Add Linux ARM64 UI build

## Describe your changes

Export agent version info for iOS

## Issue ticket number and link

## Stack

<!-- branch-stack -->

### Checklist
- [ ] Is it a bug fix
- [ ] Is a typo/documentation fix
- [ ] Is a feature enhancement
- [x] It is a refactor
- [ ] Created tests that fail without the change (if possible)
- [ ] This change does **not** modify the public API, gRPC protocols,
functionality behavior, CLI / service flags, or introduce a new feature
— **OR** I have discussed it with the NetBird team beforehand (link the
issue / Slack thread in the description). See
[CONTRIBUTING.md](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#discuss-changes-with-the-netbird-team-first).

> By submitting this pull request, you confirm that you have read and
agree to the terms of the [Contributor License
Agreement](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/blob/main/CONTRIBUTOR_LICENSE_AGREEMENT.md).

## Documentation
Select exactly one:

- [ ] I added/updated documentation for this change
- [x] Documentation is **not needed** for this change (explain why)

### Docs PR URL (required if "docs added" is checked)
Paste the PR link from https://github.com/netbirdio/docs here:

https://github.com/netbirdio/docs/pull/__

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.goreleaser_ui.yaml

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ builds:
       - linux
     goarch:
       - amd64
+      - arm64
     ldflags:
       - -s -w -X github.com/netbirdio/netbird/version.version={{.Version}} -X main.commit={{.Commit}} -X main.date={{.CommitDate}} -X main.builtBy=goreleaser
     mod_timestamp: "{{ .CommitTimestamp }}"

client/ios/NetBirdSDK/version.go

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+//go:build ios
+
+package NetBirdSDK
+
+import "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/version"
+
+// GoClientVersion returns the NetBird Go client version that was baked into
+// the framework at compile time via
+// -ldflags "-X github.com/netbirdio/netbird/version.version=<version>".
+func GoClientVersion() string {
+	return version.NetbirdVersion()
+}

infrastructure_files/getting-started.sh

@@ -228,8 +228,6 @@ read_enable_crowdsec() {
   echo "CrowdSec checks client IPs against a community threat intelligence database" > /dev/stderr
   echo "and blocks known malicious sources before they reach your services." > /dev/stderr
   echo "A local CrowdSec LAPI container will be added to your deployment." > /dev/stderr
-  echo "It also enables the AppSec (WAF) endpoint, so services can inspect HTTP" > /dev/stderr
-  echo "requests for exploits. Both stay off per service until you enable them." > /dev/stderr
   echo -n "Enable CrowdSec? [y/N]: " > /dev/stderr
   read -r CHOICE < /dev/tty
 
@@ -499,8 +497,7 @@ generate_configuration_files() {
         # TCP ServersTransport for PROXY protocol v2 to the proxy backend
         render_traefik_dynamic > traefik-dynamic.yaml
         if [[ "$ENABLE_CROWDSEC" == "true" ]]; then
-          mkdir -p crowdsec/acquis.d
-          render_crowdsec_appsec_acquis > crowdsec/acquis.d/appsec.yaml
+          mkdir -p crowdsec
         fi
       fi
       ;;
@@ -534,23 +531,6 @@ generate_configuration_files() {
   return 0
 }
 
-# The AppSec (WAF) listener only exists if an appsec acquisition datasource is
-# configured. One datasource is one listener carrying one merged rule set: the
-# protocol has no rule-set selector, so per-service rule variation would need
-# either a second datasource on another port or pre_eval hooks filtering on
-# req.Host.
-render_crowdsec_appsec_acquis() {
-  cat <<EOF
-source: appsec
-listen_addr: 0.0.0.0:7422
-appsec_configs:
-  - crowdsecurity/appsec-default
-labels:
-  type: appsec
-EOF
-  return 0
-}
-
 start_services_and_show_instructions() {
   # For built-in Traefik, start containers immediately
   # For NPM, start containers first (NPM needs services running to create proxy)
@@ -762,11 +742,7 @@ render_docker_compose_traefik_builtin() {
     restart: unless-stopped
     networks: [netbird]
     environment:
-      # appsec-generic-rules is required alongside appsec-virtual-patching:
-      # the appsec-default config references crowdsecurity/generic-* and
-      # crowdsecurity/experimental-*, which only that collection provides, and
-      # the engine exits at startup if they are missing.
-      COLLECTIONS: crowdsecurity/linux crowdsecurity/appsec-virtual-patching crowdsecurity/appsec-generic-rules
+      COLLECTIONS: crowdsecurity/linux
     volumes:
       - ./crowdsec:/etc/crowdsec
       - crowdsec_db:/var/lib/crowdsec/data
@@ -1031,11 +1007,6 @@ EOF
     cat <<EOF
 NB_PROXY_CROWDSEC_API_URL=http://crowdsec:8080
 NB_PROXY_CROWDSEC_API_KEY=$CROWDSEC_BOUNCER_KEY
-# AppSec (WAF) request inspection. Separate endpoint from the LAPI above and
-# validated with the same bouncer key. Setting it makes the proxy advertise the
-# AppSec capability, which is what lets a service select appsec_mode; nothing is
-# inspected until a service opts in.
-NB_PROXY_CROWDSEC_APPSEC_URL=http://crowdsec:7422/
 EOF
   fi
 

management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/domain/domain.go

@@ -23,9 +23,6 @@ type Domain struct {
 	// SupportsCrowdSec is populated at query time from proxy cluster capabilities.
 	// Not persisted.
 	SupportsCrowdSec *bool `gorm:"-"`
-	// SupportsAppSec is populated at query time from proxy cluster capabilities.
-	// Not persisted.
-	SupportsAppSec *bool `gorm:"-"`
 	// SupportsPrivate is populated at query time from proxy cluster capabilities. Not persisted.
 	SupportsPrivate *bool `gorm:"-"`
 }

management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/domain/manager/api.go

@@ -49,7 +49,6 @@ func domainToApi(d *domain.Domain) api.ReverseProxyDomain {
 		SupportsCustomPorts: d.SupportsCustomPorts,
 		RequireSubdomain:    d.RequireSubdomain,
 		SupportsCrowdsec:    d.SupportsCrowdSec,
-		SupportsAppsec:      d.SupportsAppSec,
 		SupportsPrivate:     d.SupportsPrivate,
 	}
 	if d.TargetCluster != "" {

management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/domain/manager/manager.go

@@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ type proxyManager interface {
 	ClusterSupportsCustomPorts(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	ClusterRequireSubdomain(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	ClusterSupportsCrowdSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
-	ClusterSupportsAppSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	ClusterSupportsPrivate(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 }
 
@@ -95,7 +94,6 @@ func (m Manager) GetDomains(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID string) ([]*d
 		d.SupportsCustomPorts = m.proxyManager.ClusterSupportsCustomPorts(ctx, cluster)
 		d.RequireSubdomain = m.proxyManager.ClusterRequireSubdomain(ctx, cluster)
 		d.SupportsCrowdSec = m.proxyManager.ClusterSupportsCrowdSec(ctx, cluster)
-		d.SupportsAppSec = m.proxyManager.ClusterSupportsAppSec(ctx, cluster)
 		d.SupportsPrivate = m.proxyManager.ClusterSupportsPrivate(ctx, cluster)
 		ret = append(ret, d)
 	}
@@ -113,7 +111,6 @@ func (m Manager) GetDomains(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID string) ([]*d
 		if d.TargetCluster != "" {
 			cd.SupportsCustomPorts = m.proxyManager.ClusterSupportsCustomPorts(ctx, d.TargetCluster)
 			cd.SupportsCrowdSec = m.proxyManager.ClusterSupportsCrowdSec(ctx, d.TargetCluster)
-			cd.SupportsAppSec = m.proxyManager.ClusterSupportsAppSec(ctx, d.TargetCluster)
 			cd.SupportsPrivate = m.proxyManager.ClusterSupportsPrivate(ctx, d.TargetCluster)
 		}
 		// Custom domains never require a subdomain by default since

management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/domain/manager/manager_test.go

@@ -40,10 +40,6 @@ func (m *mockProxyManager) ClusterSupportsCrowdSec(_ context.Context, _ string)
 	return nil
 }
 
-func (m *mockProxyManager) ClusterSupportsAppSec(_ context.Context, _ string) *bool {
-	return nil
-}
-
 func (m *mockProxyManager) ClusterSupportsPrivate(_ context.Context, _ string) *bool {
 	return nil
 }

management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/proxy/manager.go

@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ type Manager interface {
 	ClusterSupportsCustomPorts(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	ClusterRequireSubdomain(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	ClusterSupportsCrowdSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
-	ClusterSupportsAppSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	ClusterSupportsPrivate(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	CleanupStale(ctx context.Context, inactivityDuration time.Duration) error
 	GetAccountProxy(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (*Proxy, error)

management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/proxy/manager/manager.go

@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ type store interface {
 	GetClusterSupportsCustomPorts(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	GetClusterRequireSubdomain(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	GetClusterSupportsCrowdSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
-	GetClusterSupportsAppSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	GetClusterSupportsPrivate(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	CleanupStaleProxies(ctx context.Context, inactivityDuration time.Duration) error
 	GetProxyByAccountID(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (*proxy.Proxy, error)
@@ -139,13 +138,6 @@ func (m Manager) ClusterSupportsCrowdSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string
 	return m.store.GetClusterSupportsCrowdSec(ctx, clusterAddr)
 }
 
-// ClusterSupportsAppSec returns whether all active proxies in the cluster have
-// a CrowdSec AppSec endpoint configured (unanimous). Returns nil when no proxy
-// has reported capabilities.
-func (m Manager) ClusterSupportsAppSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool {
-	return m.store.GetClusterSupportsAppSec(ctx, clusterAddr)
-}
-
 // ClusterSupportsPrivate reports whether any active proxy claims the private capability (nil = unreported).
 func (m Manager) ClusterSupportsPrivate(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool {
 	return m.store.GetClusterSupportsPrivate(ctx, clusterAddr)

management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/proxy/manager/manager_test.go

@@ -99,9 +99,6 @@ func (m *mockStore) GetClusterRequireSubdomain(_ context.Context, _ string) *boo
 func (m *mockStore) GetClusterSupportsCrowdSec(_ context.Context, _ string) *bool {
 	return nil
 }
-func (m *mockStore) GetClusterSupportsAppSec(_ context.Context, _ string) *bool {
-	return nil
-}
 func (m *mockStore) GetClusterSupportsPrivate(_ context.Context, _ string) *bool {
 	return nil
 }

management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/proxy/manager_mock.go

@@ -50,6 +50,20 @@ func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) CleanupStale(ctx, inactivityDuration interfac
 	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "CleanupStale", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).CleanupStale), ctx, inactivityDuration)
 }
 
+// ClusterSupportsCustomPorts mocks base method.
+func (m *MockManager) ClusterSupportsCustomPorts(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool {
+	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
+	ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "ClusterSupportsCustomPorts", ctx, clusterAddr)
+	ret0, _ := ret[0].(*bool)
+	return ret0
+}
+
+// ClusterSupportsCustomPorts indicates an expected call of ClusterSupportsCustomPorts.
+func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) ClusterSupportsCustomPorts(ctx, clusterAddr interface{}) *gomock.Call {
+	mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
+	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "ClusterSupportsCustomPorts", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).ClusterSupportsCustomPorts), ctx, clusterAddr)
+}
+
 // ClusterRequireSubdomain mocks base method.
 func (m *MockManager) ClusterRequireSubdomain(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool {
 	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
@@ -64,20 +78,6 @@ func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) ClusterRequireSubdomain(ctx, clusterAddr inte
 	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "ClusterRequireSubdomain", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).ClusterRequireSubdomain), ctx, clusterAddr)
 }
 
-// ClusterSupportsAppSec mocks base method.
-func (m *MockManager) ClusterSupportsAppSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool {
-	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
-	ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "ClusterSupportsAppSec", ctx, clusterAddr)
-	ret0, _ := ret[0].(*bool)
-	return ret0
-}
-
-// ClusterSupportsAppSec indicates an expected call of ClusterSupportsAppSec.
-func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) ClusterSupportsAppSec(ctx, clusterAddr interface{}) *gomock.Call {
-	mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
-	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "ClusterSupportsAppSec", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).ClusterSupportsAppSec), ctx, clusterAddr)
-}
-
 // ClusterSupportsCrowdSec mocks base method.
 func (m *MockManager) ClusterSupportsCrowdSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool {
 	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
@@ -92,20 +92,6 @@ func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) ClusterSupportsCrowdSec(ctx, clusterAddr inte
 	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "ClusterSupportsCrowdSec", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).ClusterSupportsCrowdSec), ctx, clusterAddr)
 }
 
-// ClusterSupportsCustomPorts mocks base method.
-func (m *MockManager) ClusterSupportsCustomPorts(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool {
-	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
-	ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "ClusterSupportsCustomPorts", ctx, clusterAddr)
-	ret0, _ := ret[0].(*bool)
-	return ret0
-}
-
-// ClusterSupportsCustomPorts indicates an expected call of ClusterSupportsCustomPorts.
-func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) ClusterSupportsCustomPorts(ctx, clusterAddr interface{}) *gomock.Call {
-	mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
-	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "ClusterSupportsCustomPorts", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).ClusterSupportsCustomPorts), ctx, clusterAddr)
-}
-
 // ClusterSupportsPrivate mocks base method.
 func (m *MockManager) ClusterSupportsPrivate(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool {
 	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
@@ -135,35 +121,6 @@ func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) Connect(ctx, proxyID, sessionID, clusterAddre
 	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "Connect", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).Connect), ctx, proxyID, sessionID, clusterAddress, ipAddress, accountID, capabilities)
 }
 
-// CountAccountProxies mocks base method.
-func (m *MockManager) CountAccountProxies(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (int64, error) {
-	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
-	ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "CountAccountProxies", ctx, accountID)
-	ret0, _ := ret[0].(int64)
-	ret1, _ := ret[1].(error)
-	return ret0, ret1
-}
-
-// CountAccountProxies indicates an expected call of CountAccountProxies.
-func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) CountAccountProxies(ctx, accountID interface{}) *gomock.Call {
-	mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
-	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "CountAccountProxies", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).CountAccountProxies), ctx, accountID)
-}
-
-// DeleteAccountCluster mocks base method.
-func (m *MockManager) DeleteAccountCluster(ctx context.Context, clusterAddress, accountID string) error {
-	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
-	ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "DeleteAccountCluster", ctx, clusterAddress, accountID)
-	ret0, _ := ret[0].(error)
-	return ret0
-}
-
-// DeleteAccountCluster indicates an expected call of DeleteAccountCluster.
-func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) DeleteAccountCluster(ctx, clusterAddress, accountID interface{}) *gomock.Call {
-	mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
-	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "DeleteAccountCluster", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).DeleteAccountCluster), ctx, clusterAddress, accountID)
-}
-
 // Disconnect mocks base method.
 func (m *MockManager) Disconnect(ctx context.Context, proxyID, sessionID string) error {
 	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
@@ -178,21 +135,6 @@ func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) Disconnect(ctx, proxyID, sessionID interface{
 	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "Disconnect", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).Disconnect), ctx, proxyID, sessionID)
 }
 
-// GetAccountProxy mocks base method.
-func (m *MockManager) GetAccountProxy(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (*Proxy, error) {
-	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
-	ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "GetAccountProxy", ctx, accountID)
-	ret0, _ := ret[0].(*Proxy)
-	ret1, _ := ret[1].(error)
-	return ret0, ret1
-}
-
-// GetAccountProxy indicates an expected call of GetAccountProxy.
-func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) GetAccountProxy(ctx, accountID interface{}) *gomock.Call {
-	mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
-	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "GetAccountProxy", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).GetAccountProxy), ctx, accountID)
-}
-
 // GetActiveClusterAddresses mocks base method.
 func (m *MockManager) GetActiveClusterAddresses(ctx context.Context) ([]string, error) {
 	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
@@ -208,7 +150,6 @@ func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) GetActiveClusterAddresses(ctx interface{}) *g
 	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "GetActiveClusterAddresses", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).GetActiveClusterAddresses), ctx)
 }
 
-// GetActiveClusterAddressesForAccount mocks base method.
 func (m *MockManager) GetActiveClusterAddressesForAccount(ctx context.Context, accountID string) ([]string, error) {
 	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
 	ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "GetActiveClusterAddressesForAccount", ctx, accountID)
@@ -217,7 +158,6 @@ func (m *MockManager) GetActiveClusterAddressesForAccount(ctx context.Context, a
 	return ret0, ret1
 }
 
-// GetActiveClusterAddressesForAccount indicates an expected call of GetActiveClusterAddressesForAccount.
 func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) GetActiveClusterAddressesForAccount(ctx, accountID interface{}) *gomock.Call {
 	mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
 	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "GetActiveClusterAddressesForAccount", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).GetActiveClusterAddressesForAccount), ctx, accountID)
@@ -237,6 +177,36 @@ func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) Heartbeat(ctx, p interface{}) *gomock.Call {
 	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "Heartbeat", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).Heartbeat), ctx, p)
 }
 
+// GetAccountProxy mocks base method.
+func (m *MockManager) GetAccountProxy(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (*Proxy, error) {
+	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
+	ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "GetAccountProxy", ctx, accountID)
+	ret0, _ := ret[0].(*Proxy)
+	ret1, _ := ret[1].(error)
+	return ret0, ret1
+}
+
+// GetAccountProxy indicates an expected call of GetAccountProxy.
+func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) GetAccountProxy(ctx, accountID interface{}) *gomock.Call {
+	mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
+	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "GetAccountProxy", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).GetAccountProxy), ctx, accountID)
+}
+
+// CountAccountProxies mocks base method.
+func (m *MockManager) CountAccountProxies(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (int64, error) {
+	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
+	ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "CountAccountProxies", ctx, accountID)
+	ret0, _ := ret[0].(int64)
+	ret1, _ := ret[1].(error)
+	return ret0, ret1
+}
+
+// CountAccountProxies indicates an expected call of CountAccountProxies.
+func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) CountAccountProxies(ctx, accountID interface{}) *gomock.Call {
+	mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
+	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "CountAccountProxies", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).CountAccountProxies), ctx, accountID)
+}
+
 // IsClusterAddressAvailable mocks base method.
 func (m *MockManager) IsClusterAddressAvailable(ctx context.Context, clusterAddress, accountID string) (bool, error) {
 	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
@@ -252,6 +222,20 @@ func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) IsClusterAddressAvailable(ctx, clusterAddress
 	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "IsClusterAddressAvailable", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).IsClusterAddressAvailable), ctx, clusterAddress, accountID)
 }
 
+// DeleteAccountCluster mocks base method.
+func (m *MockManager) DeleteAccountCluster(ctx context.Context, clusterAddress, accountID string) error {
+	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
+	ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "DeleteAccountCluster", ctx, clusterAddress, accountID)
+	ret0, _ := ret[0].(error)
+	return ret0
+}
+
+// DeleteAccountCluster indicates an expected call of DeleteAccountCluster.
+func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) DeleteAccountCluster(ctx, clusterAddress, accountID interface{}) *gomock.Call {
+	mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
+	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "DeleteAccountCluster", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).DeleteAccountCluster), ctx, clusterAddress, accountID)
+}
+
 // MockController is a mock of Controller interface.
 type MockController struct {
 	ctrl     *gomock.Controller

management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/proxy/proxy.go

@@ -20,9 +20,6 @@ type Capabilities struct {
 	RequireSubdomain *bool
 	// SupportsCrowdsec indicates whether this proxy has CrowdSec configured.
 	SupportsCrowdsec *bool
-	// SupportsAppsec indicates whether this proxy has a CrowdSec AppSec (WAF)
-	// endpoint configured.
-	SupportsAppsec *bool
 	// Private indicates whether this proxy supports inbound access via Wireguard
 	// tunnel and netbird-only authentication policies
 	Private *bool
@@ -77,6 +74,5 @@ type Cluster struct {
 	SupportsCustomPorts *bool
 	RequireSubdomain    *bool
 	SupportsCrowdSec    *bool
-	SupportsAppSec      *bool
 	Private             *bool
 }

management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/service/manager/api.go

@@ -204,7 +204,6 @@ func (h *handler) getClusters(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 			SupportsCustomPorts: c.SupportsCustomPorts,
 			RequireSubdomain:    c.RequireSubdomain,
 			SupportsCrowdsec:    c.SupportsCrowdSec,
-			SupportsAppsec:      c.SupportsAppSec,
 			Private:             c.Private,
 		})
 	}

management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/service/manager/manager.go

@@ -82,7 +82,6 @@ type CapabilityProvider interface {
 	ClusterSupportsCustomPorts(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	ClusterRequireSubdomain(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	ClusterSupportsCrowdSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
-	ClusterSupportsAppSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	ClusterSupportsPrivate(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 }
 
@@ -138,7 +137,6 @@ func (m *Manager) GetClusters(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID string) ([]
 		clusters[i].SupportsCustomPorts = m.capabilities.ClusterSupportsCustomPorts(ctx, clusters[i].Address)
 		clusters[i].RequireSubdomain = m.capabilities.ClusterRequireSubdomain(ctx, clusters[i].Address)
 		clusters[i].SupportsCrowdSec = m.capabilities.ClusterSupportsCrowdSec(ctx, clusters[i].Address)
-		clusters[i].SupportsAppSec = m.capabilities.ClusterSupportsAppSec(ctx, clusters[i].Address)
 		clusters[i].Private = m.capabilities.ClusterSupportsPrivate(ctx, clusters[i].Address)
 	}
 

management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/service/service.go

@@ -165,18 +165,6 @@ type AccessRestrictions struct {
 	AllowedCountries []string `json:"allowed_countries,omitempty" gorm:"serializer:json"`
 	BlockedCountries []string `json:"blocked_countries,omitempty" gorm:"serializer:json"`
 	CrowdSecMode     string   `json:"crowdsec_mode,omitempty" gorm:"serializer:json"`
-	// AppSecMode is the CrowdSec AppSec (WAF) request inspection mode: "",
-	// "off", "enforce", or "observe". HTTP services only.
-	AppSecMode string `json:"appsec_mode,omitempty" gorm:"serializer:json"`
-}
-
-// isEmpty reports whether no restriction is configured. Both conversions drop
-// the object entirely in that case, so a field missing from this check is
-// silently discarded on the way to the API and the proxy.
-func (r AccessRestrictions) isEmpty() bool {
-	return len(r.AllowedCIDRs) == 0 && len(r.BlockedCIDRs) == 0 &&
-		len(r.AllowedCountries) == 0 && len(r.BlockedCountries) == 0 &&
-		r.CrowdSecMode == "" && r.AppSecMode == ""
 }
 
 // Copy returns a deep copy of the AccessRestrictions.
@@ -187,7 +175,6 @@ func (r AccessRestrictions) Copy() AccessRestrictions {
 		AllowedCountries: slices.Clone(r.AllowedCountries),
 		BlockedCountries: slices.Clone(r.BlockedCountries),
 		CrowdSecMode:     r.CrowdSecMode,
-		AppSecMode:       r.AppSecMode,
 	}
 }
 
@@ -821,17 +808,13 @@ func restrictionsFromAPI(r *api.AccessRestrictions) (AccessRestrictions, error)
 		}
 		res.CrowdSecMode = string(*r.CrowdsecMode)
 	}
-	if r.AppsecMode != nil {
-		if !r.AppsecMode.Valid() {
-			return AccessRestrictions{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid appsec_mode %q", *r.AppsecMode)
-		}
-		res.AppSecMode = string(*r.AppsecMode)
-	}
 	return res, nil
 }
 
 func restrictionsToAPI(r AccessRestrictions) *api.AccessRestrictions {
-	if r.isEmpty() {
+	if len(r.AllowedCIDRs) == 0 && len(r.BlockedCIDRs) == 0 &&
+		len(r.AllowedCountries) == 0 && len(r.BlockedCountries) == 0 &&
+		r.CrowdSecMode == "" {
 		return nil
 	}
 	res := &api.AccessRestrictions{}
@@ -851,15 +834,13 @@ func restrictionsToAPI(r AccessRestrictions) *api.AccessRestrictions {
 		mode := api.AccessRestrictionsCrowdsecMode(r.CrowdSecMode)
 		res.CrowdsecMode = &mode
 	}
-	if r.AppSecMode != "" {
-		mode := api.AccessRestrictionsAppsecMode(r.AppSecMode)
-		res.AppsecMode = &mode
-	}
 	return res
 }
 
 func restrictionsToProto(r AccessRestrictions) *proto.AccessRestrictions {
-	if r.isEmpty() {
+	if len(r.AllowedCIDRs) == 0 && len(r.BlockedCIDRs) == 0 &&
+		len(r.AllowedCountries) == 0 && len(r.BlockedCountries) == 0 &&
+		r.CrowdSecMode == "" {
 		return nil
 	}
 	return &proto.AccessRestrictions{
@@ -868,7 +849,6 @@ func restrictionsToProto(r AccessRestrictions) *proto.AccessRestrictions {
 		AllowedCountries: r.AllowedCountries,
 		BlockedCountries: r.BlockedCountries,
 		CrowdsecMode:     r.CrowdSecMode,
-		AppsecMode:       r.AppSecMode,
 	}
 }
 
@@ -894,11 +874,6 @@ func (s *Service) Validate() error {
 	if err := validateAccessRestrictions(&s.Restrictions); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
-	// AppSec inspects HTTP requests, so it cannot apply to the L4 modes, which
-	// forward opaque byte streams.
-	if appSecEnabled(s.Restrictions.AppSecMode) && s.Mode != ModeHTTP {
-		return fmt.Errorf("appsec_mode is only supported for HTTP services, got mode %q", s.Mode)
-	}
 	if err := s.validatePrivateRequirements(); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
@@ -1267,27 +1242,10 @@ func validateCrowdSecMode(mode string) error {
 	}
 }
 
-func validateAppSecMode(mode string) error {
-	switch mode {
-	case "", "off", "enforce", "observe":
-		return nil
-	default:
-		return fmt.Errorf("appsec_mode %q is invalid", mode)
-	}
-}
-
-// appSecEnabled reports whether the mode asks for request inspection.
-func appSecEnabled(mode string) bool {
-	return mode == "enforce" || mode == "observe"
-}
-
 func validateAccessRestrictions(r *AccessRestrictions) error {
 	if err := validateCrowdSecMode(r.CrowdSecMode); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
-	if err := validateAppSecMode(r.AppSecMode); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
 
 	if len(r.AllowedCIDRs) > maxCIDREntries {
 		return fmt.Errorf("allowed_cidrs: exceeds maximum of %d entries", maxCIDREntries)

management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/service/service_test.go

@@ -26,17 +26,6 @@ func validProxy() *Service {
 	}
 }
 
-// validL4Proxy returns a service that passes validation in one of the L4 modes.
-func validL4Proxy(mode string) *Service {
-	rp := validProxy()
-	rp.Mode = mode
-	rp.ListenPort = 9000
-	rp.Targets = []*Target{
-		{TargetId: "peer-1", TargetType: TargetTypePeer, Host: "10.0.0.1", Port: 5432, Protocol: mode, Enabled: true},
-	}
-	return rp
-}
-
 func TestValidate_Valid(t *testing.T) {
 	require.NoError(t, validProxy().Validate())
 }
@@ -1326,68 +1315,3 @@ func TestValidate_Private_RejectsNonHTTPMode(t *testing.T) {
 	}}
 	assert.ErrorContains(t, rp.Validate(), "HTTP")
 }
-
-func TestRestrictions_AppSecMode_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
-	mode := api.AccessRestrictionsAppsecModeEnforce
-	apiIn := &api.AccessRestrictions{AppsecMode: &mode}
-
-	model, err := restrictionsFromAPI(apiIn)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, "enforce", model.AppSecMode)
-
-	// appsec_mode alone must keep the restrictions object alive on both the API
-	// and proto legs: it is meaningful without any CIDR or country entry.
-	apiOut := restrictionsToAPI(model)
-	require.NotNil(t, apiOut, "appsec_mode alone must not collapse the restrictions to nil")
-	require.NotNil(t, apiOut.AppsecMode)
-	assert.Equal(t, api.AccessRestrictionsAppsecModeEnforce, *apiOut.AppsecMode)
-
-	protoOut := restrictionsToProto(model)
-	require.NotNil(t, protoOut, "appsec_mode alone must reach the proxy")
-	assert.Equal(t, "enforce", protoOut.AppsecMode)
-}
-
-func TestRestrictions_AppSecMode_EmptyIsOmitted(t *testing.T) {
-	model, err := restrictionsFromAPI(&api.AccessRestrictions{
-		AllowedCidrs: &[]string{"203.0.113.0/24"},
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Empty(t, model.AppSecMode)
-
-	apiOut := restrictionsToAPI(model)
-	require.NotNil(t, apiOut)
-	assert.Nil(t, apiOut.AppsecMode, "empty appsec_mode is omitted from the API response")
-}
-
-func TestRestrictions_AppSecMode_CopyIsDeep(t *testing.T) {
-	original := AccessRestrictions{AppSecMode: "observe", CrowdSecMode: "enforce"}
-	assert.Equal(t, original, original.Copy(), "Copy must carry every mode field")
-}
-
-func TestValidate_RejectsInvalidAppSecMode(t *testing.T) {
-	rp := validProxy()
-	rp.Restrictions = AccessRestrictions{AppSecMode: "sometimes"}
-	assert.ErrorContains(t, rp.Validate(), "appsec_mode")
-}
-
-func TestValidate_RejectsAppSecOnL4Modes(t *testing.T) {
-	// AppSec inspects HTTP requests, so the L4 modes cannot honor it. Accepting
-	// the field there would report protection that never runs.
-	for _, mode := range []string{ModeTCP, ModeUDP, ModeTLS} {
-		t.Run(mode, func(t *testing.T) {
-			rp := validL4Proxy(mode)
-			rp.Restrictions = AccessRestrictions{AppSecMode: "enforce"}
-			assert.ErrorContains(t, rp.Validate(), "appsec_mode is only supported for HTTP services")
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-func TestValidate_AllowsAppSecOffOnL4Modes(t *testing.T) {
-	for _, mode := range []string{ModeTCP, ModeUDP, ModeTLS} {
-		t.Run(mode, func(t *testing.T) {
-			rp := validL4Proxy(mode)
-			rp.Restrictions = AccessRestrictions{AppSecMode: "off"}
-			require.NoError(t, rp.Validate(), "an explicit off must not be rejected on L4 services")
-		})
-	}
-}

management/internals/shared/grpc/proxy.go

@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
 
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/peers"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/accesslogs"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/proxy"
@@ -37,6 +36,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/sessionkey"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/idp"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/users"
 	proxyauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/auth"
@@ -505,7 +505,6 @@ func (s *ProxyServiceServer) registerProxyConnection(ctx context.Context, params
 			SupportsCustomPorts: c.SupportsCustomPorts,
 			RequireSubdomain:    c.RequireSubdomain,
 			SupportsCrowdsec:    c.SupportsCrowdsec,
-			SupportsAppsec:      c.SupportsAppsec,
 			Private:             c.Private,
 		}
 	}

management/server/store/sql_store.go

@@ -2259,7 +2259,7 @@ func (s *SqlStore) getPostureChecks(ctx context.Context, accountID string) ([]*p
 }
 
 func (s *SqlStore) getServices(ctx context.Context, accountID string) ([]*rpservice.Service, error) {
-	const serviceQuery = `SELECT id, account_id, name, domain, enabled, auth, restrictions,
+	const serviceQuery = `SELECT id, account_id, name, domain, enabled, auth,
 		meta_created_at, meta_certificate_issued_at, meta_status, proxy_cluster,
 		pass_host_header, rewrite_redirects, session_private_key, session_public_key,
 		mode, listen_port, port_auto_assigned, source, source_peer, terminated,
@@ -2278,7 +2278,6 @@ func (s *SqlStore) getServices(ctx context.Context, accountID string) ([]*rpserv
 	services, err := pgx.CollectRows(serviceRows, func(row pgx.CollectableRow) (*rpservice.Service, error) {
 		var s rpservice.Service
 		var auth []byte
-		var restrictions []byte
 		var accessGroups []byte
 		var createdAt, certIssuedAt sql.NullTime
 		var status, proxyCluster, sessionPrivateKey, sessionPublicKey sql.NullString
@@ -2292,7 +2291,6 @@ func (s *SqlStore) getServices(ctx context.Context, accountID string) ([]*rpserv
 			&s.Domain,
 			&s.Enabled,
 			&auth,
-			&restrictions,
 			&createdAt,
 			&certIssuedAt,
 			&status,
@@ -2320,12 +2318,6 @@ func (s *SqlStore) getServices(ctx context.Context, accountID string) ([]*rpserv
 			}
 		}
 
-		if len(restrictions) > 0 {
-			if err := json.Unmarshal(restrictions, &s.Restrictions); err != nil {
-				return nil, fmt.Errorf("unmarshal restrictions: %w", err)
-			}
-		}
-
 		if len(accessGroups) > 0 {
 			if err := json.Unmarshal(accessGroups, &s.AccessGroups); err != nil {
 				return nil, fmt.Errorf("unmarshal access_groups: %w", err)
@@ -6365,7 +6357,6 @@ var validCapabilityColumns = map[string]struct{}{
 	"supports_custom_ports": {},
 	"require_subdomain":     {},
 	"supports_crowdsec":     {},
-	"supports_appsec":       {},
 	"private":               {},
 }
 
@@ -6396,14 +6387,6 @@ func (s *SqlStore) GetClusterSupportsCrowdSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr s
 	return s.getClusterUnanimousCapability(ctx, clusterAddr, "supports_crowdsec")
 }
 
-// GetClusterSupportsAppSec returns whether all active proxies in the cluster
-// have a CrowdSec AppSec endpoint configured. Returns nil when no proxy
-// reported the capability. Unanimous for the same reason as CrowdSec: a single
-// proxy without AppSec would let requests through uninspected.
-func (s *SqlStore) GetClusterSupportsAppSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool {
-	return s.getClusterUnanimousCapability(ctx, clusterAddr, "supports_appsec")
-}
-
 // getClusterUnanimousCapability returns an aggregated boolean capability
 // requiring all active proxies in the cluster to report true.
 func (s *SqlStore) getClusterUnanimousCapability(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr, column string) *bool {

management/server/store/sql_store_service_test.go

@@ -44,42 +44,3 @@ func TestSqlStore_GetAccount_PrivateServiceRoundtrip(t *testing.T) {
 		assert.Equal(t, []string{"grp-admins", "grp-ops"}, got.AccessGroups)
 	})
 }
-
-// Restrictions are stored as a JSON blob, and the Postgres read path lists
-// columns by hand: a mode that is not read there is silently off on Postgres
-// while working in SQLite dev.
-func TestSqlStore_GetAccount_ServiceRestrictionsRoundtrip(t *testing.T) {
-	if os.Getenv("CI") == "true" && (runtime.GOOS == "darwin" || runtime.GOOS == "windows") {
-		t.Skip("skip CI tests on darwin and windows")
-	}
-
-	runTestForAllEngines(t, "", func(t *testing.T, store Store) {
-		ctx := context.Background()
-		account := newAccountWithId(ctx, "account_svc_restrictions", "testuser", "")
-		require.NoError(t, store.SaveAccount(ctx, account))
-
-		svc := &rpservice.Service{
-			ID:        "svc-restrictions",
-			AccountID: account.Id,
-			Name:      "restricted-svc",
-			Domain:    "restricted.example",
-			Enabled:   true,
-			Mode:      rpservice.ModeHTTP,
-			Restrictions: rpservice.AccessRestrictions{
-				AllowedCIDRs: []string{"203.0.113.0/24"},
-				CrowdSecMode: "observe",
-				AppSecMode:   "enforce",
-			},
-		}
-		require.NoError(t, store.CreateService(ctx, svc))
-
-		loaded, err := store.GetAccount(ctx, account.Id)
-		require.NoError(t, err)
-		require.Len(t, loaded.Services, 1)
-
-		got := loaded.Services[0].Restrictions
-		assert.Equal(t, []string{"203.0.113.0/24"}, got.AllowedCIDRs)
-		assert.Equal(t, "observe", got.CrowdSecMode)
-		assert.Equal(t, "enforce", got.AppSecMode)
-	})
-}

management/server/store/store.go

@@ -321,7 +321,6 @@ type Store interface {
 	GetClusterSupportsCustomPorts(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	GetClusterRequireSubdomain(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	GetClusterSupportsCrowdSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
-	GetClusterSupportsAppSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	GetClusterSupportsPrivate(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	CleanupStaleProxies(ctx context.Context, inactivityDuration time.Duration) error
 	GetAllProxies(ctx context.Context) ([]*proxy.Proxy, error)

management/server/store/store_mock.go

@@ -1835,20 +1835,6 @@ func (mr *MockStoreMockRecorder) GetClusterRequireSubdomain(ctx, clusterAddr int
 	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "GetClusterRequireSubdomain", reflect.TypeOf((*MockStore)(nil).GetClusterRequireSubdomain), ctx, clusterAddr)
 }
 
-// GetClusterSupportsAppSec mocks base method.
-func (m *MockStore) GetClusterSupportsAppSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool {
-	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
-	ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "GetClusterSupportsAppSec", ctx, clusterAddr)
-	ret0, _ := ret[0].(*bool)
-	return ret0
-}
-
-// GetClusterSupportsAppSec indicates an expected call of GetClusterSupportsAppSec.
-func (mr *MockStoreMockRecorder) GetClusterSupportsAppSec(ctx, clusterAddr interface{}) *gomock.Call {
-	mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
-	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "GetClusterSupportsAppSec", reflect.TypeOf((*MockStore)(nil).GetClusterSupportsAppSec), ctx, clusterAddr)
-}
-
 // GetClusterSupportsCrowdSec mocks base method.
 func (m *MockStore) GetClusterSupportsCrowdSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool {
 	m.ctrl.T.Helper()

proxy/cmd/proxy/cmd/root.go

@@ -79,9 +79,6 @@ var (
 	geoDataDir            string
 	crowdsecAPIURL        string
 	crowdsecAPIKey        string
-	appsecURL             string
-	appsecTimeout         time.Duration
-	appsecMaxBodyBytes    int64
 )
 
 var rootCmd = &cobra.Command{
@@ -128,9 +125,6 @@ func init() {
 	rootCmd.Flags().StringVar(&geoDataDir, "geo-data-dir", envStringOrDefault("NB_PROXY_GEO_DATA_DIR", "/var/lib/netbird/geolocation"), "Directory for the GeoLite2 MMDB file (auto-downloaded if missing)")
 	rootCmd.Flags().StringVar(&crowdsecAPIURL, "crowdsec-api-url", envStringOrDefault("NB_PROXY_CROWDSEC_API_URL", ""), "CrowdSec LAPI URL for IP reputation checks")
 	rootCmd.Flags().StringVar(&crowdsecAPIKey, "crowdsec-api-key", envStringOrDefault("NB_PROXY_CROWDSEC_API_KEY", ""), "CrowdSec bouncer API key")
-	rootCmd.Flags().StringVar(&appsecURL, "crowdsec-appsec-url", envStringOrDefault("NB_PROXY_CROWDSEC_APPSEC_URL", ""), "CrowdSec AppSec (WAF) endpoint for HTTP request inspection, e.g. http://127.0.0.1:7422/ (reuses the bouncer API key)")
-	rootCmd.Flags().DurationVar(&appsecTimeout, "crowdsec-appsec-timeout", envDurationOrDefault("NB_PROXY_CROWDSEC_APPSEC_TIMEOUT", 0), "Timeout for a single AppSec inspection call (0 = 200ms)")
-	rootCmd.Flags().Int64Var(&appsecMaxBodyBytes, "crowdsec-appsec-max-body-bytes", envInt64OrDefault("NB_PROXY_CROWDSEC_APPSEC_MAX_BODY_BYTES", 0), "Cap on the request body mirrored to AppSec (0 = 64KiB, negative = headers and URI only)")
 }
 
 // Execute runs the root command.
@@ -224,57 +218,47 @@ func runServer(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
 	ctx, stop := signal.NotifyContext(context.Background(), syscall.SIGTERM, syscall.SIGINT)
 	defer stop()
 
-	srv := proxy.New(ctx, serverConfig(logger, proxyToken, parsedTrustedProxies, perf))
+	srv := proxy.New(ctx, proxy.Config{
+		ListenAddr:               addr,
+		Logger:                   logger,
+		Version:                  Version,
+		ManagementAddress:        mgmtAddr,
+		ProxyURL:                 proxyDomain,
+		ProxyToken:               proxyToken,
+		CertificateDirectory:     certDir,
+		CertificateFile:          certFile,
+		CertificateKeyFile:       certKeyFile,
+		GenerateACMECertificates: acmeCerts,
+		ACMEChallengeAddress:     acmeAddr,
+		ACMEDirectory:            acmeDir,
+		ACMEEABKID:               acmeEABKID,
+		ACMEEABHMACKey:           acmeEABHMACKey,
+		ACMEChallengeType:        acmeChallengeType,
+		DebugEndpointEnabled:     debugEndpoint,
+		DebugEndpointAddress:     debugEndpointAddr,
+		HealthAddr:               healthAddr,
+		ForwardedProto:           forwardedProto,
+		TrustedProxies:           parsedTrustedProxies,
+		CertLockMethod:           nbacme.CertLockMethod(certLockMethod),
+		WildcardCertDir:          wildcardCertDir,
+		WireguardPort:            wgPort,
+		Performance:              perf,
+		ProxyProtocol:            proxyProtocol,
+		PreSharedKey:             preSharedKey,
+		SupportsCustomPorts:      supportsCustomPorts,
+		RequireSubdomain:         requireSubdomain,
+		Private:                  private,
+		MaxDialTimeout:           maxDialTimeout,
+		MaxSessionIdleTimeout:    maxSessionIdleTimeout,
+		MappingBatchWatchdog:     envDurationOrDefault("NB_PROXY_MAPPING_BATCH_WATCHDOG", 0),
+		GeoDataDir:               geoDataDir,
+		CrowdSecAPIURL:           crowdsecAPIURL,
+		CrowdSecAPIKey:           crowdsecAPIKey,
+	})
 
 	return srv.ListenAndServe(ctx, addr)
 }
 
-// serverConfig maps the parsed flags and environment onto the proxy config.
-// Kept separate from runServer so registering a new flag does not grow the
-// startup path.
-func serverConfig(logger *log.Logger, proxyToken string, trustedProxyList *trustedproxy.List, perf embed.Performance) proxy.Config {
-	return proxy.Config{
-		ListenAddr:                 addr,
-		Logger:                     logger,
-		Version:                    Version,
-		ManagementAddress:          mgmtAddr,
-		ProxyURL:                   proxyDomain,
-		ProxyToken:                 proxyToken,
-		CertificateDirectory:       certDir,
-		CertificateFile:            certFile,
-		CertificateKeyFile:         certKeyFile,
-		GenerateACMECertificates:   acmeCerts,
-		ACMEChallengeAddress:       acmeAddr,
-		ACMEDirectory:              acmeDir,
-		ACMEEABKID:                 acmeEABKID,
-		ACMEEABHMACKey:             acmeEABHMACKey,
-		ACMEChallengeType:          acmeChallengeType,
-		DebugEndpointEnabled:       debugEndpoint,
-		DebugEndpointAddress:       debugEndpointAddr,
-		HealthAddr:                 healthAddr,
-		ForwardedProto:             forwardedProto,
-		TrustedProxies:             trustedProxyList,
-		CertLockMethod:             nbacme.CertLockMethod(certLockMethod),
-		WildcardCertDir:            wildcardCertDir,
-		WireguardPort:              wgPort,
-		Performance:                perf,
-		ProxyProtocol:              proxyProtocol,
-		PreSharedKey:               preSharedKey,
-		SupportsCustomPorts:        supportsCustomPorts,
-		RequireSubdomain:           requireSubdomain,
-		Private:                    private,
-		MaxDialTimeout:             maxDialTimeout,
-		MaxSessionIdleTimeout:      maxSessionIdleTimeout,
-		MappingBatchWatchdog:       envDurationOrDefault("NB_PROXY_MAPPING_BATCH_WATCHDOG", 0),
-		GeoDataDir:                 geoDataDir,
-		CrowdSecAPIURL:             crowdsecAPIURL,
-		CrowdSecAPIKey:             crowdsecAPIKey,
-		CrowdSecAppSecURL:          appsecURL,
-		CrowdSecAppSecTimeout:      appsecTimeout,
-		CrowdSecAppSecMaxBodyBytes: appsecMaxBodyBytes,
-	}
-}
-
 func envBoolOrDefault(key string, def bool) bool {
 	v, exists := os.LookupEnv(key)
 	if !exists {
@@ -309,19 +293,6 @@ func envUint16OrDefault(key string, def uint16) uint16 {
 	return uint16(parsed)
 }
 
-func envInt64OrDefault(key string, def int64) int64 {
-	v, exists := os.LookupEnv(key)
-	if !exists {
-		return def
-	}
-	parsed, err := strconv.ParseInt(v, 10, 64)
-	if err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("parse %s=%q: %v, using default %d", key, v, err, def)
-		return def
-	}
-	return parsed
-}
-
 func envDurationOrDefault(key string, def time.Duration) time.Duration {
 	v, exists := os.LookupEnv(key)
 	if !exists {

proxy/internal/appsec/body.go

@@ -1,163 +0,0 @@
-package appsec
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"errors"
-	"io"
-	"mime"
-	"net/http"
-	"net/url"
-	"slices"
-	"strings"
-)
-
-// bufferBody reads up to limit+1 bytes from r.Body and always restores r.Body so
-// the request stays forwardable. oversize reports that the body exceeded limit, in
-// which case the returned prefix must not be used for inspection: the bytes are
-// only read so they can be replayed to the backend.
-func bufferBody(r *http.Request, limit int64) (body []byte, oversize bool, err error) {
-	original := r.Body
-	buf, readErr := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(original, limit+1))
-	if readErr != nil && !errors.Is(readErr, io.EOF) {
-		// Restore what was read so a downstream retry sees a consistent stream,
-		// then surface the failure.
-		r.Body = replay(buf, original)
-		return nil, false, readErr
-	}
-
-	if int64(len(buf)) > limit {
-		r.Body = replay(buf, original)
-		return nil, true, nil
-	}
-
-	// The whole body is buffered, so the original is drained and can be closed.
-	// A close error on a drained read-only body does not invalidate the bytes.
-	_ = original.Close()
-	r.Body = io.NopCloser(bytes.NewReader(buf))
-	// Framing is deliberately left as the client sent it. Rewriting a chunked
-	// request to a fixed Content-Length here would be invisible to the client
-	// but not to the rest of the chain: a later body capture with a smaller cap
-	// sees a known length over its cap and skips capture entirely, where an
-	// unknown length would have given it a truncated prefix. Inspecting a
-	// request must not change what any other layer gets to inspect.
-	return buf, false, nil
-}
-
-// replay returns a ReadCloser that yields the already-read prefix followed by
-// the remainder of the original stream, and closes the original.
-func replay(prefix []byte, rest io.ReadCloser) io.ReadCloser {
-	return struct {
-		io.Reader
-		io.Closer
-	}{
-		Reader: io.MultiReader(bytes.NewReader(prefix), rest),
-		Closer: rest,
-	}
-}
-
-// redactedPlaceholder replaces a credential value in the mirrored body. It is
-// inert for rule matching, and its fixed length leaks nothing about the secret.
-const redactedPlaceholder = "redacted"
-
-// redactFormFields returns the body to mirror for a URL-encoded form, with the
-// values of the named fields replaced. The proxy's own password / PIN login
-// form posts to the service path itself, so without this the plaintext
-// credential would reach the Security Engine.
-//
-// Only the credential values are removed, never the whole body: dropping the
-// body outright would let a caller exempt any payload from inspection just by
-// appending a field named "password". Everything else in the form stays
-// inspectable, which is the point.
-//
-// Returns body unchanged when it is not a URL-encoded form or carries none of
-// the fields.
-//
-// Substitution happens on the raw bytes rather than by re-encoding parsed
-// values. Re-encoding would drop pairs that url.ParseQuery rejects, so a
-// payload hidden in a malformed pair alongside a credential-named field would
-// never be inspected while a tolerant backend parser still acted on it. Working
-// byte-wise also avoids reordering keys and normalizing escapes, so the engine
-// sees the same bytes the backend will.
-//
-// Field names match case-sensitively, on purpose: the caller passes the exact
-// names the login handler reads via r.FormValue, and that lookup is itself
-// case-sensitive. A "Password" field is therefore never a credential as far as
-// the proxy is concerned, and redacting it would only blind the WAF to a value
-// the proxy does not own.
-func redactFormFields(contentType string, body []byte, fields []string) []byte {
-	if len(fields) == 0 || len(body) == 0 {
-		return body
-	}
-	media, _, err := mime.ParseMediaType(contentType)
-	if err != nil || media != "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" {
-		return body
-	}
-	return redactURLEncoded(body, fields)
-}
-
-// redactURLEncoded replaces the values of the named keys in a URL-encoded
-// key/value sequence, the shared syntax of a query string and a form body.
-func redactURLEncoded(raw []byte, fields []string) []byte {
-	// Split on "&" only, matching how Go's form parser delimits pairs.
-	segments := bytes.Split(raw, []byte("&"))
-	redacted := false
-	for i, segment := range segments {
-		rawKey, _, hasValue := bytes.Cut(segment, []byte("="))
-		if !hasValue {
-			continue
-		}
-		// Compare the decoded name, so an escaped spelling of the field
-		// ("pass%77ord") is redacted too: the reader decodes before looking it
-		// up. A key that fails to decode never reaches that reader either,
-		// since the parser drops the pair.
-		name, err := url.QueryUnescape(string(rawKey))
-		if err != nil || !slices.Contains(fields, name) {
-			continue
-		}
-		// Keep the key bytes as sent and replace only the value. Assigning a
-		// fresh slice leaves raw untouched, which matters: the caller restored
-		// the request body from the same buffer.
-		segments[i] = []byte(string(rawKey) + "=" + redactedPlaceholder)
-		redacted = true
-	}
-	if !redacted {
-		return raw
-	}
-	return bytes.Join(segments, []byte("&"))
-}
-
-// redactQuery replaces the values of the named query parameters in a raw query
-// string, leaving every other byte as sent.
-func redactQuery(rawQuery string, params []string) string {
-	if len(params) == 0 || rawQuery == "" {
-		return rawQuery
-	}
-	return string(redactURLEncoded([]byte(rawQuery), params))
-}
-
-// redactCookieHeader replaces the values of the named cookies in a Cookie
-// header, keeping the others intact: cookies are a zone WAF rules match on, so
-// dropping the whole header would cost real coverage.
-func redactCookieHeader(value string, names []string) string {
-	if len(names) == 0 || value == "" {
-		return value
-	}
-	parts := strings.Split(value, ";")
-	redacted := false
-	for i, part := range parts {
-		name, _, hasValue := strings.Cut(part, "=")
-		if !hasValue {
-			continue
-		}
-		// Cookie names are case-sensitive and are not percent-decoded.
-		if !slices.Contains(names, strings.TrimSpace(name)) {
-			continue
-		}
-		parts[i] = name + "=" + redactedPlaceholder
-		redacted = true
-	}
-	if !redacted {
-		return value
-	}
-	return strings.Join(parts, ";")
-}

proxy/internal/appsec/client.go

@@ -1,495 +0,0 @@
-// Package appsec implements the CrowdSec AppSec (WAF) side of the remediation
-// component protocol: each inspected HTTP request is mirrored to the Security
-// Engine's AppSec endpoint, which replies with an allow / ban / captcha verdict
-// for that request.
-//
-// This is a separate endpoint from the LAPI decision stream used by the
-// crowdsec package: LAPI answers "is this IP known bad", AppSec answers "is
-// this request an attack". The two are configured and enabled independently.
-package appsec
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"context"
-	"encoding/json"
-	"errors"
-	"fmt"
-	"io"
-	"net/http"
-	"net/netip"
-	"net/url"
-	"strings"
-	"sync"
-	"time"
-
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/netutil"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/restrict"
-)
-
-// Header names the AppSec component reads off the mirrored request. IP, URI and
-// Verb are mandatory: the engine answers 500 when any of them is missing.
-const (
-	headerAPIKey        = "X-Crowdsec-Appsec-Api-Key" //nolint:gosec // G101: a header name, not a credential
-	headerIP            = "X-Crowdsec-Appsec-Ip"
-	headerURI           = "X-Crowdsec-Appsec-Uri"
-	headerVerb          = "X-Crowdsec-Appsec-Verb"
-	headerHost          = "X-Crowdsec-Appsec-Host"
-	headerUserAgent     = "X-Crowdsec-Appsec-User-Agent"
-	headerHTTPVersion   = "X-Crowdsec-Appsec-Http-Version"
-	headerTransactionID = "X-Crowdsec-Appsec-Transaction-Id"
-)
-
-// headerPrefix covers every protocol header. Any client-supplied header in this
-// namespace is dropped before forwarding so a caller cannot influence the
-// engine's view of its own address, or replay an API key.
-const headerPrefix = "X-Crowdsec-Appsec-"
-
-// Remediation actions the engine can return.
-const (
-	actionAllow   = "allow"
-	actionBan     = "ban"
-	actionCaptcha = "captcha"
-)
-
-const (
-	// DefaultTimeout matches the 200ms budget CrowdSec's remediation component
-	// spec sets for the blocking AppSec call.
-	DefaultTimeout = 200 * time.Millisecond
-	// MinTimeout and MaxTimeout bound the configured inspection timeout.
-	// Inspection is synchronous, so the upper bound is what keeps a
-	// mis-set value from parking every request to an inspected service on a
-	// slow engine; the lower bound keeps the call from timing out before the
-	// engine can realistically answer. Mirrors the per-middleware bounds the
-	// proxy already applies to in-path calls.
-	MinTimeout = 10 * time.Millisecond
-	MaxTimeout = 5 * time.Second
-	// DefaultMaxBodyBytes caps the request body mirrored to the engine.
-	// Requests with a larger body are inspected on headers and URI only.
-	DefaultMaxBodyBytes int64 = 64 << 10
-	// MaxBodyBytesLimit is the ceiling for that cap. A single request can hold
-	// this much in memory; the shared Budget is what bounds the total across
-	// concurrent requests. Matches the proxy-wide body-capture ceiling.
-	MaxBodyBytesLimit int64 = 8 << 20
-	// maxResponseBytes bounds how much of a verdict response is read. The
-	// engine answers with a two-field JSON object, so anything beyond this is
-	// not a response we can act on.
-	maxResponseBytes int64 = 4 << 10
-)
-
-// Reasons the request body was not mirrored. Reported so an access-log reader
-// can distinguish "inspected and clean" from "never inspected", and so an
-// oversize opt-out is visible rather than silent.
-const (
-	BypassOversize = "oversize"
-	BypassUpgrade  = "upgrade"
-	BypassDisabled = "disabled"
-	BypassBudget   = "budget_exhausted"
-)
-
-// ErrUnavailable reports that the engine could not produce a verdict: the call
-// failed, timed out, or the engine rejected it (401 bad key, 500 malformed).
-// Distinguished from a block verdict so the caller can apply the per-service
-// mode: enforce fails closed, observe allows.
-var ErrUnavailable = errors.New("appsec engine unavailable")
-
-// Config configures a Client.
-type Config struct {
-	// URL is the AppSec endpoint, e.g. http://127.0.0.1:7422/.
-	URL string
-	// APIKey is the CrowdSec bouncer API key. The AppSec component validates it
-	// against LAPI, so the same key used for the decision stream works here.
-	APIKey string
-	// Timeout bounds a single inspection call. Zero means DefaultTimeout.
-	Timeout time.Duration
-	// MaxBodyBytes caps the mirrored request body. Zero means
-	// DefaultMaxBodyBytes; negative disables body forwarding entirely.
-	MaxBodyBytes int64
-	// Budget bounds the total body buffering in flight across all inspected
-	// requests. Nil disables that ceiling, which leaves the worst case at
-	// MaxBodyBytes times the concurrent request count; callers serving
-	// untrusted traffic should share the proxy-wide capture budget here.
-	Budget Budget
-	Logger *log.Entry
-}
-
-// Budget is the shared allowance for in-flight body buffering. Acquire reports
-// whether n bytes could be reserved; every successful Acquire is matched by a
-// Release of the same n. Satisfied by the proxy's capture budget, so AppSec and
-// the middleware body tap draw down one pool rather than two independent ones.
-type Budget interface {
-	Acquire(n int64) bool
-	Release(n int64)
-}
-
-// Client mirrors HTTP requests to a CrowdSec AppSec endpoint. It holds no
-// per-service state and is safe for concurrent use.
-type Client struct {
-	url          string
-	apiKey       string
-	maxBodyBytes int64
-	budget       Budget
-	http         *http.Client
-	logger       *log.Entry
-}
-
-// New validates the config and returns a Client. The endpoint is not contacted
-// here: the engine may come up after the proxy.
-func New(cfg Config) (*Client, error) {
-	if cfg.URL == "" {
-		return nil, errors.New("appsec url is empty")
-	}
-	if cfg.APIKey == "" {
-		return nil, errors.New("appsec api key is empty")
-	}
-	parsed, err := url.Parse(cfg.URL)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse appsec url: %w", err)
-	}
-	if parsed.Scheme != "http" && parsed.Scheme != "https" {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("appsec url scheme %q is not http(s)", parsed.Scheme)
-	}
-	if parsed.Host == "" {
-		return nil, errors.New("appsec url has no host")
-	}
-
-	logger := cfg.Logger
-	if logger == nil {
-		logger = log.NewEntry(log.StandardLogger())
-	}
-
-	timeout := cfg.Timeout
-	switch {
-	case timeout <= 0:
-		timeout = DefaultTimeout
-	case timeout < MinTimeout:
-		logger.Warnf("appsec timeout %s is below the minimum, using %s", timeout, MinTimeout)
-		timeout = MinTimeout
-	case timeout > MaxTimeout:
-		logger.Warnf("appsec timeout %s exceeds the maximum, using %s", timeout, MaxTimeout)
-		timeout = MaxTimeout
-	}
-
-	// A negative cap is meaningful: forward no body at all.
-	maxBody := cfg.MaxBodyBytes
-	switch {
-	case maxBody == 0:
-		maxBody = DefaultMaxBodyBytes
-	case maxBody > MaxBodyBytesLimit:
-		logger.Warnf("appsec max body %d exceeds the maximum, using %d", maxBody, MaxBodyBytesLimit)
-		maxBody = MaxBodyBytesLimit
-	}
-
-	return &Client{
-		url:          cfg.URL,
-		apiKey:       cfg.APIKey,
-		maxBodyBytes: maxBody,
-		budget:       cfg.Budget,
-		logger:       logger,
-		http: &http.Client{
-			Timeout: timeout,
-			Transport: &http.Transport{
-				MaxIdleConns:        100,
-				MaxIdleConnsPerHost: 32,
-				IdleConnTimeout:     90 * time.Second,
-			},
-		},
-	}, nil
-}
-
-// Request is one inspection request.
-type Request struct {
-	// HTTP is the in-flight client request. Inspect buffers and restores its
-	// body, so the request stays forwardable afterwards.
-	HTTP *http.Request
-	// ClientIP is the resolved client address (after trusted-proxy handling).
-	ClientIP netip.Addr
-	// TransactionID correlates the engine's alert with the proxy's access log
-	// entry. Empty lets the engine generate its own UUID.
-	TransactionID string
-	// RedactBodyFields lists form fields whose values are replaced before the
-	// body is mirrored. Used to keep credentials submitted to the proxy's own
-	// login form out of the engine while still inspecting the rest.
-	RedactBodyFields []string
-	// RedactHeaders, RedactCookies and RedactQueryParams name the credentials
-	// the proxy already withholds from backends: the header-auth values, its
-	// session cookie, and the OIDC session token. The engine logs and alerts on
-	// what it inspects, so mirroring them there would reintroduce the leak the
-	// upstream strippers exist to prevent. Only the values are replaced, so the
-	// surrounding headers, cookies and query stay inspectable.
-	RedactHeaders     []string
-	RedactCookies     []string
-	RedactQueryParams []string
-}
-
-// Result is the outcome of an inspection.
-type Result struct {
-	Verdict restrict.Verdict
-	// BodyBypass names why the request body was not mirrored, empty when it
-	// was (or when the request had none). The engine still saw the headers and
-	// URI, so this is a coverage note, not a failure.
-	BodyBypass string
-	// Release returns the buffered body's budget reservation. Never nil, so it
-	// is always safe to defer. It must run only once the request has been
-	// served, not when Inspect returns: the buffer stays alive as r.Body for
-	// the backend to read, so releasing earlier would let the budget admit
-	// buffering that is still resident.
-	Release func()
-}
-
-// noopRelease is the Release for inspections that reserved no budget.
-func noopRelease() {}
-
-// Inspect mirrors r to the AppSec engine and returns its verdict. A nil error
-// with restrict.Allow means the request passed. On failure it returns
-// DenyAppSecUnavailable wrapped with ErrUnavailable; the caller decides whether
-// that blocks, based on the per-service mode.
-func (c *Client) Inspect(ctx context.Context, req Request) (Result, error) {
-	if c == nil {
-		return Result{Verdict: restrict.DenyAppSecUnavailable, Release: noopRelease}, ErrUnavailable
-	}
-	if req.HTTP == nil {
-		return Result{Verdict: restrict.DenyAppSecUnavailable, Release: noopRelease}, fmt.Errorf("%w: nil request", ErrUnavailable)
-	}
-
-	// release is carried out to the caller rather than deferred here: the
-	// buffered body outlives this call as r.Body.
-	body, bypass, release, err := c.readBody(req)
-	if err != nil {
-		return Result{Verdict: restrict.DenyAppSecUnavailable, Release: release}, fmt.Errorf("%w: read body: %w", ErrUnavailable, err)
-	}
-
-	outbound, err := c.buildRequest(ctx, req, body)
-	if err != nil {
-		return Result{Verdict: restrict.DenyAppSecUnavailable, BodyBypass: bypass, Release: release}, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", ErrUnavailable, err)
-	}
-
-	resp, err := c.http.Do(outbound)
-	if err != nil {
-		return Result{Verdict: restrict.DenyAppSecUnavailable, BodyBypass: bypass, Release: release}, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", ErrUnavailable, err)
-	}
-	defer func() {
-		// Drain before closing. net/http only returns a connection to the idle
-		// pool once its body is read to EOF; closing with bytes outstanding
-		// discards it. Every verdict carries a JSON body, so skipping this
-		// would cost a fresh handshake per inspected request, inside the
-		// timeout budget.
-		if _, err := io.Copy(io.Discard, io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxResponseBytes)); err != nil {
-			c.logger.Tracef("drain appsec response body: %v", err)
-		}
-		if err := resp.Body.Close(); err != nil {
-			c.logger.Tracef("close appsec response body: %v", err)
-		}
-	}()
-
-	verdict, err := c.verdict(resp)
-	return Result{Verdict: verdict, BodyBypass: bypass, Release: release}, err
-}
-
-// readBody buffers the body so it can be mirrored, always restoring it on the
-// original request. Returns nil when there is no body to forward: no body at
-// all, an upgrade request, or a body over the cap. A login form is forwarded
-// with its credential values redacted rather than suppressed.
-// release is never nil; the caller invokes it once the request has been served.
-func (c *Client) readBody(req Request) (body []byte, bypass string, release func(), err error) {
-	r := req.HTTP
-	if r.Body == nil || r.Body == http.NoBody {
-		return nil, "", noopRelease, nil
-	}
-	if c.maxBodyBytes < 0 {
-		return nil, BypassDisabled, noopRelease, nil
-	}
-	// A genuine upgrade request carries no body to inspect (net/http hands us
-	// http.NoBody, caught above); the hijacked stream is reached through
-	// Hijacker, never r.Body. The test has to be the forwarder's own, because a
-	// looser one would skip inspection for requests the forwarder still
-	// delivers to the backend with their body intact.
-	if netutil.IsUpgradeRequest(r.Header) {
-		return nil, BypassUpgrade, noopRelease, nil
-	}
-	// A Content-Length over the cap is known to be too large before reading.
-	if r.ContentLength > c.maxBodyBytes {
-		return nil, BypassOversize, noopRelease, nil
-	}
-
-	// Reserve the whole cap rather than the eventual length: the reservation
-	// has to be made before the body is read, and until then the only bound
-	// known is the cap. Skipping inspection when the pool is drained keeps a
-	// burst of large bodies from being an out-of-memory lever; the bypass is
-	// recorded so the gap in coverage is visible.
-	release = noopRelease
-	if c.budget != nil {
-		if !c.budget.Acquire(c.maxBodyBytes) {
-			c.logger.Debugf("appsec buffer budget exhausted, inspecting headers and URI only")
-			return nil, BypassBudget, noopRelease, nil
-		}
-		var once sync.Once
-		release = func() { once.Do(func() { c.budget.Release(c.maxBodyBytes) }) }
-	}
-
-	buffered, oversize, err := bufferBody(r, c.maxBodyBytes)
-	if err != nil {
-		// bufferBody restored r.Body from the bytes it did read, so the
-		// reservation stays held until the caller releases it.
-		return nil, "", release, err
-	}
-	// An oversize body was only partially read: a truncated prefix changes the
-	// engine's verdict in both directions, so inspect headers and URI only.
-	if oversize {
-		return nil, BypassOversize, release, nil
-	}
-	return redactFormFields(r.Header.Get("Content-Type"), buffered, req.RedactBodyFields), "", release, nil
-}
-
-// buildRequest assembles the mirrored request. Per the protocol it is a GET
-// when there is no body and a POST otherwise; bytes.Reader gives the outbound
-// request an accurate Content-Length, which the engine relies on to read the
-// body at all.
-func (c *Client) buildRequest(ctx context.Context, req Request, body []byte) (*http.Request, error) {
-	method := http.MethodGet
-	var payload io.Reader
-	if len(body) > 0 {
-		method = http.MethodPost
-		payload = bytes.NewReader(body)
-	}
-
-	outbound, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, method, c.url, payload)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("build appsec request: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	r := req.HTTP
-	copyInspectableHeaders(outbound.Header, r.Header)
-	redactSecrets(outbound.Header, req)
-
-	outbound.Header.Set(headerAPIKey, c.apiKey)
-	outbound.Header.Set(headerIP, req.ClientIP.Unmap().String())
-	outbound.Header.Set(headerURI, mirroredURI(r.URL, req.RedactQueryParams))
-	outbound.Header.Set(headerVerb, r.Method)
-	outbound.Header.Set(headerHost, r.Host)
-	if ua := r.UserAgent(); ua != "" {
-		outbound.Header.Set(headerUserAgent, ua)
-	}
-	outbound.Header.Set(headerHTTPVersion, httpVersion(r))
-	if req.TransactionID != "" {
-		outbound.Header.Set(headerTransactionID, req.TransactionID)
-	}
-	return outbound, nil
-}
-
-// verdict maps the engine's response to a restrict.Verdict. 200 is a pass and
-// 401/500 are engine-side failures; every other status carries a remediation in
-// the body. The blocked status code is operator-configurable
-// (blocked_http_code), so the action field decides, not the status.
-func (c *Client) verdict(resp *http.Response) (restrict.Verdict, error) {
-	switch resp.StatusCode {
-	case http.StatusOK:
-		return restrict.Allow, nil
-	case http.StatusUnauthorized:
-		return restrict.DenyAppSecUnavailable, fmt.Errorf("%w: rejected api key", ErrUnavailable)
-	case http.StatusInternalServerError:
-		return restrict.DenyAppSecUnavailable, fmt.Errorf("%w: engine error", ErrUnavailable)
-	}
-
-	var decoded struct {
-		Action string `json:"action"`
-	}
-	if err := json.NewDecoder(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxResponseBytes)).Decode(&decoded); err != nil {
-		// Every remediation carries a decodable action, so a response without
-		// one is not a verdict: most often the URL points at something that is
-		// not the AppSec endpoint, which answers 404 with HTML. Reported as
-		// unavailable rather than a ban so the access log names the real fault
-		// instead of sending an operator hunting for a rule that never fired.
-		// Enforce still blocks either way; only the recorded reason differs.
-		return restrict.DenyAppSecUnavailable, fmt.Errorf("%w: undecodable response (status %d): %w", ErrUnavailable, resp.StatusCode, err)
-	}
-
-	switch decoded.Action {
-	case actionAllow:
-		return restrict.Allow, nil
-	case actionCaptcha:
-		return restrict.DenyAppSecCaptcha, nil
-	case actionBan:
-		return restrict.DenyAppSecBan, nil
-	default:
-		// Unknown remediation: the engine flagged the request, so deny.
-		c.logger.Debugf("unknown appsec action %q (status %d), treating as ban", decoded.Action, resp.StatusCode)
-		return restrict.DenyAppSecBan, nil
-	}
-}
-
-// copyInspectableHeaders copies the client's headers, which are what the WAF
-// rules actually match on, dropping hop-by-hop headers that describe the
-// proxy-to-engine connection rather than the client request, and any header in
-// the AppSec protocol namespace.
-func copyInspectableHeaders(dst, src http.Header) {
-	for name, values := range src {
-		if hopByHopHeaders[http.CanonicalHeaderKey(name)] {
-			continue
-		}
-		if strings.HasPrefix(http.CanonicalHeaderKey(name), headerPrefix) {
-			continue
-		}
-		dst[http.CanonicalHeaderKey(name)] = append([]string(nil), values...)
-	}
-	// Content-Length describes the mirrored payload, not the client's: net/http
-	// sets it from the body we actually attach. Content-Type is kept either way
-	// so rules matching on it still fire when the body was not forwarded.
-	dst.Del("Content-Length")
-}
-
-// redactSecrets replaces the credential values the proxy withholds from
-// backends, so the mirrored copy does not carry them either.
-func redactSecrets(dst http.Header, req Request) {
-	for _, name := range req.RedactHeaders {
-		// Presence, not Get: a header whose first value is empty still carries
-		// its later values to the engine, while the upstream strip deletes the
-		// name outright. Set collapses every value into the placeholder.
-		if len(dst.Values(name)) > 0 {
-			dst.Set(name, redactedPlaceholder)
-		}
-	}
-	if cookie := dst.Get("Cookie"); cookie != "" {
-		if redacted := redactCookieHeader(cookie, req.RedactCookies); redacted != cookie {
-			dst.Set("Cookie", redacted)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// mirroredURI renders the request target for the URI header, with the named
-// query parameter values replaced.
-func mirroredURI(u *url.URL, redactParams []string) string {
-	uri := u.RequestURI()
-	if u.RawQuery == "" || len(redactParams) == 0 {
-		return uri
-	}
-	redacted := redactQuery(u.RawQuery, redactParams)
-	if redacted == u.RawQuery {
-		return uri
-	}
-	// RequestURI is path + "?" + RawQuery; swap only the query part so the
-	// path keeps its original encoding.
-	return strings.TrimSuffix(uri, u.RawQuery) + redacted
-}
-
-var hopByHopHeaders = map[string]bool{
-	"Connection":          true,
-	"Keep-Alive":          true,
-	"Proxy-Authenticate":  true,
-	"Proxy-Authorization": true,
-	"Proxy-Connection":    true,
-	"Te":                  true,
-	"Trailer":             true,
-	"Transfer-Encoding":   true,
-	"Upgrade":             true,
-}
-
-// httpVersion renders the two-digit form the engine parses ("11", "20").
-func httpVersion(r *http.Request) string {
-	major, minor := r.ProtoMajor, r.ProtoMinor
-	if major < 0 || major > 9 || minor < 0 || minor > 9 {
-		return ""
-	}
-	return fmt.Sprintf("%d%d", major, minor)
-}

proxy/internal/appsec/client_test.go

@@ -1,878 +0,0 @@
-package appsec
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"errors"
-	"io"
-	"net"
-	"net/http"
-	"net/http/httptest"
-	"net/netip"
-	"strings"
-	"sync"
-	"sync/atomic"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/restrict"
-)
-
-// engine records what the AppSec component received and replies with a
-// canned status and body.
-type engine struct {
-	status int
-	body   string
-
-	gotMethod string
-	gotHeader http.Header
-	gotBody   []byte
-	gotLength int64
-	requests  int
-}
-
-func (e *engine) start(t *testing.T) *httptest.Server {
-	t.Helper()
-	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		body, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
-		require.NoError(t, err)
-		e.requests++
-		e.gotMethod = r.Method
-		e.gotHeader = r.Header.Clone()
-		e.gotBody = body
-		e.gotLength = r.ContentLength
-
-		status := e.status
-		if status == 0 {
-			status = http.StatusOK
-		}
-		w.WriteHeader(status)
-		if e.body != "" {
-			_, _ = w.Write([]byte(e.body))
-		}
-	}))
-	t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
-	return srv
-}
-
-func newClient(t *testing.T, url string, cfg ...func(*Config)) *Client {
-	t.Helper()
-	c := Config{URL: url, APIKey: "test-key"}
-	for _, fn := range cfg {
-		fn(&c)
-	}
-	client, err := New(c)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	return client
-}
-
-func inbound(method, target string, body string) *http.Request {
-	var r *http.Request
-	if body == "" {
-		r = httptest.NewRequest(method, target, nil)
-	} else {
-		r = httptest.NewRequest(method, target, strings.NewReader(body))
-	}
-	r.Host = "svc.example.com"
-	r.Header.Set("User-Agent", "curl/8.0")
-	return r
-}
-
-func TestNew_RejectsBadConfig(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name string
-		cfg  Config
-	}{
-		{"empty url", Config{APIKey: "k"}},
-		{"empty key", Config{URL: "http://127.0.0.1:7422/"}},
-		{"non http scheme", Config{URL: "tcp://127.0.0.1:7422", APIKey: "k"}},
-		{"no host", Config{URL: "http:///path", APIKey: "k"}},
-	}
-	for _, tt := range tests {
-		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			_, err := New(tt.cfg)
-			require.Error(t, err)
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-func TestInspect_AllowSendsProtocolHeaders(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{status: http.StatusOK, body: `{"action":"allow","http_status":200}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL)
-
-	r := inbound(http.MethodGet, "http://svc.example.com/admin?q=1", "")
-	r.Header.Set("Cookie", "session=abc")
-
-	res, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:          r,
-		ClientIP:      netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-		TransactionID: "req-42",
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, restrict.Allow, res.Verdict, "allow action must pass the request")
-
-	assert.Equal(t, http.MethodGet, eng.gotMethod, "a bodyless request is forwarded as GET")
-	assert.Equal(t, "203.0.113.7", eng.gotHeader.Get(headerIP))
-	assert.Equal(t, "/admin?q=1", eng.gotHeader.Get(headerURI), "URI header must carry path and query")
-	assert.Equal(t, http.MethodGet, eng.gotHeader.Get(headerVerb))
-	assert.Equal(t, "svc.example.com", eng.gotHeader.Get(headerHost))
-	assert.Equal(t, "curl/8.0", eng.gotHeader.Get(headerUserAgent))
-	assert.Equal(t, "11", eng.gotHeader.Get(headerHTTPVersion))
-	assert.Equal(t, "req-42", eng.gotHeader.Get(headerTransactionID))
-	assert.Equal(t, "test-key", eng.gotHeader.Get(headerAPIKey))
-	// Client headers are what the WAF rules match on.
-	assert.Equal(t, "session=abc", eng.gotHeader.Get("Cookie"))
-}
-
-func TestInspect_MapsActionsToVerdicts(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name    string
-		status  int
-		body    string
-		want    restrict.Verdict
-		wantErr bool
-	}{
-		{"allow", http.StatusOK, `{"action":"allow"}`, restrict.Allow, false},
-		{"ban", http.StatusForbidden, `{"action":"ban","http_status":403}`, restrict.DenyAppSecBan, false},
-		{"captcha", http.StatusForbidden, `{"action":"captcha","http_status":403}`, restrict.DenyAppSecCaptcha, false},
-		// blocked_http_code is operator-configurable, so the action decides.
-		{"custom block status", http.StatusTeapot, `{"action":"ban"}`, restrict.DenyAppSecBan, false},
-		{"allow on custom status", http.StatusTeapot, `{"action":"allow"}`, restrict.Allow, false},
-		{"unknown action denies", http.StatusForbidden, `{"action":"something-new"}`, restrict.DenyAppSecBan, false},
-		// No decodable action means no remediation was communicated, so this is
-		// an engine fault, not a ban. Enforce blocks on it either way.
-		{"unreadable body is unavailable", http.StatusForbidden, `not json`, restrict.DenyAppSecUnavailable, true},
-		// A misdirected URL answering 404 with HTML must not read as a ban.
-		{"non-appsec endpoint is unavailable", http.StatusNotFound, `<html>404</html>`, restrict.DenyAppSecUnavailable, true},
-		{"bad api key is unavailable", http.StatusUnauthorized, "", restrict.DenyAppSecUnavailable, true},
-		{"engine error is unavailable", http.StatusInternalServerError, "", restrict.DenyAppSecUnavailable, true},
-	}
-	for _, tt := range tests {
-		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			eng := &engine{status: tt.status, body: tt.body}
-			srv := eng.start(t)
-			client := newClient(t, srv.URL)
-
-			res, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-				HTTP:     inbound(http.MethodGet, "http://svc.example.com/", ""),
-				ClientIP: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-			})
-			if tt.wantErr {
-				require.Error(t, err)
-				assert.True(t, errors.Is(err, ErrUnavailable), "engine-side failures must be ErrUnavailable so the caller can apply the mode")
-			} else {
-				require.NoError(t, err)
-			}
-			assert.Equal(t, tt.want, res.Verdict)
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-func TestInspect_ForwardsBodyAndRestoresIt(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{body: `{"action":"allow"}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL)
-
-	const payload = `{"user":"' OR 1=1--"}`
-	r := inbound(http.MethodPost, "http://svc.example.com/login", payload)
-	r.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-
-	_, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:     r,
-		ClientIP: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	assert.Equal(t, http.MethodPost, eng.gotMethod, "a request with a body is forwarded as POST")
-	assert.Equal(t, payload, string(eng.gotBody))
-	assert.Equal(t, int64(len(payload)), eng.gotLength,
-		"the engine reads exactly Content-Length bytes, so it must be accurate")
-
-	// The backend still needs the body.
-	restored, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, payload, string(restored), "body must be restored for the upstream request")
-}
-
-func TestInspect_OversizeBodyFallsBackToHeaders(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{body: `{"action":"allow"}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL, func(c *Config) { c.MaxBodyBytes = 16 })
-
-	payload := strings.Repeat("A", 64)
-	r := inbound(http.MethodPost, "http://svc.example.com/upload", payload)
-
-	_, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:     r,
-		ClientIP: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	assert.Equal(t, http.MethodGet, eng.gotMethod, "an oversize body is not forwarded")
-	assert.Empty(t, eng.gotBody, "a truncated prefix must never be sent: it changes the verdict")
-
-	restored, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, payload, string(restored), "the full body must still reach the upstream")
-}
-
-func TestInspect_ChunkedOversizeBodyIsReplayed(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{body: `{"action":"allow"}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL, func(c *Config) { c.MaxBodyBytes = 8 })
-
-	payload := strings.Repeat("B", 40)
-	r := inbound(http.MethodPost, "http://svc.example.com/upload", payload)
-	// Unknown length: the cap can only be detected while reading.
-	r.ContentLength = -1
-	r.Header.Del("Content-Length")
-
-	_, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:     r,
-		ClientIP: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	assert.Empty(t, eng.gotBody)
-	restored, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, payload, string(restored), "bytes read to detect the cap must be replayed")
-}
-
-func TestInspect_RedactsCredentialForm(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{body: `{"action":"allow"}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL)
-
-	r := inbound(http.MethodPost, "http://svc.example.com/", "password=hunter2&next=%2Fhome")
-	r.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
-
-	_, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:             r,
-		ClientIP:         netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-		RedactBodyFields: []string{"password", "pin"},
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	assert.NotContains(t, string(eng.gotBody), "hunter2", "the credential must not reach the engine")
-	assert.Contains(t, string(eng.gotBody), "next=%2Fhome", "the rest of the form stays inspectable")
-	assert.Equal(t, 1, eng.requests)
-
-	restored, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, "password=hunter2&next=%2Fhome", string(restored),
-		"the login handler still needs to read the real form")
-}
-
-// A caller must not be able to exempt a payload from inspection by naming one
-// of its fields "password": only the credential value is dropped.
-func TestInspect_RedactionIsNotABodyBypass(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{body: `{"action":"allow"}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL)
-
-	const payload = "q=%27+OR+1%3D1--&password=x"
-	r := inbound(http.MethodPost, "http://svc.example.com/search", payload)
-	r.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
-
-	_, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:             r,
-		ClientIP:         netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-		RedactBodyFields: []string{"password", "pin"},
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	forwarded := string(eng.gotBody)
-	assert.Contains(t, forwarded, "OR+1%3D1", "the attack payload must still be inspected")
-	assert.NotContains(t, forwarded, "password=x")
-}
-
-// A body that fails to parse carries no credential the login handler could
-// read either, so it is inspected as-is rather than withheld.
-func TestInspect_MalformedFormIsStillInspected(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{body: `{"action":"allow"}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL)
-
-	const payload = "q=%zz&evil=%3Cscript%3E"
-	r := inbound(http.MethodPost, "http://svc.example.com/search", payload)
-	r.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
-
-	_, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:             r,
-		ClientIP:         netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-		RedactBodyFields: []string{"password", "pin"},
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, payload, string(eng.gotBody))
-}
-
-func TestInspect_ForwardsNonCredentialForm(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{body: `{"action":"allow"}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL)
-
-	r := inbound(http.MethodPost, "http://svc.example.com/search", "q=%3Cscript%3E")
-	r.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
-
-	_, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:             r,
-		ClientIP:         netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-		RedactBodyFields: []string{"password", "pin"},
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, "q=%3Cscript%3E", string(eng.gotBody), "ordinary form bodies must be inspected")
-}
-
-func TestInspect_StripsSpoofedProtocolHeaders(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{body: `{"action":"allow"}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL)
-
-	r := inbound(http.MethodGet, "http://svc.example.com/", "")
-	// A caller trying to make the engine see a different source address, and to
-	// smuggle in its own key.
-	r.Header.Set(headerIP, "10.0.0.1")
-	r.Header.Set(headerAPIKey, "attacker-key")
-	r.Header.Set(headerURI, "/harmless")
-
-	_, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:     r,
-		ClientIP: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	assert.Equal(t, "203.0.113.7", eng.gotHeader.Get(headerIP), "the proxy's resolved IP must win")
-	assert.Equal(t, "test-key", eng.gotHeader.Get(headerAPIKey))
-	assert.Equal(t, "/", eng.gotHeader.Get(headerURI))
-	assert.Len(t, eng.gotHeader.Values(headerIP), 1, "no duplicate protocol headers")
-}
-
-func TestInspect_DropsHopByHopHeaders(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{body: `{"action":"allow"}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL)
-
-	r := inbound(http.MethodGet, "http://svc.example.com/", "")
-	r.Header.Set("Proxy-Authorization", "Basic zzz")
-	r.Header.Set("Keep-Alive", "timeout=5")
-
-	_, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:     r,
-		ClientIP: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	assert.Empty(t, eng.gotHeader.Get("Proxy-Authorization"))
-	assert.Empty(t, eng.gotHeader.Get("Keep-Alive"))
-}
-
-func TestInspect_UpgradeRequestKeepsStreamIntact(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{body: `{"action":"allow"}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL)
-
-	r := inbound(http.MethodGet, "http://svc.example.com/ws", "")
-	r.Header.Set("Upgrade", "websocket")
-	r.Header.Set("Connection", "upgrade")
-
-	_, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:     r,
-		ClientIP: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, http.MethodGet, eng.gotMethod)
-	assert.Empty(t, eng.gotBody)
-	assert.Equal(t, 1, eng.requests, "upgrade requests are still inspected on headers")
-}
-
-func TestInspect_TimeoutIsUnavailable(t *testing.T) {
-	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
-		time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond)
-		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-	}))
-	t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
-
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL, func(c *Config) { c.Timeout = 10 * time.Millisecond })
-
-	res, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:     inbound(http.MethodGet, "http://svc.example.com/", ""),
-		ClientIP: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-	})
-	require.Error(t, err)
-	assert.True(t, errors.Is(err, ErrUnavailable))
-	assert.Equal(t, restrict.DenyAppSecUnavailable, res.Verdict)
-}
-
-func TestInspect_UnreachableEngineIsUnavailable(t *testing.T) {
-	// Port 1 on loopback refuses connections.
-	client := newClient(t, "http://127.0.0.1:1/")
-
-	res, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:     inbound(http.MethodGet, "http://svc.example.com/", ""),
-		ClientIP: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-	})
-	require.Error(t, err)
-	assert.True(t, errors.Is(err, ErrUnavailable))
-	assert.Equal(t, restrict.DenyAppSecUnavailable, res.Verdict)
-}
-
-func TestInspect_NilClientFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
-	var client *Client
-	res, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:     inbound(http.MethodGet, "http://svc.example.com/", ""),
-		ClientIP: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-	})
-	require.Error(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, restrict.DenyAppSecUnavailable, res.Verdict)
-}
-
-func TestInspect_NegativeCapDisablesBodyForwarding(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{body: `{"action":"allow"}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL, func(c *Config) { c.MaxBodyBytes = -1 })
-
-	const payload = `{"a":1}`
-	r := inbound(http.MethodPost, "http://svc.example.com/", payload)
-
-	_, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:     r,
-		ClientIP: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Empty(t, eng.gotBody)
-
-	restored, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, payload, string(restored), "an untouched body must still be forwardable")
-}
-
-func TestInspect_MapsV4MappedClientIP(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{body: `{"action":"allow"}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL)
-
-	_, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:     inbound(http.MethodGet, "http://svc.example.com/", ""),
-		ClientIP: netip.MustParseAddr("::ffff:203.0.113.7"),
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, "203.0.113.7", eng.gotHeader.Get(headerIP),
-		"v4-mapped addresses must be unmapped so engine allowlists and rules match")
-}
-
-// Inspection is a blocking call on every request, so the connection to the
-// engine must be reused. net/http only pools a connection whose body was read
-// to EOF, which a verdict path returning early would skip.
-func TestInspect_ReusesConnections(t *testing.T) {
-	var conns atomic.Int64
-	srv := httptest.NewUnstartedServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
-		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-		_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"action":"allow","http_status":200}`))
-	}))
-	srv.Config.ConnState = func(_ net.Conn, state http.ConnState) {
-		if state == http.StateNew {
-			conns.Add(1)
-		}
-	}
-	srv.Start()
-	t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
-
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL)
-	for range 5 {
-		res, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-			HTTP:     inbound(http.MethodGet, "http://svc.example.com/", ""),
-			ClientIP: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-		})
-		require.NoError(t, err)
-		require.Equal(t, restrict.Allow, res.Verdict)
-	}
-
-	assert.Equal(t, int64(1), conns.Load(),
-		"all five inspections must share one connection; a fresh handshake per request would eat the timeout budget")
-}
-
-func TestNew_ClampsOperatorValues(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name        string
-		cfg         Config
-		wantTimeout time.Duration
-		wantMaxBody int64
-	}{
-		{"defaults", Config{}, DefaultTimeout, DefaultMaxBodyBytes},
-		{"timeout below minimum", Config{Timeout: time.Microsecond}, MinTimeout, DefaultMaxBodyBytes},
-		{"timeout above maximum", Config{Timeout: time.Hour}, MaxTimeout, DefaultMaxBodyBytes},
-		{"body above maximum", Config{MaxBodyBytes: 1 << 30}, DefaultTimeout, MaxBodyBytesLimit},
-		// A negative cap means "forward no body" and must survive clamping.
-		{"negative body preserved", Config{MaxBodyBytes: -1}, DefaultTimeout, -1},
-		{"in-range values kept", Config{Timeout: time.Second, MaxBodyBytes: 1 << 10}, time.Second, 1 << 10},
-	}
-	for _, tt := range tests {
-		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			tt.cfg.URL = "http://127.0.0.1:7422/"
-			tt.cfg.APIKey = "k"
-			client, err := New(tt.cfg)
-			require.NoError(t, err)
-			assert.Equal(t, tt.wantTimeout, client.http.Timeout, "inspection is in the request path, so the timeout must stay bounded")
-			assert.Equal(t, tt.wantMaxBody, client.maxBodyBytes, "buffered bodies are held per in-flight request")
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// A payload hidden in a pair the form parser rejects must still be inspected.
-// Re-encoding from parsed values would silently drop it while a tolerant
-// backend parser could still act on it.
-func TestInspect_RedactionDoesNotSmuggleMalformedPairs(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{body: `{"action":"allow"}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL)
-
-	const payload = "password=hunter2&%zzSMUGGLED=attack&evil=payload"
-	r := inbound(http.MethodPost, "http://svc.example.com/", payload)
-	r.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
-
-	_, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:             r,
-		ClientIP:         netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-		RedactBodyFields: []string{"password", "pin"},
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	forwarded := string(eng.gotBody)
-	assert.Equal(t, "password=redacted&%zzSMUGGLED=attack&evil=payload", forwarded,
-		"only the credential value may change; every other byte reaches the engine as sent")
-	assert.NotContains(t, forwarded, "hunter2")
-}
-
-// The login handler decodes the field name before looking it up, so an escaped
-// spelling is a real credential submission and must be redacted too.
-func TestInspect_RedactsEscapedFieldName(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{body: `{"action":"allow"}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL)
-
-	r := inbound(http.MethodPost, "http://svc.example.com/", "pass%77ord=hunter2")
-	r.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
-
-	_, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:             r,
-		ClientIP:         netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-		RedactBodyFields: []string{"password"},
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	assert.Equal(t, "pass%77ord=redacted", string(eng.gotBody), "the key is preserved as sent")
-	assert.NotContains(t, string(eng.gotBody), "hunter2")
-}
-
-func TestInspect_RedactsRepeatedCredentialField(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{body: `{"action":"allow"}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL)
-
-	r := inbound(http.MethodPost, "http://svc.example.com/", "password=one&q=keep&password=two")
-	r.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
-
-	_, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:             r,
-		ClientIP:         netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-		RedactBodyFields: []string{"password"},
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	assert.Equal(t, "password=redacted&q=keep&password=redacted", string(eng.gotBody))
-}
-
-// A header that does not make the forwarder treat the request as an upgrade
-// must not make the inspector skip the body: the backend still receives it.
-func TestInspect_FakeUpgradeHeadersDoNotSkipBody(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name    string
-		headers map[string]string
-	}{
-		{"upgrade header alone", map[string]string{"Upgrade": "websocket"}},
-		{"connection token alone", map[string]string{"Connection": "upgrade"}},
-		{"connection keep-alive with upgrade header", map[string]string{
-			"Connection": "keep-alive", "Upgrade": "websocket",
-		}},
-	}
-	for _, tt := range tests {
-		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			eng := &engine{body: `{"action":"allow"}`}
-			srv := eng.start(t)
-			client := newClient(t, srv.URL)
-
-			const payload = `{"q":"' OR 1=1--"}`
-			r := inbound(http.MethodPost, "http://svc.example.com/api", payload)
-			r.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-			for k, v := range tt.headers {
-				r.Header.Set(k, v)
-			}
-
-			res, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-				HTTP:     r,
-				ClientIP: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-			})
-			require.NoError(t, err)
-			assert.Equal(t, payload, string(eng.gotBody),
-				"the forwarder delivers this body to the backend, so it must be inspected")
-			assert.Empty(t, res.BodyBypass)
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// A real upgrade handshake carries no body, and is reported as a bypass so the
-// coverage gap is visible.
-func TestInspect_RealUpgradeIsReportedAsBypass(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{body: `{"action":"allow"}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL)
-
-	r := inbound(http.MethodPost, "http://svc.example.com/ws", "ignored")
-	r.Header.Set("Connection", "Upgrade")
-	r.Header.Set("Upgrade", "websocket")
-
-	res, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:     r,
-		ClientIP: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, BypassUpgrade, res.BodyBypass)
-	assert.Empty(t, eng.gotBody)
-}
-
-func TestInspect_ReportsOversizeBypass(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{body: `{"action":"allow"}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL, func(c *Config) { c.MaxBodyBytes = 8 })
-
-	r := inbound(http.MethodPost, "http://svc.example.com/upload", strings.Repeat("A", 64))
-	res, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:     r,
-		ClientIP: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, BypassOversize, res.BodyBypass,
-		"padding past the cap is attacker-controlled, so the skip must be visible")
-}
-
-// The proxy strips these three from upstream requests as credentials; the
-// mirrored copy must not carry them either.
-func TestInspect_RedactsCredentialsTheProxyWithholds(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{body: `{"action":"allow"}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL)
-
-	r := inbound(http.MethodGet, "http://svc.example.com/app?session_token=SECRET_JWT&q=search", "")
-	r.Header.Set("Cookie", "nb_session=SECRET_SESSION; theme=dark")
-	r.Header.Set("X-Api-Key", "SECRET_API_KEY")
-
-	_, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:              r,
-		ClientIP:          netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-		RedactHeaders:     []string{"X-Api-Key"},
-		RedactCookies:     []string{"nb_session"},
-		RedactQueryParams: []string{"session_token"},
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	assert.Equal(t, "redacted", eng.gotHeader.Get("X-Api-Key"))
-	assert.Equal(t, "nb_session=redacted; theme=dark", eng.gotHeader.Get("Cookie"),
-		"other cookies stay inspectable")
-	assert.Equal(t, "/app?session_token=redacted&q=search", eng.gotHeader.Get(headerURI),
-		"the rest of the query stays inspectable")
-
-	forwarded := eng.gotHeader.Get("Cookie") + eng.gotHeader.Get("X-Api-Key") + eng.gotHeader.Get(headerURI)
-	for _, secret := range []string{"SECRET_JWT", "SECRET_SESSION", "SECRET_API_KEY"} {
-		assert.NotContains(t, forwarded, secret)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestInspect_LeavesUnrelatedHeadersAndQueryIntact(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{body: `{"action":"allow"}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL)
-
-	r := inbound(http.MethodGet, "http://svc.example.com/app?q=%27+OR+1%3D1--", "")
-	r.Header.Set("Cookie", "theme=dark")
-
-	_, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:              r,
-		ClientIP:          netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-		RedactCookies:     []string{"nb_session"},
-		RedactQueryParams: []string{"session_token"},
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, "theme=dark", eng.gotHeader.Get("Cookie"))
-	assert.Equal(t, "/app?q=%27+OR+1%3D1--", eng.gotHeader.Get(headerURI),
-		"an untouched query keeps its original encoding")
-}
-
-// r.FormValue merges the URL query into the form, so a credential passed as a
-// query parameter authenticates exactly like a form post and must not be
-// mirrored in the clear either.
-func TestInspect_RedactsCredentialsInQuery(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{body: `{"action":"allow"}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL)
-
-	r := inbound(http.MethodGet, "http://svc.example.com/?password=hunter2&pin=1234&q=keep", "")
-
-	_, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:              r,
-		ClientIP:          netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-		RedactQueryParams: []string{"session_token", "password", "pin"},
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	uri := eng.gotHeader.Get(headerURI)
-	assert.Equal(t, "/?password=redacted&pin=redacted&q=keep", uri)
-	assert.NotContains(t, uri, "hunter2")
-	assert.NotContains(t, uri, "1234")
-}
-
-// Inspecting a request must not change what any later layer can inspect: a
-// chunked body stays chunked, so a downstream capture with a smaller cap still
-// gets its truncated prefix instead of skipping on a now-known length.
-func TestInspect_PreservesChunkedFraming(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{body: `{"action":"allow"}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL)
-
-	payload := strings.Repeat("A", 32)
-	r := inbound(http.MethodPost, "http://svc.example.com/upload", payload)
-	r.ContentLength = -1
-	r.Header.Del("Content-Length")
-	r.TransferEncoding = []string{"chunked"}
-
-	_, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:     r,
-		ClientIP: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, payload, string(eng.gotBody), "the body is still inspected")
-
-	assert.Equal(t, int64(-1), r.ContentLength, "framing must stay as the client sent it")
-	assert.Empty(t, r.Header.Get("Content-Length"))
-	assert.Equal(t, []string{"chunked"}, r.TransferEncoding)
-
-	restored, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, payload, string(restored))
-}
-
-// testBudget is a minimal Budget recording reservations, so a test can assert
-// both that the ceiling is honoured and that it is handed back.
-type testBudget struct {
-	mu        sync.Mutex
-	total     int64
-	used      int64
-	acquires  int
-	releases  int
-	acquiredN []int64
-}
-
-func (b *testBudget) Acquire(n int64) bool {
-	b.mu.Lock()
-	defer b.mu.Unlock()
-	b.acquires++
-	if b.used+n > b.total {
-		return false
-	}
-	b.used += n
-	b.acquiredN = append(b.acquiredN, n)
-	return true
-}
-
-func (b *testBudget) Release(n int64) {
-	b.mu.Lock()
-	defer b.mu.Unlock()
-	b.releases++
-	b.used -= n
-}
-
-func (b *testBudget) inUse() int64 {
-	b.mu.Lock()
-	defer b.mu.Unlock()
-	return b.used
-}
-
-func TestInspect_BudgetReservesCapAndReleasesOnlyWhenCalled(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{body: `{"action":"allow"}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	budget := &testBudget{total: 1 << 20}
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL, func(c *Config) {
-		c.MaxBodyBytes = 4096
-		c.Budget = budget
-	})
-
-	r := inbound(http.MethodPost, "http://svc.example.com/", "hello")
-	res, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:     r,
-		ClientIP: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.NotNil(t, res.Release, "Release must never be nil")
-
-	// The whole cap is reserved: the reservation precedes the read, so the
-	// eventual body length is not yet known.
-	assert.Equal(t, []int64{4096}, budget.acquiredN, "the cap, not the body length, is reserved")
-	assert.Equal(t, int64(4096), budget.inUse(),
-		"the reservation must outlive Inspect: the buffered body is still r.Body for the backend")
-
-	// The backend can still read the body while the reservation is held.
-	got, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, "hello", string(got))
-
-	res.Release()
-	assert.Equal(t, int64(0), budget.inUse(), "Release returns the reservation")
-	res.Release()
-	assert.Equal(t, int64(0), budget.inUse(), "Release is idempotent")
-}
-
-func TestInspect_BudgetExhaustedSkipsBodyButStillInspects(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{body: `{"action":"allow"}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	// Nothing available, so the reservation always fails.
-	budget := &testBudget{total: 0}
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL, func(c *Config) {
-		c.MaxBodyBytes = 4096
-		c.Budget = budget
-	})
-
-	r := inbound(http.MethodPost, "http://svc.example.com/", "payload")
-	res, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:     r,
-		ClientIP: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	defer res.Release()
-
-	assert.Equal(t, BypassBudget, res.BodyBypass, "the coverage gap must be recorded, not silent")
-	assert.Equal(t, restrict.Allow, res.Verdict, "headers and URI are still inspected")
-	assert.Empty(t, eng.gotBody, "no body is mirrored when the reservation fails")
-	assert.Equal(t, 0, budget.releases, "a failed Acquire must not be released")
-
-	// The body must still reach the backend untouched.
-	got, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, "payload", string(got))
-}
-
-func TestInspect_NoBudgetConfiguredStillReleases(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{body: `{"action":"allow"}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL)
-
-	res, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:     inbound(http.MethodPost, "http://svc.example.com/", "hello"),
-		ClientIP: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.NotNil(t, res.Release, "Release must be safe to defer even with no budget")
-	res.Release()
-}

proxy/internal/auth/appsec_test.go

@@ -1,306 +0,0 @@
-package auth
-
-import (
-	"crypto/ed25519"
-	"encoding/base64"
-	"io"
-	"net/http"
-	"net/http/httptest"
-	"strings"
-	"sync"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/appsec"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/proxy"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/restrict"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/types"
-)
-
-// appsecEngine is a stub AppSec component returning a fixed remediation.
-func appsecEngine(t *testing.T, status int, body string) *httptest.Server {
-	t.Helper()
-	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
-		w.WriteHeader(status)
-		if body != "" {
-			_, _ = w.Write([]byte(body))
-		}
-	}))
-	t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
-	return srv
-}
-
-// serveWithAppSec runs a request through the middleware for a domain configured
-// with the given AppSec mode, returning the response and the captured metadata.
-func serveWithAppSec(t *testing.T, mode restrict.AppSecMode, client *appsec.Client, r *http.Request) (*httptest.ResponseRecorder, map[string]string, bool) {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
-	mw.SetAppSec(client)
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("svc.example.com", DomainSettings{
-		AccountID:  types.AccountID("acct-1"),
-		ServiceID:  types.ServiceID("svc-1"),
-		AppSecMode: mode,
-	}))
-
-	reached := false
-	handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
-		reached = true
-		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-	}))
-
-	cd := proxy.NewCapturedData("req-1")
-	r = r.WithContext(proxy.WithCapturedData(r.Context(), cd))
-	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
-	handler.ServeHTTP(rec, r)
-
-	return rec, cd.GetMetadata(), reached
-}
-
-func appsecRequest() *http.Request {
-	r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://svc.example.com/?x=/etc/passwd", nil)
-	r.Host = "svc.example.com"
-	r.RemoteAddr = "203.0.113.7:44444"
-	return r
-}
-
-func TestCheckAppSec_EnforceBlocksBannedRequest(t *testing.T) {
-	srv := appsecEngine(t, http.StatusForbidden, `{"action":"ban","http_status":403}`)
-	client, err := appsec.New(appsec.Config{URL: srv.URL, APIKey: "k"})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	rec, meta, reached := serveWithAppSec(t, restrict.AppSecEnforce, client, appsecRequest())
-
-	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, rec.Code)
-	assert.False(t, reached, "a banned request must not reach the backend")
-	assert.Equal(t, "appsec_ban", meta["appsec_verdict"])
-	assert.NotContains(t, meta, "appsec_mode", "enforce is the default, only observe is annotated")
-}
-
-func TestCheckAppSec_ObserveAllowsAndRecordsVerdict(t *testing.T) {
-	srv := appsecEngine(t, http.StatusForbidden, `{"action":"ban","http_status":403}`)
-	client, err := appsec.New(appsec.Config{URL: srv.URL, APIKey: "k"})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	rec, meta, reached := serveWithAppSec(t, restrict.AppSecObserve, client, appsecRequest())
-
-	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code)
-	assert.True(t, reached, "observe mode must not block")
-	assert.Equal(t, "appsec_ban", meta["appsec_verdict"])
-	assert.Equal(t, "observe", meta["appsec_mode"])
-}
-
-func TestCheckAppSec_AllowedRequestPasses(t *testing.T) {
-	srv := appsecEngine(t, http.StatusOK, `{"action":"allow","http_status":200}`)
-	client, err := appsec.New(appsec.Config{URL: srv.URL, APIKey: "k"})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	rec, meta, reached := serveWithAppSec(t, restrict.AppSecEnforce, client, appsecRequest())
-
-	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code)
-	assert.True(t, reached)
-	assert.NotContains(t, meta, "appsec_verdict", "a clean request records no verdict")
-}
-
-func TestCheckAppSec_OffSkipsInspection(t *testing.T) {
-	// An engine that would ban everything; the mode must keep us away from it.
-	srv := appsecEngine(t, http.StatusForbidden, `{"action":"ban"}`)
-	client, err := appsec.New(appsec.Config{URL: srv.URL, APIKey: "k"})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	rec, meta, reached := serveWithAppSec(t, restrict.AppSecOff, client, appsecRequest())
-
-	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code)
-	assert.True(t, reached)
-	assert.Empty(t, meta)
-}
-
-func TestCheckAppSec_EnforceFailsClosedWithoutClient(t *testing.T) {
-	rec, meta, reached := serveWithAppSec(t, restrict.AppSecEnforce, nil, appsecRequest())
-
-	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, rec.Code,
-		"enforce with no configured endpoint must deny rather than pass traffic uninspected")
-	assert.False(t, reached)
-	assert.Equal(t, "appsec_unavailable", meta["appsec_verdict"])
-}
-
-func TestCheckAppSec_ObserveAllowsWithoutClient(t *testing.T) {
-	rec, meta, reached := serveWithAppSec(t, restrict.AppSecObserve, nil, appsecRequest())
-
-	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code)
-	assert.True(t, reached)
-	assert.Equal(t, "appsec_unavailable", meta["appsec_verdict"])
-	assert.Equal(t, "observe", meta["appsec_mode"])
-}
-
-func TestCheckAppSec_EnforceFailsClosedWhenEngineUnreachable(t *testing.T) {
-	client, err := appsec.New(appsec.Config{URL: "http://127.0.0.1:1/", APIKey: "k"})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	rec, meta, reached := serveWithAppSec(t, restrict.AppSecEnforce, client, appsecRequest())
-
-	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, rec.Code)
-	assert.False(t, reached)
-	assert.Equal(t, "appsec_unavailable", meta["appsec_verdict"])
-}
-
-func TestCheckAppSec_InspectsOverlayTraffic(t *testing.T) {
-	srv := appsecEngine(t, http.StatusForbidden, `{"action":"ban"}`)
-	client, err := appsec.New(appsec.Config{URL: srv.URL, APIKey: "k"})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	// Requests arriving over the WireGuard overlay skip the geo and IP-reputation
-	// checks, but request content is just as inspectable.
-	r := appsecRequest()
-	r = r.WithContext(types.WithOverlayOrigin(r.Context()))
-
-	rec, meta, reached := serveWithAppSec(t, restrict.AppSecEnforce, client, r)
-
-	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, rec.Code, "overlay traffic must still be inspected")
-	assert.False(t, reached)
-	assert.Equal(t, "appsec_ban", meta["appsec_verdict"])
-}
-
-func TestCheckAppSec_UnresolvableClientIPFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
-	srv := appsecEngine(t, http.StatusOK, `{"action":"allow"}`)
-	client, err := appsec.New(appsec.Config{URL: srv.URL, APIKey: "k"})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	r := appsecRequest()
-	r.RemoteAddr = "not-an-address"
-
-	rec, meta, reached := serveWithAppSec(t, restrict.AppSecEnforce, client, r)
-
-	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, rec.Code,
-		"the engine requires a client address; a request we cannot attribute must not pass")
-	assert.False(t, reached)
-	assert.Equal(t, "appsec_unavailable", meta["appsec_verdict"])
-}
-
-// The redaction sets are resolved from the domain's schemes at registration, so
-// what AppSec withholds cannot drift from what those schemes actually accept.
-func TestAddDomain_ResolvesRedactionSetsFromSchemes(t *testing.T) {
-	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("svc.example.com", DomainSettings{
-		Schemes: []Scheme{
-			NewPassword(nil, "svc-1", "acct-1"),
-			NewHeader(nil, "svc-1", "acct-1", "X-Api-Key"),
-		},
-		SessionPublicKey:  base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(make([]byte, ed25519.PublicKeySize)),
-		SessionExpiration: time.Hour,
-		AppSecMode:        restrict.AppSecEnforce,
-	}))
-
-	mw.domainsMux.RLock()
-	config := mw.domains["svc.example.com"]
-	mw.domainsMux.RUnlock()
-
-	assert.Equal(t, []string{"password"}, config.redactBodyFields)
-	assert.Equal(t, []string{"X-Api-Key"}, config.redactHeaders)
-	// r.FormValue merges the query into the form, so a credential passed there
-	// authenticates and must be redacted alongside the OIDC session token.
-	assert.Equal(t, []string{"session_token", "password"}, config.redactQueryParams)
-}
-
-// countingBudget records reservations so a test can observe when the
-// middleware hands them back.
-type countingBudget struct {
-	mu        sync.Mutex
-	total     int64
-	used      int64
-	maxAtOnce int64
-}
-
-func (b *countingBudget) Acquire(n int64) bool {
-	b.mu.Lock()
-	defer b.mu.Unlock()
-	if b.used+n > b.total {
-		return false
-	}
-	b.used += n
-	if b.used > b.maxAtOnce {
-		b.maxAtOnce = b.used
-	}
-	return true
-}
-
-func (b *countingBudget) Release(n int64) {
-	b.mu.Lock()
-	defer b.mu.Unlock()
-	b.used -= n
-}
-
-func (b *countingBudget) inUse() int64 {
-	b.mu.Lock()
-	defer b.mu.Unlock()
-	return b.used
-}
-
-// The buffered body stays alive as r.Body until the backend has read it, so
-// Protect must hold the reservation for the whole request and return it only
-// once the handler chain has unwound. Releasing inside Inspect would let the
-// budget admit buffering that is still resident.
-func TestProtect_AppSecBudgetHeldForRequestAndReleasedAfter(t *testing.T) {
-	srv := appsecEngine(t, http.StatusOK, `{"action":"allow"}`)
-	budget := &countingBudget{total: 1 << 20}
-	client, err := appsec.New(appsec.Config{
-		URL:          srv.URL,
-		APIKey:       "k",
-		MaxBodyBytes: 4096,
-		Budget:       budget,
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
-	mw.SetAppSec(client)
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("svc.example.com", DomainSettings{
-		AccountID:  types.AccountID("acct-1"),
-		ServiceID:  types.ServiceID("svc-1"),
-		AppSecMode: restrict.AppSecEnforce,
-	}))
-
-	var inHandler int64
-	handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		// The backend reads the buffered body here, so the reservation must
-		// still be held at this point.
-		inHandler = budget.inUse()
-		_, _ = io.ReadAll(r.Body)
-		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-	}))
-
-	r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "http://svc.example.com/", strings.NewReader("payload"))
-	r.Host = "svc.example.com"
-	cd := proxy.NewCapturedData("req-1")
-	r = r.WithContext(proxy.WithCapturedData(r.Context(), cd))
-
-	handler.ServeHTTP(httptest.NewRecorder(), r)
-
-	assert.Equal(t, int64(4096), inHandler, "the reservation must be held while the backend reads the body")
-	assert.Equal(t, int64(0), budget.inUse(), "Protect must release the reservation once the request is served")
-}
-
-// A denied request never reaches the backend, but Protect still has to hand the
-// reservation back or the pool leaks one cap per blocked request.
-func TestProtect_AppSecBudgetReleasedOnDeny(t *testing.T) {
-	srv := appsecEngine(t, http.StatusForbidden, `{"action":"ban"}`)
-	budget := &countingBudget{total: 1 << 20}
-	client, err := appsec.New(appsec.Config{
-		URL:          srv.URL,
-		APIKey:       "k",
-		MaxBodyBytes: 4096,
-		Budget:       budget,
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "http://svc.example.com/", strings.NewReader("payload"))
-	r.Host = "svc.example.com"
-	rec, _, reached := serveWithAppSec(t, restrict.AppSecEnforce, client, r)
-
-	assert.False(t, reached, "a banned request must not reach the backend")
-	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, rec.Code)
-	assert.Equal(t, int64(0), budget.inUse(), "a blocked request must not leak its reservation")
-}

proxy/internal/auth/header.go

@@ -39,11 +39,6 @@ func (Header) Type() auth.Method {
 	return auth.MethodHeader
 }
 
-// HeaderName returns the request header this scheme reads its credential from.
-func (h Header) HeaderName() string {
-	return h.headerName
-}
-
 // Authenticate checks for the configured header in the request. If absent,
 // returns empty (unauthenticated). If present, validates via gRPC.
 func (h Header) Authenticate(r *http.Request) (string, string, error) {

proxy/internal/auth/middleware.go

@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ import (
 	"google.golang.org/grpc"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/auth"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/appsec"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/proxy"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/restrict"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/types"
@@ -26,11 +25,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
 )
 
-// sessionCookieNames is the cookie set AppSec redacts before mirroring: the
-// proxy's session cookie is a bearer credential for the service, and the
-// reverse proxy already strips it before forwarding upstream.
-var sessionCookieNames = []string{auth.SessionCookieName}
-
 // errValidationUnavailable indicates that session validation failed due to
 // an infrastructure error (e.g. gRPC unavailable), not an invalid token.
 var errValidationUnavailable = errors.New("session validation unavailable")
@@ -65,14 +59,6 @@ type DomainConfig struct {
 	IPRestrictions    *restrict.Filter
 	// Private routes the domain through ValidateTunnelPeer; failure → 403.
 	Private bool
-	// AppSecMode enables CrowdSec AppSec request inspection for this domain.
-	AppSecMode restrict.AppSecMode
-	// redact* name the credentials this domain's schemes accept, resolved once
-	// at registration. AppSec replaces their values before mirroring a request,
-	// matching what the reverse proxy strips before forwarding upstream.
-	redactBodyFields  []string
-	redactHeaders     []string
-	redactQueryParams []string
 }
 
 type validationResult struct {
@@ -96,9 +82,6 @@ type Middleware struct {
 	sessionValidator SessionValidator
 	geo              restrict.GeoResolver
 	tunnelCache      *tunnelValidationCache
-	// appsec is the shared CrowdSec AppSec client, nil when the proxy has no
-	// AppSec endpoint configured. Set once during startup, before serving.
-	appsec *appsec.Client
 }
 
 // NewMiddleware creates a new authentication middleware. The sessionValidator is
@@ -116,12 +99,6 @@ func NewMiddleware(logger *log.Logger, sessionValidator SessionValidator, geo re
 	}
 }
 
-// SetAppSec installs the shared CrowdSec AppSec client. Must be called during
-// startup, before the middleware serves any request.
-func (mw *Middleware) SetAppSec(client *appsec.Client) {
-	mw.appsec = client
-}
-
 // Protect wraps next with per-domain authentication and IP restriction checks.
 // Requests whose Host is not registered pass through unchanged.
 func (mw *Middleware) Protect(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
@@ -146,14 +123,6 @@ func (mw *Middleware) Protect(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
 			return
 		}
 
-		// Deferred, not released here: the inspected body stays alive as r.Body
-		// until the backend has read it, which happens inside next.ServeHTTP.
-		appSecAllowed, releaseAppSec := mw.checkAppSec(w, r, config)
-		defer releaseAppSec()
-		if !appSecAllowed {
-			return
-		}
-
 		// Private services bypass operator schemes and gate on tunnel peer.
 		if config.Private {
 			if mw.forwardWithTunnelPeer(w, r, host, config, next) {
@@ -293,134 +262,6 @@ func (mw *Middleware) checkIPRestrictions(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request
 	return false
 }
 
-// checkAppSec mirrors the request to the CrowdSec AppSec engine when the domain
-// enables inspection. Returns false when the request was blocked and a response
-// has been written.
-//
-// The returned release frees the body-buffering budget the inspection reserved
-// and is never nil. It must run only after the request has been served, since
-// the buffered body stays alive as r.Body for the backend to read.
-//
-// Every non-allow remediation blocks with 403, captcha included: the proxy has
-// no challenge flow to serve. The distinct verdict is still recorded so the
-// access log shows which remediation the engine actually chose.
-//
-// Unlike the geo and IP-reputation checks, this runs for overlay traffic too:
-// AppSec inspects request content, which is just as meaningful when the caller
-// reached the proxy through the WireGuard tunnel.
-func (mw *Middleware) checkAppSec(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, config DomainConfig) (bool, func()) {
-	if !config.AppSecMode.Enabled() {
-		return true, func() {}
-	}
-
-	verdict, release := mw.inspectAppSec(r, config)
-	if verdict == restrict.Allow {
-		return true, release
-	}
-
-	observe := config.AppSecMode == restrict.AppSecObserve
-	if cd := proxy.CapturedDataFromContext(r.Context()); cd != nil {
-		cd.SetMetadata("appsec_verdict", verdict.String())
-		if observe {
-			cd.SetMetadata("appsec_mode", "observe")
-		}
-	}
-
-	if observe {
-		mw.logger.Debugf("AppSec observe: would block %s for %s (%s)", r.RemoteAddr, r.Host, verdict)
-		return true, release
-	}
-
-	mw.markDenied(r, verdict.String())
-	mw.logger.Debugf("AppSec: %s for %s %s", verdict, r.Host, r.RemoteAddr)
-	http.Error(w, "Forbidden", http.StatusForbidden)
-	return false, release
-}
-
-// inspectAppSec runs the AppSec call and returns its verdict. Failures come
-// back as DenyAppSecUnavailable regardless of mode so observe mode still
-// records that inspection did not happen; the caller decides what blocks. The
-// returned release is never nil.
-func (mw *Middleware) inspectAppSec(r *http.Request, config DomainConfig) (restrict.Verdict, func()) {
-	// Mode requested but the proxy has no AppSec endpoint configured. Management
-	// gates this on the cluster capability; a stale mapping can still arrive.
-	if mw.appsec == nil {
-		mw.logger.Debugf("AppSec mode %q requested for %s but no AppSec endpoint is configured", config.AppSecMode, r.Host)
-		return restrict.DenyAppSecUnavailable, func() {}
-	}
-
-	clientIP := mw.resolveClientIP(r)
-	if !clientIP.IsValid() {
-		// The engine requires a client address, and a request whose source we
-		// cannot establish is exactly the kind we must not wave through.
-		mw.logger.Debugf("AppSec: cannot resolve client address for %q", r.RemoteAddr)
-		return restrict.DenyAppSecUnavailable, func() {}
-	}
-
-	req := appsec.Request{
-		HTTP:              r,
-		ClientIP:          clientIP,
-		RedactBodyFields:  config.redactBodyFields,
-		RedactHeaders:     config.redactHeaders,
-		RedactCookies:     sessionCookieNames,
-		RedactQueryParams: config.redactQueryParams,
-	}
-	if cd := proxy.CapturedDataFromContext(r.Context()); cd != nil {
-		req.TransactionID = cd.GetRequestID()
-	}
-
-	result, err := mw.appsec.Inspect(r.Context(), req)
-	if err != nil {
-		mw.logger.Debugf("AppSec inspection failed for %s: %v", r.Host, err)
-	}
-	// Record when the body went uninspected: headers and URI were still
-	// checked, but an operator reading the log should not read a clean verdict
-	// as "the payload was examined". Oversize is reachable by padding, so its
-	// absence from the log would hide a deliberate opt-out.
-	if result.BodyBypass != "" {
-		if cd := proxy.CapturedDataFromContext(r.Context()); cd != nil {
-			cd.SetMetadata("appsec_body_bypass", result.BodyBypass)
-		}
-	}
-	return result.Verdict, result.Release
-}
-
-// credentialFormFields lists the login form fields whose values are redacted
-// from the mirrored body, so a password or PIN submitted to the proxy's own
-// login form never reaches the Security Engine.
-func credentialFormFields(schemes []Scheme) []string {
-	var fields []string
-	for _, s := range schemes {
-		switch s.Type() {
-		case auth.MethodPassword:
-			fields = append(fields, passwordFormId)
-		case auth.MethodPIN:
-			fields = append(fields, pinFormId)
-		}
-	}
-	return fields
-}
-
-// credentialHeaders lists the request headers whose values are redacted from
-// the mirrored request. A header-auth scheme carries a session token the proxy
-// validates and never forwards upstream, so the engine must not see it either.
-func credentialHeaders(schemes []Scheme) []string {
-	var names []string
-	for _, s := range schemes {
-		// Structural, not a concrete Header assertion: if the scheme is ever
-		// registered as a pointer, a type assertion would quietly stop matching
-		// and the header would start reaching the engine again.
-		named, ok := s.(interface{ HeaderName() string })
-		if !ok {
-			continue
-		}
-		if name := named.HeaderName(); name != "" {
-			names = append(names, name)
-		}
-	}
-	return names
-}
-
 // resolveClientIP extracts the real client IP from CapturedData, falling back to r.RemoteAddr.
 func (mw *Middleware) resolveClientIP(r *http.Request) netip.Addr {
 	if cd := proxy.CapturedDataFromContext(r.Context()); cd != nil {
@@ -440,18 +281,12 @@ func (mw *Middleware) resolveClientIP(r *http.Request) netip.Addr {
 	return addr.Unmap()
 }
 
-// markDenied records the deny reason on the captured data so the access log
-// attributes the response to the proxy rather than the backend.
-func (mw *Middleware) markDenied(r *http.Request, reason string) {
+// blockIPRestriction sets captured data fields for an IP-restriction block event.
+func (mw *Middleware) blockIPRestriction(r *http.Request, reason string) {
 	if cd := proxy.CapturedDataFromContext(r.Context()); cd != nil {
 		cd.SetOrigin(proxy.OriginAuth)
 		cd.SetAuthMethod(reason)
 	}
-}
-
-// blockIPRestriction sets captured data fields for an IP-restriction block event.
-func (mw *Middleware) blockIPRestriction(r *http.Request, reason string) {
-	mw.markDenied(r, reason)
 	mw.logger.Debugf("IP restriction: %s for %s", reason, r.RemoteAddr)
 }
 
@@ -802,61 +637,45 @@ func wasCredentialSubmitted(r *http.Request, method auth.Method) bool {
 	case auth.MethodPassword:
 		return r.FormValue("password") != ""
 	case auth.MethodOIDC:
-		return r.URL.Query().Get(sessionTokenParam) != ""
+		return r.URL.Query().Get("session_token") != ""
 	}
 	return false
 }
 
-// DomainSettings is the per-domain configuration AddDomain applies.
-type DomainSettings struct {
-	Schemes []Scheme
-	// SessionPublicKey is the base64-encoded ed25519 key used to verify session
-	// cookies. Required when Schemes is non-empty.
-	SessionPublicKey  string
-	SessionExpiration time.Duration
-	AccountID         types.AccountID
-	ServiceID         types.ServiceID
-	IPRestrictions    *restrict.Filter
-	// Private forces ValidateTunnelPeer enforcement (403 on failure) regardless
-	// of the schemes list.
-	Private    bool
-	AppSecMode restrict.AppSecMode
-}
-
-// AddDomain registers authentication schemes for the given domain. With schemes
-// a valid session public key is required.
-func (mw *Middleware) AddDomain(domain string, settings DomainSettings) error {
-	credentialFields := credentialFormFields(settings.Schemes)
-	config := DomainConfig{
-		AccountID:        settings.AccountID,
-		ServiceID:        settings.ServiceID,
-		IPRestrictions:   settings.IPRestrictions,
-		Private:          settings.Private,
-		AppSecMode:       settings.AppSecMode,
-		redactBodyFields: credentialFields,
-		redactHeaders:    credentialHeaders(settings.Schemes),
-		// A credential can arrive in the query too: r.FormValue merges the URL
-		// query into the form, so "?password=..." authenticates just as a form
-		// post does and must not be mirrored in the clear either.
-		redactQueryParams: append([]string{sessionTokenParam}, credentialFields...),
+// AddDomain registers authentication schemes for the given domain. With schemes a valid session public key is required.
+// private=true forces ValidateTunnelPeer enforcement (403 on failure) regardless of the schemes list.
+func (mw *Middleware) AddDomain(domain string, schemes []Scheme, publicKeyB64 string, expiration time.Duration, accountID types.AccountID, serviceID types.ServiceID, ipRestrictions *restrict.Filter, private bool) error {
+	if len(schemes) == 0 {
+		mw.domainsMux.Lock()
+		defer mw.domainsMux.Unlock()
+		mw.domains[domain] = DomainConfig{
+			AccountID:      accountID,
+			ServiceID:      serviceID,
+			IPRestrictions: ipRestrictions,
+			Private:        private,
+		}
+		return nil
 	}
 
-	if len(settings.Schemes) > 0 {
-		pubKeyBytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(settings.SessionPublicKey)
-		if err != nil {
-			return fmt.Errorf("decode session public key for domain %s: %w", domain, err)
-		}
-		if len(pubKeyBytes) != ed25519.PublicKeySize {
-			return fmt.Errorf("invalid session public key size for domain %s: got %d, want %d", domain, len(pubKeyBytes), ed25519.PublicKeySize)
-		}
-		config.Schemes = settings.Schemes
-		config.SessionPublicKey = pubKeyBytes
-		config.SessionExpiration = settings.SessionExpiration
+	pubKeyBytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(publicKeyB64)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("decode session public key for domain %s: %w", domain, err)
+	}
+	if len(pubKeyBytes) != ed25519.PublicKeySize {
+		return fmt.Errorf("invalid session public key size for domain %s: got %d, want %d", domain, len(pubKeyBytes), ed25519.PublicKeySize)
 	}
 
 	mw.domainsMux.Lock()
 	defer mw.domainsMux.Unlock()
-	mw.domains[domain] = config
+	mw.domains[domain] = DomainConfig{
+		Schemes:           schemes,
+		SessionPublicKey:  pubKeyBytes,
+		SessionExpiration: expiration,
+		AccountID:         accountID,
+		ServiceID:         serviceID,
+		IPRestrictions:    ipRestrictions,
+		Private:           private,
+	}
 	return nil
 }
 
@@ -911,10 +730,10 @@ func (mw *Middleware) validateSessionToken(ctx context.Context, host, token stri
 // parameter removed so it doesn't linger in the browser's address bar or history.
 func stripSessionTokenParam(u *url.URL) string {
 	q := u.Query()
-	if !q.Has(sessionTokenParam) {
+	if !q.Has("session_token") {
 		return u.RequestURI()
 	}
-	q.Del(sessionTokenParam)
+	q.Del("session_token")
 	clean := *u
 	clean.RawQuery = q.Encode()
 	return clean.RequestURI()

proxy/internal/auth/middleware_test.go

@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ func TestAddDomain_ValidKey(t *testing.T) {
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
 
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
-	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour})
+	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	mw.domainsMux.RLock()
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ func TestAddDomain_EmptyKey(t *testing.T) {
 	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
 
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
-	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionExpiration: time.Hour})
+	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, "", time.Hour, "", "", nil, false)
 	require.Error(t, err)
 	assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "invalid session public key size")
 
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ func TestAddDomain_InvalidBase64(t *testing.T) {
 	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
 
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
-	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: "not-valid-base64!!!", SessionExpiration: time.Hour})
+	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, "not-valid-base64!!!", time.Hour, "", "", nil, false)
 	require.Error(t, err)
 	assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "decode session public key")
 
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ func TestAddDomain_WrongKeySize(t *testing.T) {
 
 	shortKey := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte("tooshort"))
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
-	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: shortKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour})
+	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, shortKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false)
 	require.Error(t, err)
 	assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "invalid session public key size")
 
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ func TestAddDomain_WrongKeySize(t *testing.T) {
 func TestAddDomain_NoSchemes_NoKeyRequired(t *testing.T) {
 	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
 
-	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{SessionExpiration: time.Hour})
+	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", nil, "", time.Hour, "", "", nil, false)
 	require.NoError(t, err, "domains with no auth schemes should not require a key")
 
 	mw.domainsMux.RLock()
@@ -139,8 +139,8 @@ func TestAddDomain_OverwritesPreviousConfig(t *testing.T) {
 
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
 
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp1.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp2.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: 2 * time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp1.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp2.PublicKey, 2*time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	mw.domainsMux.RLock()
 	config := mw.domains["example.com"]
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ func TestRemoveDomain(t *testing.T) {
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
 
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	mw.RemoveDomain("example.com")
 
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ func TestProtect_UnknownDomainPassesThrough(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestProtect_DomainWithNoSchemesPassesThrough(t *testing.T) {
 	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", nil, "", time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
 
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ func TestProtect_UnauthenticatedRequestIsBlocked(t *testing.T) {
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
 
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	var backendCalled bool
 	backend := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ func TestProtect_HostWithPortIsMatched(t *testing.T) {
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
 
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	var backendCalled bool
 	backend := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ func TestProtect_ValidSessionCookiePassesThrough(t *testing.T) {
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
 
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	token, err := sessionkey.SignToken(kp.PrivateKey, "test-user", "", "example.com", auth.MethodPIN, nil, nil, time.Hour)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ func TestProtect_SessionCookieGroupsPropagate(t *testing.T) {
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
 
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	groups := []string{"engineering", "sre"}
 	token, err := sessionkey.SignToken(kp.PrivateKey, "test-user", "", "example.com", auth.MethodPIN, groups, nil, time.Hour)
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ func TestProtect_PrivateService_TunnelPeerGroupsPropagate(t *testing.T) {
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
 
 	// Private service: no operator schemes — auth gates solely on the tunnel peer.
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("agent.example.com", DomainSettings{SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour, AccountID: "acct-1", ServiceID: "svc-1", Private: true}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("agent.example.com", nil, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acct-1", "svc-1", nil, true))
 
 	cd := proxy.NewCapturedData("")
 	cd.SetClientIP(netip.MustParseAddr("100.90.1.14")) // CGNAT tunnel source
@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ func TestProtect_PrivateService_TunnelPeerDenied(t *testing.T) {
 	}}
 	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), validator, nil)
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("agent.example.com", DomainSettings{SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour, AccountID: "acct-1", ServiceID: "svc-1", Private: true}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("agent.example.com", nil, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acct-1", "svc-1", nil, true))
 
 	cd := proxy.NewCapturedData("")
 	cd.SetClientIP(netip.MustParseAddr("100.90.1.14"))
@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ func TestProtect_ExpiredSessionCookieIsRejected(t *testing.T) {
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
 
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	// Sign a token that expired 1 second ago.
 	token, err := sessionkey.SignToken(kp.PrivateKey, "test-user", "", "example.com", auth.MethodPIN, nil, nil, -time.Second)
@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ func TestProtect_WrongDomainCookieIsRejected(t *testing.T) {
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
 
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	// Token signed for a different domain audience.
 	token, err := sessionkey.SignToken(kp.PrivateKey, "test-user", "", "other.com", auth.MethodPIN, nil, nil, time.Hour)
@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ func TestProtect_WrongKeyCookieIsRejected(t *testing.T) {
 	kp2 := generateTestKeyPair(t)
 
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp1.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp1.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	// Token signed with a different private key.
 	token, err := sessionkey.SignToken(kp2.PrivateKey, "test-user", "", "example.com", auth.MethodPIN, nil, nil, time.Hour)
@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ func TestProtect_SchemeAuthRedirectsWithCookie(t *testing.T) {
 			return "", "pin", nil
 		},
 	}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	var backendCalled bool
 	backend := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
@@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ func TestProtect_FailedAuthDoesNotSetCookie(t *testing.T) {
 			return "", "pin", nil
 		},
 	}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
 
@@ -584,7 +584,7 @@ func TestProtect_MultipleSchemes(t *testing.T) {
 			return "", "password", nil
 		},
 	}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{pinScheme, passwordScheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{pinScheme, passwordScheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	var backendCalled bool
 	backend := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
@@ -614,7 +614,7 @@ func TestProtect_InvalidTokenFromSchemeReturns400(t *testing.T) {
 			return "invalid-jwt-token", "", nil
 		},
 	}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
 
@@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ func TestAddDomain_RandomBytes32NotEd25519(t *testing.T) {
 	key := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(randomBytes)
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
 
-	err = mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: key, SessionExpiration: time.Hour})
+	err = mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, key, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false)
 	require.NoError(t, err, "any 32-byte key should be accepted at registration time")
 }
 
@@ -647,10 +647,10 @@ func TestAddDomain_InvalidKeyDoesNotCorruptExistingConfig(t *testing.T) {
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
 
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	// Attempt to overwrite with an invalid key.
-	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: "bad", SessionExpiration: time.Hour})
+	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, "bad", time.Hour, "", "", nil, false)
 	require.Error(t, err)
 
 	// The original valid config should still be intact.
@@ -674,7 +674,7 @@ func TestProtect_FailedPinAuthCapturesAuthMethod(t *testing.T) {
 			return "", "pin", nil
 		},
 	}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	capturedData := proxy.NewCapturedData("")
 	handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
@@ -701,7 +701,7 @@ func TestProtect_FailedPasswordAuthCapturesAuthMethod(t *testing.T) {
 			return "", "password", nil
 		},
 	}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	capturedData := proxy.NewCapturedData("")
 	handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
@@ -728,7 +728,7 @@ func TestProtect_NoCredentialsDoesNotCaptureAuthMethod(t *testing.T) {
 			return "", "pin", nil
 		},
 	}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	capturedData := proxy.NewCapturedData("")
 	handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
@@ -815,7 +815,8 @@ func TestWasCredentialSubmitted(t *testing.T) {
 func TestCheckIPRestrictions_UnparseableAddress(t *testing.T) {
 	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
 
-	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{AccountID: "acc1", ServiceID: "svc1", IPRestrictions: restrict.ParseFilter(restrict.FilterConfig{AllowedCIDRs: []string{"10.0.0.0/8"}})})
+	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", nil, "", 0, "acc1", "svc1",
+		restrict.ParseFilter(restrict.FilterConfig{AllowedCIDRs: []string{"10.0.0.0/8"}}), false)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
@@ -850,7 +851,8 @@ func TestCheckIPRestrictions_UsesCapturedDataClientIP(t *testing.T) {
 	// trusted proxies), checkIPRestrictions should use that IP, not RemoteAddr.
 	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
 
-	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{AccountID: "acc1", ServiceID: "svc1", IPRestrictions: restrict.ParseFilter(restrict.FilterConfig{AllowedCIDRs: []string{"203.0.113.0/24"}})})
+	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", nil, "", 0, "acc1", "svc1",
+		restrict.ParseFilter(restrict.FilterConfig{AllowedCIDRs: []string{"203.0.113.0/24"}}), false)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
@@ -890,7 +892,8 @@ func TestCheckIPRestrictions_NilGeoWithCountryRules(t *testing.T) {
 	// Geo is nil, country restrictions are configured: must deny (fail-close).
 	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
 
-	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{AccountID: "acc1", ServiceID: "svc1", IPRestrictions: restrict.ParseFilter(restrict.FilterConfig{AllowedCountries: []string{"US"}})})
+	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", nil, "", 0, "acc1", "svc1",
+		restrict.ParseFilter(restrict.FilterConfig{AllowedCountries: []string{"US"}}), false)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
@@ -913,10 +916,11 @@ func TestCheckIPRestrictions_NilGeoWithCountryRules(t *testing.T) {
 func TestCheckIPRestrictions_OverlayOriginSkipsCountryRules(t *testing.T) {
 	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
 
-	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{AccountID: "acc1", ServiceID: "svc1", IPRestrictions: restrict.ParseFilter(restrict.FilterConfig{
-		AllowedCIDRs:     []string{"100.64.0.0/10"},
-		AllowedCountries: []string{"US"},
-	})})
+	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", nil, "", 0, "acc1", "svc1",
+		restrict.ParseFilter(restrict.FilterConfig{
+			AllowedCIDRs:     []string{"100.64.0.0/10"},
+			AllowedCountries: []string{"US"},
+		}), false)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
@@ -949,7 +953,8 @@ func TestCheckIPRestrictions_OverlayOriginSkipsCountryRules(t *testing.T) {
 func TestCheckIPRestrictions_OverlayOriginRespectsCIDR(t *testing.T) {
 	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
 
-	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{AccountID: "acc1", ServiceID: "svc1", IPRestrictions: restrict.ParseFilter(restrict.FilterConfig{AllowedCIDRs: []string{"100.64.0.0/16"}})})
+	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", nil, "", 0, "acc1", "svc1",
+		restrict.ParseFilter(restrict.FilterConfig{AllowedCIDRs: []string{"100.64.0.0/16"}}), false)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
@@ -977,7 +982,7 @@ func TestProtect_OIDCOnlyRedirectsDirectly(t *testing.T) {
 			return "", oidcURL, nil
 		},
 	}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
 
@@ -1006,7 +1011,7 @@ func TestProtect_OIDCWithOtherMethodShowsLoginPage(t *testing.T) {
 			return "", "pin", nil
 		},
 	}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{oidcScheme, pinScheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{oidcScheme, pinScheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
 
@@ -1050,7 +1055,7 @@ func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_ForwardsOnSuccess(t *testing.T) {
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
 
 	hdr := newHeaderSchemeWithToken(t, kp, "X-API-Key", "secret-key")
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{hdr}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour, AccountID: "acc1", ServiceID: "svc1"}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{hdr}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false))
 
 	var backendCalled bool
 	capturedData := proxy.NewCapturedData("")
@@ -1093,7 +1098,7 @@ func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_MissingHeaderFallsThrough(t *testing.T) {
 	hdr := newHeaderSchemeWithToken(t, kp, "X-API-Key", "secret-key")
 	// Also add a PIN scheme so we can verify fallthrough behavior.
 	pinScheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{hdr, pinScheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour, AccountID: "acc1", ServiceID: "svc1"}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{hdr, pinScheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false))
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
 
@@ -1113,7 +1118,7 @@ func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_WrongValueReturns401(t *testing.T) {
 		return &proto.AuthenticateResponse{Success: false}, nil
 	}}
 	hdr := NewHeader(mock, "svc1", "acc1", "X-API-Key")
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{hdr}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour, AccountID: "acc1", ServiceID: "svc1"}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{hdr}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false))
 
 	capturedData := proxy.NewCapturedData("")
 	handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
@@ -1136,7 +1141,7 @@ func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_InfraErrorReturns502(t *testing.T) {
 		return nil, errors.New("gRPC unavailable")
 	}}
 	hdr := NewHeader(mock, "svc1", "acc1", "X-API-Key")
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{hdr}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour, AccountID: "acc1", ServiceID: "svc1"}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{hdr}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false))
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
 
@@ -1153,7 +1158,7 @@ func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_SubsequentRequestUsesSessionCookie(t *testing.T) {
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
 
 	hdr := newHeaderSchemeWithToken(t, kp, "X-API-Key", "secret-key")
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{hdr}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour, AccountID: "acc1", ServiceID: "svc1"}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{hdr}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false))
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
 		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
@@ -1213,7 +1218,7 @@ func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_MultipleValuesSameHeader(t *testing.T) {
 
 	// Single Header scheme (as if one entry existed), but the mock checks both values.
 	hdr := NewHeader(mock, "svc1", "acc1", "Authorization")
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{hdr}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour, AccountID: "acc1", ServiceID: "svc1"}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{hdr}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false))
 
 	var backendCalled bool
 	handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
@@ -1271,7 +1276,7 @@ func TestProtect_OIDCOnPlainHTTP_BlockedWith400(t *testing.T) {
 			return "", "https://idp.example.com/authorize", nil
 		},
 	}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
 
@@ -1295,7 +1300,7 @@ func TestProtect_OIDCOverTLS_NotBlocked(t *testing.T) {
 			return "", "https://idp.example.com/authorize", nil
 		},
 	}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
 
@@ -1315,7 +1320,7 @@ func TestProtect_NonOIDCSchemes_PlainHTTP_NotBlocked(t *testing.T) {
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
 
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
 
@@ -1345,7 +1350,7 @@ func TestProtect_TunnelPeerFastPath_RequiresInboundMarker(t *testing.T) {
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
 
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
 
@@ -1380,7 +1385,7 @@ func TestProtect_TunnelPeerFastPath_TakesPathWithInboundMarker(t *testing.T) {
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
 
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
 

proxy/internal/auth/oidc.go

@@ -13,10 +13,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
 )
 
-// sessionTokenParam is the query parameter the management server uses to hand
-// the minted session token back to the proxy after an OIDC login.
-const sessionTokenParam = "session_token"
-
 type urlGenerator interface {
 	GetOIDCURL(context.Context, *proto.GetOIDCURLRequest, ...grpc.CallOption) (*proto.GetOIDCURLResponse, error)
 }
@@ -47,7 +43,7 @@ func (o OIDC) Authenticate(r *http.Request) (string, string, error) {
 	// Check for the session_token query param (from OIDC redirects).
 	// The management server passes the token in the URL because it cannot set
 	// cookies for the proxy's domain (cookies are domain-scoped per RFC 6265).
-	if token := r.URL.Query().Get(sessionTokenParam); token != "" {
+	if token := r.URL.Query().Get("session_token"); token != "" {
 		return token, "", nil
 	}
 

proxy/internal/auth/tunnel_lookup_test.go

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ func (s *stubSessionValidator) ValidateTunnelPeer(_ context.Context, in *proto.V
 func newTunnelMiddleware(t *testing.T, validator SessionValidator) *Middleware {
 	t.Helper()
 	mw := NewMiddleware(log.New(), validator, nil)
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("svc.example", DomainSettings{AccountID: "acct-1", ServiceID: "svc-1"}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("svc.example", nil, "", 0, "acct-1", "svc-1", nil, false))
 	return mw
 }
 
@@ -235,8 +235,8 @@ func TestForwardWithTunnelPeer_RoutesAccountIDIntoCacheKey(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	mw := NewMiddleware(log.New(), validator, nil)
 
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("svc-a.example", DomainSettings{AccountID: "acct-a", ServiceID: "svc-a"}))
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("svc-b.example", DomainSettings{AccountID: "acct-b", ServiceID: "svc-b"}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("svc-a.example", nil, "", 0, "acct-a", "svc-a", nil, false))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("svc-b.example", nil, "", 0, "acct-b", "svc-b", nil, false))
 
 	// The fast-path requires the inbound-listener marker on the context.
 	// The peerstore lookup itself is account-agnostic at this level
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ func TestForwardWithTunnelPeer_LocalLookupShortCircuitDoesNotPopulateCache(t *te
 
 func TestPrivateService_FailsClosedOnTunnelPeerFailure(t *testing.T) {
 	mw := NewMiddleware(log.New(), nil, nil)
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("private.svc", DomainSettings{AccountID: "acct-1", ServiceID: "svc-1", Private: true}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("private.svc", nil, "", 0, "acct-1", "svc-1", nil, true))
 
 	called := false
 	handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ func TestPrivateService_ForwardsOnTunnelPeerSuccess(t *testing.T) {
 		},
 	}
 	mw := NewMiddleware(log.New(), validator, nil)
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("private.svc", DomainSettings{AccountID: "acct-1", ServiceID: "svc-1", Private: true}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("private.svc", nil, "", 0, "acct-1", "svc-1", nil, true))
 
 	called := false
 	handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {

proxy/internal/llm/pricing/defaults_coverage_test.go

@@ -28,12 +28,12 @@ func TestDefaultTable_FirstPartyModelCoverage(t *testing.T) {
 			"ministral-8b-latest", "mistral-embed",
 		},
 		"anthropic": {
-			"claude-fable-5", "claude-opus-4-8", "claude-opus-4-7", "claude-opus-4-6",
+			"claude-fable-5", "claude-opus-5", "claude-opus-4-8", "claude-opus-4-7", "claude-opus-4-6",
 			"claude-opus-4-1", "claude-sonnet-4-6", "claude-sonnet-4-5", "claude-haiku-4-5",
 		},
 		// bedrock keys are the normalized ids the request parser emits.
 		"bedrock": {
-			"anthropic.claude-opus-4-8", "anthropic.claude-opus-4-7", "anthropic.claude-opus-4-6",
+			"anthropic.claude-opus-5", "anthropic.claude-opus-4-8", "anthropic.claude-opus-4-7", "anthropic.claude-opus-4-6",
 			"anthropic.claude-opus-4-1", "anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-6", "anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-5",
 			"anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5", "meta.llama3-3-70b-instruct",
 			"amazon.nova-pro", "amazon.nova-lite", "amazon.nova-micro", "amazon.nova-2-lite",

proxy/internal/llm/pricing/defaults_pricing.yaml

@@ -180,6 +180,11 @@ anthropic:
     output_per_1k: 0.050
     cache_read_per_1k: 0.001
     cache_creation_per_1k: 0.0125
+  claude-opus-5:
+    input_per_1k: 0.005
+    output_per_1k: 0.025
+    cache_read_per_1k: 0.0005
+    cache_creation_per_1k: 0.00625
   claude-opus-4-8:
     input_per_1k: 0.005
     output_per_1k: 0.025
@@ -236,6 +241,11 @@ bedrock:
   # eu.anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929-v1:0 -> anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-5.
   # Anthropic-on-Bedrock keeps the additive cache buckets (read ≈0.1x input,
   # write ≈1.25x input); Nova / Llama report no cache, so cost is input+output.
+  anthropic.claude-opus-5:
+    input_per_1k: 0.005
+    output_per_1k: 0.025
+    cache_read_per_1k: 0.0005
+    cache_creation_per_1k: 0.00625
   anthropic.claude-opus-4-8:
     input_per_1k: 0.005
     output_per_1k: 0.025

proxy/internal/middleware/bodytap/request.go

@@ -21,8 +21,6 @@ import (
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/netutil"
 )
 
 // MaxRoutingScanBytes bounds how far ScanRoutingFields will read into a
@@ -36,6 +34,7 @@ const MaxRoutingScanBytes int64 = 32 << 20
 // metadata key by the chain when a request body is not surfaced.
 const (
 	BypassUpgradeHeader    = "upgrade_header"
+	BypassConnectionUpgrd  = "connection_upgrade"
 	BypassContentType      = "content_type_not_allowed"
 	BypassBudget           = "capture_budget_exhausted"
 	BypassNoConfig         = "no_capture_config"
@@ -126,13 +125,12 @@ func CaptureRequest(r *http.Request, cfg *Config, b Budget) (body []byte, trunca
 	if cfg.MaxRequestBytes <= 0 {
 		return nil, false, 0, BypassCapZero, release, nil
 	}
-	// The predicate has to be the forwarder's own: a looser one (either header
-	// on its own) skips capture for requests the forwarder still delivers to
-	// the upstream with their body intact, which hides them from every
-	// deny-capable middleware in the chain.
-	if netutil.IsUpgradeRequest(r.Header) {
+	if r.Header.Get("Upgrade") != "" {
 		return nil, false, 0, BypassUpgradeHeader, release, nil
 	}
+	if strings.EqualFold(r.Header.Get("Connection"), "upgrade") {
+		return nil, false, 0, BypassConnectionUpgrd, release, nil
+	}
 	if !contentTypeAllowed(r.Header.Get("Content-Type"), cfg.ContentTypes) {
 		return nil, false, 0, BypassContentType, release, nil
 	}

proxy/internal/netutil/upgrade.go

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-package netutil
-
-import (
-	"net/http"
-
-	"golang.org/x/net/http/httpguts"
-)
-
-// IsUpgradeRequest reports whether r is a protocol-upgrade request, using the
-// same predicate httputil.ReverseProxy applies when it decides to hand the
-// connection over instead of proxying normally.
-//
-// Matching the forwarder exactly matters for anything that inspects a request
-// before it is proxied: a looser test (an Upgrade header on its own, say) marks
-// a request as an upgrade and skips inspection, while the forwarder still
-// delivers it to the backend as an ordinary request with its body intact. That
-// gap is a body-inspection bypass reachable by adding one header.
-func IsUpgradeRequest(h http.Header) bool {
-	if !httpguts.HeaderValuesContainsToken(h["Connection"], "Upgrade") {
-		return false
-	}
-	return h.Get("Upgrade") != ""
-}

proxy/internal/restrict/restrict.go

@@ -50,37 +50,6 @@ const (
 	CrowdSecObserve CrowdSecMode = "observe"
 )
 
-// AppSecMode is the per-service CrowdSec AppSec (WAF) enforcement mode.
-type AppSecMode string
-
-const (
-	// AppSecOff disables request inspection.
-	AppSecOff AppSecMode = ""
-	// AppSecEnforce blocks requests the engine flags, and fails closed when the
-	// engine is unreachable.
-	AppSecEnforce AppSecMode = "enforce"
-	// AppSecObserve records the verdict without blocking.
-	AppSecObserve AppSecMode = "observe"
-)
-
-// ParseAppSecMode maps a wire value to an AppSecMode. Unrecognized values map
-// to AppSecOff so a typo never turns inspection into an unintended block.
-func ParseAppSecMode(s string) AppSecMode {
-	switch AppSecMode(s) {
-	case AppSecEnforce:
-		return AppSecEnforce
-	case AppSecObserve:
-		return AppSecObserve
-	default:
-		return AppSecOff
-	}
-}
-
-// Enabled reports whether the mode asks for request inspection.
-func (m AppSecMode) Enabled() bool {
-	return m == AppSecEnforce || m == AppSecObserve
-}
-
 // Filter evaluates IP restrictions. CIDR checks are performed first
 // (cheap), followed by country lookups (more expensive) only when needed.
 type Filter struct {
@@ -177,13 +146,6 @@ const (
 	// DenyCrowdSecUnavailable indicates enforce mode but the bouncer has not
 	// completed its initial sync.
 	DenyCrowdSecUnavailable
-	// DenyAppSecBan indicates a CrowdSec AppSec "ban" remediation.
-	DenyAppSecBan
-	// DenyAppSecCaptcha indicates a CrowdSec AppSec "captcha" remediation.
-	DenyAppSecCaptcha
-	// DenyAppSecUnavailable indicates enforce mode but the AppSec engine could
-	// not produce a verdict (unreachable, timed out, or it rejected the call).
-	DenyAppSecUnavailable
 )
 
 // String returns the deny reason string matching the HTTP auth mechanism names.
@@ -205,12 +167,6 @@ func (v Verdict) String() string {
 		return "crowdsec_throttle"
 	case DenyCrowdSecUnavailable:
 		return "crowdsec_unavailable"
-	case DenyAppSecBan:
-		return "appsec_ban"
-	case DenyAppSecCaptcha:
-		return "appsec_captcha"
-	case DenyAppSecUnavailable:
-		return "appsec_unavailable"
 	default:
 		return "unknown"
 	}
@@ -226,16 +182,6 @@ func (v Verdict) IsCrowdSec() bool {
 	}
 }
 
-// IsAppSec returns true when the verdict originates from an AppSec inspection.
-func (v Verdict) IsAppSec() bool {
-	switch v {
-	case DenyAppSecBan, DenyAppSecCaptcha, DenyAppSecUnavailable:
-		return true
-	default:
-		return false
-	}
-}
-
 // IsObserveOnly returns true when v is a CrowdSec verdict and the filter is in
 // observe mode. Callers should log the verdict but not block the request.
 func (f *Filter) IsObserveOnly(v Verdict) bool {

proxy/lifecycle.go

@@ -126,15 +126,6 @@ type Config struct {
 	// CrowdSecAPIKey is the CrowdSec bouncer API key. Empty disables
 	// CrowdSec.
 	CrowdSecAPIKey string
-	// CrowdSecAppSecURL is the CrowdSec AppSec (WAF) endpoint. Empty disables
-	// HTTP request inspection.
-	CrowdSecAppSecURL string
-	// CrowdSecAppSecTimeout bounds a single AppSec inspection call. Zero falls
-	// back to the internal default.
-	CrowdSecAppSecTimeout time.Duration
-	// CrowdSecAppSecMaxBodyBytes caps the request body mirrored to AppSec.
-	// Zero falls back to the internal default; negative forwards no body.
-	CrowdSecAppSecMaxBodyBytes int64
 }
 
 // New builds a Server from cfg without performing any I/O. No goroutines
@@ -144,45 +135,42 @@ type Config struct {
 // directly) byte-for-byte equivalent.
 func New(ctx context.Context, cfg Config) *Server {
 	return &Server{
-		ctx:                        ctx,
-		ListenAddr:                 cfg.ListenAddr,
-		ID:                         cfg.ID,
-		Logger:                     cfg.Logger,
-		Version:                    cfg.Version,
-		ProxyURL:                   cfg.ProxyURL,
-		ManagementAddress:          cfg.ManagementAddress,
-		ProxyToken:                 cfg.ProxyToken,
-		CertificateDirectory:       cfg.CertificateDirectory,
-		CertificateFile:            cfg.CertificateFile,
-		CertificateKeyFile:         cfg.CertificateKeyFile,
-		GenerateACMECertificates:   cfg.GenerateACMECertificates,
-		ACMEChallengeAddress:       cfg.ACMEChallengeAddress,
-		ACMEDirectory:              cfg.ACMEDirectory,
-		ACMEEABKID:                 cfg.ACMEEABKID,
-		ACMEEABHMACKey:             cfg.ACMEEABHMACKey,
-		ACMEChallengeType:          cfg.ACMEChallengeType,
-		CertLockMethod:             cfg.CertLockMethod,
-		WildcardCertDir:            cfg.WildcardCertDir,
-		DebugEndpointEnabled:       cfg.DebugEndpointEnabled,
-		DebugEndpointAddress:       cfg.DebugEndpointAddress,
-		HealthAddress:              cfg.HealthAddr,
-		ForwardedProto:             cfg.ForwardedProto,
-		TrustedProxies:             cfg.TrustedProxies,
-		WireguardPort:              cfg.WireguardPort,
-		ProxyProtocol:              cfg.ProxyProtocol,
-		PreSharedKey:               cfg.PreSharedKey,
-		Performance:                cfg.Performance,
-		SupportsCustomPorts:        cfg.SupportsCustomPorts,
-		RequireSubdomain:           cfg.RequireSubdomain,
-		Private:                    cfg.Private,
-		MaxDialTimeout:             cfg.MaxDialTimeout,
-		MaxSessionIdleTimeout:      cfg.MaxSessionIdleTimeout,
-		MappingBatchWatchdog:       cfg.MappingBatchWatchdog,
-		GeoDataDir:                 cfg.GeoDataDir,
-		CrowdSecAPIURL:             cfg.CrowdSecAPIURL,
-		CrowdSecAPIKey:             cfg.CrowdSecAPIKey,
-		CrowdSecAppSecURL:          cfg.CrowdSecAppSecURL,
-		CrowdSecAppSecTimeout:      cfg.CrowdSecAppSecTimeout,
-		CrowdSecAppSecMaxBodyBytes: cfg.CrowdSecAppSecMaxBodyBytes,
+		ctx:                      ctx,
+		ListenAddr:               cfg.ListenAddr,
+		ID:                       cfg.ID,
+		Logger:                   cfg.Logger,
+		Version:                  cfg.Version,
+		ProxyURL:                 cfg.ProxyURL,
+		ManagementAddress:        cfg.ManagementAddress,
+		ProxyToken:               cfg.ProxyToken,
+		CertificateDirectory:     cfg.CertificateDirectory,
+		CertificateFile:          cfg.CertificateFile,
+		CertificateKeyFile:       cfg.CertificateKeyFile,
+		GenerateACMECertificates: cfg.GenerateACMECertificates,
+		ACMEChallengeAddress:     cfg.ACMEChallengeAddress,
+		ACMEDirectory:            cfg.ACMEDirectory,
+		ACMEEABKID:               cfg.ACMEEABKID,
+		ACMEEABHMACKey:           cfg.ACMEEABHMACKey,
+		ACMEChallengeType:        cfg.ACMEChallengeType,
+		CertLockMethod:           cfg.CertLockMethod,
+		WildcardCertDir:          cfg.WildcardCertDir,
+		DebugEndpointEnabled:     cfg.DebugEndpointEnabled,
+		DebugEndpointAddress:     cfg.DebugEndpointAddress,
+		HealthAddress:            cfg.HealthAddr,
+		ForwardedProto:           cfg.ForwardedProto,
+		TrustedProxies:           cfg.TrustedProxies,
+		WireguardPort:            cfg.WireguardPort,
+		ProxyProtocol:            cfg.ProxyProtocol,
+		PreSharedKey:             cfg.PreSharedKey,
+		Performance:              cfg.Performance,
+		SupportsCustomPorts:      cfg.SupportsCustomPorts,
+		RequireSubdomain:         cfg.RequireSubdomain,
+		Private:                  cfg.Private,
+		MaxDialTimeout:           cfg.MaxDialTimeout,
+		MaxSessionIdleTimeout:    cfg.MaxSessionIdleTimeout,
+		MappingBatchWatchdog:     cfg.MappingBatchWatchdog,
+		GeoDataDir:               cfg.GeoDataDir,
+		CrowdSecAPIURL:           cfg.CrowdSecAPIURL,
+		CrowdSecAPIKey:           cfg.CrowdSecAPIKey,
 	}
 }

proxy/management_integration_test.go

@@ -240,10 +240,6 @@ func (m *testProxyManager) ClusterSupportsCrowdSec(_ context.Context, _ string)
 	return nil
 }
 
-func (m *testProxyManager) ClusterSupportsAppSec(_ context.Context, _ string) *bool {
-	return nil
-}
-
 func (m *testProxyManager) ClusterSupportsPrivate(_ context.Context, _ string) *bool {
 	return nil
 }
@@ -566,11 +562,16 @@ func TestIntegration_ProxyConnection_ReconnectDoesNotDuplicateState(t *testing.T
 				addMappingCalls.Add(1)
 
 				// Apply to real auth middleware (idempotent)
-				err := authMw.AddDomain(mapping.GetDomain(), auth.DomainSettings{
-					AccountID: proxytypes.AccountID(mapping.GetAccountId()),
-					ServiceID: proxytypes.ServiceID(mapping.GetId()),
-					Private:   mapping.GetPrivate(),
-				})
+				err := authMw.AddDomain(
+					mapping.GetDomain(),
+					nil,
+					"",
+					0,
+					proxytypes.AccountID(mapping.GetAccountId()),
+					proxytypes.ServiceID(mapping.GetId()),
+					nil,
+					mapping.GetPrivate(),
+				)
 				require.NoError(t, err)
 
 				// Apply to real proxy (idempotent)

proxy/server.go

@@ -45,7 +45,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/embed"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/accesslog"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/acme"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/appsec"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/auth"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/certwatch"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/conntrack"
@@ -127,10 +126,6 @@ type Server struct {
 	crowdsecMu       sync.Mutex
 	crowdsecServices map[types.ServiceID]bool
 
-	// appsecClient is the shared CrowdSec AppSec client, nil when no AppSec
-	// endpoint is configured. Stateless, so it needs no per-service lifecycle.
-	appsecClient *appsec.Client
-
 	// routerReady is closed once mainRouter is fully initialized.
 	// The mapping worker waits on this before processing updates.
 	routerReady chan struct{}
@@ -243,17 +238,6 @@ type Server struct {
 	CrowdSecAPIURL string
 	// CrowdSecAPIKey is the CrowdSec bouncer API key. Empty disables CrowdSec.
 	CrowdSecAPIKey string
-	// CrowdSecAppSecURL is the CrowdSec AppSec (WAF) endpoint, e.g.
-	// http://127.0.0.1:7422/. Empty disables request inspection. Requires
-	// CrowdSecAPIKey, which the AppSec component validates against LAPI.
-	CrowdSecAppSecURL string
-	// CrowdSecAppSecTimeout bounds a single AppSec inspection call.
-	// Zero means appsec.DefaultTimeout.
-	CrowdSecAppSecTimeout time.Duration
-	// CrowdSecAppSecMaxBodyBytes caps the request body mirrored to the AppSec
-	// engine. Zero means appsec.DefaultMaxBodyBytes; negative disables body
-	// forwarding, leaving header and URI inspection.
-	CrowdSecAppSecMaxBodyBytes int64
 	// MaxSessionIdleTimeout caps the per-service session idle timeout.
 	// Zero means no cap (the proxy honors whatever management sends).
 	// Set via NB_PROXY_MAX_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT for shared deployments.
@@ -400,13 +384,6 @@ func (s *Server) Start(ctx context.Context) error {
 
 	s.crowdsecRegistry = crowdsec.NewRegistry(s.CrowdSecAPIURL, s.CrowdSecAPIKey, log.NewEntry(s.Logger))
 	s.crowdsecServices = make(map[types.ServiceID]bool)
-	// Must precede the mapping worker: the worker opens the management stream
-	// and reports proxyCapabilities, which reads appsecClient. Building it
-	// afterwards would both race the read and, when the worker won, advertise
-	// the proxy as AppSec-incapable for the lifetime of that stream.
-	if err := s.initAppSec(); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
 
 	go s.newManagementMappingWorker(runCtx, s.mgmtClient)
 
@@ -434,7 +411,6 @@ func (s *Server) Start(ctx context.Context) error {
 	}()
 
 	s.auth = auth.NewMiddleware(s.Logger, s.mgmtClient, s.geo)
-	s.auth.SetAppSec(s.appsecClient)
 	s.accessLog = accesslog.NewLogger(s.mgmtClient, s.Logger, s.TrustedProxies)
 
 	s.startDebugEndpoint()
@@ -1298,7 +1274,6 @@ func (s *Server) newManagementMappingWorker(ctx context.Context, client proto.Pr
 
 func (s *Server) proxyCapabilities() *proto.ProxyCapabilities {
 	supportsCrowdSec := s.crowdsecRegistry.Available()
-	supportsAppSec := s.appsecClient != nil
 	privateCapability := s.Private
 	// Always true: this build enforces ProxyMapping.private via the auth middleware.
 	supportsPrivateService := true
@@ -1306,7 +1281,6 @@ func (s *Server) proxyCapabilities() *proto.ProxyCapabilities {
 		SupportsCustomPorts:    &s.SupportsCustomPorts,
 		RequireSubdomain:       &s.RequireSubdomain,
 		SupportsCrowdsec:       &supportsCrowdSec,
-		SupportsAppsec:         &supportsAppSec,
 		Private:                &privateCapability,
 		SupportsPrivateService: &supportsPrivateService,
 	}
@@ -1934,57 +1908,6 @@ func (s *Server) parseRestrictions(mapping *proto.ProxyMapping) *restrict.Filter
 	})
 }
 
-// initAppSec builds the shared AppSec client when an endpoint is configured.
-// A configured-but-invalid endpoint is a startup error rather than a silent
-// downgrade: services asking for enforce would otherwise fail closed on every
-// request with no indication why.
-//
-// Runs before the management stream opens so the reported capability is stable;
-// the auth middleware picks the client up separately once it exists.
-func (s *Server) initAppSec() error {
-	if s.CrowdSecAppSecURL == "" {
-		return nil
-	}
-	if s.CrowdSecAPIKey == "" {
-		return errors.New("crowdsec appsec url is set but the crowdsec api key is empty")
-	}
-
-	// Share the middleware capture budget rather than opening a second pool:
-	// AppSec buffers before authentication, so its ceiling has to count against
-	// the same proxy-wide allowance the body tap draws from.
-	var budget appsec.Budget
-	if s.middlewareManager != nil {
-		budget = s.middlewareManager.Budget()
-	}
-
-	client, err := appsec.New(appsec.Config{
-		URL:          s.CrowdSecAppSecURL,
-		APIKey:       s.CrowdSecAPIKey,
-		Timeout:      s.CrowdSecAppSecTimeout,
-		MaxBodyBytes: s.CrowdSecAppSecMaxBodyBytes,
-		Budget:       budget,
-		Logger:       log.NewEntry(s.Logger),
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("init crowdsec appsec: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	s.appsecClient = client
-	s.Logger.Infof("CrowdSec AppSec inspection available at %s", s.CrowdSecAppSecURL)
-	return nil
-}
-
-// appSecMode resolves the per-service AppSec mode. A service asking for
-// inspection on a proxy with no AppSec endpoint keeps its mode so the auth
-// middleware fails closed for enforce, mirroring the CrowdSec behavior.
-func (s *Server) appSecMode(mapping *proto.ProxyMapping) restrict.AppSecMode {
-	mode := restrict.ParseAppSecMode(mapping.GetAccessRestrictions().GetAppsecMode())
-	if mode.Enabled() && s.appsecClient == nil {
-		s.Logger.Warnf("service %s requests AppSec mode %q but proxy has no AppSec endpoint configured", mapping.GetId(), mode)
-	}
-	return mode
-}
-
 // releaseCrowdSec releases the CrowdSec bouncer reference for the given
 // service if it had one.
 func (s *Server) releaseCrowdSec(svcID types.ServiceID) {
@@ -2151,17 +2074,7 @@ func (s *Server) updateMapping(ctx context.Context, mapping *proto.ProxyMapping)
 	s.warnIfGeoUnavailable(mapping.GetDomain(), mapping.GetAccessRestrictions())
 
 	maxSessionAge := time.Duration(mapping.GetAuth().GetMaxSessionAgeSeconds()) * time.Second
-	settings := auth.DomainSettings{
-		Schemes:           schemes,
-		SessionPublicKey:  mapping.GetAuth().GetSessionKey(),
-		SessionExpiration: maxSessionAge,
-		AccountID:         accountID,
-		ServiceID:         svcID,
-		IPRestrictions:    ipRestrictions,
-		Private:           mapping.GetPrivate(),
-		AppSecMode:        s.appSecMode(mapping),
-	}
-	if err := s.auth.AddDomain(mapping.GetDomain(), settings); err != nil {
+	if err := s.auth.AddDomain(mapping.GetDomain(), schemes, mapping.GetAuth().GetSessionKey(), maxSessionAge, accountID, svcID, ipRestrictions, mapping.GetPrivate()); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("auth setup for domain %s: %w", mapping.GetDomain(), err)
 	}
 	m := s.protoToMapping(ctx, mapping)

shared/management/http/api/openapi.yml

@@ -3379,18 +3379,6 @@ components:
             - "observe"
           default: "off"
           description: CrowdSec IP reputation mode. Only available when the proxy cluster supports CrowdSec.
-        appsec_mode:
-          type: string
-          enum:
-            - "off"
-            - "enforce"
-            - "observe"
-          default: "off"
-          description: >-
-            CrowdSec AppSec (WAF) request inspection mode. Only available when
-            the proxy cluster supports AppSec, and only applied to HTTP
-            services. "enforce" blocks requests the WAF flags; "observe" records
-            the verdict in the access log without blocking.
     PasswordAuthConfig:
       type: object
       properties:
@@ -3527,10 +3515,6 @@ components:
           type: boolean
           description: Whether all active proxies in the cluster have CrowdSec configured
           example: false
-        supports_appsec:
-          type: boolean
-          description: Whether all active proxies in the cluster have a CrowdSec AppSec (WAF) endpoint configured
-          example: false
         private:
           type: boolean
           description: True when at least one connected proxy in this cluster is running embedded in a netbird client (`netbird proxy`) and serving over a WireGuard tunnel. Lets the dashboard distinguish per-peer / private clusters from centralised ones.
@@ -3590,10 +3574,6 @@ components:
           type: boolean
           description: Whether the proxy cluster has CrowdSec configured
           example: false
-        supports_appsec:
-          type: boolean
-          description: Whether the proxy cluster has a CrowdSec AppSec (WAF) endpoint configured
-          example: false
         supports_private:
           type: boolean
           description: Whether the proxy cluster supports private (NetBird-only) services. True when at least one connected proxy in the cluster runs embedded in a netbird client.

shared/management/http/api/types.gen.go

@@ -17,27 +17,6 @@ const (
 	TokenAuthScopes  tokenAuthContextKey  = "TokenAuth.Scopes"
 )
 
-// Defines values for AccessRestrictionsAppsecMode.
-const (
-	AccessRestrictionsAppsecModeEnforce AccessRestrictionsAppsecMode = "enforce"
-	AccessRestrictionsAppsecModeObserve AccessRestrictionsAppsecMode = "observe"
-	AccessRestrictionsAppsecModeOff     AccessRestrictionsAppsecMode = "off"
-)
-
-// Valid indicates whether the value is a known member of the AccessRestrictionsAppsecMode enum.
-func (e AccessRestrictionsAppsecMode) Valid() bool {
-	switch e {
-	case AccessRestrictionsAppsecModeEnforce:
-		return true
-	case AccessRestrictionsAppsecModeObserve:
-		return true
-	case AccessRestrictionsAppsecModeOff:
-		return true
-	default:
-		return false
-	}
-}
-
 // Defines values for AccessRestrictionsCrowdsecMode.
 const (
 	AccessRestrictionsCrowdsecModeEnforce AccessRestrictionsCrowdsecMode = "enforce"
@@ -1561,9 +1540,6 @@ type AccessRestrictions struct {
 	// AllowedCountries ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 country codes to allow. If non-empty, only these countries are permitted.
 	AllowedCountries *[]string `json:"allowed_countries,omitempty"`
 
-	// AppsecMode CrowdSec AppSec (WAF) request inspection mode. Only available when the proxy cluster supports AppSec, and only applied to HTTP services. "enforce" blocks requests the WAF flags; "observe" records the verdict in the access log without blocking.
-	AppsecMode *AccessRestrictionsAppsecMode `json:"appsec_mode,omitempty"`
-
 	// BlockedCidrs CIDR blocklist. Connections from these CIDRs are rejected. Evaluated after allowed_cidrs.
 	BlockedCidrs *[]string `json:"blocked_cidrs,omitempty"`
 
@@ -1574,9 +1550,6 @@ type AccessRestrictions struct {
 	CrowdsecMode *AccessRestrictionsCrowdsecMode `json:"crowdsec_mode,omitempty"`
 }
 
-// AccessRestrictionsAppsecMode CrowdSec AppSec (WAF) request inspection mode. Only available when the proxy cluster supports AppSec, and only applied to HTTP services. "enforce" blocks requests the WAF flags; "observe" records the verdict in the access log without blocking.
-type AccessRestrictionsAppsecMode string
-
 // AccessRestrictionsCrowdsecMode CrowdSec IP reputation mode. Only available when the proxy cluster supports CrowdSec.
 type AccessRestrictionsCrowdsecMode string
 
@@ -4755,9 +4728,6 @@ type ProxyCluster struct {
 	// RequireSubdomain Whether services on this cluster must include a subdomain label
 	RequireSubdomain *bool `json:"require_subdomain,omitempty"`
 
-	// SupportsAppsec Whether all active proxies in the cluster have a CrowdSec AppSec (WAF) endpoint configured
-	SupportsAppsec *bool `json:"supports_appsec,omitempty"`
-
 	// SupportsCrowdsec Whether all active proxies in the cluster have CrowdSec configured
 	SupportsCrowdsec *bool `json:"supports_crowdsec,omitempty"`
 
@@ -4826,9 +4796,6 @@ type ReverseProxyDomain struct {
 	// RequireSubdomain Whether a subdomain label is required in front of this domain. When true, the domain cannot be used bare.
 	RequireSubdomain *bool `json:"require_subdomain,omitempty"`
 
-	// SupportsAppsec Whether the proxy cluster has a CrowdSec AppSec (WAF) endpoint configured
-	SupportsAppsec *bool `json:"supports_appsec,omitempty"`
-
 	// SupportsCrowdsec Whether the proxy cluster has CrowdSec configured
 	SupportsCrowdsec *bool `json:"supports_crowdsec,omitempty"`
 

shared/management/proto/proxy_service.proto

@@ -73,10 +73,6 @@ message ProxyCapabilities {
   optional bool private = 4;
   // Whether the proxy enforces ProxyMapping.private (fails closed on ValidateTunnelPeer failure). Management MUST NOT stream private mappings to proxies that don't claim this.
   optional bool supports_private_service = 5;
-  // Whether the proxy has a CrowdSec AppSec (WAF) endpoint configured and can
-  // inspect HTTP requests. Independent of supports_crowdsec: AppSec is a
-  // separate endpoint on the Security Engine and applies to HTTP services only.
-  optional bool supports_appsec = 6;
 }
 
 // GetMappingUpdateRequest is sent to initialise a mapping stream.
@@ -207,10 +203,6 @@ message AccessRestrictions {
   repeated string blocked_countries = 4;
   // CrowdSec IP reputation mode: "", "off", "enforce", or "observe".
   string crowdsec_mode = 5;
-  // CrowdSec AppSec (WAF) request inspection mode: "", "off", "enforce", or
-  // "observe". HTTP services only: "enforce" and "observe" are rejected at
-  // validation for TCP/UDP/TLS services, which carry no requests to inspect.
-  string appsec_mode = 7;
 }
 
 message ProxyMapping {