Compare commits

..

1 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Maycon Santos
001fda5393 Add Linux ARM64 UI build 2026-07-27 18:13:44 +02:00
22 changed files with 46 additions and 2110 deletions

View File

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ builds:
- linux
goarch:
- amd64
- arm64
ldflags:
- -s -w -X github.com/netbirdio/netbird/version.version={{.Version}} -X main.commit={{.Commit}} -X main.date={{.CommitDate}} -X main.builtBy=goreleaser
mod_timestamp: "{{ .CommitTimestamp }}"

View File

@@ -50,7 +50,6 @@ import (
icemaker "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/ice"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peerstore"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/portforward"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/pqkem"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/relay"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/rosenpass"
@@ -198,10 +197,6 @@ type Engine struct {
// rpManager is a Rosenpass manager
rpManager *rosenpass.Manager
// pqkemManager runs the ML-KEM post-quantum PSK exchange (gated by NB_ENABLE_PQ_MLKEM).
// It owns the data-path transport and peer endpoint routing.
pqkemManager *pqkem.Manager
// syncMsgMux is used to guarantee sequential Management Service message processing
syncMsgMux *sync.Mutex
@@ -656,30 +651,6 @@ func (e *Engine) Start(netbirdConfig *mgmProto.NetbirdConfig, mgmtURL *url.URL)
e.rpManager.SetInterface(e.wgInterface)
}
// Start the ML-KEM PQ manager after the interface is up so its dedicated UDP
// transport can bind on the WG overlay IP.
if pqkem.Enabled() {
tr, pqErr := newPQTransport(e.config.WgAddr.IP)
if pqErr != nil {
log.Errorf("pqkem: transport bind failed, exchange disabled: %v", pqErr)
} else {
cbHandler := pqCallbackHandler{
wg: e.wgInterface,
// On a persistent rekey failure, re-bootstrap the KEM over Signal: a
// fresh signalling offer starts a new exchange that overwrites the
// stalled PSK on both sides, recovering from a data-path desync.
reoffer: func(remoteKey string) {
if conn, ok := e.peerStore.PeerConn(remoteKey); ok {
conn.RequestReoffer()
}
},
}
e.pqkemManager = pqkem.NewManager(pqkem.LocalID(publicKey.String()), cbHandler, pqkem.NewLogger())
e.pqkemManager.Start(tr)
log.Infof("pqkem: enabled (udp port %d on overlay %s)", e.pqkemManager.LocalPort(), e.config.WgAddr.IP)
}
}
// if inbound conns are blocked there is no need to create the ACL manager
if e.firewall != nil && !e.config.BlockInbound {
e.acl = acl.NewDefaultManager(e.firewall)
@@ -943,10 +914,6 @@ func (e *Engine) removePeer(peerKey string) error {
e.connMgr.RemovePeerConn(peerKey)
if e.pqkemManager != nil {
e.pqkemManager.RemovePeer(pqkem.RemoteID(peerKey))
}
err := e.statusRecorder.RemovePeer(peerKey)
if err != nil {
log.Warnf("received error when removing peer %s from status recorder: %v", peerKey, err)
@@ -1933,10 +1900,6 @@ func (e *Engine) createPeerConn(pubKey string, allowedIPs []netip.Prefix, agentV
},
ICEConfig: e.createICEConfig(),
}
if e.pqkemManager != nil {
config.PQ = pqHandshaker{mgr: e.pqkemManager}
config.PQStrict = pqkem.Strict()
}
serviceDependencies := peer.ServiceDependencies{
StatusRecorder: e.statusRecorder,
@@ -2120,10 +2083,6 @@ func (e *Engine) close() {
_ = e.rpManager.Close()
}
if e.pqkemManager != nil {
e.pqkemManager.Stop()
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
if err := e.portForwardManager.GracefullyStop(ctx); err != nil {
@@ -2936,8 +2895,6 @@ func convertToOfferAnswer(msg *sProto.Message) (*peer.OfferAnswer, error) {
Version: msg.GetBody().GetNetBirdVersion(),
RosenpassPubKey: rosenpassPubKey,
RosenpassAddr: rosenpassAddr,
MlkemPayload: msg.GetBody().GetMlkemPayload(),
MlkemPort: int(msg.GetBody().GetMlkemPort()),
RelaySrvAddress: msg.GetBody().GetRelayServerAddress(),
RelaySrvIP: relayIP,
SessionID: sessionID,

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package peer
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"math"
"net"
"net/netip"
"runtime"
@@ -27,7 +26,6 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/portforward"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/rosenpass"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/stdnet"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/monotime"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
relayClient "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/relay/client"
)
@@ -76,34 +74,6 @@ type RosenpassConfig struct {
PermissiveMode bool
}
// PQHandshaker attaches post-quantum ML-KEM material to signalling offers/answers and
// feeds received material back. It is implemented by the engine over the pqkem
// manager and is nil when the PQ exchange is disabled. remoteKey is the peer's
// WireGuard public key.
type PQHandshaker interface {
// OfferPayload returns the KEM offer to embed in an outgoing offer (nil if this
// peer is not the KEM initiator) and the local PQ data-path port to announce.
OfferPayload(remoteKey string) (payload []byte, port int)
// AnswerPayload processes a received KEM offer (nil if absent) and returns the KEM
// answer to embed in the outgoing answer (nil if none) and the local PQ port.
AnswerPayload(remoteKey string, recvOffer []byte) (payload []byte, port int)
// OnAnswer feeds a received KEM answer (nil if absent).
OnAnswer(remoteKey string, recvAnswer []byte)
// PSK returns the peer's latest derived post-quantum PSK to program at WG
// peer-config time (the pull path). ok is false until one has been derived.
PSK(remoteKey string) (wgtypes.Key, bool)
// SetRemoteAddr registers the peer's data-path endpoint learned from signalling:
// its WG overlay IP with the advertised pq UDP port.
SetRemoteAddr(remoteKey string, addr netip.AddrPort)
// OnDataPathRekeyed signals a fresh WireGuard handshake for the peer; it clocks the
// next chained PSK rotation pushed over the data path. sinceActivity is how long
// ago the peer last exchanged real user data, so the rotation can be skipped for
// idle tunnels.
OnDataPathRekeyed(remoteKey string, sinceActivity time.Duration)
// OnDataPathDown signals the peer's tunnel went down.
OnDataPathDown(remoteKey string)
}
// ConnConfig is a peer Connection configuration
type ConnConfig struct {
// Key is a public key of a remote peer
@@ -121,12 +91,6 @@ type ConnConfig struct {
RosenpassConfig RosenpassConfig
// PQ carries post-quantum ML-KEM material on offers/answers; nil when disabled.
PQ PQHandshaker
// PQStrict fails closed: block peer traffic until the ML-KEM PSK is established,
// instead of letting the tunnel come up classically and upgrading to PQ later.
PQStrict bool
// ICEConfig ICE protocol configuration
ICEConfig icemaker.Config
}
@@ -185,11 +149,6 @@ type Conn struct {
// pendingFirstPacket is the lazyconn-captured handshake init, replayed once the real
// transport is up.
pendingFirstPacket []byte
// pqBlockingKey is a per-conn random sentinel PSK used in PQ strict mode to fail
// closed: it is programmed until the real ML-KEM PSK is derived, so no session can
// form on a non-PQ key. Per-conn random so two strict peers never match by chance.
pqBlockingKey *wgtypes.Key
}
// injectPendingFirstPacket replays the captured handshake through the proxy if present, else
@@ -247,14 +206,6 @@ func NewConn(config ConnConfig, services ServiceDependencies) (*Conn, error) {
metricsRecorder: services.MetricsRecorder,
}
if config.PQ != nil && config.PQStrict {
if k, err := wgtypes.GenerateKey(); err != nil {
connLog.Errorf("pqkem: failed to generate strict-mode sentinel key, strict fail-closed disabled for this peer: %v", err)
} else {
conn.pqBlockingKey = &k
}
}
return conn, nil
}
@@ -719,22 +670,6 @@ func (conn *Conn) onGuardEvent() {
}
}
// RequestReoffer sends a fresh signalling offer for the peer, re-running the
// post-quantum bootstrap over Signal. Used to recover from a persistent data-path
// rekey failure: a new exchange overwrites the stalled PSK on both sides. No-op if the
// connection is not open yet.
func (conn *Conn) RequestReoffer() {
conn.mu.Lock()
h := conn.handshaker
conn.mu.Unlock()
if h == nil {
return
}
if err := h.SendOffer(); err != nil {
conn.Log.Debugf("pqkem: recovery re-offer failed: %v", err)
}
}
func (conn *Conn) onWGDisconnected(watcherCtx context.Context) {
conn.mu.Lock()
defer conn.mu.Unlock()
@@ -746,10 +681,6 @@ func (conn *Conn) onWGDisconnected(watcherCtx context.Context) {
conn.Log.Warnf("WireGuard handshake timeout detected, closing current connection")
if conn.config.PQ != nil {
conn.config.PQ.OnDataPathDown(conn.config.Key)
}
// Close the active connection based on current priority
switch conn.currentConnPriority {
case conntype.Relay:
@@ -792,7 +723,7 @@ func (conn *Conn) updateRelayStatus(relayServerAddr string, rosenpassPubKey []by
ConnStatus: conn.evalStatus(),
Relayed: conn.isRelayed(),
RelayServerAddress: relayServerAddr,
RosenpassEnabled: conn.quantumResistant(rosenpassPubKey),
RosenpassEnabled: isRosenpassEnabled(rosenpassPubKey),
}
err := conn.statusRecorder.UpdatePeerRelayedState(peerState)
@@ -811,7 +742,7 @@ func (conn *Conn) updateIceState(iceConnInfo ICEConnInfo, updateTime time.Time)
RemoteIceCandidateType: iceConnInfo.RemoteIceCandidateType,
LocalIceCandidateEndpoint: iceConnInfo.LocalIceCandidateEndpoint,
RemoteIceCandidateEndpoint: iceConnInfo.RemoteIceCandidateEndpoint,
RosenpassEnabled: conn.quantumResistant(iceConnInfo.RosenpassPubKey),
RosenpassEnabled: isRosenpassEnabled(iceConnInfo.RosenpassPubKey),
}
err := conn.statusRecorder.UpdatePeerICEState(peerState)
@@ -1015,35 +946,6 @@ func (conn *Conn) onWGCheckSuccess() {
conn.mu.Lock()
conn.wgTimeouts = 0
conn.mu.Unlock()
// A fresh WireGuard handshake clocks the post-quantum PSK rotation. Pass how long
// ago the peer last exchanged real user data (keepalives excluded) so the pqkem
// manager can skip rotation on idle tunnels — rotating then would push data-path
// traffic that keeps the lazy connection artificially active.
if conn.config.PQ != nil {
conn.config.PQ.OnDataPathRekeyed(conn.config.Key, conn.dataActivityAge())
}
}
// dataActivityAge returns how long ago the peer last exchanged real user data
// (WireGuard keepalives excluded), per the same LastActivities signal the
// lazy-connection inactivity monitor uses. It reports a very large duration when no
// activity has ever been recorded, so the peer is treated as idle.
//
// In kernel mode there is no per-peer data-activity signal (LastActivities is
// userspace-only), so we cannot tell active from idle. We report zero — always
// "active" — so PSK rotation is not disabled in kernel mode. Lazy back-to-idle is
// already limited there; the eBPF WG-activity detection (future) will supply a real
// signal that excludes handshake/pqkem traffic.
func (conn *Conn) dataActivityAge() time.Duration {
if !conn.config.WgConfig.WgInterface.IsUserspaceBind() {
return 0
}
last, ok := conn.config.WgConfig.WgInterface.LastActivities()[conn.config.WgConfig.RemoteKey]
if !ok {
return time.Duration(math.MaxInt64)
}
return monotime.Since(last)
}
// recordConnectionMetrics records connection stage timestamps as metrics
@@ -1085,23 +987,6 @@ func (conn *Conn) AgentVersionString() string {
}
func (conn *Conn) presharedKey(remoteRosenpassKey []byte) *wgtypes.Key {
// Post-quantum: once the ML-KEM exchange has derived a PSK for this peer, program
// it here so the peer's next WireGuard handshake adopts it. Applied at peer-config
// time (bootstrap / reconnect); steady-state rotation is pushed separately.
if conn.config.PQ != nil {
if psk, ok := conn.config.PQ.PSK(conn.config.Key); ok {
return &psk
}
if conn.config.PQStrict && conn.pqBlockingKey != nil {
// Fail closed: program a non-matching sentinel so no session forms on a
// non-PQ key until the ML-KEM exchange derives the real PSK (pushed via
// SetPresharedKey once it converges). "pending" — turns into a "stuck"
// warning from the manager if the exchange keeps failing (see raiseFailure).
conn.Log.Debugf("pqkem: strict mode — no PQ PSK yet, blocking peer traffic until the ML-KEM exchange converges")
return conn.pqBlockingKey
}
}
if conn.config.RosenpassConfig.PubKey == nil {
return conn.config.WgConfig.PreSharedKey
}
@@ -1141,21 +1026,6 @@ func isRosenpassEnabled(remoteRosenpassPubKey []byte) bool {
return remoteRosenpassPubKey != nil
}
// quantumResistant reports whether the peer's tunnel is post-quantum protected, for
// the status "Quantum resistance" field: either Rosenpass (the remote advertised a
// Rosenpass key) or the ML-KEM exchange (a PQ PSK has been derived for this peer).
func (conn *Conn) quantumResistant(remoteRosenpassPubKey []byte) bool {
if isRosenpassEnabled(remoteRosenpassPubKey) {
return true
}
if conn.config.PQ != nil {
if _, ok := conn.config.PQ.PSK(conn.config.Key); ok {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func evalConnStatus(in connStatusInputs) guard.ConnStatus {
// "Relay up and needed" — the peer uses relay and the transport is connected.
relayUsedAndUp := in.peerUsesRelay && in.relayConnected

View File

@@ -39,16 +39,6 @@ type OfferAnswer struct {
// This value is the local Rosenpass server address when sending the message
RosenpassAddr string
// MlkemPayload carries the post-quantum X25519MLKEM768 handshake message
// (pqkem-framed offer on an OFFER, answer on an ANSWER) that seeds the
// WireGuard PSK. Opaque here — the pqkem library frames and parses it. Nil
// when the peer does not run the ML-KEM PQ exchange.
MlkemPayload []byte
// MlkemPort is the peer's ML-KEM PQ service UDP port (bound on its WG overlay
// IP) where data-path rekey messages are sent. Zero when not running the exchange.
MlkemPort int
// relay server address
RelaySrvAddress string
// RelaySrvIP is the IP the remote peer is connected to on its
@@ -91,20 +81,14 @@ type Handshaker struct {
func NewHandshaker(log *log.Entry, config ConnConfig, signaler *Signaler, ice *WorkerICE, relay *WorkerRelay, metricsStages *MetricsStages) *Handshaker {
h := &Handshaker{
log: log,
config: config,
signaler: signaler,
ice: ice,
relay: relay,
metricsStages: metricsStages,
// Buffered by 1: the single Listen goroutine can be busy handling an offer
// (sendAnswer does a blocking signal send) exactly when the matching answer
// arrives on the other channel. Unbuffered, that answer would hit the
// non-blocking send's default and be dropped — fatal for the post-quantum
// exchange, which needs the answer to converge. A 1-slot cushion lets it wait
// until Listen loops back, without ever blocking the signal receiver.
remoteOffersCh: make(chan OfferAnswer, 1),
remoteAnswerCh: make(chan OfferAnswer, 1),
log: log,
config: config,
signaler: signaler,
ice: ice,
relay: relay,
metricsStages: metricsStages,
remoteOffersCh: make(chan OfferAnswer),
remoteAnswerCh: make(chan OfferAnswer),
}
// assume remote supports ICE until we learn otherwise from received offers
h.remoteICESupported.Store(ice != nil)
@@ -136,8 +120,6 @@ func (h *Handshaker) Listen(ctx context.Context) {
h.updateRemoteICEState(&remoteOfferAnswer)
h.pqRegisterEndpoint(remoteOfferAnswer.MlkemPort)
if h.relayListener != nil {
h.relayListener.Notify(&remoteOfferAnswer)
}
@@ -146,7 +128,7 @@ func (h *Handshaker) Listen(ctx context.Context) {
h.iceListener(&remoteOfferAnswer)
}
if err := h.sendAnswer(&remoteOfferAnswer); err != nil {
if err := h.sendAnswer(); err != nil {
h.log.Errorf("failed to send remote offer confirmation: %s", err)
continue
}
@@ -160,8 +142,6 @@ func (h *Handshaker) Listen(ctx context.Context) {
h.updateRemoteICEState(&remoteOfferAnswer)
h.pqRegisterEndpoint(remoteOfferAnswer.MlkemPort)
if h.relayListener != nil {
h.relayListener.Notify(&remoteOfferAnswer)
}
@@ -169,10 +149,6 @@ func (h *Handshaker) Listen(ctx context.Context) {
if h.iceListener != nil && h.RemoteICESupported() {
h.iceListener(&remoteOfferAnswer)
}
if h.config.PQ != nil {
h.config.PQ.OnAnswer(h.config.Key, remoteOfferAnswer.MlkemPayload)
}
case <-ctx.Done():
h.log.Infof("stop listening for remote offers and answers")
return
@@ -180,16 +156,6 @@ func (h *Handshaker) Listen(ctx context.Context) {
}
}
// pqRegisterEndpoint feeds the post-quantum handshaker the peer's data-path endpoint
// (its WG overlay IP plus the advertised pq UDP port) learned from a remote offer/answer.
func (h *Handshaker) pqRegisterEndpoint(remotePort int) {
if h.config.PQ == nil || remotePort <= 0 || remotePort > 65535 || len(h.config.WgConfig.AllowedIps) == 0 {
return
}
addr := netip.AddrPortFrom(h.config.WgConfig.AllowedIps[0].Addr(), uint16(remotePort))
h.config.PQ.SetRemoteAddr(h.config.Key, addr)
}
func (h *Handshaker) SendOffer() error {
h.mu.Lock()
defer h.mu.Unlock()
@@ -229,23 +195,13 @@ func (h *Handshaker) sendOffer() error {
}
offer := h.buildOfferAnswer()
if h.config.PQ != nil {
offer.MlkemPayload, offer.MlkemPort = h.config.PQ.OfferPayload(h.config.Key)
}
h.log.Debugf("sending offer with serial: %s", offer.SessionIDString())
return h.signaler.SignalOffer(offer, h.config.Key)
}
func (h *Handshaker) sendAnswer(remoteOffer *OfferAnswer) error {
func (h *Handshaker) sendAnswer() error {
answer := h.buildOfferAnswer()
if h.config.PQ != nil {
var recvOffer []byte
if remoteOffer != nil {
recvOffer = remoteOffer.MlkemPayload
}
answer.MlkemPayload, answer.MlkemPort = h.config.PQ.AnswerPayload(h.config.Key, recvOffer)
}
h.log.Debugf("sending answer with serial: %s", answer.SessionIDString())
return h.signaler.SignalAnswer(answer, h.config.Key)

View File

@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/configurer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgproxy"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/monotime"
)
type WGIface interface {
@@ -20,11 +19,4 @@ type WGIface interface {
GetProxy() wgproxy.Proxy
Address() wgaddr.Address
RemoveEndpointAddress(key string) error
// LastActivities returns the last real-data activity time per peer (WireGuard
// keepalives excluded), used to gate post-quantum PSK rotation on active tunnels.
LastActivities() map[string]monotime.Time
// IsUserspaceBind reports whether WireGuard runs in userspace. Only there does
// LastActivities track per-peer data activity; in kernel mode it is unavailable,
// so PSK rotation cannot be gated on activity.
IsUserspaceBind() bool
}

View File

@@ -63,8 +63,6 @@ func (s *Signaler) signalOfferAnswer(offerAnswer OfferAnswer, remoteKey string,
},
RosenpassPubKey: offerAnswer.RosenpassPubKey,
RosenpassAddr: offerAnswer.RosenpassAddr,
MlkemPayload: offerAnswer.MlkemPayload,
MlkemPort: offerAnswer.MlkemPort,
RelaySrvAddress: offerAnswer.RelaySrvAddress,
RelaySrvIP: offerAnswer.RelaySrvIP,
SessionID: sessionIDBytes,

View File

@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
package pqkem
import (
"crypto/ecdh"
"crypto/mlkem"
"crypto/rand"
"testing"
)
func BenchmarkX25519Keygen(b *testing.B) {
c := ecdh.X25519()
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
if _, err := c.GenerateKey(rand.Reader); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
}
}
func BenchmarkX25519ECDH(b *testing.B) {
c := ecdh.X25519()
a, _ := c.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
p, _ := c.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
pub := p.PublicKey()
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
if _, err := a.ECDH(pub); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
}
}
func BenchmarkMLKEMKeygen(b *testing.B) {
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
if _, err := mlkem.GenerateKey768(); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
}
}
func BenchmarkMLKEMEncaps(b *testing.B) {
dk, _ := mlkem.GenerateKey768()
ek := dk.EncapsulationKey()
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
_, _ = ek.Encapsulate()
}
}
func BenchmarkMLKEMDecaps(b *testing.B) {
dk, _ := mlkem.GenerateKey768()
_, ct := dk.EncapsulationKey().Encapsulate()
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
if _, err := dk.Decapsulate(ct); err != nil {
b.Fatal(err)
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
package pqkem
// CallbackHandler is implemented by the host and invoked by the library. The
// library only reports events; the host owns the reaction. Keeping this an
// interface — rather than touching the transport or keying directly — is what lets
// the KEM code be extracted as a standalone library.
type CallbackHandler interface {
// OnNewPSKReady fires when a fresh post-quantum PSK has been derived for a peer
// and must be programmed into the consumer's secure channel. It is invoked at
// the commit point of each side: the initiator on receiving the answer, the
// responder on receiving the confirm.
OnNewPSKReady(remoteID RemoteID, psk PSK) error
// OnRekeyFailed fires when an exchange fails to converge within the allotted
// time. The host should tear the peer connection down so it re-establishes, and
// log a WARN. The library reports the event; it does not dictate the reaction.
OnRekeyFailed(remoteID RemoteID) error
}

View File

@@ -1,271 +0,0 @@
package pqkem
import (
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"time"
)
// idHex renders an exchange ID for logs.
func idHex(id ExchangeID) string { return hex.EncodeToString(id[:]) }
// pskFingerprint is a short, non-secret digest of a derived PSK: identical on both
// peers iff they derived the same key. Logged instead of the raw PSK so debug logs
// never carry the actual WireGuard preshared key.
func pskFingerprint(psk PSK) string {
sum := sha256.Sum256(psk[:])
return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:8])
}
// startExchange creates a fresh initiator exchange (acknowledging ackID, zero for a
// bootstrap) and returns the framed offer for the caller to send — pushed over the
// data path for a chained rekey, or handed to the host for signalling when viaSignal
// is set. Any previous in-flight exchange for the peer is cancelled.
func (m *Manager) startExchange(remoteID RemoteID, viaSignal bool, ackID ExchangeID) ([]byte, error) {
init, err := NewInitiator()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
id, err := newExchangeID()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
raw, err := (&OfferMsg{ExchangeID: id, AckID: ackID, KEMOffer: init.Offer()}).Encode()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(m.rootCtx)
m.mu.Lock()
if old := m.exchanges[remoteID]; old != nil && old.cancel != nil {
old.cancel()
}
m.exchanges[remoteID] = &exchangeCtl{
id: id,
state: stateAwaitingAnswer,
startedAt: time.Now(),
cancel: cancel,
lastSent: raw,
initiator: init,
viaSignal: viaSignal,
}
m.mu.Unlock()
m.wait.Add(1)
go m.initiatorLoop(ctx, remoteID, id)
via := "data-path"
if viaSignal {
via = "signal"
}
m.trace("pqkem: offer sent", "peer", remoteID, "exchange", idHex(id), "acks", idHex(ackID), "via", via)
return raw, nil
}
// processOffer (responder) first acknowledges the previous exchange the offer names
// (that offer riding the data path under the freshly adopted key proves it worked),
// then derives the PSK for the new offer, commits it optimistically, and returns the
// framed answer. A duplicate offer returns the cached answer without re-deriving.
func (m *Manager) processOffer(remoteID RemoteID, o *OfferMsg) ([]byte, error) {
m.trace("pqkem: offer received", "peer", remoteID, "exchange", idHex(o.ExchangeID), "acks", idHex(o.AckID))
if o.AckID != (ExchangeID{}) {
m.ackConverged(remoteID, o.AckID)
}
m.mu.Lock()
if ex := m.exchanges[remoteID]; ex != nil && ex.id == o.ExchangeID {
state, last := ex.state, ex.lastSent
m.mu.Unlock()
if state == stateReserved {
return nil, nil
}
m.trace("pqkem: duplicate offer, resending cached answer", "peer", remoteID, "exchange", idHex(o.ExchangeID))
return last, nil
}
// Reserve the slot so a concurrent duplicate offer bails.
m.exchanges[remoteID] = &exchangeCtl{id: o.ExchangeID, state: stateReserved, startedAt: time.Now()}
m.mu.Unlock()
answerBytes, psk, err := Respond(o.KEMOffer, m.binding(remoteID))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
raw, err := (&AnswerMsg{ExchangeID: o.ExchangeID, KEMAnswer: answerBytes}).Encode()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
m.mu.Lock()
ex := m.exchanges[remoteID]
if ex == nil || ex.id != o.ExchangeID {
m.mu.Unlock()
m.trace("pqkem: exchange superseded during respond, dropping answer", "peer", remoteID, "exchange", idHex(o.ExchangeID))
return nil, nil
}
ex.state = stateAwaitingAck
ex.lastSent = raw
ex.pendingPSK = psk
m.psks[remoteID] = psk
m.mu.Unlock()
m.trace("pqkem: new PSK derived", "peer", remoteID, "exchange", idHex(o.ExchangeID), "role", "responder", "psk_fp", pskFingerprint(psk))
// Commit optimistically so our data path can rekey to the new PSK.
if err := m.cbHandler.OnNewPSKReady(remoteID, psk); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
m.trace("pqkem: answer sent", "peer", remoteID, "exchange", idHex(o.ExchangeID))
return raw, nil
}
// processAnswer (initiator) derives and commits the PSK and parks in
// stateAwaitingRekey; the next offer (chained from OnDataPathRekeyed) will acknowledge
// this exchange. Only valid in stateAwaitingAnswer; advancing the state under the
// lock makes a concurrent/duplicate answer bail.
func (m *Manager) processAnswer(remoteID RemoteID, a *AnswerMsg) error {
m.mu.Lock()
ex := m.exchanges[remoteID]
if ex == nil || ex.id != a.ExchangeID || ex.state != stateAwaitingAnswer {
haveID := "none"
if ex != nil {
haveID = idHex(ex.id)
}
m.mu.Unlock()
m.trace("pqkem: unexpected answer dropped (inconsistency)", "peer", remoteID, "answer_for", idHex(a.ExchangeID), "have_exchange", haveID)
return nil
}
ex.state = stateAwaitingRekey
init := ex.initiator
ex.initiator = nil
m.mu.Unlock()
m.trace("pqkem: answer received", "peer", remoteID, "exchange", idHex(a.ExchangeID))
psk, err := init.Finish(a.KEMAnswer, m.binding(remoteID))
if err != nil {
return err
}
// The initiator has converged: the responder must have derived the key to answer.
m.mu.Lock()
m.established[remoteID] = true
m.failures[remoteID] = 0
m.psks[remoteID] = psk
m.mu.Unlock()
m.trace("pqkem: new PSK derived", "peer", remoteID, "exchange", idHex(a.ExchangeID), "role", "initiator", "psk_fp", pskFingerprint(psk))
return m.cbHandler.OnNewPSKReady(remoteID, psk)
}
// ackConverged (responder) records convergence of the exchange named by ackID: a
// later offer acknowledging it proves both sides operate on that exchange's key. Only
// acts on a matching stateAwaitingAck exchange; anything else is ignored.
func (m *Manager) ackConverged(remoteID RemoteID, ackID ExchangeID) {
m.mu.Lock()
ex := m.exchanges[remoteID]
if ex == nil || ex.id != ackID || ex.state != stateAwaitingAck {
m.mu.Unlock()
m.trace("pqkem: ack for unknown/mismatched exchange, ignored (inconsistency)", "peer", remoteID, "acks", idHex(ackID))
return
}
delete(m.exchanges, remoteID)
m.established[remoteID] = true
m.failures[remoteID] = 0
_ = time.Since(ex.startedAt) // convergence latency (metrics hook, later step)
m.mu.Unlock()
m.trace("pqkem: previous exchange confirmed by ack", "peer", remoteID, "exchange", idHex(ackID))
}
// initiatorLoop enforces the offer->answer convergence deadline and retransmits the
// initiator's outstanding data-path offer while awaiting the answer (a
// signalling-bootstrapped offer is retransmitted by the host, so it is not resent
// here). Exhausting the deadline before the answer arrives is a failure. Once the
// answer is in (state past awaitingAnswer) the loop exits: the next rotation is driven
// by OnDataPathRekeyed, and the idle wait for it has no deadline.
func (m *Manager) initiatorLoop(ctx context.Context, remoteID RemoteID, id ExchangeID) {
defer m.wait.Done()
t := time.NewTicker(m.retryInterval)
defer t.Stop()
attempts := 0
for {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case <-t.C:
m.mu.Lock()
ex := m.exchanges[remoteID]
if ex == nil || ex.id != id {
m.mu.Unlock()
return
}
switch ex.state {
case stateAwaitingAnswer:
if attempts >= m.maxRetries {
delete(m.exchanges, remoteID)
initial := !m.established[remoteID]
fail := m.registerFailureLocked(remoteID)
m.mu.Unlock()
m.raiseFailure(remoteID, fail, initial)
return
}
viaSignal := ex.viaSignal
msg := ex.lastSent
attempts++
m.mu.Unlock()
if !viaSignal {
if err := m.pushDataPath(remoteID, msg); err != nil {
m.logger.Warn("pqkem: offer retransmit failed", "peer", remoteID, "err", err)
}
}
default:
// Past awaiting the answer (converged) or superseded: the loop's job
// is done. The next rotation is driven externally by OnDataPathRekeyed,
// so there is no deadline while idle-waiting for it (that wait can be
// as long as the transport's natural rekey interval).
m.mu.Unlock()
return
}
}
}
}
// registerFailureLocked applies policy B and reports whether OnRekeyFailed is due:
// an initial exchange (peer never established) fails immediately; a rekey tolerates
// up to maxRekeyFailures consecutive misses (we stay on the still-valid previous
// PSK) before failing. Assumes m.mu is held.
func (m *Manager) registerFailureLocked(remoteID RemoteID) bool {
if !m.established[remoteID] {
return true
}
m.failures[remoteID]++
if m.failures[remoteID] >= m.maxRekeyFailures {
m.failures[remoteID] = 0
return true
}
return false
}
// raiseFailure reports a convergence failure. initial distinguishes a never-established
// peer (bootstrap failed → no PQ PSK at all; in strict mode the peer stays blocked =
// "stuck") from a rekey failure (a previous PSK is still in force and traffic continues).
func (m *Manager) raiseFailure(remoteID RemoteID, fail, initial bool) {
if !fail {
m.logger.Warn("pqkem: rekey attempt timed out, will retry next cycle", "peer", remoteID)
return
}
if initial {
m.logger.Warn("pqkem: initial exchange failed — no PQ PSK established for peer (strict mode keeps the peer blocked until it converges)", "peer", remoteID)
} else {
m.logger.Warn("pqkem: rekey failed after retries — staying on the previous PSK", "peer", remoteID)
}
if err := m.cbHandler.OnRekeyFailed(remoteID); err != nil {
m.logger.Error("pqkem: OnRekeyFailed handler error", "peer", remoteID, "err", err)
}
}

View File

@@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
package pqkem
import (
"net/netip"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// dropTransport is a pqkem.Transport that silently discards everything.
type dropTransport struct{}
func (dropTransport) Send(netip.AddrPort, []byte) error { return nil }
func (dropTransport) LocalPort() int { return 0 }
func (dropTransport) Run(func(netip.AddrPort, []byte)) {}
func (dropTransport) Close() error { return nil }
func failedCount(f *fakeWG) int {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
return len(f.failed)
}
func TestManager_InitialTimeoutFailsImmediately(t *testing.T) {
wg := newFakeWG()
d := NewManager("bbbb", wg, nil) // bbbb > aaaa -> initiator
d.Start(dropTransport{})
d.retryInterval = 5 * time.Millisecond
d.maxRetries = 3
defer d.Stop()
// Bootstrap offer is produced for signalling; no answer ever comes back -> the
// initial exchange fails fast.
offer, err := d.SignalOffer("aaaa")
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, offer)
require.Eventually(t, func() bool { return failedCount(wg) == 1 }, time.Second, 5*time.Millisecond)
}
func TestManager_RekeyToleratesKFailures(t *testing.T) {
dA, dB, _, wgB, lbB := pair(t)
defer dA.Stop()
defer dB.Stop()
// Tighten B's timings before any exchange loop spawns (the loop reads these
// fields, so writing them after a loop is running would race).
dB.retryInterval = 5 * time.Millisecond
dB.maxRetries = 2
// Establish: bootstrap + data-path-rekeyed so B becomes established and its data
// path is usable.
bootstrap(t, dA, dB)
dA.OnDataPathRekeyed("bbbb", 0)
dB.OnDataPathRekeyed("aaaa", 0)
require.NotEqual(t, PSK{}, wgB.psk("aaaa"))
// Drop B's outbound so rekeys can no longer converge.
lbB.drop.Store(true)
// K-1 data-path rekeys must NOT raise OnRekeyFailed.
for i := 0; i < DefaultMaxRekeyFailures-1; i++ {
_, err := dB.startExchange("aaaa", false, ExchangeID{})
require.NoError(t, err)
time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
}
require.Equal(t, 0, failedCount(wgB), "no failure before K attempts")
// The K-th failure raises it once.
_, err := dB.startExchange("aaaa", false, ExchangeID{})
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Eventually(t, func() bool { return failedCount(wgB) == 1 }, time.Second, 5*time.Millisecond)
}

View File

@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
package pqkem
import (
"context"
"log/slog"
"os"
"strconv"
"strings"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
)
// EnvEnabled is the environment variable that turns the ML-KEM post-quantum
// exchange on for this client. Accepts on/off aliases plus anything
// strconv.ParseBool understands (true/false/1/0).
const EnvEnabled = "NB_ENABLE_PQ_MLKEM"
// Enabled reports whether the ML-KEM PQ exchange is enabled via the environment.
// An empty or unrecognized value is treated as disabled.
func Enabled() bool {
raw := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(EnvEnabled)))
switch raw {
case "":
return false
case "on":
return true
case "off":
return false
}
enabled, err := strconv.ParseBool(raw)
if err != nil {
log.Warnf("failed to parse %s value %q: %v", EnvEnabled, raw, err)
return false
}
return enabled
}
// EnvStrict enables strict (fail-closed) mode: block peer traffic until the ML-KEM
// PSK has been established, instead of the default opportunistic behaviour that lets
// the tunnel come up classically and upgrades to PQ once the exchange converges.
const EnvStrict = "NB_PQ_MLKEM_STRICT"
// Strict reports whether strict (fail-closed) mode is enabled via the environment.
// An empty or unrecognized value is treated as disabled (opportunistic).
func Strict() bool {
switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(EnvStrict))) {
case "on":
return true
case "", "off":
return false
}
enabled, err := strconv.ParseBool(strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(EnvStrict)))
if err != nil {
log.Warnf("failed to parse %s value %q: %v", EnvStrict, os.Getenv(EnvStrict), err)
return false
}
return enabled
}
// EnvLogLevel overrides the ML-KEM manager's slog level (trace/debug/info/warn/error).
// Defaults to info. The verbose per-exchange lifecycle logs are emitted at trace.
const EnvLogLevel = "NB_PQ_MLKEM_LOG_LEVEL"
// LevelTrace is a custom slog level below Debug for the verbose per-exchange lifecycle
// logs, so they stay off unless NB_PQ_MLKEM_LOG_LEVEL=trace (and the daemon log level
// is trace, since the records are forwarded to logrus).
const LevelTrace = slog.LevelDebug - 4
// NewLogger builds the slog logger for the ML-KEM manager. It forwards records to
// logrus so PQ logs land in the same sink as the rest of the daemon (console +
// client.log) rather than stdout. Verbosity is gated by EnvLogLevel.
func NewLogger() *slog.Logger {
return slog.New(slogToLogrus{})
}
func logLevel() slog.Level {
switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(EnvLogLevel))) {
case "trace":
return LevelTrace
case "debug":
return slog.LevelDebug
case "warn":
return slog.LevelWarn
case "error":
return slog.LevelError
default:
return slog.LevelInfo
}
}
// slogToLogrus is a slog.Handler that forwards records to logrus, so the ML-KEM
// manager's logs go wherever the daemon's logrus is configured (console + client.log)
// instead of stdout. Verbosity is gated by EnvLogLevel via logLevel().
type slogToLogrus struct {
fields log.Fields
}
func (h slogToLogrus) Enabled(_ context.Context, level slog.Level) bool {
return level >= logLevel()
}
func (h slogToLogrus) Handle(_ context.Context, r slog.Record) error {
fields := make(log.Fields, len(h.fields)+r.NumAttrs())
for k, v := range h.fields {
fields[k] = v
}
r.Attrs(func(a slog.Attr) bool {
fields[a.Key] = a.Value.Any()
return true
})
entry := log.WithFields(fields)
switch {
case r.Level >= slog.LevelError:
entry.Error(r.Message)
case r.Level >= slog.LevelWarn:
entry.Warn(r.Message)
case r.Level >= slog.LevelInfo:
entry.Info(r.Message)
case r.Level >= slog.LevelDebug:
entry.Debug(r.Message)
default:
entry.Trace(r.Message)
}
return nil
}
func (h slogToLogrus) WithAttrs(attrs []slog.Attr) slog.Handler {
fields := make(log.Fields, len(h.fields)+len(attrs))
for k, v := range h.fields {
fields[k] = v
}
for _, a := range attrs {
fields[a.Key] = a.Value.Any()
}
return slogToLogrus{fields: fields}
}
func (h slogToLogrus) WithGroup(_ string) slog.Handler { return h }

View File

@@ -1,178 +0,0 @@
// Package pqkem is a spike (NET-1406) for a post-quantum pre-shared-key exchange
// that could replace Rosenpass. It performs an X25519MLKEM768 hybrid key
// encapsulation and derives a 32-byte pre-shared key (PSK).
//
// The exchange is a single round trip designed to ride the (already
// authenticated) Signal offer/answer channel:
//
// initiator --Offer(1216B)--> responder
// initiator <--Answer(1120B)-- responder
//
// Both sides then hold the same PSK, which is bound to the two peers' identities
// (their peer identity keys) so the derived key cannot be transplanted
// to a different peer pair even if the transport authentication were bypassed.
//
// Combiner note: this follows draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem for X25519MLKEM768 — on
// the wire ML-KEM ‖ X25519 (the draft deliberately reversed the share order for
// this group), and ML-KEM_ss ‖ X25519_ss as the KDF input. The PSK is derived with
// HKDF-SHA256 over that hybrid secret, salted with a domain-separation label and
// bound (via the HKDF info) to the full transcript and the canonicalised peer
// identities.
package pqkem
import (
"crypto/ecdh"
"crypto/hkdf"
"crypto/mlkem"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/sha256"
"fmt"
)
const (
// OfferSize is the initiator message: ML-KEM-768 encapsulation key ‖ X25519 public key
// (share order per draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem for X25519MLKEM768).
OfferSize = mlkem.EncapsulationKeySize768 + 32 // 1216
// AnswerSize is the responder message: ML-KEM-768 ciphertext ‖ X25519 public key.
AnswerSize = mlkem.CiphertextSize768 + 32 // 1120
pskLabel = "netbird-pq-psk-v1"
)
// PSK is the 32-byte derived pre-shared key handed to the consumer to key its channel.
type PSK [32]byte
// Binding identifies the peer pair the PSK is derived for. Callers set both
// peer identity keys; the order does not matter (it is canonicalised).
type Binding struct {
LocalID []byte
RemoteID []byte
}
// Initiator holds the ephemeral secrets between Offer and Finish.
type Initiator struct {
x25519 *ecdh.PrivateKey
mlkemDK *mlkem.DecapsulationKey768
offer []byte
}
// NewInitiator generates the ephemeral X25519 + ML-KEM-768 keypairs.
func NewInitiator() (*Initiator, error) {
x, err := ecdh.X25519().GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("x25519 keygen: %w", err)
}
dk, err := mlkem.GenerateKey768()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("ml-kem keygen: %w", err)
}
offer := make([]byte, 0, OfferSize)
offer = append(offer, dk.EncapsulationKey().Bytes()...)
offer = append(offer, x.PublicKey().Bytes()...)
return &Initiator{x25519: x, mlkemDK: dk, offer: offer}, nil
}
// Offer returns the initiator message to send over Signal.
func (i *Initiator) Offer() []byte {
return i.offer
}
// Finish consumes the responder's answer and derives the PSK.
func (i *Initiator) Finish(answer []byte, b Binding) (PSK, error) {
if len(answer) != AnswerSize {
return PSK{}, fmt.Errorf("answer: got %d bytes, want %d", len(answer), AnswerSize)
}
ct := answer[:mlkem.CiphertextSize768]
peerX := answer[mlkem.CiphertextSize768:]
ssMLKEM, err := i.mlkemDK.Decapsulate(ct)
if err != nil {
return PSK{}, fmt.Errorf("ml-kem decapsulate: %w", err)
}
pub, err := ecdh.X25519().NewPublicKey(peerX)
if err != nil {
return PSK{}, fmt.Errorf("parse peer x25519: %w", err)
}
ssX, err := i.x25519.ECDH(pub)
if err != nil {
return PSK{}, fmt.Errorf("x25519 ecdh: %w", err)
}
return derivePSK(ssMLKEM, ssX, i.offer, answer, b)
}
// Respond consumes an initiator offer, produces the answer, and derives the PSK.
func Respond(offer []byte, b Binding) (answer []byte, psk PSK, err error) {
if len(offer) != OfferSize {
return nil, PSK{}, fmt.Errorf("offer: got %d bytes, want %d", len(offer), OfferSize)
}
peerEK := offer[:mlkem.EncapsulationKeySize768]
peerX := offer[mlkem.EncapsulationKeySize768:]
ek, err := mlkem.NewEncapsulationKey768(peerEK)
if err != nil {
return nil, PSK{}, fmt.Errorf("parse peer ml-kem key: %w", err)
}
ssMLKEM, ct := ek.Encapsulate()
x, err := ecdh.X25519().GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
return nil, PSK{}, fmt.Errorf("x25519 keygen: %w", err)
}
pub, err := ecdh.X25519().NewPublicKey(peerX)
if err != nil {
return nil, PSK{}, fmt.Errorf("parse peer x25519: %w", err)
}
ssX, err := x.ECDH(pub)
if err != nil {
return nil, PSK{}, fmt.Errorf("x25519 ecdh: %w", err)
}
answer = make([]byte, 0, AnswerSize)
answer = append(answer, ct...)
answer = append(answer, x.PublicKey().Bytes()...)
// derivePSK uses the same argument order on both sides; the responder's local
// binding is the mirror of the initiator's, canonicalised inside derivePSK.
psk, err = derivePSK(ssMLKEM, ssX, offer, answer, b)
if err != nil {
return nil, PSK{}, err
}
return answer, psk, nil
}
// derivePSK runs HKDF-SHA256 over the hybrid shared secret (ML-KEM_ss ‖ X25519_ss,
// per draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem), salted with the domain-separation label, and binds
// the result — via the HKDF info — to the full transcript (offer ‖ answer) and the
// canonicalised peer identities, so the PSK cannot be transplanted to another peer
// pair or a different exchange.
func derivePSK(ssMLKEM, ssX, offer, answer []byte, b Binding) (PSK, error) {
lo, hi := canonicalPair(b.LocalID, b.RemoteID)
ikm := make([]byte, 0, len(ssMLKEM)+len(ssX))
ikm = append(ikm, ssMLKEM...)
ikm = append(ikm, ssX...)
info := make([]byte, 0, len(offer)+len(answer)+len(lo)+len(hi))
info = append(info, offer...)
info = append(info, answer...)
info = append(info, lo...)
info = append(info, hi...)
var psk PSK
key, err := hkdf.Key(sha256.New, ikm, []byte(pskLabel), string(info), len(psk))
if err != nil {
return PSK{}, fmt.Errorf("hkdf derive psk: %w", err)
}
copy(psk[:], key)
return psk, nil
}
func canonicalPair(a, b []byte) (lo, hi []byte) {
if string(a) <= string(b) {
return a, b
}
return b, a
}

View File

@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
package pqkem
import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
var (
wgA = []byte("peer-A-wireguard-pubkey-32bytes!")
wgB = []byte("peer-B-wireguard-pubkey-32bytes!")
)
func TestExchange_DerivesMatchingPSK(t *testing.T) {
init, err := NewInitiator()
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, init.Offer(), OfferSize)
answer, pskB, err := Respond(init.Offer(), Binding{LocalID: wgB, RemoteID: wgA})
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, answer, AnswerSize)
pskA, err := init.Finish(answer, Binding{LocalID: wgA, RemoteID: wgB})
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, pskB, pskA, "both sides must derive the same PSK")
require.NotEqual(t, PSK{}, pskA, "PSK must not be zero")
}
func TestExchange_PSKBoundToPeerIdentities(t *testing.T) {
init, err := NewInitiator()
require.NoError(t, err)
// responder computes with the honest pair...
_, pskHonest, err := Respond(init.Offer(), Binding{LocalID: wgB, RemoteID: wgA})
require.NoError(t, err)
// ...a second responder run with a different peer identity yields a different PSK,
// even though the KEM material would otherwise combine identically.
wgC := []byte("peer-C-wireguard-pubkey-32bytes!")
_, pskWrong, err := Respond(init.Offer(), Binding{LocalID: wgC, RemoteID: wgA})
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotEqual(t, pskHonest, pskWrong, "PSK must be bound to the peer pair")
}
func TestExchange_RejectsMalformedMessages(t *testing.T) {
init, err := NewInitiator()
require.NoError(t, err)
_, _, err = Respond(init.Offer()[:10], Binding{})
require.Error(t, err)
_, err = init.Finish([]byte("too short"), Binding{})
require.Error(t, err)
}
// TestExchange_ReportSizesAndTiming is a spike measurement, not a pass/fail gate.
// Run with: go test -run TestExchange_ReportSizesAndTiming -v ./client/internal/pqkem/
func TestExchange_ReportSizesAndTiming(t *testing.T) {
const iters = 200
var tInit, tResp, tFinish time.Duration
for i := 0; i < iters; i++ {
s0 := time.Now()
init, err := NewInitiator()
require.NoError(t, err)
tInit += time.Since(s0)
s1 := time.Now()
answer, _, err := Respond(init.Offer(), Binding{LocalID: wgB, RemoteID: wgA})
require.NoError(t, err)
tResp += time.Since(s1)
s2 := time.Now()
_, err = init.Finish(answer, Binding{LocalID: wgA, RemoteID: wgB})
require.NoError(t, err)
tFinish += time.Since(s2)
}
t.Logf("wire sizes: offer=%d B answer=%d B (Rosenpass static pubkey ~524160 B)", OfferSize, AnswerSize)
t.Logf("total on-wire per handshake: %d B (~%.0fx smaller than RP static key)", OfferSize+AnswerSize, 524160.0/float64(OfferSize+AnswerSize))
t.Logf("avg NewInitiator (keygen): %s", tInit/iters)
t.Logf("avg Respond (encaps+dh): %s", tResp/iters)
t.Logf("avg Finish (decaps+dh): %s", tFinish/iters)
t.Logf("avg full handshake CPU: %s", (tInit+tResp+tFinish)/iters)
}

View File

@@ -1,399 +0,0 @@
package pqkem
import (
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net/netip"
"sync"
"time"
)
const (
// DefaultRetryInterval is how often the initiator retransmits its outstanding
// data-path offer while awaiting the answer.
DefaultRetryInterval = 2 * time.Second
// DefaultMaxRetries bounds how many ticks an exchange may run before it is
// declared failed. The convergence deadline is thus MaxRetries * RetryInterval.
DefaultMaxRetries = 10
// DefaultMaxRekeyFailures is how many consecutive rekey (non-initial) failures
// are tolerated before OnRekeyFailed. The initial exchange fails immediately.
DefaultMaxRekeyFailures = 3
// rotationActivityWindow gates rotation on recent real-data activity: a rekey
// clocks a rotation only if the peer exchanged user data within this window. It
// must stay shorter than the data path's rekey interval (WireGuard
// REKEY_AFTER_TIME ~120s) so the rotation's own traffic — which itself renews the
// activity signal — ages out before the next rekey, letting an idle tunnel stop
// rotating instead of self-sustaining.
rotationActivityWindow = 90 * time.Second
)
// LocalID and RemoteID are peer identity keys (e.g. WireGuard public keys). They are
// distinct types so the local and a remote identity cannot be mixed up.
type (
LocalID string
RemoteID string
)
// Transport is the data-path socket the Manager drives (the analogue of
// go-rosenpass's Conn). It is a dumb mover of bytes to/from endpoints: the Manager
// owns the remoteID<->endpoint routing and hands the transport a resolved endpoint
// to Send, and reverse-resolves the source of each inbound datagram. Its lifecycle
// belongs to the Manager (Run at Start, Close at Stop).
type Transport interface {
// Send delivers msg to the given data-path endpoint.
Send(endpoint netip.AddrPort, msg []byte) error
// LocalPort is the bound local UDP port, announced to peers so they know where
// to send data-path messages.
LocalPort() int
// Run starts delivering inbound datagrams as (source endpoint, msg) to onInbound
// and returns immediately; it runs until Close.
Run(onInbound func(src netip.AddrPort, msg []byte))
// Close stops delivery and releases the socket.
Close() error
}
// exchangeState is the single source of truth for an exchange's role and phase.
type exchangeState uint8
const (
stateReserved exchangeState = iota // responder: deriving the answer
stateAwaitingAnswer // initiator: offer sent, awaiting the answer
stateAwaitingRekey // initiator: PSK derived+set, awaiting OnDataPathRekeyed to chain the next offer
stateAwaitingAck // responder: answer sent, awaiting the next offer that acks this exchange
)
// exchangeCtl holds all state for one in-flight exchange with a peer, under the
// Manager's single lock. state drives every decision. lastSent is the current
// data-path retransmit payload (the offer, for the initiator). initiator is the
// ephemeral handle used at Finish; pendingPSK is the responder's derived key.
// viaSignal records that the offer went to the host for the signalling channel, so
// the loop does not retransmit it on the data path. Only the initiator runs a
// retransmit loop, so only it sets cancel.
type exchangeCtl struct {
id ExchangeID
state exchangeState
startedAt time.Time
cancel context.CancelFunc
lastSent []byte
initiator *Initiator
pendingPSK PSK
viaSignal bool
}
// Manager is the stateful orchestrator — the analogue of go-rosenpass's Server. It
// drives the X25519MLKEM768 exchange, owns the peer endpoint routing and the data-path
// transport, and surfaces the derived PSK and convergence to the host via
// CallbackHandler. It is event-driven: the bootstrap is triggered by the host
// (SignalOffer) and each rotation is clocked by OnDataPathRekeyed. The cryptography is
// the pure kem.go primitives; all state lives here under one lock.
type Manager struct {
localID LocalID
cbHandler CallbackHandler
logger *slog.Logger
retryInterval time.Duration
maxRetries int
maxRekeyFailures int
rootCtx context.Context
rootCancel context.CancelFunc
mu sync.Mutex
transport Transport
exchanges map[RemoteID]*exchangeCtl // in-flight exchange per peer
established map[RemoteID]bool // peer has completed at least one exchange
failures map[RemoteID]int // consecutive rekey failures per peer
psks map[RemoteID]PSK // latest derived PSK per peer (pulled at WG peer-config time)
peerAddrs map[RemoteID]netip.AddrPort // remoteID -> data-path endpoint (send routing)
peersByAddr map[netip.AddrPort]RemoteID // reverse: source endpoint -> remoteID (inbound)
wait sync.WaitGroup
}
// NewManager builds a manager for the local peer identified by its peer identity key
// (used for the deterministic initiator role and the identity binding). A nil logger
// falls back to slog.Default(). Install the data-path transport with Start.
func NewManager(localID LocalID, h CallbackHandler, logger *slog.Logger) *Manager {
if logger == nil {
logger = slog.Default()
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
return &Manager{
localID: localID,
cbHandler: h,
logger: logger,
retryInterval: DefaultRetryInterval,
maxRetries: DefaultMaxRetries,
maxRekeyFailures: DefaultMaxRekeyFailures,
rootCtx: ctx,
rootCancel: cancel,
exchanges: make(map[RemoteID]*exchangeCtl),
established: make(map[RemoteID]bool),
failures: make(map[RemoteID]int),
psks: make(map[RemoteID]PSK),
peerAddrs: make(map[RemoteID]netip.AddrPort),
peersByAddr: make(map[netip.AddrPort]RemoteID),
}
}
// Start installs the data-path transport and begins its inbound delivery. The Manager
// owns it from here; Stop closes it. Start/Stop are the transport lifecycle pair.
func (m *Manager) Start(t Transport) {
m.mu.Lock()
m.transport = t
m.mu.Unlock()
if t != nil {
t.Run(m.onDataPathInbound)
}
}
// LocalPort is the data-path transport's bound UDP port (0 if no transport), to be
// announced to peers.
func (m *Manager) LocalPort() int {
m.mu.Lock()
t := m.transport
m.mu.Unlock()
if t == nil {
return 0
}
return t.LocalPort()
}
// IsInitiator reports whether the local peer drives the exchange for this remote
// peer. Roles are deterministic (lexicographic identity-key compare) so exactly one
// side initiates, mirroring how Rosenpass picks its handshake initiator.
func (m *Manager) IsInitiator(remoteID RemoteID) bool {
return string(m.localID) > string(remoteID)
}
// PSK returns the latest PSK derived for the peer, for the host to program at WG
// peer-config time (the pull path). ok is false until an exchange has derived one.
func (m *Manager) PSK(remoteID RemoteID) (PSK, bool) {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
psk, ok := m.psks[remoteID]
return psk, ok
}
// trace logs at LevelTrace, the verbose per-exchange lifecycle level gated by
// NB_PQ_MLKEM_LOG_LEVEL=trace.
func (m *Manager) trace(msg string, args ...any) {
m.logger.Log(context.Background(), LevelTrace, msg, args...)
}
// AddPeer registers where a peer's data-path messages are sent and received: its
// overlay endpoint (IP:port). Re-adding updates the endpoint.
func (m *Manager) AddPeer(remoteID RemoteID, endpoint netip.AddrPort) {
if !endpoint.IsValid() {
return
}
m.mu.Lock()
if old, ok := m.peerAddrs[remoteID]; ok {
delete(m.peersByAddr, old)
}
m.peerAddrs[remoteID] = endpoint
m.peersByAddr[endpoint] = remoteID
m.mu.Unlock()
}
// RemovePeer stops any in-flight exchange for a peer and drops its state and routing.
func (m *Manager) RemovePeer(remoteID RemoteID) {
m.mu.Lock()
if ex, ok := m.exchanges[remoteID]; ok {
if ex.cancel != nil {
ex.cancel()
}
delete(m.exchanges, remoteID)
}
delete(m.established, remoteID)
delete(m.failures, remoteID)
delete(m.psks, remoteID)
if ep, ok := m.peerAddrs[remoteID]; ok {
delete(m.peersByAddr, ep)
delete(m.peerAddrs, remoteID)
}
m.mu.Unlock()
}
// Stop cancels all in-flight exchanges, closes the transport, and waits for the
// exchange goroutines to exit.
func (m *Manager) Stop() {
m.rootCancel()
m.wait.Wait()
m.mu.Lock()
t := m.transport
m.transport = nil
m.exchanges = make(map[RemoteID]*exchangeCtl)
m.psks = make(map[RemoteID]PSK)
m.mu.Unlock()
if t != nil {
if err := t.Close(); err != nil {
m.logger.Warn("pqkem: closing data-path transport", "err", err)
}
}
}
// ---- Signalling channel (host-driven; rides the host's negotiation) ----
// SignalOffer returns the KEM offer for the host to embed in its outgoing offer to
// remoteID (bootstrap). It returns (nil, nil) when the local peer is not the
// initiator. It is idempotent for an in-flight bootstrap: a repeat call returns the
// same offer rather than starting a new exchange.
func (m *Manager) SignalOffer(remoteID RemoteID) ([]byte, error) {
if !m.IsInitiator(remoteID) {
return nil, nil
}
m.mu.Lock()
if ex := m.exchanges[remoteID]; ex != nil && ex.viaSignal && ex.state == stateAwaitingAnswer {
last := ex.lastSent
m.mu.Unlock()
return last, nil
}
m.mu.Unlock()
// bootstrap offer acknowledges nothing (zero AckID).
return m.startExchange(remoteID, true, ExchangeID{})
}
// SignalOnOffer processes a KEM offer the host extracted from an incoming offer and
// returns the KEM answer for the host to embed in its outgoing answer.
func (m *Manager) SignalOnOffer(remoteID RemoteID, offer []byte) ([]byte, error) {
typ, msg, err := Decode(offer)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("decode signal offer from %s: %w", remoteID, err)
}
if typ != MsgOffer {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("expected offer from %s, got type %d", remoteID, typ)
}
return m.processOffer(remoteID, msg.(*OfferMsg))
}
// SignalOnAnswer processes a KEM answer the host extracted from an incoming answer.
// There is no reply: the next offer (over the data path) acknowledges this exchange.
func (m *Manager) SignalOnAnswer(remoteID RemoteID, answer []byte) error {
typ, msg, err := Decode(answer)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("decode signal answer from %s: %w", remoteID, err)
}
if typ != MsgAnswer {
return fmt.Errorf("expected answer from %s, got type %d", remoteID, typ)
}
return m.processAnswer(remoteID, msg.(*AnswerMsg))
}
// ---- Data path ----
// onDataPathInbound is the transport's inbound handler: it reverse-resolves the
// source endpoint to a peer and dispatches. Unknown sources are dropped.
func (m *Manager) onDataPathInbound(src netip.AddrPort, msg []byte) {
m.mu.Lock()
remoteID, ok := m.peersByAddr[src]
m.mu.Unlock()
if !ok {
return
}
if err := m.OnDataPathMessage(remoteID, msg); err != nil {
m.trace("pqkem: inbound", "peer", remoteID, "err", err)
}
}
// OnDataPathMessage handles a KEM message received over the data path from remoteID
// and pushes any reply back over the data path.
func (m *Manager) OnDataPathMessage(remoteID RemoteID, raw []byte) error {
typ, msg, err := Decode(raw)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("decode data-path msg from %s: %w", remoteID, err)
}
switch typ {
case MsgOffer:
answer, err := m.processOffer(remoteID, msg.(*OfferMsg))
if err != nil {
return err
}
if answer == nil {
return nil
}
return m.pushDataPath(remoteID, answer)
case MsgAnswer:
return m.processAnswer(remoteID, msg.(*AnswerMsg))
default:
return fmt.Errorf("unhandled data-path message type %d from %s", typ, remoteID)
}
}
// OnDataPathRekeyed notifies that the peer's data path is up and freshly keyed with
// the latest PSK (fired on first establishment AND every rekey). If we are the
// initiator that just derived a PSK, it chains the next exchange: a fresh offer over
// the data path that acknowledges the just-completed one (its arrival under the new
// key proves to the responder that the key works).
// OnDataPathRekeyed clocks the next chained PSK rotation on a fresh data-path rekey.
// sinceActivity is how long ago the peer last exchanged real user data; when it
// exceeds rotationActivityWindow the tunnel is treated as idle and rotation is
// skipped — an idle tunnel has nothing to protect, and rotating would emit data-path
// traffic that keeps the peer artificially active (see conn.onWGCheckSuccess).
func (m *Manager) OnDataPathRekeyed(remoteID RemoteID, sinceActivity time.Duration) {
if sinceActivity >= rotationActivityWindow {
m.trace("pqkem: peer idle, skipping data-path rotation", "peer", remoteID, "since_activity", sinceActivity)
return
}
m.mu.Lock()
ex := m.exchanges[remoteID]
chain := ex != nil && ex.state == stateAwaitingRekey
var ackID ExchangeID
if chain {
ackID = ex.id
}
m.mu.Unlock()
m.trace("pqkem: data-path rekey signal", "peer", remoteID, "chaining", chain)
if !chain {
return
}
offer, err := m.startExchange(remoteID, false, ackID)
if err != nil {
m.logger.Error("pqkem: chain offer failed to start", "peer", remoteID, "err", err)
return
}
if err := m.pushDataPath(remoteID, offer); err != nil {
m.logger.Warn("pqkem: send chain offer failed", "peer", remoteID, "err", err)
return
}
m.trace("pqkem: chain offer sent over data path", "peer", remoteID)
}
// OnDataPathDown notifies that the peer's data path went down. Rotations resume once
// the host re-bootstraps over signalling on reconnect; in-flight data-path sends will
// simply fail until then. Reserved as an explicit hook.
func (m *Manager) OnDataPathDown(remoteID RemoteID) {}
// ---- internals ----
// pushDataPath resolves the peer's endpoint and sends over the data-path transport,
// erroring if the peer is unknown or no transport is set.
func (m *Manager) pushDataPath(remoteID RemoteID, msg []byte) error {
m.mu.Lock()
ep, ok := m.peerAddrs[remoteID]
t := m.transport
m.mu.Unlock()
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("no data-path endpoint for peer %s", remoteID)
}
if t == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("no data-path transport")
}
return t.Send(ep, msg)
}
func (m *Manager) binding(remoteID RemoteID) Binding {
return Binding{LocalID: []byte(m.localID), RemoteID: []byte(remoteID)}
}
func newExchangeID() (ExchangeID, error) {
var id ExchangeID
if _, err := rand.Read(id[:]); err != nil {
return ExchangeID{}, fmt.Errorf("generate exchange id: %w", err)
}
return id, nil
}

View File

@@ -1,193 +0,0 @@
package pqkem
import (
"fmt"
"net/netip"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// netSwitch is an in-memory UDP fabric: transports register their endpoint and get
// datagrams delivered to their inbound handler.
type netSwitch struct {
mu sync.Mutex
h map[netip.AddrPort]func(netip.AddrPort, []byte)
}
func newSwitch() *netSwitch {
return &netSwitch{h: map[netip.AddrPort]func(netip.AddrPort, []byte){}}
}
func (s *netSwitch) register(ep netip.AddrPort, fn func(netip.AddrPort, []byte)) {
s.mu.Lock()
s.h[ep] = fn
s.mu.Unlock()
}
func (s *netSwitch) deliver(dst, src netip.AddrPort, msg []byte) error {
s.mu.Lock()
fn := s.h[dst]
s.mu.Unlock()
if fn == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("no route to %s", dst)
}
fn(src, msg)
return nil
}
// loopback is an endpoint-based pqkem.Transport over a netSwitch, with a switchable
// drop flag.
type loopback struct {
ep netip.AddrPort
sw *netSwitch
drop atomic.Bool
}
func (l *loopback) Send(dst netip.AddrPort, msg []byte) error {
if l.drop.Load() {
return nil
}
return l.sw.deliver(dst, l.ep, append([]byte(nil), msg...))
}
func (l *loopback) LocalPort() int { return int(l.ep.Port()) }
func (l *loopback) Run(onInbound func(netip.AddrPort, []byte)) { l.sw.register(l.ep, onInbound) }
func (l *loopback) Close() error { return nil }
type fakeWG struct {
mu sync.Mutex
psks map[RemoteID]PSK
failed []RemoteID
}
func newFakeWG() *fakeWG { return &fakeWG{psks: map[RemoteID]PSK{}} }
func (f *fakeWG) OnNewPSKReady(remoteID RemoteID, psk PSK) error {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
f.psks[remoteID] = psk
return nil
}
func (f *fakeWG) OnRekeyFailed(remoteID RemoteID) error {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
f.failed = append(f.failed, remoteID)
return nil
}
func (f *fakeWG) psk(peer RemoteID) PSK {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
return f.psks[peer]
}
var (
epA = netip.MustParseAddrPort("100.64.0.1:51833")
epB = netip.MustParseAddrPort("100.64.0.2:51833")
)
// pair builds two wired managers (B is the initiator, "bbbb" > "aaaa") sharing a
// netSwitch, with each peer's data-path endpoint registered. lbB is B's loopback
// (for toggling drop).
func pair(t *testing.T) (dA, dB *Manager, wgA, wgB *fakeWG, lbB *loopback) {
t.Helper()
sw := newSwitch()
wgA = newFakeWG()
wgB = newFakeWG()
dA = NewManager("aaaa", wgA, nil)
dB = NewManager("bbbb", wgB, nil)
dA.Start(&loopback{ep: epA, sw: sw})
lbB = &loopback{ep: epB, sw: sw}
dB.Start(lbB)
dA.AddPeer("bbbb", epB)
dB.AddPeer("aaaa", epA)
return dA, dB, wgA, wgB, lbB
}
// bootstrap runs the signalling offer/answer (the test plays the host carrying bytes).
func bootstrap(t *testing.T, dA, dB *Manager) {
t.Helper()
offer, err := dB.SignalOffer("aaaa")
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, offer)
answer, err := dA.SignalOnOffer("bbbb", offer)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, answer)
require.NoError(t, dB.SignalOnAnswer("aaaa", answer))
}
func TestManager_BootstrapDerivesSamePSK(t *testing.T) {
dA, dB, wgA, wgB, _ := pair(t)
defer dA.Stop()
defer dB.Stop()
bootstrap(t, dA, dB)
pskA := wgA.psk("bbbb")
pskB := wgB.psk("aaaa")
require.NotEqual(t, PSK{}, pskA)
require.Equal(t, pskB, pskA, "both sides derive the same PSK from the bootstrap exchange")
}
func TestManager_ChainRotatesAndAcks(t *testing.T) {
dA, dB, wgA, wgB, _ := pair(t)
defer dA.Stop()
defer dB.Stop()
bootstrap(t, dA, dB)
psk1 := wgB.psk("aaaa")
// Data path up: B (initiator) chains the next offer over the data path, which
// rotates both to a fresh PSK and acknowledges A.
dA.OnDataPathRekeyed("bbbb", 0)
dB.OnDataPathRekeyed("aaaa", 0)
psk2A := wgA.psk("bbbb")
psk2B := wgB.psk("aaaa")
require.Equal(t, psk2B, psk2A, "both sides converge on the rotated PSK")
require.NotEqual(t, psk1, psk2B, "the chain rotated to a new PSK")
}
func TestManager_RotationSkippedWhenIdle(t *testing.T) {
dA, dB, wgA, wgB, _ := pair(t)
defer dA.Stop()
defer dB.Stop()
bootstrap(t, dA, dB)
psk1 := wgB.psk("aaaa")
require.NotEqual(t, PSK{}, psk1)
// Idle: the peer's last real-data activity is older than the window, so a rekey
// must NOT clock a rotation.
dA.OnDataPathRekeyed("bbbb", rotationActivityWindow)
dB.OnDataPathRekeyed("aaaa", rotationActivityWindow)
require.Equal(t, psk1, wgB.psk("aaaa"), "idle peer must not rotate the PSK")
require.Equal(t, psk1, wgA.psk("bbbb"), "idle peer must not rotate the PSK")
// Active: activity within the window clocks the rotation as usual.
dA.OnDataPathRekeyed("bbbb", rotationActivityWindow-1)
dB.OnDataPathRekeyed("aaaa", rotationActivityWindow-1)
psk2 := wgB.psk("aaaa")
require.NotEqual(t, psk1, psk2, "recent activity must clock a rotation")
require.Equal(t, psk2, wgA.psk("bbbb"), "both sides converge on the rotated PSK")
}
func TestManager_NonInitiatorReturnsNoOffer(t *testing.T) {
dA := NewManager("aaaa", newFakeWG(), nil)
defer dA.Stop()
offer, err := dA.SignalOffer("bbbb") // not the initiator vs "bbbb"
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Nil(t, offer)
}
func TestManager_StopIsIdempotent(t *testing.T) {
dA := NewManager("aaaa", newFakeWG(), nil)
dA.Start(&loopback{ep: epA, sw: newSwitch()})
dA.Stop()
dA.Stop() // must not panic or hang
}

View File

@@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
package pqkem
import (
"crypto/mlkem"
"fmt"
)
// Wire framing for the PQ-KEM exchange. Messages are self-contained, versioned,
// transport-agnostic byte blobs: the same bytes ride the signalling channel
// (initial bootstrap) or a data-tunnel packet (rekey). The library only ever sees
// opaque []byte at the transport seam.
//
// Layout (all messages): [type:1][version:1][exchangeID:16][payload...]
//
// There is no confirm message: an exchange is acknowledged by the NEXT offer, which
// carries the acked exchange's id (see OfferMsg.AckID) and — riding the data path
// under the freshly adopted key — proves that key works.
const (
// ProtocolVersion is bumped on any wire-incompatible change; a peer rejects
// messages it does not understand rather than misparsing them.
ProtocolVersion uint8 = 1
// ExchangeIDSize identifies one exchange so answers/acks correlate and stale
// messages are dropped.
ExchangeIDSize = 16
headerSize = 1 + 1 + ExchangeIDSize
)
// MsgType tags the two message kinds of the exchange.
type MsgType uint8
const (
MsgOffer MsgType = iota + 1
MsgAnswer
)
// ExchangeID is the per-exchange correlator. The zero value means "none" (an offer
// that acknowledges nothing, i.e. the first exchange of a connection).
type ExchangeID [ExchangeIDSize]byte
// OfferMsg carries the initiator's public material (X25519 pub ‖ ML-KEM encap key)
// and AckID, the id of the previous exchange this offer acknowledges (zero if none).
type OfferMsg struct {
ExchangeID ExchangeID
AckID ExchangeID
// KEMOffer is the raw Initiator.Offer() blob (OfferSize bytes).
KEMOffer []byte
}
// AnswerMsg carries the responder's reply (ML-KEM ciphertext ‖ X25519 pub) for the
// round identified by ExchangeID.
type AnswerMsg struct {
ExchangeID ExchangeID
// KEMAnswer is the raw Respond() answer blob (AnswerSize bytes).
KEMAnswer []byte
}
// Encode serialises the offer with its framed header (payload = AckID ‖ KEMOffer).
func (m *OfferMsg) Encode() ([]byte, error) {
if len(m.KEMOffer) != OfferSize {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("offer payload: got %d, want %d", len(m.KEMOffer), OfferSize)
}
payload := make([]byte, 0, ExchangeIDSize+OfferSize)
payload = append(payload, m.AckID[:]...)
payload = append(payload, m.KEMOffer...)
return frame(MsgOffer, m.ExchangeID, payload), nil
}
// Encode serialises the answer with its framed header.
func (m *AnswerMsg) Encode() ([]byte, error) {
if len(m.KEMAnswer) != AnswerSize {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("answer payload: got %d, want %d", len(m.KEMAnswer), AnswerSize)
}
return frame(MsgAnswer, m.ExchangeID, m.KEMAnswer), nil
}
// Decode parses a framed message into one of *OfferMsg / *AnswerMsg.
func Decode(buf []byte) (MsgType, any, error) {
if len(buf) < headerSize {
return 0, nil, fmt.Errorf("message too short: %d bytes", len(buf))
}
typ := MsgType(buf[0])
if ver := buf[1]; ver != ProtocolVersion {
return typ, nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported protocol version %d (want %d)", ver, ProtocolVersion)
}
var id ExchangeID
copy(id[:], buf[2:headerSize])
payload := buf[headerSize:]
switch typ {
case MsgOffer:
if len(payload) != ExchangeIDSize+OfferSize {
return typ, nil, fmt.Errorf("offer payload: got %d, want %d", len(payload), ExchangeIDSize+OfferSize)
}
var ack ExchangeID
copy(ack[:], payload[:ExchangeIDSize])
return typ, &OfferMsg{ExchangeID: id, AckID: ack, KEMOffer: payload[ExchangeIDSize:]}, nil
case MsgAnswer:
if len(payload) != AnswerSize {
return typ, nil, fmt.Errorf("answer payload: got %d, want %d", len(payload), AnswerSize)
}
return typ, &AnswerMsg{ExchangeID: id, KEMAnswer: payload}, nil
default:
return typ, nil, fmt.Errorf("unknown message type %d", typ)
}
}
func frame(typ MsgType, id ExchangeID, payload []byte) []byte {
buf := make([]byte, headerSize+len(payload))
buf[0] = byte(typ)
buf[1] = ProtocolVersion
copy(buf[2:], id[:])
copy(buf[headerSize:], payload)
return buf
}
// compile-time assurance the KEM blob sizes referenced here stay in sync with kem.go.
var _ = [1]struct{}{}[OfferSize-(32+mlkem.EncapsulationKeySize768)]

View File

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
package pqkem
import (
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestMessageRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
init, err := NewInitiator()
require.NoError(t, err)
answer, _, err := Respond(init.Offer(), Binding{LocalID: wgB, RemoteID: wgA})
require.NoError(t, err)
id := ExchangeID{1, 2, 3, 4}
ack := ExchangeID{9, 9, 9}
offBytes, err := (&OfferMsg{ExchangeID: id, AckID: ack, KEMOffer: init.Offer()}).Encode()
require.NoError(t, err)
typ, decoded, err := Decode(offBytes)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, MsgOffer, typ)
require.Equal(t, id, decoded.(*OfferMsg).ExchangeID)
require.Equal(t, ack, decoded.(*OfferMsg).AckID)
require.Equal(t, init.Offer(), decoded.(*OfferMsg).KEMOffer)
ansBytes, err := (&AnswerMsg{ExchangeID: id, KEMAnswer: answer}).Encode()
require.NoError(t, err)
typ, decoded, err = Decode(ansBytes)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, MsgAnswer, typ)
require.Equal(t, answer, decoded.(*AnswerMsg).KEMAnswer)
}
func TestDecodeRejects(t *testing.T) {
// too short
_, _, err := Decode([]byte{1, 1})
require.Error(t, err)
// wrong version
bad := make([]byte, headerSize+ExchangeIDSize+OfferSize)
bad[0] = byte(MsgOffer)
bad[1] = ProtocolVersion + 1
_, _, err = Decode(bad)
require.Error(t, err)
// unknown type
bad2 := make([]byte, headerSize)
bad2[0] = 99
bad2[1] = ProtocolVersion
_, _, err = Decode(bad2)
require.Error(t, err)
// offer with wrong payload size
_, err = (&OfferMsg{KEMOffer: []byte{1, 2, 3}}).Encode()
require.Error(t, err)
}

View File

@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
package internal
import (
"net/netip"
"time"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/pqkem"
)
// pqPresharedKeySetter is the subset of the WireGuard interface the ML-KEM callback
// needs: programming a peer's preshared key. *iface.WGIface satisfies it.
type pqPresharedKeySetter interface {
SetPresharedKey(peerKey string, psk wgtypes.Key, updateOnly bool) error
}
// pqCallbackHandler programs the derived PQ PSK onto the WireGuard peer. It is the
// engine-side implementation of pqkem.CallbackHandler.
type pqCallbackHandler struct {
wg pqPresharedKeySetter
// reoffer re-bootstraps the KEM over Signal for a peer (a fresh signalling offer)
// to recover from a persistent data-path rekey failure. Nil disables recovery.
reoffer func(remoteKey string)
}
// OnNewPSKReady programs the freshly derived PSK for the peer (updateOnly: a no-op
// if the peer is not present, mirroring Rosenpass). remoteID is the peer's WG pubkey.
func (h pqCallbackHandler) OnNewPSKReady(remoteID pqkem.RemoteID, psk pqkem.PSK) error {
// updateOnly: applies to an already-configured peer (rotation). At bootstrap the
// peer is not configured yet, so this is a no-op there and the PSK is instead
// pulled at peer-config time (pqHandshaker.PSK / conn.presharedKey).
log.Tracef("pqkem: programming PSK for peer %s", remoteID)
return h.wg.SetPresharedKey(string(remoteID), wgtypes.Key(psk), true)
}
// OnRekeyFailed reports a failed PQ (re)key convergence and re-bootstraps the KEM over
// Signal to recover: a fresh signalling offer starts a new exchange that overwrites the
// stalled PSK on both sides, resyncing after a persistent data-path desync. The tunnel
// stays up on the previous PSK meanwhile (the Signal channel is independent of the
// broken data path).
func (h pqCallbackHandler) OnRekeyFailed(remoteID pqkem.RemoteID) error {
log.Warnf("pqkem: post-quantum rekey failed for peer %s, re-bootstrapping over signal", remoteID)
if h.reoffer != nil {
h.reoffer(string(remoteID))
}
return nil
}
// pqHandshaker adapts the pqkem manager to peer.PQHandshaker (string peer keys),
// wiring the host's signalling offers/answers to the KEM exchange.
type pqHandshaker struct {
mgr *pqkem.Manager
}
func (p pqHandshaker) OfferPayload(remoteKey string) ([]byte, int) {
payload, err := p.mgr.SignalOffer(pqkem.RemoteID(remoteKey))
if err != nil {
log.Warnf("pqkem: build offer for %s: %v", remoteKey, err)
}
return payload, p.mgr.LocalPort()
}
func (p pqHandshaker) AnswerPayload(remoteKey string, recvOffer []byte) ([]byte, int) {
if len(recvOffer) == 0 {
return nil, p.mgr.LocalPort()
}
payload, err := p.mgr.SignalOnOffer(pqkem.RemoteID(remoteKey), recvOffer)
if err != nil {
log.Warnf("pqkem: build answer for %s: %v", remoteKey, err)
}
return payload, p.mgr.LocalPort()
}
func (p pqHandshaker) OnAnswer(remoteKey string, recvAnswer []byte) {
if len(recvAnswer) == 0 {
return
}
if err := p.mgr.SignalOnAnswer(pqkem.RemoteID(remoteKey), recvAnswer); err != nil {
log.Warnf("pqkem: process answer from %s: %v", remoteKey, err)
}
}
// PSK exposes the peer's derived PSK for the conn to program at WG peer-config time.
func (p pqHandshaker) PSK(remoteKey string) (wgtypes.Key, bool) {
psk, ok := p.mgr.PSK(pqkem.RemoteID(remoteKey))
if !ok {
return wgtypes.Key{}, false
}
return wgtypes.Key(psk), true
}
// SetRemoteAddr registers the peer's data-path endpoint (overlay IP + pq UDP port)
// learned from signalling. Sends only ever fire once the tunnel is up (clocked by
// OnDataPathRekeyed), so registering here is safe even before connection-up.
func (p pqHandshaker) SetRemoteAddr(remoteKey string, addr netip.AddrPort) {
if !addr.IsValid() || addr.Port() == 0 {
return
}
p.mgr.AddPeer(pqkem.RemoteID(remoteKey), addr)
}
// OnDataPathRekeyed clocks the next chained PSK rotation on a fresh WG handshake.
// sinceActivity is how long ago the peer last exchanged real user data; the manager
// skips rotation for idle tunnels.
func (p pqHandshaker) OnDataPathRekeyed(remoteKey string, sinceActivity time.Duration) {
p.mgr.OnDataPathRekeyed(pqkem.RemoteID(remoteKey), sinceActivity)
}
// OnDataPathDown signals the peer's tunnel went down.
func (p pqHandshaker) OnDataPathDown(remoteKey string) {
p.mgr.OnDataPathDown(pqkem.RemoteID(remoteKey))
}

View File

@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
package internal
import (
"fmt"
"net"
"net/netip"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
)
// DefaultPort is the preferred UDP port for the ML-KEM data-path service, bound on
// the WG overlay IP. Since each client owns a distinct overlay IP, this port is
// almost always free, so it need not be announced (peers assume it). A peer only
// announces Body.mlkemPort when a collision forced it onto a different port.
const DefaultPort = 51833
// pqTransport is the ML-KEM data-path transport: a dumb UDP socket bound on the WG
// overlay IP. It implements pqkem.Transport — the manager owns the remoteID<->endpoint
// routing and drives this socket's lifecycle (Run / Close).
type pqTransport struct {
conn *net.UDPConn
port int
}
// newPQTransport binds a UDP socket on the WG overlay IP, preferring DefaultPort and
// falling back to an OS-assigned ephemeral port if it is in use. Call it after the WG
// interface is up so the overlay IP is assigned; when the bound port is not
// DefaultPort it must be announced to peers via Body.mlkemPort.
func newPQTransport(overlayIP netip.Addr) (*pqTransport, error) {
if !overlayIP.IsValid() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid overlay IP for pqkem transport")
}
ip := net.IP(overlayIP.AsSlice())
conn, err := net.ListenUDP("udp4", &net.UDPAddr{IP: ip, Port: DefaultPort})
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("pqkem: default port %d unavailable on %s (%v), using an ephemeral port", DefaultPort, overlayIP, err)
conn, err = net.ListenUDP("udp4", &net.UDPAddr{IP: ip, Port: 0})
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("bind pqkem udp on overlay %s: %w", overlayIP, err)
}
}
return &pqTransport{conn: conn, port: conn.LocalAddr().(*net.UDPAddr).Port}, nil
}
// Send implements pqkem.Transport.
func (t *pqTransport) Send(endpoint netip.AddrPort, msg []byte) error {
_, err := t.conn.WriteToUDPAddrPort(msg, endpoint)
return err
}
// LocalPort implements pqkem.Transport.
func (t *pqTransport) LocalPort() int { return t.port }
// Run implements pqkem.Transport: the receive loop, delivering each datagram as
// (source endpoint, msg). Exits when the socket is closed.
func (t *pqTransport) Run(onInbound func(src netip.AddrPort, msg []byte)) {
go func() {
buf := make([]byte, 2048)
for {
n, src, err := t.conn.ReadFromUDPAddrPort(buf)
if err != nil {
return
}
msg := make([]byte, n)
copy(msg, buf[:n])
onInbound(src, msg)
}
}()
}
// Close implements pqkem.Transport.
func (t *pqTransport) Close() error { return t.conn.Close() }

View File

@@ -52,11 +52,6 @@ type CredentialPayload struct {
Credential *Credential
RosenpassPubKey []byte
RosenpassAddr string
// MlkemPayload is the opaque post-quantum KEM handshake message riding this
// OFFER/ANSWER (see Body.mlkemPayload). Nil when not running the PQ exchange.
MlkemPayload []byte
// MlkemPort is the sender's ML-KEM PQ service UDP port (0 when not running).
MlkemPort int
RelaySrvAddress string
RelaySrvIP netip.Addr
SessionID []byte
@@ -94,13 +89,6 @@ func MarshalCredential(myKey wgtypes.Key, remoteKey string, p CredentialPayload)
if p.RelaySrvIP.IsValid() {
body.RelayServerIP = p.RelaySrvIP.Unmap().AsSlice()
}
if len(p.MlkemPayload) > 0 {
body.MlkemPayload = p.MlkemPayload
}
if p.MlkemPort > 0 {
port := uint32(p.MlkemPort)
body.MlkemPort = &port
}
return &proto.Message{
Key: myKey.PublicKey().String(),
RemoteKey: remoteKey,

View File

@@ -239,16 +239,6 @@ type Body struct {
// fallback dial target when DNS resolution of relayServerAddress fails.
// SNI/TLS verification still uses relayServerAddress.
RelayServerIP []byte `protobuf:"bytes,11,opt,name=relayServerIP,proto3,oneof" json:"relayServerIP,omitempty"`
// mlkemPayload carries a post-quantum X25519MLKEM768 handshake message that
// seeds the WireGuard PSK, riding this Body's OFFER/ANSWER: on an OFFER it is
// the KEM offer, on an ANSWER the KEM answer. It is opaque to signal — the
// pqkem library frames and parses it. Absent when the sender does not run the
// ML-KEM PQ exchange; unknown to older clients, which ignore it.
MlkemPayload []byte `protobuf:"bytes,12,opt,name=mlkemPayload,proto3,oneof" json:"mlkemPayload,omitempty"`
// mlkemPort is the UDP port of the sender's ML-KEM PQ service, bound on its
// WireGuard overlay IP. Peers send subsequent rekey messages there over the
// data path. Zero/absent when the ML-KEM PQ exchange is not running.
MlkemPort *uint32 `protobuf:"varint,13,opt,name=mlkemPort,proto3,oneof" json:"mlkemPort,omitempty"`
}
func (x *Body) Reset() {
@@ -353,20 +343,6 @@ func (x *Body) GetRelayServerIP() []byte {
return nil
}
func (x *Body) GetMlkemPayload() []byte {
if x != nil {
return x.MlkemPayload
}
return nil
}
func (x *Body) GetMlkemPort() uint32 {
if x != nil && x.MlkemPort != nil {
return *x.MlkemPort
}
return 0
}
// Mode indicates a connection mode
type Mode struct {
state protoimpl.MessageState
@@ -490,7 +466,7 @@ var file_signalexchange_proto_rawDesc = []byte{
0x52, 0x09, 0x72, 0x65, 0x6d, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x65, 0x4b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x12, 0x28, 0x0a, 0x04, 0x62,
0x6f, 0x64, 0x79, 0x18, 0x04, 0x20, 0x01, 0x28, 0x0b, 0x32, 0x14, 0x2e, 0x73, 0x69, 0x67, 0x6e,
0x61, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x78, 0x63, 0x68, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x2e, 0x42, 0x6f, 0x64, 0x79, 0x52,
0x04, 0x62, 0x6f, 0x64, 0x79, 0x22, 0xbd, 0x05, 0x0a, 0x04, 0x42, 0x6f, 0x64, 0x79, 0x12, 0x2d,
0x04, 0x62, 0x6f, 0x64, 0x79, 0x22, 0xd2, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x04, 0x42, 0x6f, 0x64, 0x79, 0x12, 0x2d,
0x0a, 0x04, 0x74, 0x79, 0x70, 0x65, 0x18, 0x01, 0x20, 0x01, 0x28, 0x0e, 0x32, 0x19, 0x2e, 0x73,
0x69, 0x67, 0x6e, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x78, 0x63, 0x68, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x2e, 0x42, 0x6f,
0x64, 0x79, 0x2e, 0x54, 0x79, 0x70, 0x65, 0x52, 0x04, 0x74, 0x79, 0x70, 0x65, 0x12, 0x18, 0x0a,
@@ -518,46 +494,39 @@ var file_signalexchange_proto_rawDesc = []byte{
0x52, 0x09, 0x73, 0x65, 0x73, 0x73, 0x69, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x49, 0x64, 0x88, 0x01, 0x01, 0x12, 0x29,
0x0a, 0x0d, 0x72, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x79, 0x53, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x49, 0x50, 0x18,
0x0b, 0x20, 0x01, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x48, 0x02, 0x52, 0x0d, 0x72, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x79, 0x53, 0x65,
0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x49, 0x50, 0x88, 0x01, 0x01, 0x12, 0x27, 0x0a, 0x0c, 0x6d, 0x6c, 0x6b,
0x65, 0x6d, 0x50, 0x61, 0x79, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x61, 0x64, 0x18, 0x0c, 0x20, 0x01, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x48,
0x03, 0x52, 0x0c, 0x6d, 0x6c, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x6d, 0x50, 0x61, 0x79, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x61, 0x64, 0x88,
0x01, 0x01, 0x12, 0x21, 0x0a, 0x09, 0x6d, 0x6c, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x6d, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x74, 0x18,
0x0d, 0x20, 0x01, 0x28, 0x0d, 0x48, 0x04, 0x52, 0x09, 0x6d, 0x6c, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x6d, 0x50, 0x6f,
0x72, 0x74, 0x88, 0x01, 0x01, 0x22, 0x52, 0x0a, 0x04, 0x54, 0x79, 0x70, 0x65, 0x12, 0x09, 0x0a,
0x05, 0x4f, 0x46, 0x46, 0x45, 0x52, 0x10, 0x00, 0x12, 0x0a, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x41, 0x4e, 0x53, 0x57,
0x45, 0x52, 0x10, 0x01, 0x12, 0x0d, 0x0a, 0x09, 0x43, 0x41, 0x4e, 0x44, 0x49, 0x44, 0x41, 0x54,
0x45, 0x10, 0x02, 0x12, 0x08, 0x0a, 0x04, 0x4d, 0x4f, 0x44, 0x45, 0x10, 0x04, 0x12, 0x0b, 0x0a,
0x07, 0x47, 0x4f, 0x5f, 0x49, 0x44, 0x4c, 0x45, 0x10, 0x05, 0x12, 0x0d, 0x0a, 0x09, 0x48, 0x45,
0x41, 0x52, 0x54, 0x42, 0x45, 0x41, 0x54, 0x10, 0x06, 0x42, 0x15, 0x0a, 0x13, 0x5f, 0x72, 0x65,
0x6c, 0x61, 0x79, 0x53, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x41, 0x64, 0x64, 0x72, 0x65, 0x73, 0x73,
0x42, 0x0c, 0x0a, 0x0a, 0x5f, 0x73, 0x65, 0x73, 0x73, 0x69, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x49, 0x64, 0x42, 0x10,
0x0a, 0x0e, 0x5f, 0x72, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x79, 0x53, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x49, 0x50,
0x42, 0x0f, 0x0a, 0x0d, 0x5f, 0x6d, 0x6c, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x6d, 0x50, 0x61, 0x79, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x61,
0x64, 0x42, 0x0c, 0x0a, 0x0a, 0x5f, 0x6d, 0x6c, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x6d, 0x50, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x74, 0x4a,
0x04, 0x08, 0x09, 0x10, 0x0a, 0x22, 0x2e, 0x0a, 0x04, 0x4d, 0x6f, 0x64, 0x65, 0x12, 0x1b, 0x0a,
0x06, 0x64, 0x69, 0x72, 0x65, 0x63, 0x74, 0x18, 0x01, 0x20, 0x01, 0x28, 0x08, 0x48, 0x00, 0x52,
0x06, 0x64, 0x69, 0x72, 0x65, 0x63, 0x74, 0x88, 0x01, 0x01, 0x42, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x07, 0x5f, 0x64,
0x69, 0x72, 0x65, 0x63, 0x74, 0x22, 0x6d, 0x0a, 0x0f, 0x52, 0x6f, 0x73, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x70, 0x61,
0x73, 0x73, 0x43, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x66, 0x69, 0x67, 0x12, 0x28, 0x0a, 0x0f, 0x72, 0x6f, 0x73, 0x65,
0x6e, 0x70, 0x61, 0x73, 0x73, 0x50, 0x75, 0x62, 0x4b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x18, 0x01, 0x20, 0x01, 0x28,
0x0c, 0x52, 0x0f, 0x72, 0x6f, 0x73, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x70, 0x61, 0x73, 0x73, 0x50, 0x75, 0x62, 0x4b,
0x65, 0x79, 0x12, 0x30, 0x0a, 0x13, 0x72, 0x6f, 0x73, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x70, 0x61, 0x73, 0x73, 0x53,
0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x41, 0x64, 0x64, 0x72, 0x18, 0x02, 0x20, 0x01, 0x28, 0x09, 0x52,
0x13, 0x72, 0x6f, 0x73, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x70, 0x61, 0x73, 0x73, 0x53, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72,
0x41, 0x64, 0x64, 0x72, 0x32, 0xb9, 0x01, 0x0a, 0x0e, 0x53, 0x69, 0x67, 0x6e, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x45,
0x78, 0x63, 0x68, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x12, 0x4c, 0x0a, 0x04, 0x53, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x12,
0x20, 0x2e, 0x73, 0x69, 0x67, 0x6e, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x78, 0x63, 0x68, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x65,
0x2e, 0x45, 0x6e, 0x63, 0x72, 0x79, 0x70, 0x74, 0x65, 0x64, 0x4d, 0x65, 0x73, 0x73, 0x61, 0x67,
0x65, 0x1a, 0x20, 0x2e, 0x73, 0x69, 0x67, 0x6e, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x78, 0x63, 0x68, 0x61, 0x6e,
0x67, 0x65, 0x2e, 0x45, 0x6e, 0x63, 0x72, 0x79, 0x70, 0x74, 0x65, 0x64, 0x4d, 0x65, 0x73, 0x73,
0x61, 0x67, 0x65, 0x22, 0x00, 0x12, 0x59, 0x0a, 0x0d, 0x43, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x6e, 0x65, 0x63, 0x74,
0x53, 0x74, 0x72, 0x65, 0x61, 0x6d, 0x12, 0x20, 0x2e, 0x73, 0x69, 0x67, 0x6e, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x65,
0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x49, 0x50, 0x88, 0x01, 0x01, 0x22, 0x52, 0x0a, 0x04, 0x54, 0x79, 0x70,
0x65, 0x12, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x05, 0x4f, 0x46, 0x46, 0x45, 0x52, 0x10, 0x00, 0x12, 0x0a, 0x0a, 0x06,
0x41, 0x4e, 0x53, 0x57, 0x45, 0x52, 0x10, 0x01, 0x12, 0x0d, 0x0a, 0x09, 0x43, 0x41, 0x4e, 0x44,
0x49, 0x44, 0x41, 0x54, 0x45, 0x10, 0x02, 0x12, 0x08, 0x0a, 0x04, 0x4d, 0x4f, 0x44, 0x45, 0x10,
0x04, 0x12, 0x0b, 0x0a, 0x07, 0x47, 0x4f, 0x5f, 0x49, 0x44, 0x4c, 0x45, 0x10, 0x05, 0x12, 0x0d,
0x0a, 0x09, 0x48, 0x45, 0x41, 0x52, 0x54, 0x42, 0x45, 0x41, 0x54, 0x10, 0x06, 0x42, 0x15, 0x0a,
0x13, 0x5f, 0x72, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x79, 0x53, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x41, 0x64, 0x64,
0x72, 0x65, 0x73, 0x73, 0x42, 0x0c, 0x0a, 0x0a, 0x5f, 0x73, 0x65, 0x73, 0x73, 0x69, 0x6f, 0x6e,
0x49, 0x64, 0x42, 0x10, 0x0a, 0x0e, 0x5f, 0x72, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x79, 0x53, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76,
0x65, 0x72, 0x49, 0x50, 0x4a, 0x04, 0x08, 0x09, 0x10, 0x0a, 0x22, 0x2e, 0x0a, 0x04, 0x4d, 0x6f,
0x64, 0x65, 0x12, 0x1b, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x64, 0x69, 0x72, 0x65, 0x63, 0x74, 0x18, 0x01, 0x20, 0x01,
0x28, 0x08, 0x48, 0x00, 0x52, 0x06, 0x64, 0x69, 0x72, 0x65, 0x63, 0x74, 0x88, 0x01, 0x01, 0x42,
0x09, 0x0a, 0x07, 0x5f, 0x64, 0x69, 0x72, 0x65, 0x63, 0x74, 0x22, 0x6d, 0x0a, 0x0f, 0x52, 0x6f,
0x73, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x70, 0x61, 0x73, 0x73, 0x43, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x66, 0x69, 0x67, 0x12, 0x28, 0x0a,
0x0f, 0x72, 0x6f, 0x73, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x70, 0x61, 0x73, 0x73, 0x50, 0x75, 0x62, 0x4b, 0x65, 0x79,
0x18, 0x01, 0x20, 0x01, 0x28, 0x0c, 0x52, 0x0f, 0x72, 0x6f, 0x73, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x70, 0x61, 0x73,
0x73, 0x50, 0x75, 0x62, 0x4b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x12, 0x30, 0x0a, 0x13, 0x72, 0x6f, 0x73, 0x65, 0x6e,
0x70, 0x61, 0x73, 0x73, 0x53, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x41, 0x64, 0x64, 0x72, 0x18, 0x02,
0x20, 0x01, 0x28, 0x09, 0x52, 0x13, 0x72, 0x6f, 0x73, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x70, 0x61, 0x73, 0x73, 0x53,
0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x41, 0x64, 0x64, 0x72, 0x32, 0xb9, 0x01, 0x0a, 0x0e, 0x53, 0x69,
0x67, 0x6e, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x45, 0x78, 0x63, 0x68, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x12, 0x4c, 0x0a, 0x04,
0x53, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x12, 0x20, 0x2e, 0x73, 0x69, 0x67, 0x6e, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x78, 0x63,
0x68, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x2e, 0x45, 0x6e, 0x63, 0x72, 0x79, 0x70, 0x74, 0x65, 0x64, 0x4d,
0x65, 0x73, 0x73, 0x61, 0x67, 0x65, 0x1a, 0x20, 0x2e, 0x73, 0x69, 0x67, 0x6e, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x65,
0x78, 0x63, 0x68, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x2e, 0x45, 0x6e, 0x63, 0x72, 0x79, 0x70, 0x74, 0x65,
0x64, 0x4d, 0x65, 0x73, 0x73, 0x61, 0x67, 0x65, 0x1a, 0x20, 0x2e, 0x73, 0x69, 0x67, 0x6e, 0x61,
0x6c, 0x65, 0x78, 0x63, 0x68, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x2e, 0x45, 0x6e, 0x63, 0x72, 0x79, 0x70,
0x74, 0x65, 0x64, 0x4d, 0x65, 0x73, 0x73, 0x61, 0x67, 0x65, 0x22, 0x00, 0x28, 0x01, 0x30, 0x01,
0x42, 0x08, 0x5a, 0x06, 0x2f, 0x70, 0x72, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x6f, 0x62, 0x06, 0x70, 0x72, 0x6f, 0x74,
0x6f, 0x33,
0x64, 0x4d, 0x65, 0x73, 0x73, 0x61, 0x67, 0x65, 0x22, 0x00, 0x12, 0x59, 0x0a, 0x0d, 0x43, 0x6f,
0x6e, 0x6e, 0x65, 0x63, 0x74, 0x53, 0x74, 0x72, 0x65, 0x61, 0x6d, 0x12, 0x20, 0x2e, 0x73, 0x69,
0x67, 0x6e, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x78, 0x63, 0x68, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x2e, 0x45, 0x6e, 0x63,
0x72, 0x79, 0x70, 0x74, 0x65, 0x64, 0x4d, 0x65, 0x73, 0x73, 0x61, 0x67, 0x65, 0x1a, 0x20, 0x2e,
0x73, 0x69, 0x67, 0x6e, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x78, 0x63, 0x68, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x2e, 0x45,
0x6e, 0x63, 0x72, 0x79, 0x70, 0x74, 0x65, 0x64, 0x4d, 0x65, 0x73, 0x73, 0x61, 0x67, 0x65, 0x22,
0x00, 0x28, 0x01, 0x30, 0x01, 0x42, 0x08, 0x5a, 0x06, 0x2f, 0x70, 0x72, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x6f, 0x62,
0x06, 0x70, 0x72, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x6f, 0x33,
}
var (

View File

@@ -75,18 +75,6 @@ message Body {
// fallback dial target when DNS resolution of relayServerAddress fails.
// SNI/TLS verification still uses relayServerAddress.
optional bytes relayServerIP = 11;
// mlkemPayload carries a post-quantum X25519MLKEM768 handshake message that
// seeds the WireGuard PSK, riding this Body's OFFER/ANSWER: on an OFFER it is
// the KEM offer, on an ANSWER the KEM answer. It is opaque to signal — the
// pqkem library frames and parses it. Absent when the sender does not run the
// ML-KEM PQ exchange; unknown to older clients, which ignore it.
optional bytes mlkemPayload = 12;
// mlkemPort is the UDP port of the sender's ML-KEM PQ service, bound on its
// WireGuard overlay IP. Peers send subsequent rekey messages there over the
// data path. Zero/absent when the ML-KEM PQ exchange is not running.
optional uint32 mlkemPort = 13;
}
// Mode indicates a connection mode