[management, client] Make the agent-network setup RPC provable at runtime

An Unimplemented answer to GetAgentNetworkSetup can only come from a
server binary compiled without the regenerated management proto — the
combined and management servers share the one registration path in
boot.go. Make that failure mode self-diagnosing:

- Log "ManagementService registered on gRPC server (agent-network
  setup RPC available)" at boot, so server logs prove which build is
  running.
- Have the CLI name the management URL it dialed in every error, and
  map Unimplemented to an actionable message including the binary
  check (grep -ac GetAgentNetworkSetup <server binary>).
- Pin the wire path with a round-trip test: a real gRPC server built
  from this tree routes the RPC through the NaCl envelope end to end.

Verified live: a combined server built from this branch answers an
unregistered probe with PermissionDenied "peer is not registered",
never Unimplemented.

Linear: NET-1399

.github/workflows/pr-title-check.yml

@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ jobs:
             const allowedTags = [
               'management',
               'client',
+              'android',
+              'ios',
               'signal',
               'proxy',
               'relay',

.goreleaser_ui.yaml

@@ -93,7 +93,9 @@ nfpms:
       - src: client/ui/build/appicon.png
         dst: /usr/share/pixmaps/netbird.png
     dependencies:
-      - netbird
+      - netbird (>= 0.75.0)
+      - libgtk-4-1 (>= 4.14)
+      - libwebkitgtk-6.0-4
 
   - maintainer: Netbird <dev@netbird.io>
     description: Netbird client UI.
@@ -114,7 +116,9 @@ nfpms:
       - src: client/ui/build/appicon.png
         dst: /usr/share/pixmaps/netbird.png
     dependencies:
-      - netbird
+      - netbird >= 0.75.0
+      - (gtk4 >= 4.14 or libgtk-4-1 >= 4.14)
+      - (webkitgtk6.0 or libwebkitgtk-6_0-4)
 
     rpm:
       signature:

AGENTS.md

@@ -0,0 +1,514 @@
+# NetBird Agent Guidelines
+
+**NetBird** is an open-source connectivity platform: a WireGuard®-based overlay
+network with a control plane. The **agent** (`client/`) runs on user machines as
+a privileged daemon and manages the WireGuard interface, routing, firewall, and
+DNS. **Management** (`management/`) is the control plane and REST/gRPC API,
+**Signal** (`signal/`) brokers peer handshakes, **Relay** (`relay/`) carries
+traffic when a direct tunnel is impossible, and **Proxy** (`proxy/`) is the
+identity-aware proxy behind Agent Network.
+
+This file applies to the whole repository, and is the single source of truth for
+agent guidance here. `CLAUDE.md` is a one-line pointer to it — keep the guidance
+in this file, not duplicated there.
+
+## Contents
+
+- [NetBird Agent Guidelines](#netbird-agent-guidelines)
+  - [Contents](#contents)
+  - [STOP and ask the user before](#stop-and-ask-the-user-before)
+  - [Quick reference](#quick-reference)
+  - [Structure](#structure)
+  - [Where to look](#where-to-look)
+  - [Repo-wide principles](#repo-wide-principles)
+  - [Error handling](#error-handling)
+  - [Comments](#comments)
+  - [Testing](#testing)
+  - [Pitfalls](#pitfalls)
+  - [Commits, PRs, releases](#commits-prs-releases)
+  - [After you push: CI and review bots](#after-you-push-ci-and-review-bots)
+  - [Discussion and support](#discussion-and-support)
+
+## STOP and ask the user before
+
+- **Opening a pull request for anything beyond a trivial fix, without an agreed
+  ticket.** Ask the user directly: *"Is there a discussion or issue for this
+  change?"* NetBird is discussion-first — community reports start in
+  [Discussions](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/discussions), DevRel
+  validates them, and only validated discussions become issues. A PR that
+  changes behavior with no linked issue may be closed on arrival. If there is no
+  ticket, offer to draft the discussion post **instead of** the PR, and wait for
+  the user's call. Only typos, broken links, documentation corrections, and
+  one-line fixes that already have an issue can skip this.
+- **Designing in any high-risk area** (see
+  [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md#high-risk-areas)): public API and OpenAPI
+  schema, gRPC protos, behavior existing deployments would notice after an
+  upgrade, peer connectivity (ICE, NAT traversal, relay selection, WireGuard® or
+  Rosenpass key handling), client system integration (routing, firewall, DNS,
+  interface), authentication and authorization, CLI or service flags, config
+  file format, daemon IPC, store schema and migrations, or a new feature. The
+  design gets agreed in the ticket before code is written.
+- **Writing a store migration or changing a persisted model.** Migrations are
+  one-way in the field and both the GORM and pgx paths may need the change.
+- **Hand-editing generated code.** `*.pb.go`, `*.gen.go`, and mocks are outputs.
+  Edit the source (`.proto`, `openapi.yml`) and rerun the matching
+  `generate.sh`.
+- **Adding, removing, or bumping a dependency**, and never vendor a fork.
+- **Weakening a security control** — authentication, authorization, certificate
+  verification, privilege dropping, or peer identity checks — even when it is
+  the fastest way to make a test pass.
+- **Force-pushing to `main`**, force-pushing any branch that is already under
+  review, amending pushed commits, or bypassing hooks with `--no-verify`.
+
+## Quick reference
+
+```bash
+# Build
+go build ./...
+cd client && CGO_ENABLED=0 go build .        # agent
+cd management && go build .                  # management service
+cd signal && go build .                      # signal service
+
+# Verify (run before every push)
+go fmt ./...
+make lint            # golangci-lint on files changed vs origin/main (also the pre-push hook)
+make lint-all        # full-repository lint, matches CI
+make test-unit       # host-safe unit tests, -tags devcert, no sudo
+make test-privileged # privileged-tagged suite in a Docker container with NET_ADMIN
+make setup-hooks     # wire make lint into .githooks/pre-push
+
+# Narrow runs
+go test ./client/internal/dns/...
+go test -race -run TestPeerConn ./client/internal/peer/...
+PRIV_RUN=TestNftablesManager PRIV_PKGS=./client/firewall/nftables/... make test-privileged
+
+# Code generation (never hand-edit the output)
+./shared/management/http/api/generate.sh   # REST types from openapi.yml
+./shared/management/proto/generate.sh
+./shared/signal/proto/generate.sh
+./client/proto/generate.sh
+./flow/proto/generate.sh
+
+# Run locally (lab only, never on a machine you rely on)
+sudo ./client/netbird up --log-level debug --log-file console
+sudo ./client/netbird down                   # teardown: restores routing, firewall, DNS
+./signal/signal run --log-level debug --log-file console
+./management/management management --log-level debug --log-file console --config ./management.json
+```
+
+`netbird up` needs root and rewrites the host's routing table, firewall rules,
+DNS configuration, and WireGuard® interface. Run it only in a disposable test
+environment (a VM, container, or throwaway host) that you can rebuild, never on
+a workstation or server whose connectivity matters. Run `sudo netbird down`
+before you stop working, before rebuilding the binary, and on every failure
+path, so the host's networking state is restored instead of left half-applied.
+See [Pitfalls](#pitfalls) for why cleanup on every exit path matters.
+
+## Structure
+
+```text
+netbird/
+├── client/              NetBird agent
+│   ├── cmd/             agent CLI
+│   ├── internal/        agent business logic (engine, peer, dns, routemanager, ...)
+│   ├── server/          daemon for background execution
+│   ├── proto/           daemon gRPC protos
+│   ├── iface/           WireGuard® interface management
+│   ├── firewall/        nftables, iptables, pf, WFP, userspace backends
+│   ├── ssh/             built-in SSH server and client
+│   ├── ui/              desktop UI (Wails v3 + React)
+│   ├── android/, ios/   mobile bindings
+│   ├── wasm/            WebAssembly build
+│   └── mdm/, system/    MDM policy, host information
+├── management/          control plane
+│   └── server/          account, peer, groups, networks, posture, permissions,
+│                        settings, store, http (REST), idp, integrations, migration
+├── signal/              handshake broker (peer/, server/)
+├── relay/               relay service (protocol/, server/, healthcheck/)
+├── proxy/               identity-aware proxy (llm/, acme/, accesslog/, middleware/, tcp/, udp/)
+├── agent-network/       Agent Network overview
+├── shared/              imported by both agent and services
+│   ├── management/      proto/, client/, http/api (OpenAPI + generated types)
+│   ├── signal/          proto/, client/
+│   └── relay/, auth/, sshauth/, metrics/
+├── e2e/                 end-to-end suites and harness
+├── encryption/, dns/, route/, stun/, sharedsock/, util/, flow/
+├── infrastructure_files/  docker compose and getting-started templates
+└── release_files/       files packaged into releases
+```
+
+## Where to look
+
+| Task                        | Location                                                     |
+| --------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| REST API / OpenAPI          | `shared/management/http/api/` + `management/server/http/`    |
+| Management gRPC protocol    | `shared/management/proto/`                                   |
+| Signal protocol             | `shared/signal/proto/`                                       |
+| Daemon IPC protocol         | `client/proto/`                                              |
+| Peer connection and NAT     | `client/internal/peer/`                                      |
+| Network map handling        | `client/internal/engine.go`, `shared/management/networkmap/` |
+| Routing                     | `client/internal/routemanager/`, `route/`                    |
+| Firewall backends           | `client/firewall/`                                           |
+| DNS                         | `client/internal/dns/`, `dns/`                               |
+| WireGuard® interface        | `client/iface/`                                              |
+| Persistence and migrations  | `management/server/store/`, `management/server/migration/`   |
+| IdP integrations            | `management/server/idp/`                                     |
+| Permissions model           | `management/server/permissions/`                             |
+| LLM routing / Agent Network | `proxy/internal/llm/`, `agent-network/`                      |
+| End-to-end tests            | `e2e/`                                                       |
+
+## Repo-wide principles
+
+1. **Run `go fmt` on every modified Go file.** Formatting is not optional.
+2. **Zero unaddressed diagnostics.** Fix IDE and linter warnings on code you
+   touch, and delete imports, helpers, and parameters your refactor orphaned.
+   Exception: unused parameters in shared code may be consumed by builds outside
+   this repository — do not remove them, ask instead.
+3. **Function comments are mandatory for exported functions**, written as full
+   sentences with a period, starting with the identifier name.
+4. **Prefer private functions and constants.** Export only what a caller outside
+   the package genuinely needs.
+5. **Early returns and guard clauses.** Handle errors and edge cases first
+   instead of nesting `if`/`else` chains.
+6. **Split complex functions.** If a function trips a complexity warning, break
+   it into named helpers rather than silencing the warning.
+7. **Avoid LLM-slop tells:** em dashes, hedging narration, restating the diff in
+   prose, trailing summaries. Defaults, not absolute bans. Applies to code,
+   comments, commit messages, and PR descriptions alike.
+8. **Concurrency: do a two-pass race analysis after every change** that adds
+   shared state. Guard maps and slices with a mutex, keep critical sections
+   short, and run `go test -race` on the touched packages.
+9. **Cross-platform builds must keep working.** The agent targets Linux, macOS,
+   Windows, FreeBSD, Android, and iOS. When you add a platform-specific file,
+   add the counterpart or a build-tagged fallback for the others.
+10. **Never hand-edit generated files.** Change the source and regenerate.
+11. **Never log secrets** — private keys, setup keys, tokens, PAT values — and
+    keep peer IPs and hostnames out of logs above debug level.
+
+## Error handling
+
+Use single-assignment form when the error is only needed inside the `if`:
+
+```go
+// Good
+if err := someCall(); err != nil {
+    return fmt.Errorf("context: %w", err)
+}
+
+// Bad - unnecessary split
+err := someCall()
+if err != nil {
+    return fmt.Errorf("context: %w", err)
+}
+```
+
+Use multiple assignment when the value is needed after the block:
+
+```go
+result, err := someCall()
+if err != nil {
+    return fmt.Errorf("context: %w", err)
+}
+```
+
+Add short, meaningful context, and **do not** start `fmt.Errorf` messages with
+obvious words like "failed to" or "error":
+
+```go
+// Good
+return fmt.Errorf("parse remote address: %w", err)
+return fmt.Errorf("listen on %s: %w", addr, err)
+
+// Bad
+return fmt.Errorf("failed to parse remote address: %w", err)
+return fmt.Errorf("error listening on %s: %w", addr, err)
+
+// "failed" is fine in log messages
+log.Debugf("failed to parse remote address: %v", err)
+```
+
+Skip the wrapping when a function only extracts or delegates and the wrap would
+add nothing:
+
+```go
+func parseAddr(addr string) (string, int, error) {
+    host, portStr, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
+    if err != nil {
+        return "", 0, err
+    }
+    // ...
+}
+```
+
+Log the errors you choose not to act on:
+
+- `log.Debugf()` for errors that do not affect program flow but help debugging.
+- `log.Tracef()` for very verbose errors that would otherwise spam logs.
+- **Never ignore** errors from writes, network sends, or critical cleanup.
+- Close errors may be ignored for read-only operations; log them at debug for
+  writes.
+
+## Comments
+
+Comment the **why**, never the **what**. Default to no comment, and add one only
+when a hidden constraint or workaround would surprise a future reader. Never
+reference the current task, PR, or your own changes in a comment.
+
+```go
+// Bad - trailing comments explaining the obvious
+defer localConn.Close() // Close the connection
+if err != nil {         // Check if error occurred
+
+// Good
+defer localConn.Close()
+
+// Good - explains a non-obvious constraint
+// Use incremental checksum update per RFC 1624 for performance.
+checksum = updateChecksum(checksum, oldPort, newPort)
+```
+
+### Length budget
+
+- **90 characters per line.** Wrap the comment, do not run past it.
+- **250 characters per comment**, roughly three wrapped lines. Doc comments on
+  exported identifiers may exceed it when the API genuinely needs the
+  explanation; inline comments inside a function body may not.
+
+The budget is a smell detector, not a rule to game. Do not compress a needed
+explanation into cryptic shorthand to fit — if a block of code needs more than
+250 characters of prose, the code is doing too much. Fix the code:
+
+- **Extract a named function.** A well-named function replaces the comment: the
+  name says *what*, the body shows *how*, and the comment you no longer write
+  was the *what* anyway. Clean Code calls this "explain yourself in code".
+- **Extract a named constant or predicate.** `if isExpiredSetupKey(key)` needs
+  no comment; `if key.ExpiresAt.Before(now) && !key.Revoked && key.UsageLimit > 0`
+  does.
+- **Keep the surviving comment for the why** — the RFC, the kernel quirk, the
+  ordering constraint. That part is usually one or two lines.
+
+### Long switch and if/else chains
+
+A `switch` whose cases carry multi-line explanations is the usual place this
+budget is breached, and the comment is a symptom. In order of preference:
+
+1. **Extract each case body into a named function.** The case becomes one line,
+   the name carries the meaning, and the switch reads as a table of contents.
+2. **Replace the switch with a lookup table** — `map[Kind]handlerFunc` — when the
+   branches are uniform. Adding a case stops meaning editing a growing function.
+3. **Replace conditional with polymorphism** when branches vary by type and the
+   same switch shape starts appearing in more than one place. Clean Code's rule
+   of thumb: tolerate a switch statement if it appears **once**, is buried in a
+   factory that returns an interface, and no other switch dispatches on the same
+   type. A second switch over the same enum is the signal to introduce the
+   interface.
+
+Do not restructure a switch purely to satisfy the budget when the cases are one
+line each and self-evident — a flat, boring `switch` over an enum is fine and
+needs no comments at all.
+
+Explanatory comments in tests are welcome — they document the scenario being set
+up, and the 250-character budget does not apply to them.
+
+## Testing
+
+- **Unit tests** live beside the code as `_test.go`. `make test-unit` runs the
+  host-safe set with `-tags devcert` and no sudo.
+- **Privileged tests** carry the `privileged` build tag and mutate host
+  networking. They run through `make test-privileged`, inside a Docker container
+  with `NET_ADMIN`. Never bypass that harness by running them directly on the
+  host.
+- **End-to-end suites** live in `e2e/` with a shared harness.
+- **Test real behavior, not API existence.** Assert on the observable end state
+  a consumer would see — bytes that arrived, the packet after translation, the
+  row after the write — not merely that a method exists or returns an error.
+- **Avoid mocks for code we own.** Exercise the real store, manager, or
+  controller and assert what the caller actually receives.
+- **`require` for setup and preconditions, `assert` for the conditions under
+  test.** Use `require` whenever a later line would panic or be meaningless
+  otherwise.
+- **Message guidance:** optional for `NoError`/`Error`; always give context for
+  comparison, boolean, and collection assertions.
+
+```go
+server, err := StartTestServer()
+require.NoError(t, err, "Test server setup must succeed")
+defer server.Close()
+
+result, err := client.DoOperation()
+assert.NoError(t, err)
+assert.Equal(t, expectedResult, result, "Result should match expected")
+```
+
+## Pitfalls
+
+- **The agent runs as root.** Anything touching routing, firewall, DNS, or the
+  interface can take a user's machine off the network. Prefer a reversible
+  change and make sure cleanup runs on every exit path.
+- **Management has two account loaders** (GORM and pgx). Adding a relation to an
+  account often means updating both, or it silently comes back empty in
+  production.
+- **`go test ./...` without `-tags devcert` skips tests** that need the
+  development certificate. Use `make test-unit`.
+- **`make lint` only checks the diff against `origin/main`.** CI runs
+  `make lint-all`; run it too before pushing a large change.
+- **Protos are consumed by released clients.** An old agent must keep working
+  against a new Management, so fields are added, never renumbered or removed.
+- **Windows requires the wintun driver**, and the daemon serves a named pipe
+  (`npipe://netbird`) rather than loopback TCP. Loopback TCP carries no caller
+  identity, so privileged operations are refused over it.
+
+## Commits, PRs, releases
+
+- **PR titles must start with a bracketed tag.** Before you propose a title,
+  **read [`.github/workflows/pr-title-check.yml`](.github/workflows/pr-title-check.yml)
+  and take the allowed tags from the `allowedTags` array in that file.** It is
+  the only source of truth, it changes as components are added, and the check
+  runs on every title edit — a tag that is not in that array is a red build. Do
+  not rely on a list memorized from anywhere else, including this file.
+
+  ```text
+  [client] Authorize daemon IPC callers by their local identity
+  [management,client] Add MDM policy support
+  ```
+
+  Multiple tags are comma-separated inside one pair of brackets. Match the tag
+  to the component you actually changed, not to the one you read the most.
+
+- **Use the repository's PR template.** Fill in
+  [`.github/pull_request_template.md`](.github/pull_request_template.md) rather
+  than replacing it with your own summary: describe the change, link the issue,
+  tick the checklist honestly (including "ran locally" and "single purpose"),
+  and complete the documentation section. Do not tick a box you have not
+  verified, and do not delete rows that do not apply.
+
+- **Keep the PR description short.** Under 1000 words on top of the template's
+  own text, and usually far less — a few paragraphs. Reviewers read the diff;
+  the description exists to explain what the diff cannot say for itself. This is
+  well below what an agent will produce by default, so cut before you post.
+
+- **Body: why before what.** Lead with the problem and the reason for this
+  approach, then the shape of the change. No bullet list of files changed, no
+  per-function walkthrough, no restating the diff in prose, no trailing summary
+  section, no self-congratulatory closing line.
+
+- **No `Co-Authored-By` or tool-attribution trailers in the PR description**,
+  and none in commits either. Contributors own their contributions. Whatever
+  tooling produced the diff, the person opening the PR is its author: they have
+  read every line, they can explain why it works, they can answer review
+  questions without going back to a model, and they are accountable for the
+  consequences of merging it. Do not add a trailer, footer, or description line
+  that spreads that ownership onto a tool.
+
+- **Commit subjects follow the same `[scope] Subject` convention.** Keep the
+  subject short, and use the body for why before what. No bullet lists of files
+  changed.
+
+- **Push review fixes as separate commits.** The PR is squashed on merge, so
+  there is no reason to rewrite history mid-review; many small commits make the
+  re-review readable.
+
+- **Do not force-push a branch that is under review.** A force-push detaches
+  existing review comments from the lines they were written against, destroys
+  the "changes since your last review" diff a reviewer relies on, and discards
+  the CI history that showed which commit broke what. Add commits instead —
+  including for fixups and reverts. Force-push only when there is no
+  alternative: a rebase to clear a genuine conflict, or removing a secret or a
+  large binary that was committed by mistake. When you must, ask the user first,
+  then say so in a PR comment so reviewers know their anchors moved. Never
+  force-push `main`, and never force-push a branch you do not own.
+
+- **One PR, one purpose.** Split refactors out of fixes and fixes out of
+  features.
+
+- **Keep the PR small.** Size is the single strongest predictor of how long a PR
+  waits. Aim for **under ~400 changed lines across under ~20 files**; past
+  roughly **1000 lines or 50 files** a community PR is likely to be sent back to
+  be split, or left unreviewed until it is. Large PRs from outside the core team
+  may be blocked outright when the size was never agreed in the ticket —
+  reviewing a sprawling change against a privileged networking daemon is a
+  security risk in itself, not just a time cost.
+
+  Judge the size by hand-written code: exclude generated output, `go.sum`,
+  vendored files, and test fixtures from the estimate, but do not use their
+  presence to argue a 3000-line PR is small.
+
+  When a change genuinely cannot be small — a protocol migration, a
+  cross-component rename — agree the split in the ticket **before** writing
+  code, and land it as a sequence of PRs that each build, test, and make sense
+  on their own. Propose that split to the user rather than opening one large PR
+  and hoping.
+
+- **User-facing changes need a docs PR** in
+  [netbirdio/docs](https://github.com/netbirdio/docs), linked from the PR
+  description.
+
+## After you push: CI and review bots
+
+Opening the PR is not the end of the task. Watch the run, read what the bots
+say, and drive the PR to green before you report the work as done.
+
+```bash
+gh pr checks <pr>            --watch    # all checks, live
+gh run view <run-id> --log-failed       # only the failing steps
+gh pr view <pr> --comments              # bot and human review comments
+```
+
+**Never report a change as finished while checks are pending or red**, and never
+describe a red PR as passing. If you ran out of turn before CI finished, say
+which checks were still running.
+
+### The checks
+
+- **Go tests** — `golang-test-{linux,darwin,windows,freebsd}.yml`, sharded per
+  component. A failure in a component you did not touch is usually a real
+  interaction, not noise; read the log before assuming flake.
+- **golangci-lint** — `golangci-lint.yml` runs the full repository, while
+  `make lint` only checks your diff. A clean local lint does not guarantee green
+  CI on a large change.
+- **PR Title Check** — `pr-title-check.yml`, see above.
+- **Codecov** — uploaded from the Linux test workflow with per-component flags
+  (`unit,client`, `unit,management`, `unit,relay`, `unit,proxy`, `unit,signal`,
+  `integration,management`). Coverage on new code should not go backwards. Add
+  tests for the paths you introduced; do not adjust thresholds or exclude files
+  to clear the report.
+- **CodeRabbit** — configured in [`.coderabbit.yaml`](.coderabbit.yaml): `chill`
+  profile, auto-review on every non-draft PR, TypeScript/JavaScript/SVG paths
+  filtered out. Chat auto-reply is on, so `@coderabbitai` in a comment reaches
+  it.
+- **SonarCloud** — project `netbirdio_netbird`, quality gate on new code (bugs,
+  vulnerabilities, code smells, duplication, coverage).
+- **Snyk** — dependency and code scanning.
+
+Sonar and Snyk report as GitHub App checks rather than workflows in this
+repository, so their detail lives on the PR check, not in the Actions logs.
+
+### Handling bot findings
+
+- **Read every comment and act on it.** Either fix it, or reply with the reason
+  it does not apply. Do not bulk-resolve threads to clear the count, and do not
+  silently ignore a finding because the check is advisory.
+- **Bots are frequently wrong here.** NetBird has privileged, platform-specific,
+  and concurrency-heavy code that static analysis reads poorly. A confident
+  CodeRabbit or Sonar comment can still be nonsense. Verify the claim against
+  the code before you change anything — never edit correct code just to silence
+  a bot.
+- **Security findings get the opposite default.** For a Snyk or Sonar
+  vulnerability, or a CodeRabbit comment about authentication, authorization,
+  certificate verification, or key handling, assume it is real until you have
+  disproved it. Surface it to the user rather than dismissing it yourself.
+- **A new vulnerable dependency is a stop.** Bumping or replacing dependencies
+  needs the user's decision, as above.
+- **Never change a workflow, threshold, lint exclusion, or bot config to make a
+  check pass.** If a check is genuinely wrong, say so and let the user decide.
+- **Do not paper over flakes with blind re-runs.** Identify the failure first. If
+  it is a known flake, name it; if you cannot tell, report it as unresolved
+  rather than re-running until it goes green.
+
+## Discussion and support
+
+- Discussions: <https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/discussions>
+- Slack: <https://docs.netbird.io/slack-url>
+- Docs: <https://docs.netbird.io>
+- Security: <https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/security/policy> — never in public
+- Contribution process: [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md)

CLAUDE.md

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+See [AGENTS.md](AGENTS.md) for the agent guidelines in this repository.

CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -66,11 +66,41 @@ Typical bug fixes, internal refactors, documentation updates, and tests do not
 need a design discussion, but should still be tied to an issue so the work is
 visible and nobody duplicates it.
 
+### Using AI coding agents
+
+We have no policy for or against using an AI agent to write NetBird code. That
+choice is yours, and we are not going to interrogate anyone about their tools.
+
+What we do have is a lot of incoming contributions that were plainly drafted with
+one, and enough experience reviewing them to see the same avoidable problems
+again and again: no ticket behind the change, a diff far too large to review, a
+description longer than the code it describes, an approach that was never going
+to be accepted, and an author who cannot answer questions about their own PR.
+None of that is caused by the tooling — it is what happens when a tool is pointed
+at a repository whose expectations it has never been told.
+
+So rather than a rule, there is a guide. [AGENTS.md](AGENTS.md) restates the
+expectations from this document in the form agents read automatically
+(`CLAUDE.md` points to it), so pointing your tool at the repository is usually
+enough. Among other things it tells the agent to ask you for the
+discussion or issue before drafting a PR, to keep the change small and
+single-purpose, to run the tests locally, to use this repository's PR template
+and title tags, and to write a description a reviewer can get through.
+
+The guardrails are the point, and they are the same ones we apply to everyone: an
+agreed ticket, a change you have actually run, a diff small enough to review with
+care, and an author who can explain it. Whatever wrote the diff, you are its
+author — you own every line you submit and the consequences of opening a PR with it.
+
+We may assess whether a contribution is maintainable and whether its merged code
+aligns with our security standards and design expectations.
+
 ## Contents
 
 - [Contributing to NetBird](#contributing-to-netbird)
     - [Ticket first, PR second](#ticket-first-pr-second)
         - [High-risk areas](#high-risk-areas)
+        - [Using AI coding agents](#using-ai-coding-agents)
     - [Contents](#contents)
     - [Code of conduct](#code-of-conduct)
     - [Directory structure](#directory-structure)

client/android/client.go

@@ -57,6 +57,12 @@ type DnsReadyListener interface {
 	dns.ReadyListener
 }
 
+// TunSettings is a snapshot of the settings the TUN device is rebuilt with
+type TunSettings struct {
+	Routes        string
+	SearchDomains string
+}
+
 func init() {
 	formatter.SetLogcatFormatter(log.StandardLogger())
 }
@@ -76,6 +82,8 @@ type Client struct {
 	connectClient *internal.ConnectClient
 	config        *profilemanager.Config
 	cacheDir      string
+	// Identifies the running profile for the SSO login hint; see profile_state.go.
+	cfgPath string
 
 	stateChangeMu    sync.Mutex
 	stateChangeSubID string
@@ -96,11 +104,12 @@ type Client struct {
 	extendCancel context.CancelFunc
 }
 
-func (c *Client) setState(cfg *profilemanager.Config, cacheDir string, cc *internal.ConnectClient) {
+func (c *Client) setState(cfg *profilemanager.Config, cacheDir string, cfgPath string, cc *internal.ConnectClient) {
 	c.stateMu.Lock()
 	defer c.stateMu.Unlock()
 	c.config = cfg
 	c.cacheDir = cacheDir
+	c.cfgPath = cfgPath
 	c.connectClient = cc
 }
 
@@ -110,6 +119,16 @@ func (c *Client) stateSnapshot() (*profilemanager.Config, string, *internal.Conn
 	return c.config, c.cacheDir, c.connectClient
 }
 
+// authSnapshot returns the config together with the path it was loaded from, in
+// one lock: the path identifies the profile whose account email backs the login
+// hint, so reading it separately could pair one profile's config with another's
+// hint when a profile switch lands in between.
+func (c *Client) authSnapshot() (*profilemanager.Config, string, *internal.ConnectClient) {
+	c.stateMu.RLock()
+	defer c.stateMu.RUnlock()
+	return c.config, c.cfgPath, c.connectClient
+}
+
 func (c *Client) getConnectClient() *internal.ConnectClient {
 	c.stateMu.RLock()
 	defer c.stateMu.RUnlock()
@@ -162,7 +181,7 @@ func (c *Client) Run(platformFiles PlatformFiles, urlOpener URLOpener, isAndroid
 	defer c.ctxCancel()
 	c.ctxCancelLock.Unlock()
 
-	auth := NewAuthWithConfig(ctx, cfg)
+	auth := NewAuthWithConfig(ctx, cfg, cfgFile)
 	err = auth.login(urlOpener, isAndroidTV)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
@@ -170,7 +189,7 @@ func (c *Client) Run(platformFiles PlatformFiles, urlOpener URLOpener, isAndroid
 	// todo do not throw error in case of cancelled context
 	ctx = internal.CtxInitState(ctx)
 	connectClient := internal.NewConnectClient(ctx, cfg, c.recorder)
-	c.setState(cfg, cacheDir, connectClient)
+	c.setState(cfg, cacheDir, cfgFile, connectClient)
 	// This path runs the interactive SSO flow, so reaching here means the peer
 	// is authenticated again — release the latch Status() reports from. Clear
 	// only once the fresh connect client is installed: until then Status()
@@ -211,7 +230,7 @@ func (c *Client) RunWithoutLogin(platformFiles PlatformFiles, dns *DNSList, dnsR
 	// todo do not throw error in case of cancelled context
 	ctx = internal.CtxInitState(ctx)
 	connectClient := internal.NewConnectClient(ctx, cfg, c.recorder)
-	c.setState(cfg, cacheDir, connectClient)
+	c.setState(cfg, cacheDir, cfgFile, connectClient)
 	return connectClient.RunOnAndroid(c.tunAdapter, c.iFaceDiscover, c.networkChangeListener, slices.Clone(dns.items), dnsReadyListener, stateFile, cacheDir)
 }
 
@@ -240,6 +259,24 @@ func (c *Client) RenewTun(fd int) error {
 	return e.RenewTun(fd)
 }
 
+func (c *Client) GetTunSettings() (*TunSettings, error) {
+	cc := c.getConnectClient()
+	if cc == nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("engine not running")
+	}
+
+	e := cc.Engine()
+	if e == nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("engine not initialized")
+	}
+
+	routes, searchDomains := e.TunSettings()
+	return &TunSettings{
+		Routes:        strings.Join(routes, ";"),
+		SearchDomains: strings.Join(searchDomains, ";"),
+	}, nil
+}
+
 // DebugBundle generates a debug bundle, uploads it, and returns the upload key.
 // It works both with and without a running engine.
 func (c *Client) DebugBundle(platformFiles PlatformFiles, anonymize bool) (string, error) {

client/android/login.go

@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"fmt"
 
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/auth"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/system"
@@ -36,12 +38,20 @@ type Auth struct {
 }
 
 // NewAuth instantiate Auth struct and validate the management URL
+//
+// The configuration at cfgPath is reused when one is already there, and only created when it is
+// not. Building a fresh in-memory config unconditionally gives the client a new WireGuard key on
+// every call: the peer registers under that key, the key is written out, and any peer registered by
+// an earlier call is orphaned on the server. It also breaks a client that enrols and then runs from
+// the persisted config, because the identity it registered is not the one it runs with — the
+// management stream rejects it with "no peer auth method provided".
 func NewAuth(cfgPath string, mgmURL string) (*Auth, error) {
 	inputCfg := profilemanager.ConfigInput{
+		ConfigPath:    cfgPath,
 		ManagementURL: mgmURL,
 	}
 
-	cfg, err := profilemanager.CreateInMemoryConfig(inputCfg)
+	cfg, err := profilemanager.UpdateOrCreateConfig(inputCfg)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
@@ -53,11 +63,14 @@ func NewAuth(cfgPath string, mgmURL string) (*Auth, error) {
 	}, nil
 }
 
-// NewAuthWithConfig instantiate Auth based on existing config
-func NewAuthWithConfig(ctx context.Context, config *profilemanager.Config) *Auth {
+// NewAuthWithConfig instantiate Auth based on existing config. cfgPath is the
+// file the config was loaded from; it identifies the profile whose account email
+// backs the login_hint.
+func NewAuthWithConfig(ctx context.Context, config *profilemanager.Config, cfgPath string) *Auth {
 	return &Auth{
-		ctx:    ctx,
-		config: config,
+		ctx:     ctx,
+		config:  config,
+		cfgPath: cfgPath,
 	}
 }
 
@@ -150,12 +163,14 @@ func (a *Auth) login(urlOpener URLOpener, isAndroidTV bool) error {
 	}
 
 	jwtToken := ""
+	email := ""
 	if needsLogin {
 		tokenInfo, err := a.foregroundGetTokenInfo(authClient, urlOpener, isAndroidTV)
 		if err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("interactive sso login failed: %v", err)
 		}
 		jwtToken = tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse()
+		email = tokenInfo.Email
 	}
 
 	err, _ = authClient.Login(a.ctx, "", jwtToken)
@@ -163,17 +178,42 @@ func (a *Auth) login(urlOpener URLOpener, isAndroidTV bool) error {
 		return fmt.Errorf("login failed: %v", err)
 	}
 
+	// Stored after Login, not before: a rejected token must not leave a hint
+	// pointing at an account that cannot be used.
+	if email != "" && a.cfgPath != "" {
+		if err := writeProfileEmail(a.cfgPath, email); err != nil {
+			log.Warnf("failed to store profile account email: %v", err)
+		}
+	}
+
 	go urlOpener.OnLoginSuccess()
 
 	return nil
 }
 
+// loginHintSetter is implemented by both concrete flows (PKCE and device code)
+// but absent from the OAuthFlow interface, hence the assertion below — the same
+// way internal/auth wires it in authenticateWithPKCEFlow.
+type loginHintSetter interface {
+	SetLoginHint(hint string)
+}
+
 func (a *Auth) foregroundGetTokenInfo(authClient *auth.Auth, urlOpener URLOpener, isAndroidTV bool) (*auth.TokenInfo, error) {
 	oAuthFlow, err := authClient.GetOAuthFlow(a.ctx, isAndroidTV)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get OAuth flow: %v", err)
 	}
 
+	// An empty hint is deliberate, not a fallback: a fresh or logged-out profile
+	// leaves the choice to the IdP, which is how accounts get switched.
+	if a.cfgPath != "" {
+		if hint := readProfileEmail(a.cfgPath); hint != "" {
+			if setter, ok := oAuthFlow.(loginHintSetter); ok {
+				setter.SetLoginHint(hint)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
 	flowInfo, err := oAuthFlow.RequestAuthInfo(context.TODO())
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("getting a request OAuth flow info failed: %v", err)

client/android/login_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+package android
+
+import (
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// NewAuth must reuse the configuration already at cfgPath rather than building a fresh one.
+//
+// Creating a new in-memory config on every call gives the client a new WireGuard private key each
+// time. The peer registers under that key and the key is written out, so a peer registered by an
+// earlier call is orphaned on the server — a client that enrols twice leaves two entries and owns
+// neither. It also breaks enrol-then-run: RunWithoutLogin reloads the configuration from disk, so
+// the identity that registered is not the identity that runs, and the management stream rejects it
+// with "no peer auth method provided, please use a setup key or interactive SSO login".
+func TestNewAuth_ReusesPersistedIdentity(t *testing.T) {
+	cfgPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
+
+	first, err := NewAuth(cfgPath, "https://api.example.com:443")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("first NewAuth: %v", err)
+	}
+	if first.config.PrivateKey == "" {
+		t.Fatal("first NewAuth produced no private key")
+	}
+
+	second, err := NewAuth(cfgPath, "https://api.example.com:443")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("second NewAuth: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if second.config.PrivateKey != first.config.PrivateKey {
+		t.Errorf("private key changed between calls: a second enrolment would orphan the peer registered by the first")
+	}
+}
+
+// A missing configuration is still created, so a first enrolment works unchanged.
+func TestNewAuth_CreatesConfigWhenAbsent(t *testing.T) {
+	cfgPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
+
+	auth, err := NewAuth(cfgPath, "https://api.example.com:443")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("NewAuth: %v", err)
+	}
+	if auth.config == nil || auth.config.PrivateKey == "" {
+		t.Fatal("NewAuth did not create a usable configuration")
+	}
+	if auth.cfgPath != cfgPath {
+		t.Errorf("cfgPath = %q, want %q", auth.cfgPath, cfgPath)
+	}
+}

client/android/profile_manager.go

@@ -13,18 +13,17 @@ import (
 )
 
 const (
-	// Android-specific config filename (different from desktop default.json)
-	defaultConfigFilename = "netbird.cfg"
-	// Subdirectory for non-default profiles (must match Java Preferences.java)
-	profilesSubdir = "profiles"
 	// Android uses a single user context per app (non-empty username required by ServiceManager)
 	androidUsername = "android"
 )
 
 // Profile represents a profile for gomobile
 type Profile struct {
-	ID       string
-	Name     string
+	ID   string
+	Name string
+	// Email is the account this profile last logged in with, "" if it never
+	// completed an SSO login or was logged out. See profile_state.go.
+	Email    string
 	IsActive bool
 }
 
@@ -101,6 +100,7 @@ func (pm *ProfileManager) ListProfiles() (*ProfileArray, error) {
 		profiles = append(profiles, &Profile{
 			ID:       p.ID.String(),
 			Name:     p.Name,
+			Email:    pm.profileEmail(p.ID.String()),
 			IsActive: p.IsActive,
 		})
 	}
@@ -123,7 +123,22 @@ func (pm *ProfileManager) GetActiveProfile() (*Profile, error) {
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve active profile %q: %w", activeState.ID, err)
 	}
-	return &Profile{ID: prof.ID.String(), Name: prof.Name, IsActive: true}, nil
+	return &Profile{
+		ID:       prof.ID.String(),
+		Name:     prof.Name,
+		Email:    pm.profileEmail(prof.ID.String()),
+		IsActive: true,
+	}, nil
+}
+
+// profileEmail returns the account email recorded for a profile. Display-only, so
+// an unresolvable path degrades to "" rather than an error.
+func (pm *ProfileManager) profileEmail(id string) string {
+	configPath, err := pm.getProfileConfigPath(id)
+	if err != nil {
+		return ""
+	}
+	return readProfileEmail(configPath)
 }
 
 // SwitchProfile switches to a different profile
@@ -185,6 +200,11 @@ func (pm *ProfileManager) LogoutProfile(id string) error {
 		return fmt.Errorf("failed to save config: %w", err)
 	}
 
+	// Not fatal: a stale hint costs an account switch, not the logout itself.
+	if err := removeProfileEmail(configPath); err != nil {
+		log.Warnf("failed to clear stored account email for profile %s: %v", id, err)
+	}
+
 	log.Infof("logged out from profile: %s", id)
 	return nil
 }

client/android/profile_state.go

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+package android
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
+)
+
+const (
+	// Android-specific config filename (different from desktop default.json)
+	defaultConfigFilename = "netbird.cfg"
+	// Subdirectory for non-default profiles (must match Java Preferences.java)
+	profilesSubdir = "profiles"
+	// profileAccountSuffix names the file holding the profile's account email.
+	// Deliberately not ".state.json", which desktop uses for the same data:
+	// there the email and the engine's state manager live in different
+	// directories, but on Android both resolve under files/, so sharing the name
+	// would have the two overwrite each other — the state manager rewrites the
+	// whole file from its own keys (see statemanager.Manager.PersistState), and
+	// this package's writer does the same in reverse.
+	profileAccountSuffix = ".account.json"
+)
+
+// profileAccountPathFor derives the account file path from a profile's config
+// path: netbird.cfg -> netbird.account.json, <id>.json -> <id>.account.json.
+//
+// Deriving from the config path rather than resolving the active profile keeps
+// the write on the profile the login actually ran for: Auth.login runs in a
+// goroutine, so the active profile can change under a flow already in flight.
+func profileAccountPathFor(configPath string) (string, error) {
+	if configPath == "" {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("empty config path")
+	}
+
+	base := filepath.Base(configPath)
+	stem := strings.TrimSuffix(base, filepath.Ext(base))
+	if stem == "" || stem == "." {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("config path %q has no filename stem", configPath)
+	}
+
+	return filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(configPath), stem+profileAccountSuffix), nil
+}
+
+// readProfileEmail returns the account email stored for the profile whose config
+// lives at configPath. A missing or unreadable file yields "", which leaves the
+// account choice to the IdP.
+func readProfileEmail(configPath string) string {
+	accountPath, err := profileAccountPathFor(configPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Debugf("no profile account path for login hint: %v", err)
+		return ""
+	}
+
+	var state profilemanager.ProfileState
+	if _, err := util.ReadJson(accountPath, &state); err != nil {
+		if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+			log.Debugf("failed to read profile account for login hint: %v", err)
+		}
+		return ""
+	}
+
+	return state.Email
+}
+
+// writeProfileEmail records the account email for the profile whose config lives
+// at configPath, so later logins can pass it as an OIDC login_hint. An empty
+// email is ignored rather than blanking what is already stored.
+func writeProfileEmail(configPath string, email string) error {
+	if email == "" {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	accountPath, err := profileAccountPathFor(configPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("resolve profile account path: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	state := profilemanager.ProfileState{Email: email}
+	if err := util.WriteJsonWithRestrictedPermission(context.Background(), accountPath, state); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("write profile account: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// removeProfileEmail drops the stored account email. Called on logout: while the
+// email is on disk it goes out as a login_hint, which would steer the next login
+// straight back into the account just logged out of. Mirrors the desktop UI's
+// RemoveProfileState call.
+func removeProfileEmail(configPath string) error {
+	accountPath, err := profileAccountPathFor(configPath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("resolve profile account path: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	if err := os.Remove(accountPath); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("remove profile account: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}

client/android/profile_state_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+package android
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestProfileAccountPathFor(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name       string
+		configPath string
+		want       string
+		wantErr    bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name:       "default profile",
+			configPath: "/data/data/io.netbird.client/files/netbird.cfg",
+			want:       "/data/data/io.netbird.client/files/netbird.account.json",
+		},
+		{
+			name:       "id profile",
+			configPath: "/data/data/io.netbird.client/files/profiles/4c5f5c8198c3989cffb5b5394f5a7ae0.json",
+			want:       "/data/data/io.netbird.client/files/profiles/4c5f5c8198c3989cffb5b5394f5a7ae0.account.json",
+		},
+		{
+			name:       "legacy name-keyed profile is handled the same way",
+			configPath: "/data/data/io.netbird.client/files/profiles/work.json",
+			want:       "/data/data/io.netbird.client/files/profiles/work.account.json",
+		},
+		{
+			name:       "empty path is rejected",
+			configPath: "",
+			wantErr:    true,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			got, err := profileAccountPathFor(tt.configPath)
+			if tt.wantErr {
+				if err == nil {
+					t.Fatalf("expected an error, got path %q", got)
+				}
+				return
+			}
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
+			}
+			if got != tt.want {
+				t.Errorf("got %q, want %q", got, tt.want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestProfileAccountPathForDefaultDoesNotCollide(t *testing.T) {
+	root := "/data/data/io.netbird.client/files"
+
+	defaultAccount, err := profileAccountPathFor(filepath.Join(root, defaultConfigFilename))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("default profile: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	idAccount, err := profileAccountPathFor(filepath.Join(root, profilesSubdir, "abc123.json"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("id profile: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if defaultAccount == idAccount {
+		t.Fatalf("default and id profile share an account file: %q", defaultAccount)
+	}
+}
+
+// The account file must never land on the engine state file: on Android both
+// resolve under files/, and the state manager rewrites the whole file from its
+// own keys, so sharing a path would have the two overwrite each other. The
+// expected names here mirror ProfileManager.GetStateFilePath.
+func TestProfileAccountPathAvoidsEngineStateFile(t *testing.T) {
+	root := "/data/data/io.netbird.client/files"
+
+	cases := []struct {
+		configPath  string
+		engineState string
+	}{
+		{
+			configPath:  filepath.Join(root, defaultConfigFilename),
+			engineState: filepath.Join(root, "state.json"),
+		},
+		{
+			configPath:  filepath.Join(root, profilesSubdir, "abc123.json"),
+			engineState: filepath.Join(root, profilesSubdir, "abc123.state.json"),
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, c := range cases {
+		account, err := profileAccountPathFor(c.configPath)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("%s: %v", c.configPath, err)
+		}
+		if account == c.engineState {
+			t.Errorf("account file collides with the engine state file: %q", account)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestWriteThenReadProfileEmail(t *testing.T) {
+	configPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "profiles", "abc123.json")
+	if err := ensureDirFor(t, configPath); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("prepare dir: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if got := readProfileEmail(configPath); got != "" {
+		t.Errorf("expected no email before a login, got %q", got)
+	}
+
+	const email = "user@example.com"
+	if err := writeProfileEmail(configPath, email); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if got := readProfileEmail(configPath); got != email {
+		t.Errorf("got %q, want %q", got, email)
+	}
+
+	if err := removeProfileEmail(configPath); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("remove: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got := readProfileEmail(configPath); got != "" {
+		t.Errorf("expected no email after logout, got %q", got)
+	}
+
+	// Logout may run on a never-logged-in profile, so a second remove must pass.
+	if err := removeProfileEmail(configPath); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("second remove should be a no-op: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestWriteProfileEmailIgnoresEmpty(t *testing.T) {
+	configPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "profiles", "abc123.json")
+	if err := ensureDirFor(t, configPath); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("prepare dir: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	const email = "user@example.com"
+	if err := writeProfileEmail(configPath, email); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := writeProfileEmail(configPath, ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("write empty: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if got := readProfileEmail(configPath); got != email {
+		t.Errorf("empty write clobbered the stored email: got %q, want %q", got, email)
+	}
+}
+
+func ensureDirFor(t *testing.T, path string) error {
+	t.Helper()
+	return os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0o700)
+}

client/android/session.go

@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ func (c *Client) endExtend() {
 }
 
 func (c *Client) extendAuthSession(ctx context.Context, urlOpener URLOpener, isAndroidTV bool) error {
-	cfg, _, cc := c.stateSnapshot()
+	cfg, cfgPath, cc := c.authSnapshot()
 	if cfg == nil || cc == nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("engine is not running")
 	}
@@ -293,7 +293,10 @@ func (c *Client) extendAuthSession(ctx context.Context, urlOpener URLOpener, isA
 	}
 	defer authClient.Close()
 
-	a := &Auth{ctx: ctx, config: cfg}
+	// Passing the config path makes the flow pick up the login_hint: an extend
+	// renews the session of the account already signed in, so it must not stop to
+	// offer a choice.
+	a := NewAuthWithConfig(ctx, cfg, cfgPath)
 	tokenInfo, err := a.foregroundGetTokenInfo(authClient, urlOpener, isAndroidTV)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("interactive sso login failed: %v", err)

client/cmd/agentnetwork.go

@@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
+	"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/status"
+	"google.golang.org/protobuf/encoding/protojson"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
+	mgm "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/client"
+	mgmProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
+)
+
+// agentNetworkAuthToken is the placeholder credential exported for
+// AI-tool CLIs: the Agent Network proxy authenticates callers by tunnel
+// peer and injects the real upstream credentials itself, so the
+// client-side token only needs to satisfy the tool's non-empty check.
+const agentNetworkAuthToken = "netbird"
+
+var (
+	agentNetworkModelFlag string
+	agentNetworkJSONFlag  bool
+)
+
+var agentNetworkCmd = &cobra.Command{
+	Use:   "agent-network",
+	Short: "Show the Agent Network setup available to this peer",
+	Long: `Commands to inspect the Agent Network (AI provider proxy) setup this peer's groups authorize:
+the proxy endpoint, the reachable providers, and the allowed models.`,
+}
+
+var agentNetworkLsCmd = &cobra.Command{
+	Use:     "ls",
+	Aliases: []string{"list"},
+	Short:   "List the Agent Network endpoint, providers, and allowed models",
+	Example: "  netbird agent-network ls",
+	RunE:    agentNetworkLs,
+}
+
+var agentNetworkEnvCmd = &cobra.Command{
+	Use:   "env",
+	Short: "Print shell export lines that point AI tools at the Agent Network",
+	Long: `Print POSIX shell export lines (ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL, ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN, and
+ANTHROPIC_MODEL when unambiguous) that configure Anthropic-compatible AI tools, such as
+Claude Code, to use the Agent Network proxy. Apply them to the current shell with:
+
+  eval "$(netbird agent-network env)"
+
+When several models are allowed, none is exported — pass --model to pin one.`,
+	Example: "  eval \"$(netbird agent-network env)\"\n  eval \"$(netbird agent-network env --model claude-sonnet-4-5)\"",
+	RunE:    agentNetworkEnv,
+}
+
+func init() {
+	agentNetworkLsCmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVar(&agentNetworkJSONFlag, "json", false, "output the setup as JSON")
+	agentNetworkEnvCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&agentNetworkModelFlag, "model", "", "model to export as ANTHROPIC_MODEL (required when several models are allowed)")
+}
+
+// fetchAgentNetworkSetup dials the management server directly with the
+// active profile's WireGuard key — the same credential and path every
+// other peer RPC uses — and asks for the caller-scoped setup. No daemon
+// involvement: the request is read-only and needs no tunnel state.
+func fetchAgentNetworkSetup(ctx context.Context) (*mgmProto.AgentNetworkSetupResponse, error) {
+	pm := profilemanager.NewProfileManager()
+	activeProf, err := pm.GetActiveProfile()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("get active profile: %v", err)
+	}
+	if activeProf == nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("active profile not found, please run 'netbird up' first")
+	}
+
+	configFilePath, err := activeProf.FilePath()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("get active profile file path: %v", err)
+	}
+	config, err := profilemanager.ReadConfig(configFilePath)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("read config file %s: %v (run 'netbird up' first)", configFilePath, err)
+	}
+
+	privateKey, err := wgtypes.ParseKey(config.PrivateKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse profile private key: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	mgmCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 30*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+
+	tlsEnabled := config.ManagementURL.Scheme == "https"
+	mgmClient, err := mgm.NewClient(mgmCtx, config.ManagementURL.Host, privateKey, tlsEnabled)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("connect to management service %s: %v", config.ManagementURL.String(), err)
+	}
+	defer func() {
+		_ = mgmClient.Close()
+	}()
+
+	setup, err := mgmClient.GetAgentNetworkSetup(mgmCtx)
+	if err != nil {
+		if s, ok := status.FromError(err); ok {
+			switch s.Code() {
+			case codes.PermissionDenied:
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("this peer is not registered with the management service at %s — run 'netbird up' first", config.ManagementURL.String())
+			case codes.Unimplemented:
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("the management server at %s does not implement the agent-network setup RPC — the process answering runs a build without it.\n"+
+					"Verify the running binary contains the RPC: grep -ac GetAgentNetworkSetup <path-to-server-binary> (0 = built without it),\n"+
+					"and that this URL actually reaches the server you rebuilt", config.ManagementURL.String())
+			}
+		}
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("get agent network setup from %s: %v", config.ManagementURL.String(), err)
+	}
+	return setup, nil
+}
+
+func agentNetworkLs(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
+	setup, err := fetchAgentNetworkSetup(cmd.Context())
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if agentNetworkJSONFlag {
+		out, err := protojson.MarshalOptions{Multiline: true, Indent: "  "}.Marshal(setup)
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("marshal setup: %v", err)
+		}
+		cmd.Println(string(out))
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	if !setup.Configured {
+		cmd.Println("Agent Network is not available for this peer. Ask your administrator.")
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	cmd.Printf("Agent Network endpoint: %s\n", setup.Endpoint)
+	cmd.Println("(reachable while connected to NetBird)")
+	for _, p := range setup.Providers {
+		cmd.Println()
+		cmd.Printf("%s (%s)\n", sanitizeOutput(p.Name), sanitizeOutput(providerFlavorLabel(p)))
+		switch {
+		case p.AllModelsAllowed && len(p.Models) == 0:
+			cmd.Println("  All models allowed")
+		case p.AllModelsAllowed:
+			cmd.Println("  All models allowed, including:")
+			printModels(cmd, p.Models)
+		default:
+			cmd.Println("  Allowed models:")
+			printModels(cmd, p.Models)
+		}
+	}
+	cmd.Println()
+	cmd.Println("To configure Anthropic-compatible tools in the current shell: eval \"$(netbird agent-network env)\"")
+	return nil
+}
+
+func printModels(cmd *cobra.Command, models []string) {
+	if len(models) == 0 {
+		cmd.Println("    (none)")
+		return
+	}
+	for _, m := range models {
+		cmd.Printf("    %s\n", sanitizeOutput(m))
+	}
+}
+
+func providerFlavorLabel(p *mgmProto.AgentNetworkProviderInfo) string {
+	if p.ApiFlavor == "" {
+		return p.CatalogId
+	}
+	return fmt.Sprintf("%s · %s-flavor API", p.CatalogId, p.ApiFlavor)
+}
+
+func agentNetworkEnv(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
+	setup, err := fetchAgentNetworkSetup(cmd.Context())
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	if !setup.Configured {
+		// An answer, not an error: print nothing eval-able and say why on
+		// stderr so `eval "$(...)"` stays a harmless no-op.
+		cmd.PrintErrln("Agent Network is not available for this peer. Ask your administrator.")
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	cmd.Printf("export ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=%s\n", shellQuote(setup.Endpoint))
+	cmd.Printf("export ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN=%s\n", shellQuote(agentNetworkAuthToken))
+
+	model, note, err := resolveAgentNetworkModel(setup, agentNetworkModelFlag)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if model != "" {
+		cmd.Printf("export ANTHROPIC_MODEL=%s\n", shellQuote(model))
+	}
+	for _, line := range note {
+		cmd.Printf("# %s\n", sanitizeOutput(line))
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// resolveAgentNetworkModel picks the model to export from the
+// Anthropic-flavor providers' effective model sets. A model is never
+// guessed: --model wins (validated against the allowed set), a single
+// allowed model is used, and anything ambiguous is returned as comment
+// lines instead of an export.
+func resolveAgentNetworkModel(setup *mgmProto.AgentNetworkSetupResponse, flagModel string) (string, []string, error) {
+	allowAny := false
+	var models []string
+	seen := make(map[string]struct{})
+	for _, p := range setup.Providers {
+		if p.ApiFlavor != "anthropic" {
+			continue
+		}
+		if p.AllModelsAllowed {
+			allowAny = true
+		}
+		for _, m := range p.Models {
+			key := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(m))
+			if key == "" {
+				continue
+			}
+			if _, dup := seen[key]; dup {
+				continue
+			}
+			seen[key] = struct{}{}
+			models = append(models, strings.TrimSpace(m))
+		}
+	}
+
+	if flagModel != "" {
+		if allowAny {
+			return flagModel, nil, nil
+		}
+		if _, ok := seen[strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(flagModel))]; !ok {
+			return "", nil, fmt.Errorf("model %q is not in the allowed model list — run 'netbird agent-network ls' to see it", flagModel)
+		}
+		return flagModel, nil, nil
+	}
+
+	if len(models) == 0 && !allowAny {
+		return "", []string{"No Anthropic-flavor provider is authorized for this peer; ANTHROPIC_MODEL not exported."}, nil
+	}
+	if len(models) == 1 && !allowAny {
+		return models[0], nil, nil
+	}
+
+	note := []string{"Multiple models are allowed — none exported. Re-run with --model to pin one:"}
+	for _, m := range models {
+		note = append(note, "  "+m)
+	}
+	if allowAny {
+		note = append(note, "  (any other model the provider serves)")
+	}
+	return "", note, nil
+}
+
+// shellQuote single-quotes a value for safe use in an eval'd export
+// line, escaping embedded single quotes.
+func shellQuote(v string) string {
+	return "'" + strings.ReplaceAll(v, "'", `'\''`) + "'"
+}
+
+// sanitizeOutput strips control characters (including newlines) from
+// server-supplied strings so operator-typed values can't break the
+// line-oriented output or smuggle lines past a `# ` comment prefix.
+func sanitizeOutput(v string) string {
+	return strings.Map(func(r rune) rune {
+		if r < 0x20 || r == 0x7f {
+			return -1
+		}
+		return r
+	}, v)
+}

client/cmd/root.go

@@ -171,6 +171,9 @@ func init() {
 	rootCmd.AddCommand(debugCmd)
 	rootCmd.AddCommand(profileCmd)
 	rootCmd.AddCommand(exposeCmd)
+	rootCmd.AddCommand(agentNetworkCmd)
+	agentNetworkCmd.AddCommand(agentNetworkLsCmd)
+	agentNetworkCmd.AddCommand(agentNetworkEnvCmd)
 
 	networksCMD.AddCommand(routesListCmd)
 	networksCMD.AddCommand(routesSelectCmd, routesDeselectCmd)

client/cmd/up.go

@@ -421,12 +421,6 @@ func setupSetConfigReq(customDNSAddressConverted []byte, cmd *cobra.Command, pro
 	if cmd.Flag(serverSSHAllowedFlag).Changed {
 		req.ServerSSHAllowed = &serverSSHAllowed
 	}
-	if cmd.Flag(serverVNCAllowedFlag).Changed {
-		req.ServerVNCAllowed = &serverVNCAllowed
-	}
-	if cmd.Flag(disableVNCApprovalFlag).Changed {
-		req.DisableVNCApproval = &disableVNCApproval
-	}
 	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRootFlag).Changed {
 		req.EnableSSHRoot = &enableSSHRoot
 	}
@@ -529,14 +523,30 @@ func setupConfig(customDNSAddressConverted []byte, cmd *cobra.Command, configFil
 	if cmd.Flag(serverSSHAllowedFlag).Changed {
 		ic.ServerSSHAllowed = &serverSSHAllowed
 	}
-	if cmd.Flag(serverVNCAllowedFlag).Changed {
-		ic.ServerVNCAllowed = &serverVNCAllowed
-	}
-	if cmd.Flag(disableVNCApprovalFlag).Changed {
-		ic.DisableVNCApproval = &disableVNCApproval
+
+	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRootFlag).Changed {
+		ic.EnableSSHRoot = &enableSSHRoot
 	}
 
-	applySSHFlagsToConfig(cmd, &ic)
+	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHSFTPFlag).Changed {
+		ic.EnableSSHSFTP = &enableSSHSFTP
+	}
+
+	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHLocalPortForwardFlag).Changed {
+		ic.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding = &enableSSHLocalPortForward
+	}
+
+	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRemotePortForwardFlag).Changed {
+		ic.EnableSSHRemotePortForwarding = &enableSSHRemotePortForward
+	}
+
+	if cmd.Flag(disableSSHAuthFlag).Changed {
+		ic.DisableSSHAuth = &disableSSHAuth
+	}
+
+	if cmd.Flag(sshJWTCacheTTLFlag).Changed {
+		ic.SSHJWTCacheTTL = &sshJWTCacheTTL
+	}
 
 	if cmd.Flag(interfaceNameFlag).Changed {
 		if err := parseInterfaceName(interfaceName); err != nil {
@@ -609,49 +619,6 @@ func setupConfig(customDNSAddressConverted []byte, cmd *cobra.Command, configFil
 	return &ic, nil
 }
 
-func applySSHFlagsToConfig(cmd *cobra.Command, ic *profilemanager.ConfigInput) {
-	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRootFlag).Changed {
-		ic.EnableSSHRoot = &enableSSHRoot
-	}
-	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHSFTPFlag).Changed {
-		ic.EnableSSHSFTP = &enableSSHSFTP
-	}
-	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHLocalPortForwardFlag).Changed {
-		ic.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding = &enableSSHLocalPortForward
-	}
-	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRemotePortForwardFlag).Changed {
-		ic.EnableSSHRemotePortForwarding = &enableSSHRemotePortForward
-	}
-	if cmd.Flag(disableSSHAuthFlag).Changed {
-		ic.DisableSSHAuth = &disableSSHAuth
-	}
-	if cmd.Flag(sshJWTCacheTTLFlag).Changed {
-		ic.SSHJWTCacheTTL = &sshJWTCacheTTL
-	}
-}
-
-func applySSHFlagsToLogin(cmd *cobra.Command, req *proto.LoginRequest) {
-	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRootFlag).Changed {
-		req.EnableSSHRoot = &enableSSHRoot
-	}
-	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHSFTPFlag).Changed {
-		req.EnableSSHSFTP = &enableSSHSFTP
-	}
-	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHLocalPortForwardFlag).Changed {
-		req.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding = &enableSSHLocalPortForward
-	}
-	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRemotePortForwardFlag).Changed {
-		req.EnableSSHRemotePortForwarding = &enableSSHRemotePortForward
-	}
-	if cmd.Flag(disableSSHAuthFlag).Changed {
-		req.DisableSSHAuth = &disableSSHAuth
-	}
-	if cmd.Flag(sshJWTCacheTTLFlag).Changed {
-		ttl := int32(sshJWTCacheTTL)
-		req.SshJWTCacheTTL = &ttl
-	}
-}
-
 func setupLoginRequest(providedSetupKey string, customDNSAddressConverted []byte, cmd *cobra.Command) (*proto.LoginRequest, error) {
 	loginRequest := proto.LoginRequest{
 		SetupKey:            providedSetupKey,
@@ -681,14 +648,31 @@ func setupLoginRequest(providedSetupKey string, customDNSAddressConverted []byte
 	if cmd.Flag(serverSSHAllowedFlag).Changed {
 		loginRequest.ServerSSHAllowed = &serverSSHAllowed
 	}
-	if cmd.Flag(serverVNCAllowedFlag).Changed {
-		loginRequest.ServerVNCAllowed = &serverVNCAllowed
-	}
-	if cmd.Flag(disableVNCApprovalFlag).Changed {
-		loginRequest.DisableVNCApproval = &disableVNCApproval
+
+	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRootFlag).Changed {
+		loginRequest.EnableSSHRoot = &enableSSHRoot
 	}
 
-	applySSHFlagsToLogin(cmd, &loginRequest)
+	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHSFTPFlag).Changed {
+		loginRequest.EnableSSHSFTP = &enableSSHSFTP
+	}
+
+	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHLocalPortForwardFlag).Changed {
+		loginRequest.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding = &enableSSHLocalPortForward
+	}
+
+	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRemotePortForwardFlag).Changed {
+		loginRequest.EnableSSHRemotePortForwarding = &enableSSHRemotePortForward
+	}
+
+	if cmd.Flag(disableSSHAuthFlag).Changed {
+		loginRequest.DisableSSHAuth = &disableSSHAuth
+	}
+
+	if cmd.Flag(sshJWTCacheTTLFlag).Changed {
+		sshJWTCacheTTL32 := int32(sshJWTCacheTTL)
+		loginRequest.SshJWTCacheTTL = &sshJWTCacheTTL32
+	}
 
 	if cmd.Flag(disableAutoConnectFlag).Changed {
 		loginRequest.DisableAutoConnect = &autoConnectDisabled

client/cmd/vnc_agent.go

@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
-//go:build windows || (darwin && !ios)
-
-package cmd
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"net"
-	"net/netip"
-	"os"
-
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
-
-	vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
-)
-
-var (
-	vncAgentSocket    string
-	vncAgentTargetUID uint32
-)
-
-func init() {
-	vncAgentCmd.Flags().StringVar(&vncAgentSocket, "socket", "", "Unix-domain socket path the agent listens on (required)")
-	vncAgentCmd.Flags().Uint32Var(&vncAgentTargetUID, "target-uid", 0, "uid the agent should drop privileges to before listening (darwin only; 0 = stay as current uid)")
-	rootCmd.AddCommand(vncAgentCmd)
-}
-
-// vncAgentCmd runs a VNC server inside the user's interactive session,
-// listening on a Unix-domain socket. The NetBird service spawns it: on
-// Windows via CreateProcessAsUser into the console session, on macOS via
-// launchctl asuser into the Aqua session.
-var vncAgentCmd = &cobra.Command{
-	Use:    "vnc-agent",
-	Short:  "Run VNC capture agent (internal, spawned by service)",
-	Hidden: true,
-	RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
-		log.SetReportCaller(true)
-		log.SetFormatter(&log.JSONFormatter{})
-		log.SetOutput(os.Stderr)
-
-		if vncAgentSocket == "" {
-			return fmt.Errorf("--socket is required")
-		}
-
-		token := os.Getenv("NB_VNC_AGENT_TOKEN")
-		if token == "" {
-			return fmt.Errorf("NB_VNC_AGENT_TOKEN not set; agent requires a token from the service")
-		}
-		// Purge the token from env so it doesn't leak via /proc/<pid>/environ.
-		if err := os.Unsetenv("NB_VNC_AGENT_TOKEN"); err != nil {
-			log.Debugf("unset NB_VNC_AGENT_TOKEN: %v", err)
-		}
-
-		// Drop root privileges to the target console user BEFORE creating
-		// the listening socket: keeps a post-auth bug in the encoder /
-		// input / capture paths confined to the user's own privileges
-		// rather than escalating to host root, and makes the daemon's
-		// LOCAL_PEERCRED check see the right uid. No-op on Windows
-		// (both processes run as SYSTEM) and when --target-uid is 0.
-		if vncAgentTargetUID != 0 {
-			if err := dropAgentPrivileges(vncAgentTargetUID); err != nil {
-				return fmt.Errorf("drop privileges to uid %d: %w", vncAgentTargetUID, err)
-			}
-		}
-
-		if err := os.Remove(vncAgentSocket); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
-			log.Debugf("remove stale socket %s: %v", vncAgentSocket, err)
-		}
-		ln, err := net.Listen("unix", vncAgentSocket)
-		if err != nil {
-			return fmt.Errorf("listen on %s: %w", vncAgentSocket, err)
-		}
-		if err := os.Chmod(vncAgentSocket, 0o600); err != nil {
-			log.Debugf("chmod %s: %v", vncAgentSocket, err)
-		}
-
-		capturer, injector, err := newAgentResources()
-		if err != nil {
-			_ = ln.Close()
-			return err
-		}
-		srv := vncserver.New(vncserver.Config{
-			Capturer:      capturer,
-			Injector:      injector,
-			DisableAuth:   true,
-			AgentTokenHex: token,
-			Listener:      ln,
-		})
-
-		if err := srv.Start(cmd.Context(), netip.AddrPort{}, netip.Prefix{}); err != nil {
-			return fmt.Errorf("start vnc server: %w", err)
-		}
-		log.Infof("vnc-agent listening on %s, ready", vncAgentSocket)
-
-		<-cmd.Context().Done()
-		log.Info("vnc-agent context cancelled, shutting down")
-		return srv.Stop()
-	},
-	SilenceUsage: true,
-}

client/cmd/vnc_agent_darwin.go

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-//go:build darwin && !ios
-
-package cmd
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-
-	vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
-)
-
-func newAgentResources() (vncserver.ScreenCapturer, vncserver.InputInjector, error) {
-	capturer := vncserver.NewMacPoller()
-	injector, err := vncserver.NewMacInputInjector()
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("macOS input injector: %w", err)
-	}
-	return capturer, injector, nil
-}

client/cmd/vnc_agent_dropprivs_darwin.go

@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
-//go:build darwin && !ios
-
-package cmd
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"os"
-	"os/user"
-	"strconv"
-	"syscall"
-)
-
-// dropAgentPrivileges drops the vnc-agent process from root (its
-// launchctl-asuser-inherited starting uid) to the target console user
-// before any other initialisation runs. Without this the agent runs as
-// root for the lifetime of the session; any post-auth memory-safety
-// issue in the capture/input/encode paths would then be a root-level
-// RCE on the host instead of a user-level one. Also makes the daemon's
-// LOCAL_PEERCRED check correctly identify the agent as the console user,
-// not as root.
-//
-// Returns an error when the agent is running as a non-root uid that
-// differs from targetUID: non-root can only setuid to itself, so a
-// mismatch here means the spawn went to the wrong session.
-func dropAgentPrivileges(targetUID uint32) error {
-	if targetUID == 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("refusing to keep agent running as root (target uid 0)")
-	}
-	cur := uint32(os.Getuid())
-	if cur == targetUID {
-		return nil
-	}
-	if cur != 0 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("agent uid %d does not match expected %d and we lack root to fix it", cur, targetUID)
-	}
-	// Resolve the target user's real primary group rather than reusing
-	// targetUID as the gid: a user's primary group on macOS is typically
-	// staff(20), not gid==uid. Fail closed if the lookup fails.
-	targetGID, err := primaryGroupID(targetUID)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	// Drop supplementary groups first: setgid alone doesn't touch the
-	// auxiliary group list, leaving root's groups attached would let the
-	// dropped process write to root-only group-writable files.
-	if err := syscall.Setgroups([]int{}); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("setgroups([]): %w", err)
-	}
-	if err := syscall.Setgid(targetGID); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("setgid(%d): %w", targetGID, err)
-	}
-	if os.Getgid() != targetGID || os.Getegid() != targetGID {
-		return fmt.Errorf("setgid verification: gid=%d egid=%d, expected %d", os.Getgid(), os.Getegid(), targetGID)
-	}
-	if err := syscall.Setuid(int(targetUID)); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("setuid(%d): %w", targetUID, err)
-	}
-	if uint32(os.Getuid()) != targetUID || uint32(os.Geteuid()) != targetUID {
-		return fmt.Errorf("setuid verification: uid=%d euid=%d, expected %d", os.Getuid(), os.Geteuid(), targetUID)
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// primaryGroupID resolves the real primary group id of the user with the
-// given uid. Fails closed: a lookup or parse error returns an error so the
-// caller never falls back to using uid as the gid.
-func primaryGroupID(targetUID uint32) (int, error) {
-	u, err := user.LookupId(strconv.Itoa(int(targetUID)))
-	if err != nil {
-		return 0, fmt.Errorf("look up uid %d: %w", targetUID, err)
-	}
-	gid, err := strconv.Atoi(u.Gid)
-	if err != nil {
-		return 0, fmt.Errorf("parse gid %q for uid %d: %w", u.Gid, targetUID, err)
-	}
-	return gid, nil
-}

client/cmd/vnc_agent_dropprivs_darwin_test.go

@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-//go:build darwin && !ios
-
-package cmd
-
-import (
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// TestDropAgentPrivileges_RefusesRootTarget locks in the contract that
-// dropAgentPrivileges must never be a no-op when asked to keep the
-// agent as root (target uid 0). A future caller that passes 0 by
-// mistake would otherwise leave the post-auth attack surface running
-// with full root privileges.
-func TestDropAgentPrivileges_RefusesRootTarget(t *testing.T) {
-	err := dropAgentPrivileges(0)
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected refusal for target uid 0, got nil")
-	}
-	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "root") {
-		t.Fatalf("error should mention root, got: %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestDropAgentPrivileges_NoOpWhenAlreadyTarget covers the dev path
-// where the agent is launched by hand as the target user (no root
-// available, no setuid needed). The helper must succeed silently
-// instead of trying (and failing) a setuid to its current uid.
-func TestDropAgentPrivileges_NoOpWhenAlreadyTarget(t *testing.T) {
-	// Skip when running as root: the early-return path we want to
-	// cover only fires when current uid == target uid.
-	uid := currentUIDForTest()
-	if uid == 0 {
-		t.Skip("test must not run as root; cannot exercise the no-op early-return")
-	}
-	if err := dropAgentPrivileges(uid); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("expected no-op when current uid == target, got: %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestDropAgentPrivileges_RefusesMismatchedNonRoot guards the "non-root
-// caller tries to setuid to a different uid" path: setuid would fail
-// with EPERM anyway, but the helper should surface a clear error
-// before issuing the syscall so a misconfigured spawn (wrong --target-uid
-// flag) is debuggable.
-func TestDropAgentPrivileges_RefusesMismatchedNonRoot(t *testing.T) {
-	uid := currentUIDForTest()
-	if uid == 0 {
-		t.Skip("test must not run as root; covered case requires non-root caller")
-	}
-	err := dropAgentPrivileges(uid + 1)
-	if err == nil {
-		t.Fatal("expected refusal when non-root caller asks to setuid elsewhere")
-	}
-}

client/cmd/vnc_agent_dropprivs_testhelpers_darwin.go

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-//go:build darwin && !ios
-
-package cmd
-
-import "os"
-
-// currentUIDForTest exposes os.Getuid for the darwin dropprivs tests
-// without leaking an os import into the test file itself.
-func currentUIDForTest() uint32 {
-	return uint32(os.Getuid())
-}

client/cmd/vnc_agent_dropprivs_windows.go

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-//go:build windows
-
-package cmd
-
-// dropAgentPrivileges is a no-op on Windows: the agent and the daemon
-// both run as SYSTEM (the daemon spawns the agent into the interactive
-// session via CreateProcessAsUser with an impersonation token, but the
-// resulting process still runs under SYSTEM, not under the user's
-// account). The Windows path relies on the DACL-restricted socket
-// directory, the unpredictable per-spawn socket name, the listen-readiness
-// gate, and the per-spawn token for integrity instead.
-func dropAgentPrivileges(_ uint32) error {
-	return nil
-}

client/cmd/vnc_agent_windows.go

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-//go:build windows
-
-package cmd
-
-import (
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-
-	vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
-)
-
-func newAgentResources() (vncserver.ScreenCapturer, vncserver.InputInjector, error) {
-	sessionID := vncserver.GetCurrentSessionID()
-	log.Infof("VNC agent running in Windows session %d", sessionID)
-	return vncserver.NewDesktopCapturer(), vncserver.NewWindowsInputInjector(), nil
-}

client/cmd/vnc_flags.go

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-package cmd
-
-const (
-	serverVNCAllowedFlag   = "allow-server-vnc"
-	disableVNCApprovalFlag = "disable-vnc-approval"
-)
-
-var (
-	serverVNCAllowed   bool
-	disableVNCApproval bool
-)
-
-func init() {
-	upCmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVar(&serverVNCAllowed, serverVNCAllowedFlag, false, "Allow embedded VNC server on peer")
-	upCmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVar(&disableVNCApproval, disableVNCApprovalFlag, false, "Disable per-connection user approval prompts for the embedded VNC server")
-}

client/configs/configs.go

@@ -11,30 +11,19 @@ import (
 // bundle collector all share one definition.
 const UILogFile = "gui-client.log"
 
-var (
-	// StateDir holds persistent state (config, profiles, install metadata).
-	StateDir string
-	// RuntimeDir holds ephemeral artifacts that should not survive reboot,
-	// such as Unix sockets for daemon and per-session IPC. Empty on
-	// platforms without a conventional /var/run-style location.
-	RuntimeDir string
-)
+var StateDir string
 
 func init() {
+	StateDir = os.Getenv("NB_STATE_DIR")
+	if StateDir != "" {
+		return
+	}
 	switch runtime.GOOS {
 	case "windows":
 		StateDir = filepath.Join(os.Getenv("PROGRAMDATA"), "Netbird")
 	case "darwin", "linux":
 		StateDir = "/var/lib/netbird"
-		RuntimeDir = "/var/run/netbird"
 	case "freebsd", "openbsd", "netbsd", "dragonfly":
 		StateDir = "/var/db/netbird"
-		RuntimeDir = "/var/run/netbird"
-	}
-	if v := os.Getenv("NB_STATE_DIR"); v != "" {
-		StateDir = v
-	}
-	if v := os.Getenv("NB_RUNTIME_DIR"); v != "" {
-		RuntimeDir = v
 	}
 }

client/internal/approval/broker.go

@@ -1,219 +0,0 @@
-// Package approval brokers per-attempt user-accept prompts for inbound
-// remote access (VNC today, SSH and others in the future). A caller pushes
-// a Prompt; the broker emits a SystemEvent on the daemon→UI stream and
-// blocks until the UI calls the daemon's RespondApproval RPC, the per-
-// request timeout fires, or no subscriber is connected. The latter case
-// fails closed so a backgrounded UI cannot silently bypass the gate.
-package approval
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"errors"
-	"fmt"
-	"sync"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/google/uuid"
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
-)
-
-// Metadata keys the broker reserves on the emitted SystemEvent. Callers
-// should not set these themselves; values in Prompt.Metadata that collide
-// are overwritten by the broker.
-const (
-	MetaRequestID = "request_id"
-	MetaKind      = "kind"
-	MetaExpiresAt = "expires_at"
-)
-
-// ShortKeyFingerprint formats a hex-encoded Noise_IK static pubkey as a
-// short, eyeball-able fingerprint to display in the approval dialog.
-// The dashboard-supplied display name attached to a SessionPubKey isn't
-// cryptographically asserted by the connecting client, so the prompt
-// must also show something that IS: the key fingerprint, a hash of
-// the static public key the client just proved possession of during the
-// Noise handshake. Returns the empty string when the input is too short
-// to plausibly be a hex pubkey, so the row is omitted rather than
-// rendered as a misleading partial.
-//
-// Output format: 16 hex chars grouped as XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX (64 bits of
-// fingerprint, resistant to random-prefix collisions and easy for a human
-// to compare with an out-of-band reference).
-func ShortKeyFingerprint(hexKey string) string {
-	if len(hexKey) < 8 {
-		return ""
-	}
-	src := hexKey
-	if len(src) > 16 {
-		src = src[:16]
-	}
-	var out []byte
-	for i, c := range src {
-		if i > 0 && i%4 == 0 {
-			out = append(out, '-')
-		}
-		out = append(out, byte(c))
-	}
-	return string(out)
-}
-
-// Kind values for the well-known prompt subjects. New subsystems should
-// add a constant here so the UI can dispatch on a known string.
-const (
-	KindVNC = "vnc"
-	KindSSH = "ssh"
-)
-
-// DefaultTimeout is the wall-clock window the user has to accept or deny a
-// pending approval before the broker fails closed and returns ErrTimeout.
-// Kept well under typical VNC client and dashboard connection timeouts so
-// the RFB rejection actually reaches the browser instead of racing the
-// browser's own "connection timed out" message.
-const DefaultTimeout = 15 * time.Second
-
-// timeoutValue returns the active timeout. It's a var so tests in this
-// package can shorten the wait without exposing a setter on the public
-// API. Production code always sees DefaultTimeout.
-var timeoutValue = func() time.Duration { return DefaultTimeout }
-
-// ErrNoSubscriber indicates no UI is connected to consume the prompt.
-// The caller must reject the underlying connection (fail-closed).
-var ErrNoSubscriber = errors.New("no UI subscriber connected for approval")
-
-// ErrTimeout indicates the user did not respond within DefaultTimeout.
-var ErrTimeout = errors.New("approval timed out")
-
-// ErrDenied indicates the user explicitly denied the connection.
-var ErrDenied = errors.New("approval denied")
-
-// EventPublisher is the subset of peer.Status used to emit prompts.
-type EventPublisher interface {
-	PublishEvent(
-		severity proto.SystemEvent_Severity,
-		category proto.SystemEvent_Category,
-		msg string,
-		userMsg string,
-		metadata map[string]string,
-	)
-	HasEventSubscribers() bool
-}
-
-// Prompt describes the pending request shown to the user. Kind selects
-// the UI dispatch path (e.g. "vnc", "ssh"). Subject is the human-readable
-// one-liner the UI may show as a title or notification body. Metadata is
-// passed through verbatim and is the subsystem-specific payload (peer
-// name, source IP, mode, etc.).
-type Prompt struct {
-	Kind     string
-	Subject  string
-	Metadata map[string]string
-}
-
-// Decision carries the user's response to an approval prompt. ViewOnly is
-// only meaningful when Accept is true; it lets the host grant the
-// connection but signal the requester that input control is withheld.
-type Decision struct {
-	Accept   bool
-	ViewOnly bool
-}
-
-// Broker holds in-flight approval requests keyed by request ID.
-type Broker struct {
-	pub EventPublisher
-
-	mu      sync.Mutex
-	pending map[string]chan Decision
-}
-
-// New returns a broker that publishes prompts via pub.
-func New(pub EventPublisher) *Broker {
-	return &Broker{
-		pub:     pub,
-		pending: make(map[string]chan Decision),
-	}
-}
-
-// Request emits a SystemEvent for p and blocks until the UI calls Respond,
-// ctx is cancelled, or DefaultTimeout elapses. Returns a Decision when
-// the user replied; ErrDenied / ErrTimeout / ErrNoSubscriber / ctx.Err
-// otherwise. Callers must treat any non-nil error as a deny.
-func (b *Broker) Request(ctx context.Context, p Prompt) (Decision, error) {
-	var zero Decision
-	if b == nil || b.pub == nil {
-		return zero, fmt.Errorf("approval broker not configured")
-	}
-	if !b.pub.HasEventSubscribers() {
-		return zero, ErrNoSubscriber
-	}
-
-	id := uuid.NewString()
-	resp := make(chan Decision, 1)
-
-	b.mu.Lock()
-	b.pending[id] = resp
-	b.mu.Unlock()
-
-	defer b.dropPending(id)
-
-	timeout := timeoutValue()
-	expiresAt := time.Now().Add(timeout)
-	meta := make(map[string]string, len(p.Metadata)+3)
-	for k, v := range p.Metadata {
-		meta[k] = v
-	}
-	meta[MetaRequestID] = id
-	meta[MetaKind] = p.Kind
-	meta[MetaExpiresAt] = expiresAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
-
-	subject := p.Subject
-	if subject == "" {
-		subject = fmt.Sprintf("%s connection requires approval", p.Kind)
-	}
-	b.pub.PublishEvent(proto.SystemEvent_INFO, proto.SystemEvent_APPROVAL, subject, subject, meta)
-	log.Debugf("approval request %s (%s) emitted: %s", id, p.Kind, subject)
-
-	timer := time.NewTimer(timeout)
-	defer timer.Stop()
-
-	select {
-	case d := <-resp:
-		if !d.Accept {
-			return zero, ErrDenied
-		}
-		return d, nil
-	case <-timer.C:
-		return zero, ErrTimeout
-	case <-ctx.Done():
-		return zero, ctx.Err()
-	}
-}
-
-// Respond delivers the user's decision for id. Returns true when a pending
-// request matched and was woken, false when id was unknown or already done.
-func (b *Broker) Respond(id string, d Decision) bool {
-	if b == nil {
-		return false
-	}
-	b.mu.Lock()
-	ch, ok := b.pending[id]
-	if ok {
-		delete(b.pending, id)
-	}
-	b.mu.Unlock()
-	if !ok {
-		return false
-	}
-	select {
-	case ch <- d:
-	default:
-	}
-	return true
-}
-
-func (b *Broker) dropPending(id string) {
-	b.mu.Lock()
-	delete(b.pending, id)
-	b.mu.Unlock()
-}

client/internal/approval/broker_test.go

@@ -1,434 +0,0 @@
-package approval
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"sync"
-	"sync/atomic"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
-)
-
-// fakePublisher records published events and reports whether subscribers
-// are connected. The subscribers flag is the security-critical signal:
-// when false the broker must refuse to emit and the gate must fail closed.
-type fakePublisher struct {
-	mu          sync.Mutex
-	subscribers bool
-	events      []*proto.SystemEvent
-}
-
-func (p *fakePublisher) PublishEvent(
-	severity proto.SystemEvent_Severity,
-	category proto.SystemEvent_Category,
-	msg string,
-	userMsg string,
-	metadata map[string]string,
-) {
-	p.mu.Lock()
-	p.events = append(p.events, &proto.SystemEvent{
-		Severity:    severity,
-		Category:    category,
-		Message:     msg,
-		UserMessage: userMsg,
-		Metadata:    metadata,
-	})
-	p.mu.Unlock()
-}
-
-func (p *fakePublisher) HasEventSubscribers() bool {
-	p.mu.Lock()
-	defer p.mu.Unlock()
-	return p.subscribers
-}
-
-func (p *fakePublisher) lastEvent(t *testing.T) *proto.SystemEvent {
-	t.Helper()
-	p.mu.Lock()
-	defer p.mu.Unlock()
-	require.NotEmpty(t, p.events, "publisher saw no events")
-	return p.events[len(p.events)-1]
-}
-
-func (p *fakePublisher) eventCount() int {
-	p.mu.Lock()
-	defer p.mu.Unlock()
-	return len(p.events)
-}
-
-// TestRequestNoSubscriberFailsClosed is the core fail-closed invariant:
-// when the UI is not subscribed, the broker must refuse without emitting
-// an event or arming a waiter. A regression here is a silent bypass.
-func TestRequestNoSubscriberFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
-	pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: false}
-	b := New(pub)
-
-	_, err := b.Request(context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC, Subject: "test"})
-	assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrNoSubscriber)
-	assert.Equal(t, 0, pub.eventCount(), "no event must be emitted when fail-closed")
-
-	b.mu.Lock()
-	pending := len(b.pending)
-	b.mu.Unlock()
-	assert.Equal(t, 0, pending, "no waiter must be registered on fail-closed")
-}
-
-// TestRequestTimeoutDenies verifies that a request without a UI response
-// returns ErrTimeout (deny) rather than nil (silent accept). Uses a short
-// per-test broker timeout via Respond after the fact to keep the test fast.
-func TestRequestTimeoutDenies(t *testing.T) {
-	// Replace DefaultTimeout for the lifetime of this test.
-	orig := DefaultTimeout
-	defaultTimeout(t, 60*time.Millisecond)
-	defer defaultTimeout(t, orig)
-
-	pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
-	b := New(pub)
-
-	start := time.Now()
-	_, err := b.Request(context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC, Subject: "test"})
-	assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrTimeout, "missing user response must yield ErrTimeout, not nil")
-	assert.GreaterOrEqual(t, time.Since(start), 50*time.Millisecond, "timeout fired prematurely")
-}
-
-// TestRequestDenied returns ErrDenied when the UI responds with false.
-func TestRequestDenied(t *testing.T) {
-	pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
-	b := New(pub)
-
-	var requestID string
-	done := make(chan error, 1)
-	go func() {
-		done <- requestErr(b, context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC, Subject: "test"})
-	}()
-
-	requestID = waitForRequestID(t, pub)
-	require.True(t, b.Respond(requestID, Decision{Accept: false}))
-
-	select {
-	case err := <-done:
-		assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrDenied)
-	case <-time.After(time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("Request did not return after Respond(false)")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestRequestAccepted is the happy path. Failure here doesn't bypass the
-// gate but breaks the feature.
-func TestRequestAccepted(t *testing.T) {
-	pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
-	b := New(pub)
-
-	done := make(chan error, 1)
-	go func() {
-		done <- requestErr(b, context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC, Subject: "test"})
-	}()
-
-	id := waitForRequestID(t, pub)
-	require.True(t, b.Respond(id, Decision{Accept: true}))
-
-	select {
-	case err := <-done:
-		assert.NoError(t, err)
-	case <-time.After(time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("Request did not return after Respond(true)")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestRequestCtxCancelDenies verifies that an upstream cancel (e.g. the
-// engine shutting down mid-prompt) returns the cancel error rather than
-// nil. A nil here would be a silent bypass on shutdown races.
-func TestRequestCtxCancelDenies(t *testing.T) {
-	pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
-	b := New(pub)
-
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-	done := make(chan error, 1)
-	go func() {
-		done <- requestErr(b, ctx, Prompt{Kind: KindVNC, Subject: "test"})
-	}()
-
-	// Wait until the prompt is in flight so cancel races a live waiter.
-	_ = waitForRequestID(t, pub)
-	cancel()
-
-	select {
-	case err := <-done:
-		assert.ErrorIs(t, err, context.Canceled)
-	case <-time.After(time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("Request did not return after ctx cancel")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestRespondUnknownIsNoop ensures a stray RespondApproval RPC cannot
-// affect or accidentally accept any in-flight request whose id it doesn't
-// match. Also confirms it doesn't panic.
-func TestRespondUnknownIsNoop(t *testing.T) {
-	pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
-	b := New(pub)
-
-	// No in-flight prompts: Respond returns false.
-	assert.False(t, b.Respond("does-not-exist", Decision{Accept: true}))
-
-	// With an in-flight prompt, a wrong id still returns false and the
-	// prompt remains armed (eventually timing out as a deny).
-	defaultTimeout(t, 60*time.Millisecond)
-	defer defaultTimeout(t, DefaultTimeout)
-
-	done := make(chan error, 1)
-	go func() {
-		done <- requestErr(b, context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC})
-	}()
-	realID := waitForRequestID(t, pub)
-	assert.False(t, b.Respond("totally-bogus", Decision{Accept: true}), "unknown id must not match")
-	assert.NotEqual(t, "totally-bogus", realID)
-
-	select {
-	case err := <-done:
-		assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrTimeout, "armed prompt must still time out, not accept")
-	case <-time.After(time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("prompt did not resolve")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestRespondAfterTimeoutNoop confirms a late accept response can't
-// retroactively flip a denied (timed-out) request. The dropPending defer
-// in Request must have removed the entry by the time Respond races in.
-func TestRespondAfterTimeoutNoop(t *testing.T) {
-	defaultTimeout(t, 30*time.Millisecond)
-	defer defaultTimeout(t, DefaultTimeout)
-
-	pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
-	b := New(pub)
-
-	done := make(chan error, 1)
-	go func() {
-		done <- requestErr(b, context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC})
-	}()
-	id := waitForRequestID(t, pub)
-
-	select {
-	case err := <-done:
-		require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrTimeout)
-	case <-time.After(time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("prompt did not time out")
-	}
-
-	assert.False(t, b.Respond(id, Decision{Accept: true}), "late respond must be no-op")
-}
-
-// TestRespondDoubleNoop ensures a duplicate ack from the UI doesn't leak
-// past the matched waiter or panic on a closed/full channel.
-func TestRespondDoubleNoop(t *testing.T) {
-	pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
-	b := New(pub)
-
-	done := make(chan error, 1)
-	go func() {
-		done <- requestErr(b, context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC})
-	}()
-	id := waitForRequestID(t, pub)
-	require.True(t, b.Respond(id, Decision{Accept: true}))
-	assert.False(t, b.Respond(id, Decision{Accept: false}), "second response must be no-op")
-
-	select {
-	case err := <-done:
-		assert.NoError(t, err)
-	case <-time.After(time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("prompt did not resolve")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestNilBrokerRequestErrors guards the engine pre-init path where the
-// broker may not yet exist (or its publisher is nil): Request must
-// error, never silently accept.
-func TestNilBrokerRequestErrors(t *testing.T) {
-	var b *Broker
-	_, err := b.Request(context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC})
-	assert.Error(t, err, "nil broker must error, never silently accept")
-
-	b2 := New(nil)
-	_, err = b2.Request(context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC})
-	assert.Error(t, err, "broker with nil publisher must error, never silently accept")
-}
-
-// TestPromptMetadataInjected confirms the broker stamps request_id, kind,
-// and expires_at on the emitted event. The UI relies on these keys; if
-// they are dropped, the user cannot route the prompt and the response
-// path breaks (which fails closed via timeout).
-func TestPromptMetadataInjected(t *testing.T) {
-	pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
-	b := New(pub)
-
-	done := make(chan error, 1)
-	go func() {
-		done <- requestErr(b, context.Background(), Prompt{
-			Kind:     KindVNC,
-			Subject:  "VNC connection from peerA",
-			Metadata: map[string]string{"peer_name": "peerA"},
-		})
-	}()
-
-	id := waitForRequestID(t, pub)
-	ev := pub.lastEvent(t)
-
-	assert.Equal(t, proto.SystemEvent_APPROVAL, ev.Category)
-	assert.Equal(t, KindVNC, ev.Metadata[MetaKind])
-	assert.Equal(t, id, ev.Metadata[MetaRequestID])
-	assert.NotEmpty(t, ev.Metadata[MetaExpiresAt])
-	assert.Equal(t, "peerA", ev.Metadata["peer_name"], "caller metadata must pass through")
-
-	require.True(t, b.Respond(id, Decision{Accept: true}))
-	<-done
-}
-
-// TestConcurrentRequests verifies that two concurrent prompts are tracked
-// independently. A bug that aliases ids would let one Respond unblock
-// the wrong waiter (a silent accept across prompts).
-func TestConcurrentRequests(t *testing.T) {
-	pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
-	b := New(pub)
-
-	const n = 20
-	results := make(chan error, n)
-	for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
-		go func() {
-			results <- requestErr(b, context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC})
-		}()
-	}
-
-	ids := waitForNRequestIDs(t, pub, n)
-	require.Len(t, ids, n)
-
-	// Deny exactly half, accept the rest. Track outcome per id so we can
-	// match each Request's return value against the response we sent.
-	denySet := make(map[string]bool, n)
-	for i, id := range ids {
-		deny := i%2 == 0
-		denySet[id] = deny
-		require.True(t, b.Respond(id, Decision{Accept: !deny}))
-	}
-
-	// Collect all returns and check no nil errors slipped past a deny.
-	var accepted, denied atomic.Int32
-	for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
-		select {
-		case err := <-results:
-			if err == nil {
-				accepted.Add(1)
-			} else {
-				assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrDenied)
-				denied.Add(1)
-			}
-		case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
-			t.Fatalf("only got %d/%d responses", i, n)
-		}
-	}
-	assert.Equal(t, int32(n/2), denied.Load())
-	assert.Equal(t, int32(n/2), accepted.Load())
-}
-
-// waitForRequestID blocks until the publisher sees its next event and
-// returns the request_id stamped on it.
-func waitForRequestID(t *testing.T, pub *fakePublisher) string {
-	t.Helper()
-	deadline := time.Now().Add(2 * time.Second)
-	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
-		pub.mu.Lock()
-		count := len(pub.events)
-		var id string
-		if count > 0 {
-			id = pub.events[count-1].Metadata[MetaRequestID]
-		}
-		pub.mu.Unlock()
-		if id != "" {
-			return id
-		}
-		time.Sleep(2 * time.Millisecond)
-	}
-	t.Fatal("timeout waiting for emitted event")
-	return ""
-}
-
-func waitForNRequestIDs(t *testing.T, pub *fakePublisher, n int) []string {
-	t.Helper()
-	deadline := time.Now().Add(2 * time.Second)
-	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
-		pub.mu.Lock()
-		count := len(pub.events)
-		pub.mu.Unlock()
-		if count >= n {
-			break
-		}
-		time.Sleep(2 * time.Millisecond)
-	}
-	pub.mu.Lock()
-	defer pub.mu.Unlock()
-	out := make([]string, 0, len(pub.events))
-	seen := make(map[string]struct{}, len(pub.events))
-	for _, ev := range pub.events {
-		id := ev.Metadata[MetaRequestID]
-		if id == "" {
-			continue
-		}
-		if _, dup := seen[id]; dup {
-			continue
-		}
-		seen[id] = struct{}{}
-		out = append(out, id)
-	}
-	if len(out) < n {
-		t.Fatalf("only got %d/%d request ids", len(out), n)
-	}
-	return out
-}
-
-// defaultTimeout swaps the broker's per-request wall-clock window so the
-// timeout tests run quickly. Restores the prior value on the next call.
-func defaultTimeout(t *testing.T, d time.Duration) {
-	t.Helper()
-	if d <= 0 {
-		t.Fatal("defaultTimeout must be > 0")
-	}
-	timeoutValue = func() time.Duration { return d }
-}
-
-// requestErr wraps Broker.Request to drop the Decision when tests only
-// care about the error path. Keeps the goroutine bodies tight.
-func requestErr(b *Broker, ctx context.Context, p Prompt) error {
-	_, err := b.Request(ctx, p)
-	return err
-}
-
-// TestRequestViewOnly checks the view-only outcome flows through Request's
-// Decision return without being silently swallowed.
-func TestRequestViewOnly(t *testing.T) {
-	pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
-	b := New(pub)
-
-	type result struct {
-		d   Decision
-		err error
-	}
-	done := make(chan result, 1)
-	go func() {
-		d, err := b.Request(context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC})
-		done <- result{d, err}
-	}()
-
-	id := waitForRequestID(t, pub)
-	require.True(t, b.Respond(id, Decision{Accept: true, ViewOnly: true}))
-
-	select {
-	case r := <-done:
-		assert.NoError(t, r.err)
-		assert.True(t, r.d.Accept)
-		assert.True(t, r.d.ViewOnly, "ViewOnly must survive the round-trip")
-	case <-time.After(time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("view-only request did not resolve")
-	}
-}

client/internal/approval/fingerprint_test.go

@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
-package approval
-
-import "testing"
-
-// TestShortKeyFingerprint locks in the format the VNC approval prompt
-// shows to the user. The fingerprint is the user's only cryptographic
-// anchor against a malicious management server that pushes a spoofed
-// display name, so accidental changes to its format would silently
-// undermine that defence.
-func TestShortKeyFingerprint(t *testing.T) {
-	cases := []struct {
-		name string
-		in   string
-		want string
-	}{
-		{
-			name: "full_32_byte_pubkey",
-			in:   "0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210ffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100",
-			want: "0123-4567-89ab-cdef",
-		},
-		{
-			name: "exactly_16_chars",
-			in:   "0123456789abcdef",
-			want: "0123-4567-89ab-cdef",
-		},
-		{
-			name: "borderline_8_chars",
-			in:   "01234567",
-			want: "0123-4567",
-		},
-		{
-			name: "too_short_returns_empty",
-			in:   "0123",
-			want: "",
-		},
-		{
-			name: "empty_returns_empty",
-			in:   "",
-			want: "",
-		},
-	}
-	for _, tc := range cases {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			got := ShortKeyFingerprint(tc.in)
-			if got != tc.want {
-				t.Fatalf("ShortKeyFingerprint(%q) = %q, want %q", tc.in, got, tc.want)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestShortKeyFingerprint_DistinctKeysDistinctOutputs guards against a
-// formatting bug that would collapse different prefixes onto the same
-// displayed fingerprint and let an attacker substitute their pubkey for
-// a victim's while keeping the prompt visually identical.
-func TestShortKeyFingerprint_DistinctKeysDistinctOutputs(t *testing.T) {
-	a := ShortKeyFingerprint("0123456789abcdef" + "rest_of_pubkey_ignored")
-	b := ShortKeyFingerprint("0123456789abcde0" + "rest_of_pubkey_ignored")
-	if a == b {
-		t.Fatalf("expected distinct outputs for distinct prefixes, both = %q", a)
-	}
-}

client/internal/auth/auth.go

@@ -344,7 +344,6 @@ func (a *Auth) setSystemInfoFlags(info *system.Info) {
 		a.config.RosenpassEnabled,
 		a.config.RosenpassPermissive,
 		a.config.ServerSSHAllowed,
-		a.config.ServerVNCAllowed,
 		a.config.DisableClientRoutes,
 		a.config.DisableServerRoutes,
 		a.config.DisableDNS,

client/internal/connect.go

@@ -113,11 +113,14 @@ func (c *ConnectClient) RunOnAndroid(
 	stateFilePath string,
 	cacheDir string,
 ) error {
+	notifier := tunnelnotifier.New(networkChangeListener, nil)
+	defer notifier.Close()
+
 	// in case of non Android os these variables will be nil
 	mobileDependency := MobileDependency{
 		TunAdapter:            tunAdapter,
 		IFaceDiscover:         iFaceDiscover,
-		NetworkChangeListener: networkChangeListener,
+		NetworkChangeListener: notifier,
 		HostDNSAddresses:      dnsAddresses,
 		DnsReadyListener:      dnsReadyListener,
 		StateFilePath:         stateFilePath,
@@ -611,8 +614,6 @@ func createEngineConfig(key wgtypes.Key, config *profilemanager.Config, peerConf
 		RosenpassEnabled:              config.RosenpassEnabled,
 		RosenpassPermissive:           config.RosenpassPermissive,
 		ServerSSHAllowed:              util.ReturnBoolWithDefaultTrue(config.ServerSSHAllowed),
-		ServerVNCAllowed:              config.ServerVNCAllowed != nil && *config.ServerVNCAllowed,
-		DisableVNCApproval:            config.DisableVNCApproval,
 		EnableSSHRoot:                 config.EnableSSHRoot,
 		EnableSSHSFTP:                 config.EnableSSHSFTP,
 		EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding:  config.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding,
@@ -696,7 +697,6 @@ func loginToManagement(ctx context.Context, client mgm.Client, pubSSHKey []byte,
 		config.RosenpassEnabled,
 		config.RosenpassPermissive,
 		config.ServerSSHAllowed,
-		config.ServerVNCAllowed,
 		config.DisableClientRoutes,
 		config.DisableServerRoutes,
 		config.DisableDNS,

client/internal/debug/debug.go

@@ -694,12 +694,6 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addCommonConfigFields(configContent *strings.Builder)
 	if g.internalConfig.SSHJWTCacheTTL != nil {
 		configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("SSHJWTCacheTTL: %d\n", *g.internalConfig.SSHJWTCacheTTL))
 	}
-	if g.internalConfig.ServerVNCAllowed != nil {
-		configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("ServerVNCAllowed: %v\n", *g.internalConfig.ServerVNCAllowed))
-	}
-	if g.internalConfig.DisableVNCApproval != nil {
-		configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("DisableVNCApproval: %v\n", *g.internalConfig.DisableVNCApproval))
-	}
 
 	configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("DisableClientRoutes: %v\n", g.internalConfig.DisableClientRoutes))
 	configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("DisableServerRoutes: %v\n", g.internalConfig.DisableServerRoutes))

client/internal/debug/debug_test.go

@@ -864,8 +864,6 @@ func TestAddConfig_AllFieldsCovered(t *testing.T) {
 		RosenpassEnabled:              true,
 		RosenpassPermissive:           true,
 		ServerSSHAllowed:              &bTrue,
-		ServerVNCAllowed:              &bTrue,
-		DisableVNCApproval:            &bTrue,
 		EnableSSHRoot:                 &bTrue,
 		EnableSSHSFTP:                 &bTrue,
 		EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding:  &bTrue,

client/internal/dns/interface_index.go

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+package dns
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"net"
+)
+
+func getInterfaceIndex(interfaceName string) (int, error) {
+	iface, err := net.InterfaceByName(interfaceName)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("lookup interface %q: %w", interfaceName, err)
+	}
+
+	return iface.Index, nil
+}

client/internal/dns/interface_index_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+package dns
+
+import (
+	"net"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+func TestGetInterfaceIndexExisting(t *testing.T) {
+	interfaces, err := net.Interfaces()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("list network interfaces: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(interfaces) == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("expected at least one network interface")
+	}
+
+	iface := interfaces[0]
+	index, err := getInterfaceIndex(iface.Name)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("look up existing interface %q: %v", iface.Name, err)
+	}
+	if index != iface.Index {
+		t.Fatalf("expected interface index %d, got %d", iface.Index, index)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestGetInterfaceIndexMissing(t *testing.T) {
+	index, err := getInterfaceIndex("netbird-interface-that-does-not-exist")
+	if index != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected missing interface index to be 0, got %d", index)
+	}
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected missing interface lookup to return an error")
+	}
+}

client/internal/dns/notifier.go

@@ -51,7 +51,5 @@ func (n *notifier) notify() {
 		return
 	}
 
-	go func(l listener.NetworkChangeListener) {
-		l.OnNetworkChanged("")
-	}(n.listener)
+	n.listener.OnNetworkChanged("")
 }

client/internal/dns/server.go

@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ func NewDefaultServerPermanentUpstream(
 	ds.hostsDNSHolder.set(hostsDnsList)
 	ds.permanent = true
 	ds.currentConfig = dnsConfigToHostDNSConfig(config, ds.service.RuntimeIP(), ds.service.RuntimePort())
-	ds.searchDomainNotifier = newNotifier(ds.SearchDomains())
+	ds.searchDomainNotifier = newNotifier(ds.searchDomains())
 	ds.searchDomainNotifier.setListener(listener)
 	setServerDns(ds)
 	return ds
@@ -602,6 +602,12 @@ func (s *DefaultServer) UpdateDNSServer(serial uint64, update nbdns.Config) erro
 }
 
 func (s *DefaultServer) SearchDomains() []string {
+	s.mux.Lock()
+	defer s.mux.Unlock()
+	return s.searchDomains()
+}
+
+func (s *DefaultServer) searchDomains() []string {
 	var searchDomains []string
 
 	for _, dConf := range s.currentConfig.Domains {
@@ -686,7 +692,7 @@ func (s *DefaultServer) applyConfiguration(update nbdns.Config) error {
 	}()
 
 	if s.searchDomainNotifier != nil {
-		s.searchDomainNotifier.onNewSearchDomains(s.SearchDomains())
+		s.searchDomainNotifier.onNewSearchDomains(s.searchDomains())
 	}
 
 	s.updateNSGroupStates(update.NameServerGroups)

client/internal/dns/upstream_ios.go

@@ -130,8 +130,3 @@ func GetClientPrivate(iface privateClientIface, upstreamIP netip.Addr, dialTimeo
 	}
 	return client, nil
 }
-
-func getInterfaceIndex(interfaceName string) (int, error) {
-	iface, err := net.InterfaceByName(interfaceName)
-	return iface.Index, err
-}

client/internal/engine.go

@@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/udpmux"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/acl"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/approval"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/debug"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns"
 	dnsconfig "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns/config"
@@ -136,8 +135,6 @@ type EngineConfig struct {
 	RosenpassPermissive bool
 
 	ServerSSHAllowed              bool
-	ServerVNCAllowed              bool
-	DisableVNCApproval            *bool
 	EnableSSHRoot                 *bool
 	EnableSSHSFTP                 *bool
 	EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding  *bool
@@ -236,9 +233,7 @@ type Engine struct {
 
 	networkMonitor *networkmonitor.NetworkMonitor
 
-	sshServer      sshServer
-	vncSrv         vncServer
-	approvalBroker *approval.Broker
+	sshServer sshServer
 
 	statusRecorder *peer.Status
 
@@ -345,7 +340,6 @@ func NewEngine(
 		TURNs:              []*stun.URI{},
 		networkSerial:      0,
 		statusRecorder:     services.StatusRecorder,
-		approvalBroker:     approval.New(services.StatusRecorder),
 		stateManager:       services.StateManager,
 		portForwardManager: portforward.NewManager(),
 		checks:             services.Checks,
@@ -420,10 +414,6 @@ func (e *Engine) stopLocked() {
 		log.Warnf("failed to stop SSH server: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	if err := e.stopVNCServer(); err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("failed to stop VNC server: %v", err)
-	}
-
 	e.cleanupSSHConfig()
 
 	if e.ingressGatewayMgr != nil {
@@ -582,12 +572,7 @@ func (e *Engine) Start(netbirdConfig *mgmProto.NetbirdConfig, mgmtURL *url.URL)
 	}
 	e.stateManager.Start()
 
-	initialRoutes, dnsConfig, dnsFeatureFlag, err := e.readInitialSettings()
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("read initial settings: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	dnsServer, err := e.newDnsServer(dnsConfig)
+	dnsServer, err := e.newDnsServer()
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("create dns server: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -605,10 +590,8 @@ func (e *Engine) Start(netbirdConfig *mgmProto.NetbirdConfig, mgmtURL *url.URL)
 		WGInterface:         e.wgInterface,
 		StatusRecorder:      e.statusRecorder,
 		RelayManager:        e.relayManager,
-		InitialRoutes:       initialRoutes,
 		StateManager:        e.stateManager,
 		DNSServer:           dnsServer,
-		DNSFeatureFlag:      dnsFeatureFlag,
 		PeerStore:           e.peerStore,
 		DisableClientRoutes: e.config.DisableClientRoutes,
 		DisableServerRoutes: e.config.DisableServerRoutes,
@@ -1254,7 +1237,6 @@ func (e *Engine) applyInfoFlags(info *system.Info) {
 		e.config.RosenpassEnabled,
 		e.config.RosenpassPermissive,
 		&e.config.ServerSSHAllowed,
-		&e.config.ServerVNCAllowed,
 		e.config.DisableClientRoutes,
 		e.config.DisableServerRoutes,
 		e.config.DisableDNS,
@@ -1310,10 +1292,6 @@ func (e *Engine) updateConfig(conf *mgmProto.PeerConfig) error {
 		}
 	}
 
-	if err := e.updateVNC(); err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("failed handling VNC server setup: %v", err)
-	}
-
 	state := e.statusRecorder.GetLocalPeerState()
 	state.IP = e.wgInterface.Address().String()
 	state.IPv6 = e.wgInterface.Address().IPv6String()
@@ -1614,11 +1592,6 @@ func (e *Engine) reconcilePeers(networkMap *mgmProto.NetworkMap) ([]*mgmProto.Re
 		}
 	}
 
-	// VNC auth: always sync, including nil so cleared auth on the management
-	// side is applied locally, and so it isn't skipped on the RemotePeersIsEmpty
-	// cleanup path.
-	e.updateVNCServerAuth(networkMap.GetVncAuth())
-
 	// cleanup request, most likely our peer has been deleted
 	if networkMap.GetRemotePeersIsEmpty() {
 		err := e.removeAllPeers()
@@ -2122,43 +2095,6 @@ func (e *Engine) close() {
 	}
 }
 
-func (e *Engine) readInitialSettings() ([]*route.Route, *nbdns.Config, bool, error) {
-	if runtime.GOOS != "android" {
-		// nolint:nilnil
-		return nil, nil, false, nil
-	}
-
-	info := system.GetInfo(e.ctx)
-	info.SetFlags(
-		e.config.RosenpassEnabled,
-		e.config.RosenpassPermissive,
-		&e.config.ServerSSHAllowed,
-		&e.config.ServerVNCAllowed,
-		e.config.DisableClientRoutes,
-		e.config.DisableServerRoutes,
-		e.config.DisableDNS,
-		e.config.DisableFirewall,
-		e.config.BlockLANAccess,
-		e.config.BlockInbound,
-		e.config.DisableIPv6,
-		e.config.SyncMessageVersion,
-		e.config.EnableSSHRoot,
-		e.config.EnableSSHSFTP,
-		e.config.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding,
-		e.config.EnableSSHRemotePortForwarding,
-		e.config.DisableSSHAuth,
-	)
-
-	netMap, err := e.mgmClient.GetNetworkMap(info)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, nil, false, err
-	}
-	routes := toRoutes(netMap.GetRoutes())
-	dnsCfg := toDNSConfig(netMap.GetDNSConfig(), e.wgInterface.Address())
-	dnsFeatureFlag := toDNSFeatureFlag(netMap)
-	return routes, &dnsCfg, dnsFeatureFlag, nil
-}
-
 func (e *Engine) newWgIface() (*iface.WGIface, error) {
 	transportNet, err := e.newStdNet()
 	if err != nil {
@@ -2193,7 +2129,7 @@ func (e *Engine) newWgIface() (*iface.WGIface, error) {
 func (e *Engine) wgInterfaceCreate() (err error) {
 	switch runtime.GOOS {
 	case "android":
-		err = e.wgInterface.CreateOnAndroid(e.routeManager.InitialRouteRange(), e.dnsServer.DnsIP().String(), e.dnsServer.SearchDomains())
+		err = e.wgInterface.CreateOnAndroid(e.routeManager.CurrentRouteRange(), e.dnsServer.DnsIP().String(), e.dnsServer.SearchDomains())
 	case "ios":
 		e.mobileDep.NetworkChangeListener.SetInterfaceIP(e.config.WgAddr.String())
 		if e.config.WgAddr.HasIPv6() {
@@ -2206,7 +2142,7 @@ func (e *Engine) wgInterfaceCreate() (err error) {
 	return err
 }
 
-func (e *Engine) newDnsServer(dnsConfig *nbdns.Config) (dns.Server, error) {
+func (e *Engine) newDnsServer() (dns.Server, error) {
 	// due to tests where we are using a mocked version of the DNS server
 	if e.dnsServer != nil {
 		return e.dnsServer, nil
@@ -2218,7 +2154,7 @@ func (e *Engine) newDnsServer(dnsConfig *nbdns.Config) (dns.Server, error) {
 			e.ctx,
 			e.wgInterface,
 			e.mobileDep.HostDNSAddresses,
-			*dnsConfig,
+			nbdns.Config{},
 			e.mobileDep.NetworkChangeListener,
 			e.statusRecorder,
 			e.config.DisableDNS,
@@ -2937,16 +2873,3 @@ func decodeRelayIP(b []byte) netip.Addr {
 	}
 	return ip.Unmap()
 }
-
-// RespondApproval relays the user's decision for a pending approval to
-// the broker. viewOnly is honoured only when accept is true. Returns
-// true when the request_id matched a live prompt.
-func (e *Engine) RespondApproval(requestID string, accept, viewOnly bool) bool {
-	if e == nil || e.approvalBroker == nil {
-		return false
-	}
-	return e.approvalBroker.Respond(requestID, approval.Decision{
-		Accept:   accept,
-		ViewOnly: accept && viewOnly,
-	})
-}

client/internal/engine_ssh.go

@@ -12,10 +12,10 @@ import (
 	firewallManager "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/netstack"
 	nftypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/netflow/types"
+	sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/auth"
 	sshconfig "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/config"
 	sshserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/server"
 	mgmProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
-	sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sessionauth"
 	sshuserhash "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sshauth"
 )
 
@@ -237,18 +237,22 @@ func (e *Engine) startSSHServer(jwtConfig *sshserver.JWTConfig) error {
 		return errors.New("wg interface not initialized")
 	}
 
-	wgAddr := e.wgInterface.Address()
 	serverConfig := &sshserver.Config{
-		HostKeyPEM:        e.config.SSHKey,
-		JWT:               jwtConfig,
-		NetstackNet:       e.wgInterface.GetNet(),
-		NetworkValidation: wgAddr,
+		HostKeyPEM: e.config.SSHKey,
+		JWT:        jwtConfig,
 	}
 	server := sshserver.New(serverConfig)
 
+	wgAddr := e.wgInterface.Address()
+	server.SetNetworkValidation(wgAddr)
+
 	netbirdIP := wgAddr.IP
 	listenAddr := netip.AddrPortFrom(netbirdIP, sshserver.InternalSSHPort)
 
+	if netstackNet := e.wgInterface.GetNet(); netstackNet != nil {
+		server.SetNetstackNet(netstackNet)
+	}
+
 	e.configureSSHServer(server)
 
 	if err := server.Start(e.ctx, listenAddr); err != nil {

client/internal/engine_tunsettings.go

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+package internal
+
+func (e *Engine) TunSettings() ([]string, []string) {
+	e.syncMsgMux.Lock()
+	routeManager := e.routeManager
+	dnsServer := e.dnsServer
+	e.syncMsgMux.Unlock()
+
+	var routes []string
+	if routeManager != nil {
+		routes = routeManager.CurrentRouteRange()
+	}
+
+	var searchDomains []string
+	if dnsServer != nil {
+		searchDomains = dnsServer.SearchDomains()
+	}
+
+	return routes, searchDomains
+}

client/internal/engine_vnc.go

@@ -1,329 +0,0 @@
-//go:build !js && !ios && !android
-
-package internal
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"errors"
-	"fmt"
-	"net/netip"
-
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-
-	firewallManager "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/approval"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/metrics"
-	nftypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/netflow/types"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc"
-	vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
-	mgmProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
-	sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sessionauth"
-	sshuserhash "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sshauth"
-)
-
-type vncServer interface {
-	Start(ctx context.Context, addr netip.AddrPort, network netip.Prefix) error
-	AddListener(ctx context.Context, addr netip.AddrPort, network netip.Prefix) error
-	Stop() error
-	ActiveSessions() []vncserver.ActiveSessionInfo
-}
-
-func (e *Engine) setupVNCPortRedirection() error {
-	if e.firewall == nil || e.wgInterface == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-
-	localAddr := e.wgInterface.Address().IP
-	if !localAddr.IsValid() {
-		return errors.New("invalid local NetBird address")
-	}
-
-	if err := e.firewall.AddInboundDNAT(localAddr, firewallManager.ProtocolTCP, vnc.ExternalPort, vnc.InternalPort); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("add VNC port redirection: %w", err)
-	}
-	log.Infof("VNC port redirection: %s:%d -> %s:%d", localAddr, vnc.ExternalPort, localAddr, vnc.InternalPort)
-
-	if wgAddr := e.wgInterface.Address(); wgAddr.HasIPv6() {
-		v6 := wgAddr.IPv6
-		if err := e.firewall.AddInboundDNAT(v6, firewallManager.ProtocolTCP, vnc.ExternalPort, vnc.InternalPort); err != nil {
-			log.Warnf("failed to add IPv6 VNC port redirection: %v", err)
-		} else {
-			log.Infof("VNC port redirection: [%s]:%d -> [%s]:%d", v6, vnc.ExternalPort, v6, vnc.InternalPort)
-		}
-	}
-
-	return nil
-}
-
-func (e *Engine) cleanupVNCPortRedirection() error {
-	if e.firewall == nil || e.wgInterface == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-
-	localAddr := e.wgInterface.Address().IP
-	if !localAddr.IsValid() {
-		return errors.New("invalid local NetBird address")
-	}
-
-	if err := e.firewall.RemoveInboundDNAT(localAddr, firewallManager.ProtocolTCP, vnc.ExternalPort, vnc.InternalPort); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("remove VNC port redirection: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	if wgAddr := e.wgInterface.Address(); wgAddr.HasIPv6() {
-		if err := e.firewall.RemoveInboundDNAT(wgAddr.IPv6, firewallManager.ProtocolTCP, vnc.ExternalPort, vnc.InternalPort); err != nil {
-			log.Debugf("failed to remove IPv6 VNC port redirection: %v", err)
-		}
-	}
-
-	return nil
-}
-
-// updateVNC handles starting/stopping the VNC server based on the config flag.
-func (e *Engine) updateVNC() error {
-	if !e.config.ServerVNCAllowed {
-		if e.vncSrv != nil {
-			log.Info("VNC server disabled, stopping")
-		}
-		return e.stopVNCServer()
-	}
-
-	if e.config.BlockInbound {
-		log.Info("VNC server disabled because inbound connections are blocked")
-		return e.stopVNCServer()
-	}
-
-	if e.vncSrv != nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-
-	return e.startVNCServer()
-}
-
-func (e *Engine) startVNCServer() error {
-	if e.wgInterface == nil {
-		return errors.New("wg interface not initialized")
-	}
-
-	capturer, injector, ok := newPlatformVNC()
-	if !ok {
-		log.Debug("VNC server not supported on this platform")
-		return nil
-	}
-
-	netbirdIP := e.wgInterface.Address().IP
-
-	var sessionRecorder func(vncserver.SessionTick)
-	if e.clientMetrics != nil {
-		sessionRecorder = func(t vncserver.SessionTick) {
-			e.clientMetrics.RecordVNCSessionTick(e.ctx, metrics.VNCSessionTick{
-				Period:        t.Period,
-				BytesOut:      t.BytesOut,
-				Writes:        t.Writes,
-				FBUs:          t.FBUs,
-				MaxFBUBytes:   t.MaxFBUBytes,
-				MaxFBURects:   t.MaxFBURects,
-				MaxWriteBytes: t.MaxWriteBytes,
-				WriteNanos:    t.WriteNanos,
-			})
-		}
-	}
-	serviceMode := vncNeedsServiceMode()
-	if serviceMode {
-		log.Info("VNC: running as system service, enabling service mode (per-session agent proxy)")
-	}
-	requireApproval := e.config.DisableVNCApproval == nil || !*e.config.DisableVNCApproval
-	srv := vncserver.New(vncserver.Config{
-		Capturer:        capturer,
-		Injector:        injector,
-		IdentityKey:     e.config.WgPrivateKey[:],
-		ServiceMode:     serviceMode,
-		SessionRecorder: sessionRecorder,
-		NetstackNet:     e.wgInterface.GetNet(),
-		RequireApproval: requireApproval,
-		Approver:        &vncApprover{broker: e.approvalBroker, statusRecorder: e.statusRecorder},
-		// Session start/stop is invisible to the peer status recorder, so push a
-		// snapshot ourselves; otherwise the UI's session list goes stale until an
-		// unrelated peer change happens to fire one.
-		OnSessionsChanged: e.statusRecorder.NotifyStateChange,
-	})
-
-	listenAddr := netip.AddrPortFrom(netbirdIP, vnc.InternalPort)
-	network := e.wgInterface.Address().Network
-	if err := srv.Start(e.ctx, listenAddr, network); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("start VNC server: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	if wgAddr := e.wgInterface.Address(); wgAddr.HasIPv6() {
-		v6Addr := netip.AddrPortFrom(wgAddr.IPv6, vnc.InternalPort)
-		if err := srv.AddListener(e.ctx, v6Addr, wgAddr.IPv6Net); err != nil {
-			log.Warnf("failed to add IPv6 VNC listener: %v", err)
-		}
-	}
-
-	e.vncSrv = srv
-
-	if netstackNet := e.wgInterface.GetNet(); netstackNet != nil {
-		if registrar, ok := e.firewall.(interface {
-			RegisterNetstackService(protocol nftypes.Protocol, port uint16)
-		}); ok {
-			registrar.RegisterNetstackService(nftypes.TCP, vnc.InternalPort)
-			log.Debugf("registered VNC service with netstack for TCP:%d", vnc.InternalPort)
-		}
-	}
-
-	if err := e.setupVNCPortRedirection(); err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("setup VNC port redirection: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	log.Info("VNC server enabled")
-	return nil
-}
-
-// updateVNCServerAuth updates VNC fine-grained access control from management.
-// A nil vncAuth clears all authorized users and session pubkeys so management
-// can revoke access by omitting the field on the next sync.
-func (e *Engine) updateVNCServerAuth(vncAuth *mgmProto.VNCAuth) {
-	if e.vncSrv == nil {
-		return
-	}
-
-	vncSrv, ok := e.vncSrv.(*vncserver.Server)
-	if !ok {
-		return
-	}
-
-	if vncAuth == nil {
-		vncSrv.UpdateVNCAuth(&sshauth.Config{})
-		return
-	}
-
-	protoUsers := vncAuth.GetAuthorizedUsers()
-	authorizedUsers := make([]sshuserhash.UserIDHash, len(protoUsers))
-	for i, hash := range protoUsers {
-		if len(hash) != 16 {
-			log.Warnf("invalid VNC auth hash length %d, expected 16", len(hash))
-			return
-		}
-		authorizedUsers[i] = sshuserhash.UserIDHash(hash)
-	}
-
-	machineUsers := make(map[string][]uint32)
-	for osUser, indexes := range vncAuth.GetMachineUsers() {
-		machineUsers[osUser] = indexes.GetIndexes()
-	}
-
-	sessionPubKeys := make([]sshauth.SessionPubKey, 0, len(vncAuth.GetSessionPubKeys()))
-	for _, pk := range vncAuth.GetSessionPubKeys() {
-		pub := pk.GetPubKey()
-		if len(pub) != 32 {
-			log.Warnf("VNC session pubkey wrong length %d", len(pub))
-			continue
-		}
-		hash := pk.GetUserIdHash()
-		if len(hash) != 16 {
-			log.Warnf("VNC session user id hash wrong length %d", len(hash))
-			continue
-		}
-		sessionPubKeys = append(sessionPubKeys, sshauth.SessionPubKey{
-			PubKey:      pub,
-			UserIDHash:  sshuserhash.UserIDHash(hash),
-			DisplayName: pk.GetDisplayName(),
-		})
-	}
-
-	vncSrv.UpdateVNCAuth(&sshauth.Config{
-		AuthorizedUsers: authorizedUsers,
-		MachineUsers:    machineUsers,
-		SessionPubKeys:  sessionPubKeys,
-	})
-}
-
-// GetVNCServerStatus returns whether the VNC server is running and the list
-// of active VNC sessions. The pointer is captured under syncMsgMux so a
-// concurrent updateVNC/stopVNCServer cannot swap it out between the nil
-// check and the ActiveSessions call.
-func (e *Engine) GetVNCServerStatus() (enabled bool, sessions []vncserver.ActiveSessionInfo) {
-	e.syncMsgMux.Lock()
-	vncSrv := e.vncSrv
-	e.syncMsgMux.Unlock()
-	if vncSrv == nil {
-		return false, nil
-	}
-	return true, vncSrv.ActiveSessions()
-}
-
-func (e *Engine) stopVNCServer() error {
-	if e.vncSrv == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-
-	if err := e.cleanupVNCPortRedirection(); err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("cleanup VNC port redirection: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	if e.wgInterface != nil && e.wgInterface.GetNet() != nil {
-		if registrar, ok := e.firewall.(interface {
-			UnregisterNetstackService(protocol nftypes.Protocol, port uint16)
-		}); ok {
-			registrar.UnregisterNetstackService(nftypes.TCP, vnc.InternalPort)
-		}
-	}
-
-	log.Info("stopping VNC server")
-	err := e.vncSrv.Stop()
-	e.vncSrv = nil
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("stop VNC server: %w", err)
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// vncApprover adapts the generic approval.Broker for the VNC server.
-type vncApprover struct {
-	broker         *approval.Broker
-	statusRecorder *peer.Status
-}
-
-func (a *vncApprover) Request(ctx context.Context, info vncserver.ApprovalInfo) (vncserver.ApprovalDecision, error) {
-	// Resolve the source overlay IP to a peer FQDN for the prompt label.
-	if info.PeerName == "" && info.SourceIP != "" && a.statusRecorder != nil {
-		if fqdn, ok := a.statusRecorder.PeerByIP(info.SourceIP); ok {
-			info.PeerName = fqdn
-		}
-	}
-	subject := fmt.Sprintf("VNC connection from %s", displayPeer(info))
-	meta := map[string]string{
-		"peer_name":   info.PeerName,
-		"peer_pubkey": info.PeerPubKey,
-		"source_ip":   info.SourceIP,
-		"mode":        info.Mode,
-		"username":    info.Username,
-		"initiator":   info.Initiator,
-	}
-	d, err := a.broker.Request(ctx, approval.Prompt{
-		Kind:     approval.KindVNC,
-		Subject:  subject,
-		Metadata: meta,
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		return vncserver.ApprovalDecision{}, err
-	}
-	return vncserver.ApprovalDecision{ViewOnly: d.ViewOnly}, nil
-}
-
-func displayPeer(info vncserver.ApprovalInfo) string {
-	if info.Initiator != "" {
-		return info.Initiator
-	}
-	if info.PeerName != "" {
-		return info.PeerName
-	}
-	if info.SourceIP != "" {
-		return info.SourceIP
-	}
-	if info.PeerPubKey != "" {
-		return info.PeerPubKey
-	}
-	return "unknown peer"
-}

client/internal/engine_vnc_console_freebsd.go

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-//go:build freebsd
-
-package internal
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-
-	vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
-)
-
-// newConsoleVNC builds the FreeBSD console fallback: vt(4) framebuffer
-// for capture, /dev/uinput for input. The uinput device requires the
-// `uinput` kernel module (`kldload uinput`); without it, input init
-// fails and we drop to a stub injector so the user still gets a
-// view-only screen mirror.
-func newConsoleVNC() (vncserver.ScreenCapturer, vncserver.InputInjector, error) {
-	poller := vncserver.NewFBPoller("")
-	w, h := poller.Width(), poller.Height()
-	if w == 0 || h == 0 {
-		poller.Close()
-		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("vt framebuffer init failed (vt may not allow mmap on this driver)")
-	}
-	if inj, err := vncserver.NewUInputInjector(w, h); err == nil {
-		return poller, inj, nil
-	} else {
-		log.Infof("VNC console: uinput unavailable (%v); view-only mode. Run `kldload uinput` to enable input.", err)
-		return poller, &vncserver.StubInputInjector{}, nil
-	}
-}

client/internal/engine_vnc_console_linux.go

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-//go:build linux && !android
-
-package internal
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-
-	vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
-)
-
-// newConsoleVNC builds a framebuffer + uinput VNC backend for boxes
-// without a running X server. Used as the auto-fallback when
-// newPlatformVNC can't reach X. Returns an error when /dev/fb0 or
-// /dev/uinput aren't usable so the caller can drop back to a stub.
-func newConsoleVNC() (vncserver.ScreenCapturer, vncserver.InputInjector, error) {
-	poller := vncserver.NewFBPoller("")
-	w, h := poller.Width(), poller.Height()
-	if w == 0 || h == 0 {
-		poller.Close()
-		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("framebuffer capturer init failed (is /dev/fb0 readable?)")
-	}
-	inj, err := vncserver.NewUInputInjector(w, h)
-	if err != nil {
-		log.Debugf("uinput unavailable, falling back to view-only VNC: %v", err)
-		return poller, &vncserver.StubInputInjector{}, nil
-	}
-	return poller, inj, nil
-}

client/internal/engine_vnc_darwin.go

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-//go:build darwin && !ios
-
-package internal
-
-import (
-	"os"
-
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-
-	vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
-)
-
-func newPlatformVNC() (vncserver.ScreenCapturer, vncserver.InputInjector, bool) {
-	capturer := vncserver.NewMacPoller()
-	// Prompt for Screen Recording at server-enable time rather than first
-	// client-connect. The native prompt is far easier for users to act on
-	// in the moment they toggled VNC on than later when "the screen looks
-	// like wallpaper" would otherwise be the only clue.
-	vncserver.PrimeScreenCapturePermission()
-	injector, err := vncserver.NewMacInputInjector()
-	if err != nil {
-		log.Debugf("VNC: macOS input injector: %v", err)
-		return capturer, &vncserver.StubInputInjector{}, true
-	}
-	return capturer, injector, true
-}
-
-// vncNeedsServiceMode reports whether the running process is a system
-// LaunchDaemon (root, parented by launchd). Daemons sit in the global
-// bootstrap namespace and cannot talk to WindowServer; we route capture
-// through a per-user agent in that case.
-func vncNeedsServiceMode() bool {
-	return os.Geteuid() == 0 && os.Getppid() == 1
-}

client/internal/engine_vnc_stub.go

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-//go:build js || ios || android
-
-package internal
-
-import (
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-
-	mgmProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
-)
-
-type vncServer interface{}
-
-func (e *Engine) updateVNC() error { return nil }
-
-func (e *Engine) updateVNCServerAuth(auth *mgmProto.VNCAuth) {
-	if auth == nil {
-		return
-	}
-	log.Debugf("ignoring VNC auth push on platform without a VNC server: %d session pubkeys, %d authorized users",
-		len(auth.GetSessionPubKeys()), len(auth.GetAuthorizedUsers()))
-}
-
-func (e *Engine) stopVNCServer() error { return nil }

client/internal/engine_vnc_windows.go

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-//go:build windows
-
-package internal
-
-import vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
-
-func newPlatformVNC() (vncserver.ScreenCapturer, vncserver.InputInjector, bool) {
-	return vncserver.NewDesktopCapturer(), vncserver.NewWindowsInputInjector(), true
-}
-
-func vncNeedsServiceMode() bool {
-	return vncserver.GetCurrentSessionID() == 0
-}

client/internal/engine_vnc_x11.go

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-//go:build (linux && !android) || freebsd
-
-package internal
-
-import (
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-
-	vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
-)
-
-func newPlatformVNC() (vncserver.ScreenCapturer, vncserver.InputInjector, bool) {
-	// Prefer X11 when an X server is reachable. NewX11InputInjector probes
-	// DISPLAY (and /proc) eagerly, so a non-nil error here means no X.
-	injector, err := vncserver.NewX11InputInjector("", "", "")
-	if err == nil {
-		return vncserver.NewX11Poller("", ""), injector, true
-	}
-	log.Debugf("VNC: X11 not available: %v", err)
-
-	// Fallback for headless / pre-X states (kernel console, login manager
-	// without X, physical server in recovery): stream the framebuffer and
-	// inject input via /dev/uinput.
-	consoleCap, consoleInj, err := newConsoleVNC()
-	if err == nil {
-		log.Infof("VNC: using framebuffer console capture (%dx%d)", consoleCap.Width(), consoleCap.Height())
-		return consoleCap, consoleInj, true
-	}
-	log.Debugf("VNC: framebuffer console fallback unavailable: %v", err)
-
-	return &vncserver.StubCapturer{}, &vncserver.StubInputInjector{}, false
-}
-
-func vncNeedsServiceMode() bool {
-	return false
-}

client/internal/metrics/influxdb.go

@@ -120,36 +120,6 @@ func (m *influxDBMetrics) RecordSyncDuration(_ context.Context, agentInfo AgentI
 	m.trimLocked()
 }
 
-func (m *influxDBMetrics) RecordVNCSessionTick(_ context.Context, agentInfo AgentInfo, tick VNCSessionTick) {
-	tags := fmt.Sprintf("deployment_type=%s,version=%s,os=%s,arch=%s,peer_id=%s",
-		agentInfo.DeploymentType.String(),
-		agentInfo.Version,
-		agentInfo.OS,
-		agentInfo.Arch,
-		agentInfo.peerID,
-	)
-
-	m.mu.Lock()
-	defer m.mu.Unlock()
-
-	m.samples = append(m.samples, influxSample{
-		measurement: "netbird_vnc_traffic",
-		tags:        tags,
-		fields: map[string]float64{
-			"period_seconds":     tick.Period.Seconds(),
-			"bytes_out":          float64(tick.BytesOut),
-			"writes":             float64(tick.Writes),
-			"fbus":               float64(tick.FBUs),
-			"max_fbu_bytes":      float64(tick.MaxFBUBytes),
-			"max_fbu_rects":      float64(tick.MaxFBURects),
-			"max_write_bytes":    float64(tick.MaxWriteBytes),
-			"write_time_seconds": float64(tick.WriteNanos) / 1e9,
-		},
-		timestamp: time.Now(),
-	})
-	m.trimLocked()
-}
-
 func (m *influxDBMetrics) RecordSyncPhase(_ context.Context, agentInfo AgentInfo, phase string, duration time.Duration) {
 	tags := fmt.Sprintf("deployment_type=%s,version=%s,os=%s,arch=%s,peer_id=%s,phase=%s",
 		agentInfo.DeploymentType.String(),

client/internal/metrics/metrics.go

@@ -63,11 +63,6 @@ type metricsImplementation interface {
 	// RecordLoginDuration records how long the login to management took
 	RecordLoginDuration(ctx context.Context, agentInfo AgentInfo, duration time.Duration, success bool)
 
-	// RecordVNCSessionTick records a periodic snapshot of one VNC
-	// session's wire activity. Called once per metricsConn tick interval
-	// (and once at session close), only when the tick saw activity.
-	RecordVNCSessionTick(ctx context.Context, agentInfo AgentInfo, tick VNCSessionTick)
-
 	// Export exports metrics in InfluxDB line protocol format
 	Export(w io.Writer) error
 
@@ -87,21 +82,6 @@ type ClientMetrics struct {
 	pushCancel context.CancelFunc
 }
 
-// VNCSessionTick is one sampling slice of a VNC session's wire activity.
-// BytesOut / Writes / FBUs / WriteNanos are deltas observed during this
-// tick; Max* fields are the high-water marks observed during the tick.
-// Period is the wall-clock duration the deltas cover.
-type VNCSessionTick struct {
-	Period        time.Duration
-	BytesOut      uint64
-	Writes        uint64
-	FBUs          uint64
-	MaxFBUBytes   uint64
-	MaxFBURects   uint64
-	MaxWriteBytes uint64
-	WriteNanos    uint64
-}
-
 // ConnectionStageTimestamps holds timestamps for each connection stage
 type ConnectionStageTimestamps struct {
 	SignalingReceived  time.Time // First signal received from remote peer (both initial and reconnection)
@@ -151,18 +131,6 @@ func (c *ClientMetrics) RecordSyncDuration(ctx context.Context, duration time.Du
 	c.impl.RecordSyncDuration(ctx, agentInfo, duration)
 }
 
-// RecordVNCSessionTick records a periodic snapshot of one VNC session.
-func (c *ClientMetrics) RecordVNCSessionTick(ctx context.Context, tick VNCSessionTick) {
-	if c == nil {
-		return
-	}
-	c.mu.RLock()
-	agentInfo := c.agentInfo
-	c.mu.RUnlock()
-
-	c.impl.RecordVNCSessionTick(ctx, agentInfo, tick)
-}
-
 // RecordSyncPhase records the duration of a single sub-phase of sync processing
 func (c *ClientMetrics) RecordSyncPhase(ctx context.Context, phase string, duration time.Duration) {
 	if c == nil {

client/internal/metrics/push_test.go

@@ -76,9 +76,6 @@ func (m *mockMetrics) RecordSyncPhase(_ context.Context, _ AgentInfo, _ string,
 func (m *mockMetrics) RecordLoginDuration(_ context.Context, _ AgentInfo, _ time.Duration, _ bool) {
 }
 
-func (m *mockMetrics) RecordVNCSessionTick(_ context.Context, _ AgentInfo, _ VNCSessionTick) {
-}
-
 func (m *mockMetrics) Export(w io.Writer) error {
 	if m.exportData != "" {
 		_, err := w.Write([]byte(m.exportData))

client/internal/peer/status.go

@@ -1330,15 +1330,6 @@ func (d *Status) SubscribeToEvents() *EventSubscription {
 	}
 }
 
-// HasEventSubscribers reports whether any client is currently subscribed
-// to the daemon's SystemEvent stream. Used by the VNC approval broker to
-// fail closed when no UI is connected to prompt the user.
-func (d *Status) HasEventSubscribers() bool {
-	d.eventMux.Lock()
-	defer d.eventMux.Unlock()
-	return len(d.eventStreams) > 0
-}
-
 // UnsubscribeFromEvents removes an event subscription
 func (d *Status) UnsubscribeFromEvents(sub *EventSubscription) {
 	if sub == nil {

client/internal/profilemanager/config.go

@@ -70,8 +70,6 @@ type ConfigInput struct {
 	StateFilePath                 string
 	PreSharedKey                  *string
 	ServerSSHAllowed              *bool
-	ServerVNCAllowed              *bool
-	DisableVNCApproval            *bool
 	EnableSSHRoot                 *bool
 	EnableSSHSFTP                 *bool
 	EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding  *bool
@@ -126,8 +124,6 @@ type Config struct {
 	RosenpassEnabled              bool
 	RosenpassPermissive           bool
 	ServerSSHAllowed              *bool
-	ServerVNCAllowed              *bool
-	DisableVNCApproval            *bool
 	EnableSSHRoot                 *bool
 	EnableSSHSFTP                 *bool
 	EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding  *bool
@@ -460,33 +456,6 @@ func (config *Config) apply(input ConfigInput) (updated bool, err error) {
 		updated = true
 	}
 
-	if input.ServerVNCAllowed != nil {
-		if config.ServerVNCAllowed == nil || *input.ServerVNCAllowed != *config.ServerVNCAllowed {
-			if *input.ServerVNCAllowed {
-				log.Infof("enabling VNC server")
-			} else {
-				log.Infof("disabling VNC server")
-			}
-			config.ServerVNCAllowed = input.ServerVNCAllowed
-			updated = true
-		}
-	} else if config.ServerVNCAllowed == nil {
-		config.ServerVNCAllowed = util.False()
-		updated = true
-	}
-
-	if input.DisableVNCApproval != nil {
-		if config.DisableVNCApproval == nil || *input.DisableVNCApproval != *config.DisableVNCApproval {
-			if *input.DisableVNCApproval {
-				log.Infof("disabling VNC connection approval prompt")
-			} else {
-				log.Infof("enabling VNC connection approval prompt")
-			}
-			config.DisableVNCApproval = input.DisableVNCApproval
-			updated = true
-		}
-	}
-
 	if input.EnableSSHRoot != nil && (config.EnableSSHRoot == nil || *input.EnableSSHRoot != *config.EnableSSHRoot) {
 		if *input.EnableSSHRoot {
 			log.Infof("enabling SSH root login")
@@ -743,8 +712,6 @@ func (config *Config) applyMDMPolicy(policy *mdm.Policy) {
 	}
 
 	applyBool(mdm.KeyAllowServerSSH, func(v bool) { bv := v; config.ServerSSHAllowed = &bv })
-	applyBool(mdm.KeyAllowServerVNC, func(v bool) { bv := v; config.ServerVNCAllowed = &bv })
-	applyBool(mdm.KeyDisableVNCApproval, func(v bool) { bv := v; config.DisableVNCApproval = &bv })
 	applyBool(mdm.KeyDisableClientRoutes, func(v bool) { config.DisableClientRoutes = v })
 	applyBool(mdm.KeyDisableServerRoutes, func(v bool) { config.DisableServerRoutes = v })
 	applyBool(mdm.KeyBlockInbound, func(v bool) { config.BlockInbound = v })

client/internal/profilemanager/config_mdm_test.go

@@ -130,36 +130,6 @@ func TestApply_MDMBoolKeysOverrideOnDiskValue(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.True(t, cfg.Policy().HasKey(mdm.KeyRosenpassEnabled))
 }
 
-func TestApply_MDMVNCKeys(t *testing.T) {
-	tmp := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
-
-	// Seed without MDM: VNC off, approval prompt on.
-	withMDMPolicy(t, mdm.NewPolicy(nil))
-	_, err := UpdateOrCreateConfig(ConfigInput{
-		ConfigPath:         tmp,
-		ServerVNCAllowed:   boolPtr(false),
-		DisableVNCApproval: boolPtr(false),
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	// MDM enforces VNC on and disables the approval prompt.
-	withMDMPolicy(t, mdm.NewPolicy(map[string]any{
-		mdm.KeyAllowServerVNC:     true,
-		mdm.KeyDisableVNCApproval: true,
-	}))
-
-	cfg, err := UpdateOrCreateConfig(ConfigInput{ConfigPath: tmp})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.NotNil(t, cfg)
-
-	require.NotNil(t, cfg.ServerVNCAllowed)
-	assert.True(t, *cfg.ServerVNCAllowed, "MDM override should flip on-disk false to true")
-	require.NotNil(t, cfg.DisableVNCApproval)
-	assert.True(t, *cfg.DisableVNCApproval)
-	assert.True(t, cfg.Policy().HasKey(mdm.KeyAllowServerVNC))
-	assert.True(t, cfg.Policy().HasKey(mdm.KeyDisableVNCApproval))
-}
-
 func TestApply_MDMLazyConnection(t *testing.T) {
 	cases := []struct {
 		name string

client/internal/profilemanager/state.go

@@ -45,12 +45,35 @@ func (pm *ProfileManager) GetProfileState(id ID) (*ProfileState, error) {
 	return &state, nil
 }
 
-func (pm *ProfileManager) SetActiveProfileState(state *ProfileState) error {
+// SetProfileState writes the state file of the profile identified by id. Prefer
+// it over SetActiveProfileState whenever the caller knows which profile the data
+// belongs to: an SSO login spans seconds of user interaction, and the active
+// profile can change during it, which would file the account email under
+// whichever profile happened to be active when the flow returned.
+func (pm *ProfileManager) SetProfileState(id ID, state *ProfileState) error {
 	configDir, err := getConfigDir()
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("get config directory: %w", err)
 	}
 
+	if id == "" {
+		return fmt.Errorf("empty profile ID")
+	}
+	if id != defaultProfileName && !IsValidProfileFilenameStem(id) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("invalid profile ID: %q", id)
+	}
+
+	stateFile := filepath.Join(configDir, id.String()+".state.json")
+	if err := util.WriteJsonWithRestrictedPermission(context.Background(), stateFile, state); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("write profile state: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// SetActiveProfileState writes the state file of whichever profile is active at
+// call time. Use SetProfileState when the target profile is known.
+func (pm *ProfileManager) SetActiveProfileState(state *ProfileState) error {
 	activeProf, err := pm.GetActiveProfile()
 	if err != nil {
 		if errors.Is(err, ErrNoActiveProfile) {
@@ -59,18 +82,7 @@ func (pm *ProfileManager) SetActiveProfileState(state *ProfileState) error {
 		return fmt.Errorf("get active profile: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	id := activeProf.ID
-	if id != defaultProfileName && !IsValidProfileFilenameStem(id) {
-		return fmt.Errorf("invalid active profile ID: %q", id)
-	}
-
-	stateFile := filepath.Join(configDir, id.String()+".state.json")
-	err = util.WriteJsonWithRestrictedPermission(context.Background(), stateFile, state)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("write profile state: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	return nil
+	return pm.SetProfileState(activeProf.ID, state)
 }
 
 // RemoveProfileState deletes the per-profile state file (which holds the

client/internal/routemanager/dnsinterceptor/handler.go

@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ func (d *DnsInterceptor) removeDNATMappings(realPrefixes []netip.Prefix, logger
 
 // internalDnatFw checks if the firewall supports internal DNAT
 func (d *DnsInterceptor) internalDnatFw() (internalDNATer, bool) {
-	if d.firewall == nil || runtime.GOOS != "android" {
+	if d.firewall == nil || d.fakeIPManager == nil || runtime.GOOS != "android" {
 		return nil, false
 	}
 	fw, ok := d.firewall.(internalDNATer)

client/internal/routemanager/manager.go

@@ -8,14 +8,13 @@ import (
 	"net/netip"
 	"net/url"
 	"runtime"
-	"slices"
+	"sort"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"sync/atomic"
 	"syscall"
 	"time"
 
-	"github.com/google/uuid"
 	"github.com/hashicorp/go-multierror"
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 	"golang.org/x/exp/maps"
@@ -62,7 +61,7 @@ type Manager interface {
 	GetActiveClientRoutes() route.HAMap
 	GetClientRoutesWithNetID() map[route.NetID][]*route.Route
 	SetRouteChangeListener(listener listener.NetworkChangeListener)
-	InitialRouteRange() []string
+	CurrentRouteRange() []string
 	SetFirewall(firewall.Manager) error
 	SetDNSForwarderPort(port uint16)
 	ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs(peerKey string) error
@@ -76,10 +75,8 @@ type ManagerConfig struct {
 	WGInterface         iface.WGIface
 	StatusRecorder      *peer.Status
 	RelayManager        *relayClient.Manager
-	InitialRoutes       []*route.Route
 	StateManager        *statemanager.Manager
 	DNSServer           dns.Server
-	DNSFeatureFlag      bool
 	PeerStore           *peerstore.Store
 	DisableClientRoutes bool
 	DisableServerRoutes bool
@@ -149,45 +146,12 @@ func NewManager(config ManagerConfig) *DefaultManager {
 	useNoop := netstack.IsEnabled() || config.DisableClientRoutes
 	dm.setupRefCounters(useNoop)
 
-	// don't proceed with client routes if it is disabled
-	if config.DisableClientRoutes {
-		return dm
-	}
-
-	if runtime.GOOS == "android" {
-		dm.setupAndroidRoutes(config)
-	}
 	return dm
 }
-func (m *DefaultManager) setupAndroidRoutes(config ManagerConfig) {
-	cr := m.initialClientRoutes(config.InitialRoutes)
 
-	routesForComparison := slices.Clone(cr)
-
-	if config.DNSFeatureFlag {
-		m.fakeIPManager = fakeip.NewManager()
-
-		v4ID := uuid.NewString()
-		fakeIPRoute := &route.Route{
-			ID:          route.ID(v4ID),
-			Network:     m.fakeIPManager.GetFakeIPBlock(),
-			NetID:       route.NetID(v4ID),
-			Peer:        m.pubKey,
-			NetworkType: route.IPv4Network,
-		}
-		v6ID := uuid.NewString()
-		fakeIPv6Route := &route.Route{
-			ID:          route.ID(v6ID),
-			Network:     m.fakeIPManager.GetFakeIPv6Block(),
-			NetID:       route.NetID(v6ID),
-			Peer:        m.pubKey,
-			NetworkType: route.IPv6Network,
-		}
-		cr = append(cr, fakeIPRoute, fakeIPv6Route)
-		m.notifier.SetFakeIPRoutes([]*route.Route{fakeIPRoute, fakeIPv6Route})
-	}
-
-	m.notifier.SetInitialClientRoutes(cr, routesForComparison)
+func (m *DefaultManager) enableFakeIPRoutes() {
+	m.fakeIPManager = fakeip.NewManager()
+	m.notifier.NotifyRouteChange()
 }
 
 func (m *DefaultManager) setupRefCounters(useNoop bool) {
@@ -464,6 +428,9 @@ func (m *DefaultManager) UpdateRoutes(
 
 	var merr *multierror.Error
 	if !m.disableClientRoutes {
+		if runtime.GOOS == "android" && useNewDNSRoute && m.fakeIPManager == nil {
+			m.enableFakeIPRoutes()
+		}
 
 		// Update route selector based on management server's isSelected status
 		m.updateRouteSelectorFromManagement(clientRoutes)
@@ -500,9 +467,32 @@ func (m *DefaultManager) SetRouteChangeListener(listener listener.NetworkChangeL
 	m.notifier.SetListener(listener)
 }
 
-// InitialRouteRange return the list of initial routes. It used by mobile systems
-func (m *DefaultManager) InitialRouteRange() []string {
-	return m.notifier.GetInitialRouteRanges()
+// CurrentRouteRange returns the current TUN route list. It is used by mobile systems
+func (m *DefaultManager) CurrentRouteRange() []string {
+	m.mux.Lock()
+	defer m.mux.Unlock()
+
+	if m.disableClientRoutes {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	filtered := m.routeSelector.FilterSelectedExitNodes(m.clientRoutes)
+	var nets []string
+	for _, routes := range filtered {
+		for _, r := range routes {
+			if r.IsDynamic() {
+				continue
+			}
+			nets = append(nets, r.NetString())
+		}
+	}
+
+	if m.fakeIPManager != nil {
+		nets = append(nets, m.fakeIPManager.GetFakeIPBlock().String(), m.fakeIPManager.GetFakeIPv6Block().String())
+	}
+
+	sort.Strings(nets)
+	return nets
 }
 
 // GetRouteSelector returns the route selector
@@ -700,16 +690,6 @@ func (m *DefaultManager) ClassifyRoutes(newRoutes []*route.Route) (map[route.ID]
 	return newServerRoutesMap, newClientRoutesIDMap
 }
 
-func (m *DefaultManager) initialClientRoutes(initialRoutes []*route.Route) []*route.Route {
-	_, crMap := m.ClassifyRoutes(initialRoutes)
-	rs := make([]*route.Route, 0, len(crMap))
-	for _, routes := range crMap {
-		rs = append(rs, routes...)
-	}
-
-	return rs
-}
-
 func isRouteSupported(route *route.Route) bool {
 	if netstack.IsEnabled() || !nbnet.CustomRoutingDisabled() || route.IsDynamic() {
 		return true

client/internal/routemanager/mock.go

@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@ func (m *MockManager) Init() error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-// InitialRouteRange mock implementation of InitialRouteRange from Manager interface
-func (m *MockManager) InitialRouteRange() []string {
+// CurrentRouteRange mock implementation of CurrentRouteRange from Manager interface
+func (m *MockManager) CurrentRouteRange() []string {
 	return nil
 }
 

client/internal/routemanager/notifier/notifier_android.go

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
 	"net/netip"
 	"slices"
 	"sort"
-	"strings"
 	"sync"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/listener"
@@ -14,12 +13,15 @@ import (
 )
 
 type Notifier struct {
-	initialRoutes []*route.Route
-	currentRoutes []*route.Route
-	fakeIPRoutes  []*route.Route
+	mu sync.Mutex
 
-	listener    listener.NetworkChangeListener
-	listenerMux sync.Mutex
+	// currentRoutes is the last announced route set. It exists only to
+	// suppress noise: without it every network map sync would trigger the
+	// Java side, even when the routes did not change. The actual TUN route
+	// state is owned by the route manager and pulled from there.
+	currentRoutes []*route.Route
+
+	listener listener.NetworkChangeListener
 }
 
 func NewNotifier() *Notifier {
@@ -27,20 +29,15 @@ func NewNotifier() *Notifier {
 }
 
 func (n *Notifier) SetListener(listener listener.NetworkChangeListener) {
-	n.listenerMux.Lock()
-	defer n.listenerMux.Unlock()
+	n.mu.Lock()
+	defer n.mu.Unlock()
 	n.listener = listener
 }
 
-// SetInitialClientRoutes stores the initial route sets for TUN configuration.
-func (n *Notifier) SetInitialClientRoutes(initialRoutes []*route.Route, routesForComparison []*route.Route) {
-	n.initialRoutes = filterStatic(initialRoutes)
-	n.currentRoutes = filterStatic(routesForComparison)
-}
-
-// SetFakeIPRoutes stores the fake IP routes to be included in every TUN rebuild.
-func (n *Notifier) SetFakeIPRoutes(routes []*route.Route) {
-	n.fakeIPRoutes = routes
+func (n *Notifier) NotifyRouteChange() {
+	n.mu.Lock()
+	defer n.mu.Unlock()
+	n.notifyLocked()
 }
 
 func (n *Notifier) OnNewRoutes(idMap route.HAMap) {
@@ -54,46 +51,32 @@ func (n *Notifier) OnNewRoutes(idMap route.HAMap) {
 		}
 	}
 
-	if !n.hasRouteDiff(n.currentRoutes, newRoutes) {
+	n.mu.Lock()
+	defer n.mu.Unlock()
+	if !hasRouteDiff(n.currentRoutes, newRoutes) {
 		return
 	}
 
 	n.currentRoutes = newRoutes
-	n.notify()
+	n.notifyLocked()
 }
 
 func (n *Notifier) OnNewPrefixes([]netip.Prefix) {
 	// Not used on Android
 }
 
-func (n *Notifier) notify() {
-	n.listenerMux.Lock()
-	defer n.listenerMux.Unlock()
+func (n *Notifier) notifyLocked() {
 	if n.listener == nil {
 		return
 	}
-
-	allRoutes := slices.Clone(n.currentRoutes)
-	allRoutes = append(allRoutes, n.fakeIPRoutes...)
-
-	routeStrings := n.routesToStrings(allRoutes)
-	sort.Strings(routeStrings)
-	go func(l listener.NetworkChangeListener) {
-		l.OnNetworkChanged(strings.Join(routeStrings, ","))
-	}(n.listener)
+	n.listener.OnNetworkChanged("")
 }
 
-func filterStatic(routes []*route.Route) []*route.Route {
-	out := make([]*route.Route, 0, len(routes))
-	for _, r := range routes {
-		if !r.IsDynamic() {
-			out = append(out, r)
-		}
-	}
-	return out
+func (n *Notifier) Close() {
+	// unused
 }
 
-func (n *Notifier) routesToStrings(routes []*route.Route) []string {
+func routesToStrings(routes []*route.Route) []string {
 	nets := make([]string, 0, len(routes))
 	for _, r := range routes {
 		nets = append(nets, r.NetString())
@@ -101,25 +84,10 @@ func (n *Notifier) routesToStrings(routes []*route.Route) []string {
 	return nets
 }
 
-func (n *Notifier) hasRouteDiff(a []*route.Route, b []*route.Route) bool {
-	slices.SortFunc(a, func(x, y *route.Route) int {
-		return strings.Compare(x.NetString(), y.NetString())
-	})
-	slices.SortFunc(b, func(x, y *route.Route) int {
-		return strings.Compare(x.NetString(), y.NetString())
-	})
-
-	return !slices.EqualFunc(a, b, func(x, y *route.Route) bool {
-		return x.NetString() == y.NetString()
-	})
-}
-
-func (n *Notifier) GetInitialRouteRanges() []string {
-	initialStrings := n.routesToStrings(n.initialRoutes)
-	sort.Strings(initialStrings)
-	return initialStrings
-}
-
-func (n *Notifier) Close() {
-	// unused
+func hasRouteDiff(a []*route.Route, b []*route.Route) bool {
+	as := routesToStrings(a)
+	bs := routesToStrings(b)
+	sort.Strings(as)
+	sort.Strings(bs)
+	return !slices.Equal(as, bs)
 }

client/internal/routemanager/notifier/notifier_ios.go

@@ -29,11 +29,7 @@ func (n *Notifier) SetListener(listener listener.NetworkChangeListener) {
 	n.listener = listener
 }
 
-func (n *Notifier) SetInitialClientRoutes([]*route.Route, []*route.Route) {
-	// iOS doesn't care about initial routes
-}
-
-func (n *Notifier) SetFakeIPRoutes([]*route.Route) {
+func (n *Notifier) NotifyRouteChange() {
 	// Not used on iOS
 }
 

client/internal/routemanager/notifier/notifier_other.go

@@ -19,11 +19,7 @@ func (n *Notifier) SetListener(listener listener.NetworkChangeListener) {
 	// Not used on non-mobile platforms
 }
 
-func (n *Notifier) SetInitialClientRoutes([]*route.Route, []*route.Route) {
-	// Not used on non-mobile platforms
-}
-
-func (n *Notifier) SetFakeIPRoutes([]*route.Route) {
+func (n *Notifier) NotifyRouteChange() {
 	// Not used on non-mobile platforms
 }
 
@@ -35,10 +31,6 @@ func (n *Notifier) OnNewPrefixes(prefixes []netip.Prefix) {
 	// Not used on non-mobile platforms
 }
 
-func (n *Notifier) GetInitialRouteRanges() []string {
-	return []string{}
-}
-
 func (n *Notifier) Close() {
 	// unused
 }

client/internal/statemanager/manager.go

@@ -75,14 +75,6 @@ func New(filePath string) *Manager {
 	}
 }
 
-// FilePath returns the path of the underlying state file.
-func (m *Manager) FilePath() string {
-	if m == nil {
-		return ""
-	}
-	return m.filePath
-}
-
 // Start starts the state manager periodic save routine
 func (m *Manager) Start() {
 	if m == nil {

client/internal/updater/installer/installer_run_darwin.go

@@ -98,47 +98,44 @@ func (u *Installer) startDaemon(daemonFolder string) error {
 func (u *Installer) startUIAsUser() error {
 	log.Infof("starting netbird-ui: %s", uiBinary)
 
-	// Get the current console user
-	cmd := exec.Command("stat", "-f", "%Su", "/dev/console")
-	output, err := cmd.Output()
+	username, err := consoleUser()
 	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("failed to get console user: %w", err)
+		return err
 	}
 
-	username := strings.TrimSpace(string(output))
-	if username == "" || username == "root" {
-		return fmt.Errorf("no active user session found")
-	}
-
-	log.Infof("starting UI for user: %s", username)
-
-	// Get user's UID
 	userInfo, err := user.Lookup(username)
 	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("failed to lookup user %s: %w", username, err)
+		return fmt.Errorf("lookup user %s: %w", username, err)
 	}
 
-	// Start the UI process as the console user using launchctl
-	// This ensures the app runs in the user's context with proper GUI access
-	launchCmd := exec.Command("launchctl", "asuser", userInfo.Uid, "open", "-a", uiBinary)
+	log.Infof("starting UI for user: %s (uid %s)", username, userInfo.Uid)
+
+	launchCmd := exec.Command("launchctl", "asuser", userInfo.Uid, "sudo", "-u", username, "-H", "open", "-a", uiBinary)
 	log.Infof("launchCmd: %s", launchCmd.String())
-	// Set the user's home directory for proper macOS app behavior
-	launchCmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "HOME="+userInfo.HomeDir)
-	log.Infof("set HOME environment variable: %s", userInfo.HomeDir)
 
-	if err := launchCmd.Start(); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("failed to start UI process: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	// Release the process so it can run independently
-	if err := launchCmd.Process.Release(); err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("failed to release UI process: %v", err)
+	if err := launchCmd.Run(); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("run UI launch: %w", err)
 	}
 
 	log.Infof("netbird-ui started successfully for user %s", username)
 	return nil
 }
 
+func consoleUser() (string, error) {
+	output, err := exec.Command("stat", "-f", "%Su", "/dev/console").Output()
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("get console user: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	username := strings.TrimSpace(string(output))
+	switch username {
+	case "", "root", "loginwindow", "_mbsetupuser":
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("no active GUI user session, console user: %q", username)
+	}
+
+	return username, nil
+}
+
 func (u *Installer) installPkgFile(ctx context.Context, path string) error {
 	log.Infof("installing pkg file: %s", path)
 

client/ios/NetBirdSDK/client.go

@@ -158,13 +158,19 @@ func (c *Client) Run(fd int32, interfaceName string, envList *EnvList) error {
 	defer c.ctxCancel()
 	c.ctxCancelLock.Unlock()
 
-	auth := NewAuthWithConfig(ctx, cfg)
-	err = auth.LoginSync()
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-
-	log.Infof("Auth successful")
+	// No login pre-flight here. The engine's own loginToManagement (connect.go) performs
+	// the authoritative Login immediately before the first Sync, so a LoginSync() call at
+	// this point only duplicated it — costing two extra Login RPCs (IsLoginRequired +
+	// Login) on every engine start, since IsLoginRequired is itself a full Login RPC.
+	//
+	// Auth failures still reach the caller through the engine path: loginToManagement
+	// returns PermissionDenied, which marks the shared status recorder
+	// (MarkManagementDisconnected) and fires ClientStop → onDisconnected, where
+	// IsLoginRequiredCached() reports login-required. The error is also returned out of Run().
+	//
+	// A pre-flight was also actively harmful when the server is unreachable: its 2-minute
+	// backoff blocked the start and then reported "login required" for what was really a
+	// timeout. The engine instead keeps retrying and recovers when the server returns.
 	// todo do not throw error in case of cancelled context
 	ctx = internal.CtxInitState(ctx)
 	c.onHostDnsFn = func([]string) {}

client/ios/NetBirdSDK/login.go

@@ -222,17 +222,36 @@ func (a *Auth) Login(resultListener ErrListener, urlOpener URLOpener, forceDevic
 // LoginWithDeviceName performs interactive login with device authentication support
 // The deviceName parameter allows specifying a custom device name (required for tvOS)
 func (a *Auth) LoginWithDeviceName(resultListener ErrListener, urlOpener URLOpener, forceDeviceAuth bool, deviceName string) {
+	a.startLogin(resultListener, urlOpener, forceDeviceAuth, deviceName, false)
+}
+
+// LoginInteractive performs the same interactive login as LoginWithDeviceName but skips the
+// IsLoginRequired() pre-flight and goes straight to the browser / device-code flow.
+//
+// IsLoginRequired() is itself a full Login RPC against the management server, so when the
+// caller has ALREADY established that login is required it is a pure duplicate. On iOS the
+// main app decides to show the browser based on its own isLoginRequired() check and then
+// calls straight into this method, so re-asking the server would add another Login RPC to
+// every interactive login.
+//
+// Use LoginWithDeviceName when the auth state is unknown and a silent (browser-less) login
+// must still be possible; use this when the browser is going to be shown regardless.
+func (a *Auth) LoginInteractive(resultListener ErrListener, urlOpener URLOpener, forceDeviceAuth bool, deviceName string) {
+	a.startLogin(resultListener, urlOpener, forceDeviceAuth, deviceName, true)
+}
+
+func (a *Auth) startLogin(resultListener ErrListener, urlOpener URLOpener, forceDeviceAuth bool, deviceName string, skipLoginCheck bool) {
 	if resultListener == nil {
-		log.Errorf("LoginWithDeviceName: resultListener is nil")
+		log.Errorf("startLogin: resultListener is nil")
 		return
 	}
 	if urlOpener == nil {
-		log.Errorf("LoginWithDeviceName: urlOpener is nil")
+		log.Errorf("startLogin: urlOpener is nil")
 		resultListener.OnError(fmt.Errorf("urlOpener is nil"))
 		return
 	}
 	go func() {
-		err := a.login(urlOpener, forceDeviceAuth, deviceName)
+		err := a.login(urlOpener, forceDeviceAuth, deviceName, skipLoginCheck)
 		if err != nil {
 			resultListener.OnError(err)
 		} else {
@@ -241,7 +260,7 @@ func (a *Auth) LoginWithDeviceName(resultListener ErrListener, urlOpener URLOpen
 	}()
 }
 
-func (a *Auth) login(urlOpener URLOpener, forceDeviceAuth bool, deviceName string) error {
+func (a *Auth) login(urlOpener URLOpener, forceDeviceAuth bool, deviceName string, skipLoginCheck bool) error {
 	// Create context with device name if provided
 	ctx := a.ctx
 	if deviceName != "" {
@@ -255,10 +274,13 @@ func (a *Auth) login(urlOpener URLOpener, forceDeviceAuth bool, deviceName strin
 	}
 	defer authClient.Close()
 
-	// check if we need to generate JWT token
-	needsLogin, err := authClient.IsLoginRequired(ctx)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("failed to check login requirement: %v", err)
+	// check if we need to generate JWT token (skipped when the caller already knows)
+	needsLogin := true
+	if !skipLoginCheck {
+		needsLogin, err = authClient.IsLoginRequired(ctx)
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("failed to check login requirement: %v", err)
+		}
 	}
 
 	jwtToken := ""

client/mdm/canonical_loaders.go

@@ -21,8 +21,6 @@ var allKeys = []string{
 	KeyBlockInbound,
 	KeyDisableMetricsCollection,
 	KeyAllowServerSSH,
-	KeyAllowServerVNC,
-	KeyDisableVNCApproval,
 	KeyDisableAutoConnect,
 	KeyDisableAutostart,
 	KeyPreSharedKey,

client/mdm/policy.go

@@ -36,8 +36,6 @@ const (
 	KeyBlockInbound             = "blockInbound"
 	KeyDisableMetricsCollection = "disableMetricsCollection"
 	KeyAllowServerSSH           = "allowServerSSH"
-	KeyAllowServerVNC           = "allowServerVNC"
-	KeyDisableVNCApproval       = "disableVNCApproval"
 	KeyDisableAutoConnect       = "disableAutoConnect"
 	// KeyDisableAutostart suppresses the GUI's fresh-install
 	// launch-on-login default and marks the Settings toggle as

client/proto/daemon.pb.gw.go

@@ -1099,30 +1099,6 @@ func request_DaemonService_ExposeService_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtim
 	return stream, metadata, nil
 }
 
-func request_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, client DaemonServiceClient, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
-	var (
-		protoReq RespondApprovalRequest
-		metadata runtime.ServerMetadata
-	)
-	if err := marshaler.NewDecoder(req.Body).Decode(&protoReq); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
-		return nil, metadata, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "%v", err)
-	}
-	msg, err := client.RespondApproval(ctx, &protoReq, grpc.Header(&metadata.HeaderMD), grpc.Trailer(&metadata.TrailerMD))
-	return msg, metadata, err
-}
-
-func local_request_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, server DaemonServiceServer, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
-	var (
-		protoReq RespondApprovalRequest
-		metadata runtime.ServerMetadata
-	)
-	if err := marshaler.NewDecoder(req.Body).Decode(&protoReq); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
-		return nil, metadata, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "%v", err)
-	}
-	msg, err := server.RespondApproval(ctx, &protoReq)
-	return msg, metadata, err
-}
-
 func request_DaemonService_WailsUIReady_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, client DaemonServiceClient, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
 	var (
 		protoReq WailsUIReadyRequest
@@ -2001,26 +1977,6 @@ func RegisterDaemonServiceHandlerServer(ctx context.Context, mux *runtime.ServeM
 		runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
 		return
 	})
-	mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
-		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
-		defer cancel()
-		var stream runtime.ServerTransportStream
-		ctx = grpc.NewContextWithServerTransportStream(ctx, &stream)
-		inboundMarshaler, outboundMarshaler := runtime.MarshalerForRequest(mux, req)
-		annotatedContext, err := runtime.AnnotateIncomingContext(ctx, mux, req, "/daemon.DaemonService/RespondApproval", runtime.WithHTTPPathPattern("/daemon.DaemonService/RespondApproval"))
-		if err != nil {
-			runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
-			return
-		}
-		resp, md, err := local_request_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0(annotatedContext, inboundMarshaler, server, req, pathParams)
-		md.HeaderMD, md.TrailerMD = metadata.Join(md.HeaderMD, stream.Header()), metadata.Join(md.TrailerMD, stream.Trailer())
-		annotatedContext = runtime.NewServerMetadataContext(annotatedContext, md)
-		if err != nil {
-			runtime.HTTPError(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
-			return
-		}
-		forward_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
-	})
 	mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_WailsUIReady_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
 		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
 		defer cancel()
@@ -2846,23 +2802,6 @@ func RegisterDaemonServiceHandlerClient(ctx context.Context, mux *runtime.ServeM
 		}
 		forward_DaemonService_ExposeService_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, func() (proto.Message, error) { return resp.Recv() }, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
 	})
-	mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
-		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
-		defer cancel()
-		inboundMarshaler, outboundMarshaler := runtime.MarshalerForRequest(mux, req)
-		annotatedContext, err := runtime.AnnotateContext(ctx, mux, req, "/daemon.DaemonService/RespondApproval", runtime.WithHTTPPathPattern("/daemon.DaemonService/RespondApproval"))
-		if err != nil {
-			runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
-			return
-		}
-		resp, md, err := request_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0(annotatedContext, inboundMarshaler, client, req, pathParams)
-		annotatedContext = runtime.NewServerMetadataContext(annotatedContext, md)
-		if err != nil {
-			runtime.HTTPError(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
-			return
-		}
-		forward_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
-	})
 	mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_WailsUIReady_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
 		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
 		defer cancel()
@@ -2929,7 +2868,6 @@ var (
 	pattern_DaemonService_StopCPUProfile_0             = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "StopCPUProfile"}, ""))
 	pattern_DaemonService_GetInstallerResult_0         = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "GetInstallerResult"}, ""))
 	pattern_DaemonService_ExposeService_0              = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "ExposeService"}, ""))
-	pattern_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0            = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "RespondApproval"}, ""))
 	pattern_DaemonService_WailsUIReady_0               = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "WailsUIReady"}, ""))
 )
 
@@ -2979,6 +2917,5 @@ var (
 	forward_DaemonService_StopCPUProfile_0             = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
 	forward_DaemonService_GetInstallerResult_0         = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
 	forward_DaemonService_ExposeService_0              = runtime.ForwardResponseStream
-	forward_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0            = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
 	forward_DaemonService_WailsUIReady_0               = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
 )

client/proto/daemon.proto

@@ -152,14 +152,6 @@ service DaemonService {
   // ExposeService exposes a local port via the NetBird reverse proxy
   rpc ExposeService(ExposeServiceRequest) returns (stream ExposeServiceEvent) {}
 
-  // RespondApproval delivers the user's accept/deny decision for a
-  // pending user-approval prompt. The daemon pushes the prompt as a
-  // SystemEvent with category APPROVAL and metadata key "request_id";
-  // the UI calls this RPC with the same request_id to unblock whichever
-  // subsystem (VNC, SSH, ...) is waiting. The "kind" metadata key tells
-  // the UI which subsystem the prompt belongs to.
-  rpc RespondApproval(RespondApprovalRequest) returns (RespondApprovalResponse) {}
-
   // WailsUIReady is a no-op probe the Wails UI calls once at startup. The UI
   // only cares whether the daemon implements it: an Unimplemented response
   // means the daemon predates this UI and is too old to drive it.
@@ -250,10 +242,6 @@ message LoginRequest {
   optional bool disableSSHAuth = 38;
   optional int32 sshJWTCacheTTL = 39;
   optional bool disable_ipv6 = 40;
-
-  optional bool serverVNCAllowed = 41;
-
-  optional bool disableVNCApproval = 42;
 }
 
 message LoginResponse {
@@ -374,16 +362,12 @@ message GetConfigResponse {
 
   bool disable_ipv6 = 27;
 
-  bool serverVNCAllowed = 28;
-
-  bool disableVNCApproval = 29;
-
   // mDMManagedFields lists the names of configuration keys whose value is
   // currently enforced by an MDM policy. Names match mdm.Key* constants
   // (e.g. "managementURL", "disableClientRoutes"). UI/CLI clients should
   // render the corresponding inputs as read-only and display a "managed
   // by MDM" indicator.
-  repeated string mDMManagedFields = 30;
+  repeated string mDMManagedFields = 28;
 }
 
 // PeerState contains the latest state of a peer
@@ -468,25 +452,6 @@ message SSHServerState {
   repeated SSHSessionInfo sessions = 2;
 }
 
-// VNCSessionInfo contains information about an active VNC session
-message VNCSessionInfo {
-  string remoteAddress = 1;
-  string mode = 2;
-  string username = 3;
-  // userID is the Noise-verified session identity (hashed user ID from
-  // the ACL session-key entry), empty when auth is disabled.
-  string userID = 4;
-  // initiator is the human-readable display name of the dashboard user
-  // who minted the SessionPubKey, when known.
-  string initiator = 5;
-}
-
-// VNCServerState contains the latest state of the VNC server
-message VNCServerState {
-  bool enabled = 1;
-  repeated VNCSessionInfo sessions = 2;
-}
-
 // FullStatus contains the full state held by the Status instance
 message FullStatus {
   ManagementState managementState = 1;
@@ -507,7 +472,6 @@ message FullStatus {
   // on it to know when to re-fetch ListNetworks via the push stream, instead
   // of polling on every status snapshot.
   uint64 networksRevision = 11;
-  VNCServerState vncServerState = 12;
 }
 
 // Networks
@@ -707,7 +671,6 @@ message SystemEvent {
     AUTHENTICATION = 2;
     CONNECTIVITY = 3;
     SYSTEM = 4;
-    APPROVAL = 5;
   }
 
   string id = 1;
@@ -798,10 +761,6 @@ message SetConfigRequest {
   optional bool disableSSHAuth = 33;
   optional int32 sshJWTCacheTTL = 34;
   optional bool disable_ipv6 = 35;
-
-  optional bool serverVNCAllowed = 36;
-
-  optional bool disableVNCApproval = 37;
 }
 
 message SetConfigResponse{}
@@ -1091,18 +1050,3 @@ message StartBundleCaptureRequest {
 message StartBundleCaptureResponse {}
 message StopBundleCaptureRequest {}
 message StopBundleCaptureResponse {}
-
-message RespondApprovalRequest {
-  // request_id matches the SystemEvent metadata key emitted by the daemon
-  // when a subsystem awaits user approval for an inbound connection.
-  string request_id = 1;
-  // accept is true if the user approved the request, false if they
-  // denied it. A missing or unknown request_id is treated as a no-op.
-  bool accept = 2;
-  // view_only signals that the user granted the connection but withheld
-  // input control. Only meaningful when accept is true; ignored when
-  // accept is false.
-  bool view_only = 3;
-}
-
-message RespondApprovalResponse {}

client/proto/daemon_grpc.pb.go

@@ -64,7 +64,6 @@ const (
 	DaemonService_StopCPUProfile_FullMethodName             = "/daemon.DaemonService/StopCPUProfile"
 	DaemonService_GetInstallerResult_FullMethodName         = "/daemon.DaemonService/GetInstallerResult"
 	DaemonService_ExposeService_FullMethodName              = "/daemon.DaemonService/ExposeService"
-	DaemonService_RespondApproval_FullMethodName            = "/daemon.DaemonService/RespondApproval"
 	DaemonService_WailsUIReady_FullMethodName               = "/daemon.DaemonService/WailsUIReady"
 )
 
@@ -168,13 +167,6 @@ type DaemonServiceClient interface {
 	GetInstallerResult(ctx context.Context, in *InstallerResultRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*InstallerResultResponse, error)
 	// ExposeService exposes a local port via the NetBird reverse proxy
 	ExposeService(ctx context.Context, in *ExposeServiceRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (grpc.ServerStreamingClient[ExposeServiceEvent], error)
-	// RespondApproval delivers the user's accept/deny decision for a
-	// pending user-approval prompt. The daemon pushes the prompt as a
-	// SystemEvent with category APPROVAL and metadata key "request_id";
-	// the UI calls this RPC with the same request_id to unblock whichever
-	// subsystem (VNC, SSH, ...) is waiting. The "kind" metadata key tells
-	// the UI which subsystem the prompt belongs to.
-	RespondApproval(ctx context.Context, in *RespondApprovalRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*RespondApprovalResponse, error)
 	// WailsUIReady is a no-op probe the Wails UI calls once at startup. The UI
 	// only cares whether the daemon implements it: an Unimplemented response
 	// means the daemon predates this UI and is too old to drive it.
@@ -675,16 +667,6 @@ func (c *daemonServiceClient) ExposeService(ctx context.Context, in *ExposeServi
 // This type alias is provided for backwards compatibility with existing code that references the prior non-generic stream type by name.
 type DaemonService_ExposeServiceClient = grpc.ServerStreamingClient[ExposeServiceEvent]
 
-func (c *daemonServiceClient) RespondApproval(ctx context.Context, in *RespondApprovalRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*RespondApprovalResponse, error) {
-	cOpts := append([]grpc.CallOption{grpc.StaticMethod()}, opts...)
-	out := new(RespondApprovalResponse)
-	err := c.cc.Invoke(ctx, DaemonService_RespondApproval_FullMethodName, in, out, cOpts...)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	return out, nil
-}
-
 func (c *daemonServiceClient) WailsUIReady(ctx context.Context, in *WailsUIReadyRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*WailsUIReadyResponse, error) {
 	cOpts := append([]grpc.CallOption{grpc.StaticMethod()}, opts...)
 	out := new(WailsUIReadyResponse)
@@ -795,13 +777,6 @@ type DaemonServiceServer interface {
 	GetInstallerResult(context.Context, *InstallerResultRequest) (*InstallerResultResponse, error)
 	// ExposeService exposes a local port via the NetBird reverse proxy
 	ExposeService(*ExposeServiceRequest, grpc.ServerStreamingServer[ExposeServiceEvent]) error
-	// RespondApproval delivers the user's accept/deny decision for a
-	// pending user-approval prompt. The daemon pushes the prompt as a
-	// SystemEvent with category APPROVAL and metadata key "request_id";
-	// the UI calls this RPC with the same request_id to unblock whichever
-	// subsystem (VNC, SSH, ...) is waiting. The "kind" metadata key tells
-	// the UI which subsystem the prompt belongs to.
-	RespondApproval(context.Context, *RespondApprovalRequest) (*RespondApprovalResponse, error)
 	// WailsUIReady is a no-op probe the Wails UI calls once at startup. The UI
 	// only cares whether the daemon implements it: an Unimplemented response
 	// means the daemon predates this UI and is too old to drive it.
@@ -951,9 +926,6 @@ func (UnimplementedDaemonServiceServer) GetInstallerResult(context.Context, *Ins
 func (UnimplementedDaemonServiceServer) ExposeService(*ExposeServiceRequest, grpc.ServerStreamingServer[ExposeServiceEvent]) error {
 	return status.Error(codes.Unimplemented, "method ExposeService not implemented")
 }
-func (UnimplementedDaemonServiceServer) RespondApproval(context.Context, *RespondApprovalRequest) (*RespondApprovalResponse, error) {
-	return nil, status.Error(codes.Unimplemented, "method RespondApproval not implemented")
-}
 func (UnimplementedDaemonServiceServer) WailsUIReady(context.Context, *WailsUIReadyRequest) (*WailsUIReadyResponse, error) {
 	return nil, status.Error(codes.Unimplemented, "method WailsUIReady not implemented")
 }
@@ -1760,24 +1732,6 @@ func _DaemonService_ExposeService_Handler(srv interface{}, stream grpc.ServerStr
 // This type alias is provided for backwards compatibility with existing code that references the prior non-generic stream type by name.
 type DaemonService_ExposeServiceServer = grpc.ServerStreamingServer[ExposeServiceEvent]
 
-func _DaemonService_RespondApproval_Handler(srv interface{}, ctx context.Context, dec func(interface{}) error, interceptor grpc.UnaryServerInterceptor) (interface{}, error) {
-	in := new(RespondApprovalRequest)
-	if err := dec(in); err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	if interceptor == nil {
-		return srv.(DaemonServiceServer).RespondApproval(ctx, in)
-	}
-	info := &grpc.UnaryServerInfo{
-		Server:     srv,
-		FullMethod: DaemonService_RespondApproval_FullMethodName,
-	}
-	handler := func(ctx context.Context, req interface{}) (interface{}, error) {
-		return srv.(DaemonServiceServer).RespondApproval(ctx, req.(*RespondApprovalRequest))
-	}
-	return interceptor(ctx, in, info, handler)
-}
-
 func _DaemonService_WailsUIReady_Handler(srv interface{}, ctx context.Context, dec func(interface{}) error, interceptor grpc.UnaryServerInterceptor) (interface{}, error) {
 	in := new(WailsUIReadyRequest)
 	if err := dec(in); err != nil {
@@ -1967,10 +1921,6 @@ var DaemonService_ServiceDesc = grpc.ServiceDesc{
 			MethodName: "GetInstallerResult",
 			Handler:    _DaemonService_GetInstallerResult_Handler,
 		},
-		{
-			MethodName: "RespondApproval",
-			Handler:    _DaemonService_RespondApproval_Handler,
-		},
 		{
 			MethodName: "WailsUIReady",
 			Handler:    _DaemonService_WailsUIReady_Handler,

client/server/capture.go

@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ func (s *Server) StartCapture(req *proto.StartCaptureRequest, stream proto.Daemo
 		return status.Errorf(codes.Internal, "create capture session: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	engine, err := s.claimCapture(sess, func() { pw.Close() })
+	engine, err := s.claimCapture(sess)
 	if err != nil {
 		sess.Stop()
 		pw.Close()
@@ -190,7 +190,10 @@ func (s *Server) StartBundleCapture(_ context.Context, req *proto.StartBundleCap
 
 	s.stopBundleCaptureLocked()
 	s.cleanupBundleCapture()
-	s.evictActiveCaptureLocked()
+
+	if s.activeCapture != nil {
+		return nil, status.Error(codes.FailedPrecondition, "another capture is already running")
+	}
 
 	engine, err := s.getCaptureEngineLocked()
 	if err != nil {
@@ -301,58 +304,29 @@ func (s *Server) cleanupBundleCapture() {
 	s.bundleCapture = nil
 }
 
-// claimCapture reserves the engine's capture slot for sess. If another
-// capture is already running it is evicted: a previous streaming session
-// whose gRPC client died and never freed the slot stays stuck otherwise,
-// and a bundle capture is just informational state.
-func (s *Server) claimCapture(sess *capture.Session, cancel func()) (*internal.Engine, error) {
+// claimCapture reserves the engine's capture slot for sess. Returns
+// FailedPrecondition if another capture is already active.
+func (s *Server) claimCapture(sess *capture.Session) (*internal.Engine, error) {
 	s.mutex.Lock()
 	defer s.mutex.Unlock()
 
-	s.evictActiveCaptureLocked()
+	if s.activeCapture != nil {
+		return nil, status.Error(codes.FailedPrecondition, "another capture is already running")
+	}
 	engine, err := s.getCaptureEngineLocked()
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 	s.activeCapture = sess
-	s.activeCaptureCancel = cancel
 	return engine, nil
 }
 
-// evictActiveCaptureLocked tears down whatever capture currently owns
-// the engine slot so a fresh claim can succeed. Caller must hold mutex.
-func (s *Server) evictActiveCaptureLocked() {
-	if s.activeCapture == nil {
-		return
-	}
-	if s.bundleCapture != nil && s.bundleCapture.sess == s.activeCapture {
-		log.Infof("evicting running bundle capture to start a new capture")
-		s.stopBundleCaptureLocked()
-		return
-	}
-	log.Infof("evicting previous streaming capture to start a new one")
-	prev := s.activeCapture
-	cancel := s.activeCaptureCancel
-	if engine, err := s.getCaptureEngineLocked(); err == nil {
-		if err := engine.SetCapture(nil); err != nil {
-			log.Debugf("clear previous capture: %v", err)
-		}
-	}
-	s.activeCapture = nil
-	s.activeCaptureCancel = nil
-	prev.Stop()
-	if cancel != nil {
-		cancel()
-	}
-}
-
 // releaseCapture clears the active-capture owner if it still matches sess.
 func (s *Server) releaseCapture(sess *capture.Session) {
 	s.mutex.Lock()
 	defer s.mutex.Unlock()
 	if s.activeCapture == sess {
 		s.activeCapture = nil
-		s.activeCaptureCancel = nil
 	}
 }
 
@@ -367,7 +341,6 @@ func (s *Server) clearCaptureIfOwner(sess *capture.Session, engine *internal.Eng
 		log.Debugf("clear capture: %v", err)
 	}
 	s.activeCapture = nil
-	s.activeCaptureCancel = nil
 }
 
 func (s *Server) getCaptureEngineLocked() (*internal.Engine, error) {

client/server/login_outcome_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"errors"
+	"os"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
+	gstatus "google.golang.org/grpc/status"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
+)
+
+// A login that never reached Management is not a decision about the peer's
+// credentials, so it must come back as a retryable error rather than an SSO
+// prompt: the user cannot finish a browser login while Management is down, and
+// the CLI's own backoff resolves the outage on its own once the daemon reports
+// the failure. Reproduces `netbird down; netbird up` printing a device-code URL
+// because Management happened to be restarting when the daemon dialed it.
+func TestLogin_ManagementUnreachableIsReturnedInsteadOfDemandingSSO(t *testing.T) {
+	s, _, _, username, _ := setupServerWithProfile(t)
+	s.rootCtx = internal.CtxInitState(context.Background())
+
+	unreachable := errors.New("create connection: dial context: context deadline exceeded")
+	attempts := 0
+	s.loginAttemptFn = func(context.Context, string, string) (internal.StatusType, error) {
+		attempts++
+		return internal.StatusLoginFailed, unreachable
+	}
+
+	resp, err := s.Login(userCtx(), &proto.LoginRequest{Username: &username})
+	require.Error(t, err)
+	require.ErrorIs(t, err, unreachable, "the transport failure was replaced by something else")
+	require.Nil(t, resp, "a failed login must not answer with a login response")
+	require.Equal(t, 1, attempts)
+	require.Nil(t, s.oauthAuthFlow.flow, "the daemon started an SSO flow for a peer whose login was never decided")
+
+	status, err := internal.CtxGetState(s.rootCtx).Status()
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, internal.StatusLoginFailed, status,
+		"a peer that could not reach Management is not waiting on a login")
+}
+
+// The counterpart: Management refusing the peer's credentials is a decision, and
+// the SSO flow still has to start for it. The profile carries an unusable
+// private key so the flow setup fails immediately instead of dialing, which is
+// enough to show the branch was entered — the refusal itself is never what comes
+// back out.
+func TestLogin_AuthRefusalStartsSSOFlow(t *testing.T) {
+	s, _, _, username, cfgPath := setupServerWithProfile(t)
+	s.rootCtx = internal.CtxInitState(context.Background())
+	breakProfilePrivateKey(t, cfgPath)
+
+	refused := gstatus.Error(codes.PermissionDenied, "peer is not registered")
+	s.loginAttemptFn = func(context.Context, string, string) (internal.StatusType, error) {
+		return internal.StatusNeedsLogin, refused
+	}
+
+	_, err := s.Login(userCtx(), &proto.LoginRequest{Username: &username})
+	require.Error(t, err)
+	require.NotErrorIs(t, err, refused,
+		"the refusal was handed back to the caller instead of starting the SSO flow")
+
+	status, stateErr := internal.CtxGetState(s.rootCtx).Status()
+	require.NoError(t, stateErr)
+	require.Equal(t, internal.StatusLoginFailed, status,
+		"the SSO flow setup was never reached with the broken key")
+}
+
+// breakProfilePrivateKey replaces the profile's private key with an unparseable
+// one, which makes any attempt to build a Management client fail on the spot.
+func breakProfilePrivateKey(t *testing.T, cfgPath string) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile(cfgPath)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	var cfg map[string]any
+	require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(raw, &cfg))
+	cfg["PrivateKey"] = "not-a-key"
+
+	patched, err := json.Marshal(cfg)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(cfgPath, patched, 0o600))
+}

client/server/mdm.go

@@ -297,8 +297,6 @@ func mdmManagedFieldConflicts(msg *proto.SetConfigRequest, policy *mdm.Policy) [
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyRosenpassPermissive, msg.RosenpassPermissive),
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableAutoConnect, msg.DisableAutoConnect),
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyAllowServerSSH, msg.ServerSSHAllowed),
-		conflictBool(mdm.KeyAllowServerVNC, msg.ServerVNCAllowed),
-		conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableVNCApproval, msg.DisableVNCApproval),
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableClientRoutes, msg.DisableClientRoutes),
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableServerRoutes, msg.DisableServerRoutes),
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyBlockInbound, msg.BlockInbound),
@@ -334,8 +332,6 @@ func setConfigRequestHasConfigOverrides(msg *proto.SetConfigRequest) bool {
 		msg.Mtu != nil ||
 		msg.DisableAutoConnect != nil ||
 		msg.ServerSSHAllowed != nil ||
-		msg.ServerVNCAllowed != nil ||
-		msg.DisableVNCApproval != nil ||
 		msg.NetworkMonitor != nil ||
 		msg.DisableClientRoutes != nil ||
 		msg.DisableServerRoutes != nil ||
@@ -374,8 +370,6 @@ func loginRequestHasConfigOverrides(msg *proto.LoginRequest) bool {
 		msg.WireguardPort != nil ||
 		msg.DisableAutoConnect != nil ||
 		msg.ServerSSHAllowed != nil ||
-		msg.ServerVNCAllowed != nil ||
-		msg.DisableVNCApproval != nil ||
 		msg.RosenpassPermissive != nil ||
 		len(msg.ExtraIFaceBlacklist) > 0 ||
 		msg.NetworkMonitor != nil ||
@@ -424,8 +418,6 @@ func loginRequestMDMConflicts(msg *proto.LoginRequest, policy *mdm.Policy) []str
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyRosenpassPermissive, msg.RosenpassPermissive),
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableAutoConnect, msg.DisableAutoConnect),
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyAllowServerSSH, msg.ServerSSHAllowed),
-		conflictBool(mdm.KeyAllowServerVNC, msg.ServerVNCAllowed),
-		conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableVNCApproval, msg.DisableVNCApproval),
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableClientRoutes, msg.DisableClientRoutes),
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableServerRoutes, msg.DisableServerRoutes),
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyBlockInbound, msg.BlockInbound),

client/server/server.go

@@ -122,12 +122,8 @@ type Server struct {
 	captureEnabled         bool
 	bundleCapture          *bundleCapture
 	// activeCapture is the session currently installed on the engine; guarded by s.mutex.
-	activeCapture *capture.Session
-	// activeCaptureCancel tears down the streaming pipe/cancel for the
-	// active streaming capture so eviction unblocks the StartCapture RPC
-	// handler. Nil for bundle captures (they own their own context).
-	activeCaptureCancel func()
-	networksDisabled    bool
+	activeCapture    *capture.Session
+	networksDisabled bool
 
 	sleepHandler *sleephandler.SleepHandler
 
@@ -139,6 +135,11 @@ type Server struct {
 	updateManager *updater.Manager
 
 	jwtCache *jwtCache
+
+	// loginAttemptFn stands in for the Management login round trip. Tests set
+	// it to drive the login outcomes that need a server on the other end;
+	// production leaves it nil, and every login goes through loginAttempt.
+	loginAttemptFn func(ctx context.Context, setupKey, jwtToken string) (internal.StatusType, error)
 }
 
 type oauthAuthFlow struct {
@@ -374,7 +375,19 @@ func (s *Server) connectionGoroutineRunning() bool {
 	}
 }
 
-// loginAttempt attempts to login using the provided information. it returns a status in case something fails
+// attemptLogin runs a login round trip against Management, or the stand-in a
+// test installed in place of it.
+func (s *Server) attemptLogin(ctx context.Context, setupKey, jwtToken string) (internal.StatusType, error) {
+	if s.loginAttemptFn != nil {
+		return s.loginAttemptFn(ctx, setupKey, jwtToken)
+	}
+	return s.loginAttempt(ctx, setupKey, jwtToken)
+}
+
+// loginAttempt attempts to login using the provided information. It returns
+// StatusNeedsLogin when Management refused the peer's credentials and
+// StatusLoginFailed for every other failure, so callers can tell an
+// authentication decision apart from a login that never got made.
 func (s *Server) loginAttempt(ctx context.Context, setupKey, jwtToken string) (internal.StatusType, error) {
 	authClient, err := auth.NewAuth(ctx, s.config.PrivateKey, s.config.ManagementURL, s.config)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -523,8 +536,6 @@ func (s *Server) setConfigInputFromRequest(msg *proto.SetConfigRequest) (profile
 	config.RosenpassPermissive = msg.RosenpassPermissive
 	config.DisableAutoConnect = msg.DisableAutoConnect
 	config.ServerSSHAllowed = msg.ServerSSHAllowed
-	config.ServerVNCAllowed = msg.ServerVNCAllowed
-	config.DisableVNCApproval = msg.DisableVNCApproval
 	config.NetworkMonitor = msg.NetworkMonitor
 	config.DisableClientRoutes = msg.DisableClientRoutes
 	config.DisableServerRoutes = msg.DisableServerRoutes
@@ -629,11 +640,23 @@ func (s *Server) Login(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.LoginRequest) (*pro
 	s.config = config
 	s.mutex.Unlock()
 
-	if _, err := s.loginAttempt(ctx, "", ""); err == nil {
+	loginStatus, err := s.attemptLogin(ctx, "", "")
+	if err == nil {
 		state.Set(internal.StatusIdle)
 		return &proto.LoginResponse{}, nil
 	}
 
+	// Only an authentication refusal means the peer has to (re-)authenticate.
+	// Any other failure leaves the login undecided: Management unreachable, a
+	// restart mid-request, an internal error. Those are returned for the caller
+	// to retry, because turning them into an SSO prompt asks the user to solve
+	// something that is not theirs to solve, and a browser login cannot succeed
+	// while Management is unreachable anyway.
+	if loginStatus != internal.StatusNeedsLogin {
+		state.Set(loginStatus)
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
 	if msg.SetupKey == "" {
 		hint := ""
 		if msg.Hint != nil {
@@ -690,7 +713,7 @@ func (s *Server) Login(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.LoginRequest) (*pro
 	// which returns NeedsLogin and parks on the browser leg.
 	state.Set(internal.StatusConnecting)
 
-	if loginStatus, err := s.loginAttempt(ctx, msg.SetupKey, ""); err != nil {
+	if loginStatus, err := s.attemptLogin(ctx, msg.SetupKey, ""); err != nil {
 		state.Set(loginStatus)
 		return nil, err
 	}
@@ -845,7 +868,7 @@ func (s *Server) WaitSSOLogin(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.WaitSSOLogin
 	s.oauthAuthFlow.expiresAt = time.Now()
 	s.mutex.Unlock()
 
-	if loginStatus, err := s.loginAttempt(ctx, "", tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse()); err != nil {
+	if loginStatus, err := s.attemptLogin(ctx, "", tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse()); err != nil {
 		state.Set(loginStatus)
 		return nil, err
 	}
@@ -1532,7 +1555,6 @@ func (s *Server) buildStatusResponse(ctx context.Context, msg *proto.StatusReque
 		pbFullStatus := fullStatus.ToProto()
 		pbFullStatus.Events = s.statusRecorder.GetEventHistory()
 		pbFullStatus.SshServerState = s.getSSHServerState()
-		pbFullStatus.VncServerState = s.getVNCServerState()
 		pbFullStatus.NetworksRevision = s.statusRecorder.GetNetworksRevision()
 		statusResponse.FullStatus = pbFullStatus
 	}
@@ -1573,38 +1595,6 @@ func (s *Server) getSSHServerState() *proto.SSHServerState {
 	return sshServerState
 }
 
-// getVNCServerState retrieves the current VNC server state.
-func (s *Server) getVNCServerState() *proto.VNCServerState {
-	s.mutex.Lock()
-	connectClient := s.connectClient
-	s.mutex.Unlock()
-
-	if connectClient == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-
-	engine := connectClient.Engine()
-	if engine == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-
-	enabled, sessions := engine.GetVNCServerStatus()
-	pbSessions := make([]*proto.VNCSessionInfo, 0, len(sessions))
-	for _, sess := range sessions {
-		pbSessions = append(pbSessions, &proto.VNCSessionInfo{
-			RemoteAddress: sess.RemoteAddress,
-			Mode:          sess.Mode,
-			Username:      sess.Username,
-			UserID:        sess.UserID,
-			Initiator:     sess.Initiator,
-		})
-	}
-	return &proto.VNCServerState{
-		Enabled:  enabled,
-		Sessions: pbSessions,
-	}
-}
-
 // GetPeerSSHHostKey retrieves SSH host key for a specific peer
 func (s *Server) GetPeerSSHHostKey(
 	ctx context.Context,
@@ -1990,30 +1980,6 @@ func (s *Server) ExposeService(req *proto.ExposeServiceRequest, srv proto.Daemon
 	return nil
 }
 
-// RespondApproval relays the user's accept/deny decision for a pending
-// approval prompt to the engine's broker. Unknown or already-resolved
-// request_ids are silently no-op'd so a slow UI cannot deny a prompt the
-// user already handled (or that already timed out).
-func (s *Server) RespondApproval(_ context.Context, msg *proto.RespondApprovalRequest) (*proto.RespondApprovalResponse, error) {
-	if msg.GetRequestId() == "" {
-		return nil, gstatus.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "request_id is required")
-	}
-	s.mutex.Lock()
-	connectClient := s.connectClient
-	s.mutex.Unlock()
-	if connectClient == nil {
-		return nil, gstatus.Errorf(codes.FailedPrecondition, "client not initialized")
-	}
-	engine := connectClient.Engine()
-	if engine == nil {
-		return nil, gstatus.Errorf(codes.FailedPrecondition, "engine not running")
-	}
-	if !engine.RespondApproval(msg.GetRequestId(), msg.GetAccept(), msg.GetViewOnly()) {
-		log.Debugf("approval response for unknown request_id %s", msg.GetRequestId())
-	}
-	return &proto.RespondApprovalResponse{}, nil
-}
-
 func isUnixRunningDesktop() bool {
 	if runtime.GOOS != "linux" && runtime.GOOS != "freebsd" {
 		return false
@@ -2121,8 +2087,6 @@ func (s *Server) GetConfig(ctx context.Context, req *proto.GetConfigRequest) (*p
 		Mtu:                           int64(cfg.MTU),
 		DisableAutoConnect:            cfg.DisableAutoConnect,
 		ServerSSHAllowed:              *cfg.ServerSSHAllowed,
-		ServerVNCAllowed:              cfg.ServerVNCAllowed != nil && *cfg.ServerVNCAllowed,
-		DisableVNCApproval:            cfg.DisableVNCApproval != nil && *cfg.DisableVNCApproval,
 		RosenpassEnabled:              cfg.RosenpassEnabled,
 		RosenpassPermissive:           cfg.RosenpassPermissive,
 		BlockInbound:                  cfg.BlockInbound,

client/server/setconfig_mdm_test.go

@@ -109,30 +109,6 @@ func TestSetConfig_MDMReject_SingleField(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Equal(t, []string{mdm.KeyManagementURL}, v.GetFields())
 }
 
-func TestSetConfig_MDMReject_VNCFields(t *testing.T) {
-	withMDMPolicy(t, mdm.NewPolicy(map[string]any{
-		mdm.KeyAllowServerVNC:     true,
-		mdm.KeyDisableVNCApproval: false,
-	}))
-
-	s, ctx, profName, username, _ := setupServerWithProfile(t)
-
-	vncAllowed := false
-	disableApproval := true
-	_, err := s.SetConfig(ctx, &proto.SetConfigRequest{
-		ProfileName:        profName,
-		Username:           username,
-		ServerVNCAllowed:   &vncAllowed,
-		DisableVNCApproval: &disableApproval,
-	})
-
-	v := extractViolation(t, err)
-	assert.ElementsMatch(t, []string{
-		mdm.KeyAllowServerVNC,
-		mdm.KeyDisableVNCApproval,
-	}, v.GetFields())
-}
-
 func TestSetConfig_MDMReject_MultipleFields(t *testing.T) {
 	withMDMPolicy(t, mdm.NewPolicy(map[string]any{
 		mdm.KeyManagementURL:    "https://mdm.example.com:443",

client/server/setconfig_test.go

@@ -61,8 +61,6 @@ func TestSetConfig_AllFieldsSaved(t *testing.T) {
 	rosenpassEnabled := true
 	rosenpassPermissive := true
 	serverSSHAllowed := true
-	serverVNCAllowed := true
-	disableVNCApproval := true
 	interfaceName := "utun100"
 	wireguardPort := int64(51820)
 	preSharedKey := "test-psk"
@@ -87,8 +85,6 @@ func TestSetConfig_AllFieldsSaved(t *testing.T) {
 		RosenpassEnabled:     &rosenpassEnabled,
 		RosenpassPermissive:  &rosenpassPermissive,
 		ServerSSHAllowed:     &serverSSHAllowed,
-		ServerVNCAllowed:     &serverVNCAllowed,
-		DisableVNCApproval:   &disableVNCApproval,
 		InterfaceName:        &interfaceName,
 		WireguardPort:        &wireguardPort,
 		OptionalPreSharedKey: &preSharedKey,
@@ -132,10 +128,6 @@ func TestSetConfig_AllFieldsSaved(t *testing.T) {
 	require.Equal(t, rosenpassPermissive, cfg.RosenpassPermissive)
 	require.NotNil(t, cfg.ServerSSHAllowed)
 	require.Equal(t, serverSSHAllowed, *cfg.ServerSSHAllowed)
-	require.NotNil(t, cfg.ServerVNCAllowed)
-	require.Equal(t, serverVNCAllowed, *cfg.ServerVNCAllowed)
-	require.NotNil(t, cfg.DisableVNCApproval)
-	require.Equal(t, disableVNCApproval, *cfg.DisableVNCApproval)
 	require.Equal(t, interfaceName, cfg.WgIface)
 	require.Equal(t, int(wireguardPort), cfg.WgPort)
 	require.Equal(t, preSharedKey, cfg.PreSharedKey)
@@ -188,8 +180,6 @@ func verifyAllFieldsCovered(t *testing.T, req *proto.SetConfigRequest) {
 		"RosenpassEnabled":              true,
 		"RosenpassPermissive":           true,
 		"ServerSSHAllowed":              true,
-		"ServerVNCAllowed":              true,
-		"DisableVNCApproval":            true,
 		"InterfaceName":                 true,
 		"WireguardPort":                 true,
 		"OptionalPreSharedKey":          true,
@@ -250,8 +240,6 @@ func TestCLIFlags_MappedToSetConfig(t *testing.T) {
 		"enable-rosenpass":                  "RosenpassEnabled",
 		"rosenpass-permissive":              "RosenpassPermissive",
 		"allow-server-ssh":                  "ServerSSHAllowed",
-		"allow-server-vnc":                  "ServerVNCAllowed",
-		"disable-vnc-approval":              "DisableVNCApproval",
 		"interface-name":                    "InterfaceName",
 		"wireguard-port":                    "WireguardPort",
 		"preshared-key":                     "OptionalPreSharedKey",

client/server/ssh_gate.go

@@ -26,51 +26,40 @@ import (
 //     daemon's SSH server into a root (or unauthenticated) shell.
 //   - Enabling the SSH server at all is what makes the above reachable, and a
 //     profile the caller owns is not a privilege they hold.
-//   - Enabling the VNC server exposes the console session, which on a
-//     multi-user host belongs to another user, and disabling its approval
-//     prompt removes that user's only say in it.
-//   - While a remote-access server (SSH or VNC) is enabled, repointing the
-//     profile at another management identity hands authorization decisions,
-//     including which keys and users are accepted, to whoever controls that
-//     identity. Changing the management URL and deregistering the peer are both
-//     ways to do that.
+//   - While the SSH server is enabled, repointing the profile at another
+//     management identity hands SSH authorization decisions, including which
+//     keys and users are accepted, to whoever controls that identity. Changing
+//     the management URL and deregistering the peer are both ways to do that.
 //
 // Everything else stays unauthenticated, so this is not an authorization model:
-// it only refuses the changes that would let a local user become root, or reach
-// another user's desktop. A caller whose identity cannot be established is
-// refused as well.
+// it only refuses the changes that would let a local user become root. A caller
+// whose identity cannot be established is refused as well.
 
 // privilegedConfigChange is the subset of a config request that crosses the
 // user-to-root boundary. Fields are nil or empty when the request leaves them
 // untouched.
 type privilegedConfigChange struct {
-	managementURL      string
-	serverSSHAllowed   *bool
-	enableSSHRoot      *bool
-	disableSSHAuth     *bool
-	serverVNCAllowed   *bool
-	disableVNCApproval *bool
+	managementURL    string
+	serverSSHAllowed *bool
+	enableSSHRoot    *bool
+	disableSSHAuth   *bool
 }
 
 func privilegedChangeFromSetConfig(msg *proto.SetConfigRequest) privilegedConfigChange {
 	return privilegedConfigChange{
-		managementURL:      msg.GetManagementUrl(),
-		serverSSHAllowed:   msg.ServerSSHAllowed,
-		enableSSHRoot:      msg.EnableSSHRoot,
-		disableSSHAuth:     msg.DisableSSHAuth,
-		serverVNCAllowed:   msg.ServerVNCAllowed,
-		disableVNCApproval: msg.DisableVNCApproval,
+		managementURL:    msg.GetManagementUrl(),
+		serverSSHAllowed: msg.ServerSSHAllowed,
+		enableSSHRoot:    msg.EnableSSHRoot,
+		disableSSHAuth:   msg.DisableSSHAuth,
 	}
 }
 
 func privilegedChangeFromLogin(msg *proto.LoginRequest) privilegedConfigChange {
 	return privilegedConfigChange{
-		managementURL:      msg.GetManagementUrl(),
-		serverSSHAllowed:   msg.ServerSSHAllowed,
-		enableSSHRoot:      msg.EnableSSHRoot,
-		disableSSHAuth:     msg.DisableSSHAuth,
-		serverVNCAllowed:   msg.ServerVNCAllowed,
-		disableVNCApproval: msg.DisableVNCApproval,
+		managementURL:    msg.GetManagementUrl(),
+		serverSSHAllowed: msg.ServerSSHAllowed,
+		enableSSHRoot:    msg.EnableSSHRoot,
+		disableSSHAuth:   msg.DisableSSHAuth,
 	}
 }
 
@@ -94,21 +83,15 @@ func requirePrivilegeForConfigChange(ctx context.Context, stored *profilemanager
 		return denyPrivileged(ctx, "enabling the NetBird SSH server", ipcauth.UpCommand("--allow-server-ssh"))
 	}
 
-	if err := requirePrivilegeForVNCChange(ctx, stored, change); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-
-	// Only guard the management binding while a remote-access server is enabled:
-	// that is when the management identity decides who may open a shell or reach
-	// the desktop here.
-	server, enabled := enabledRemoteAccessServer(stored)
-	if !enabled {
+	// Only guard the management binding while the SSH server is enabled: that is
+	// when the management identity decides who may open a shell here.
+	if !sshServerEnabled(stored) {
 		return nil
 	}
 
 	if change.managementURL != "" && !sameManagementURL(stored.ManagementURL, change.managementURL) {
 		return denyPrivileged(ctx,
-			fmt.Sprintf("changing the management URL while the NetBird %s server is enabled", server),
+			"changing the management URL while the NetBird SSH server is enabled",
 			ipcauth.UpCommand("-m "+change.managementURL))
 	}
 
@@ -116,21 +99,20 @@ func requirePrivilegeForConfigChange(ctx context.Context, stored *profilemanager
 }
 
 // requirePrivilegeForDeregistration refuses to deregister the peer from the
-// management server when the caller is not privileged and the profile has a
-// remote-access server enabled. Deregistering frees the peer's key to be
-// registered against another management identity, which is the same handover the
+// management server when the caller is not privileged and the profile has the
+// SSH server enabled. Deregistering frees the peer's key to be registered
+// against another management identity, which is the same handover the
 // management URL check refuses.
 //
 // Callers that treat deregistration as best-effort (profile removal) continue
 // without it; callers that were asked to deregister surface the error.
 func requirePrivilegeForDeregistration(ctx context.Context, cfg *profilemanager.Config) error {
-	server, enabled := enabledRemoteAccessServer(cfg)
-	if !enabled {
+	if !sshServerEnabled(cfg) {
 		return nil
 	}
 
 	return denyPrivileged(ctx,
-		fmt.Sprintf("deregistering this peer while the NetBird %s server is enabled", server),
+		"deregistering this peer while the NetBird SSH server is enabled",
 		ipcauth.ElevatedCommand("netbird logout"))
 }
 

client/server/vnc_gate.go

@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-package server
-
-import (
-	"context"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
-)
-
-// The VNC half of the privilege gate described in ssh_gate.go. The daemon runs
-// as root/LocalSystem and the VNC server it hosts attaches to the console
-// session, so both of these cross the user-to-root boundary:
-//
-//   - Enabling the VNC server publishes the console desktop, keyboard and
-//     mouse to whoever the account authorizes. On a multi-user host that
-//     desktop belongs to another user, and the profile the caller owns is not a
-//     privilege they hold over it.
-//   - Disabling the approval prompt removes the console user's per-connection
-//     consent, turning an authorized VNC session into a silent one.
-func requirePrivilegeForVNCChange(ctx context.Context, stored *profilemanager.Config, change privilegedConfigChange) error {
-	if enables(storedFlag(stored, func(c *profilemanager.Config) *bool { return c.DisableVNCApproval }), change.disableVNCApproval) {
-		return denyPrivileged(ctx, "disabling VNC connection approval", ipcauth.UpCommand("--disable-vnc-approval"))
-	}
-
-	if enables(storedFlag(stored, func(c *profilemanager.Config) *bool { return c.ServerVNCAllowed }), change.serverVNCAllowed) {
-		return denyPrivileged(ctx, "enabling the NetBird VNC server", ipcauth.UpCommand("--allow-server-vnc"))
-	}
-
-	return nil
-}
-
-// vncServerEnabled reports whether the profile currently runs the VNC server.
-//
-// Unlike the SSH server, VNC defaults to off: the flag was introduced with the
-// server itself, so a nil value is a config written before VNC existed and
-// means the server is not running.
-func vncServerEnabled(cfg *profilemanager.Config) bool {
-	if cfg == nil || cfg.ServerVNCAllowed == nil {
-		return false
-	}
-	return *cfg.ServerVNCAllowed
-}
-
-// enabledRemoteAccessServer names a remote-access server the profile currently
-// runs, and whether it runs any. It decides whether the management-binding and
-// deregistration guards apply, since either server hands authorization
-// decisions to the management identity the profile points at. SSH is reported
-// first when both are on: it is the more privileged of the two.
-func enabledRemoteAccessServer(cfg *profilemanager.Config) (string, bool) {
-	switch {
-	case sshServerEnabled(cfg):
-		return "SSH", true
-	case vncServerEnabled(cfg):
-		return "VNC", true
-	default:
-		return "", false
-	}
-}

client/server/vnc_gate_test.go

@@ -1,178 +0,0 @@
-package server
-
-import (
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
-)
-
-func TestRequirePrivilegeForConfigChange_VNCFlags(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name       string
-		stored     *profilemanager.Config
-		change     privilegedConfigChange
-		privileged bool
-		wantDeny   bool
-	}{
-		{
-			name:     "enabling the vnc server unprivileged is refused",
-			stored:   &profilemanager.Config{ServerVNCAllowed: boolPtr(false)},
-			change:   privilegedConfigChange{serverVNCAllowed: boolPtr(true)},
-			wantDeny: true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:       "enabling the vnc server as root is allowed",
-			stored:     &profilemanager.Config{ServerVNCAllowed: boolPtr(false)},
-			change:     privilegedConfigChange{serverVNCAllowed: boolPtr(true)},
-			privileged: true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:   "restating an already enabled vnc server is not a change",
-			stored: &profilemanager.Config{ServerVNCAllowed: boolPtr(true)},
-			change: privilegedConfigChange{serverVNCAllowed: boolPtr(true)},
-		},
-		{
-			name:   "turning the vnc server off is not guarded",
-			stored: &profilemanager.Config{ServerVNCAllowed: boolPtr(true)},
-			change: privilegedConfigChange{serverVNCAllowed: boolPtr(false)},
-		},
-		{
-			// Unlike SSH, a nil flag means off: the flag shipped with the server.
-			name:     "a config written before vnc existed counts as off, so enabling is refused",
-			stored:   &profilemanager.Config{},
-			change:   privilegedConfigChange{serverVNCAllowed: boolPtr(true)},
-			wantDeny: true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "a profile with no config yet counts as off, so enabling is refused",
-			stored:   nil,
-			change:   privilegedConfigChange{serverVNCAllowed: boolPtr(true)},
-			wantDeny: true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "disabling the vnc approval prompt unprivileged is refused",
-			stored:   &profilemanager.Config{DisableVNCApproval: boolPtr(false)},
-			change:   privilegedConfigChange{disableVNCApproval: boolPtr(true)},
-			wantDeny: true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:       "disabling the vnc approval prompt as root is allowed",
-			stored:     &profilemanager.Config{DisableVNCApproval: boolPtr(false)},
-			change:     privilegedConfigChange{disableVNCApproval: boolPtr(true)},
-			privileged: true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:   "re-enabling the vnc approval prompt is not guarded",
-			stored: &profilemanager.Config{DisableVNCApproval: boolPtr(true)},
-			change: privilegedConfigChange{disableVNCApproval: boolPtr(false)},
-		},
-		{
-			name:   "restating a disabled approval prompt is not a change",
-			stored: &profilemanager.Config{DisableVNCApproval: boolPtr(true)},
-			change: privilegedConfigChange{disableVNCApproval: boolPtr(true)},
-		},
-	}
-
-	for _, tt := range tests {
-		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			ctx := userCtx()
-			if tt.privileged {
-				ctx = rootCtx()
-			}
-			err := requirePrivilegeForConfigChange(ctx, tt.stored, tt.change)
-			if tt.wantDeny {
-				assertDenied(t, err)
-				return
-			}
-			assertAllowed(t, err)
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// The management binding and deregistration guards protect either remote-access
-// server, so the VNC server alone must arm them even with SSH off.
-func TestRequirePrivilegeForConfigChange_ManagementURLWithVNCOnly(t *testing.T) {
-	vncOnly := &profilemanager.Config{
-		ServerSSHAllowed:   boolPtr(false),
-		ServerVNCAllowed:   boolPtr(true),
-		ManagementURL:      mustURL(t, "https://api.netbird.io:443"),
-		DisableVNCApproval: boolPtr(false),
-	}
-
-	err := requirePrivilegeForConfigChange(userCtx(), vncOnly,
-		privilegedConfigChange{managementURL: "https://attacker.example.com:443"})
-	assertDenied(t, err)
-
-	// The same move is the administrator's to make.
-	assertAllowed(t, requirePrivilegeForConfigChange(rootCtx(), vncOnly,
-		privilegedConfigChange{managementURL: "https://selfhosted.example.com:443"}))
-
-	// Restating the stored binding is not a change, so it is never refused.
-	assertAllowed(t, requirePrivilegeForConfigChange(userCtx(), vncOnly,
-		privilegedConfigChange{managementURL: "https://api.netbird.io"}))
-}
-
-func TestRequirePrivilegeForDeregistration_VNCOnly(t *testing.T) {
-	vncOnly := &profilemanager.Config{ServerSSHAllowed: boolPtr(false), ServerVNCAllowed: boolPtr(true)}
-
-	assertDenied(t, requirePrivilegeForDeregistration(userCtx(), vncOnly))
-	assertAllowed(t, requirePrivilegeForDeregistration(rootCtx(), vncOnly))
-
-	bothOff := &profilemanager.Config{ServerSSHAllowed: boolPtr(false), ServerVNCAllowed: boolPtr(false)}
-	assertAllowed(t, requirePrivilegeForDeregistration(userCtx(), bothOff))
-}
-
-// enabledRemoteAccessServer names the server in the refusal, so the user is told
-// which one is holding the binding down. SSH wins when both are on: it is the
-// more privileged of the two.
-func TestEnabledRemoteAccessServer(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name       string
-		cfg        *profilemanager.Config
-		wantServer string
-		wantOn     bool
-	}{
-		{
-			name:       "ssh only",
-			cfg:        &profilemanager.Config{ServerSSHAllowed: boolPtr(true), ServerVNCAllowed: boolPtr(false)},
-			wantServer: "SSH",
-			wantOn:     true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:       "vnc only",
-			cfg:        &profilemanager.Config{ServerSSHAllowed: boolPtr(false), ServerVNCAllowed: boolPtr(true)},
-			wantServer: "VNC",
-			wantOn:     true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:       "both on reports ssh",
-			cfg:        &profilemanager.Config{ServerSSHAllowed: boolPtr(true), ServerVNCAllowed: boolPtr(true)},
-			wantServer: "SSH",
-			wantOn:     true,
-		},
-		{
-			name: "both off",
-			cfg:  &profilemanager.Config{ServerSSHAllowed: boolPtr(false), ServerVNCAllowed: boolPtr(false)},
-		},
-		{
-			// A nil SSH flag means on (legacy configs), so it still arms the guard.
-			name:       "legacy config with no flags at all reports ssh",
-			cfg:        &profilemanager.Config{},
-			wantServer: "SSH",
-			wantOn:     true,
-		},
-		{
-			name: "no config",
-			cfg:  nil,
-		},
-	}
-
-	for _, tt := range tests {
-		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			server, on := enabledRemoteAccessServer(tt.cfg)
-			if on != tt.wantOn || server != tt.wantServer {
-				t.Fatalf("enabledRemoteAccessServer() = (%q, %v), want (%q, %v)", server, on, tt.wantServer, tt.wantOn)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}

client/ssh/auth/auth.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package sessionauth
+package auth
 
 import (
 	"errors"
@@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ const (
 	DefaultUserIDClaim = "sub"
 	// Wildcard is a special user ID that matches all users
 	Wildcard = "*"
-	// sessionPubKeyLen is the size of an X25519 static public key in bytes.
-	sessionPubKeyLen = 32
 )
 
 var (
@@ -24,7 +22,6 @@ var (
 	ErrUserNotAuthorized     = errors.New("user is not authorized to access this peer")
 	ErrNoMachineUserMapping  = errors.New("no authorization mapping for OS user")
 	ErrUserNotMappedToOSUser = errors.New("user is not authorized to login as OS user")
-	ErrSessionKeyNotKnown    = errors.New("session pubkey not registered")
 )
 
 // Authorizer handles SSH fine-grained access control authorization
@@ -38,17 +35,6 @@ type Authorizer struct {
 	// machineUsers maps OS login usernames to lists of authorized user indexes
 	machineUsers map[string][]uint32
 
-	// sessionPubKeys maps an X25519 static public key (as map-safe
-	// array) to the hashed user identity that key authenticates as.
-	// Populated from management's temporary-access flow; used by VNC to
-	// authenticate via the Noise_IK handshake.
-	sessionPubKeys map[[sessionPubKeyLen]byte]sshuserhash.UserIDHash
-	// sessionDisplayNames mirrors sessionPubKeys with the optional
-	// human-readable display name management associated with each
-	// session key. Used by the per-connection UI approval prompt; not
-	// consulted by any authorization decision.
-	sessionDisplayNames map[[sessionPubKeyLen]byte]string
-
 	// mu protects the list of users
 	mu sync.RWMutex
 }
@@ -64,29 +50,13 @@ type Config struct {
 	// MachineUsers maps OS login usernames to indexes in AuthorizedUsers
 	// If a user wants to login as a specific OS user, their index must be in the corresponding list
 	MachineUsers map[string][]uint32
-
-	// SessionPubKeys binds ephemeral X25519 static public keys to hashed
-	// user identities. Populated for VNC; ignored on the SSH side.
-	SessionPubKeys []SessionPubKey
-}
-
-// SessionPubKey is a single ephemeral-key entry: the 32-byte X25519
-// static public key plus the hashed user identity it authenticates as,
-// optionally plus a human-readable display name for the UI approval
-// prompt to identify the requester.
-type SessionPubKey struct {
-	PubKey      []byte
-	UserIDHash  sshuserhash.UserIDHash
-	DisplayName string
 }
 
 // NewAuthorizer creates a new SSH authorizer with empty configuration
 func NewAuthorizer() *Authorizer {
 	a := &Authorizer{
-		userIDClaim:         DefaultUserIDClaim,
-		machineUsers:        make(map[string][]uint32),
-		sessionPubKeys:      make(map[[sessionPubKeyLen]byte]sshuserhash.UserIDHash),
-		sessionDisplayNames: make(map[[sessionPubKeyLen]byte]string),
+		userIDClaim:  DefaultUserIDClaim,
+		machineUsers: make(map[string][]uint32),
 	}
 
 	return a
@@ -102,8 +72,6 @@ func (a *Authorizer) Update(config *Config) {
 		a.userIDClaim = DefaultUserIDClaim
 		a.authorizedUsers = []sshuserhash.UserIDHash{}
 		a.machineUsers = make(map[string][]uint32)
-		a.sessionPubKeys = make(map[[sessionPubKeyLen]byte]sshuserhash.UserIDHash)
-		a.sessionDisplayNames = make(map[[sessionPubKeyLen]byte]string)
 		log.Info("SSH authorization cleared")
 		return
 	}
@@ -126,35 +94,8 @@ func (a *Authorizer) Update(config *Config) {
 	}
 	a.machineUsers = machineUsers
 
-	sessionPubKeys := make(map[[sessionPubKeyLen]byte]sshuserhash.UserIDHash, len(config.SessionPubKeys))
-	sessionDisplayNames := make(map[[sessionPubKeyLen]byte]string, len(config.SessionPubKeys))
-	conflicted := make(map[[sessionPubKeyLen]byte]struct{})
-	for _, e := range config.SessionPubKeys {
-		if len(e.PubKey) != sessionPubKeyLen {
-			continue
-		}
-		var key [sessionPubKeyLen]byte
-		copy(key[:], e.PubKey)
-		if _, bad := conflicted[key]; bad {
-			continue
-		}
-		if existing, ok := sessionPubKeys[key]; ok && existing != e.UserIDHash {
-			log.Warnf("SSH auth: session pubkey bound to conflicting user hashes; dropping binding")
-			delete(sessionPubKeys, key)
-			delete(sessionDisplayNames, key)
-			conflicted[key] = struct{}{}
-			continue
-		}
-		sessionPubKeys[key] = e.UserIDHash
-		if e.DisplayName != "" {
-			sessionDisplayNames[key] = e.DisplayName
-		}
-	}
-	a.sessionPubKeys = sessionPubKeys
-	a.sessionDisplayNames = sessionDisplayNames
-
-	log.Debugf("SSH auth: updated with %d authorized users, %d machine user mappings, %d session pubkeys",
-		len(config.AuthorizedUsers), len(machineUsers), len(sessionPubKeys))
+	log.Debugf("SSH auth: updated with %d authorized users, %d machine user mappings",
+		len(config.AuthorizedUsers), len(machineUsers))
 }
 
 // Authorize validates if a user is authorized to login as the specified OS user.
@@ -214,54 +155,6 @@ func (a *Authorizer) GetUserIDClaim() string {
 	return a.userIDClaim
 }
 
-// LookupSessionKey resolves a Noise-verified static public key to the
-// hashed user identity registered with it. Fails closed when the key is
-// unknown.
-func (a *Authorizer) LookupSessionKey(pubKey []byte) (sshuserhash.UserIDHash, error) {
-	var zero sshuserhash.UserIDHash
-	if len(pubKey) != sessionPubKeyLen {
-		return zero, fmt.Errorf("session pubkey wrong length: %d", len(pubKey))
-	}
-	var key [sessionPubKeyLen]byte
-	copy(key[:], pubKey)
-	a.mu.RLock()
-	hash, ok := a.sessionPubKeys[key]
-	a.mu.RUnlock()
-	if !ok {
-		return zero, ErrSessionKeyNotKnown
-	}
-	return hash, nil
-}
-
-// LookupSessionDisplayName returns the human-readable display name
-// management associated with a session pubkey, or empty string when none
-// is recorded. Never returns an error: a missing/unknown key reports as
-// "" and the caller falls back to other identifiers.
-func (a *Authorizer) LookupSessionDisplayName(pubKey []byte) string {
-	if len(pubKey) != sessionPubKeyLen {
-		return ""
-	}
-	var key [sessionPubKeyLen]byte
-	copy(key[:], pubKey)
-	a.mu.RLock()
-	name := a.sessionDisplayNames[key]
-	a.mu.RUnlock()
-	return name
-}
-
-// AuthorizeOSUserBySessionKey resolves the OS-user mapping for a session
-// key. Mirrors Authorize but skips the JWT-hash step since the key has
-// already been verified and the user identity hash is in hand.
-func (a *Authorizer) AuthorizeOSUserBySessionKey(userIDHash sshuserhash.UserIDHash, osUsername string) (string, error) {
-	a.mu.RLock()
-	defer a.mu.RUnlock()
-	userIndex, found := a.findUserIndex(userIDHash)
-	if !found {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("session user (hash: %s) not in authorized list for OS user %q: %w", userIDHash, osUsername, ErrUserNotAuthorized)
-	}
-	return a.checkMachineUserMapping("session", osUsername, userIndex)
-}
-
 // findUserIndex finds the index of a hashed user ID in the authorized users list
 // Returns the index and true if found, 0 and false if not found
 func (a *Authorizer) findUserIndex(hashedUserID sshuserhash.UserIDHash) (int, bool) {

client/ssh/auth/auth_test.go

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
-package sessionauth
+package auth
 
 import (
-	"errors"
 	"testing"
 
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
@@ -611,61 +610,3 @@ func TestAuthorizer_Wildcard_WithPartialIndexes_AllowsAllUsers(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Error(t, err)
 	assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrUserNotAuthorized, "unauthorized user should be denied")
 }
-
-func TestAuthorizer_LookupSessionKey_Valid(t *testing.T) {
-	pub := bytesRepeat(0x11, sessionPubKeyLen)
-	userHash, err := sshauth.HashUserID("alice")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	a := NewAuthorizer()
-	a.Update(&Config{
-		AuthorizedUsers: []sshauth.UserIDHash{userHash},
-		MachineUsers:    map[string][]uint32{Wildcard: {0}},
-		SessionPubKeys:  []SessionPubKey{{PubKey: pub, UserIDHash: userHash}},
-	})
-
-	got, err := a.LookupSessionKey(pub)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, userHash, got)
-
-	if _, err := a.AuthorizeOSUserBySessionKey(got, "alice"); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("AuthorizeOSUserBySessionKey: %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestAuthorizer_LookupSessionKey_UnknownPub(t *testing.T) {
-	a := NewAuthorizer()
-	a.Update(&Config{})
-	_, err := a.LookupSessionKey(bytesRepeat(0x22, sessionPubKeyLen))
-	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrSessionKeyNotKnown)
-}
-
-func TestAuthorizer_LookupSessionKey_WrongLength(t *testing.T) {
-	a := NewAuthorizer()
-	_, err := a.LookupSessionKey([]byte("short"))
-	require.Error(t, err)
-}
-
-func TestAuthorizer_LookupSessionKey_UpdateClears(t *testing.T) {
-	pub := bytesRepeat(0x33, sessionPubKeyLen)
-	userHash, err := sshauth.HashUserID("alice")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	a := NewAuthorizer()
-	a.Update(&Config{SessionPubKeys: []SessionPubKey{{PubKey: pub, UserIDHash: userHash}}})
-	if _, err := a.LookupSessionKey(pub); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("setup lookup: %v", err)
-	}
-	a.Update(&Config{})
-	if _, err := a.LookupSessionKey(pub); !errors.Is(err, ErrSessionKeyNotKnown) {
-		t.Fatalf("expected ErrSessionKeyNotKnown, got %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
-func bytesRepeat(b byte, n int) []byte {
-	out := make([]byte, n)
-	for i := range out {
-		out[i] = b
-	}
-	return out
-}

client/ssh/proxy/proxy_privileged_test.go

@@ -26,10 +26,10 @@ import (
 	cryptossh "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
 
 	nbssh "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh"
+	sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/auth"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/server"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/testutil"
 	nbjwt "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/auth/jwt"
-	sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sessionauth"
 	sshuserhash "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sshauth"
 )
 

client/ssh/server/jwt_test.go

@@ -23,11 +23,11 @@ import (
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 
 	nbssh "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh"
+	sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/auth"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/client"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/detection"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/testutil"
 	nbjwt "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/auth/jwt"
-	sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sessionauth"
 	sshuserhash "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sshauth"
 )
 

client/ssh/server/server.go

@@ -23,10 +23,10 @@ import (
 	"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/tun/netstack"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
+	sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/auth"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/detection"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/auth"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/auth/jwt"
-	sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sessionauth"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util/netrelay"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/version"
 )
@@ -197,14 +197,6 @@ type Config struct {
 
 	// HostKey is the SSH server host key in PEM format
 	HostKeyPEM []byte
-
-	// NetstackNet, when non-nil, makes the SSH server listen via the
-	// supplied userspace network stack instead of an OS socket.
-	NetstackNet *netstack.Net
-
-	// NetworkValidation, when non-zero, restricts inbound connections to
-	// peers inside the NetBird overlay defined by this WireGuard address.
-	NetworkValidation wgaddr.Address
 }
 
 // SessionInfo contains information about an active SSH session
@@ -216,15 +208,12 @@ type SessionInfo struct {
 	PortForwards  []string
 }
 
-// New creates an SSH server instance from the supplied Config. Fields are
-// read once at construction; mutating Config afterwards has no effect.
-// JWT == nil disables JWT authentication.
+// New creates an SSH server instance with the provided host key and optional JWT configuration
+// If jwtConfig is nil, JWT authentication is disabled
 func New(config *Config) *Server {
 	s := &Server{
 		mu:                     sync.RWMutex{},
 		hostKeyPEM:             config.HostKeyPEM,
-		netstackNet:            config.NetstackNet,
-		wgAddress:              config.NetworkValidation,
 		sessions:               make(map[sessionKey]*sessionState),
 		pendingAuthJWT:         make(map[authKey]string),
 		remoteForwardListeners: make(map[forwardKey]net.Listener),
@@ -445,6 +434,20 @@ func (s *Server) buildSessionInfo(state *sessionState) SessionInfo {
 	return info
 }
 
+// SetNetstackNet sets the netstack network for userspace networking
+func (s *Server) SetNetstackNet(net *netstack.Net) {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	s.netstackNet = net
+}
+
+// SetNetworkValidation configures network-based connection filtering
+func (s *Server) SetNetworkValidation(addr wgaddr.Address) {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	s.wgAddress = addr
+}
+
 // UpdateSSHAuth updates the SSH fine-grained access control configuration
 // This should be called when network map updates include new SSH auth configuration
 func (s *Server) UpdateSSHAuth(config *sshauth.Config) {

client/status/status.go

@@ -136,19 +136,6 @@ type SSHServerStateOutput struct {
 	Sessions []SSHSessionOutput `json:"sessions" yaml:"sessions"`
 }
 
-type VNCSessionOutput struct {
-	RemoteAddress string `json:"remoteAddress" yaml:"remoteAddress"`
-	Mode          string `json:"mode" yaml:"mode"`
-	Username      string `json:"username,omitempty" yaml:"username,omitempty"`
-	UserID        string `json:"userID,omitempty" yaml:"userID,omitempty"`
-	Initiator     string `json:"initiator,omitempty" yaml:"initiator,omitempty"`
-}
-
-type VNCServerStateOutput struct {
-	Enabled  bool               `json:"enabled" yaml:"enabled"`
-	Sessions []VNCSessionOutput `json:"sessions" yaml:"sessions"`
-}
-
 type OutputOverview struct {
 	Peers                   PeersStateOutput           `json:"peers" yaml:"peers"`
 	CliVersion              string                     `json:"cliVersion" yaml:"cliVersion"`
@@ -172,7 +159,6 @@ type OutputOverview struct {
 	LazyConnectionEnabled   bool                       `json:"lazyConnectionEnabled" yaml:"lazyConnectionEnabled"`
 	ProfileName             string                     `json:"profileName" yaml:"profileName"`
 	SSHServerState          SSHServerStateOutput       `json:"sshServer" yaml:"sshServer"`
-	VNCServerState          VNCServerStateOutput       `json:"vncServer" yaml:"vncServer"`
 	// SessionExpiresAt is the absolute UTC instant at which the peer's SSO
 	// session expires. nil when the peer is not SSO-tracked or login
 	// expiration is disabled. Pointer (rather than zero-value time.Time) so
@@ -198,7 +184,6 @@ func ConvertToStatusOutputOverview(pbFullStatus *proto.FullStatus, opts ConvertO
 
 	relayOverview := mapRelays(pbFullStatus.GetRelays())
 	sshServerOverview := mapSSHServer(pbFullStatus.GetSshServerState())
-	vncServerOverview := mapVNCServer(pbFullStatus.GetVncServerState())
 	peersOverview := mapPeers(pbFullStatus.GetPeers(), opts.StatusFilter, opts.PrefixNamesFilter, opts.PrefixNamesFilterMap, opts.IPsFilter, opts.ConnectionTypeFilter)
 
 	overview := OutputOverview{
@@ -224,7 +209,6 @@ func ConvertToStatusOutputOverview(pbFullStatus *proto.FullStatus, opts ConvertO
 		LazyConnectionEnabled:   pbFullStatus.GetLazyConnectionEnabled(),
 		ProfileName:             opts.ProfileName,
 		SSHServerState:          sshServerOverview,
-		VNCServerState:          vncServerOverview,
 	}
 	if !opts.SessionExpiresAt.IsZero() {
 		t := opts.SessionExpiresAt
@@ -310,26 +294,6 @@ func mapSSHServer(sshServerState *proto.SSHServerState) SSHServerStateOutput {
 	}
 }
 
-func mapVNCServer(state *proto.VNCServerState) VNCServerStateOutput {
-	if state == nil {
-		return VNCServerStateOutput{Sessions: []VNCSessionOutput{}}
-	}
-	sessions := make([]VNCSessionOutput, 0, len(state.GetSessions()))
-	for _, sess := range state.GetSessions() {
-		sessions = append(sessions, VNCSessionOutput{
-			RemoteAddress: sess.GetRemoteAddress(),
-			Mode:          sess.GetMode(),
-			Username:      sess.GetUsername(),
-			UserID:        sess.GetUserID(),
-			Initiator:     sess.GetInitiator(),
-		})
-	}
-	return VNCServerStateOutput{
-		Enabled:  state.GetEnabled(),
-		Sessions: sessions,
-	}
-}
-
 func mapPeers(
 	peers []*proto.PeerState,
 	statusFilter string,
@@ -594,26 +558,6 @@ func (o *OutputOverview) GeneralSummary(showURL bool, showRelays bool, showNameS
 		}
 	}
 
-	vncServerStatus := "Disabled"
-	if o.VNCServerState.Enabled {
-		vncSessionCount := len(o.VNCServerState.Sessions)
-		if vncSessionCount > 0 {
-			sessionWord := "session"
-			if vncSessionCount > 1 {
-				sessionWord = "sessions"
-			}
-			vncServerStatus = fmt.Sprintf("Enabled (%d active %s)", vncSessionCount, sessionWord)
-		} else {
-			vncServerStatus = "Enabled"
-		}
-
-		if showSSHSessions && vncSessionCount > 0 {
-			for _, sess := range o.VNCServerState.Sessions {
-				vncServerStatus += "\n  " + formatVNCSessionLine(sess)
-			}
-		}
-	}
-
 	peersCountString := fmt.Sprintf("%d/%d Connected", o.Peers.Connected, o.Peers.Total)
 
 	var sessionExpiryString string
@@ -669,7 +613,6 @@ func (o *OutputOverview) GeneralSummary(showURL bool, showRelays bool, showNameS
 			"Quantum resistance: %s\n"+
 			"Lazy connection: %s\n"+
 			"SSH Server: %s\n"+
-			"VNC Server: %s\n"+
 			"Networks: %s\n"+
 			"%s"+
 			"%s"+
@@ -690,7 +633,6 @@ func (o *OutputOverview) GeneralSummary(showURL bool, showRelays bool, showNameS
 		rosenpassEnabledStatus,
 		lazyConnectionEnabledStatus,
 		sshServerStatus,
-		vncServerStatus,
 		networks,
 		forwardingRulesString,
 		sessionExpiryString,
@@ -1053,26 +995,6 @@ func anonymizePeerDetail(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, peer *PeerStateDetailOutput) {
 	}
 }
 
-// formatVNCSessionLine renders a single VNC session row for the detailed
-// status output. The leading slot identifies the initiator (display name
-// when known, hashed UserID otherwise); the post-arrow slot is the OS
-// user the session targets and is omitted in attach mode where the
-// destination is the current console user (unknown to the daemon).
-func formatVNCSessionLine(sess VNCSessionOutput) string {
-	who := sess.Initiator
-	if who == "" {
-		who = sess.UserID
-	}
-	prefix := sess.RemoteAddress
-	if who != "" {
-		prefix = fmt.Sprintf("%s@%s", who, sess.RemoteAddress)
-	}
-	if sess.Username != "" {
-		return fmt.Sprintf("[%s -> %s] mode=%s", prefix, sess.Username, sess.Mode)
-	}
-	return fmt.Sprintf("[%s] mode=%s", prefix, sess.Mode)
-}
-
 func anonymizeOverview(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, overview *OutputOverview) {
 	for i, peer := range overview.Peers.Details {
 		peer := peer
@@ -1093,19 +1015,6 @@ func anonymizeOverview(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, overview *OutputOverview) {
 		overview.Relays.Details[i] = detail
 	}
 
-	anonymizeNSServerGroups(a, overview)
-
-	for i, route := range overview.Networks {
-		overview.Networks[i] = a.AnonymizeRoute(route)
-	}
-
-	overview.FQDN = a.AnonymizeDomain(overview.FQDN)
-
-	anonymizeEvents(a, overview)
-	anonymizeServerSessions(a, overview)
-}
-
-func anonymizeNSServerGroups(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, overview *OutputOverview) {
 	for i, nsGroup := range overview.NSServerGroups {
 		for j, domain := range nsGroup.Domains {
 			overview.NSServerGroups[i].Domains[j] = a.AnonymizeDomain(domain)
@@ -1117,9 +1026,13 @@ func anonymizeNSServerGroups(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, overview *OutputOverview)
 			}
 		}
 	}
-}
 
-func anonymizeEvents(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, overview *OutputOverview) {
+	for i, route := range overview.Networks {
+		overview.Networks[i] = a.AnonymizeRoute(route)
+	}
+
+	overview.FQDN = a.AnonymizeDomain(overview.FQDN)
+
 	for i, event := range overview.Events {
 		overview.Events[i].Message = a.AnonymizeString(event.Message)
 		overview.Events[i].UserMessage = a.AnonymizeString(event.UserMessage)
@@ -1128,26 +1041,15 @@ func anonymizeEvents(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, overview *OutputOverview) {
 			event.Metadata[k] = a.AnonymizeString(v)
 		}
 	}
-}
 
-func anonymizeRemoteAddress(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, addr string) string {
-	if host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr); err == nil {
-		return fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", a.AnonymizeIPString(host), port)
-	}
-	return a.AnonymizeIPString(addr)
-}
-
-func anonymizeServerSessions(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, overview *OutputOverview) {
 	for i, session := range overview.SSHServerState.Sessions {
-		overview.SSHServerState.Sessions[i].RemoteAddress = anonymizeRemoteAddress(a, session.RemoteAddress)
+		if host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(session.RemoteAddress); err == nil {
+			overview.SSHServerState.Sessions[i].RemoteAddress = fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", a.AnonymizeIPString(host), port)
+		} else {
+			overview.SSHServerState.Sessions[i].RemoteAddress = a.AnonymizeIPString(session.RemoteAddress)
+		}
 		overview.SSHServerState.Sessions[i].Command = a.AnonymizeString(session.Command)
 	}
-	for i, sess := range overview.VNCServerState.Sessions {
-		overview.VNCServerState.Sessions[i].RemoteAddress = anonymizeRemoteAddress(a, sess.RemoteAddress)
-		overview.VNCServerState.Sessions[i].Username = a.AnonymizeString(sess.Username)
-		overview.VNCServerState.Sessions[i].UserID = a.AnonymizeString(sess.UserID)
-		overview.VNCServerState.Sessions[i].Initiator = a.AnonymizeString(sess.Initiator)
-	}
 }
 
 // FormatRemainingDuration renders a time.Duration for the "Session expires"

client/status/status_test.go

@@ -242,10 +242,6 @@ var overview = OutputOverview{
 		Enabled:  false,
 		Sessions: []SSHSessionOutput{},
 	},
-	VNCServerState: VNCServerStateOutput{
-		Enabled:  false,
-		Sessions: []VNCSessionOutput{},
-	},
 }
 
 func TestConversionFromFullStatusToOutputOverview(t *testing.T) {
@@ -411,10 +407,6 @@ func TestParsingToJSON(t *testing.T) {
 		  "sshServer":{
 		    "enabled":false,
 			"sessions":[]
-		  },
-		  "vncServer":{
-		    "enabled":false,
-			"sessions":[]
 		  }
         }`
 	// @formatter:on
@@ -525,9 +517,6 @@ profileName: ""
 sshServer:
     enabled: false
     sessions: []
-vncServer:
-    enabled: false
-    sessions: []
 `
 
 	assert.Equal(t, expectedYAML, yaml)
@@ -598,7 +587,6 @@ Wireguard port: %d
 Quantum resistance: false
 Lazy connection: false
 SSH Server: Disabled
-VNC Server: Disabled
 Networks: 10.10.0.0/24
 Peers count: 2/2 Connected
 `, lastConnectionUpdate1, lastHandshake1, lastConnectionUpdate2, lastHandshake2, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH, overview.CliVersion, overview.WgPort)
@@ -625,7 +613,6 @@ Wireguard port: 51820
 Quantum resistance: false
 Lazy connection: false
 SSH Server: Disabled
-VNC Server: Disabled
 Networks: 10.10.0.0/24
 Peers count: 2/2 Connected
 `

client/system/info.go

@@ -65,7 +65,6 @@ type Info struct {
 	RosenpassEnabled    bool
 	RosenpassPermissive bool
 	ServerSSHAllowed    bool
-	ServerVNCAllowed    bool
 
 	DisableClientRoutes bool
 	DisableServerRoutes bool
@@ -87,7 +86,6 @@ type Info struct {
 func (i *Info) SetFlags(
 	rosenpassEnabled, rosenpassPermissive bool,
 	serverSSHAllowed *bool,
-	serverVNCAllowed *bool,
 	disableClientRoutes, disableServerRoutes,
 	disableDNS, disableFirewall, blockLANAccess, blockInbound, disableIPv6 bool, syncMessageVersion *int,
 	enableSSHRoot, enableSSHSFTP, enableSSHLocalPortForwarding, enableSSHRemotePortForwarding *bool,
@@ -98,9 +96,6 @@ func (i *Info) SetFlags(
 	if serverSSHAllowed != nil {
 		i.ServerSSHAllowed = *serverSSHAllowed
 	}
-	if serverVNCAllowed != nil {
-		i.ServerVNCAllowed = *serverVNCAllowed
-	}
 
 	i.DisableClientRoutes = disableClientRoutes
 	i.DisableServerRoutes = disableServerRoutes

client/ui/build/linux/nfpm/nfpm.yaml

@@ -26,17 +26,17 @@ contents:
 
 # Default dependencies for the GTK4 + WebKitGTK 6.0 stack (Ubuntu 24.04+ / Debian 13+)
 depends:
-  - libgtk-4-1
+  - libgtk-4-1 (>= 4.14)
   - libwebkitgtk-6.0-4
   - xdg-utils
 
 # Distribution-specific overrides for different package formats
 overrides:
-  # RPM packages for Fedora / RHEL / AlmaLinux / Rocky Linux
+  # RPM packages for Fedora / RHEL / AlmaLinux / Rocky Linux / openSUSE
   rpm:
     depends:
-      - gtk4
-      - webkitgtk6.0
+      - (gtk4 >= 4.14 or libgtk-4-1 >= 4.14)
+      - (webkitgtk6.0 or libwebkitgtk-6_0-4)
       - xdg-utils
 
   # Arch Linux packages

client/ui/frontend/src/app.tsx

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ import ReactDOM from "react-dom/client";
 import "./globals.css";
 import { HashRouter, Navigate, Route, Routes } from "react-router-dom";
 import SessionExpirationDialog from "@/modules/session/SessionExpirationDialog.tsx";
-import ApprovalDialog from "@/modules/approval/ApprovalDialog.tsx";
 import UpdateInProgressDialog from "@/modules/auto-update/UpdateInProgressDialog.tsx";
 import WelcomeDialog from "@/modules/welcome/WelcomeDialog.tsx";
 import ErrorDialog from "@/modules/error/ErrorDialog.tsx";
@@ -49,7 +48,6 @@ Promise.all([
                                 path={"session-expiration"}
                                 element={<SessionExpirationDialog />}
                             />
-                            <Route path={"approval"} element={<ApprovalDialog />} />
                             <Route path={"welcome"} element={<WelcomeDialog />} />
                             <Route path={"error"} element={<ErrorDialog />} />
                         </Route>

client/ui/frontend/src/lib/connection.ts

@@ -43,7 +43,12 @@ function buildSsoCancelPromise(state: SsoState, signal?: AbortSignal): Promise<v
 }
 
 async function runSsoLogin(
-    result: { verificationUri: string; verificationUriComplete: string; userCode: string },
+    result: {
+        verificationUri: string;
+        verificationUriComplete: string;
+        userCode: string;
+        profileId: string;
+    },
     state: SsoState,
     signal?: AbortSignal,
 ): Promise<void> {
@@ -56,7 +61,7 @@ async function runSsoLogin(
     // suspended, so a frontend-driven Up (a promise continuation) would not
     // fire until the user woke the window (e.g. hovering the tray icon).
     const waitPromise = Connection.WaitSSOLoginAndUp(
-        { userCode: result.userCode, hostname: "" },
+        { userCode: result.userCode, hostname: "", profileId: result.profileId },
         { profileName: "", username: "" },
     );
 

client/ui/frontend/src/modules/approval/ApprovalDialog.tsx

@@ -1,170 +0,0 @@
-import { useCallback, useEffect, useMemo, useRef, useState } from "react";
-import { useTranslation } from "react-i18next";
-import { useSearchParams } from "react-router-dom";
-import { MonitorIcon } from "lucide-react";
-import { Button } from "@/components/buttons/Button";
-import { ConfirmDialog } from "@/components/dialog/ConfirmDialog";
-import { DialogActions } from "@/components/dialog/DialogActions";
-import { DialogHeading } from "@/components/dialog/DialogHeading";
-import { SquareIcon } from "@/components/SquareIcon";
-import { Approval, WindowManager } from "@bindings/services";
-import { useAutoSizeWindow } from "@/hooks/useAutoSizeWindow";
-
-const WINDOW_WIDTH = 360;
-// Fallback window so a missing/unparseable expires_at can't leave the prompt open forever.
-const FALLBACK_SECONDS = 13;
-
-// shortFingerprint groups a hex key as XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX (16 chars). Mirrors the
-// daemon's approval.ShortKeyFingerprint so the value matches an out-of-band reference.
-function shortFingerprint(hexKey: string): string {
-    if (hexKey.length < 8) return "";
-    const src = hexKey.slice(0, 16);
-    return src.match(/.{1,4}/g)?.join("-") ?? src;
-}
-
-type Row = { label: string; value: string; mono?: boolean };
-
-export default function ApprovalDialog() {
-    const { t } = useTranslation();
-    const contentRef = useAutoSizeWindow<HTMLDivElement>(WINDOW_WIDTH);
-    const [params] = useSearchParams();
-    const [busy, setBusy] = useState(false);
-
-    const requestID = params.get("request_id") ?? "";
-    const kind = params.get("kind") ?? "";
-    const initiator = params.get("initiator") ?? "";
-    const peerName = params.get("peer_name") ?? "";
-    const sourceIP = params.get("source_ip") ?? "";
-    const username = params.get("username") ?? "";
-    const peerPubKey = params.get("peer_pubkey") ?? "";
-    const expiresAt = params.get("expires_at") ?? "";
-
-    const deadline = useMemo(() => {
-        const parsed = Date.parse(expiresAt);
-        return Number.isFinite(parsed) ? parsed : Date.now() + FALLBACK_SECONDS * 1000;
-    }, [expiresAt]);
-
-    const title = useMemo(() => {
-        switch (kind) {
-            case "vnc":
-                return t("approval.title.vnc");
-            case "ssh":
-                return t("approval.title.ssh");
-            default:
-                return t("approval.title.default");
-        }
-    }, [kind, t]);
-
-    const rows = useMemo<Row[]>(() => {
-        const out: Row[] = [];
-        // The display name is dashboard-supplied and not cryptographically
-        // asserted; the key fingerprint below IS, so show both.
-        if (initiator) out.push({ label: t("approval.field.user"), value: initiator });
-        const fp = shortFingerprint(peerPubKey);
-        if (fp) out.push({ label: t("approval.field.keyFingerprint"), value: fp, mono: true });
-        if (peerName) out.push({ label: t("approval.field.peer"), value: peerName });
-        if (sourceIP && sourceIP !== peerName)
-            out.push({ label: t("approval.field.sourceIp"), value: sourceIP, mono: true });
-        if (username) out.push({ label: t("approval.field.osUser"), value: username });
-        return out;
-    }, [initiator, peerPubKey, peerName, sourceIP, username, t]);
-
-    const respond = useCallback(
-        async (accept: boolean, viewOnly: boolean) => {
-            if (busy) return;
-            setBusy(true);
-            try {
-                if (requestID) {
-                    await Approval.Respond(requestID, accept, viewOnly);
-                }
-            } catch (e) {
-                console.error("respond approval failed", e);
-            } finally {
-                WindowManager.CloseApproval().catch(console.error);
-            }
-        },
-        [busy, requestID],
-    );
-
-    const secondsLeft = () => Math.max(0, Math.ceil((deadline - Date.now()) / 1000));
-    const [remaining, setRemaining] = useState(secondsLeft);
-    const closedRef = useRef(false);
-    useEffect(() => {
-        const id = globalThis.setInterval(() => {
-            const left = secondsLeft();
-            setRemaining(left);
-            // On the deadline the daemon auto-denies; just close the prompt.
-            if (left <= 0 && !closedRef.current) {
-                closedRef.current = true;
-                WindowManager.CloseApproval().catch(console.error);
-            }
-        }, 1000);
-        return () => globalThis.clearInterval(id);
-        // eslint-disable-next-line react-hooks/exhaustive-deps
-    }, [deadline]);
-
-    const showViewOnly = kind === "vnc";
-
-    return (
-        <ConfirmDialog ref={contentRef} aria-labelledby={"nb-approval-title"}>
-            <SquareIcon icon={MonitorIcon} />
-
-            <DialogHeading id={"nb-approval-title"}>{title}</DialogHeading>
-
-            {rows.length > 0 && (
-                <dl className={"w-full space-y-1 text-left text-sm"}>
-                    {rows.map((row) => (
-                        <div key={row.label} className={"flex justify-between gap-4"}>
-                            <dt className={"shrink-0 text-nb-gray-400"}>{row.label}</dt>
-                            <dd
-                                className={`min-w-0 truncate text-nb-gray-100 ${
-                                    row.mono ? "font-mono" : ""
-                                }`}
-                                title={row.value}
-                            >
-                                {row.value}
-                            </dd>
-                        </div>
-                    ))}
-                </dl>
-            )}
-
-            <div className={"text-sm tabular-nums text-nb-gray-400"} aria-live={"polite"}>
-                {t("approval.countdown", { seconds: remaining })}
-            </div>
-
-            <DialogActions>
-                <Button
-                    autoFocus
-                    variant={"primary"}
-                    size={"md"}
-                    className={"w-full"}
-                    onClick={() => respond(true, false)}
-                    disabled={busy}
-                >
-                    {t("approval.action.allow")}
-                </Button>
-                {showViewOnly && (
-                    <Button
-                        variant={"secondary"}
-                        size={"md"}
-                        className={"w-full"}
-                        onClick={() => respond(true, true)}
-                        disabled={busy}
-                    >
-                        {t("approval.action.allowViewOnly")}
-                    </Button>
-                )}
-                <Button
-                    variant={"danger"}
-                    size={"md"}
-                    className={"w-full"}
-                    onClick={() => respond(false, false)}
-                    disabled={busy}
-                >
-                    {t("approval.action.deny")}
-                </Button>
-            </DialogActions>
-        </ConfirmDialog>
-    );
-}

client/ui/frontend/src/modules/main/ActiveSessionIndicator.tsx

@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-import { useTranslation } from "react-i18next";
-import { CircleAlert } from "lucide-react";
-import { Tooltip } from "@/components/Tooltip";
-import { useStatus } from "@/contexts/StatusContext.tsx";
-import { cn } from "@/lib/cn.ts";
-import { type ReactNode } from "react";
-
-// ActiveSessionIndicator marks that someone is attached to this machine over
-// VNC right now, and warns that disconnecting ends that session — which may be
-// the session the person reading it is using.
-//
-// An alert glyph rather than an info one: this is not neutral context, it is a
-// state that changes what the disconnect button does to you.
-//
-// Only a warning, never a block. Input injected by the VNC agent is
-// indistinguishable from local input, so we cannot tell whether this UI is being
-// driven remotely, and the owner may want to disconnect on purpose either way.
-//
-// Renders nothing when no session is attached.
-export function ActiveSessionIndicator({ className }: { className?: string }): ReactNode {
-    const { t } = useTranslation();
-    const { status } = useStatus();
-    const sessions = status?.vncSessions ?? [];
-    if (sessions.length === 0) return null;
-
-    // The initiator is the dashboard user who started the session, which is more
-    // use than a source address. Absent when the session carries no identity.
-    const who = sessions
-        .map((s) => s.initiator)
-        .filter((name): name is string => !!name)
-        .join(", ");
-
-    const message = who
-        ? t("connect.activeSession.tooltipNamed", { sessionCount: sessions.length, who })
-        : t("connect.activeSession.tooltip", { sessionCount: sessions.length });
-
-    return (
-        <Tooltip content={<span className={"block max-w-64"}>{message}</span>}>
-            <span
-                role={"status"}
-                aria-label={message}
-                className={cn(
-                    "inline-flex items-center gap-1 rounded-full border border-yellow-700/50 bg-yellow-900/20 px-2 py-0.5 text-yellow-300",
-                    className,
-                )}
-            >
-                <CircleAlert size={12} aria-hidden={true} />
-                <span className={"text-[0.7rem] leading-none"}>
-                    {t("connect.activeSession.badge")}
-                </span>
-            </span>
-        </Tooltip>
-    );
-}

client/ui/frontend/src/modules/main/MainConnectionStatusSwitch.tsx

@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ import { useFocusVisible } from "@/hooks/useFocusVisible";
 import { Check as CheckIcon, ChevronDownIcon, Copy as CopyIcon } from "lucide-react";
 import * as Popover from "@radix-ui/react-popover";
 import netbirdFullLogo from "@/assets/logos/netbird-full.svg";
-import { ActiveSessionIndicator } from "@/modules/main/ActiveSessionIndicator.tsx";
 
 enum ConnectionState {
     Disconnected = "disconnected",
@@ -273,9 +272,6 @@ export const MainConnectionStatusSwitch = () => {
                     />
                 </CopyToClipboard>
                 <LocalIpLine ip={ip} ipv6={ipv6} show={show} />
-                {connState === ConnectionState.Connected && (
-                    <ActiveSessionIndicator className={"mt-3"} />
-                )}
             </div>
         </div>
     );

client/ui/frontend/src/modules/settings/PrivilegeGuard.tsx

@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
-import { useTranslation } from "react-i18next";
-import { CopyToClipboard } from "@/components/CopyToClipboard";
-import { usePrivilege } from "@/hooks/usePrivilege.ts";
-import { Privilege } from "@bindings/services/models.js";
-import { type ReactNode } from "react";
-
-export type GuardedControl = {
-    disabled: boolean;
-    hint: ReactNode;
-};
-
-// useGuardedControl returns a guard for the settings controls the daemon
-// restricts to root/administrator: enabling a remote-access server, or removing
-// one of its safeguards.
-//
-// The daemon restricts only the direction that hands out access from a process
-// running as root. So for an unprivileged user a guarded control is either
-// unavailable (it is off and only they could turn it on) or a one-way switch (it
-// is on, they may turn it off, but not back on) — say which, either way.
-//
-// A null privilege means we could not determine it: leave the control alone
-// rather than greying it out with nothing to explain why. The daemon enforces
-// this regardless, and a rejected save reports its own guidance.
-export const useGuardedControl = () => {
-    const privilege = usePrivilege();
-
-    return (
-        guardedDirectionActive: boolean,
-        command: (p: Privilege) => string,
-        // inverted marks a control whose guarded direction is switching it off,
-        // so the one-way warning has to read the other way round.
-        inverted = false,
-    ): GuardedControl => {
-        if (!privilege || privilege.privileged) {
-            return { disabled: false, hint: undefined };
-        }
-        const hint = (
-            <PrivilegeHint
-                actor={privilege.actor}
-                command={command(privilege)}
-                oneWay={guardedDirectionActive}
-                inverted={inverted}
-            />
-        );
-        return { disabled: !guardedDirectionActive, hint };
-    };
-};
-
-// PrivilegeHint explains what an unprivileged user can and cannot do with a
-// guarded control, and offers the command that does it with the privileges the
-// daemon requires. oneWay covers the control being in the guarded state already:
-// switching it back is the part that needs privileges.
-export function PrivilegeHint({
-    actor,
-    command,
-    oneWay,
-    inverted,
-}: {
-    actor: string;
-    command: string;
-    oneWay: boolean;
-    inverted: boolean;
-}): ReactNode {
-    const { t } = useTranslation();
-    if (!command) return null;
-    return (
-        <div
-            className={
-                "-mt-2 flex flex-col gap-1 rounded-md bg-nb-gray-930 px-3 py-2 text-xs text-nb-gray-300"
-            }
-        >
-            <span>
-                {!oneWay
-                    ? t("settings.privilege.hint", { actor })
-                    : inverted
-                      ? t("settings.privilege.oneWayInverted", { actor })
-                      : t("settings.privilege.oneWay", { actor })}
-            </span>
-            <CopyToClipboard message={command} alwaysShowIcon wrap variant={"bright"}>
-                <code className={"select-text break-all font-mono text-xs text-nb-gray-200"}>
-                    {command}
-                </code>
-            </CopyToClipboard>
-        </div>
-    );
-}

client/ui/frontend/src/modules/settings/SettingsNavigation.tsx

@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import {
     BoltIcon,
     InfoIcon,
     LifeBuoyIcon,
-    MonitorIcon,
     NetworkIcon,
     ShieldIcon,
     SlidersHorizontalIcon,
@@ -21,7 +20,6 @@ export const SettingsNavigation = () => {
     const { updateAvailable } = useClientVersion();
     const { mdm, features } = useRestrictions();
     const showSsh = mdm.allowServerSSH ?? !features.disableUpdateSettings;
-    const showVnc = mdm.allowServerVNC ?? !features.disableUpdateSettings;
 
     const aboutAdornment = updateAvailable ? (
         <Tooltip content={t("settings.tabs.updateAvailable")} side={"right"}>
@@ -65,13 +63,6 @@ export const SettingsNavigation = () => {
                         title={t("settings.tabs.ssh")}
                     />
                 )}
-                {showVnc && (
-                    <VerticalTabs.Trigger
-                        value={"vnc"}
-                        icon={MonitorIcon}
-                        title={t("settings.tabs.vnc")}
-                    />
-                )}
                 {!features.disableUpdateSettings && (
                     <VerticalTabs.Trigger
                         value={"advanced"}

client/ui/frontend/src/modules/settings/SettingsPage.tsx

@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import { SettingsNetwork } from "@/modules/settings/SettingsNetwork.tsx";
 import { SettingsSecurity } from "@/modules/settings/SettingsSecurity.tsx";
 import { ProfilesTab } from "@/modules/profiles/ProfilesTab.tsx";
 import { SettingsSSH } from "@/modules/settings/SettingsSSH.tsx";
-import { SettingsVNC } from "@/modules/settings/SettingsVNC.tsx";
 import { SettingsAdvanced } from "@/modules/settings/SettingsAdvanced.tsx";
 import { SettingsTroubleshooting } from "@/modules/settings/SettingsTroubleshooting.tsx";
 import { SettingsAbout } from "@/modules/settings/SettingsAbout.tsx";
@@ -27,7 +26,6 @@ const enum Tab {
     Security = "security",
     Profiles = "profiles",
     SSH = "ssh",
-    VNC = "vnc",
     Advanced = "advanced",
     Troubleshooting = "troubleshooting",
     About = "about",
@@ -39,7 +37,6 @@ const TAB_CONTENT: Record<Tab, ReactNode> = {
     [Tab.Security]: <SettingsSecurity />,
     [Tab.Profiles]: <ProfilesTab />,
     [Tab.SSH]: <SettingsSSH />,
-    [Tab.VNC]: <SettingsVNC />,
     [Tab.Advanced]: <SettingsAdvanced />,
     [Tab.Troubleshooting]: <SettingsTroubleshooting />,
     [Tab.About]: <SettingsAbout />,
@@ -58,18 +55,12 @@ export const SettingsPage = () => {
             [Tab.Security]: editable,
             [Tab.Profiles]: !features.disableProfiles,
             [Tab.SSH]: mdm.allowServerSSH ?? editable,
-            [Tab.VNC]: mdm.allowServerVNC ?? editable,
             [Tab.Advanced]: editable,
             [Tab.Troubleshooting]: true,
             [Tab.About]: true,
         };
         return (Object.keys(visibility) as Tab[]).filter((t) => visibility[t]);
-    }, [
-        features.disableUpdateSettings,
-        features.disableProfiles,
-        mdm.allowServerSSH,
-        mdm.allowServerVNC,
-    ]);
+    }, [features.disableUpdateSettings, features.disableProfiles, mdm.allowServerSSH]);
 
     const defaultTab = visibleTabs[0];
     const [active, setActive] = useState<string>(() => navState?.tab ?? defaultTab);

client/ui/frontend/src/modules/settings/SettingsSSH.tsx

@@ -1,19 +1,51 @@
 import { useTranslation } from "react-i18next";
+import { CopyToClipboard } from "@/components/CopyToClipboard";
 import FancyToggleSwitch from "@/components/switches/FancyToggleSwitch";
 import { HelpText } from "@/components/typography/HelpText";
 import { Input } from "@/components/inputs/Input";
 import { Label } from "@/components/typography/Label";
 import { cn } from "@/lib/cn";
 import { SectionGroup } from "@/modules/settings/SettingsSection.tsx";
-import { useGuardedControl } from "@/modules/settings/PrivilegeGuard.tsx";
 import { useSettings } from "@/contexts/SettingsContext.tsx";
-import { type ChangeEvent, useEffect, useId, useState } from "react";
+import { usePrivilege } from "@/hooks/usePrivilege.ts";
+import { Privilege } from "@bindings/services/models.js";
+import { type ChangeEvent, type ReactNode, useEffect, useId, useState } from "react";
 
 export function SettingsSSH() {
     const { t } = useTranslation();
     const { config, setField } = useSettings();
-    const guarded = useGuardedControl();
+    const privilege = usePrivilege();
     const isSSHServerEnabled = config.serverSshAllowed;
+
+    // The daemon restricts only the direction that hands out shells from a process
+    // running as root. So for an unprivileged user a guarded control is either
+    // unavailable (it is off and only they could turn it on) or a one-way switch
+    // (it is on, they may turn it off, but not back on) — say which, either way.
+    //
+    // A null privilege means we could not determine it: leave the control alone
+    // rather than greying it out with nothing to explain why. The daemon enforces
+    // this regardless, and a rejected save reports its own guidance.
+    const guarded = (
+        guardedDirectionActive: boolean,
+        command: (p: Privilege) => string,
+        // inverted marks a control whose guarded direction is switching it off, so
+        // the one-way warning has to read the other way round.
+        inverted = false,
+    ) => {
+        if (!privilege || privilege.privileged) {
+            return { disabled: false, hint: undefined };
+        }
+        const hint = (
+            <PrivilegeHint
+                actor={privilege.actor}
+                command={command(privilege)}
+                oneWay={guardedDirectionActive}
+                inverted={inverted}
+            />
+        );
+        return { disabled: !guardedDirectionActive, hint };
+    };
+
     const sshServer = guarded(config.serverSshAllowed, (p) => p.allowSshServer);
     const sshRoot = guarded(config.enableSshRoot, (p) => p.enableSshRoot);
     // Inverted control: the guarded direction is switching authentication off, so
@@ -130,3 +162,42 @@ export function SettingsSSH() {
         </>
     );
 }
+
+// PrivilegeHint explains what an unprivileged user can and cannot do with a
+// guarded control, and offers the command that does it with the privileges the
+// daemon requires. oneWay covers the control being in the guarded state already:
+// switching it back is the part that needs privileges.
+function PrivilegeHint({
+    actor,
+    command,
+    oneWay,
+    inverted,
+}: {
+    actor: string;
+    command: string;
+    oneWay: boolean;
+    inverted: boolean;
+}): ReactNode {
+    const { t } = useTranslation();
+    if (!command) return null;
+    return (
+        <div
+            className={
+                "-mt-2 flex flex-col gap-1 rounded-md bg-nb-gray-930 px-3 py-2 text-xs text-nb-gray-300"
+            }
+        >
+            <span>
+                {!oneWay
+                    ? t("settings.ssh.privilege.hint", { actor })
+                    : inverted
+                      ? t("settings.ssh.privilege.oneWayInverted", { actor })
+                      : t("settings.ssh.privilege.oneWay", { actor })}
+            </span>
+            <CopyToClipboard message={command} alwaysShowIcon wrap variant={"bright"}>
+                <code className={"select-text break-all font-mono text-xs text-nb-gray-200"}>
+                    {command}
+                </code>
+            </CopyToClipboard>
+        </div>
+    );
+}

client/ui/frontend/src/modules/settings/SettingsVNC.tsx

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-import { useTranslation } from "react-i18next";
-import FancyToggleSwitch from "@/components/switches/FancyToggleSwitch";
-import { SectionGroup } from "@/modules/settings/SettingsSection.tsx";
-import { useGuardedControl } from "@/modules/settings/PrivilegeGuard.tsx";
-import { useSettings } from "@/contexts/SettingsContext.tsx";
-import { useRestrictions } from "@/contexts/RestrictionsContext.tsx";
-
-export function SettingsVNC() {
-    const { t } = useTranslation();
-    const { config, setField } = useSettings();
-    const { mdm } = useRestrictions();
-    const guarded = useGuardedControl();
-    const isVNCServerEnabled = config.serverVncAllowed;
-    const vncServerManaged = mdm.allowServerVNC != null;
-
-    const vncServer = guarded(config.serverVncAllowed, (p) => p.allowVncServer);
-    // Inverted control: the guarded direction is switching the approval prompt
-    // off, so the already-disabled state is the one-way one.
-    const vncApproval = guarded(config.disableVncApproval, (p) => p.disableVncApproval, true);
-
-    return (
-        <>
-            <SectionGroup title={t("settings.vnc.section.server")}>
-                <FancyToggleSwitch
-                    value={config.serverVncAllowed}
-                    onChange={(v) => setField("serverVncAllowed", v)}
-                    label={t("settings.vnc.server.label")}
-                    helpText={t("settings.vnc.server.help")}
-                    disabled={vncServerManaged || vncServer.disabled}
-                />
-                {!vncServerManaged && vncServer.hint}
-            </SectionGroup>
-
-            {!mdm.disableVNCApproval && (
-                <SectionGroup
-                    title={t("settings.vnc.section.approval")}
-                    disabled={!isVNCServerEnabled}
-                >
-                    <FancyToggleSwitch
-                        value={!config.disableVncApproval}
-                        onChange={(v) => setField("disableVncApproval", !v)}
-                        label={t("settings.vnc.approval.label")}
-                        helpText={t("settings.vnc.approval.help")}
-                        disabled={vncApproval.disabled}
-                    />
-                    {vncApproval.hint}
-                </SectionGroup>
-            )}
-        </>
-    );
-}

client/ui/i18n/locales/de/common.json

@@ -1330,65 +1330,5 @@
     },
     "error.unknown": {
         "message": "Vorgang fehlgeschlagen."
-    },
-    "settings.tabs.vnc": {
-        "message": "VNC"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.section.server": {
-        "message": "Server"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.section.approval": {
-        "message": "Genehmigung"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.server.label": {
-        "message": "VNC-Server aktivieren"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.server.help": {
-        "message": "Den NetBird-VNC-Server auf diesem Host ausführen, damit autorisierte Peers den Bildschirm ansehen oder steuern können."
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.approval.label": {
-        "message": "Verbindungsgenehmigung erforderlich"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.approval.help": {
-        "message": "Auf diesem Host eine Aufforderung anzeigen, die bestätigt werden muss, bevor eine eingehende VNC-Verbindung zugelassen wird."
-    },
-    "window.title.approval": {
-        "message": "Verbindungsanfrage"
-    },
-    "approval.title.vnc": {
-        "message": "VNC-Verbindung zulassen?"
-    },
-    "approval.title.ssh": {
-        "message": "SSH-Verbindung zulassen?"
-    },
-    "approval.title.default": {
-        "message": "Eingehende Verbindung zulassen?"
-    },
-    "approval.field.user": {
-        "message": "Von Benutzer"
-    },
-    "approval.field.keyFingerprint": {
-        "message": "Schlüssel-Fingerabdruck"
-    },
-    "approval.field.peer": {
-        "message": "Über Peer"
-    },
-    "approval.field.sourceIp": {
-        "message": "Quell-IP"
-    },
-    "approval.field.osUser": {
-        "message": "Betriebssystem-Benutzer"
-    },
-    "approval.countdown": {
-        "message": "Automatische Ablehnung in {seconds}s"
-    },
-    "approval.action.allow": {
-        "message": "Zulassen"
-    },
-    "approval.action.allowViewOnly": {
-        "message": "Zulassen (nur ansehen)"
-    },
-    "approval.action.deny": {
-        "message": "Ablehnen"
     }
 }

client/ui/i18n/locales/en/common.json

@@ -683,10 +683,6 @@
         "message": "SSH",
         "description": "Settings tab label: SSH. Acronym — keep as-is."
     },
-    "settings.tabs.vnc": {
-        "message": "VNC",
-        "description": "Settings tab label: VNC. Acronym — keep as-is."
-    },
     "settings.tabs.advanced": {
         "message": "Advanced",
         "description": "Settings tab label: Advanced. Keep short."
@@ -955,30 +951,6 @@
         "message": "Second(s)",
         "description": "Unit suffix shown after the JWT TTL number field. The '(s)' marks an optional plural."
     },
-    "settings.vnc.section.server": {
-        "message": "Server",
-        "description": "Section heading: Server (VNC settings)."
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.section.approval": {
-        "message": "Approval",
-        "description": "Section heading: Approval (VNC connection approval settings)."
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.server.label": {
-        "message": "Enable VNC Server",
-        "description": "Toggle label: enable the embedded VNC server."
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.server.help": {
-        "message": "Run the NetBird VNC server on this host so authorized peers can view or control its screen.",
-        "description": "Helper text for the VNC server toggle."
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.approval.label": {
-        "message": "Require Connection Approval",
-        "description": "Toggle label: prompt for approval before each inbound VNC connection."
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.approval.help": {
-        "message": "Show a prompt on this host that must be accepted before an incoming VNC connection is allowed.",
-        "description": "Helper text for the VNC connection-approval toggle."
-    },
     "settings.advanced.section.interface": {
         "message": "Interface",
         "description": "Section heading: Interface (network-interface settings)."
@@ -1391,58 +1363,6 @@
         "message": "Session Expiring",
         "description": "OS window-chrome title for the session-expiration window."
     },
-    "window.title.approval": {
-        "message": "Connection Request",
-        "description": "OS window-chrome title for the inbound-connection approval window."
-    },
-    "approval.title.vnc": {
-        "message": "Allow VNC Connection?",
-        "description": "Approval dialog heading for an inbound VNC connection."
-    },
-    "approval.title.ssh": {
-        "message": "Allow SSH Connection?",
-        "description": "Approval dialog heading for an inbound SSH connection."
-    },
-    "approval.title.default": {
-        "message": "Allow Incoming Connection?",
-        "description": "Approval dialog heading for an inbound connection of unknown kind."
-    },
-    "approval.field.user": {
-        "message": "From user",
-        "description": "Approval dialog row label: the initiating user's display name."
-    },
-    "approval.field.keyFingerprint": {
-        "message": "Key fingerprint",
-        "description": "Approval dialog row label: the connecting peer's cryptographic key fingerprint."
-    },
-    "approval.field.peer": {
-        "message": "Via peer",
-        "description": "Approval dialog row label: the peer the connection arrives through."
-    },
-    "approval.field.sourceIp": {
-        "message": "Source IP",
-        "description": "Approval dialog row label: the source IP address of the connection."
-    },
-    "approval.field.osUser": {
-        "message": "OS user",
-        "description": "Approval dialog row label: the target operating-system user."
-    },
-    "approval.countdown": {
-        "message": "Auto-deny in {seconds}s",
-        "description": "Approval dialog countdown; {seconds} is the remaining whole seconds before the daemon auto-denies."
-    },
-    "approval.action.allow": {
-        "message": "Allow",
-        "description": "Approval dialog button: allow the connection."
-    },
-    "approval.action.allowViewOnly": {
-        "message": "Allow (view only)",
-        "description": "Approval dialog button: allow the connection in view-only mode."
-    },
-    "approval.action.deny": {
-        "message": "Deny",
-        "description": "Approval dialog button: deny the connection."
-    },
     "window.title.updating": {
         "message": "Updating",
         "description": "OS window-chrome title for the update / install window."
@@ -1855,28 +1775,16 @@
         "message": "Operation failed.",
         "description": "Generic fallback error message used when no specific error applies."
     },
-    "connect.activeSession.badge": {
-        "message": "Screen shared",
-        "description": "Short label on the badge shown on the main screen while somebody is attached to this machine over VNC."
-    },
-    "connect.activeSession.tooltip": {
-        "message": "This screen is being viewed over VNC ({sessionCount} session(s)). Disconnecting ends it, and if you are connected through VNC you will lose access.",
-        "description": "Tooltip on the screen-shared badge. {sessionCount} is how many VNC sessions are attached; wording covers any number since the bundle has no plural forms."
-    },
-    "connect.activeSession.tooltipNamed": {
-        "message": "This screen is being viewed over VNC by {who} ({sessionCount} session(s)). Disconnecting ends it, and if you are connected through VNC you will lose access.",
-        "description": "As connect.activeSession.tooltip, with {who} naming the dashboard users who started the sessions."
-    },
-    "settings.privilege.hint": {
+    "settings.ssh.privilege.hint": {
         "message": "Requires {actor}. Run this instead:",
-        "description": "Help text under a remote-access setting the user cannot change: it needs elevated privileges. {actor} is 'root' on Linux/macOS or 'administrator privileges' on Windows. Followed by a copyable command."
+        "description": "Help text under an SSH setting the user cannot change: it needs elevated privileges. {actor} is 'root' on Linux/macOS or 'administrator privileges' on Windows. Followed by a copyable command."
     },
-    "settings.privilege.oneWay": {
+    "settings.ssh.privilege.oneWay": {
         "message": "You can switch this off, but switching it back on needs {actor}:",
-        "description": "Warning under a remote-access setting an unprivileged user may disable but not re-enable. {actor} is 'root' on Linux/macOS or 'administrator privileges' on Windows. Followed by a copyable command."
+        "description": "Warning under an SSH setting an unprivileged user may disable but not re-enable. {actor} is 'root' on Linux/macOS or 'administrator privileges' on Windows. Followed by a copyable command."
     },
-    "settings.privilege.oneWayInverted": {
+    "settings.ssh.privilege.oneWayInverted": {
         "message": "You can switch this on, but switching it back off needs {actor}:",
-        "description": "Warning under a safeguard setting (SSH authentication, VNC approval) which an unprivileged user may re-enable but not disable again. {actor} is 'root' on Linux/macOS or 'administrator privileges' on Windows. Followed by a copyable command."
+        "description": "Warning under the SSH authentication setting, which an unprivileged user may re-enable but not disable again. {actor} is 'root' on Linux/macOS or 'administrator privileges' on Windows. Followed by a copyable command."
     }
 }

client/ui/i18n/locales/es/common.json

@@ -1330,65 +1330,5 @@
     },
     "error.unknown": {
         "message": "La operación falló."
-    },
-    "settings.tabs.vnc": {
-        "message": "VNC"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.section.server": {
-        "message": "Servidor"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.section.approval": {
-        "message": "Aprobación"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.server.label": {
-        "message": "Habilitar el servidor VNC"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.server.help": {
-        "message": "Ejecuta el servidor VNC de NetBird en este host para que los peers autorizados puedan ver o controlar su pantalla."
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.approval.label": {
-        "message": "Requerir aprobación de conexión"
-    },
-    "settings.vnc.approval.help": {
-        "message": "Mostrar en este host una solicitud que debe aceptarse antes de permitir una conexión VNC entrante."
-    },
-    "window.title.approval": {
-        "message": "Solicitud de conexión"
-    },
-    "approval.title.vnc": {
-        "message": "¿Permitir la conexión VNC?"
-    },
-    "approval.title.ssh": {
-        "message": "¿Permitir la conexión SSH?"
-    },
-    "approval.title.default": {
-        "message": "¿Permitir la conexión entrante?"
-    },
-    "approval.field.user": {
-        "message": "Del usuario"
-    },
-    "approval.field.keyFingerprint": {
-        "message": "Huella de la clave"
-    },
-    "approval.field.peer": {
-        "message": "A través del peer"
-    },
-    "approval.field.sourceIp": {
-        "message": "IP de origen"
-    },
-    "approval.field.osUser": {
-        "message": "Usuario del SO"
-    },
-    "approval.countdown": {
-        "message": "Rechazo automático en {seconds}s"
-    },
-    "approval.action.allow": {
-        "message": "Permitir"
-    },
-    "approval.action.allowViewOnly": {
-        "message": "Permitir (solo ver)"
-    },
-    "approval.action.deny": {
-        "message": "Denegar"
     }
 }