer reference counts for a single prefix and which peer is
// currently installed in WireGuard. WireGuard allows a prefix on exactly one peer, so at most
// one peer is active at a time even when several peers reference the prefix.
type allowedIPsEntry struct {
// peers maps a peerKey to the number of references holding the prefix for that peer.
peers map[string]int
// active is the peerKey currently installed in WireGuard for this prefix ("" if none).
active string
// total is the sum of all per-peer reference counts (kept in sync with peers).
total int
}
// AllowedIPsRefCounter is a peer-aware reference counter for WireGuard AllowedIPs.
//
// The generic Counter keys only by prefix and remembers a single Out value set by the first
// caller, which it never changes. That is wrong for AllowedIPs: two independent watchers (or
// multiple resolved domains) can reference the same prefix through different peers, and when the
// peer currently installed in WireGuard releases its last reference the prefix must be handed over
// to a surviving peer instead of being left pointing at the released one.
//
// It calls add/remove (which program WireGuard) only on the transitions that matter:
// - add on the first reference for a prefix, or when swapping the active peer;
// - remove on the last reference for a prefix, or on the old peer during a swap.
type AllowedIPsRefCounter struct {
mu sync.Mutex
entries map[netip.Prefix]*allowedIPsEntry
add AddFunc[netip.Prefix, string, string]
remove RemoveFunc[netip.Prefix, string]
}
// NewAllowedIPs creates a new peer-aware AllowedIPs reference counter.
// add programs a prefix on a peer in WireGuard and returns the peerKey to store as the active peer.
// remove unprograms the prefix from the given peer.
func NewAllowedIPs(add AddFunc[netip.Prefix, string, string], remove RemoveFunc[netip.Prefix, string]) *AllowedIPsRefCounter {
return &AllowedIPsRefCounter{
entries: map[netip.Prefix]*allowedIPsEntry{},
add: add,
remove: remove,
}
}
// Increment adds a reference to prefix for peerKey. WireGuard is programmed only for the first
// reference to a prefix; while a different peer is already installed the prefix is left with it
// (first peer wins, HA at the WireGuard layer is not possible) and only the reference count is kept.
func (rm *AllowedIPsRefCounter) Increment(prefix netip.Prefix, peerKey string) (Ref[string], error) {
rm.mu.Lock()
defer rm.mu.Unlock()
e, ok := rm.entries[prefix]
if !ok {
e = &allowedIPsEntry{peers: map[string]int{}}
rm.entries[prefix] = e
}
logCallerF("Increasing allowed IP ref count for prefix %v peer %s [peer %d -> %d, total %d -> %d, active %q]",
prefix, peerKey, e.peers[peerKey], e.peers[peerKey]+1, e.total, e.total+1, e.active)
// Program WireGuard only when nothing is installed yet for this prefix.
if e.active == "" {
out, err := rm.add(prefix, peerKey)
if errors.Is(err, ErrIgnore) {
if e.total == 0 {
delete(rm.entries, prefix)
}
return Ref[string]{Count: e.total, Out: e.active}, nil
}
if err != nil {
if e.total == 0 {
delete(rm.entries, prefix)
}
return Ref[string]{}, fmt.Errorf("failed to add allowed IP %v for peer %s: %w", prefix, peerKey, err)
}
e.active = out
}
e.peers[peerKey]++
e.total++
return Ref[string]{Count: e.total, Out: e.active}, nil
}
// Decrement removes a reference to prefix for peerKey. When the peer currently installed in
// WireGuard releases its last reference, the prefix is swapped to a surviving peer if one exists,
// otherwise it is removed from WireGuard.
func (rm *AllowedIPsRefCounter) Decrement(prefix netip.Prefix, peerKey string) (Ref[string], error) {
rm.mu.Lock()
defer rm.mu.Unlock()
e, ok := rm.entries[prefix]
if !ok {
logCallerF("No allowed IP reference found for prefix %v", prefix)
return Ref[string]{}, nil
}
if e.peers[peerKey] > 0 {
logCallerF("Decreasing allowed IP ref count for prefix %v peer %s [peer %d -> %d, total %d -> %d, active %q]",
prefix, peerKey, e.peers[peerKey], e.peers[peerKey]-1, e.total, e.total-1, e.active)
e.peers[peerKey]--
e.total--
if e.peers[peerKey] == 0 {
delete(e.peers, peerKey)
}
} else {
logCallerF("No allowed IP reference found for prefix %v peer %s", prefix, peerKey)
}
// If the peer currently installed in WireGuard still holds references, nothing to reprogram.
// Keying the check on the active peer (not the one just released) makes this self-healing:
// a prior swap whose remove/add failed leaves e.active pointing at a peer with no references,
// and this retries the hand-off on the next Decrement instead of getting stuck.
if e.active != "" && e.peers[e.active] > 0 {
return Ref[string]{Count: e.total, Out: e.active}, nil
}
// Detach the stale/gone active peer from WireGuard before reprogramming.
if e.active != "" {
if err := rm.remove(prefix, e.active); err != nil {
return Ref[string]{Count: e.total, Out: e.active}, fmt.Errorf("remove allowed IP %v for peer %s: %w", prefix, e.active, err)
}
e.active = ""
}
// Hand the prefix over to a surviving peer, or drop the entry when none remain.
if survivor, ok := pickSurvivor(e.peers); ok {
out, err := rm.add(prefix, survivor)
if err != nil {
return Ref[string]{Count: e.total, Out: ""}, fmt.Errorf("swap allowed IP %v to peer %s: %w", prefix, survivor, err)
}
e.active = out
return Ref[string]{Count: e.total, Out: e.active}, nil
}
delete(rm.entries, prefix)
return Ref[string]{Count: 0, Out: ""}, nil
}
// Flush removes all prefixes from WireGuard and clears the counter.
func (rm *AllowedIPsRefCounter) Flush() error {
rm.mu.Lock()
defer rm.mu.Unlock()
var merr *multierror.Error
for prefix, e := range rm.entries {
if e.active == "" {
continue
}
logCallerF("Flushing allowed IP for prefix %v peer %s", prefix, e.active)
if err := rm.remove(prefix, e.active); err != nil {
merr = multierror.Append(merr, fmt.Errorf("remove allowed IP %v for peer %s: %w", prefix, e.active, err))
}
}
clear(rm.entries)
return nberrors.FormatErrorOrNil(merr)
}
// ReapplyMatching calls apply for every prefix whose currently installed (active) peer satisfies
// pred, holding the lock for the whole pass. It is used to re-push allowed IPs onto a peer whose
// WireGuard entry was rebuilt (e.g. a lazy connection cycling idle->wake) without a matching
// refcounter change, which would otherwise leave the prefix installed in the counter but missing
// on the device. Only the active peer is considered — a prefix that lost its installed peer to a
// failed swap is skipped here and reconciled by the next Increment/Decrement.
func (rm *AllowedIPsRefCounter) ReapplyMatching(pred func(out string) bool, apply func(key netip.Prefix) error) error {
rm.mu.Lock()
defer rm.mu.Unlock()
var merr *multierror.Error
for prefix, e := range rm.entries {
if e.active != "" && pred(e.active) {
if err := apply(prefix); err != nil {
merr = multierror.Append(merr, err)
}
}
}
return nberrors.FormatErrorOrNil(merr)
}
// pickSurvivor deterministically selects a peer still referencing the prefix. WireGuard cannot do
// multipath for a single prefix, so any surviving peer is a valid winner; the choice is made stable
// (lowest peerKey) for predictable behavior and testability.
func pickSurvivor(peers map[string]int) (string, bool) {
if len(peers) == 0 {
return "", false
}
keys := make([]string, 0, len(peers))
for k := range peers {
keys = append(keys, k)
}
sort.Strings(keys)
return keys[0], true
}

View File

@@ -1,241 +0,0 @@
package refcounter
import (
"errors"
"net/netip"
"testing"
)
// fakeWG models WireGuard's cryptokey routing: a prefix can be installed on exactly one peer.
// failAdd/failRemove make the next add/remove fail once, to exercise the self-healing error paths.
type fakeWG struct {
installed map[netip.Prefix]string
adds int
removes int
failAdd bool
failRemove bool
}
func newFakeWG() *fakeWG {
return &fakeWG{installed: map[netip.Prefix]string{}}
}
func (f *fakeWG) counter() *AllowedIPsRefCounter {
return NewAllowedIPs(
func(prefix netip.Prefix, peerKey string) (string, error) {
if f.failAdd {
f.failAdd = false
return "", errors.New("add failed")
}
f.adds++
f.installed[prefix] = peerKey
return peerKey, nil
},
func(prefix netip.Prefix, peerKey string) error {
if f.failRemove {
f.failRemove = false
return errors.New("remove failed")
}
f.removes++
// only clear if this peer is the one installed, mirroring wg semantics
if f.installed[prefix] == peerKey {
delete(f.installed, prefix)
}
return nil
},
)
}
func mustPrefix(t *testing.T, s string) netip.Prefix {
t.Helper()
p, err := netip.ParsePrefix(s)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("parse prefix %q: %v", s, err)
}
return p
}
func mustIncrement(t *testing.T, c *AllowedIPsRefCounter, p netip.Prefix, peer string) Ref[string] {
t.Helper()
ref, err := c.Increment(p, peer)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Increment(%v, %s): %v", p, peer, err)
}
return ref
}
func mustDecrement(t *testing.T, c *AllowedIPsRefCounter, p netip.Prefix, peer string) Ref[string] {
t.Helper()
ref, err := c.Decrement(p, peer)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Decrement(%v, %s): %v", p, peer, err)
}
return ref
}
// TestAllowedIPs_SwapOnActivePeerRemoval reproduces the reported bug: two networks with the same
// prefix routed by different peers. Removing the network whose peer is installed must hand the
// prefix over to the surviving peer instead of leaving it on the removed one.
func TestAllowedIPs_SwapOnActivePeerRemoval(t *testing.T) {
f := newFakeWG()
c := f.counter()
p := mustPrefix(t, "10.44.8.0/24")
mustIncrement(t, c, p, "peerA")
mustIncrement(t, c, p, "peerB")
// First peer wins while both are present.
if got := f.installed[p]; got != "peerA" {
t.Fatalf("expected peerA installed, got %q", got)
}
// Remove the active peer's network -> must swap to peerB.
mustDecrement(t, c, p, "peerA")
if got := f.installed[p]; got != "peerB" {
t.Fatalf("BUG: prefix stuck on removed peer, want peerB got %q", got)
}
// Remove the last one -> prefix gone.
mustDecrement(t, c, p, "peerB")
if _, ok := f.installed[p]; ok {
t.Fatalf("expected prefix removed, still installed on %q", f.installed[p])
}
}
// TestAllowedIPs_RemoveNonActivePeer removing a non-installed peer must not touch WireGuard.
func TestAllowedIPs_RemoveNonActivePeer(t *testing.T) {
f := newFakeWG()
c := f.counter()
p := mustPrefix(t, "10.44.8.0/24")
mustIncrement(t, c, p, "peerA")
mustIncrement(t, c, p, "peerB")
removesBefore := f.removes
mustDecrement(t, c, p, "peerB")
if f.installed[p] != "peerA" {
t.Fatalf("active peer must stay peerA, got %q", f.installed[p])
}
if f.removes != removesBefore {
t.Fatalf("removing a non-active peer must not call wg remove")
}
}
// TestAllowedIPs_SamePeerMultipleRefs two references via the same peer must keep the prefix until
// the last reference is released (the reason the per-peer count must be an int, not a set).
func TestAllowedIPs_SamePeerMultipleRefs(t *testing.T) {
f := newFakeWG()
c := f.counter()
p := mustPrefix(t, "10.44.8.0/24")
mustIncrement(t, c, p, "peerA")
mustIncrement(t, c, p, "peerA")
if f.adds != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected a single wg add for the same peer, got %d", f.adds)
}
mustDecrement(t, c, p, "peerA")
if f.installed[p] != "peerA" {
t.Fatalf("prefix must stay while a reference remains, got %q", f.installed[p])
}
if f.removes != 0 {
t.Fatalf("no wg remove expected while a reference remains, got %d", f.removes)
}
mustDecrement(t, c, p, "peerA")
if _, ok := f.installed[p]; ok {
t.Fatalf("prefix must be removed after last reference")
}
}
// TestAllowedIPs_RefCountAndActive checks the Ref returned to callers (used for the HA-disabled log).
func TestAllowedIPs_RefCountAndActive(t *testing.T) {
f := newFakeWG()
c := f.counter()
p := mustPrefix(t, "10.44.8.0/24")
ref := mustIncrement(t, c, p, "peerA")
if ref.Count != 1 || ref.Out != "peerA" {
t.Fatalf("want {1, peerA}, got {%d, %q}", ref.Count, ref.Out)
}
ref = mustIncrement(t, c, p, "peerB")
if ref.Count != 2 || ref.Out != "peerA" {
t.Fatalf("want {2, peerA}, got {%d, %q}", ref.Count, ref.Out)
}
}
// TestAllowedIPs_Flush removes everything installed and clears the counter.
func TestAllowedIPs_Flush(t *testing.T) {
f := newFakeWG()
c := f.counter()
p1 := mustPrefix(t, "10.44.8.0/24")
p2 := mustPrefix(t, "10.44.9.0/24")
mustIncrement(t, c, p1, "peerA")
mustIncrement(t, c, p2, "peerB")
if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(f.installed) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected all prefixes removed, got %v", f.installed)
}
// After flush, a fresh increment must add again.
mustIncrement(t, c, p1, "peerC")
if f.installed[p1] != "peerC" {
t.Fatalf("counter not reset after flush")
}
}
// TestAllowedIPs_SelfHealAfterSwapAddError ensures a failed add during a swap does not permanently
// strand the prefix: the next Decrement (or Increment) must retry and install a surviving peer.
func TestAllowedIPs_SelfHealAfterSwapAddError(t *testing.T) {
f := newFakeWG()
c := f.counter()
p := mustPrefix(t, "10.44.8.0/24")
mustIncrement(t, c, p, "peerA")
mustIncrement(t, c, p, "peerB")
mustIncrement(t, c, p, "peerC")
// Removing the active peerA triggers a swap to a survivor; make the add fail once.
f.failAdd = true
if _, err := c.Decrement(p, "peerA"); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected error from failed swap add")
}
if _, ok := f.installed[p]; ok {
t.Fatalf("nothing should be installed after a failed swap add, got %q", f.installed[p])
}
// A later Decrement of a non-active survivor must retry the hand-off (self-heal), not stay stuck.
ref := mustDecrement(t, c, p, "peerC")
if got := f.installed[p]; got == "" {
t.Fatalf("self-heal failed: prefix left unrouted after add recovered")
}
if ref.Out == "" {
t.Fatalf("expected an active peer after self-heal, got empty")
}
}
// TestAllowedIPs_SelfHealAfterRemoveError ensures a failed remove during a swap is retried instead
// of leaving e.active stuck on a peer that no longer holds references.
func TestAllowedIPs_SelfHealAfterRemoveError(t *testing.T) {
f := newFakeWG()
c := f.counter()
p := mustPrefix(t, "10.44.8.0/24")
mustIncrement(t, c, p, "peerA")
mustIncrement(t, c, p, "peerB")
// Releasing active peerA must detach it (remove) then add peerB; fail the remove once.
f.failRemove = true
if _, err := c.Decrement(p, "peerA"); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected error from failed remove")
}
// Next Decrement of the non-active survivor retries: removes stale peerA, installs peerB.
mustDecrement(t, c, p, "peerB")
// peerB had only one ref, so after retry the prefix is fully released.
if _, ok := f.installed[p]; ok {
t.Fatalf("expected prefix released after self-heal, still on %q", f.installed[p])
}
}

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,5 @@ import "net/netip"
// RouteRefCounter is a Counter for Route, it doesn't take any input on Increment and doesn't use any output on Decrement
type RouteRefCounter = Counter[netip.Prefix, struct{}, struct{}]
// AllowedIPsRefCounter tracks WireGuard AllowedIPs per prefix. Unlike the generic Counter it is peer-aware:
// a prefix can be claimed by several peers at once and WireGuard allows a given prefix on exactly one peer,
// so the counter records the per-peer reference count and swaps the installed peer when the active one is released.
// See allowedips.go.
// AllowedIPsRefCounter is a Counter for AllowedIPs, it takes a peer key on Increment and passes it back to Decrement
type AllowedIPsRefCounter = Counter[netip.Prefix, string, string]

View File

@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
package routemanager
import (
"fmt"
"slices"
"github.com/hashicorp/go-multierror"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"golang.org/x/exp/maps"
nberrors "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/errors"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
)
// SelectRoutes selects the routes with the given network IDs and applies the
// new selection. V4/v6 exit-node pairs are expanded automatically. Exit nodes
// are mutually exclusive: if the selection activates an exit node, every other
// available exit node is deselected so two can't be active at once. With
// appendRoute=false the previous selection is replaced instead of extended.
func (m *DefaultManager) SelectRoutes(ids []route.NetID, appendRoute bool) error {
if err := m.selectRoutes(ids, appendRoute); err != nil {
return err
}
m.TriggerSelection(m.GetClientRoutes())
return nil
}
// DeselectRoutes removes the routes with the given network IDs from the
// selection and applies the change. V4/v6 exit-node pairs are expanded
// automatically.
func (m *DefaultManager) DeselectRoutes(ids []route.NetID) error {
if err := m.deselectRoutes(ids); err != nil {
return err
}
m.TriggerSelection(m.GetClientRoutes())
return nil
}
func (m *DefaultManager) deselectRoutes(ids []route.NetID) error {
routesMap := m.GetClientRoutesWithNetID()
routes := route.ExpandV6ExitPairs(slices.Clone(ids), routesMap)
log.Debugf("deselecting routes with ids: %v", routes)
if err := m.routeSelector.DeselectRoutes(routes, maps.Keys(routesMap)); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("deselect routes: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// SelectAllRoutes selects every available route and applies the selection.
// Exit nodes stay mutually exclusive: at most one remains active.
func (m *DefaultManager) SelectAllRoutes() {
m.selectAllRoutes()
m.TriggerSelection(m.GetClientRoutes())
}
func (m *DefaultManager) selectAllRoutes() {
m.routeSelector.SelectAllRoutes()
// Select-all wipes every explicit selection, so exit nodes fall back to
// management's auto-apply flags — which may mark several at once.
// Reconcile immediately so at most one exit node stays active instead of
// waiting for the next network map to enforce it.
m.mux.Lock()
defer m.mux.Unlock()
m.updateRouteSelectorFromManagement(m.clientRoutes)
}
// DeselectAllRoutes deselects every route and applies the change.
func (m *DefaultManager) DeselectAllRoutes() {
m.routeSelector.DeselectAllRoutes()
m.TriggerSelection(m.GetClientRoutes())
}
func (m *DefaultManager) selectRoutes(ids []route.NetID, appendRoute bool) error {
routesMap := m.GetClientRoutesWithNetID()
routes := route.ExpandV6ExitPairs(slices.Clone(ids), routesMap)
allIDs := maps.Keys(routesMap)
log.Debugf("selecting routes with ids: %v", routes)
// A partial failure (e.g. an unknown ID in the request) still selects the
// valid routes, so exclusivity below must run regardless of the error.
var merr *multierror.Error
if err := m.routeSelector.SelectRoutes(routes, appendRoute, allIDs); err != nil {
merr = multierror.Append(merr, fmt.Errorf("select routes: %w", err))
}
// Exit nodes are mutually exclusive: if this selection activates an
// exit node, deselect every other available exit node so two can't be
// selected at once. Non-exit route selections are left untouched.
if requestActivatesExitNode(routes, routesMap) {
if others := otherExitNodeIDs(routesMap, routes); len(others) > 0 {
if err := m.routeSelector.DeselectRoutes(others, allIDs); err != nil {
merr = multierror.Append(merr, fmt.Errorf("deselect sibling exit nodes: %w", err))
}
}
}
return nberrors.FormatErrorOrNil(merr)
}
func isExitNodeRoutes(routes []*route.Route) bool {
return len(routes) > 0 && (route.IsV4DefaultRoute(routes[0].Network) || route.IsV6DefaultRoute(routes[0].Network))
}
// requestActivatesExitNode reports whether any requested NetID maps to an exit
// node (default route) in the current route table.
func requestActivatesExitNode(requested []route.NetID, routesMap map[route.NetID][]*route.Route) bool {
for _, id := range requested {
if isExitNodeRoutes(routesMap[id]) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// otherExitNodeIDs returns every available exit-node NetID that is not in the
// requested set — the siblings to deselect so a single exit node stays active.
func otherExitNodeIDs(routesMap map[route.NetID][]*route.Route, requested []route.NetID) []route.NetID {
keep := make(map[route.NetID]struct{}, len(requested))
for _, id := range requested {
keep[id] = struct{}{}
}
var others []route.NetID
for id, routes := range routesMap {
if !isExitNodeRoutes(routes) {
continue
}
if _, ok := keep[id]; ok {
continue
}
others = append(others, id)
}
return others
}

View File

@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
package routemanager
import (
"net/netip"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/routeselector"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
)
func v6ExitRoute(netID, peer string) *route.Route {
return &route.Route{
NetID: route.NetID(netID),
Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("::/0"),
Peer: peer,
}
}
func newSelectionTestManager() *DefaultManager {
return &DefaultManager{
routeSelector: routeselector.NewRouteSelector(),
clientRoutes: route.HAMap{
"exitA|0.0.0.0/0": {exitRoute("exitA", "p1", true)},
"exitA-v6|::/0": {v6ExitRoute("exitA-v6", "p1")},
"exitB|0.0.0.0/0": {exitRoute("exitB", "p2", true)},
"lan|192.168.1.0/24": {{NetID: "lan", Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("192.168.1.0/24"), Peer: "p3"}},
},
}
}
func TestSelectRoutes_ExitNodeExclusivity(t *testing.T) {
m := newSelectionTestManager()
// Selecting an exit node selects its v6 pair and deselects the sibling.
require.NoError(t, m.selectRoutes([]route.NetID{"exitA"}, true))
assert.True(t, m.routeSelector.IsSelected("exitA"), "exitA should be selected")
assert.True(t, m.routeSelector.IsSelected("exitA-v6"), "the v6 pair follows its v4 base")
assert.False(t, m.routeSelector.IsSelected("exitB"), "the sibling exit node must be deselected")
// Switching to the sibling deselects the previous exit node and its v6 pair.
require.NoError(t, m.selectRoutes([]route.NetID{"exitB"}, true))
assert.True(t, m.routeSelector.IsSelected("exitB"), "exitB should now be selected")
assert.False(t, m.routeSelector.IsSelected("exitA"), "the previous exit node must be deselected")
assert.False(t, m.routeSelector.IsSelected("exitA-v6"), "the previous exit node's v6 pair must be deselected")
assert.True(t, m.routeSelector.IsSelected("lan"), "non-exit route selection is untouched")
// Selecting a non-exit route leaves the active exit node alone.
require.NoError(t, m.selectRoutes([]route.NetID{"lan"}, true))
assert.True(t, m.routeSelector.IsSelected("exitB"), "selecting a non-exit route keeps the exit node")
// Deselecting the active exit node turns every exit node off.
require.NoError(t, m.deselectRoutes([]route.NetID{"exitB"}))
assert.False(t, m.routeSelector.IsSelected("exitB"), "exitB should be deselected")
assert.False(t, m.routeSelector.IsSelected("exitA"), "exitA stays deselected")
assert.True(t, m.routeSelector.IsSelected("lan"), "non-exit route selection is untouched")
}
func TestSelectRoutes_PartialErrorStillEnforcesExclusivity(t *testing.T) {
// The unknown ID must be reported, but the valid exit node in the same
// request is still selected — so its sibling must still be deselected.
// Both orderings are covered: processing must continue past the invalid
// ID wherever it sits in the request.
requests := map[string][]route.NetID{
"invalid id first": {"missing", "exitB"},
"invalid id last": {"exitB", "missing"},
}
for name, ids := range requests {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
m := newSelectionTestManager()
require.NoError(t, m.selectRoutes([]route.NetID{"exitA"}, true))
err := m.selectRoutes(ids, true)
assert.Error(t, err, "unknown id must be reported")
assert.True(t, m.routeSelector.IsSelected("exitB"), "valid exit node from the request is selected")
assert.False(t, m.routeSelector.IsSelected("exitA"), "sibling exit node must be deselected despite the error")
assert.False(t, m.routeSelector.IsSelected("exitA-v6"), "sibling's v6 pair must be deselected too")
})
}
}
func TestSelectAllRoutes_KeepsSingleExitNode(t *testing.T) {
// Both exit nodes are marked for auto-apply by management
// (SkipAutoApply=false), the state where select-all could turn on two at
// once without the immediate reconciliation.
m := &DefaultManager{
routeSelector: routeselector.NewRouteSelector(),
clientRoutes: route.HAMap{
"exitA|0.0.0.0/0": {exitRoute("exitA", "p1", false)},
"exitB|0.0.0.0/0": {exitRoute("exitB", "p2", false)},
"lan|192.168.1.0/24": {{NetID: "lan", Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("192.168.1.0/24"), Peer: "p3"}},
},
}
require.NoError(t, m.selectRoutes([]route.NetID{"exitB"}, true))
m.selectAllRoutes()
assert.True(t, m.routeSelector.IsSelected("lan"), "non-exit routes are all selected")
assert.True(t, m.routeSelector.IsSelected("exitA"), "the deterministic management pick stays active")
assert.False(t, m.routeSelector.IsSelected("exitB"), "select-all must not leave a second exit node active")
}
func TestSelectRoutes_UnknownRoute(t *testing.T) {
m := newSelectionTestManager()
assert.Error(t, m.selectRoutes([]route.NetID{"missing"}, true), "selecting an unavailable route must fail")
assert.Error(t, m.deselectRoutes([]route.NetID{"missing"}), "deselecting an unavailable route must fail")
}
func TestExitNodeSelectionHelpers(t *testing.T) {
routesMap := map[route.NetID][]*route.Route{
"exitA": {{Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("0.0.0.0/0")}},
"exitB": {{Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("::/0")}},
"lan": {{Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("192.168.0.0/16")}},
}
assert.True(t, requestActivatesExitNode([]route.NetID{"exitA"}, routesMap), "v4 default route is an exit node")
assert.True(t, requestActivatesExitNode([]route.NetID{"exitB"}, routesMap), "v6 default route is an exit node")
assert.False(t, requestActivatesExitNode([]route.NetID{"lan"}, routesMap), "lan route is not an exit node")
assert.False(t, requestActivatesExitNode([]route.NetID{"missing"}, routesMap), "unknown id is not an exit node")
others := otherExitNodeIDs(routesMap, []route.NetID{"exitB"})
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []route.NetID{"exitA"}, others, "only the other exit node is a sibling; the lan route is ignored")
}

View File

@@ -15,11 +15,6 @@ type Route struct {
route *route.Route
routeRefCounter *refcounter.RouteRefCounter
allowedIPsRefcounter *refcounter.AllowedIPsRefCounter
// currentPeerKey is the routing peer this watcher currently has the prefix installed on
// (the HA winner elected by the watcher). It can differ from route.Peer and change on
// failover, so it is recorded on AddAllowedIPs and used on RemoveAllowedIPs to decrement
// the exact peer that was incremented.
currentPeerKey string
}
func NewRoute(params common.HandlerParams) *Route {
@@ -57,15 +52,12 @@ func (r *Route) AddAllowedIPs(peerKey string) error {
ref.Out,
)
}
r.currentPeerKey = peerKey
return nil
}
func (r *Route) RemoveAllowedIPs() error {
var err error
if _, decErr := r.allowedIPsRefcounter.Decrement(r.route.Network, r.currentPeerKey); decErr != nil {
err = fmt.Errorf("remove allowed IP %s: %w", r.route.Network, decErr)
if _, err := r.allowedIPsRefcounter.Decrement(r.route.Network); err != nil {
return err
}
r.currentPeerKey = ""
return err
return nil
}

View File

@@ -20,8 +20,6 @@ const (
rpFilterPath = "net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter"
rpFilterInterfacePath = "net.ipv4.conf.%s.rp_filter"
srcValidMarkPath = "net.ipv4.conf.all.src_valid_mark"
percentEscape = "%25"
dotEscape = "%2E"
)
type iface interface {
@@ -58,11 +56,7 @@ func Setup(wgIface iface) (map[string]int, error) {
continue
}
// Escape '%' and '.' so they survive the dot-to-slash conversion in Set()
safeName := strings.ReplaceAll(intf.Name, "%", percentEscape)
safeName = strings.ReplaceAll(safeName, ".", dotEscape)
i := fmt.Sprintf(rpFilterInterfacePath, safeName)
i := fmt.Sprintf(rpFilterInterfacePath, intf.Name)
oldVal, err := Set(i, 2, true)
if err != nil {
result = multierror.Append(result, err)
@@ -76,11 +70,7 @@ func Setup(wgIface iface) (map[string]int, error) {
// Set sets a sysctl configuration, if onlyIfOne is true it will only set the new value if it's set to 1
func Set(key string, desiredValue int, onlyIfOne bool) (int, error) {
path := strings.ReplaceAll(key, ".", "/")
// Unescape interface dots and percent signs
path = strings.ReplaceAll(path, dotEscape, ".")
path = strings.ReplaceAll(path, percentEscape, "%")
path = fmt.Sprintf("/proc/sys/%s", path)
path := fmt.Sprintf("/proc/sys/%s", strings.ReplaceAll(key, ".", "/"))
currentValue, err := os.ReadFile(path)
if err != nil {
return -1, fmt.Errorf("read sysctl %s: %w", key, err)

View File

@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
package tunnelnotifier
import (
"container/list"
"sync"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/listener"
)
type eventKind int
const (
eventRoutes eventKind = iota
eventIfaceIP
eventIfaceIPv6
eventDNS
)
var (
_ listener.NetworkChangeListener = (*Notifier)(nil)
_ dns.IosDnsManager = (*Notifier)(nil)
)
type event struct {
kind eventKind
payload string
}
type Notifier struct {
mu sync.Mutex
cond *sync.Cond
queue *list.List
closed bool
done chan struct{}
listener listener.NetworkChangeListener
dnsManager dns.IosDnsManager
}
func New(l listener.NetworkChangeListener, dm dns.IosDnsManager) *Notifier {
n := &Notifier{
queue: list.New(),
done: make(chan struct{}),
listener: l,
dnsManager: dm,
}
n.cond = sync.NewCond(&n.mu)
go n.deliverLoop()
return n
}
func (n *Notifier) OnNetworkChanged(routes string) {
n.enqueue(event{kind: eventRoutes, payload: routes})
}
func (n *Notifier) SetInterfaceIP(ip string) {
n.enqueue(event{kind: eventIfaceIP, payload: ip})
}
func (n *Notifier) SetInterfaceIPv6(ip string) {
n.enqueue(event{kind: eventIfaceIPv6, payload: ip})
}
func (n *Notifier) ApplyDns(config string) {
n.enqueue(event{kind: eventDNS, payload: config})
}
// Close stops accepting new events and blocks until the delivery loop has
// drained all queued events and exited.
func (n *Notifier) Close() {
n.mu.Lock()
n.closed = true
n.cond.Signal()
n.mu.Unlock()
<-n.done
}
func (n *Notifier) enqueue(ev event) {
n.mu.Lock()
defer n.mu.Unlock()
if n.closed {
return
}
n.queue.PushBack(ev)
n.cond.Signal()
}
func (n *Notifier) deliverLoop() {
defer close(n.done)
for {
n.mu.Lock()
for n.queue.Len() == 0 && !n.closed {
n.cond.Wait()
}
if n.closed && n.queue.Len() == 0 {
n.mu.Unlock()
return
}
ev := n.queue.Remove(n.queue.Front()).(event)
l := n.listener
dm := n.dnsManager
n.mu.Unlock()
switch ev.kind {
case eventRoutes:
if l != nil {
l.OnNetworkChanged(ev.payload)
}
case eventIfaceIP:
if l != nil {
l.SetInterfaceIP(ev.payload)
}
case eventIfaceIPv6:
if l != nil {
l.SetInterfaceIPv6(ev.payload)
}
case eventDNS:
if dm != nil {
dm.ApplyDns(ev.payload)
}
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,192 +0,0 @@
package tunnelnotifier
import (
"fmt"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
type call struct {
kind string
payload string
}
type recorder struct {
mu sync.Mutex
calls []call
inFlight atomic.Int32
overlap atomic.Bool
delay time.Duration
}
func (r *recorder) record(kind, payload string) {
if r.inFlight.Add(1) != 1 {
r.overlap.Store(true)
}
if r.delay > 0 {
time.Sleep(r.delay)
}
r.mu.Lock()
r.calls = append(r.calls, call{kind: kind, payload: payload})
r.mu.Unlock()
r.inFlight.Add(-1)
}
func (r *recorder) count() int {
r.mu.Lock()
defer r.mu.Unlock()
return len(r.calls)
}
func (r *recorder) snapshot() []call {
r.mu.Lock()
defer r.mu.Unlock()
out := make([]call, len(r.calls))
copy(out, r.calls)
return out
}
type fakeListener struct {
rec *recorder
}
func (f *fakeListener) OnNetworkChanged(routes string) {
f.rec.record("routes", routes)
}
func (f *fakeListener) SetInterfaceIP(ip string) {
f.rec.record("ip", ip)
}
func (f *fakeListener) SetInterfaceIPv6(ip string) {
f.rec.record("ipv6", ip)
}
type fakeDNSManager struct {
rec *recorder
}
func (f *fakeDNSManager) ApplyDns(config string) {
f.rec.record("dns", config)
}
func TestFIFOOrder(t *testing.T) {
rec := &recorder{}
n := New(&fakeListener{rec: rec}, &fakeDNSManager{rec: rec})
defer n.Close()
n.SetInterfaceIP("10.0.0.1")
n.SetInterfaceIPv6("fd00::1")
n.ApplyDns(`{"domains":[]}`)
n.OnNetworkChanged("10.0.0.0/8,192.168.0.0/16")
n.ApplyDns(`{"domains":["example.com"]}`)
require.Eventually(t, func() bool { return rec.count() == 5 }, time.Second, time.Millisecond)
expected := []call{
{kind: "ip", payload: "10.0.0.1"},
{kind: "ipv6", payload: "fd00::1"},
{kind: "dns", payload: `{"domains":[]}`},
{kind: "routes", payload: "10.0.0.0/8,192.168.0.0/16"},
{kind: "dns", payload: `{"domains":["example.com"]}`},
}
assert.Equal(t, expected, rec.snapshot())
}
func TestNoOverlappingCalls(t *testing.T) {
rec := &recorder{delay: 100 * time.Microsecond}
n := New(&fakeListener{rec: rec}, &fakeDNSManager{rec: rec})
defer n.Close()
const producers = 8
const perProducer = 25
var wg sync.WaitGroup
for i := 0; i < producers; i++ {
wg.Add(1)
go func(id int) {
defer wg.Done()
for j := 0; j < perProducer; j++ {
payload := fmt.Sprintf("%d-%d", id, j)
switch j % 4 {
case 0:
n.OnNetworkChanged(payload)
case 1:
n.SetInterfaceIP(payload)
case 2:
n.SetInterfaceIPv6(payload)
case 3:
n.ApplyDns(payload)
}
}
}(i)
}
wg.Wait()
require.Eventually(t, func() bool { return rec.count() == producers*perProducer }, 5*time.Second, time.Millisecond)
assert.False(t, rec.overlap.Load())
}
func TestDNSAndRoutesInterleaved(t *testing.T) {
rec := &recorder{delay: 100 * time.Microsecond}
n := New(&fakeListener{rec: rec}, &fakeDNSManager{rec: rec})
defer n.Close()
const events = 50
var wg sync.WaitGroup
wg.Add(2)
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
for i := 0; i < events; i++ {
n.ApplyDns(fmt.Sprintf("dns-%d", i))
}
}()
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
for i := 0; i < events; i++ {
n.OnNetworkChanged(fmt.Sprintf("routes-%d", i))
}
}()
wg.Wait()
require.Eventually(t, func() bool { return rec.count() == 2*events }, 5*time.Second, time.Millisecond)
assert.False(t, rec.overlap.Load())
var dnsSeen, routesSeen int
for _, c := range rec.snapshot() {
switch c.kind {
case "dns":
assert.Equal(t, fmt.Sprintf("dns-%d", dnsSeen), c.payload)
dnsSeen++
case "routes":
assert.Equal(t, fmt.Sprintf("routes-%d", routesSeen), c.payload)
routesSeen++
}
}
assert.Equal(t, events, dnsSeen)
assert.Equal(t, events, routesSeen)
}
func TestCloseDrainsQueue(t *testing.T) {
rec := &recorder{delay: time.Millisecond}
n := New(&fakeListener{rec: rec}, &fakeDNSManager{rec: rec})
const events = 20
for i := 0; i < events; i++ {
n.OnNetworkChanged(fmt.Sprintf("routes-%d", i))
}
n.Close()
require.Equal(t, events, rec.count(), "Close must not return before all queued events are delivered")
n.OnNetworkChanged("after-close")
n.ApplyDns("after-close")
time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
assert.Equal(t, events, rec.count())
}

View File

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import (
"time"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"golang.org/x/exp/maps"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/auth"
@@ -636,18 +637,23 @@ func (c *Client) SelectRoute(id string) error {
}
routeManager := engine.GetRouteManager()
routeSelector := routeManager.GetRouteSelector()
if id == "All" {
log.Debugf("select all routes")
routeManager.SelectAllRoutes()
return nil
}
log.Debugf("select route with id: %s", id)
if err := routeManager.SelectRoutes(toNetIDs([]string{id}), true); err != nil {
log.Debugf("error when selecting routes: %s", err)
return err
routeSelector.SelectAllRoutes()
} else {
log.Debugf("select route with id: %s", id)
routes := toNetIDs([]string{id})
routesMap := routeManager.GetClientRoutesWithNetID()
routes = route.ExpandV6ExitPairs(routes, routesMap)
if err := routeSelector.SelectRoutes(routes, true, maps.Keys(routesMap)); err != nil {
log.Debugf("error when selecting routes: %s", err)
return fmt.Errorf("select routes: %w", err)
}
}
routeManager.TriggerSelection(routeManager.GetClientRoutes())
return nil
}
func (c *Client) DeselectRoute(id string) error {
@@ -661,17 +667,21 @@ func (c *Client) DeselectRoute(id string) error {
}
routeManager := engine.GetRouteManager()
routeSelector := routeManager.GetRouteSelector()
if id == "All" {
log.Debugf("deselect all routes")
routeManager.DeselectAllRoutes()
return nil
}
log.Debugf("deselect route with id: %s", id)
if err := routeManager.DeselectRoutes(toNetIDs([]string{id})); err != nil {
log.Debugf("error when deselecting routes: %s", err)
return err
routeSelector.DeselectAllRoutes()
} else {
log.Debugf("deselect route with id: %s", id)
routes := toNetIDs([]string{id})
routesMap := routeManager.GetClientRoutesWithNetID()
routes = route.ExpandV6ExitPairs(routes, routesMap)
if err := routeSelector.DeselectRoutes(routes, maps.Keys(routesMap)); err != nil {
log.Debugf("error when deselecting routes: %s", err)
return fmt.Errorf("deselect routes: %w", err)
}
}
routeManager.TriggerSelection(routeManager.GetClientRoutes())
return nil
}

View File

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
"sort"
"strings"
"golang.org/x/exp/maps"
"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
gstatus "google.golang.org/grpc/status"
@@ -160,11 +161,30 @@ func (s *Server) SelectNetworks(_ context.Context, req *proto.SelectNetworksRequ
return nil, fmt.Errorf("no route manager")
}
routeSelector := routeManager.GetRouteSelector()
if req.GetAll() {
routeManager.SelectAllRoutes()
} else if err := routeManager.SelectRoutes(toNetIDs(req.GetNetworkIDs()), req.GetAppend()); err != nil {
return nil, err
routeSelector.SelectAllRoutes()
} else {
routes := toNetIDs(req.GetNetworkIDs())
routesMap := routeManager.GetClientRoutesWithNetID()
routes = route.ExpandV6ExitPairs(routes, routesMap)
netIdRoutes := maps.Keys(routesMap)
if err := routeSelector.SelectRoutes(routes, req.GetAppend(), netIdRoutes); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("select routes: %w", err)
}
// Exit nodes are mutually exclusive: if this selection activates an
// exit node, deselect every other available exit node so two can't be
// selected at once. Non-exit route selections are left untouched.
if requestActivatesExitNode(routes, routesMap) {
if others := otherExitNodeIDs(routesMap, routes); len(others) > 0 {
if err := routeSelector.DeselectRoutes(others, netIdRoutes); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("deselect sibling exit nodes: %w", err)
}
}
}
}
routeManager.TriggerSelection(routeManager.GetClientRoutes())
s.statusRecorder.PublishEvent(
proto.SystemEvent_INFO,
@@ -204,11 +224,19 @@ func (s *Server) DeselectNetworks(_ context.Context, req *proto.SelectNetworksRe
return nil, fmt.Errorf("no route manager")
}
routeSelector := routeManager.GetRouteSelector()
if req.GetAll() {
routeManager.DeselectAllRoutes()
} else if err := routeManager.DeselectRoutes(toNetIDs(req.GetNetworkIDs())); err != nil {
return nil, err
routeSelector.DeselectAllRoutes()
} else {
routes := toNetIDs(req.GetNetworkIDs())
routesMap := routeManager.GetClientRoutesWithNetID()
routes = route.ExpandV6ExitPairs(routes, routesMap)
netIdRoutes := maps.Keys(routesMap)
if err := routeSelector.DeselectRoutes(routes, netIdRoutes); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("deselect routes: %w", err)
}
}
routeManager.TriggerSelection(routeManager.GetClientRoutes())
s.statusRecorder.PublishEvent(
proto.SystemEvent_INFO,
@@ -233,3 +261,37 @@ func toNetIDs(routes []string) []route.NetID {
return netIDs
}
func isExitNodeRoutes(routes []*route.Route) bool {
return len(routes) > 0 && (route.IsV4DefaultRoute(routes[0].Network) || route.IsV6DefaultRoute(routes[0].Network))
}
// requestActivatesExitNode reports whether any requested NetID maps to an exit
// node (default route) in the current route table.
func requestActivatesExitNode(requested []route.NetID, routesMap map[route.NetID][]*route.Route) bool {
for _, id := range requested {
if isExitNodeRoutes(routesMap[id]) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// otherExitNodeIDs returns every available exit-node NetID that is not in the
// requested set — the siblings to deselect so a single exit node stays active.
func otherExitNodeIDs(routesMap map[route.NetID][]*route.Route, requested []route.NetID) []route.NetID {
keep := make(map[route.NetID]struct{}, len(requested))
for _, id := range requested {
keep[id] = struct{}{}
}
var others []route.NetID
for id, routes := range routesMap {
if !isExitNodeRoutes(routes) {
continue
}
if _, ok := keep[id]; ok {
continue
}
others = append(others, id)
}
return others
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
package server
import (
"net/netip"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
)
func TestExitNodeSelectionHelpers(t *testing.T) {
routesMap := map[route.NetID][]*route.Route{
"exitA": {{Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("0.0.0.0/0")}},
"exitB": {{Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("::/0")}},
"lan": {{Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("192.168.0.0/16")}},
}
assert.True(t, requestActivatesExitNode([]route.NetID{"exitA"}, routesMap), "v4 default route is an exit node")
assert.True(t, requestActivatesExitNode([]route.NetID{"exitB"}, routesMap), "v6 default route is an exit node")
assert.False(t, requestActivatesExitNode([]route.NetID{"lan"}, routesMap), "lan route is not an exit node")
assert.False(t, requestActivatesExitNode([]route.NetID{"missing"}, routesMap), "unknown id is not an exit node")
others := otherExitNodeIDs(routesMap, []route.NetID{"exitB"})
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []route.NetID{"exitA"}, others, "only the other exit node is a sibling; the lan route is ignored")
}

View File

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ import { type ReactNode } from "react";
import { useTranslation } from "react-i18next";
import { Browser } from "@wailsio/runtime";
import { DownloadIcon, NotepadText } from "lucide-react";
import { Update as UpdateSvc } from "@bindings/services";
import { Button } from "@/components/buttons/Button";
import { useClientVersion } from "@/contexts/ClientVersionContext";
import { cn } from "@/lib/cn";
@@ -15,12 +14,6 @@ function openUrl(url: string) {
});
}
function openInstallerDownload() {
UpdateSvc.DownloadURL()
.then(openUrl)
.catch(() => openUrl(GITHUB_RELEASES));
}
export function UpdateVersionCard() {
const { t } = useTranslation();
const { updateVersion, enforced, triggerUpdate } = useClientVersion();
@@ -44,7 +37,11 @@ export function UpdateVersionCard() {
{t("update.card.installNow")}
</Button>
) : (
<Button variant={"primary"} size={"xs"} onClick={openInstallerDownload}>
<Button
variant={"primary"}
size={"xs"}
onClick={() => openUrl(GITHUB_RELEASES)}
>
<DownloadIcon size={14} />
{t("update.card.getInstaller")}
</Button>

View File

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import (
"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/wailsapp/wails/v3/pkg/application"
"github.com/wailsapp/wails/v3/pkg/events"
"github.com/wailsapp/wails/v3/pkg/services/notifications"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ui/authsession"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ui/i18n"
@@ -62,7 +63,7 @@ type registeredServices struct {
profiles *services.Profiles
update *services.Update
daemonFeed *services.DaemonFeed
notifier *Notifier
notifier *notifications.NotificationService
compat *services.Compat
profileSwitcher *services.ProfileSwitcher
bundle *i18n.Bundle
@@ -102,7 +103,7 @@ func main() {
updaterHolder := updater.NewHolder(app.Event)
update := services.NewUpdate(conn, updaterHolder)
daemonFeed := services.NewDaemonFeed(conn, app.Event, updaterHolder, debugLog)
notifier := newNotifier()
notifier := notifications.New()
compat := services.NewCompat(conn)
// macOS shows no toast until permission is requested. Run it after
// ApplicationStarted so the notifier's Startup has initialised the
@@ -209,7 +210,7 @@ func main() {
// requestNotificationAuthorization prompts for macOS notification permission.
// The request blocks until the user responds (up to 3 minutes), so callers run
// it in a goroutine. No-op on Linux/Windows.
func requestNotificationAuthorization(notifier *Notifier) {
func requestNotificationAuthorization(notifier *notifications.NotificationService) {
authorized, err := notifier.CheckNotificationAuthorization()
if err != nil {
logrus.Debugf("check notification authorization: %v", err)
@@ -280,9 +281,6 @@ func newApplication(onSecondInstance func()) *application.App {
Linux: application.LinuxOptions{
ProgramName: "netbird",
},
Windows: application.WindowsOptions{
WndProcInterceptor: endSessionInterceptor(),
},
SingleInstance: &application.SingleInstanceOptions{
UniqueID: "io.netbird.ui",
OnSecondInstanceLaunch: func(_ application.SecondInstanceData) {
@@ -369,9 +367,6 @@ func newMainWindow(app *application.App, prefStore *preferences.Store) *applicat
// Hide instead of quit on close; "really quit" is reached via tray -> Quit.
window.RegisterHook(events.Common.WindowClosing, func(e *application.WindowEvent) {
if services.ShuttingDown() {
return
}
e.Cancel()
window.Hide()
})

View File

@@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
//go:build !android && !ios && !freebsd && !js
package main
import (
"context"
"errors"
"sync/atomic"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/wailsapp/wails/v3/pkg/application"
"github.com/wailsapp/wails/v3/pkg/services/notifications"
)
var errNotificationsUnavailable = errors.New("notifications unavailable")
// Notifier wraps the Wails notification service so an unavailable backend
// disables notifications instead of aborting the app. Startup fails for
// environment reasons (a bare unbundled binary on macOS has no bundle
// identifier, a headless Linux session has no D-Bus session bus), and Wails
// treats a service startup error as fatal. After a failed startup every call
// is a no-op: on macOS, touching UNUserNotificationCenter without a bundle
// identifier raises an Objective-C exception that recover() cannot catch.
type Notifier struct {
inner *notifications.NotificationService
available atomic.Bool
}
func newNotifier() *Notifier {
return &Notifier{inner: notifications.New()}
}
// ServiceName implements the Wails service-name hook for startup logs.
func (n *Notifier) ServiceName() string {
return n.inner.ServiceName()
}
// ServiceStartup starts the platform notifier, downgrading failure to a
// warning so the app keeps running without notifications.
func (n *Notifier) ServiceStartup(ctx context.Context, options application.ServiceOptions) error {
if err := n.inner.ServiceStartup(ctx, options); err != nil {
log.Warnf("notifications disabled: %v", err)
return nil
}
n.available.Store(true)
return nil
}
func (n *Notifier) ServiceShutdown() error {
if !n.available.Load() {
return nil
}
return n.inner.ServiceShutdown()
}
func (n *Notifier) CheckNotificationAuthorization() (bool, error) {
if !n.available.Load() {
return false, errNotificationsUnavailable
}
return n.inner.CheckNotificationAuthorization()
}
func (n *Notifier) RequestNotificationAuthorization() (bool, error) {
if !n.available.Load() {
return false, errNotificationsUnavailable
}
return n.inner.RequestNotificationAuthorization()
}
// SendNotification delivers a notification, silently dropping it when the
// backend never started (notifications are best-effort everywhere).
func (n *Notifier) SendNotification(options notifications.NotificationOptions) error {
if !n.available.Load() {
log.Debugf("notifications disabled, dropping %q", options.ID)
return nil
}
return n.inner.SendNotification(options)
}
func (n *Notifier) SendNotificationWithActions(options notifications.NotificationOptions) error {
if !n.available.Load() {
log.Debugf("notifications disabled, dropping %q", options.ID)
return nil
}
return n.inner.SendNotificationWithActions(options)
}
func (n *Notifier) RegisterNotificationCategory(category notifications.NotificationCategory) error {
if !n.available.Load() {
return nil
}
return n.inner.RegisterNotificationCategory(category)
}
// OnNotificationResponse registers the response callback. Pure Go state, so
// it is safe (and simply inert) when the backend never started.
//
//wails:ignore
func (n *Notifier) OnNotificationResponse(callback func(result notifications.NotificationResult)) {
n.inner.OnNotificationResponse(callback)
}

View File

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
package services
import "sync/atomic"
var (
sessionEnding atomic.Bool
quitting atomic.Bool
)
func BeginSessionEnd() {
sessionEnding.Store(true)
}
func AbortSessionEnd() {
sessionEnding.Store(false)
}
func BeginShutdown() {
quitting.Store(true)
}
func ShuttingDown() bool {
return sessionEnding.Load() || quitting.Load()
}

View File

@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ui/updater"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/version"
)
// UpdateResult mirrors TriggerUpdateResponse.
@@ -34,12 +33,6 @@ func (s *Update) GetState() updater.State {
return s.holder.Get()
}
// DownloadURL returns the platform-appropriate installer download link for
// manual (non-enforced) updates.
func (s *Update) DownloadURL() string {
return version.DownloadUrl()
}
// Quit exits the app. Scheduled off the calling goroutine so the JS caller's
// response returns before the runtime tears down.
func (s *Update) Quit() {

View File

@@ -154,9 +154,6 @@ func NewWindowManager(app *application.App, mainWindow *application.WebviewWindo
})
// Hide (not destroy) on close to keep React state; reset to General for a flash-free reopen.
s.settings.RegisterHook(events.Common.WindowClosing, func(e *application.WindowEvent) {
if ShuttingDown() {
return
}
e.Cancel()
s.app.Event.Emit(EventSettingsOpen, "general")
s.settings.Hide()
@@ -396,9 +393,6 @@ func (s *WindowManager) CloseWelcome() {
// OpenError shows the custom error dialog; title/message are pre-localised and ride in the
// start URL. A second error replaces the open one via SetURL. Singleton, destroyed on close.
func (s *WindowManager) OpenError(title, message string) {
if ShuttingDown() {
return
}
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
startURL := errorDialogURL(title, message)

View File

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
//go:build !windows && !android && !ios && !freebsd && !js
package main
func endSessionInterceptor() func(hwnd uintptr, msg uint32, wParam, lParam uintptr) (uintptr, bool) {
return nil
}

View File

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
//go:build windows
package main
import (
"os"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ui/services"
)
const (
wmQueryEndSession = 0x0011
wmEndSession = 0x0016
)
func endSessionInterceptor() func(hwnd uintptr, msg uint32, wParam, lParam uintptr) (uintptr, bool) {
return func(_ uintptr, msg uint32, wParam, _ uintptr) (uintptr, bool) {
switch msg {
case wmQueryEndSession:
services.BeginSessionEnd()
return 1, true
case wmEndSession:
if wParam == 0 {
services.AbortSessionEnd()
return 0, true
}
log.Info("windows session is ending; exiting immediately")
os.Exit(0)
return 0, true
default:
return 0, false
}
}
}

View File

@@ -32,8 +32,9 @@ const (
quitDownTimeout = 5 * time.Second
urlGitHubRepo = "https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird"
urlDocs = "https://docs.netbird.io"
urlGitHubRepo = "https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird"
urlGitHubReleases = "https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/releases/latest"
urlDocs = "https://docs.netbird.io"
)
// TrayServices bundles the services the tray menu needs, grouped so NewTray
@@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ type TrayServices struct {
Profiles *services.Profiles
Networks *services.Networks
DaemonFeed *services.DaemonFeed
Notifier *Notifier
Notifier *notifications.NotificationService
Update *services.Update
ProfileSwitcher *services.ProfileSwitcher
WindowManager *services.WindowManager
@@ -452,7 +453,6 @@ func (t *Tray) buildMenu() *application.Menu {
}
func (t *Tray) handleQuit() {
services.BeginShutdown()
t.profileMu.Lock()
if t.switchCancel != nil {
t.switchCancel()

View File

@@ -25,9 +25,6 @@ type sendFn func(notifications.NotificationOptions) error
// event-dispatch goroutine that panic is fatal process-wide; recover() turns
// it into a logged no-op.
func safeSendNotification(send sendFn, what string, opts notifications.NotificationOptions) (err error) {
if services.ShuttingDown() {
return nil
}
defer func() {
if r := recover(); r != nil {
log.Errorf("notify %s: recovered from panic (notification bus unavailable): %v", what, r)
@@ -44,7 +41,7 @@ func safeSendNotification(send sendFn, what string, opts notifications.Notificat
// notifyIfDaemonOutdated probes the daemon once and fires an OS toast when it
// is reachable but too old for this UI. A probe error means the daemon isn't
// reachable (not outdated), so it is left to the normal connection flow.
func notifyIfDaemonOutdated(compat *services.Compat, notifier *Notifier, loc *Localizer) {
func notifyIfDaemonOutdated(compat *services.Compat, notifier *notifications.NotificationService, loc *Localizer) {
ready, err := compat.DaemonReady(context.Background())
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("daemon compatibility probe: %v", err)

View File

@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ui/services"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ui/updater"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/version"
)
// trayUpdater owns the tray UI that reacts to auto-update. Composed inside Tray.
@@ -21,7 +20,7 @@ type trayUpdater struct {
app *application.App
window *application.WebviewWindow
update *services.Update
notifier *Notifier
notifier *notifications.NotificationService
loc *Localizer
onIconChange func()
// onMenuChange drives a full tray relayout: the update row lives in the
@@ -36,7 +35,7 @@ type trayUpdater struct {
progressWindowOpen bool
}
func newTrayUpdater(app *application.App, window *application.WebviewWindow, update *services.Update, notifier *Notifier, loc *Localizer, onIconChange func(), onMenuChange func()) *trayUpdater {
func newTrayUpdater(app *application.App, window *application.WebviewWindow, update *services.Update, notifier *notifications.NotificationService, loc *Localizer, onIconChange func(), onMenuChange func()) *trayUpdater {
u := &trayUpdater{
app: app,
window: window,
@@ -77,15 +76,15 @@ func (u *trayUpdater) applyLanguage() {
u.refreshMenuItem(state)
}
// handleClick opens the installer download link when not Enforced, otherwise
// shows the progress page and asks the daemon to start the installer.
// handleClick opens the GitHub releases page when not Enforced, otherwise shows
// the progress page and asks the daemon to start the installer.
func (u *trayUpdater) handleClick() {
u.mu.Lock()
state := u.state
u.mu.Unlock()
if !state.Enforced {
_ = u.app.Browser.OpenURL(version.DownloadUrl())
_ = u.app.Browser.OpenURL(urlGitHubReleases)
return
}

View File

@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ sequenceDiagram
Chk->>Inj: continue
Inj->>Inj: inject NetBird identity headers per provider config
Inj->>Grd: continue
Grd->>Grd: enforce per-provider allowlist (fail-closed backstop)
Grd->>Grd: enforce model allowlist
Grd->>Up: forward (over WireGuard)
Up-->>Resp: response (JSON or SSE stream)
Resp->>Resp: parse usage tokens, completion
@@ -135,21 +135,6 @@ sequenceDiagram
(`redact_pii = settings.RedactPii`). Phones, emails, credit cards,
PII names — see `redact.go` for the full set. See
[`modules/31-proxy-middleware-builtin.md`](modules/31-proxy-middleware-builtin.md).
- The model allowlist is enforced in TWO places. `CheckLLMPolicyLimits`
is authoritative: it resolves the policy that governs this
(provider, caller-groups) and denies (`deny_code = llm_policy.model_blocked`)
when no applicable policy permits the model — so an allowlist scoped to
one group/provider never leaks to another, and an un-guardrailed policy
is genuinely unrestricted. `llm_guardrail` is a per-provider fail-closed
backstop: it only carries an allowlist for a provider every authorising
policy restricts, and blocks unknown/undetermined models even when
management is unreachable. Because that backstop allowlist is the UNION
of every restricting policy's models, per-group narrowing lives only in
the authoritative check: during a `CheckLLMPolicyLimits` outage
`llm_limit_check` fails open, so a caller can reach any model in the
provider's union — a group scoped to model A could reach model B if
another group restricts the same provider to B. This is the documented
fail-open trade-off; a future flag may switch it to fail-closed.
- SSE streaming requires special handling on the response side; the
parser must handle partial chunks without buffering the whole
stream. See [`modules/32-proxy-llm-parsers.md`](modules/32-proxy-llm-parsers.md).

View File

@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ At request time the path is independent: the proxy calls `SelectPolicyForRequest
| on_request | 1 | `llm_router` | `{"providers":[{id, models[], upstream_*, auth_header_*, allowed_group_ids[]}]}` | **true** |
| on_request | 2 | `llm_limit_check` | `{}` | |
| on_request | 3 | `llm_identity_inject` | `{"providers":[{provider_id, header_pair?, json_metadata?, extra_headers?}]}` | **true** |
| on_request | 4 | `llm_guardrail` | `{"provider_allowlists"?: {providerID: []model}, "prompt_capture":{enabled,redact_pii}}` | |
| on_request | 4 | `llm_guardrail` | `{"model_allowlist"?, "prompt_capture":{enabled,redact_pii}}` | |
| on_response | 5 | `llm_limit_record` | `{}` (runs LAST at runtime) | |
| on_response | 6 | `cost_meter` | `{}` | |
| on_response | 7 | `llm_response_parser` | `{"capture_completion": <bool>, "redact_pii"?: true}` | |

View File

@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ no mocks. Tests: `TestChain_AllowPath_StampsAttributionAndRecordsCounter`
| `llm_router` | `{providers: [{id, models, upstream_scheme, upstream_host, upstream_path?, auth_header_name, auth_header_value, allowed_group_ids}]}` |
| `llm_limit_check` | `{}` — pulls `MgmtClient` from `FactoryContext` |
| `llm_identity_inject` | `{providers: [{provider_id, header_pair?|json_metadata?, extra_headers?}]}` |
| `llm_guardrail` | `{provider_allowlists: {providerID: []string}, prompt_capture: {enabled, redact_pii}}` — allowlist keyed by resolved provider id; a provider absent from the map is unrestricted (fail-closed backstop; authoritative per-policy/group check is management's `CheckLLMPolicyLimits`) |
| `llm_guardrail` | `{model_allowlist: []string, prompt_capture: {enabled, redact_pii}}` |
| `llm_response_parser` | `{redact_pii?, capture_completion?: *bool}` |
| `cost_meter` | `{pricing_path?}` (basename inside data-dir; defaults `pricing.yaml`) |
| `llm_limit_record` | `{}` — same pattern as `llm_limit_check` |

View File

@@ -1,209 +0,0 @@
//go:build e2e
package agentnetwork
import (
"context"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/e2e/harness"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/api"
)
// pathRoutedGuardrailCase is one provider's self-contained scenario: its own
// provider, its own guardrail whose allowlist holds ONLY that provider's
// allowed model, and its own policy. Each case runs in isolation (its own
// proxy + client), so the guardrail the proxy enforces contains exactly this
// provider's model — never a mixed cross-provider list.
type pathRoutedGuardrailCase struct {
name string
catalogID string // agent-network catalog provider id
wire string // harness.WireVertex | harness.WireBedrock
allowEntry string // the single model id put on the guardrail allowlist
allowModel string // model id sent that MUST be served (200)
blockModel string // model id sent that MUST be denied (403 model_blocked)
}
// TestGuardrailBlocksUnselectedModel_PathRouted is the end-to-end regression
// guard for the customer report that a model-allowlist guardrail attached to a
// policy has no effect for PATH-ROUTED providers — where the model travels in
// the URL, not the JSON body: Google Vertex (…/models/{model}:rawPredict) and
// AWS Bedrock (/model/{id}/invoke).
//
// Each provider is tested in isolation with a guardrail allowlisting a single
// model of its own: the allowed model (in the URL path) is served (200) and an
// unselected model (in the URL path) is denied 403 by the guardrail
// (llm_policy.model_blocked) before the upstream. The Vertex case mirrors the
// customer verbatim — allow Sonnet, and the unselected model is the exact
// claude-opus-4-6 they reported reaching the model unblocked. The Bedrock case
// sends a region-prefixed, versioned inference-profile id so URL-path model
// normalization is exercised too.
//
// The provider is catch-all (no models), so the router forwards any model and a
// 403 can only come from the guardrail, never model_not_routable. Only the
// upstream LLM is mocked (the vLLM nginx answers any path with 200); management
// synth/reconcile, the proxy middleware chain (URL-path model extraction,
// router, guardrail) and the tunnel are all real, and the guardrail denies
// before the upstream is dialed so the mock cannot influence the block. A
// static bearer api key is used so the router injects a static Authorization
// header instead of minting a GCP token — the only reason path-routed providers
// normally need live credentials — so the test runs with none and is always on.
func TestGuardrailBlocksUnselectedModel_PathRouted(t *testing.T) {
cases := []pathRoutedGuardrailCase{
{
name: "vertex",
catalogID: "vertex_ai_api",
wire: harness.WireVertex,
allowEntry: "claude-sonnet-4-5",
allowModel: "claude-sonnet-4-5",
blockModel: "claude-opus-4-6", // the customer-reported model
},
{
name: "bedrock",
catalogID: "bedrock_api",
wire: harness.WireBedrock,
allowEntry: "anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-5", // normalized catalog id
allowModel: "us.anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-5-v1:0",
blockModel: "us.anthropic.claude-opus-4-8-v1:0",
},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
tc := tc
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
runPathRoutedGuardrailCase(t, tc)
})
}
}
func runPathRoutedGuardrailCase(t *testing.T, tc pathRoutedGuardrailCase) {
t.Helper()
const (
vertexProject = "e2e-project"
vertexRegion = "global"
)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 15*time.Minute)
defer cancel()
vllm, err := harness.StartVLLM(ctx, srv)
require.NoError(t, err, "start mock upstream")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = vllm.Terminate(context.Background()) })
grp, err := srv.API().Groups.Create(ctx, api.PostApiGroupsJSONRequestBody{Name: "e2e-guardrail-" + tc.name})
require.NoError(t, err, "create group")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.API().Groups.Delete(context.Background(), grp.Id) })
ephemeral := false
sk, err := srv.API().SetupKeys.Create(ctx, api.PostApiSetupKeysJSONRequestBody{
Name: "e2e-guardrail-" + tc.name + "-client",
Type: "reusable",
ExpiresIn: 86400,
UsageLimit: 0,
AutoGroups: []string{grp.Id},
Ephemeral: &ephemeral,
})
require.NoError(t, err, "mint setup key")
require.NotEmpty(t, sk.Key, "setup key plaintext")
// Catch-all provider (no models) so the router forwards any model; a static
// bearer key means the router injects a static auth header instead of minting
// a GCP token. Bootstraps the cluster if it isn't already.
staticKey := "static-e2e-token"
prov, err := srv.CreateProvider(ctx, api.AgentNetworkProviderRequest{
Name: tc.name,
ProviderId: tc.catalogID,
UpstreamUrl: vllm.URL,
ApiKey: &staticKey,
Enabled: ptr(true),
BootstrapCluster: ptr(harness.AgentNetworkCluster),
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create %s provider", tc.name)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteProvider(context.Background(), prov.Id) })
// Guardrail allowlisting ONLY this provider's allowed model.
var gr api.AgentNetworkGuardrailRequest
gr.Name = "e2e-guardrail-" + tc.name
gr.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Enabled = true
gr.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Models = []string{tc.allowEntry}
guard, err := srv.CreateGuardrail(ctx, gr)
require.NoError(t, err, "create guardrail")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteGuardrail(context.Background(), guard.Id) })
enabled := true
pol, err := srv.CreatePolicy(ctx, api.AgentNetworkPolicyRequest{
Name: "e2e-guardrail-" + tc.name,
Enabled: &enabled,
SourceGroups: []string{grp.Id},
DestinationProviderIds: []string{prov.Id},
GuardrailIds: &[]string{guard.Id},
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create policy")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeletePolicy(context.Background(), pol.Id) })
settings, err := srv.GetSettings(ctx)
require.NoError(t, err, "read settings")
require.NotEmpty(t, settings.Endpoint, "endpoint must be assigned")
proxyToken, err := srv.CreateProxyTokenCLI(ctx, "e2e-guardrail-"+tc.name+"-proxy")
require.NoError(t, err, "mint proxy token")
px, err := harness.StartProxy(ctx, srv, proxyToken)
require.NoError(t, err, "start proxy")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = px.Terminate(context.Background()) })
cl, err := harness.StartClient(ctx, srv, sk.Key)
require.NoError(t, err, "start client")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = cl.Terminate(context.Background()) })
require.NoError(t, cl.WaitConnected(ctx, 90*time.Second), "client must connect to management")
// Probe first: the GET resolves the endpoint and its first packet wakes the
// lazy proxy peer, so WaitProxyPeer then observes it connected.
proxyIP, err := cl.ResolveProxyIP(ctx, settings.Endpoint)
require.NoError(t, err, "resolve endpoint to proxy IP")
if err := cl.WaitProxyPeer(ctx, 180*time.Second); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("client did not see the proxy peer: %v\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", err, px.Logs(context.Background()))
}
send := func(model string) (int, string) {
var code int
var body string
var cerr error
switch tc.wire {
case harness.WireVertex:
code, body, cerr = cl.Vertex(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, vertexProject, vertexRegion, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
case harness.WireBedrock:
code, body, cerr = cl.Bedrock(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
default:
t.Fatalf("unsupported wire %q", tc.wire)
}
require.NoError(t, cerr, "request must reach the proxy for %s", tc.name)
return code, body
}
// Allowed model (in the URL path) is served. Retry to absorb tunnel/DNS
// jitter on the first call over the freshly warmed tunnel.
var code int
var body string
deadline := time.Now().Add(90 * time.Second)
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
code, body = send(tc.allowModel)
if code == 200 {
break
}
time.Sleep(5 * time.Second)
}
assert.Equal(t, 200, code,
"allowed %s model (URL path) must be served; body: %s\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", tc.name, body, px.Logs(context.Background()))
// Unselected model (in the URL path) must be blocked by the guardrail.
code, body = send(tc.blockModel)
assert.Equal(t, 403, code,
"unselected %s model (URL path) must be denied, not served; body: %s\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", tc.name, body, px.Logs(context.Background()))
assert.Contains(t, body, "llm_policy.model_blocked",
"%s denial must come from the guardrail allowlist, not routing; body: %s", tc.name, body)
}

View File

@@ -1,205 +0,0 @@
//go:build e2e
package agentnetwork
import (
"context"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/e2e/harness"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/api"
)
// TestGuardrailGroupSwitchTakesEffectAfterTTL proves that moving a peer between
// groups flips its model-allowlist decision once the proxy's tunnel-peer cache
// expires. The peer's groups reach the guardrail via ValidateTunnelPeer, which
// the proxy caches; the switch is invisible until that cache expires. The proxy
// runs with a short NB_PROXY_TUNNEL_CACHE_TTL so the flip happens in seconds
// instead of the 5-minute default.
//
// Setup: one catch-all provider declaring modelA + modelB; polA (grpA -> allow
// modelA) and polB (grpB -> allow modelB). The client starts in grpA. modelA is
// served and modelB denied; after switching the client grpA -> grpB, modelB is
// served and modelA denied. The cross-group deny comes from management's
// per-policy/group CheckLLMPolicyLimits (the proxy backstop carries the union).
func TestGuardrailGroupSwitchTakesEffectAfterTTL(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 15*time.Minute)
defer cancel()
const (
modelA = "e2e-model-a"
modelB = "e2e-model-b"
// Short tunnel-cache TTL so a group switch propagates in seconds.
// Exercises the NB_PROXY_TUNNEL_CACHE_TTL override.
cacheTTL = 3 * time.Second
)
vllm, err := harness.StartVLLM(ctx, srv)
require.NoError(t, err, "start mock upstream")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = vllm.Terminate(context.Background()) })
grpA, err := srv.API().Groups.Create(ctx, api.PostApiGroupsJSONRequestBody{Name: "e2e-gswitch-a"})
require.NoError(t, err, "create group A")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.API().Groups.Delete(context.Background(), grpA.Id) })
grpB, err := srv.API().Groups.Create(ctx, api.PostApiGroupsJSONRequestBody{Name: "e2e-gswitch-b"})
require.NoError(t, err, "create group B")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.API().Groups.Delete(context.Background(), grpB.Id) })
ephemeral := false
sk, err := srv.API().SetupKeys.Create(ctx, api.PostApiSetupKeysJSONRequestBody{
Name: "e2e-gswitch-client",
Type: "reusable",
ExpiresIn: 86400,
UsageLimit: 0,
AutoGroups: []string{grpA.Id}, // client starts in group A
Ephemeral: &ephemeral,
})
require.NoError(t, err, "mint setup key")
require.NotEmpty(t, sk.Key, "setup key plaintext")
staticKey := "static-e2e-token"
prov, err := srv.CreateProvider(ctx, api.AgentNetworkProviderRequest{
Name: "gswitch",
ProviderId: "openai_api",
UpstreamUrl: vllm.URL,
ApiKey: &staticKey,
Enabled: ptr(true),
Models: &[]api.AgentNetworkProviderModel{
{Id: modelA, InputPer1k: 0.001, OutputPer1k: 0.001},
{Id: modelB, InputPer1k: 0.001, OutputPer1k: 0.001},
},
BootstrapCluster: ptr(harness.AgentNetworkCluster),
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create provider")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteProvider(context.Background(), prov.Id) })
mkGuard := func(name, model string) api.AgentNetworkGuardrail {
var gr api.AgentNetworkGuardrailRequest
gr.Name = name
gr.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Enabled = true
gr.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Models = []string{model}
g, gerr := srv.CreateGuardrail(ctx, gr)
require.NoError(t, gerr, "create guardrail %s", name)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteGuardrail(context.Background(), g.Id) })
return g
}
gA := mkGuard("e2e-gswitch-a", modelA)
gB := mkGuard("e2e-gswitch-b", modelB)
enabled := true
polA, err := srv.CreatePolicy(ctx, api.AgentNetworkPolicyRequest{
Name: "e2e-gswitch-a",
Enabled: &enabled,
SourceGroups: []string{grpA.Id},
DestinationProviderIds: []string{prov.Id},
GuardrailIds: &[]string{gA.Id},
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create policy A")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeletePolicy(context.Background(), polA.Id) })
polB, err := srv.CreatePolicy(ctx, api.AgentNetworkPolicyRequest{
Name: "e2e-gswitch-b",
Enabled: &enabled,
SourceGroups: []string{grpB.Id},
DestinationProviderIds: []string{prov.Id},
GuardrailIds: &[]string{gB.Id},
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create policy B")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeletePolicy(context.Background(), polB.Id) })
settings, err := srv.GetSettings(ctx)
require.NoError(t, err, "read settings")
require.NotEmpty(t, settings.Endpoint, "endpoint must be assigned")
proxyToken, err := srv.CreateProxyTokenCLI(ctx, "e2e-gswitch-proxy")
require.NoError(t, err, "mint proxy token")
px, err := harness.StartProxy(ctx, srv, proxyToken, map[string]string{
"NB_PROXY_TUNNEL_CACHE_TTL": cacheTTL.String(),
})
require.NoError(t, err, "start proxy")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = px.Terminate(context.Background()) })
cl, err := harness.StartClient(ctx, srv, sk.Key)
require.NoError(t, err, "start client")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = cl.Terminate(context.Background()) })
require.NoError(t, cl.WaitConnected(ctx, 90*time.Second), "client must connect to management")
proxyIP, err := cl.ResolveProxyIP(ctx, settings.Endpoint)
require.NoError(t, err, "resolve endpoint to proxy IP")
if err := cl.WaitProxyPeer(ctx, 180*time.Second); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("client did not see the proxy peer: %v\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", err, px.Logs(context.Background()))
}
send := func(model string) (int, string) {
code, body, cerr := cl.Chat(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, harness.WireChat, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
require.NoError(t, cerr, "request must reach the proxy")
return code, body
}
sendUntil := func(model string, want int, timeout time.Duration) (int, string) {
var code int
var body string
deadline := time.Now().Add(timeout)
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
code, body = send(model)
if code == want {
return code, body
}
time.Sleep(2 * time.Second)
}
return code, body
}
// Phase 1 — client is in group A: modelA served, modelB denied.
code, body := sendUntil(modelA, 200, 90*time.Second)
assert.Equal(t, 200, code,
"group-A model must be served while the client is in group A; body: %s\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", body, px.Logs(context.Background()))
code, body = send(modelB)
assert.Equal(t, 403, code,
"group-B model must be denied while the client is in group A; body: %s", body)
assert.Contains(t, body, "llm_policy.model_blocked")
// Switch the client peer from group A to group B.
peerID := clientPeerInGroup(t, ctx, grpA.Id)
_, err = srv.API().Groups.Update(ctx, grpB.Id, api.PutApiGroupsGroupIdJSONRequestBody{
Name: grpB.Name,
Peers: &[]string{peerID},
})
require.NoError(t, err, "add peer to group B")
_, err = srv.API().Groups.Update(ctx, grpA.Id, api.PutApiGroupsGroupIdJSONRequestBody{
Name: grpA.Name,
Peers: &[]string{},
})
require.NoError(t, err, "remove peer from group A")
// Phase 2 — after the short TTL expires the proxy re-validates the peer,
// sees group B, and the decision flips. Poll to absorb TTL + re-validation.
code, body = sendUntil(modelB, 200, 60*time.Second)
assert.Equal(t, 200, code,
"after the group switch + TTL, the group-B model must be served; body: %s\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", body, px.Logs(context.Background()))
code, body = send(modelA)
assert.Equal(t, 403, code,
"after the switch, the old group-A model must be denied; body: %s", body)
assert.Contains(t, body, "llm_policy.model_blocked")
}
// clientPeerInGroup returns the id of the single peer that is a member of the
// given group — the test client. The proxy peer is never added to test groups.
func clientPeerInGroup(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, groupID string) string {
t.Helper()
peers, err := srv.API().Peers.List(ctx)
require.NoError(t, err, "list peers")
for _, p := range peers {
for _, g := range p.Groups {
if g.Id == groupID {
return p.Id
}
}
}
t.Fatalf("no peer found in group %s", groupID)
return ""
}

View File

@@ -1,201 +0,0 @@
//go:build e2e
package agentnetwork
import (
"context"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/e2e/harness"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/api"
)
// TestGuardrailMultiPolicyModelAllowlist: modelSelected served (200), grpOther's
// modelOther denied for the grpMain client (403 model_blocked, no cross-group
// leak), and openModel on the un-guardrailed policy's provider served (200).
func TestGuardrailMultiPolicyModelAllowlist(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 15*time.Minute)
defer cancel()
const (
modelSelected = "e2e-selected"
modelOther = "e2e-other"
openModel = "e2e-open"
)
vllm, err := harness.StartVLLM(ctx, srv)
require.NoError(t, err, "start mock upstream")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = vllm.Terminate(context.Background()) })
grpMain, err := srv.API().Groups.Create(ctx, api.PostApiGroupsJSONRequestBody{Name: "e2e-guardrail-mp-main"})
require.NoError(t, err, "create main group")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.API().Groups.Delete(context.Background(), grpMain.Id) })
grpOther, err := srv.API().Groups.Create(ctx, api.PostApiGroupsJSONRequestBody{Name: "e2e-guardrail-mp-other"})
require.NoError(t, err, "create other group")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.API().Groups.Delete(context.Background(), grpOther.Id) })
ephemeral := false
sk, err := srv.API().SetupKeys.Create(ctx, api.PostApiSetupKeysJSONRequestBody{
Name: "e2e-guardrail-mp-client",
Type: "reusable",
ExpiresIn: 86400,
UsageLimit: 0,
AutoGroups: []string{grpMain.Id}, // client joins grpMain only
Ephemeral: &ephemeral,
})
require.NoError(t, err, "mint setup key")
require.NotEmpty(t, sk.Key, "setup key plaintext")
staticKey := "static-e2e-token"
models := func(ids ...string) *[]api.AgentNetworkProviderModel {
out := make([]api.AgentNetworkProviderModel, 0, len(ids))
for _, id := range ids {
out = append(out, api.AgentNetworkProviderModel{Id: id, InputPer1k: 0.001, OutputPer1k: 0.001})
}
return &out
}
// pRestricted declares the two guardrailed models so routing is deterministic
// (model -> provider). Created first, so it carries the bootstrap cluster.
pRestricted, err := srv.CreateProvider(ctx, api.AgentNetworkProviderRequest{
Name: "restricted",
ProviderId: "openai_api",
UpstreamUrl: vllm.URL,
ApiKey: &staticKey,
Enabled: ptr(true),
Models: models(modelSelected, modelOther),
BootstrapCluster: ptr(harness.AgentNetworkCluster),
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create restricted provider")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteProvider(context.Background(), pRestricted.Id) })
pOpen, err := srv.CreateProvider(ctx, api.AgentNetworkProviderRequest{
Name: "open",
ProviderId: "openai_api",
UpstreamUrl: vllm.URL,
ApiKey: &staticKey,
Enabled: ptr(true),
Models: models(openModel),
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create open provider")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteProvider(context.Background(), pOpen.Id) })
mkGuardrail := func(name, model string) api.AgentNetworkGuardrail {
var gr api.AgentNetworkGuardrailRequest
gr.Name = name
gr.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Enabled = true
gr.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Models = []string{model}
g, gerr := srv.CreateGuardrail(ctx, gr)
require.NoError(t, gerr, "create guardrail %s", name)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteGuardrail(context.Background(), g.Id) })
return g
}
gMain := mkGuardrail("e2e-guardrail-mp-main", modelSelected)
gOther := mkGuardrail("e2e-guardrail-mp-other", modelOther)
enabled := true
// polMain: grpMain restricted to modelSelected on pRestricted.
polMain, err := srv.CreatePolicy(ctx, api.AgentNetworkPolicyRequest{
Name: "e2e-guardrail-mp-main",
Enabled: &enabled,
SourceGroups: []string{grpMain.Id},
DestinationProviderIds: []string{pRestricted.Id},
GuardrailIds: &[]string{gMain.Id},
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create main policy")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeletePolicy(context.Background(), polMain.Id) })
// polOther: grpOther restricted to modelOther on the SAME provider. The
// client is not in grpOther, so modelOther must never be usable by it.
polOther, err := srv.CreatePolicy(ctx, api.AgentNetworkPolicyRequest{
Name: "e2e-guardrail-mp-other",
Enabled: &enabled,
SourceGroups: []string{grpOther.Id},
DestinationProviderIds: []string{pRestricted.Id},
GuardrailIds: &[]string{gOther.Id},
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create other policy")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeletePolicy(context.Background(), polOther.Id) })
// polOpen: grpMain on pOpen with NO guardrail — unrestricted.
polOpen, err := srv.CreatePolicy(ctx, api.AgentNetworkPolicyRequest{
Name: "e2e-guardrail-mp-open",
Enabled: &enabled,
SourceGroups: []string{grpMain.Id},
DestinationProviderIds: []string{pOpen.Id},
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create open policy")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeletePolicy(context.Background(), polOpen.Id) })
settings, err := srv.GetSettings(ctx)
require.NoError(t, err, "read settings")
require.NotEmpty(t, settings.Endpoint, "endpoint must be assigned")
proxyToken, err := srv.CreateProxyTokenCLI(ctx, "e2e-guardrail-mp-proxy")
require.NoError(t, err, "mint proxy token")
px, err := harness.StartProxy(ctx, srv, proxyToken)
require.NoError(t, err, "start proxy")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = px.Terminate(context.Background()) })
cl, err := harness.StartClient(ctx, srv, sk.Key)
require.NoError(t, err, "start client")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = cl.Terminate(context.Background()) })
require.NoError(t, cl.WaitConnected(ctx, 90*time.Second), "client must connect to management")
proxyIP, err := cl.ResolveProxyIP(ctx, settings.Endpoint)
require.NoError(t, err, "resolve endpoint to proxy IP")
if err := cl.WaitProxyPeer(ctx, 180*time.Second); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("client did not see the proxy peer: %v\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", err, px.Logs(context.Background()))
}
send := func(model string) (int, string) {
code, body, cerr := cl.Chat(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, harness.WireChat, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
require.NoError(t, cerr, "request must reach the proxy")
return code, body
}
// sendUntil200 absorbs first-call tunnel/DNS jitter on the freshly warmed tunnel.
sendUntil200 := func(model string) (int, string) {
var code int
var body string
deadline := time.Now().Add(90 * time.Second)
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
code, body = send(model)
if code == 200 {
break
}
time.Sleep(5 * time.Second)
}
return code, body
}
t.Run("selected model allowed for its group", func(t *testing.T) {
code, body := sendUntil200(modelSelected)
assert.Equal(t, 200, code,
"grpMain's allowlisted model must be served; body: %s\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", body, px.Logs(context.Background()))
})
t.Run("other group's model does not leak", func(t *testing.T) {
// modelOther is allowlisted only for grpOther. The grpMain client must be
// denied by management's per-policy/group check — not waved through by an
// account-wide union. This is the security-critical wrong-ALLOW guard.
code, body := send(modelOther)
assert.Equal(t, 403, code,
"another group's allowlisted model must be denied for this caller; body: %s\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", body, px.Logs(context.Background()))
assert.Contains(t, body, "llm_policy.model_blocked",
"denial must be a model-allowlist decision; body: %s", body)
})
t.Run("unguarded policy leaves its provider unrestricted", func(t *testing.T) {
// polOpen carries no guardrail, so pOpen is unrestricted for grpMain. The
// old account-wide union would have blocked openModel (it is on no
// allowlist); it must now be served — the false-DENY guard.
code, body := sendUntil200(openModel)
assert.Equal(t, 200, code,
"an un-guardrailed policy's provider must not be blocked by another policy's allowlist; body: %s\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", body, px.Logs(context.Background()))
})
}

View File

@@ -1,422 +0,0 @@
//go:build e2e
package agentnetwork
import (
"context"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/e2e/harness"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/api"
)
// pergroupCase describes one provider surface for the per-group allowlist matrix.
// selectedReq/otherReq are the model identifiers as they travel in the request
// (URL path for Bedrock/Vertex, body "model" for chat/messages). selectedAllow/
// otherAllow are the (normalized) forms the guardrail allowlist holds — for
// Bedrock these differ from the request form so path normalization is exercised.
type pergroupCase struct {
name string
catalogID string
wire string // "chat", "messages", "vertex", "bedrock"
models *[]api.AgentNetworkProviderModel
selectedReq string
selectedAllow string
otherReq string
otherAllow string
providerID string // filled during setup
}
// TestGuardrailPerGroupAllowlist_AllProviders proves the per-policy/group model
// allowlist end to end across every always-on provider surface, including the
// path-routed ones (Vertex, Bedrock) where the model travels in the URL.
//
// For each provider two policies target it: grpMain (the client) is allowed only
// selectedReq; grpOther (which the client is NOT in) is allowed only otherReq.
// The client must get selectedReq served (200) and otherReq denied (403,
// llm_policy.model_blocked) — the cross-group no-leak property. The deny is the
// authoritative per-policy/group decision from management (the proxy per-provider
// backstop carries the union of both models), so this also confirms management
// receives the correct normalized model for path-routed providers.
func TestGuardrailPerGroupAllowlist_AllProviders(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 20*time.Minute)
defer cancel()
const (
vertexProject = "e2e-project"
vertexRegion = "global"
)
priced := func(ids ...string) *[]api.AgentNetworkProviderModel {
out := make([]api.AgentNetworkProviderModel, 0, len(ids))
for _, id := range ids {
out = append(out, api.AgentNetworkProviderModel{Id: id, InputPer1k: 0.001, OutputPer1k: 0.001})
}
return &out
}
cases := []*pergroupCase{
{
name: "openai", catalogID: "openai_api", wire: harness.WireChat,
models: priced("oai-model-a", "oai-model-b"),
selectedReq: "oai-model-a", selectedAllow: "oai-model-a",
otherReq: "oai-model-b", otherAllow: "oai-model-b",
},
{
name: "anthropic", catalogID: "anthropic_api", wire: harness.WireMessages,
models: priced("ant-model-a", "ant-model-b"),
selectedReq: "ant-model-a", selectedAllow: "ant-model-a",
otherReq: "ant-model-b", otherAllow: "ant-model-b",
},
{
// Vertex catalog ids travel bare in the rawPredict path.
name: "vertex", catalogID: "vertex_ai_api", wire: "vertex",
selectedReq: "claude-sonnet-4-5", selectedAllow: "claude-sonnet-4-5",
otherReq: "claude-opus-4-6", otherAllow: "claude-opus-4-6",
},
{
// Bedrock request ids are region-prefixed/versioned; the parser
// normalizes them to the catalog key the allowlist holds.
name: "bedrock", catalogID: "bedrock_api", wire: "bedrock",
selectedReq: "us.anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-5-v1:0", selectedAllow: "anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-5",
otherReq: "us.anthropic.claude-opus-4-8-v1:0", otherAllow: "anthropic.claude-opus-4-8",
},
}
vllm, err := harness.StartVLLM(ctx, srv)
require.NoError(t, err, "start mock upstream")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = vllm.Terminate(context.Background()) })
grpMain, err := srv.API().Groups.Create(ctx, api.PostApiGroupsJSONRequestBody{Name: "e2e-pergroup-main"})
require.NoError(t, err, "create main group")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.API().Groups.Delete(context.Background(), grpMain.Id) })
grpOther, err := srv.API().Groups.Create(ctx, api.PostApiGroupsJSONRequestBody{Name: "e2e-pergroup-other"})
require.NoError(t, err, "create other group")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.API().Groups.Delete(context.Background(), grpOther.Id) })
ephemeral := false
sk, err := srv.API().SetupKeys.Create(ctx, api.PostApiSetupKeysJSONRequestBody{
Name: "e2e-pergroup-client",
Type: "reusable",
ExpiresIn: 86400,
UsageLimit: 0,
AutoGroups: []string{grpMain.Id},
Ephemeral: &ephemeral,
})
require.NoError(t, err, "mint setup key")
require.NotEmpty(t, sk.Key, "setup key plaintext")
staticKey := "static-e2e-token"
enabled := true
for i, c := range cases {
req := api.AgentNetworkProviderRequest{
Name: "e2e-pergroup-" + c.name,
ProviderId: c.catalogID,
UpstreamUrl: vllm.URL,
ApiKey: &staticKey,
Enabled: ptr(true),
Models: c.models,
}
if i == 0 {
req.BootstrapCluster = ptr(harness.AgentNetworkCluster)
}
prov, perr := srv.CreateProvider(ctx, req)
require.NoError(t, perr, "create provider %s", c.name)
c.providerID = prov.Id
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteProvider(context.Background(), prov.Id) })
gSel := mkAllowGuardrail(t, ctx, "e2e-pergroup-"+c.name+"-sel", c.selectedAllow)
gOth := mkAllowGuardrail(t, ctx, "e2e-pergroup-"+c.name+"-oth", c.otherAllow)
polMain, merr := srv.CreatePolicy(ctx, api.AgentNetworkPolicyRequest{
Name: "e2e-pergroup-" + c.name + "-main",
Enabled: &enabled,
SourceGroups: []string{grpMain.Id},
DestinationProviderIds: []string{prov.Id},
GuardrailIds: &[]string{gSel.Id},
})
require.NoError(t, merr, "create main policy %s", c.name)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeletePolicy(context.Background(), polMain.Id) })
polOther, oerr := srv.CreatePolicy(ctx, api.AgentNetworkPolicyRequest{
Name: "e2e-pergroup-" + c.name + "-other",
Enabled: &enabled,
SourceGroups: []string{grpOther.Id},
DestinationProviderIds: []string{prov.Id},
GuardrailIds: &[]string{gOth.Id},
})
require.NoError(t, oerr, "create other policy %s", c.name)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeletePolicy(context.Background(), polOther.Id) })
}
settings, err := srv.GetSettings(ctx)
require.NoError(t, err, "read settings")
require.NotEmpty(t, settings.Endpoint, "endpoint must be assigned")
proxyToken, err := srv.CreateProxyTokenCLI(ctx, "e2e-pergroup-proxy")
require.NoError(t, err, "mint proxy token")
px, err := harness.StartProxy(ctx, srv, proxyToken)
require.NoError(t, err, "start proxy")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = px.Terminate(context.Background()) })
cl, err := harness.StartClient(ctx, srv, sk.Key)
require.NoError(t, err, "start client")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = cl.Terminate(context.Background()) })
require.NoError(t, cl.WaitConnected(ctx, 90*time.Second), "client must connect to management")
proxyIP, err := cl.ResolveProxyIP(ctx, settings.Endpoint)
require.NoError(t, err, "resolve endpoint to proxy IP")
if err := cl.WaitProxyPeer(ctx, 180*time.Second); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("client did not see the proxy peer: %v\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", err, px.Logs(context.Background()))
}
send := func(c *pergroupCase, model string) (int, string) {
var code int
var body string
var cerr error
switch c.wire {
case "vertex":
code, body, cerr = cl.Vertex(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, vertexProject, vertexRegion, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
case "bedrock":
code, body, cerr = cl.Bedrock(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
default:
code, body, cerr = cl.Chat(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, c.wire, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
}
require.NoError(t, cerr, "request must reach the proxy for %s", c.name)
return code, body
}
for _, c := range cases {
t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// grpMain's own model is served. Retry to absorb tunnel/DNS jitter on
// the first call over the freshly warmed tunnel.
var code int
var body string
deadline := time.Now().Add(90 * time.Second)
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
code, body = send(c, c.selectedReq)
if code == 200 {
break
}
time.Sleep(5 * time.Second)
}
assert.Equal(t, 200, code,
"%s: grpMain's allowlisted model must be served; body: %s\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", c.name, body, px.Logs(context.Background()))
// grpOther's model must NOT leak to the grpMain client.
code, body = send(c, c.otherReq)
assert.Equal(t, 403, code,
"%s: another group's allowlisted model must be denied for this caller; body: %s\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", c.name, body, px.Logs(context.Background()))
assert.Contains(t, body, "llm_policy.model_blocked",
"%s: denial must be a model-allowlist decision, not routing; body: %s", c.name, body)
})
}
}
// TestGuardrailMultiGroupUser proves the per-policy/group decision for a caller
// that belongs to MULTIPLE groups at once. Two scenarios, one shared stack:
//
// - union across the user's groups: the client is in gUX and gUY, each with
// its own policy+guardrail on provider P1 (gUX->union-a, gUY->union-b). The
// client may use BOTH models (the union of its groups' allowlists) while a
// third, un-allowlisted model is denied.
// - an un-guardrailed group lifts the restriction: the client is in gMP and
// gMQ on provider P2, where gMP restricts to mix-a but gMQ's policy carries
// NO guardrail. Because one applicable policy is unrestricted, the client may
// use a model on no allowlist (mix-z) as well as mix-a.
func TestGuardrailMultiGroupUser(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 15*time.Minute)
defer cancel()
const (
unionA = "mg-union-a"
unionB = "mg-union-b"
unionC = "mg-union-c" // allowlisted by neither group
mixA = "mg-mix-a"
mixZ = "mg-mix-z" // on no allowlist; reachable only via the un-guardrailed policy
)
priced := func(ids ...string) *[]api.AgentNetworkProviderModel {
out := make([]api.AgentNetworkProviderModel, 0, len(ids))
for _, id := range ids {
out = append(out, api.AgentNetworkProviderModel{Id: id, InputPer1k: 0.001, OutputPer1k: 0.001})
}
return &out
}
vllm, err := harness.StartVLLM(ctx, srv)
require.NoError(t, err, "start mock upstream")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = vllm.Terminate(context.Background()) })
mkGroup := func(name string) *api.Group {
g, gerr := srv.API().Groups.Create(ctx, api.PostApiGroupsJSONRequestBody{Name: name})
require.NoError(t, gerr, "create group %s", name)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.API().Groups.Delete(context.Background(), g.Id) })
return g
}
gUX := mkGroup("e2e-mg-union-x")
gUY := mkGroup("e2e-mg-union-y")
gMP := mkGroup("e2e-mg-mix-p")
gMQ := mkGroup("e2e-mg-mix-q")
ephemeral := false
sk, err := srv.API().SetupKeys.Create(ctx, api.PostApiSetupKeysJSONRequestBody{
Name: "e2e-mg-client",
Type: "reusable",
ExpiresIn: 86400,
UsageLimit: 0,
AutoGroups: []string{gUX.Id, gUY.Id, gMP.Id, gMQ.Id}, // client in all four groups
Ephemeral: &ephemeral,
})
require.NoError(t, err, "mint setup key")
require.NotEmpty(t, sk.Key, "setup key plaintext")
staticKey := "static-e2e-token"
enabled := true
// P1 — union scenario: two restricting policies, one per group.
p1, err := srv.CreateProvider(ctx, api.AgentNetworkProviderRequest{
Name: "e2e-mg-union",
ProviderId: "openai_api",
UpstreamUrl: vllm.URL,
ApiKey: &staticKey,
Enabled: ptr(true),
Models: priced(unionA, unionB, unionC),
BootstrapCluster: ptr(harness.AgentNetworkCluster),
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create union provider")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteProvider(context.Background(), p1.Id) })
polUX, err := srv.CreatePolicy(ctx, api.AgentNetworkPolicyRequest{
Name: "e2e-mg-union-x",
Enabled: &enabled,
SourceGroups: []string{gUX.Id},
DestinationProviderIds: []string{p1.Id},
GuardrailIds: &[]string{mkAllowGuardrail(t, ctx, "e2e-mg-union-x", unionA).Id},
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create union policy X")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeletePolicy(context.Background(), polUX.Id) })
polUY, err := srv.CreatePolicy(ctx, api.AgentNetworkPolicyRequest{
Name: "e2e-mg-union-y",
Enabled: &enabled,
SourceGroups: []string{gUY.Id},
DestinationProviderIds: []string{p1.Id},
GuardrailIds: &[]string{mkAllowGuardrail(t, ctx, "e2e-mg-union-y", unionB).Id},
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create union policy Y")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeletePolicy(context.Background(), polUY.Id) })
// P2 — mixed scenario: one restricting policy + one un-guardrailed policy.
p2, err := srv.CreateProvider(ctx, api.AgentNetworkProviderRequest{
Name: "e2e-mg-mix",
ProviderId: "openai_api",
UpstreamUrl: vllm.URL,
ApiKey: &staticKey,
Enabled: ptr(true),
Models: priced(mixA, mixZ),
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create mix provider")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteProvider(context.Background(), p2.Id) })
polMP, err := srv.CreatePolicy(ctx, api.AgentNetworkPolicyRequest{
Name: "e2e-mg-mix-p",
Enabled: &enabled,
SourceGroups: []string{gMP.Id},
DestinationProviderIds: []string{p2.Id},
GuardrailIds: &[]string{mkAllowGuardrail(t, ctx, "e2e-mg-mix-p", mixA).Id},
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create mix policy P")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeletePolicy(context.Background(), polMP.Id) })
polMQ, err := srv.CreatePolicy(ctx, api.AgentNetworkPolicyRequest{
Name: "e2e-mg-mix-q",
Enabled: &enabled,
SourceGroups: []string{gMQ.Id},
DestinationProviderIds: []string{p2.Id}, // NO guardrail -> unrestricted
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create mix policy Q")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeletePolicy(context.Background(), polMQ.Id) })
settings, err := srv.GetSettings(ctx)
require.NoError(t, err, "read settings")
require.NotEmpty(t, settings.Endpoint, "endpoint must be assigned")
proxyToken, err := srv.CreateProxyTokenCLI(ctx, "e2e-mg-proxy")
require.NoError(t, err, "mint proxy token")
px, err := harness.StartProxy(ctx, srv, proxyToken)
require.NoError(t, err, "start proxy")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = px.Terminate(context.Background()) })
cl, err := harness.StartClient(ctx, srv, sk.Key)
require.NoError(t, err, "start client")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = cl.Terminate(context.Background()) })
require.NoError(t, cl.WaitConnected(ctx, 90*time.Second), "client must connect to management")
proxyIP, err := cl.ResolveProxyIP(ctx, settings.Endpoint)
require.NoError(t, err, "resolve endpoint to proxy IP")
if err := cl.WaitProxyPeer(ctx, 180*time.Second); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("client did not see the proxy peer: %v\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", err, px.Logs(context.Background()))
}
send := func(model string) (int, string) {
code, body, cerr := cl.Chat(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, harness.WireChat, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
require.NoError(t, cerr, "request must reach the proxy")
return code, body
}
sendUntil200 := func(model string) (int, string) {
var code int
var body string
deadline := time.Now().Add(90 * time.Second)
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
code, body = send(model)
if code == 200 {
break
}
time.Sleep(5 * time.Second)
}
return code, body
}
t.Run("union across the user's groups", func(t *testing.T) {
code, body := sendUntil200(unionA)
assert.Equal(t, 200, code, "model allowed by group X must be served; body: %s\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", body, px.Logs(context.Background()))
code, body = sendUntil200(unionB)
assert.Equal(t, 200, code, "model allowed by group Y must also be served (union across the user's groups); body: %s", body)
code, body = send(unionC)
assert.Equal(t, 403, code, "a model on neither group's allowlist must be denied; body: %s", body)
assert.Contains(t, body, "llm_policy.model_blocked")
})
t.Run("an un-guardrailed group lifts the restriction", func(t *testing.T) {
code, body := sendUntil200(mixA)
assert.Equal(t, 200, code, "the restricted group's model must be served; body: %s\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", body, px.Logs(context.Background()))
code, body = sendUntil200(mixZ)
assert.Equal(t, 200, code,
"a non-allowlisted model must be served because the user is also in a group whose policy has no guardrail; body: %s\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", body, px.Logs(context.Background()))
})
}
// mkAllowGuardrail creates a guardrail whose model allowlist is enabled and holds
// exactly the given model, registering cleanup.
func mkAllowGuardrail(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, name, model string) api.AgentNetworkGuardrail {
t.Helper()
var gr api.AgentNetworkGuardrailRequest
gr.Name = name
gr.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Enabled = true
gr.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Models = []string{model}
g, err := srv.CreateGuardrail(ctx, gr)
require.NoError(t, err, "create guardrail %s", name)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteGuardrail(context.Background(), g.Id) })
return g
}

View File

@@ -38,11 +38,7 @@ type Proxy struct {
// network, registered via the given account proxy token and serving the
// AgentNetworkCluster over a self-signed wildcard cert. It does not wait for
// peer connectivity — callers poll management for the proxy peer.
// StartProxy launches the reverse-proxy container. Optional envOverrides are
// merged into the container environment after the defaults, so callers can set
// or override any NB_PROXY_* var (e.g. NB_PROXY_TUNNEL_CACHE_TTL for tests that
// need a short authorization-cache window).
func StartProxy(ctx context.Context, c *Combined, proxyToken string, envOverrides ...map[string]string) (*Proxy, error) {
func StartProxy(ctx context.Context, c *Combined, proxyToken string) (*Proxy, error) {
root, err := repoRoot()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -97,12 +93,6 @@ func StartProxy(ctx context.Context, c *Combined, proxyToken string, envOverride
WaitingFor: wait.ForLog("Initial mapping sync complete").WithStartupTimeout(90 * time.Second),
}
for _, ov := range envOverrides {
for k, v := range ov {
req.Env[k] = v
}
}
ctr, err := testcontainers.GenericContainer(ctx, testcontainers.GenericContainerRequest{
ContainerRequest: req,
Started: true,

View File

@@ -1,19 +1,557 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
#!/bin/bash
cat >&2 <<'EOF'
ERROR: This legacy installation script has been retired and no longer runs.
set -e
Dex support is not deprecated. For new deployments, use getting-started.sh:
# NetBird Getting Started with Dex IDP
# This script sets up NetBird with Dex as the identity provider
https://docs.netbird.io/selfhosted/selfhosted-quickstart
# Sed pattern to strip base64 padding characters
SED_STRIP_PADDING='s/=//g'
The current installer includes NetBird's embedded Dex-based identity provider.
Local users and external identity providers can be managed through the
NetBird Dashboard:
check_docker_compose() {
if command -v docker-compose &> /dev/null
then
echo "docker-compose"
return
fi
if docker compose --help &> /dev/null
then
echo "docker compose"
return
fi
https://docs.netbird.io/selfhosted/identity-providers/local
echo "docker-compose is not installed or not in PATH. Please follow the steps from the official guide: https://docs.docker.com/engine/install/" > /dev/stderr
exit 1
}
This compatibility notice will be removed in NetBird v0.80.
check_jq() {
if ! command -v jq &> /dev/null
then
echo "jq is not installed or not in PATH, please install with your package manager. e.g. sudo apt install jq" > /dev/stderr
exit 1
fi
return 0
}
get_main_ip_address() {
if [[ "$OSTYPE" == "darwin"* ]]; then
interface=$(route -n get default | grep 'interface:' | awk '{print $2}')
ip_address=$(ifconfig "$interface" | grep 'inet ' | awk '{print $2}')
else
interface=$(ip route | grep default | awk '{print $5}' | head -n 1)
ip_address=$(ip addr show "$interface" | grep 'inet ' | awk '{print $2}' | cut -d'/' -f1)
fi
echo "$ip_address"
return 0
}
check_nb_domain() {
DOMAIN=$1
if [[ "$DOMAIN-x" == "-x" ]]; then
echo "The NETBIRD_DOMAIN variable cannot be empty." > /dev/stderr
return 1
fi
if [[ "$DOMAIN" == "netbird.example.com" ]]; then
echo "The NETBIRD_DOMAIN cannot be netbird.example.com" > /dev/stderr
return 1
fi
return 0
}
read_nb_domain() {
READ_NETBIRD_DOMAIN=""
echo -n "Enter the domain you want to use for NetBird (e.g. netbird.my-domain.com): " > /dev/stderr
read -r READ_NETBIRD_DOMAIN < /dev/tty
if ! check_nb_domain "$READ_NETBIRD_DOMAIN"; then
read_nb_domain
fi
echo "$READ_NETBIRD_DOMAIN"
return 0
}
get_turn_external_ip() {
TURN_EXTERNAL_IP_CONFIG="#external-ip="
IP=$(curl -s -4 https://jsonip.com | jq -r '.ip')
if [[ "x-$IP" != "x-" ]]; then
TURN_EXTERNAL_IP_CONFIG="external-ip=$IP"
fi
echo "$TURN_EXTERNAL_IP_CONFIG"
return 0
}
wait_dex() {
set +e
echo -n "Waiting for Dex to become ready (via $NETBIRD_HTTP_PROTOCOL://$NETBIRD_DOMAIN)"
counter=1
while true; do
# Check Dex through Caddy proxy (also validates TLS is working)
if curl -sk -f -o /dev/null "$NETBIRD_HTTP_PROTOCOL://$NETBIRD_DOMAIN/dex/.well-known/openid-configuration" 2>/dev/null; then
break
fi
if [[ $counter -eq 60 ]]; then
echo ""
echo "Taking too long. Checking logs..."
$DOCKER_COMPOSE_COMMAND logs --tail=20 caddy
$DOCKER_COMPOSE_COMMAND logs --tail=20 dex
fi
echo -n " ."
sleep 2
counter=$((counter + 1))
done
echo " done"
set -e
return 0
}
init_environment() {
CADDY_SECURE_DOMAIN=""
NETBIRD_PORT=80
NETBIRD_HTTP_PROTOCOL="http"
NETBIRD_RELAY_PROTO="rel"
TURN_USER="self"
TURN_PASSWORD=$(openssl rand -base64 32 | sed "$SED_STRIP_PADDING")
NETBIRD_RELAY_AUTH_SECRET=$(openssl rand -base64 32 | sed "$SED_STRIP_PADDING")
TURN_MIN_PORT=49152
TURN_MAX_PORT=65535
TURN_EXTERNAL_IP_CONFIG=$(get_turn_external_ip)
# Generate secrets for Dex
DEX_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_SECRET=$(openssl rand -base64 32 | sed "$SED_STRIP_PADDING")
# Generate admin password
NETBIRD_ADMIN_PASSWORD=$(openssl rand -base64 16 | sed "$SED_STRIP_PADDING")
if ! check_nb_domain "$NETBIRD_DOMAIN"; then
NETBIRD_DOMAIN=$(read_nb_domain)
fi
if [[ "$NETBIRD_DOMAIN" == "use-ip" ]]; then
NETBIRD_DOMAIN=$(get_main_ip_address)
else
NETBIRD_PORT=443
CADDY_SECURE_DOMAIN=", $NETBIRD_DOMAIN:$NETBIRD_PORT"
NETBIRD_HTTP_PROTOCOL="https"
NETBIRD_RELAY_PROTO="rels"
fi
check_jq
DOCKER_COMPOSE_COMMAND=$(check_docker_compose)
if [[ -f dex.yaml ]]; then
echo "Generated files already exist, if you want to reinitialize the environment, please remove them first."
echo "You can use the following commands:"
echo " $DOCKER_COMPOSE_COMMAND down --volumes # to remove all containers and volumes"
echo " rm -f docker-compose.yml Caddyfile dex.yaml dashboard.env turnserver.conf management.json relay.env"
echo "Be aware that this will remove all data from the database, and you will have to reconfigure the dashboard."
exit 1
fi
echo Rendering initial files...
render_docker_compose > docker-compose.yml
render_caddyfile > Caddyfile
render_dex_config > dex.yaml
render_dashboard_env > dashboard.env
render_management_json > management.json
render_turn_server_conf > turnserver.conf
render_relay_env > relay.env
echo -e "\nStarting Dex IDP\n"
$DOCKER_COMPOSE_COMMAND up -d caddy dex
# Wait for Dex to be ready (through caddy proxy)
sleep 3
wait_dex
echo -e "\nStarting NetBird services\n"
$DOCKER_COMPOSE_COMMAND up -d
echo -e "\nDone!\n"
echo "You can access the NetBird dashboard at $NETBIRD_HTTP_PROTOCOL://$NETBIRD_DOMAIN"
echo ""
echo "Login with the following credentials:"
install -m 600 /dev/null .env
printf 'Email: admin@%s\nPassword: %s\n' \
"$NETBIRD_DOMAIN" "$NETBIRD_ADMIN_PASSWORD" >> .env
echo "Email: admin@$NETBIRD_DOMAIN"
echo "Password: $NETBIRD_ADMIN_PASSWORD"
echo ""
echo "Dex admin UI is not available (Dex has no built-in UI)."
echo "To add more users, edit dex.yaml and restart: $DOCKER_COMPOSE_COMMAND restart dex"
return 0
}
render_caddyfile() {
cat <<EOF
{
debug
servers :80,:443 {
protocols h1 h2c h2 h3
}
}
(security_headers) {
header * {
Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=3600; includeSubDomains; preload"
X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN"
X-XSS-Protection "1; mode=block"
-Server
Referrer-Policy strict-origin-when-cross-origin
}
}
:80${CADDY_SECURE_DOMAIN} {
import security_headers
# Relay
reverse_proxy /relay* relay:80
# Signal
reverse_proxy /signalexchange.SignalExchange/* h2c://signal:10000
# Management
reverse_proxy /api/* management:80
reverse_proxy /management.ManagementService/* h2c://management:80
# Dex
reverse_proxy /dex/* dex:5556
# Dashboard
reverse_proxy /* dashboard:80
}
EOF
return 0
}
exit 1
render_dex_config() {
# Generate bcrypt hash of the admin password
# Using a simple approach - htpasswd or python if available
ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH=""
if command -v htpasswd &> /dev/null; then
ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH=$(htpasswd -bnBC 10 "" "$NETBIRD_ADMIN_PASSWORD" | tr -d ':\n')
elif command -v python3 &> /dev/null; then
ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH=$(python3 -c "import bcrypt; print(bcrypt.hashpw('$NETBIRD_ADMIN_PASSWORD'.encode(), bcrypt.gensalt(rounds=10)).decode())" 2>/dev/null || echo "")
fi
# Fallback to a known hash if we can't generate one
if [[ -z "$ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH" ]]; then
# This is hash of "password" - user should change it
ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH='$2a$10$2b2cU8CPhOTaGrs1HRQuAueS7JTT5ZHsHSzYiFPm1leZck7Mc8T4W'
NETBIRD_ADMIN_PASSWORD="password"
echo "Warning: Could not generate password hash. Using default password: password. Please change it in dex.yaml" > /dev/stderr
fi
cat <<EOF
# Dex configuration for NetBird
# Generated by getting-started-with-dex.sh
issuer: $NETBIRD_HTTP_PROTOCOL://$NETBIRD_DOMAIN/dex
storage:
type: sqlite3
config:
file: /var/dex/dex.db
web:
http: 0.0.0.0:5556
# gRPC API for user management (used by NetBird IDP manager)
grpc:
addr: 0.0.0.0:5557
oauth2:
skipApprovalScreen: true
# Static OAuth2 clients for NetBird
staticClients:
# Dashboard client
- id: netbird-dashboard
name: NetBird Dashboard
secret: $DEX_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_SECRET
redirectURIs:
- $NETBIRD_HTTP_PROTOCOL://$NETBIRD_DOMAIN/nb-auth
- $NETBIRD_HTTP_PROTOCOL://$NETBIRD_DOMAIN/nb-silent-auth
# CLI client (public - uses PKCE)
- id: netbird-cli
name: NetBird CLI
public: true
redirectURIs:
- http://localhost:53000/
- http://localhost:54000/
# Enable password database for static users
enablePasswordDB: true
# Static users - add more users here as needed
staticPasswords:
- email: "admin@$NETBIRD_DOMAIN"
hash: "$ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH"
username: "admin"
userID: "$(uuidgen 2>/dev/null || cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/uuid 2>/dev/null || echo "admin-user-id-001")"
# Optional: Add external identity provider connectors
# connectors:
# - type: github
# id: github
# name: GitHub
# config:
# clientID: \$GITHUB_CLIENT_ID
# clientSecret: \$GITHUB_CLIENT_SECRET
# redirectURI: $NETBIRD_HTTP_PROTOCOL://$NETBIRD_DOMAIN/dex/callback
#
# - type: ldap
# id: ldap
# name: LDAP
# config:
# host: ldap.example.com:636
# insecureNoSSL: false
# bindDN: cn=admin,dc=example,dc=com
# bindPW: admin
# userSearch:
# baseDN: ou=users,dc=example,dc=com
# filter: "(objectClass=person)"
# username: uid
# idAttr: uid
# emailAttr: mail
# nameAttr: cn
EOF
return 0
}
render_turn_server_conf() {
cat <<EOF
listening-port=3478
$TURN_EXTERNAL_IP_CONFIG
tls-listening-port=5349
min-port=$TURN_MIN_PORT
max-port=$TURN_MAX_PORT
fingerprint
lt-cred-mech
user=$TURN_USER:$TURN_PASSWORD
realm=wiretrustee.com
cert=/etc/coturn/certs/cert.pem
pkey=/etc/coturn/private/privkey.pem
log-file=stdout
no-software-attribute
pidfile="/var/tmp/turnserver.pid"
no-cli
EOF
return 0
}
render_management_json() {
cat <<EOF
{
"Stuns": [
{
"Proto": "udp",
"URI": "stun:$NETBIRD_DOMAIN:3478"
}
],
"Relay": {
"Addresses": ["$NETBIRD_RELAY_PROTO://$NETBIRD_DOMAIN:$NETBIRD_PORT"],
"CredentialsTTL": "24h",
"Secret": "$NETBIRD_RELAY_AUTH_SECRET"
},
"Signal": {
"Proto": "$NETBIRD_HTTP_PROTOCOL",
"URI": "$NETBIRD_DOMAIN:$NETBIRD_PORT"
},
"HttpConfig": {
"AuthIssuer": "$NETBIRD_HTTP_PROTOCOL://$NETBIRD_DOMAIN/dex",
"AuthAudience": "netbird-dashboard",
"OIDCConfigEndpoint": "$NETBIRD_HTTP_PROTOCOL://$NETBIRD_DOMAIN/dex/.well-known/openid-configuration"
},
"IdpManagerConfig": {
"ManagerType": "dex",
"ClientConfig": {
"Issuer": "$NETBIRD_HTTP_PROTOCOL://$NETBIRD_DOMAIN/dex"
},
"ExtraConfig": {
"GRPCAddr": "dex:5557"
}
},
"DeviceAuthorizationFlow": {
"Provider": "hosted",
"ProviderConfig": {
"Audience": "netbird-cli",
"ClientID": "netbird-cli",
"Scope": "openid profile email offline_access",
"DeviceAuthEndpoint": "$NETBIRD_HTTP_PROTOCOL://$NETBIRD_DOMAIN/dex/device/code",
"TokenEndpoint": "$NETBIRD_HTTP_PROTOCOL://$NETBIRD_DOMAIN/dex/token"
}
},
"PKCEAuthorizationFlow": {
"ProviderConfig": {
"Audience": "netbird-cli",
"ClientID": "netbird-cli",
"Scope": "openid profile email offline_access",
"RedirectURLs": ["http://localhost:53000/", "http://localhost:54000/"]
}
}
}
EOF
return 0
}
render_dashboard_env() {
cat <<EOF
# Endpoints
NETBIRD_MGMT_API_ENDPOINT=$NETBIRD_HTTP_PROTOCOL://$NETBIRD_DOMAIN
NETBIRD_MGMT_GRPC_API_ENDPOINT=$NETBIRD_HTTP_PROTOCOL://$NETBIRD_DOMAIN
# OIDC
AUTH_AUDIENCE=netbird-dashboard
AUTH_CLIENT_ID=netbird-dashboard
AUTH_CLIENT_SECRET=$DEX_DASHBOARD_CLIENT_SECRET
AUTH_AUTHORITY=$NETBIRD_HTTP_PROTOCOL://$NETBIRD_DOMAIN/dex
USE_AUTH0=false
AUTH_SUPPORTED_SCOPES=openid profile email offline_access
AUTH_REDIRECT_URI=/nb-auth
AUTH_SILENT_REDIRECT_URI=/nb-silent-auth
# SSL
NGINX_SSL_PORT=443
# Letsencrypt
LETSENCRYPT_DOMAIN=none
EOF
return 0
}
render_relay_env() {
cat <<EOF
NB_LOG_LEVEL=info
NB_LISTEN_ADDRESS=:80
NB_EXPOSED_ADDRESS=$NETBIRD_RELAY_PROTO://$NETBIRD_DOMAIN:$NETBIRD_PORT
NB_AUTH_SECRET=$NETBIRD_RELAY_AUTH_SECRET
EOF
return 0
}
render_docker_compose() {
cat <<EOF
services:
# Caddy reverse proxy
caddy:
image: caddy
container_name: netbird-caddy
restart: unless-stopped
networks: [netbird]
ports:
- '443:443'
- '443:443/udp'
- '80:80'
volumes:
- netbird_caddy_data:/data
- ./Caddyfile:/etc/caddy/Caddyfile
logging:
driver: "json-file"
options:
max-size: "500m"
max-file: "2"
# Dex - identity provider
dex:
image: ghcr.io/dexidp/dex:v2.38.0
container_name: netbird-dex
restart: unless-stopped
networks: [netbird]
volumes:
- ./dex.yaml:/etc/dex/config.docker.yaml:ro
- netbird_dex_data:/var/dex
command: ["dex", "serve", "/etc/dex/config.docker.yaml"]
logging:
driver: "json-file"
options:
max-size: "500m"
max-file: "2"
# UI dashboard
dashboard:
image: netbirdio/dashboard:latest
container_name: netbird-dashboard
restart: unless-stopped
networks: [netbird]
env_file:
- ./dashboard.env
logging:
driver: "json-file"
options:
max-size: "500m"
max-file: "2"
# Signal
signal:
image: netbirdio/signal:latest
container_name: netbird-signal
restart: unless-stopped
networks: [netbird]
logging:
driver: "json-file"
options:
max-size: "500m"
max-file: "2"
# Relay
relay:
image: netbirdio/relay:latest
container_name: netbird-relay
restart: unless-stopped
networks: [netbird]
env_file:
- ./relay.env
logging:
driver: "json-file"
options:
max-size: "500m"
max-file: "2"
# Management
management:
image: netbirdio/management:latest
container_name: netbird-management
restart: unless-stopped
networks: [netbird]
volumes:
- netbird_management:/var/lib/netbird
- ./management.json:/etc/netbird/management.json
command: [
"--port", "80",
"--log-file", "console",
"--log-level", "info",
"--disable-anonymous-metrics=false",
"--single-account-mode-domain=netbird.selfhosted",
"--dns-domain=netbird.selfhosted",
"--idp-sign-key-refresh-enabled",
]
logging:
driver: "json-file"
options:
max-size: "500m"
max-file: "2"
# Coturn, AKA TURN server
coturn:
image: coturn/coturn
container_name: netbird-coturn
restart: unless-stopped
volumes:
- ./turnserver.conf:/etc/turnserver.conf:ro
network_mode: host
command:
- -c /etc/turnserver.conf
logging:
driver: "json-file"
options:
max-size: "500m"
max-file: "2"
volumes:
netbird_caddy_data:
netbird_dex_data:
netbird_management:
networks:
netbird:
EOF
return 0
}
init_environment

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -86,17 +86,12 @@ type Manager interface {
// PolicySelectionInput is the per-request selection envelope. The
// proxy populates it from CapturedData (account, user, groups) plus
// the provider llm_router resolved and the model it extracted.
// the provider llm_router resolved.
type PolicySelectionInput struct {
AccountID string
UserID string
GroupIDs []string
ProviderID string
// Model is the already-normalised upstream model id the proxy extracted
// (parser strips Bedrock region/version, Vertex @version), so a
// case-insensitive compare suffices. Empty = undetermined → not permitted
// (fail closed).
Model string
}
// PolicySelectionResult names the policy that "pays" for this request

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import (
"fmt"
"math"
"sort"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/types"
@@ -36,10 +35,6 @@ const (
denyCodeAccountTokenCapExceeded = "llm_account.token_cap_exceeded"
//nolint:gosec // account deny code label, not a credential
denyCodeAccountBudgetCapExceeded = "llm_account.budget_cap_exceeded"
// denyCodeModelBlocked is returned when policies govern the request's
// (provider, caller-groups) but none permits the model. Matches the proxy
// guardrail's code so both layers surface the same label.
denyCodeModelBlocked = "llm_policy.model_blocked"
)
// consumptionCache holds the consumption counters prefetched for one
@@ -164,25 +159,6 @@ func (m *managerImpl) SelectPolicyForRequest(ctx context.Context, in PolicySelec
}
candidates := filterApplicablePolicies(policies, in)
// Model-allowlist gate scoped to the matched policies: keep candidates whose
// guardrails permit the model (none enabled = unrestricted), deny when
// policies apply but none permits it. Skip the load when none has a guardrail.
if len(candidates) > 0 && anyPolicyHasGuardrails(candidates) {
guardrailsByID, gErr := m.loadGuardrailsByID(ctx, in.AccountID)
if gErr != nil {
return nil, gErr
}
permitted := filterModelPermittedPolicies(candidates, guardrailsByID, in.Model)
if len(permitted) == 0 {
return &PolicySelectionResult{
Allow: false,
DenyCode: denyCodeModelBlocked,
DenyReason: modelBlockedReason(in.Model),
}, nil
}
candidates = permitted
}
// Prefetch every consumption counter the ceiling + candidate policies will
// read, in a single store round-trip, then score against the cache.
cache, err := m.prefetchConsumption(ctx, in, rules, candidates, now)
@@ -274,90 +250,6 @@ func filterApplicablePolicies(policies []*types.Policy, in PolicySelectionInput)
return out
}
// anyPolicyHasGuardrails reports whether any policy references at least one
// guardrail, so the selector can skip loading guardrails when none do.
func anyPolicyHasGuardrails(policies []*types.Policy) bool {
for _, p := range policies {
if p != nil && len(p.GuardrailIDs) > 0 {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// loadGuardrailsByID loads the account's guardrails indexed by ID. Used by the
// model-allowlist gate to resolve each candidate policy's attached guardrails.
func (m *managerImpl) loadGuardrailsByID(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (map[string]*types.Guardrail, error) {
guardrails, err := m.store.GetAccountAgentNetworkGuardrails(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, accountID)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("list account guardrails: %w", err)
}
byID := make(map[string]*types.Guardrail, len(guardrails))
for _, g := range guardrails {
if g != nil {
byID[g.ID] = g
}
}
return byID, nil
}
// filterModelPermittedPolicies returns the subset of policies whose guardrails
// permit the model. Order is preserved so downstream scoring is unaffected.
func filterModelPermittedPolicies(policies []*types.Policy, byID map[string]*types.Guardrail, model string) []*types.Policy {
out := make([]*types.Policy, 0, len(policies))
for _, p := range policies {
if policyPermitsModel(p, byID, model) {
out = append(out, p)
}
}
return out
}
// policyPermitsModel reports whether a policy permits the model. No
// allowlist-enabled guardrail = unrestricted (permits any, incl. empty);
// otherwise the model must be in the union of its allowlists, so an
// empty/undetermined model fails closed.
func policyPermitsModel(p *types.Policy, byID map[string]*types.Guardrail, model string) bool {
if p == nil {
return false
}
wanted := normaliseModelID(model)
restricted := false
for _, gID := range p.GuardrailIDs {
g, ok := byID[gID]
if !ok || g == nil || !g.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Enabled {
continue
}
restricted = true
if wanted == "" {
continue
}
for _, allowed := range g.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Models {
if normaliseModelID(allowed) == wanted {
return true
}
}
}
return !restricted
}
// normaliseModelID lowercases and trims a model identifier so the allowlist
// compare is case-insensitive and trim-tolerant. Mirrors the proxy guardrail's
// normaliseModel so both layers agree on what "same model" means.
func normaliseModelID(model string) string {
return strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(model))
}
// modelBlockedReason builds the human-readable deny reason for a model-allowlist
// rejection. The model is quoted when known; an undetermined model is reported
// as such so the access log distinguishes "wrong model" from "no model".
func modelBlockedReason(model string) string {
if normaliseModelID(model) == "" {
return "request model could not be determined for the policy allowlist"
}
return fmt.Sprintf("model %q is not permitted by any applicable policy allowlist", model)
}
// candidate is the per-policy intermediate the selector ranks. A
// policy that's been exhausted on any enabled cap never makes it
// into this slice; the selector's deny envelope carries the latest

View File

@@ -1,329 +0,0 @@
package agentnetwork
import (
"context"
"errors"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/golang/mock/gomock"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/types"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/store"
)
// guardedPolicy builds an enabled, uncapped policy that authorises sourceGroups
// to reach providerID under the given guardrails. Uncapped keeps the selector's
// headroom scoring trivial so these tests isolate the model-allowlist gate.
func guardedPolicy(id, account string, sourceGroups []string, providerID string, guardrailIDs ...string) *types.Policy {
return &types.Policy{
ID: id,
AccountID: account,
Enabled: true,
SourceGroups: sourceGroups,
DestinationProviderIDs: []string{providerID},
GuardrailIDs: guardrailIDs,
CreatedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
}
}
// allowlistGuardrail builds a guardrail whose model allowlist is enabled and
// carries the given models.
func allowlistGuardrail(id, account string, models ...string) *types.Guardrail {
return &types.Guardrail{
ID: id,
AccountID: account,
Checks: types.GuardrailChecks{
ModelAllowlist: types.GuardrailModelAllowlist{Enabled: true, Models: models},
},
}
}
func expectPolicies(mockStore *store.MockStore, account string, policies ...*types.Policy) {
mockStore.EXPECT().
GetAccountAgentNetworkPolicies(gomock.Any(), gomock.Any(), account).
Return(policies, nil)
}
func expectGuardrails(mockStore *store.MockStore, account string, guardrails ...*types.Guardrail) {
mockStore.EXPECT().
GetAccountAgentNetworkGuardrails(gomock.Any(), gomock.Any(), account).
Return(guardrails, nil)
}
// TestSelectPolicy_ModelBlockedByAllowlist proves the authoritative allowlist
// decision: a policy authorises the (provider, group) but restricts the model,
// and the requested model isn't on the list, so the request is denied.
func TestSelectPolicy_ModelBlockedByAllowlist(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1")
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1", allowlistGuardrail("g-1", "acc-1", "gpt-4o"))
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
UserID: "user-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "claude-opus-4",
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, res.Allow, "a model outside the only applicable policy's allowlist must be denied")
assert.Equal(t, denyCodeModelBlocked, res.DenyCode, "deny code must be model_blocked")
assert.NotEmpty(t, res.DenyReason, "deny reason must be populated")
}
// TestSelectPolicy_ModelAllowedByAllowlist is the allow counterpart: the model
// is on the applicable policy's allowlist, so selection proceeds normally.
func TestSelectPolicy_ModelAllowedByAllowlist(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1")
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1", allowlistGuardrail("g-1", "acc-1", "gpt-4o", "claude-opus-4"))
expectConsumptionBatch(mockStore, nil)
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
UserID: "user-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "claude-opus-4",
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, res.Allow, "a model on the applicable policy's allowlist must be allowed")
assert.Equal(t, "pol-A", res.SelectedPolicyID)
}
// TestSelectPolicy_CaseInsensitiveModelMatch proves the compare tolerates case
// and surrounding whitespace, matching the proxy guardrail's normalisation.
func TestSelectPolicy_CaseInsensitiveModelMatch(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1")
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1", allowlistGuardrail("g-1", "acc-1", " GPT-4o "))
expectConsumptionBatch(mockStore, nil)
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "gpt-4o",
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, res.Allow, "case/whitespace variants must match the allowlist entry")
}
// TestSelectPolicy_UnguardedPolicyIsUnrestricted is the false-deny fix: when two
// policies authorise the same (provider, group) and one has no guardrail, that
// policy makes the request unrestricted — not caught by the other's allowlist.
func TestSelectPolicy_UnguardedPolicyIsUnrestricted(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
restricted := guardedPolicy("pol-restricted", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1")
open := guardedPolicy("pol-open", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1") // no guardrail
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", restricted, open)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1", allowlistGuardrail("g-1", "acc-1", "gpt-4o"))
expectConsumptionBatch(mockStore, nil)
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "claude-opus-4",
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, res.Allow, "an un-guardrailed policy for the same (provider, group) must leave the request unrestricted")
assert.Equal(t, "pol-open", res.SelectedPolicyID, "the unrestricted policy must be the one that pays")
}
// TestSelectPolicy_AllowlistDoesNotLeakAcrossGroups is the false-allow fix: a
// model allowlisted only for grp-b must not be usable by a grp-a caller. The
// selector considers only policies applicable to the caller's groups.
func TestSelectPolicy_AllowlistDoesNotLeakAcrossGroups(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
polA := guardedPolicy("pol-a", "acc-1", []string{"grp-a"}, "prov-1", "g-a")
polB := guardedPolicy("pol-b", "acc-1", []string{"grp-b"}, "prov-1", "g-b")
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", polA, polB)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1",
allowlistGuardrail("g-a", "acc-1", "gpt-4o"),
allowlistGuardrail("g-b", "acc-1", "claude-opus-4"),
)
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-a"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "claude-opus-4", // only allowed for grp-b
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, res.Allow, "grp-b's allowlisted model must not leak to a grp-a caller")
assert.Equal(t, denyCodeModelBlocked, res.DenyCode)
}
// TestSelectPolicy_UndeterminedModelFailsClosed proves the fail-closed contract
// mirrors the proxy: with a restricted applicable policy and an empty model
// (e.g. a path-routed shape the parser couldn't map), the request is denied.
func TestSelectPolicy_UndeterminedModelFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1")
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1", allowlistGuardrail("g-1", "acc-1", "gpt-4o"))
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "", // undetermined
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, res.Allow, "an undetermined model must fail closed against a restricted policy")
assert.Equal(t, denyCodeModelBlocked, res.DenyCode)
}
// TestSelectPolicy_DisabledAllowlistDoesNotRestrict proves a guardrail whose
// model allowlist is disabled imposes no model restriction, even though the
// policy references it.
func TestSelectPolicy_DisabledAllowlistDoesNotRestrict(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1")
disabled := &types.Guardrail{
ID: "g-1",
AccountID: "acc-1",
Checks: types.GuardrailChecks{
ModelAllowlist: types.GuardrailModelAllowlist{Enabled: false, Models: []string{"gpt-4o"}},
},
}
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1", disabled)
expectConsumptionBatch(mockStore, nil)
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "anything-goes",
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, res.Allow, "a disabled allowlist must not restrict the model")
assert.Equal(t, "pol-A", res.SelectedPolicyID)
}
// TestSelectPolicy_UnionAcrossPolicyGuardrails proves a policy with multiple
// allowlist guardrails permits the union of their models (not just the first).
func TestSelectPolicy_UnionAcrossPolicyGuardrails(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1", "g-2")
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1",
allowlistGuardrail("g-1", "acc-1", "gpt-4o"),
allowlistGuardrail("g-2", "acc-1", "claude-opus-4"),
)
expectConsumptionBatch(mockStore, nil)
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "claude-opus-4", // only in the second guardrail's list
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, res.Allow, "a model in any of the policy's allowlist guardrails must be permitted")
assert.Equal(t, "pol-A", res.SelectedPolicyID)
}
// TestSelectPolicy_GuardrailLookupErrorPropagates proves a store failure while
// resolving the candidate policies' guardrails surfaces as an error, not a
// silent allow/deny.
func TestSelectPolicy_GuardrailLookupErrorPropagates(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1")
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
mockStore.EXPECT().
GetAccountAgentNetworkGuardrails(gomock.Any(), gomock.Any(), "acc-1").
Return(nil, errors.New("store unavailable"))
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "gpt-4o",
})
require.Error(t, err, "a guardrail-lookup failure must surface as an error")
assert.Nil(t, res)
}
// TestSelectPolicy_MissingGuardrailReferenceTreatedAsUnrestricted proves a
// policy referencing a guardrail ID absent from the account's set (a stale
// reference) imposes no model restriction — same as no guardrail.
func TestSelectPolicy_MissingGuardrailReferenceTreatedAsUnrestricted(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-missing")
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1")
expectConsumptionBatch(mockStore, nil)
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "anything-goes",
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, res.Allow, "an orphaned guardrail reference must not restrict the model")
assert.Equal(t, "pol-A", res.SelectedPolicyID)
}
// TestSelectPolicy_PartialCandidatesPermittedAfterModelFilter proves the model
// gate narrows candidates before cap scoring: the permitting policy is selected
// even though the blocked one has a larger, more attractive cap.
func TestSelectPolicy_PartialCandidatesPermittedAfterModelFilter(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
polBig := guardedPolicy("pol-big", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-restrict")
polBig.Limits = types.PolicyLimits{
TokenLimit: types.PolicyTokenLimit{Enabled: true, GroupCap: 1_000_000, WindowSeconds: 3600},
}
polSmall := guardedPolicy("pol-small", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-permit")
polSmall.Limits = types.PolicyLimits{
TokenLimit: types.PolicyTokenLimit{Enabled: true, GroupCap: 100, WindowSeconds: 3600},
}
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", polBig, polSmall)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1",
allowlistGuardrail("g-restrict", "acc-1", "gpt-4o"),
allowlistGuardrail("g-permit", "acc-1", "claude-opus-4"),
)
expectConsumptionBatch(mockStore, nil)
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "claude-opus-4", // only pol-small's guardrail permits this
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, res.Allow)
assert.Equal(t, "pol-small", res.SelectedPolicyID,
"the model filter must exclude pol-big before cap scoring")
}

View File

@@ -235,12 +235,7 @@ func SynthesizeServices(ctx context.Context, s store.Store, accountID string) ([
mergedGuardrails := mergeGuardrails(enabledPolicies, guardrailsByID)
applyAccountCollectionControls(&mergedGuardrails, settings)
// The proxy guardrail is a per-provider fail-closed backstop; the
// authoritative per-policy/group decision is management's
// SelectPolicyForRequest. A provider lands in this map only when every
// authorising policy restricts models.
providerAllowlists := buildProviderAllowlists(enabledPolicies, guardrailsByID)
guardrailJSON, err := marshalGuardrailConfig(providerAllowlists, mergedGuardrails.PromptCapture)
guardrailJSON, err := marshalGuardrailConfig(mergedGuardrails)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -785,12 +780,10 @@ func buildMiddlewareChain(routerCfgJSON, identityInjectJSON, guardrailJSON []byt
// guardrailConfig is the JSON shape the proxy-side llm_guardrail
// middleware expects. Mirrors the proxy registration documented in
// the management→proxy contract. provider_allowlists is keyed by the
// resolved provider id llm_router stamps; a provider absent from the map is
// unrestricted at the proxy layer.
// the management→proxy contract.
type guardrailConfig struct {
ProviderAllowlists map[string][]string `json:"provider_allowlists,omitempty"`
PromptCapture guardrailPromptCapture `json:"prompt_capture"`
ModelAllowlist []string `json:"model_allowlist,omitempty"`
PromptCapture guardrailPromptCapture `json:"prompt_capture"`
}
type guardrailPromptCapture struct {
@@ -835,10 +828,13 @@ func applyAccountCollectionControls(merged *MergedGuardrails, settings *types.Se
merged.PromptCapture.RedactPii = settings.RedactPii || merged.PromptCapture.RedactPii
}
func marshalGuardrailConfig(providerAllowlists map[string][]string, capture MergedPromptCapture) ([]byte, error) {
func marshalGuardrailConfig(merged MergedGuardrails) ([]byte, error) {
cfg := guardrailConfig{
ProviderAllowlists: providerAllowlists,
PromptCapture: guardrailPromptCapture(capture),
ModelAllowlist: merged.ModelAllowlist,
PromptCapture: guardrailPromptCapture{
Enabled: merged.PromptCapture.Enabled,
RedactPii: merged.PromptCapture.RedactPii,
},
}
out, err := json.Marshal(cfg)
if err != nil {
@@ -847,74 +843,6 @@ func marshalGuardrailConfig(providerAllowlists map[string][]string, capture Merg
return out, nil
}
// buildProviderAllowlists returns the proxy's per-provider backstop: a provider
// is included only when every authorising policy restricts models (their union);
// if any leaves it unrestricted it is omitted, so management decides per group.
func buildProviderAllowlists(policies []*types.Policy, byID map[string]*types.Guardrail) map[string][]string {
type providerAcc struct {
models map[string]struct{}
anyUnrestricted bool
}
accs := make(map[string]*providerAcc)
for _, p := range policies {
if p == nil {
continue
}
restricted, models := policyModelAllowlist(p, byID)
for _, providerID := range p.DestinationProviderIDs {
if providerID == "" {
continue
}
acc, ok := accs[providerID]
if !ok {
acc = &providerAcc{models: make(map[string]struct{})}
accs[providerID] = acc
}
if !restricted {
acc.anyUnrestricted = true
continue
}
for _, m := range models {
acc.models[m] = struct{}{}
}
}
}
out := make(map[string][]string, len(accs))
for providerID, acc := range accs {
if acc.anyUnrestricted {
continue
}
models := make([]string, 0, len(acc.models))
for m := range acc.models {
models = append(models, m)
}
sort.Strings(models)
out[providerID] = models
}
return out
}
// policyModelAllowlist reports whether a policy restricts models (has an
// allowlist-enabled guardrail) and the union of allowed models. Models are
// verbatim; the proxy factory lowercases/trims them at decode time.
func policyModelAllowlist(p *types.Policy, byID map[string]*types.Guardrail) (bool, []string) {
restricted := false
var models []string
for _, gID := range p.GuardrailIDs {
g, ok := byID[gID]
if !ok || g == nil || !g.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Enabled {
continue
}
restricted = true
for _, m := range g.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Models {
if m != "" {
models = append(models, m)
}
}
}
return restricted, models
}
// buildAccountService composes the per-account gateway Service. The
// target carries the noop placeholder URL — the router middleware
// rewrites every request to the matched provider's upstream before the
@@ -1058,11 +986,38 @@ func unionSourceGroups(policies []*types.Policy) []string {
return out
}
// MergedGuardrails is the synthesiser's fold target. Only prompt capture is
// merged here — the model allowlist is emitted per-provider, and
// token/budget/retention moved onto Policy.Limits and account Settings.
// MergedGuardrails is the JSON shape passed to the proxy via the
// guardrail middleware's config_json. Mirrors the proxy-side
// expectations and is intentionally distinct from
// types.GuardrailChecks so we can evolve either side independently.
type MergedGuardrails struct {
PromptCapture MergedPromptCapture
ModelAllowlist []string `json:"model_allowlist,omitempty"`
TokenLimits MergedTokenLimits `json:"token_limits"`
Budget MergedBudget `json:"budget"`
PromptCapture MergedPromptCapture `json:"prompt_capture"`
Retention MergedRetention `json:"retention"`
}
type MergedTokenLimits struct {
Hourly *MergedTokenWindow `json:"hourly,omitempty"`
Daily *MergedTokenWindow `json:"daily,omitempty"`
Monthly *MergedTokenWindow `json:"monthly,omitempty"`
}
type MergedTokenWindow struct {
MaxInputTokens int `json:"max_input_tokens,omitempty"`
MaxOutputTokens int `json:"max_output_tokens,omitempty"`
}
type MergedBudget struct {
Hourly *MergedBudgetWindow `json:"hourly,omitempty"`
Daily *MergedBudgetWindow `json:"daily,omitempty"`
Monthly *MergedBudgetWindow `json:"monthly,omitempty"`
}
type MergedBudgetWindow struct {
SoftCapUSD float64 `json:"soft_cap_usd,omitempty"`
HardCapUSD float64 `json:"hard_cap_usd,omitempty"`
}
type MergedPromptCapture struct {
@@ -1070,31 +1025,64 @@ type MergedPromptCapture struct {
RedactPii bool `json:"redact_pii"`
}
// mergeGuardrails folds the referencing policies' guardrails into the
// prompt-capture decision only. The model allowlist is enforced per-policy/group
// in management and shipped per-provider; token/budget/retention live off
// guardrails now.
type MergedRetention struct {
Enabled bool `json:"enabled"`
Days int `json:"days"`
}
// mergeGuardrails computes the effective guardrail spec applied at the
// proxy, given the referencing policies and the account's guardrail
// catalogue. Policy enabled-ness is the caller's responsibility — only
// enabled policies should be passed in.
//
// Merge rule — prompt capture: enabled if any policy enables it; redact_pii
// sticks if any enabling policy turns it on.
// Merge rules:
// - Model allowlist: union of allowlists across policies that enable it.
// - Token / Budget: most-restrictive (min of non-zero caps) per window.
// - Prompt capture: enabled if any policy enables it; redact_pii sticks
// if any enabling policy turns it on.
// - Retention: enabled if any enables it; smallest non-zero days wins.
func mergeGuardrails(policies []*types.Policy, byID map[string]*types.Guardrail) MergedGuardrails {
merged := MergedGuardrails{}
allowlist := make(map[string]struct{})
allowlistEnabled := false
for _, policy := range policies {
for _, gID := range policy.GuardrailIDs {
g, ok := byID[gID]
if !ok || g == nil {
continue
}
mergeGuardrail(g, &merged)
mergeGuardrail(g, &merged, allowlist, &allowlistEnabled)
}
}
if allowlistEnabled {
merged.ModelAllowlist = make([]string, 0, len(allowlist))
for m := range allowlist {
merged.ModelAllowlist = append(merged.ModelAllowlist, m)
}
sort.Strings(merged.ModelAllowlist)
}
return merged
}
// mergeGuardrail folds a single guardrail's prompt-capture settings into the
// running merge: enabled / redact-pii stick once any enabling guardrail turns
// them on.
func mergeGuardrail(g *types.Guardrail, merged *MergedGuardrails) {
// mergeGuardrail folds a single guardrail's enabled checks into the
// running merge: model-allowlist models join the shared set (and flip
// allowlistEnabled), and prompt-capture / redact-pii stick once any
// enabling guardrail turns them on.
//
// TokenLimits, Budget, and Retention have moved off guardrails — token
// and budget caps now live on the Policy itself (Policy.Limits) and
// retention moves to account-level Settings — so they are not merged here.
func mergeGuardrail(g *types.Guardrail, merged *MergedGuardrails, allowlist map[string]struct{}, allowlistEnabled *bool) {
if g.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Enabled {
*allowlistEnabled = true
for _, m := range g.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Models {
if m != "" {
allowlist[m] = struct{}{}
}
}
}
if g.Checks.PromptCapture.Enabled {
merged.PromptCapture.Enabled = true
if g.Checks.PromptCapture.RedactPii {

View File

@@ -81,8 +81,8 @@ func TestSynthesizeServices_RealStore_PromptCaptureAccountIsSoleControl(t *testi
require.Len(t, services, 1)
cfg := decodeServiceGuardrailConfig(t, services[0])
assert.Equal(t, map[string][]string{"prov-1": {"gpt-5.4"}}, cfg.ProviderAllowlists,
"model allowlist is a pure policy guardrail and must reach the per-provider config")
assert.Equal(t, []string{"gpt-5.4"}, cfg.ModelAllowlist,
"model allowlist is a pure policy guardrail and must always reach the config")
assert.False(t, cfg.PromptCapture.Enabled,
"prompt capture must be off when the account toggle is off, even with a capture-enabled guardrail")
}
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ func TestSynthesizeServices_RealStore_NoGuardrail_CaptureOff(t *testing.T) {
require.Len(t, services, 1, "exactly one synth service expected")
cfg := decodeServiceGuardrailConfig(t, services[0])
assert.Empty(t, cfg.ProviderAllowlists, "no guardrail → provider unrestricted (absent from map)")
assert.Empty(t, cfg.ModelAllowlist, "no guardrail → no allowlist")
assert.False(t, cfg.PromptCapture.Enabled, "no guardrail → prompt capture off by default")
assert.False(t, cfg.PromptCapture.RedactPii, "no guardrail → redact off by default")
}

View File

@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
package agentnetwork
import (
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/types"
)
// policyForProviders builds an enabled policy authorising the given providers
// under the given guardrails (both optional). Groups are irrelevant to
// buildProviderAllowlists, which keys purely on destination provider.
func policyForProviders(id string, guardrailIDs []string, providerIDs ...string) *types.Policy {
return &types.Policy{
ID: id,
Enabled: true,
DestinationProviderIDs: providerIDs,
GuardrailIDs: guardrailIDs,
}
}
func TestBuildProviderAllowlists(t *testing.T) {
byID := map[string]*types.Guardrail{
"g-4o": allowlistGuardrail("g-4o", "acc-1", "gpt-4o"),
"g-opus": allowlistGuardrail("g-opus", "acc-1", "claude-opus-4"),
"g-disabled": {ID: "g-disabled", Checks: types.GuardrailChecks{ModelAllowlist: types.GuardrailModelAllowlist{Enabled: false, Models: []string{"gpt-4o"}}}},
}
t.Run("all authorising policies restrict yields per-provider union", func(t *testing.T) {
policies := []*types.Policy{
policyForProviders("p1", []string{"g-4o"}, "prov-x"),
policyForProviders("p2", []string{"g-opus"}, "prov-x"),
}
got := buildProviderAllowlists(policies, byID)
assert.Equal(t, map[string][]string{"prov-x": {"claude-opus-4", "gpt-4o"}}, got,
"a provider every policy restricts carries the sorted union of their models")
})
t.Run("any un-guardrailed policy leaves the provider unrestricted (omitted)", func(t *testing.T) {
policies := []*types.Policy{
policyForProviders("p1", []string{"g-4o"}, "prov-x"),
policyForProviders("p2", nil, "prov-x"), // no guardrail
}
got := buildProviderAllowlists(policies, byID)
assert.NotContains(t, got, "prov-x",
"a provider reachable by an un-guardrailed policy must be omitted so the proxy treats it as unrestricted")
})
t.Run("a disabled allowlist counts as unrestricted", func(t *testing.T) {
policies := []*types.Policy{
policyForProviders("p1", []string{"g-disabled"}, "prov-x"),
}
got := buildProviderAllowlists(policies, byID)
assert.NotContains(t, got, "prov-x",
"a policy whose only guardrail has a disabled allowlist is unrestricted")
})
t.Run("providers are isolated from one another", func(t *testing.T) {
policies := []*types.Policy{
policyForProviders("p1", []string{"g-4o"}, "prov-x"),
policyForProviders("p2", []string{"g-opus"}, "prov-y"),
}
got := buildProviderAllowlists(policies, byID)
assert.Equal(t, []string{"gpt-4o"}, got["prov-x"], "prov-x keeps only its own model")
assert.Equal(t, []string{"claude-opus-4"}, got["prov-y"], "prov-y keeps only its own model")
})
t.Run("one policy authorising two providers restricts both", func(t *testing.T) {
policies := []*types.Policy{
policyForProviders("p1", []string{"g-4o"}, "prov-x", "prov-y"),
}
got := buildProviderAllowlists(policies, byID)
assert.Equal(t, []string{"gpt-4o"}, got["prov-x"])
assert.Equal(t, []string{"gpt-4o"}, got["prov-y"])
})
t.Run("union across a single policy's guardrails", func(t *testing.T) {
policies := []*types.Policy{
policyForProviders("p1", []string{"g-4o", "g-opus"}, "prov-x"),
}
got := buildProviderAllowlists(policies, byID)
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []string{"claude-opus-4", "gpt-4o"}, got["prov-x"],
"a policy's own multiple allowlist guardrails union together")
})
t.Run("an enabled allowlist with no models denies everything", func(t *testing.T) {
empty := map[string]*types.Guardrail{"g-empty": allowlistGuardrail("g-empty", "acc-1")}
got := buildProviderAllowlists([]*types.Policy{
policyForProviders("p1", []string{"g-empty"}, "prov-x"),
}, empty)
assert.Equal(t, map[string][]string{"prov-x": {}}, got,
"an enabled-but-empty allowlist is restricted with an empty set, not unrestricted")
})
}

View File

@@ -1031,12 +1031,8 @@ func TestSynthesizeServices_GuardrailMerge_AllowlistUnion_LimitsRestrictive(t *t
var cfg guardrailConfig
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(guardrailJSON, &cfg), "guardrail config must unmarshal cleanly")
// Both policies restrict the same provider, so the per-provider backstop
// carries the union of their models — a coarse gate that management's
// per-policy/group check narrows; it only blocks models outside the union
// when management is down.
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []string{"gpt-5.4-mini", "gpt-5.4-pro"}, cfg.ProviderAllowlists["prov-1"],
"per-provider allowlist union must keep both models")
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []string{"gpt-5.4-mini", "gpt-5.4-pro"}, cfg.ModelAllowlist,
"model allowlist union must keep both models")
}
func TestSynthesizeServices_BackfillsMissingSessionKeys(t *testing.T) {

View File

@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ func ToComponentSyncResponse(
// TODO (dmitri) consider using invariants?
//
enableSSH := computeSSHEnabledForPeer(components, peer)
peerConfig := toPeerConfig(peer, components.Network, dnsName, settings, httpConfig, deviceFlowConfig, enableSSH, components.ForceRoutingPeerDNSResolution)
peerConfig := toPeerConfig(peer, components.Network, dnsName, settings, httpConfig, deviceFlowConfig, enableSSH)
includeIPv6 := peer.SupportsIPv6() && peer.IPv6.IsValid()
useSourcePrefixes := peer.SupportsSourcePrefixes()

View File

@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ func toNetbirdConfig(config *nbconfig.Config, turnCredentials *Token, relayToken
return nbConfig
}
func toPeerConfig(peer *nbpeer.Peer, network *types.Network, dnsName string, settings *types.Settings, httpConfig *nbconfig.HttpServerConfig, deviceFlowConfig *nbconfig.DeviceAuthorizationFlow, enableSSH bool, forceRoutingPeerDNS bool) *proto.PeerConfig {
func toPeerConfig(peer *nbpeer.Peer, network *types.Network, dnsName string, settings *types.Settings, httpConfig *nbconfig.HttpServerConfig, deviceFlowConfig *nbconfig.DeviceAuthorizationFlow, enableSSH bool) *proto.PeerConfig {
netmask, _ := network.Net.Mask.Size()
fqdn := peer.FQDN(dnsName)
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ func toPeerConfig(peer *nbpeer.Peer, network *types.Network, dnsName string, set
Address: fmt.Sprintf("%s/%d", peer.IP.String(), netmask),
SshConfig: sshConfig,
Fqdn: fqdn,
RoutingPeerDnsResolutionEnabled: settings.RoutingPeerDNSResolutionEnabled || peer.ProxyMeta.Embedded || forceRoutingPeerDNS,
RoutingPeerDnsResolutionEnabled: settings.RoutingPeerDNSResolutionEnabled,
LazyConnectionEnabled: settings.LazyConnectionEnabled,
AutoUpdate: &proto.AutoUpdateSettings{
Version: settings.AutoUpdateVersion,
@@ -162,12 +162,12 @@ func ToSyncResponse(ctx context.Context, config *nbconfig.Config, httpConfig *nb
useSourcePrefixes := peer.SupportsSourcePrefixes()
response := &proto.SyncResponse{
PeerConfig: toPeerConfig(peer, networkMap.Network, dnsName, settings, httpConfig, deviceFlowConfig, networkMap.EnableSSH, networkMap.ForceRoutingPeerDNSResolution),
PeerConfig: toPeerConfig(peer, networkMap.Network, dnsName, settings, httpConfig, deviceFlowConfig, networkMap.EnableSSH),
NetworkMap: &proto.NetworkMap{
Serial: networkMap.Network.CurrentSerial(),
Routes: networkmap.ToProtocolRoutes(networkMap.Routes),
DNSConfig: networkmap.ToProtocolDNSConfig(networkMap.DNSConfig, dnsCache, dnsFwdPort),
PeerConfig: toPeerConfig(peer, networkMap.Network, dnsName, settings, httpConfig, deviceFlowConfig, networkMap.EnableSSH, networkMap.ForceRoutingPeerDNSResolution),
PeerConfig: toPeerConfig(peer, networkMap.Network, dnsName, settings, httpConfig, deviceFlowConfig, networkMap.EnableSSH),
},
Checks: toProtocolChecks(ctx, checks),
}

View File

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package grpc
import (
"fmt"
"net"
"net/netip"
"reflect"
"testing"
@@ -15,7 +14,6 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/controllers/network_map"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/controllers/network_map/controller/cache"
nbconfig "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/server/config"
nbpeer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/networkmap"
)
@@ -303,35 +301,3 @@ func TestToNetbirdConfig_RelayInvariant(t *testing.T) {
assert.True(t, nbCfg.Metrics.Enabled, "metrics flag should carry the settings value")
})
}
func TestToPeerConfig_RoutingPeerDNSResolution(t *testing.T) {
network := &types.Network{Net: net.IPNet{IP: net.IPv4(100, 0, 0, 0), Mask: net.CIDRMask(8, 32)}}
newPeer := func(embedded bool) *nbpeer.Peer {
p := &nbpeer.Peer{IP: netip.MustParseAddr("100.0.0.1")}
p.ProxyMeta.Embedded = embedded
return p
}
tests := []struct {
name string
globalFlag bool
embedded bool
forceParam bool
wantEnabled bool
}{
{name: "global off, regular peer, no force", wantEnabled: false},
{name: "global on wins", globalFlag: true, wantEnabled: true},
{name: "embedded proxy peer forced", embedded: true, wantEnabled: true},
{name: "routing peer forced via param", forceParam: true, wantEnabled: true},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
settings := &types.Settings{RoutingPeerDNSResolutionEnabled: tt.globalFlag}
cfg := toPeerConfig(newPeer(tt.embedded), network, "netbird.selfhosted", settings, nil, nil, false, tt.forceParam)
assert.Equal(t, tt.wantEnabled, cfg.RoutingPeerDnsResolutionEnabled,
"RoutingPeerDnsResolutionEnabled should reflect global || embedded || forced")
})
}
}

View File

@@ -285,7 +285,6 @@ func (s *ProxyServiceServer) CheckLLMPolicyLimits(ctx context.Context, req *prot
UserID: req.GetUserId(),
GroupIDs: req.GetGroupIds(),
ProviderID: req.GetProviderId(),
Model: req.GetModel(),
})
if err != nil {
log.WithContext(ctx).Errorf("select policy for request: %v", err)

View File

@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
package grpc
import (
"context"
"errors"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
grpcstatus "google.golang.org/grpc/status"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
)
// fakeAgentNetworkLimits records the PolicySelectionInput it was invoked with
// and returns a pre-programmed result, so tests can assert what the handler
// forwards to the selector.
type fakeAgentNetworkLimits struct {
gotInput agentnetwork.PolicySelectionInput
result *agentnetwork.PolicySelectionResult
err error
}
func (f *fakeAgentNetworkLimits) SelectPolicyForRequest(_ context.Context, in agentnetwork.PolicySelectionInput) (*agentnetwork.PolicySelectionResult, error) {
f.gotInput = in
if f.err != nil {
return nil, f.err
}
return f.result, nil
}
func (f *fakeAgentNetworkLimits) RecordUsage(_ context.Context, _ agentnetwork.RecordUsageInput) error {
return nil
}
// TestCheckLLMPolicyLimits_ForwardsModelToSelector proves the wiring added here:
// the model the proxy extracted must reach the selector's Model unchanged,
// alongside the account/user/group/provider fields.
func TestCheckLLMPolicyLimits_ForwardsModelToSelector(t *testing.T) {
fake := &fakeAgentNetworkLimits{result: &agentnetwork.PolicySelectionResult{Allow: true, SelectedPolicyID: "pol-1"}}
s := &ProxyServiceServer{}
s.SetAgentNetworkLimitsService(fake)
req := &proto.CheckLLMPolicyLimitsRequest{
AccountId: "acc-1",
UserId: "user-1",
GroupIds: []string{"grp-a", "grp-b"},
ProviderId: "prov-1",
Model: "claude-opus-4",
}
resp, err := s.CheckLLMPolicyLimits(context.Background(), req)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, resp)
assert.Equal(t, "acc-1", fake.gotInput.AccountID)
assert.Equal(t, "user-1", fake.gotInput.UserID)
assert.Equal(t, []string{"grp-a", "grp-b"}, fake.gotInput.GroupIDs)
assert.Equal(t, "prov-1", fake.gotInput.ProviderID)
assert.Equal(t, "claude-opus-4", fake.gotInput.Model,
"the request's model must be forwarded to the selector")
}
// TestCheckLLMPolicyLimits_EmptyModelForwardedAsEmpty proves an undetermined
// model (empty string) is forwarded as-is; the selector decides how to treat it.
func TestCheckLLMPolicyLimits_EmptyModelForwardedAsEmpty(t *testing.T) {
fake := &fakeAgentNetworkLimits{result: &agentnetwork.PolicySelectionResult{Allow: true}}
s := &ProxyServiceServer{}
s.SetAgentNetworkLimitsService(fake)
req := &proto.CheckLLMPolicyLimitsRequest{
AccountId: "acc-1",
ProviderId: "prov-1",
}
_, err := s.CheckLLMPolicyLimits(context.Background(), req)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, "", fake.gotInput.Model, "an absent model must be forwarded as empty, not fabricated")
}
// TestCheckLLMPolicyLimits_DenyResponseCarriesModelBlockedCode proves the deny
// envelope surfaces the model-allowlist deny code + reason through the response.
func TestCheckLLMPolicyLimits_DenyResponseCarriesModelBlockedCode(t *testing.T) {
fake := &fakeAgentNetworkLimits{result: &agentnetwork.PolicySelectionResult{
Allow: false,
DenyCode: "llm_policy.model_blocked",
DenyReason: `model "claude-opus-4" is not permitted by any applicable policy allowlist`,
}}
s := &ProxyServiceServer{}
s.SetAgentNetworkLimitsService(fake)
resp, err := s.CheckLLMPolicyLimits(context.Background(), &proto.CheckLLMPolicyLimitsRequest{
AccountId: "acc-1",
ProviderId: "prov-1",
Model: "claude-opus-4",
})
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, resp)
assert.Equal(t, "deny", resp.Decision)
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_blocked", resp.DenyCode)
assert.NotEmpty(t, resp.DenyReason)
assert.Empty(t, resp.SelectedPolicyId, "a denied request must carry no selected policy")
}
// TestCheckLLMPolicyLimits_SelectorErrorSurfacesAsInternal proves a selector
// failure surfaces as an Internal gRPC error rather than a silent allow.
func TestCheckLLMPolicyLimits_SelectorErrorSurfacesAsInternal(t *testing.T) {
fake := &fakeAgentNetworkLimits{err: errors.New("boom")}
s := &ProxyServiceServer{}
s.SetAgentNetworkLimitsService(fake)
_, err := s.CheckLLMPolicyLimits(context.Background(), &proto.CheckLLMPolicyLimitsRequest{
AccountId: "acc-1",
ProviderId: "prov-1",
Model: "gpt-4o",
})
require.Error(t, err)
st, ok := grpcstatus.FromError(err)
require.True(t, ok)
assert.Equal(t, codes.Internal, st.Code(), "selector errors must never fail open on the hot path")
}
// TestCheckLLMPolicyLimits_UnconfiguredServiceReturnsUnimplemented locks the
// fallback: with no limits service wired the RPC returns Unimplemented.
func TestCheckLLMPolicyLimits_UnconfiguredServiceReturnsUnimplemented(t *testing.T) {
s := &ProxyServiceServer{}
_, err := s.CheckLLMPolicyLimits(context.Background(), &proto.CheckLLMPolicyLimitsRequest{
AccountId: "acc-1",
ProviderId: "prov-1",
})
require.Error(t, err)
st, ok := grpcstatus.FromError(err)
require.True(t, ok)
assert.Equal(t, codes.Unimplemented, st.Code())
}

View File

@@ -921,7 +921,7 @@ func (s *Server) prepareLoginResponse(ctx context.Context, peer *nbpeer.Peer, ne
// if peer has reached this point then it has logged in
loginResp := &proto.LoginResponse{
NetbirdConfig: toNetbirdConfig(s.config, nil, relayToken, nil, settings),
PeerConfig: toPeerConfig(peer, network, s.networkMapController.GetDNSDomain(settings), settings, s.config.HttpConfig, s.config.DeviceAuthorizationFlow, enableSSH, false),
PeerConfig: toPeerConfig(peer, network, s.networkMapController.GetDNSDomain(settings), settings, s.config.HttpConfig, s.config.DeviceAuthorizationFlow, enableSSH),
Checks: toProtocolChecks(ctx, postureChecks),
}

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"math"
"net"
"net/netip"
"net/url"
@@ -2259,30 +2258,117 @@ func (s *SqlStore) getPostureChecks(ctx context.Context, accountID string) ([]*p
return checks, nil
}
// serviceSelectColumns and targetSelectColumns are the column lists the Postgres
// pgx read path scans. They must stay in sync with the rpservice.Service and
// rpservice.Target gorm models; TestPgxServiceColumnsMatchGorm enforces this.
const serviceSelectColumns = `id, account_id, name, domain, enabled, auth, restrictions,
meta_created_at, meta_certificate_issued_at, meta_last_renewed_at, meta_status, proxy_cluster,
pass_host_header, rewrite_redirects, session_private_key, session_public_key,
mode, listen_port, port_auto_assigned, source, source_peer, terminated,
private, access_groups`
const targetSelectColumns = `id, account_id, service_id, path, host, port, protocol,
target_id, target_type, enabled, proxy_protocol,
skip_tls_verify, request_timeout, session_idle_timeout, path_rewrite, custom_headers,
direct_upstream, middlewares, capture_max_request_bytes, capture_max_response_bytes,
capture_content_types, agent_network, disable_access_log`
func (s *SqlStore) getServices(ctx context.Context, accountID string) ([]*rpservice.Service, error) {
const serviceQuery = `SELECT ` + serviceSelectColumns + ` FROM services WHERE account_id = $1`
const serviceQuery = `SELECT id, account_id, name, domain, enabled, auth,
meta_created_at, meta_certificate_issued_at, meta_status, proxy_cluster,
pass_host_header, rewrite_redirects, session_private_key, session_public_key,
mode, listen_port, port_auto_assigned, source, source_peer, terminated,
private, access_groups
FROM services WHERE account_id = $1`
const targetsQuery = `SELECT id, account_id, service_id, path, host, port, protocol,
target_id, target_type, enabled
FROM targets WHERE service_id = ANY($1)`
serviceRows, err := s.pool.Query(ctx, serviceQuery, accountID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
services, err := pgx.CollectRows(serviceRows, scanService)
services, err := pgx.CollectRows(serviceRows, func(row pgx.CollectableRow) (*rpservice.Service, error) {
var s rpservice.Service
var auth []byte
var accessGroups []byte
var createdAt, certIssuedAt sql.NullTime
var status, proxyCluster, sessionPrivateKey, sessionPublicKey sql.NullString
var mode, source, sourcePeer sql.NullString
var terminated, portAutoAssigned, private sql.NullBool
var listenPort sql.NullInt64
err := row.Scan(
&s.ID,
&s.AccountID,
&s.Name,
&s.Domain,
&s.Enabled,
&auth,
&createdAt,
&certIssuedAt,
&status,
&proxyCluster,
&s.PassHostHeader,
&s.RewriteRedirects,
&sessionPrivateKey,
&sessionPublicKey,
&mode,
&listenPort,
&portAutoAssigned,
&source,
&sourcePeer,
&terminated,
&private,
&accessGroups,
)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if auth != nil {
if err := json.Unmarshal(auth, &s.Auth); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
if len(accessGroups) > 0 {
if err := json.Unmarshal(accessGroups, &s.AccessGroups); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unmarshal access_groups: %w", err)
}
}
if private.Valid {
s.Private = private.Bool
}
s.Meta = rpservice.Meta{}
if createdAt.Valid {
s.Meta.CreatedAt = createdAt.Time
}
if certIssuedAt.Valid {
t := certIssuedAt.Time
s.Meta.CertificateIssuedAt = &t
}
if status.Valid {
s.Meta.Status = status.String
}
if proxyCluster.Valid {
s.ProxyCluster = proxyCluster.String
}
if sessionPrivateKey.Valid {
s.SessionPrivateKey = sessionPrivateKey.String
}
if sessionPublicKey.Valid {
s.SessionPublicKey = sessionPublicKey.String
}
if mode.Valid {
s.Mode = mode.String
}
if source.Valid {
s.Source = source.String
}
if sourcePeer.Valid {
s.SourcePeer = sourcePeer.String
}
if terminated.Valid {
s.Terminated = terminated.Bool
}
if portAutoAssigned.Valid {
s.PortAutoAssigned = portAutoAssigned.Bool
}
if listenPort.Valid {
s.ListenPort = uint16(listenPort.Int64)
}
s.Targets = []*rpservice.Target{}
return &s, nil
})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -2293,12 +2379,39 @@ func (s *SqlStore) getServices(ctx context.Context, accountID string) ([]*rpserv
serviceIDs := make([]string, len(services))
serviceMap := make(map[string]*rpservice.Service)
for i, svc := range services {
serviceIDs[i] = svc.ID
serviceMap[svc.ID] = svc
for i, s := range services {
serviceIDs[i] = s.ID
serviceMap[s.ID] = s
}
targets, err := s.getServiceTargets(ctx, serviceIDs)
targetRows, err := s.pool.Query(ctx, targetsQuery, serviceIDs)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
targets, err := pgx.CollectRows(targetRows, func(row pgx.CollectableRow) (*rpservice.Target, error) {
var t rpservice.Target
var path sql.NullString
err := row.Scan(
&t.ID,
&t.AccountID,
&t.ServiceID,
&path,
&t.Host,
&t.Port,
&t.Protocol,
&t.TargetId,
&t.TargetType,
&t.Enabled,
)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if path.Valid {
t.Path = &path.String
}
return &t, nil
})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -2312,201 +2425,6 @@ func (s *SqlStore) getServices(ctx context.Context, accountID string) ([]*rpserv
return services, nil
}
func scanService(row pgx.CollectableRow) (*rpservice.Service, error) {
var s rpservice.Service
var auth []byte
var restrictions []byte
var accessGroups []byte
var createdAt, certIssuedAt, lastRenewedAt sql.NullTime
var status, proxyCluster, sessionPrivateKey, sessionPublicKey sql.NullString
var mode, source, sourcePeer sql.NullString
var terminated, portAutoAssigned, private sql.NullBool
var listenPort sql.NullInt64
err := row.Scan(
&s.ID,
&s.AccountID,
&s.Name,
&s.Domain,
&s.Enabled,
&auth,
&restrictions,
&createdAt,
&certIssuedAt,
&lastRenewedAt,
&status,
&proxyCluster,
&s.PassHostHeader,
&s.RewriteRedirects,
&sessionPrivateKey,
&sessionPublicKey,
&mode,
&listenPort,
&portAutoAssigned,
&source,
&sourcePeer,
&terminated,
&private,
&accessGroups,
)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if auth != nil {
if err := json.Unmarshal(auth, &s.Auth); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
if len(restrictions) > 0 {
if err := json.Unmarshal(restrictions, &s.Restrictions); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unmarshal restrictions: %w", err)
}
}
if len(accessGroups) > 0 {
if err := json.Unmarshal(accessGroups, &s.AccessGroups); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unmarshal access_groups: %w", err)
}
}
if private.Valid {
s.Private = private.Bool
}
s.Meta = serviceMetaFromRow(createdAt, certIssuedAt, lastRenewedAt, status)
if proxyCluster.Valid {
s.ProxyCluster = proxyCluster.String
}
if sessionPrivateKey.Valid {
s.SessionPrivateKey = sessionPrivateKey.String
}
if sessionPublicKey.Valid {
s.SessionPublicKey = sessionPublicKey.String
}
if mode.Valid {
s.Mode = mode.String
}
if source.Valid {
s.Source = source.String
}
if sourcePeer.Valid {
s.SourcePeer = sourcePeer.String
}
if terminated.Valid {
s.Terminated = terminated.Bool
}
if portAutoAssigned.Valid {
s.PortAutoAssigned = portAutoAssigned.Bool
}
if listenPort.Valid {
if listenPort.Int64 < 0 || listenPort.Int64 > math.MaxUint16 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("listen_port %d out of range", listenPort.Int64)
}
s.ListenPort = uint16(listenPort.Int64)
}
s.Targets = []*rpservice.Target{}
return &s, nil
}
func serviceMetaFromRow(createdAt, certIssuedAt, lastRenewedAt sql.NullTime, status sql.NullString) rpservice.Meta {
meta := rpservice.Meta{}
if createdAt.Valid {
meta.CreatedAt = createdAt.Time
}
if certIssuedAt.Valid {
t := certIssuedAt.Time
meta.CertificateIssuedAt = &t
}
if lastRenewedAt.Valid {
t := lastRenewedAt.Time
meta.LastRenewedAt = &t
}
if status.Valid {
meta.Status = status.String
}
return meta
}
func (s *SqlStore) getServiceTargets(ctx context.Context, serviceIDs []string) ([]*rpservice.Target, error) {
const targetsQuery = `SELECT ` + targetSelectColumns + ` FROM targets WHERE service_id = ANY($1)`
rows, err := s.pool.Query(ctx, targetsQuery, serviceIDs)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return pgx.CollectRows(rows, scanTarget)
}
func scanTarget(row pgx.CollectableRow) (*rpservice.Target, error) {
var t rpservice.Target
var path sql.NullString
var pathRewrite sql.NullString
var proxyProtocol, skipTLSVerify, directUpstream, agentNetwork, disableAccessLog sql.NullBool
var requestTimeout, sessionIdleTimeout, captureMaxRequestBytes, captureMaxResponseBytes sql.NullInt64
var customHeaders, middlewares, captureContentTypes []byte
err := row.Scan(
&t.ID,
&t.AccountID,
&t.ServiceID,
&path,
&t.Host,
&t.Port,
&t.Protocol,
&t.TargetId,
&t.TargetType,
&t.Enabled,
&proxyProtocol,
&skipTLSVerify,
&requestTimeout,
&sessionIdleTimeout,
&pathRewrite,
&customHeaders,
&directUpstream,
&middlewares,
&captureMaxRequestBytes,
&captureMaxResponseBytes,
&captureContentTypes,
&agentNetwork,
&disableAccessLog,
)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if path.Valid {
t.Path = &path.String
}
t.ProxyProtocol = proxyProtocol.Bool
t.Options.SkipTLSVerify = skipTLSVerify.Bool
t.Options.RequestTimeout = time.Duration(requestTimeout.Int64)
t.Options.SessionIdleTimeout = time.Duration(sessionIdleTimeout.Int64)
t.Options.PathRewrite = rpservice.PathRewriteMode(pathRewrite.String)
t.Options.DirectUpstream = directUpstream.Bool
t.Options.CaptureMaxRequestBytes = captureMaxRequestBytes.Int64
t.Options.CaptureMaxResponseBytes = captureMaxResponseBytes.Int64
t.Options.AgentNetwork = agentNetwork.Bool
t.Options.DisableAccessLog = disableAccessLog.Bool
if len(customHeaders) > 0 {
if err := json.Unmarshal(customHeaders, &t.Options.CustomHeaders); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unmarshal custom_headers: %w", err)
}
}
if len(middlewares) > 0 {
if err := json.Unmarshal(middlewares, &t.Options.Middlewares); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unmarshal middlewares: %w", err)
}
}
if len(captureContentTypes) > 0 {
if err := json.Unmarshal(captureContentTypes, &t.Options.CaptureContentTypes); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unmarshal capture_content_types: %w", err)
}
}
return &t, nil
}
func (s *SqlStore) getNetworks(ctx context.Context, accountID string) ([]*networkTypes.Network, error) {
const query = `SELECT id, account_id, public_id, name, description FROM networks WHERE account_id = $1`
rows, err := s.pool.Query(ctx, query, accountID)

View File

@@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
package store
import (
"strings"
"sync"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"gorm.io/gorm/schema"
rpservice "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/service"
)
// TestPgxServiceColumnsMatchGorm guards the Postgres pgx read path against
// drifting from the gorm model. The SQLite/MySQL gorm path loads rows by struct,
// so a new column on a model is picked up automatically, but the hand-written
// pgx SELECT in sql_store.go must be updated by hand. This test fails when a
// gorm column is missing from the pgx column list, which otherwise silently
// returns zero-valued on Postgres with no compile error.
func TestPgxServiceColumnsMatchGorm(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
model any
selectColumns string
// excluded lists gorm columns intentionally not loaded by the pgx path.
excluded map[string]struct{}
}{
{
name: "service",
model: &rpservice.Service{},
selectColumns: serviceSelectColumns,
},
{
name: "target",
model: &rpservice.Target{},
selectColumns: targetSelectColumns,
},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
selected := parseColumnList(tc.selectColumns)
for _, col := range gormColumnNames(t, tc.model) {
if _, ok := tc.excluded[col]; ok {
continue
}
_, ok := selected[col]
assert.Truef(t, ok,
"gorm column %q is not read by the Postgres pgx SELECT; add it to %sSelectColumns in sql_store.go (or to the test's excluded set if it is intentionally not loaded)",
col, tc.name)
}
})
}
}
func parseColumnList(cols string) map[string]struct{} {
set := make(map[string]struct{})
for _, c := range strings.Split(cols, ",") {
if c = strings.TrimSpace(c); c != "" {
set[c] = struct{}{}
}
}
return set
}
// gormColumnNames returns the DB column names gorm would migrate for the model,
// using the same default naming strategy the store configures.
func gormColumnNames(t *testing.T, model any) []string {
t.Helper()
sch, err := schema.Parse(model, &sync.Map{}, schema.NamingStrategy{})
require.NoError(t, err)
return sch.DBNames
}

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import (
"os"
"runtime"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
@@ -45,91 +44,3 @@ func TestSqlStore_GetAccount_PrivateServiceRoundtrip(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, []string{"grp-admins", "grp-ops"}, got.AccessGroups)
})
}
// TestSqlStore_GetAccount_ServiceTargetOptionsRoundtrip guards the Postgres pgx
// read path (getServices) against silently dropping columns present on the gorm
// model. Before the fix these fields loaded correctly on SQLite but came back
// zero-valued on Postgres because the hand-written SELECT and scan omitted them.
func TestSqlStore_GetAccount_ServiceTargetOptionsRoundtrip(t *testing.T) {
if os.Getenv("CI") == "true" && (runtime.GOOS == "darwin" || runtime.GOOS == "windows") {
t.Skip("skip CI tests on darwin and windows")
}
runTestForAllEngines(t, "", func(t *testing.T, store Store) {
ctx := context.Background()
account := newAccountWithId(ctx, "account_svc_opts", "testuser", "")
require.NoError(t, store.SaveAccount(ctx, account))
renewedAt := time.Now().UTC().Truncate(time.Second)
targetPath := "/api"
svc := &rpservice.Service{
ID: "svc-opts",
AccountID: account.Id,
Name: "opts-svc",
Domain: "opts.example",
Enabled: true,
Mode: rpservice.ModeHTTP,
Restrictions: rpservice.AccessRestrictions{
AllowedCIDRs: []string{"10.0.0.0/8"},
BlockedCountries: []string{"XX"},
CrowdSecMode: "block",
},
Meta: rpservice.Meta{
LastRenewedAt: &renewedAt,
},
Targets: []*rpservice.Target{
{
AccountID: account.Id,
ServiceID: "svc-opts",
Path: &targetPath,
Host: "backend.internal",
Port: 8080,
Protocol: "http",
TargetId: "tgt-1",
Enabled: true,
ProxyProtocol: true,
Options: rpservice.TargetOptions{
SkipTLSVerify: true,
RequestTimeout: 30 * time.Second,
SessionIdleTimeout: 5 * time.Minute,
PathRewrite: rpservice.PathRewritePreserve,
CustomHeaders: map[string]string{"X-Foo": "bar"},
DirectUpstream: true,
CaptureMaxRequestBytes: 1024,
CaptureMaxResponseBytes: 2048,
CaptureContentTypes: []string{"application/json"},
AgentNetwork: true,
DisableAccessLog: true,
},
},
},
}
require.NoError(t, store.CreateService(ctx, svc))
loaded, err := store.GetAccount(ctx, account.Id)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, loaded.Services, 1)
got := loaded.Services[0]
assert.Equal(t, []string{"10.0.0.0/8"}, got.Restrictions.AllowedCIDRs, "restrictions allowed CIDRs")
assert.Equal(t, []string{"XX"}, got.Restrictions.BlockedCountries, "restrictions blocked countries")
assert.Equal(t, "block", got.Restrictions.CrowdSecMode, "restrictions crowdsec mode")
require.NotNil(t, got.Meta.LastRenewedAt, "meta last renewed at")
assert.WithinDuration(t, renewedAt, *got.Meta.LastRenewedAt, time.Second, "meta last renewed at")
require.Len(t, got.Targets, 1)
tg := got.Targets[0]
assert.True(t, tg.ProxyProtocol, "target proxy protocol")
assert.True(t, tg.Options.SkipTLSVerify, "options skip TLS verify")
assert.Equal(t, 30*time.Second, tg.Options.RequestTimeout, "options request timeout")
assert.Equal(t, 5*time.Minute, tg.Options.SessionIdleTimeout, "options session idle timeout")
assert.Equal(t, rpservice.PathRewritePreserve, tg.Options.PathRewrite, "options path rewrite")
assert.Equal(t, map[string]string{"X-Foo": "bar"}, tg.Options.CustomHeaders, "options custom headers")
assert.True(t, tg.Options.DirectUpstream, "options direct upstream")
assert.Equal(t, int64(1024), tg.Options.CaptureMaxRequestBytes, "options capture max request bytes")
assert.Equal(t, int64(2048), tg.Options.CaptureMaxResponseBytes, "options capture max response bytes")
assert.Equal(t, []string{"application/json"}, tg.Options.CaptureContentTypes, "options capture content types")
assert.True(t, tg.Options.AgentNetwork, "options agent network")
assert.True(t, tg.Options.DisableAccessLog, "options disable access log")
})
}

View File

@@ -1517,54 +1517,6 @@ func (a *Account) GetResourceRoutersMap() map[string]map[string]*routerTypes.Net
return routers
}
// forcesRoutingPeerDNSResolution reports whether the given peer must run
// routing-peer DNS resolution regardless of the account-global
// RoutingPeerDNSResolutionEnabled setting. It returns true when the peer is a
// router for a domain network resource that is targeted by an enabled
// reverse-proxy service, so the peer's DNS forwarder starts and can resolve
// the target for the embedded proxy peers. Embedded proxy peers themselves are
// handled at PeerConfig build time.
func (a *Account) forcesRoutingPeerDNSResolution(peerID string, routers map[string]map[string]*routerTypes.NetworkRouter) bool {
targeted := a.proxyTargetedDomainResourceIDs()
if len(targeted) == 0 {
return false
}
for _, resource := range a.NetworkResources {
if resource == nil || !resource.Enabled || resource.Type != resourceTypes.Domain {
continue
}
if _, ok := targeted[resource.ID]; !ok {
continue
}
if _, isRouter := routers[resource.NetworkID][peerID]; isRouter {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// proxyTargetedDomainResourceIDs returns the set of domain network resource IDs
// targeted by an enabled, non-terminated reverse-proxy service.
func (a *Account) proxyTargetedDomainResourceIDs() map[string]struct{} {
ids := make(map[string]struct{})
for _, svc := range a.Services {
if svc == nil || !svc.Enabled || svc.Terminated {
continue
}
for _, target := range svc.Targets {
if target == nil || !target.Enabled {
continue
}
if target.TargetType == service.TargetTypeDomain {
ids[target.TargetId] = struct{}{}
}
}
}
return ids
}
// getPoliciesSourcePeers collects all unique peers from the source groups defined in the given policies.
func getPoliciesSourcePeers(policies []*Policy, groups map[string]*Group) map[string]struct{} {
sourcePeers := make(map[string]struct{})

View File

@@ -140,8 +140,6 @@ func (a *Account) GetPeerNetworkMapComponents(
RouterPeers: make(map[string]*ComponentPeer),
NetworkXIDToPublicID: make(map[string]string, len(a.Networks)),
PostureCheckXIDToPublicID: make(map[string]string, len(a.PostureChecks)),
ForceRoutingPeerDNSResolution: a.forcesRoutingPeerDNSResolution(peerID, routers),
}
for _, n := range a.Networks {
if n != nil {

View File

@@ -1751,71 +1751,3 @@ func hasPrivateAccessPolicy(account *Account, serviceID string) bool {
}
return false
}
func TestForcesRoutingPeerDNSResolution(t *testing.T) {
buildAccountRes := func(serviceEnabled, targetEnabled, resourceEnabled bool, targetType service.TargetType, resType resourceTypes.NetworkResourceType) *Account {
return &Account{
Id: "accountID",
Groups: map[string]*Group{
"router-group": {ID: "router-group", Peers: []string{"router-peer-grp"}},
},
NetworkRouters: []*routerTypes.NetworkRouter{
{ID: "r1", NetworkID: "net-1", AccountID: "accountID", Peer: "router-peer", Enabled: true},
{ID: "r2", NetworkID: "net-1", AccountID: "accountID", PeerGroups: []string{"router-group"}, Enabled: true},
},
NetworkResources: []*resourceTypes.NetworkResource{
{ID: "res-domain", AccountID: "accountID", NetworkID: "net-1", Type: resType, Domain: "example.org", Enabled: resourceEnabled},
},
Services: []*service.Service{
{
ID: "svc-1", AccountID: "accountID", Enabled: serviceEnabled,
Targets: []*service.Target{
{TargetId: "res-domain", TargetType: targetType, Enabled: targetEnabled},
},
},
},
}
}
buildAccount := func(serviceEnabled, targetEnabled, resourceEnabled bool, targetType service.TargetType) *Account {
return buildAccountRes(serviceEnabled, targetEnabled, resourceEnabled, targetType, resourceTypes.Domain)
}
t.Run("router peer for RP-targeted domain resource is forced", func(t *testing.T) {
account := buildAccount(true, true, true, service.TargetTypeDomain)
routers := account.GetResourceRoutersMap()
assert.True(t, account.forcesRoutingPeerDNSResolution("router-peer", routers), "direct router peer should be forced")
assert.True(t, account.forcesRoutingPeerDNSResolution("router-peer-grp", routers), "group-member router peer should be forced")
})
t.Run("non-router peer is not forced", func(t *testing.T) {
account := buildAccount(true, true, true, service.TargetTypeDomain)
assert.False(t, account.forcesRoutingPeerDNSResolution("other-peer", account.GetResourceRoutersMap()))
})
t.Run("not forced when service disabled", func(t *testing.T) {
account := buildAccount(false, true, true, service.TargetTypeDomain)
assert.False(t, account.forcesRoutingPeerDNSResolution("router-peer", account.GetResourceRoutersMap()))
})
t.Run("not forced when target disabled", func(t *testing.T) {
account := buildAccount(true, false, true, service.TargetTypeDomain)
assert.False(t, account.forcesRoutingPeerDNSResolution("router-peer", account.GetResourceRoutersMap()))
})
t.Run("not forced when resource disabled", func(t *testing.T) {
account := buildAccount(true, true, false, service.TargetTypeDomain)
assert.False(t, account.forcesRoutingPeerDNSResolution("router-peer", account.GetResourceRoutersMap()))
})
t.Run("not forced for non-domain target type", func(t *testing.T) {
account := buildAccount(true, true, true, service.TargetTypePeer)
assert.False(t, account.forcesRoutingPeerDNSResolution("router-peer", account.GetResourceRoutersMap()))
})
t.Run("not forced when targeted resource is not a domain", func(t *testing.T) {
account := buildAccountRes(true, true, true, service.TargetTypeDomain, resourceTypes.Host)
assert.False(t, account.forcesRoutingPeerDNSResolution("router-peer", account.GetResourceRoutersMap()),
"a domain target pointing at a non-domain resource must not force resolution")
})
}

View File

@@ -321,10 +321,6 @@ func (am *DefaultAccountManager) DeleteUser(ctx context.Context, accountID, init
return err
}
if targetUser.AccountID != accountID {
return status.NewUserNotFoundError(targetUserID)
}
if targetUser.Role == types.UserRoleOwner {
return status.NewOwnerDeletePermissionError()
}

View File

@@ -802,52 +802,6 @@ func TestUser_DeleteUser_SelfDelete(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestUser_DeleteUser_OtherAccount(t *testing.T) {
testStore, cleanup, err := store.NewTestStoreFromSQL(context.Background(), "", t.TempDir())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Error when creating store: %s", err)
}
t.Cleanup(cleanup)
account := newAccountWithId(context.Background(), mockAccountID, mockUserID, "", "", "", false)
if err = testStore.SaveAccount(context.Background(), account); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Error when saving account: %s", err)
}
otherAccount := newAccountWithId(context.Background(), "otherAccount", "otherOwner", "", "", "", false)
otherAccount.Users["otherRegularUser"] = &types.User{
Id: "otherRegularUser",
AccountID: "otherAccount",
Role: types.UserRoleUser,
}
otherAccount.Users["otherServiceUser"] = &types.User{
Id: "otherServiceUser",
AccountID: "otherAccount",
Role: types.UserRoleUser,
IsServiceUser: true,
ServiceUserName: "otherServiceUser",
}
if err = testStore.SaveAccount(context.Background(), otherAccount); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Error when saving other account: %s", err)
}
am := DefaultAccountManager{
Store: testStore,
eventStore: &activity.InMemoryEventStore{},
permissionsManager: permissions.NewManager(testStore),
}
for _, targetUserID := range []string{"otherRegularUser", "otherServiceUser"} {
t.Run(targetUserID, func(t *testing.T) {
err := am.DeleteUser(context.Background(), mockAccountID, mockUserID, targetUserID)
assert.Equal(t, status.NewUserNotFoundError(targetUserID), err)
_, err = testStore.GetUserByUserID(context.Background(), store.LockingStrengthNone, targetUserID)
assert.NoError(t, err, "user of another account must not be deleted")
})
}
}
func TestUser_DeleteUser_regularUser(t *testing.T) {
store, cleanup, err := store.NewTestStoreFromSQL(context.Background(), "", t.TempDir())
if err != nil {

View File

@@ -3,30 +3,20 @@ package auth
import (
"context"
"net/netip"
"os"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"golang.org/x/sync/singleflight"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/types"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
)
// tunnelCacheTTL is the default cap on how long a positive ValidateTunnelPeer
// result is reused before re-fetching from management. 5 minutes balances
// freshness against management load on busy mesh networks. Override it with
// envTunnelCacheTTL when an account needs authorization changes to take effect
// sooner (at the cost of more ValidateTunnelPeer RPCs).
// tunnelCacheTTL caps how long a positive ValidateTunnelPeer result is
// reused before re-fetching from management. 5 minutes balances freshness
// against management load on busy mesh networks.
const tunnelCacheTTL = 300 * time.Second
// envTunnelCacheTTL overrides tunnelCacheTTL. The value is a Go duration string
// (e.g. "30s", "2m"); an unset, unparseable, or non-positive value keeps the
// default.
const envTunnelCacheTTL = "NB_PROXY_TUNNEL_CACHE_TTL"
// tunnelCachePerAccount caps the number of cached identities per account.
// Bounded eviction avoids memory growth in pathological cases (huge peer
// roster, brief request bursts) while staying generous for normal use.
@@ -70,35 +60,16 @@ type accountBucket struct {
order []tunnelCacheKey
}
// newTunnelValidationCache constructs a cache with the configured TTL
// (envTunnelCacheTTL override or default) and default bounds.
// newTunnelValidationCache constructs a cache with default TTL and bounds.
func newTunnelValidationCache() *tunnelValidationCache {
return &tunnelValidationCache{
entries: make(map[types.AccountID]*accountBucket),
ttl: tunnelCacheTTLFromEnv(),
ttl: tunnelCacheTTL,
maxSize: tunnelCachePerAccount,
now: time.Now,
}
}
// tunnelCacheTTLFromEnv returns the tunnel-cache TTL, honoring the
// envTunnelCacheTTL override. The override must be a positive Go duration
// string (e.g. "30s", "2m"); anything unset, unparseable, or non-positive
// falls back to tunnelCacheTTL.
func tunnelCacheTTLFromEnv() time.Duration {
raw := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(envTunnelCacheTTL))
if raw == "" {
return tunnelCacheTTL
}
d, err := time.ParseDuration(raw)
if err != nil || d <= 0 {
log.Warnf("ignoring invalid %s=%q (want a positive Go duration like 30s or 2m); using default %s",
envTunnelCacheTTL, raw, tunnelCacheTTL)
return tunnelCacheTTL
}
return d
}
// get returns a cached response for the key, or nil when missing or
// expired. Expired entries are evicted lazily on read.
func (c *tunnelValidationCache) get(key tunnelCacheKey) *proto.ValidateTunnelPeerResponse {

View File

@@ -169,32 +169,3 @@ func TestTunnelCache_BoundedSizeEvictsOldest(t *testing.T) {
assert.NotNil(t, cache.get(keys[1]), "second-newest must remain cached")
assert.NotNil(t, cache.get(keys[2]), "newest must remain cached")
}
func TestTunnelCacheTTLFromEnv(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("unset uses default", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(envTunnelCacheTTL, "")
assert.Equal(t, tunnelCacheTTL, tunnelCacheTTLFromEnv())
})
t.Run("valid duration overrides", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(envTunnelCacheTTL, "45s")
assert.Equal(t, 45*time.Second, tunnelCacheTTLFromEnv())
})
t.Run("whitespace trimmed", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(envTunnelCacheTTL, " 2m ")
assert.Equal(t, 2*time.Minute, tunnelCacheTTLFromEnv())
})
t.Run("unparseable uses default", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(envTunnelCacheTTL, "nonsense")
assert.Equal(t, tunnelCacheTTL, tunnelCacheTTLFromEnv())
})
t.Run("non-positive uses default", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(envTunnelCacheTTL, "0s")
assert.Equal(t, tunnelCacheTTL, tunnelCacheTTLFromEnv())
t.Setenv(envTunnelCacheTTL, "-30s")
assert.Equal(t, tunnelCacheTTL, tunnelCacheTTLFromEnv())
})
t.Run("constructor honors override", func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(envTunnelCacheTTL, "90s")
assert.Equal(t, 90*time.Second, newTunnelValidationCache().ttl)
})
}

View File

@@ -10,15 +10,11 @@ import (
)
// Config is the JSON-decoded shape accepted by the factory. The
// runtime path consumes the normalised allowlists; raw config is not
// runtime path consumes the normalised allowlist; raw config is not
// retained beyond construction.
type Config struct {
// ProviderAllowlists maps a resolved provider id (KeyLLMResolvedProviderID) to
// its model allowlist. A provider present is restricted to those models; one
// absent is unrestricted. Kept per-provider so one provider's list can't leak
// onto another.
ProviderAllowlists map[string][]string `json:"provider_allowlists,omitempty"`
PromptCapture PromptCapture `json:"prompt_capture"`
ModelAllowlist []string `json:"model_allowlist"`
PromptCapture PromptCapture `json:"prompt_capture"`
}
// PromptCapture toggles the optional prompt capture + redaction step
@@ -58,28 +54,21 @@ func isEmptyJSON(raw []byte) bool {
return false
}
// normaliseConfig lowercases and trims allowlist entries for case-insensitive
// matching; empty entries drop. A provider whose entries all drop keeps an empty
// (non-nil) list — "deny every model" — distinct from an absent provider
// (unrestricted).
// normaliseConfig lowercases and trims allowlist entries so the runtime
// match is case-insensitive. Empty entries are dropped.
func normaliseConfig(cfg Config) Config {
if len(cfg.ProviderAllowlists) == 0 {
cfg.ProviderAllowlists = nil
if len(cfg.ModelAllowlist) == 0 {
return cfg
}
cleaned := make(map[string][]string, len(cfg.ProviderAllowlists))
for provider, models := range cfg.ProviderAllowlists {
list := make([]string, 0, len(models))
for _, entry := range models {
n := normaliseModel(entry)
if n == "" {
continue
}
list = append(list, n)
cleaned := make([]string, 0, len(cfg.ModelAllowlist))
for _, entry := range cfg.ModelAllowlist {
n := normaliseModel(entry)
if n == "" {
continue
}
cleaned[provider] = list
cleaned = append(cleaned, n)
}
cfg.ProviderAllowlists = cleaned
cfg.ModelAllowlist = cleaned
return cfg
}

View File

@@ -83,9 +83,8 @@ func (m *Middleware) MutationsSupported() bool { return false }
// prompt capture only affects the metadata emitted alongside an allow.
func (m *Middleware) Invoke(_ context.Context, in *middleware.Input) (*middleware.Output, error) {
model, modelPresent := lookupMetadata(in.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMModel)
providerID, _ := lookupMetadata(in.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMResolvedProviderID)
if denial := m.evaluateAllowlist(providerID, model, modelPresent); denial != nil {
if denial := m.evaluateAllowlist(model, modelPresent); denial != nil {
return denial, nil
}
@@ -111,32 +110,20 @@ func (m *Middleware) Invoke(_ context.Context, in *middleware.Input) (*middlewar
// is a no-op.
func (m *Middleware) Close() error { return nil }
// evaluateAllowlist denies when the resolved provider's allowlist rejects the
// model; nil means proceed. Scoped to the provider llm_router resolved, so an
// unrestricted provider (absent from config) is never caught by another's list.
func (m *Middleware) evaluateAllowlist(providerID, model string, modelPresent bool) *middleware.Output {
if len(m.cfg.ProviderAllowlists) == 0 {
// evaluateAllowlist returns a deny Output when the configured allowlist
// rejects the model. A nil return means the request should proceed.
func (m *Middleware) evaluateAllowlist(model string, modelPresent bool) *middleware.Output {
if len(m.cfg.ModelAllowlist) == 0 {
return nil
}
// Restrictions exist but the resolved provider is unknown, so we can't tell
// if this request targets a restricted provider — fail closed. llm_router
// normally stamps the provider first, so this is a defensive guard.
if providerID == "" {
return denyModel("", denyCodeModelUnknown, denyMessageModelUnknown, denyReasonModelUnknown)
}
allowlist, restricted := m.cfg.ProviderAllowlists[providerID]
if !restricted {
// This provider has no allowlist (some authorising policy left it
// unrestricted); management owns any per-policy/group decision.
return nil
}
// Fail closed: with an allowlist in effect for this provider, a request whose
// model the parser couldn't extract (absent/empty) is denied. This enforces
// the allowlist for path-routed providers (Bedrock, Vertex) with no body model.
// Fail closed: with an allowlist configured, a request whose model the
// upstream parser could not extract (absent or empty) must be denied rather
// than allowed. This is what enforces the allowlist for URL/path-routed
// providers (Bedrock, Vertex, ...) whose model lives outside the JSON body.
if !modelPresent || normaliseModel(model) == "" {
return denyModel("", denyCodeModelUnknown, denyMessageModelUnknown, denyReasonModelUnknown)
}
if modelInAllowlist(allowlist, model) {
if m.modelInAllowlist(model) {
return nil
}
return denyModel(model, denyCodeModel, denyMessageModel, denyReasonModel)
@@ -164,15 +151,14 @@ func denyModel(model, code, message, reason string) *middleware.Output {
}
}
// modelInAllowlist reports whether the model matches any entry in the supplied
// (already-normalised) allowlist under the case-insensitive, trim-tolerant
// comparison rule.
func modelInAllowlist(allowlist []string, model string) bool {
// modelInAllowlist reports whether the model matches any allowlist
// entry under the case-insensitive, trim-tolerant comparison rule.
func (m *Middleware) modelInAllowlist(model string) bool {
normalised := normaliseModel(model)
if normalised == "" {
return false
}
for _, allowed := range allowlist {
for _, allowed := range m.cfg.ModelAllowlist {
if allowed == normalised {
return true
}

View File

@@ -26,25 +26,6 @@ func newInput(meta ...middleware.KV) *middleware.Input {
return &middleware.Input{Slot: middleware.SlotOnRequest, Metadata: meta}
}
const (
testProvider = "prov-1"
otherProvider = "prov-2"
)
// providerCfg builds a Config restricting testProvider to the given models.
func providerCfg(models ...string) Config {
return Config{ProviderAllowlists: map[string][]string{testProvider: models}}
}
// newInputProvider builds an input that carries a resolved provider id (as
// llm_router would stamp) plus any extra metadata.
func newInputProvider(provider string, meta ...middleware.KV) *middleware.Input {
all := make([]middleware.KV, 0, len(meta)+1)
all = append(all, middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMResolvedProviderID, Value: provider})
all = append(all, meta...)
return &middleware.Input{Slot: middleware.SlotOnRequest, Metadata: all}
}
func TestMiddlewareIdentity(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(Config{})
assert.Equal(t, ID, mw.ID(), "middleware ID must be llm_guardrail")
@@ -66,12 +47,12 @@ func TestMiddlewareIdentity(t *testing.T) {
func TestAllowlistEmptyAllowsAnyModel(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(Config{})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "no provider allowlists must allow any model")
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "empty allowlist must allow any model")
v, ok := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMPolicyDecision)
require.True(t, ok, "decision metadata must be emitted")
assert.Equal(t, "allow", v, "decision must be allow")
@@ -81,8 +62,8 @@ func TestAllowlistEmptyAllowsAnyModel(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestAllowlistMatchAllows(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o", "claude-opus-4"))
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
mw := New(Config{ModelAllowlist: []string{"gpt-4o", "claude-opus-4"}})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
@@ -90,8 +71,8 @@ func TestAllowlistMatchAllows(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestAllowlistMissDenies(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o"))
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
mw := New(Config{ModelAllowlist: []string{"gpt-4o"}})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "claude-opus-4"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
@@ -110,10 +91,10 @@ func TestAllowlistMissDenies(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestAllowlistCaseInsensitive(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(providerCfg(" GPT-4o ", "Claude-OPUS-4"))
mw := New(Config{ModelAllowlist: []string{" GPT-4o ", "Claude-OPUS-4"}})
cases := []string{"gpt-4o", "GPT-4O", " claude-opus-4 "}
for _, model := range cases {
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: model},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
@@ -122,15 +103,14 @@ func TestAllowlistCaseInsensitive(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestAllowlistMissingModelKeyDenies(t *testing.T) {
// Fail closed: with an allowlist in effect for the resolved provider, a
// request whose model the parser could not extract (URL/path-routed
// providers such as Bedrock or Vertex whose shape wasn't recognised) must be
// denied, not allowed.
mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o"))
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider))
// Fail closed: with an allowlist configured, a request whose model the
// parser could not extract (URL/path-routed providers such as Bedrock or
// Vertex whose shape wasn't recognised) must be denied, not allowed.
mw := New(Config{ModelAllowlist: []string{"gpt-4o"}})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput())
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "absent model must be denied when the provider is restricted")
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "absent model must be denied when an allowlist is set")
assert.Equal(t, 403, out.DenyStatus, "deny status must be 403")
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason, "deny reason must be populated")
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_unknown", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must be model_unknown")
@@ -142,101 +122,26 @@ func TestAllowlistMissingModelKeyDenies(t *testing.T) {
func TestAllowlistEmptyModelValueDenies(t *testing.T) {
// A present-but-empty model is as undeterminable as an absent one.
mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o"))
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
mw := New(Config{ModelAllowlist: []string{"gpt-4o"}})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: " "},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "empty model must be denied when the provider is restricted")
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "empty model must be denied when an allowlist is set")
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason, "deny reason must be populated")
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_unknown", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must be model_unknown")
}
func TestAllowlistEmptyListAllowsMissingModel(t *testing.T) {
// Without any provider allowlists there is nothing to enforce, so a missing
// model is still allowed — the fail-closed rule only applies when a
// restriction is in effect.
// Without an allowlist there is nothing to enforce, so a missing model is
// still allowed — the fail-closed rule only applies when a list is set.
mw := New(Config{})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput())
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "no allowlist must allow even without a model")
}
func TestUnrestrictedProviderAllowsAnyModel(t *testing.T) {
// The request resolved to otherProvider, which has no allowlist, so its
// traffic must not be caught by testProvider's restriction — the
// cross-provider-leak / false-deny guard.
mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o"))
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(otherProvider,
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "claude-opus-4"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "an unrestricted provider must not inherit another provider's allowlist")
}
func TestPerProviderAllowlistsAreIsolated(t *testing.T) {
// gpt-4o is allowed only on testProvider; claude-opus-4 only on
// otherProvider. A model allowlisted for one provider must not be usable on
// the other — the fail-closed layer never unions allowlists across providers.
mw := New(Config{ProviderAllowlists: map[string][]string{
testProvider: {"gpt-4o"},
otherProvider: {"claude-opus-4"},
}})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "claude-opus-4"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "claude-opus-4 is allowed only on otherProvider, not testProvider")
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason)
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_blocked", out.DenyReason.Code, "cross-provider model must be blocked, not model_unknown")
}
func TestRestrictionsButNoResolvedProviderFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
// Restrictions exist for the account but the resolved provider id is absent,
// so the request cannot be scoped to a provider. Fail closed rather than
// wave it through.
mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o"))
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "missing resolved provider must fail closed when restrictions exist")
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason)
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_unknown", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must be model_unknown")
}
func TestEnabledButEmptyAllowlistDeniesEveryModel(t *testing.T) {
// An allowlist-enabled provider with zero models is distinct from an
// unrestricted (absent) provider: it must deny every model.
mw := New(providerCfg())
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "an enabled-but-empty allowlist must deny every model")
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason)
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_blocked", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must be model_blocked, not model_unknown")
}
func TestFactoryAllEmptyEntriesDenyEveryModel(t *testing.T) {
// All the provider's entries are blank; they collapse to a non-nil empty
// list (deny everything for that provider), not "no restriction".
raw := []byte(`{"provider_allowlists":{"prov-1":[""," "]}}`)
mw, err := Factory{}.New(raw)
require.NoError(t, err)
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "all-blank allowlist entries must still restrict the provider")
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason)
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_blocked", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must be model_blocked")
}
func TestPromptCaptureDisabledEmitsNoPrompt(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(Config{})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
@@ -312,8 +217,8 @@ func TestFactoryAcceptsZeroConfigs(t *testing.T) {
func TestFactoryDecodesValidConfig(t *testing.T) {
cfg := Config{
ProviderAllowlists: map[string][]string{testProvider: {"gpt-4o"}},
PromptCapture: PromptCapture{Enabled: true, RedactPii: true},
ModelAllowlist: []string{"gpt-4o"},
PromptCapture: PromptCapture{Enabled: true, RedactPii: true},
}
raw, err := json.Marshal(cfg)
require.NoError(t, err, "marshalling test config must succeed")
@@ -329,15 +234,15 @@ func TestFactoryRejectsMalformedJSON(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestFactoryNormalisesAllowlist(t *testing.T) {
raw := []byte(`{"provider_allowlists":{"prov-1":[" GPT-4o ","",""," Claude-3 "]}}`)
raw := []byte(`{"model_allowlist":[" GPT-4o ","",""," Claude-3 "]}`)
mw, err := Factory{}.New(raw)
require.NoError(t, err)
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "factory must lowercase + trim allowlist entries")
out2, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
out2, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "claude-3"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)

View File

@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ func denyFromManagement(resp *proto.CheckLLMPolicyLimitsResponse) *middleware.Ou
DenyStatus: 403,
DenyReason: &middleware.DenyReason{
Code: code,
Message: denyMessageForCode(code),
Message: "LLM policy limit exceeded",
},
Metadata: []middleware.KV{
{Key: middleware.KeyLLMPolicyDecision, Value: "deny"},
@@ -184,21 +184,6 @@ func denyFromManagement(resp *proto.CheckLLMPolicyLimitsResponse) *middleware.Ou
}
}
// denyMessageForCode maps a management deny code to a public message.
// Model-allowlist rejections get a model-specific message matching the
// local guardrail; everything else keeps the generic quota wording. The
// message stays generic so it never leaks internal quota detail.
func denyMessageForCode(code string) string {
switch code {
case "llm_policy.model_blocked":
return "model is not in the policy allowlist"
case "llm_policy.model_unknown":
return "request model could not be determined for the policy allowlist"
default:
return "LLM policy limit exceeded"
}
}
// lookupKV returns the value associated with key, or the empty
// string when absent.
func lookupKV(kvs []middleware.KV, key string) string {

View File

@@ -115,46 +115,6 @@ func TestInvoke_DenyConvertsToProxyDeny(t *testing.T) {
assert.NotContains(t, out.DenyReason.Message, "1000", "internal cap numbers must not reach the caller")
}
// TestInvoke_ModelDenyMessages proves a model-allowlist rejection gets a
// model-specific public message rather than the generic quota wording, so a
// blocked or undetermined model reads consistently with the local guardrail.
func TestInvoke_ModelDenyMessages(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
code string
message string
}{
{"blocked", "llm_policy.model_blocked", "model is not in the policy allowlist"},
{"unknown", "llm_policy.model_unknown", "request model could not be determined for the policy allowlist"},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
mgmt := &fakeMgmt{
checkResp: &proto.CheckLLMPolicyLimitsResponse{
Decision: "deny",
DenyCode: tc.code,
},
}
m := New(mgmt, nil)
out := runInvoke(t, m, &middleware.Input{
AccountID: "acc-1",
UserGroups: []string{"grp-engineers"},
Metadata: []middleware.KV{
{Key: middleware.KeyLLMResolvedProviderID, Value: "prov-1"},
{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "some-model"},
},
})
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision)
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason, "deny envelope must carry a reason payload")
assert.Equal(t, tc.code, out.DenyReason.Code, "canonical deny code surfaces to the caller")
assert.Equal(t, tc.message, out.DenyReason.Message,
"model denials must use a model-specific message, matching the local guardrail")
})
}
}
// TestInvoke_NoMgmtClientPassesThrough proves the partial-wiring
// safety: a middleware constructed without a management client
// allows every request without attribution. This makes a half-set-up

View File

@@ -25,17 +25,10 @@ func runParserGuardrail(t *testing.T, url string, body []byte, allowlist []strin
})
require.NoError(t, err, "parser must not error")
const providerID = "prov-under-test"
guard := llm_guardrail.New(llm_guardrail.Config{
ProviderAllowlists: map[string][]string{providerID: allowlist},
})
// The real chain has llm_router stamp the resolved provider id before the
// guardrail runs; the parser doesn't, so add it here so the guardrail can
// scope the allowlist to this provider.
meta := append([]middleware.KV{{Key: middleware.KeyLLMResolvedProviderID, Value: providerID}}, parsed.Metadata...)
guard := llm_guardrail.New(llm_guardrail.Config{ModelAllowlist: allowlist})
out, err := guard.Invoke(context.Background(), &middleware.Input{
Slot: middleware.SlotOnRequest,
Metadata: meta,
Metadata: parsed.Metadata,
})
require.NoError(t, err, "guardrail must not error")
require.NotNil(t, out, "guardrail must return an output")

View File

@@ -47,10 +47,6 @@ type NetworkMap struct {
ForwardingRules []*ForwardingRule
AuthorizedUsers map[string]map[string]struct{}
EnableSSH bool
// ForceRoutingPeerDNSResolution forces the peer to run/use routing-peer DNS
// resolution regardless of the account-global setting, for reverse-proxy
// domain targets.
ForceRoutingPeerDNSResolution bool
}
func (nm *NetworkMap) Merge(other *NetworkMap) {
@@ -60,7 +56,6 @@ func (nm *NetworkMap) Merge(other *NetworkMap) {
nm.FirewallRules = mergeUnique(nm.FirewallRules, other.FirewallRules)
nm.RoutesFirewallRules = mergeUnique(nm.RoutesFirewallRules, other.RoutesFirewallRules)
nm.ForwardingRules = mergeUnique(nm.ForwardingRules, other.ForwardingRules)
nm.ForceRoutingPeerDNSResolution = nm.ForceRoutingPeerDNSResolution || other.ForceRoutingPeerDNSResolution
}
type comparableObject[T any] interface {

View File

@@ -56,11 +56,6 @@ type NetworkMapComponents struct {
// true when returning an empty-like map (returned instead of nil)
empty bool
// ForceRoutingPeerDNSResolution forces the peer to run/use routing-peer DNS
// resolution regardless of the account-global setting, for reverse-proxy
// domain targets.
ForceRoutingPeerDNSResolution bool
}
type routeIndexEntry struct {
@@ -195,8 +190,6 @@ func (c *NetworkMapComponents) Calculate(ctx context.Context) *NetworkMap {
RoutesFirewallRules: append(networkResourcesFirewallRules, routesFirewallRules...),
AuthorizedUsers: authorizedUsers,
EnableSSH: sshEnabled,
ForceRoutingPeerDNSResolution: c.ForceRoutingPeerDNSResolution,
}
}