Rework signal protocol to minimize number of exchanged initial RP 512KB keys

The Rosenpass static keypair was regenerated on every engine start
(rp.GenerateKeyPair in NewManager), so the local ~512KB public key —
and its fingerprint — changed on each client restart.

Persist the keypair to <StateDir>/rosenpass_key.json with 0600
permissions (same protection tier as the WireGuard private key), and
reload it on start so the public key stays stable across restarts. A
missing, corrupt, or version-incompatible file degrades gracefully to
generating a fresh ephemeral keypair (previous behaviour); an empty
StateDir keeps the ephemeral path for callers without a state dir.

This is the foundation for fingerprint-based RP pubkey caching over
signalling (NET-1407): a stable local key lets remote peers keep their
cached copy valid across our restart.

client/cmd/login.go

@@ -17,7 +17,9 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/auth"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
+	nbnet "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/net"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/server"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/system"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
 )
@@ -331,6 +333,14 @@ func doForegroundLogin(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, setupKey string,
 		return fmt.Errorf("read config file %s: %v", configFilePath, err)
 	}
 
+	// Mirror runInForegroundMode: recover residual state (DNS, firewall,
+	// ssh config, legacy routing) from a previous unclean shutdown and
+	// enable advanced routing before dialing management.
+	if err := server.RestoreResidualState(ctx, profilemanager.NewServiceManager(configFilePath).GetStatePath()); err != nil {
+		log.Warnf("failed to restore residual state: %v", err)
+	}
+	nbnet.Init()
+
 	err = foregroundLogin(ctx, cmd, config, setupKey, activeProf.ID)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("foreground login failed: %v", err)

client/cmd/up.go

@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
+	nbnet "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/net"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/server"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/system"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
@@ -229,6 +231,24 @@ func runInForegroundMode(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, activeProf *pr
 
 	_, _ = profilemanager.UpdateOldManagementURL(ctx, config, configFilePath)
 
+	// Restore residual state left by a previous run that did not shut down
+	// cleanly, mirroring what the daemon does before connecting: it recovers
+	// DNS config (a stale resolv.conf takeover can make the management
+	// hostname unresolvable), firewall rules, ssh config and legacy routing.
+	// Route cleanup itself happens at engine start; nbnet.Init() below lets
+	// the management dial bypass a leftover fwmark rule until then.
+	// Foreground mode is particularly exposed in containers: a crashed
+	// container restarts inside the same (pod) network namespace, so stale
+	// state survives while the process does not.
+	if err := server.RestoreResidualState(ctx, profilemanager.NewServiceManager(configPath).GetStatePath()); err != nil {
+		log.Warnf("failed to restore residual state: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Enable advanced routing (as the daemon does on startup) so the
+	// management dial bypasses a leftover fwmark rule instead of being
+	// shunted into a stale routing table.
+	nbnet.Init()
+
 	err = foregroundLogin(ctx, cmd, config, providedSetupKey, activeProf.ID)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("foreground login failed: %v", err)
@@ -401,12 +421,6 @@ func setupSetConfigReq(customDNSAddressConverted []byte, cmd *cobra.Command, pro
 	if cmd.Flag(serverSSHAllowedFlag).Changed {
 		req.ServerSSHAllowed = &serverSSHAllowed
 	}
-	if cmd.Flag(serverVNCAllowedFlag).Changed {
-		req.ServerVNCAllowed = &serverVNCAllowed
-	}
-	if cmd.Flag(disableVNCApprovalFlag).Changed {
-		req.DisableVNCApproval = &disableVNCApproval
-	}
 	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRootFlag).Changed {
 		req.EnableSSHRoot = &enableSSHRoot
 	}
@@ -509,14 +523,30 @@ func setupConfig(customDNSAddressConverted []byte, cmd *cobra.Command, configFil
 	if cmd.Flag(serverSSHAllowedFlag).Changed {
 		ic.ServerSSHAllowed = &serverSSHAllowed
 	}
-	if cmd.Flag(serverVNCAllowedFlag).Changed {
-		ic.ServerVNCAllowed = &serverVNCAllowed
-	}
-	if cmd.Flag(disableVNCApprovalFlag).Changed {
-		ic.DisableVNCApproval = &disableVNCApproval
+
+	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRootFlag).Changed {
+		ic.EnableSSHRoot = &enableSSHRoot
 	}
 
-	applySSHFlagsToConfig(cmd, &ic)
+	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHSFTPFlag).Changed {
+		ic.EnableSSHSFTP = &enableSSHSFTP
+	}
+
+	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHLocalPortForwardFlag).Changed {
+		ic.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding = &enableSSHLocalPortForward
+	}
+
+	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRemotePortForwardFlag).Changed {
+		ic.EnableSSHRemotePortForwarding = &enableSSHRemotePortForward
+	}
+
+	if cmd.Flag(disableSSHAuthFlag).Changed {
+		ic.DisableSSHAuth = &disableSSHAuth
+	}
+
+	if cmd.Flag(sshJWTCacheTTLFlag).Changed {
+		ic.SSHJWTCacheTTL = &sshJWTCacheTTL
+	}
 
 	if cmd.Flag(interfaceNameFlag).Changed {
 		if err := parseInterfaceName(interfaceName); err != nil {
@@ -589,49 +619,6 @@ func setupConfig(customDNSAddressConverted []byte, cmd *cobra.Command, configFil
 	return &ic, nil
 }
 
-func applySSHFlagsToConfig(cmd *cobra.Command, ic *profilemanager.ConfigInput) {
-	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRootFlag).Changed {
-		ic.EnableSSHRoot = &enableSSHRoot
-	}
-	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHSFTPFlag).Changed {
-		ic.EnableSSHSFTP = &enableSSHSFTP
-	}
-	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHLocalPortForwardFlag).Changed {
-		ic.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding = &enableSSHLocalPortForward
-	}
-	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRemotePortForwardFlag).Changed {
-		ic.EnableSSHRemotePortForwarding = &enableSSHRemotePortForward
-	}
-	if cmd.Flag(disableSSHAuthFlag).Changed {
-		ic.DisableSSHAuth = &disableSSHAuth
-	}
-	if cmd.Flag(sshJWTCacheTTLFlag).Changed {
-		ic.SSHJWTCacheTTL = &sshJWTCacheTTL
-	}
-}
-
-func applySSHFlagsToLogin(cmd *cobra.Command, req *proto.LoginRequest) {
-	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRootFlag).Changed {
-		req.EnableSSHRoot = &enableSSHRoot
-	}
-	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHSFTPFlag).Changed {
-		req.EnableSSHSFTP = &enableSSHSFTP
-	}
-	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHLocalPortForwardFlag).Changed {
-		req.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding = &enableSSHLocalPortForward
-	}
-	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRemotePortForwardFlag).Changed {
-		req.EnableSSHRemotePortForwarding = &enableSSHRemotePortForward
-	}
-	if cmd.Flag(disableSSHAuthFlag).Changed {
-		req.DisableSSHAuth = &disableSSHAuth
-	}
-	if cmd.Flag(sshJWTCacheTTLFlag).Changed {
-		ttl := int32(sshJWTCacheTTL)
-		req.SshJWTCacheTTL = &ttl
-	}
-}
-
 func setupLoginRequest(providedSetupKey string, customDNSAddressConverted []byte, cmd *cobra.Command) (*proto.LoginRequest, error) {
 	loginRequest := proto.LoginRequest{
 		SetupKey:            providedSetupKey,
@@ -661,14 +648,31 @@ func setupLoginRequest(providedSetupKey string, customDNSAddressConverted []byte
 	if cmd.Flag(serverSSHAllowedFlag).Changed {
 		loginRequest.ServerSSHAllowed = &serverSSHAllowed
 	}
-	if cmd.Flag(serverVNCAllowedFlag).Changed {
-		loginRequest.ServerVNCAllowed = &serverVNCAllowed
-	}
-	if cmd.Flag(disableVNCApprovalFlag).Changed {
-		loginRequest.DisableVNCApproval = &disableVNCApproval
+
+	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRootFlag).Changed {
+		loginRequest.EnableSSHRoot = &enableSSHRoot
 	}
 
-	applySSHFlagsToLogin(cmd, &loginRequest)
+	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHSFTPFlag).Changed {
+		loginRequest.EnableSSHSFTP = &enableSSHSFTP
+	}
+
+	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHLocalPortForwardFlag).Changed {
+		loginRequest.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding = &enableSSHLocalPortForward
+	}
+
+	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRemotePortForwardFlag).Changed {
+		loginRequest.EnableSSHRemotePortForwarding = &enableSSHRemotePortForward
+	}
+
+	if cmd.Flag(disableSSHAuthFlag).Changed {
+		loginRequest.DisableSSHAuth = &disableSSHAuth
+	}
+
+	if cmd.Flag(sshJWTCacheTTLFlag).Changed {
+		sshJWTCacheTTL32 := int32(sshJWTCacheTTL)
+		loginRequest.SshJWTCacheTTL = &sshJWTCacheTTL32
+	}
 
 	if cmd.Flag(disableAutoConnectFlag).Changed {
 		loginRequest.DisableAutoConnect = &autoConnectDisabled

client/cmd/vnc_agent.go

@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
-//go:build windows || (darwin && !ios)
-
-package cmd
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"net"
-	"net/netip"
-	"os"
-
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
-
-	vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
-)
-
-var (
-	vncAgentSocket    string
-	vncAgentTargetUID uint32
-)
-
-func init() {
-	vncAgentCmd.Flags().StringVar(&vncAgentSocket, "socket", "", "Unix-domain socket path the agent listens on (required)")
-	vncAgentCmd.Flags().Uint32Var(&vncAgentTargetUID, "target-uid", 0, "uid the agent should drop privileges to before listening (darwin only; 0 = stay as current uid)")
-	rootCmd.AddCommand(vncAgentCmd)
-}
-
-// vncAgentCmd runs a VNC server inside the user's interactive session,
-// listening on a Unix-domain socket. The NetBird service spawns it: on
-// Windows via CreateProcessAsUser into the console session, on macOS via
-// launchctl asuser into the Aqua session.
-var vncAgentCmd = &cobra.Command{
-	Use:    "vnc-agent",
-	Short:  "Run VNC capture agent (internal, spawned by service)",
-	Hidden: true,
-	RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
-		log.SetReportCaller(true)
-		log.SetFormatter(&log.JSONFormatter{})
-		log.SetOutput(os.Stderr)
-
-		if vncAgentSocket == "" {
-			return fmt.Errorf("--socket is required")
-		}
-
-		token := os.Getenv("NB_VNC_AGENT_TOKEN")
-		if token == "" {
-			return fmt.Errorf("NB_VNC_AGENT_TOKEN not set; agent requires a token from the service")
-		}
-		// Purge the token from env so it doesn't leak via /proc/<pid>/environ.
-		if err := os.Unsetenv("NB_VNC_AGENT_TOKEN"); err != nil {
-			log.Debugf("unset NB_VNC_AGENT_TOKEN: %v", err)
-		}
-
-		// Drop root privileges to the target console user BEFORE creating
-		// the listening socket: keeps a post-auth bug in the encoder /
-		// input / capture paths confined to the user's own privileges
-		// rather than escalating to host root, and makes the daemon's
-		// LOCAL_PEERCRED check see the right uid. No-op on Windows
-		// (both processes run as SYSTEM) and when --target-uid is 0.
-		if vncAgentTargetUID != 0 {
-			if err := dropAgentPrivileges(vncAgentTargetUID); err != nil {
-				return fmt.Errorf("drop privileges to uid %d: %w", vncAgentTargetUID, err)
-			}
-		}
-
-		if err := os.Remove(vncAgentSocket); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
-			log.Debugf("remove stale socket %s: %v", vncAgentSocket, err)
-		}
-		ln, err := net.Listen("unix", vncAgentSocket)
-		if err != nil {
-			return fmt.Errorf("listen on %s: %w", vncAgentSocket, err)
-		}
-		if err := os.Chmod(vncAgentSocket, 0o600); err != nil {
-			log.Debugf("chmod %s: %v", vncAgentSocket, err)
-		}
-
-		capturer, injector, err := newAgentResources()
-		if err != nil {
-			_ = ln.Close()
-			return err
-		}
-		srv := vncserver.New(vncserver.Config{
-			Capturer:      capturer,
-			Injector:      injector,
-			DisableAuth:   true,
-			AgentTokenHex: token,
-			Listener:      ln,
-		})
-
-		if err := srv.Start(cmd.Context(), netip.AddrPort{}, netip.Prefix{}); err != nil {
-			return fmt.Errorf("start vnc server: %w", err)
-		}
-		log.Infof("vnc-agent listening on %s, ready", vncAgentSocket)
-
-		<-cmd.Context().Done()
-		log.Info("vnc-agent context cancelled, shutting down")
-		return srv.Stop()
-	},
-	SilenceUsage: true,
-}

client/cmd/vnc_agent_darwin.go

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-//go:build darwin && !ios
-
-package cmd
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-
-	vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
-)
-
-func newAgentResources() (vncserver.ScreenCapturer, vncserver.InputInjector, error) {
-	capturer := vncserver.NewMacPoller()
-	injector, err := vncserver.NewMacInputInjector()
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("macOS input injector: %w", err)
-	}
-	return capturer, injector, nil
-}

client/cmd/vnc_agent_dropprivs_darwin.go

@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
-//go:build darwin && !ios
-
-package cmd
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"os"
-	"os/user"
-	"strconv"
-	"syscall"
-)
-
-// dropAgentPrivileges drops the vnc-agent process from root (its
-// launchctl-asuser-inherited starting uid) to the target console user
-// before any other initialisation runs. Without this the agent runs as
-// root for the lifetime of the session; any post-auth memory-safety
-// issue in the capture/input/encode paths would then be a root-level
-// RCE on the host instead of a user-level one. Also makes the daemon's
-// LOCAL_PEERCRED check correctly identify the agent as the console user,
-// not as root.
-//
-// Returns an error when the agent is running as a non-root uid that
-// differs from targetUID: non-root can only setuid to itself, so a
-// mismatch here means the spawn went to the wrong session.
-func dropAgentPrivileges(targetUID uint32) error {
-	if targetUID == 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("refusing to keep agent running as root (target uid 0)")
-	}
-	cur := uint32(os.Getuid())
-	if cur == targetUID {
-		return nil
-	}
-	if cur != 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("agent uid %d does not match expected %d and we lack root to fix it", cur, targetUID)
-	}
-	// Resolve the target user's real primary group rather than reusing
-	// targetUID as the gid: a user's primary group on macOS is typically
-	// staff(20), not gid==uid. Fail closed if the lookup fails.
-	targetGID, err := primaryGroupID(targetUID)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	// Drop supplementary groups first: setgid alone doesn't touch the
-	// auxiliary group list, leaving root's groups attached would let the
-	// dropped process write to root-only group-writable files.
-	if err := syscall.Setgroups([]int{}); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("setgroups([]): %w", err)
-	}
-	if err := syscall.Setgid(targetGID); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("setgid(%d): %w", targetGID, err)
-	}
-	if os.Getgid() != targetGID || os.Getegid() != targetGID {
-		return fmt.Errorf("setgid verification: gid=%d egid=%d, expected %d", os.Getgid(), os.Getegid(), targetGID)
-	}
-	if err := syscall.Setuid(int(targetUID)); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("setuid(%d): %w", targetUID, err)
-	}
-	if uint32(os.Getuid()) != targetUID || uint32(os.Geteuid()) != targetUID {
-		return fmt.Errorf("setuid verification: uid=%d euid=%d, expected %d", os.Getuid(), os.Geteuid(), targetUID)
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// primaryGroupID resolves the real primary group id of the user with the
-// given uid. Fails closed: a lookup or parse error returns an error so the
-// caller never falls back to using uid as the gid.
-func primaryGroupID(targetUID uint32) (int, error) {
-	u, err := user.LookupId(strconv.Itoa(int(targetUID)))
-	if err != nil {
-		return 0, fmt.Errorf("look up uid %d: %w", targetUID, err)
-	}
-	gid, err := strconv.Atoi(u.Gid)
-	if err != nil {
-		return 0, fmt.Errorf("parse gid %q for uid %d: %w", u.Gid, targetUID, err)
-	}
-	return gid, nil
-}

client/cmd/vnc_agent_dropprivs_darwin_test.go

@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-//go:build darwin && !ios
-
-package cmd
-
-import (
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// TestDropAgentPrivileges_RefusesRootTarget locks in the contract that
-// dropAgentPrivileges must never be a no-op when asked to keep the
-// agent as root (target uid 0). A future caller that passes 0 by
-// mistake would otherwise leave the post-auth attack surface running
-// with full root privileges.
-func TestDropAgentPrivileges_RefusesRootTarget(t *testing.T) {
-	err := dropAgentPrivileges(0)
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected refusal for target uid 0, got nil")
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "root") {
-		t.Fatalf("error should mention root, got: %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestDropAgentPrivileges_NoOpWhenAlreadyTarget covers the dev path
-// where the agent is launched by hand as the target user (no root
-// available, no setuid needed). The helper must succeed silently
-// instead of trying (and failing) a setuid to its current uid.
-func TestDropAgentPrivileges_NoOpWhenAlreadyTarget(t *testing.T) {
-	// Skip when running as root: the early-return path we want to
-	// cover only fires when current uid == target uid.
-	uid := currentUIDForTest()
-	if uid == 0 {
-		t.Skip("test must not run as root; cannot exercise the no-op early-return")
-	}
-	if err := dropAgentPrivileges(uid); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("expected no-op when current uid == target, got: %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestDropAgentPrivileges_RefusesMismatchedNonRoot guards the "non-root
-// caller tries to setuid to a different uid" path: setuid would fail
-// with EPERM anyway, but the helper should surface a clear error
-// before issuing the syscall so a misconfigured spawn (wrong --target-uid
-// flag) is debuggable.
-func TestDropAgentPrivileges_RefusesMismatchedNonRoot(t *testing.T) {
-	uid := currentUIDForTest()
-	if uid == 0 {
-		t.Skip("test must not run as root; covered case requires non-root caller")
-	}
-	err := dropAgentPrivileges(uid + 1)
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected refusal when non-root caller asks to setuid elsewhere")
-	}
-}

client/cmd/vnc_agent_dropprivs_testhelpers_darwin.go

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-//go:build darwin && !ios
-
-package cmd
-
-import "os"
-
-// currentUIDForTest exposes os.Getuid for the darwin dropprivs tests
-// without leaking an os import into the test file itself.
-func currentUIDForTest() uint32 {
-	return uint32(os.Getuid())
-}

client/cmd/vnc_agent_dropprivs_windows.go

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-//go:build windows
-
-package cmd
-
-// dropAgentPrivileges is a no-op on Windows: the agent and the daemon
-// both run as SYSTEM (the daemon spawns the agent into the interactive
-// session via CreateProcessAsUser with an impersonation token, but the
-// resulting process still runs under SYSTEM, not under the user's
-// account). The Windows path relies on the DACL-restricted socket
-// directory, the unpredictable per-spawn socket name, the listen-readiness
-// gate, and the per-spawn token for integrity instead.
-func dropAgentPrivileges(_ uint32) error {
-	return nil
-}

client/cmd/vnc_agent_windows.go

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-//go:build windows
-
-package cmd
-
-import (
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-
-	vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
-)
-
-func newAgentResources() (vncserver.ScreenCapturer, vncserver.InputInjector, error) {
-	sessionID := vncserver.GetCurrentSessionID()
-	log.Infof("VNC agent running in Windows session %d", sessionID)
-	return vncserver.NewDesktopCapturer(), vncserver.NewWindowsInputInjector(), nil
-}

client/cmd/vnc_flags.go

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-package cmd
-
-const (
-	serverVNCAllowedFlag   = "allow-server-vnc"
-	disableVNCApprovalFlag = "disable-vnc-approval"
-)
-
-var (
-	serverVNCAllowed   bool
-	disableVNCApproval bool
-)
-
-func init() {
-	upCmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVar(&serverVNCAllowed, serverVNCAllowedFlag, false, "Allow embedded VNC server on peer")
-	upCmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVar(&disableVNCApproval, disableVNCApprovalFlag, false, "Disable per-connection user approval prompts for the embedded VNC server")
-}

client/configs/configs.go

@@ -6,30 +6,19 @@ import (
 	"runtime"
 )
 
-var (
-	// StateDir holds persistent state (config, profiles, install metadata).
-	StateDir string
-	// RuntimeDir holds ephemeral artifacts that should not survive reboot,
-	// such as Unix sockets for daemon and per-session IPC. Empty on
-	// platforms without a conventional /var/run-style location.
-	RuntimeDir string
-)
+var StateDir string
 
 func init() {
+	StateDir = os.Getenv("NB_STATE_DIR")
+	if StateDir != "" {
+		return
+	}
 	switch runtime.GOOS {
 	case "windows":
 		StateDir = filepath.Join(os.Getenv("PROGRAMDATA"), "Netbird")
 	case "darwin", "linux":
 		StateDir = "/var/lib/netbird"
-		RuntimeDir = "/var/run/netbird"
 	case "freebsd", "openbsd", "netbsd", "dragonfly":
 		StateDir = "/var/db/netbird"
-		RuntimeDir = "/var/run/netbird"
-	}
-	if v := os.Getenv("NB_STATE_DIR"); v != "" {
-		StateDir = v
-	}
-	if v := os.Getenv("NB_RUNTIME_DIR"); v != "" {
-		RuntimeDir = v
 	}
 }

client/internal/approval/broker.go

@@ -1,219 +0,0 @@
-// Package approval brokers per-attempt user-accept prompts for inbound
-// remote access (VNC today, SSH and others in the future). A caller pushes
-// a Prompt; the broker emits a SystemEvent on the daemon→UI stream and
-// blocks until the UI calls the daemon's RespondApproval RPC, the per-
-// request timeout fires, or no subscriber is connected. The latter case
-// fails closed so a backgrounded UI cannot silently bypass the gate.
-package approval
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"errors"
-	"fmt"
-	"sync"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/google/uuid"
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
-)
-
-// Metadata keys the broker reserves on the emitted SystemEvent. Callers
-// should not set these themselves; values in Prompt.Metadata that collide
-// are overwritten by the broker.
-const (
-	MetaRequestID = "request_id"
-	MetaKind      = "kind"
-	MetaExpiresAt = "expires_at"
-)
-
-// ShortKeyFingerprint formats a hex-encoded Noise_IK static pubkey as a
-// short, eyeball-able fingerprint to display in the approval dialog.
-// The dashboard-supplied display name attached to a SessionPubKey isn't
-// cryptographically asserted by the connecting client, so the prompt
-// must also show something that IS: the key fingerprint, a hash of
-// the static public key the client just proved possession of during the
-// Noise handshake. Returns the empty string when the input is too short
-// to plausibly be a hex pubkey, so the row is omitted rather than
-// rendered as a misleading partial.
-//
-// Output format: 16 hex chars grouped as XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX (64 bits of
-// fingerprint, resistant to random-prefix collisions and easy for a human
-// to compare with an out-of-band reference).
-func ShortKeyFingerprint(hexKey string) string {
-	if len(hexKey) < 8 {
-		return ""
-	}
-	src := hexKey
-	if len(src) > 16 {
-		src = src[:16]
-	}
-	var out []byte
-	for i, c := range src {
-		if i > 0 && i%4 == 0 {
-			out = append(out, '-')
-		}
-		out = append(out, byte(c))
-	}
-	return string(out)
-}
-
-// Kind values for the well-known prompt subjects. New subsystems should
-// add a constant here so the UI can dispatch on a known string.
-const (
-	KindVNC = "vnc"
-	KindSSH = "ssh"
-)
-
-// DefaultTimeout is the wall-clock window the user has to accept or deny a
-// pending approval before the broker fails closed and returns ErrTimeout.
-// Kept well under typical VNC client and dashboard connection timeouts so
-// the RFB rejection actually reaches the browser instead of racing the
-// browser's own "connection timed out" message.
-const DefaultTimeout = 15 * time.Second
-
-// timeoutValue returns the active timeout. It's a var so tests in this
-// package can shorten the wait without exposing a setter on the public
-// API. Production code always sees DefaultTimeout.
-var timeoutValue = func() time.Duration { return DefaultTimeout }
-
-// ErrNoSubscriber indicates no UI is connected to consume the prompt.
-// The caller must reject the underlying connection (fail-closed).
-var ErrNoSubscriber = errors.New("no UI subscriber connected for approval")
-
-// ErrTimeout indicates the user did not respond within DefaultTimeout.
-var ErrTimeout = errors.New("approval timed out")
-
-// ErrDenied indicates the user explicitly denied the connection.
-var ErrDenied = errors.New("approval denied")
-
-// EventPublisher is the subset of peer.Status used to emit prompts.
-type EventPublisher interface {
-	PublishEvent(
-		severity proto.SystemEvent_Severity,
-		category proto.SystemEvent_Category,
-		msg string,
-		userMsg string,
-		metadata map[string]string,
-	)
-	HasEventSubscribers() bool
-}
-
-// Prompt describes the pending request shown to the user. Kind selects
-// the UI dispatch path (e.g. "vnc", "ssh"). Subject is the human-readable
-// one-liner the UI may show as a title or notification body. Metadata is
-// passed through verbatim and is the subsystem-specific payload (peer
-// name, source IP, mode, etc.).
-type Prompt struct {
-	Kind     string
-	Subject  string
-	Metadata map[string]string
-}
-
-// Decision carries the user's response to an approval prompt. ViewOnly is
-// only meaningful when Accept is true; it lets the host grant the
-// connection but signal the requester that input control is withheld.
-type Decision struct {
-	Accept   bool
-	ViewOnly bool
-}
-
-// Broker holds in-flight approval requests keyed by request ID.
-type Broker struct {
-	pub EventPublisher
-
-	mu      sync.Mutex
-	pending map[string]chan Decision
-}
-
-// New returns a broker that publishes prompts via pub.
-func New(pub EventPublisher) *Broker {
-	return &Broker{
-		pub:     pub,
-		pending: make(map[string]chan Decision),
-	}
-}
-
-// Request emits a SystemEvent for p and blocks until the UI calls Respond,
-// ctx is cancelled, or DefaultTimeout elapses. Returns a Decision when
-// the user replied; ErrDenied / ErrTimeout / ErrNoSubscriber / ctx.Err
-// otherwise. Callers must treat any non-nil error as a deny.
-func (b *Broker) Request(ctx context.Context, p Prompt) (Decision, error) {
-	var zero Decision
-	if b == nil || b.pub == nil {
-		return zero, fmt.Errorf("approval broker not configured")
-	}
-	if !b.pub.HasEventSubscribers() {
-		return zero, ErrNoSubscriber
-	}
-
-	id := uuid.NewString()
-	resp := make(chan Decision, 1)
-
-	b.mu.Lock()
-	b.pending[id] = resp
-	b.mu.Unlock()
-
-	defer b.dropPending(id)
-
-	timeout := timeoutValue()
-	expiresAt := time.Now().Add(timeout)
-	meta := make(map[string]string, len(p.Metadata)+3)
-	for k, v := range p.Metadata {
-		meta[k] = v
-	}
-	meta[MetaRequestID] = id
-	meta[MetaKind] = p.Kind
-	meta[MetaExpiresAt] = expiresAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
-
-	subject := p.Subject
-	if subject == "" {
-		subject = fmt.Sprintf("%s connection requires approval", p.Kind)
-	}
-	b.pub.PublishEvent(proto.SystemEvent_INFO, proto.SystemEvent_APPROVAL, subject, subject, meta)
-	log.Debugf("approval request %s (%s) emitted: %s", id, p.Kind, subject)
-
-	timer := time.NewTimer(timeout)
-	defer timer.Stop()
-
-	select {
-	case d := <-resp:
-		if !d.Accept {
-			return zero, ErrDenied
-		}
-		return d, nil
-	case <-timer.C:
-		return zero, ErrTimeout
-	case <-ctx.Done():
-		return zero, ctx.Err()
-	}
-}
-
-// Respond delivers the user's decision for id. Returns true when a pending
-// request matched and was woken, false when id was unknown or already done.
-func (b *Broker) Respond(id string, d Decision) bool {
-	if b == nil {
-		return false
-	}
-	b.mu.Lock()
-	ch, ok := b.pending[id]
-	if ok {
-		delete(b.pending, id)
-	}
-	b.mu.Unlock()
-	if !ok {
-		return false
-	}
-	select {
-	case ch <- d:
-	default:
-	}
-	return true
-}
-
-func (b *Broker) dropPending(id string) {
-	b.mu.Lock()
-	delete(b.pending, id)
-	b.mu.Unlock()
-}

client/internal/approval/broker_test.go

@@ -1,434 +0,0 @@
-package approval
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"sync"
-	"sync/atomic"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
-)
-
-// fakePublisher records published events and reports whether subscribers
-// are connected. The subscribers flag is the security-critical signal:
-// when false the broker must refuse to emit and the gate must fail closed.
-type fakePublisher struct {
-	mu          sync.Mutex
-	subscribers bool
-	events      []*proto.SystemEvent
-}
-
-func (p *fakePublisher) PublishEvent(
-	severity proto.SystemEvent_Severity,
-	category proto.SystemEvent_Category,
-	msg string,
-	userMsg string,
-	metadata map[string]string,
-) {
-	p.mu.Lock()
-	p.events = append(p.events, &proto.SystemEvent{
-		Severity:    severity,
-		Category:    category,
-		Message:     msg,
-		UserMessage: userMsg,
-		Metadata:    metadata,
-	})
-	p.mu.Unlock()
-}
-
-func (p *fakePublisher) HasEventSubscribers() bool {
-	p.mu.Lock()
-	defer p.mu.Unlock()
-	return p.subscribers
-}
-
-func (p *fakePublisher) lastEvent(t *testing.T) *proto.SystemEvent {
-	t.Helper()
-	p.mu.Lock()
-	defer p.mu.Unlock()
-	require.NotEmpty(t, p.events, "publisher saw no events")
-	return p.events[len(p.events)-1]
-}
-
-func (p *fakePublisher) eventCount() int {
-	p.mu.Lock()
-	defer p.mu.Unlock()
-	return len(p.events)
-}
-
-// TestRequestNoSubscriberFailsClosed is the core fail-closed invariant:
-// when the UI is not subscribed, the broker must refuse without emitting
-// an event or arming a waiter. A regression here is a silent bypass.
-func TestRequestNoSubscriberFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
-	pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: false}
-	b := New(pub)
-
-	_, err := b.Request(context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC, Subject: "test"})
-	assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrNoSubscriber)
-	assert.Equal(t, 0, pub.eventCount(), "no event must be emitted when fail-closed")
-
-	b.mu.Lock()
-	pending := len(b.pending)
-	b.mu.Unlock()
-	assert.Equal(t, 0, pending, "no waiter must be registered on fail-closed")
-}
-
-// TestRequestTimeoutDenies verifies that a request without a UI response
-// returns ErrTimeout (deny) rather than nil (silent accept). Uses a short
-// per-test broker timeout via Respond after the fact to keep the test fast.
-func TestRequestTimeoutDenies(t *testing.T) {
-	// Replace DefaultTimeout for the lifetime of this test.
-	orig := DefaultTimeout
-	defaultTimeout(t, 60*time.Millisecond)
-	defer defaultTimeout(t, orig)
-
-	pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
-	b := New(pub)
-
-	start := time.Now()
-	_, err := b.Request(context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC, Subject: "test"})
-	assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrTimeout, "missing user response must yield ErrTimeout, not nil")
-	assert.GreaterOrEqual(t, time.Since(start), 50*time.Millisecond, "timeout fired prematurely")
-}
-
-// TestRequestDenied returns ErrDenied when the UI responds with false.
-func TestRequestDenied(t *testing.T) {
-	pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
-	b := New(pub)
-
-	var requestID string
-	done := make(chan error, 1)
-	go func() {
-		done <- requestErr(b, context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC, Subject: "test"})
-	}()
-
-	requestID = waitForRequestID(t, pub)
-	require.True(t, b.Respond(requestID, Decision{Accept: false}))
-
-	select {
-	case err := <-done:
-		assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrDenied)
-	case <-time.After(time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("Request did not return after Respond(false)")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestRequestAccepted is the happy path. Failure here doesn't bypass the
-// gate but breaks the feature.
-func TestRequestAccepted(t *testing.T) {
-	pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
-	b := New(pub)
-
-	done := make(chan error, 1)
-	go func() {
-		done <- requestErr(b, context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC, Subject: "test"})
-	}()
-
-	id := waitForRequestID(t, pub)
-	require.True(t, b.Respond(id, Decision{Accept: true}))
-
-	select {
-	case err := <-done:
-		assert.NoError(t, err)
-	case <-time.After(time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("Request did not return after Respond(true)")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestRequestCtxCancelDenies verifies that an upstream cancel (e.g. the
-// engine shutting down mid-prompt) returns the cancel error rather than
-// nil. A nil here would be a silent bypass on shutdown races.
-func TestRequestCtxCancelDenies(t *testing.T) {
-	pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
-	b := New(pub)
-
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-	done := make(chan error, 1)
-	go func() {
-		done <- requestErr(b, ctx, Prompt{Kind: KindVNC, Subject: "test"})
-	}()
-
-	// Wait until the prompt is in flight so cancel races a live waiter.
-	_ = waitForRequestID(t, pub)
-	cancel()
-
-	select {
-	case err := <-done:
-		assert.ErrorIs(t, err, context.Canceled)
-	case <-time.After(time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("Request did not return after ctx cancel")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestRespondUnknownIsNoop ensures a stray RespondApproval RPC cannot
-// affect or accidentally accept any in-flight request whose id it doesn't
-// match. Also confirms it doesn't panic.
-func TestRespondUnknownIsNoop(t *testing.T) {
-	pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
-	b := New(pub)
-
-	// No in-flight prompts: Respond returns false.
-	assert.False(t, b.Respond("does-not-exist", Decision{Accept: true}))
-
-	// With an in-flight prompt, a wrong id still returns false and the
-	// prompt remains armed (eventually timing out as a deny).
-	defaultTimeout(t, 60*time.Millisecond)
-	defer defaultTimeout(t, DefaultTimeout)
-
-	done := make(chan error, 1)
-	go func() {
-		done <- requestErr(b, context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC})
-	}()
-	realID := waitForRequestID(t, pub)
-	assert.False(t, b.Respond("totally-bogus", Decision{Accept: true}), "unknown id must not match")
-	assert.NotEqual(t, "totally-bogus", realID)
-
-	select {
-	case err := <-done:
-		assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrTimeout, "armed prompt must still time out, not accept")
-	case <-time.After(time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("prompt did not resolve")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestRespondAfterTimeoutNoop confirms a late accept response can't
-// retroactively flip a denied (timed-out) request. The dropPending defer
-// in Request must have removed the entry by the time Respond races in.
-func TestRespondAfterTimeoutNoop(t *testing.T) {
-	defaultTimeout(t, 30*time.Millisecond)
-	defer defaultTimeout(t, DefaultTimeout)
-
-	pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
-	b := New(pub)
-
-	done := make(chan error, 1)
-	go func() {
-		done <- requestErr(b, context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC})
-	}()
-	id := waitForRequestID(t, pub)
-
-	select {
-	case err := <-done:
-		require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrTimeout)
-	case <-time.After(time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("prompt did not time out")
-	}
-
-	assert.False(t, b.Respond(id, Decision{Accept: true}), "late respond must be no-op")
-}
-
-// TestRespondDoubleNoop ensures a duplicate ack from the UI doesn't leak
-// past the matched waiter or panic on a closed/full channel.
-func TestRespondDoubleNoop(t *testing.T) {
-	pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
-	b := New(pub)
-
-	done := make(chan error, 1)
-	go func() {
-		done <- requestErr(b, context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC})
-	}()
-	id := waitForRequestID(t, pub)
-	require.True(t, b.Respond(id, Decision{Accept: true}))
-	assert.False(t, b.Respond(id, Decision{Accept: false}), "second response must be no-op")
-
-	select {
-	case err := <-done:
-		assert.NoError(t, err)
-	case <-time.After(time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("prompt did not resolve")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestNilBrokerRequestErrors guards the engine pre-init path where the
-// broker may not yet exist (or its publisher is nil): Request must
-// error, never silently accept.
-func TestNilBrokerRequestErrors(t *testing.T) {
-	var b *Broker
-	_, err := b.Request(context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC})
-	assert.Error(t, err, "nil broker must error, never silently accept")
-
-	b2 := New(nil)
-	_, err = b2.Request(context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC})
-	assert.Error(t, err, "broker with nil publisher must error, never silently accept")
-}
-
-// TestPromptMetadataInjected confirms the broker stamps request_id, kind,
-// and expires_at on the emitted event. The UI relies on these keys; if
-// they are dropped, the user cannot route the prompt and the response
-// path breaks (which fails closed via timeout).
-func TestPromptMetadataInjected(t *testing.T) {
-	pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
-	b := New(pub)
-
-	done := make(chan error, 1)
-	go func() {
-		done <- requestErr(b, context.Background(), Prompt{
-			Kind:     KindVNC,
-			Subject:  "VNC connection from peerA",
-			Metadata: map[string]string{"peer_name": "peerA"},
-		})
-	}()
-
-	id := waitForRequestID(t, pub)
-	ev := pub.lastEvent(t)
-
-	assert.Equal(t, proto.SystemEvent_APPROVAL, ev.Category)
-	assert.Equal(t, KindVNC, ev.Metadata[MetaKind])
-	assert.Equal(t, id, ev.Metadata[MetaRequestID])
-	assert.NotEmpty(t, ev.Metadata[MetaExpiresAt])
-	assert.Equal(t, "peerA", ev.Metadata["peer_name"], "caller metadata must pass through")
-
-	require.True(t, b.Respond(id, Decision{Accept: true}))
-	<-done
-}
-
-// TestConcurrentRequests verifies that two concurrent prompts are tracked
-// independently. A bug that aliases ids would let one Respond unblock
-// the wrong waiter (a silent accept across prompts).
-func TestConcurrentRequests(t *testing.T) {
-	pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
-	b := New(pub)
-
-	const n = 20
-	results := make(chan error, n)
-	for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
-		go func() {
-			results <- requestErr(b, context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC})
-		}()
-	}
-
-	ids := waitForNRequestIDs(t, pub, n)
-	require.Len(t, ids, n)
-
-	// Deny exactly half, accept the rest. Track outcome per id so we can
-	// match each Request's return value against the response we sent.
-	denySet := make(map[string]bool, n)
-	for i, id := range ids {
-		deny := i%2 == 0
-		denySet[id] = deny
-		require.True(t, b.Respond(id, Decision{Accept: !deny}))
-	}
-
-	// Collect all returns and check no nil errors slipped past a deny.
-	var accepted, denied atomic.Int32
-	for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
-		select {
-		case err := <-results:
-			if err == nil {
-				accepted.Add(1)
-			} else {
-				assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrDenied)
-				denied.Add(1)
-			}
-		case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
-			t.Fatalf("only got %d/%d responses", i, n)
-		}
-	}
-	assert.Equal(t, int32(n/2), denied.Load())
-	assert.Equal(t, int32(n/2), accepted.Load())
-}
-
-// waitForRequestID blocks until the publisher sees its next event and
-// returns the request_id stamped on it.
-func waitForRequestID(t *testing.T, pub *fakePublisher) string {
-	t.Helper()
-	deadline := time.Now().Add(2 * time.Second)
-	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
-		pub.mu.Lock()
-		count := len(pub.events)
-		var id string
-		if count > 0 {
-			id = pub.events[count-1].Metadata[MetaRequestID]
-		}
-		pub.mu.Unlock()
-		if id != "" {
-			return id
-		}
-		time.Sleep(2 * time.Millisecond)
-	}
-	t.Fatal("timeout waiting for emitted event")
-	return ""
-}
-
-func waitForNRequestIDs(t *testing.T, pub *fakePublisher, n int) []string {
-	t.Helper()
-	deadline := time.Now().Add(2 * time.Second)
-	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
-		pub.mu.Lock()
-		count := len(pub.events)
-		pub.mu.Unlock()
-		if count >= n {
-			break
-		}
-		time.Sleep(2 * time.Millisecond)
-	}
-	pub.mu.Lock()
-	defer pub.mu.Unlock()
-	out := make([]string, 0, len(pub.events))
-	seen := make(map[string]struct{}, len(pub.events))
-	for _, ev := range pub.events {
-		id := ev.Metadata[MetaRequestID]
-		if id == "" {
-			continue
-		}
-		if _, dup := seen[id]; dup {
-			continue
-		}
-		seen[id] = struct{}{}
-		out = append(out, id)
-	}
-	if len(out) < n {
-		t.Fatalf("only got %d/%d request ids", len(out), n)
-	}
-	return out
-}
-
-// defaultTimeout swaps the broker's per-request wall-clock window so the
-// timeout tests run quickly. Restores the prior value on the next call.
-func defaultTimeout(t *testing.T, d time.Duration) {
-	t.Helper()
-	if d <= 0 {
-		t.Fatal("defaultTimeout must be > 0")
-	}
-	timeoutValue = func() time.Duration { return d }
-}
-
-// requestErr wraps Broker.Request to drop the Decision when tests only
-// care about the error path. Keeps the goroutine bodies tight.
-func requestErr(b *Broker, ctx context.Context, p Prompt) error {
-	_, err := b.Request(ctx, p)
-	return err
-}
-
-// TestRequestViewOnly checks the view-only outcome flows through Request's
-// Decision return without being silently swallowed.
-func TestRequestViewOnly(t *testing.T) {
-	pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
-	b := New(pub)
-
-	type result struct {
-		d   Decision
-		err error
-	}
-	done := make(chan result, 1)
-	go func() {
-		d, err := b.Request(context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC})
-		done <- result{d, err}
-	}()
-
-	id := waitForRequestID(t, pub)
-	require.True(t, b.Respond(id, Decision{Accept: true, ViewOnly: true}))
-
-	select {
-	case r := <-done:
-		assert.NoError(t, r.err)
-		assert.True(t, r.d.Accept)
-		assert.True(t, r.d.ViewOnly, "ViewOnly must survive the round-trip")
-	case <-time.After(time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("view-only request did not resolve")
-	}
-}

client/internal/approval/fingerprint_test.go

@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
-package approval
-
-import "testing"
-
-// TestShortKeyFingerprint locks in the format the VNC approval prompt
-// shows to the user. The fingerprint is the user's only cryptographic
-// anchor against a malicious management server that pushes a spoofed
-// display name, so accidental changes to its format would silently
-// undermine that defence.
-func TestShortKeyFingerprint(t *testing.T) {
-	cases := []struct {
-		name string
-		in   string
-		want string
-	}{
-		{
-			name: "full_32_byte_pubkey",
-			in:   "0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210ffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100",
-			want: "0123-4567-89ab-cdef",
-		},
-		{
-			name: "exactly_16_chars",
-			in:   "0123456789abcdef",
-			want: "0123-4567-89ab-cdef",
-		},
-		{
-			name: "borderline_8_chars",
-			in:   "01234567",
-			want: "0123-4567",
-		},
-		{
-			name: "too_short_returns_empty",
-			in:   "0123",
-			want: "",
-		},
-		{
-			name: "empty_returns_empty",
-			in:   "",
-			want: "",
-		},
-	}
-	for _, tc := range cases {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			got := ShortKeyFingerprint(tc.in)
-			if got != tc.want {
-				t.Fatalf("ShortKeyFingerprint(%q) = %q, want %q", tc.in, got, tc.want)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestShortKeyFingerprint_DistinctKeysDistinctOutputs guards against a
-// formatting bug that would collapse different prefixes onto the same
-// displayed fingerprint and let an attacker substitute their pubkey for
-// a victim's while keeping the prompt visually identical.
-func TestShortKeyFingerprint_DistinctKeysDistinctOutputs(t *testing.T) {
-	a := ShortKeyFingerprint("0123456789abcdef" + "rest_of_pubkey_ignored")
-	b := ShortKeyFingerprint("0123456789abcde0" + "rest_of_pubkey_ignored")
-	if a == b {
-		t.Fatalf("expected distinct outputs for distinct prefixes, both = %q", a)
-	}
-}

client/internal/auth/auth.go

@@ -344,7 +344,6 @@ func (a *Auth) setSystemInfoFlags(info *system.Info) {
 		a.config.RosenpassEnabled,
 		a.config.RosenpassPermissive,
 		a.config.ServerSSHAllowed,
-		a.config.ServerVNCAllowed,
 		a.config.DisableClientRoutes,
 		a.config.DisableServerRoutes,
 		a.config.DisableDNS,

client/internal/connect.go

@@ -604,8 +604,6 @@ func createEngineConfig(key wgtypes.Key, config *profilemanager.Config, peerConf
 		RosenpassEnabled:              config.RosenpassEnabled,
 		RosenpassPermissive:           config.RosenpassPermissive,
 		ServerSSHAllowed:              util.ReturnBoolWithDefaultTrue(config.ServerSSHAllowed),
-		ServerVNCAllowed:              config.ServerVNCAllowed != nil && *config.ServerVNCAllowed,
-		DisableVNCApproval:            config.DisableVNCApproval,
 		EnableSSHRoot:                 config.EnableSSHRoot,
 		EnableSSHSFTP:                 config.EnableSSHSFTP,
 		EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding:  config.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding,
@@ -688,7 +686,6 @@ func loginToManagement(ctx context.Context, client mgm.Client, pubSSHKey []byte,
 		config.RosenpassEnabled,
 		config.RosenpassPermissive,
 		config.ServerSSHAllowed,
-		config.ServerVNCAllowed,
 		config.DisableClientRoutes,
 		config.DisableServerRoutes,
 		config.DisableDNS,

client/internal/debug/debug.go

@@ -480,7 +480,6 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addStatus() error {
 
 		fullStatus := g.statusRecorder.GetFullStatus()
 		protoFullStatus := nbstatus.ToProtoFullStatus(fullStatus)
-		protoFullStatus.Events = g.statusRecorder.GetEventHistory()
 		overview := nbstatus.ConvertToStatusOutputOverview(protoFullStatus, nbstatus.ConvertOptions{
 			Anonymize:     g.anonymize,
 			ProfileName:   profName,
@@ -669,12 +668,6 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addCommonConfigFields(configContent *strings.Builder)
 	if g.internalConfig.SSHJWTCacheTTL != nil {
 		configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("SSHJWTCacheTTL: %d\n", *g.internalConfig.SSHJWTCacheTTL))
 	}
-	if g.internalConfig.ServerVNCAllowed != nil {
-		configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("ServerVNCAllowed: %v\n", *g.internalConfig.ServerVNCAllowed))
-	}
-	if g.internalConfig.DisableVNCApproval != nil {
-		configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("DisableVNCApproval: %v\n", *g.internalConfig.DisableVNCApproval))
-	}
 
 	configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("DisableClientRoutes: %v\n", g.internalConfig.DisableClientRoutes))
 	configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("DisableServerRoutes: %v\n", g.internalConfig.DisableServerRoutes))

client/internal/debug/debug_test.go

@@ -864,8 +864,6 @@ func TestAddConfig_AllFieldsCovered(t *testing.T) {
 		RosenpassEnabled:              true,
 		RosenpassPermissive:           true,
 		ServerSSHAllowed:              &bTrue,
-		ServerVNCAllowed:              &bTrue,
-		DisableVNCApproval:            &bTrue,
 		EnableSSHRoot:                 &bTrue,
 		EnableSSHSFTP:                 &bTrue,
 		EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding:  &bTrue,

client/internal/engine.go

@@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/udpmux"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/acl"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/approval"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/debug"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns"
 	dnsconfig "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns/config"
@@ -133,8 +132,6 @@ type EngineConfig struct {
 	RosenpassPermissive bool
 
 	ServerSSHAllowed              bool
-	ServerVNCAllowed              bool
-	DisableVNCApproval            *bool
 	EnableSSHRoot                 *bool
 	EnableSSHSFTP                 *bool
 	EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding  *bool
@@ -225,9 +222,7 @@ type Engine struct {
 
 	networkMonitor *networkmonitor.NetworkMonitor
 
-	sshServer      sshServer
-	vncSrv         vncServer
-	approvalBroker *approval.Broker
+	sshServer sshServer
 
 	statusRecorder *peer.Status
 
@@ -334,7 +329,6 @@ func NewEngine(
 		TURNs:              []*stun.URI{},
 		networkSerial:      0,
 		statusRecorder:     services.StatusRecorder,
-		approvalBroker:     approval.New(services.StatusRecorder),
 		stateManager:       services.StateManager,
 		portForwardManager: portforward.NewManager(),
 		checks:             services.Checks,
@@ -409,10 +403,6 @@ func (e *Engine) stopLocked() {
 		log.Warnf("failed to stop SSH server: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	if err := e.stopVNCServer(); err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("failed to stop VNC server: %v", err)
-	}
-
 	e.cleanupSSHConfig()
 
 	if e.ingressGatewayMgr != nil {
@@ -561,7 +551,7 @@ func (e *Engine) Start(netbirdConfig *mgmProto.NetbirdConfig, mgmtURL *url.URL)
 		} else {
 			log.Infof("running rosenpass in strict mode")
 		}
-		e.rpManager, err = rosenpass.NewManager(e.config.PreSharedKey, e.config.WgIfaceName, publicKey)
+		e.rpManager, err = rosenpass.NewManager(e.config.PreSharedKey, e.config.WgIfaceName, publicKey, e.config.StateDir)
 		if err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("create rosenpass manager: %w", err)
 		}
@@ -1167,7 +1157,6 @@ func (e *Engine) applyInfoFlags(info *system.Info) {
 		e.config.RosenpassEnabled,
 		e.config.RosenpassPermissive,
 		&e.config.ServerSSHAllowed,
-		&e.config.ServerVNCAllowed,
 		e.config.DisableClientRoutes,
 		e.config.DisableServerRoutes,
 		e.config.DisableDNS,
@@ -1222,10 +1211,6 @@ func (e *Engine) updateConfig(conf *mgmProto.PeerConfig) error {
 		}
 	}
 
-	if err := e.updateVNC(); err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("failed handling VNC server setup: %v", err)
-	}
-
 	state := e.statusRecorder.GetLocalPeerState()
 	state.IP = e.wgInterface.Address().String()
 	state.IPv6 = e.wgInterface.Address().IPv6String()
@@ -1526,11 +1511,6 @@ func (e *Engine) reconcilePeers(networkMap *mgmProto.NetworkMap) ([]*mgmProto.Re
 		}
 	}
 
-	// VNC auth: always sync, including nil so cleared auth on the management
-	// side is applied locally, and so it isn't skipped on the RemotePeersIsEmpty
-	// cleanup path.
-	e.updateVNCServerAuth(networkMap.GetVncAuth())
-
 	// cleanup request, most likely our peer has been deleted
 	if networkMap.GetRemotePeersIsEmpty() {
 		err := e.removeAllPeers()
@@ -1829,6 +1809,7 @@ func (e *Engine) createPeerConn(pubKey string, allowedIPs []netip.Prefix, agentV
 			PubKey:         e.getRosenpassPubKey(),
 			Addr:           e.getRosenpassAddr(),
 			PermissiveMode: e.config.RosenpassPermissive,
+			KeyResolver:    e.rosenpassKeyResolver(),
 		},
 		ICEConfig: e.createICEConfig(),
 	}
@@ -1899,6 +1880,8 @@ func (e *Engine) receiveSignalEvents() error {
 
 				log.Debugf("receiveMSG: took %s to get lock for peer %s with session id %s", gotLock, msg.Key, offerAnswer.SessionID)
 
+				e.applyRosenpassKeyExchange(msg, offerAnswer)
+
 				if msg.Body.Type == sProto.Body_OFFER {
 					conn.OnRemoteOffer(*offerAnswer)
 				} else {
@@ -2045,7 +2028,6 @@ func (e *Engine) readInitialSettings() ([]*route.Route, *nbdns.Config, bool, err
 		e.config.RosenpassEnabled,
 		e.config.RosenpassPermissive,
 		&e.config.ServerSSHAllowed,
-		&e.config.ServerVNCAllowed,
 		e.config.DisableClientRoutes,
 		e.config.DisableServerRoutes,
 		e.config.DisableDNS,
@@ -2243,6 +2225,34 @@ func (e *Engine) getRosenpassAddr() string {
 	return ""
 }
 
+// rosenpassKeyResolver returns the Rosenpass manager as the offer/answer key
+// resolver, or a true nil interface when Rosenpass is disabled (returning the
+// typed-nil *Manager would make the interface non-nil and panic on use).
+func (e *Engine) rosenpassKeyResolver() peer.RosenpassKeyResolver {
+	if e.rpManager == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return e.rpManager
+}
+
+// applyRosenpassKeyExchange reconciles the fingerprint/cache fields of an incoming
+// offer/answer against the Rosenpass manager's cache: it resolves the remote peer's
+// full public key (from the message or the cache) into the OfferAnswer, and records
+// whether the peer acknowledged holding our key. No-op when Rosenpass is disabled.
+func (e *Engine) applyRosenpassKeyExchange(msg *sProto.Message, oa *peer.OfferAnswer) {
+	if e.rpManager == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	cfg := msg.GetBody().GetRosenpassConfig()
+	if cfg == nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	remoteWgKey := msg.GetKey()
+	oa.RosenpassPubKey = e.rpManager.ResolveRemotePubKey(remoteWgKey, cfg.GetRosenpassPubKey(), cfg.GetRosenpassPubKeyHash())
+	e.rpManager.SetRemoteAck(remoteWgKey, cfg.GetAcknowledgedRosenpassPubKeyHash())
+}
+
 // RunHealthProbes executes health checks for Signal, Management, Relay, and WireGuard services
 // and updates the status recorder with the latest states.
 //
@@ -2626,13 +2636,14 @@ func (e *Engine) updateForwardRules(rules []*mgmProto.ForwardingRule) ([]firewal
 
 func (e *Engine) toExcludedLazyPeers(rules []firewallManager.ForwardRule, peers []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig) map[string]bool {
 	excludedPeers := make(map[string]bool)
+
+	// Ingress forward targets: inbound forwarded traffic is initiated remotely and
+	// cannot wake a lazy connection, so the peer routing the target must stay
+	// permanently connected. AllowedIPs are already parsed on the peer conn, so
+	// reuse those typed prefixes instead of re-parsing the network map strings.
 	for _, r := range rules {
-		ip := r.TranslatedAddress
 		for _, p := range peers {
-			for _, allowedIP := range p.GetAllowedIps() {
-				if allowedIP != ip.String() {
-					continue
-				}
+			if e.peerRoutesAddr(p, r.TranslatedAddress) {
 				log.Infof("exclude forwarder peer from lazy connection: %s", p.GetWgPubKey())
 				excludedPeers[p.GetWgPubKey()] = true
 			}
@@ -2642,6 +2653,27 @@ func (e *Engine) toExcludedLazyPeers(rules []firewallManager.ForwardRule, peers
 	return excludedPeers
 }
 
+// peerRoutesAddr reports whether the peer is a router for addr, matched against
+// the peer's already-parsed AllowedIPs from the store (the same typed value the
+// lazy manager consumes) rather than re-parsing the network map strings.
+func (e *Engine) peerRoutesAddr(p *mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig, addr netip.Addr) bool {
+	prefixes, ok := e.peerStore.AllowedIPs(p.GetWgPubKey())
+	if !ok {
+		return false
+	}
+	return prefixesContain(prefixes, addr)
+}
+
+// prefixesContain reports whether addr falls within any of the prefixes.
+func prefixesContain(prefixes []netip.Prefix, addr netip.Addr) bool {
+	for _, prefix := range prefixes {
+		if prefix.Contains(addr) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
 // isChecksEqual checks if two slices of checks are equal.
 func isChecksEqual(checks1, checks2 []*mgmProto.Checks) bool {
 	normalize := func(checks []*mgmProto.Checks) []string {
@@ -2826,16 +2858,3 @@ func decodeRelayIP(b []byte) netip.Addr {
 	}
 	return ip.Unmap()
 }
-
-// RespondApproval relays the user's decision for a pending approval to
-// the broker. viewOnly is honoured only when accept is true. Returns
-// true when the request_id matched a live prompt.
-func (e *Engine) RespondApproval(requestID string, accept, viewOnly bool) bool {
-	if e == nil || e.approvalBroker == nil {
-		return false
-	}
-	return e.approvalBroker.Respond(requestID, approval.Decision{
-		Accept:   accept,
-		ViewOnly: accept && viewOnly,
-	})
-}

client/internal/engine_lazy_exclude_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+package internal
+
+import (
+	"net/netip"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	firewallManager "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peerstore"
+	mgmProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
+)
+
+func TestPrefixesContain(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name     string
+		prefixes []string
+		addr     string
+		want     bool
+	}{
+		{name: "own overlay /32 matches", prefixes: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}, addr: "100.110.8.145", want: true},
+		{name: "addr inside routed subnet", prefixes: []string{"10.121.0.0/16"}, addr: "10.121.208.4", want: true},
+		{name: "addr outside subnet", prefixes: []string{"10.121.0.0/16"}, addr: "10.122.0.1", want: false},
+		{name: "different /32", prefixes: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}, addr: "100.110.8.146", want: false},
+		{name: "ipv6 /128 matches", prefixes: []string{"fd00::1/128"}, addr: "fd00::1", want: true},
+		{name: "no prefixes", prefixes: nil, addr: "10.121.208.4", want: false},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			prefixes := make([]netip.Prefix, 0, len(tt.prefixes))
+			for _, p := range tt.prefixes {
+				prefixes = append(prefixes, netip.MustParsePrefix(p))
+			}
+			require.Equal(t, tt.want, prefixesContain(prefixes, netip.MustParseAddr(tt.addr)))
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestToExcludedLazyPeers_ForwardTarget guards a regression: the forward-target
+// peer (the peer routing a ForwardRule.TranslatedAddress) must be excluded from
+// lazy connections, matched via the peer's already-parsed AllowedIPs.
+func TestToExcludedLazyPeers_ForwardTarget(t *testing.T) {
+	const targetPeerKey = "cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc0="
+	const otherPeerKey = "dddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd0="
+
+	store := peerstore.NewConnStore()
+	store.AddPeerConn(targetPeerKey, newTestConn(t, targetPeerKey, "100.110.8.145/32"))
+	store.AddPeerConn(otherPeerKey, newTestConn(t, otherPeerKey, "100.110.9.10/32"))
+
+	e := &Engine{peerStore: store}
+
+	peers := []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig{
+		{WgPubKey: targetPeerKey, AllowedIps: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}},
+		{WgPubKey: otherPeerKey, AllowedIps: []string{"100.110.9.10/32"}},
+	}
+	rules := []firewallManager.ForwardRule{
+		{TranslatedAddress: netip.MustParseAddr("100.110.8.145")},
+	}
+
+	excluded := e.toExcludedLazyPeers(rules, peers)
+
+	require.True(t, excluded[targetPeerKey], "forward-target peer must be excluded from lazy connections")
+	require.False(t, excluded[otherPeerKey], "non-target peer must not be excluded")
+	require.Len(t, excluded, 1)
+}
+
+func TestToExcludedLazyPeers_NoRules(t *testing.T) {
+	e := &Engine{peerStore: peerstore.NewConnStore()}
+
+	peers := []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig{
+		{WgPubKey: "peer-a", AllowedIps: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}},
+	}
+
+	require.Empty(t, e.toExcludedLazyPeers(nil, peers))
+}
+
+func newTestConn(t *testing.T, key, allowedIP string) *peer.Conn {
+	t.Helper()
+	conn, err := peer.NewConn(peer.ConnConfig{
+		Key:      key,
+		WgConfig: peer.WgConfig{AllowedIps: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix(allowedIP)}},
+	}, peer.ServiceDependencies{})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	return conn
+}

client/internal/engine_ssh.go

@@ -12,10 +12,10 @@ import (
 	firewallManager "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/netstack"
 	nftypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/netflow/types"
+	sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/auth"
 	sshconfig "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/config"
 	sshserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/server"
 	mgmProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
-	sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sessionauth"
 	sshuserhash "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sshauth"
 )
 
@@ -237,18 +237,22 @@ func (e *Engine) startSSHServer(jwtConfig *sshserver.JWTConfig) error {
 		return errors.New("wg interface not initialized")
 	}
 
-	wgAddr := e.wgInterface.Address()
 	serverConfig := &sshserver.Config{
-		HostKeyPEM:        e.config.SSHKey,
-		JWT:               jwtConfig,
-		NetstackNet:       e.wgInterface.GetNet(),
-		NetworkValidation: wgAddr,
+		HostKeyPEM: e.config.SSHKey,
+		JWT:        jwtConfig,
 	}
 	server := sshserver.New(serverConfig)
 
+	wgAddr := e.wgInterface.Address()
+	server.SetNetworkValidation(wgAddr)
+
 	netbirdIP := wgAddr.IP
 	listenAddr := netip.AddrPortFrom(netbirdIP, sshserver.InternalSSHPort)
 
+	if netstackNet := e.wgInterface.GetNet(); netstackNet != nil {
+		server.SetNetstackNet(netstackNet)
+	}
+
 	e.configureSSHServer(server)
 
 	if err := server.Start(e.ctx, listenAddr); err != nil {

client/internal/engine_vnc.go

@@ -1,325 +0,0 @@
-//go:build !js && !ios && !android
-
-package internal
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"errors"
-	"fmt"
-	"net/netip"
-
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-
-	firewallManager "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/approval"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/metrics"
-	nftypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/netflow/types"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc"
-	vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
-	mgmProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
-	sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sessionauth"
-	sshuserhash "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sshauth"
-)
-
-type vncServer interface {
-	Start(ctx context.Context, addr netip.AddrPort, network netip.Prefix) error
-	AddListener(ctx context.Context, addr netip.AddrPort, network netip.Prefix) error
-	Stop() error
-	ActiveSessions() []vncserver.ActiveSessionInfo
-}
-
-func (e *Engine) setupVNCPortRedirection() error {
-	if e.firewall == nil || e.wgInterface == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-
-	localAddr := e.wgInterface.Address().IP
-	if !localAddr.IsValid() {
-		return errors.New("invalid local NetBird address")
-	}
-
-	if err := e.firewall.AddInboundDNAT(localAddr, firewallManager.ProtocolTCP, vnc.ExternalPort, vnc.InternalPort); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("add VNC port redirection: %w", err)
-	}
-	log.Infof("VNC port redirection: %s:%d -> %s:%d", localAddr, vnc.ExternalPort, localAddr, vnc.InternalPort)
-
-	if wgAddr := e.wgInterface.Address(); wgAddr.HasIPv6() {
-		v6 := wgAddr.IPv6
-		if err := e.firewall.AddInboundDNAT(v6, firewallManager.ProtocolTCP, vnc.ExternalPort, vnc.InternalPort); err != nil {
-			log.Warnf("failed to add IPv6 VNC port redirection: %v", err)
-		} else {
-			log.Infof("VNC port redirection: [%s]:%d -> [%s]:%d", v6, vnc.ExternalPort, v6, vnc.InternalPort)
-		}
-	}
-
-	return nil
-}
-
-func (e *Engine) cleanupVNCPortRedirection() error {
-	if e.firewall == nil || e.wgInterface == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-
-	localAddr := e.wgInterface.Address().IP
-	if !localAddr.IsValid() {
-		return errors.New("invalid local NetBird address")
-	}
-
-	if err := e.firewall.RemoveInboundDNAT(localAddr, firewallManager.ProtocolTCP, vnc.ExternalPort, vnc.InternalPort); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("remove VNC port redirection: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	if wgAddr := e.wgInterface.Address(); wgAddr.HasIPv6() {
-		if err := e.firewall.RemoveInboundDNAT(wgAddr.IPv6, firewallManager.ProtocolTCP, vnc.ExternalPort, vnc.InternalPort); err != nil {
-			log.Debugf("failed to remove IPv6 VNC port redirection: %v", err)
-		}
-	}
-
-	return nil
-}
-
-// updateVNC handles starting/stopping the VNC server based on the config flag.
-func (e *Engine) updateVNC() error {
-	if !e.config.ServerVNCAllowed {
-		if e.vncSrv != nil {
-			log.Info("VNC server disabled, stopping")
-		}
-		return e.stopVNCServer()
-	}
-
-	if e.config.BlockInbound {
-		log.Info("VNC server disabled because inbound connections are blocked")
-		return e.stopVNCServer()
-	}
-
-	if e.vncSrv != nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-
-	return e.startVNCServer()
-}
-
-func (e *Engine) startVNCServer() error {
-	if e.wgInterface == nil {
-		return errors.New("wg interface not initialized")
-	}
-
-	capturer, injector, ok := newPlatformVNC()
-	if !ok {
-		log.Debug("VNC server not supported on this platform")
-		return nil
-	}
-
-	netbirdIP := e.wgInterface.Address().IP
-
-	var sessionRecorder func(vncserver.SessionTick)
-	if e.clientMetrics != nil {
-		sessionRecorder = func(t vncserver.SessionTick) {
-			e.clientMetrics.RecordVNCSessionTick(e.ctx, metrics.VNCSessionTick{
-				Period:        t.Period,
-				BytesOut:      t.BytesOut,
-				Writes:        t.Writes,
-				FBUs:          t.FBUs,
-				MaxFBUBytes:   t.MaxFBUBytes,
-				MaxFBURects:   t.MaxFBURects,
-				MaxWriteBytes: t.MaxWriteBytes,
-				WriteNanos:    t.WriteNanos,
-			})
-		}
-	}
-	serviceMode := vncNeedsServiceMode()
-	if serviceMode {
-		log.Info("VNC: running as system service, enabling service mode (per-session agent proxy)")
-	}
-	requireApproval := e.config.DisableVNCApproval == nil || !*e.config.DisableVNCApproval
-	srv := vncserver.New(vncserver.Config{
-		Capturer:        capturer,
-		Injector:        injector,
-		IdentityKey:     e.config.WgPrivateKey[:],
-		ServiceMode:     serviceMode,
-		SessionRecorder: sessionRecorder,
-		NetstackNet:     e.wgInterface.GetNet(),
-		RequireApproval: requireApproval,
-		Approver:        &vncApprover{broker: e.approvalBroker, statusRecorder: e.statusRecorder},
-	})
-
-	listenAddr := netip.AddrPortFrom(netbirdIP, vnc.InternalPort)
-	network := e.wgInterface.Address().Network
-	if err := srv.Start(e.ctx, listenAddr, network); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("start VNC server: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	if wgAddr := e.wgInterface.Address(); wgAddr.HasIPv6() {
-		v6Addr := netip.AddrPortFrom(wgAddr.IPv6, vnc.InternalPort)
-		if err := srv.AddListener(e.ctx, v6Addr, wgAddr.IPv6Net); err != nil {
-			log.Warnf("failed to add IPv6 VNC listener: %v", err)
-		}
-	}
-
-	e.vncSrv = srv
-
-	if netstackNet := e.wgInterface.GetNet(); netstackNet != nil {
-		if registrar, ok := e.firewall.(interface {
-			RegisterNetstackService(protocol nftypes.Protocol, port uint16)
-		}); ok {
-			registrar.RegisterNetstackService(nftypes.TCP, vnc.InternalPort)
-			log.Debugf("registered VNC service with netstack for TCP:%d", vnc.InternalPort)
-		}
-	}
-
-	if err := e.setupVNCPortRedirection(); err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("setup VNC port redirection: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	log.Info("VNC server enabled")
-	return nil
-}
-
-// updateVNCServerAuth updates VNC fine-grained access control from management.
-// A nil vncAuth clears all authorized users and session pubkeys so management
-// can revoke access by omitting the field on the next sync.
-func (e *Engine) updateVNCServerAuth(vncAuth *mgmProto.VNCAuth) {
-	if e.vncSrv == nil {
-		return
-	}
-
-	vncSrv, ok := e.vncSrv.(*vncserver.Server)
-	if !ok {
-		return
-	}
-
-	if vncAuth == nil {
-		vncSrv.UpdateVNCAuth(&sshauth.Config{})
-		return
-	}
-
-	protoUsers := vncAuth.GetAuthorizedUsers()
-	authorizedUsers := make([]sshuserhash.UserIDHash, len(protoUsers))
-	for i, hash := range protoUsers {
-		if len(hash) != 16 {
-			log.Warnf("invalid VNC auth hash length %d, expected 16", len(hash))
-			return
-		}
-		authorizedUsers[i] = sshuserhash.UserIDHash(hash)
-	}
-
-	machineUsers := make(map[string][]uint32)
-	for osUser, indexes := range vncAuth.GetMachineUsers() {
-		machineUsers[osUser] = indexes.GetIndexes()
-	}
-
-	sessionPubKeys := make([]sshauth.SessionPubKey, 0, len(vncAuth.GetSessionPubKeys()))
-	for _, pk := range vncAuth.GetSessionPubKeys() {
-		pub := pk.GetPubKey()
-		if len(pub) != 32 {
-			log.Warnf("VNC session pubkey wrong length %d", len(pub))
-			continue
-		}
-		hash := pk.GetUserIdHash()
-		if len(hash) != 16 {
-			log.Warnf("VNC session user id hash wrong length %d", len(hash))
-			continue
-		}
-		sessionPubKeys = append(sessionPubKeys, sshauth.SessionPubKey{
-			PubKey:      pub,
-			UserIDHash:  sshuserhash.UserIDHash(hash),
-			DisplayName: pk.GetDisplayName(),
-		})
-	}
-
-	vncSrv.UpdateVNCAuth(&sshauth.Config{
-		AuthorizedUsers: authorizedUsers,
-		MachineUsers:    machineUsers,
-		SessionPubKeys:  sessionPubKeys,
-	})
-}
-
-// GetVNCServerStatus returns whether the VNC server is running and the list
-// of active VNC sessions. The pointer is captured under syncMsgMux so a
-// concurrent updateVNC/stopVNCServer cannot swap it out between the nil
-// check and the ActiveSessions call.
-func (e *Engine) GetVNCServerStatus() (enabled bool, sessions []vncserver.ActiveSessionInfo) {
-	e.syncMsgMux.Lock()
-	vncSrv := e.vncSrv
-	e.syncMsgMux.Unlock()
-	if vncSrv == nil {
-		return false, nil
-	}
-	return true, vncSrv.ActiveSessions()
-}
-
-func (e *Engine) stopVNCServer() error {
-	if e.vncSrv == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-
-	if err := e.cleanupVNCPortRedirection(); err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("cleanup VNC port redirection: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	if e.wgInterface != nil && e.wgInterface.GetNet() != nil {
-		if registrar, ok := e.firewall.(interface {
-			UnregisterNetstackService(protocol nftypes.Protocol, port uint16)
-		}); ok {
-			registrar.UnregisterNetstackService(nftypes.TCP, vnc.InternalPort)
-		}
-	}
-
-	log.Info("stopping VNC server")
-	err := e.vncSrv.Stop()
-	e.vncSrv = nil
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("stop VNC server: %w", err)
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// vncApprover adapts the generic approval.Broker for the VNC server.
-type vncApprover struct {
-	broker         *approval.Broker
-	statusRecorder *peer.Status
-}
-
-func (a *vncApprover) Request(ctx context.Context, info vncserver.ApprovalInfo) (vncserver.ApprovalDecision, error) {
-	// Resolve the source overlay IP to a peer FQDN for the prompt label.
-	if info.PeerName == "" && info.SourceIP != "" && a.statusRecorder != nil {
-		if fqdn, ok := a.statusRecorder.PeerByIP(info.SourceIP); ok {
-			info.PeerName = fqdn
-		}
-	}
-	subject := fmt.Sprintf("VNC connection from %s", displayPeer(info))
-	meta := map[string]string{
-		"peer_name":   info.PeerName,
-		"peer_pubkey": info.PeerPubKey,
-		"source_ip":   info.SourceIP,
-		"mode":        info.Mode,
-		"username":    info.Username,
-		"initiator":   info.Initiator,
-	}
-	d, err := a.broker.Request(ctx, approval.Prompt{
-		Kind:     approval.KindVNC,
-		Subject:  subject,
-		Metadata: meta,
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		return vncserver.ApprovalDecision{}, err
-	}
-	return vncserver.ApprovalDecision{ViewOnly: d.ViewOnly}, nil
-}
-
-func displayPeer(info vncserver.ApprovalInfo) string {
-	if info.Initiator != "" {
-		return info.Initiator
-	}
-	if info.PeerName != "" {
-		return info.PeerName
-	}
-	if info.SourceIP != "" {
-		return info.SourceIP
-	}
-	if info.PeerPubKey != "" {
-		return info.PeerPubKey
-	}
-	return "unknown peer"
-}

client/internal/engine_vnc_console_freebsd.go

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-//go:build freebsd
-
-package internal
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-
-	vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
-)
-
-// newConsoleVNC builds the FreeBSD console fallback: vt(4) framebuffer
-// for capture, /dev/uinput for input. The uinput device requires the
-// `uinput` kernel module (`kldload uinput`); without it, input init
-// fails and we drop to a stub injector so the user still gets a
-// view-only screen mirror.
-func newConsoleVNC() (vncserver.ScreenCapturer, vncserver.InputInjector, error) {
-	poller := vncserver.NewFBPoller("")
-	w, h := poller.Width(), poller.Height()
-	if w == 0 || h == 0 {
-		poller.Close()
-		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("vt framebuffer init failed (vt may not allow mmap on this driver)")
-	}
-	if inj, err := vncserver.NewUInputInjector(w, h); err == nil {
-		return poller, inj, nil
-	} else {
-		log.Infof("VNC console: uinput unavailable (%v); view-only mode. Run `kldload uinput` to enable input.", err)
-		return poller, &vncserver.StubInputInjector{}, nil
-	}
-}

client/internal/engine_vnc_console_linux.go

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-//go:build linux && !android
-
-package internal
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-
-	vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
-)
-
-// newConsoleVNC builds a framebuffer + uinput VNC backend for boxes
-// without a running X server. Used as the auto-fallback when
-// newPlatformVNC can't reach X. Returns an error when /dev/fb0 or
-// /dev/uinput aren't usable so the caller can drop back to a stub.
-func newConsoleVNC() (vncserver.ScreenCapturer, vncserver.InputInjector, error) {
-	poller := vncserver.NewFBPoller("")
-	w, h := poller.Width(), poller.Height()
-	if w == 0 || h == 0 {
-		poller.Close()
-		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("framebuffer capturer init failed (is /dev/fb0 readable?)")
-	}
-	inj, err := vncserver.NewUInputInjector(w, h)
-	if err != nil {
-		log.Debugf("uinput unavailable, falling back to view-only VNC: %v", err)
-		return poller, &vncserver.StubInputInjector{}, nil
-	}
-	return poller, inj, nil
-}

client/internal/engine_vnc_darwin.go

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-//go:build darwin && !ios
-
-package internal
-
-import (
-	"os"
-
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-
-	vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
-)
-
-func newPlatformVNC() (vncserver.ScreenCapturer, vncserver.InputInjector, bool) {
-	capturer := vncserver.NewMacPoller()
-	// Prompt for Screen Recording at server-enable time rather than first
-	// client-connect. The native prompt is far easier for users to act on
-	// in the moment they toggled VNC on than later when "the screen looks
-	// like wallpaper" would otherwise be the only clue.
-	vncserver.PrimeScreenCapturePermission()
-	injector, err := vncserver.NewMacInputInjector()
-	if err != nil {
-		log.Debugf("VNC: macOS input injector: %v", err)
-		return capturer, &vncserver.StubInputInjector{}, true
-	}
-	return capturer, injector, true
-}
-
-// vncNeedsServiceMode reports whether the running process is a system
-// LaunchDaemon (root, parented by launchd). Daemons sit in the global
-// bootstrap namespace and cannot talk to WindowServer; we route capture
-// through a per-user agent in that case.
-func vncNeedsServiceMode() bool {
-	return os.Geteuid() == 0 && os.Getppid() == 1
-}

client/internal/engine_vnc_stub.go

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-//go:build js || ios || android
-
-package internal
-
-import (
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-
-	mgmProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
-)
-
-type vncServer interface{}
-
-func (e *Engine) updateVNC() error { return nil }
-
-func (e *Engine) updateVNCServerAuth(auth *mgmProto.VNCAuth) {
-	if auth == nil {
-		return
-	}
-	log.Debugf("ignoring VNC auth push on platform without a VNC server: %d session pubkeys, %d authorized users",
-		len(auth.GetSessionPubKeys()), len(auth.GetAuthorizedUsers()))
-}
-
-func (e *Engine) stopVNCServer() error { return nil }

client/internal/engine_vnc_windows.go

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-//go:build windows
-
-package internal
-
-import vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
-
-func newPlatformVNC() (vncserver.ScreenCapturer, vncserver.InputInjector, bool) {
-	return vncserver.NewDesktopCapturer(), vncserver.NewWindowsInputInjector(), true
-}
-
-func vncNeedsServiceMode() bool {
-	return vncserver.GetCurrentSessionID() == 0
-}

client/internal/engine_vnc_x11.go

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-//go:build (linux && !android) || freebsd
-
-package internal
-
-import (
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-
-	vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
-)
-
-func newPlatformVNC() (vncserver.ScreenCapturer, vncserver.InputInjector, bool) {
-	// Prefer X11 when an X server is reachable. NewX11InputInjector probes
-	// DISPLAY (and /proc) eagerly, so a non-nil error here means no X.
-	injector, err := vncserver.NewX11InputInjector("", "", "")
-	if err == nil {
-		return vncserver.NewX11Poller("", ""), injector, true
-	}
-	log.Debugf("VNC: X11 not available: %v", err)
-
-	// Fallback for headless / pre-X states (kernel console, login manager
-	// without X, physical server in recovery): stream the framebuffer and
-	// inject input via /dev/uinput.
-	consoleCap, consoleInj, err := newConsoleVNC()
-	if err == nil {
-		log.Infof("VNC: using framebuffer console capture (%dx%d)", consoleCap.Width(), consoleCap.Height())
-		return consoleCap, consoleInj, true
-	}
-	log.Debugf("VNC: framebuffer console fallback unavailable: %v", err)
-
-	return &vncserver.StubCapturer{}, &vncserver.StubInputInjector{}, false
-}
-
-func vncNeedsServiceMode() bool {
-	return false
-}

client/internal/metrics/influxdb.go

@@ -120,36 +120,6 @@ func (m *influxDBMetrics) RecordSyncDuration(_ context.Context, agentInfo AgentI
 	m.trimLocked()
 }
 
-func (m *influxDBMetrics) RecordVNCSessionTick(_ context.Context, agentInfo AgentInfo, tick VNCSessionTick) {
-	tags := fmt.Sprintf("deployment_type=%s,version=%s,os=%s,arch=%s,peer_id=%s",
-		agentInfo.DeploymentType.String(),
-		agentInfo.Version,
-		agentInfo.OS,
-		agentInfo.Arch,
-		agentInfo.peerID,
-	)
-
-	m.mu.Lock()
-	defer m.mu.Unlock()
-
-	m.samples = append(m.samples, influxSample{
-		measurement: "netbird_vnc_traffic",
-		tags:        tags,
-		fields: map[string]float64{
-			"period_seconds":     tick.Period.Seconds(),
-			"bytes_out":          float64(tick.BytesOut),
-			"writes":             float64(tick.Writes),
-			"fbus":               float64(tick.FBUs),
-			"max_fbu_bytes":      float64(tick.MaxFBUBytes),
-			"max_fbu_rects":      float64(tick.MaxFBURects),
-			"max_write_bytes":    float64(tick.MaxWriteBytes),
-			"write_time_seconds": float64(tick.WriteNanos) / 1e9,
-		},
-		timestamp: time.Now(),
-	})
-	m.trimLocked()
-}
-
 func (m *influxDBMetrics) RecordSyncPhase(_ context.Context, agentInfo AgentInfo, phase string, duration time.Duration) {
 	tags := fmt.Sprintf("deployment_type=%s,version=%s,os=%s,arch=%s,peer_id=%s,phase=%s",
 		agentInfo.DeploymentType.String(),

client/internal/metrics/metrics.go

@@ -63,11 +63,6 @@ type metricsImplementation interface {
 	// RecordLoginDuration records how long the login to management took
 	RecordLoginDuration(ctx context.Context, agentInfo AgentInfo, duration time.Duration, success bool)
 
-	// RecordVNCSessionTick records a periodic snapshot of one VNC
-	// session's wire activity. Called once per metricsConn tick interval
-	// (and once at session close), only when the tick saw activity.
-	RecordVNCSessionTick(ctx context.Context, agentInfo AgentInfo, tick VNCSessionTick)
-
 	// Export exports metrics in InfluxDB line protocol format
 	Export(w io.Writer) error
 
@@ -87,21 +82,6 @@ type ClientMetrics struct {
 	pushCancel context.CancelFunc
 }
 
-// VNCSessionTick is one sampling slice of a VNC session's wire activity.
-// BytesOut / Writes / FBUs / WriteNanos are deltas observed during this
-// tick; Max* fields are the high-water marks observed during the tick.
-// Period is the wall-clock duration the deltas cover.
-type VNCSessionTick struct {
-	Period        time.Duration
-	BytesOut      uint64
-	Writes        uint64
-	FBUs          uint64
-	MaxFBUBytes   uint64
-	MaxFBURects   uint64
-	MaxWriteBytes uint64
-	WriteNanos    uint64
-}
-
 // ConnectionStageTimestamps holds timestamps for each connection stage
 type ConnectionStageTimestamps struct {
 	SignalingReceived  time.Time // First signal received from remote peer (both initial and reconnection)
@@ -151,18 +131,6 @@ func (c *ClientMetrics) RecordSyncDuration(ctx context.Context, duration time.Du
 	c.impl.RecordSyncDuration(ctx, agentInfo, duration)
 }
 
-// RecordVNCSessionTick records a periodic snapshot of one VNC session.
-func (c *ClientMetrics) RecordVNCSessionTick(ctx context.Context, tick VNCSessionTick) {
-	if c == nil {
-		return
-	}
-	c.mu.RLock()
-	agentInfo := c.agentInfo
-	c.mu.RUnlock()
-
-	c.impl.RecordVNCSessionTick(ctx, agentInfo, tick)
-}
-
 // RecordSyncPhase records the duration of a single sub-phase of sync processing
 func (c *ClientMetrics) RecordSyncPhase(ctx context.Context, phase string, duration time.Duration) {
 	if c == nil {

client/internal/metrics/push_test.go

@@ -76,9 +76,6 @@ func (m *mockMetrics) RecordSyncPhase(_ context.Context, _ AgentInfo, _ string,
 func (m *mockMetrics) RecordLoginDuration(_ context.Context, _ AgentInfo, _ time.Duration, _ bool) {
 }
 
-func (m *mockMetrics) RecordVNCSessionTick(_ context.Context, _ AgentInfo, _ VNCSessionTick) {
-}
-
 func (m *mockMetrics) Export(w io.Writer) error {
 	if m.exportData != "" {
 		_, err := w.Write([]byte(m.exportData))

client/internal/peer/conn.go

@@ -65,6 +65,20 @@ type WgConfig struct {
 	PreSharedKey *wgtypes.Key
 }
 
+// RosenpassKeyResolver lets the handshaker fill the fingerprint/cache fields of an
+// offer/answer without depending on the Rosenpass manager directly. Implemented by
+// rosenpass.Manager and wired in by the engine.
+type RosenpassKeyResolver interface {
+	// LocalPubKeyHash is the SHA256 of our own Rosenpass public key.
+	LocalPubKeyHash() []byte
+	// RemotePubKeyAck is the SHA256 of the remote peer's cached key (nil if we do
+	// not hold it), sent back as an acknowledgement.
+	RemotePubKeyAck(remoteWgKey string) []byte
+	// RemoteHasLocalKey reports whether the peer already holds our key, so the full
+	// key may be omitted.
+	RemoteHasLocalKey(remoteWgKey string) bool
+}
+
 type RosenpassConfig struct {
 	// RosenpassPubKey is this peer's Rosenpass public key
 	PubKey []byte
@@ -72,6 +86,10 @@ type RosenpassConfig struct {
 	Addr string
 
 	PermissiveMode bool
+
+	// KeyResolver drives fingerprint-based key caching over signalling. Nil when
+	// Rosenpass is disabled, which makes the handshaker always send the full key.
+	KeyResolver RosenpassKeyResolver
 }
 
 // ConnConfig is a peer Connection configuration
@@ -203,7 +221,6 @@ func NewConn(config ConnConfig, services ServiceDependencies) (*Conn, error) {
 		statusICE:          worker.NewAtomicStatus(),
 		dumpState:          dumpState,
 		endpointUpdater:    NewEndpointUpdater(connLog, config.WgConfig, isController(config)),
-		wgWatcher:          NewWGWatcher(connLog, config.WgConfig.WgInterface, config.Key, dumpState),
 		metricsRecorder:    services.MetricsRecorder,
 	}
 
@@ -671,11 +688,12 @@ func (conn *Conn) onGuardEvent() {
 	}
 }
 
-func (conn *Conn) onWGDisconnected() {
+func (conn *Conn) onWGDisconnected(watcherCtx context.Context) {
 	conn.mu.Lock()
 	defer conn.mu.Unlock()
 
-	if conn.ctx.Err() != nil {
+	// watcherCtx guards against a stale watcher tearing down a connection that already superseded it.
+	if conn.ctx.Err() != nil || watcherCtx.Err() != nil {
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -833,25 +851,39 @@ func (conn *Conn) isConnectedOnAllWay() (status guard.ConnStatus) {
 	})
 }
 
+// enableWgWatcherIfNeeded starts a fresh watcher instance per connection attempt, so its
+// lifecycle stays bound to conn.mu and enable/disable can't race an old goroutine's shutdown.
+// Caller must hold conn.mu.
 func (conn *Conn) enableWgWatcherIfNeeded(enabledTime time.Time) {
-	if !conn.wgWatcher.PrepareInitialHandshake() {
+	if conn.wgWatcher != nil {
 		return
 	}
 
+	watcher := NewWGWatcher(conn.Log, conn.config.WgConfig.WgInterface, conn.config.Key, conn.dumpState)
+	watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
+
 	wgWatcherCtx, wgWatcherCancel := context.WithCancel(conn.ctx)
+	conn.wgWatcher = watcher
 	conn.wgWatcherCancel = wgWatcherCancel
+
 	conn.wgWatcherWg.Add(1)
 	go func() {
 		defer conn.wgWatcherWg.Done()
-		conn.wgWatcher.EnableWgWatcher(wgWatcherCtx, enabledTime, conn.onWGDisconnected, conn.onWGHandshakeSuccess, conn.onWGCheckSuccess)
+		onDisconnected := func() { conn.onWGDisconnected(wgWatcherCtx) }
+		watcher.EnableWgWatcher(wgWatcherCtx, enabledTime, onDisconnected, conn.onWGHandshakeSuccess, conn.onWGCheckSuccess)
 	}()
 }
 
+// disableWgWatcherIfNeeded cancels and drops the watcher once no transport is active. It never
+// waits for the goroutine: the timeout path reentrantly calls back here under conn.mu, so
+// blocking would deadlock. Caller must hold conn.mu.
 func (conn *Conn) disableWgWatcherIfNeeded() {
-	if conn.currentConnPriority == conntype.None && conn.wgWatcherCancel != nil {
-		conn.wgWatcherCancel()
-		conn.wgWatcherCancel = nil
+	if conn.currentConnPriority != conntype.None || conn.wgWatcher == nil {
+		return
 	}
+	conn.wgWatcherCancel()
+	conn.wgWatcher = nil
+	conn.wgWatcherCancel = nil
 }
 
 func (conn *Conn) newProxy(remoteConn net.Conn) (wgproxy.Proxy, error) {
@@ -874,7 +906,9 @@ func (conn *Conn) resetEndpoint() {
 		return
 	}
 	conn.Log.Infof("reset wg endpoint")
-	conn.wgWatcher.Reset()
+	if conn.wgWatcher != nil {
+		conn.wgWatcher.Reset()
+	}
 	if err := conn.endpointUpdater.RemoveEndpointAddress(); err != nil {
 		conn.Log.Warnf("failed to remove endpoint address before update: %v", err)
 	}

client/internal/peer/conn_test.go

@@ -339,20 +339,20 @@ func TestConn_onWGDisconnected_EscalatesToRosenpassReset(t *testing.T) {
 	conn := newWGTimeoutTestConn(true, &disconnected)
 
 	for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
-		conn.onWGDisconnected()
+		conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
 	}
 	assert.Empty(t, disconnected, "escalation must not fire below the threshold")
 
-	conn.onWGDisconnected()
+	conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
 	assert.Equal(t, []string{conn.config.WgConfig.RemoteKey}, disconnected,
 		"reaching the threshold must report the peer disconnected once")
 
 	for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
-		conn.onWGDisconnected()
+		conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
 	}
 	assert.Len(t, disconnected, 1, "escalation must restart counting after firing")
 
-	conn.onWGDisconnected()
+	conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
 	assert.Len(t, disconnected, 2, "continued timeouts must escalate again")
 }
 
@@ -364,12 +364,12 @@ func TestConn_onWGDisconnected_CheckSuccessResetsEscalation(t *testing.T) {
 	conn := newWGTimeoutTestConn(true, &disconnected)
 
 	for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
-		conn.onWGDisconnected()
+		conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
 	}
 	conn.onWGCheckSuccess()
 
 	for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
-		conn.onWGDisconnected()
+		conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
 	}
 	assert.Empty(t, disconnected, "handshake success must reset the timeout count")
 }
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ func TestConn_onWGDisconnected_NoEscalationWithoutRosenpass(t *testing.T) {
 	conn := newWGTimeoutTestConn(false, &disconnected)
 
 	for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold*3; i++ {
-		conn.onWGDisconnected()
+		conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
 	}
 	assert.Empty(t, disconnected, "escalation must be limited to rosenpass connections")
 }

client/internal/peer/handshaker.go

@@ -33,8 +33,13 @@ type OfferAnswer struct {
 	// Version of NetBird Agent
 	Version string
 	// RosenpassPubKey is the Rosenpass public key of the remote peer when receiving this message
-	// This value is the local Rosenpass server public key when sending the message
+	// This value is the local Rosenpass server public key when sending the message.
+	// May be empty on send when the remote peer has acknowledged already holding it (see RosenpassPubKeyAck).
 	RosenpassPubKey []byte
+	// RosenpassPubKeyHash is the SHA256 of the sender's own RosenpassPubKey. Always set when Rosenpass is enabled.
+	RosenpassPubKeyHash []byte
+	// RosenpassPubKeyAck is the SHA256 of the remote peer's key the sender holds cached; empty means "send it in full".
+	RosenpassPubKeyAck []byte
 	// RosenpassAddr is the Rosenpass server address (IP:port) of the remote peer when receiving this message
 	// This value is the local Rosenpass server address when sending the message
 	RosenpassAddr string
@@ -209,11 +214,11 @@ func (h *Handshaker) sendAnswer() error {
 
 func (h *Handshaker) buildOfferAnswer() OfferAnswer {
 	answer := OfferAnswer{
-		WgListenPort:    h.config.LocalWgPort,
-		Version:         version.NetbirdVersion(),
-		RosenpassPubKey: h.config.RosenpassConfig.PubKey,
-		RosenpassAddr:   h.config.RosenpassConfig.Addr,
+		WgListenPort:  h.config.LocalWgPort,
+		Version:       version.NetbirdVersion(),
+		RosenpassAddr: h.config.RosenpassConfig.Addr,
 	}
+	h.setRosenpassPubKey(&answer)
 
 	if h.ice != nil && h.RemoteICESupported() {
 		uFrag, pwd := h.ice.GetLocalUserCredentials()
@@ -230,6 +235,30 @@ func (h *Handshaker) buildOfferAnswer() OfferAnswer {
 	return answer
 }
 
+// setRosenpassPubKey fills the Rosenpass key fields of an outgoing offer/answer.
+// With a resolver wired it advertises our key hash and the ack for the remote key
+// we hold, and includes the full public key only when the peer has not yet
+// acknowledged holding it. Without a resolver (Rosenpass disabled, or an older
+// code path) it always sends the full key, preserving the previous behaviour.
+func (h *Handshaker) setRosenpassPubKey(answer *OfferAnswer) {
+	localKey := h.config.RosenpassConfig.PubKey
+	if len(localKey) == 0 {
+		return
+	}
+
+	resolver := h.config.RosenpassConfig.KeyResolver
+	if resolver == nil {
+		answer.RosenpassPubKey = localKey
+		return
+	}
+
+	answer.RosenpassPubKeyHash = resolver.LocalPubKeyHash()
+	answer.RosenpassPubKeyAck = resolver.RemotePubKeyAck(h.config.Key)
+	if !resolver.RemoteHasLocalKey(h.config.Key) {
+		answer.RosenpassPubKey = localKey
+	}
+}
+
 func (h *Handshaker) updateRemoteICEState(offer *OfferAnswer) {
 	hasICE := offer.hasICECredentials()
 	prev := h.remoteICESupported.Swap(hasICE)

client/internal/peer/handshaker_rosenpass_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+package peer
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+type fakeRPResolver struct {
+	localHash []byte
+	ack       []byte
+	hasLocal  bool
+}
+
+func (f fakeRPResolver) LocalPubKeyHash() []byte              { return f.localHash }
+func (f fakeRPResolver) RemotePubKeyAck(string) []byte        { return f.ack }
+func (f fakeRPResolver) RemoteHasLocalKey(remote string) bool { return f.hasLocal }
+
+func TestSetRosenpassPubKey_NoResolverAlwaysSendsFullKey(t *testing.T) {
+	localKey := []byte{1, 2, 3}
+	h := &Handshaker{config: ConnConfig{RosenpassConfig: RosenpassConfig{PubKey: localKey}}}
+
+	var a OfferAnswer
+	h.setRosenpassPubKey(&a)
+
+	require.Equal(t, localKey, a.RosenpassPubKey)
+	require.Nil(t, a.RosenpassPubKeyHash)
+	require.Nil(t, a.RosenpassPubKeyAck)
+}
+
+func TestSetRosenpassPubKey_ResolverIncludesFullKeyUntilAcked(t *testing.T) {
+	localKey := []byte{1, 2, 3}
+	res := fakeRPResolver{localHash: []byte{9}, ack: []byte{8}, hasLocal: false}
+	h := &Handshaker{config: ConnConfig{Key: "peerA", RosenpassConfig: RosenpassConfig{PubKey: localKey, KeyResolver: res}}}
+
+	var a OfferAnswer
+	h.setRosenpassPubKey(&a)
+
+	require.Equal(t, localKey, a.RosenpassPubKey, "full key must be sent until the peer acks it")
+	require.Equal(t, []byte{9}, a.RosenpassPubKeyHash)
+	require.Equal(t, []byte{8}, a.RosenpassPubKeyAck)
+}
+
+func TestSetRosenpassPubKey_ResolverOmitsFullKeyOnceAcked(t *testing.T) {
+	localKey := []byte{1, 2, 3}
+	res := fakeRPResolver{localHash: []byte{9}, ack: []byte{8}, hasLocal: true}
+	h := &Handshaker{config: ConnConfig{Key: "peerA", RosenpassConfig: RosenpassConfig{PubKey: localKey, KeyResolver: res}}}
+
+	var a OfferAnswer
+	h.setRosenpassPubKey(&a)
+
+	require.Nil(t, a.RosenpassPubKey, "full key must be omitted once the peer holds it")
+	require.Equal(t, []byte{9}, a.RosenpassPubKeyHash)
+	require.Equal(t, []byte{8}, a.RosenpassPubKeyAck)
+}
+
+func TestSetRosenpassPubKey_DisabledSetsNothing(t *testing.T) {
+	h := &Handshaker{config: ConnConfig{RosenpassConfig: RosenpassConfig{}}}
+
+	var a OfferAnswer
+	h.setRosenpassPubKey(&a)
+
+	require.Nil(t, a.RosenpassPubKey)
+	require.Nil(t, a.RosenpassPubKeyHash)
+}

client/internal/peer/signaler.go

@@ -61,11 +61,13 @@ func (s *Signaler) signalOfferAnswer(offerAnswer OfferAnswer, remoteKey string,
 			UFrag: offerAnswer.IceCredentials.UFrag,
 			Pwd:   offerAnswer.IceCredentials.Pwd,
 		},
-		RosenpassPubKey: offerAnswer.RosenpassPubKey,
-		RosenpassAddr:   offerAnswer.RosenpassAddr,
-		RelaySrvAddress: offerAnswer.RelaySrvAddress,
-		RelaySrvIP:      offerAnswer.RelaySrvIP,
-		SessionID:       sessionIDBytes,
+		RosenpassPubKey:     offerAnswer.RosenpassPubKey,
+		RosenpassPubKeyHash: offerAnswer.RosenpassPubKeyHash,
+		RosenpassPubKeyAck:  offerAnswer.RosenpassPubKeyAck,
+		RosenpassAddr:       offerAnswer.RosenpassAddr,
+		RelaySrvAddress:     offerAnswer.RelaySrvAddress,
+		RelaySrvIP:          offerAnswer.RelaySrvIP,
+		SessionID:           sessionIDBytes,
 	})
 	if err != nil {
 		return err

client/internal/peer/status.go

@@ -1335,15 +1335,6 @@ func (d *Status) SubscribeToEvents() *EventSubscription {
 	}
 }
 
-// HasEventSubscribers reports whether any client is currently subscribed
-// to the daemon's SystemEvent stream. Used by the VNC approval broker to
-// fail closed when no UI is connected to prompt the user.
-func (d *Status) HasEventSubscribers() bool {
-	d.eventMux.Lock()
-	defer d.eventMux.Unlock()
-	return len(d.eventStreams) > 0
-}
-
 // UnsubscribeFromEvents removes an event subscription
 func (d *Status) UnsubscribeFromEvents(sub *EventSubscription) {
 	if sub == nil {

client/internal/peer/wg_watcher.go

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package peer
 import (
 	"context"
 	"fmt"
-	"sync"
 	"time"
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
@@ -24,14 +23,14 @@ type WGInterfaceStater interface {
 	GetStats() (map[string]configurer.WGStats, error)
 }
 
+// WGWatcher is single-shot: one instance per connection attempt, run once, then discarded.
+// Lifecycle is owned by Conn under conn.mu, so it keeps no "enabled" state to go stale.
 type WGWatcher struct {
 	log           *log.Entry
 	wgIfaceStater WGInterfaceStater
 	peerKey       string
 	stateDump     *stateDump
 
-	enabled   bool
-	muEnabled sync.Mutex
 	// initialHandshake is not thread-safe; never call PrepareInitialHandshake and EnableWgWatcher concurrently.
 	initialHandshake time.Time
 
@@ -48,25 +47,14 @@ func NewWGWatcher(log *log.Entry, wgIfaceStater WGInterfaceStater, peerKey strin
 	}
 }
 
-// PrepareInitialHandshake reserves the watcher and reads the peer's current WireGuard
-// handshake time. It must be called before the peer is (re)configured on the WireGuard
-// interface, so the captured baseline reflects the state prior to this connection attempt
-// instead of racing with that configuration. Returns ok=false if the watcher is already
-// running, in which case EnableWgWatcher must not be called.
-func (w *WGWatcher) PrepareInitialHandshake() (ok bool) {
-	w.muEnabled.Lock()
-	if w.enabled {
-		w.muEnabled.Unlock()
-		return false
-	}
-
+// PrepareInitialHandshake reads the peer's current WireGuard handshake time. It must be
+// called before the peer is (re)configured on the WireGuard interface, so the captured
+// baseline reflects the state prior to this connection attempt instead of racing with
+// that configuration.
+func (w *WGWatcher) PrepareInitialHandshake() {
 	w.log.Debugf("enable WireGuard watcher")
-	w.enabled = true
-	w.muEnabled.Unlock()
-
 	handshake, _ := w.wgState()
 	w.initialHandshake = handshake
-	return true
 }
 
 // EnableWgWatcher runs the WireGuard watcher loop using the handshake baseline captured by
@@ -76,10 +64,6 @@ func (w *WGWatcher) PrepareInitialHandshake() (ok bool) {
 // handshake, including the first.
 func (w *WGWatcher) EnableWgWatcher(ctx context.Context, enabledTime time.Time, onDisconnectedFn func(), onHandshakeSuccessFn func(when time.Time), onCheckSuccessFn func()) {
 	w.periodicHandshakeCheck(ctx, onDisconnectedFn, onHandshakeSuccessFn, onCheckSuccessFn, enabledTime, w.initialHandshake)
-
-	w.muEnabled.Lock()
-	w.enabled = false
-	w.muEnabled.Unlock()
 }
 
 // Reset signals the watcher that the WireGuard peer has been reset and a new
@@ -105,6 +89,7 @@ func (w *WGWatcher) periodicHandshakeCheck(ctx context.Context, onDisconnectedFn
 		case <-timer.C:
 			handshake, ok := w.handshakeCheck(lastHandshake)
 			if !ok {
+				// early ctx cancel check return
 				if ctx.Err() != nil {
 					return
 				}
@@ -153,9 +138,9 @@ func (w *WGWatcher) handshakeCheck(lastHandshake time.Time) (*time.Time, bool) {
 
 	w.log.Tracef("previous handshake, handshake: %v, %v", lastHandshake, handshake)
 
-	// the current know handshake did not change
+	// the current known handshake did not change
 	if handshake.Equal(lastHandshake) {
-		w.log.Warnf("WireGuard handshake timed out: %v", handshake)
+		w.log.Warnf("WireGuard handshake not updated: %v", handshake)
 		return nil, false
 	}
 

client/internal/peer/wg_watcher_test.go

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import (
 	"time"
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/configurer"
 )
@@ -62,7 +61,7 @@ func TestWGWatcher_CheckSuccessCallback(t *testing.T) {
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
 	defer cancel()
 
-	require.True(t, watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake())
+	watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
 
 	firstHandshake := make(chan struct{}, 1)
 	checkSuccess := make(chan struct{}, 1)
@@ -101,8 +100,7 @@ func TestWGWatcher_EnableWgWatcher(t *testing.T) {
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
 	defer cancel()
 
-	ok := watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
-	require.True(t, ok, "watcher should not be enabled yet")
+	watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
 
 	onDisconnected := make(chan struct{}, 1)
 	go watcher.EnableWgWatcher(ctx, time.Now(), func() {
@@ -132,8 +130,7 @@ func TestWGWatcher_ReEnable(t *testing.T) {
 	watcher := NewWGWatcher(mlog, mocWgIface, "", newStateDump("peer", mlog, &Status{}))
 
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-	ok := watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
-	require.True(t, ok, "watcher should not be enabled yet")
+	watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
 
 	wg := &sync.WaitGroup{}
 	wg.Add(1)
@@ -149,8 +146,7 @@ func TestWGWatcher_ReEnable(t *testing.T) {
 	ctx, cancel = context.WithCancel(context.Background())
 	defer cancel()
 
-	ok = watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
-	require.True(t, ok, "watcher should be re-enabled after the previous run stopped")
+	watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
 
 	onDisconnected := make(chan struct{}, 1)
 	go watcher.EnableWgWatcher(ctx, time.Now(), func() {

client/internal/profilemanager/config.go

@@ -70,8 +70,6 @@ type ConfigInput struct {
 	StateFilePath                 string
 	PreSharedKey                  *string
 	ServerSSHAllowed              *bool
-	ServerVNCAllowed              *bool
-	DisableVNCApproval            *bool
 	EnableSSHRoot                 *bool
 	EnableSSHSFTP                 *bool
 	EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding  *bool
@@ -125,8 +123,6 @@ type Config struct {
 	RosenpassEnabled              bool
 	RosenpassPermissive           bool
 	ServerSSHAllowed              *bool
-	ServerVNCAllowed              *bool
-	DisableVNCApproval            *bool
 	EnableSSHRoot                 *bool
 	EnableSSHSFTP                 *bool
 	EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding  *bool
@@ -458,33 +454,6 @@ func (config *Config) apply(input ConfigInput) (updated bool, err error) {
 		updated = true
 	}
 
-	if input.ServerVNCAllowed != nil {
-		if config.ServerVNCAllowed == nil || *input.ServerVNCAllowed != *config.ServerVNCAllowed {
-			if *input.ServerVNCAllowed {
-				log.Infof("enabling VNC server")
-			} else {
-				log.Infof("disabling VNC server")
-			}
-			config.ServerVNCAllowed = input.ServerVNCAllowed
-			updated = true
-		}
-	} else if config.ServerVNCAllowed == nil {
-		config.ServerVNCAllowed = util.False()
-		updated = true
-	}
-
-	if input.DisableVNCApproval != nil {
-		if config.DisableVNCApproval == nil || *input.DisableVNCApproval != *config.DisableVNCApproval {
-			if *input.DisableVNCApproval {
-				log.Infof("disabling VNC connection approval prompt")
-			} else {
-				log.Infof("enabling VNC connection approval prompt")
-			}
-			config.DisableVNCApproval = input.DisableVNCApproval
-			updated = true
-		}
-	}
-
 	if input.EnableSSHRoot != nil && (config.EnableSSHRoot == nil || *input.EnableSSHRoot != *config.EnableSSHRoot) {
 		if *input.EnableSSHRoot {
 			log.Infof("enabling SSH root login")
@@ -735,8 +704,6 @@ func (config *Config) applyMDMPolicy(policy *mdm.Policy) {
 	}
 
 	applyBool(mdm.KeyAllowServerSSH, func(v bool) { bv := v; config.ServerSSHAllowed = &bv })
-	applyBool(mdm.KeyAllowServerVNC, func(v bool) { bv := v; config.ServerVNCAllowed = &bv })
-	applyBool(mdm.KeyDisableVNCApproval, func(v bool) { bv := v; config.DisableVNCApproval = &bv })
 	applyBool(mdm.KeyDisableClientRoutes, func(v bool) { config.DisableClientRoutes = v })
 	applyBool(mdm.KeyDisableServerRoutes, func(v bool) { config.DisableServerRoutes = v })
 	applyBool(mdm.KeyBlockInbound, func(v bool) { config.BlockInbound = v })

client/internal/profilemanager/config_mdm_test.go

@@ -130,36 +130,6 @@ func TestApply_MDMBoolKeysOverrideOnDiskValue(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.True(t, cfg.Policy().HasKey(mdm.KeyRosenpassEnabled))
 }
 
-func TestApply_MDMVNCKeys(t *testing.T) {
-	tmp := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
-
-	// Seed without MDM: VNC off, approval prompt on.
-	withMDMPolicy(t, mdm.NewPolicy(nil))
-	_, err := UpdateOrCreateConfig(ConfigInput{
-		ConfigPath:         tmp,
-		ServerVNCAllowed:   boolPtr(false),
-		DisableVNCApproval: boolPtr(false),
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	// MDM enforces VNC on and disables the approval prompt.
-	withMDMPolicy(t, mdm.NewPolicy(map[string]any{
-		mdm.KeyAllowServerVNC:     true,
-		mdm.KeyDisableVNCApproval: true,
-	}))
-
-	cfg, err := UpdateOrCreateConfig(ConfigInput{ConfigPath: tmp})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.NotNil(t, cfg)
-
-	require.NotNil(t, cfg.ServerVNCAllowed)
-	assert.True(t, *cfg.ServerVNCAllowed, "MDM override should flip on-disk false to true")
-	require.NotNil(t, cfg.DisableVNCApproval)
-	assert.True(t, *cfg.DisableVNCApproval)
-	assert.True(t, cfg.Policy().HasKey(mdm.KeyAllowServerVNC))
-	assert.True(t, cfg.Policy().HasKey(mdm.KeyDisableVNCApproval))
-}
-
 func TestApply_MDMLazyConnection(t *testing.T) {
 	cases := []struct {
 		name string

client/internal/rosenpass/cache_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+package rosenpass
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+func newCacheTestManager(spk []byte) *Manager {
+	return &Manager{
+		spk:               spk,
+		remotePubKeys:     make(map[string][]byte),
+		remoteHasLocalKey: make(map[string]bool),
+	}
+}
+
+func TestResolveRemotePubKey(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newCacheTestManager([]byte{0x01, 0x02})
+	full := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xAB}, 64)
+
+	// a received full key is cached and returned
+	require.Equal(t, full, m.ResolveRemotePubKey("peerA", full, nil))
+
+	// a later hash-only message resolves from the cache
+	require.Equal(t, full, m.ResolveRemotePubKey("peerA", nil, rawRosenpassKeyHash(full)))
+
+	// hash mismatch is a cache miss
+	require.Nil(t, m.ResolveRemotePubKey("peerA", nil, bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x01}, 32)))
+
+	// no key and no hash (remote without Rosenpass) resolves to nil
+	require.Nil(t, m.ResolveRemotePubKey("peerB", nil, nil))
+}
+
+func TestRemotePubKeyAck(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newCacheTestManager([]byte{0x01})
+
+	// unknown peer -> no ack (signals "send me the full key")
+	require.Nil(t, m.RemotePubKeyAck("peerA"))
+
+	full := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x09}, 48)
+	m.ResolveRemotePubKey("peerA", full, nil)
+	require.Equal(t, rawRosenpassKeyHash(full), m.RemotePubKeyAck("peerA"))
+}
+
+func TestSetRemoteAckAndRemoteHasLocalKey(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newCacheTestManager(bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x07}, 100))
+
+	require.False(t, m.RemoteHasLocalKey("peerA"))
+
+	// an ack matching our own key hash marks the peer as holding our key
+	m.SetRemoteAck("peerA", m.LocalPubKeyHash())
+	require.True(t, m.RemoteHasLocalKey("peerA"))
+
+	// empty ack clears it
+	m.SetRemoteAck("peerA", nil)
+	require.False(t, m.RemoteHasLocalKey("peerA"))
+
+	// a non-matching ack does not count
+	m.SetRemoteAck("peerA", bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x01}, 32))
+	require.False(t, m.RemoteHasLocalKey("peerA"))
+}

client/internal/rosenpass/manager.go

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
 	"log/slog"
 	"net"
 	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
@@ -28,6 +29,11 @@ func hashRosenpassKey(key []byte) string {
 	return hex.EncodeToString(hasher.Sum(nil))
 }
 
+func rawRosenpassKeyHash(key []byte) []byte {
+	sum := sha256.Sum256(key)
+	return sum[:]
+}
+
 // rpServer is the subset of rp.Server used by Manager. Defined as an interface
 // so tests can substitute a mock without spinning up a real UDP server.
 type rpServer interface {
@@ -50,12 +56,29 @@ type Manager struct {
 	lock         sync.Mutex
 	port         int
 	wgIface      PresharedKeySetter
+
+	// remotePubKeys caches remote peers' full Rosenpass public keys keyed by their
+	// WireGuard public key, so a peer that already sent us its (large) key over
+	// signalling need only send its hash on subsequent offers/answers. RAM only —
+	// never persisted (1000 peers x ~512KB would be ~512MB on disk).
+	remotePubKeys map[string][]byte
+	// remoteHasLocalKey tracks, per remote WireGuard key, whether that peer has
+	// acknowledged holding our current Rosenpass public key, letting us omit it.
+	remoteHasLocalKey map[string]bool
 }
 
 // NewManager creates a new Rosenpass manager. localWgKey is the local
-// WireGuard public key, used to derive the per-peer rendezvous key.
-func NewManager(preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key, wgIfaceName string, localWgKey wgtypes.Key) (*Manager, error) {
-	public, secret, err := rp.GenerateKeyPair()
+// WireGuard public key, used to derive the per-peer rendezvous key. When stateDir
+// is non-empty the static keypair is persisted under it and reused across
+// restarts, keeping the public key (and the fingerprint peers cache) stable;
+// an empty stateDir keeps the previous behaviour of an ephemeral per-run keypair.
+func NewManager(preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key, wgIfaceName string, localWgKey wgtypes.Key, stateDir string) (*Manager, error) {
+	var keyPath string
+	if stateDir != "" {
+		keyPath = filepath.Join(stateDir, keypairFileName)
+	}
+
+	public, secret, err := loadOrGenerateKeypair(keyPath)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
@@ -76,8 +99,10 @@ func NewManager(preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key, wgIfaceName string, localWgKey wgtype
 		// nil receiver in addPeer -> m.rpWgHandler.AddPeer. generateConfig will
 		// replace it with a fresh handler on each Run() to clear stale peer
 		// state from previous engine sessions.
-		rpWgHandler: NewNetbirdHandler((*[32]byte)(preSharedKey), localWgKey),
-		lock:        sync.Mutex{},
+		rpWgHandler:       NewNetbirdHandler((*[32]byte)(preSharedKey), localWgKey),
+		lock:              sync.Mutex{},
+		remotePubKeys:     make(map[string][]byte),
+		remoteHasLocalKey: make(map[string]bool),
 	}, nil
 }
 
@@ -90,6 +115,68 @@ func (m *Manager) GetAddress() *net.UDPAddr {
 	return &net.UDPAddr{Port: m.port}
 }
 
+// LocalPubKeyHash returns the raw SHA256 of the local Rosenpass public key. It is
+// advertised on every offer/answer so the remote peer can tell (via its cache)
+// whether it already holds our full key.
+func (m *Manager) LocalPubKeyHash() []byte {
+	return rawRosenpassKeyHash(m.spk)
+}
+
+// RemotePubKeyAck returns the SHA256 of the remote peer's cached public key, used
+// as the acknowledgement we send back. Nil means we do not hold the peer's key,
+// which signals the peer to include its full key next time.
+func (m *Manager) RemotePubKeyAck(remoteWgKey string) []byte {
+	m.lock.Lock()
+	defer m.lock.Unlock()
+
+	key, ok := m.remotePubKeys[remoteWgKey]
+	if !ok {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return rawRosenpassKeyHash(key)
+}
+
+// RemoteHasLocalKey reports whether the remote peer acknowledged holding our
+// current public key, so we may omit the full key from the next offer/answer.
+func (m *Manager) RemoteHasLocalKey(remoteWgKey string) bool {
+	m.lock.Lock()
+	defer m.lock.Unlock()
+
+	return m.remoteHasLocalKey[remoteWgKey]
+}
+
+// ResolveRemotePubKey reconciles the Rosenpass key material from a received
+// offer/answer: it caches a received full key, or — when only a hash was sent —
+// returns the cached key matching that hash. It returns nil when the remote peer
+// does not use Rosenpass (no key, no hash) or on a cache miss (hash sent but not
+// held); a miss self-heals because our resulting empty ack makes the peer resend
+// its full key.
+func (m *Manager) ResolveRemotePubKey(remoteWgKey string, full, hash []byte) []byte {
+	m.lock.Lock()
+	defer m.lock.Unlock()
+
+	if len(full) > 0 {
+		m.remotePubKeys[remoteWgKey] = full
+		return full
+	}
+	if len(hash) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	if cached, ok := m.remotePubKeys[remoteWgKey]; ok && bytes.Equal(rawRosenpassKeyHash(cached), hash) {
+		return cached
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// SetRemoteAck records whether the remote peer's acknowledgement matches our
+// current public key hash, i.e. whether it already holds our key.
+func (m *Manager) SetRemoteAck(remoteWgKey string, ack []byte) {
+	m.lock.Lock()
+	defer m.lock.Unlock()
+
+	m.remoteHasLocalKey[remoteWgKey] = len(ack) > 0 && bytes.Equal(ack, rawRosenpassKeyHash(m.spk))
+}
+
 // addPeer adds a new peer to the Rosenpass server
 func (m *Manager) addPeer(rosenpassPubKey []byte, rosenpassAddr string, wireGuardIP string, wireGuardPubKey string) error {
 	// Defense in depth against issue #4341 (Android crash): if Run() has not

client/internal/rosenpass/manager_test.go

@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ func TestAddPeer_NilServer_ReturnsErrorNoCrash(t *testing.T) {
 // issue #4341 cannot occur in the window between NewManager and Run().
 func TestNewManager_PreInitializesHandler(t *testing.T) {
 	psk := wgtypes.Key{}
-	m, err := NewManager(&psk, "wt0", wgtypes.Key{0x01})
+	m, err := NewManager(&psk, "wt0", wgtypes.Key{0x01}, "")
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	require.NotNil(t, m.rpWgHandler, "rpWgHandler must be initialized in NewManager")
 }

client/internal/rosenpass/persistence.go

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+package rosenpass
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+
+	rp "cunicu.li/go-rosenpass"
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
+)
+
+const (
+	// keypairFileName is the file, relative to the state directory, that holds
+	// the persisted local Rosenpass static keypair.
+	keypairFileName = "rosenpass_key.json"
+
+	// rpStaticPublicKeySize is the byte length of a Rosenpass (Classic McEliece)
+	// static public key as produced by the pinned go-rosenpass version. Used as a
+	// version-compatibility guard: a persisted key of any other size is treated as
+	// stale and regenerated instead of being fed to go-rosenpass (which would fail).
+	rpStaticPublicKeySize = 524160
+
+	// keypairFormatVersion is bumped whenever the on-disk representation changes so
+	// old files are discarded and regenerated rather than misparsed.
+	keypairFormatVersion = 1
+)
+
+// persistedKeypair is the on-disk representation of the local Rosenpass static
+// keypair. Keys are stored raw (base64 via JSON) with the same restricted 0600
+// permission as the WireGuard private key and other client secrets.
+type persistedKeypair struct {
+	Version   int    `json:"version"`
+	PublicKey []byte `json:"public_key"`
+	SecretKey []byte `json:"secret_key"`
+}
+
+// loadOrGenerateKeypair returns a Rosenpass static keypair. When keyPath is set
+// and holds a valid persisted keypair it is reused, so the local public key —
+// and therefore the fingerprint advertised to remote peers over signalling —
+// stays stable across restarts. Otherwise a fresh keypair is generated and, when
+// keyPath is set, persisted for subsequent runs. A missing or corrupt file is not
+// fatal: it degrades to generating an ephemeral keypair, matching the pre-persistence
+// behaviour.
+func loadOrGenerateKeypair(keyPath string) (public []byte, secret []byte, err error) {
+	if keyPath != "" {
+		public, secret, err = loadKeypair(keyPath)
+		switch {
+		case err == nil:
+			return public, secret, nil
+		case os.IsNotExist(err):
+			// first run for this state dir; fall through to generate
+		default:
+			log.Warnf("failed to load persisted rosenpass keypair, generating a new one: %v", err)
+		}
+	}
+
+	pub, sec, err := rp.GenerateKeyPair()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("generate rosenpass key pair: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	if keyPath != "" {
+		if err := saveKeypair(keyPath, pub, sec); err != nil {
+			log.Warnf("failed to persist rosenpass keypair, key will be regenerated on next restart: %v", err)
+		}
+	}
+
+	return pub, sec, nil
+}
+
+func loadKeypair(keyPath string) ([]byte, []byte, error) {
+	var kp persistedKeypair
+	if _, err := util.ReadJson(keyPath, &kp); err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, err
+	}
+
+	if kp.Version != keypairFormatVersion || len(kp.PublicKey) != rpStaticPublicKeySize || len(kp.SecretKey) == 0 {
+		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("persisted rosenpass keypair is incompatible (version %d, public %d bytes, secret %d bytes)", kp.Version, len(kp.PublicKey), len(kp.SecretKey))
+	}
+
+	return kp.PublicKey, kp.SecretKey, nil
+}
+
+func saveKeypair(keyPath string, public, secret []byte) error {
+	return util.WriteJsonWithRestrictedPermission(context.Background(), keyPath, persistedKeypair{
+		Version:   keypairFormatVersion,
+		PublicKey: public,
+		SecretKey: secret,
+	})
+}

client/internal/rosenpass/persistence_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+package rosenpass
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+func TestLoadOrGenerateKeypair_EphemeralWhenNoPath(t *testing.T) {
+	pub, sec, err := loadOrGenerateKeypair("")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Len(t, pub, rpStaticPublicKeySize)
+	require.NotEmpty(t, sec)
+}
+
+func TestLoadOrGenerateKeypair_PersistsAndReloads(t *testing.T) {
+	keyPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), keypairFileName)
+
+	pub1, sec1, err := loadOrGenerateKeypair(keyPath)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	info, err := os.Stat(keyPath)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "keypair file must be written")
+	require.Equal(t, os.FileMode(0600), info.Mode().Perm(), "keypair file must be 0600")
+
+	pub2, sec2, err := loadOrGenerateKeypair(keyPath)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.True(t, bytes.Equal(pub1, pub2), "public key must be stable across reloads")
+	require.True(t, bytes.Equal(sec1, sec2), "secret key must be stable across reloads")
+}
+
+func TestLoadOrGenerateKeypair_RegeneratesOnCorruptFile(t *testing.T) {
+	keyPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), keypairFileName)
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(keyPath, []byte("not json"), 0600))
+
+	pub, sec, err := loadOrGenerateKeypair(keyPath)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Len(t, pub, rpStaticPublicKeySize)
+	require.NotEmpty(t, sec)
+
+	// the corrupt file must have been overwritten with a valid, reloadable keypair
+	pub2, _, err := loadOrGenerateKeypair(keyPath)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.True(t, bytes.Equal(pub, pub2))
+}
+
+func TestLoadOrGenerateKeypair_RegeneratesOnVersionMismatch(t *testing.T) {
+	keyPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), keypairFileName)
+
+	pub1, _, err := loadOrGenerateKeypair(keyPath)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	// rewrite with a bumped/unknown format version -> must be discarded
+	bs, err := json.Marshal(persistedKeypair{Version: keypairFormatVersion + 1, PublicKey: pub1, SecretKey: []byte{0x01}})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(keyPath, bs, 0600))
+
+	pub2, sec2, err := loadOrGenerateKeypair(keyPath)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Len(t, pub2, rpStaticPublicKeySize)
+	require.NotEmpty(t, sec2)
+}

client/internal/statemanager/manager.go

@@ -74,14 +74,6 @@ func New(filePath string) *Manager {
 	}
 }
 
-// FilePath returns the path of the underlying state file.
-func (m *Manager) FilePath() string {
-	if m == nil {
-		return ""
-	}
-	return m.filePath
-}
-
 // Start starts the state manager periodic save routine
 func (m *Manager) Start() {
 	if m == nil {

client/mdm/canonical_loaders.go

@@ -21,9 +21,8 @@ var allKeys = []string{
 	KeyBlockInbound,
 	KeyDisableMetricsCollection,
 	KeyAllowServerSSH,
-	KeyAllowServerVNC,
-	KeyDisableVNCApproval,
 	KeyDisableAutoConnect,
+	KeyDisableAutostart,
 	KeyPreSharedKey,
 	KeyRosenpassEnabled,
 	KeyRosenpassPermissive,

client/mdm/policy.go

@@ -36,13 +36,17 @@ const (
 	KeyBlockInbound             = "blockInbound"
 	KeyDisableMetricsCollection = "disableMetricsCollection"
 	KeyAllowServerSSH           = "allowServerSSH"
-	KeyAllowServerVNC           = "allowServerVNC"
-	KeyDisableVNCApproval       = "disableVNCApproval"
 	KeyDisableAutoConnect       = "disableAutoConnect"
-	KeyPreSharedKey             = "preSharedKey"
-	KeyRosenpassEnabled         = "rosenpassEnabled"
-	KeyRosenpassPermissive      = "rosenpassPermissive"
-	KeyWireguardPort            = "wireguardPort"
+	// KeyDisableAutostart suppresses the GUI's fresh-install
+	// launch-on-login default and marks the Settings toggle as
+	// MDM-managed. UI-only: NOT stored on Config and not applied by
+	// applyMDMPolicy; the GUI reads it directly and it appears in
+	// GetConfigResponse.mDMManagedFields when set.
+	KeyDisableAutostart    = "disableAutostart"
+	KeyPreSharedKey        = "preSharedKey"
+	KeyRosenpassEnabled    = "rosenpassEnabled"
+	KeyRosenpassPermissive = "rosenpassPermissive"
+	KeyWireguardPort       = "wireguardPort"
 
 	// Split tunnel is modeled as a single conceptual policy with two
 	// registry/plist values. KeySplitTunnelMode is the discriminator

client/proto/daemon.pb.gw.go

@@ -1099,30 +1099,6 @@ func request_DaemonService_ExposeService_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtim
 	return stream, metadata, nil
 }
 
-func request_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, client DaemonServiceClient, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
-	var (
-		protoReq RespondApprovalRequest
-		metadata runtime.ServerMetadata
-	)
-	if err := marshaler.NewDecoder(req.Body).Decode(&protoReq); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
-		return nil, metadata, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "%v", err)
-	}
-	msg, err := client.RespondApproval(ctx, &protoReq, grpc.Header(&metadata.HeaderMD), grpc.Trailer(&metadata.TrailerMD))
-	return msg, metadata, err
-}
-
-func local_request_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, server DaemonServiceServer, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
-	var (
-		protoReq RespondApprovalRequest
-		metadata runtime.ServerMetadata
-	)
-	if err := marshaler.NewDecoder(req.Body).Decode(&protoReq); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
-		return nil, metadata, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "%v", err)
-	}
-	msg, err := server.RespondApproval(ctx, &protoReq)
-	return msg, metadata, err
-}
-
 func request_DaemonService_WailsUIReady_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, client DaemonServiceClient, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
 	var (
 		protoReq WailsUIReadyRequest
@@ -2001,26 +1977,6 @@ func RegisterDaemonServiceHandlerServer(ctx context.Context, mux *runtime.ServeM
 		runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
 		return
 	})
-	mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
-		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
-		defer cancel()
-		var stream runtime.ServerTransportStream
-		ctx = grpc.NewContextWithServerTransportStream(ctx, &stream)
-		inboundMarshaler, outboundMarshaler := runtime.MarshalerForRequest(mux, req)
-		annotatedContext, err := runtime.AnnotateIncomingContext(ctx, mux, req, "/daemon.DaemonService/RespondApproval", runtime.WithHTTPPathPattern("/daemon.DaemonService/RespondApproval"))
-		if err != nil {
-			runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
-			return
-		}
-		resp, md, err := local_request_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0(annotatedContext, inboundMarshaler, server, req, pathParams)
-		md.HeaderMD, md.TrailerMD = metadata.Join(md.HeaderMD, stream.Header()), metadata.Join(md.TrailerMD, stream.Trailer())
-		annotatedContext = runtime.NewServerMetadataContext(annotatedContext, md)
-		if err != nil {
-			runtime.HTTPError(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
-			return
-		}
-		forward_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
-	})
 	mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_WailsUIReady_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
 		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
 		defer cancel()
@@ -2846,23 +2802,6 @@ func RegisterDaemonServiceHandlerClient(ctx context.Context, mux *runtime.ServeM
 		}
 		forward_DaemonService_ExposeService_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, func() (proto.Message, error) { return resp.Recv() }, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
 	})
-	mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
-		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
-		defer cancel()
-		inboundMarshaler, outboundMarshaler := runtime.MarshalerForRequest(mux, req)
-		annotatedContext, err := runtime.AnnotateContext(ctx, mux, req, "/daemon.DaemonService/RespondApproval", runtime.WithHTTPPathPattern("/daemon.DaemonService/RespondApproval"))
-		if err != nil {
-			runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
-			return
-		}
-		resp, md, err := request_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0(annotatedContext, inboundMarshaler, client, req, pathParams)
-		annotatedContext = runtime.NewServerMetadataContext(annotatedContext, md)
-		if err != nil {
-			runtime.HTTPError(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
-			return
-		}
-		forward_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
-	})
 	mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_WailsUIReady_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
 		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
 		defer cancel()
@@ -2929,7 +2868,6 @@ var (
 	pattern_DaemonService_StopCPUProfile_0             = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "StopCPUProfile"}, ""))
 	pattern_DaemonService_GetInstallerResult_0         = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "GetInstallerResult"}, ""))
 	pattern_DaemonService_ExposeService_0              = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "ExposeService"}, ""))
-	pattern_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0            = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "RespondApproval"}, ""))
 	pattern_DaemonService_WailsUIReady_0               = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "WailsUIReady"}, ""))
 )
 
@@ -2979,6 +2917,5 @@ var (
 	forward_DaemonService_StopCPUProfile_0             = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
 	forward_DaemonService_GetInstallerResult_0         = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
 	forward_DaemonService_ExposeService_0              = runtime.ForwardResponseStream
-	forward_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0            = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
 	forward_DaemonService_WailsUIReady_0               = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
 )

client/proto/daemon.proto

@@ -152,14 +152,6 @@ service DaemonService {
   // ExposeService exposes a local port via the NetBird reverse proxy
   rpc ExposeService(ExposeServiceRequest) returns (stream ExposeServiceEvent) {}
 
-  // RespondApproval delivers the user's accept/deny decision for a
-  // pending user-approval prompt. The daemon pushes the prompt as a
-  // SystemEvent with category APPROVAL and metadata key "request_id";
-  // the UI calls this RPC with the same request_id to unblock whichever
-  // subsystem (VNC, SSH, ...) is waiting. The "kind" metadata key tells
-  // the UI which subsystem the prompt belongs to.
-  rpc RespondApproval(RespondApprovalRequest) returns (RespondApprovalResponse) {}
-
   // WailsUIReady is a no-op probe the Wails UI calls once at startup. The UI
   // only cares whether the daemon implements it: an Unimplemented response
   // means the daemon predates this UI and is too old to drive it.
@@ -250,10 +242,6 @@ message LoginRequest {
   optional bool disableSSHAuth = 38;
   optional int32 sshJWTCacheTTL = 39;
   optional bool disable_ipv6 = 40;
-
-  optional bool serverVNCAllowed = 41;
-
-  optional bool disableVNCApproval = 42;
 }
 
 message LoginResponse {
@@ -374,16 +362,12 @@ message GetConfigResponse {
 
   bool disable_ipv6 = 27;
 
-  bool serverVNCAllowed = 28;
-
-  bool disableVNCApproval = 29;
-
   // mDMManagedFields lists the names of configuration keys whose value is
   // currently enforced by an MDM policy. Names match mdm.Key* constants
   // (e.g. "managementURL", "disableClientRoutes"). UI/CLI clients should
   // render the corresponding inputs as read-only and display a "managed
   // by MDM" indicator.
-  repeated string mDMManagedFields = 30;
+  repeated string mDMManagedFields = 28;
 }
 
 // PeerState contains the latest state of a peer
@@ -468,25 +452,6 @@ message SSHServerState {
   repeated SSHSessionInfo sessions = 2;
 }
 
-// VNCSessionInfo contains information about an active VNC session
-message VNCSessionInfo {
-  string remoteAddress = 1;
-  string mode = 2;
-  string username = 3;
-  // userID is the Noise-verified session identity (hashed user ID from
-  // the ACL session-key entry), empty when auth is disabled.
-  string userID = 4;
-  // initiator is the human-readable display name of the dashboard user
-  // who minted the SessionPubKey, when known.
-  string initiator = 5;
-}
-
-// VNCServerState contains the latest state of the VNC server
-message VNCServerState {
-  bool enabled = 1;
-  repeated VNCSessionInfo sessions = 2;
-}
-
 // FullStatus contains the full state held by the Status instance
 message FullStatus {
   ManagementState managementState = 1;
@@ -507,7 +472,6 @@ message FullStatus {
   // on it to know when to re-fetch ListNetworks via the push stream, instead
   // of polling on every status snapshot.
   uint64 networksRevision = 11;
-  VNCServerState vncServerState = 12;
 }
 
 // Networks
@@ -703,7 +667,6 @@ message SystemEvent {
     AUTHENTICATION = 2;
     CONNECTIVITY = 3;
     SYSTEM = 4;
-    APPROVAL = 5;
   }
 
   string id = 1;
@@ -794,10 +757,6 @@ message SetConfigRequest {
   optional bool disableSSHAuth = 33;
   optional int32 sshJWTCacheTTL = 34;
   optional bool disable_ipv6 = 35;
-
-  optional bool serverVNCAllowed = 36;
-
-  optional bool disableVNCApproval = 37;
 }
 
 message SetConfigResponse{}
@@ -1087,18 +1046,3 @@ message StartBundleCaptureRequest {
 message StartBundleCaptureResponse {}
 message StopBundleCaptureRequest {}
 message StopBundleCaptureResponse {}
-
-message RespondApprovalRequest {
-  // request_id matches the SystemEvent metadata key emitted by the daemon
-  // when a subsystem awaits user approval for an inbound connection.
-  string request_id = 1;
-  // accept is true if the user approved the request, false if they
-  // denied it. A missing or unknown request_id is treated as a no-op.
-  bool accept = 2;
-  // view_only signals that the user granted the connection but withheld
-  // input control. Only meaningful when accept is true; ignored when
-  // accept is false.
-  bool view_only = 3;
-}
-
-message RespondApprovalResponse {}

client/proto/daemon_grpc.pb.go

@@ -64,7 +64,6 @@ const (
 	DaemonService_StopCPUProfile_FullMethodName             = "/daemon.DaemonService/StopCPUProfile"
 	DaemonService_GetInstallerResult_FullMethodName         = "/daemon.DaemonService/GetInstallerResult"
 	DaemonService_ExposeService_FullMethodName              = "/daemon.DaemonService/ExposeService"
-	DaemonService_RespondApproval_FullMethodName            = "/daemon.DaemonService/RespondApproval"
 	DaemonService_WailsUIReady_FullMethodName               = "/daemon.DaemonService/WailsUIReady"
 )
 
@@ -168,13 +167,6 @@ type DaemonServiceClient interface {
 	GetInstallerResult(ctx context.Context, in *InstallerResultRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*InstallerResultResponse, error)
 	// ExposeService exposes a local port via the NetBird reverse proxy
 	ExposeService(ctx context.Context, in *ExposeServiceRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (grpc.ServerStreamingClient[ExposeServiceEvent], error)
-	// RespondApproval delivers the user's accept/deny decision for a
-	// pending user-approval prompt. The daemon pushes the prompt as a
-	// SystemEvent with category APPROVAL and metadata key "request_id";
-	// the UI calls this RPC with the same request_id to unblock whichever
-	// subsystem (VNC, SSH, ...) is waiting. The "kind" metadata key tells
-	// the UI which subsystem the prompt belongs to.
-	RespondApproval(ctx context.Context, in *RespondApprovalRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*RespondApprovalResponse, error)
 	// WailsUIReady is a no-op probe the Wails UI calls once at startup. The UI
 	// only cares whether the daemon implements it: an Unimplemented response
 	// means the daemon predates this UI and is too old to drive it.
@@ -675,16 +667,6 @@ func (c *daemonServiceClient) ExposeService(ctx context.Context, in *ExposeServi
 // This type alias is provided for backwards compatibility with existing code that references the prior non-generic stream type by name.
 type DaemonService_ExposeServiceClient = grpc.ServerStreamingClient[ExposeServiceEvent]
 
-func (c *daemonServiceClient) RespondApproval(ctx context.Context, in *RespondApprovalRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*RespondApprovalResponse, error) {
-	cOpts := append([]grpc.CallOption{grpc.StaticMethod()}, opts...)
-	out := new(RespondApprovalResponse)
-	err := c.cc.Invoke(ctx, DaemonService_RespondApproval_FullMethodName, in, out, cOpts...)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	return out, nil
-}
-
 func (c *daemonServiceClient) WailsUIReady(ctx context.Context, in *WailsUIReadyRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*WailsUIReadyResponse, error) {
 	cOpts := append([]grpc.CallOption{grpc.StaticMethod()}, opts...)
 	out := new(WailsUIReadyResponse)
@@ -795,13 +777,6 @@ type DaemonServiceServer interface {
 	GetInstallerResult(context.Context, *InstallerResultRequest) (*InstallerResultResponse, error)
 	// ExposeService exposes a local port via the NetBird reverse proxy
 	ExposeService(*ExposeServiceRequest, grpc.ServerStreamingServer[ExposeServiceEvent]) error
-	// RespondApproval delivers the user's accept/deny decision for a
-	// pending user-approval prompt. The daemon pushes the prompt as a
-	// SystemEvent with category APPROVAL and metadata key "request_id";
-	// the UI calls this RPC with the same request_id to unblock whichever
-	// subsystem (VNC, SSH, ...) is waiting. The "kind" metadata key tells
-	// the UI which subsystem the prompt belongs to.
-	RespondApproval(context.Context, *RespondApprovalRequest) (*RespondApprovalResponse, error)
 	// WailsUIReady is a no-op probe the Wails UI calls once at startup. The UI
 	// only cares whether the daemon implements it: an Unimplemented response
 	// means the daemon predates this UI and is too old to drive it.
@@ -951,9 +926,6 @@ func (UnimplementedDaemonServiceServer) GetInstallerResult(context.Context, *Ins
 func (UnimplementedDaemonServiceServer) ExposeService(*ExposeServiceRequest, grpc.ServerStreamingServer[ExposeServiceEvent]) error {
 	return status.Error(codes.Unimplemented, "method ExposeService not implemented")
 }
-func (UnimplementedDaemonServiceServer) RespondApproval(context.Context, *RespondApprovalRequest) (*RespondApprovalResponse, error) {
-	return nil, status.Error(codes.Unimplemented, "method RespondApproval not implemented")
-}
 func (UnimplementedDaemonServiceServer) WailsUIReady(context.Context, *WailsUIReadyRequest) (*WailsUIReadyResponse, error) {
 	return nil, status.Error(codes.Unimplemented, "method WailsUIReady not implemented")
 }
@@ -1760,24 +1732,6 @@ func _DaemonService_ExposeService_Handler(srv interface{}, stream grpc.ServerStr
 // This type alias is provided for backwards compatibility with existing code that references the prior non-generic stream type by name.
 type DaemonService_ExposeServiceServer = grpc.ServerStreamingServer[ExposeServiceEvent]
 
-func _DaemonService_RespondApproval_Handler(srv interface{}, ctx context.Context, dec func(interface{}) error, interceptor grpc.UnaryServerInterceptor) (interface{}, error) {
-	in := new(RespondApprovalRequest)
-	if err := dec(in); err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	if interceptor == nil {
-		return srv.(DaemonServiceServer).RespondApproval(ctx, in)
-	}
-	info := &grpc.UnaryServerInfo{
-		Server:     srv,
-		FullMethod: DaemonService_RespondApproval_FullMethodName,
-	}
-	handler := func(ctx context.Context, req interface{}) (interface{}, error) {
-		return srv.(DaemonServiceServer).RespondApproval(ctx, req.(*RespondApprovalRequest))
-	}
-	return interceptor(ctx, in, info, handler)
-}
-
 func _DaemonService_WailsUIReady_Handler(srv interface{}, ctx context.Context, dec func(interface{}) error, interceptor grpc.UnaryServerInterceptor) (interface{}, error) {
 	in := new(WailsUIReadyRequest)
 	if err := dec(in); err != nil {
@@ -1967,10 +1921,6 @@ var DaemonService_ServiceDesc = grpc.ServiceDesc{
 			MethodName: "GetInstallerResult",
 			Handler:    _DaemonService_GetInstallerResult_Handler,
 		},
-		{
-			MethodName: "RespondApproval",
-			Handler:    _DaemonService_RespondApproval_Handler,
-		},
 		{
 			MethodName: "WailsUIReady",
 			Handler:    _DaemonService_WailsUIReady_Handler,

client/server/capture.go

@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ func (s *Server) StartCapture(req *proto.StartCaptureRequest, stream proto.Daemo
 		return status.Errorf(codes.Internal, "create capture session: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	engine, err := s.claimCapture(sess, func() { pw.Close() })
+	engine, err := s.claimCapture(sess)
 	if err != nil {
 		sess.Stop()
 		pw.Close()
@@ -190,7 +190,10 @@ func (s *Server) StartBundleCapture(_ context.Context, req *proto.StartBundleCap
 
 	s.stopBundleCaptureLocked()
 	s.cleanupBundleCapture()
-	s.evictActiveCaptureLocked()
+
+	if s.activeCapture != nil {
+		return nil, status.Error(codes.FailedPrecondition, "another capture is already running")
+	}
 
 	engine, err := s.getCaptureEngineLocked()
 	if err != nil {
@@ -301,58 +304,29 @@ func (s *Server) cleanupBundleCapture() {
 	s.bundleCapture = nil
 }
 
-// claimCapture reserves the engine's capture slot for sess. If another
-// capture is already running it is evicted: a previous streaming session
-// whose gRPC client died and never freed the slot stays stuck otherwise,
-// and a bundle capture is just informational state.
-func (s *Server) claimCapture(sess *capture.Session, cancel func()) (*internal.Engine, error) {
+// claimCapture reserves the engine's capture slot for sess. Returns
+// FailedPrecondition if another capture is already active.
+func (s *Server) claimCapture(sess *capture.Session) (*internal.Engine, error) {
 	s.mutex.Lock()
 	defer s.mutex.Unlock()
 
-	s.evictActiveCaptureLocked()
+	if s.activeCapture != nil {
+		return nil, status.Error(codes.FailedPrecondition, "another capture is already running")
+	}
 	engine, err := s.getCaptureEngineLocked()
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 	s.activeCapture = sess
-	s.activeCaptureCancel = cancel
 	return engine, nil
 }
 
-// evictActiveCaptureLocked tears down whatever capture currently owns
-// the engine slot so a fresh claim can succeed. Caller must hold mutex.
-func (s *Server) evictActiveCaptureLocked() {
-	if s.activeCapture == nil {
-		return
-	}
-	if s.bundleCapture != nil && s.bundleCapture.sess == s.activeCapture {
-		log.Infof("evicting running bundle capture to start a new capture")
-		s.stopBundleCaptureLocked()
-		return
-	}
-	log.Infof("evicting previous streaming capture to start a new one")
-	prev := s.activeCapture
-	cancel := s.activeCaptureCancel
-	if engine, err := s.getCaptureEngineLocked(); err == nil {
-		if err := engine.SetCapture(nil); err != nil {
-			log.Debugf("clear previous capture: %v", err)
-		}
-	}
-	s.activeCapture = nil
-	s.activeCaptureCancel = nil
-	prev.Stop()
-	if cancel != nil {
-		cancel()
-	}
-}
-
 // releaseCapture clears the active-capture owner if it still matches sess.
 func (s *Server) releaseCapture(sess *capture.Session) {
 	s.mutex.Lock()
 	defer s.mutex.Unlock()
 	if s.activeCapture == sess {
 		s.activeCapture = nil
-		s.activeCaptureCancel = nil
 	}
 }
 
@@ -367,7 +341,6 @@ func (s *Server) clearCaptureIfOwner(sess *capture.Session, engine *internal.Eng
 		log.Debugf("clear capture: %v", err)
 	}
 	s.activeCapture = nil
-	s.activeCaptureCancel = nil
 }
 
 func (s *Server) getCaptureEngineLocked() (*internal.Engine, error) {

client/server/mdm.go

@@ -297,8 +297,6 @@ func mdmManagedFieldConflicts(msg *proto.SetConfigRequest, policy *mdm.Policy) [
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyRosenpassPermissive, msg.RosenpassPermissive),
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableAutoConnect, msg.DisableAutoConnect),
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyAllowServerSSH, msg.ServerSSHAllowed),
-		conflictBool(mdm.KeyAllowServerVNC, msg.ServerVNCAllowed),
-		conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableVNCApproval, msg.DisableVNCApproval),
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableClientRoutes, msg.DisableClientRoutes),
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableServerRoutes, msg.DisableServerRoutes),
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyBlockInbound, msg.BlockInbound),
@@ -334,8 +332,6 @@ func setConfigRequestHasConfigOverrides(msg *proto.SetConfigRequest) bool {
 		msg.Mtu != nil ||
 		msg.DisableAutoConnect != nil ||
 		msg.ServerSSHAllowed != nil ||
-		msg.ServerVNCAllowed != nil ||
-		msg.DisableVNCApproval != nil ||
 		msg.NetworkMonitor != nil ||
 		msg.DisableClientRoutes != nil ||
 		msg.DisableServerRoutes != nil ||
@@ -374,8 +370,6 @@ func loginRequestHasConfigOverrides(msg *proto.LoginRequest) bool {
 		msg.WireguardPort != nil ||
 		msg.DisableAutoConnect != nil ||
 		msg.ServerSSHAllowed != nil ||
-		msg.ServerVNCAllowed != nil ||
-		msg.DisableVNCApproval != nil ||
 		msg.RosenpassPermissive != nil ||
 		len(msg.ExtraIFaceBlacklist) > 0 ||
 		msg.NetworkMonitor != nil ||
@@ -424,8 +418,6 @@ func loginRequestMDMConflicts(msg *proto.LoginRequest, policy *mdm.Policy) []str
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyRosenpassPermissive, msg.RosenpassPermissive),
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableAutoConnect, msg.DisableAutoConnect),
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyAllowServerSSH, msg.ServerSSHAllowed),
-		conflictBool(mdm.KeyAllowServerVNC, msg.ServerVNCAllowed),
-		conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableVNCApproval, msg.DisableVNCApproval),
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableClientRoutes, msg.DisableClientRoutes),
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableServerRoutes, msg.DisableServerRoutes),
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyBlockInbound, msg.BlockInbound),

client/server/server.go

@@ -113,12 +113,8 @@ type Server struct {
 	captureEnabled         bool
 	bundleCapture          *bundleCapture
 	// activeCapture is the session currently installed on the engine; guarded by s.mutex.
-	activeCapture *capture.Session
-	// activeCaptureCancel tears down the streaming pipe/cancel for the
-	// active streaming capture so eviction unblocks the StartCapture RPC
-	// handler. Nil for bundle captures (they own their own context).
-	activeCaptureCancel func()
-	networksDisabled    bool
+	activeCapture    *capture.Session
+	networksDisabled bool
 
 	sleepHandler *sleephandler.SleepHandler
 
@@ -185,7 +181,7 @@ func (s *Server) Start() error {
 		log.Warnf("failed to redirect stderr: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	if err := restoreResidualState(s.rootCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
+	if err := RestoreResidualState(s.rootCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
 		log.Warnf(errRestoreResidualState, err)
 	}
 
@@ -496,8 +492,6 @@ func (s *Server) setConfigInputFromRequest(msg *proto.SetConfigRequest) (profile
 	config.RosenpassPermissive = msg.RosenpassPermissive
 	config.DisableAutoConnect = msg.DisableAutoConnect
 	config.ServerSSHAllowed = msg.ServerSSHAllowed
-	config.ServerVNCAllowed = msg.ServerVNCAllowed
-	config.DisableVNCApproval = msg.DisableVNCApproval
 	config.NetworkMonitor = msg.NetworkMonitor
 	config.DisableClientRoutes = msg.DisableClientRoutes
 	config.DisableServerRoutes = msg.DisableServerRoutes
@@ -557,7 +551,7 @@ func (s *Server) Login(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.LoginRequest) (*pro
 	s.actCancel = cancel
 	s.mutex.Unlock()
 
-	if err := restoreResidualState(s.rootCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
+	if err := RestoreResidualState(s.rootCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
 		log.Warnf(errRestoreResidualState, err)
 	}
 
@@ -864,7 +858,7 @@ func (s *Server) Up(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.UpRequest) (*proto.UpR
 
 		return s.waitForUp(callerCtx)
 	}
-	if err := restoreResidualState(callerCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
+	if err := RestoreResidualState(callerCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
 		log.Warnf(errRestoreResidualState, err)
 	}
 
@@ -1443,7 +1437,6 @@ func (s *Server) buildStatusResponse(ctx context.Context, msg *proto.StatusReque
 		pbFullStatus := fullStatus.ToProto()
 		pbFullStatus.Events = s.statusRecorder.GetEventHistory()
 		pbFullStatus.SshServerState = s.getSSHServerState()
-		pbFullStatus.VncServerState = s.getVNCServerState()
 		pbFullStatus.NetworksRevision = s.statusRecorder.GetNetworksRevision()
 		statusResponse.FullStatus = pbFullStatus
 	}
@@ -1484,38 +1477,6 @@ func (s *Server) getSSHServerState() *proto.SSHServerState {
 	return sshServerState
 }
 
-// getVNCServerState retrieves the current VNC server state.
-func (s *Server) getVNCServerState() *proto.VNCServerState {
-	s.mutex.Lock()
-	connectClient := s.connectClient
-	s.mutex.Unlock()
-
-	if connectClient == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-
-	engine := connectClient.Engine()
-	if engine == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-
-	enabled, sessions := engine.GetVNCServerStatus()
-	pbSessions := make([]*proto.VNCSessionInfo, 0, len(sessions))
-	for _, sess := range sessions {
-		pbSessions = append(pbSessions, &proto.VNCSessionInfo{
-			RemoteAddress: sess.RemoteAddress,
-			Mode:          sess.Mode,
-			Username:      sess.Username,
-			UserID:        sess.UserID,
-			Initiator:     sess.Initiator,
-		})
-	}
-	return &proto.VNCServerState{
-		Enabled:  enabled,
-		Sessions: pbSessions,
-	}
-}
-
 // GetPeerSSHHostKey retrieves SSH host key for a specific peer
 func (s *Server) GetPeerSSHHostKey(
 	ctx context.Context,
@@ -1901,30 +1862,6 @@ func (s *Server) ExposeService(req *proto.ExposeServiceRequest, srv proto.Daemon
 	return nil
 }
 
-// RespondApproval relays the user's accept/deny decision for a pending
-// approval prompt to the engine's broker. Unknown or already-resolved
-// request_ids are silently no-op'd so a slow UI cannot deny a prompt the
-// user already handled (or that already timed out).
-func (s *Server) RespondApproval(_ context.Context, msg *proto.RespondApprovalRequest) (*proto.RespondApprovalResponse, error) {
-	if msg.GetRequestId() == "" {
-		return nil, gstatus.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "request_id is required")
-	}
-	s.mutex.Lock()
-	connectClient := s.connectClient
-	s.mutex.Unlock()
-	if connectClient == nil {
-		return nil, gstatus.Errorf(codes.FailedPrecondition, "client not initialized")
-	}
-	engine := connectClient.Engine()
-	if engine == nil {
-		return nil, gstatus.Errorf(codes.FailedPrecondition, "engine not running")
-	}
-	if !engine.RespondApproval(msg.GetRequestId(), msg.GetAccept(), msg.GetViewOnly()) {
-		log.Debugf("approval response for unknown request_id %s", msg.GetRequestId())
-	}
-	return &proto.RespondApprovalResponse{}, nil
-}
-
 func isUnixRunningDesktop() bool {
 	if runtime.GOOS != "linux" && runtime.GOOS != "freebsd" {
 		return false
@@ -2032,8 +1969,6 @@ func (s *Server) GetConfig(ctx context.Context, req *proto.GetConfigRequest) (*p
 		Mtu:                           int64(cfg.MTU),
 		DisableAutoConnect:            cfg.DisableAutoConnect,
 		ServerSSHAllowed:              *cfg.ServerSSHAllowed,
-		ServerVNCAllowed:              cfg.ServerVNCAllowed != nil && *cfg.ServerVNCAllowed,
-		DisableVNCApproval:            cfg.DisableVNCApproval != nil && *cfg.DisableVNCApproval,
 		RosenpassEnabled:              cfg.RosenpassEnabled,
 		RosenpassPermissive:           cfg.RosenpassPermissive,
 		BlockInbound:                  cfg.BlockInbound,

client/server/setconfig_mdm_test.go

@@ -105,30 +105,6 @@ func TestSetConfig_MDMReject_SingleField(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Equal(t, []string{mdm.KeyManagementURL}, v.GetFields())
 }
 
-func TestSetConfig_MDMReject_VNCFields(t *testing.T) {
-	withMDMPolicy(t, mdm.NewPolicy(map[string]any{
-		mdm.KeyAllowServerVNC:     true,
-		mdm.KeyDisableVNCApproval: false,
-	}))
-
-	s, ctx, profName, username, _ := setupServerWithProfile(t)
-
-	vncAllowed := false
-	disableApproval := true
-	_, err := s.SetConfig(ctx, &proto.SetConfigRequest{
-		ProfileName:        profName,
-		Username:           username,
-		ServerVNCAllowed:   &vncAllowed,
-		DisableVNCApproval: &disableApproval,
-	})
-
-	v := extractViolation(t, err)
-	assert.ElementsMatch(t, []string{
-		mdm.KeyAllowServerVNC,
-		mdm.KeyDisableVNCApproval,
-	}, v.GetFields())
-}
-
 func TestSetConfig_MDMReject_MultipleFields(t *testing.T) {
 	withMDMPolicy(t, mdm.NewPolicy(map[string]any{
 		mdm.KeyManagementURL:    "https://mdm.example.com:443",

client/server/setconfig_test.go

@@ -58,8 +58,6 @@ func TestSetConfig_AllFieldsSaved(t *testing.T) {
 	rosenpassEnabled := true
 	rosenpassPermissive := true
 	serverSSHAllowed := true
-	serverVNCAllowed := true
-	disableVNCApproval := true
 	interfaceName := "utun100"
 	wireguardPort := int64(51820)
 	preSharedKey := "test-psk"
@@ -84,8 +82,6 @@ func TestSetConfig_AllFieldsSaved(t *testing.T) {
 		RosenpassEnabled:     &rosenpassEnabled,
 		RosenpassPermissive:  &rosenpassPermissive,
 		ServerSSHAllowed:     &serverSSHAllowed,
-		ServerVNCAllowed:     &serverVNCAllowed,
-		DisableVNCApproval:   &disableVNCApproval,
 		InterfaceName:        &interfaceName,
 		WireguardPort:        &wireguardPort,
 		OptionalPreSharedKey: &preSharedKey,
@@ -129,10 +125,6 @@ func TestSetConfig_AllFieldsSaved(t *testing.T) {
 	require.Equal(t, rosenpassPermissive, cfg.RosenpassPermissive)
 	require.NotNil(t, cfg.ServerSSHAllowed)
 	require.Equal(t, serverSSHAllowed, *cfg.ServerSSHAllowed)
-	require.NotNil(t, cfg.ServerVNCAllowed)
-	require.Equal(t, serverVNCAllowed, *cfg.ServerVNCAllowed)
-	require.NotNil(t, cfg.DisableVNCApproval)
-	require.Equal(t, disableVNCApproval, *cfg.DisableVNCApproval)
 	require.Equal(t, interfaceName, cfg.WgIface)
 	require.Equal(t, int(wireguardPort), cfg.WgPort)
 	require.Equal(t, preSharedKey, cfg.PreSharedKey)
@@ -185,8 +177,6 @@ func verifyAllFieldsCovered(t *testing.T, req *proto.SetConfigRequest) {
 		"RosenpassEnabled":              true,
 		"RosenpassPermissive":           true,
 		"ServerSSHAllowed":              true,
-		"ServerVNCAllowed":              true,
-		"DisableVNCApproval":            true,
 		"InterfaceName":                 true,
 		"WireguardPort":                 true,
 		"OptionalPreSharedKey":          true,
@@ -247,8 +237,6 @@ func TestCLIFlags_MappedToSetConfig(t *testing.T) {
 		"enable-rosenpass":                  "RosenpassEnabled",
 		"rosenpass-permissive":              "RosenpassPermissive",
 		"allow-server-ssh":                  "ServerSSHAllowed",
-		"allow-server-vnc":                  "ServerVNCAllowed",
-		"disable-vnc-approval":              "DisableVNCApproval",
 		"interface-name":                    "InterfaceName",
 		"wireguard-port":                    "WireguardPort",
 		"preshared-key":                     "OptionalPreSharedKey",

client/server/state.go

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ func (s *Server) CleanState(ctx context.Context, req *proto.CleanStateRequest) (
 
 	if req.All {
 		// Reuse existing cleanup logic for all states
-		if err := restoreResidualState(ctx, statePath); err != nil {
+		if err := RestoreResidualState(ctx, statePath); err != nil {
 			return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Internal, "failed to clean all states: %v", err)
 		}
 
@@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ func (s *Server) DeleteState(ctx context.Context, req *proto.DeleteStateRequest)
 	}, nil
 }
 
-// restoreResidualState checks if the client was not shut down in a clean way and restores residual if required.
+// RestoreResidualState checks if the client was not shut down in a clean way and restores residual if required.
 // Otherwise, we might not be able to connect to the management server to retrieve new config.
-func restoreResidualState(ctx context.Context, statePath string) error {
+func RestoreResidualState(ctx context.Context, statePath string) error {
 	if statePath == "" {
 		return nil
 	}

client/ssh/auth/auth.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package sessionauth
+package auth
 
 import (
 	"errors"
@@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ const (
 	DefaultUserIDClaim = "sub"
 	// Wildcard is a special user ID that matches all users
 	Wildcard = "*"
-	// sessionPubKeyLen is the size of an X25519 static public key in bytes.
-	sessionPubKeyLen = 32
 )
 
 var (
@@ -24,7 +22,6 @@ var (
 	ErrUserNotAuthorized     = errors.New("user is not authorized to access this peer")
 	ErrNoMachineUserMapping  = errors.New("no authorization mapping for OS user")
 	ErrUserNotMappedToOSUser = errors.New("user is not authorized to login as OS user")
-	ErrSessionKeyNotKnown    = errors.New("session pubkey not registered")
 )
 
 // Authorizer handles SSH fine-grained access control authorization
@@ -38,17 +35,6 @@ type Authorizer struct {
 	// machineUsers maps OS login usernames to lists of authorized user indexes
 	machineUsers map[string][]uint32
 
-	// sessionPubKeys maps an X25519 static public key (as map-safe
-	// array) to the hashed user identity that key authenticates as.
-	// Populated from management's temporary-access flow; used by VNC to
-	// authenticate via the Noise_IK handshake.
-	sessionPubKeys map[[sessionPubKeyLen]byte]sshuserhash.UserIDHash
-	// sessionDisplayNames mirrors sessionPubKeys with the optional
-	// human-readable display name management associated with each
-	// session key. Used by the per-connection UI approval prompt; not
-	// consulted by any authorization decision.
-	sessionDisplayNames map[[sessionPubKeyLen]byte]string
-
 	// mu protects the list of users
 	mu sync.RWMutex
 }
@@ -64,29 +50,13 @@ type Config struct {
 	// MachineUsers maps OS login usernames to indexes in AuthorizedUsers
 	// If a user wants to login as a specific OS user, their index must be in the corresponding list
 	MachineUsers map[string][]uint32
-
-	// SessionPubKeys binds ephemeral X25519 static public keys to hashed
-	// user identities. Populated for VNC; ignored on the SSH side.
-	SessionPubKeys []SessionPubKey
-}
-
-// SessionPubKey is a single ephemeral-key entry: the 32-byte X25519
-// static public key plus the hashed user identity it authenticates as,
-// optionally plus a human-readable display name for the UI approval
-// prompt to identify the requester.
-type SessionPubKey struct {
-	PubKey      []byte
-	UserIDHash  sshuserhash.UserIDHash
-	DisplayName string
 }
 
 // NewAuthorizer creates a new SSH authorizer with empty configuration
 func NewAuthorizer() *Authorizer {
 	a := &Authorizer{
-		userIDClaim:         DefaultUserIDClaim,
-		machineUsers:        make(map[string][]uint32),
-		sessionPubKeys:      make(map[[sessionPubKeyLen]byte]sshuserhash.UserIDHash),
-		sessionDisplayNames: make(map[[sessionPubKeyLen]byte]string),
+		userIDClaim:  DefaultUserIDClaim,
+		machineUsers: make(map[string][]uint32),
 	}
 
 	return a
@@ -102,8 +72,6 @@ func (a *Authorizer) Update(config *Config) {
 		a.userIDClaim = DefaultUserIDClaim
 		a.authorizedUsers = []sshuserhash.UserIDHash{}
 		a.machineUsers = make(map[string][]uint32)
-		a.sessionPubKeys = make(map[[sessionPubKeyLen]byte]sshuserhash.UserIDHash)
-		a.sessionDisplayNames = make(map[[sessionPubKeyLen]byte]string)
 		log.Info("SSH authorization cleared")
 		return
 	}
@@ -126,35 +94,8 @@ func (a *Authorizer) Update(config *Config) {
 	}
 	a.machineUsers = machineUsers
 
-	sessionPubKeys := make(map[[sessionPubKeyLen]byte]sshuserhash.UserIDHash, len(config.SessionPubKeys))
-	sessionDisplayNames := make(map[[sessionPubKeyLen]byte]string, len(config.SessionPubKeys))
-	conflicted := make(map[[sessionPubKeyLen]byte]struct{})
-	for _, e := range config.SessionPubKeys {
-		if len(e.PubKey) != sessionPubKeyLen {
-			continue
-		}
-		var key [sessionPubKeyLen]byte
-		copy(key[:], e.PubKey)
-		if _, bad := conflicted[key]; bad {
-			continue
-		}
-		if existing, ok := sessionPubKeys[key]; ok && existing != e.UserIDHash {
-			log.Warnf("SSH auth: session pubkey bound to conflicting user hashes; dropping binding")
-			delete(sessionPubKeys, key)
-			delete(sessionDisplayNames, key)
-			conflicted[key] = struct{}{}
-			continue
-		}
-		sessionPubKeys[key] = e.UserIDHash
-		if e.DisplayName != "" {
-			sessionDisplayNames[key] = e.DisplayName
-		}
-	}
-	a.sessionPubKeys = sessionPubKeys
-	a.sessionDisplayNames = sessionDisplayNames
-
-	log.Debugf("SSH auth: updated with %d authorized users, %d machine user mappings, %d session pubkeys",
-		len(config.AuthorizedUsers), len(machineUsers), len(sessionPubKeys))
+	log.Debugf("SSH auth: updated with %d authorized users, %d machine user mappings",
+		len(config.AuthorizedUsers), len(machineUsers))
 }
 
 // Authorize validates if a user is authorized to login as the specified OS user.
@@ -214,54 +155,6 @@ func (a *Authorizer) GetUserIDClaim() string {
 	return a.userIDClaim
 }
 
-// LookupSessionKey resolves a Noise-verified static public key to the
-// hashed user identity registered with it. Fails closed when the key is
-// unknown.
-func (a *Authorizer) LookupSessionKey(pubKey []byte) (sshuserhash.UserIDHash, error) {
-	var zero sshuserhash.UserIDHash
-	if len(pubKey) != sessionPubKeyLen {
-		return zero, fmt.Errorf("session pubkey wrong length: %d", len(pubKey))
-	}
-	var key [sessionPubKeyLen]byte
-	copy(key[:], pubKey)
-	a.mu.RLock()
-	hash, ok := a.sessionPubKeys[key]
-	a.mu.RUnlock()
-	if !ok {
-		return zero, ErrSessionKeyNotKnown
-	}
-	return hash, nil
-}
-
-// LookupSessionDisplayName returns the human-readable display name
-// management associated with a session pubkey, or empty string when none
-// is recorded. Never returns an error: a missing/unknown key reports as
-// "" and the caller falls back to other identifiers.
-func (a *Authorizer) LookupSessionDisplayName(pubKey []byte) string {
-	if len(pubKey) != sessionPubKeyLen {
-		return ""
-	}
-	var key [sessionPubKeyLen]byte
-	copy(key[:], pubKey)
-	a.mu.RLock()
-	name := a.sessionDisplayNames[key]
-	a.mu.RUnlock()
-	return name
-}
-
-// AuthorizeOSUserBySessionKey resolves the OS-user mapping for a session
-// key. Mirrors Authorize but skips the JWT-hash step since the key has
-// already been verified and the user identity hash is in hand.
-func (a *Authorizer) AuthorizeOSUserBySessionKey(userIDHash sshuserhash.UserIDHash, osUsername string) (string, error) {
-	a.mu.RLock()
-	defer a.mu.RUnlock()
-	userIndex, found := a.findUserIndex(userIDHash)
-	if !found {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("session user (hash: %s) not in authorized list for OS user %q: %w", userIDHash, osUsername, ErrUserNotAuthorized)
-	}
-	return a.checkMachineUserMapping("session", osUsername, userIndex)
-}
-
 // findUserIndex finds the index of a hashed user ID in the authorized users list
 // Returns the index and true if found, 0 and false if not found
 func (a *Authorizer) findUserIndex(hashedUserID sshuserhash.UserIDHash) (int, bool) {

client/ssh/auth/auth_test.go

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
-package sessionauth
+package auth
 
 import (
-	"errors"
 	"testing"
 
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
@@ -611,61 +610,3 @@ func TestAuthorizer_Wildcard_WithPartialIndexes_AllowsAllUsers(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Error(t, err)
 	assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrUserNotAuthorized, "unauthorized user should be denied")
 }
-
-func TestAuthorizer_LookupSessionKey_Valid(t *testing.T) {
-	pub := bytesRepeat(0x11, sessionPubKeyLen)
-	userHash, err := sshauth.HashUserID("alice")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	a := NewAuthorizer()
-	a.Update(&Config{
-		AuthorizedUsers: []sshauth.UserIDHash{userHash},
-		MachineUsers:    map[string][]uint32{Wildcard: {0}},
-		SessionPubKeys:  []SessionPubKey{{PubKey: pub, UserIDHash: userHash}},
-	})
-
-	got, err := a.LookupSessionKey(pub)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, userHash, got)
-
-	if _, err := a.AuthorizeOSUserBySessionKey(got, "alice"); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("AuthorizeOSUserBySessionKey: %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestAuthorizer_LookupSessionKey_UnknownPub(t *testing.T) {
-	a := NewAuthorizer()
-	a.Update(&Config{})
-	_, err := a.LookupSessionKey(bytesRepeat(0x22, sessionPubKeyLen))
-	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrSessionKeyNotKnown)
-}
-
-func TestAuthorizer_LookupSessionKey_WrongLength(t *testing.T) {
-	a := NewAuthorizer()
-	_, err := a.LookupSessionKey([]byte("short"))
-	require.Error(t, err)
-}
-
-func TestAuthorizer_LookupSessionKey_UpdateClears(t *testing.T) {
-	pub := bytesRepeat(0x33, sessionPubKeyLen)
-	userHash, err := sshauth.HashUserID("alice")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	a := NewAuthorizer()
-	a.Update(&Config{SessionPubKeys: []SessionPubKey{{PubKey: pub, UserIDHash: userHash}}})
-	if _, err := a.LookupSessionKey(pub); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("setup lookup: %v", err)
-	}
-	a.Update(&Config{})
-	if _, err := a.LookupSessionKey(pub); !errors.Is(err, ErrSessionKeyNotKnown) {
-		t.Fatalf("expected ErrSessionKeyNotKnown, got %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func bytesRepeat(b byte, n int) []byte {
-	out := make([]byte, n)
-	for i := range out {
-		out[i] = b
-	}
-	return out
-}

client/ssh/proxy/proxy_privileged_test.go

@@ -26,10 +26,10 @@ import (
 	cryptossh "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
 
 	nbssh "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh"
+	sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/auth"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/server"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/testutil"
 	nbjwt "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/auth/jwt"
-	sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sessionauth"
 	sshuserhash "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sshauth"
 )
 

client/ssh/server/jwt_test.go

@@ -23,11 +23,11 @@ import (
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 
 	nbssh "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh"
+	sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/auth"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/client"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/detection"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/testutil"
 	nbjwt "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/auth/jwt"
-	sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sessionauth"
 	sshuserhash "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sshauth"
 )
 

client/ssh/server/server.go

@@ -23,10 +23,10 @@ import (
 	"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/tun/netstack"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
+	sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/auth"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/detection"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/auth"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/auth/jwt"
-	sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sessionauth"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util/netrelay"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/version"
 )
@@ -197,14 +197,6 @@ type Config struct {
 
 	// HostKey is the SSH server host key in PEM format
 	HostKeyPEM []byte
-
-	// NetstackNet, when non-nil, makes the SSH server listen via the
-	// supplied userspace network stack instead of an OS socket.
-	NetstackNet *netstack.Net
-
-	// NetworkValidation, when non-zero, restricts inbound connections to
-	// peers inside the NetBird overlay defined by this WireGuard address.
-	NetworkValidation wgaddr.Address
 }
 
 // SessionInfo contains information about an active SSH session
@@ -216,15 +208,12 @@ type SessionInfo struct {
 	PortForwards  []string
 }
 
-// New creates an SSH server instance from the supplied Config. Fields are
-// read once at construction; mutating Config afterwards has no effect.
-// JWT == nil disables JWT authentication.
+// New creates an SSH server instance with the provided host key and optional JWT configuration
+// If jwtConfig is nil, JWT authentication is disabled
 func New(config *Config) *Server {
 	s := &Server{
 		mu:                     sync.RWMutex{},
 		hostKeyPEM:             config.HostKeyPEM,
-		netstackNet:            config.NetstackNet,
-		wgAddress:              config.NetworkValidation,
 		sessions:               make(map[sessionKey]*sessionState),
 		pendingAuthJWT:         make(map[authKey]string),
 		remoteForwardListeners: make(map[forwardKey]net.Listener),
@@ -445,6 +434,20 @@ func (s *Server) buildSessionInfo(state *sessionState) SessionInfo {
 	return info
 }
 
+// SetNetstackNet sets the netstack network for userspace networking
+func (s *Server) SetNetstackNet(net *netstack.Net) {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	s.netstackNet = net
+}
+
+// SetNetworkValidation configures network-based connection filtering
+func (s *Server) SetNetworkValidation(addr wgaddr.Address) {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	s.wgAddress = addr
+}
+
 // UpdateSSHAuth updates the SSH fine-grained access control configuration
 // This should be called when network map updates include new SSH auth configuration
 func (s *Server) UpdateSSHAuth(config *sshauth.Config) {

client/status/status.go

@@ -136,19 +136,6 @@ type SSHServerStateOutput struct {
 	Sessions []SSHSessionOutput `json:"sessions" yaml:"sessions"`
 }
 
-type VNCSessionOutput struct {
-	RemoteAddress string `json:"remoteAddress" yaml:"remoteAddress"`
-	Mode          string `json:"mode" yaml:"mode"`
-	Username      string `json:"username,omitempty" yaml:"username,omitempty"`
-	UserID        string `json:"userID,omitempty" yaml:"userID,omitempty"`
-	Initiator     string `json:"initiator,omitempty" yaml:"initiator,omitempty"`
-}
-
-type VNCServerStateOutput struct {
-	Enabled  bool               `json:"enabled" yaml:"enabled"`
-	Sessions []VNCSessionOutput `json:"sessions" yaml:"sessions"`
-}
-
 type OutputOverview struct {
 	Peers                   PeersStateOutput           `json:"peers" yaml:"peers"`
 	CliVersion              string                     `json:"cliVersion" yaml:"cliVersion"`
@@ -172,7 +159,6 @@ type OutputOverview struct {
 	LazyConnectionEnabled   bool                       `json:"lazyConnectionEnabled" yaml:"lazyConnectionEnabled"`
 	ProfileName             string                     `json:"profileName" yaml:"profileName"`
 	SSHServerState          SSHServerStateOutput       `json:"sshServer" yaml:"sshServer"`
-	VNCServerState          VNCServerStateOutput       `json:"vncServer" yaml:"vncServer"`
 	// SessionExpiresAt is the absolute UTC instant at which the peer's SSO
 	// session expires. nil when the peer is not SSO-tracked or login
 	// expiration is disabled. Pointer (rather than zero-value time.Time) so
@@ -198,7 +184,6 @@ func ConvertToStatusOutputOverview(pbFullStatus *proto.FullStatus, opts ConvertO
 
 	relayOverview := mapRelays(pbFullStatus.GetRelays())
 	sshServerOverview := mapSSHServer(pbFullStatus.GetSshServerState())
-	vncServerOverview := mapVNCServer(pbFullStatus.GetVncServerState())
 	peersOverview := mapPeers(pbFullStatus.GetPeers(), opts.StatusFilter, opts.PrefixNamesFilter, opts.PrefixNamesFilterMap, opts.IPsFilter, opts.ConnectionTypeFilter)
 
 	overview := OutputOverview{
@@ -224,7 +209,6 @@ func ConvertToStatusOutputOverview(pbFullStatus *proto.FullStatus, opts ConvertO
 		LazyConnectionEnabled:   pbFullStatus.GetLazyConnectionEnabled(),
 		ProfileName:             opts.ProfileName,
 		SSHServerState:          sshServerOverview,
-		VNCServerState:          vncServerOverview,
 	}
 	if !opts.SessionExpiresAt.IsZero() {
 		t := opts.SessionExpiresAt
@@ -310,26 +294,6 @@ func mapSSHServer(sshServerState *proto.SSHServerState) SSHServerStateOutput {
 	}
 }
 
-func mapVNCServer(state *proto.VNCServerState) VNCServerStateOutput {
-	if state == nil {
-		return VNCServerStateOutput{Sessions: []VNCSessionOutput{}}
-	}
-	sessions := make([]VNCSessionOutput, 0, len(state.GetSessions()))
-	for _, sess := range state.GetSessions() {
-		sessions = append(sessions, VNCSessionOutput{
-			RemoteAddress: sess.GetRemoteAddress(),
-			Mode:          sess.GetMode(),
-			Username:      sess.GetUsername(),
-			UserID:        sess.GetUserID(),
-			Initiator:     sess.GetInitiator(),
-		})
-	}
-	return VNCServerStateOutput{
-		Enabled:  state.GetEnabled(),
-		Sessions: sessions,
-	}
-}
-
 func mapPeers(
 	peers []*proto.PeerState,
 	statusFilter string,
@@ -594,26 +558,6 @@ func (o *OutputOverview) GeneralSummary(showURL bool, showRelays bool, showNameS
 		}
 	}
 
-	vncServerStatus := "Disabled"
-	if o.VNCServerState.Enabled {
-		vncSessionCount := len(o.VNCServerState.Sessions)
-		if vncSessionCount > 0 {
-			sessionWord := "session"
-			if vncSessionCount > 1 {
-				sessionWord = "sessions"
-			}
-			vncServerStatus = fmt.Sprintf("Enabled (%d active %s)", vncSessionCount, sessionWord)
-		} else {
-			vncServerStatus = "Enabled"
-		}
-
-		if showSSHSessions && vncSessionCount > 0 {
-			for _, sess := range o.VNCServerState.Sessions {
-				vncServerStatus += "\n  " + formatVNCSessionLine(sess)
-			}
-		}
-	}
-
 	peersCountString := fmt.Sprintf("%d/%d Connected", o.Peers.Connected, o.Peers.Total)
 
 	var sessionExpiryString string
@@ -669,7 +613,6 @@ func (o *OutputOverview) GeneralSummary(showURL bool, showRelays bool, showNameS
 			"Quantum resistance: %s\n"+
 			"Lazy connection: %s\n"+
 			"SSH Server: %s\n"+
-			"VNC Server: %s\n"+
 			"Networks: %s\n"+
 			"%s"+
 			"%s"+
@@ -690,7 +633,6 @@ func (o *OutputOverview) GeneralSummary(showURL bool, showRelays bool, showNameS
 		rosenpassEnabledStatus,
 		lazyConnectionEnabledStatus,
 		sshServerStatus,
-		vncServerStatus,
 		networks,
 		forwardingRulesString,
 		sessionExpiryString,
@@ -804,6 +746,8 @@ func ToProtoFullStatus(fullStatus peer.FullStatus) *proto.FullStatus {
 		pbFullStatus.DnsServers = append(pbFullStatus.DnsServers, pbDnsState)
 	}
 
+	pbFullStatus.Events = fullStatus.Events
+
 	return &pbFullStatus
 }
 
@@ -1051,26 +995,6 @@ func anonymizePeerDetail(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, peer *PeerStateDetailOutput) {
 	}
 }
 
-// formatVNCSessionLine renders a single VNC session row for the detailed
-// status output. The leading slot identifies the initiator (display name
-// when known, hashed UserID otherwise); the post-arrow slot is the OS
-// user the session targets and is omitted in attach mode where the
-// destination is the current console user (unknown to the daemon).
-func formatVNCSessionLine(sess VNCSessionOutput) string {
-	who := sess.Initiator
-	if who == "" {
-		who = sess.UserID
-	}
-	prefix := sess.RemoteAddress
-	if who != "" {
-		prefix = fmt.Sprintf("%s@%s", who, sess.RemoteAddress)
-	}
-	if sess.Username != "" {
-		return fmt.Sprintf("[%s -> %s] mode=%s", prefix, sess.Username, sess.Mode)
-	}
-	return fmt.Sprintf("[%s] mode=%s", prefix, sess.Mode)
-}
-
 func anonymizeOverview(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, overview *OutputOverview) {
 	for i, peer := range overview.Peers.Details {
 		peer := peer
@@ -1091,19 +1015,6 @@ func anonymizeOverview(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, overview *OutputOverview) {
 		overview.Relays.Details[i] = detail
 	}
 
-	anonymizeNSServerGroups(a, overview)
-
-	for i, route := range overview.Networks {
-		overview.Networks[i] = a.AnonymizeRoute(route)
-	}
-
-	overview.FQDN = a.AnonymizeDomain(overview.FQDN)
-
-	anonymizeEvents(a, overview)
-	anonymizeServerSessions(a, overview)
-}
-
-func anonymizeNSServerGroups(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, overview *OutputOverview) {
 	for i, nsGroup := range overview.NSServerGroups {
 		for j, domain := range nsGroup.Domains {
 			overview.NSServerGroups[i].Domains[j] = a.AnonymizeDomain(domain)
@@ -1115,9 +1026,13 @@ func anonymizeNSServerGroups(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, overview *OutputOverview)
 			}
 		}
 	}
-}
 
-func anonymizeEvents(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, overview *OutputOverview) {
+	for i, route := range overview.Networks {
+		overview.Networks[i] = a.AnonymizeRoute(route)
+	}
+
+	overview.FQDN = a.AnonymizeDomain(overview.FQDN)
+
 	for i, event := range overview.Events {
 		overview.Events[i].Message = a.AnonymizeString(event.Message)
 		overview.Events[i].UserMessage = a.AnonymizeString(event.UserMessage)
@@ -1126,26 +1041,15 @@ func anonymizeEvents(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, overview *OutputOverview) {
 			event.Metadata[k] = a.AnonymizeString(v)
 		}
 	}
-}
 
-func anonymizeRemoteAddress(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, addr string) string {
-	if host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr); err == nil {
-		return fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", a.AnonymizeIPString(host), port)
-	}
-	return a.AnonymizeIPString(addr)
-}
-
-func anonymizeServerSessions(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, overview *OutputOverview) {
 	for i, session := range overview.SSHServerState.Sessions {
-		overview.SSHServerState.Sessions[i].RemoteAddress = anonymizeRemoteAddress(a, session.RemoteAddress)
+		if host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(session.RemoteAddress); err == nil {
+			overview.SSHServerState.Sessions[i].RemoteAddress = fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", a.AnonymizeIPString(host), port)
+		} else {
+			overview.SSHServerState.Sessions[i].RemoteAddress = a.AnonymizeIPString(session.RemoteAddress)
+		}
 		overview.SSHServerState.Sessions[i].Command = a.AnonymizeString(session.Command)
 	}
-	for i, sess := range overview.VNCServerState.Sessions {
-		overview.VNCServerState.Sessions[i].RemoteAddress = anonymizeRemoteAddress(a, sess.RemoteAddress)
-		overview.VNCServerState.Sessions[i].Username = a.AnonymizeString(sess.Username)
-		overview.VNCServerState.Sessions[i].UserID = a.AnonymizeString(sess.UserID)
-		overview.VNCServerState.Sessions[i].Initiator = a.AnonymizeString(sess.Initiator)
-	}
 }
 
 // FormatRemainingDuration renders a time.Duration for the "Session expires"

client/status/status_test.go

@@ -242,10 +242,6 @@ var overview = OutputOverview{
 		Enabled:  false,
 		Sessions: []SSHSessionOutput{},
 	},
-	VNCServerState: VNCServerStateOutput{
-		Enabled:  false,
-		Sessions: []VNCSessionOutput{},
-	},
 }
 
 func TestConversionFromFullStatusToOutputOverview(t *testing.T) {
@@ -411,10 +407,6 @@ func TestParsingToJSON(t *testing.T) {
 		  "sshServer":{
 		    "enabled":false,
 			"sessions":[]
-		  },
-		  "vncServer":{
-		    "enabled":false,
-			"sessions":[]
 		  }
         }`
 	// @formatter:on
@@ -525,9 +517,6 @@ profileName: ""
 sshServer:
     enabled: false
     sessions: []
-vncServer:
-    enabled: false
-    sessions: []
 `
 
 	assert.Equal(t, expectedYAML, yaml)
@@ -598,7 +587,6 @@ Wireguard port: %d
 Quantum resistance: false
 Lazy connection: false
 SSH Server: Disabled
-VNC Server: Disabled
 Networks: 10.10.0.0/24
 Peers count: 2/2 Connected
 `, lastConnectionUpdate1, lastHandshake1, lastConnectionUpdate2, lastHandshake2, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH, overview.CliVersion, overview.WgPort)
@@ -625,7 +613,6 @@ Wireguard port: 51820
 Quantum resistance: false
 Lazy connection: false
 SSH Server: Disabled
-VNC Server: Disabled
 Networks: 10.10.0.0/24
 Peers count: 2/2 Connected
 `

client/system/info.go

@@ -65,7 +65,6 @@ type Info struct {
 	RosenpassEnabled    bool
 	RosenpassPermissive bool
 	ServerSSHAllowed    bool
-	ServerVNCAllowed    bool
 
 	DisableClientRoutes bool
 	DisableServerRoutes bool
@@ -85,7 +84,6 @@ type Info struct {
 func (i *Info) SetFlags(
 	rosenpassEnabled, rosenpassPermissive bool,
 	serverSSHAllowed *bool,
-	serverVNCAllowed *bool,
 	disableClientRoutes, disableServerRoutes,
 	disableDNS, disableFirewall, blockLANAccess, blockInbound, disableIPv6 bool,
 	enableSSHRoot, enableSSHSFTP, enableSSHLocalPortForwarding, enableSSHRemotePortForwarding *bool,
@@ -96,9 +94,6 @@ func (i *Info) SetFlags(
 	if serverSSHAllowed != nil {
 		i.ServerSSHAllowed = *serverSSHAllowed
 	}
-	if serverVNCAllowed != nil {
-		i.ServerVNCAllowed = *serverVNCAllowed
-	}
 
 	i.DisableClientRoutes = disableClientRoutes
 	i.DisableServerRoutes = disableServerRoutes

client/ui/autostart_default.go

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+//go:build !android && !ios && !freebsd && !js
+
+package main
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/mdm"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ui/preferences"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ui/services"
+)
+
+// autostartDefaultState carries the guard inputs of the one-time autostart
+// default decision so the decision itself stays a pure, testable function.
+type autostartDefaultState struct {
+	supported    bool
+	mdmDisabled  bool
+	priorInstall bool
+}
+
+// shouldEnableAutostartDefault applies the first-run guards in order and
+// returns whether autostart may be enabled, plus the reason when it may not.
+func shouldEnableAutostartDefault(s autostartDefaultState) (bool, string) {
+	switch {
+	case !s.supported:
+		return false, "autostart not supported on this platform"
+	case s.mdmDisabled:
+		return false, "autostart disabled by MDM policy"
+	case s.priorInstall:
+		return false, "existing NetBird installation"
+	}
+	return true, ""
+}
+
+// autostartDisabledByMDM reports whether the MDM policy manages the
+// disableAutostart key in a way that must suppress the default. An
+// unparseable managed value is treated as disabled to stay on the safe side.
+func autostartDisabledByMDM(policy *mdm.Policy) bool {
+	if !policy.HasKey(mdm.KeyDisableAutostart) {
+		return false
+	}
+	disabled, ok := policy.GetBool(mdm.KeyDisableAutostart)
+	return !ok || disabled
+}
+
+// netbirdFootprintExists reports whether the machine already carries NetBird
+// daemon config or state, meaning this is not a genuinely fresh install. It is
+// the update-safety gate for the autostart default: upgrading users always
+// have a footprint, so an update can never trigger a login-item write.
+func netbirdFootprintExists() bool {
+	candidates := []string{
+		profilemanager.DefaultConfigPath,
+		filepath.Join(profilemanager.DefaultConfigPathDir, "config.json"),
+		filepath.Join(profilemanager.DefaultConfigPathDir, "state.json"),
+	}
+	for _, path := range candidates {
+		if path != "" && fileExists(path) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// applyAutostartDefault runs the one-time launch-on-login default for genuinely
+// fresh installs. The autostartInitialized marker is persisted before any
+// enable attempt so a crash mid-flow degrades to "never enabled" instead of
+// retrying login-item writes on every launch. A user's later disable in
+// Settings is never overridden: the marker guarantees at-most-once, ever.
+func applyAutostartDefault(ctx context.Context, autostart *services.Autostart, prefs *preferences.Store, prefsFileExisted bool) {
+	priorFootprint := netbirdFootprintExists() || prefsFileExisted
+
+	if prefs.Get().AutostartInitialized {
+		return
+	}
+	if err := prefs.SetAutostartInitialized(true); err != nil {
+		log.Warnf("persist autostart marker, skipping autostart default: %v", err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	state := autostartDefaultState{
+		supported:    autostart.Supported(ctx),
+		mdmDisabled:  autostartDisabledByMDM(mdm.LoadPolicy()),
+		priorInstall: priorFootprint,
+	}
+	enable, reason := shouldEnableAutostartDefault(state)
+	if !enable {
+		log.Debugf("skipping autostart default: %s", reason)
+		return
+	}
+
+	if err := autostart.SetEnabled(ctx, true); err != nil {
+		log.Warnf("enable autostart on fresh install: %v", err)
+		return
+	}
+	log.Info("autostart enabled by default on fresh install")
+}
+
+// fileExists reports whether path exists.
+func fileExists(path string) bool {
+	_, err := os.Stat(path)
+	return err == nil
+}

client/ui/autostart_default_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+//go:build !android && !ios && !freebsd && !js
+
+package main
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/mdm"
+)
+
+func TestShouldEnableAutostartDefault(t *testing.T) {
+	allPass := autostartDefaultState{
+		supported:    true,
+		mdmDisabled:  false,
+		priorInstall: false,
+	}
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name       string
+		mutate     func(*autostartDefaultState)
+		wantEnable bool
+		wantReason string
+	}{
+		{
+			name:       "fresh install with all guards passing enables",
+			mutate:     func(*autostartDefaultState) {},
+			wantEnable: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:       "unsupported platform skips",
+			mutate:     func(s *autostartDefaultState) { s.supported = false },
+			wantReason: "autostart not supported on this platform",
+		},
+		{
+			name:       "MDM disable skips",
+			mutate:     func(s *autostartDefaultState) { s.mdmDisabled = true },
+			wantReason: "autostart disabled by MDM policy",
+		},
+		{
+			name:       "existing installation (upgrade) skips",
+			mutate:     func(s *autostartDefaultState) { s.priorInstall = true },
+			wantReason: "existing NetBird installation",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "unsupported wins over every other guard",
+			mutate: func(s *autostartDefaultState) {
+				s.supported = false
+				s.mdmDisabled = true
+				s.priorInstall = true
+			},
+			wantReason: "autostart not supported on this platform",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "MDM disable wins over prior install",
+			mutate: func(s *autostartDefaultState) {
+				s.mdmDisabled = true
+				s.priorInstall = true
+			},
+			wantReason: "autostart disabled by MDM policy",
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			state := allPass
+			tc.mutate(&state)
+			enable, reason := shouldEnableAutostartDefault(state)
+			assert.Equal(t, tc.wantEnable, enable, "enable decision should match for state %+v", state)
+			assert.Equal(t, tc.wantReason, reason, "skip reason should identify the failing guard")
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAutostartDisabledByMDM(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name   string
+		values map[string]any
+		want   bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name:   "empty policy does not disable",
+			values: nil,
+			want:   false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:   "unrelated managed keys do not disable",
+			values: map[string]any{mdm.KeyDisableAutoConnect: true},
+			want:   false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:   "disableAutostart true disables",
+			values: map[string]any{mdm.KeyDisableAutostart: true},
+			want:   true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:   "disableAutostart registry DWORD 1 disables",
+			values: map[string]any{mdm.KeyDisableAutostart: int64(1)},
+			want:   true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:   "disableAutostart string true disables",
+			values: map[string]any{mdm.KeyDisableAutostart: "true"},
+			want:   true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:   "disableAutostart explicit false allows",
+			values: map[string]any{mdm.KeyDisableAutostart: false},
+			want:   false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:   "unparseable managed value is treated as disabled",
+			values: map[string]any{mdm.KeyDisableAutostart: "not-a-bool"},
+			want:   true,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			got := autostartDisabledByMDM(mdm.NewPolicy(tc.values))
+			assert.Equal(t, tc.want, got, "MDM disable decision should match for values %v", tc.values)
+		})
+	}
+}

client/ui/frontend/src/app.tsx

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ import ReactDOM from "react-dom/client";
 import "./globals.css";
 import { HashRouter, Navigate, Route, Routes } from "react-router-dom";
 import SessionExpirationDialog from "@/modules/session/SessionExpirationDialog.tsx";
-import ApprovalDialog from "@/modules/approval/ApprovalDialog.tsx";
 import UpdateInProgressDialog from "@/modules/auto-update/UpdateInProgressDialog.tsx";
 import WelcomeDialog from "@/modules/welcome/WelcomeDialog.tsx";
 import ErrorDialog from "@/modules/error/ErrorDialog.tsx";
@@ -49,7 +48,6 @@ Promise.all([
                                 path={"session-expiration"}
                                 element={<SessionExpirationDialog />}
                             />
-                            <Route path={"approval"} element={<ApprovalDialog />} />
                             <Route path={"welcome"} element={<WelcomeDialog />} />
                             <Route path={"error"} element={<ErrorDialog />} />
                         </Route>

client/ui/frontend/src/lib/connection.ts

@@ -51,7 +51,14 @@ async function runSsoLogin(
     if (uri) await openBrowserLoginUri(uri);
 
     const cancelPromise = buildSsoCancelPromise(state, signal);
-    const waitPromise = Connection.WaitSSOLogin({ userCode: result.userCode, hostname: "" });
+    // Combine wait + up in Go so the connection comes up the moment SSO
+    // completes. During SSO the tray window is hidden and the webview is
+    // suspended, so a frontend-driven Up (a promise continuation) would not
+    // fire until the user woke the window (e.g. hovering the tray icon).
+    const waitPromise = Connection.WaitSSOLoginAndUp(
+        { userCode: result.userCode, hostname: "" },
+        { profileName: "", username: "" },
+    );
 
     try {
         await Promise.race([waitPromise, cancelPromise]);
@@ -89,13 +96,13 @@ export async function startConnection(onSettled?: () => void, signal?: AbortSign
         if (signal?.aborted) state.cancelled = true;
 
         if (!state.cancelled && result.needsSsoLogin) {
+            // runSsoLogin brings the connection up in Go once SSO completes.
             await runSsoLogin(result, state, signal);
-        }
-
-        if (!state.cancelled && signal?.aborted) state.cancelled = true;
-
-        if (!state.cancelled) {
-            await Connection.Up({ profileName: "", username: "" });
+        } else {
+            if (!state.cancelled && signal?.aborted) state.cancelled = true;
+            if (!state.cancelled) {
+                await Connection.Up({ profileName: "", username: "" });
+            }
         }
     } catch (e) {
         WindowManager.CloseBrowserLogin().catch(console.error);

client/ui/frontend/src/modules/approval/ApprovalDialog.tsx

@@ -1,170 +0,0 @@
-import { useCallback, useEffect, useMemo, useRef, useState } from "react";
-import { useTranslation } from "react-i18next";
-import { useSearchParams } from "react-router-dom";
-import { MonitorIcon } from "lucide-react";
-import { Button } from "@/components/buttons/Button";
-import { ConfirmDialog } from "@/components/dialog/ConfirmDialog";
-import { DialogActions } from "@/components/dialog/DialogActions";
-import { DialogHeading } from "@/components/dialog/DialogHeading";
-import { SquareIcon } from "@/components/SquareIcon";
-import { Approval, WindowManager } from "@bindings/services";
-import { useAutoSizeWindow } from "@/hooks/useAutoSizeWindow";
-
-const WINDOW_WIDTH = 360;
-// Fallback window so a missing/unparseable expires_at can't leave the prompt open forever.
-const FALLBACK_SECONDS = 13;
-
-// shortFingerprint groups a hex key as XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX (16 chars). Mirrors the
-// daemon's approval.ShortKeyFingerprint so the value matches an out-of-band reference.
-function shortFingerprint(hexKey: string): string {
-    if (hexKey.length < 8) return "";
-    const src = hexKey.slice(0, 16);
-    return src.match(/.{1,4}/g)?.join("-") ?? src;
-}
-
-type Row = { label: string; value: string; mono?: boolean };
-
-export default function ApprovalDialog() {
-    const { t } = useTranslation();
-    const contentRef = useAutoSizeWindow<HTMLDivElement>(WINDOW_WIDTH);
-    const [params] = useSearchParams();
-    const [busy, setBusy] = useState(false);
-
-    const requestID = params.get("request_id") ?? "";
-    const kind = params.get("kind") ?? "";
-    const initiator = params.get("initiator") ?? "";
-    const peerName = params.get("peer_name") ?? "";
-    const sourceIP = params.get("source_ip") ?? "";
-    const username = params.get("username") ?? "";
-    const peerPubKey = params.get("peer_pubkey") ?? "";
-    const expiresAt = params.get("expires_at") ?? "";
-
-    const deadline = useMemo(() => {
-        const parsed = Date.parse(expiresAt);
-        return Number.isFinite(parsed) ? parsed : Date.now() + FALLBACK_SECONDS * 1000;
-    }, [expiresAt]);
-
-    const title = useMemo(() => {
-        switch (kind) {
-            case "vnc":
-                return t("approval.title.vnc");
-            case "ssh":
-                return t("approval.title.ssh");
-            default:
-                return t("approval.title.default");
-        }
-    }, [kind, t]);
-
-    const rows = useMemo<Row[]>(() => {
-        const out: Row[] = [];
-        // The display name is dashboard-supplied and not cryptographically
-        // asserted; the key fingerprint below IS, so show both.
-        if (initiator) out.push({ label: t("approval.field.user"), value: initiator });
-        const fp = shortFingerprint(peerPubKey);
-        if (fp) out.push({ label: t("approval.field.keyFingerprint"), value: fp, mono: true });
-        if (peerName) out.push({ label: t("approval.field.peer"), value: peerName });
-        if (sourceIP && sourceIP !== peerName)
-            out.push({ label: t("approval.field.sourceIp"), value: sourceIP, mono: true });
-        if (username) out.push({ label: t("approval.field.osUser"), value: username });
-        return out;
-    }, [initiator, peerPubKey, peerName, sourceIP, username, t]);
-
-    const respond = useCallback(
-        async (accept: boolean, viewOnly: boolean) => {
-            if (busy) return;
-            setBusy(true);
-            try {
-                if (requestID) {
-                    await Approval.Respond(requestID, accept, viewOnly);
-                }
-            } catch (e) {
-                console.error("respond approval failed", e);
-            } finally {
-                WindowManager.CloseApproval().catch(console.error);
-            }
-        },
-        [busy, requestID],
-    );
-
-    const secondsLeft = () => Math.max(0, Math.ceil((deadline - Date.now()) / 1000));
-    const [remaining, setRemaining] = useState(secondsLeft);
-    const closedRef = useRef(false);
-    useEffect(() => {
-        const id = globalThis.setInterval(() => {
-            const left = secondsLeft();
-            setRemaining(left);
-            // On the deadline the daemon auto-denies; just close the prompt.
-            if (left <= 0 && !closedRef.current) {
-                closedRef.current = true;
-                WindowManager.CloseApproval().catch(console.error);
-            }
-        }, 1000);
-        return () => globalThis.clearInterval(id);
-        // eslint-disable-next-line react-hooks/exhaustive-deps
-    }, [deadline]);
-
-    const showViewOnly = kind === "vnc";
-
-    return (
-        <ConfirmDialog ref={contentRef} aria-labelledby={"nb-approval-title"}>
-            <SquareIcon icon={MonitorIcon} />
-
-            <DialogHeading id={"nb-approval-title"}>{title}</DialogHeading>
-
-            {rows.length > 0 && (
-                <dl className={"w-full space-y-1 text-left text-sm"}>
-                    {rows.map((row) => (
-                        <div key={row.label} className={"flex justify-between gap-4"}>
-                            <dt className={"shrink-0 text-nb-gray-400"}>{row.label}</dt>
-                            <dd
-                                className={`min-w-0 truncate text-nb-gray-100 ${
-                                    row.mono ? "font-mono" : ""
-                                }`}
-                                title={row.value}
-                            >
-                                {row.value}
-                            </dd>
-                        </div>
-                    ))}
-                </dl>
-            )}
-
-            <div className={"text-sm tabular-nums text-nb-gray-400"} aria-live={"polite"}>
-                {t("approval.countdown", { seconds: remaining })}
-            </div>
-
-            <DialogActions>
-                <Button
-                    autoFocus
-                    variant={"primary"}
-                    size={"md"}
-                    className={"w-full"}
-                    onClick={() => respond(true, false)}
-                    disabled={busy}
-                >
-                    {t("approval.action.allow")}
-                </Button>
-                {showViewOnly && (
-                    <Button
-                        variant={"secondary"}
-                        size={"md"}
-                        className={"w-full"}
-                        onClick={() => respond(true, true)}
-                        disabled={busy}
-                    >
-                        {t("approval.action.allowViewOnly")}
-                    </Button>
-                )}
-                <Button
-                    variant={"danger"}
-                    size={"md"}
-                    className={"w-full"}
-                    onClick={() => respond(false, false)}
-                    disabled={busy}
-                >
-                    {t("approval.action.deny")}
-                </Button>
-            </DialogActions>
-        </ConfirmDialog>
-    );
-}

client/ui/frontend/src/modules/settings/SettingsNavigation.tsx

@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import {
     BoltIcon,
     InfoIcon,
     LifeBuoyIcon,
-    MonitorIcon,
     NetworkIcon,
     ShieldIcon,
     SlidersHorizontalIcon,
@@ -21,7 +20,6 @@ export const SettingsNavigation = () => {
     const { updateAvailable } = useClientVersion();
     const { mdm, features } = useRestrictions();
     const showSsh = mdm.allowServerSSH ?? !features.disableUpdateSettings;
-    const showVnc = mdm.allowServerVNC ?? !features.disableUpdateSettings;
 
     const aboutAdornment = updateAvailable ? (
         <Tooltip content={t("settings.tabs.updateAvailable")} side={"right"}>
@@ -65,13 +63,6 @@ export const SettingsNavigation = () => {
                         title={t("settings.tabs.ssh")}
                     />
                 )}
-                {showVnc && (
-                    <VerticalTabs.Trigger
-                        value={"vnc"}
-                        icon={MonitorIcon}
-                        title={t("settings.tabs.vnc")}
-                    />
-                )}
                 {!features.disableUpdateSettings && (
                     <VerticalTabs.Trigger
                         value={"advanced"}

client/ui/frontend/src/modules/settings/SettingsPage.tsx

@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import { SettingsNetwork } from "@/modules/settings/SettingsNetwork.tsx";
 import { SettingsSecurity } from "@/modules/settings/SettingsSecurity.tsx";
 import { ProfilesTab } from "@/modules/profiles/ProfilesTab.tsx";
 import { SettingsSSH } from "@/modules/settings/SettingsSSH.tsx";
-import { SettingsVNC } from "@/modules/settings/SettingsVNC.tsx";
 import { SettingsAdvanced } from "@/modules/settings/SettingsAdvanced.tsx";
 import { SettingsTroubleshooting } from "@/modules/settings/SettingsTroubleshooting.tsx";
 import { SettingsAbout } from "@/modules/settings/SettingsAbout.tsx";
@@ -27,7 +26,6 @@ const enum Tab {
     Security = "security",
     Profiles = "profiles",
     SSH = "ssh",
-    VNC = "vnc",
     Advanced = "advanced",
     Troubleshooting = "troubleshooting",
     About = "about",
@@ -39,7 +37,6 @@ const TAB_CONTENT: Record<Tab, ReactNode> = {
     [Tab.Security]: <SettingsSecurity />,
     [Tab.Profiles]: <ProfilesTab />,
     [Tab.SSH]: <SettingsSSH />,
-    [Tab.VNC]: <SettingsVNC />,
     [Tab.Advanced]: <SettingsAdvanced />,
     [Tab.Troubleshooting]: <SettingsTroubleshooting />,
     [Tab.About]: <SettingsAbout />,
@@ -58,18 +55,12 @@ export const SettingsPage = () => {
             [Tab.Security]: editable,
             [Tab.Profiles]: !features.disableProfiles,
             [Tab.SSH]: mdm.allowServerSSH ?? editable,
-            [Tab.VNC]: mdm.allowServerVNC ?? editable,
             [Tab.Advanced]: editable,
             [Tab.Troubleshooting]: true,
             [Tab.About]: true,
         };
         return (Object.keys(visibility) as Tab[]).filter((t) => visibility[t]);
-    }, [
-        features.disableUpdateSettings,
-        features.disableProfiles,
-        mdm.allowServerSSH,
-        mdm.allowServerVNC,
-    ]);
+    }, [features.disableUpdateSettings, features.disableProfiles, mdm.allowServerSSH]);
 
     const defaultTab = visibleTabs[0];
     const [active, setActive] = useState<string>(() => navState?.tab ?? defaultTab);

client/ui/frontend/src/modules/settings/SettingsVNC.tsx

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-import { useTranslation } from "react-i18next";
-import FancyToggleSwitch from "@/components/switches/FancyToggleSwitch";
-import { SectionGroup } from "@/modules/settings/SettingsSection.tsx";
-import { useSettings } from "@/contexts/SettingsContext.tsx";
-import { useRestrictions } from "@/contexts/RestrictionsContext.tsx";
-
-export function SettingsVNC() {
-    const { t } = useTranslation();
-    const { config, setField } = useSettings();
-    const { mdm } = useRestrictions();
-    const isVNCServerEnabled = config.serverVncAllowed;
-    const vncServerManaged = mdm.allowServerVNC != null;
-
-    return (
-        <>
-            <SectionGroup title={t("settings.vnc.section.server")}>
-                <FancyToggleSwitch
-                    value={config.serverVncAllowed}
-                    onChange={(v) => setField("serverVncAllowed", v)}
-                    label={t("settings.vnc.server.label")}
-                    helpText={t("settings.vnc.server.help")}
-                    disabled={vncServerManaged}
-                />
-            </SectionGroup>
-
-            {!mdm.disableVNCApproval && (
-                <SectionGroup
-                    title={t("settings.vnc.section.approval")}
-                    disabled={!isVNCServerEnabled}
-                >
-                    <FancyToggleSwitch
-                        value={!config.disableVncApproval}
-                        onChange={(v) => setField("disableVncApproval", !v)}
-                        label={t("settings.vnc.approval.label")}
-                        helpText={t("settings.vnc.approval.help")}
-                    />
-                </SectionGroup>
-            )}
-        </>
-    );
-}

client/ui/i18n/locales/de/common.json

@@ -1321,65 +1321,5 @@
     },
     "error.unknown": {
         "message": "Vorgang fehlgeschlagen."
-    },
-    "settings.tabs.vnc": {
-        "message": "VNC"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.section.server": {
-        "message": "Server"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.section.approval": {
-        "message": "Genehmigung"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.server.label": {
-        "message": "VNC-Server aktivieren"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.server.help": {
-        "message": "Den NetBird-VNC-Server auf diesem Host ausführen, damit autorisierte Peers den Bildschirm ansehen oder steuern können."
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.approval.label": {
-        "message": "Verbindungsgenehmigung erforderlich"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.approval.help": {
-        "message": "Auf diesem Host eine Aufforderung anzeigen, die bestätigt werden muss, bevor eine eingehende VNC-Verbindung zugelassen wird."
-    },
-    "window.title.approval": {
-        "message": "Verbindungsanfrage"
-    },
-    "approval.title.vnc": {
-        "message": "VNC-Verbindung zulassen?"
-    },
-    "approval.title.ssh": {
-        "message": "SSH-Verbindung zulassen?"
-    },
-    "approval.title.default": {
-        "message": "Eingehende Verbindung zulassen?"
-    },
-    "approval.field.user": {
-        "message": "Von Benutzer"
-    },
-    "approval.field.keyFingerprint": {
-        "message": "Schlüssel-Fingerabdruck"
-    },
-    "approval.field.peer": {
-        "message": "Über Peer"
-    },
-    "approval.field.sourceIp": {
-        "message": "Quell-IP"
-    },
-    "approval.field.osUser": {
-        "message": "Betriebssystem-Benutzer"
-    },
-    "approval.countdown": {
-        "message": "Automatische Ablehnung in {seconds}s"
-    },
-    "approval.action.allow": {
-        "message": "Zulassen"
-    },
-    "approval.action.allowViewOnly": {
-        "message": "Zulassen (nur ansehen)"
-    },
-    "approval.action.deny": {
-        "message": "Ablehnen"
     }
 }

client/ui/i18n/locales/en/common.json

@@ -683,10 +683,6 @@
         "message": "SSH",
         "description": "Settings tab label: SSH. Acronym — keep as-is."
     },
-    "settings.tabs.vnc": {
-        "message": "VNC",
-        "description": "Settings tab label: VNC. Acronym — keep as-is."
-    },
     "settings.tabs.advanced": {
         "message": "Advanced",
         "description": "Settings tab label: Advanced. Keep short."
@@ -955,30 +951,6 @@
         "message": "Second(s)",
         "description": "Unit suffix shown after the JWT TTL number field. The '(s)' marks an optional plural."
     },
-    "settings.vnc.section.server": {
-        "message": "Server",
-        "description": "Section heading: Server (VNC settings)."
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.section.approval": {
-        "message": "Approval",
-        "description": "Section heading: Approval (VNC connection approval settings)."
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.server.label": {
-        "message": "Enable VNC Server",
-        "description": "Toggle label: enable the embedded VNC server."
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.server.help": {
-        "message": "Run the NetBird VNC server on this host so authorized peers can view or control its screen.",
-        "description": "Helper text for the VNC server toggle."
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.approval.label": {
-        "message": "Require Connection Approval",
-        "description": "Toggle label: prompt for approval before each inbound VNC connection."
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.approval.help": {
-        "message": "Show a prompt on this host that must be accepted before an incoming VNC connection is allowed.",
-        "description": "Helper text for the VNC connection-approval toggle."
-    },
     "settings.advanced.section.interface": {
         "message": "Interface",
         "description": "Section heading: Interface (network-interface settings)."
@@ -1391,58 +1363,6 @@
         "message": "Session Expiring",
         "description": "OS window-chrome title for the session-expiration window."
     },
-    "window.title.approval": {
-        "message": "Connection Request",
-        "description": "OS window-chrome title for the inbound-connection approval window."
-    },
-    "approval.title.vnc": {
-        "message": "Allow VNC Connection?",
-        "description": "Approval dialog heading for an inbound VNC connection."
-    },
-    "approval.title.ssh": {
-        "message": "Allow SSH Connection?",
-        "description": "Approval dialog heading for an inbound SSH connection."
-    },
-    "approval.title.default": {
-        "message": "Allow Incoming Connection?",
-        "description": "Approval dialog heading for an inbound connection of unknown kind."
-    },
-    "approval.field.user": {
-        "message": "From user",
-        "description": "Approval dialog row label: the initiating user's display name."
-    },
-    "approval.field.keyFingerprint": {
-        "message": "Key fingerprint",
-        "description": "Approval dialog row label: the connecting peer's cryptographic key fingerprint."
-    },
-    "approval.field.peer": {
-        "message": "Via peer",
-        "description": "Approval dialog row label: the peer the connection arrives through."
-    },
-    "approval.field.sourceIp": {
-        "message": "Source IP",
-        "description": "Approval dialog row label: the source IP address of the connection."
-    },
-    "approval.field.osUser": {
-        "message": "OS user",
-        "description": "Approval dialog row label: the target operating-system user."
-    },
-    "approval.countdown": {
-        "message": "Auto-deny in {seconds}s",
-        "description": "Approval dialog countdown; {seconds} is the remaining whole seconds before the daemon auto-denies."
-    },
-    "approval.action.allow": {
-        "message": "Allow",
-        "description": "Approval dialog button: allow the connection."
-    },
-    "approval.action.allowViewOnly": {
-        "message": "Allow (view only)",
-        "description": "Approval dialog button: allow the connection in view-only mode."
-    },
-    "approval.action.deny": {
-        "message": "Deny",
-        "description": "Approval dialog button: deny the connection."
-    },
     "window.title.updating": {
         "message": "Updating",
         "description": "OS window-chrome title for the update / install window."

client/ui/i18n/locales/es/common.json

@@ -1321,65 +1321,5 @@
     },
     "error.unknown": {
         "message": "La operación falló."
-    },
-    "settings.tabs.vnc": {
-        "message": "VNC"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.section.server": {
-        "message": "Servidor"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.section.approval": {
-        "message": "Aprobación"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.server.label": {
-        "message": "Habilitar el servidor VNC"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.server.help": {
-        "message": "Ejecuta el servidor VNC de NetBird en este host para que los peers autorizados puedan ver o controlar su pantalla."
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.approval.label": {
-        "message": "Requerir aprobación de conexión"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.approval.help": {
-        "message": "Mostrar en este host una solicitud que debe aceptarse antes de permitir una conexión VNC entrante."
-    },
-    "window.title.approval": {
-        "message": "Solicitud de conexión"
-    },
-    "approval.title.vnc": {
-        "message": "¿Permitir la conexión VNC?"
-    },
-    "approval.title.ssh": {
-        "message": "¿Permitir la conexión SSH?"
-    },
-    "approval.title.default": {
-        "message": "¿Permitir la conexión entrante?"
-    },
-    "approval.field.user": {
-        "message": "Del usuario"
-    },
-    "approval.field.keyFingerprint": {
-        "message": "Huella de la clave"
-    },
-    "approval.field.peer": {
-        "message": "A través del peer"
-    },
-    "approval.field.sourceIp": {
-        "message": "IP de origen"
-    },
-    "approval.field.osUser": {
-        "message": "Usuario del SO"
-    },
-    "approval.countdown": {
-        "message": "Rechazo automático en {seconds}s"
-    },
-    "approval.action.allow": {
-        "message": "Permitir"
-    },
-    "approval.action.allowViewOnly": {
-        "message": "Permitir (solo ver)"
-    },
-    "approval.action.deny": {
-        "message": "Denegar"
     }
 }

client/ui/i18n/locales/fr/common.json

@@ -1321,65 +1321,5 @@
     },
     "error.unknown": {
         "message": "L’opération a échoué."
-    },
-    "settings.tabs.vnc": {
-        "message": "VNC"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.section.server": {
-        "message": "Serveur"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.section.approval": {
-        "message": "Approbation"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.server.label": {
-        "message": "Activer le serveur VNC"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.server.help": {
-        "message": "Exécuter le serveur VNC de NetBird sur cet hôte afin que les pairs autorisés puissent voir ou contrôler son écran."
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.approval.label": {
-        "message": "Exiger l'approbation des connexions"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.approval.help": {
-        "message": "Afficher sur cet hôte une invite qui doit être acceptée avant d'autoriser une connexion VNC entrante."
-    },
-    "window.title.approval": {
-        "message": "Demande de connexion"
-    },
-    "approval.title.vnc": {
-        "message": "Autoriser la connexion VNC ?"
-    },
-    "approval.title.ssh": {
-        "message": "Autoriser la connexion SSH ?"
-    },
-    "approval.title.default": {
-        "message": "Autoriser la connexion entrante ?"
-    },
-    "approval.field.user": {
-        "message": "De l'utilisateur"
-    },
-    "approval.field.keyFingerprint": {
-        "message": "Empreinte de clé"
-    },
-    "approval.field.peer": {
-        "message": "Via le pair"
-    },
-    "approval.field.sourceIp": {
-        "message": "IP source"
-    },
-    "approval.field.osUser": {
-        "message": "Utilisateur du système"
-    },
-    "approval.countdown": {
-        "message": "Refus automatique dans {seconds}s"
-    },
-    "approval.action.allow": {
-        "message": "Autoriser"
-    },
-    "approval.action.allowViewOnly": {
-        "message": "Autoriser (lecture seule)"
-    },
-    "approval.action.deny": {
-        "message": "Refuser"
     }
 }

client/ui/i18n/locales/hu/common.json

@@ -1321,65 +1321,5 @@
     },
     "error.unknown": {
         "message": "A művelet meghiúsult."
-    },
-    "settings.tabs.vnc": {
-        "message": "VNC"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.section.server": {
-        "message": "Szerver"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.section.approval": {
-        "message": "Jóváhagyás"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.server.label": {
-        "message": "VNC szerver engedélyezése"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.server.help": {
-        "message": "A NetBird VNC szerver futtatása ezen a gépen, hogy az arra jogosult partnerek megtekinthessék vagy vezérelhessék a képernyőjét."
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.approval.label": {
-        "message": "Kapcsolat jóváhagyásának megkövetelése"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.approval.help": {
-        "message": "Megerősítést kérő ablak megjelenítése ezen a gépen, amelyet el kell fogadni a bejövő VNC-kapcsolat engedélyezése előtt."
-    },
-    "window.title.approval": {
-        "message": "Kapcsolódási kérés"
-    },
-    "approval.title.vnc": {
-        "message": "Engedélyezi a VNC-kapcsolatot?"
-    },
-    "approval.title.ssh": {
-        "message": "Engedélyezi az SSH-kapcsolatot?"
-    },
-    "approval.title.default": {
-        "message": "Engedélyezi a bejövő kapcsolatot?"
-    },
-    "approval.field.user": {
-        "message": "Felhasználótól"
-    },
-    "approval.field.keyFingerprint": {
-        "message": "Kulcs ujjlenyomata"
-    },
-    "approval.field.peer": {
-        "message": "Partneren keresztül"
-    },
-    "approval.field.sourceIp": {
-        "message": "Forrás IP"
-    },
-    "approval.field.osUser": {
-        "message": "OS-felhasználó"
-    },
-    "approval.countdown": {
-        "message": "Automatikus elutasítás {seconds} mp múlva"
-    },
-    "approval.action.allow": {
-        "message": "Engedélyezés"
-    },
-    "approval.action.allowViewOnly": {
-        "message": "Engedélyezés (csak megtekintés)"
-    },
-    "approval.action.deny": {
-        "message": "Elutasítás"
     }
 }

client/ui/i18n/locales/it/common.json

@@ -1321,65 +1321,5 @@
     },
     "error.unknown": {
         "message": "Operazione non riuscita."
-    },
-    "settings.tabs.vnc": {
-        "message": "VNC"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.section.server": {
-        "message": "Server"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.section.approval": {
-        "message": "Approvazione"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.server.label": {
-        "message": "Abilita server VNC"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.server.help": {
-        "message": "Esegui il server VNC di NetBird su questo host in modo che i peer autorizzati possano visualizzarne o controllarne lo schermo."
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.approval.label": {
-        "message": "Richiedi l'approvazione della connessione"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.approval.help": {
-        "message": "Mostra su questo host una richiesta che deve essere accettata prima di consentire una connessione VNC in entrata."
-    },
-    "window.title.approval": {
-        "message": "Richiesta di connessione"
-    },
-    "approval.title.vnc": {
-        "message": "Consentire la connessione VNC?"
-    },
-    "approval.title.ssh": {
-        "message": "Consentire la connessione SSH?"
-    },
-    "approval.title.default": {
-        "message": "Consentire la connessione in entrata?"
-    },
-    "approval.field.user": {
-        "message": "Dall'utente"
-    },
-    "approval.field.keyFingerprint": {
-        "message": "Impronta della chiave"
-    },
-    "approval.field.peer": {
-        "message": "Tramite peer"
-    },
-    "approval.field.sourceIp": {
-        "message": "IP di origine"
-    },
-    "approval.field.osUser": {
-        "message": "Utente del sistema"
-    },
-    "approval.countdown": {
-        "message": "Rifiuto automatico tra {seconds}s"
-    },
-    "approval.action.allow": {
-        "message": "Consenti"
-    },
-    "approval.action.allowViewOnly": {
-        "message": "Consenti (sola visualizzazione)"
-    },
-    "approval.action.deny": {
-        "message": "Rifiuta"
     }
 }

client/ui/i18n/locales/pt/common.json

@@ -1321,65 +1321,5 @@
     },
     "error.unknown": {
         "message": "A operação falhou."
-    },
-    "settings.tabs.vnc": {
-        "message": "VNC"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.section.server": {
-        "message": "Servidor"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.section.approval": {
-        "message": "Aprovação"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.server.label": {
-        "message": "Ativar servidor VNC"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.server.help": {
-        "message": "Execute o servidor VNC do NetBird neste host para que os peers autorizados possam ver ou controlar a sua tela."
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.approval.label": {
-        "message": "Exigir aprovação de conexão"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.approval.help": {
-        "message": "Mostrar neste host um aviso que precisa ser aceito antes de permitir uma conexão VNC de entrada."
-    },
-    "window.title.approval": {
-        "message": "Solicitação de conexão"
-    },
-    "approval.title.vnc": {
-        "message": "Permitir a conexão VNC?"
-    },
-    "approval.title.ssh": {
-        "message": "Permitir a conexão SSH?"
-    },
-    "approval.title.default": {
-        "message": "Permitir a conexão de entrada?"
-    },
-    "approval.field.user": {
-        "message": "Do usuário"
-    },
-    "approval.field.keyFingerprint": {
-        "message": "Impressão digital da chave"
-    },
-    "approval.field.peer": {
-        "message": "Via peer"
-    },
-    "approval.field.sourceIp": {
-        "message": "IP de origem"
-    },
-    "approval.field.osUser": {
-        "message": "Usuário do SO"
-    },
-    "approval.countdown": {
-        "message": "Negação automática em {seconds}s"
-    },
-    "approval.action.allow": {
-        "message": "Permitir"
-    },
-    "approval.action.allowViewOnly": {
-        "message": "Permitir (somente visualização)"
-    },
-    "approval.action.deny": {
-        "message": "Negar"
     }
 }

client/ui/i18n/locales/ru/common.json

@@ -1321,65 +1321,5 @@
     },
     "error.unknown": {
         "message": "Не удалось выполнить операцию."
-    },
-    "settings.tabs.vnc": {
-        "message": "VNC"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.section.server": {
-        "message": "Сервер"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.section.approval": {
-        "message": "Подтверждение"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.server.label": {
-        "message": "Включить VNC-сервер"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.server.help": {
-        "message": "Запустить VNC-сервер NetBird на этом хосте, чтобы авторизованные пиры могли просматривать его экран или управлять им."
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.approval.label": {
-        "message": "Требовать подтверждение подключения"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.approval.help": {
-        "message": "Показывать на этом хосте запрос, который нужно принять перед разрешением входящего VNC-подключения."
-    },
-    "window.title.approval": {
-        "message": "Запрос на подключение"
-    },
-    "approval.title.vnc": {
-        "message": "Разрешить VNC-подключение?"
-    },
-    "approval.title.ssh": {
-        "message": "Разрешить SSH-подключение?"
-    },
-    "approval.title.default": {
-        "message": "Разрешить входящее подключение?"
-    },
-    "approval.field.user": {
-        "message": "От пользователя"
-    },
-    "approval.field.keyFingerprint": {
-        "message": "Отпечаток ключа"
-    },
-    "approval.field.peer": {
-        "message": "Через пир"
-    },
-    "approval.field.sourceIp": {
-        "message": "IP-адрес источника"
-    },
-    "approval.field.osUser": {
-        "message": "Пользователь ОС"
-    },
-    "approval.countdown": {
-        "message": "Автоотклонение через {seconds} с"
-    },
-    "approval.action.allow": {
-        "message": "Разрешить"
-    },
-    "approval.action.allowViewOnly": {
-        "message": "Разрешить (только просмотр)"
-    },
-    "approval.action.deny": {
-        "message": "Отклонить"
     }
 }

client/ui/i18n/locales/zh-CN/common.json

@@ -1321,65 +1321,5 @@
     },
     "error.unknown": {
         "message": "操作失败。"
-    },
-    "settings.tabs.vnc": {
-        "message": "VNC"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.section.server": {
-        "message": "服务器"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.section.approval": {
-        "message": "批准"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.server.label": {
-        "message": "启用 VNC 服务器"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.server.help": {
-        "message": "在此主机上运行 NetBird VNC 服务器，以便授权的对端可以查看或控制其屏幕。"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.approval.label": {
-        "message": "要求连接批准"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.approval.help": {
-        "message": "在此主机上显示一个提示，必须先接受该提示才能允许传入的 VNC 连接。"
-    },
-    "window.title.approval": {
-        "message": "连接请求"
-    },
-    "approval.title.vnc": {
-        "message": "允许 VNC 连接？"
-    },
-    "approval.title.ssh": {
-        "message": "允许 SSH 连接？"
-    },
-    "approval.title.default": {
-        "message": "允许传入连接？"
-    },
-    "approval.field.user": {
-        "message": "来自用户"
-    },
-    "approval.field.keyFingerprint": {
-        "message": "密钥指纹"
-    },
-    "approval.field.peer": {
-        "message": "经由对端"
-    },
-    "approval.field.sourceIp": {
-        "message": "源 IP"
-    },
-    "approval.field.osUser": {
-        "message": "操作系统用户"
-    },
-    "approval.countdown": {
-        "message": "{seconds} 秒后自动拒绝"
-    },
-    "approval.action.allow": {
-        "message": "允许"
-    },
-    "approval.action.allowViewOnly": {
-        "message": "允许（仅查看）"
-    },
-    "approval.action.deny": {
-        "message": "拒绝"
     }
 }

client/ui/main.go

@@ -197,6 +197,9 @@ func main() {
 		// daemon may keep the main window from showing, so the OS toast is the
 		// only reliable signal the user gets.
 		go notifyIfDaemonOutdated(compat, notifier, localizer)
+		// One-time launch-on-login default for fresh installs; gated by the
+		// NetBird footprint check, MDM policy, and the persisted marker.
+		go applyAutostartDefault(context.Background(), services.NewAutostart(app.Autostart), prefStore, prefStore.ExistedAtLoad())
 	})
 
 	if err := app.Run(); err != nil {
@@ -318,7 +321,6 @@ func registerServices(app *application.App, conn *Conn, s registeredServices) {
 	app.RegisterService(application.NewService(s.settings))
 	app.RegisterService(application.NewService(s.networks))
 	app.RegisterService(application.NewService(services.NewForwarding(conn)))
-	app.RegisterService(application.NewService(services.NewApproval(conn)))
 	app.RegisterService(application.NewService(s.profiles))
 	app.RegisterService(application.NewService(services.NewDebug(conn)))
 	app.RegisterService(application.NewService(s.update))

client/ui/preferences/store.go

@@ -54,6 +54,10 @@ type UIPreferences struct {
 	Language            i18n.LanguageCode `json:"language"`
 	ViewMode            ViewMode          `json:"viewMode"`
 	OnboardingCompleted bool              `json:"onboardingCompleted"`
+	// AutostartInitialized records that the one-time autostart default
+	// decision has run for this OS user. It only ever transitions to true
+	// and is never reset, so the default-on flow runs at most once, ever.
+	AutostartInitialized bool `json:"autostartInitialized"`
 }
 
 // LanguageValidator rejects SetLanguage inputs with no shipped bundle.
@@ -72,8 +76,9 @@ type Emitter interface {
 type Store struct {
 	path string
 
-	mu      sync.RWMutex
-	current UIPreferences
+	mu            sync.RWMutex
+	current       UIPreferences
+	existedAtLoad bool
 
 	subsMu sync.Mutex
 	subs   []chan UIPreferences
@@ -157,6 +162,27 @@ func (s *Store) SetOnboardingCompleted(done bool) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
+// SetAutostartInitialized persists the one-time autostart decision marker.
+// No-op if unchanged.
+func (s *Store) SetAutostartInitialized(done bool) error {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	if s.current.AutostartInitialized == done {
+		s.mu.Unlock()
+		return nil
+	}
+	next := s.current
+	next.AutostartInitialized = done
+	if err := s.persistLocked(next); err != nil {
+		s.mu.Unlock()
+		return fmt.Errorf("persist preferences: %w", err)
+	}
+	s.current = next
+	s.mu.Unlock()
+
+	s.broadcast(next)
+	return nil
+}
+
 // SetLanguage validates, persists, and broadcasts. No-op if unchanged.
 func (s *Store) SetLanguage(lang i18n.LanguageCode) error {
 	if lang == "" {
@@ -206,13 +232,29 @@ func (s *Store) Subscribe() (<-chan UIPreferences, func()) {
 	return ch, unsubscribe
 }
 
+// ExistedAtLoad reports whether the backing preferences file was present on
+// disk when the store loaded. It distinguishes a user who ran a prior GUI
+// version from a brand-new OS user with no preferences yet.
+func (s *Store) ExistedAtLoad() bool {
+	s.mu.RLock()
+	defer s.mu.RUnlock()
+	return s.existedAtLoad
+}
+
 // load reads the file into current. A missing file is not an error (the
 // in-memory default stands); malformed contents return an error.
 func (s *Store) load() error {
-	if _, err := os.Stat(s.path); errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
-		return nil
+	if _, err := os.Stat(s.path); err != nil {
+		if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
+			return nil
+		}
+		return fmt.Errorf("stat preferences: %w", err)
 	}
 
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	s.existedAtLoad = true
+	s.mu.Unlock()
+
 	var loaded UIPreferences
 	if _, err := util.ReadJson(s.path, &loaded); err != nil {
 		return err

client/ui/preferences/store_test.go

@@ -215,6 +215,46 @@ func TestStore_FileShapeIsJSON(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Equal(t, i18n.LanguageCode("hu"), parsed.Language)
 }
 
+func TestStore_SetAutostartInitializedPersistsAcrossReload(t *testing.T) {
+	withTempConfigDir(t)
+	emitter := &recordingEmitter{}
+	s, err := NewStore(nil, emitter)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	assert.False(t, s.Get().AutostartInitialized, "marker must default to false when no file is on disk")
+
+	require.NoError(t, s.SetAutostartInitialized(true))
+	assert.True(t, s.Get().AutostartInitialized, "Get should reflect the persisted marker")
+	require.Len(t, emitter.calledWith(EventPreferencesChanged), 1, "first marker write should broadcast")
+
+	// Re-setting the same value must be a no-op: no disk write, no broadcast.
+	require.NoError(t, s.SetAutostartInitialized(true))
+	assert.Len(t, emitter.calledWith(EventPreferencesChanged), 1, "idempotent marker write should not broadcast again")
+
+	// A fresh Store (new GUI launch) must see the marker so the autostart
+	// default decision never runs twice.
+	reloaded, err := NewStore(nil, nil)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.True(t, reloaded.Get().AutostartInitialized, "marker must survive a reload from disk")
+}
+
+func TestStore_ExistedAtLoad(t *testing.T) {
+	withTempConfigDir(t)
+
+	// Brand-new OS user: no preferences file on disk yet.
+	fresh, err := NewStore(nil, nil)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.False(t, fresh.ExistedAtLoad(), "ExistedAtLoad must be false when no file is on disk")
+
+	// Persisting a value writes the file to disk.
+	require.NoError(t, fresh.SetLanguage("en"))
+
+	// A subsequent GUI launch reopens the now-present file.
+	reopened, err := NewStore(nil, nil)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.True(t, reopened.ExistedAtLoad(), "ExistedAtLoad must be true after the store has persisted and is reopened")
+}
+
 func TestStore_ErrUnsupportedSentinel(t *testing.T) {
 	// Verifies callers can match on the sentinel error rather than parsing
 	// strings — protects against accidental %v -> %w changes that would

client/ui/services/approval.go

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-//go:build !android && !ios && !freebsd && !js
-
-package services
-
-import (
-	"context"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
-)
-
-// Approval forwards the user's decision on a pending inbound-connection
-// approval prompt to the daemon. The daemon pushes the prompt as a SystemEvent
-// with category APPROVAL; the dialog calls Respond with the same request id to
-// unblock whichever subsystem (VNC, SSH, ...) is waiting.
-type Approval struct {
-	conn DaemonConn
-}
-
-func NewApproval(conn DaemonConn) *Approval {
-	return &Approval{conn: conn}
-}
-
-// Respond delivers the accept/deny decision for requestID. viewOnly is only
-// meaningful when accept is true and the subsystem supports a read-only grant.
-func (a *Approval) Respond(ctx context.Context, requestID string, accept, viewOnly bool) error {
-	cli, err := a.conn.Client()
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	_, err = cli.RespondApproval(ctx, &proto.RespondApprovalRequest{
-		RequestId: requestID,
-		Accept:    accept,
-		ViewOnly:  viewOnly,
-	})
-	return err
-}

client/ui/services/connection.go

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ type LoginResult struct {
 	VerificationURIComplete string `json:"verificationUriComplete"`
 }
 
-// WaitSSOParams are the inputs to WaitSSOLogin.
+// WaitSSOParams are the inputs to waitSSOLogin.
 type WaitSSOParams struct {
 	UserCode string `json:"userCode"`
 	Hostname string `json:"hostname"`
@@ -125,23 +125,6 @@ func (s *Connection) Login(ctx context.Context, p LoginParams) (LoginResult, err
 	}, nil
 }
 
-func (s *Connection) WaitSSOLogin(ctx context.Context, p WaitSSOParams) (string, error) {
-	cli, err := s.conn.Client()
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	log.Infof("waiting for SSO login to complete")
-	resp, err := cli.WaitSSOLogin(ctx, &proto.WaitSSOLoginRequest{
-		UserCode: p.UserCode,
-		Hostname: p.Hostname,
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", s.classifyDaemonError(err)
-	}
-	log.Infof("SSO login completed, daemon reported success")
-	return resp.GetEmail(), nil
-}
-
 func (s *Connection) Up(ctx context.Context, p UpParams) error {
 	cli, err := s.conn.Client()
 	if err != nil {
@@ -162,6 +145,27 @@ func (s *Connection) Up(ctx context.Context, p UpParams) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
+// WaitSSOLoginAndUp blocks until the SSO login completes and then brings the
+// connection up, both from the Go side. Keeping the post-login Up here rather
+// than as a frontend continuation is deliberate: during SSO the tray window is
+// hidden and the webview is suspended (macOS App Nap / hidden-window timer
+// throttling), so a frontend-driven Up would not run until the user woke the
+// window (e.g. by hovering the tray icon). Doing it in Go connects the moment
+// the daemon reports SSO success. Returns the authenticated user's email.
+func (s *Connection) WaitSSOLoginAndUp(ctx context.Context, wait WaitSSOParams, up UpParams) (string, error) {
+	email, err := s.waitSSOLogin(ctx, wait)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	if err := s.Up(ctx, up); err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	return email, nil
+}
+
 func (s *Connection) Down(ctx context.Context) error {
 	cli, err := s.conn.Client()
 	if err != nil {
@@ -221,6 +225,26 @@ func (s *Connection) Logout(ctx context.Context, p LogoutParams) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
+// waitSSOLogin blocks until the daemon reports the SSO login result and returns
+// the authenticated user's email. It is unexported because the frontend drives
+// SSO through the exported WaitSSOLoginAndUp.
+func (s *Connection) waitSSOLogin(ctx context.Context, p WaitSSOParams) (string, error) {
+	cli, err := s.conn.Client()
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	log.Infof("waiting for SSO login to complete")
+	resp, err := cli.WaitSSOLogin(ctx, &proto.WaitSSOLoginRequest{
+		UserCode: p.UserCode,
+		Hostname: p.Hostname,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", s.classifyDaemonError(err)
+	}
+	log.Infof("SSO login completed, daemon reported success")
+	return resp.GetEmail(), nil
+}
+
 // classifyDaemonError maps a gRPC error to a localised ClientError.
 func (s *Connection) classifyDaemonError(err error) *ClientError {
 	return s.classifier.classify(err)

client/ui/services/settings.go

@@ -19,9 +19,8 @@ type MDMFields struct {
 	DisableClientRoutes      bool   `json:"disableClientRoutes"`
 	DisableServerRoutes      bool   `json:"disableServerRoutes"`
 	AllowServerSSH           *bool  `json:"allowServerSSH"`
-	AllowServerVNC           *bool  `json:"allowServerVNC"`
-	DisableVNCApproval       bool   `json:"disableVNCApproval"`
 	DisableAutoConnect       bool   `json:"disableAutoConnect"`
+	DisableAutostart         bool   `json:"disableAutostart"`
 	BlockInbound             bool   `json:"blockInbound"`
 	DisableMetricsCollection bool   `json:"disableMetricsCollection"`
 	SplitTunnelMode          bool   `json:"splitTunnelMode"`
@@ -56,8 +55,6 @@ type Config struct {
 	MTU                           int64  `json:"mtu"`
 	DisableAutoConnect            bool   `json:"disableAutoConnect"`
 	ServerSSHAllowed              bool   `json:"serverSshAllowed"`
-	ServerVNCAllowed              bool   `json:"serverVncAllowed"`
-	DisableVNCApproval            bool   `json:"disableVncApproval"`
 	RosenpassEnabled              bool   `json:"rosenpassEnabled"`
 	RosenpassPermissive           bool   `json:"rosenpassPermissive"`
 	DisableNotifications          bool   `json:"disableNotifications"`
@@ -89,8 +86,6 @@ type SetConfigParams struct {
 	PreSharedKey                  *string `json:"preSharedKey,omitempty"`
 	DisableAutoConnect            *bool   `json:"disableAutoConnect,omitempty"`
 	ServerSSHAllowed              *bool   `json:"serverSshAllowed,omitempty"`
-	ServerVNCAllowed              *bool   `json:"serverVncAllowed,omitempty"`
-	DisableVNCApproval            *bool   `json:"disableVncApproval,omitempty"`
 	RosenpassEnabled              *bool   `json:"rosenpassEnabled,omitempty"`
 	RosenpassPermissive           *bool   `json:"rosenpassPermissive,omitempty"`
 	DisableNotifications          *bool   `json:"disableNotifications,omitempty"`
@@ -141,8 +136,6 @@ func (s *Settings) GetConfig(ctx context.Context, p ConfigParams) (Config, error
 		MTU:                           resp.GetMtu(),
 		DisableAutoConnect:            resp.GetDisableAutoConnect(),
 		ServerSSHAllowed:              resp.GetServerSSHAllowed(),
-		ServerVNCAllowed:              resp.GetServerVNCAllowed(),
-		DisableVNCApproval:            resp.GetDisableVNCApproval(),
 		RosenpassEnabled:              resp.GetRosenpassEnabled(),
 		RosenpassPermissive:           resp.GetRosenpassPermissive(),
 		DisableNotifications:          resp.GetDisableNotifications(),
@@ -178,8 +171,6 @@ func (s *Settings) SetConfig(ctx context.Context, p SetConfigParams) error {
 		OptionalPreSharedKey:          p.PreSharedKey,
 		DisableAutoConnect:            p.DisableAutoConnect,
 		ServerSSHAllowed:              p.ServerSSHAllowed,
-		ServerVNCAllowed:              p.ServerVNCAllowed,
-		DisableVNCApproval:            p.DisableVNCApproval,
 		RosenpassEnabled:              p.RosenpassEnabled,
 		RosenpassPermissive:           p.RosenpassPermissive,
 		DisableNotifications:          p.DisableNotifications,
@@ -263,8 +254,4 @@ func applyMDMRestrictions(mdm *MDMFields, cfgResp *proto.GetConfigResponse) {
 		allowed := cfgResp.GetServerSSHAllowed()
 		mdm.AllowServerSSH = &allowed
 	}
-	if _, ok := set["allowServerVNC"]; ok {
-		allowed := cfgResp.GetServerVNCAllowed()
-		mdm.AllowServerVNC = &allowed
-	}
 }

client/ui/services/settings_mdm_test.go

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-//go:build !android && !ios && !freebsd && !js
-
-package services
-
-import (
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
-)
-
-func TestApplyMDMRestrictions_VNCFields(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Run("unmanaged leaves fields at zero", func(t *testing.T) {
-		var mdm MDMFields
-		applyMDMRestrictions(&mdm, &proto.GetConfigResponse{})
-		assert.Nil(t, mdm.AllowServerVNC)
-		assert.False(t, mdm.DisableVNCApproval)
-	})
-
-	t.Run("managed surfaces enforced values", func(t *testing.T) {
-		var mdm MDMFields
-		applyMDMRestrictions(&mdm, &proto.GetConfigResponse{
-			MDMManagedFields:   []string{"allowServerVNC", "disableVNCApproval"},
-			ServerVNCAllowed:   true,
-			DisableVNCApproval: true,
-		})
-		require.NotNil(t, mdm.AllowServerVNC)
-		assert.True(t, *mdm.AllowServerVNC, "AllowServerVNC should carry the enforced value")
-		assert.True(t, mdm.DisableVNCApproval, "DisableVNCApproval should be flagged managed")
-	})
-
-	t.Run("managed VNC disallowed surfaces false", func(t *testing.T) {
-		var mdm MDMFields
-		applyMDMRestrictions(&mdm, &proto.GetConfigResponse{
-			MDMManagedFields: []string{"allowServerVNC"},
-			ServerVNCAllowed: false,
-		})
-		require.NotNil(t, mdm.AllowServerVNC)
-		assert.False(t, *mdm.AllowServerVNC)
-		assert.False(t, mdm.DisableVNCApproval, "unmanaged approval stays zero")
-	})
-}

client/ui/services/windowmanager.go

@@ -106,7 +106,6 @@ type WindowManager struct {
 	settings          *application.WebviewWindow
 	browserLogin      *application.WebviewWindow
 	sessionExpiration *application.WebviewWindow
-	approval          *application.WebviewWindow
 	installProgress   *application.WebviewWindow
 	welcome           *application.WebviewWindow
 	errorDialog       *application.WebviewWindow
@@ -280,58 +279,6 @@ func (s *WindowManager) CloseSessionExpiration() {
 	}
 }
 
-// ApprovalRequest carries the daemon-supplied metadata for an inbound-connection
-// approval prompt to the dialog window as query params. Kind, RequestID and
-// ExpiresAt are daemon-issued; the rest are remote-influenced and shown so the
-// user can vet who is connecting.
-type ApprovalRequest struct {
-	RequestID  string
-	Kind       string
-	Initiator  string
-	PeerName   string
-	SourceIP   string
-	Username   string
-	PeerPubKey string
-	ExpiresAt  string
-}
-
-// OpenApproval shows the inbound-connection approval prompt on the cursor's
-// display. Singleton, destroyed on close: a second request replaces the window,
-// and the superseded request auto-denies on the daemon's deadline.
-func (s *WindowManager) OpenApproval(req ApprovalRequest) {
-	s.mu.Lock()
-	defer s.mu.Unlock()
-	startURL := approvalDialogURL(req)
-	if s.approval == nil {
-		opts := DialogWindowOptions("approval", s.title("window.title.approval"), startURL, s.linuxIcon)
-		opts.Height = 380
-		opts.Screen = s.getScreenBasedOnCursorPosition()
-		opts.InitialPosition = application.WindowCentered
-		s.approval = s.app.Window.NewWithOptions(opts)
-		s.approval.OnWindowEvent(events.Common.WindowClosing, func(_ *application.WindowEvent) {
-			s.mu.Lock()
-			s.approval = nil
-			s.mu.Unlock()
-		})
-		s.centerOnCursorScreen(s.approval)
-		return
-	}
-	s.approval.SetURL(startURL)
-	s.centerOnCursorScreen(s.approval)
-	s.approval.Show()
-	s.approval.Focus()
-}
-
-func (s *WindowManager) CloseApproval() {
-	s.mu.Lock()
-	w := s.approval
-	s.approval = nil
-	s.mu.Unlock()
-	if w != nil {
-		w.Close()
-	}
-}
-
 // OpenInstallProgress shows the install-progress window and hides the rest for the duration
 // (restored on close). It owns its own result polling since the daemon restarts mid-install.
 func (s *WindowManager) OpenInstallProgress(version string) {
@@ -625,30 +572,5 @@ func errorDialogURL(title, message string) string {
 	return startURL
 }
 
-// approvalDialogURL builds the approval window's start URL with the request
-// metadata as escaped query params. Empty fields are omitted so the dialog
-// renders only the rows it has values for.
-func approvalDialogURL(req ApprovalRequest) string {
-	q := url.Values{}
-	set := func(k, v string) {
-		if v != "" {
-			q.Set(k, v)
-		}
-	}
-	set("request_id", req.RequestID)
-	set("kind", req.Kind)
-	set("initiator", req.Initiator)
-	set("peer_name", req.PeerName)
-	set("source_ip", req.SourceIP)
-	set("username", req.Username)
-	set("peer_pubkey", req.PeerPubKey)
-	set("expires_at", req.ExpiresAt)
-	startURL := "/#/dialog/approval"
-	if enc := q.Encode(); enc != "" {
-		startURL += "?" + enc
-	}
-	return startURL
-}
-
 // u32ptr returns a pointer to v, for the optional *uint32 Wails theme fields.
 func u32ptr(v uint32) *uint32 { return &v }

client/ui/tray_events.go

@@ -42,14 +42,6 @@ func (t *Tray) onSystemEvent(ev *application.CustomEvent) {
 		}
 		return
 	}
-	// Inbound-connection approval prompts open a dedicated dialog instead of a
-	// toast. Handle before the message gate: the daemon auto-denies on its
-	// deadline, so a missing WindowManager fails closed.
-	if se.Category == "approval" {
-		t.openApproval(se)
-		return
-	}
-
 	// Session-warning and deadline-rejected events build their body locally from
 	// metadata; every other event needs a UserMessage.
 	isSessionWarning := se.Metadata[authsession.MetaWarning] == "true"
@@ -101,30 +93,6 @@ func (t *Tray) onSystemEvent(ev *application.CustomEvent) {
 	t.notify(eventTitle(se), body, notifyIDEvent+se.ID)
 }
 
-// openApproval opens the inbound-connection approval dialog from an APPROVAL
-// SystemEvent. request_id is daemon-issued; without it the prompt can't be
-// answered, so it's dropped and the daemon auto-denies on its deadline.
-func (t *Tray) openApproval(se services.SystemEvent) {
-	if t.svc.WindowManager == nil {
-		return
-	}
-	requestID := se.Metadata["request_id"]
-	if requestID == "" {
-		log.Warnf("approval event missing request_id: %v", se.Metadata)
-		return
-	}
-	t.svc.WindowManager.OpenApproval(services.ApprovalRequest{
-		RequestID:  requestID,
-		Kind:       se.Metadata["kind"],
-		Initiator:  se.Metadata["initiator"],
-		PeerName:   se.Metadata["peer_name"],
-		SourceIP:   se.Metadata["source_ip"],
-		Username:   se.Metadata["username"],
-		PeerPubKey: se.Metadata["peer_pubkey"],
-		ExpiresAt:  se.Metadata["expires_at"],
-	})
-}
-
 // eventTitle composes a notification title, e.g. "Critical: DNS", "Warning: Authentication".
 func eventTitle(e services.SystemEvent) string {
 	prefix := titleCase(e.Severity)

client/vnc/ports.go

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-// Package vnc holds shared constants for the NetBird embedded VNC stack
-// so non-server consumers (CLI capture, debug tooling) can refer to the
-// well-known ports without depending on internal engine packages.
-package vnc
-
-// External and internal listen ports for the embedded VNC server.
-// ExternalPort is what dashboard / browser clients see; the daemon
-// DNATs it to InternalPort, where the in-process VNC server actually
-// listens. Both flow over the WireGuard interface. AgentLegacyPort is
-// the TCP port the per-session agent used before it switched to Unix
-// sockets; kept here so packet captures from older builds still get
-// tagged, and so any future on-wire agent variant has a reserved port.
-const (
-	ExternalPort    uint16 = 5900
-	InternalPort    uint16 = 25900
-	AgentLegacyPort uint16 = 15900
-)
-
-// WellKnownPorts is the unordered set of ports a packet capture should
-// treat as carrying NetBird VNC traffic.
-var WellKnownPorts = [...]uint16{ExternalPort, InternalPort, AgentLegacyPort}
-
-// IsWellKnownPort reports whether port matches any of WellKnownPorts.
-func IsWellKnownPort(port uint16) bool {
-	for _, p := range WellKnownPorts {
-		if port == p {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}

client/vnc/server/agent_darwin.go

@@ -1,434 +0,0 @@
-//go:build darwin && !ios
-
-package server
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"context"
-	"errors"
-	"fmt"
-	"net"
-	"os"
-	"os/exec"
-	"strconv"
-	"sync"
-	"syscall"
-	"time"
-
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/configs"
-)
-
-// darwinAgentManager spawns a per-user VNC agent on demand and keeps it
-// alive across multiple client connections within the same console-user
-// session. A new agent is spawned the first time a client connects, or
-// whenever the console user changes underneath us.
-//
-// Lifecycle is lazy by design: a daemon that never receives a VNC
-// connection never spawns anything. The trade-off versus an eager spawn
-// (the Windows model) is that the first VNC client pays the launchctl
-// asuser + listen-readiness wait, ~hundreds of milliseconds in practice.
-// That cost only repeats on user switch.
-type darwinAgentManager struct {
-	mu         sync.Mutex
-	authToken  string
-	socketPath string
-	uid        uint32
-	running    bool
-}
-
-func newDarwinAgentManager(ctx context.Context) *darwinAgentManager {
-	m := &darwinAgentManager{}
-	go m.watchConsoleUser(ctx)
-	return m
-}
-
-// agentSocketName is the file name inside the per-uid socket directory
-// the agent binds. The directory itself is created and chowned by the
-// daemon (see prepareAgentSocketDir) so a non-root local user cannot
-// pre-create or symlink the path before the agent listens.
-const agentSocketName = "agent.sock"
-
-// watchConsoleUser kills the cached agent whenever the console user
-// changes (logout, fast user switch, login window). Without it the daemon
-// keeps proxying to an agent whose TCC grant and WindowServer access
-// belong to a user who is no longer at the screen, so the new user only
-// ever sees the locked-screen wallpaper. Killing the agent breaks the
-// loopback TCP that the daemon proxies into, the client disconnects, and
-// the next reconnect runs ensure() against the new console uid.
-func (m *darwinAgentManager) watchConsoleUser(ctx context.Context) {
-	t := time.NewTicker(2 * time.Second)
-	defer t.Stop()
-	for {
-		select {
-		case <-ctx.Done():
-			return
-		case <-t.C:
-			uid, err := consoleUserID()
-			m.mu.Lock()
-			if !m.running {
-				m.mu.Unlock()
-				continue
-			}
-			if err != nil || uid != m.uid {
-				prev := m.uid
-				m.killLocked()
-				m.mu.Unlock()
-				if err != nil {
-					log.Infof("console user gone (was uid=%d): %v; agent stopped", prev, err)
-				} else {
-					log.Infof("console user changed %d -> %d; agent stopped, will respawn on next connect", prev, uid)
-				}
-				continue
-			}
-			m.mu.Unlock()
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// Resolve spawns or respawns the per-user agent process as needed and
-// returns its Unix-socket path, shared token, and the uid the agent was
-// spawned under (so the daemon can validate peer credentials before
-// dispatching the token). Each call is serialized so concurrent VNC
-// clients share the same agent.
-func (m *darwinAgentManager) Resolve(ctx context.Context) (string, string, uint32, error) {
-	consoleUID, err := consoleUserID()
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", "", 0, fmt.Errorf("no console user: %w", err)
-	}
-	m.mu.Lock()
-	defer m.mu.Unlock()
-	if m.running && m.uid == consoleUID && vncAgentRunning() {
-		return m.socketPath, m.authToken, m.uid, nil
-	}
-	m.killLocked()
-	// Reap stray agents so the new token is the only accepted one.
-	killAllVNCAgents()
-
-	socketDir, err := prepareAgentSocketDir(consoleUID)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", "", 0, fmt.Errorf("prepare agent socket dir: %w", err)
-	}
-	socketPath := socketDir + "/" + agentSocketName
-	if err := os.Remove(socketPath); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
-		log.Debugf("clear stale agent socket %s: %v", socketPath, err)
-	}
-
-	token, err := generateAuthToken()
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", "", 0, fmt.Errorf("generate agent auth token: %w", err)
-	}
-	if err := spawnAgentForUser(consoleUID, socketPath, token); err != nil {
-		return "", "", 0, err
-	}
-	if err := waitForAgent(ctx, socketPath, 5*time.Second); err != nil {
-		killAllVNCAgents()
-		return "", "", 0, fmt.Errorf("agent did not start listening: %w", err)
-	}
-	m.authToken = token
-	m.socketPath = socketPath
-	m.uid = consoleUID
-	m.running = true
-	log.Infof("spawned VNC agent for console uid=%d on %s", consoleUID, socketPath)
-	return socketPath, token, consoleUID, nil
-}
-
-// prepareAgentSocketDir creates a per-uid subdirectory under the netbird
-// runtime directory where the agent will bind its Unix socket. The leaf is
-// owned by uid with mode 0700, so only the target user and root can write
-// there. The parent is created root-owned with mode 0755 if missing.
-// Symlinks at the per-uid level are refused (replaced with a fresh
-// directory) so a low-priv user cannot redirect the chown that follows.
-func prepareAgentSocketDir(uid uint32) (string, error) {
-	parent := configs.RuntimeDir
-	if err := ensureAgentSocketParent(parent); err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	subdir := fmt.Sprintf("%s/vnc-%d", parent, uid)
-	if err := purgeStaleAgentSubdir(subdir, uid); err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	if err := os.Mkdir(subdir, 0o700); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, os.ErrExist) {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("mkdir %s: %w", subdir, err)
-	}
-	if err := os.Chmod(subdir, 0o700); err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("chmod %s: %w", subdir, err)
-	}
-	if err := os.Chown(subdir, int(uid), -1); err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("chown %s -> uid %d: %w", subdir, uid, err)
-	}
-	return subdir, nil
-}
-
-// ensureAgentSocketParent verifies the runtime parent dir exists, is not a
-// symlink, and is owned by root.
-func ensureAgentSocketParent(parent string) error {
-	if parent == "" {
-		return fmt.Errorf("no runtime directory configured for this platform")
-	}
-	if err := os.MkdirAll(parent, 0o755); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("mkdir %s: %w", parent, err)
-	}
-	info, err := os.Lstat(parent)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("lstat %s: %w", parent, err)
-	}
-	if info.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink != 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("%s is a symlink", parent)
-	}
-	if st, ok := info.Sys().(*syscall.Stat_t); ok && st.Uid != 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("%s not owned by root (uid=%d)", parent, st.Uid)
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// purgeStaleAgentSubdir removes a leftover subdir unless it is a real dir
-// owned by uid with mode 0700. Lstat (not Stat) so a symlink is detected.
-func purgeStaleAgentSubdir(subdir string, uid uint32) error {
-	info, err := os.Lstat(subdir)
-	if errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
-		return nil
-	}
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("lstat %s: %w", subdir, err)
-	}
-	if agentSubdirOK(info, uid) {
-		return nil
-	}
-	if err := os.RemoveAll(subdir); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("remove stale %s: %w", subdir, err)
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-func agentSubdirOK(info os.FileInfo, uid uint32) bool {
-	if info.Mode()&os.ModeSymlink != 0 || !info.IsDir() {
-		return false
-	}
-	st, ok := info.Sys().(*syscall.Stat_t)
-	if !ok {
-		return false
-	}
-	return st.Uid == uid && info.Mode().Perm() == 0o700
-}
-
-// stop terminates the spawned agent, if any. Intended for daemon shutdown.
-func (m *darwinAgentManager) stop() {
-	m.mu.Lock()
-	defer m.mu.Unlock()
-	m.killLocked()
-}
-
-func (m *darwinAgentManager) killLocked() {
-	if !m.running {
-		return
-	}
-	killAllVNCAgents()
-	if m.socketPath != "" {
-		if err := os.Remove(m.socketPath); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist) {
-			log.Debugf("remove agent socket %s: %v", m.socketPath, err)
-		}
-	}
-	m.running = false
-	m.authToken = ""
-	m.socketPath = ""
-	m.uid = 0
-}
-
-// consoleUserID returns the uid of the user currently sitting at the
-// console (the one whose Aqua session is active). Returns
-// errNoConsoleUser when nobody is logged in: at the login window
-// /dev/console is owned by root.
-func consoleUserID() (uint32, error) {
-	info, err := os.Stat("/dev/console")
-	if err != nil {
-		return 0, fmt.Errorf("stat /dev/console: %w", err)
-	}
-	st, ok := info.Sys().(*syscall.Stat_t)
-	if !ok {
-		return 0, fmt.Errorf("/dev/console stat has unexpected type")
-	}
-	if st.Uid == 0 {
-		return 0, errNoConsoleUser
-	}
-	return st.Uid, nil
-}
-
-// spawnAgentForUser uses launchctl asuser to start a netbird vnc-agent
-// process inside the target user's launchd bootstrap namespace. That is
-// the only spawn mode on macOS that gives the child access to the user's
-// WindowServer. The agent's stderr is relogged into the daemon log so
-// startup failures are not silently lost when the readiness check times
-// out.
-func spawnAgentForUser(uid uint32, socketPath, token string) error {
-	exe, err := os.Executable()
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("resolve own executable: %w", err)
-	}
-	cmd := exec.Command(
-		"/bin/launchctl", "asuser", strconv.FormatUint(uint64(uid), 10),
-		exe, vncAgentSubcommand,
-		"--socket", socketPath,
-		// Drop privs inside the agent: launchctl asuser preserves the
-		// daemon's uid (root), so without this the capture/input/
-		// encoder paths would run as root for the lifetime of the
-		// session. validateAgentPeer on the daemon side also relies on
-		// the agent's effective uid matching consoleUID.
-		"--target-uid", strconv.FormatUint(uint64(uid), 10),
-	)
-	cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), agentTokenEnvVar+"="+token)
-	stderr, err := cmd.StderrPipe()
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("agent stderr pipe: %w", err)
-	}
-	if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("launchctl asuser: %w", err)
-	}
-	go func() {
-		defer stderr.Close()
-		relogAgentStream(stderr)
-	}()
-	go func() { _ = cmd.Wait() }()
-	return nil
-}
-
-// waitForAgent dials the agent's Unix socket until it answers. Used to
-// gate proxy attempts until the spawned process has finished its Start.
-func waitForAgent(ctx context.Context, socketPath string, wait time.Duration) error {
-	var d net.Dialer
-	deadline := time.Now().Add(wait)
-	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
-		if ctx.Err() != nil {
-			return ctx.Err()
-		}
-		dialCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 200*time.Millisecond)
-		c, err := d.DialContext(dialCtx, "unix", socketPath)
-		cancel()
-		if err == nil {
-			_ = c.Close()
-			return nil
-		}
-		time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
-	}
-	return fmt.Errorf("timeout dialing %s", socketPath)
-}
-
-// vncAgentRunning reports whether any vnc-agent process exists on the
-// system. There is at most one agent per machine, so any match is "the"
-// agent.
-func vncAgentRunning() bool {
-	pids, err := vncAgentPIDs()
-	if err != nil {
-		log.Debugf("scan for vnc-agent: %v", err)
-		return false
-	}
-	return len(pids) > 0
-}
-
-// killAllVNCAgents sends SIGTERM to every process whose argv contains
-// "vnc-agent", waits briefly for them to exit, and escalates to SIGKILL
-// for any that remain. We enumerate kern.proc.all rather than
-// kern.proc.uid because launchctl asuser preserves the caller's uid
-// (root) on the spawned child, so a uid-scoped filter would never match.
-func killAllVNCAgents() {
-	pids, err := vncAgentPIDs()
-	if err != nil {
-		log.Debugf("scan for vnc-agent: %v", err)
-		return
-	}
-	for _, pid := range pids {
-		_ = syscall.Kill(pid, syscall.SIGTERM)
-	}
-	if len(pids) == 0 {
-		return
-	}
-	deadline := time.Now().Add(2 * time.Second)
-	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
-		remaining, _ := vncAgentPIDs()
-		if len(remaining) == 0 {
-			return
-		}
-		time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
-	}
-	leftover, _ := vncAgentPIDs()
-	for _, pid := range leftover {
-		_ = syscall.Kill(pid, syscall.SIGKILL)
-	}
-}
-
-// vncAgentPIDs returns the pids of vnc-agent subprocesses spawned from
-// this binary. Matches exactly on argv[0] == our own executable path
-// AND argv[1] == "vnc-agent" so unrelated processes that happen to have
-// the same name elsewhere in argv are not targeted. Skips pid 0 and 1
-// defensively.
-func vncAgentPIDs() ([]int, error) {
-	procs, err := unix.SysctlKinfoProcSlice("kern.proc.all")
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("sysctl kern.proc.all: %w", err)
-	}
-	ownExe, err := os.Executable()
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("resolve own executable: %w", err)
-	}
-	var out []int
-	for i := range procs {
-		pid := int(procs[i].Proc.P_pid)
-		if pid <= 1 {
-			continue
-		}
-		argv, err := procArgv(pid)
-		if err != nil || !argvIsVNCAgent(argv, ownExe) {
-			continue
-		}
-		out = append(out, pid)
-	}
-	return out, nil
-}
-
-// procArgv reads the kernel's stored argv for pid via the kern.procargs2
-// sysctl. Format: 4-byte argc, then argv[0..argc) each NUL-terminated,
-// then envp, then padding. We only need argv so we stop after argc.
-func procArgv(pid int) ([]string, error) {
-	raw, err := unix.SysctlRaw("kern.procargs2", pid)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	if len(raw) < 4 {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("procargs2 truncated")
-	}
-	argc := int(raw[0]) | int(raw[1])<<8 | int(raw[2])<<16 | int(raw[3])<<24
-	body := raw[4:]
-	// Skip the executable path (NUL-terminated) and any zero padding that
-	// follows before argv[0].
-	end := bytes.IndexByte(body, 0)
-	if end < 0 {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("procargs2 path unterminated")
-	}
-	body = body[end+1:]
-	for len(body) > 0 && body[0] == 0 {
-		body = body[1:]
-	}
-	args := make([]string, 0, argc)
-	for i := 0; i < argc; i++ {
-		end := bytes.IndexByte(body, 0)
-		if end < 0 {
-			break
-		}
-		args = append(args, string(body[:end]))
-		body = body[end+1:]
-	}
-	return args, nil
-}
-
-// argvIsVNCAgent reports whether argv belongs to a vnc-agent subprocess
-// spawned from our binary. Requires argv[0] to match ownExe exactly and
-// argv[1] to be the vnc-agent subcommand. Matches the spawn shape in
-// spawnAgentForUser and rejects anything else.
-func argvIsVNCAgent(argv []string, ownExe string) bool {
-	if len(argv) < 2 || ownExe == "" {
-		return false
-	}
-	return argv[0] == ownExe && argv[1] == vncAgentSubcommand
-}

client/vnc/server/agent_ipc.go

@@ -1,305 +0,0 @@
-//go:build darwin || windows
-
-package server
-
-import (
-	"bufio"
-	"bytes"
-	"context"
-	crand "crypto/rand"
-	"encoding/hex"
-	"encoding/json"
-	"errors"
-	"fmt"
-	"io"
-	"net"
-	"time"
-
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-)
-
-// errNoConsoleUser is the sentinel returned by sessionAgent.Resolve when
-// the platform has no interactive user to attach a capture agent to (the
-// macOS loginwindow state). Mapped to a distinct RFB reject code so the
-// browser can show a meaningful message.
-var errNoConsoleUser = errors.New("no user logged into console")
-
-// sessionAgent abstracts the per-platform manager that spawns and tracks
-// the user-session VNC agent. Resolve returns the agent's Unix-socket
-// path, the shared per-spawn token, and the uid the agent was spawned
-// under (used to validate peer credentials before the daemon hands the
-// token to whoever is on the other end of the socket). Resolve may spawn
-// the agent lazily.
-type sessionAgent interface {
-	Resolve(ctx context.Context) (socketPath, token string, peerUID uint32, err error)
-}
-
-// prefixConn replays already-consumed header bytes ahead of the proxy
-// stream by swapping in a different Reader on the same underlying Conn.
-type prefixConn struct {
-	io.Reader
-	net.Conn
-}
-
-func (p *prefixConn) Read(b []byte) (int, error) { return p.Reader.Read(b) }
-
-// handleServiceConnection runs the connection-header handshake (source
-// check, Noise_IK auth) on conn, resolves the right per-session agent
-// via sa, and proxies to it. Every accepted connection emits exactly one
-// outcome line on the daemon log.
-func (s *Server) handleServiceConnection(conn net.Conn, sa sessionAgent) {
-	start := time.Now()
-	connLog := s.log.WithField("remote", conn.RemoteAddr().String())
-
-	if !s.isAllowedSource(conn.RemoteAddr()) {
-		connLog.Info("VNC connection rejected: source not allowed")
-		_ = conn.Close()
-		return
-	}
-
-	var headerBuf bytes.Buffer
-	tee := io.TeeReader(conn, &headerBuf)
-	teeConn := &prefixConn{Reader: tee, Conn: conn}
-
-	header, err := s.readConnectionHeader(teeConn)
-	if err != nil {
-		connLog.Infof("VNC connection rejected: header read failed: %v", err)
-		_ = conn.Close()
-		return
-	}
-
-	authedLog, sessionUserID, ok := s.authorizeSession(conn, header, connLog)
-	if !ok {
-		authedLog.Info("VNC connection rejected: auth failed")
-		return
-	}
-	if err := s.registerConnAuth(conn, header); err != nil {
-		rejectConnection(conn, codeMessage(RejectCodeAuthForbidden, err.Error()))
-		authedLog.Warnf("VNC connection rejected: %v", err)
-		return
-	}
-
-	decision, err := s.gateApproval(conn, header)
-	if err != nil {
-		authedLog.Infof("VNC connection rejected: %v", err)
-		return
-	}
-	if decision.ViewOnly {
-		authedLog.Info("VNC connection approved by user (view-only)")
-	} else if s.requireApproval {
-		authedLog.Info("VNC connection approved by user")
-	}
-
-	socketPath, token, peerUID, err := sa.Resolve(s.ctx)
-	if err != nil {
-		code := RejectCodeCapturerError
-		if errors.Is(err, errNoConsoleUser) {
-			code = RejectCodeNoConsoleUser
-		}
-		rejectConnection(conn, codeMessage(code, err.Error()))
-		authedLog.Warnf("VNC connection rejected: agent unavailable: %v", err)
-		return
-	}
-
-	var initiator string
-	if s.authorizer != nil {
-		initiator = s.authorizer.LookupSessionDisplayName(header.clientStatic)
-	}
-	sessionID := s.addSession(ActiveSessionInfo{
-		RemoteAddress: conn.RemoteAddr().String(),
-		Mode:          modeString(header.mode),
-		Username:      header.username,
-		UserID:        sessionUserID,
-		Initiator:     initiator,
-	}, conn)
-	defer s.removeSession(sessionID)
-
-	replayConn := &prefixConn{
-		Reader: io.MultiReader(&headerBuf, conn),
-		Conn:   conn,
-	}
-	if err := proxyToAgent(s.ctx, replayConn, socketPath, token, peerUID, decision.ViewOnly, authedLog); err != nil {
-		rejectConnection(conn, codeMessage(RejectCodeCapturerError, err.Error()))
-		authedLog.Warnf("VNC connection rejected: agent unreachable: %v", err)
-		return
-	}
-	authedLog.Infof("VNC connection closed (%dms)", time.Since(start).Milliseconds())
-}
-
-const (
-	// agentTokenLen is the size of the random per-spawn token in bytes.
-	agentTokenLen = 32
-
-	// agentTokenEnvVar names the environment variable the daemon uses to
-	// hand the per-spawn token to the agent child. Out-of-band channels
-	// like this keep the secret out of the command line, where listings
-	// such as `ps` or Windows tasklist would expose it.
-	agentTokenEnvVar = "NB_VNC_AGENT_TOKEN" // #nosec G101 -- env var name, not a credential
-
-	// vncAgentSubcommand is the CLI subcommand the daemon invokes to start
-	// the per-session agent process. Must match cmd.vncAgentCmd.Use in
-	// client/cmd/vnc_agent.go.
-	vncAgentSubcommand = "vnc-agent"
-)
-
-// generateAuthToken returns a fresh hex-encoded random token for one
-// daemon→agent session. The daemon hands this to the spawned agent
-// out-of-band (env var on Windows) and verifies it on every connection
-// the agent accepts.
-func generateAuthToken() (string, error) {
-	b := make([]byte, agentTokenLen)
-	if _, err := crand.Read(b); err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("read random: %w", err)
-	}
-	return hex.EncodeToString(b), nil
-}
-
-// proxyToAgent dials the per-session agent's Unix socket, validates the
-// peer's kernel-asserted uid (so the daemon never hands its per-spawn
-// token to an impostor that won the listen race), writes the raw token
-// bytes plus a single view-only flag byte, then copies bytes both ways
-// until either side closes. The token + flag prefix must precede any RFB
-// byte so the agent's verifyAgentToken can run first. Returns nil once a
-// stream is established; the caller is responsible for sending an
-// RFB-level rejection on error so the client sees a reason instead of a
-// bare timeout. authedLog receives one audit line per dispatched
-// preamble so an operator can correlate daemon→agent traffic with the
-// remote session that triggered it.
-func proxyToAgent(ctx context.Context, client net.Conn, socketPath, authToken string, peerUID uint32, viewOnly bool, authedLog *log.Entry) error {
-	tokenBytes, err := hex.DecodeString(authToken)
-	if err != nil || len(tokenBytes) != agentTokenLen {
-		return fmt.Errorf("invalid auth token (len=%d): %w", len(tokenBytes), err)
-	}
-
-	agentConn, err := dialAgentWithRetry(ctx, socketPath)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("dial agent at %s: %w", socketPath, err)
-	}
-
-	if err := validateAgentPeer(agentConn, peerUID); err != nil {
-		_ = agentConn.Close()
-		return fmt.Errorf("agent peer validation failed: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	preamble := make([]byte, len(tokenBytes)+1)
-	copy(preamble, tokenBytes)
-	if viewOnly {
-		preamble[len(tokenBytes)] = 1
-	}
-	if _, err := agentConn.Write(preamble); err != nil {
-		_ = agentConn.Close()
-		return fmt.Errorf("send auth preamble to agent: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	// Audit: one line per successfully-dispatched daemon→agent preamble.
-	// Token printed as its first 8 hex chars (enough to correlate, not
-	// enough to use). Kept at Info so the default deployment captures it.
-	tokenFp := authToken
-	if len(tokenFp) > 8 {
-		tokenFp = tokenFp[:8]
-	}
-	if authedLog != nil {
-		authedLog.Infof("VNC IPC: dispatched preamble to agent socket=%s peer_uid=%d view_only=%v token_fp=%s", socketPath, peerUID, viewOnly, tokenFp)
-	}
-
-	defer client.Close()
-	defer agentConn.Close()
-	log.Debugf("proxy connected to agent, starting bidirectional copy")
-	done := make(chan struct{}, 2)
-	cp := func(label string, dst, src net.Conn) {
-		n, err := io.Copy(dst, src)
-		log.Debugf("proxy %s: %d bytes, err=%v", label, n, err)
-		done <- struct{}{}
-	}
-	go cp("client->agent", agentConn, client)
-	go cp("agent->client", client, agentConn)
-	<-done
-	return nil
-}
-
-// relogAgentStream reads log lines from the agent's stderr and re-emits
-// them through the daemon's logrus, so the merged log keeps a single
-// format. JSON lines (the agent's normal output) are parsed and dispatched
-// by level; plain-text lines (cobra errors, panic traces) are forwarded
-// verbatim so early-startup failures stay visible.
-func relogAgentStream(r io.Reader) {
-	entry := log.WithField("component", "vnc-agent")
-	scanner := bufio.NewScanner(r)
-	scanner.Buffer(make([]byte, 0, 64*1024), 1024*1024)
-	for scanner.Scan() {
-		line := scanner.Bytes()
-		if len(line) == 0 {
-			continue
-		}
-		if line[0] != '{' {
-			entry.Warn(string(line))
-			continue
-		}
-		var m map[string]any
-		if err := json.Unmarshal(line, &m); err != nil {
-			entry.Warn(string(line))
-			continue
-		}
-		msg, _ := m["msg"].(string)
-		if msg == "" {
-			continue
-		}
-		fields := make(log.Fields)
-		for k, v := range m {
-			switch k {
-			case "msg", "level", "time", "func":
-				continue
-			case "caller":
-				fields["source"] = v
-			default:
-				fields[k] = v
-			}
-		}
-		e := entry.WithFields(fields)
-		switch m["level"] {
-		case "error":
-			e.Error(msg)
-		case "warning":
-			e.Warn(msg)
-		case "debug":
-			e.Debug(msg)
-		case "trace":
-			e.Trace(msg)
-		default:
-			e.Info(msg)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// dialAgentWithRetry retries the loopback connect for up to ~10 s so the
-// daemon does not race the agent's first listen. Returns the live conn or
-// the final error. Aborts early when ctx is cancelled so a Stop() during
-// service-mode startup doesn't leave a goroutine sleeping for 10 s.
-func dialAgentWithRetry(ctx context.Context, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
-	var d net.Dialer
-	var lastErr error
-	for range 50 {
-		if err := ctx.Err(); err != nil {
-			if lastErr == nil {
-				lastErr = err
-			}
-			return nil, lastErr
-		}
-		dialCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, time.Second)
-		c, err := d.DialContext(dialCtx, "unix", addr)
-		cancel()
-		if err == nil {
-			return c, nil
-		}
-		lastErr = err
-		select {
-		case <-ctx.Done():
-			if errors.Is(lastErr, context.Canceled) || errors.Is(lastErr, context.DeadlineExceeded) {
-				lastErr = ctx.Err()
-			}
-			return nil, lastErr
-		case <-time.After(200 * time.Millisecond):
-		}
-	}
-	return nil, lastErr
-}

client/vnc/server/agent_peercred_darwin.go

@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-//go:build darwin && !ios
-
-package server
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"net"
-
-	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
-)
-
-// validateAgentPeer enforces that the peer behind the just-connected Unix
-// socket is the agent we expect it to be: a process running under
-// expectedUID, with the right effective uid stamped by the kernel on the
-// socket. Refuses (with a non-nil error) if anything else is listening on
-// the path (an unrelated local process that won the listen race or
-// squatted the path before us). Defends against the daemon shipping its
-// per-spawn auth token to a process that isn't the spawned agent.
-func validateAgentPeer(conn net.Conn, expectedUID uint32) error {
-	uconn, ok := conn.(*net.UnixConn)
-	if !ok {
-		return fmt.Errorf("peer cred: expected *net.UnixConn, got %T", conn)
-	}
-	raw, err := uconn.SyscallConn()
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("peer cred: syscall conn: %w", err)
-	}
-	var cred *unix.Xucred
-	var inner error
-	ctlErr := raw.Control(func(fd uintptr) {
-		cred, inner = unix.GetsockoptXucred(int(fd), unix.SOL_LOCAL, unix.LOCAL_PEERCRED)
-	})
-	if ctlErr != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("peer cred: control: %w", ctlErr)
-	}
-	if inner != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("peer cred: getsockopt LOCAL_PEERCRED: %w", inner)
-	}
-	if cred == nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("peer cred: nil xucred")
-	}
-	if cred.Uid != expectedUID {
-		return fmt.Errorf("peer cred: agent uid %d does not match expected %d", cred.Uid, expectedUID)
-	}
-	return nil
-}

client/vnc/server/agent_peercred_darwin_test.go

@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
-//go:build darwin && !ios
-
-package server
-
-import (
-	"net"
-	"os"
-	"path/filepath"
-	"strings"
-	"sync"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// TestValidateAgentPeerAcceptsOwnUID confirms the happy path: a Unix
-// socket whose peer is the current process must validate when the
-// expected uid matches the process's own. Both sides of a unix-socket
-// pair share the same kernel cred, so this exercises the real getsockopt
-// LOCAL_PEERCRED path.
-func TestValidateAgentPeerAcceptsOwnUID(t *testing.T) {
-	dir := t.TempDir()
-	sockPath := filepath.Join(dir, "test.sock")
-	ln, err := net.Listen("unix", sockPath)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
-	}
-	defer ln.Close()
-
-	var wg sync.WaitGroup
-	wg.Add(1)
-	go func() {
-		defer wg.Done()
-		c, err := ln.Accept()
-		if err == nil {
-			_ = c.Close()
-		}
-	}()
-	c, err := net.Dial("unix", sockPath)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("dial: %v", err)
-	}
-	defer c.Close()
-
-	if err := validateAgentPeer(c, uint32(os.Getuid())); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("validateAgentPeer rejected own uid: %v", err)
-	}
-	wg.Wait()
-}
-
-// TestValidateAgentPeerRejectsWrongUID ensures the validator fails when
-// the expected uid differs from the kernel-reported peer uid. This is
-// the path that catches a hostile process that won the listen race.
-func TestValidateAgentPeerRejectsWrongUID(t *testing.T) {
-	dir := t.TempDir()
-	sockPath := filepath.Join(dir, "test.sock")
-	ln, err := net.Listen("unix", sockPath)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
-	}
-	defer ln.Close()
-
-	var wg sync.WaitGroup
-	wg.Add(1)
-	go func() {
-		defer wg.Done()
-		c, err := ln.Accept()
-		if err == nil {
-			_ = c.Close()
-		}
-	}()
-	c, err := net.Dial("unix", sockPath)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("dial: %v", err)
-	}
-	defer c.Close()
-
-	// Pick a uid the test process certainly isn't running as.
-	wrongUID := uint32(os.Getuid()) + 1
-	err = validateAgentPeer(c, wrongUID)
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected mismatch error, got nil")
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "does not match expected") {
-		t.Fatalf("error should mention uid mismatch, got: %v", err)
-	}
-	wg.Wait()
-}
-
-// TestValidateAgentPeerRejectsNonUnix protects against being handed a
-// non-Unix-socket connection (the validator can't enforce anything on
-// e.g. a *net.TCPConn so it must refuse rather than silently pass).
-func TestValidateAgentPeerRejectsNonUnix(t *testing.T) {
-	ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("listen tcp: %v", err)
-	}
-	defer ln.Close()
-	var wg sync.WaitGroup
-	wg.Add(1)
-	go func() {
-		defer wg.Done()
-		c, err := ln.Accept()
-		if err == nil {
-			_ = c.Close()
-		}
-	}()
-	c, err := net.Dial("tcp", ln.Addr().String())
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("dial tcp: %v", err)
-	}
-	defer c.Close()
-	if err := validateAgentPeer(c, 0); err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected refusal on non-unix conn, got nil")
-	}
-	wg.Wait()
-}

client/vnc/server/agent_peercred_windows.go

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-//go:build windows
-
-package server
-
-import (
-	"net"
-)
-
-// validateAgentPeer is a documented no-op on Windows. AF_UNIX on Windows
-// exposes no SO_PEERCRED equivalent and no supported API to recover the
-// peer process from an accepted AF_UNIX connection, so the daemon cannot
-// match the connected peer against the agent PID it spawned the way the
-// darwin path does via LOCAL_PEERCRED. The Windows trust model therefore
-// rests on three other measures, none of which assume the socket path is
-// secret:
-//
-//   - the socket lives in a dedicated directory (agentSocketDir) created
-//     with a DACL granting only SYSTEM and Administrators, so an
-//     unprivileged local user cannot create or squat a socket there;
-//   - each spawn uses a cryptographically random socket name, so the path
-//     is unguessable before the agent binds it;
-//   - the daemon publishes the path only after confirming the spawned
-//     agent is listening (see waitForAgentListening), and gates every
-//     connection on the per-spawn auth-token preamble that follows this
-//     call.
-//
-// If a future Windows release exposes peer-PID retrieval for AF_UNIX,
-// this function should verify the peer against the spawned agent PID.
-func validateAgentPeer(_ net.Conn, _ uint32) error {
-	return nil
-}

client/vnc/server/agent_windows.go

@@ -1,747 +0,0 @@
-//go:build windows
-
-package server
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	crand "crypto/rand"
-	"encoding/binary"
-	"encoding/hex"
-	"errors"
-	"fmt"
-	"net"
-	"os"
-	"path/filepath"
-	"runtime"
-	"sync"
-	"time"
-	"unsafe"
-
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-	"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
-)
-
-const (
-	stillActive = 259
-
-	tokenPrimary          = 1
-	securityImpersonation = 2
-	tokenSessionID        = 12
-
-	createUnicodeEnvironment = 0x00000400
-	createNoWindow           = 0x08000000
-	createSuspended          = 0x00000004
-	createBreakawayFromJob   = 0x01000000
-)
-
-var (
-	kernel32 = windows.NewLazySystemDLL("kernel32.dll")
-	advapi32 = windows.NewLazySystemDLL("advapi32.dll")
-	userenv  = windows.NewLazySystemDLL("userenv.dll")
-
-	procWTSGetActiveConsoleSessionId = kernel32.NewProc("WTSGetActiveConsoleSessionId")
-	procCreateJobObjectW             = kernel32.NewProc("CreateJobObjectW")
-	procSetInformationJobObject      = kernel32.NewProc("SetInformationJobObject")
-	procAssignProcessToJobObject     = kernel32.NewProc("AssignProcessToJobObject")
-	procSetTokenInformation          = advapi32.NewProc("SetTokenInformation")
-	procCreateEnvironmentBlock       = userenv.NewProc("CreateEnvironmentBlock")
-	procDestroyEnvironmentBlock      = userenv.NewProc("DestroyEnvironmentBlock")
-
-	wtsapi32                       = windows.NewLazySystemDLL("wtsapi32.dll")
-	procWTSEnumerateSessionsW      = wtsapi32.NewProc("WTSEnumerateSessionsW")
-	procWTSFreeMemory              = wtsapi32.NewProc("WTSFreeMemory")
-	procWTSQuerySessionInformation = wtsapi32.NewProc("WTSQuerySessionInformationW")
-)
-
-// GetCurrentSessionID returns the session ID of the current process.
-func GetCurrentSessionID() uint32 {
-	var token windows.Token
-	if err := windows.OpenProcessToken(windows.CurrentProcess(),
-		windows.TOKEN_QUERY, &token); err != nil {
-		return 0
-	}
-	defer token.Close()
-	var id uint32
-	var ret uint32
-	_ = windows.GetTokenInformation(token, windows.TokenSessionId,
-		(*byte)(unsafe.Pointer(&id)), 4, &ret)
-	return id
-}
-
-func getConsoleSessionID() uint32 {
-	r, _, _ := procWTSGetActiveConsoleSessionId.Call()
-	return uint32(r)
-}
-
-const (
-	wtsActive       = 0
-	wtsConnected    = 1
-	wtsDisconnected = 4
-)
-
-// getActiveSessionID returns the session ID of the best session to attach to.
-// On a Windows Server with no console display attached, session 1 still
-// reports WTSActive (login screen "owns" the console), so a naive
-// first-active-wins pick lands on a session with no actual rendering.
-// Preference order:
-//  1. Active session with a user logged in (RDP user in session ≥2)
-//  2. Active session without a user (console at login screen)
-//  3. Console session ID
-func getActiveSessionID() uint32 {
-	var sessionInfo uintptr
-	var count uint32
-
-	r, _, _ := procWTSEnumerateSessionsW.Call(
-		0, // WTS_CURRENT_SERVER_HANDLE
-		0, // reserved
-		1, // version
-		uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&sessionInfo)),
-		uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&count)),
-	)
-	if r == 0 || count == 0 {
-		return getConsoleSessionID()
-	}
-	defer func() { _, _, _ = procWTSFreeMemory.Call(sessionInfo) }()
-
-	type wtsSession struct {
-		SessionID uint32
-		Station   *uint16
-		State     uint32
-	}
-	sessions := unsafe.Slice((*wtsSession)(unsafe.Pointer(sessionInfo)), count)
-
-	var withUser uint32
-	var withUserFound bool
-	var anyActive uint32
-	var anyActiveFound bool
-	for _, s := range sessions {
-		if s.SessionID == 0 {
-			continue
-		}
-		if s.State != wtsActive {
-			continue
-		}
-		if !anyActiveFound {
-			anyActive = s.SessionID
-			anyActiveFound = true
-		}
-		if !withUserFound && wtsSessionHasUser(s.SessionID) {
-			withUser = s.SessionID
-			withUserFound = true
-		}
-	}
-	if withUserFound {
-		return withUser
-	}
-	if anyActiveFound {
-		return anyActive
-	}
-	return getConsoleSessionID()
-}
-
-// wtsSessionHasUser returns true if the session has a non-empty user name,
-// i.e. someone is logged in (vs. the login/Welcome screen). The console
-// session at the lock screen has WTSUserName == "".
-const wtsUserName = 5
-
-func wtsSessionHasUser(sessionID uint32) bool {
-	var buf uintptr
-	var bytesReturned uint32
-	r, _, _ := procWTSQuerySessionInformation.Call(
-		0, // WTS_CURRENT_SERVER_HANDLE
-		uintptr(sessionID),
-		uintptr(wtsUserName),
-		uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&buf)),
-		uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&bytesReturned)),
-	)
-	if r == 0 || buf == 0 {
-		return false
-	}
-	defer func() { _, _, _ = procWTSFreeMemory.Call(buf) }()
-	// First UTF-16 code unit non-zero ⇒ non-empty username.
-	return *(*uint16)(unsafe.Pointer(buf)) != 0
-}
-
-// getSystemTokenForSession duplicates the current SYSTEM token and sets its
-// session ID so the spawned process runs in the target session. Using a SYSTEM
-// token gives access to both Default and Winlogon desktops plus UIPI bypass.
-func getSystemTokenForSession(sessionID uint32) (windows.Token, error) {
-	var cur windows.Token
-	if err := windows.OpenProcessToken(windows.CurrentProcess(),
-		windows.MAXIMUM_ALLOWED, &cur); err != nil {
-		return 0, fmt.Errorf("OpenProcessToken: %w", err)
-	}
-	defer cur.Close()
-
-	var dup windows.Token
-	if err := windows.DuplicateTokenEx(cur, windows.MAXIMUM_ALLOWED, nil,
-		securityImpersonation, tokenPrimary, &dup); err != nil {
-		return 0, fmt.Errorf("DuplicateTokenEx: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	sid := sessionID
-	r, _, err := procSetTokenInformation.Call(
-		uintptr(dup),
-		uintptr(tokenSessionID),
-		uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&sid)),
-		unsafe.Sizeof(sid),
-	)
-	if r == 0 {
-		dup.Close()
-		return 0, fmt.Errorf("SetTokenInformation(SessionId=%d): %w", sessionID, err)
-	}
-	return dup, nil
-}
-
-// injectEnvVar appends a KEY=VALUE entry to a Unicode environment block.
-// The block is a sequence of null-terminated UTF-16 strings, terminated by
-// an extra null. Returns the new []uint16 backing slice; the caller must
-// hold the returned slice alive until CreateProcessAsUser completes.
-func injectEnvVar(envBlock uintptr, key, value string) []uint16 {
-	entry := key + "=" + value
-
-	// Walk the existing block to find its total length.
-	ptr := (*uint16)(unsafe.Pointer(envBlock))
-	var totalChars int
-	for {
-		ch := *(*uint16)(unsafe.Pointer(uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(ptr)) + uintptr(totalChars)*2))
-		if ch == 0 {
-			// Check for double-null terminator.
-			next := *(*uint16)(unsafe.Pointer(uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(ptr)) + uintptr(totalChars+1)*2))
-			totalChars++
-			if next == 0 {
-				// End of block (don't count the final null yet, we'll rebuild).
-				break
-			}
-		} else {
-			totalChars++
-		}
-	}
-
-	entryUTF16, _ := windows.UTF16FromString(entry)
-	// New block: existing entries + new entry (null-terminated) + final null.
-	newLen := totalChars + len(entryUTF16) + 1
-	newBlock := make([]uint16, newLen)
-	// Copy existing entries (up to but not including the final null).
-	for i := range totalChars {
-		newBlock[i] = *(*uint16)(unsafe.Pointer(uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(ptr)) + uintptr(i)*2))
-	}
-	copy(newBlock[totalChars:], entryUTF16)
-	newBlock[newLen-1] = 0 // final null terminator
-
-	return newBlock
-}
-
-func spawnAgentInSession(sessionID uint32, socketPath, authToken string, jobHandle windows.Handle) (windows.Handle, error) {
-	token, err := getSystemTokenForSession(sessionID)
-	if err != nil {
-		return 0, fmt.Errorf("get SYSTEM token for session %d: %w", sessionID, err)
-	}
-	defer token.Close()
-
-	var envBlock uintptr
-	r, _, e := procCreateEnvironmentBlock.Call(
-		uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&envBlock)),
-		uintptr(token),
-		0,
-	)
-	if r == 0 {
-		// Without an environment block we cannot inject NB_VNC_AGENT_TOKEN;
-		// the agent would start unauthenticated. Abort instead of launching.
-		return 0, fmt.Errorf("CreateEnvironmentBlock: %w", e)
-	}
-	defer func() { _, _, _ = procDestroyEnvironmentBlock.Call(envBlock) }()
-
-	// Inject the auth token into the environment block so it doesn't appear
-	// in the process command line (visible via tasklist/wmic). injectedBlock
-	// must stay alive until CreateProcessAsUser returns.
-	injectedBlock := injectEnvVar(envBlock, agentTokenEnvVar, authToken)
-
-	exePath, err := os.Executable()
-	if err != nil {
-		return 0, fmt.Errorf("get executable path: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	cmdLine := fmt.Sprintf(`"%s" %s --socket %q`, exePath, vncAgentSubcommand, socketPath)
-	cmdLineW, err := windows.UTF16PtrFromString(cmdLine)
-	if err != nil {
-		return 0, fmt.Errorf("UTF16 cmdline: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	// Create an inheritable pipe for the agent's stderr so we can relog
-	// its output in the service process.
-	var sa windows.SecurityAttributes
-	sa.Length = uint32(unsafe.Sizeof(sa))
-	sa.InheritHandle = 1
-
-	var stderrRead, stderrWrite windows.Handle
-	if err := windows.CreatePipe(&stderrRead, &stderrWrite, &sa, 0); err != nil {
-		return 0, fmt.Errorf("create stderr pipe: %w", err)
-	}
-	// The read end must NOT be inherited by the child.
-	_ = windows.SetHandleInformation(stderrRead, windows.HANDLE_FLAG_INHERIT, 0)
-
-	desktop, _ := windows.UTF16PtrFromString(`WinSta0\Default`)
-	si := windows.StartupInfo{
-		Cb:         uint32(unsafe.Sizeof(windows.StartupInfo{})),
-		Desktop:    desktop,
-		Flags:      windows.STARTF_USESHOWWINDOW | windows.STARTF_USESTDHANDLES,
-		ShowWindow: 0,
-		StdErr:     stderrWrite,
-		StdOutput:  stderrWrite,
-	}
-	var pi windows.ProcessInformation
-
-	var envPtr *uint16
-	if len(injectedBlock) > 0 {
-		envPtr = &injectedBlock[0]
-	} else if envBlock != 0 {
-		envPtr = (*uint16)(unsafe.Pointer(envBlock))
-	}
-
-	// CREATE_SUSPENDED so we can assign the process to our Job Object
-	// before it executes. Without this the agent could spawn its own child
-	// processes and have them inherit the SCM service-job (not ours), or
-	// briefly listen on the agent port before we tear it down on rollback.
-	// CREATE_BREAKAWAY_FROM_JOB lets the child leave the SCM-managed
-	// service job; harmless if that job allows breakaway, and is required
-	// before AssignProcessToJobObject can succeed in the no-nested-jobs case.
-	err = windows.CreateProcessAsUser(
-		token, nil, cmdLineW,
-		nil, nil, true, // inheritHandles=true for the pipe
-		createUnicodeEnvironment|createNoWindow|createSuspended|createBreakawayFromJob,
-		envPtr, nil, &si, &pi,
-	)
-	runtime.KeepAlive(injectedBlock)
-	// Close the write end in the parent so reads will get EOF when the child exits.
-	_ = windows.CloseHandle(stderrWrite)
-	if err != nil {
-		_ = windows.CloseHandle(stderrRead)
-		return 0, fmt.Errorf("CreateProcessAsUser: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	if jobHandle != 0 {
-		r, _, e := procAssignProcessToJobObject.Call(uintptr(jobHandle), uintptr(pi.Process))
-		if r == 0 {
-			log.Warnf("assign agent to job object: %v (orphan possible on service crash)", e)
-		}
-	}
-
-	if _, err := windows.ResumeThread(pi.Thread); err != nil {
-		_ = windows.CloseHandle(pi.Thread)
-		_ = windows.TerminateProcess(pi.Process, 1)
-		_ = windows.CloseHandle(pi.Process)
-		_ = windows.CloseHandle(stderrRead)
-		return 0, fmt.Errorf("ResumeThread: %w", err)
-	}
-	_ = windows.CloseHandle(pi.Thread)
-
-	// Relog agent output in the service with a [vnc-agent] prefix.
-	go relogAgentOutput(stderrRead)
-
-	log.Infof("spawned agent PID=%d in session %d on %s", pi.ProcessId, sessionID, socketPath)
-	return pi.Process, nil
-}
-
-// sessionManager monitors the active console session and ensures a VNC agent
-// process is running in it. When the session changes (e.g., user switch, RDP
-// connect/disconnect), it kills the old agent and spawns a new one. Each
-// spawn picks a per-session Unix-socket path the agent binds and the
-// daemon dials over local IPC.
-type sessionManager struct {
-	mu             sync.Mutex
-	agentProc      windows.Handle
-	everSpawned    bool
-	agentStartedAt time.Time
-	spawnFailures  int
-	nextSpawnAt    time.Time
-	sessionID      uint32
-	authToken      string
-	socketPath     string
-	done           chan struct{}
-	// jobHandle owns the agent processes via a Windows Job Object with
-	// JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_KILL_ON_JOB_CLOSE. When the service exits or crashes,
-	// the OS closes the handle and terminates every assigned agent: no
-	// orphaned agent processes holding a socket across restarts.
-	jobHandle windows.Handle
-}
-
-const (
-	// agentSocketDir is a dedicated subdirectory under C:\Windows\Temp that
-	// the daemon creates with a restrictive DACL (SYSTEM + Administrators
-	// only). The default ACL on C:\Windows\Temp grants BUILTIN\Users
-	// create-file rights, so the agent socket must not live directly there:
-	// an unprivileged local user could pre-create a predictable path and
-	// intercept the daemon→agent stream. Both the daemon and the agent run
-	// as SYSTEM, so a SYSTEM-write-only directory is sufficient.
-	agentSocketDir = `C:\Windows\Temp\netbird-vnc`
-
-	// agentSocketDirSDDL grants full access to Local System (SY) and the
-	// Builtin Administrators group (BA) only, with the DACL protected
-	// (P) from inheritance so the parent's BUILTIN\Users grant does not
-	// flow in. AI is omitted; PAI marks the DACL protected and auto-
-	// inherited entries cleared.
-	agentSocketDirSDDL = "D:PAI(A;;FA;;;SY)(A;;FA;;;BA)"
-
-	// agentSocketRandomLen is the number of random bytes mixed into each
-	// per-spawn socket name so the path is unguessable before the agent
-	// owns it.
-	agentSocketRandomLen = 16
-
-	// agentReadyTimeout bounds how long the daemon waits for the freshly
-	// spawned agent to bind and accept on its socket before treating the
-	// spawn as failed.
-	agentReadyTimeout = 5 * time.Second
-)
-
-func newSessionManager() *sessionManager {
-	m := &sessionManager{sessionID: ^uint32(0), done: make(chan struct{})}
-	if h, err := createKillOnCloseJob(); err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("create job object for vnc-agent (orphan agents possible after crash): %v", err)
-	} else {
-		m.jobHandle = h
-	}
-	return m
-}
-
-// createKillOnCloseJob returns a Job Object configured so that closing its
-// handle (process exit or explicit Close) terminates every process assigned
-// to it. Used to keep orphaned vnc-agent processes from outliving the service.
-func createKillOnCloseJob() (windows.Handle, error) {
-	r, _, e := procCreateJobObjectW.Call(0, 0)
-	if r == 0 {
-		return 0, fmt.Errorf("CreateJobObject: %w", e)
-	}
-	job := windows.Handle(r)
-
-	// JOBOBJECT_EXTENDED_LIMIT_INFORMATION on amd64 = 144 bytes.
-	//
-	//  JOBOBJECT_BASIC_LIMIT_INFORMATION  (64 bytes with alignment padding)
-	//    PerProcessUserTimeLimit  LARGE_INTEGER  off  0
-	//    PerJobUserTimeLimit      LARGE_INTEGER  off  8
-	//    LimitFlags               DWORD          off 16
-	//    [4 byte pad to align SIZE_T]
-	//    MinimumWorkingSetSize    SIZE_T         off 24
-	//    MaximumWorkingSetSize    SIZE_T         off 32
-	//    ActiveProcessLimit       DWORD          off 40
-	//    [4 byte pad to align ULONG_PTR]
-	//    Affinity                 ULONG_PTR      off 48
-	//    PriorityClass            DWORD          off 56
-	//    SchedulingClass          DWORD          off 60
-	//  IO_COUNTERS (48)  +  4 * SIZE_T (32)  =  144 total.
-	//
-	// We only set LimitFlags; the rest stays zero.
-	const sizeofExtended = 144
-	const offsetLimitFlags = 16
-	const jobObjectExtendedLimitInformation = 9
-	const jobObjectLimitKillOnJobClose = 0x00002000
-
-	var info [sizeofExtended]byte
-	binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(info[offsetLimitFlags:offsetLimitFlags+4], jobObjectLimitKillOnJobClose)
-
-	r, _, e = procSetInformationJobObject.Call(
-		uintptr(job),
-		uintptr(jobObjectExtendedLimitInformation),
-		uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&info[0])),
-		uintptr(sizeofExtended),
-	)
-	if r == 0 {
-		_ = windows.CloseHandle(job)
-		return 0, fmt.Errorf("SetInformationJobObject(KILL_ON_JOB_CLOSE): %w", e)
-	}
-	return job, nil
-}
-
-// Resolve returns the current agent socket path, shared token, and the
-// uid the agent runs under (0 on Windows since the agent runs as
-// SYSTEM in the interactive session; see validateAgentPeer for the
-// Windows trust model). The path is only published after the spawned
-// agent is confirmed listening, so a caller never receives a socket a
-// squatter could be holding. When no agent is spawned yet (initial
-// boot, between session switches, or permanently disabled when
-// SE_TCB_NAME is missing) it surfaces a distinct error so the daemon
-// can reject the connection with a meaningful message instead of timing
-// out the proxy dial.
-func (m *sessionManager) Resolve(_ context.Context) (string, string, uint32, error) {
-	m.mu.Lock()
-	defer m.mu.Unlock()
-	if m.socketPath == "" {
-		return "", "", 0, errAgentNotReady
-	}
-	return m.socketPath, m.authToken, 0, nil
-}
-
-var errAgentNotReady = errors.New("VNC agent not running yet")
-
-// Stop signals the session manager to exit its polling loop and closes the
-// Job Object handle, which Windows uses as the trigger to terminate every
-// agent process this manager spawned.
-func (m *sessionManager) Stop() {
-	select {
-	case <-m.done:
-	default:
-		close(m.done)
-	}
-	m.mu.Lock()
-	if m.jobHandle != 0 {
-		_ = windows.CloseHandle(m.jobHandle)
-		m.jobHandle = 0
-	}
-	m.mu.Unlock()
-}
-
-func (m *sessionManager) run() {
-	ticker := time.NewTicker(2 * time.Second)
-	defer ticker.Stop()
-
-	for {
-		if !m.tick() {
-			return
-		}
-		select {
-		case <-m.done:
-			m.mu.Lock()
-			m.killAgent()
-			m.mu.Unlock()
-			return
-		case <-ticker.C:
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// tick performs one session/agent-state update. Returns false if the manager
-// should permanently stop (e.g. missing SYSTEM privileges).
-func (m *sessionManager) tick() bool {
-	sid := getActiveSessionID()
-
-	m.mu.Lock()
-	defer m.mu.Unlock()
-
-	m.handleSessionChange(sid)
-	m.reapExitedAgent()
-	return m.maybeSpawnAgent(sid)
-}
-
-func (m *sessionManager) handleSessionChange(sid uint32) {
-	if sid == m.sessionID {
-		return
-	}
-	log.Infof("active session changed: %d -> %d", m.sessionID, sid)
-	m.killAgent()
-	m.sessionID = sid
-}
-
-func (m *sessionManager) reapExitedAgent() {
-	if m.agentProc == 0 {
-		return
-	}
-	var code uint32
-	if err := windows.GetExitCodeProcess(m.agentProc, &code); err != nil {
-		log.Debugf("GetExitCodeProcess: %v", err)
-		return
-	}
-	if code == stillActive {
-		return
-	}
-	m.scheduleNextSpawn(code, time.Since(m.agentStartedAt))
-	if err := windows.CloseHandle(m.agentProc); err != nil {
-		log.Debugf("close agent handle: %v", err)
-	}
-	m.agentProc = 0
-	m.authToken = ""
-	m.socketPath = ""
-}
-
-// scheduleNextSpawn applies an exponential backoff on fast crashes (<5s) and
-// resets immediately otherwise.
-func (m *sessionManager) scheduleNextSpawn(exitCode uint32, lifetime time.Duration) {
-	if lifetime < 5*time.Second {
-		m.spawnFailures++
-		backoff := time.Duration(1<<min(m.spawnFailures, 5)) * time.Second
-		if backoff > 30*time.Second {
-			backoff = 30 * time.Second
-		}
-		m.nextSpawnAt = time.Now().Add(backoff)
-		log.Warnf("agent exited (code=%d) after %v, retrying in %v (failures=%d)", exitCode, lifetime.Round(time.Millisecond), backoff, m.spawnFailures)
-		return
-	}
-	m.spawnFailures = 0
-	m.nextSpawnAt = time.Time{}
-	log.Infof("agent exited (code=%d) after %v, respawning", exitCode, lifetime.Round(time.Second))
-}
-
-// maybeSpawnAgent spawns a new agent if there's no current one and the backoff
-// window has elapsed. Returns false to permanently stop the manager when the
-// service lacks the privileges needed to spawn cross-session.
-func (m *sessionManager) maybeSpawnAgent(sid uint32) bool {
-	if m.agentProc != 0 || sid == 0xFFFFFFFF || !time.Now().After(m.nextSpawnAt) {
-		return true
-	}
-
-	if err := ensureAgentSocketDir(); err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("prepare agent socket dir: %v", err)
-		m.nextSpawnAt = time.Now().Add(5 * time.Second)
-		return true
-	}
-
-	// The leaf name carries a cryptographically random component so a local
-	// user cannot pre-create the path at a guessable location. The session
-	// id is kept for diagnostics only; security does not rely on it.
-	socketPath, err := newAgentSocketPath(sid)
-	if err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("generate agent socket path: %v", err)
-		return true
-	}
-	// Covers a previous-run crash that escaped Job Object kill-on-close.
-	if err := os.Remove(socketPath); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
-		log.Debugf("clear stale agent socket %s: %v", socketPath, err)
-	}
-	token, err := generateAuthToken()
-	if err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("generate agent auth token: %v", err)
-		return true
-	}
-	h, err := spawnAgentInSession(sid, socketPath, token, m.jobHandle)
-	if err != nil {
-		if errors.Is(err, windows.ERROR_PRIVILEGE_NOT_HELD) {
-			// SE_TCB_NAME (token-impersonation across sessions) is only
-			// granted to SYSTEM. Without it spawnAgent will fail every 2
-			// seconds forever: log once and give up.
-			log.Warnf("VNC service mode disabled: agent spawn requires SYSTEM privileges (got: %v)", err)
-			return false
-		}
-		log.Warnf("spawn agent in session %d: %v", sid, err)
-		return true
-	}
-
-	// Gate on listen-readiness before publishing the path: do not hand a
-	// caller a socket the agent has not bound yet. On timeout, fail closed
-	// by killing the agent and leaving socketPath/authToken unset so
-	// Resolve keeps returning errAgentNotReady.
-	if err := waitForAgentListening(socketPath, agentReadyTimeout); err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("agent in session %d did not start listening: %v", sid, err)
-		_ = windows.TerminateProcess(h, 1)
-		_ = windows.CloseHandle(h)
-		if rmErr := os.Remove(socketPath); rmErr != nil && !os.IsNotExist(rmErr) {
-			log.Debugf("clear unready agent socket %s: %v", socketPath, rmErr)
-		}
-		m.scheduleNextSpawn(0, 0)
-		return true
-	}
-
-	m.authToken = token
-	m.socketPath = socketPath
-	m.agentProc = h
-	m.agentStartedAt = time.Now()
-	m.everSpawned = true
-	return true
-}
-
-// ensureAgentSocketDir creates the dedicated socket directory with a
-// restrictive DACL (SYSTEM + Administrators only). A pre-existing directory
-// is torn down and recreated rather than reused: it may have been created by
-// an unprivileged user with a permissive ACL, and it only ever holds our
-// transient sockets, so removing it loses nothing. Fails closed: returns an
-// error if the directory cannot be created with the intended security.
-func ensureAgentSocketDir() error {
-	sd, err := windows.SecurityDescriptorFromString(agentSocketDirSDDL)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("parse socket dir SDDL: %w", err)
-	}
-	var sa windows.SecurityAttributes
-	sa.Length = uint32(unsafe.Sizeof(sa))
-	sa.SecurityDescriptor = sd
-
-	dirW, err := windows.UTF16PtrFromString(agentSocketDir)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("encode socket dir path: %w", err)
-	}
-	err = windows.CreateDirectory(dirW, &sa)
-	if errors.Is(err, windows.ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS) {
-		if rmErr := os.RemoveAll(agentSocketDir); rmErr != nil {
-			return fmt.Errorf("remove pre-existing socket dir %s: %w", agentSocketDir, rmErr)
-		}
-		err = windows.CreateDirectory(dirW, &sa)
-	}
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("create socket dir %s: %w", agentSocketDir, err)
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// newAgentSocketPath returns a per-spawn socket path inside the secured
-// socket directory. The leaf name mixes a cryptographically random component
-// with the session id (for diagnostics) so the path is unguessable before the
-// agent binds it.
-func newAgentSocketPath(sessionID uint32) (string, error) {
-	b := make([]byte, agentSocketRandomLen)
-	if _, err := crand.Read(b); err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("read random: %w", err)
-	}
-	name := fmt.Sprintf("netbird-vnc-%d-%s.sock", sessionID, hex.EncodeToString(b))
-	return filepath.Join(agentSocketDir, name), nil
-}
-
-// waitForAgentListening dials the agent's Unix socket until it answers or the
-// timeout elapses. Mirrors the darwin readiness gate so the daemon never
-// exposes a socket path before the legitimate agent owns it.
-func waitForAgentListening(socketPath string, wait time.Duration) error {
-	var d net.Dialer
-	deadline := time.Now().Add(wait)
-	var lastErr error
-	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
-		c, err := d.Dial("unix", socketPath)
-		if err == nil {
-			_ = c.Close()
-			return nil
-		}
-		lastErr = err
-		time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
-	}
-	if lastErr == nil {
-		lastErr = fmt.Errorf("timeout")
-	}
-	return fmt.Errorf("dial %s: %w", socketPath, lastErr)
-}
-
-func (m *sessionManager) killAgent() {
-	if m.agentProc == 0 {
-		return
-	}
-	_ = windows.TerminateProcess(m.agentProc, 0)
-	_ = windows.CloseHandle(m.agentProc)
-	m.agentProc = 0
-	m.authToken = ""
-	m.socketPath = ""
-	log.Info("killed old agent")
-}
-
-// relogAgentOutput reads log lines from the agent's stderr pipe and
-// relogs them with the service's formatter. The *os.File owns the
-// underlying handle, so closing it suffices.
-func relogAgentOutput(pipe windows.Handle) {
-	f := os.NewFile(uintptr(pipe), "vnc-agent-stderr")
-	defer func() { _ = f.Close() }()
-	relogAgentStream(f)
-}
-
-// logCleanupCall invokes a Windows syscall used solely as a cleanup primitive
-// (CloseClipboard, ReleaseDC, etc.) and logs failures at trace level. The
-// indirection lets us satisfy errcheck without scattering ignored returns at
-// each call site, while still capturing diagnostic info when the OS reports
-// a failure.
-func logCleanupCall(name string, proc *windows.LazyProc) {
-	r, _, err := proc.Call()
-	if r == 0 && err != nil && err != windows.NTE_OP_OK {
-		log.Tracef("%s: %v", name, err)
-	}
-}
-
-// logCleanupCallArgs is logCleanupCall with one argument; common pattern for
-// release-by-handle syscalls.
-func logCleanupCallArgs(name string, proc *windows.LazyProc, args ...uintptr) {
-	r, _, err := proc.Call(args...)
-	if r == 0 && err != nil && err != windows.NTE_OP_OK {
-		log.Tracef("%s: %v", name, err)
-	}
-}