[proxy] full-chain regression test: Vertex model allowlist is enforced

Add a realstack test that drives Anthropic-on-Vertex requests (model in
the URL path, no model in the body — the shape Claude Code sends) through
the full synthesized middleware chain against an in-process management
stack and a fake Vertex upstream, reproducing the customer scenario end
to end.

With a guardrail allowlisting only Sonnet, an Opus rawPredict must be
denied by the guardrail (llm_policy.model_blocked) before the upstream,
and Sonnet must be served. Covers two provider shapes:

  - catch_all: provider registered with no models (historical Vertex
    default) — the router waves every model through, so this is the
    direct guard for "the disallowed model is never blocked".
  - versioned_models: provider registered with the raw "@version" ids —
    the router must normalize the registered id to route the
    version-stripped request model while the guardrail still blocks Opus.

A static bearer api key is used so the router injects a static auth
header instead of minting a GCP OAuth token (which needs network egress
and would deny before the guardrail runs, masking the decision under
test). The upstream-hit counter proves a denied request never leaks to
Google.

.github/workflows/agent-network-e2e.yml

@@ -51,9 +51,6 @@ jobs:
           # token (and URL, for gateways) is unset, so partial coverage is fine.
           OPENAI_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.E2E_OPENAI_TOKEN }}
           ANTHROPIC_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.E2E_ANTHROPIC_TOKEN }}
-          # Moonshot AI platform key (platform.kimi.ai); drives both Kimi wire
-          # shapes (OpenAI /v1 and Anthropic /anthropic) through kimi_api.
-          KIMI_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.E2E_KIMI_TOKEN }}
           VERCEL_URL: ${{ secrets.E2E_VERCEL_URL }}
           VERCEL_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.E2E_VERCEL_TOKEN }}
           OPENROUTER_URL: ${{ secrets.E2E_OPENROUTER_URL }}

client/iface/iface_test.go

@@ -464,8 +464,6 @@ func Test_RemovePeer(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func Test_ConnectPeers(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv("NB_DISABLE_EBPF_WG_PROXY", "true")
-
 	peer1ifaceName := fmt.Sprintf("utun%d", WgIntNumber+400)
 	peer1wgIP := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.99.99.17/30")
 	peer1Key, _ := wgtypes.GeneratePrivateKey()
@@ -507,8 +505,12 @@ func Test_ConnectPeers(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
 
-	localIP1 := "127.0.0.1"
-	peer1endpoint, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", localIP1, peer1wgPort))
+	localIP, err := getLocalIP()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	peer1endpoint, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", localIP, peer1wgPort))
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
@@ -544,8 +546,7 @@ func Test_ConnectPeers(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
 
-	localIP2 := "127.0.0.1"
-	peer2endpoint, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", localIP2, peer2wgPort))
+	peer2endpoint, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", localIP, peer2wgPort))
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
@@ -568,17 +569,17 @@ func Test_ConnectPeers(t *testing.T) {
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
-	// The peers use userspace WireGuard (stdnet transport). A tight busy-loop
-	// here starves the wireguard-go goroutines that process the handshake, so
-	// poll on a ticker instead and yield the CPU between checks. WireGuard also
-	// only retries a lost handshake initiation every REKEY_TIMEOUT (5s), which
-	// is why the overall wait can occasionally stretch to tens of seconds.
+	// todo: investigate why in some tests execution we need 30s
 	timeout := 30 * time.Second
 	timeoutChannel := time.After(timeout)
-	ticker := time.NewTicker(500 * time.Millisecond)
-	defer ticker.Stop()
 
 	for {
+		select {
+		case <-timeoutChannel:
+			t.Fatalf("waiting for peer handshake timeout after %s", timeout.String())
+		default:
+		}
+
 		peer, gpErr := getPeer(peer1ifaceName, peer2Key.PublicKey().String())
 		if gpErr != nil {
 			t.Fatal(gpErr)
@@ -587,12 +588,6 @@ func Test_ConnectPeers(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Log("peers successfully handshake")
 			break
 		}
-
-		select {
-		case <-timeoutChannel:
-			t.Fatalf("waiting for peer handshake timeout after %s", timeout.String())
-		case <-ticker.C:
-		}
 	}
 
 }
@@ -620,3 +615,28 @@ func getPeer(ifaceName, peerPubKey string) (wgtypes.Peer, error) {
 	}
 	return wgtypes.Peer{}, fmt.Errorf("peer not found")
 }
+
+func getLocalIP() (string, error) {
+	// Get all interfaces
+	addrs, err := net.InterfaceAddrs()
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+
+	for _, addr := range addrs {
+		ipNet, ok := addr.(*net.IPNet)
+		if !ok {
+			continue
+		}
+		if ipNet.IP.IsLoopback() {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		if ipNet.IP.To4() == nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		return ipNet.IP.String(), nil
+	}
+
+	return "", fmt.Errorf("no local IP found")
+}

client/internal/conn_mgr.go

@@ -49,21 +49,11 @@ type ConnMgr struct {
 	// engine.syncMsgMux; all other reads stay under engine.syncMsgMux only.
 	lazyConnMgrMu sync.RWMutex
 
-	// reconcileRoutedIPs re-applies a peer's routed allowed IPs after its lazy wake endpoint is
-	// (re)armed (Mode A at arm time). Injected by the engine; nil disables the reconcile.
-	reconcileRoutedIPs func(peerKey string) error
-
 	wg            sync.WaitGroup
 	lazyCtx       context.Context
 	lazyCtxCancel context.CancelFunc
 }
 
-// SetRoutedIPsReconciler injects the callback used to re-apply a peer's routed allowed IPs when
-// its lazy wake endpoint is (re)armed. Must be called before the lazy manager starts.
-func (e *ConnMgr) SetRoutedIPsReconciler(fn func(peerKey string) error) {
-	e.reconcileRoutedIPs = fn
-}
-
 func NewConnMgr(engineConfig *EngineConfig, statusRecorder *peer.Status, peerStore *peerstore.Store, iface lazyconn.WGIface) *ConnMgr {
 	e := &ConnMgr{
 		peerStore:        peerStore,
@@ -301,7 +291,6 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) Close() {
 func (e *ConnMgr) initLazyManager(engineCtx context.Context) {
 	cfg := manager.Config{
 		InactivityThreshold: inactivityThresholdEnv(),
-		ReconcileAllowedIPs: e.reconcileRoutedIPs,
 	}
 
 	e.lazyConnMgrMu.Lock()

client/internal/ebpf/ebpf/src/dns_fwd.c

@@ -52,14 +52,11 @@ int xdp_dns_fwd(struct iphdr  *ip, struct udphdr *udp) {
 
     if (udp->dest == GENERAL_DNS_PORT && ip->daddr == dns_ip) {
         udp->dest = dns_port;
-        // Clear the now-stale checksum; zero means "not computed" for IPv4.
-        udp->check = 0;
         return XDP_PASS;
     }
 
     if (udp->source == dns_port && ip->saddr == dns_ip) {
         udp->source = GENERAL_DNS_PORT;
-        udp->check = 0;
         return XDP_PASS;
     }
 

client/internal/ebpf/ebpf/src/wg_proxy.c

@@ -50,11 +50,5 @@ int xdp_wg_proxy(struct iphdr  *ip, struct udphdr *udp) {
     __be16 new_dst_port = htons(proxy_port);
     udp->dest = new_dst_port;
     udp->source = new_src_port;
-
-    // The ports are covered by the UDP checksum. This is an IPv4 loopback hop
-    // and the payload is already integrity-protected, so clear the checksum (a
-    // zero UDP checksum means "not computed" for IPv4) rather than leave a
-    // stale value the kernel would drop as UDP_CSUM.
-    udp->check = 0;
 	return XDP_PASS;
 }

client/internal/engine.go

@@ -663,12 +663,6 @@ func (e *Engine) Start(netbirdConfig *mgmProto.NetbirdConfig, mgmtURL *url.URL)
 	iceCfg := e.createICEConfig()
 
 	e.connMgr = NewConnMgr(e.config, e.statusRecorder, e.peerStore, wgIface)
-	e.connMgr.SetRoutedIPsReconciler(func(peerKey string) error {
-		if e.routeManager == nil {
-			return nil
-		}
-		return e.routeManager.ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs(peerKey)
-	})
 	e.connMgr.Start(e.ctx)
 
 	// Wire DNS-time lazy-connection warm-up now that the connection manager

client/internal/lazyconn/manager/manager.go

@@ -29,11 +29,6 @@ type managedPeer struct {
 
 type Config struct {
 	InactivityThreshold *time.Duration
-	// ReconcileAllowedIPs re-applies a peer's routed allowed IPs after its wake endpoint is
-	// armed. The activity listener creates the wake peer with the overlay /32 only; without the
-	// routed prefixes WireGuard would not steer subnet-bound traffic to the wake endpoint, so an
-	// idle routing peer could never be woken by that traffic. Optional; nil disables the reconcile.
-	ReconcileAllowedIPs func(peerKey string) error
 }
 
 // Manager manages lazy connections
@@ -61,9 +56,6 @@ type Manager struct {
 	peerToHAGroups map[string][]route.HAUniqueID // peer ID -> HA groups they belong to
 	haGroupToPeers map[route.HAUniqueID][]string // HA group -> peer IDs in the group
 	routesMu       sync.RWMutex
-
-	// reconcileAllowedIPs re-applies a peer's routed allowed IPs after its wake endpoint is armed.
-	reconcileAllowedIPs func(peerKey string) error
 }
 
 // NewManager creates a new lazy connection manager
@@ -81,7 +73,6 @@ func NewManager(config Config, engineCtx context.Context, peerStore *peerstore.S
 		activityManager:      activity.NewManager(wgIface),
 		peerToHAGroups:       make(map[string][]route.HAUniqueID),
 		haGroupToPeers:       make(map[route.HAUniqueID][]string),
-		reconcileAllowedIPs:  config.ReconcileAllowedIPs,
 	}
 
 	if wgIface.IsUserspaceBind() {
@@ -210,7 +201,7 @@ func (m *Manager) AddPeer(peerCfg lazyconn.PeerConfig) (bool, error) {
 		return false, nil
 	}
 
-	if err := m.armActivityListener(peerCfg); err != nil {
+	if err := m.activityManager.MonitorPeerActivity(peerCfg); err != nil {
 		return false, err
 	}
 
@@ -297,7 +288,7 @@ func (m *Manager) DeactivatePeer(peerID peerid.ConnID) {
 
 	m.inactivityManager.RemovePeer(mp.peerCfg.PublicKey)
 
-	if err := m.armActivityListener(*mp.peerCfg); err != nil {
+	if err := m.activityManager.MonitorPeerActivity(*mp.peerCfg); err != nil {
 		mp.peerCfg.Log.Errorf("failed to create activity monitor: %v", err)
 		return
 	}
@@ -474,31 +465,6 @@ func (m *Manager) close() {
 }
 
 // shouldDeferIdleForHA checks if peer should stay connected due to HA group requirements
-// armRoutedAllowedIPs re-applies the peer's routed allowed IPs onto its freshly armed wake
-// endpoint. The activity listener creates the wake peer with the overlay /32 only, so without
-// this the routed prefixes would be missing and traffic to a routed subnet could not wake the
-// idle routing peer. It is a no-op when no reconciler is configured.
-// armActivityListener (re)arms the peer's wake endpoint via the activity manager and then
-// re-applies its routed allowed IPs, so traffic to a routed subnet can wake an idle routing
-// peer. The routed prefixes must be re-applied after the wake endpoint exists because the
-// listener creates it with the overlay /32 only.
-func (m *Manager) armActivityListener(peerCfg lazyconn.PeerConfig) error {
-	if err := m.activityManager.MonitorPeerActivity(peerCfg); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	m.armRoutedAllowedIPs(&peerCfg)
-	return nil
-}
-
-func (m *Manager) armRoutedAllowedIPs(peerCfg *lazyconn.PeerConfig) {
-	if m.reconcileAllowedIPs == nil {
-		return
-	}
-	if err := m.reconcileAllowedIPs(peerCfg.PublicKey); err != nil {
-		peerCfg.Log.Errorf("failed to reconcile routed allowed IPs on wake endpoint: %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
 func (m *Manager) shouldDeferIdleForHA(inactivePeers map[string]struct{}, peerID string) bool {
 	m.routesMu.RLock()
 	defer m.routesMu.RUnlock()
@@ -611,7 +577,7 @@ func (m *Manager) onPeerInactivityTimedOut(peerIDs map[string]struct{}) {
 
 		mp.peerCfg.Log.Infof("start activity monitor")
 
-		if err := m.armActivityListener(*mp.peerCfg); err != nil {
+		if err := m.activityManager.MonitorPeerActivity(*mp.peerCfg); err != nil {
 			mp.peerCfg.Log.Errorf("failed to create activity monitor: %v", err)
 			continue
 		}

client/internal/routemanager/manager.go

@@ -61,7 +61,6 @@ type Manager interface {
 	InitialRouteRange() []string
 	SetFirewall(firewall.Manager) error
 	SetDNSForwarderPort(port uint16)
-	ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs(peerKey string) error
 	Stop(stateManager *statemanager.Manager)
 }
 
@@ -233,30 +232,6 @@ func (m *DefaultManager) setupRefCounters(useNoop bool) {
 	)
 }
 
-// ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs re-applies every routed allowed IP currently tracked for the peer
-// onto the WireGuard device. The allowed-IP refcounter only calls its AddFunc (which pushes to
-// the device) on a prefix's 0->1 transition, so a peer whose device entry was rebuilt without a
-// matching refcounter change — e.g. a lazy connection cycling through idle->wake, which recreates
-// the WireGuard peer with the overlay /32 only — ends up missing routed prefixes the refcounter
-// still considers installed, and nothing retries. Calling this when the peer's WireGuard entry is
-// (re)created restores convergence. It is add-only and idempotent: AddAllowedIP is update-only, so
-// prefixes are re-added to an existing peer and an absent peer is left untouched.
-func (m *DefaultManager) ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs(peerKey string) error {
-	if m.allowedIPsRefCounter == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-
-	return m.allowedIPsRefCounter.ReapplyMatching(
-		func(out string) bool { return out == peerKey },
-		func(prefix netip.Prefix) error {
-			if err := m.wgInterface.AddAllowedIP(peerKey, prefix); err != nil {
-				return fmt.Errorf("add allowed IP %s for peer %s: %w", prefix, peerKey, err)
-			}
-			return nil
-		},
-	)
-}
-
 // Init sets up the routing
 func (m *DefaultManager) Init() error {
 	m.routeSelector = m.initSelector()

client/internal/routemanager/mock.go

@@ -112,11 +112,6 @@ func (m *MockManager) SetFirewall(firewall.Manager) error {
 func (m *MockManager) SetDNSForwarderPort(port uint16) {
 }
 
-// ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs mock implementation of ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs from Manager interface
-func (m *MockManager) ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs(peerKey string) error {
-	return nil
-}
-
 // Stop mock implementation of Stop from Manager interface
 func (m *MockManager) Stop(stateManager *statemanager.Manager) {
 	if m.StopFunc != nil {

client/internal/routemanager/reconcile_test.go

@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
-//go:build !windows
-
-package routemanager
-
-import (
-	"net"
-	"net/netip"
-	"sync"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-	"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/tun/netstack"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/device"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/routemanager/refcounter"
-)
-
-// reconcileWGMock is a minimal iface.WGIface that only records AddAllowedIP calls; every other
-// method is an inert stub because ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs exercises none of them.
-type reconcileWGMock struct {
-	mu   sync.Mutex
-	adds map[string][]netip.Prefix
-}
-
-func (m *reconcileWGMock) AddAllowedIP(peerKey string, allowedIP netip.Prefix) error {
-	m.mu.Lock()
-	defer m.mu.Unlock()
-	if m.adds == nil {
-		m.adds = map[string][]netip.Prefix{}
-	}
-	m.adds[peerKey] = append(m.adds[peerKey], allowedIP)
-	return nil
-}
-
-func (m *reconcileWGMock) added(peerKey string) []netip.Prefix {
-	m.mu.Lock()
-	defer m.mu.Unlock()
-	return m.adds[peerKey]
-}
-
-func (m *reconcileWGMock) RemoveAllowedIP(string, netip.Prefix) error { return nil }
-func (m *reconcileWGMock) Name() string                               { return "utun-test" }
-func (m *reconcileWGMock) Address() wgaddr.Address                    { return wgaddr.Address{} }
-func (m *reconcileWGMock) ToInterface() *net.Interface                { return nil }
-func (m *reconcileWGMock) IsUserspaceBind() bool                      { return false }
-func (m *reconcileWGMock) GetFilter() device.PacketFilter             { return nil }
-func (m *reconcileWGMock) GetDevice() *device.FilteredDevice          { return nil }
-func (m *reconcileWGMock) GetNet() *netstack.Net                      { return nil }
-
-// TestReconcilePeerAllowedIPs verifies the declarative reconcile re-applies every routed prefix
-// tracked for the peer (self-heal, independent of refcount level) and stays scoped to that peer.
-func TestReconcilePeerAllowedIPs(t *testing.T) {
-	wg := &reconcileWGMock{}
-	m := &DefaultManager{wgInterface: wg}
-	m.allowedIPsRefCounter = refcounter.New[netip.Prefix, string, string](
-		func(_ netip.Prefix, peerKey string) (string, error) { return peerKey, nil },
-		func(netip.Prefix, string) error { return nil },
-	)
-
-	peerA1 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/24")
-	peerA2 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.1.0.0/24")
-	peerB1 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.2.0.0/24")
-
-	for prefix, peer := range map[netip.Prefix]string{peerA1: "peerA", peerA2: "peerA", peerB1: "peerB"} {
-		_, err := m.allowedIPsRefCounter.Increment(prefix, peer)
-		require.NoError(t, err)
-	}
-	// Extra reference: reconcile must still re-apply the prefix even though its refcount never
-	// hit 0 again (the exact case the plain incremental path skips).
-	_, err := m.allowedIPsRefCounter.Increment(peerA1, "peerA")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	require.NoError(t, m.ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs("peerA"))
-
-	assert.ElementsMatch(t, []netip.Prefix{peerA1, peerA2}, wg.added("peerA"),
-		"reconcile must re-apply all routed prefixes of the peer")
-	assert.Empty(t, wg.added("peerB"), "reconcile must not touch another peer's prefixes")
-}
-
-// TestReconcilePeerAllowedIPsNoCounter verifies reconcile is a safe no-op before the refcounter is
-// set up.
-func TestReconcilePeerAllowedIPsNoCounter(t *testing.T) {
-	wg := &reconcileWGMock{}
-	m := &DefaultManager{wgInterface: wg}
-
-	require.NoError(t, m.ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs("peerA"))
-	assert.Empty(t, wg.added("peerA"))
-}

client/internal/routemanager/refcounter/refcounter.go

@@ -94,26 +94,6 @@ func (rm *Counter[Key, I, O]) Get(key Key) (Ref[O], bool) {
 	return ref, ok
 }
 
-// ReapplyMatching calls apply for every key whose stored Out satisfies pred, holding the
-// counter lock for the whole pass. Running apply under the lock keeps it atomic with respect
-// to Increment/Decrement: a prefix dropped to zero is removed from the map (and had its
-// RemoveFunc called) before this pass observes it, so a stale key can never be re-applied.
-// pred and apply are invoked under the lock, so they must not call back into the counter.
-func (rm *Counter[Key, I, O]) ReapplyMatching(pred func(out O) bool, apply func(key Key) error) error {
-	rm.mu.Lock()
-	defer rm.mu.Unlock()
-
-	var merr *multierror.Error
-	for key, ref := range rm.refCountMap {
-		if pred(ref.Out) {
-			if err := apply(key); err != nil {
-				merr = multierror.Append(merr, err)
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	return nberrors.FormatErrorOrNil(merr)
-}
-
 // Increment increments the reference count for the given key.
 // If this is the first reference to the key, the AddFunc is called.
 func (rm *Counter[Key, I, O]) Increment(key Key, in I) (Ref[O], error) {

client/internal/routemanager/refcounter/refcounter_test.go

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-package refcounter
-
-import (
-	"net/netip"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-)
-
-// TestReapplyMatching verifies ReapplyMatching invokes apply for exactly the keys whose stored
-// Out satisfies the predicate (no duplicates for multiply-referenced keys) — the primitive
-// ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs relies on to re-apply a single peer's routed prefixes.
-func TestReapplyMatching(t *testing.T) {
-	rc := New[netip.Prefix, string, string](
-		func(_ netip.Prefix, peerKey string) (string, error) { return peerKey, nil },
-		func(netip.Prefix, string) error { return nil },
-	)
-
-	peerA1 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/24")
-	peerA2 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.1.0.0/24")
-	peerB1 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.2.0.0/24")
-
-	for prefix, peer := range map[netip.Prefix]string{peerA1: "peerA", peerA2: "peerA", peerB1: "peerB"} {
-		_, err := rc.Increment(prefix, peer)
-		require.NoError(t, err)
-	}
-	// a second reference must not make the key applied twice
-	_, err := rc.Increment(peerA1, "peerA")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	var applied []netip.Prefix
-	err = rc.ReapplyMatching(
-		func(out string) bool { return out == "peerA" },
-		func(key netip.Prefix) error { applied = append(applied, key); return nil },
-	)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.ElementsMatch(t, []netip.Prefix{peerA1, peerA2}, applied)
-
-	var none []netip.Prefix
-	err = rc.ReapplyMatching(
-		func(out string) bool { return out == "missing" },
-		func(key netip.Prefix) error { none = append(none, key); return nil },
-	)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Empty(t, none)
-}

e2e/agentnetwork/chat_test.go

@@ -20,15 +20,14 @@ import (
 // covers whatever credentials are present (source ~/.llm-keys locally / set the
 // Actions secrets in CI).
 type providerCase struct {
-	name       string
-	catalogID  string
-	upstream   string
-	apiKey     string
-	model      string // body model (chat/messages) or path model@version (vertex)
-	kind       string // harness.WireChat, harness.WireMessages, or harness.WireVertex
-	project    string // vertex only: GCP project for the rawPredict path
-	region     string // vertex only: GCP region for the rawPredict path
-	pathPrefix string // base-URL path prefix the agent carries (e.g. "/anthropic" for Kimi)
+	name      string
+	catalogID string
+	upstream  string
+	apiKey    string
+	model     string // body model (chat/messages) or path model@version (vertex)
+	kind      string // harness.WireChat, harness.WireMessages, or harness.WireVertex
+	project   string // vertex only: GCP project for the rawPredict path
+	region    string // vertex only: GCP region for the rawPredict path
 }
 
 // availableProviders builds the matrix from the provider env vars that are set.
@@ -40,24 +39,6 @@ func availableProviders() []providerCase {
 	if k := os.Getenv("ANTHROPIC_TOKEN"); k != "" {
 		ps = append(ps, providerCase{name: "anthropic", catalogID: "anthropic_api", upstream: "https://api.anthropic.com", apiKey: k, model: "claude-haiku-4-5", kind: harness.WireMessages})
 	}
-	if k := os.Getenv("KIMI_TOKEN"); k != "" {
-		// Kimi (Moonshot AI) serves two body shapes from the same key: OpenAI
-		// Chat Completions on the bare host (/v1/...) and the Anthropic
-		// Messages API under the /anthropic path prefix (the endpoint
-		// Moonshot's Claude Code guide uses). The provider keeps the bare
-		// default upstream and the AGENT carries the /anthropic prefix in
-		// its base URL — exactly the documented Claude Code / Kimi CLI
-		// setup (ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=https://<endpoint>/anthropic) — so one
-		// provider serves both shapes and the prefix rides through to
-		// Moonshot. Run the Anthropic shape, the flagship Claude Code path;
-		// the OpenAI wire shape is covered live by the other chat-shaped
-		// matrix providers, and Kimi-over-chat passed with kimi-k3 before
-		// the single-model constraint surfaced (run #73 on the kimi feature
-		// branch). The platform serves this account exactly ONE model —
-		// kimi-k3 (kimi-k2-thinking and even kimi-latest return
-		// resource_not_found_error on both surfaces).
-		ps = append(ps, providerCase{name: "kimi", catalogID: "kimi_api", upstream: "https://api.moonshot.ai", apiKey: k, model: "kimi-k3", kind: harness.WireMessages, pathPrefix: "/anthropic"})
-	}
 	if k, u := os.Getenv("VERCEL_TOKEN"), os.Getenv("VERCEL_URL"); k != "" && u != "" {
 		ps = append(ps, providerCase{name: "vercel", catalogID: "vercel_ai_gateway", upstream: u, apiKey: k, model: "openai/gpt-4o-mini", kind: harness.WireChat})
 	}
@@ -103,18 +84,12 @@ func availableProviders() []providerCase {
 		}
 	}
 
-	// Bedrock: path-routed, bearer auth. Model is the FULL cross-region
-	// inference-profile id exactly as AWS issues it — region-family prefix
-	// plus the date/version suffix. A bare or wrong-region id makes Bedrock
-	// reject the request with "The provided model identifier is invalid"
-	// before any inference runs. The proxy normalizes this id to the catalog
-	// key (anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5) for routing/pricing/allowlists.
-	// Defaults pair eu-central-1 with the eu.* profile; AWS_REGION overrides
-	// the region and the prefix follows its family.
+	// Bedrock: path-routed, bearer auth. Model is a cross-region inference
+	// profile id (distinct string from the first-party Anthropic case).
 	if k := os.Getenv("AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK"); k != "" {
 		region := os.Getenv("AWS_REGION")
 		if region == "" {
-			region = "eu-central-1"
+			region = "us-east-1"
 		}
 		// A valid Bedrock inference-profile id (region prefix + date + version),
 		// overridable per account. `global.` profiles can be invoked from any
@@ -129,8 +104,9 @@ func availableProviders() []providerCase {
 }
 
 // providerRequest builds a create request for a matrix provider: enabled, with
-// a uniquely-priced model for body-routed providers and none for the
-// path-routed Vertex (whose model lives in the request path).
+// a uniquely-priced model registered under the id an operator would paste —
+// the normalized catalog id for Bedrock, the raw form elsewhere (including the
+// "@version" Vertex id, which the router must normalize to route).
 func providerRequest(pc providerCase) api.AgentNetworkProviderRequest {
 	req := api.AgentNetworkProviderRequest{
 		Name:        pc.name,
@@ -139,18 +115,15 @@ func providerRequest(pc providerCase) api.AgentNetworkProviderRequest {
 		ApiKey:      &pc.apiKey,
 		Enabled:     ptr(true),
 	}
-	if pc.kind != harness.WireVertex {
-		// The router matches the normalized catalog id. Bedrock's request model
-		// travels as a region-prefixed inference-profile id in the URL path
-		// (us.anthropic...), which the router strips before matching, so register
-		// the normalized form here or routing fails as model_not_routable.
-		modelID := pc.model
-		if pc.kind == harness.WireBedrock {
-			modelID = catalogModel(pc)
-		}
-		req.Models = &[]api.AgentNetworkProviderModel{
-			{Id: modelID, InputPer1k: 0.001, OutputPer1k: 0.002},
-		}
+	// Register Bedrock under its normalized catalog id (the router strips the
+	// region prefix before matching); other providers, incl. the raw "@version"
+	// Vertex id, register as-is so the router's normalization is exercised.
+	modelID := pc.model
+	if pc.kind == harness.WireBedrock {
+		modelID = catalogModel(pc)
+	}
+	req.Models = &[]api.AgentNetworkProviderModel{
+		{Id: modelID, InputPer1k: 0.001, OutputPer1k: 0.002},
 	}
 	return req
 }
@@ -241,7 +214,8 @@ func TestProvidersMatrix(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = cl.Terminate(context.Background()) })
 
 	require.NoError(t, cl.WaitConnected(ctx, 90*time.Second), "client must connect to management")
-	// Probe first: the GET resolves the endpoint (DNS error fails) and its first packet wakes the lazy proxy peer, so WaitProxyPeer sees it connected; any HTTP status counts.
+	// Resolve first: the DNS lookup triggers the lazy-connection warm-up, waking
+	// the proxy peer so WaitProxyPeer then observes it connected.
 	proxyIP, err := cl.ResolveProxyIP(ctx, settings.Endpoint)
 	require.NoError(t, err, "resolve agent-network endpoint to proxy IP")
 	if err := cl.WaitProxyPeer(ctx, 180*time.Second); err != nil {
@@ -271,7 +245,7 @@ func TestProvidersMatrix(t *testing.T) {
 				case harness.WireBedrock:
 					c, b, cerr = cl.Bedrock(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc.model, "Reply with exactly: pong", sessionID)
 				default:
-					c, b, cerr = cl.ChatPrefixed(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc.pathPrefix, pc.kind, pc.model, "Reply with exactly: pong", sessionID)
+					c, b, cerr = cl.Chat(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc.kind, pc.model, "Reply with exactly: pong", sessionID)
 				}
 				if cerr == nil {
 					code, body = c, b

e2e/agentnetwork/guardrail_test.go

@@ -52,9 +52,7 @@ func catalogModel(pc providerCase) string {
 func disallowedModel(pc providerCase) string {
 	switch pc.kind {
 	case harness.WireBedrock:
-		// Same profile prefix as the allowed model so only the model name
-		// differs; the guardrail must deny it before it reaches AWS.
-		return strings.SplitN(pc.model, ".", 2)[0] + ".anthropic.claude-opus-4-8"
+		return "us.anthropic.claude-opus-4-8"
 	case harness.WireVertex:
 		return "claude-opus-4-8@20250101"
 	default:
@@ -74,7 +72,7 @@ func sendModel(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, cl *harness.Client, endpoint,
 	case harness.WireVertex:
 		code, _, err = cl.Vertex(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, pc.project, pc.region, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
 	default:
-		code, _, err = cl.ChatPrefixed(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, pc.pathPrefix, pc.kind, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
+		code, _, err = cl.Chat(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, pc.kind, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
 	}
 	require.NoError(t, err, "request must reach the proxy for %s", pc.name)
 	return code
@@ -127,7 +125,13 @@ func TestModelAllowlistEnforced(t *testing.T) {
 		require.NoError(t, perr, "create provider %s", pc.name)
 		id := prov.Id
 		ids = append(ids, id)
-		allowed = append(allowed, catalogModel(pc))
+		// Vertex allowlists the raw "@version" id (the guardrail normalizes it);
+		// other providers allowlist the normalized catalog id.
+		if pc.kind == harness.WireVertex {
+			allowed = append(allowed, pc.model)
+		} else {
+			allowed = append(allowed, catalogModel(pc))
+		}
 		t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteProvider(context.Background(), id) })
 	}
 
@@ -166,7 +170,8 @@ func TestModelAllowlistEnforced(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = cl.Terminate(context.Background()) })
 
 	require.NoError(t, cl.WaitConnected(ctx, 90*time.Second), "client must connect to management")
-	// Probe first: the GET resolves the endpoint (DNS error fails) and its first packet wakes the lazy proxy peer, so WaitProxyPeer sees it connected; any HTTP status counts.
+	// Resolve first: the DNS lookup triggers the lazy-connection warm-up, waking
+	// the proxy peer so WaitProxyPeer then observes it connected.
 	proxyIP, err := cl.ResolveProxyIP(ctx, settings.Endpoint)
 	require.NoError(t, err, "resolve agent-network endpoint to proxy IP")
 	if err := cl.WaitProxyPeer(ctx, 180*time.Second); err != nil {
@@ -183,6 +188,22 @@ func TestModelAllowlistEnforced(t *testing.T) {
 			// the upstream), regardless of whether it is a real catalog model.
 			assert.Equal(t, 403, sendModel(ctx, t, cl, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc, disallowedModel(pc)),
 				"model outside the allowlist must be denied for %s", pc.name)
+
+			if pc.kind != harness.WireVertex {
+				return
+			}
+			// Unversioned model id (the customer-reported shape) must pass the
+			// same allowlist entry.
+			assert.Equal(t, 200, sendModel(ctx, t, cl, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc, catalogModel(pc)),
+				"unversioned model id must be permitted for %s", pc.name)
+			// count-tokens carries the real model in the body: allowed → served.
+			code, _, err := cl.VertexCountTokens(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc.project, pc.region, pc.model)
+			require.NoError(t, err, "count-tokens request must reach the proxy for %s", pc.name)
+			assert.Equal(t, 200, code, "count-tokens with an allowlisted body model must be permitted for %s", pc.name)
+			// Disallowed body model → denied before the upstream.
+			code, _, err = cl.VertexCountTokens(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc.project, pc.region, disallowedModel(pc))
+			require.NoError(t, err, "count-tokens request must reach the proxy for %s", pc.name)
+			assert.Equal(t, 403, code, "count-tokens with a body model outside the allowlist must be denied for %s", pc.name)
 		})
 	}
 }

e2e/agentnetwork/skiptls_test.go

@@ -104,7 +104,8 @@ func TestProviderSkipTLSVerification(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = cl.Terminate(context.Background()) })
 
 	require.NoError(t, cl.WaitConnected(ctx, 90*time.Second), "client must connect to management")
-	// Probe first: the GET resolves the endpoint (DNS error fails) and its first packet wakes the lazy proxy peer, so WaitProxyPeer sees it connected; any HTTP status counts.
+	// Resolve first: the DNS lookup triggers the lazy-connection warm-up, waking
+	// the proxy peer so WaitProxyPeer then observes it connected.
 	proxyIP, err := cl.ResolveProxyIP(ctx, settings.Endpoint)
 	require.NoError(t, err, "resolve endpoint to proxy IP")
 	if err := cl.WaitProxyPeer(ctx, 180*time.Second); err != nil {

e2e/agentnetwork/vllm_test.go

@@ -106,7 +106,8 @@ func TestVLLMProvider(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = cl.Terminate(context.Background()) })
 
 	require.NoError(t, cl.WaitConnected(ctx, 90*time.Second), "client must connect to management")
-	// Probe first: the GET resolves the endpoint (DNS error fails) and its first packet wakes the lazy proxy peer, so WaitProxyPeer sees it connected; any HTTP status counts.
+	// Resolve first: the DNS lookup triggers the lazy-connection warm-up, waking
+	// the proxy peer so WaitProxyPeer then observes it connected.
 	proxyIP, err := cl.ResolveProxyIP(ctx, settings.Endpoint)
 	require.NoError(t, err, "resolve endpoint to proxy IP")
 	if err := cl.WaitProxyPeer(ctx, 180*time.Second); err != nil {

e2e/harness/client.go

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ package harness
 
 import (
 	"context"
-	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"os/exec"
@@ -168,54 +167,22 @@ func (cl *Client) pollStatus(ctx context.Context, timeout time.Duration, want st
 	return fmt.Errorf("timed out waiting for %q; last status:\n%s", want, last)
 }
 
-const (
-	// curlExitCouldNotResolve is curl's exit code for a DNS resolution failure, distinct from connection-level failures.
-	curlExitCouldNotResolve = 6
-	// dnsProbeRetryWindow bounds DNS-failure retries: the synthesized zone lands a beat after management connects, so early NXDOMAIN is propagation; a zone still absent after this window is a real failure.
-	dnsProbeRetryWindow   = 30 * time.Second
-	dnsProbeRetryInterval = 2 * time.Second
-)
-
-// ResolveProxyIP GETs https://<endpoint>/ from the client's netns: any HTTP status proves DNS + tunnel and wakes the lazy proxy peer; only DNS failures retry, within dnsProbeRetryWindow. Returns the connected IP for --resolve pinning.
+// ResolveProxyIP resolves the agent-network endpoint to the proxy peer's
+// NetBird IP from inside the client (via magic DNS).
 func (cl *Client) ResolveProxyIP(ctx context.Context, endpoint string) (string, error) {
-	args := []string{
-		"run", "--rm",
-		"--network", "container:" + cl.container.GetContainerID(),
-		curlImage,
-		"-ksS", "-o", "/dev/null",
-		"--connect-timeout", "30", "--max-time", "60",
-		"-w", "%{remote_ip}",
-		"https://" + endpoint + "/",
+	code, reader, err := cl.container.Exec(ctx, []string{"getent", "hosts", endpoint}, tcexec.Multiplexed())
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
 	}
-	deadline := time.Now().Add(dnsProbeRetryWindow)
-	for {
-		cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "docker", args...)
-		var stdout, stderr strings.Builder
-		cmd.Stdout = &stdout
-		cmd.Stderr = &stderr
-		err := cmd.Run()
-		if err == nil {
-			ip := strings.TrimSpace(stdout.String())
-			if ip == "" {
-				return "", fmt.Errorf("got an HTTP response from %s but no remote IP", endpoint)
-			}
-			return ip, nil
-		}
-
-		var exitErr *exec.ExitError
-		if !errors.As(err, &exitErr) || exitErr.ExitCode() != curlExitCouldNotResolve {
-			return "", fmt.Errorf("no HTTP response from %s: %w (%s)", endpoint, err, strings.TrimSpace(stderr.String()))
-		}
-		dnsErr := fmt.Errorf("DNS resolution failed for %s: %s", endpoint, strings.TrimSpace(stderr.String()))
-		if time.Until(deadline) < dnsProbeRetryInterval {
-			return "", dnsErr
-		}
-		select {
-		case <-ctx.Done():
-			return "", fmt.Errorf("%w (%w)", dnsErr, ctx.Err())
-		case <-time.After(dnsProbeRetryInterval):
-		}
+	out, _ := io.ReadAll(reader)
+	if code != 0 {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("getent hosts %s exited %d", endpoint, code)
 	}
+	fields := strings.Fields(string(out))
+	if len(fields) == 0 {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("no address for %s", endpoint)
+	}
+	return fields[0], nil
 }
 
 // Wire shapes for Chat.
@@ -239,17 +206,6 @@ const (
 // the wire shape: WireChat (OpenAI) or WireMessages (Anthropic). A non-empty
 // sessionID is sent as the universal x-session-id header the proxy records.
 func (cl *Client) Chat(ctx context.Context, endpoint, proxyIP, kind, model, prompt, sessionID string) (int, string, error) {
-	return cl.ChatPrefixed(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, "", kind, model, prompt, sessionID)
-}
-
-// ChatPrefixed is Chat with a base-URL path prefix prepended to the wire
-// path, mirroring agents whose base URL carries a shape-selecting prefix that
-// rides through to the upstream — e.g. Claude Code against a Kimi provider
-// sets ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=https://<endpoint>/anthropic so the proxy forwards
-// /anthropic/v1/messages to Moonshot's Anthropic surface while the provider's
-// upstream URL stays the bare https://api.moonshot.ai. Empty prefix is plain
-// Chat.
-func (cl *Client) ChatPrefixed(ctx context.Context, endpoint, proxyIP, pathPrefix, kind, model, prompt, sessionID string) (int, string, error) {
 	var path, body string
 	var headers []string
 	switch kind {
@@ -261,7 +217,7 @@ func (cl *Client) ChatPrefixed(ctx context.Context, endpoint, proxyIP, pathPrefi
 		path = "/v1/chat/completions"
 		body = fmt.Sprintf(`{"model":%q,"messages":[{"role":"user","content":%q}]}`, model, prompt)
 	}
-	return cl.post(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, pathPrefix+path, body, withSessionID(headers, sessionID))
+	return cl.post(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, path, body, withSessionID(headers, sessionID))
 }
 
 // Vertex issues an Anthropic-on-Vertex rawPredict POST over the tunnel. Unlike
@@ -275,6 +231,15 @@ func (cl *Client) Vertex(ctx context.Context, endpoint, proxyIP, project, region
 	return cl.post(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, path, body, withSessionID(nil, sessionID))
 }
 
+// VertexCountTokens issues the Anthropic-on-Vertex token-count POST: the URL
+// carries the "count-tokens" pseudo-model and the real model travels in the
+// body, so the proxy must resolve the body model for the allowlist and routing.
+func (cl *Client) VertexCountTokens(ctx context.Context, endpoint, proxyIP, project, region, model string) (int, string, error) {
+	path := fmt.Sprintf("/v1/projects/%s/locations/%s/publishers/anthropic/models/count-tokens:rawPredict", project, region)
+	body := fmt.Sprintf(`{"model":%q,"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}`, model)
+	return cl.post(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, path, body, nil)
+}
+
 // Bedrock issues a native AWS Bedrock InvokeModel POST over the tunnel. The
 // model id is carried in the request path (/model/{id}/invoke), so the proxy
 // routes by path; the body uses the bedrock anthropic_version rather than a

infrastructure_files/getting-started-enterprise.sh

@@ -234,6 +234,9 @@ init_environment() {
 
   NETBIRD_LICENSE_KEY=$(read_secret "Enter license key (input hidden)")
 
+  GHCR_USERNAME="netbirdExtAccess1"
+  GHCR_TOKEN=$(read_secret "Enter GHCR token (input hidden)")
+
   POSTGRES_USER="netbird"
   POSTGRES_DB="netbird"
   POSTGRES_PASSWORD=$(rand_secret)
@@ -260,6 +263,10 @@ init_environment() {
   install -m 600 /dev/null config.yaml
   render_config_yaml >> config.yaml
 
+  echo "Logging in to ghcr.io ..."
+  printf '%s' "$GHCR_TOKEN" | docker login ghcr.io -u "$GHCR_USERNAME" --password-stdin
+  unset GHCR_TOKEN
+
   echo ""
   echo "Pulling images ..."
   $DOCKER_COMPOSE_COMMAND pull

infrastructure_files/migrate-to-enterprise.sh

@@ -490,6 +490,8 @@ init_migration() {
   echo ""
   echo "Step 1: Image swap (community → Enterprise). License key required."
   NB_LICENSE_KEY=$(read_secret "  License key")
+  GHCR_USERNAME="netbirdExtAccess1"
+  GHCR_TOKEN=$(read_secret "  GHCR token (input hidden)")
 
   # Step 2 — optional
   echo ""
@@ -586,6 +588,11 @@ apply_changes() {
     fi
   } >> "$ENV_FILE"
 
+  echo ""
+  echo "Logging in to ghcr.io ..."
+  printf '%s' "$GHCR_TOKEN" | docker login ghcr.io -u "$GHCR_USERNAME" --password-stdin
+  unset GHCR_TOKEN
+
   echo ""
   echo "Pulling enterprise images ..."
   $DOCKER_COMPOSE_COMMAND pull

management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/catalog/catalog.go

@@ -420,47 +420,6 @@ var providers = []Provider{
 			{ID: "mistral-embed", Label: "Mistral Embed", InputPer1k: 0.0001, OutputPer1k: 0, ContextWindow: 8192},
 		},
 	},
-	{
-		ID:                 "kimi_api",
-		Kind:               KindProvider,
-		Name:               "Kimi (Moonshot AI) API",
-		Description:        "Kimi K3 / K2 models via the Moonshot AI platform",
-		DefaultHost:        "api.moonshot.ai",
-		AuthHeaderName:     "Authorization",
-		AuthHeaderTemplate: "Bearer ${API_KEY}",
-		DefaultContentType: "application/json",
-		BrandColor:         "#1A1A2E",
-		// ParserID empty on purpose: Moonshot serves two body shapes on
-		// the same host and key, and the proxy's URL sniffer dispatches
-		// both (same pattern as Bifrost). /v1/chat/completions matches
-		// OpenAIParser; the Anthropic-compatible endpoint the official
-		// Claude Code guide uses (/anthropic/v1/messages) contains
-		// "/v1/messages" and matches AnthropicParser. Pinning "openai"
-		// here would misparse the Claude Code path — the primary way
-		// teams consume Kimi for coding today. Both endpoints accept the
-		// same Moonshot key via Authorization: Bearer (Claude Code's
-		// ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN rides that header too).
-		//
-		// api.moonshot.ai is the international platform; mainland-China
-		// accounts live on api.moonshot.cn with separate billing —
-		// operators there override the host on the provider record. The
-		// kimi.com subscription coding endpoint (api.kimi.com/coding,
-		// model id "k3") is account-bound seat licensing rather than a
-		// meterable platform key, so it's deliberately not the default.
-		ParserID: "",
-		// Pricing per Moonshot's platform rates at K3 launch (July 2026):
-		// $3/$15 per MTok with $0.30 cached input, flat across the 1M-token
-		// window. kimi-k3 is the ONLY model the platform serves newer
-		// accounts — K2-era ids (kimi-k2-thinking) and even the kimi-latest
-		// alias return resource_not_found_error, verified live 2026-07-21 —
-		// so it's the only catalog entry. Grandfathered accounts with K2
-		// access can still type those ids on the provider's model rows.
-		// The consumer app's "K3 Swarm Max" mode is not an API SKU, so it
-		// doesn't appear here.
-		Models: []Model{
-			{ID: "kimi-k3", Label: "Kimi K3", InputPer1k: 0.003, OutputPer1k: 0.015, ContextWindow: 1000000},
-		},
-	},
 	{
 		ID:                 "litellm_proxy",
 		Kind:               KindGateway,

management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/domain/domain.go

@@ -23,9 +23,6 @@ type Domain struct {
 	// SupportsCrowdSec is populated at query time from proxy cluster capabilities.
 	// Not persisted.
 	SupportsCrowdSec *bool `gorm:"-"`
-	// SupportsAppSec is populated at query time from proxy cluster capabilities.
-	// Not persisted.
-	SupportsAppSec *bool `gorm:"-"`
 	// SupportsPrivate is populated at query time from proxy cluster capabilities. Not persisted.
 	SupportsPrivate *bool `gorm:"-"`
 }

management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/domain/manager/api.go

@@ -49,7 +49,6 @@ func domainToApi(d *domain.Domain) api.ReverseProxyDomain {
 		SupportsCustomPorts: d.SupportsCustomPorts,
 		RequireSubdomain:    d.RequireSubdomain,
 		SupportsCrowdsec:    d.SupportsCrowdSec,
-		SupportsAppsec:      d.SupportsAppSec,
 		SupportsPrivate:     d.SupportsPrivate,
 	}
 	if d.TargetCluster != "" {

management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/domain/manager/manager.go

@@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ type proxyManager interface {
 	ClusterSupportsCustomPorts(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	ClusterRequireSubdomain(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	ClusterSupportsCrowdSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
-	ClusterSupportsAppSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	ClusterSupportsPrivate(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 }
 
@@ -95,7 +94,6 @@ func (m Manager) GetDomains(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID string) ([]*d
 		d.SupportsCustomPorts = m.proxyManager.ClusterSupportsCustomPorts(ctx, cluster)
 		d.RequireSubdomain = m.proxyManager.ClusterRequireSubdomain(ctx, cluster)
 		d.SupportsCrowdSec = m.proxyManager.ClusterSupportsCrowdSec(ctx, cluster)
-		d.SupportsAppSec = m.proxyManager.ClusterSupportsAppSec(ctx, cluster)
 		d.SupportsPrivate = m.proxyManager.ClusterSupportsPrivate(ctx, cluster)
 		ret = append(ret, d)
 	}
@@ -113,7 +111,6 @@ func (m Manager) GetDomains(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID string) ([]*d
 		if d.TargetCluster != "" {
 			cd.SupportsCustomPorts = m.proxyManager.ClusterSupportsCustomPorts(ctx, d.TargetCluster)
 			cd.SupportsCrowdSec = m.proxyManager.ClusterSupportsCrowdSec(ctx, d.TargetCluster)
-			cd.SupportsAppSec = m.proxyManager.ClusterSupportsAppSec(ctx, d.TargetCluster)
 			cd.SupportsPrivate = m.proxyManager.ClusterSupportsPrivate(ctx, d.TargetCluster)
 		}
 		// Custom domains never require a subdomain by default since

management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/domain/manager/manager_test.go

@@ -40,10 +40,6 @@ func (m *mockProxyManager) ClusterSupportsCrowdSec(_ context.Context, _ string)
 	return nil
 }
 
-func (m *mockProxyManager) ClusterSupportsAppSec(_ context.Context, _ string) *bool {
-	return nil
-}
-
 func (m *mockProxyManager) ClusterSupportsPrivate(_ context.Context, _ string) *bool {
 	return nil
 }

management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/proxy/manager.go

@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ type Manager interface {
 	ClusterSupportsCustomPorts(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	ClusterRequireSubdomain(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	ClusterSupportsCrowdSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
-	ClusterSupportsAppSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	ClusterSupportsPrivate(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	CleanupStale(ctx context.Context, inactivityDuration time.Duration) error
 	GetAccountProxy(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (*Proxy, error)

management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/proxy/manager/manager.go

@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ type store interface {
 	GetClusterSupportsCustomPorts(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	GetClusterRequireSubdomain(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	GetClusterSupportsCrowdSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
-	GetClusterSupportsAppSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	GetClusterSupportsPrivate(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	CleanupStaleProxies(ctx context.Context, inactivityDuration time.Duration) error
 	GetProxyByAccountID(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (*proxy.Proxy, error)
@@ -139,13 +138,6 @@ func (m Manager) ClusterSupportsCrowdSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string
 	return m.store.GetClusterSupportsCrowdSec(ctx, clusterAddr)
 }
 
-// ClusterSupportsAppSec returns whether all active proxies in the cluster have
-// a CrowdSec AppSec endpoint configured (unanimous). Returns nil when no proxy
-// has reported capabilities.
-func (m Manager) ClusterSupportsAppSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool {
-	return m.store.GetClusterSupportsAppSec(ctx, clusterAddr)
-}
-
 // ClusterSupportsPrivate reports whether any active proxy claims the private capability (nil = unreported).
 func (m Manager) ClusterSupportsPrivate(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool {
 	return m.store.GetClusterSupportsPrivate(ctx, clusterAddr)

management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/proxy/manager/manager_test.go

@@ -99,9 +99,6 @@ func (m *mockStore) GetClusterRequireSubdomain(_ context.Context, _ string) *boo
 func (m *mockStore) GetClusterSupportsCrowdSec(_ context.Context, _ string) *bool {
 	return nil
 }
-func (m *mockStore) GetClusterSupportsAppSec(_ context.Context, _ string) *bool {
-	return nil
-}
 func (m *mockStore) GetClusterSupportsPrivate(_ context.Context, _ string) *bool {
 	return nil
 }

management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/proxy/manager_mock.go

@@ -50,6 +50,20 @@ func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) CleanupStale(ctx, inactivityDuration interfac
 	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "CleanupStale", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).CleanupStale), ctx, inactivityDuration)
 }
 
+// ClusterSupportsCustomPorts mocks base method.
+func (m *MockManager) ClusterSupportsCustomPorts(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool {
+	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
+	ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "ClusterSupportsCustomPorts", ctx, clusterAddr)
+	ret0, _ := ret[0].(*bool)
+	return ret0
+}
+
+// ClusterSupportsCustomPorts indicates an expected call of ClusterSupportsCustomPorts.
+func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) ClusterSupportsCustomPorts(ctx, clusterAddr interface{}) *gomock.Call {
+	mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
+	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "ClusterSupportsCustomPorts", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).ClusterSupportsCustomPorts), ctx, clusterAddr)
+}
+
 // ClusterRequireSubdomain mocks base method.
 func (m *MockManager) ClusterRequireSubdomain(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool {
 	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
@@ -64,20 +78,6 @@ func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) ClusterRequireSubdomain(ctx, clusterAddr inte
 	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "ClusterRequireSubdomain", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).ClusterRequireSubdomain), ctx, clusterAddr)
 }
 
-// ClusterSupportsAppSec mocks base method.
-func (m *MockManager) ClusterSupportsAppSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool {
-	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
-	ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "ClusterSupportsAppSec", ctx, clusterAddr)
-	ret0, _ := ret[0].(*bool)
-	return ret0
-}
-
-// ClusterSupportsAppSec indicates an expected call of ClusterSupportsAppSec.
-func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) ClusterSupportsAppSec(ctx, clusterAddr interface{}) *gomock.Call {
-	mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
-	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "ClusterSupportsAppSec", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).ClusterSupportsAppSec), ctx, clusterAddr)
-}
-
 // ClusterSupportsCrowdSec mocks base method.
 func (m *MockManager) ClusterSupportsCrowdSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool {
 	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
@@ -92,20 +92,6 @@ func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) ClusterSupportsCrowdSec(ctx, clusterAddr inte
 	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "ClusterSupportsCrowdSec", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).ClusterSupportsCrowdSec), ctx, clusterAddr)
 }
 
-// ClusterSupportsCustomPorts mocks base method.
-func (m *MockManager) ClusterSupportsCustomPorts(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool {
-	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
-	ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "ClusterSupportsCustomPorts", ctx, clusterAddr)
-	ret0, _ := ret[0].(*bool)
-	return ret0
-}
-
-// ClusterSupportsCustomPorts indicates an expected call of ClusterSupportsCustomPorts.
-func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) ClusterSupportsCustomPorts(ctx, clusterAddr interface{}) *gomock.Call {
-	mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
-	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "ClusterSupportsCustomPorts", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).ClusterSupportsCustomPorts), ctx, clusterAddr)
-}
-
 // ClusterSupportsPrivate mocks base method.
 func (m *MockManager) ClusterSupportsPrivate(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool {
 	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
@@ -135,35 +121,6 @@ func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) Connect(ctx, proxyID, sessionID, clusterAddre
 	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "Connect", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).Connect), ctx, proxyID, sessionID, clusterAddress, ipAddress, accountID, capabilities)
 }
 
-// CountAccountProxies mocks base method.
-func (m *MockManager) CountAccountProxies(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (int64, error) {
-	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
-	ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "CountAccountProxies", ctx, accountID)
-	ret0, _ := ret[0].(int64)
-	ret1, _ := ret[1].(error)
-	return ret0, ret1
-}
-
-// CountAccountProxies indicates an expected call of CountAccountProxies.
-func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) CountAccountProxies(ctx, accountID interface{}) *gomock.Call {
-	mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
-	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "CountAccountProxies", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).CountAccountProxies), ctx, accountID)
-}
-
-// DeleteAccountCluster mocks base method.
-func (m *MockManager) DeleteAccountCluster(ctx context.Context, clusterAddress, accountID string) error {
-	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
-	ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "DeleteAccountCluster", ctx, clusterAddress, accountID)
-	ret0, _ := ret[0].(error)
-	return ret0
-}
-
-// DeleteAccountCluster indicates an expected call of DeleteAccountCluster.
-func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) DeleteAccountCluster(ctx, clusterAddress, accountID interface{}) *gomock.Call {
-	mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
-	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "DeleteAccountCluster", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).DeleteAccountCluster), ctx, clusterAddress, accountID)
-}
-
 // Disconnect mocks base method.
 func (m *MockManager) Disconnect(ctx context.Context, proxyID, sessionID string) error {
 	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
@@ -178,21 +135,6 @@ func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) Disconnect(ctx, proxyID, sessionID interface{
 	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "Disconnect", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).Disconnect), ctx, proxyID, sessionID)
 }
 
-// GetAccountProxy mocks base method.
-func (m *MockManager) GetAccountProxy(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (*Proxy, error) {
-	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
-	ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "GetAccountProxy", ctx, accountID)
-	ret0, _ := ret[0].(*Proxy)
-	ret1, _ := ret[1].(error)
-	return ret0, ret1
-}
-
-// GetAccountProxy indicates an expected call of GetAccountProxy.
-func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) GetAccountProxy(ctx, accountID interface{}) *gomock.Call {
-	mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
-	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "GetAccountProxy", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).GetAccountProxy), ctx, accountID)
-}
-
 // GetActiveClusterAddresses mocks base method.
 func (m *MockManager) GetActiveClusterAddresses(ctx context.Context) ([]string, error) {
 	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
@@ -208,7 +150,6 @@ func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) GetActiveClusterAddresses(ctx interface{}) *g
 	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "GetActiveClusterAddresses", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).GetActiveClusterAddresses), ctx)
 }
 
-// GetActiveClusterAddressesForAccount mocks base method.
 func (m *MockManager) GetActiveClusterAddressesForAccount(ctx context.Context, accountID string) ([]string, error) {
 	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
 	ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "GetActiveClusterAddressesForAccount", ctx, accountID)
@@ -217,7 +158,6 @@ func (m *MockManager) GetActiveClusterAddressesForAccount(ctx context.Context, a
 	return ret0, ret1
 }
 
-// GetActiveClusterAddressesForAccount indicates an expected call of GetActiveClusterAddressesForAccount.
 func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) GetActiveClusterAddressesForAccount(ctx, accountID interface{}) *gomock.Call {
 	mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
 	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "GetActiveClusterAddressesForAccount", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).GetActiveClusterAddressesForAccount), ctx, accountID)
@@ -237,6 +177,36 @@ func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) Heartbeat(ctx, p interface{}) *gomock.Call {
 	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "Heartbeat", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).Heartbeat), ctx, p)
 }
 
+// GetAccountProxy mocks base method.
+func (m *MockManager) GetAccountProxy(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (*Proxy, error) {
+	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
+	ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "GetAccountProxy", ctx, accountID)
+	ret0, _ := ret[0].(*Proxy)
+	ret1, _ := ret[1].(error)
+	return ret0, ret1
+}
+
+// GetAccountProxy indicates an expected call of GetAccountProxy.
+func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) GetAccountProxy(ctx, accountID interface{}) *gomock.Call {
+	mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
+	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "GetAccountProxy", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).GetAccountProxy), ctx, accountID)
+}
+
+// CountAccountProxies mocks base method.
+func (m *MockManager) CountAccountProxies(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (int64, error) {
+	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
+	ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "CountAccountProxies", ctx, accountID)
+	ret0, _ := ret[0].(int64)
+	ret1, _ := ret[1].(error)
+	return ret0, ret1
+}
+
+// CountAccountProxies indicates an expected call of CountAccountProxies.
+func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) CountAccountProxies(ctx, accountID interface{}) *gomock.Call {
+	mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
+	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "CountAccountProxies", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).CountAccountProxies), ctx, accountID)
+}
+
 // IsClusterAddressAvailable mocks base method.
 func (m *MockManager) IsClusterAddressAvailable(ctx context.Context, clusterAddress, accountID string) (bool, error) {
 	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
@@ -252,6 +222,20 @@ func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) IsClusterAddressAvailable(ctx, clusterAddress
 	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "IsClusterAddressAvailable", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).IsClusterAddressAvailable), ctx, clusterAddress, accountID)
 }
 
+// DeleteAccountCluster mocks base method.
+func (m *MockManager) DeleteAccountCluster(ctx context.Context, clusterAddress, accountID string) error {
+	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
+	ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "DeleteAccountCluster", ctx, clusterAddress, accountID)
+	ret0, _ := ret[0].(error)
+	return ret0
+}
+
+// DeleteAccountCluster indicates an expected call of DeleteAccountCluster.
+func (mr *MockManagerMockRecorder) DeleteAccountCluster(ctx, clusterAddress, accountID interface{}) *gomock.Call {
+	mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
+	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "DeleteAccountCluster", reflect.TypeOf((*MockManager)(nil).DeleteAccountCluster), ctx, clusterAddress, accountID)
+}
+
 // MockController is a mock of Controller interface.
 type MockController struct {
 	ctrl     *gomock.Controller

management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/proxy/proxy.go

@@ -20,9 +20,6 @@ type Capabilities struct {
 	RequireSubdomain *bool
 	// SupportsCrowdsec indicates whether this proxy has CrowdSec configured.
 	SupportsCrowdsec *bool
-	// SupportsAppsec indicates whether this proxy has a CrowdSec AppSec (WAF)
-	// endpoint configured.
-	SupportsAppsec *bool
 	// Private indicates whether this proxy supports inbound access via Wireguard
 	// tunnel and netbird-only authentication policies
 	Private *bool
@@ -77,6 +74,5 @@ type Cluster struct {
 	SupportsCustomPorts *bool
 	RequireSubdomain    *bool
 	SupportsCrowdSec    *bool
-	SupportsAppSec      *bool
 	Private             *bool
 }

management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/service/manager/api.go

@@ -204,7 +204,6 @@ func (h *handler) getClusters(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 			SupportsCustomPorts: c.SupportsCustomPorts,
 			RequireSubdomain:    c.RequireSubdomain,
 			SupportsCrowdsec:    c.SupportsCrowdSec,
-			SupportsAppsec:      c.SupportsAppSec,
 			Private:             c.Private,
 		})
 	}

management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/service/manager/manager.go

@@ -82,7 +82,6 @@ type CapabilityProvider interface {
 	ClusterSupportsCustomPorts(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	ClusterRequireSubdomain(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	ClusterSupportsCrowdSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
-	ClusterSupportsAppSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	ClusterSupportsPrivate(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 }
 
@@ -138,7 +137,6 @@ func (m *Manager) GetClusters(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID string) ([]
 		clusters[i].SupportsCustomPorts = m.capabilities.ClusterSupportsCustomPorts(ctx, clusters[i].Address)
 		clusters[i].RequireSubdomain = m.capabilities.ClusterRequireSubdomain(ctx, clusters[i].Address)
 		clusters[i].SupportsCrowdSec = m.capabilities.ClusterSupportsCrowdSec(ctx, clusters[i].Address)
-		clusters[i].SupportsAppSec = m.capabilities.ClusterSupportsAppSec(ctx, clusters[i].Address)
 		clusters[i].Private = m.capabilities.ClusterSupportsPrivate(ctx, clusters[i].Address)
 	}
 

management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/service/service.go

@@ -165,13 +165,6 @@ type AccessRestrictions struct {
 	AllowedCountries []string `json:"allowed_countries,omitempty" gorm:"serializer:json"`
 	BlockedCountries []string `json:"blocked_countries,omitempty" gorm:"serializer:json"`
 	CrowdSecMode     string   `json:"crowdsec_mode,omitempty" gorm:"serializer:json"`
-	// AllowMatch controls how the allowlists combine: "" or "all" require
-	// matching every allowlist (AND), "any" requires matching at least one (OR).
-	// Empty is treated as "all" for backward compatibility with existing records.
-	AllowMatch string `json:"allow_match,omitempty" gorm:"serializer:json"`
-	// AppSecMode is the CrowdSec AppSec (WAF) request inspection mode: "",
-	// "off", "enforce", or "observe". HTTP services only.
-	AppSecMode string `json:"appsec_mode,omitempty" gorm:"serializer:json"`
 }
 
 // Copy returns a deep copy of the AccessRestrictions.
@@ -182,8 +175,6 @@ func (r AccessRestrictions) Copy() AccessRestrictions {
 		AllowedCountries: slices.Clone(r.AllowedCountries),
 		BlockedCountries: slices.Clone(r.BlockedCountries),
 		CrowdSecMode:     r.CrowdSecMode,
-		AllowMatch:       r.AllowMatch,
-		AppSecMode:       r.AppSecMode,
 	}
 }
 
@@ -817,25 +808,13 @@ func restrictionsFromAPI(r *api.AccessRestrictions) (AccessRestrictions, error)
 		}
 		res.CrowdSecMode = string(*r.CrowdsecMode)
 	}
-	if r.AllowMatch != nil {
-		if !r.AllowMatch.Valid() {
-			return AccessRestrictions{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid allow_match %q", *r.AllowMatch)
-		}
-		res.AllowMatch = string(*r.AllowMatch)
-	}
-	if r.AppsecMode != nil {
-		if !r.AppsecMode.Valid() {
-			return AccessRestrictions{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid appsec_mode %q", *r.AppsecMode)
-		}
-		res.AppSecMode = string(*r.AppsecMode)
-	}
 	return res, nil
 }
 
 func restrictionsToAPI(r AccessRestrictions) *api.AccessRestrictions {
 	if len(r.AllowedCIDRs) == 0 && len(r.BlockedCIDRs) == 0 &&
 		len(r.AllowedCountries) == 0 && len(r.BlockedCountries) == 0 &&
-		r.CrowdSecMode == "" && r.AllowMatch == "" && r.AppSecMode == "" {
+		r.CrowdSecMode == "" {
 		return nil
 	}
 	res := &api.AccessRestrictions{}
@@ -855,21 +834,13 @@ func restrictionsToAPI(r AccessRestrictions) *api.AccessRestrictions {
 		mode := api.AccessRestrictionsCrowdsecMode(r.CrowdSecMode)
 		res.CrowdsecMode = &mode
 	}
-	if r.AllowMatch != "" {
-		match := api.AccessRestrictionsAllowMatch(r.AllowMatch)
-		res.AllowMatch = &match
-	}
-	if r.AppSecMode != "" {
-		mode := api.AccessRestrictionsAppsecMode(r.AppSecMode)
-		res.AppsecMode = &mode
-	}
 	return res
 }
 
 func restrictionsToProto(r AccessRestrictions) *proto.AccessRestrictions {
 	if len(r.AllowedCIDRs) == 0 && len(r.BlockedCIDRs) == 0 &&
 		len(r.AllowedCountries) == 0 && len(r.BlockedCountries) == 0 &&
-		r.CrowdSecMode == "" && r.AllowMatch == "" && r.AppSecMode == "" {
+		r.CrowdSecMode == "" {
 		return nil
 	}
 	return &proto.AccessRestrictions{
@@ -878,8 +849,6 @@ func restrictionsToProto(r AccessRestrictions) *proto.AccessRestrictions {
 		AllowedCountries: r.AllowedCountries,
 		BlockedCountries: r.BlockedCountries,
 		CrowdsecMode:     r.CrowdSecMode,
-		AllowMatch:       r.AllowMatch,
-		AppsecMode:       r.AppSecMode,
 	}
 }
 
@@ -905,11 +874,6 @@ func (s *Service) Validate() error {
 	if err := validateAccessRestrictions(&s.Restrictions); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
-	// AppSec inspects HTTP requests, so it cannot apply to the L4 modes, which
-	// forward opaque byte streams.
-	if appSecEnabled(s.Restrictions.AppSecMode) && s.Mode != ModeHTTP {
-		return fmt.Errorf("appsec_mode is only supported for HTTP services, got mode %q", s.Mode)
-	}
 	if err := s.validatePrivateRequirements(); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
@@ -1278,39 +1242,10 @@ func validateCrowdSecMode(mode string) error {
 	}
 }
 
-func validateAllowMatch(mode string) error {
-	switch mode {
-	case "", "all", "any":
-		return nil
-	default:
-		return fmt.Errorf("allow_match %q is invalid", mode)
-	}
-}
-
-func validateAppSecMode(mode string) error {
-	switch mode {
-	case "", "off", "enforce", "observe":
-		return nil
-	default:
-		return fmt.Errorf("appsec_mode %q is invalid", mode)
-	}
-}
-
-// appSecEnabled reports whether the mode asks for request inspection.
-func appSecEnabled(mode string) bool {
-	return mode == "enforce" || mode == "observe"
-}
-
 func validateAccessRestrictions(r *AccessRestrictions) error {
 	if err := validateCrowdSecMode(r.CrowdSecMode); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
-	if err := validateAllowMatch(r.AllowMatch); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	if err := validateAppSecMode(r.AppSecMode); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
 
 	if len(r.AllowedCIDRs) > maxCIDREntries {
 		return fmt.Errorf("allowed_cidrs: exceeds maximum of %d entries", maxCIDREntries)

management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/service/service_test.go

@@ -26,17 +26,6 @@ func validProxy() *Service {
 	}
 }
 
-// validL4Proxy returns a service that passes validation in one of the L4 modes.
-func validL4Proxy(mode string) *Service {
-	rp := validProxy()
-	rp.Mode = mode
-	rp.ListenPort = 9000
-	rp.Targets = []*Target{
-		{TargetId: "peer-1", TargetType: TargetTypePeer, Host: "10.0.0.1", Port: 5432, Protocol: mode, Enabled: true},
-	}
-	return rp
-}
-
 func TestValidate_Valid(t *testing.T) {
 	require.NoError(t, validProxy().Validate())
 }
@@ -1313,130 +1302,6 @@ func TestValidate_Private_AcceptsClusterTargetWithAccessGroups(t *testing.T) {
 	require.NoError(t, rp.Validate())
 }
 
-func TestRestrictions_AllowMatch_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
-	anyMatch := api.AccessRestrictionsAllowMatchAny
-	apiIn := &api.AccessRestrictions{
-		AllowedCidrs:     &[]string{"203.0.113.0/24"},
-		AllowedCountries: &[]string{"US"},
-		AllowMatch:       &anyMatch,
-	}
-
-	model, err := restrictionsFromAPI(apiIn)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, "any", model.AllowMatch)
-
-	apiOut := restrictionsToAPI(model)
-	require.NotNil(t, apiOut.AllowMatch)
-	assert.Equal(t, api.AccessRestrictionsAllowMatchAny, *apiOut.AllowMatch)
-
-	protoOut := restrictionsToProto(model)
-	require.NotNil(t, protoOut)
-	assert.Equal(t, "any", protoOut.AllowMatch)
-}
-
-func TestRestrictions_AllowMatch_EmptyDefaultsToAll(t *testing.T) {
-	// A stored record with no allow_match (existing services) stays empty and
-	// must not surface a value on the API, preserving AND behavior downstream.
-	model, err := restrictionsFromAPI(&api.AccessRestrictions{
-		AllowedCidrs: &[]string{"203.0.113.0/24"},
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Empty(t, model.AllowMatch, "unset allow_match stays empty")
-
-	apiOut := restrictionsToAPI(model)
-	require.NotNil(t, apiOut)
-	assert.Nil(t, apiOut.AllowMatch, "empty allow_match is omitted from the API response")
-}
-
-func TestRestrictions_AllowMatchOnly_Preserved(t *testing.T) {
-	// allow_match set without any list must not be dropped by the emptiness
-	// guards, so it round-trips through both the API and proto conversions.
-	model := AccessRestrictions{AllowMatch: "any"}
-
-	apiOut := restrictionsToAPI(model)
-	require.NotNil(t, apiOut, "allow-match-only restriction must not be omitted from the API response")
-	require.NotNil(t, apiOut.AllowMatch)
-	assert.Equal(t, api.AccessRestrictionsAllowMatchAny, *apiOut.AllowMatch)
-
-	protoOut := restrictionsToProto(model)
-	require.NotNil(t, protoOut, "allow-match-only restriction must not be omitted from the proto output")
-	assert.Equal(t, "any", protoOut.AllowMatch)
-}
-
-func TestValidate_RejectsInvalidAllowMatch(t *testing.T) {
-	rp := validProxy()
-	rp.Restrictions = AccessRestrictions{
-		AllowedCIDRs: []string{"203.0.113.0/24"},
-		AllowMatch:   "sometimes",
-	}
-	assert.ErrorContains(t, rp.Validate(), "allow_match")
-}
-
-func TestRestrictions_AppSecMode_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
-	mode := api.AccessRestrictionsAppsecModeEnforce
-	apiIn := &api.AccessRestrictions{AppsecMode: &mode}
-
-	model, err := restrictionsFromAPI(apiIn)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, "enforce", model.AppSecMode)
-
-	// appsec_mode alone must keep the restrictions object alive on both the API
-	// and proto legs: it is meaningful without any CIDR or country entry.
-	apiOut := restrictionsToAPI(model)
-	require.NotNil(t, apiOut, "appsec_mode alone must not collapse the restrictions to nil")
-	require.NotNil(t, apiOut.AppsecMode)
-	assert.Equal(t, api.AccessRestrictionsAppsecModeEnforce, *apiOut.AppsecMode)
-
-	protoOut := restrictionsToProto(model)
-	require.NotNil(t, protoOut, "appsec_mode alone must reach the proxy")
-	assert.Equal(t, "enforce", protoOut.AppsecMode)
-}
-
-func TestRestrictions_AppSecMode_EmptyIsOmitted(t *testing.T) {
-	model, err := restrictionsFromAPI(&api.AccessRestrictions{
-		AllowedCidrs: &[]string{"203.0.113.0/24"},
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Empty(t, model.AppSecMode)
-
-	apiOut := restrictionsToAPI(model)
-	require.NotNil(t, apiOut)
-	assert.Nil(t, apiOut.AppsecMode, "empty appsec_mode is omitted from the API response")
-}
-
-func TestRestrictions_AppSecMode_CopyIsDeep(t *testing.T) {
-	original := AccessRestrictions{AppSecMode: "observe", CrowdSecMode: "enforce"}
-	assert.Equal(t, original, original.Copy(), "Copy must carry every mode field")
-}
-
-func TestValidate_RejectsInvalidAppSecMode(t *testing.T) {
-	rp := validProxy()
-	rp.Restrictions = AccessRestrictions{AppSecMode: "sometimes"}
-	assert.ErrorContains(t, rp.Validate(), "appsec_mode")
-}
-
-func TestValidate_RejectsAppSecOnL4Modes(t *testing.T) {
-	// AppSec inspects HTTP requests, so the L4 modes cannot honor it. Accepting
-	// the field there would report protection that never runs.
-	for _, mode := range []string{ModeTCP, ModeUDP, ModeTLS} {
-		t.Run(mode, func(t *testing.T) {
-			rp := validL4Proxy(mode)
-			rp.Restrictions = AccessRestrictions{AppSecMode: "enforce"}
-			assert.ErrorContains(t, rp.Validate(), "appsec_mode is only supported for HTTP services")
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-func TestValidate_AllowsAppSecOffOnL4Modes(t *testing.T) {
-	for _, mode := range []string{ModeTCP, ModeUDP, ModeTLS} {
-		t.Run(mode, func(t *testing.T) {
-			rp := validL4Proxy(mode)
-			rp.Restrictions = AccessRestrictions{AppSecMode: "off"}
-			require.NoError(t, rp.Validate(), "an explicit off must not be rejected on L4 services")
-		})
-	}
-}
-
 func TestValidate_Private_RejectsNonHTTPMode(t *testing.T) {
 	rp := validProxy()
 	rp.Private = true

management/internals/shared/grpc/components_encoder.go

@@ -5,6 +5,9 @@ import (
 	"strconv"
 
 	nbdns "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/dns"
+	resourceTypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/networks/resources/types"
+	routerTypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/networks/routers/types"
+	nbpeer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
 	nbroute "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/networkmap"
@@ -163,7 +166,7 @@ func (e *componentEncoder) indexAllPeers() {
 	}
 }
 
-func (e *componentEncoder) appendPeer(p *types.ComponentPeer) uint32 {
+func (e *componentEncoder) appendPeer(p *nbpeer.Peer) uint32 {
 	if idx, ok := e.peerOrder[p.ID]; ok {
 		return idx
 	}
@@ -177,7 +180,7 @@ func (e *componentEncoder) appendPeer(p *types.ComponentPeer) uint32 {
 // (c.RouterPeers may contain peers not in c.Peers when validation rules drop
 // them) and returns their wire indexes for the RouterPeerIndexes field. Must
 // run before any encoder that resolves peer ids via e.peerOrder.
-func (e *componentEncoder) indexRouterPeers(routers map[string]*types.ComponentPeer) []uint32 {
+func (e *componentEncoder) indexRouterPeers(routers map[string]*nbpeer.Peer) []uint32 {
 	if len(routers) == 0 {
 		return nil
 	}
@@ -511,7 +514,7 @@ func encodeCustomZones(zones []nbdns.CustomZone) []*proto.CustomZone {
 	return out
 }
 
-func (e *componentEncoder) encodeNetworkResources(resources []*types.ComponentResource) []*proto.NetworkResourceRaw {
+func (e *componentEncoder) encodeNetworkResources(resources []*resourceTypes.NetworkResource) []*proto.NetworkResourceRaw {
 	if len(resources) == 0 {
 		return nil
 	}
@@ -540,7 +543,7 @@ func (e *componentEncoder) encodeNetworkResources(resources []*types.ComponentRe
 	return out
 }
 
-func (e *componentEncoder) encodeRoutersMap(routersMap map[string]map[string]*types.ComponentRouter) map[string]*proto.NetworkRouterList {
+func (e *componentEncoder) encodeRoutersMap(routersMap map[string]map[string]*routerTypes.NetworkRouter) map[string]*proto.NetworkRouterList {
 	if len(routersMap) == 0 {
 		return nil
 	}
@@ -689,20 +692,20 @@ func toAccountNetwork(n *types.Network) *proto.AccountNetwork {
 	return out
 }
 
-func toPeerCompact(p *types.ComponentPeer) *proto.PeerCompact {
+func toPeerCompact(p *nbpeer.Peer) *proto.PeerCompact {
 	pc := &proto.PeerCompact{
 		WgPubKey:               decodeWgKey(p.Key),
 		SshPubKey:              []byte(p.SSHKey),
 		DnsLabel:               p.DNSLabel,
-		AgentVersion:           p.AgentVersion,
-		AddedWithSsoLogin:      p.AddedWithSSOLogin,
+		AgentVersion:           p.Meta.WtVersion,
+		AddedWithSsoLogin:      p.UserID != "",
 		LoginExpirationEnabled: p.LoginExpirationEnabled,
 		SshEnabled:             p.SSHEnabled,
-		SupportsIpv6:           p.SupportsIPv6,
-		SupportsSourcePrefixes: p.SupportsSourcePrefixes,
-		ServerSshAllowed:       p.ServerSSHAllowed,
+		SupportsIpv6:           p.SupportsIPv6(),
+		SupportsSourcePrefixes: p.SupportsSourcePrefixes(),
+		ServerSshAllowed:       p.Meta.Flags.ServerSSHAllowed,
 	}
-	if !p.LastLogin.IsZero() {
+	if p.LastLogin != nil {
 		pc.LastLoginUnixNano = p.LastLogin.UnixNano()
 	}
 	switch {

management/internals/shared/grpc/components_encoder_test.go

@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@ import (
 	goproto "google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"
 
 	nbdns "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/dns"
+	resourceTypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/networks/resources/types"
+	routerTypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/networks/routers/types"
+	nbpeer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
 	nbroute "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
@@ -152,28 +155,29 @@ func envelopesEquivalent(a, b *proto.NetworkMapEnvelope) bool {
 }
 
 func newTestComponents() *types.NetworkMapComponents {
-	peerA := &types.ComponentPeer{
-		ID:           "peer-a",
-		Key:          testWgKeyA,
-		IP:           netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{100, 64, 0, 1}),
-		DNSLabel:     "peera",
-		SSHKey:       "ssh-a",
-		AgentVersion: "0.40.0",
+	peerA := &nbpeer.Peer{
+		ID:       "peer-a",
+		Key:      testWgKeyA,
+		IP:       netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{100, 64, 0, 1}),
+		DNSLabel: "peera",
+		SSHKey:   "ssh-a",
+		Status:   &nbpeer.PeerStatus{Connected: true, LastSeen: time.Now()},
+		Meta:     nbpeer.PeerSystemMeta{WtVersion: "0.40.0"},
 	}
-	peerB := &types.ComponentPeer{
-		ID:           "peer-b",
-		Key:          testWgKeyB,
-		IP:           netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{100, 64, 0, 2}),
-		IPv6:         netip.AddrFrom16([16]byte{0xfd, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2}),
-		DNSLabel:     "peerb",
-		AgentVersion: "0.25.0",
+	peerB := &nbpeer.Peer{
+		ID:       "peer-b",
+		Key:      testWgKeyB,
+		IP:       netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{100, 64, 0, 2}),
+		IPv6:     netip.AddrFrom16([16]byte{0xfd, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2}),
+		DNSLabel: "peerb",
+		Meta:     nbpeer.PeerSystemMeta{WtVersion: "0.25.0"},
 	}
-	peerC := &types.ComponentPeer{
-		ID:           "peer-c",
-		Key:          testWgKeyC,
-		IP:           netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{100, 64, 0, 3}),
-		DNSLabel:     "peerc",
-		AgentVersion: "0.40.0",
+	peerC := &nbpeer.Peer{
+		ID:       "peer-c",
+		Key:      testWgKeyC,
+		IP:       netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{100, 64, 0, 3}),
+		DNSLabel: "peerc",
+		Meta:     nbpeer.PeerSystemMeta{WtVersion: "0.40.0"},
 	}
 
 	return &types.NetworkMapComponents{
@@ -187,12 +191,12 @@ func newTestComponents() *types.NetworkMapComponents {
 			PeerLoginExpirationEnabled: true,
 			PeerLoginExpiration:        2 * time.Hour,
 		},
-		Peers: map[string]*types.ComponentPeer{
+		Peers: map[string]*nbpeer.Peer{
 			"peer-a": peerA,
 			"peer-b": peerB,
 			"peer-c": peerC,
 		},
-		Groups: map[string]*types.ComponentGroup{
+		Groups: map[string]*types.Group{
 			"group-src": {ID: "group-src", PublicID: "1", Name: "Src", Peers: []string{"peer-a"}},
 			"group-dst": {ID: "group-dst", PublicID: "2", Name: "Dst", Peers: []string{"peer-b", "peer-c"}},
 		},
@@ -211,7 +215,7 @@ func newTestComponents() *types.NetworkMapComponents {
 				}},
 			},
 		},
-		RouterPeers: map[string]*types.ComponentPeer{"peer-c": peerC},
+		RouterPeers: map[string]*nbpeer.Peer{"peer-c": peerC},
 	}
 }
 
@@ -377,12 +381,12 @@ func TestEncodeNetworkMapEnvelope_MalformedWgKey(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestEncodeNetworkMapEnvelope_IPv6OnlyPeer(t *testing.T) {
 	c := newTestComponents()
-	v6Only := &types.ComponentPeer{
-		ID:           "peer-v6",
-		Key:          testWgKeyA,
-		IPv6:         netip.AddrFrom16([16]byte{0xfd, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 9}),
-		DNSLabel:     "peerv6",
-		AgentVersion: "0.40.0",
+	v6Only := &nbpeer.Peer{
+		ID:       "peer-v6",
+		Key:      testWgKeyA,
+		IPv6:     netip.AddrFrom16([16]byte{0xfd, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 9}),
+		DNSLabel: "peerv6",
+		Meta:     nbpeer.PeerSystemMeta{WtVersion: "0.40.0"},
 	}
 	c.Peers["peer-v6"] = v6Only
 
@@ -401,11 +405,11 @@ func TestEncodeNetworkMapEnvelope_IPv6OnlyPeer(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestEncodeNetworkMapEnvelope_PeerWithoutIP(t *testing.T) {
 	c := newTestComponents()
-	c.Peers["peer-noip"] = &types.ComponentPeer{
-		ID:           "peer-noip",
-		Key:          testWgKeyA,
-		DNSLabel:     "peernoip",
-		AgentVersion: "0.40.0",
+	c.Peers["peer-noip"] = &nbpeer.Peer{
+		ID:       "peer-noip",
+		Key:      testWgKeyA,
+		DNSLabel: "peernoip",
+		Meta:     nbpeer.PeerSystemMeta{WtVersion: "0.40.0"},
 	}
 
 	full := EncodeNetworkMapEnvelope(ComponentsEnvelopeInput{Components: c}).GetFull()
@@ -440,9 +444,9 @@ func TestEncodeNetworkMapEnvelope_EmptyInput(t *testing.T) {
 func TestEncodeNetworkMapEnvelope_PeerLoginExpirationFields(t *testing.T) {
 	c := newTestComponents()
 	now := time.Date(2024, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 0, time.UTC)
-	c.Peers["peer-a"].AddedWithSSOLogin = true
+	c.Peers["peer-a"].UserID = "user-1"
 	c.Peers["peer-a"].LoginExpirationEnabled = true
-	c.Peers["peer-a"].LastLogin = now
+	c.Peers["peer-a"].LastLogin = &now
 
 	full := EncodeNetworkMapEnvelope(ComponentsEnvelopeInput{Components: c}).GetFull()
 
@@ -553,7 +557,7 @@ func TestEncodeNetworkMapEnvelope_ResourceOnlyPolicyShippedAndIndexed(t *testing
 	}
 	// Resource must appear in components.NetworkResources with a seq id —
 	// encoder uses that to translate the xid map key to uint32.
-	c.NetworkResources = []*types.ComponentResource{
+	c.NetworkResources = []*resourceTypes.NetworkResource{
 		{ID: "resource-x", PublicID: "77", Name: "res-x", Enabled: true},
 	}
 
@@ -621,11 +625,11 @@ func TestEncodeNetworkMapEnvelope_PostureFailedPeers(t *testing.T) {
 func TestEncodeNetworkMapEnvelope_RoutersMap(t *testing.T) {
 	c := newTestComponents()
 	c.NetworkXIDToPublicID = map[string]string{"net-1": "5"}
-	c.RoutersMap = map[string]map[string]*types.ComponentRouter{
+	c.RoutersMap = map[string]map[string]*routerTypes.NetworkRouter{
 		"net-1": {
 			"peer-c": {
-				PublicID: "200",
-				Peer:     "peer-c", Masquerade: true, Metric: 10, Enabled: true,
+				ID: "router-1", PublicID: "200",
+				Peer: "peer-c", Masquerade: true, Metric: 10, Enabled: true,
 			},
 		},
 	}
@@ -651,14 +655,14 @@ func TestEncodeNetworkMapEnvelope_RouterPeerNotInComponentsPeers(t *testing.T) {
 	// peer_index reference must still resolve.
 	c := newTestComponents()
 	delete(c.Peers, "peer-c")
-	routerPeer := &types.ComponentPeer{
+	routerPeer := &nbpeer.Peer{
 		ID: "peer-c", Key: testWgKeyC, IP: netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{100, 64, 0, 3}),
-		DNSLabel: "peerc", AgentVersion: "0.40.0",
+		DNSLabel: "peerc", Meta: nbpeer.PeerSystemMeta{WtVersion: "0.40.0"},
 	}
-	c.RouterPeers = map[string]*types.ComponentPeer{"peer-c": routerPeer}
+	c.RouterPeers = map[string]*nbpeer.Peer{"peer-c": routerPeer}
 	c.NetworkXIDToPublicID = map[string]string{"net-1": "5"}
-	c.RoutersMap = map[string]map[string]*types.ComponentRouter{
-		"net-1": {"peer-c": {PublicID: "1", Peer: "peer-c", Enabled: true}},
+	c.RoutersMap = map[string]map[string]*routerTypes.NetworkRouter{
+		"net-1": {"peer-c": {ID: "r-1", PublicID: "1", Peer: "peer-c", Enabled: true}},
 	}
 
 	full := EncodeNetworkMapEnvelope(ComponentsEnvelopeInput{Components: c}).GetFull()
@@ -691,9 +695,9 @@ func TestToProxyPatch_EmptyInputReturnsNil(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestToProxyPatch_PopulatesAllFields(t *testing.T) {
 	nm := &types.NetworkMap{
-		Peers: []*types.ComponentPeer{{
+		Peers: []*nbpeer.Peer{{
 			ID: "ext-peer", Key: testWgKeyA, IP: netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{100, 64, 0, 9}),
-			DNSLabel: "extpeer", AgentVersion: "0.40.0",
+			DNSLabel: "extpeer", Meta: nbpeer.PeerSystemMeta{WtVersion: "0.40.0"},
 		}},
 		FirewallRules: []*types.FirewallRule{{
 			PeerIP: "100.64.0.9", Action: "accept", Direction: 0, Protocol: "tcp",
@@ -776,6 +780,6 @@ func TestEncodeNetworkMapEnvelope_AccountSettingsAlwaysEmitted(t *testing.T) {
 func emptyNetworkMapComponents() *types.NetworkMapComponents {
 	return types.EmptyNetworkMapComponents(
 		&types.NetworkMapComponents{
-			PeerID: "peer-id", Peers: map[string]*types.ComponentPeer{"peer-id": {}}},
+			PeerID: "peer-id", Peers: map[string]*nbpeer.Peer{"peer-id": {}}},
 	)
 }

management/internals/shared/grpc/components_envelope_response_test.go

@@ -19,10 +19,10 @@ func TestComputeSSHEnabledForPeer(t *testing.T) {
 
 	mkComponents := func(rule *types.PolicyRule, sshEnabled bool) (*types.NetworkMapComponents, *nbpeer.Peer) {
 		peer := &nbpeer.Peer{ID: targetPeerID, SSHEnabled: sshEnabled}
-		group := &types.ComponentGroup{ID: targetGroupID, Name: "dst", Peers: []string{targetPeerID}}
+		group := &types.Group{ID: targetGroupID, Name: "dst", Peers: []string{targetPeerID}}
 		return &types.NetworkMapComponents{
-			Peers:  map[string]*types.ComponentPeer{targetPeerID: peer.ToComponent()},
-			Groups: map[string]*types.ComponentGroup{targetGroupID: group},
+			Peers:  map[string]*nbpeer.Peer{targetPeerID: peer},
+			Groups: map[string]*types.Group{targetGroupID: group},
 			Policies: []*types.Policy{{
 				ID:      "p",
 				Enabled: true,
@@ -158,8 +158,8 @@ func TestComputeSSHEnabledForPeer(t *testing.T) {
 func TestComputeSSHEnabledForPeer_TargetMissingFromComponents(t *testing.T) {
 	peer := &nbpeer.Peer{ID: "missing", SSHEnabled: true}
 	c := &types.NetworkMapComponents{
-		Peers: map[string]*types.ComponentPeer{}, // target peer NOT present
-		Groups: map[string]*types.ComponentGroup{
+		Peers: map[string]*nbpeer.Peer{}, // target peer NOT present
+		Groups: map[string]*types.Group{
 			"g": {ID: "g", Peers: []string{"missing"}},
 		},
 		Policies: []*types.Policy{{

management/internals/shared/grpc/proxy.go

@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
 
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/peers"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/accesslogs"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/proxy"
@@ -37,6 +36,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/sessionkey"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/idp"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/users"
 	proxyauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/auth"
@@ -505,7 +505,6 @@ func (s *ProxyServiceServer) registerProxyConnection(ctx context.Context, params
 			SupportsCustomPorts: c.SupportsCustomPorts,
 			RequireSubdomain:    c.RequireSubdomain,
 			SupportsCrowdsec:    c.SupportsCrowdsec,
-			SupportsAppsec:      c.SupportsAppsec,
 			Private:             c.Private,
 		}
 	}

management/server/groups/manager.go

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/account"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/activity"
-	resourceTypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/networks/resources/types"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/permissions"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/permissions/modules"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/permissions/operations"
@@ -31,10 +30,6 @@ type managerImpl struct {
 	accountManager     account.Manager
 }
 
-func eventMetaResource(group *types.Group, resource *resourceTypes.NetworkResource) map[string]any {
-	return map[string]any{"name": group.Name, "id": group.ID, "resource_name": resource.Name, "resource_id": resource.ID, "resource_type": resource.Type}
-}
-
 type mockManager struct {
 }
 
@@ -114,7 +109,7 @@ func (m *managerImpl) AddResourceToGroupInTransaction(ctx context.Context, trans
 	}
 
 	event := func() {
-		m.accountManager.StoreEvent(ctx, userID, groupID, accountID, activity.ResourceAddedToGroup, eventMetaResource(group, networkResource))
+		m.accountManager.StoreEvent(ctx, userID, groupID, accountID, activity.ResourceAddedToGroup, group.EventMetaResource(networkResource))
 	}
 
 	return event, nil
@@ -138,7 +133,7 @@ func (m *managerImpl) RemoveResourceFromGroupInTransaction(ctx context.Context,
 	}
 
 	event := func() {
-		m.accountManager.StoreEvent(ctx, userID, groupID, accountID, activity.ResourceRemovedFromGroup, eventMetaResource(group, networkResource))
+		m.accountManager.StoreEvent(ctx, userID, groupID, accountID, activity.ResourceRemovedFromGroup, group.EventMetaResource(networkResource))
 	}
 
 	return event, nil

management/server/http/handlers/peers/peers_handler.go

@@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ func (h *Handler) GetAccessiblePeers(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 
 	netMap := account.GetPeerNetworkMapFromComponents(ctx, peerID, dns.CustomZone{}, nil, validPeers, account.GetResourcePoliciesMap(), account.GetResourceRoutersMap(), nil, account.GetActiveGroupUsers())
 
-	util.WriteJSONObject(ctx, w, toAccessiblePeers(netMap, account.Peers, dnsDomain))
+	util.WriteJSONObject(ctx, w, toAccessiblePeers(netMap, dnsDomain))
 }
 
 func (h *Handler) CreateTemporaryAccess(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
@@ -534,20 +534,15 @@ func (h *Handler) CreateTemporaryAccess(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request)
 	util.WriteJSONObject(r.Context(), w, resp)
 }
 
-// toAccessiblePeers rehydrates the calculated map's component peers into the
-// account's full peer objects, which carry the location/status/meta fields
-// the API response needs.
-func toAccessiblePeers(netMap *types.NetworkMap, accountPeers map[string]*nbpeer.Peer, dnsDomain string) []api.AccessiblePeer {
+func toAccessiblePeers(netMap *types.NetworkMap, dnsDomain string) []api.AccessiblePeer {
 	accessiblePeers := make([]api.AccessiblePeer, 0, len(netMap.Peers)+len(netMap.OfflinePeers))
-	add := func(peers []*types.ComponentPeer) {
-		for _, p := range peers {
-			if peer := accountPeers[p.ID]; peer != nil {
-				accessiblePeers = append(accessiblePeers, peerToAccessiblePeer(peer, dnsDomain))
-			}
-		}
+	for _, p := range netMap.Peers {
+		accessiblePeers = append(accessiblePeers, peerToAccessiblePeer(p, dnsDomain))
+	}
+
+	for _, p := range netMap.OfflinePeers {
+		accessiblePeers = append(accessiblePeers, peerToAccessiblePeer(p, dnsDomain))
 	}
-	add(netMap.Peers)
-	add(netMap.OfflinePeers)
 
 	return accessiblePeers
 }

management/server/networks/resources/types/resource.go

@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ import (
 	nbDomain "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/api"
-	sharedTypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/types"
 )
 
 type NetworkResourceType string
@@ -65,27 +64,6 @@ func NewNetworkResource(accountID, networkID, name, description, address string,
 	}, nil
 }
 
-// ToComponent converts the resource to its self-contained components
-// representation. Returns nil for a nil resource.
-func (n *NetworkResource) ToComponent() *sharedTypes.ComponentResource {
-	if n == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-	return &sharedTypes.ComponentResource{
-		ID:          n.ID,
-		PublicID:    n.PublicID,
-		NetworkID:   n.NetworkID,
-		AccountID:   n.AccountID,
-		Name:        n.Name,
-		Description: n.Description,
-		Type:        sharedTypes.ComponentResourceType(n.Type),
-		Address:     n.Address,
-		Domain:      n.Domain,
-		Prefix:      n.Prefix,
-		Enabled:     n.Enabled,
-	}
-}
-
 func (n *NetworkResource) ToAPIResponse(groups []api.GroupMinimum) *api.NetworkResource {
 	addr := n.Prefix.String()
 	if n.Type == Domain {

management/server/networks/routers/types/router.go

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/networks/types"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/api"
-	sharedTypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/types"
 )
 
 type NetworkRouter struct {
@@ -22,36 +21,6 @@ type NetworkRouter struct {
 	Enabled    bool
 }
 
-// ToComponent converts the router to its self-contained components
-// representation. Returns nil for a nil router.
-func (n *NetworkRouter) ToComponent() *sharedTypes.ComponentRouter {
-	if n == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-	return &sharedTypes.ComponentRouter{
-		NetworkID:  n.NetworkID,
-		PublicID:   n.PublicID,
-		Peer:       n.Peer,
-		PeerGroups: n.PeerGroups,
-		Masquerade: n.Masquerade,
-		Metric:     n.Metric,
-		Enabled:    n.Enabled,
-	}
-}
-
-// ToComponentMap converts a peer-keyed router map to its components
-// representation.
-func ToComponentMap(routers map[string]*NetworkRouter) map[string]*sharedTypes.ComponentRouter {
-	if routers == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-	out := make(map[string]*sharedTypes.ComponentRouter, len(routers))
-	for id, r := range routers {
-		out[id] = r.ToComponent()
-	}
-	return out
-}
-
 func NewNetworkRouter(accountID string, networkID string, peer string, peerGroups []string, masquerade bool, metric int, enabled bool) (*NetworkRouter, error) {
 	r := &NetworkRouter{
 		ID:         xid.New().String(),

management/server/peer.go

@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ func (am *DefaultAccountManager) CreatePeerJob(ctx context.Context, accountID, p
 		return status.NewPeerNotPartOfAccountError()
 	}
 
-	meetMinVer, err := version.MeetsMinVersion(remoteJobsMinVer, p.Meta.WtVersion)
+	meetMinVer, err := posture.MeetsMinVersion(remoteJobsMinVer, p.Meta.WtVersion)
 	if !version.IsDevelopmentVersion(p.Meta.WtVersion) && (!meetMinVer || err != nil) {
 		return status.Errorf(status.PreconditionFailed, "peer version %s does not meet the minimum required version %s for remote jobs", p.Meta.WtVersion, remoteJobsMinVer)
 	}
@@ -1588,7 +1588,7 @@ func affectedPeerIDsFromNetworkMap(nmap *types.NetworkMap, selfPeerID string) []
 	}
 	seen := make(map[string]struct{}, len(nmap.Peers)+len(nmap.OfflinePeers))
 	ids := make([]string, 0, len(nmap.Peers)+len(nmap.OfflinePeers))
-	add := func(peers []*types.ComponentPeer) {
+	add := func(peers []*nbpeer.Peer) {
 		for _, p := range peers {
 			if p == nil || p.ID == "" || p.ID == selfPeerID {
 				continue

management/server/peer/peer.go

@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/util"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/api"
-	sharedTypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/types"
 )
 
 // Peer capability constants mirror the proto enum values.
@@ -206,35 +205,6 @@ func (p *Peer) AddedWithSSOLogin() bool {
 	return p.UserID != ""
 }
 
-// ToComponent converts the peer to its self-contained components
-// representation, carrying exactly the subset of peer data that crosses the
-// components wire format. Returns nil for a nil peer so callers can convert
-// possibly-missing peers without guarding.
-func (p *Peer) ToComponent() *sharedTypes.ComponentPeer {
-	if p == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-	cp := &sharedTypes.ComponentPeer{
-		ID:                     p.ID,
-		Key:                    p.Key,
-		IP:                     p.IP,
-		IPv6:                   p.IPv6,
-		DNSLabel:               p.DNSLabel,
-		SSHKey:                 p.SSHKey,
-		SSHEnabled:             p.SSHEnabled,
-		ServerSSHAllowed:       p.Meta.Flags.ServerSSHAllowed,
-		AgentVersion:           p.Meta.WtVersion,
-		SupportsSourcePrefixes: p.SupportsSourcePrefixes(),
-		SupportsIPv6:           p.SupportsIPv6(),
-		LoginExpirationEnabled: p.LoginExpirationEnabled,
-		AddedWithSSOLogin:      p.AddedWithSSOLogin(),
-	}
-	if p.LastLogin != nil {
-		cp.LastLogin = *p.LastLogin
-	}
-	return cp
-}
-
 // HasCapability reports whether the peer has the given capability.
 func (p *Peer) HasCapability(capability int32) bool {
 	return slices.Contains(p.Meta.Capabilities, capability)

management/server/peer_test.go

@@ -1092,14 +1092,14 @@ func TestToSyncResponse(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	networkMap := &types.NetworkMap{
 		Network: &types.Network{Net: *ipnet, Serial: 1000},
-		Peers: []*types.ComponentPeer{{
+		Peers: []*nbpeer.Peer{{
 			IP:         netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.2"),
 			IPv6:       netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::2"),
 			Key:        "peer2-key",
 			DNSLabel:   "peer2",
 			SSHEnabled: true,
 			SSHKey:     "peer2-ssh-key"}},
-		OfflinePeers: []*types.ComponentPeer{{
+		OfflinePeers: []*nbpeer.Peer{{
 			IP:         netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.3"),
 			IPv6:       netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::3"),
 			Key:        "peer3-key",

management/server/posture/nb_version.go

@@ -3,9 +3,11 @@ package posture
 import (
 	"context"
 	"fmt"
+	"strings"
+
+	"github.com/hashicorp/go-version"
 
 	nbpeer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
-	nbversion "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/version"
 )
 
 type NBVersionCheck struct {
@@ -14,8 +16,14 @@ type NBVersionCheck struct {
 
 var _ Check = (*NBVersionCheck)(nil)
 
+// sanitizeVersion removes anything after the pre-release tag (e.g., "-dev", "-alpha", etc.)
+func sanitizeVersion(version string) string {
+	parts := strings.Split(version, "-")
+	return parts[0]
+}
+
 func (n *NBVersionCheck) Check(ctx context.Context, peer nbpeer.Peer) (bool, error) {
-	meetsMin, err := nbversion.MeetsMinVersion(n.MinVersion, peer.Meta.WtVersion)
+	meetsMin, err := MeetsMinVersion(n.MinVersion, peer.Meta.WtVersion)
 	if err != nil {
 		return false, err
 	}
@@ -40,3 +48,21 @@ func (n *NBVersionCheck) Validate() error {
 	}
 	return nil
 }
+
+// MeetsMinVersion checks if the peer's version meets or exceeds the minimum required version
+func MeetsMinVersion(minVer, peerVer string) (bool, error) {
+	peerVer = sanitizeVersion(peerVer)
+	minVer = sanitizeVersion(minVer)
+
+	peerNBVer, err := version.NewVersion(peerVer)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, err
+	}
+
+	constraints, err := version.NewConstraint(">= " + minVer)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, err
+	}
+
+	return constraints.Check(peerNBVer), nil
+}

management/server/posture/nb_version_test.go

@@ -139,3 +139,68 @@ func TestNBVersionCheck_Validate(t *testing.T) {
 		})
 	}
 }
+
+func TestMeetsMinVersion(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name    string
+		minVer  string
+		peerVer string
+		want    bool
+		wantErr bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name:    "Peer version greater than min version",
+			minVer:  "0.26.0",
+			peerVer: "0.60.1",
+			want:    true,
+			wantErr: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "Peer version equals min version",
+			minVer:  "1.0.0",
+			peerVer: "1.0.0",
+			want:    true,
+			wantErr: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "Peer version less than min version",
+			minVer:  "1.0.0",
+			peerVer: "0.9.9",
+			want:    false,
+			wantErr: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "Peer version with pre-release tag greater than min version",
+			minVer:  "1.0.0",
+			peerVer: "1.0.1-alpha",
+			want:    true,
+			wantErr: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "Invalid peer version format",
+			minVer:  "1.0.0",
+			peerVer: "dev",
+			want:    false,
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:    "Invalid min version format",
+			minVer:  "invalid.version",
+			peerVer: "1.0.0",
+			want:    false,
+			wantErr: true,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			got, err := MeetsMinVersion(tt.minVer, tt.peerVer)
+			if tt.wantErr {
+				assert.Error(t, err)
+			} else {
+				assert.NoError(t, err)
+			}
+			assert.Equal(t, tt.want, got)
+		})
+	}
+}

management/server/store/sql_store.go

@@ -2259,7 +2259,7 @@ func (s *SqlStore) getPostureChecks(ctx context.Context, accountID string) ([]*p
 }
 
 func (s *SqlStore) getServices(ctx context.Context, accountID string) ([]*rpservice.Service, error) {
-	const serviceQuery = `SELECT id, account_id, name, domain, enabled, auth, restrictions,
+	const serviceQuery = `SELECT id, account_id, name, domain, enabled, auth,
 		meta_created_at, meta_certificate_issued_at, meta_status, proxy_cluster,
 		pass_host_header, rewrite_redirects, session_private_key, session_public_key,
 		mode, listen_port, port_auto_assigned, source, source_peer, terminated,
@@ -2278,7 +2278,6 @@ func (s *SqlStore) getServices(ctx context.Context, accountID string) ([]*rpserv
 	services, err := pgx.CollectRows(serviceRows, func(row pgx.CollectableRow) (*rpservice.Service, error) {
 		var s rpservice.Service
 		var auth []byte
-		var restrictions []byte
 		var accessGroups []byte
 		var createdAt, certIssuedAt sql.NullTime
 		var status, proxyCluster, sessionPrivateKey, sessionPublicKey sql.NullString
@@ -2292,7 +2291,6 @@ func (s *SqlStore) getServices(ctx context.Context, accountID string) ([]*rpserv
 			&s.Domain,
 			&s.Enabled,
 			&auth,
-			&restrictions,
 			&createdAt,
 			&certIssuedAt,
 			&status,
@@ -2320,12 +2318,6 @@ func (s *SqlStore) getServices(ctx context.Context, accountID string) ([]*rpserv
 			}
 		}
 
-		if len(restrictions) > 0 {
-			if err := json.Unmarshal(restrictions, &s.Restrictions); err != nil {
-				return nil, fmt.Errorf("unmarshal restrictions: %w", err)
-			}
-		}
-
 		if len(accessGroups) > 0 {
 			if err := json.Unmarshal(accessGroups, &s.AccessGroups); err != nil {
 				return nil, fmt.Errorf("unmarshal access_groups: %w", err)
@@ -6365,7 +6357,6 @@ var validCapabilityColumns = map[string]struct{}{
 	"supports_custom_ports": {},
 	"require_subdomain":     {},
 	"supports_crowdsec":     {},
-	"supports_appsec":       {},
 	"private":               {},
 }
 
@@ -6396,14 +6387,6 @@ func (s *SqlStore) GetClusterSupportsCrowdSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr s
 	return s.getClusterUnanimousCapability(ctx, clusterAddr, "supports_crowdsec")
 }
 
-// GetClusterSupportsAppSec returns whether all active proxies in the cluster
-// have a CrowdSec AppSec endpoint configured. Returns nil when no proxy
-// reported the capability. Unanimous for the same reason as CrowdSec: a single
-// proxy without AppSec would let requests through uninspected.
-func (s *SqlStore) GetClusterSupportsAppSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool {
-	return s.getClusterUnanimousCapability(ctx, clusterAddr, "supports_appsec")
-}
-
 // getClusterUnanimousCapability returns an aggregated boolean capability
 // requiring all active proxies in the cluster to report true.
 func (s *SqlStore) getClusterUnanimousCapability(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr, column string) *bool {

management/server/store/sql_store_service_test.go

@@ -44,46 +44,3 @@ func TestSqlStore_GetAccount_PrivateServiceRoundtrip(t *testing.T) {
 		assert.Equal(t, []string{"grp-admins", "grp-ops"}, got.AccessGroups)
 	})
 }
-
-func TestSqlStore_GetAccount_ServiceRestrictionsRoundtrip(t *testing.T) {
-	if os.Getenv("CI") == "true" && (runtime.GOOS == "darwin" || runtime.GOOS == "windows") {
-		t.Skip("skip CI tests on darwin and windows")
-	}
-
-	runTestForAllEngines(t, "", func(t *testing.T, store Store) {
-		ctx := context.Background()
-		account := newAccountWithId(ctx, "account_svc_restrictions", "testuser", "")
-		require.NoError(t, store.SaveAccount(ctx, account))
-
-		svc := &rpservice.Service{
-			ID:        "svc-restrictions",
-			AccountID: account.Id,
-			Name:      "restricted-svc",
-			Domain:    "restricted.example",
-			Enabled:   true,
-			Mode:      rpservice.ModeHTTP,
-			Restrictions: rpservice.AccessRestrictions{
-				AllowedCIDRs:     []string{"203.0.113.0/24"},
-				AllowedCountries: []string{"US"},
-				AllowMatch:       "any",
-				CrowdSecMode:     "observe",
-				AppSecMode:       "enforce",
-			},
-		}
-		require.NoError(t, store.CreateService(ctx, svc))
-
-		loaded, err := store.GetAccount(ctx, account.Id)
-		require.NoError(t, err)
-		require.Len(t, loaded.Services, 1)
-
-		// Restrictions are stored as a JSON blob; confirm the whole struct,
-		// including allow_match and the crowdsec/appsec modes, survives the
-		// read path (Postgres pgx path included via runTestForAllEngines).
-		got := loaded.Services[0].Restrictions
-		assert.Equal(t, []string{"203.0.113.0/24"}, got.AllowedCIDRs)
-		assert.Equal(t, []string{"US"}, got.AllowedCountries)
-		assert.Equal(t, "any", got.AllowMatch)
-		assert.Equal(t, "observe", got.CrowdSecMode)
-		assert.Equal(t, "enforce", got.AppSecMode)
-	})
-}

management/server/store/store.go

@@ -321,7 +321,6 @@ type Store interface {
 	GetClusterSupportsCustomPorts(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	GetClusterRequireSubdomain(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	GetClusterSupportsCrowdSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
-	GetClusterSupportsAppSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	GetClusterSupportsPrivate(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
 	CleanupStaleProxies(ctx context.Context, inactivityDuration time.Duration) error
 	GetAllProxies(ctx context.Context) ([]*proxy.Proxy, error)

management/server/store/store_mock.go

@@ -1835,20 +1835,6 @@ func (mr *MockStoreMockRecorder) GetClusterRequireSubdomain(ctx, clusterAddr int
 	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "GetClusterRequireSubdomain", reflect.TypeOf((*MockStore)(nil).GetClusterRequireSubdomain), ctx, clusterAddr)
 }
 
-// GetClusterSupportsAppSec mocks base method.
-func (m *MockStore) GetClusterSupportsAppSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool {
-	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
-	ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "GetClusterSupportsAppSec", ctx, clusterAddr)
-	ret0, _ := ret[0].(*bool)
-	return ret0
-}
-
-// GetClusterSupportsAppSec indicates an expected call of GetClusterSupportsAppSec.
-func (mr *MockStoreMockRecorder) GetClusterSupportsAppSec(ctx, clusterAddr interface{}) *gomock.Call {
-	mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
-	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "GetClusterSupportsAppSec", reflect.TypeOf((*MockStore)(nil).GetClusterSupportsAppSec), ctx, clusterAddr)
-}
-
 // GetClusterSupportsCrowdSec mocks base method.
 func (m *MockStore) GetClusterSupportsCrowdSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool {
 	m.ctrl.T.Helper()

management/server/types/account.go

@@ -283,8 +283,8 @@ func (a *Account) SynthesizePrivateServiceZones(peerID string) []nbdns.CustomZon
 			// it, adding a single private service would black-hole every
 			// other name under the zone apex.
 			zone = &nbdns.CustomZone{
-				Domain:               dns.Fqdn(serviceDomainZone),
-				Records:              []nbdns.SimpleRecord{},
+				Domain:           dns.Fqdn(serviceDomainZone),
+				Records:          []nbdns.SimpleRecord{},
 				NonAuthoritative:     true,
 				SearchDomainDisabled: true,
 			}
@@ -1082,7 +1082,6 @@ func (a *Account) connResourcesGenerator(ctx context.Context, targetPeer *nbpeer
 	peersExists := make(map[string]struct{})
 	rules := make([]*FirewallRule, 0)
 	peers := make([]*nbpeer.Peer, 0)
-	targetComponent := targetPeer.ToComponent()
 
 	return func(rule *PolicyRule, groupPeers []*nbpeer.Peer, direction int) {
 			for _, peer := range groupPeers {
@@ -1118,10 +1117,10 @@ func (a *Account) connResourcesGenerator(ctx context.Context, targetPeer *nbpeer
 				if len(rule.Ports) == 0 && len(rule.PortRanges) == 0 {
 					rules = append(rules, &fr)
 				} else {
-					rules = append(rules, ExpandPortsAndRanges(fr, rule, targetComponent)...)
+					rules = append(rules, ExpandPortsAndRanges(fr, rule, targetPeer)...)
 				}
 
-				rules = AppendIPv6FirewallRule(rules, rulesExists, peer.ToComponent(), targetComponent, rule, FirewallRuleContext{
+				rules = AppendIPv6FirewallRule(rules, rulesExists, peer, targetPeer, rule, FirewallRuleContext{
 					Direction:   direction,
 					DirStr:      strconv.Itoa(direction),
 					ProtocolStr: string(protocol),
@@ -1281,7 +1280,7 @@ func (a *Account) getRouteFirewallRules(ctx context.Context, peerID string, poli
 	return fwRules
 }
 
-func (a *Account) getRulePeers(rule *PolicyRule, postureChecks []string, peerID string, distributionPeers map[string]struct{}, validatedPeersMap map[string]struct{}) []*ComponentPeer {
+func (a *Account) getRulePeers(rule *PolicyRule, postureChecks []string, peerID string, distributionPeers map[string]struct{}, validatedPeersMap map[string]struct{}) []*nbpeer.Peer {
 	distPeersWithPolicy := make(map[string]struct{})
 	for _, id := range rule.Sources {
 		group := a.Groups[id]
@@ -1308,13 +1307,13 @@ func (a *Account) getRulePeers(rule *PolicyRule, postureChecks []string, peerID
 		}
 	}
 
-	distributionGroupPeers := make([]*ComponentPeer, 0, len(distPeersWithPolicy))
+	distributionGroupPeers := make([]*nbpeer.Peer, 0, len(distPeersWithPolicy))
 	for pID := range distPeersWithPolicy {
 		peer := a.Peers[pID]
 		if peer == nil {
 			continue
 		}
-		distributionGroupPeers = append(distributionGroupPeers, peer.ToComponent())
+		distributionGroupPeers = append(distributionGroupPeers, peer)
 	}
 	return distributionGroupPeers
 }

management/server/types/account_components.go

@@ -9,7 +9,9 @@ import (
 
 	nbdns "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/dns"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/zones"
+	resourceTypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/networks/resources/types"
 	routerTypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/networks/routers/types"
+	nbpeer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/telemetry"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
 )
@@ -111,7 +113,7 @@ func (a *Account) GetPeerNetworkMapComponents(
 			PeerID:  peerID,
 			Network: a.Network.Copy(),
 			// must include the target peer as it's required on the client
-			Peers: map[string]*ComponentPeer{peerID: peer.ToComponent()},
+			Peers: map[string]*nbpeer.Peer{peerID: peer},
 		})
 	}
 
@@ -124,7 +126,7 @@ func (a *Account) GetPeerNetworkMapComponents(
 			PeerID:  peerID,
 			Network: a.Network.Copy(),
 			// must include the target peer as it's required on the client
-			Peers: map[string]*ComponentPeer{peerID: peer.ToComponent()},
+			Peers: map[string]*nbpeer.Peer{peerID: peer},
 		})
 	}
 
@@ -134,10 +136,10 @@ func (a *Account) GetPeerNetworkMapComponents(
 		NameServerGroups:          make([]*nbdns.NameServerGroup, 0),
 		CustomZoneDomain:          peersCustomZone.Domain,
 		ResourcePoliciesMap:       make(map[string][]*Policy),
-		RoutersMap:                make(map[string]map[string]*ComponentRouter),
-		NetworkResources:          make([]*ComponentResource, 0),
+		RoutersMap:                make(map[string]map[string]*routerTypes.NetworkRouter),
+		NetworkResources:          make([]*resourceTypes.NetworkResource, 0),
 		PostureFailedPeers:        make(map[string]map[string]struct{}, len(a.PostureChecks)),
-		RouterPeers:               make(map[string]*ComponentPeer),
+		RouterPeers:               make(map[string]*nbpeer.Peer),
 		NetworkXIDToPublicID:      make(map[string]string, len(a.Networks)),
 		PostureCheckXIDToPublicID: make(map[string]string, len(a.PostureChecks)),
 	}
@@ -172,7 +174,7 @@ func (a *Account) GetPeerNetworkMapComponents(
 	}
 
 	components.Peers = relevantPeers
-	components.Groups = GroupsToComponent(relevantGroups)
+	components.Groups = relevantGroups
 	components.Policies = relevantPolicies
 	components.Routes = relevantRoutes
 	components.AllDNSRecords = filterDNSRecordsByPeers(peersCustomZone.Records, relevantPeers, peer.SupportsIPv6() && peer.IPv6.IsValid())
@@ -221,7 +223,7 @@ func (a *Account) GetPeerNetworkMapComponents(
 				}
 				for _, pID := range a.getPostureValidPeersSaveFailed(peers, policy.SourcePostureChecks, validatedPeersMap, &components.PostureFailedPeers) {
 					if _, exists := components.Peers[pID]; !exists {
-						components.Peers[pID] = a.GetPeer(pID).ToComponent()
+						components.Peers[pID] = a.GetPeer(pID)
 					}
 				}
 			} else {
@@ -254,14 +256,14 @@ func (a *Account) GetPeerNetworkMapComponents(
 				for _, srcGroupID := range rule.Sources {
 					if g := a.Groups[srcGroupID]; g != nil {
 						if _, exists := components.Groups[srcGroupID]; !exists {
-							components.Groups[srcGroupID] = g.ToComponent()
+							components.Groups[srcGroupID] = g
 						}
 					}
 				}
 				for _, dstGroupID := range rule.Destinations {
 					if g := a.Groups[dstGroupID]; g != nil {
 						if _, exists := components.Groups[dstGroupID]; !exists {
-							components.Groups[dstGroupID] = g.ToComponent()
+							components.Groups[dstGroupID] = g
 						}
 					}
 				}
@@ -276,22 +278,20 @@ func (a *Account) GetPeerNetworkMapComponents(
 		// network in the account — accounts with many tenants/networks
 		// shipped tens of unrelated peers in `peers[]` and `routers_map`.
 		if addSourcePeers {
-			components.RoutersMap[resource.NetworkID] = routerTypes.ToComponentMap(networkRoutingPeers)
+			components.RoutersMap[resource.NetworkID] = networkRoutingPeers
 			for peerIDKey := range networkRoutingPeers {
 				if p := a.Peers[peerIDKey]; p != nil {
-					cp := components.RouterPeers[peerIDKey]
-					if cp == nil {
-						cp = p.ToComponent()
-						components.RouterPeers[peerIDKey] = cp
+					if _, exists := components.RouterPeers[peerIDKey]; !exists {
+						components.RouterPeers[peerIDKey] = p
 					}
 					if _, exists := components.Peers[peerIDKey]; !exists {
 						if _, validated := validatedPeersMap[peerIDKey]; validated {
-							components.Peers[peerIDKey] = cp
+							components.Peers[peerIDKey] = p
 						}
 					}
 				}
 			}
-			components.NetworkResources = append(components.NetworkResources, resource.ToComponent())
+			components.NetworkResources = append(components.NetworkResources, resource)
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -312,14 +312,14 @@ func (a *Account) getPeersGroupsPoliciesRoutes(
 	peerSSHEnabled bool,
 	validatedPeersMap map[string]struct{},
 	postureFailedPeers *map[string]map[string]struct{},
-) (map[string]*ComponentPeer, map[string]*Group, []*Policy, []*route.Route, sshRequirements) {
-	relevantPeerIDs := make(map[string]*ComponentPeer, len(a.Peers)/4)
+) (map[string]*nbpeer.Peer, map[string]*Group, []*Policy, []*route.Route, sshRequirements) {
+	relevantPeerIDs := make(map[string]*nbpeer.Peer, len(a.Peers)/4)
 	relevantGroupIDs := make(map[string]*Group, len(a.Groups)/4)
 	relevantPolicies := make([]*Policy, 0, len(a.Policies))
 	relevantRoutes := make([]*route.Route, 0, len(a.Routes))
 	sshReqs := sshRequirements{neededGroupIDs: make(map[string]struct{})}
 
-	relevantPeerIDs[peerID] = a.GetPeer(peerID).ToComponent()
+	relevantPeerIDs[peerID] = a.GetPeer(peerID)
 
 	peerGroupSet := make(map[string]struct{}, 8)
 	for groupID, group := range a.Groups {
@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ func (a *Account) getPeersGroupsPoliciesRoutes(
 		if r.Peer != "" {
 			if _, ok := validatedPeersMap[r.Peer]; ok {
 				if p := a.GetPeer(r.Peer); p != nil {
-					relevantPeerIDs[r.Peer] = p.ToComponent()
+					relevantPeerIDs[r.Peer] = p
 				}
 			}
 		}
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ func (a *Account) getPeersGroupsPoliciesRoutes(
 					continue
 				}
 				if p := a.GetPeer(pid); p != nil {
-					relevantPeerIDs[pid] = p.ToComponent()
+					relevantPeerIDs[pid] = p
 				}
 			}
 		}
@@ -458,9 +458,7 @@ func (a *Account) getPeersGroupsPoliciesRoutes(
 			if peerInSources {
 				policyRelevant = true
 				for _, pid := range destinationPeers {
-					if _, exists := relevantPeerIDs[pid]; !exists {
-						relevantPeerIDs[pid] = a.GetPeer(pid).ToComponent()
-					}
+					relevantPeerIDs[pid] = a.GetPeer(pid)
 				}
 				for _, dstGroupID := range rule.Destinations {
 					relevantGroupIDs[dstGroupID] = a.GetGroup(dstGroupID)
@@ -470,9 +468,7 @@ func (a *Account) getPeersGroupsPoliciesRoutes(
 			if peerInDestinations {
 				policyRelevant = true
 				for _, pid := range sourcePeers {
-					if _, exists := relevantPeerIDs[pid]; !exists {
-						relevantPeerIDs[pid] = a.GetPeer(pid).ToComponent()
-					}
+					relevantPeerIDs[pid] = a.GetPeer(pid)
 				}
 				for _, srcGroupID := range rule.Sources {
 					relevantGroupIDs[srcGroupID] = a.GetGroup(srcGroupID)
@@ -628,7 +624,7 @@ func (a *Account) getPostureValidPeersSaveFailed(inputPeers []string, postureChe
 // that name them. Calculate() tolerates groups with empty Peers (the inner
 // loops simply iterate zero times), so retaining them is behaviourally a
 // no-op for the legacy path that consumes the same NetworkMapComponents.
-func filterGroupPeers(groups *map[string]*ComponentGroup, peers map[string]*ComponentPeer) {
+func filterGroupPeers(groups *map[string]*Group, peers map[string]*nbpeer.Peer) {
 	for groupID, groupInfo := range *groups {
 		filteredPeers := make([]string, 0, len(groupInfo.Peers))
 		for _, pid := range groupInfo.Peers {
@@ -638,14 +634,14 @@ func filterGroupPeers(groups *map[string]*ComponentGroup, peers map[string]*Comp
 		}
 
 		if len(filteredPeers) != len(groupInfo.Peers) {
-			ng := *groupInfo
+			ng := groupInfo.Copy()
 			ng.Peers = filteredPeers
-			(*groups)[groupID] = &ng
+			(*groups)[groupID] = ng
 		}
 	}
 }
 
-func filterPostureFailedPeers(postureFailedPeers *map[string]map[string]struct{}, policies []*Policy, resourcePoliciesMap map[string][]*Policy, peers map[string]*ComponentPeer) {
+func filterPostureFailedPeers(postureFailedPeers *map[string]map[string]struct{}, policies []*Policy, resourcePoliciesMap map[string][]*Policy, peers map[string]*nbpeer.Peer) {
 	if len(*postureFailedPeers) == 0 {
 		return
 	}
@@ -680,7 +676,7 @@ func filterPostureFailedPeers(postureFailedPeers *map[string]map[string]struct{}
 	}
 }
 
-func filterDNSRecordsByPeers(records []nbdns.SimpleRecord, peers map[string]*ComponentPeer, includeIPv6 bool) []nbdns.SimpleRecord {
+func filterDNSRecordsByPeers(records []nbdns.SimpleRecord, peers map[string]*nbpeer.Peer, includeIPv6 bool) []nbdns.SimpleRecord {
 	if len(records) == 0 || len(peers) == 0 {
 		return nil
 	}

management/server/types/account_private_netmap_test.go

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 
 	nbdns "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/dns"
+	nbpeer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
 )
 
 func TestPrivateService_NetworkMap_UserPeer_AndProxyPeer(t *testing.T) {
@@ -48,7 +49,7 @@ func TestPrivateService_NetworkMap_UserPeer_AndProxyPeer(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 }
 
-func netmapPeerIDs(peers []*ComponentPeer) []string {
+func netmapPeerIDs(peers []*nbpeer.Peer) []string {
 	ids := make([]string, 0, len(peers))
 	for _, p := range peers {
 		if p == nil {

management/server/types/account_test.go

@@ -666,7 +666,7 @@ func Test_ExpandPortsAndRanges_SSHRuleExpansion(t *testing.T) {
 
 	for _, tt := range tests {
 		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			result := ExpandPortsAndRanges(tt.base, tt.rule, tt.peer.ToComponent())
+			result := ExpandPortsAndRanges(tt.base, tt.rule, tt.peer)
 
 			var ports []string
 			for _, fr := range result {

management/server/types/aliases.go

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
 	"net"
 	"net/netip"
 
+	nbpeer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
 	nbroute "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
 	sharedtypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/types"
 )
@@ -17,6 +18,9 @@ type DNSSettings = sharedtypes.DNSSettings
 
 type FirewallRule = sharedtypes.FirewallRule
 
+type Group = sharedtypes.Group
+type GroupPeer = sharedtypes.GroupPeer
+
 type Network = sharedtypes.Network
 type NetworkMap = sharedtypes.NetworkMap
 type ForwardingRule = sharedtypes.ForwardingRule
@@ -38,18 +42,6 @@ type RouteFirewallRule = sharedtypes.RouteFirewallRule
 
 type NetworkMapComponents = sharedtypes.NetworkMapComponents
 
-type ComponentPeer = sharedtypes.ComponentPeer
-type ComponentGroup = sharedtypes.ComponentGroup
-type ComponentRouter = sharedtypes.ComponentRouter
-type ComponentResource = sharedtypes.ComponentResource
-type ComponentResourceType = sharedtypes.ComponentResourceType
-
-const (
-	ComponentResourceHost   = sharedtypes.ComponentResourceHost
-	ComponentResourceSubnet = sharedtypes.ComponentResourceSubnet
-	ComponentResourceDomain = sharedtypes.ComponentResourceDomain
-)
-
 var EmptyNetworkMapComponents = sharedtypes.EmptyNetworkMapComponents
 
 type AccountSettingsInfo = sharedtypes.AccountSettingsInfo
@@ -60,7 +52,12 @@ type NetworkMapComponentsCompact = sharedtypes.NetworkMapComponentsCompact
 type LookupMap = sharedtypes.LookupMap
 type FirewallRuleContext = sharedtypes.FirewallRuleContext
 
-const GroupAllName = sharedtypes.GroupAllName
+const (
+	GroupIssuedAPI         = sharedtypes.GroupIssuedAPI
+	GroupIssuedJWT         = sharedtypes.GroupIssuedJWT
+	GroupIssuedIntegration = sharedtypes.GroupIssuedIntegration
+	GroupAllName           = sharedtypes.GroupAllName
+)
 
 // Function forwarders preserve types.X(...) call sites that previously
 // resolved to package-local funcs. Plain forwarders (not var aliases) keep
@@ -70,11 +67,11 @@ func PolicyRuleImpliesLegacySSH(rule *PolicyRule) bool {
 	return sharedtypes.PolicyRuleImpliesLegacySSH(rule)
 }
 
-func ExpandPortsAndRanges(base FirewallRule, rule *PolicyRule, peer *ComponentPeer) []*FirewallRule {
+func ExpandPortsAndRanges(base FirewallRule, rule *PolicyRule, peer *nbpeer.Peer) []*FirewallRule {
 	return sharedtypes.ExpandPortsAndRanges(base, rule, peer)
 }
 
-func AppendIPv6FirewallRule(rules []*FirewallRule, rulesExists map[string]struct{}, peer, targetPeer *ComponentPeer, rule *PolicyRule, rc FirewallRuleContext) []*FirewallRule {
+func AppendIPv6FirewallRule(rules []*FirewallRule, rulesExists map[string]struct{}, peer, targetPeer *nbpeer.Peer, rule *PolicyRule, rc FirewallRuleContext) []*FirewallRule {
 	return sharedtypes.AppendIPv6FirewallRule(rules, rulesExists, peer, targetPeer, rule, rc)
 }
 
@@ -82,7 +79,7 @@ func CalculateNetworkMapFromComponents(ctx context.Context, components *NetworkM
 	return sharedtypes.CalculateNetworkMapFromComponents(ctx, components)
 }
 
-func GenerateRouteFirewallRules(ctx context.Context, route *nbroute.Route, rule *PolicyRule, groupPeers []*ComponentPeer, direction int, includeIPv6 bool) []*RouteFirewallRule {
+func GenerateRouteFirewallRules(ctx context.Context, route *nbroute.Route, rule *PolicyRule, groupPeers []*nbpeer.Peer, direction int, includeIPv6 bool) []*RouteFirewallRule {
 	return sharedtypes.GenerateRouteFirewallRules(ctx, route, rule, groupPeers, direction, includeIPv6)
 }
 

management/server/types/ipv6_endtoend_test.go

@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 
 	nbpeer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
 )
 
 func TestNetworkMapComponents_IPv6EndToEnd(t *testing.T) {
@@ -105,7 +104,7 @@ func TestNetworkMapComponents_RemotePeerWithoutCapability(t *testing.T) {
 	require.NotNil(t, nm)
 
 	t.Run("AllowedIPs include remote v6", func(t *testing.T) {
-		var dst *types.ComponentPeer
+		var dst *nbpeer.Peer
 		for _, p := range nm.Peers {
 			if p.ID == "peer-dst-1" {
 				dst = p

management/server/types/networkmap_components_test.go

@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ func allPeersValidated(account *types.Account, excludePeerIDs ...string) map[str
 	return validated
 }
 
-func peerIDs(peers []*types.ComponentPeer) []string {
+func peerIDs(peers []*nbpeer.Peer) []string {
 	ids := make([]string, len(peers))
 	for i, p := range peers {
 		ids[i] = p.ID

management/server/util/util.go

@@ -19,3 +19,34 @@ func Difference(a, b []string) []string {
 func ToPtr[T any](value T) *T {
 	return &value
 }
+
+type comparableObject[T any] interface {
+	Equal(other T) bool
+}
+
+func MergeUnique[T comparableObject[T]](arr1, arr2 []T) []T {
+	var result []T
+
+	for _, item := range arr1 {
+		if !contains(result, item) {
+			result = append(result, item)
+		}
+	}
+
+	for _, item := range arr2 {
+		if !contains(result, item) {
+			result = append(result, item)
+		}
+	}
+
+	return result
+}
+
+func contains[T comparableObject[T]](slice []T, element T) bool {
+	for _, item := range slice {
+		if item.Equal(element) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}

management/server/util/util_test.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package types
+package util
 
 import (
 	"testing"
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ func (t testObject) Equal(other testObject) bool {
 func Test_MergeUniqueArraysWithoutDuplicates(t *testing.T) {
 	arr1 := []testObject{{value: 1}, {value: 2}}
 	arr2 := []testObject{{value: 2}, {value: 3}}
-	result := mergeUnique(arr1, arr2)
+	result := MergeUnique(arr1, arr2)
 	assert.Len(t, result, 3)
 	assert.Contains(t, result, testObject{value: 1})
 	assert.Contains(t, result, testObject{value: 2})
@@ -27,14 +27,14 @@ func Test_MergeUniqueArraysWithoutDuplicates(t *testing.T) {
 func Test_MergeUniqueHandlesEmptyArrays(t *testing.T) {
 	arr1 := []testObject{}
 	arr2 := []testObject{}
-	result := mergeUnique(arr1, arr2)
+	result := MergeUnique(arr1, arr2)
 	assert.Empty(t, result)
 }
 
 func Test_MergeUniqueHandlesOneEmptyArray(t *testing.T) {
 	arr1 := []testObject{{value: 1}, {value: 2}}
 	arr2 := []testObject{}
-	result := mergeUnique(arr1, arr2)
+	result := MergeUnique(arr1, arr2)
 	assert.Len(t, result, 2)
 	assert.Contains(t, result, testObject{value: 1})
 	assert.Contains(t, result, testObject{value: 2})

proxy/Dockerfile.multistage

@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ COPY encryption ./encryption
 COPY flow ./flow
 COPY formatter ./formatter
 COPY monotime ./monotime
-COPY management ./management
 COPY proxy ./proxy
 COPY route ./route
 COPY shared ./shared

proxy/cmd/proxy/cmd/root.go

@@ -79,9 +79,6 @@ var (
 	geoDataDir            string
 	crowdsecAPIURL        string
 	crowdsecAPIKey        string
-	appsecURL             string
-	appsecTimeout         time.Duration
-	appsecMaxBodyBytes    int64
 )
 
 var rootCmd = &cobra.Command{
@@ -128,9 +125,6 @@ func init() {
 	rootCmd.Flags().StringVar(&geoDataDir, "geo-data-dir", envStringOrDefault("NB_PROXY_GEO_DATA_DIR", "/var/lib/netbird/geolocation"), "Directory for the GeoLite2 MMDB file (auto-downloaded if missing)")
 	rootCmd.Flags().StringVar(&crowdsecAPIURL, "crowdsec-api-url", envStringOrDefault("NB_PROXY_CROWDSEC_API_URL", ""), "CrowdSec LAPI URL for IP reputation checks")
 	rootCmd.Flags().StringVar(&crowdsecAPIKey, "crowdsec-api-key", envStringOrDefault("NB_PROXY_CROWDSEC_API_KEY", ""), "CrowdSec bouncer API key")
-	rootCmd.Flags().StringVar(&appsecURL, "crowdsec-appsec-url", envStringOrDefault("NB_PROXY_CROWDSEC_APPSEC_URL", ""), "CrowdSec AppSec (WAF) endpoint for HTTP request inspection, e.g. http://127.0.0.1:7422/ (reuses the bouncer API key)")
-	rootCmd.Flags().DurationVar(&appsecTimeout, "crowdsec-appsec-timeout", envDurationOrDefault("NB_PROXY_CROWDSEC_APPSEC_TIMEOUT", 0), "Timeout for a single AppSec inspection call (0 = 200ms)")
-	rootCmd.Flags().Int64Var(&appsecMaxBodyBytes, "crowdsec-appsec-max-body-bytes", envInt64OrDefault("NB_PROXY_CROWDSEC_APPSEC_MAX_BODY_BYTES", 0), "Cap on the request body mirrored to AppSec (0 = 64KiB, negative = headers and URI only)")
 }
 
 // Execute runs the root command.
@@ -260,10 +254,6 @@ func runServer(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
 		GeoDataDir:               geoDataDir,
 		CrowdSecAPIURL:           crowdsecAPIURL,
 		CrowdSecAPIKey:           crowdsecAPIKey,
-		CrowdSecAppSecURL:        appsecURL,
-		CrowdSecAppSecTimeout:    appsecTimeout,
-
-		CrowdSecAppSecMaxBodyBytes: appsecMaxBodyBytes,
 	})
 
 	return srv.ListenAndServe(ctx, addr)
@@ -303,19 +293,6 @@ func envUint16OrDefault(key string, def uint16) uint16 {
 	return uint16(parsed)
 }
 
-func envInt64OrDefault(key string, def int64) int64 {
-	v, exists := os.LookupEnv(key)
-	if !exists {
-		return def
-	}
-	parsed, err := strconv.ParseInt(v, 10, 64)
-	if err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("parse %s=%q: %v, using default %d", key, v, err, def)
-		return def
-	}
-	return parsed
-}
-
 func envDurationOrDefault(key string, def time.Duration) time.Duration {
 	v, exists := os.LookupEnv(key)
 	if !exists {

proxy/internal/appsec/body.go

@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
-package appsec
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"errors"
-	"io"
-	"mime"
-	"net/http"
-	"net/url"
-	"slices"
-	"strconv"
-)
-
-// bufferBody reads up to limit+1 bytes from r.Body and always restores r.Body so
-// the request stays forwardable. oversize reports that the body exceeded limit, in
-// which case the returned prefix must not be used for inspection: the bytes are
-// only read so they can be replayed to the backend.
-func bufferBody(r *http.Request, limit int64) (body []byte, oversize bool, err error) {
-	original := r.Body
-	buf, readErr := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(original, limit+1))
-	if readErr != nil && !errors.Is(readErr, io.EOF) {
-		// Restore what was read so a downstream retry sees a consistent stream,
-		// then surface the failure.
-		r.Body = replay(buf, original)
-		return nil, false, readErr
-	}
-
-	if int64(len(buf)) > limit {
-		r.Body = replay(buf, original)
-		return nil, true, nil
-	}
-
-	// The whole body is buffered, so the original is drained and can be closed.
-	// A close error on a drained read-only body does not invalidate the bytes.
-	_ = original.Close()
-	r.Body = io.NopCloser(bytes.NewReader(buf))
-	if r.ContentLength <= 0 {
-		// A chunked request now has a known length. Keep ContentLength and the
-		// header in agreement so the upstream request is framed consistently.
-		r.ContentLength = int64(len(buf))
-		r.Header.Set("Content-Length", strconv.Itoa(len(buf)))
-		r.Header.Del("Transfer-Encoding")
-		r.TransferEncoding = nil
-	}
-	return buf, false, nil
-}
-
-// replay returns a ReadCloser that yields the already-read prefix followed by
-// the remainder of the original stream, and closes the original.
-func replay(prefix []byte, rest io.ReadCloser) io.ReadCloser {
-	return struct {
-		io.Reader
-		io.Closer
-	}{
-		Reader: io.MultiReader(bytes.NewReader(prefix), rest),
-		Closer: rest,
-	}
-}
-
-// formHasField reports whether body is a URL-encoded form carrying any of the
-// named fields. Used to keep credential submissions out of the mirrored
-// request: the proxy's own password / PIN login form posts to the service path,
-// so without this the plaintext credential would reach the Security Engine.
-func formHasField(contentType string, body []byte, fields []string) bool {
-	if len(fields) == 0 || len(body) == 0 {
-		return false
-	}
-	media, _, err := mime.ParseMediaType(contentType)
-	if err != nil || media != "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" {
-		return false
-	}
-	values, err := url.ParseQuery(string(body))
-	if err != nil {
-		// An unparsable form cannot be cleared as credential-free.
-		return true
-	}
-	for field := range values {
-		if slices.Contains(fields, field) {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}

proxy/internal/appsec/client.go

@@ -1,339 +0,0 @@
-// Package appsec implements the CrowdSec AppSec (WAF) side of the remediation
-// component protocol: each inspected HTTP request is mirrored to the Security
-// Engine's AppSec endpoint, which replies with an allow / ban / captcha verdict
-// for that request.
-//
-// This is a separate endpoint from the LAPI decision stream used by the
-// crowdsec package: LAPI answers "is this IP known bad", AppSec answers "is
-// this request an attack". The two are configured and enabled independently.
-package appsec
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"context"
-	"encoding/json"
-	"errors"
-	"fmt"
-	"io"
-	"net/http"
-	"net/netip"
-	"net/url"
-	"strings"
-	"time"
-
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/restrict"
-)
-
-// Header names the AppSec component reads off the mirrored request. IP, URI and
-// Verb are mandatory: the engine answers 500 when any of them is missing.
-const (
-	headerAPIKey        = "X-Crowdsec-Appsec-Api-Key" //nolint:gosec // G101: a header name, not a credential
-	headerIP            = "X-Crowdsec-Appsec-Ip"
-	headerURI           = "X-Crowdsec-Appsec-Uri"
-	headerVerb          = "X-Crowdsec-Appsec-Verb"
-	headerHost          = "X-Crowdsec-Appsec-Host"
-	headerUserAgent     = "X-Crowdsec-Appsec-User-Agent"
-	headerHTTPVersion   = "X-Crowdsec-Appsec-Http-Version"
-	headerTransactionID = "X-Crowdsec-Appsec-Transaction-Id"
-)
-
-// headerPrefix covers every protocol header. Any client-supplied header in this
-// namespace is dropped before forwarding so a caller cannot influence the
-// engine's view of its own address, or replay an API key.
-const headerPrefix = "X-Crowdsec-Appsec-"
-
-// Remediation actions the engine can return.
-const (
-	actionAllow   = "allow"
-	actionBan     = "ban"
-	actionCaptcha = "captcha"
-)
-
-const (
-	// DefaultTimeout matches the 200ms budget CrowdSec's remediation component
-	// spec sets for the blocking AppSec call.
-	DefaultTimeout = 200 * time.Millisecond
-	// DefaultMaxBodyBytes caps the request body mirrored to the engine.
-	// Requests with a larger body are inspected on headers and URI only.
-	DefaultMaxBodyBytes int64 = 64 << 10
-)
-
-// ErrUnavailable reports that the engine could not produce a verdict: the call
-// failed, timed out, or the engine rejected it (401 bad key, 500 malformed).
-// Distinguished from a block verdict so the caller can apply the per-service
-// mode: enforce fails closed, observe allows.
-var ErrUnavailable = errors.New("appsec engine unavailable")
-
-// Config configures a Client.
-type Config struct {
-	// URL is the AppSec endpoint, e.g. http://127.0.0.1:7422/.
-	URL string
-	// APIKey is the CrowdSec bouncer API key. The AppSec component validates it
-	// against LAPI, so the same key used for the decision stream works here.
-	APIKey string
-	// Timeout bounds a single inspection call. Zero means DefaultTimeout.
-	Timeout time.Duration
-	// MaxBodyBytes caps the mirrored request body. Zero means
-	// DefaultMaxBodyBytes; negative disables body forwarding entirely.
-	MaxBodyBytes int64
-	Logger       *log.Entry
-}
-
-// Client mirrors HTTP requests to a CrowdSec AppSec endpoint. It holds no
-// per-service state and is safe for concurrent use.
-type Client struct {
-	url          string
-	apiKey       string
-	maxBodyBytes int64
-	http         *http.Client
-	logger       *log.Entry
-}
-
-// New validates the config and returns a Client. The endpoint is not contacted
-// here: the engine may come up after the proxy.
-func New(cfg Config) (*Client, error) {
-	if cfg.URL == "" {
-		return nil, errors.New("appsec url is empty")
-	}
-	if cfg.APIKey == "" {
-		return nil, errors.New("appsec api key is empty")
-	}
-	parsed, err := url.Parse(cfg.URL)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse appsec url: %w", err)
-	}
-	if parsed.Scheme != "http" && parsed.Scheme != "https" {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("appsec url scheme %q is not http(s)", parsed.Scheme)
-	}
-	if parsed.Host == "" {
-		return nil, errors.New("appsec url has no host")
-	}
-
-	timeout := cfg.Timeout
-	if timeout <= 0 {
-		timeout = DefaultTimeout
-	}
-	maxBody := cfg.MaxBodyBytes
-	if maxBody == 0 {
-		maxBody = DefaultMaxBodyBytes
-	}
-	logger := cfg.Logger
-	if logger == nil {
-		logger = log.NewEntry(log.StandardLogger())
-	}
-
-	return &Client{
-		url:          cfg.URL,
-		apiKey:       cfg.APIKey,
-		maxBodyBytes: maxBody,
-		logger:       logger,
-		http: &http.Client{
-			Timeout: timeout,
-			Transport: &http.Transport{
-				MaxIdleConns:        100,
-				MaxIdleConnsPerHost: 32,
-				IdleConnTimeout:     90 * time.Second,
-			},
-		},
-	}, nil
-}
-
-// Request is one inspection request.
-type Request struct {
-	// HTTP is the in-flight client request. Inspect buffers and restores its
-	// body, so the request stays forwardable afterwards.
-	HTTP *http.Request
-	// ClientIP is the resolved client address (after trusted-proxy handling).
-	ClientIP netip.Addr
-	// TransactionID correlates the engine's alert with the proxy's access log
-	// entry. Empty lets the engine generate its own UUID.
-	TransactionID string
-	// OmitBodyFields suppresses body forwarding when the body is a form
-	// containing any of these field names. Used to keep credentials submitted
-	// to the proxy's own login form out of the engine.
-	OmitBodyFields []string
-}
-
-// Inspect mirrors r to the AppSec engine and returns its verdict. A nil error
-// with restrict.Allow means the request passed. On failure it returns
-// DenyAppSecUnavailable wrapped with ErrUnavailable; the caller decides whether
-// that blocks, based on the per-service mode.
-func (c *Client) Inspect(ctx context.Context, req Request) (restrict.Verdict, error) {
-	if c == nil {
-		return restrict.DenyAppSecUnavailable, ErrUnavailable
-	}
-	if req.HTTP == nil {
-		return restrict.DenyAppSecUnavailable, fmt.Errorf("%w: nil request", ErrUnavailable)
-	}
-
-	body, err := c.readBody(req)
-	if err != nil {
-		return restrict.DenyAppSecUnavailable, fmt.Errorf("%w: read body: %w", ErrUnavailable, err)
-	}
-
-	outbound, err := c.buildRequest(ctx, req, body)
-	if err != nil {
-		return restrict.DenyAppSecUnavailable, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", ErrUnavailable, err)
-	}
-
-	resp, err := c.http.Do(outbound)
-	if err != nil {
-		return restrict.DenyAppSecUnavailable, fmt.Errorf("%w: %w", ErrUnavailable, err)
-	}
-	defer func() {
-		if err := resp.Body.Close(); err != nil {
-			c.logger.Tracef("close appsec response body: %v", err)
-		}
-	}()
-
-	return c.verdict(resp)
-}
-
-// readBody buffers the body so it can be mirrored, always restoring it on the
-// original request. Returns nil when there is no body to forward: no body at
-// all, an upgrade request, a body over the cap, or a credential form.
-func (c *Client) readBody(req Request) ([]byte, error) {
-	r := req.HTTP
-	if c.maxBodyBytes < 0 || r.Body == nil || r.Body == http.NoBody {
-		return nil, nil
-	}
-	// Upgrade requests (websockets) have no meaningful request body and their
-	// stream must not be consumed here.
-	if r.Header.Get("Upgrade") != "" || strings.EqualFold(r.Header.Get("Connection"), "upgrade") {
-		return nil, nil
-	}
-	// A Content-Length over the cap is known to be too large before reading.
-	if r.ContentLength > c.maxBodyBytes {
-		return nil, nil
-	}
-
-	body, oversize, err := bufferBody(r, c.maxBodyBytes)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	// An oversize body was only partially read: a truncated prefix changes the
-	// engine's verdict in both directions, so inspect headers and URI only.
-	if oversize {
-		return nil, nil
-	}
-	if formHasField(r.Header.Get("Content-Type"), body, req.OmitBodyFields) {
-		return nil, nil
-	}
-	return body, nil
-}
-
-// buildRequest assembles the mirrored request. Per the protocol it is a GET
-// when there is no body and a POST otherwise; bytes.Reader gives the outbound
-// request an accurate Content-Length, which the engine relies on to read the
-// body at all.
-func (c *Client) buildRequest(ctx context.Context, req Request, body []byte) (*http.Request, error) {
-	method := http.MethodGet
-	var payload io.Reader
-	if len(body) > 0 {
-		method = http.MethodPost
-		payload = bytes.NewReader(body)
-	}
-
-	outbound, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, method, c.url, payload)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("build appsec request: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	r := req.HTTP
-	copyInspectableHeaders(outbound.Header, r.Header)
-
-	outbound.Header.Set(headerAPIKey, c.apiKey)
-	outbound.Header.Set(headerIP, req.ClientIP.Unmap().String())
-	outbound.Header.Set(headerURI, r.URL.RequestURI())
-	outbound.Header.Set(headerVerb, r.Method)
-	outbound.Header.Set(headerHost, r.Host)
-	if ua := r.UserAgent(); ua != "" {
-		outbound.Header.Set(headerUserAgent, ua)
-	}
-	outbound.Header.Set(headerHTTPVersion, httpVersion(r))
-	if req.TransactionID != "" {
-		outbound.Header.Set(headerTransactionID, req.TransactionID)
-	}
-	return outbound, nil
-}
-
-// verdict maps the engine's response to a restrict.Verdict. 200 is a pass and
-// 401/500 are engine-side failures; every other status carries a remediation in
-// the body. The blocked status code is operator-configurable
-// (blocked_http_code), so the action field decides, not the status.
-func (c *Client) verdict(resp *http.Response) (restrict.Verdict, error) {
-	switch resp.StatusCode {
-	case http.StatusOK:
-		return restrict.Allow, nil
-	case http.StatusUnauthorized:
-		return restrict.DenyAppSecUnavailable, fmt.Errorf("%w: rejected api key", ErrUnavailable)
-	case http.StatusInternalServerError:
-		return restrict.DenyAppSecUnavailable, fmt.Errorf("%w: engine error", ErrUnavailable)
-	}
-
-	var decoded struct {
-		Action string `json:"action"`
-	}
-	if err := json.NewDecoder(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 4<<10)).Decode(&decoded); err != nil {
-		// A non-2xx status with an unreadable body is still a block: the engine
-		// answered, we just cannot tell which remediation it chose.
-		c.logger.Debugf("failed to decode appsec response (status %d): %v", resp.StatusCode, err)
-		return restrict.DenyAppSecBan, nil
-	}
-
-	switch decoded.Action {
-	case actionAllow:
-		return restrict.Allow, nil
-	case actionCaptcha:
-		return restrict.DenyAppSecCaptcha, nil
-	case actionBan:
-		return restrict.DenyAppSecBan, nil
-	default:
-		// Unknown remediation: the engine flagged the request, so deny.
-		c.logger.Debugf("unknown appsec action %q (status %d), treating as ban", decoded.Action, resp.StatusCode)
-		return restrict.DenyAppSecBan, nil
-	}
-}
-
-// copyInspectableHeaders copies the client's headers, which are what the WAF
-// rules actually match on, dropping hop-by-hop headers that describe the
-// proxy-to-engine connection rather than the client request, and any header in
-// the AppSec protocol namespace.
-func copyInspectableHeaders(dst, src http.Header) {
-	for name, values := range src {
-		if hopByHopHeaders[http.CanonicalHeaderKey(name)] {
-			continue
-		}
-		if strings.HasPrefix(http.CanonicalHeaderKey(name), headerPrefix) {
-			continue
-		}
-		dst[http.CanonicalHeaderKey(name)] = append([]string(nil), values...)
-	}
-	// Content-Length describes the mirrored payload, not the client's: net/http
-	// sets it from the body we actually attach. Content-Type is kept either way
-	// so rules matching on it still fire when the body was not forwarded.
-	dst.Del("Content-Length")
-}
-
-var hopByHopHeaders = map[string]bool{
-	"Connection":          true,
-	"Keep-Alive":          true,
-	"Proxy-Authenticate":  true,
-	"Proxy-Authorization": true,
-	"Proxy-Connection":    true,
-	"Te":                  true,
-	"Trailer":             true,
-	"Transfer-Encoding":   true,
-	"Upgrade":             true,
-}
-
-// httpVersion renders the two-digit form the engine parses ("11", "20").
-func httpVersion(r *http.Request) string {
-	major, minor := r.ProtoMajor, r.ProtoMinor
-	if major < 0 || major > 9 || minor < 0 || minor > 9 {
-		return ""
-	}
-	return fmt.Sprintf("%d%d", major, minor)
-}

proxy/internal/appsec/client_test.go

@@ -1,416 +0,0 @@
-package appsec
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"errors"
-	"io"
-	"net/http"
-	"net/http/httptest"
-	"net/netip"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/restrict"
-)
-
-// engine records what the AppSec component received and replies with a
-// canned status and body.
-type engine struct {
-	status int
-	body   string
-
-	gotMethod string
-	gotHeader http.Header
-	gotBody   []byte
-	gotLength int64
-	requests  int
-}
-
-func (e *engine) start(t *testing.T) *httptest.Server {
-	t.Helper()
-	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		body, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
-		require.NoError(t, err)
-		e.requests++
-		e.gotMethod = r.Method
-		e.gotHeader = r.Header.Clone()
-		e.gotBody = body
-		e.gotLength = r.ContentLength
-
-		status := e.status
-		if status == 0 {
-			status = http.StatusOK
-		}
-		w.WriteHeader(status)
-		if e.body != "" {
-			_, _ = w.Write([]byte(e.body))
-		}
-	}))
-	t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
-	return srv
-}
-
-func newClient(t *testing.T, url string, cfg ...func(*Config)) *Client {
-	t.Helper()
-	c := Config{URL: url, APIKey: "test-key"}
-	for _, fn := range cfg {
-		fn(&c)
-	}
-	client, err := New(c)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	return client
-}
-
-func inbound(method, target string, body string) *http.Request {
-	var r *http.Request
-	if body == "" {
-		r = httptest.NewRequest(method, target, nil)
-	} else {
-		r = httptest.NewRequest(method, target, strings.NewReader(body))
-	}
-	r.Host = "svc.example.com"
-	r.Header.Set("User-Agent", "curl/8.0")
-	return r
-}
-
-func TestNew_RejectsBadConfig(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name string
-		cfg  Config
-	}{
-		{"empty url", Config{APIKey: "k"}},
-		{"empty key", Config{URL: "http://127.0.0.1:7422/"}},
-		{"non http scheme", Config{URL: "tcp://127.0.0.1:7422", APIKey: "k"}},
-		{"no host", Config{URL: "http:///path", APIKey: "k"}},
-	}
-	for _, tt := range tests {
-		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			_, err := New(tt.cfg)
-			require.Error(t, err)
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-func TestInspect_AllowSendsProtocolHeaders(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{status: http.StatusOK, body: `{"action":"allow","http_status":200}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL)
-
-	r := inbound(http.MethodGet, "http://svc.example.com/admin?q=1", "")
-	r.Header.Set("Cookie", "session=abc")
-
-	verdict, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:          r,
-		ClientIP:      netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-		TransactionID: "req-42",
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, restrict.Allow, verdict, "allow action must pass the request")
-
-	assert.Equal(t, http.MethodGet, eng.gotMethod, "a bodyless request is forwarded as GET")
-	assert.Equal(t, "203.0.113.7", eng.gotHeader.Get(headerIP))
-	assert.Equal(t, "/admin?q=1", eng.gotHeader.Get(headerURI), "URI header must carry path and query")
-	assert.Equal(t, http.MethodGet, eng.gotHeader.Get(headerVerb))
-	assert.Equal(t, "svc.example.com", eng.gotHeader.Get(headerHost))
-	assert.Equal(t, "curl/8.0", eng.gotHeader.Get(headerUserAgent))
-	assert.Equal(t, "11", eng.gotHeader.Get(headerHTTPVersion))
-	assert.Equal(t, "req-42", eng.gotHeader.Get(headerTransactionID))
-	assert.Equal(t, "test-key", eng.gotHeader.Get(headerAPIKey))
-	// Client headers are what the WAF rules match on.
-	assert.Equal(t, "session=abc", eng.gotHeader.Get("Cookie"))
-}
-
-func TestInspect_MapsActionsToVerdicts(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name    string
-		status  int
-		body    string
-		want    restrict.Verdict
-		wantErr bool
-	}{
-		{"allow", http.StatusOK, `{"action":"allow"}`, restrict.Allow, false},
-		{"ban", http.StatusForbidden, `{"action":"ban","http_status":403}`, restrict.DenyAppSecBan, false},
-		{"captcha", http.StatusForbidden, `{"action":"captcha","http_status":403}`, restrict.DenyAppSecCaptcha, false},
-		// blocked_http_code is operator-configurable, so the action decides.
-		{"custom block status", http.StatusTeapot, `{"action":"ban"}`, restrict.DenyAppSecBan, false},
-		{"allow on custom status", http.StatusTeapot, `{"action":"allow"}`, restrict.Allow, false},
-		{"unknown action denies", http.StatusForbidden, `{"action":"something-new"}`, restrict.DenyAppSecBan, false},
-		{"unreadable body denies", http.StatusForbidden, `not json`, restrict.DenyAppSecBan, false},
-		{"bad api key is unavailable", http.StatusUnauthorized, "", restrict.DenyAppSecUnavailable, true},
-		{"engine error is unavailable", http.StatusInternalServerError, "", restrict.DenyAppSecUnavailable, true},
-	}
-	for _, tt := range tests {
-		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			eng := &engine{status: tt.status, body: tt.body}
-			srv := eng.start(t)
-			client := newClient(t, srv.URL)
-
-			verdict, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-				HTTP:     inbound(http.MethodGet, "http://svc.example.com/", ""),
-				ClientIP: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-			})
-			if tt.wantErr {
-				require.Error(t, err)
-				assert.True(t, errors.Is(err, ErrUnavailable), "engine-side failures must be ErrUnavailable so the caller can apply the mode")
-			} else {
-				require.NoError(t, err)
-			}
-			assert.Equal(t, tt.want, verdict)
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-func TestInspect_ForwardsBodyAndRestoresIt(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{body: `{"action":"allow"}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL)
-
-	const payload = `{"user":"' OR 1=1--"}`
-	r := inbound(http.MethodPost, "http://svc.example.com/login", payload)
-	r.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
-
-	_, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:     r,
-		ClientIP: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	assert.Equal(t, http.MethodPost, eng.gotMethod, "a request with a body is forwarded as POST")
-	assert.Equal(t, payload, string(eng.gotBody))
-	assert.Equal(t, int64(len(payload)), eng.gotLength,
-		"the engine reads exactly Content-Length bytes, so it must be accurate")
-
-	// The backend still needs the body.
-	restored, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, payload, string(restored), "body must be restored for the upstream request")
-}
-
-func TestInspect_OversizeBodyFallsBackToHeaders(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{body: `{"action":"allow"}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL, func(c *Config) { c.MaxBodyBytes = 16 })
-
-	payload := strings.Repeat("A", 64)
-	r := inbound(http.MethodPost, "http://svc.example.com/upload", payload)
-
-	_, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:     r,
-		ClientIP: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	assert.Equal(t, http.MethodGet, eng.gotMethod, "an oversize body is not forwarded")
-	assert.Empty(t, eng.gotBody, "a truncated prefix must never be sent: it changes the verdict")
-
-	restored, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, payload, string(restored), "the full body must still reach the upstream")
-}
-
-func TestInspect_ChunkedOversizeBodyIsReplayed(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{body: `{"action":"allow"}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL, func(c *Config) { c.MaxBodyBytes = 8 })
-
-	payload := strings.Repeat("B", 40)
-	r := inbound(http.MethodPost, "http://svc.example.com/upload", payload)
-	// Unknown length: the cap can only be detected while reading.
-	r.ContentLength = -1
-	r.Header.Del("Content-Length")
-
-	_, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:     r,
-		ClientIP: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	assert.Empty(t, eng.gotBody)
-	restored, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, payload, string(restored), "bytes read to detect the cap must be replayed")
-}
-
-func TestInspect_SkipsCredentialForm(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{body: `{"action":"allow"}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL)
-
-	r := inbound(http.MethodPost, "http://svc.example.com/", "password=hunter2&next=%2Fhome")
-	r.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
-
-	_, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:           r,
-		ClientIP:       netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-		OmitBodyFields: []string{"password", "pin"},
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	assert.Empty(t, eng.gotBody, "a login form body must not reach the engine")
-	assert.NotContains(t, string(eng.gotBody), "hunter2")
-	// The request is still inspected on headers and URI.
-	assert.Equal(t, 1, eng.requests)
-
-	restored, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, "password=hunter2&next=%2Fhome", string(restored),
-		"the login handler still needs to read the form")
-}
-
-func TestInspect_ForwardsNonCredentialForm(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{body: `{"action":"allow"}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL)
-
-	r := inbound(http.MethodPost, "http://svc.example.com/search", "q=%3Cscript%3E")
-	r.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
-
-	_, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:           r,
-		ClientIP:       netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-		OmitBodyFields: []string{"password", "pin"},
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, "q=%3Cscript%3E", string(eng.gotBody), "ordinary form bodies must be inspected")
-}
-
-func TestInspect_StripsSpoofedProtocolHeaders(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{body: `{"action":"allow"}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL)
-
-	r := inbound(http.MethodGet, "http://svc.example.com/", "")
-	// A caller trying to make the engine see a different source address, and to
-	// smuggle in its own key.
-	r.Header.Set(headerIP, "10.0.0.1")
-	r.Header.Set(headerAPIKey, "attacker-key")
-	r.Header.Set(headerURI, "/harmless")
-
-	_, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:     r,
-		ClientIP: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	assert.Equal(t, "203.0.113.7", eng.gotHeader.Get(headerIP), "the proxy's resolved IP must win")
-	assert.Equal(t, "test-key", eng.gotHeader.Get(headerAPIKey))
-	assert.Equal(t, "/", eng.gotHeader.Get(headerURI))
-	assert.Len(t, eng.gotHeader.Values(headerIP), 1, "no duplicate protocol headers")
-}
-
-func TestInspect_DropsHopByHopHeaders(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{body: `{"action":"allow"}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL)
-
-	r := inbound(http.MethodGet, "http://svc.example.com/", "")
-	r.Header.Set("Proxy-Authorization", "Basic zzz")
-	r.Header.Set("Keep-Alive", "timeout=5")
-
-	_, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:     r,
-		ClientIP: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	assert.Empty(t, eng.gotHeader.Get("Proxy-Authorization"))
-	assert.Empty(t, eng.gotHeader.Get("Keep-Alive"))
-}
-
-func TestInspect_UpgradeRequestKeepsStreamIntact(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{body: `{"action":"allow"}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL)
-
-	r := inbound(http.MethodGet, "http://svc.example.com/ws", "")
-	r.Header.Set("Upgrade", "websocket")
-	r.Header.Set("Connection", "upgrade")
-
-	_, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:     r,
-		ClientIP: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, http.MethodGet, eng.gotMethod)
-	assert.Empty(t, eng.gotBody)
-	assert.Equal(t, 1, eng.requests, "upgrade requests are still inspected on headers")
-}
-
-func TestInspect_TimeoutIsUnavailable(t *testing.T) {
-	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
-		time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond)
-		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-	}))
-	t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
-
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL, func(c *Config) { c.Timeout = 10 * time.Millisecond })
-
-	verdict, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:     inbound(http.MethodGet, "http://svc.example.com/", ""),
-		ClientIP: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-	})
-	require.Error(t, err)
-	assert.True(t, errors.Is(err, ErrUnavailable))
-	assert.Equal(t, restrict.DenyAppSecUnavailable, verdict)
-}
-
-func TestInspect_UnreachableEngineIsUnavailable(t *testing.T) {
-	// Port 1 on loopback refuses connections.
-	client := newClient(t, "http://127.0.0.1:1/")
-
-	verdict, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:     inbound(http.MethodGet, "http://svc.example.com/", ""),
-		ClientIP: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-	})
-	require.Error(t, err)
-	assert.True(t, errors.Is(err, ErrUnavailable))
-	assert.Equal(t, restrict.DenyAppSecUnavailable, verdict)
-}
-
-func TestInspect_NilClientFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
-	var client *Client
-	verdict, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:     inbound(http.MethodGet, "http://svc.example.com/", ""),
-		ClientIP: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-	})
-	require.Error(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, restrict.DenyAppSecUnavailable, verdict)
-}
-
-func TestInspect_NegativeCapDisablesBodyForwarding(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{body: `{"action":"allow"}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL, func(c *Config) { c.MaxBodyBytes = -1 })
-
-	const payload = `{"a":1}`
-	r := inbound(http.MethodPost, "http://svc.example.com/", payload)
-
-	_, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:     r,
-		ClientIP: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"),
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Empty(t, eng.gotBody)
-
-	restored, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, payload, string(restored), "an untouched body must still be forwardable")
-}
-
-func TestInspect_MapsV4MappedClientIP(t *testing.T) {
-	eng := &engine{body: `{"action":"allow"}`}
-	srv := eng.start(t)
-	client := newClient(t, srv.URL)
-
-	_, err := client.Inspect(context.Background(), Request{
-		HTTP:     inbound(http.MethodGet, "http://svc.example.com/", ""),
-		ClientIP: netip.MustParseAddr("::ffff:203.0.113.7"),
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, "203.0.113.7", eng.gotHeader.Get(headerIP),
-		"v4-mapped addresses must be unmapped so engine allowlists and rules match")
-}

proxy/internal/auth/appsec_test.go

@@ -1,179 +0,0 @@
-package auth
-
-import (
-	"net/http"
-	"net/http/httptest"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/appsec"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/proxy"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/restrict"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/types"
-)
-
-// appsecEngine is a stub AppSec component returning a fixed remediation.
-func appsecEngine(t *testing.T, status int, body string) *httptest.Server {
-	t.Helper()
-	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		_, _ = strings.NewReader("").Read(nil)
-		defer func() { _ = r.Body.Close() }()
-		w.WriteHeader(status)
-		if body != "" {
-			_, _ = w.Write([]byte(body))
-		}
-	}))
-	t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
-	return srv
-}
-
-// serveWithAppSec runs a request through the middleware for a domain configured
-// with the given AppSec mode, returning the response and the captured metadata.
-func serveWithAppSec(t *testing.T, mode restrict.AppSecMode, client *appsec.Client, r *http.Request) (*httptest.ResponseRecorder, map[string]string, bool) {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
-	mw.SetAppSec(client)
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("svc.example.com", DomainSettings{
-		AccountID:  types.AccountID("acct-1"),
-		ServiceID:  types.ServiceID("svc-1"),
-		AppSecMode: mode,
-	}))
-
-	reached := false
-	handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
-		reached = true
-		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-	}))
-
-	cd := proxy.NewCapturedData("req-1")
-	r = r.WithContext(proxy.WithCapturedData(r.Context(), cd))
-	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
-	handler.ServeHTTP(rec, r)
-
-	return rec, cd.GetMetadata(), reached
-}
-
-func appsecRequest() *http.Request {
-	r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://svc.example.com/?x=/etc/passwd", nil)
-	r.Host = "svc.example.com"
-	r.RemoteAddr = "203.0.113.7:44444"
-	return r
-}
-
-func TestCheckAppSec_EnforceBlocksBannedRequest(t *testing.T) {
-	srv := appsecEngine(t, http.StatusForbidden, `{"action":"ban","http_status":403}`)
-	client, err := appsec.New(appsec.Config{URL: srv.URL, APIKey: "k"})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	rec, meta, reached := serveWithAppSec(t, restrict.AppSecEnforce, client, appsecRequest())
-
-	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, rec.Code)
-	assert.False(t, reached, "a banned request must not reach the backend")
-	assert.Equal(t, "appsec_ban", meta["appsec_verdict"])
-	assert.NotContains(t, meta, "appsec_mode", "enforce is the default, only observe is annotated")
-}
-
-func TestCheckAppSec_ObserveAllowsAndRecordsVerdict(t *testing.T) {
-	srv := appsecEngine(t, http.StatusForbidden, `{"action":"ban","http_status":403}`)
-	client, err := appsec.New(appsec.Config{URL: srv.URL, APIKey: "k"})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	rec, meta, reached := serveWithAppSec(t, restrict.AppSecObserve, client, appsecRequest())
-
-	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code)
-	assert.True(t, reached, "observe mode must not block")
-	assert.Equal(t, "appsec_ban", meta["appsec_verdict"])
-	assert.Equal(t, "observe", meta["appsec_mode"])
-}
-
-func TestCheckAppSec_AllowedRequestPasses(t *testing.T) {
-	srv := appsecEngine(t, http.StatusOK, `{"action":"allow","http_status":200}`)
-	client, err := appsec.New(appsec.Config{URL: srv.URL, APIKey: "k"})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	rec, meta, reached := serveWithAppSec(t, restrict.AppSecEnforce, client, appsecRequest())
-
-	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code)
-	assert.True(t, reached)
-	assert.NotContains(t, meta, "appsec_verdict", "a clean request records no verdict")
-}
-
-func TestCheckAppSec_OffSkipsInspection(t *testing.T) {
-	// An engine that would ban everything; the mode must keep us away from it.
-	srv := appsecEngine(t, http.StatusForbidden, `{"action":"ban"}`)
-	client, err := appsec.New(appsec.Config{URL: srv.URL, APIKey: "k"})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	rec, meta, reached := serveWithAppSec(t, restrict.AppSecOff, client, appsecRequest())
-
-	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code)
-	assert.True(t, reached)
-	assert.Empty(t, meta)
-}
-
-func TestCheckAppSec_EnforceFailsClosedWithoutClient(t *testing.T) {
-	rec, meta, reached := serveWithAppSec(t, restrict.AppSecEnforce, nil, appsecRequest())
-
-	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, rec.Code,
-		"enforce with no configured endpoint must deny rather than pass traffic uninspected")
-	assert.False(t, reached)
-	assert.Equal(t, "appsec_unavailable", meta["appsec_verdict"])
-}
-
-func TestCheckAppSec_ObserveAllowsWithoutClient(t *testing.T) {
-	rec, meta, reached := serveWithAppSec(t, restrict.AppSecObserve, nil, appsecRequest())
-
-	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code)
-	assert.True(t, reached)
-	assert.Equal(t, "appsec_unavailable", meta["appsec_verdict"])
-	assert.Equal(t, "observe", meta["appsec_mode"])
-}
-
-func TestCheckAppSec_EnforceFailsClosedWhenEngineUnreachable(t *testing.T) {
-	client, err := appsec.New(appsec.Config{URL: "http://127.0.0.1:1/", APIKey: "k"})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	rec, meta, reached := serveWithAppSec(t, restrict.AppSecEnforce, client, appsecRequest())
-
-	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, rec.Code)
-	assert.False(t, reached)
-	assert.Equal(t, "appsec_unavailable", meta["appsec_verdict"])
-}
-
-func TestCheckAppSec_InspectsOverlayTraffic(t *testing.T) {
-	srv := appsecEngine(t, http.StatusForbidden, `{"action":"ban"}`)
-	client, err := appsec.New(appsec.Config{URL: srv.URL, APIKey: "k"})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	// Requests arriving over the WireGuard overlay skip the geo and IP-reputation
-	// checks, but request content is just as inspectable.
-	r := appsecRequest()
-	r = r.WithContext(types.WithOverlayOrigin(r.Context()))
-
-	rec, meta, reached := serveWithAppSec(t, restrict.AppSecEnforce, client, r)
-
-	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, rec.Code, "overlay traffic must still be inspected")
-	assert.False(t, reached)
-	assert.Equal(t, "appsec_ban", meta["appsec_verdict"])
-}
-
-func TestCheckAppSec_UnresolvableClientIPFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
-	srv := appsecEngine(t, http.StatusOK, `{"action":"allow"}`)
-	client, err := appsec.New(appsec.Config{URL: srv.URL, APIKey: "k"})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	r := appsecRequest()
-	r.RemoteAddr = "not-an-address"
-
-	rec, meta, reached := serveWithAppSec(t, restrict.AppSecEnforce, client, r)
-
-	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, rec.Code,
-		"the engine requires a client address; a request we cannot attribute must not pass")
-	assert.False(t, reached)
-	assert.Equal(t, "appsec_unavailable", meta["appsec_verdict"])
-}

proxy/internal/auth/middleware.go

@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ import (
 	"google.golang.org/grpc"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/auth"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/appsec"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/proxy"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/restrict"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/types"
@@ -60,8 +59,6 @@ type DomainConfig struct {
 	IPRestrictions    *restrict.Filter
 	// Private routes the domain through ValidateTunnelPeer; failure → 403.
 	Private bool
-	// AppSecMode enables CrowdSec AppSec request inspection for this domain.
-	AppSecMode restrict.AppSecMode
 }
 
 type validationResult struct {
@@ -85,9 +82,6 @@ type Middleware struct {
 	sessionValidator SessionValidator
 	geo              restrict.GeoResolver
 	tunnelCache      *tunnelValidationCache
-	// appsec is the shared CrowdSec AppSec client, nil when the proxy has no
-	// AppSec endpoint configured. Set once during startup, before serving.
-	appsec *appsec.Client
 }
 
 // NewMiddleware creates a new authentication middleware. The sessionValidator is
@@ -105,12 +99,6 @@ func NewMiddleware(logger *log.Logger, sessionValidator SessionValidator, geo re
 	}
 }
 
-// SetAppSec installs the shared CrowdSec AppSec client. Must be called during
-// startup, before the middleware serves any request.
-func (mw *Middleware) SetAppSec(client *appsec.Client) {
-	mw.appsec = client
-}
-
 // Protect wraps next with per-domain authentication and IP restriction checks.
 // Requests whose Host is not registered pass through unchanged.
 func (mw *Middleware) Protect(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
@@ -135,10 +123,6 @@ func (mw *Middleware) Protect(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
 			return
 		}
 
-		if !mw.checkAppSec(w, r, config) {
-			return
-		}
-
 		// Private services bypass operator schemes and gate on tunnel peer.
 		if config.Private {
 			if mw.forwardWithTunnelPeer(w, r, host, config, next) {
@@ -278,93 +262,6 @@ func (mw *Middleware) checkIPRestrictions(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request
 	return false
 }
 
-// checkAppSec mirrors the request to the CrowdSec AppSec engine when the domain
-// enables inspection. Returns false when the request was blocked and a response
-// has been written.
-//
-// Unlike the geo and IP-reputation checks, this runs for overlay traffic too:
-// AppSec inspects request content, which is just as meaningful when the caller
-// reached the proxy through the WireGuard tunnel.
-func (mw *Middleware) checkAppSec(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, config DomainConfig) bool {
-	if !config.AppSecMode.Enabled() {
-		return true
-	}
-
-	verdict := mw.inspectAppSec(r, config)
-	if verdict == restrict.Allow {
-		return true
-	}
-
-	observe := config.AppSecMode == restrict.AppSecObserve
-	if cd := proxy.CapturedDataFromContext(r.Context()); cd != nil {
-		cd.SetMetadata("appsec_verdict", verdict.String())
-		if observe {
-			cd.SetMetadata("appsec_mode", "observe")
-		}
-	}
-
-	if observe {
-		mw.logger.Debugf("AppSec observe: would block %s for %s (%s)", r.RemoteAddr, r.Host, verdict)
-		return true
-	}
-
-	mw.markDenied(r, verdict.String())
-	mw.logger.Debugf("AppSec: %s for %s %s", verdict, r.Host, r.RemoteAddr)
-	http.Error(w, "Forbidden", http.StatusForbidden)
-	return false
-}
-
-// inspectAppSec runs the AppSec call and returns its verdict. Failures come
-// back as DenyAppSecUnavailable regardless of mode so observe mode still
-// records that inspection did not happen; the caller decides what blocks.
-func (mw *Middleware) inspectAppSec(r *http.Request, config DomainConfig) restrict.Verdict {
-	// Mode requested but the proxy has no AppSec endpoint configured. Management
-	// gates this on the cluster capability; a stale mapping can still arrive.
-	if mw.appsec == nil {
-		mw.logger.Debugf("AppSec mode %q requested for %s but no AppSec endpoint is configured", config.AppSecMode, r.Host)
-		return restrict.DenyAppSecUnavailable
-	}
-
-	clientIP := mw.resolveClientIP(r)
-	if !clientIP.IsValid() {
-		// The engine requires a client address, and a request whose source we
-		// cannot establish is exactly the kind we must not wave through.
-		mw.logger.Debugf("AppSec: cannot resolve client address for %q", r.RemoteAddr)
-		return restrict.DenyAppSecUnavailable
-	}
-
-	req := appsec.Request{
-		HTTP:           r,
-		ClientIP:       clientIP,
-		OmitBodyFields: credentialFormFields(config.Schemes),
-	}
-	if cd := proxy.CapturedDataFromContext(r.Context()); cd != nil {
-		req.TransactionID = cd.GetRequestID()
-	}
-
-	verdict, err := mw.appsec.Inspect(r.Context(), req)
-	if err != nil {
-		mw.logger.Debugf("AppSec inspection failed for %s: %v", r.Host, err)
-	}
-	return verdict
-}
-
-// credentialFormFields lists the login form fields whose presence suppresses
-// body forwarding, so a password or PIN submitted to the proxy's own login form
-// never reaches the Security Engine.
-func credentialFormFields(schemes []Scheme) []string {
-	var fields []string
-	for _, s := range schemes {
-		switch s.Type() {
-		case auth.MethodPassword:
-			fields = append(fields, passwordFormId)
-		case auth.MethodPIN:
-			fields = append(fields, pinFormId)
-		}
-	}
-	return fields
-}
-
 // resolveClientIP extracts the real client IP from CapturedData, falling back to r.RemoteAddr.
 func (mw *Middleware) resolveClientIP(r *http.Request) netip.Addr {
 	if cd := proxy.CapturedDataFromContext(r.Context()); cd != nil {
@@ -384,18 +281,12 @@ func (mw *Middleware) resolveClientIP(r *http.Request) netip.Addr {
 	return addr.Unmap()
 }
 
-// markDenied records the deny reason on the captured data so the access log
-// attributes the response to the proxy rather than the backend.
-func (mw *Middleware) markDenied(r *http.Request, reason string) {
+// blockIPRestriction sets captured data fields for an IP-restriction block event.
+func (mw *Middleware) blockIPRestriction(r *http.Request, reason string) {
 	if cd := proxy.CapturedDataFromContext(r.Context()); cd != nil {
 		cd.SetOrigin(proxy.OriginAuth)
 		cd.SetAuthMethod(reason)
 	}
-}
-
-// blockIPRestriction sets captured data fields for an IP-restriction block event.
-func (mw *Middleware) blockIPRestriction(r *http.Request, reason string) {
-	mw.markDenied(r, reason)
 	mw.logger.Debugf("IP restriction: %s for %s", reason, r.RemoteAddr)
 }
 
@@ -751,49 +642,40 @@ func wasCredentialSubmitted(r *http.Request, method auth.Method) bool {
 	return false
 }
 
-// DomainSettings is the per-domain configuration AddDomain applies.
-type DomainSettings struct {
-	Schemes []Scheme
-	// SessionPublicKey is the base64-encoded ed25519 key used to verify session
-	// cookies. Required when Schemes is non-empty.
-	SessionPublicKey  string
-	SessionExpiration time.Duration
-	AccountID         types.AccountID
-	ServiceID         types.ServiceID
-	IPRestrictions    *restrict.Filter
-	// Private forces ValidateTunnelPeer enforcement (403 on failure) regardless
-	// of the schemes list.
-	Private    bool
-	AppSecMode restrict.AppSecMode
-}
-
-// AddDomain registers authentication schemes for the given domain. With schemes
-// a valid session public key is required.
-func (mw *Middleware) AddDomain(domain string, settings DomainSettings) error {
-	config := DomainConfig{
-		AccountID:      settings.AccountID,
-		ServiceID:      settings.ServiceID,
-		IPRestrictions: settings.IPRestrictions,
-		Private:        settings.Private,
-		AppSecMode:     settings.AppSecMode,
+// AddDomain registers authentication schemes for the given domain. With schemes a valid session public key is required.
+// private=true forces ValidateTunnelPeer enforcement (403 on failure) regardless of the schemes list.
+func (mw *Middleware) AddDomain(domain string, schemes []Scheme, publicKeyB64 string, expiration time.Duration, accountID types.AccountID, serviceID types.ServiceID, ipRestrictions *restrict.Filter, private bool) error {
+	if len(schemes) == 0 {
+		mw.domainsMux.Lock()
+		defer mw.domainsMux.Unlock()
+		mw.domains[domain] = DomainConfig{
+			AccountID:      accountID,
+			ServiceID:      serviceID,
+			IPRestrictions: ipRestrictions,
+			Private:        private,
+		}
+		return nil
 	}
 
-	if len(settings.Schemes) > 0 {
-		pubKeyBytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(settings.SessionPublicKey)
-		if err != nil {
-			return fmt.Errorf("decode session public key for domain %s: %w", domain, err)
-		}
-		if len(pubKeyBytes) != ed25519.PublicKeySize {
-			return fmt.Errorf("invalid session public key size for domain %s: got %d, want %d", domain, len(pubKeyBytes), ed25519.PublicKeySize)
-		}
-		config.Schemes = settings.Schemes
-		config.SessionPublicKey = pubKeyBytes
-		config.SessionExpiration = settings.SessionExpiration
+	pubKeyBytes, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(publicKeyB64)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("decode session public key for domain %s: %w", domain, err)
+	}
+	if len(pubKeyBytes) != ed25519.PublicKeySize {
+		return fmt.Errorf("invalid session public key size for domain %s: got %d, want %d", domain, len(pubKeyBytes), ed25519.PublicKeySize)
 	}
 
 	mw.domainsMux.Lock()
 	defer mw.domainsMux.Unlock()
-	mw.domains[domain] = config
+	mw.domains[domain] = DomainConfig{
+		Schemes:           schemes,
+		SessionPublicKey:  pubKeyBytes,
+		SessionExpiration: expiration,
+		AccountID:         accountID,
+		ServiceID:         serviceID,
+		IPRestrictions:    ipRestrictions,
+		Private:           private,
+	}
 	return nil
 }
 

proxy/internal/auth/middleware_test.go

@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ func TestAddDomain_ValidKey(t *testing.T) {
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
 
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
-	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour})
+	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	mw.domainsMux.RLock()
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ func TestAddDomain_EmptyKey(t *testing.T) {
 	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
 
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
-	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionExpiration: time.Hour})
+	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, "", time.Hour, "", "", nil, false)
 	require.Error(t, err)
 	assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "invalid session public key size")
 
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ func TestAddDomain_InvalidBase64(t *testing.T) {
 	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
 
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
-	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: "not-valid-base64!!!", SessionExpiration: time.Hour})
+	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, "not-valid-base64!!!", time.Hour, "", "", nil, false)
 	require.Error(t, err)
 	assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "decode session public key")
 
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ func TestAddDomain_WrongKeySize(t *testing.T) {
 
 	shortKey := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte("tooshort"))
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
-	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: shortKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour})
+	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, shortKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false)
 	require.Error(t, err)
 	assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "invalid session public key size")
 
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ func TestAddDomain_WrongKeySize(t *testing.T) {
 func TestAddDomain_NoSchemes_NoKeyRequired(t *testing.T) {
 	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
 
-	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{SessionExpiration: time.Hour})
+	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", nil, "", time.Hour, "", "", nil, false)
 	require.NoError(t, err, "domains with no auth schemes should not require a key")
 
 	mw.domainsMux.RLock()
@@ -139,8 +139,8 @@ func TestAddDomain_OverwritesPreviousConfig(t *testing.T) {
 
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
 
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp1.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp2.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: 2 * time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp1.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp2.PublicKey, 2*time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	mw.domainsMux.RLock()
 	config := mw.domains["example.com"]
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ func TestRemoveDomain(t *testing.T) {
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
 
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	mw.RemoveDomain("example.com")
 
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ func TestProtect_UnknownDomainPassesThrough(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestProtect_DomainWithNoSchemesPassesThrough(t *testing.T) {
 	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", nil, "", time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
 
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ func TestProtect_UnauthenticatedRequestIsBlocked(t *testing.T) {
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
 
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	var backendCalled bool
 	backend := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ func TestProtect_HostWithPortIsMatched(t *testing.T) {
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
 
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	var backendCalled bool
 	backend := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ func TestProtect_ValidSessionCookiePassesThrough(t *testing.T) {
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
 
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	token, err := sessionkey.SignToken(kp.PrivateKey, "test-user", "", "example.com", auth.MethodPIN, nil, nil, time.Hour)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ func TestProtect_SessionCookieGroupsPropagate(t *testing.T) {
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
 
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	groups := []string{"engineering", "sre"}
 	token, err := sessionkey.SignToken(kp.PrivateKey, "test-user", "", "example.com", auth.MethodPIN, groups, nil, time.Hour)
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ func TestProtect_PrivateService_TunnelPeerGroupsPropagate(t *testing.T) {
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
 
 	// Private service: no operator schemes — auth gates solely on the tunnel peer.
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("agent.example.com", DomainSettings{SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour, AccountID: "acct-1", ServiceID: "svc-1", Private: true}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("agent.example.com", nil, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acct-1", "svc-1", nil, true))
 
 	cd := proxy.NewCapturedData("")
 	cd.SetClientIP(netip.MustParseAddr("100.90.1.14")) // CGNAT tunnel source
@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ func TestProtect_PrivateService_TunnelPeerDenied(t *testing.T) {
 	}}
 	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), validator, nil)
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("agent.example.com", DomainSettings{SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour, AccountID: "acct-1", ServiceID: "svc-1", Private: true}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("agent.example.com", nil, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acct-1", "svc-1", nil, true))
 
 	cd := proxy.NewCapturedData("")
 	cd.SetClientIP(netip.MustParseAddr("100.90.1.14"))
@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ func TestProtect_ExpiredSessionCookieIsRejected(t *testing.T) {
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
 
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	// Sign a token that expired 1 second ago.
 	token, err := sessionkey.SignToken(kp.PrivateKey, "test-user", "", "example.com", auth.MethodPIN, nil, nil, -time.Second)
@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ func TestProtect_WrongDomainCookieIsRejected(t *testing.T) {
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
 
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	// Token signed for a different domain audience.
 	token, err := sessionkey.SignToken(kp.PrivateKey, "test-user", "", "other.com", auth.MethodPIN, nil, nil, time.Hour)
@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ func TestProtect_WrongKeyCookieIsRejected(t *testing.T) {
 	kp2 := generateTestKeyPair(t)
 
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp1.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp1.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	// Token signed with a different private key.
 	token, err := sessionkey.SignToken(kp2.PrivateKey, "test-user", "", "example.com", auth.MethodPIN, nil, nil, time.Hour)
@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ func TestProtect_SchemeAuthRedirectsWithCookie(t *testing.T) {
 			return "", "pin", nil
 		},
 	}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	var backendCalled bool
 	backend := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
@@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ func TestProtect_FailedAuthDoesNotSetCookie(t *testing.T) {
 			return "", "pin", nil
 		},
 	}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
 
@@ -584,7 +584,7 @@ func TestProtect_MultipleSchemes(t *testing.T) {
 			return "", "password", nil
 		},
 	}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{pinScheme, passwordScheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{pinScheme, passwordScheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	var backendCalled bool
 	backend := http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
@@ -614,7 +614,7 @@ func TestProtect_InvalidTokenFromSchemeReturns400(t *testing.T) {
 			return "invalid-jwt-token", "", nil
 		},
 	}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
 
@@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ func TestAddDomain_RandomBytes32NotEd25519(t *testing.T) {
 	key := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(randomBytes)
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
 
-	err = mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: key, SessionExpiration: time.Hour})
+	err = mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, key, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false)
 	require.NoError(t, err, "any 32-byte key should be accepted at registration time")
 }
 
@@ -647,10 +647,10 @@ func TestAddDomain_InvalidKeyDoesNotCorruptExistingConfig(t *testing.T) {
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
 
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	// Attempt to overwrite with an invalid key.
-	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: "bad", SessionExpiration: time.Hour})
+	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, "bad", time.Hour, "", "", nil, false)
 	require.Error(t, err)
 
 	// The original valid config should still be intact.
@@ -674,7 +674,7 @@ func TestProtect_FailedPinAuthCapturesAuthMethod(t *testing.T) {
 			return "", "pin", nil
 		},
 	}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	capturedData := proxy.NewCapturedData("")
 	handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
@@ -701,7 +701,7 @@ func TestProtect_FailedPasswordAuthCapturesAuthMethod(t *testing.T) {
 			return "", "password", nil
 		},
 	}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	capturedData := proxy.NewCapturedData("")
 	handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
@@ -728,7 +728,7 @@ func TestProtect_NoCredentialsDoesNotCaptureAuthMethod(t *testing.T) {
 			return "", "pin", nil
 		},
 	}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	capturedData := proxy.NewCapturedData("")
 	handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
@@ -815,7 +815,8 @@ func TestWasCredentialSubmitted(t *testing.T) {
 func TestCheckIPRestrictions_UnparseableAddress(t *testing.T) {
 	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
 
-	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{AccountID: "acc1", ServiceID: "svc1", IPRestrictions: restrict.ParseFilter(restrict.FilterConfig{AllowedCIDRs: []string{"10.0.0.0/8"}})})
+	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", nil, "", 0, "acc1", "svc1",
+		restrict.ParseFilter(restrict.FilterConfig{AllowedCIDRs: []string{"10.0.0.0/8"}}), false)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
@@ -850,7 +851,8 @@ func TestCheckIPRestrictions_UsesCapturedDataClientIP(t *testing.T) {
 	// trusted proxies), checkIPRestrictions should use that IP, not RemoteAddr.
 	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
 
-	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{AccountID: "acc1", ServiceID: "svc1", IPRestrictions: restrict.ParseFilter(restrict.FilterConfig{AllowedCIDRs: []string{"203.0.113.0/24"}})})
+	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", nil, "", 0, "acc1", "svc1",
+		restrict.ParseFilter(restrict.FilterConfig{AllowedCIDRs: []string{"203.0.113.0/24"}}), false)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
@@ -890,7 +892,8 @@ func TestCheckIPRestrictions_NilGeoWithCountryRules(t *testing.T) {
 	// Geo is nil, country restrictions are configured: must deny (fail-close).
 	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
 
-	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{AccountID: "acc1", ServiceID: "svc1", IPRestrictions: restrict.ParseFilter(restrict.FilterConfig{AllowedCountries: []string{"US"}})})
+	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", nil, "", 0, "acc1", "svc1",
+		restrict.ParseFilter(restrict.FilterConfig{AllowedCountries: []string{"US"}}), false)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
@@ -913,10 +916,11 @@ func TestCheckIPRestrictions_NilGeoWithCountryRules(t *testing.T) {
 func TestCheckIPRestrictions_OverlayOriginSkipsCountryRules(t *testing.T) {
 	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
 
-	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{AccountID: "acc1", ServiceID: "svc1", IPRestrictions: restrict.ParseFilter(restrict.FilterConfig{
-		AllowedCIDRs:     []string{"100.64.0.0/10"},
-		AllowedCountries: []string{"US"},
-	})})
+	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", nil, "", 0, "acc1", "svc1",
+		restrict.ParseFilter(restrict.FilterConfig{
+			AllowedCIDRs:     []string{"100.64.0.0/10"},
+			AllowedCountries: []string{"US"},
+		}), false)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
@@ -949,7 +953,8 @@ func TestCheckIPRestrictions_OverlayOriginSkipsCountryRules(t *testing.T) {
 func TestCheckIPRestrictions_OverlayOriginRespectsCIDR(t *testing.T) {
 	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
 
-	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{AccountID: "acc1", ServiceID: "svc1", IPRestrictions: restrict.ParseFilter(restrict.FilterConfig{AllowedCIDRs: []string{"100.64.0.0/16"}})})
+	err := mw.AddDomain("example.com", nil, "", 0, "acc1", "svc1",
+		restrict.ParseFilter(restrict.FilterConfig{AllowedCIDRs: []string{"100.64.0.0/16"}}), false)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
@@ -977,7 +982,7 @@ func TestProtect_OIDCOnlyRedirectsDirectly(t *testing.T) {
 			return "", oidcURL, nil
 		},
 	}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
 
@@ -1006,7 +1011,7 @@ func TestProtect_OIDCWithOtherMethodShowsLoginPage(t *testing.T) {
 			return "", "pin", nil
 		},
 	}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{oidcScheme, pinScheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{oidcScheme, pinScheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
 
@@ -1050,7 +1055,7 @@ func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_ForwardsOnSuccess(t *testing.T) {
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
 
 	hdr := newHeaderSchemeWithToken(t, kp, "X-API-Key", "secret-key")
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{hdr}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour, AccountID: "acc1", ServiceID: "svc1"}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{hdr}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false))
 
 	var backendCalled bool
 	capturedData := proxy.NewCapturedData("")
@@ -1093,7 +1098,7 @@ func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_MissingHeaderFallsThrough(t *testing.T) {
 	hdr := newHeaderSchemeWithToken(t, kp, "X-API-Key", "secret-key")
 	// Also add a PIN scheme so we can verify fallthrough behavior.
 	pinScheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{hdr, pinScheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour, AccountID: "acc1", ServiceID: "svc1"}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{hdr, pinScheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false))
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
 
@@ -1113,7 +1118,7 @@ func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_WrongValueReturns401(t *testing.T) {
 		return &proto.AuthenticateResponse{Success: false}, nil
 	}}
 	hdr := NewHeader(mock, "svc1", "acc1", "X-API-Key")
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{hdr}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour, AccountID: "acc1", ServiceID: "svc1"}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{hdr}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false))
 
 	capturedData := proxy.NewCapturedData("")
 	handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
@@ -1136,7 +1141,7 @@ func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_InfraErrorReturns502(t *testing.T) {
 		return nil, errors.New("gRPC unavailable")
 	}}
 	hdr := NewHeader(mock, "svc1", "acc1", "X-API-Key")
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{hdr}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour, AccountID: "acc1", ServiceID: "svc1"}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{hdr}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false))
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
 
@@ -1153,7 +1158,7 @@ func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_SubsequentRequestUsesSessionCookie(t *testing.T) {
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
 
 	hdr := newHeaderSchemeWithToken(t, kp, "X-API-Key", "secret-key")
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{hdr}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour, AccountID: "acc1", ServiceID: "svc1"}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{hdr}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false))
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
 		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
@@ -1213,7 +1218,7 @@ func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_MultipleValuesSameHeader(t *testing.T) {
 
 	// Single Header scheme (as if one entry existed), but the mock checks both values.
 	hdr := NewHeader(mock, "svc1", "acc1", "Authorization")
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{hdr}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour, AccountID: "acc1", ServiceID: "svc1"}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{hdr}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false))
 
 	var backendCalled bool
 	handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
@@ -1271,7 +1276,7 @@ func TestProtect_OIDCOnPlainHTTP_BlockedWith400(t *testing.T) {
 			return "", "https://idp.example.com/authorize", nil
 		},
 	}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
 
@@ -1295,7 +1300,7 @@ func TestProtect_OIDCOverTLS_NotBlocked(t *testing.T) {
 			return "", "https://idp.example.com/authorize", nil
 		},
 	}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
 
@@ -1315,7 +1320,7 @@ func TestProtect_NonOIDCSchemes_PlainHTTP_NotBlocked(t *testing.T) {
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
 
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
 
@@ -1345,7 +1350,7 @@ func TestProtect_TunnelPeerFastPath_RequiresInboundMarker(t *testing.T) {
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
 
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
 
@@ -1380,7 +1385,7 @@ func TestProtect_TunnelPeerFastPath_TakesPathWithInboundMarker(t *testing.T) {
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
 
 	scheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", DomainSettings{Schemes: []Scheme{scheme}, SessionPublicKey: kp.PublicKey, SessionExpiration: time.Hour}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{scheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "", "", nil, false))
 
 	handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
 

proxy/internal/auth/tunnel_lookup_test.go

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ func (s *stubSessionValidator) ValidateTunnelPeer(_ context.Context, in *proto.V
 func newTunnelMiddleware(t *testing.T, validator SessionValidator) *Middleware {
 	t.Helper()
 	mw := NewMiddleware(log.New(), validator, nil)
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("svc.example", DomainSettings{AccountID: "acct-1", ServiceID: "svc-1"}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("svc.example", nil, "", 0, "acct-1", "svc-1", nil, false))
 	return mw
 }
 
@@ -235,8 +235,8 @@ func TestForwardWithTunnelPeer_RoutesAccountIDIntoCacheKey(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	mw := NewMiddleware(log.New(), validator, nil)
 
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("svc-a.example", DomainSettings{AccountID: "acct-a", ServiceID: "svc-a"}))
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("svc-b.example", DomainSettings{AccountID: "acct-b", ServiceID: "svc-b"}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("svc-a.example", nil, "", 0, "acct-a", "svc-a", nil, false))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("svc-b.example", nil, "", 0, "acct-b", "svc-b", nil, false))
 
 	// The fast-path requires the inbound-listener marker on the context.
 	// The peerstore lookup itself is account-agnostic at this level
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ func TestForwardWithTunnelPeer_LocalLookupShortCircuitDoesNotPopulateCache(t *te
 
 func TestPrivateService_FailsClosedOnTunnelPeerFailure(t *testing.T) {
 	mw := NewMiddleware(log.New(), nil, nil)
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("private.svc", DomainSettings{AccountID: "acct-1", ServiceID: "svc-1", Private: true}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("private.svc", nil, "", 0, "acct-1", "svc-1", nil, true))
 
 	called := false
 	handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ func TestPrivateService_ForwardsOnTunnelPeerSuccess(t *testing.T) {
 		},
 	}
 	mw := NewMiddleware(log.New(), validator, nil)
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("private.svc", DomainSettings{AccountID: "acct-1", ServiceID: "svc-1", Private: true}))
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("private.svc", nil, "", 0, "acct-1", "svc-1", nil, true))
 
 	called := false
 	handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {

proxy/internal/llm/pricing/defaults_pricing.yaml

@@ -161,16 +161,6 @@ openai:
     input_per_1k: 0.0001
     output_per_1k: 0
 
-  # Kimi / Moonshot AI (kimi_api) — OpenAI-compatible /v1 endpoint. Moonshot
-  # reports cache hits OpenAI-style when present; cached input is 10% of
-  # input ($0.30 vs $3.00 per MTok). kimi-k3 is the only model the platform
-  # serves newer accounts (K2-era ids and kimi-latest 404), matching the
-  # management catalog.
-  kimi-k3:
-    input_per_1k: 0.003
-    output_per_1k: 0.015
-    cached_input_per_1k: 0.0003
-
 anthropic:
   # Claude 4.x family — cache reads ≈10% of input, cache writes ≈125% of input.
   # Pricing source: Anthropic's current published rates per million tokens,
@@ -216,20 +206,6 @@ anthropic:
     cache_read_per_1k: 0.0001
     cache_creation_per_1k: 0.00125
 
-  # Kimi / Moonshot AI (kimi_api) via the Anthropic-compatible endpoint
-  # (/anthropic/v1/messages — the official Claude Code setup). Same rates
-  # as the OpenAI-shape entry above. "kimi-k3[1m]" is the model id some
-  # Claude Code guides set for the 1M-context alias; priced identically so
-  # cost metering doesn't silently skip those requests.
-  kimi-k3:
-    input_per_1k: 0.003
-    output_per_1k: 0.015
-    cache_read_per_1k: 0.0003
-  "kimi-k3[1m]":
-    input_per_1k: 0.003
-    output_per_1k: 0.015
-    cache_read_per_1k: 0.0003
-
 bedrock:
   # AWS Bedrock model ids, normalised by the request parser (cross-region
   # inference-profile prefix + version/throughput suffix stripped), e.g.

proxy/internal/llm/vertex_model.go

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+package llm
+
+import "strings"
+
+// NormalizeVertexModel strips the "@version" suffix from a Vertex AI model id
+// so it matches the catalog key, e.g. "claude-sonnet-4-5@20250929" ->
+// "claude-sonnet-4-5". Shared by the parser, router, and guardrail so both
+// spellings compare equal.
+func NormalizeVertexModel(modelID string) string {
+	if at := strings.Index(modelID, "@"); at >= 0 {
+		return modelID[:at]
+	}
+	return modelID
+}

proxy/internal/llm/vertex_model_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+package llm
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+func TestNormalizeVertexModel(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := map[string]string{
+		"claude-sonnet-4-5@20250929": "claude-sonnet-4-5",
+		"claude-opus-4-6@20250514":   "claude-opus-4-6",
+		"claude-opus-4-6":            "claude-opus-4-6", // bare id passes through
+		"text-embedding-005@001":     "text-embedding-005",
+		"@cf/meta/llama-3-8b":        "", // leading "@" -> empty (treated as no model)
+	}
+	for in, want := range cases {
+		require.Equal(t, want, NormalizeVertexModel(in), "normalize %q", in)
+	}
+}

proxy/internal/middleware/builtin/llm_guardrail/middleware.go

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"unicode/utf8"
 
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/llm"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/middleware"
 )
 
@@ -162,6 +163,11 @@ func (m *Middleware) modelInAllowlist(model string) bool {
 		if allowed == normalised {
 			return true
 		}
+		// Accept a Vertex entry stored with its "@version" suffix against the
+		// suffix-stripped request model. Entries without "@" stay exact.
+		if v := llm.NormalizeVertexModel(allowed); v != "" && v != allowed && v == normalised {
+			return true
+		}
 	}
 	return false
 }

proxy/internal/middleware/builtin/llm_guardrail/middleware_test.go

@@ -70,6 +70,25 @@ func TestAllowlistMatchAllows(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "model in allowlist must be allowed")
 }
 
+// A Vertex "@version" allowlist entry must match the version-stripped request
+// model the parser emits.
+func TestAllowlistVertexVersionedEntryMatchesStrippedModel(t *testing.T) {
+	mw := New(Config{ModelAllowlist: []string{"claude-opus-4-6@20250514"}})
+	out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
+		middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "claude-opus-4-6"},
+	))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision,
+		"@version allowlist entry must match the version-stripped request model")
+
+	out, err = mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
+		middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "claude-opus-4-8"},
+	))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision,
+		"a different model must stay denied")
+}
+
 func TestAllowlistMissDenies(t *testing.T) {
 	mw := New(Config{ModelAllowlist: []string{"gpt-4o"}})
 	out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(

proxy/internal/middleware/builtin/llm_request_parser/guardrail_allowlist_test.go

@@ -104,3 +104,93 @@ func TestModelAllowlist_URLRoutedProviders(t *testing.T) {
 		})
 	}
 }
+
+// TestModelAllowlist_VertexRequestShapes replays the Vertex request shapes an
+// Anthropic SDK client sends (model in the URL path, optionally unversioned,
+// plus the count-tokens body-model endpoint) against bare and "@version"
+// allowlists. URLs mirror a customer-reported request.
+func TestModelAllowlist_VertexRequestShapes(t *testing.T) {
+	const (
+		opusBare      = "/v1/projects/corp-gcp-it-all-claude/locations/global/publishers/anthropic/models/claude-opus-4-6:rawPredict"
+		opusBareSSE   = "/v1/projects/corp-gcp-it-all-claude/locations/global/publishers/anthropic/models/claude-opus-4-6:streamRawPredict"
+		countTokens   = "/v1/projects/corp-gcp-it-all-claude/locations/global/publishers/anthropic/models/count-tokens:rawPredict"
+		messagesBody  = `{"anthropic_version":"vertex-2023-10-16","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}`
+		countOpusBody = `{"model":"claude-opus-4-6","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}`
+	)
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name      string
+		url       string
+		body      string
+		allowlist []string
+		decision  middleware.Decision
+		denyCode  string
+	}{
+		{
+			name:      "unversioned model allowed by bare catalog entry",
+			url:       opusBare,
+			body:      messagesBody,
+			allowlist: []string{"claude-opus-4-6"},
+			decision:  middleware.DecisionAllow,
+		},
+		{
+			name:      "unversioned model allowed by @version allowlist entry",
+			url:       opusBare,
+			body:      messagesBody,
+			allowlist: []string{"claude-opus-4-6@20250514"},
+			decision:  middleware.DecisionAllow,
+		},
+		{
+			name:      "streaming action allowed the same as rawPredict",
+			url:       opusBareSSE,
+			body:      messagesBody,
+			allowlist: []string{"claude-opus-4-6"},
+			decision:  middleware.DecisionAllow,
+		},
+		{
+			// The customer report: a Sonnet-only allowlist must block Opus.
+			name:      "unversioned model outside the allowlist denied",
+			url:       opusBare,
+			body:      messagesBody,
+			allowlist: []string{"claude-sonnet-4-5"},
+			decision:  middleware.DecisionDeny,
+			denyCode:  "llm_policy.model_blocked",
+		},
+		{
+			name:      "count-tokens resolves the body model and passes when allowed",
+			url:       countTokens,
+			body:      countOpusBody,
+			allowlist: []string{"claude-opus-4-6"},
+			decision:  middleware.DecisionAllow,
+		},
+		{
+			name:      "count-tokens with a disallowed body model denied",
+			url:       countTokens,
+			body:      countOpusBody,
+			allowlist: []string{"claude-sonnet-4-5"},
+			decision:  middleware.DecisionDeny,
+			denyCode:  "llm_policy.model_blocked",
+		},
+		{
+			// No body model: the pseudo-model stays and fails closed.
+			name:      "count-tokens without a body model fails closed",
+			url:       countTokens,
+			body:      messagesBody,
+			allowlist: []string{"claude-opus-4-6"},
+			decision:  middleware.DecisionDeny,
+			denyCode:  "llm_policy.model_blocked",
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			out := runParserGuardrail(t, tt.url, []byte(tt.body), tt.allowlist)
+			assert.Equal(t, tt.decision, out.Decision, "unexpected decision for %s", tt.name)
+			if tt.decision == middleware.DecisionDeny {
+				require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason, "deny reason must be set for %s", tt.name)
+				assert.Equal(t, 403, out.DenyStatus, "deny status must be 403 for %s", tt.name)
+				assert.Equal(t, tt.denyCode, out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code for %s", tt.name)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

proxy/internal/middleware/builtin/llm_request_parser/middleware.go

@@ -253,9 +253,7 @@ func parseVertexPath(reqPath string) (vertexRequest, bool) {
 	if c := strings.LastIndex(rest, ":"); c >= 0 {
 		model, action = rest[:c], rest[c+1:]
 	}
-	if at := strings.Index(model, "@"); at >= 0 {
-		model = model[:at]
-	}
+	model = llm.NormalizeVertexModel(model)
 	if model == "" {
 		return vertexRequest{}, false
 	}
@@ -276,24 +274,40 @@ func vertexPublisherVendor(publisher string) string {
 	}
 }
 
+// vertexCountTokensModel is the pseudo-model of the Vertex token-count endpoint,
+// the one Vertex shape whose real model lives in the body, not the URL path.
+const vertexCountTokensModel = "count-tokens"
+
 // invokeVertex emits the model/vendor/session/prompt for a Vertex publisher
 // request, using the publisher's parser to read the (vendor-native) body.
 func (m middlewareImpl) invokeVertex(in *middleware.Input, vx vertexRequest) *middleware.Output {
 	out := &middleware.Output{Decision: middleware.DecisionAllow}
 	vendor := vertexPublisherVendor(vx.publisher)
 
-	md := []middleware.KV{}
-	if vendor != "" {
-		md = append(md, middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMProvider, Value: vendor})
-	}
-	md = append(md, middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: vx.model})
-	md = append(md, middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMStream, Value: strconv.FormatBool(vx.stream)})
-
 	var parser llm.Parser
 	if vendor != "" {
 		parser, _ = llm.ParserByName(vendor)
 	}
 
+	model := vx.model
+	// count-tokens carries its real model in the body; resolve it so the
+	// guardrail and router evaluate the actual model. An unreadable body keeps
+	// the pseudo-model and fails closed downstream.
+	if model == vertexCountTokensModel && parser != nil {
+		if facts, err := parser.ParseRequest(in.Body); err == nil && facts.Model != "" {
+			if bodyModel := llm.NormalizeVertexModel(facts.Model); bodyModel != "" {
+				model = bodyModel
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	md := []middleware.KV{}
+	if vendor != "" {
+		md = append(md, middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMProvider, Value: vendor})
+	}
+	md = append(md, middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: model})
+	md = append(md, middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMStream, Value: strconv.FormatBool(vx.stream)})
+
 	sessionID := sessionIDFromHeaders(in.Headers)
 	if sessionID == "" && parser != nil {
 		sessionID = parser.ExtractSessionID(in.Body)

proxy/internal/middleware/builtin/llm_router/middleware.go

@@ -556,14 +556,16 @@ func routeClaimsModel(route ProviderRoute, model string) bool {
 		if candidate == model {
 			return true
 		}
-		// Bedrock request models reach the router already normalized (the parser
-		// strips the region / inference-profile prefix and version suffix), but
-		// the operator may register the raw inference-profile id (e.g.
-		// "us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5"). Normalize the candidate so both sides
-		// compare equal; otherwise a native Bedrock request denies as not-routable.
+		// The request model is already normalized by the parser, but the operator
+		// may register the raw id (Bedrock inference-profile, Vertex "@version").
+		// Normalize the candidate so both spellings match; else it denies as
+		// not-routable.
 		if route.Bedrock && llm.NormalizeBedrockModel(candidate) == model {
 			return true
 		}
+		if route.Vertex && llm.NormalizeVertexModel(candidate) == model {
+			return true
+		}
 	}
 	return false
 }

proxy/internal/middleware/builtin/llm_router/vertex_route_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+package llm_router
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/middleware"
+)
+
+// A Vertex route registered with the raw "@version" id must match the
+// version-stripped request model; non-Vertex routes stay exact.
+func TestRouteClaimsModel_VertexNormalizesCandidate(t *testing.T) {
+	route := ProviderRoute{Vertex: true, Models: []string{"claude-opus-4-6@20250514"}}
+	assert.True(t, routeClaimsModel(route, "claude-opus-4-6"))
+	assert.False(t, routeClaimsModel(route, "claude-haiku-4-5"))
+
+	bare := ProviderRoute{Vertex: true, Models: []string{"claude-opus-4-6"}}
+	assert.True(t, routeClaimsModel(bare, "claude-opus-4-6"))
+
+	direct := ProviderRoute{Models: []string{"claude-opus-4-6@20250514"}}
+	assert.False(t, routeClaimsModel(direct, "claude-opus-4-6"),
+		"non-Vertex routes must not normalize @version candidates")
+}
+
+// TestRouter_VertexUnversionedModelRoutes replays the customer-reported request:
+// an unversioned model id must route on a provider registered with "@version" ids.
+func TestRouter_VertexUnversionedModelRoutes(t *testing.T) {
+	route := vertexRoute()
+	route.Models = []string{"claude-opus-4-6@20250514", "claude-sonnet-4-5@20250929"}
+	mw := New(Config{Providers: []ProviderRoute{route}})
+
+	in := pathRoutedInput(
+		"/v1/projects/corp-gcp-it-all-claude/locations/global/publishers/anthropic/models/claude-opus-4-6:rawPredict",
+		"anthropic",
+		"claude-opus-4-6",
+	)
+	out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), in)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision,
+		"unversioned request model must route on a provider registered with @version ids")
+
+	denied := pathRoutedInput(
+		"/v1/projects/corp-gcp-it-all-claude/locations/global/publishers/anthropic/models/claude-haiku-4-5:rawPredict",
+		"anthropic",
+		"claude-haiku-4-5",
+	)
+	out, err = mw.Invoke(context.Background(), denied)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision,
+		"a model outside the registered list must still deny")
+	require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason)
+	assert.Equal(t, denyCodeNotRoutable, out.DenyReason.Code)
+}

proxy/internal/proxy/agent_network_vertex_guardrail_realstack_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,272 @@
+package proxy_test
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"net"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"net/url"
+	"runtime"
+	"strings"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"google.golang.org/grpc"
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials/insecure"
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/test/bufconn"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork"
+	agentNetworkTypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/types"
+	rpservice "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/service"
+	mgmtgrpc "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/shared/grpc"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/store"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/middleware"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/middleware/bodytap"
+	mwbuiltin "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/middleware/builtin"
+	_ "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/middleware/builtin/cost_meter"
+	_ "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/middleware/builtin/llm_guardrail"
+	_ "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/middleware/builtin/llm_identity_inject"
+	_ "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/middleware/builtin/llm_limit_check"
+	_ "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/middleware/builtin/llm_limit_record"
+	_ "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/middleware/builtin/llm_request_parser"
+	_ "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/middleware/builtin/llm_response_parser"
+	_ "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/middleware/builtin/llm_router"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/proxy"
+	nbproxytypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/types"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
+
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+)
+
+// TestReverseProxy_VertexGuardrail_ModelAllowlist drives Anthropic-on-Vertex
+// requests (model in the URL path, not the body) through the full synthesized
+// middleware chain against an in-process management stack and a fake upstream.
+// With a Sonnet-only guardrail, Opus must be denied (model_blocked) before the
+// upstream and Sonnet must reach it. Two provider shapes exercise different
+// code: "catch_all" (no models → only the guardrail can block Opus) and
+// "versioned_models" (raw "@version" ids → the router must normalize to route
+// Sonnet while the guardrail still blocks Opus).
+func TestReverseProxy_VertexGuardrail_ModelAllowlist(t *testing.T) {
+	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
+		t.Skip("sqlite store not supported on Windows")
+	}
+
+	cases := []struct {
+		name           string
+		providerModels []agentNetworkTypes.ProviderModel
+	}{
+		{name: "catch_all", providerModels: nil},
+		{name: "versioned_models", providerModels: []agentNetworkTypes.ProviderModel{
+			{ID: "claude-sonnet-4-5@20250929"},
+			{ID: "claude-opus-4-6@20250514"},
+		}},
+	}
+	for _, tc := range cases {
+		tc := tc
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			runVertexGuardrailCase(t, tc.providerModels)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func runVertexGuardrailCase(t *testing.T, providerModels []agentNetworkTypes.ProviderModel) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	const (
+		testAccountID = "acct-vertex-guard-1"
+		testAdminUser = "user-admin-1"
+		adminGroupID  = "grp-admins"
+		providerID    = "prov-vertex-test"
+		guardrailID   = "ainguard-sonnet-only"
+		cluster       = "test.proxy.local"
+		subdomain     = "vertexguard"
+	)
+	testLogger := log.New()
+	testLogger.SetLevel(log.PanicLevel)
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	// Fake Vertex upstream: a hit on the disallowed model means a guardrail miss.
+	var upstreamHits atomic.Int64
+	upstreamBody := []byte(`{"id":"msg_x","type":"message","role":"assistant","model":"claude","content":[{"type":"text","text":"pong"}],"usage":{"input_tokens":5,"output_tokens":2}}`)
+	upstream := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		upstreamHits.Add(1)
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		_, _ = w.Write(upstreamBody)
+	}))
+	t.Cleanup(upstream.Close)
+
+	// In-process management gRPC (bufconn) over a real sqlite store + manager.
+	st, cleanup, err := store.NewTestStoreFromSQL(ctx, "", t.TempDir())
+	require.NoError(t, err, "real sqlite test store must come up")
+	t.Cleanup(cleanup)
+
+	anMgr := agentnetwork.NewManager(st, nil, nil, nil)
+	server := &mgmtgrpc.ProxyServiceServer{}
+	server.SetAgentNetworkLimitsService(anMgr)
+
+	lis := bufconn.Listen(1024 * 1024)
+	srv := grpc.NewServer()
+	proto.RegisterProxyServiceServer(srv, server)
+	go func() { _ = srv.Serve(lis) }()
+	t.Cleanup(srv.Stop)
+
+	conn, err := grpc.NewClient("passthrough:///bufnet",
+		grpc.WithContextDialer(func(_ context.Context, _ string) (net.Conn, error) { return lis.Dial() }),
+		grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials()),
+	)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = conn.Close() })
+	mgmtClient := proto.NewProxyServiceClient(conn)
+
+	require.NoError(t, st.SaveAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, &agentNetworkTypes.Settings{
+		AccountID: testAccountID,
+		Cluster:   cluster,
+		Subdomain: subdomain,
+	}))
+	require.NoError(t, st.SaveAgentNetworkProvider(ctx, &agentNetworkTypes.Provider{
+		ID:          providerID,
+		AccountID:   testAccountID,
+		ProviderID:  "vertex_ai_api",
+		Name:        "vertex-guard-test",
+		UpstreamURL: upstream.URL,
+		// A static bearer (not "keyfile::…") so the router injects a static auth
+		// header instead of minting a GCP token, which needs network egress and
+		// would deny before the guardrail runs, masking the decision under test.
+		APIKey:            "static-vertex-token",
+		Enabled:           true,
+		Models:            providerModels,
+		SessionPrivateKey: "priv",
+		SessionPublicKey:  "pub",
+	}))
+	// Guardrail allowlisting ONLY Sonnet.
+	require.NoError(t, st.SaveAgentNetworkGuardrail(ctx, &agentNetworkTypes.Guardrail{
+		ID:        guardrailID,
+		AccountID: testAccountID,
+		Name:      "sonnet-only",
+		Checks: agentNetworkTypes.GuardrailChecks{
+			ModelAllowlist: agentNetworkTypes.GuardrailModelAllowlist{
+				Enabled: true,
+				Models:  []string{"claude-sonnet-4-5"},
+			},
+		},
+	}))
+	require.NoError(t, st.SaveAgentNetworkPolicy(ctx, &agentNetworkTypes.Policy{
+		ID:                     "ainpol-vertex-guard",
+		AccountID:              testAccountID,
+		Name:                   "admins-vertex",
+		Enabled:                true,
+		SourceGroups:           []string{adminGroupID},
+		DestinationProviderIDs: []string{providerID},
+		GuardrailIDs:           []string{guardrailID},
+	}))
+
+	services, err := agentnetwork.SynthesizeServices(ctx, st, testAccountID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Len(t, services, 1, "exactly one synth service expected")
+	synthSvc := services[0]
+	require.NotEmpty(t, synthSvc.Targets, "synth target must exist")
+
+	mwbuiltin.Configure(ctx, t.TempDir(), nil, testLogger, mgmtClient)
+	registry := mwbuiltin.DefaultRegistry()
+	mwMetrics, err := middleware.NewMetrics(nil)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	mwMgr := middleware.NewManager(0, mwMetrics, testLogger)
+	mwMgr.SetResolver(middleware.NewResolver(registry))
+
+	specs := make([]middleware.Spec, 0, len(synthSvc.Targets[0].Options.Middlewares))
+	for _, mw := range synthSvc.Targets[0].Options.Middlewares {
+		var slot middleware.Slot
+		switch mw.Slot {
+		case rpservice.MiddlewareSlotOnRequest:
+			slot = middleware.SlotOnRequest
+		case rpservice.MiddlewareSlotOnResponse:
+			slot = middleware.SlotOnResponse
+		case rpservice.MiddlewareSlotTerminal:
+			slot = middleware.SlotTerminal
+		default:
+			t.Fatalf("unknown middleware slot %q on %s", mw.Slot, mw.ID)
+		}
+		specs = append(specs, middleware.Spec{
+			ID:        mw.ID,
+			Slot:      slot,
+			Enabled:   mw.Enabled,
+			FailMode:  middleware.FailOpen,
+			Timeout:   middleware.DefaultTimeout,
+			RawConfig: append([]byte(nil), mw.ConfigJSON...),
+			CanMutate: mw.CanMutate,
+		})
+	}
+
+	serviceIDStr := synthSvc.ID
+	require.NoError(t, mwMgr.Rebuild(serviceIDStr, []middleware.PathTargetBinding{{
+		ServiceID: serviceIDStr,
+		PathID:    "/",
+		Specs:     specs,
+	}}))
+
+	upstreamURL, err := url.Parse(upstream.URL)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	rp := proxy.NewReverseProxy(http.DefaultTransport, "auto", nil, testLogger, proxy.WithMiddlewareManager(mwMgr))
+	rp.AddMapping(proxy.Mapping{
+		ID:        nbproxytypes.ServiceID(serviceIDStr),
+		AccountID: nbproxytypes.AccountID(testAccountID),
+		Host:      synthSvc.Domain,
+		Paths: map[string]*proxy.PathTarget{
+			"/": {
+				URL:            upstreamURL,
+				DirectUpstream: true,
+				AgentNetwork:   true,
+				Middlewares:    specs,
+				CaptureConfig: &bodytap.Config{
+					MaxRequestBytes:  1 << 20,
+					MaxResponseBytes: 1 << 20,
+					ContentTypes:     []string{"application/json", "text/event-stream"},
+				},
+			},
+		},
+	})
+
+	// No "model" field — the model lives in the URL path, as Vertex clients send.
+	const vertexBody = `{"anthropic_version":"vertex-2023-10-16","max_tokens":64,"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"Reply with exactly: pong"}]}`
+
+	send := func(t *testing.T, model string) (int, int64, string) {
+		t.Helper()
+		before := upstreamHits.Load()
+		path := "/v1/projects/corp-gcp-it-all-claude/locations/global/publishers/anthropic/models/" + model + ":rawPredict"
+		req := httptest.NewRequest("POST", "https://"+synthSvc.Domain+path, strings.NewReader(vertexBody))
+		req.Host = synthSvc.Domain
+		req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+
+		cd := proxy.NewCapturedData("req-" + model)
+		cd.SetServiceID(nbproxytypes.ServiceID(serviceIDStr))
+		cd.SetAccountID(nbproxytypes.AccountID(testAccountID))
+		cd.SetUserID(testAdminUser)
+		cd.SetUserGroups([]string{adminGroupID})
+		cd.SetAuthMethod("tunnel_peer")
+		req = req.WithContext(proxy.WithCapturedData(req.Context(), cd))
+
+		w := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		rp.ServeHTTP(w, req)
+		return w.Code, upstreamHits.Load() - before, w.Body.String()
+	}
+
+	// Opus must be denied by the guardrail (model_blocked, not the router's
+	// model_not_routable) before reaching the upstream — the customer-reported bug.
+	t.Run("opus_denied_by_guardrail", func(t *testing.T) {
+		code, hits, body := send(t, "claude-opus-4-6")
+		assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, code, "Opus must be denied under a Sonnet-only allowlist; body=%s", body)
+		assert.Contains(t, body, "llm_policy.model_blocked", "denial must come from the guardrail allowlist, not routing; body=%s", body)
+		assert.Equal(t, int64(0), hits, "a denied request must never reach the Vertex upstream")
+	})
+
+	// The allowed model (Sonnet) passes the guardrail and reaches the upstream.
+	t.Run("sonnet_allowed", func(t *testing.T) {
+		code, hits, body := send(t, "claude-sonnet-4-5")
+		assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, code, "Sonnet is allowlisted and must be served; body=%s", body)
+		assert.Equal(t, int64(1), hits, "the allowed request must reach the Vertex upstream exactly once")
+	})
+}

proxy/internal/restrict/restrict.go

@@ -50,59 +50,6 @@ const (
 	CrowdSecObserve CrowdSecMode = "observe"
 )
 
-// AppSecMode is the per-service CrowdSec AppSec (WAF) enforcement mode.
-type AppSecMode string
-
-const (
-	// AppSecOff disables request inspection.
-	AppSecOff AppSecMode = ""
-	// AppSecEnforce blocks requests the engine flags, and fails closed when the
-	// engine is unreachable.
-	AppSecEnforce AppSecMode = "enforce"
-	// AppSecObserve records the verdict without blocking.
-	AppSecObserve AppSecMode = "observe"
-)
-
-// ParseAppSecMode maps a wire value to an AppSecMode. Unrecognized values map
-// to AppSecOff so a typo never turns inspection into an unintended block.
-func ParseAppSecMode(s string) AppSecMode {
-	switch AppSecMode(s) {
-	case AppSecEnforce:
-		return AppSecEnforce
-	case AppSecObserve:
-		return AppSecObserve
-	default:
-		return AppSecOff
-	}
-}
-
-// Enabled reports whether the mode asks for request inspection.
-func (m AppSecMode) Enabled() bool {
-	return m == AppSecEnforce || m == AppSecObserve
-}
-
-// AllowMatch controls how the configured allowlists (CIDR, country) combine.
-// Blocklists are always a separate hard-deny gate and are unaffected by it.
-type AllowMatch string
-
-const (
-	// AllowMatchAll requires the address to match every configured allowlist
-	// (AND). This is the default and preserves the historical behavior.
-	AllowMatchAll AllowMatch = "all"
-	// AllowMatchAny requires the address to match at least one configured
-	// allowlist (OR), e.g. "allowed country OR allowed CIDR".
-	AllowMatchAny AllowMatch = "any"
-)
-
-// normalizeAllowMatch maps unknown or empty values to the restrictive default
-// (AllowMatchAll) so an unrecognized mode never loosens access.
-func normalizeAllowMatch(m AllowMatch) AllowMatch {
-	if m == AllowMatchAny {
-		return AllowMatchAny
-	}
-	return AllowMatchAll
-}
-
 // Filter evaluates IP restrictions. CIDR checks are performed first
 // (cheap), followed by country lookups (more expensive) only when needed.
 type Filter struct {
@@ -112,9 +59,6 @@ type Filter struct {
 	BlockedCountries []string
 	CrowdSec         CrowdSecChecker
 	CrowdSecMode     CrowdSecMode
-	// AllowMatch controls how the allowlists combine (AND vs OR). Empty means
-	// AllowMatchAll.
-	AllowMatch AllowMatch
 }
 
 // FilterConfig holds the raw configuration for building a Filter.
@@ -125,7 +69,6 @@ type FilterConfig struct {
 	BlockedCountries []string
 	CrowdSec         CrowdSecChecker
 	CrowdSecMode     CrowdSecMode
-	AllowMatch       AllowMatch
 	Logger           *log.Entry
 }
 
@@ -146,7 +89,6 @@ func ParseFilter(cfg FilterConfig) *Filter {
 	f := &Filter{
 		AllowedCountries: normalizeCountryCodes(cfg.AllowedCountries),
 		BlockedCountries: normalizeCountryCodes(cfg.BlockedCountries),
-		AllowMatch:       normalizeAllowMatch(cfg.AllowMatch),
 	}
 	if hasCS {
 		f.CrowdSec = cfg.CrowdSec
@@ -204,13 +146,6 @@ const (
 	// DenyCrowdSecUnavailable indicates enforce mode but the bouncer has not
 	// completed its initial sync.
 	DenyCrowdSecUnavailable
-	// DenyAppSecBan indicates a CrowdSec AppSec "ban" remediation.
-	DenyAppSecBan
-	// DenyAppSecCaptcha indicates a CrowdSec AppSec "captcha" remediation.
-	DenyAppSecCaptcha
-	// DenyAppSecUnavailable indicates enforce mode but the AppSec engine could
-	// not produce a verdict (unreachable, timed out, or it rejected the call).
-	DenyAppSecUnavailable
 )
 
 // String returns the deny reason string matching the HTTP auth mechanism names.
@@ -232,27 +167,11 @@ func (v Verdict) String() string {
 		return "crowdsec_throttle"
 	case DenyCrowdSecUnavailable:
 		return "crowdsec_unavailable"
-	case DenyAppSecBan:
-		return "appsec_ban"
-	case DenyAppSecCaptcha:
-		return "appsec_captcha"
-	case DenyAppSecUnavailable:
-		return "appsec_unavailable"
 	default:
 		return "unknown"
 	}
 }
 
-// IsAppSec returns true when the verdict originates from an AppSec inspection.
-func (v Verdict) IsAppSec() bool {
-	switch v {
-	case DenyAppSecBan, DenyAppSecCaptcha, DenyAppSecUnavailable:
-		return true
-	default:
-		return false
-	}
-}
-
 // IsCrowdSec returns true when the verdict originates from a CrowdSec check.
 func (v Verdict) IsCrowdSec() bool {
 	switch v {
@@ -297,10 +216,6 @@ func (f *Filter) Check(addr netip.Addr, geo GeoResolver) Verdict {
 	// IPv4 CIDR rules match regardless of how the address was received.
 	addr = addr.Unmap()
 
-	if f.AllowMatch == AllowMatchAny {
-		return f.checkAny(addr, geo)
-	}
-
 	if v := f.checkCIDR(addr); v != Allow {
 		return v
 	}
@@ -310,77 +225,6 @@ func (f *Filter) Check(addr netip.Addr, geo GeoResolver) Verdict {
 	return f.checkCrowdSec(addr)
 }
 
-// checkAny evaluates the filter with OR semantics across allowlists: the
-// address is admitted if it matches any configured allowlist (CIDR or country).
-// Blocklists remain a hard-deny gate evaluated first and are independent of the
-// allow-combine mode, so a blocklist match (or unverifiable country block) still
-// denies. CrowdSec runs last, as in the default path.
-func (f *Filter) checkAny(addr netip.Addr, geo GeoResolver) Verdict {
-	if v := f.checkBlocked(addr, geo); v != Allow {
-		return v
-	}
-	if v := f.checkAllowedAny(addr, geo); v != Allow {
-		return v
-	}
-	return f.checkCrowdSec(addr)
-}
-
-// checkBlocked is the hard-deny gate: it denies on any blocklist match,
-// regardless of the allow-combine mode. A configured country blocklist with an
-// unavailable geo lookup fails closed.
-func (f *Filter) checkBlocked(addr netip.Addr, geo GeoResolver) Verdict {
-	for _, prefix := range f.BlockedCIDRs {
-		if prefix.Contains(addr) {
-			return DenyCIDR
-		}
-	}
-
-	if len(f.BlockedCountries) == 0 {
-		return Allow
-	}
-	if geo == nil || !geo.Available() {
-		return DenyGeoUnavailable
-	}
-	if code := geo.LookupAddr(addr).CountryCode; code != "" && slices.Contains(f.BlockedCountries, code) {
-		return DenyCountry
-	}
-	return Allow
-}
-
-// checkAllowedAny admits the address if it matches any active allowlist. The
-// CIDR allowlist is evaluated first so a match admits without a geo lookup;
-// only when it does not match is the country allowlist consulted, where an
-// unavailable geo lookup fails closed.
-func (f *Filter) checkAllowedAny(addr netip.Addr, geo GeoResolver) Verdict {
-	cidrActive := len(f.AllowedCIDRs) > 0
-	countryActive := len(f.AllowedCountries) > 0
-	if !cidrActive && !countryActive {
-		return Allow
-	}
-
-	if cidrActive {
-		for _, prefix := range f.AllowedCIDRs {
-			if prefix.Contains(addr) {
-				return Allow
-			}
-		}
-	}
-
-	if countryActive {
-		if geo == nil || !geo.Available() {
-			return DenyGeoUnavailable
-		}
-		if code := geo.LookupAddr(addr).CountryCode; code != "" && slices.Contains(f.AllowedCountries, code) {
-			return Allow
-		}
-	}
-
-	if cidrActive {
-		return DenyCIDR
-	}
-	return DenyCountry
-}
-
 func (f *Filter) checkCIDR(addr netip.Addr) Verdict {
 	if len(f.AllowedCIDRs) > 0 {
 		allowed := false

proxy/internal/restrict/restrict_test.go

@@ -150,187 +150,6 @@ func TestFilter_Check_CIDRAllowThenCountryBlock(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Equal(t, DenyCIDR, f.Check(netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1"), geo), "CIDR denied before country check")
 }
 
-// TestFilter_Check_CrossCategoryAllowlistsAreAND documents the current
-// behavior: when both a CIDR allowlist and a country allowlist are set, a
-// request must satisfy BOTH to be allowed (AND across categories). There is no
-// way today to express "allow if in allowed country OR in allowed CIDR", e.g.
-// "allow all US traffic plus our office IP abroad". This is the gap an
-// any/all allow-combine mode would close; the cases marked "GAP" are the ones
-// that would flip to Allow under an "any" mode.
-func TestFilter_Check_CrossCategoryAllowlistsAreAND(t *testing.T) {
-	officeAbroad := "203.0.113.7" // in allowed CIDR, but country not in allowlist
-	usOutsideOffice := "1.1.1.1"  // allowed country, but not in allowed CIDR
-	usOffice := "203.0.113.8"     // both
-	neither := "198.51.100.1"     // neither
-
-	geo := newMockGeo(map[string]string{
-		officeAbroad:    "DE",
-		usOutsideOffice: "US",
-		usOffice:        "US",
-		neither:         "CN",
-	})
-	f := ParseFilter(FilterConfig{
-		AllowedCIDRs:     []string{"203.0.113.0/24"},
-		AllowedCountries: []string{"US"},
-	})
-
-	assert.Equal(t, Allow, f.Check(netip.MustParseAddr(usOffice), geo), "in allowed CIDR and allowed country")
-	assert.Equal(t, DenyCountry, f.Check(netip.MustParseAddr(officeAbroad), geo), "GAP: in allowed CIDR but country not allowed; any-mode should Allow")
-	assert.Equal(t, DenyCIDR, f.Check(netip.MustParseAddr(usOutsideOffice), geo), "GAP: allowed country but not in allowed CIDR; any-mode should Allow")
-	assert.Equal(t, DenyCIDR, f.Check(netip.MustParseAddr(neither), geo), "neither: denied under both modes")
-}
-
-// TestFilter_Check_CrossCategoryBlockAndAllow locks the current (all/AND)
-// cross-category semantics that the evaluator must preserve: a blocklist match
-// in any category denies regardless of allowlists, and blocklists across
-// categories are effectively OR (a match in either denies).
-func TestFilter_Check_CrossCategoryBlockAndAllow(t *testing.T) {
-	geo := newMockGeo(map[string]string{
-		"1.1.1.1":  "US",
-		"10.1.2.3": "US",
-		"2.2.2.2":  "CN",
-		"3.3.3.3":  "US",
-	})
-
-	t.Run("country allowlist with CIDR blocklist", func(t *testing.T) {
-		f := ParseFilter(FilterConfig{
-			AllowedCountries: []string{"US"},
-			BlockedCIDRs:     []string{"10.1.0.0/16"},
-		})
-		assert.Equal(t, Allow, f.Check(netip.MustParseAddr("1.1.1.1"), geo), "US and not in blocked CIDR")
-		assert.Equal(t, DenyCIDR, f.Check(netip.MustParseAddr("10.1.2.3"), geo), "US but in blocked CIDR, block wins")
-		assert.Equal(t, DenyCountry, f.Check(netip.MustParseAddr("2.2.2.2"), geo), "not in allowed country")
-	})
-
-	t.Run("blocklists across categories are OR", func(t *testing.T) {
-		f := ParseFilter(FilterConfig{
-			BlockedCIDRs:     []string{"10.1.0.0/16"},
-			BlockedCountries: []string{"CN"},
-		})
-		assert.Equal(t, DenyCIDR, f.Check(netip.MustParseAddr("10.1.2.3"), geo), "in blocked CIDR")
-		assert.Equal(t, DenyCountry, f.Check(netip.MustParseAddr("2.2.2.2"), geo), "in blocked country")
-		assert.Equal(t, Allow, f.Check(netip.MustParseAddr("3.3.3.3"), geo), "in neither blocklist")
-	})
-}
-
-// TestFilter_Check_AllowCIDRPlusAllowCountryDeniesGeolessLAN documents a trap
-// with all/AND mode: pairing an allowed CIDR (a private LAN) with an allowed
-// country denies the LAN source, because a private IP has no country in the
-// geo DB and an active country allowlist denies unknown countries. Under an
-// "any" mode the CIDR match alone would admit it. This is the strongest reason
-// allow-CIDR + allow-country usually wants OR, not AND.
-func TestFilter_Check_AllowCIDRPlusAllowCountryDeniesGeolessLAN(t *testing.T) {
-	geo := newMockGeo(map[string]string{}) // no entries: every lookup is unknown country
-	f := ParseFilter(FilterConfig{
-		AllowedCIDRs:     []string{"192.168.50.0/24"},
-		AllowedCountries: []string{"US"},
-	})
-
-	got := f.Check(netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.50.5"), geo)
-	assert.Equal(t, DenyCountry, got, "GAP: LAN source in allowed CIDR is denied by the country allowlist; any-mode should Allow")
-}
-
-func TestFilter_Check_AllowMatchAny(t *testing.T) {
-	bannedIP := "203.0.113.9"
-	geo := newMockGeo(map[string]string{
-		"1.1.1.1":      "US", // allowed country, outside allowed CIDR
-		"203.0.113.7":  "DE", // allowed CIDR, non-allowed country
-		"203.0.113.8":  "US", // both
-		bannedIP:       "US", // allowed CIDR, but CrowdSec-banned
-		"198.51.100.1": "CN", // neither
-		"2.2.2.2":      "CN", // blocked country, but in allowed CIDR
-	})
-
-	tests := []struct {
-		name   string
-		config FilterConfig
-		addr   string
-		geo    GeoResolver
-		want   Verdict
-	}{
-		{
-			name:   "in allowed CIDR only",
-			config: FilterConfig{AllowMatch: AllowMatchAny, AllowedCIDRs: []string{"203.0.113.0/24"}, AllowedCountries: []string{"US"}},
-			addr:   "203.0.113.7", geo: geo, want: Allow,
-		},
-		{
-			name:   "in allowed country only",
-			config: FilterConfig{AllowMatch: AllowMatchAny, AllowedCIDRs: []string{"203.0.113.0/24"}, AllowedCountries: []string{"US"}},
-			addr:   "1.1.1.1", geo: geo, want: Allow,
-		},
-		{
-			name:   "in both",
-			config: FilterConfig{AllowMatch: AllowMatchAny, AllowedCIDRs: []string{"203.0.113.0/24"}, AllowedCountries: []string{"US"}},
-			addr:   "203.0.113.8", geo: geo, want: Allow,
-		},
-		{
-			name:   "in neither",
-			config: FilterConfig{AllowMatch: AllowMatchAny, AllowedCIDRs: []string{"203.0.113.0/24"}, AllowedCountries: []string{"US"}},
-			addr:   "198.51.100.1", geo: geo, want: DenyCIDR,
-		},
-		{
-			name:   "geoless LAN admitted via CIDR (the #597 trap, fixed)",
-			config: FilterConfig{AllowMatch: AllowMatchAny, AllowedCIDRs: []string{"192.168.50.0/24"}, AllowedCountries: []string{"US"}},
-			addr:   "192.168.50.5", geo: newMockGeo(map[string]string{}), want: Allow,
-		},
-		{
-			name:   "CIDR match short-circuits geo when geo unavailable",
-			config: FilterConfig{AllowMatch: AllowMatchAny, AllowedCIDRs: []string{"203.0.113.0/24"}, AllowedCountries: []string{"US"}},
-			addr:   "203.0.113.7", geo: &unavailableGeo{}, want: Allow,
-		},
-		{
-			name:   "geo unavailable fails closed when CIDR does not match",
-			config: FilterConfig{AllowMatch: AllowMatchAny, AllowedCIDRs: []string{"203.0.113.0/24"}, AllowedCountries: []string{"US"}},
-			addr:   "1.1.1.1", geo: &unavailableGeo{}, want: DenyGeoUnavailable,
-		},
-		{
-			name:   "block gate wins over allowed CIDR (blocked country)",
-			config: FilterConfig{AllowMatch: AllowMatchAny, AllowedCIDRs: []string{"0.0.0.0/0"}, BlockedCountries: []string{"CN"}},
-			addr:   "2.2.2.2", geo: geo, want: DenyCountry,
-		},
-		{
-			name:   "block gate wins over allowed country (blocked CIDR)",
-			config: FilterConfig{AllowMatch: AllowMatchAny, AllowedCountries: []string{"US"}, BlockedCIDRs: []string{"203.0.113.0/24"}},
-			addr:   "203.0.113.8", geo: geo, want: DenyCIDR,
-		},
-	}
-
-	for _, tc := range tests {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			f := ParseFilter(tc.config)
-			assert.Equal(t, tc.want, f.Check(netip.MustParseAddr(tc.addr), tc.geo))
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-func TestFilter_Check_AllowMatchAny_CrowdSecStillRuns(t *testing.T) {
-	bannedIP := "203.0.113.9"
-	cs := &mockCrowdSec{decisions: map[string]*CrowdSecDecision{bannedIP: {Type: DecisionBan}}, ready: true}
-	geo := newMockGeo(map[string]string{bannedIP: "US", "203.0.113.7": "US"})
-
-	f := ParseFilter(FilterConfig{
-		AllowMatch:   AllowMatchAny,
-		AllowedCIDRs: []string{"203.0.113.0/24"},
-		CrowdSec:     cs,
-		CrowdSecMode: CrowdSecEnforce,
-	})
-	assert.Equal(t, DenyCrowdSecBan, f.Check(netip.MustParseAddr(bannedIP), geo), "CrowdSec ban denies even when allowlist admits")
-	assert.Equal(t, Allow, f.Check(netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"), geo), "clean IP in allowed CIDR is allowed")
-}
-
-func TestFilter_Check_UnknownAllowMatchDefaultsToAll(t *testing.T) {
-	// An unrecognized allow-combine mode must fall back to the restrictive
-	// AND default, never loosen access.
-	geo := newMockGeo(map[string]string{"203.0.113.7": "DE"})
-	f := ParseFilter(FilterConfig{
-		AllowMatch:       AllowMatch("bogus"),
-		AllowedCIDRs:     []string{"203.0.113.0/24"},
-		AllowedCountries: []string{"US"},
-	})
-	assert.Equal(t, AllowMatchAll, f.AllowMatch, "unknown mode normalizes to all")
-	assert.Equal(t, DenyCountry, f.Check(netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.7"), geo), "AND semantics: in CIDR but wrong country denied")
-}
-
 func TestParseFilter_Empty(t *testing.T) {
 	f := ParseFilter(FilterConfig{})
 	assert.Nil(t, f)

proxy/lifecycle.go

@@ -126,15 +126,6 @@ type Config struct {
 	// CrowdSecAPIKey is the CrowdSec bouncer API key. Empty disables
 	// CrowdSec.
 	CrowdSecAPIKey string
-	// CrowdSecAppSecURL is the CrowdSec AppSec (WAF) endpoint. Empty disables
-	// HTTP request inspection.
-	CrowdSecAppSecURL string
-	// CrowdSecAppSecTimeout bounds a single AppSec inspection call. Zero falls
-	// back to the internal default.
-	CrowdSecAppSecTimeout time.Duration
-	// CrowdSecAppSecMaxBodyBytes caps the request body mirrored to AppSec.
-	// Zero falls back to the internal default; negative forwards no body.
-	CrowdSecAppSecMaxBodyBytes int64
 }
 
 // New builds a Server from cfg without performing any I/O. No goroutines
@@ -144,45 +135,42 @@ type Config struct {
 // directly) byte-for-byte equivalent.
 func New(ctx context.Context, cfg Config) *Server {
 	return &Server{
-		ctx:                        ctx,
-		ListenAddr:                 cfg.ListenAddr,
-		ID:                         cfg.ID,
-		Logger:                     cfg.Logger,
-		Version:                    cfg.Version,
-		ProxyURL:                   cfg.ProxyURL,
-		ManagementAddress:          cfg.ManagementAddress,
-		ProxyToken:                 cfg.ProxyToken,
-		CertificateDirectory:       cfg.CertificateDirectory,
-		CertificateFile:            cfg.CertificateFile,
-		CertificateKeyFile:         cfg.CertificateKeyFile,
-		GenerateACMECertificates:   cfg.GenerateACMECertificates,
-		ACMEChallengeAddress:       cfg.ACMEChallengeAddress,
-		ACMEDirectory:              cfg.ACMEDirectory,
-		ACMEEABKID:                 cfg.ACMEEABKID,
-		ACMEEABHMACKey:             cfg.ACMEEABHMACKey,
-		ACMEChallengeType:          cfg.ACMEChallengeType,
-		CertLockMethod:             cfg.CertLockMethod,
-		WildcardCertDir:            cfg.WildcardCertDir,
-		DebugEndpointEnabled:       cfg.DebugEndpointEnabled,
-		DebugEndpointAddress:       cfg.DebugEndpointAddress,
-		HealthAddress:              cfg.HealthAddr,
-		ForwardedProto:             cfg.ForwardedProto,
-		TrustedProxies:             cfg.TrustedProxies,
-		WireguardPort:              cfg.WireguardPort,
-		ProxyProtocol:              cfg.ProxyProtocol,
-		PreSharedKey:               cfg.PreSharedKey,
-		Performance:                cfg.Performance,
-		SupportsCustomPorts:        cfg.SupportsCustomPorts,
-		RequireSubdomain:           cfg.RequireSubdomain,
-		Private:                    cfg.Private,
-		MaxDialTimeout:             cfg.MaxDialTimeout,
-		MaxSessionIdleTimeout:      cfg.MaxSessionIdleTimeout,
-		MappingBatchWatchdog:       cfg.MappingBatchWatchdog,
-		GeoDataDir:                 cfg.GeoDataDir,
-		CrowdSecAPIURL:             cfg.CrowdSecAPIURL,
-		CrowdSecAPIKey:             cfg.CrowdSecAPIKey,
-		CrowdSecAppSecURL:          cfg.CrowdSecAppSecURL,
-		CrowdSecAppSecTimeout:      cfg.CrowdSecAppSecTimeout,
-		CrowdSecAppSecMaxBodyBytes: cfg.CrowdSecAppSecMaxBodyBytes,
+		ctx:                      ctx,
+		ListenAddr:               cfg.ListenAddr,
+		ID:                       cfg.ID,
+		Logger:                   cfg.Logger,
+		Version:                  cfg.Version,
+		ProxyURL:                 cfg.ProxyURL,
+		ManagementAddress:        cfg.ManagementAddress,
+		ProxyToken:               cfg.ProxyToken,
+		CertificateDirectory:     cfg.CertificateDirectory,
+		CertificateFile:          cfg.CertificateFile,
+		CertificateKeyFile:       cfg.CertificateKeyFile,
+		GenerateACMECertificates: cfg.GenerateACMECertificates,
+		ACMEChallengeAddress:     cfg.ACMEChallengeAddress,
+		ACMEDirectory:            cfg.ACMEDirectory,
+		ACMEEABKID:               cfg.ACMEEABKID,
+		ACMEEABHMACKey:           cfg.ACMEEABHMACKey,
+		ACMEChallengeType:        cfg.ACMEChallengeType,
+		CertLockMethod:           cfg.CertLockMethod,
+		WildcardCertDir:          cfg.WildcardCertDir,
+		DebugEndpointEnabled:     cfg.DebugEndpointEnabled,
+		DebugEndpointAddress:     cfg.DebugEndpointAddress,
+		HealthAddress:            cfg.HealthAddr,
+		ForwardedProto:           cfg.ForwardedProto,
+		TrustedProxies:           cfg.TrustedProxies,
+		WireguardPort:            cfg.WireguardPort,
+		ProxyProtocol:            cfg.ProxyProtocol,
+		PreSharedKey:             cfg.PreSharedKey,
+		Performance:              cfg.Performance,
+		SupportsCustomPorts:      cfg.SupportsCustomPorts,
+		RequireSubdomain:         cfg.RequireSubdomain,
+		Private:                  cfg.Private,
+		MaxDialTimeout:           cfg.MaxDialTimeout,
+		MaxSessionIdleTimeout:    cfg.MaxSessionIdleTimeout,
+		MappingBatchWatchdog:     cfg.MappingBatchWatchdog,
+		GeoDataDir:               cfg.GeoDataDir,
+		CrowdSecAPIURL:           cfg.CrowdSecAPIURL,
+		CrowdSecAPIKey:           cfg.CrowdSecAPIKey,
 	}
 }

proxy/management_integration_test.go

@@ -240,10 +240,6 @@ func (m *testProxyManager) ClusterSupportsCrowdSec(_ context.Context, _ string)
 	return nil
 }
 
-func (m *testProxyManager) ClusterSupportsAppSec(_ context.Context, _ string) *bool {
-	return nil
-}
-
 func (m *testProxyManager) ClusterSupportsPrivate(_ context.Context, _ string) *bool {
 	return nil
 }
@@ -566,11 +562,16 @@ func TestIntegration_ProxyConnection_ReconnectDoesNotDuplicateState(t *testing.T
 				addMappingCalls.Add(1)
 
 				// Apply to real auth middleware (idempotent)
-				err := authMw.AddDomain(mapping.GetDomain(), auth.DomainSettings{
-					AccountID: proxytypes.AccountID(mapping.GetAccountId()),
-					ServiceID: proxytypes.ServiceID(mapping.GetId()),
-					Private:   mapping.GetPrivate(),
-				})
+				err := authMw.AddDomain(
+					mapping.GetDomain(),
+					nil,
+					"",
+					0,
+					proxytypes.AccountID(mapping.GetAccountId()),
+					proxytypes.ServiceID(mapping.GetId()),
+					nil,
+					mapping.GetPrivate(),
+				)
 				require.NoError(t, err)
 
 				// Apply to real proxy (idempotent)

proxy/server.go

@@ -45,7 +45,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/embed"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/accesslog"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/acme"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/appsec"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/auth"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/certwatch"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/conntrack"
@@ -127,10 +126,6 @@ type Server struct {
 	crowdsecMu       sync.Mutex
 	crowdsecServices map[types.ServiceID]bool
 
-	// appsecClient is the shared CrowdSec AppSec client, nil when no AppSec
-	// endpoint is configured. Stateless, so it needs no per-service lifecycle.
-	appsecClient *appsec.Client
-
 	// routerReady is closed once mainRouter is fully initialized.
 	// The mapping worker waits on this before processing updates.
 	routerReady chan struct{}
@@ -243,17 +238,6 @@ type Server struct {
 	CrowdSecAPIURL string
 	// CrowdSecAPIKey is the CrowdSec bouncer API key. Empty disables CrowdSec.
 	CrowdSecAPIKey string
-	// CrowdSecAppSecURL is the CrowdSec AppSec (WAF) endpoint, e.g.
-	// http://127.0.0.1:7422/. Empty disables request inspection. Requires
-	// CrowdSecAPIKey, which the AppSec component validates against LAPI.
-	CrowdSecAppSecURL string
-	// CrowdSecAppSecTimeout bounds a single AppSec inspection call.
-	// Zero means appsec.DefaultTimeout.
-	CrowdSecAppSecTimeout time.Duration
-	// CrowdSecAppSecMaxBodyBytes caps the request body mirrored to the AppSec
-	// engine. Zero means appsec.DefaultMaxBodyBytes; negative disables body
-	// forwarding, leaving header and URI inspection.
-	CrowdSecAppSecMaxBodyBytes int64
 	// MaxSessionIdleTimeout caps the per-service session idle timeout.
 	// Zero means no cap (the proxy honors whatever management sends).
 	// Set via NB_PROXY_MAX_SESSION_IDLE_TIMEOUT for shared deployments.
@@ -427,10 +411,6 @@ func (s *Server) Start(ctx context.Context) error {
 	}()
 
 	s.auth = auth.NewMiddleware(s.Logger, s.mgmtClient, s.geo)
-	// Must follow the auth middleware: the AppSec client is installed on it.
-	if err := s.initAppSec(); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
 	s.accessLog = accesslog.NewLogger(s.mgmtClient, s.Logger, s.TrustedProxies)
 
 	s.startDebugEndpoint()
@@ -1294,7 +1274,6 @@ func (s *Server) newManagementMappingWorker(ctx context.Context, client proto.Pr
 
 func (s *Server) proxyCapabilities() *proto.ProxyCapabilities {
 	supportsCrowdSec := s.crowdsecRegistry.Available()
-	supportsAppSec := s.appsecClient != nil
 	privateCapability := s.Private
 	// Always true: this build enforces ProxyMapping.private via the auth middleware.
 	supportsPrivateService := true
@@ -1302,7 +1281,6 @@ func (s *Server) proxyCapabilities() *proto.ProxyCapabilities {
 		SupportsCustomPorts:    &s.SupportsCustomPorts,
 		RequireSubdomain:       &s.RequireSubdomain,
 		SupportsCrowdsec:       &supportsCrowdSec,
-		SupportsAppsec:         &supportsAppSec,
 		Private:                &privateCapability,
 		SupportsPrivateService: &supportsPrivateService,
 	}
@@ -1926,51 +1904,10 @@ func (s *Server) parseRestrictions(mapping *proto.ProxyMapping) *restrict.Filter
 		BlockedCountries: r.GetBlockedCountries(),
 		CrowdSec:         checker,
 		CrowdSecMode:     csMode,
-		AllowMatch:       restrict.AllowMatch(r.GetAllowMatch()),
 		Logger:           log.NewEntry(s.Logger),
 	})
 }
 
-// initAppSec builds the shared AppSec client when an endpoint is configured.
-// A configured-but-invalid endpoint is a startup error rather than a silent
-// downgrade: services asking for enforce would otherwise fail closed on every
-// request with no indication why.
-func (s *Server) initAppSec() error {
-	if s.CrowdSecAppSecURL == "" {
-		return nil
-	}
-	if s.CrowdSecAPIKey == "" {
-		return errors.New("crowdsec appsec url is set but the crowdsec api key is empty")
-	}
-
-	client, err := appsec.New(appsec.Config{
-		URL:          s.CrowdSecAppSecURL,
-		APIKey:       s.CrowdSecAPIKey,
-		Timeout:      s.CrowdSecAppSecTimeout,
-		MaxBodyBytes: s.CrowdSecAppSecMaxBodyBytes,
-		Logger:       log.NewEntry(s.Logger),
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("init crowdsec appsec: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	s.appsecClient = client
-	s.auth.SetAppSec(client)
-	s.Logger.Infof("CrowdSec AppSec inspection available at %s", s.CrowdSecAppSecURL)
-	return nil
-}
-
-// appSecMode resolves the per-service AppSec mode. A service asking for
-// inspection on a proxy with no AppSec endpoint keeps its mode so the auth
-// middleware fails closed for enforce, mirroring the CrowdSec behavior.
-func (s *Server) appSecMode(mapping *proto.ProxyMapping) restrict.AppSecMode {
-	mode := restrict.ParseAppSecMode(mapping.GetAccessRestrictions().GetAppsecMode())
-	if mode.Enabled() && s.appsecClient == nil {
-		s.Logger.Warnf("service %s requests AppSec mode %q but proxy has no AppSec endpoint configured", mapping.GetId(), mode)
-	}
-	return mode
-}
-
 // releaseCrowdSec releases the CrowdSec bouncer reference for the given
 // service if it had one.
 func (s *Server) releaseCrowdSec(svcID types.ServiceID) {
@@ -2137,17 +2074,7 @@ func (s *Server) updateMapping(ctx context.Context, mapping *proto.ProxyMapping)
 	s.warnIfGeoUnavailable(mapping.GetDomain(), mapping.GetAccessRestrictions())
 
 	maxSessionAge := time.Duration(mapping.GetAuth().GetMaxSessionAgeSeconds()) * time.Second
-	settings := auth.DomainSettings{
-		Schemes:           schemes,
-		SessionPublicKey:  mapping.GetAuth().GetSessionKey(),
-		SessionExpiration: maxSessionAge,
-		AccountID:         accountID,
-		ServiceID:         svcID,
-		IPRestrictions:    ipRestrictions,
-		Private:           mapping.GetPrivate(),
-		AppSecMode:        s.appSecMode(mapping),
-	}
-	if err := s.auth.AddDomain(mapping.GetDomain(), settings); err != nil {
+	if err := s.auth.AddDomain(mapping.GetDomain(), schemes, mapping.GetAuth().GetSessionKey(), maxSessionAge, accountID, svcID, ipRestrictions, mapping.GetPrivate()); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("auth setup for domain %s: %w", mapping.GetDomain(), err)
 	}
 	m := s.protoToMapping(ctx, mapping)

release_files/freebsd-port-diff.sh

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
 # FreeBSD Port Diff Generator for NetBird
 #
 # This script generates the diff file required for submitting a FreeBSD port update.
-# It works on macOS, Linux, and FreeBSD by fetching files from the FreeBSD ports
-# GitHub mirror and computing checksums from the Go module proxy.
+# It works on macOS, Linux, and FreeBSD by fetching files from FreeBSD cgit and
+# computing checksums from the Go module proxy.
 #
 # Usage: ./freebsd-port-diff.sh [new_version]
 # Example: ./freebsd-port-diff.sh 0.60.7
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 set -e
 
 GITHUB_REPO="netbirdio/netbird"
-PORTS_MIRROR_BASE="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/freebsd/freebsd-ports/main/security/netbird"
+PORTS_CGIT_BASE="https://cgit.freebsd.org/ports/plain/security/netbird"
 GO_PROXY="https://proxy.golang.org/github.com/netbirdio/netbird/@v"
 OUTPUT_DIR="${OUTPUT_DIR:-.}"
 AWK_FIRST_FIELD='{print $1}'
@@ -30,17 +30,10 @@ fetch_all_tags() {
 
 fetch_current_ports_version() {
     echo "Fetching current version from FreeBSD ports..." >&2
-    local makefile version
-    makefile=$(fetch_ports_file "Makefile") || return 1
-    version=$(echo "$makefile" | \
+    curl -sL "${PORTS_CGIT_BASE}/Makefile" 2>/dev/null | \
         grep -E "^DISTVERSION=" | \
         sed 's/DISTVERSION=[[:space:]]*//' | \
-        tr -d '\t ')
-    if [[ -z "$version" ]]; then
-        echo "Error: Could not extract DISTVERSION from ports Makefile" >&2
-        return 1
-    fi
-    echo "$version"
+        tr -d '\t '
     return 0
 }
 
@@ -52,16 +45,7 @@ fetch_latest_github_release() {
 
 fetch_ports_file() {
     local filename="$1"
-    local content
-    if ! content=$(curl -fsL --proto '=https' --proto-redir '=https' --retry 3 "${PORTS_MIRROR_BASE}/${filename}" 2>/dev/null); then
-        echo "Error: Could not fetch ${filename} from ${PORTS_MIRROR_BASE}" >&2
-        return 1
-    fi
-    if [[ "$content" == \<* ]]; then
-        echo "Error: Received HTML instead of ${filename} from ${PORTS_MIRROR_BASE}" >&2
-        return 1
-    fi
-    printf '%s' "$content"
+    curl -sL "${PORTS_CGIT_BASE}/${filename}" 2>/dev/null
     return 0
 }
 

release_files/freebsd-port-issue-body.sh

@@ -9,22 +9,18 @@
 # Example: ./freebsd-port-issue-body.sh 0.56.0 0.59.1
 #
 # If no versions are provided, the script will:
-#   - Fetch OLD version from the FreeBSD ports GitHub mirror (current version in ports tree)
+#   - Fetch OLD version from FreeBSD ports cgit (current version in ports tree)
 #   - Fetch NEW version from latest NetBird GitHub release tag
 
 set -e
 
 GITHUB_REPO="netbirdio/netbird"
-PORTS_MAKEFILE_URL="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/freebsd/freebsd-ports/main/security/netbird/Makefile"
+PORTS_CGIT_URL="https://cgit.freebsd.org/ports/plain/security/netbird/Makefile"
 
 fetch_current_ports_version() {
     echo "Fetching current version from FreeBSD ports..." >&2
     local makefile_content
-    makefile_content=$(curl -fsL --proto '=https' --proto-redir '=https' --retry 3 "$PORTS_MAKEFILE_URL" 2>/dev/null) || makefile_content=""
-    if [[ "$makefile_content" == \<* ]]; then
-        echo "Error: Received HTML instead of Makefile from ${PORTS_MAKEFILE_URL}" >&2
-        return 1
-    fi
+    makefile_content=$(curl -sL "$PORTS_CGIT_URL" 2>/dev/null)
     if [[ -z "$makefile_content" ]]; then
         echo "Error: Could not fetch Makefile from FreeBSD ports" >&2
         return 1

shared/management/client/grpc.go

@@ -187,16 +187,16 @@ func (c *GrpcClient) ready() bool {
 // Sync wraps the real client's Sync endpoint call and takes care of retries and encryption/decryption of messages
 // Blocking request. The result will be sent via msgHandler callback function
 func (c *GrpcClient) Sync(ctx context.Context, sysInfo *system.Info, msgHandler func(msg *proto.SyncResponse) error) error {
-	return c.withMgmtStream(ctx, func(ctx context.Context, serverPubKey wgtypes.Key, backOff backoff.BackOff) error {
-		return c.handleSyncStream(ctx, serverPubKey, sysInfo, msgHandler, backOff)
+	return c.withMgmtStream(ctx, func(ctx context.Context, serverPubKey wgtypes.Key) error {
+		return c.handleSyncStream(ctx, serverPubKey, sysInfo, msgHandler)
 	})
 }
 
 // Job wraps the real client's Job endpoint call and takes care of retries and encryption/decryption of messages
 // Blocking request. The result will be sent via msgHandler callback function
 func (c *GrpcClient) Job(ctx context.Context, msgHandler func(msg *proto.JobRequest) *proto.JobResponse) error {
-	return c.withMgmtStream(ctx, func(ctx context.Context, serverPubKey wgtypes.Key, backOff backoff.BackOff) error {
-		return c.handleJobStream(ctx, serverPubKey, msgHandler, backOff)
+	return c.withMgmtStream(ctx, func(ctx context.Context, serverPubKey wgtypes.Key) error {
+		return c.handleJobStream(ctx, serverPubKey, msgHandler)
 	})
 }
 
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ func (c *GrpcClient) Job(ctx context.Context, msgHandler func(msg *proto.JobRequ
 // It takes care of retries, connection readiness, and fetching server public key.
 func (c *GrpcClient) withMgmtStream(
 	ctx context.Context,
-	handler func(ctx context.Context, serverPubKey wgtypes.Key, backOff backoff.BackOff) error,
+	handler func(ctx context.Context, serverPubKey wgtypes.Key) error,
 ) error {
 	backOff := defaultBackoff(ctx)
 	operation := func() error {
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ func (c *GrpcClient) withMgmtStream(
 			return err
 		}
 
-		return handler(ctx, *serverPubKey, backOff)
+		return handler(ctx, *serverPubKey)
 	}
 
 	err := backoff.Retry(operation, backOff)
@@ -239,7 +239,6 @@ func (c *GrpcClient) handleJobStream(
 	ctx context.Context,
 	serverPubKey wgtypes.Key,
 	msgHandler func(msg *proto.JobRequest) *proto.JobResponse,
-	backOff backoff.BackOff,
 ) error {
 	ctx, cancelStream := context.WithCancel(ctx)
 	defer cancelStream()
@@ -257,19 +256,6 @@ func (c *GrpcClient) handleJobStream(
 
 	log.Debug("job stream handshake sent successfully")
 
-	// The stream is up, so reset the backoff. This matters for two reasons,
-	// both caused by the backoff lib not resetting its state on a successful
-	// connection:
-	//  1. Without a reset, after a connect followed by an error the next retry
-	//     starts from the accumulated (large) interval instead of retrying
-	//     promptly, delaying reconnection.
-	//  2. Worse, once the accumulated elapsed time exceeds MaxElapsedTime, the
-	//     next stream error makes NextBackOff() return Stop, so the retry loop
-	//     exits immediately. That error is then mislabeled unrecoverable and
-	//     bubbles up to trigger a full engine restart / data-plane teardown
-	//     instead of a silent reconnection.
-	backOff.Reset()
-
 	// Main loop: receive, process, respond
 	for {
 		jobReq, err := c.receiveJobRequest(ctx, stream, serverPubKey)
@@ -385,7 +371,7 @@ func (c *GrpcClient) sendJobResponse(
 	return nil
 }
 
-func (c *GrpcClient) handleSyncStream(ctx context.Context, serverPubKey wgtypes.Key, sysInfo *system.Info, msgHandler func(msg *proto.SyncResponse) error, backOff backoff.BackOff) error {
+func (c *GrpcClient) handleSyncStream(ctx context.Context, serverPubKey wgtypes.Key, sysInfo *system.Info, msgHandler func(msg *proto.SyncResponse) error) error {
 	ctx, cancelStream := context.WithCancel(ctx)
 	defer cancelStream()
 
@@ -404,19 +390,6 @@ func (c *GrpcClient) handleSyncStream(ctx context.Context, serverPubKey wgtypes.
 	c.notifyConnected()
 	c.setSyncStreamConnected()
 
-	// The stream is up, so reset the backoff. This matters for two reasons,
-	// both caused by the backoff lib not resetting its state on a successful
-	// connection:
-	//  1. Without a reset, after a connect followed by an error the next retry
-	//     starts from the accumulated (large) interval instead of retrying
-	//     promptly, delaying reconnection.
-	//  2. Worse, once the accumulated elapsed time exceeds MaxElapsedTime, the
-	//     next stream error makes NextBackOff() return Stop, so the retry loop
-	//     exits immediately. That error is then mislabeled unrecoverable and
-	//     bubbles up to trigger a full engine restart / data-plane teardown
-	//     instead of a silent reconnection.
-	backOff.Reset()
-
 	// blocking until error
 	err = c.receiveUpdatesEvents(stream, serverPubKey, msgHandler)
 	if err != nil {

shared/management/http/api/openapi.yml

@@ -3379,30 +3379,6 @@ components:
             - "observe"
           default: "off"
           description: CrowdSec IP reputation mode. Only available when the proxy cluster supports CrowdSec.
-        allow_match:
-          type: string
-          enum:
-            - "all"
-            - "any"
-          default: "all"
-          description: >-
-            How the allowlists (allowed_cidrs, allowed_countries) combine.
-            "all" (default) requires a connection to match every configured
-            allowlist (AND); "any" requires it to match at least one (OR), e.g.
-            an allowed country OR an allowed CIDR. Blocklists always reject on
-            match regardless of this setting.
-        appsec_mode:
-          type: string
-          enum:
-            - "off"
-            - "enforce"
-            - "observe"
-          default: "off"
-          description: >-
-            CrowdSec AppSec (WAF) request inspection mode. Only available when
-            the proxy cluster supports AppSec, and only applied to HTTP
-            services. "enforce" blocks requests the WAF flags; "observe" records
-            the verdict in the access log without blocking.
     PasswordAuthConfig:
       type: object
       properties:
@@ -3539,10 +3515,6 @@ components:
           type: boolean
           description: Whether all active proxies in the cluster have CrowdSec configured
           example: false
-        supports_appsec:
-          type: boolean
-          description: Whether all active proxies in the cluster have a CrowdSec AppSec (WAF) endpoint configured
-          example: false
         private:
           type: boolean
           description: True when at least one connected proxy in this cluster is running embedded in a netbird client (`netbird proxy`) and serving over a WireGuard tunnel. Lets the dashboard distinguish per-peer / private clusters from centralised ones.
@@ -3602,10 +3574,6 @@ components:
           type: boolean
           description: Whether the proxy cluster has CrowdSec configured
           example: false
-        supports_appsec:
-          type: boolean
-          description: Whether the proxy cluster has a CrowdSec AppSec (WAF) endpoint configured
-          example: false
         supports_private:
           type: boolean
           description: Whether the proxy cluster supports private (NetBird-only) services. True when at least one connected proxy in the cluster runs embedded in a netbird client.

shared/management/http/api/types.gen.go

@@ -17,45 +17,6 @@ const (
 	TokenAuthScopes  tokenAuthContextKey  = "TokenAuth.Scopes"
 )
 
-// Defines values for AccessRestrictionsAllowMatch.
-const (
-	AccessRestrictionsAllowMatchAll AccessRestrictionsAllowMatch = "all"
-	AccessRestrictionsAllowMatchAny AccessRestrictionsAllowMatch = "any"
-)
-
-// Valid indicates whether the value is a known member of the AccessRestrictionsAllowMatch enum.
-func (e AccessRestrictionsAllowMatch) Valid() bool {
-	switch e {
-	case AccessRestrictionsAllowMatchAll:
-		return true
-	case AccessRestrictionsAllowMatchAny:
-		return true
-	default:
-		return false
-	}
-}
-
-// Defines values for AccessRestrictionsAppsecMode.
-const (
-	AccessRestrictionsAppsecModeEnforce AccessRestrictionsAppsecMode = "enforce"
-	AccessRestrictionsAppsecModeObserve AccessRestrictionsAppsecMode = "observe"
-	AccessRestrictionsAppsecModeOff     AccessRestrictionsAppsecMode = "off"
-)
-
-// Valid indicates whether the value is a known member of the AccessRestrictionsAppsecMode enum.
-func (e AccessRestrictionsAppsecMode) Valid() bool {
-	switch e {
-	case AccessRestrictionsAppsecModeEnforce:
-		return true
-	case AccessRestrictionsAppsecModeObserve:
-		return true
-	case AccessRestrictionsAppsecModeOff:
-		return true
-	default:
-		return false
-	}
-}
-
 // Defines values for AccessRestrictionsCrowdsecMode.
 const (
 	AccessRestrictionsCrowdsecModeEnforce AccessRestrictionsCrowdsecMode = "enforce"
@@ -1573,18 +1534,12 @@ func (e PutApiIntegrationsMspTenantsIdInviteJSONBodyValue) Valid() bool {
 
 // AccessRestrictions Connection-level access restrictions based on IP address or geography. Applies to both HTTP and L4 services.
 type AccessRestrictions struct {
-	// AllowMatch How the allowlists (allowed_cidrs, allowed_countries) combine. "all" (default) requires a connection to match every configured allowlist (AND); "any" requires it to match at least one (OR), e.g. an allowed country OR an allowed CIDR. Blocklists always reject on match regardless of this setting.
-	AllowMatch *AccessRestrictionsAllowMatch `json:"allow_match,omitempty"`
-
 	// AllowedCidrs CIDR allowlist. If non-empty, only IPs matching these CIDRs are allowed.
 	AllowedCidrs *[]string `json:"allowed_cidrs,omitempty"`
 
 	// AllowedCountries ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 country codes to allow. If non-empty, only these countries are permitted.
 	AllowedCountries *[]string `json:"allowed_countries,omitempty"`
 
-	// AppsecMode CrowdSec AppSec (WAF) request inspection mode. Only available when the proxy cluster supports AppSec, and only applied to HTTP services. "enforce" blocks requests the WAF flags; "observe" records the verdict in the access log without blocking.
-	AppsecMode *AccessRestrictionsAppsecMode `json:"appsec_mode,omitempty"`
-
 	// BlockedCidrs CIDR blocklist. Connections from these CIDRs are rejected. Evaluated after allowed_cidrs.
 	BlockedCidrs *[]string `json:"blocked_cidrs,omitempty"`
 
@@ -1595,12 +1550,6 @@ type AccessRestrictions struct {
 	CrowdsecMode *AccessRestrictionsCrowdsecMode `json:"crowdsec_mode,omitempty"`
 }
 
-// AccessRestrictionsAllowMatch How the allowlists (allowed_cidrs, allowed_countries) combine. "all" (default) requires a connection to match every configured allowlist (AND); "any" requires it to match at least one (OR), e.g. an allowed country OR an allowed CIDR. Blocklists always reject on match regardless of this setting.
-type AccessRestrictionsAllowMatch string
-
-// AccessRestrictionsAppsecMode CrowdSec AppSec (WAF) request inspection mode. Only available when the proxy cluster supports AppSec, and only applied to HTTP services. "enforce" blocks requests the WAF flags; "observe" records the verdict in the access log without blocking.
-type AccessRestrictionsAppsecMode string
-
 // AccessRestrictionsCrowdsecMode CrowdSec IP reputation mode. Only available when the proxy cluster supports CrowdSec.
 type AccessRestrictionsCrowdsecMode string
 
@@ -4716,9 +4665,6 @@ type ProxyCluster struct {
 	// RequireSubdomain Whether services on this cluster must include a subdomain label
 	RequireSubdomain *bool `json:"require_subdomain,omitempty"`
 
-	// SupportsAppsec Whether all active proxies in the cluster have a CrowdSec AppSec (WAF) endpoint configured
-	SupportsAppsec *bool `json:"supports_appsec,omitempty"`
-
 	// SupportsCrowdsec Whether all active proxies in the cluster have CrowdSec configured
 	SupportsCrowdsec *bool `json:"supports_crowdsec,omitempty"`
 
@@ -4787,9 +4733,6 @@ type ReverseProxyDomain struct {
 	// RequireSubdomain Whether a subdomain label is required in front of this domain. When true, the domain cannot be used bare.
 	RequireSubdomain *bool `json:"require_subdomain,omitempty"`
 
-	// SupportsAppsec Whether the proxy cluster has a CrowdSec AppSec (WAF) endpoint configured
-	SupportsAppsec *bool `json:"supports_appsec,omitempty"`
-
 	// SupportsCrowdsec Whether the proxy cluster has CrowdSec configured
 	SupportsCrowdsec *bool `json:"supports_crowdsec,omitempty"`
 

shared/management/networkmap/decode.go

@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ import (
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 
 	nbdns "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/dns"
+	resourceTypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/networks/resources/types"
+	routerTypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/networks/routers/types"
+	nbpeer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
 	nbroute "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
@@ -35,17 +38,17 @@ func DecodeEnvelope(env *proto.NetworkMapEnvelope) (*types.NetworkMapComponents,
 		Network:             decodeAccountNetwork(full.Network),
 		AccountSettings:     decodeAccountSettings(full.AccountSettings),
 		CustomZoneDomain:    full.CustomZoneDomain,
-		Peers:               make(map[string]*types.ComponentPeer, len(full.Peers)),
-		Groups:              make(map[string]*types.ComponentGroup, len(full.Groups)),
+		Peers:               make(map[string]*nbpeer.Peer, len(full.Peers)),
+		Groups:              make(map[string]*types.Group, len(full.Groups)),
 		Policies:            make([]*types.Policy, 0, len(full.Policies)),
 		Routes:              make([]*nbroute.Route, 0, len(full.Routes)),
 		NameServerGroups:    make([]*nbdns.NameServerGroup, 0, len(full.NameserverGroups)),
 		AllDNSRecords:       decodeSimpleRecords(full.AllDnsRecords),
 		AccountZones:        decodeCustomZones(full.AccountZones),
 		ResourcePoliciesMap: make(map[string][]*types.Policy),
-		RoutersMap:          make(map[string]map[string]*types.ComponentRouter),
-		NetworkResources:    make([]*types.ComponentResource, 0, len(full.NetworkResources)),
-		RouterPeers:         make(map[string]*types.ComponentPeer),
+		RoutersMap:          make(map[string]map[string]*routerTypes.NetworkRouter),
+		NetworkResources:    make([]*resourceTypes.NetworkResource, 0, len(full.NetworkResources)),
+		RouterPeers:         make(map[string]*nbpeer.Peer),
 		AllowedUserIDs:      stringSliceToSet(full.AllowedUserIds),
 		PostureFailedPeers:  make(map[string]map[string]struct{}, len(full.PostureFailedPeers)),
 		GroupIDToUserIDs:    make(map[string][]string, len(full.GroupIdToUserIds)),
@@ -98,7 +101,7 @@ func DecodeEnvelope(env *proto.NetworkMapEnvelope) (*types.NetworkMapComponents,
 				log.WithField("peer idx", idx).Error("unrecognized peer idx during decoding")
 			}
 		}
-		group := &types.ComponentGroup{
+		group := &types.Group{
 			ID:       groupID,
 			PublicID: gc.Id,
 			Peers:    peerIDs,
@@ -148,7 +151,7 @@ func DecodeEnvelope(env *proto.NetworkMapEnvelope) (*types.NetworkMapComponents,
 	// Phase 7: routers_map (outer key = network seq id, inner key = peer-id
 	// reconstructed from peer_index). Synthesized network id is "net_<seq>".
 	for networkID, list := range full.RoutersMap {
-		inner := make(map[string]*types.ComponentRouter, len(list.Entries))
+		inner := make(map[string]*routerTypes.NetworkRouter, len(list.Entries))
 		for _, entry := range list.Entries {
 			if !entry.PeerIndexSet {
 				continue
@@ -158,7 +161,8 @@ func DecodeEnvelope(env *proto.NetworkMapEnvelope) (*types.NetworkMapComponents,
 				continue
 			}
 			peerID := peerIDByIndex[entry.PeerIndex]
-			inner[peerID] = &types.ComponentRouter{
+			inner[peerID] = &routerTypes.NetworkRouter{
+				ID:         "",
 				NetworkID:  networkID,
 				PublicID:   entry.Id,
 				Peer:       peerID,
@@ -260,22 +264,40 @@ func decodeAccountSettings(as *proto.AccountSettingsCompact) *types.AccountSetti
 	}
 }
 
-func decodePeerCompact(pc *proto.PeerCompact, peerID string) *types.ComponentPeer {
-	peer := &types.ComponentPeer{
+func decodePeerCompact(pc *proto.PeerCompact, peerID string) *nbpeer.Peer {
+	var caps []int32
+	if pc.SupportsSourcePrefixes {
+		caps = append(caps, nbpeer.PeerCapabilitySourcePrefixes)
+	}
+	if pc.SupportsIpv6 {
+		caps = append(caps, nbpeer.PeerCapabilityIPv6Overlay)
+	}
+	peer := &nbpeer.Peer{
 		ID:                     peerID,
 		Key:                    peerID,
 		SSHKey:                 string(pc.SshPubKey),
 		SSHEnabled:             pc.SshEnabled,
 		DNSLabel:               pc.DnsLabel,
 		LoginExpirationEnabled: pc.LoginExpirationEnabled,
-		AgentVersion:           pc.AgentVersion,
-		SupportsSourcePrefixes: pc.SupportsSourcePrefixes,
-		SupportsIPv6:           pc.SupportsIpv6,
-		ServerSSHAllowed:       pc.ServerSshAllowed,
-		AddedWithSSOLogin:      pc.AddedWithSsoLogin,
+		Meta: nbpeer.PeerSystemMeta{
+			WtVersion:    pc.AgentVersion,
+			Capabilities: caps,
+			Flags: nbpeer.Flags{
+				ServerSSHAllowed: pc.ServerSshAllowed,
+			},
+		},
+	}
+	if pc.AddedWithSsoLogin {
+		// Set a non-empty UserID so (*Peer).AddedWithSSOLogin() returns true.
+		// The original UserID isn't on the wire; the value is intentionally
+		// visibly synthetic so any future consumer that mistakes UserID for a
+		// real account user xid won't silently match (or worse, write the
+		// sentinel into a downstream record).
+		peer.UserID = "<env-sso>"
 	}
 	if pc.LastLoginUnixNano != 0 {
-		peer.LastLogin = time.Unix(0, pc.LastLoginUnixNano)
+		t := time.Unix(0, pc.LastLoginUnixNano)
+		peer.LastLogin = &t
 	}
 	switch len(pc.Ip) {
 	case 4:
@@ -402,14 +424,14 @@ func decodeNameServerGroupRaw(nsg *proto.NameServerGroupRaw) *nbdns.NameServerGr
 	return out
 }
 
-func decodeNetworkResource(nr *proto.NetworkResourceRaw) *types.ComponentResource {
-	out := &types.ComponentResource{
+func decodeNetworkResource(nr *proto.NetworkResourceRaw) *resourceTypes.NetworkResource {
+	out := &resourceTypes.NetworkResource{
 		ID:          nr.Id,
 		PublicID:    nr.Id,
 		NetworkID:   nr.NetworkSeq,
 		Name:        nr.Name,
 		Description: nr.Description,
-		Type:        types.ComponentResourceType(nr.Type),
+		Type:        resourceTypes.NetworkResourceType(nr.Type),
 		Address:     nr.Address,
 		Domain:      nr.DomainValue,
 		Enabled:     nr.Enabled,

shared/management/networkmap/encode.go

@@ -20,9 +20,10 @@ import (
 	nbdns "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/dns"
 	"net/netip"
 
+	nbpeer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/types"
 	nbroute "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/types"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/netiputil"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sshauth"
 )
@@ -273,7 +274,7 @@ func ToProtocolDNSConfig(update nbdns.Config, cache DNSConfigCache, forwardPort
 
 // AppendRemotePeerConfig appends typed peers as proto.RemotePeerConfig
 // entries to dst and returns the result.
-func AppendRemotePeerConfig(dst []*proto.RemotePeerConfig, peers []*types.ComponentPeer, dnsName string, includeIPv6 bool) []*proto.RemotePeerConfig {
+func AppendRemotePeerConfig(dst []*proto.RemotePeerConfig, peers []*nbpeer.Peer, dnsName string, includeIPv6 bool) []*proto.RemotePeerConfig {
 	for _, rPeer := range peers {
 		allowedIPs := []string{rPeer.IP.String() + "/32"}
 		if includeIPv6 && rPeer.IPv6.IsValid() {
@@ -284,7 +285,7 @@ func AppendRemotePeerConfig(dst []*proto.RemotePeerConfig, peers []*types.Compon
 			AllowedIps:   allowedIPs,
 			SshConfig:    &proto.SSHConfig{SshPubKey: []byte(rPeer.SSHKey)},
 			Fqdn:         rPeer.FQDN(dnsName),
-			AgentVersion: rPeer.AgentVersion,
+			AgentVersion: rPeer.Meta.WtVersion,
 		})
 	}
 	return dst

shared/management/networkmap/envelope.go

@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ func EnvelopeToNetworkMap(ctx context.Context, env *proto.NetworkMapEnvelope, lo
 	}
 	components.PeerID = canonicalKey
 
-	includeIPv6 := localPeer.SupportsIPv6 && localPeer.IPv6.IsValid()
-	useSourcePrefixes := localPeer.SupportsSourcePrefixes
+	includeIPv6 := localPeer.SupportsIPv6() && localPeer.IPv6.IsValid()
+	useSourcePrefixes := localPeer.SupportsSourcePrefixes()
 
 	typedNM := components.Calculate(ctx)
 

shared/management/networkmap/envelope_test.go

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import (
 	goproto "google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"
 
 	mgmtgrpc "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/shared/grpc"
+	nbpeer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
 	nbnetworkmap "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/networkmap"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
@@ -143,14 +144,14 @@ func TestDecodeEnvelope_MalformedWgKeyPeerSkipped(t *testing.T) {
 func TestEnvelopeRoundTrip_AllGroupShortCircuitParity(t *testing.T) {
 	ctx := context.Background()
 
-	peers := map[string]*types.ComponentPeer{}
+	peers := map[string]*nbpeer.Peer{}
 	for i, id := range []string{"peer-T", "peer-S", "peer-ALL", "peer-O"} {
-		peers[id] = &types.ComponentPeer{
-			ID:           id,
-			Key:          randomWgKey(t),
-			IP:           netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{100, 64, 0, byte(i + 1)}),
-			DNSLabel:     id,
-			AgentVersion: "0.40.0",
+		peers[id] = &nbpeer.Peer{
+			ID:       id,
+			Key:      randomWgKey(t),
+			IP:       netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{100, 64, 0, byte(i + 1)}),
+			DNSLabel: id,
+			Meta:     nbpeer.PeerSystemMeta{WtVersion: "0.40.0"},
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -164,7 +165,7 @@ func TestEnvelopeRoundTrip_AllGroupShortCircuitParity(t *testing.T) {
 		AccountSettings: &types.AccountSettingsInfo{},
 		DNSSettings:     &types.DNSSettings{},
 		Peers:           peers,
-		Groups: map[string]*types.ComponentGroup{
+		Groups: map[string]*types.Group{
 			"g-src": {ID: "g-src", PublicID: "1", Name: "staff", Peers: []string{"peer-T", "peer-S"}},
 			"g-all": {ID: "g-all", PublicID: "2", Name: "All", Peers: []string{"peer-ALL"}},
 			"g-two": {ID: "g-two", PublicID: "3", Name: "second", Peers: []string{"peer-T", "peer-O"}},
@@ -231,22 +232,22 @@ func buildSmokeComponents(t *testing.T) (*types.NetworkMapComponents, string) {
 	peerAKey := randomWgKey(t)
 	peerBKey := randomWgKey(t)
 
-	peerA := &types.ComponentPeer{
-		ID:           "peer-A",
-		Key:          peerAKey,
-		IP:           netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{100, 64, 0, 1}),
-		DNSLabel:     "peerA",
-		AgentVersion: "0.40.0",
+	peerA := &nbpeer.Peer{
+		ID:       "peer-A",
+		Key:      peerAKey,
+		IP:       netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{100, 64, 0, 1}),
+		DNSLabel: "peerA",
+		Meta:     nbpeer.PeerSystemMeta{WtVersion: "0.40.0"},
 	}
-	peerB := &types.ComponentPeer{
-		ID:           "peer-B",
-		Key:          peerBKey,
-		IP:           netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{100, 64, 0, 2}),
-		DNSLabel:     "peerB",
-		AgentVersion: "0.40.0",
+	peerB := &nbpeer.Peer{
+		ID:       "peer-B",
+		Key:      peerBKey,
+		IP:       netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{100, 64, 0, 2}),
+		DNSLabel: "peerB",
+		Meta:     nbpeer.PeerSystemMeta{WtVersion: "0.40.0"},
 	}
 
-	group := &types.ComponentGroup{
+	group := &types.Group{
 		ID: "group-all", PublicID: "1", Name: "All",
 		Peers: []string{"peer-A", "peer-B"},
 	}
@@ -273,11 +274,11 @@ func buildSmokeComponents(t *testing.T) (*types.NetworkMapComponents, string) {
 		},
 		AccountSettings: &types.AccountSettingsInfo{},
 		DNSSettings:     &types.DNSSettings{},
-		Peers: map[string]*types.ComponentPeer{
+		Peers: map[string]*nbpeer.Peer{
 			"peer-A": peerA,
 			"peer-B": peerB,
 		},
-		Groups: map[string]*types.ComponentGroup{
+		Groups: map[string]*types.Group{
 			"group-all": group,
 		},
 		Policies: []*types.Policy{policy},

shared/management/proto/proxy_service.proto

@@ -73,10 +73,6 @@ message ProxyCapabilities {
   optional bool private = 4;
   // Whether the proxy enforces ProxyMapping.private (fails closed on ValidateTunnelPeer failure). Management MUST NOT stream private mappings to proxies that don't claim this.
   optional bool supports_private_service = 5;
-  // Whether the proxy has a CrowdSec AppSec (WAF) endpoint configured and can
-  // inspect HTTP requests. Independent of supports_crowdsec: AppSec is a
-  // separate endpoint on the Security Engine and applies to HTTP services only.
-  optional bool supports_appsec = 6;
 }
 
 // GetMappingUpdateRequest is sent to initialise a mapping stream.
@@ -207,13 +203,6 @@ message AccessRestrictions {
   repeated string blocked_countries = 4;
   // CrowdSec IP reputation mode: "", "off", "enforce", or "observe".
   string crowdsec_mode = 5;
-  // How the allowlists (CIDR, country) combine: "" or "all" require matching
-  // every allowlist (AND); "any" requires matching at least one (OR).
-  // Blocklists are always a hard-deny gate, independent of this mode.
-  string allow_match = 6;
-  // CrowdSec AppSec (WAF) request inspection mode: "", "off", "enforce", or
-  // "observe". HTTP services only; ignored for TCP/UDP/TLS modes.
-  string appsec_mode = 7;
 }
 
 message ProxyMapping {

shared/management/types/component_types.go

@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
-package types
-
-import (
-	"net/netip"
-	"time"
-)
-
-// ComponentPeer is the self-contained peer representation used by
-// NetworkMapComponents and the calculated NetworkMap. It carries exactly the
-// subset of peer data that crosses the components wire format, so the shared
-// calculation layer stays independent of the management server's domain
-// types.
-type ComponentPeer struct {
-	ID                     string
-	Key                    string
-	IP                     netip.Addr
-	IPv6                   netip.Addr
-	DNSLabel               string
-	SSHKey                 string
-	SSHEnabled             bool
-	ServerSSHAllowed       bool
-	AgentVersion           string
-	SupportsSourcePrefixes bool
-	SupportsIPv6           bool
-	LoginExpirationEnabled bool
-	AddedWithSSOLogin      bool
-	LastLogin              time.Time
-}
-
-// FQDN returns the peer's FQDN combined of the peer's DNS label and the system's DNS domain.
-func (p *ComponentPeer) FQDN(dnsDomain string) string {
-	if dnsDomain == "" {
-		return ""
-	}
-	return p.DNSLabel + "." + dnsDomain
-}
-
-// LoginExpired indicates whether the peer's login has expired, mirroring the
-// server-side peer semantics: only SSO-added peers with login expiration
-// enabled can expire.
-func (p *ComponentPeer) LoginExpired(expiresIn time.Duration) (bool, time.Duration) {
-	if !p.AddedWithSSOLogin || !p.LoginExpirationEnabled {
-		return false, 0
-	}
-	timeLeft := time.Until(p.LastLogin.Add(expiresIn))
-	return timeLeft <= 0, timeLeft
-}
-
-// GroupAllName is the reserved name of the default group that contains every peer in an account.
-const GroupAllName = "All"
-
-// ComponentGroup is the self-contained group representation used by
-// NetworkMapComponents: just the membership view the network-map calculation
-// needs, without the server's storage fields.
-type ComponentGroup struct {
-	ID       string
-	PublicID string
-	Name     string
-	Peers    []string
-}
-
-// IsGroupAll checks if the group is a default "All" group.
-func (g *ComponentGroup) IsGroupAll() bool {
-	return g.Name == GroupAllName
-}
-
-// ComponentRouter is the self-contained network-router representation used by
-// NetworkMapComponents.
-type ComponentRouter struct {
-	NetworkID  string
-	PublicID   string
-	Peer       string
-	PeerGroups []string
-	Masquerade bool
-	Metric     int
-	Enabled    bool
-}
-
-// ComponentResourceType mirrors the network-resource type enum on the
-// components wire format.
-type ComponentResourceType string
-
-const (
-	ComponentResourceHost   ComponentResourceType = "host"
-	ComponentResourceSubnet ComponentResourceType = "subnet"
-	ComponentResourceDomain ComponentResourceType = "domain"
-)
-
-// ComponentResource is the self-contained network-resource representation
-// used by NetworkMapComponents.
-type ComponentResource struct {
-	ID          string
-	PublicID    string
-	NetworkID   string
-	AccountID   string
-	Name        string
-	Description string
-	Type        ComponentResourceType
-	Address     string
-	Domain      string
-	Prefix      netip.Prefix
-	Enabled     bool
-}

shared/management/types/firewall_helpers.go

@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ package types
 import (
 	"strconv"
 
+	nbpeer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/posture"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/version"
 )
 
@@ -46,8 +48,8 @@ func portsIncludesSSH(ports []string) bool {
 }
 
 // ExpandPortsAndRanges expands Ports and PortRanges of a rule into individual firewall rules.
-func ExpandPortsAndRanges(base FirewallRule, rule *PolicyRule, peer *ComponentPeer) []*FirewallRule {
-	features := peerSupportedFirewallFeatures(peer.AgentVersion)
+func ExpandPortsAndRanges(base FirewallRule, rule *PolicyRule, peer *nbpeer.Peer) []*FirewallRule {
+	features := peerSupportedFirewallFeatures(peer.Meta.WtVersion)
 
 	var expanded []*FirewallRule
 
@@ -104,8 +106,8 @@ func isPortInRule(portString string, portInt uint16, rule *FirewallRule) bool {
 	return rule.Port == portString || (rule.PortRange.Start <= portInt && portInt <= rule.PortRange.End)
 }
 
-func shouldCheckRulesForNativeSSH(supportsNative bool, rule *PolicyRule, peer *ComponentPeer) bool {
-	return supportsNative && peer.SSHEnabled && peer.ServerSSHAllowed && rule.Protocol == PolicyRuleProtocolTCP
+func shouldCheckRulesForNativeSSH(supportsNative bool, rule *PolicyRule, peer *nbpeer.Peer) bool {
+	return supportsNative && peer.SSHEnabled && peer.Meta.Flags.ServerSSHAllowed && rule.Protocol == PolicyRuleProtocolTCP
 }
 
 func peerSupportedFirewallFeatures(peerVer string) supportedFeatures {
@@ -115,13 +117,13 @@ func peerSupportedFirewallFeatures(peerVer string) supportedFeatures {
 
 	var features supportedFeatures
 
-	meetMinVer, err := version.MeetsMinVersion(firewallRuleMinNativeSSHVer, peerVer)
+	meetMinVer, err := posture.MeetsMinVersion(firewallRuleMinNativeSSHVer, peerVer)
 	features.nativeSSH = err == nil && meetMinVer
 
 	if features.nativeSSH {
 		features.portRanges = true
 	} else {
-		meetMinVer, err = version.MeetsMinVersion(firewallRuleMinPortRangesVer, peerVer)
+		meetMinVer, err = posture.MeetsMinVersion(firewallRuleMinPortRangesVer, peerVer)
 		features.portRanges = err == nil && meetMinVer
 	}
 

shared/management/types/firewall_rule.go

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 
+	nbpeer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
 	nbroute "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
 )
 
@@ -50,7 +51,7 @@ func (r *FirewallRule) Equal(other *FirewallRule) bool {
 // For static routes, source ranges match the destination family (v4 or v6).
 // For dynamic routes (domain-based), separate v4 and v6 rules are generated
 // so the routing peer's forwarding chain allows both address families.
-func GenerateRouteFirewallRules(ctx context.Context, route *nbroute.Route, rule *PolicyRule, groupPeers []*ComponentPeer, direction int, includeIPv6 bool) []*RouteFirewallRule {
+func GenerateRouteFirewallRules(ctx context.Context, route *nbroute.Route, rule *PolicyRule, groupPeers []*nbpeer.Peer, direction int, includeIPv6 bool) []*RouteFirewallRule {
 	rulesExists := make(map[string]struct{})
 	rules := make([]*RouteFirewallRule, 0)
 
@@ -106,7 +107,7 @@ func GenerateRouteFirewallRules(ctx context.Context, route *nbroute.Route, rule
 }
 
 // splitPeerSourcesByFamily separates peer IPs into v4 (/32) and v6 (/128) source ranges.
-func splitPeerSourcesByFamily(groupPeers []*ComponentPeer) (v4, v6 []string) {
+func splitPeerSourcesByFamily(groupPeers []*nbpeer.Peer) (v4, v6 []string) {
 	v4 = make([]string, 0, len(groupPeers))
 	v6 = make([]string, 0, len(groupPeers))
 	for _, peer := range groupPeers {

shared/management/types/firewall_rule_test.go

@@ -8,12 +8,13 @@ import (
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 
+	nbpeer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
 )
 
 func TestSplitPeerSourcesByFamily(t *testing.T) {
-	peers := []*ComponentPeer{
+	peers := []*nbpeer.Peer{
 		{
 			IP:   netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1"),
 			IPv6: netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::1"),
@@ -35,7 +36,7 @@ func TestSplitPeerSourcesByFamily(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestGenerateRouteFirewallRules_V4Route(t *testing.T) {
-	peers := []*ComponentPeer{
+	peers := []*nbpeer.Peer{
 		{
 			IP:   netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1"),
 			IPv6: netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::1"),
@@ -64,7 +65,7 @@ func TestGenerateRouteFirewallRules_V4Route(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestGenerateRouteFirewallRules_V6Route(t *testing.T) {
-	peers := []*ComponentPeer{
+	peers := []*nbpeer.Peer{
 		{
 			IP:   netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1"),
 			IPv6: netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::1"),
@@ -92,7 +93,7 @@ func TestGenerateRouteFirewallRules_V6Route(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestGenerateRouteFirewallRules_DynamicRoute_DualStack(t *testing.T) {
-	peers := []*ComponentPeer{
+	peers := []*nbpeer.Peer{
 		{
 			IP:   netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1"),
 			IPv6: netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::1"),
@@ -125,7 +126,7 @@ func TestGenerateRouteFirewallRules_DynamicRoute_DualStack(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestGenerateRouteFirewallRules_DynamicRoute_NoV6Peers(t *testing.T) {
-	peers := []*ComponentPeer{
+	peers := []*nbpeer.Peer{
 		{IP: netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1")},
 		{IP: netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.2")},
 	}
@@ -149,7 +150,7 @@ func TestGenerateRouteFirewallRules_DynamicRoute_NoV6Peers(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestGenerateRouteFirewallRules_IncludeIPv6False(t *testing.T) {
-	peers := []*ComponentPeer{
+	peers := []*nbpeer.Peer{
 		{
 			IP:   netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1"),
 			IPv6: netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::1"),