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11 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Zoltán Papp
4263315527 [client] Read the extend flow's config and hint path in one lock
extendAuthSession took the config from stateSnapshot and the config path from a
second call, each acquiring the lock on its own. A profile switch landing
between the two swaps every field, which would authenticate with one profile's
config while reading the login hint from another profile's account file.

Replace configPathSnapshot with authSnapshot, which returns both from a single
critical section.
2026-07-30 21:00:44 +02:00
Zoltán Papp
56ff5237dd [client] Report the login's profile ID only when it is one
LoginResult.ProfileID was filled from the request's ProfileName, which is a
handle: a display name or an ID prefix resolve just as well. waitSSOLogin names
the state file after it, so a handle would have written the account email to a
file no reader looks for — the email silently lost, plus a stray file.

Fill it only on the branch where the daemon supplied the ID, and leave it empty
otherwise; waitSSOLogin then falls back to the active profile, as it did before
the field existed.
2026-07-30 20:51:40 +02:00
Zoltán Papp
3a17d0381c [client] Clear the removed profile's email by its resolved ID
RemoveProfile takes a handle — a display name or an ID prefix resolve just as
well as a full ID — but the state file holding the account email is named after
the ID. Passing the request handle straight through therefore named a
different file, or none, leaving the email behind for a recreated profile to
inherit.

The daemon already echoes back the ID it resolved for exactly this purpose;
use it.
2026-07-30 20:46:32 +02:00
Zoltán Papp
6155c94b05 [client] Reuse the profile's account for Android SSO logins
The Android binding never recorded which account a profile belongs to, so
every interactive login and every session extend went to the IdP with no
login_hint. With nothing to go on the IdP picks an account itself, which on a
session extend means re-authenticating an account the profile is already
signed in with.

Store the email the PKCE flow already parses out of the ID token, and pass it
back as the hint on later flows. An empty hint stays meaningful: a fresh
profile, or one that was logged out, deliberately leaves the choice to the
IdP, which is how a profile changes accounts. Logout clears the stored email
for that reason — while it is on disk it would steer the next login straight
back into the account just logged out of.

The email is keyed off the profile's config path rather than the active
profile: Auth.login runs in a goroutine, so the active profile can change
under a flow already in flight. It lands in <profile>.account.json, not the
<profile>.state.json desktop uses for the same data — there the email and the
engine's state manager sit in different directories, but on Android both
resolve under files/, and the state manager rewrites the whole file from its
own keys.
2026-07-30 20:34:08 +02:00
Zoltán Papp
09f7fb6510 [client] Drop the initial GetNetworkMap fetch on Android startup
Android startup opened a throwaway Sync stream to management before
creating the TUN device, only to learn the initial routes, DNS config
and the DNS feature flag. Server side this computed a full network map
and broadcast a false connect/disconnect pair to every peer in the
account on every Android start; client side it put a blocking network
round trip on the critical startup path and failed the whole engine
start when management was unreachable.

None of its outputs are needed upfront anymore: the TUN is created
empty and the first sync triggers a rebuild that pulls the fresh route
and search domain state, the permanent DNS server starts with an empty
config that the first sync populates, and the fake IP manager is
created lazily when the DNS feature flag turns on.

Remove readInitialSettings and its plumbing: the InitialRoutes and
DNSFeatureFlag manager config fields, the android construction-time
route setup, the initial-route bookkeeping in the notifiers and the
now-unused GetNetworkMap client method.
2026-07-30 20:19:41 +02:00
Zoltán Papp
4475819f38 [client] Pull fresh TUN settings on Android rebuild instead of pushing state
The Android TUN rebuild consumed state pushed through notifications and
a Java-side snapshot, and both sources were unreliable. The DNS
search-domain notifier fired OnNetworkChanged with an empty string,
which the rebuild handler treated as the new route list, so any search
domain change rebuilt the TUN with zero routes and cut all tunnel
traffic. The rebuild also reused the search domains cached at the last
establish, so search domain updates never reached the TUN at runtime.

Make the notification a pure trigger and let the Java side pull a fresh
snapshot instead. Expose GetTunSettings on the Android SDK client: it
returns the current TUN route ranges, derived on demand by the route
manager from the client routes, the exit-node selection and the fake IP
blocks, together with the DNS search domains. The route notifier keeps
only its last-announced baseline to suppress triggers for unchanged
syncs; the TUN route state is owned by the route manager. SearchDomains
now locks the DNS server mutex since the pull arrives from a Java
thread.

Requires the matching android-client change that switches recreateTUN
to the pull API.
2026-07-30 20:19:41 +02:00
Zoltán Papp
c8adaa45da [client] Serialize Android tunnel reconfiguration callbacks
The Android route notifier and the DNS search-domain notifier both
delivered OnNetworkChanged from a fire-and-forget goroutine per update.
Two updates in quick succession could reach the Java side reordered:
the TUN rebuild handler applies them in arrival order and compares
against the last applied parameters, so a stale route set delivered
last won as the final TUN state. This is the same reordering hazard
fixed for iOS in #6454.

Wrap the Android network change listener into the shared tunnelnotifier
FIFO introduced in #6870, the same way RunOniOS does, and deliver both
notifiers synchronously into it. Enqueueing is non-blocking, a single
delivery goroutine preserves order, and calls into Java never overlap.

Also stop hasRouteDiff from sorting the notifier's shared route slices
in place; compare sorted copies instead.
2026-07-30 20:19:41 +02:00
Zoltán Papp
e970daaf5f [client] Create the Android fake IP manager lazily on DNS flag enable
The fake IP manager was only created at route manager construction,
from the DNS feature flag fetched by the initial GetNetworkMap call.
When the flag flipped to true mid-session, UpdateRoutes set
useNewDNSRoute but never created the manager, so domain routes added
after the flip got a DNS interceptor with a nil fake IP manager.

internalDnatFw only checked for a firewall and GOOS, so the interceptor
took the DNAT path and called GetFakeIP/AllocateFakeIP on the nil
*fakeip.Manager. These methods lock m.mu first, which is a nil pointer
dereference: the first DNS answer for such a route panicked and crashed
the VPN service. The fake IP blocks (240.0.0.0/8 and its v6 pair) also
never reached the TUN, since only the constructor registered them.

Create the manager and its TUN routes from UpdateRoutes when the flag
turns on, notify so the fake IP blocks get into the TUN without a
client route change, and treat a nil manager as no internal DNAT.

This is groundwork for removing the initial GetNetworkMap fetch, after
which every startup goes through the flag-off-to-on transition.
2026-07-30 20:19:41 +02:00
Zoltán Papp
5ae323a555 [client] Delete the account email when a profile is removed
Removing a profile left its state file behind: the daemon deletes what it
owns, but the file holding the account email is user-owned and out of reach
for a root daemon, which is why Connection.Logout already clears it from the
UI side.

Beyond the stray file, legacy profiles are keyed by name rather than by a
generated ID, so recreating a profile under a removed one's name inherited
its email — shown as the account in the profile list and sent as the
login_hint on the next login.
2026-07-30 20:19:41 +02:00
Zoltán Papp
19337dc056 [client] File the account email against the profile the login ran for
SetActiveProfileState resolves the target itself, so it writes to whichever
profile is active when it is called. A GUI SSO login spans seconds of user
interaction in the browser, and the tray stays clickable throughout: switching
profiles in that window left the email filed under the profile that happened
to be active when the flow returned. The wrong profile then advertised an
account it does not own, and offered it as the login_hint next time.

Add SetProfileState(id, state), the write-side counterpart of the existing
GetProfileState(id), and keep SetActiveProfileState as a wrapper for callers
with no particular profile in mind. Login now reports the profile it resolved
so the frontend can hand it back with the SSO wait, which closes the window.
2026-07-30 20:19:41 +02:00
Zoltán Papp
fd06d9a3d5 [client] Store the account email after a GUI SSO login
The daemon returns the authenticated user's email from WaitSSOLogin but
cannot persist it: it runs as root while the per-profile state file is
user-owned. The CLI's handleSSOLogin writes it after its own WaitSSOLogin;
the GUI path read the value and dropped it.

The profile was therefore left with no email, so Profiles.List showed no
account for it, and later logins and session extends went out with no
login_hint — leaving the IdP to pick an account instead of reusing the one
the profile belongs to. Mirror the CLI and store it, next to the Logout
path that already clears the same file for the same reason.
2026-07-30 20:19:41 +02:00
277 changed files with 4597 additions and 29972 deletions

View File

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ updates:
- package-ecosystem: "github-actions"
directory: "/"
schedule:
interval: "weekly"
open-pull-requests-limit: 3
interval: "daily"
open-pull-requests-limit: 15
groups:
actions:
patterns:
@@ -22,12 +22,9 @@ updates:
directories:
- "/"
schedule:
interval: "weekly"
interval: "daily"
open-pull-requests-limit: 15
groups:
golang-x-packages:
patterns:
- "golang.org/x/*"
aws-sdk:
patterns:
- "github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go-v2/*"

View File

@@ -2,12 +2,6 @@
## Issue ticket number and link
<!--
Required for anything that changes behavior. Link the issue (or the validated
discussion it came from) that the NetBird team already agreed on. See
https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#ticket-first-pr-second
-->
## Stack
<!-- branch-stack -->
@@ -18,9 +12,7 @@ https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#ticket-first-pr-s
- [ ] Is a feature enhancement
- [ ] It is a refactor
- [ ] Created tests that fail without the change (if possible)
- [ ] I ran and tested this change locally — I did not rely on CI to find out whether it works
- [ ] This PR has a single purpose (not a fix + refactor + feature in one)
- [ ] This change is a trivial fix, **OR** it links an issue the NetBird team agreed on beforehand. Changes to the public API, gRPC protocols, functionality behavior, CLI / service flags, or new features always need that agreement first. See [CONTRIBUTING.md](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#ticket-first-pr-second).
- [ ] This change does **not** modify the public API, gRPC protocols, functionality behavior, CLI / service flags, or introduce a new feature — **OR** I have discussed it with the NetBird team beforehand (link the issue / Slack thread in the description). See [CONTRIBUTING.md](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#discuss-changes-with-the-netbird-team-first).
> By submitting this pull request, you confirm that you have read and agree to the terms of the [Contributor License Agreement](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/blob/main/CONTRIBUTOR_LICENSE_AGREEMENT.md).

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Contributing to NetBird
Thanks for your interest in contributing to NetBird.
Thanks for your interest in contributing to NetBird.
There are many ways that you can contribute:
- Reporting issues
@@ -10,69 +10,12 @@ There are many ways that you can contribute:
If you haven't already, join our slack workspace [here](https://docs.netbird.io/slack-url), we would love to discuss topics that need community contribution and enhancements to existing features.
## Ticket first, PR second
**Open a ticket and wait for feedback before you open a pull request.** Every PR
that changes behavior must link to an issue the NetBird team has agreed on. A PR
that arrives without one may be closed and redirected to a discussion, no matter
how good the code is.
Issues in this repository are maintainer-curated work items, so the flow starts
in [Discussions](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/discussions):
1. **Open a discussion.** Use
[Issue Triage](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/discussions/new?category=issue-triage)
for a bug, regression, or unexpected behavior, and
[Ideas & Feature Requests](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/discussions/new?category=ideas-feature-requests)
for a feature, enhancement, or integration idea. Setup and usage questions
belong in
[Q&A / Support](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/discussions/new?category=q-a-support).
Never report a security vulnerability in public — follow the
[security policy](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/security/policy)
instead.
2. **Wait for feedback.** DevRel validates and reproduces the report, and a
maintainer confirms the direction. We may ask for more detail or propose a
different approach. Validated discussions become issues.
3. **Then write the code**, following the approach agreed in the issue, and open
the PR linking that issue.
Trivial fixes — a typo, a broken link, a documentation correction, or a one-line
fix that already has an issue — can go straight to a PR. Everything else starts
with a ticket. When in doubt, ask in the discussion or on
[Slack](https://docs.netbird.io/slack-url); an hour of conversation up front
regularly saves a week of rework.
### High-risk areas
These always need the design discussed and agreed in the issue **before** you
write code:
- **Public API** — REST / management API, OpenAPI schema, dashboard-facing contracts
- **gRPC protocols** — management, signal, relay, and client daemon protos
- **Functionality behavior** — anything existing deployments would experience differently after an upgrade
- **Peer connectivity** — ICE and NAT traversal, relay selection, WireGuard® and Rosenpass key handling
- **Client system integration** — routing, firewall, DNS, and interface management
- **Authentication and authorization** — IdP integration, tokens, permissions, cryptography
- **CLI / service flags**, configuration file format, and daemon IPC
- **Store and database schema** — models and migrations
- **New features**
These surfaces are NetBird's contract with operators, self-hosters, and
downstream integrators, and changes to them have compatibility, security, and
release-planning implications. Agreeing on the direction early lets the PR
review focus on implementation rather than design.
Typical bug fixes, internal refactors, documentation updates, and tests do not
need a design discussion, but should still be tied to an issue so the work is
visible and nobody duplicates it.
## Contents
- [Contributing to NetBird](#contributing-to-netbird)
- [Ticket first, PR second](#ticket-first-pr-second)
- [High-risk areas](#high-risk-areas)
- [Contents](#contents)
- [Code of conduct](#code-of-conduct)
- [Discuss changes with the NetBird team first](#discuss-changes-with-the-netbird-team-first)
- [Directory structure](#directory-structure)
- [Development setup](#development-setup)
- [Requirements](#requirements)
@@ -81,7 +24,6 @@ visible and nobody duplicates it.
- [Build and start](#build-and-start)
- [Test suite](#test-suite)
- [Checklist before submitting a PR](#checklist-before-submitting-a-pr)
- [When we close a PR](#when-we-close-a-pr)
- [Other project repositories](#other-project-repositories)
- [Contributor License Agreement](#contributor-license-agreement)
@@ -92,66 +34,42 @@ Conduct which can be found in the file [CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md](CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md).
By participating, you are expected to uphold this code. Please report
unacceptable behavior to community@netbird.io.
## Discuss changes with the NetBird team first
Changes to the **public API**, **gRPC protocols**, **functionality behavior**, **CLI / service flags**, or **new features** should be discussed with the NetBird team before you start the work. These surfaces are part of NetBird's contract with operators, self-hosters, and downstream integrators, and changes to them have compatibility, security, and release-planning implications that benefit from an early conversation.
Open an issue or reach out on [Slack](https://docs.netbird.io/slack-url) to talk through what you have in mind. We'll help shape the change, flag any constraints we know about, and confirm the direction so the PR review can focus on implementation rather than design.
Typical bug fixes, internal refactors, documentation updates, and tests do not need pre-discussion — open the PR directly.
## Directory structure
The NetBird project monorepo keeps most of each component's code within its own
directory, except for a few auxiliary or shared packages. Protocol definitions
and the client-side service clients live under [/shared](/shared), because both
the agent and the services import them.
The NetBird project monorepo is organized to maintain most of its individual dependencies code within their directories, except for a few auxiliary or shared packages.
**Agent**
The most important directories are:
- [/.github](/.github) - Github actions workflow files and issue templates
- [/client](/client) - NetBird agent code
- [/client/cmd](/client/cmd) - NetBird agent CLI code
- [/client/cmd](/client/cmd) - NetBird agent cli code
- [/client/internal](/client/internal) - NetBird agent business logic code
- [/client/proto](/client/proto) - NetBird agent daemon GRPC proto files
- [/client/server](/client/server) - NetBird agent daemon code for background execution
- [/client/proto](/client/proto) - NetBird agent daemon gRPC proto files
- [/client/iface](/client/iface) - WireGuard® interface code
- [/client/firewall](/client/firewall) - Platform firewall backends (nftables, iptables, pf, WFP, userspace)
- [/client/ssh](/client/ssh) - Built-in SSH server and client
- [/client/ui](/client/ui) - NetBird agent UI code (Wails v3 + React)
- [/client/android](/client/android), [/client/ios](/client/ios) - Mobile platform bindings
- [/client/wasm](/client/wasm) - WebAssembly build of the agent
- [/client/mdm](/client/mdm) - MDM-delivered policy handling
- [/client/system](/client/system) - Host and system information collection
**Control plane services**
- [/client/ui](/client/ui) - NetBird agent UI code
- [/encryption](/encryption) - Contain main encryption code for agent communication
- [/iface](/iface) - Wireguard® interface code
- [/infrastructure_files](/infrastructure_files) - Getting started files containing docker and template scripts
- [/management](/management) - Management service code
- [/management/client](/management/client) - Management service client code which is imported by the agent code
- [/management/proto](/management/proto) - Management service GRPC proto files
- [/management/server](/management/server) - Management service server code
- [/management/server/http](/management/server/http) - Management service REST API code
- [/management/server/store](/management/server/store) - Persistence layer and migrations
- [/management/server/idp](/management/server/idp) - Management service IDP management code
- [/management/server/peer](/management/server/peer), [/management/server/groups](/management/server/groups), [/management/server/networks](/management/server/networks), [/management/server/posture](/management/server/posture), [/management/server/permissions](/management/server/permissions) - Core domain packages
- [/signal](/signal) - Signal service code
- [/signal/peer](/signal/peer) - Signal service peer message logic
- [/signal/server](/signal/server) - Signal service server code
- [/relay](/relay) - Relay service code
- [/relay/protocol](/relay/protocol) - Relay wire protocol
- [/proxy](/proxy) - Identity-aware proxy used by Agent Network (LLM routing, ACME, access logs)
- [/agent-network](/agent-network) - Agent Network overview and documentation
- [/upload-server](/upload-server) - Debug bundle upload service
**Shared code**
- [/shared/management/proto](/shared/management/proto) - Management service gRPC proto files
- [/shared/management/client](/shared/management/client) - Management service client code which is imported by the agent code
- [/shared/management/http/api](/shared/management/http/api) - OpenAPI specification and generated REST API types
- [/shared/signal/proto](/shared/signal/proto) - Signal service gRPC proto files
- [/shared/signal/client](/shared/signal/client) - Signal service client code which is imported by the agent code
- [/shared/relay](/shared/relay) - Relay client and shared relay types
- [/shared/auth](/shared/auth), [/shared/sshauth](/shared/sshauth) - Shared authentication primitives
- [/encryption](/encryption) - Contain main encryption code for agent communication
- [/dns](/dns), [/route](/route), [/stun](/stun), [/sharedsock](/sharedsock), [/util](/util) - Shared networking and utility primitives
- [/flow](/flow) - Flow event protocol shared by the agent and Management
**Build, test, and packaging**
- [/.github](/.github) - Github actions workflow files, issue templates, and the pull request template
- [/e2e](/e2e) - End-to-end test suites and harness
- [/infrastructure_files](/infrastructure_files) - Getting started files containing docker and template scripts
- [/release_files](/release_files) - Files that goes into release packages
- [/tools](/tools) - Development and maintenance tooling
- [/signal](/signal) - Signal service code
- [/signal/client](/signal/client) - Signal service client code which is imported by the agent code
- [/signal/peer](/signal/peer) - Signal service peer message logic
- [/signal/proto](/signal/proto) - Signal service GRPC proto files
- [/signal/server](/signal/server) - Signal service server code
## Development setup
@@ -416,172 +334,23 @@ The installer `netbird-installer.exe` will be created in root directory.
### Test suite
The host-safe unit tests run as a normal user and leave host networking
untouched:
The tests can be started via:
```
make test-unit
cd netbird
go test -exec sudo ./...
```
Tests that need root and mutate host networking (firewall, routing, interface
management) carry the `privileged` build tag and run inside a
`--privileged --cap-add=NET_ADMIN` Docker container:
```
make test-privileged
```
Narrow a privileged run with environment variables:
```
PRIV_RUN=TestNftablesManager PRIV_PKGS=./client/firewall/nftables/... make test-privileged
```
Single packages can be run directly, adding `-race` when the change touches
shared state:
```
go test -race ./client/internal/dns/...
```
> On Windows use a powershell with administrator privileges
## Checklist before submitting a PR
As a critical network service and open-source project, we must enforce a few
things before submitting a pull request. The
[pull request template](/.github/pull_request_template.md) mirrors this list —
fill it in rather than deleting it.
### Link the issue
The PR description must link the agreed issue (or the validated discussion it
came from). See [Ticket first, PR second](#ticket-first-pr-second).
### Run it locally
**If you can't run it, you can't submit it.** Build the affected components and
exercise the change on a real setup — see [Build and start](#build-and-start).
"CI will tell me" is not acceptable for a VPN agent that runs as root on other
people's machines.
### Green CI, and answer the bots
We do not start reviewing while CI is red. Get the pipeline green first — a
failing build, lint, or test means the PR is not ready for review.
Alongside the test workflows, your PR is reviewed by CodeRabbit and scanned by
SonarCloud, Snyk, and Codecov. Read what they report and either fix it or reply
with why it does not apply; please do not resolve the threads without a
response. They are not always right — this codebase has privileged,
platform-specific, and concurrency-heavy paths that static analysis reads poorly
— so push back when a finding is wrong rather than changing correct code to
silence it. Security and dependency findings are the exception: treat those as
real until shown otherwise. Do not edit workflows, thresholds, or scanner
configuration to make a check pass.
### One PR, one purpose
Bug fix, refactor, feature: separate PRs. Mixed PRs are slow to review, hard to
revert, and may be closed with a request to split them.
### Keep it small
Size is the strongest predictor of how long a PR waits for review. Aim for under
roughly 400 changed lines across under 20 files. Past about 1000 lines or 50
files, expect to be asked to split the change — and large PRs from outside the
core team may be blocked until the scope has been agreed in a ticket. This is
not only about reviewer time: NetBird's agent runs as root on other people's
machines, and a sprawling diff cannot be reviewed with the care that deserves.
Measure by hand-written code, excluding generated output, `go.sum`, and
fixtures. If a change genuinely cannot be small — a protocol migration, a
cross-component rename — agree the split in the issue before you start, and land
it as a series of PRs that each build and make sense on their own.
### Avoid force-pushing during review
Once a PR is open, push new commits instead of rewriting history. A force-push
detaches existing review comments from their lines, throws away the
"changes since your last review" diff, and loses the CI history that showed
which commit broke what. Since we squash on merge, there is nothing to gain from
a tidy branch history.
Force-pushing is sometimes unavoidable — rebasing to clear a real conflict, or
removing a secret or large binary committed by mistake. When that happens, leave
a comment on the PR so reviewers know their anchors moved.
### Quality checks
Run these from the repository root before pushing:
```shell
go fmt ./...
make lint # golangci-lint on files changed against origin/main
make lint-all # full-repository lint, matches CI
make test-unit # host-safe unit tests
```
`make setup-hooks` wires `make lint` into a pre-push hook so the fast lint runs
automatically. If your change touches privileged paths (firewall, routing,
interface management), also run `make test-privileged`, which executes the
`privileged`-tagged suite inside a Docker container with `NET_ADMIN`.
### Code standards
As a critical network service and open-source project, we must enforce a few things before submitting the pull-requests:
- Keep functions as simple as possible, with a single purpose
- Use private functions and constants where possible
- Comment on any new public functions
- Add unit tests for any new public function
- Comment the **why**, not the **what** — explain non-obvious decisions, invariants, and constraints, not the line below
- Keep comments within 90 characters per line and roughly 250 characters per comment; when a block needs more explanation than that, extract a named function instead of writing a longer comment (see [AGENTS.md](AGENTS.md#length-budget))
### PR title and commits
PR titles must start with a bracketed tag, enforced by
[pr-title-check.yml](/.github/workflows/pr-title-check.yml):
```text
[client] Authorize daemon IPC callers by their local identity
[management,client] Add MDM policy support
```
Use a comma-separated list inside a single pair of brackets when a change spans
components. The `allowedTags` array in
[pr-title-check.yml](/.github/workflows/pr-title-check.yml) is the source of
truth — at the time of writing it accepts `management`, `client`, `signal`,
`proxy`, `relay`, `misc`, `infrastructure`, `self-hosted`, and `doc`.
Commit subjects follow the same convention — keep them short and put the
reasoning in the body, why before what, with no bullet list of files changed.
Keep the PR description itself under 1000 words on top of the template text.
Reviewers read the diff; the description explains what the diff cannot.
> When pushing fixes to the PR comments, please push as separate commits; we will squash the PR before merging, so there is no need to squash it before pushing it, and we are more than okay with 10-100 commits in a single PR. This helps review the fixes to the requested changes.
### Documentation
User-facing changes need a matching PR in
[netbirdio/docs](https://github.com/netbirdio/docs); link it in the PR
description, or state why documentation is not needed.
## When we close a PR
We would rather redirect early than let a PR sit. We may close one if:
- It changes behavior with no linked issue, or the approach was never agreed with a maintainer
- The change was clearly never run or tested locally
- CI has been red without a response
- It mixes unrelated purposes, or the purpose is not clear
- It is far too large to review and the scope was never agreed in a ticket
- The author cannot answer questions about their own change — including PRs that read as unreviewed model output, where review turns into a relay between the maintainer and an LLM. Tooling is fine; unreviewed output is not, you are responsible for the code you sign your name to
- There has been no activity for 14 days after we requested changes
A closed PR is not a rejected idea. Take it back to the
[discussion](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/discussions), settle the
approach, and reopen the work from there.
## Other project repositories
NetBird project is composed of 3 main repositories:

View File

@@ -1,70 +1,12 @@
# Security Policy
NetBird's goal is to provide a secure network. The client runs as a privileged service on every machine it is installed on,
so we take reports about it seriously and we publish what we fix.
NetBird's goal is to provide a secure network. If you find a vulnerability or bug, please report it by opening an issue [here](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/issues/new?assignees=&labels=&template=bug-issue-report.md&title=) or by contacting us by email.
There has yet to be an official bug bounty program for the NetBird project.
## Supported Versions
- We currently support only the latest version
## Reporting a Vulnerability
**Please do not open a public issue for a security vulnerability.** Public issues are visible to everyone, including before
a fix is available.
Report security issues one of these two ways:
- **GitHub private vulnerability reporting** — [open a private report](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/security/advisories/new)
on this repository. This is the preferred route: it keeps the discussion, the draft advisory, and the credit in one place.
- **Email** — `security@netbird.io`.
If the finding affects NetBird Cloud or our hosted infrastructure rather than the open-source code, email us rather than
filing a repository report.
### What to include
A report is easier to act on when it contains:
- The affected component (client, management, signal, relay, dashboard) and the version or commit you tested
- The platform and configuration, where relevant — operating system, self-hosted or NetBird Cloud, container or host install
- What an attacker needs before they can exploit it: network position, an account, local access, a specific privilege level
- Steps to reproduce, and a proof of concept if you have one
- The impact you believe it has
Partial reports are still welcome. If you are unsure whether something is a security issue, send it to `security@netbird.io`
and let us make that call.
## What to expect from us
- **We acknowledge your report** and tell you whether we can reproduce it.
- **We work with you on severity and scope.** If we assess it differently than you do, we will explain why rather than
silently downgrade it.
- **We fix and release**, then publish a [GitHub Security Advisory](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/security/advisories)
naming the affected version range and the patched version.
- **We credit reporters who want to be credited.** Tell us the name or handle you would like used, or that you would rather
stay anonymous.
- **We keep you in the loop** until the advisory is published.
We ask that you give us a reasonable opportunity to ship a fix before disclosing the issue publicly, and that you avoid
accessing, modifying, or exfiltrating data belonging to other people while testing. Testing against your own installation
or your own account is always fine.
## Supported Versions
We support the latest release. Security fixes ship in the next version rather than as backports to older releases, so
upgrading to the current release is how you get them.
Release notifications are available by watching [releases](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/releases).
## Published advisories
Every vulnerability we fix is published as a GitHub Security Advisory on the
[advisories page](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/security/advisories), including the affected version range, the
patched version, and the reporter's credit. Advisories for the Go module are also distributed through the Go vulnerability
database, so `govulncheck` will report them against your dependencies.
## Bug bounty
There is no official bug bounty program for the NetBird project. We credit reporters in advisories, and we are grateful for
the work, but we cannot currently offer payment for reports.
## Non-security bugs
For bugs that are not security issues, please use the
[issue tracker](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/discussions/new/choose).
Please report security issues to `security@netbird.io`

View File

@@ -57,6 +57,12 @@ type DnsReadyListener interface {
dns.ReadyListener
}
// TunSettings is a snapshot of the settings the TUN device is rebuilt with
type TunSettings struct {
Routes string
SearchDomains string
}
func init() {
formatter.SetLogcatFormatter(log.StandardLogger())
}
@@ -76,6 +82,8 @@ type Client struct {
connectClient *internal.ConnectClient
config *profilemanager.Config
cacheDir string
// Identifies the running profile for the SSO login hint; see profile_state.go.
cfgPath string
stateChangeMu sync.Mutex
stateChangeSubID string
@@ -96,11 +104,12 @@ type Client struct {
extendCancel context.CancelFunc
}
func (c *Client) setState(cfg *profilemanager.Config, cacheDir string, cc *internal.ConnectClient) {
func (c *Client) setState(cfg *profilemanager.Config, cacheDir string, cfgPath string, cc *internal.ConnectClient) {
c.stateMu.Lock()
defer c.stateMu.Unlock()
c.config = cfg
c.cacheDir = cacheDir
c.cfgPath = cfgPath
c.connectClient = cc
}
@@ -110,6 +119,16 @@ func (c *Client) stateSnapshot() (*profilemanager.Config, string, *internal.Conn
return c.config, c.cacheDir, c.connectClient
}
// authSnapshot returns the config together with the path it was loaded from, in
// one lock: the path identifies the profile whose account email backs the login
// hint, so reading it separately could pair one profile's config with another's
// hint when a profile switch lands in between.
func (c *Client) authSnapshot() (*profilemanager.Config, string, *internal.ConnectClient) {
c.stateMu.RLock()
defer c.stateMu.RUnlock()
return c.config, c.cfgPath, c.connectClient
}
func (c *Client) getConnectClient() *internal.ConnectClient {
c.stateMu.RLock()
defer c.stateMu.RUnlock()
@@ -162,7 +181,7 @@ func (c *Client) Run(platformFiles PlatformFiles, urlOpener URLOpener, isAndroid
defer c.ctxCancel()
c.ctxCancelLock.Unlock()
auth := NewAuthWithConfig(ctx, cfg)
auth := NewAuthWithConfig(ctx, cfg, cfgFile)
err = auth.login(urlOpener, isAndroidTV)
if err != nil {
return err
@@ -170,7 +189,7 @@ func (c *Client) Run(platformFiles PlatformFiles, urlOpener URLOpener, isAndroid
// todo do not throw error in case of cancelled context
ctx = internal.CtxInitState(ctx)
connectClient := internal.NewConnectClient(ctx, cfg, c.recorder)
c.setState(cfg, cacheDir, connectClient)
c.setState(cfg, cacheDir, cfgFile, connectClient)
// This path runs the interactive SSO flow, so reaching here means the peer
// is authenticated again — release the latch Status() reports from. Clear
// only once the fresh connect client is installed: until then Status()
@@ -211,7 +230,7 @@ func (c *Client) RunWithoutLogin(platformFiles PlatformFiles, dns *DNSList, dnsR
// todo do not throw error in case of cancelled context
ctx = internal.CtxInitState(ctx)
connectClient := internal.NewConnectClient(ctx, cfg, c.recorder)
c.setState(cfg, cacheDir, connectClient)
c.setState(cfg, cacheDir, cfgFile, connectClient)
return connectClient.RunOnAndroid(c.tunAdapter, c.iFaceDiscover, c.networkChangeListener, slices.Clone(dns.items), dnsReadyListener, stateFile, cacheDir)
}
@@ -240,6 +259,24 @@ func (c *Client) RenewTun(fd int) error {
return e.RenewTun(fd)
}
func (c *Client) GetTunSettings() (*TunSettings, error) {
cc := c.getConnectClient()
if cc == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("engine not running")
}
e := cc.Engine()
if e == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("engine not initialized")
}
routes, searchDomains := e.TunSettings()
return &TunSettings{
Routes: strings.Join(routes, ";"),
SearchDomains: strings.Join(searchDomains, ";"),
}, nil
}
// DebugBundle generates a debug bundle, uploads it, and returns the upload key.
// It works both with and without a running engine.
func (c *Client) DebugBundle(platformFiles PlatformFiles, anonymize bool) (string, error) {
@@ -301,7 +338,7 @@ func (c *Client) DebugBundle(platformFiles PlatformFiles, anonymize bool) (strin
uploadCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Minute)
defer cancel()
key, err := debug.UploadDebugBundle(uploadCtx, types.DefaultBundleURL, cfg.ManagementURL.String(), path, false)
key, err := debug.UploadDebugBundle(uploadCtx, types.DefaultBundleURL, cfg.ManagementURL.String(), path)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("upload debug bundle: %w", err)
}

View File

@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ import (
"context"
"fmt"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/auth"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/system"
@@ -53,11 +55,14 @@ func NewAuth(cfgPath string, mgmURL string) (*Auth, error) {
}, nil
}
// NewAuthWithConfig instantiate Auth based on existing config
func NewAuthWithConfig(ctx context.Context, config *profilemanager.Config) *Auth {
// NewAuthWithConfig instantiate Auth based on existing config. cfgPath is the
// file the config was loaded from; it identifies the profile whose account email
// backs the login_hint.
func NewAuthWithConfig(ctx context.Context, config *profilemanager.Config, cfgPath string) *Auth {
return &Auth{
ctx: ctx,
config: config,
ctx: ctx,
config: config,
cfgPath: cfgPath,
}
}
@@ -150,12 +155,14 @@ func (a *Auth) login(urlOpener URLOpener, isAndroidTV bool) error {
}
jwtToken := ""
email := ""
if needsLogin {
tokenInfo, err := a.foregroundGetTokenInfo(authClient, urlOpener, isAndroidTV)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("interactive sso login failed: %v", err)
}
jwtToken = tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse()
email = tokenInfo.Email
}
err, _ = authClient.Login(a.ctx, "", jwtToken)
@@ -163,17 +170,42 @@ func (a *Auth) login(urlOpener URLOpener, isAndroidTV bool) error {
return fmt.Errorf("login failed: %v", err)
}
// Stored after Login, not before: a rejected token must not leave a hint
// pointing at an account that cannot be used.
if email != "" && a.cfgPath != "" {
if err := writeProfileEmail(a.cfgPath, email); err != nil {
log.Warnf("failed to store profile account email: %v", err)
}
}
go urlOpener.OnLoginSuccess()
return nil
}
// loginHintSetter is implemented by both concrete flows (PKCE and device code)
// but absent from the OAuthFlow interface, hence the assertion below — the same
// way internal/auth wires it in authenticateWithPKCEFlow.
type loginHintSetter interface {
SetLoginHint(hint string)
}
func (a *Auth) foregroundGetTokenInfo(authClient *auth.Auth, urlOpener URLOpener, isAndroidTV bool) (*auth.TokenInfo, error) {
oAuthFlow, err := authClient.GetOAuthFlow(a.ctx, isAndroidTV)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get OAuth flow: %v", err)
}
// An empty hint is deliberate, not a fallback: a fresh or logged-out profile
// leaves the choice to the IdP, which is how accounts get switched.
if a.cfgPath != "" {
if hint := readProfileEmail(a.cfgPath); hint != "" {
if setter, ok := oAuthFlow.(loginHintSetter); ok {
setter.SetLoginHint(hint)
}
}
}
flowInfo, err := oAuthFlow.RequestAuthInfo(context.TODO())
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("getting a request OAuth flow info failed: %v", err)

View File

@@ -13,18 +13,17 @@ import (
)
const (
// Android-specific config filename (different from desktop default.json)
defaultConfigFilename = "netbird.cfg"
// Subdirectory for non-default profiles (must match Java Preferences.java)
profilesSubdir = "profiles"
// Android uses a single user context per app (non-empty username required by ServiceManager)
androidUsername = "android"
)
// Profile represents a profile for gomobile
type Profile struct {
ID string
Name string
ID string
Name string
// Email is the account this profile last logged in with, "" if it never
// completed an SSO login or was logged out. See profile_state.go.
Email string
IsActive bool
}
@@ -101,6 +100,7 @@ func (pm *ProfileManager) ListProfiles() (*ProfileArray, error) {
profiles = append(profiles, &Profile{
ID: p.ID.String(),
Name: p.Name,
Email: pm.profileEmail(p.ID.String()),
IsActive: p.IsActive,
})
}
@@ -123,7 +123,22 @@ func (pm *ProfileManager) GetActiveProfile() (*Profile, error) {
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve active profile %q: %w", activeState.ID, err)
}
return &Profile{ID: prof.ID.String(), Name: prof.Name, IsActive: true}, nil
return &Profile{
ID: prof.ID.String(),
Name: prof.Name,
Email: pm.profileEmail(prof.ID.String()),
IsActive: true,
}, nil
}
// profileEmail returns the account email recorded for a profile. Display-only, so
// an unresolvable path degrades to "" rather than an error.
func (pm *ProfileManager) profileEmail(id string) string {
configPath, err := pm.getProfileConfigPath(id)
if err != nil {
return ""
}
return readProfileEmail(configPath)
}
// SwitchProfile switches to a different profile
@@ -185,6 +200,11 @@ func (pm *ProfileManager) LogoutProfile(id string) error {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to save config: %w", err)
}
// Not fatal: a stale hint costs an account switch, not the logout itself.
if err := removeProfileEmail(configPath); err != nil {
log.Warnf("failed to clear stored account email for profile %s: %v", id, err)
}
log.Infof("logged out from profile: %s", id)
return nil
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
package android
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
)
const (
// Android-specific config filename (different from desktop default.json)
defaultConfigFilename = "netbird.cfg"
// Subdirectory for non-default profiles (must match Java Preferences.java)
profilesSubdir = "profiles"
// profileAccountSuffix names the file holding the profile's account email.
// Deliberately not ".state.json", which desktop uses for the same data:
// there the email and the engine's state manager live in different
// directories, but on Android both resolve under files/, so sharing the name
// would have the two overwrite each other — the state manager rewrites the
// whole file from its own keys (see statemanager.Manager.PersistState), and
// this package's writer does the same in reverse.
profileAccountSuffix = ".account.json"
)
// profileAccountPathFor derives the account file path from a profile's config
// path: netbird.cfg -> netbird.account.json, <id>.json -> <id>.account.json.
//
// Deriving from the config path rather than resolving the active profile keeps
// the write on the profile the login actually ran for: Auth.login runs in a
// goroutine, so the active profile can change under a flow already in flight.
func profileAccountPathFor(configPath string) (string, error) {
if configPath == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("empty config path")
}
base := filepath.Base(configPath)
stem := strings.TrimSuffix(base, filepath.Ext(base))
if stem == "" || stem == "." {
return "", fmt.Errorf("config path %q has no filename stem", configPath)
}
return filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(configPath), stem+profileAccountSuffix), nil
}
// readProfileEmail returns the account email stored for the profile whose config
// lives at configPath. A missing or unreadable file yields "", which leaves the
// account choice to the IdP.
func readProfileEmail(configPath string) string {
accountPath, err := profileAccountPathFor(configPath)
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("no profile account path for login hint: %v", err)
return ""
}
var state profilemanager.ProfileState
if _, err := util.ReadJson(accountPath, &state); err != nil {
if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
log.Debugf("failed to read profile account for login hint: %v", err)
}
return ""
}
return state.Email
}
// writeProfileEmail records the account email for the profile whose config lives
// at configPath, so later logins can pass it as an OIDC login_hint. An empty
// email is ignored rather than blanking what is already stored.
func writeProfileEmail(configPath string, email string) error {
if email == "" {
return nil
}
accountPath, err := profileAccountPathFor(configPath)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("resolve profile account path: %w", err)
}
state := profilemanager.ProfileState{Email: email}
if err := util.WriteJsonWithRestrictedPermission(context.Background(), accountPath, state); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write profile account: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// removeProfileEmail drops the stored account email. Called on logout: while the
// email is on disk it goes out as a login_hint, which would steer the next login
// straight back into the account just logged out of. Mirrors the desktop UI's
// RemoveProfileState call.
func removeProfileEmail(configPath string) error {
accountPath, err := profileAccountPathFor(configPath)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("resolve profile account path: %w", err)
}
if err := os.Remove(accountPath); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
return fmt.Errorf("remove profile account: %w", err)
}
return nil
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
package android
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
)
func TestProfileAccountPathFor(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
configPath string
want string
wantErr bool
}{
{
name: "default profile",
configPath: "/data/data/io.netbird.client/files/netbird.cfg",
want: "/data/data/io.netbird.client/files/netbird.account.json",
},
{
name: "id profile",
configPath: "/data/data/io.netbird.client/files/profiles/4c5f5c8198c3989cffb5b5394f5a7ae0.json",
want: "/data/data/io.netbird.client/files/profiles/4c5f5c8198c3989cffb5b5394f5a7ae0.account.json",
},
{
name: "legacy name-keyed profile is handled the same way",
configPath: "/data/data/io.netbird.client/files/profiles/work.json",
want: "/data/data/io.netbird.client/files/profiles/work.account.json",
},
{
name: "empty path is rejected",
configPath: "",
wantErr: true,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got, err := profileAccountPathFor(tt.configPath)
if tt.wantErr {
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected an error, got path %q", got)
}
return
}
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("got %q, want %q", got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestProfileAccountPathForDefaultDoesNotCollide(t *testing.T) {
root := "/data/data/io.netbird.client/files"
defaultAccount, err := profileAccountPathFor(filepath.Join(root, defaultConfigFilename))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("default profile: %v", err)
}
idAccount, err := profileAccountPathFor(filepath.Join(root, profilesSubdir, "abc123.json"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("id profile: %v", err)
}
if defaultAccount == idAccount {
t.Fatalf("default and id profile share an account file: %q", defaultAccount)
}
}
// The account file must never land on the engine state file: on Android both
// resolve under files/, and the state manager rewrites the whole file from its
// own keys, so sharing a path would have the two overwrite each other. The
// expected names here mirror ProfileManager.GetStateFilePath.
func TestProfileAccountPathAvoidsEngineStateFile(t *testing.T) {
root := "/data/data/io.netbird.client/files"
cases := []struct {
configPath string
engineState string
}{
{
configPath: filepath.Join(root, defaultConfigFilename),
engineState: filepath.Join(root, "state.json"),
},
{
configPath: filepath.Join(root, profilesSubdir, "abc123.json"),
engineState: filepath.Join(root, profilesSubdir, "abc123.state.json"),
},
}
for _, c := range cases {
account, err := profileAccountPathFor(c.configPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("%s: %v", c.configPath, err)
}
if account == c.engineState {
t.Errorf("account file collides with the engine state file: %q", account)
}
}
}
func TestWriteThenReadProfileEmail(t *testing.T) {
configPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "profiles", "abc123.json")
if err := ensureDirFor(t, configPath); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("prepare dir: %v", err)
}
if got := readProfileEmail(configPath); got != "" {
t.Errorf("expected no email before a login, got %q", got)
}
const email = "user@example.com"
if err := writeProfileEmail(configPath, email); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
}
if got := readProfileEmail(configPath); got != email {
t.Errorf("got %q, want %q", got, email)
}
if err := removeProfileEmail(configPath); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("remove: %v", err)
}
if got := readProfileEmail(configPath); got != "" {
t.Errorf("expected no email after logout, got %q", got)
}
// Logout may run on a never-logged-in profile, so a second remove must pass.
if err := removeProfileEmail(configPath); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("second remove should be a no-op: %v", err)
}
}
func TestWriteProfileEmailIgnoresEmpty(t *testing.T) {
configPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "profiles", "abc123.json")
if err := ensureDirFor(t, configPath); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("prepare dir: %v", err)
}
const email = "user@example.com"
if err := writeProfileEmail(configPath, email); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
}
if err := writeProfileEmail(configPath, ""); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write empty: %v", err)
}
if got := readProfileEmail(configPath); got != email {
t.Errorf("empty write clobbered the stored email: got %q, want %q", got, email)
}
}
func ensureDirFor(t *testing.T, path string) error {
t.Helper()
return os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0o700)
}

View File

@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ func (c *Client) endExtend() {
}
func (c *Client) extendAuthSession(ctx context.Context, urlOpener URLOpener, isAndroidTV bool) error {
cfg, _, cc := c.stateSnapshot()
cfg, cfgPath, cc := c.authSnapshot()
if cfg == nil || cc == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("engine is not running")
}
@@ -293,7 +293,10 @@ func (c *Client) extendAuthSession(ctx context.Context, urlOpener URLOpener, isA
}
defer authClient.Close()
a := &Auth{ctx: ctx, config: cfg}
// Passing the config path makes the flow pick up the login_hint: an extend
// renews the session of the account already signed in, so it must not stop to
// offer a choice.
a := NewAuthWithConfig(ctx, cfg, cfgPath)
tokenInfo, err := a.foregroundGetTokenInfo(authClient, urlOpener, isAndroidTV)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("interactive sso login failed: %v", err)

View File

@@ -29,9 +29,8 @@ const errCloseConnection = "Failed to close connection: %v"
var (
logFileCount uint32
systemInfoFlag bool
uploadBundleFlag bool
uploadBundleURLFlag string
uploadBundleInsecureFlag bool
uploadBundleFlag bool
uploadBundleURLFlag string
)
var debugCmd = &cobra.Command{
@@ -175,11 +174,10 @@ func debugBundle(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
}
if uploadBundleFlag {
request.UploadURL = uploadBundleURLFlag
request.UploadInsecure = uploadBundleInsecureFlag
}
resp, err := client.DebugBundle(cmd.Context(), request)
if err != nil {
return daemonCallError("bundle debug", err)
return fmt.Errorf("failed to bundle debug: %v", status.Convert(err).Message())
}
cmd.Printf("Local file:\n%s\n", resp.GetPath())
@@ -375,11 +373,10 @@ func runForDuration(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
}
if uploadBundleFlag {
request.UploadURL = uploadBundleURLFlag
request.UploadInsecure = uploadBundleInsecureFlag
}
resp, err := client.DebugBundle(cmd.Context(), request)
if err != nil {
return daemonCallError("bundle debug", err)
return fmt.Errorf("failed to bundle debug: %v", status.Convert(err).Message())
}
if needsRestoreUp {
@@ -527,12 +524,10 @@ func init() {
debugBundleCmd.Flags().BoolVarP(&systemInfoFlag, "system-info", "S", true, "Adds system information to the debug bundle")
debugBundleCmd.Flags().BoolVarP(&uploadBundleFlag, "upload-bundle", "U", false, "Uploads the debug bundle to a server")
debugBundleCmd.Flags().StringVar(&uploadBundleURLFlag, "upload-bundle-url", types.DefaultBundleURL, "Service URL to get an URL to upload the debug bundle")
debugBundleCmd.Flags().BoolVar(&uploadBundleInsecureFlag, "upload-bundle-insecure", false, "Allow uploading to an http or untrusted-TLS upload server (self-hosted); requires root")
forCmd.Flags().Uint32VarP(&logFileCount, "log-file-count", "C", 1, "Number of rotated log files to include in debug bundle")
forCmd.Flags().BoolVarP(&systemInfoFlag, "system-info", "S", true, "Adds system information to the debug bundle")
forCmd.Flags().BoolVarP(&uploadBundleFlag, "upload-bundle", "U", false, "Uploads the debug bundle to a server")
forCmd.Flags().StringVar(&uploadBundleURLFlag, "upload-bundle-url", types.DefaultBundleURL, "Service URL to get an URL to upload the debug bundle")
forCmd.Flags().BoolVar(&uploadBundleInsecureFlag, "upload-bundle-insecure", false, "Allow uploading to an http or untrusted-TLS upload server (self-hosted); requires root")
forCmd.Flags().Bool("capture", false, "Capture packets during the debug duration and include in bundle")
}

View File

@@ -421,12 +421,6 @@ func setupSetConfigReq(customDNSAddressConverted []byte, cmd *cobra.Command, pro
if cmd.Flag(serverSSHAllowedFlag).Changed {
req.ServerSSHAllowed = &serverSSHAllowed
}
if cmd.Flag(serverVNCAllowedFlag).Changed {
req.ServerVNCAllowed = &serverVNCAllowed
}
if cmd.Flag(disableVNCApprovalFlag).Changed {
req.DisableVNCApproval = &disableVNCApproval
}
if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRootFlag).Changed {
req.EnableSSHRoot = &enableSSHRoot
}
@@ -529,14 +523,30 @@ func setupConfig(customDNSAddressConverted []byte, cmd *cobra.Command, configFil
if cmd.Flag(serverSSHAllowedFlag).Changed {
ic.ServerSSHAllowed = &serverSSHAllowed
}
if cmd.Flag(serverVNCAllowedFlag).Changed {
ic.ServerVNCAllowed = &serverVNCAllowed
}
if cmd.Flag(disableVNCApprovalFlag).Changed {
ic.DisableVNCApproval = &disableVNCApproval
if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRootFlag).Changed {
ic.EnableSSHRoot = &enableSSHRoot
}
applySSHFlagsToConfig(cmd, &ic)
if cmd.Flag(enableSSHSFTPFlag).Changed {
ic.EnableSSHSFTP = &enableSSHSFTP
}
if cmd.Flag(enableSSHLocalPortForwardFlag).Changed {
ic.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding = &enableSSHLocalPortForward
}
if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRemotePortForwardFlag).Changed {
ic.EnableSSHRemotePortForwarding = &enableSSHRemotePortForward
}
if cmd.Flag(disableSSHAuthFlag).Changed {
ic.DisableSSHAuth = &disableSSHAuth
}
if cmd.Flag(sshJWTCacheTTLFlag).Changed {
ic.SSHJWTCacheTTL = &sshJWTCacheTTL
}
if cmd.Flag(interfaceNameFlag).Changed {
if err := parseInterfaceName(interfaceName); err != nil {
@@ -609,49 +619,6 @@ func setupConfig(customDNSAddressConverted []byte, cmd *cobra.Command, configFil
return &ic, nil
}
func applySSHFlagsToConfig(cmd *cobra.Command, ic *profilemanager.ConfigInput) {
if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRootFlag).Changed {
ic.EnableSSHRoot = &enableSSHRoot
}
if cmd.Flag(enableSSHSFTPFlag).Changed {
ic.EnableSSHSFTP = &enableSSHSFTP
}
if cmd.Flag(enableSSHLocalPortForwardFlag).Changed {
ic.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding = &enableSSHLocalPortForward
}
if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRemotePortForwardFlag).Changed {
ic.EnableSSHRemotePortForwarding = &enableSSHRemotePortForward
}
if cmd.Flag(disableSSHAuthFlag).Changed {
ic.DisableSSHAuth = &disableSSHAuth
}
if cmd.Flag(sshJWTCacheTTLFlag).Changed {
ic.SSHJWTCacheTTL = &sshJWTCacheTTL
}
}
func applySSHFlagsToLogin(cmd *cobra.Command, req *proto.LoginRequest) {
if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRootFlag).Changed {
req.EnableSSHRoot = &enableSSHRoot
}
if cmd.Flag(enableSSHSFTPFlag).Changed {
req.EnableSSHSFTP = &enableSSHSFTP
}
if cmd.Flag(enableSSHLocalPortForwardFlag).Changed {
req.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding = &enableSSHLocalPortForward
}
if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRemotePortForwardFlag).Changed {
req.EnableSSHRemotePortForwarding = &enableSSHRemotePortForward
}
if cmd.Flag(disableSSHAuthFlag).Changed {
req.DisableSSHAuth = &disableSSHAuth
}
if cmd.Flag(sshJWTCacheTTLFlag).Changed {
ttl := int32(sshJWTCacheTTL)
req.SshJWTCacheTTL = &ttl
}
}
func setupLoginRequest(providedSetupKey string, customDNSAddressConverted []byte, cmd *cobra.Command) (*proto.LoginRequest, error) {
loginRequest := proto.LoginRequest{
SetupKey: providedSetupKey,
@@ -681,14 +648,31 @@ func setupLoginRequest(providedSetupKey string, customDNSAddressConverted []byte
if cmd.Flag(serverSSHAllowedFlag).Changed {
loginRequest.ServerSSHAllowed = &serverSSHAllowed
}
if cmd.Flag(serverVNCAllowedFlag).Changed {
loginRequest.ServerVNCAllowed = &serverVNCAllowed
}
if cmd.Flag(disableVNCApprovalFlag).Changed {
loginRequest.DisableVNCApproval = &disableVNCApproval
if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRootFlag).Changed {
loginRequest.EnableSSHRoot = &enableSSHRoot
}
applySSHFlagsToLogin(cmd, &loginRequest)
if cmd.Flag(enableSSHSFTPFlag).Changed {
loginRequest.EnableSSHSFTP = &enableSSHSFTP
}
if cmd.Flag(enableSSHLocalPortForwardFlag).Changed {
loginRequest.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding = &enableSSHLocalPortForward
}
if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRemotePortForwardFlag).Changed {
loginRequest.EnableSSHRemotePortForwarding = &enableSSHRemotePortForward
}
if cmd.Flag(disableSSHAuthFlag).Changed {
loginRequest.DisableSSHAuth = &disableSSHAuth
}
if cmd.Flag(sshJWTCacheTTLFlag).Changed {
sshJWTCacheTTL32 := int32(sshJWTCacheTTL)
loginRequest.SshJWTCacheTTL = &sshJWTCacheTTL32
}
if cmd.Flag(disableAutoConnectFlag).Changed {
loginRequest.DisableAutoConnect = &autoConnectDisabled

View File

@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
//go:build windows || (darwin && !ios)
package cmd
import (
"fmt"
"net"
"net/netip"
"os"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
)
var (
vncAgentSocket string
vncAgentTargetUID uint32
)
func init() {
vncAgentCmd.Flags().StringVar(&vncAgentSocket, "socket", "", "Unix-domain socket path the agent listens on (required)")
vncAgentCmd.Flags().Uint32Var(&vncAgentTargetUID, "target-uid", 0, "uid the agent should drop privileges to before listening (darwin only; 0 = stay as current uid)")
rootCmd.AddCommand(vncAgentCmd)
}
// vncAgentCmd runs a VNC server inside the user's interactive session,
// listening on a Unix-domain socket. The NetBird service spawns it: on
// Windows via CreateProcessAsUser into the console session, on macOS via
// launchctl asuser into the Aqua session.
var vncAgentCmd = &cobra.Command{
Use: "vnc-agent",
Short: "Run VNC capture agent (internal, spawned by service)",
Hidden: true,
RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
log.SetReportCaller(true)
log.SetFormatter(&log.JSONFormatter{})
log.SetOutput(os.Stderr)
if vncAgentSocket == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("--socket is required")
}
token := os.Getenv("NB_VNC_AGENT_TOKEN")
if token == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("NB_VNC_AGENT_TOKEN not set; agent requires a token from the service")
}
// Purge the token from env so it doesn't leak via /proc/<pid>/environ.
if err := os.Unsetenv("NB_VNC_AGENT_TOKEN"); err != nil {
log.Debugf("unset NB_VNC_AGENT_TOKEN: %v", err)
}
// Drop root privileges to the target console user BEFORE creating
// the listening socket: keeps a post-auth bug in the encoder /
// input / capture paths confined to the user's own privileges
// rather than escalating to host root, and makes the daemon's
// LOCAL_PEERCRED check see the right uid. No-op on Windows
// (both processes run as SYSTEM) and when --target-uid is 0.
if vncAgentTargetUID != 0 {
if err := dropAgentPrivileges(vncAgentTargetUID); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("drop privileges to uid %d: %w", vncAgentTargetUID, err)
}
}
if err := os.Remove(vncAgentSocket); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
log.Debugf("remove stale socket %s: %v", vncAgentSocket, err)
}
ln, err := net.Listen("unix", vncAgentSocket)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("listen on %s: %w", vncAgentSocket, err)
}
if err := os.Chmod(vncAgentSocket, 0o600); err != nil {
log.Debugf("chmod %s: %v", vncAgentSocket, err)
}
capturer, injector, err := newAgentResources()
if err != nil {
_ = ln.Close()
return err
}
srv := vncserver.New(vncserver.Config{
Capturer: capturer,
Injector: injector,
DisableAuth: true,
AgentTokenHex: token,
Listener: ln,
})
if err := srv.Start(cmd.Context(), netip.AddrPort{}, netip.Prefix{}); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("start vnc server: %w", err)
}
log.Infof("vnc-agent listening on %s, ready", vncAgentSocket)
<-cmd.Context().Done()
log.Info("vnc-agent context cancelled, shutting down")
return srv.Stop()
},
SilenceUsage: true,
}

View File

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
//go:build darwin && !ios
package cmd
import (
"fmt"
vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
)
func newAgentResources() (vncserver.ScreenCapturer, vncserver.InputInjector, error) {
capturer := vncserver.NewMacPoller()
injector, err := vncserver.NewMacInputInjector()
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("macOS input injector: %w", err)
}
return capturer, injector, nil
}

View File

@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
//go:build darwin && !ios
package cmd
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"os/user"
"strconv"
"syscall"
)
// dropAgentPrivileges drops the vnc-agent process from root (its
// launchctl-asuser-inherited starting uid) to the target console user
// before any other initialisation runs. Without this the agent runs as
// root for the lifetime of the session; any post-auth memory-safety
// issue in the capture/input/encode paths would then be a root-level
// RCE on the host instead of a user-level one. Also makes the daemon's
// LOCAL_PEERCRED check correctly identify the agent as the console user,
// not as root.
//
// Returns an error when the agent is running as a non-root uid that
// differs from targetUID: non-root can only setuid to itself, so a
// mismatch here means the spawn went to the wrong session.
func dropAgentPrivileges(targetUID uint32) error {
if targetUID == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("refusing to keep agent running as root (target uid 0)")
}
cur := uint32(os.Getuid())
if cur == targetUID {
return nil
}
if cur != 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("agent uid %d does not match expected %d and we lack root to fix it", cur, targetUID)
}
// Resolve the target user's real primary group rather than reusing
// targetUID as the gid: a user's primary group on macOS is typically
// staff(20), not gid==uid. Fail closed if the lookup fails.
targetGID, err := primaryGroupID(targetUID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Drop supplementary groups first: setgid alone doesn't touch the
// auxiliary group list, leaving root's groups attached would let the
// dropped process write to root-only group-writable files.
if err := syscall.Setgroups([]int{}); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("setgroups([]): %w", err)
}
if err := syscall.Setgid(targetGID); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("setgid(%d): %w", targetGID, err)
}
if os.Getgid() != targetGID || os.Getegid() != targetGID {
return fmt.Errorf("setgid verification: gid=%d egid=%d, expected %d", os.Getgid(), os.Getegid(), targetGID)
}
if err := syscall.Setuid(int(targetUID)); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("setuid(%d): %w", targetUID, err)
}
if uint32(os.Getuid()) != targetUID || uint32(os.Geteuid()) != targetUID {
return fmt.Errorf("setuid verification: uid=%d euid=%d, expected %d", os.Getuid(), os.Geteuid(), targetUID)
}
return nil
}
// primaryGroupID resolves the real primary group id of the user with the
// given uid. Fails closed: a lookup or parse error returns an error so the
// caller never falls back to using uid as the gid.
func primaryGroupID(targetUID uint32) (int, error) {
u, err := user.LookupId(strconv.Itoa(int(targetUID)))
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("look up uid %d: %w", targetUID, err)
}
gid, err := strconv.Atoi(u.Gid)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("parse gid %q for uid %d: %w", u.Gid, targetUID, err)
}
return gid, nil
}

View File

@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
//go:build darwin && !ios
package cmd
import (
"strings"
"testing"
)
// TestDropAgentPrivileges_RefusesRootTarget locks in the contract that
// dropAgentPrivileges must never be a no-op when asked to keep the
// agent as root (target uid 0). A future caller that passes 0 by
// mistake would otherwise leave the post-auth attack surface running
// with full root privileges.
func TestDropAgentPrivileges_RefusesRootTarget(t *testing.T) {
err := dropAgentPrivileges(0)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected refusal for target uid 0, got nil")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "root") {
t.Fatalf("error should mention root, got: %v", err)
}
}
// TestDropAgentPrivileges_NoOpWhenAlreadyTarget covers the dev path
// where the agent is launched by hand as the target user (no root
// available, no setuid needed). The helper must succeed silently
// instead of trying (and failing) a setuid to its current uid.
func TestDropAgentPrivileges_NoOpWhenAlreadyTarget(t *testing.T) {
// Skip when running as root: the early-return path we want to
// cover only fires when current uid == target uid.
uid := currentUIDForTest()
if uid == 0 {
t.Skip("test must not run as root; cannot exercise the no-op early-return")
}
if err := dropAgentPrivileges(uid); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected no-op when current uid == target, got: %v", err)
}
}
// TestDropAgentPrivileges_RefusesMismatchedNonRoot guards the "non-root
// caller tries to setuid to a different uid" path: setuid would fail
// with EPERM anyway, but the helper should surface a clear error
// before issuing the syscall so a misconfigured spawn (wrong --target-uid
// flag) is debuggable.
func TestDropAgentPrivileges_RefusesMismatchedNonRoot(t *testing.T) {
uid := currentUIDForTest()
if uid == 0 {
t.Skip("test must not run as root; covered case requires non-root caller")
}
err := dropAgentPrivileges(uid + 1)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected refusal when non-root caller asks to setuid elsewhere")
}
}

View File

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
//go:build darwin && !ios
package cmd
import "os"
// currentUIDForTest exposes os.Getuid for the darwin dropprivs tests
// without leaking an os import into the test file itself.
func currentUIDForTest() uint32 {
return uint32(os.Getuid())
}

View File

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
//go:build windows
package cmd
// dropAgentPrivileges is a no-op on Windows: the agent and the daemon
// both run as SYSTEM (the daemon spawns the agent into the interactive
// session via CreateProcessAsUser with an impersonation token, but the
// resulting process still runs under SYSTEM, not under the user's
// account). The Windows path relies on the DACL-restricted socket
// directory, the unpredictable per-spawn socket name, the listen-readiness
// gate, and the per-spawn token for integrity instead.
func dropAgentPrivileges(_ uint32) error {
return nil
}

View File

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
//go:build windows
package cmd
import (
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
)
func newAgentResources() (vncserver.ScreenCapturer, vncserver.InputInjector, error) {
sessionID := vncserver.GetCurrentSessionID()
log.Infof("VNC agent running in Windows session %d", sessionID)
return vncserver.NewDesktopCapturer(), vncserver.NewWindowsInputInjector(), nil
}

View File

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
package cmd
const (
serverVNCAllowedFlag = "allow-server-vnc"
disableVNCApprovalFlag = "disable-vnc-approval"
)
var (
serverVNCAllowed bool
disableVNCApproval bool
)
func init() {
upCmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVar(&serverVNCAllowed, serverVNCAllowedFlag, false, "Allow embedded VNC server on peer")
upCmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVar(&disableVNCApproval, disableVNCApprovalFlag, false, "Disable per-connection user approval prompts for the embedded VNC server")
}

View File

@@ -6,35 +6,19 @@ import (
"runtime"
)
// UILogFile is the file name the desktop UI writes its log to. It is defined
// here so the UI (writer), the daemon's RegisterUILog validation, and the debug
// bundle collector all share one definition.
const UILogFile = "gui-client.log"
var (
// StateDir holds persistent state (config, profiles, install metadata).
StateDir string
// RuntimeDir holds ephemeral artifacts that should not survive reboot,
// such as Unix sockets for daemon and per-session IPC. Empty on
// platforms without a conventional /var/run-style location.
RuntimeDir string
)
var StateDir string
func init() {
StateDir = os.Getenv("NB_STATE_DIR")
if StateDir != "" {
return
}
switch runtime.GOOS {
case "windows":
StateDir = filepath.Join(os.Getenv("PROGRAMDATA"), "Netbird")
case "darwin", "linux":
StateDir = "/var/lib/netbird"
RuntimeDir = "/var/run/netbird"
case "freebsd", "openbsd", "netbsd", "dragonfly":
StateDir = "/var/db/netbird"
RuntimeDir = "/var/run/netbird"
}
if v := os.Getenv("NB_STATE_DIR"); v != "" {
StateDir = v
}
if v := os.Getenv("NB_RUNTIME_DIR"); v != "" {
RuntimeDir = v
}
}

View File

@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
package nftables
import (
"testing"
"github.com/google/nftables/expr"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestBuildLegacyRouteRuleExpressions(t *testing.T) {
sourcePayload := &expr.Payload{}
sourceCmp := &expr.Cmp{}
destinationPayload := &expr.Payload{}
destinationCmp := &expr.Cmp{}
nilSourceDestination := &expr.Payload{}
nilDestinationSource := &expr.Cmp{}
tests := []struct {
name string
source []expr.Any
destination []expr.Any
matches []expr.Any
}{
{
name: "both non-empty",
source: []expr.Any{sourcePayload, sourceCmp},
destination: []expr.Any{destinationPayload, destinationCmp},
matches: []expr.Any{sourcePayload, sourceCmp, destinationPayload, destinationCmp},
},
{
name: "nil source",
destination: []expr.Any{nilSourceDestination},
matches: []expr.Any{nilSourceDestination},
},
{
name: "nil destination",
source: []expr.Any{nilDestinationSource},
matches: []expr.Any{nilDestinationSource},
},
{
name: "both nil",
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := buildLegacyRouteRuleExpressions(tt.source, tt.destination)
require.Len(t, got, len(tt.matches)+2)
for i, match := range tt.matches {
require.Same(t, match, got[i])
}
require.IsType(t, &expr.Counter{}, got[len(tt.matches)])
verdict, ok := got[len(tt.matches)+1].(*expr.Verdict)
require.True(t, ok)
require.Equal(t, expr.VerdictAccept, verdict.Kind)
})
}
}

View File

@@ -953,17 +953,6 @@ func (r *router) addMSSClampingRules() error {
return r.conn.Flush()
}
func buildLegacyRouteRuleExpressions(sourceExp, destExp []expr.Any) []expr.Any {
exprs := make([]expr.Any, 0, len(sourceExp)+len(destExp)+2)
exprs = append(exprs, sourceExp...)
exprs = append(exprs, destExp...)
exprs = append(exprs,
&expr.Counter{},
&expr.Verdict{Kind: expr.VerdictAccept},
)
return exprs
}
// addLegacyRouteRule adds a legacy routing rule for mgmt servers pre route acls
func (r *router) addLegacyRouteRule(pair firewall.RouterPair) error {
sourceExp, err := r.applyNetwork(pair.Source, nil, true)
@@ -976,7 +965,15 @@ func (r *router) addLegacyRouteRule(pair firewall.RouterPair) error {
return fmt.Errorf("apply destination: %w", err)
}
exprs := buildLegacyRouteRuleExpressions(sourceExp, destExp)
exprs := []expr.Any{
&expr.Counter{},
&expr.Verdict{
Kind: expr.VerdictAccept,
},
}
exprs = append(exprs, sourceExp...)
exprs = append(exprs, destExp...)
ruleKey := firewall.GenKey(firewall.ForwardingFormat, pair)

View File

@@ -1,219 +0,0 @@
// Package approval brokers per-attempt user-accept prompts for inbound
// remote access (VNC today, SSH and others in the future). A caller pushes
// a Prompt; the broker emits a SystemEvent on the daemon→UI stream and
// blocks until the UI calls the daemon's RespondApproval RPC, the per-
// request timeout fires, or no subscriber is connected. The latter case
// fails closed so a backgrounded UI cannot silently bypass the gate.
package approval
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
)
// Metadata keys the broker reserves on the emitted SystemEvent. Callers
// should not set these themselves; values in Prompt.Metadata that collide
// are overwritten by the broker.
const (
MetaRequestID = "request_id"
MetaKind = "kind"
MetaExpiresAt = "expires_at"
)
// ShortKeyFingerprint formats a hex-encoded Noise_IK static pubkey as a
// short, eyeball-able fingerprint to display in the approval dialog.
// The dashboard-supplied display name attached to a SessionPubKey isn't
// cryptographically asserted by the connecting client, so the prompt
// must also show something that IS: the key fingerprint, a hash of
// the static public key the client just proved possession of during the
// Noise handshake. Returns the empty string when the input is too short
// to plausibly be a hex pubkey, so the row is omitted rather than
// rendered as a misleading partial.
//
// Output format: 16 hex chars grouped as XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX (64 bits of
// fingerprint, resistant to random-prefix collisions and easy for a human
// to compare with an out-of-band reference).
func ShortKeyFingerprint(hexKey string) string {
if len(hexKey) < 8 {
return ""
}
src := hexKey
if len(src) > 16 {
src = src[:16]
}
var out []byte
for i, c := range src {
if i > 0 && i%4 == 0 {
out = append(out, '-')
}
out = append(out, byte(c))
}
return string(out)
}
// Kind values for the well-known prompt subjects. New subsystems should
// add a constant here so the UI can dispatch on a known string.
const (
KindVNC = "vnc"
KindSSH = "ssh"
)
// DefaultTimeout is the wall-clock window the user has to accept or deny a
// pending approval before the broker fails closed and returns ErrTimeout.
// Kept well under typical VNC client and dashboard connection timeouts so
// the RFB rejection actually reaches the browser instead of racing the
// browser's own "connection timed out" message.
const DefaultTimeout = 15 * time.Second
// timeoutValue returns the active timeout. It's a var so tests in this
// package can shorten the wait without exposing a setter on the public
// API. Production code always sees DefaultTimeout.
var timeoutValue = func() time.Duration { return DefaultTimeout }
// ErrNoSubscriber indicates no UI is connected to consume the prompt.
// The caller must reject the underlying connection (fail-closed).
var ErrNoSubscriber = errors.New("no UI subscriber connected for approval")
// ErrTimeout indicates the user did not respond within DefaultTimeout.
var ErrTimeout = errors.New("approval timed out")
// ErrDenied indicates the user explicitly denied the connection.
var ErrDenied = errors.New("approval denied")
// EventPublisher is the subset of peer.Status used to emit prompts.
type EventPublisher interface {
PublishEvent(
severity proto.SystemEvent_Severity,
category proto.SystemEvent_Category,
msg string,
userMsg string,
metadata map[string]string,
)
HasEventSubscribers() bool
}
// Prompt describes the pending request shown to the user. Kind selects
// the UI dispatch path (e.g. "vnc", "ssh"). Subject is the human-readable
// one-liner the UI may show as a title or notification body. Metadata is
// passed through verbatim and is the subsystem-specific payload (peer
// name, source IP, mode, etc.).
type Prompt struct {
Kind string
Subject string
Metadata map[string]string
}
// Decision carries the user's response to an approval prompt. ViewOnly is
// only meaningful when Accept is true; it lets the host grant the
// connection but signal the requester that input control is withheld.
type Decision struct {
Accept bool
ViewOnly bool
}
// Broker holds in-flight approval requests keyed by request ID.
type Broker struct {
pub EventPublisher
mu sync.Mutex
pending map[string]chan Decision
}
// New returns a broker that publishes prompts via pub.
func New(pub EventPublisher) *Broker {
return &Broker{
pub: pub,
pending: make(map[string]chan Decision),
}
}
// Request emits a SystemEvent for p and blocks until the UI calls Respond,
// ctx is cancelled, or DefaultTimeout elapses. Returns a Decision when
// the user replied; ErrDenied / ErrTimeout / ErrNoSubscriber / ctx.Err
// otherwise. Callers must treat any non-nil error as a deny.
func (b *Broker) Request(ctx context.Context, p Prompt) (Decision, error) {
var zero Decision
if b == nil || b.pub == nil {
return zero, fmt.Errorf("approval broker not configured")
}
if !b.pub.HasEventSubscribers() {
return zero, ErrNoSubscriber
}
id := uuid.NewString()
resp := make(chan Decision, 1)
b.mu.Lock()
b.pending[id] = resp
b.mu.Unlock()
defer b.dropPending(id)
timeout := timeoutValue()
expiresAt := time.Now().Add(timeout)
meta := make(map[string]string, len(p.Metadata)+3)
for k, v := range p.Metadata {
meta[k] = v
}
meta[MetaRequestID] = id
meta[MetaKind] = p.Kind
meta[MetaExpiresAt] = expiresAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
subject := p.Subject
if subject == "" {
subject = fmt.Sprintf("%s connection requires approval", p.Kind)
}
b.pub.PublishEvent(proto.SystemEvent_INFO, proto.SystemEvent_APPROVAL, subject, subject, meta)
log.Debugf("approval request %s (%s) emitted: %s", id, p.Kind, subject)
timer := time.NewTimer(timeout)
defer timer.Stop()
select {
case d := <-resp:
if !d.Accept {
return zero, ErrDenied
}
return d, nil
case <-timer.C:
return zero, ErrTimeout
case <-ctx.Done():
return zero, ctx.Err()
}
}
// Respond delivers the user's decision for id. Returns true when a pending
// request matched and was woken, false when id was unknown or already done.
func (b *Broker) Respond(id string, d Decision) bool {
if b == nil {
return false
}
b.mu.Lock()
ch, ok := b.pending[id]
if ok {
delete(b.pending, id)
}
b.mu.Unlock()
if !ok {
return false
}
select {
case ch <- d:
default:
}
return true
}
func (b *Broker) dropPending(id string) {
b.mu.Lock()
delete(b.pending, id)
b.mu.Unlock()
}

View File

@@ -1,434 +0,0 @@
package approval
import (
"context"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
)
// fakePublisher records published events and reports whether subscribers
// are connected. The subscribers flag is the security-critical signal:
// when false the broker must refuse to emit and the gate must fail closed.
type fakePublisher struct {
mu sync.Mutex
subscribers bool
events []*proto.SystemEvent
}
func (p *fakePublisher) PublishEvent(
severity proto.SystemEvent_Severity,
category proto.SystemEvent_Category,
msg string,
userMsg string,
metadata map[string]string,
) {
p.mu.Lock()
p.events = append(p.events, &proto.SystemEvent{
Severity: severity,
Category: category,
Message: msg,
UserMessage: userMsg,
Metadata: metadata,
})
p.mu.Unlock()
}
func (p *fakePublisher) HasEventSubscribers() bool {
p.mu.Lock()
defer p.mu.Unlock()
return p.subscribers
}
func (p *fakePublisher) lastEvent(t *testing.T) *proto.SystemEvent {
t.Helper()
p.mu.Lock()
defer p.mu.Unlock()
require.NotEmpty(t, p.events, "publisher saw no events")
return p.events[len(p.events)-1]
}
func (p *fakePublisher) eventCount() int {
p.mu.Lock()
defer p.mu.Unlock()
return len(p.events)
}
// TestRequestNoSubscriberFailsClosed is the core fail-closed invariant:
// when the UI is not subscribed, the broker must refuse without emitting
// an event or arming a waiter. A regression here is a silent bypass.
func TestRequestNoSubscriberFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: false}
b := New(pub)
_, err := b.Request(context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC, Subject: "test"})
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrNoSubscriber)
assert.Equal(t, 0, pub.eventCount(), "no event must be emitted when fail-closed")
b.mu.Lock()
pending := len(b.pending)
b.mu.Unlock()
assert.Equal(t, 0, pending, "no waiter must be registered on fail-closed")
}
// TestRequestTimeoutDenies verifies that a request without a UI response
// returns ErrTimeout (deny) rather than nil (silent accept). Uses a short
// per-test broker timeout via Respond after the fact to keep the test fast.
func TestRequestTimeoutDenies(t *testing.T) {
// Replace DefaultTimeout for the lifetime of this test.
orig := DefaultTimeout
defaultTimeout(t, 60*time.Millisecond)
defer defaultTimeout(t, orig)
pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
b := New(pub)
start := time.Now()
_, err := b.Request(context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC, Subject: "test"})
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrTimeout, "missing user response must yield ErrTimeout, not nil")
assert.GreaterOrEqual(t, time.Since(start), 50*time.Millisecond, "timeout fired prematurely")
}
// TestRequestDenied returns ErrDenied when the UI responds with false.
func TestRequestDenied(t *testing.T) {
pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
b := New(pub)
var requestID string
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
done <- requestErr(b, context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC, Subject: "test"})
}()
requestID = waitForRequestID(t, pub)
require.True(t, b.Respond(requestID, Decision{Accept: false}))
select {
case err := <-done:
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrDenied)
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("Request did not return after Respond(false)")
}
}
// TestRequestAccepted is the happy path. Failure here doesn't bypass the
// gate but breaks the feature.
func TestRequestAccepted(t *testing.T) {
pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
b := New(pub)
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
done <- requestErr(b, context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC, Subject: "test"})
}()
id := waitForRequestID(t, pub)
require.True(t, b.Respond(id, Decision{Accept: true}))
select {
case err := <-done:
assert.NoError(t, err)
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("Request did not return after Respond(true)")
}
}
// TestRequestCtxCancelDenies verifies that an upstream cancel (e.g. the
// engine shutting down mid-prompt) returns the cancel error rather than
// nil. A nil here would be a silent bypass on shutdown races.
func TestRequestCtxCancelDenies(t *testing.T) {
pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
b := New(pub)
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
done <- requestErr(b, ctx, Prompt{Kind: KindVNC, Subject: "test"})
}()
// Wait until the prompt is in flight so cancel races a live waiter.
_ = waitForRequestID(t, pub)
cancel()
select {
case err := <-done:
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, context.Canceled)
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("Request did not return after ctx cancel")
}
}
// TestRespondUnknownIsNoop ensures a stray RespondApproval RPC cannot
// affect or accidentally accept any in-flight request whose id it doesn't
// match. Also confirms it doesn't panic.
func TestRespondUnknownIsNoop(t *testing.T) {
pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
b := New(pub)
// No in-flight prompts: Respond returns false.
assert.False(t, b.Respond("does-not-exist", Decision{Accept: true}))
// With an in-flight prompt, a wrong id still returns false and the
// prompt remains armed (eventually timing out as a deny).
defaultTimeout(t, 60*time.Millisecond)
defer defaultTimeout(t, DefaultTimeout)
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
done <- requestErr(b, context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC})
}()
realID := waitForRequestID(t, pub)
assert.False(t, b.Respond("totally-bogus", Decision{Accept: true}), "unknown id must not match")
assert.NotEqual(t, "totally-bogus", realID)
select {
case err := <-done:
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrTimeout, "armed prompt must still time out, not accept")
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("prompt did not resolve")
}
}
// TestRespondAfterTimeoutNoop confirms a late accept response can't
// retroactively flip a denied (timed-out) request. The dropPending defer
// in Request must have removed the entry by the time Respond races in.
func TestRespondAfterTimeoutNoop(t *testing.T) {
defaultTimeout(t, 30*time.Millisecond)
defer defaultTimeout(t, DefaultTimeout)
pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
b := New(pub)
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
done <- requestErr(b, context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC})
}()
id := waitForRequestID(t, pub)
select {
case err := <-done:
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrTimeout)
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("prompt did not time out")
}
assert.False(t, b.Respond(id, Decision{Accept: true}), "late respond must be no-op")
}
// TestRespondDoubleNoop ensures a duplicate ack from the UI doesn't leak
// past the matched waiter or panic on a closed/full channel.
func TestRespondDoubleNoop(t *testing.T) {
pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
b := New(pub)
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
done <- requestErr(b, context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC})
}()
id := waitForRequestID(t, pub)
require.True(t, b.Respond(id, Decision{Accept: true}))
assert.False(t, b.Respond(id, Decision{Accept: false}), "second response must be no-op")
select {
case err := <-done:
assert.NoError(t, err)
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("prompt did not resolve")
}
}
// TestNilBrokerRequestErrors guards the engine pre-init path where the
// broker may not yet exist (or its publisher is nil): Request must
// error, never silently accept.
func TestNilBrokerRequestErrors(t *testing.T) {
var b *Broker
_, err := b.Request(context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC})
assert.Error(t, err, "nil broker must error, never silently accept")
b2 := New(nil)
_, err = b2.Request(context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC})
assert.Error(t, err, "broker with nil publisher must error, never silently accept")
}
// TestPromptMetadataInjected confirms the broker stamps request_id, kind,
// and expires_at on the emitted event. The UI relies on these keys; if
// they are dropped, the user cannot route the prompt and the response
// path breaks (which fails closed via timeout).
func TestPromptMetadataInjected(t *testing.T) {
pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
b := New(pub)
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
done <- requestErr(b, context.Background(), Prompt{
Kind: KindVNC,
Subject: "VNC connection from peerA",
Metadata: map[string]string{"peer_name": "peerA"},
})
}()
id := waitForRequestID(t, pub)
ev := pub.lastEvent(t)
assert.Equal(t, proto.SystemEvent_APPROVAL, ev.Category)
assert.Equal(t, KindVNC, ev.Metadata[MetaKind])
assert.Equal(t, id, ev.Metadata[MetaRequestID])
assert.NotEmpty(t, ev.Metadata[MetaExpiresAt])
assert.Equal(t, "peerA", ev.Metadata["peer_name"], "caller metadata must pass through")
require.True(t, b.Respond(id, Decision{Accept: true}))
<-done
}
// TestConcurrentRequests verifies that two concurrent prompts are tracked
// independently. A bug that aliases ids would let one Respond unblock
// the wrong waiter (a silent accept across prompts).
func TestConcurrentRequests(t *testing.T) {
pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
b := New(pub)
const n = 20
results := make(chan error, n)
for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
go func() {
results <- requestErr(b, context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC})
}()
}
ids := waitForNRequestIDs(t, pub, n)
require.Len(t, ids, n)
// Deny exactly half, accept the rest. Track outcome per id so we can
// match each Request's return value against the response we sent.
denySet := make(map[string]bool, n)
for i, id := range ids {
deny := i%2 == 0
denySet[id] = deny
require.True(t, b.Respond(id, Decision{Accept: !deny}))
}
// Collect all returns and check no nil errors slipped past a deny.
var accepted, denied atomic.Int32
for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
select {
case err := <-results:
if err == nil {
accepted.Add(1)
} else {
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrDenied)
denied.Add(1)
}
case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
t.Fatalf("only got %d/%d responses", i, n)
}
}
assert.Equal(t, int32(n/2), denied.Load())
assert.Equal(t, int32(n/2), accepted.Load())
}
// waitForRequestID blocks until the publisher sees its next event and
// returns the request_id stamped on it.
func waitForRequestID(t *testing.T, pub *fakePublisher) string {
t.Helper()
deadline := time.Now().Add(2 * time.Second)
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
pub.mu.Lock()
count := len(pub.events)
var id string
if count > 0 {
id = pub.events[count-1].Metadata[MetaRequestID]
}
pub.mu.Unlock()
if id != "" {
return id
}
time.Sleep(2 * time.Millisecond)
}
t.Fatal("timeout waiting for emitted event")
return ""
}
func waitForNRequestIDs(t *testing.T, pub *fakePublisher, n int) []string {
t.Helper()
deadline := time.Now().Add(2 * time.Second)
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
pub.mu.Lock()
count := len(pub.events)
pub.mu.Unlock()
if count >= n {
break
}
time.Sleep(2 * time.Millisecond)
}
pub.mu.Lock()
defer pub.mu.Unlock()
out := make([]string, 0, len(pub.events))
seen := make(map[string]struct{}, len(pub.events))
for _, ev := range pub.events {
id := ev.Metadata[MetaRequestID]
if id == "" {
continue
}
if _, dup := seen[id]; dup {
continue
}
seen[id] = struct{}{}
out = append(out, id)
}
if len(out) < n {
t.Fatalf("only got %d/%d request ids", len(out), n)
}
return out
}
// defaultTimeout swaps the broker's per-request wall-clock window so the
// timeout tests run quickly. Restores the prior value on the next call.
func defaultTimeout(t *testing.T, d time.Duration) {
t.Helper()
if d <= 0 {
t.Fatal("defaultTimeout must be > 0")
}
timeoutValue = func() time.Duration { return d }
}
// requestErr wraps Broker.Request to drop the Decision when tests only
// care about the error path. Keeps the goroutine bodies tight.
func requestErr(b *Broker, ctx context.Context, p Prompt) error {
_, err := b.Request(ctx, p)
return err
}
// TestRequestViewOnly checks the view-only outcome flows through Request's
// Decision return without being silently swallowed.
func TestRequestViewOnly(t *testing.T) {
pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
b := New(pub)
type result struct {
d Decision
err error
}
done := make(chan result, 1)
go func() {
d, err := b.Request(context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC})
done <- result{d, err}
}()
id := waitForRequestID(t, pub)
require.True(t, b.Respond(id, Decision{Accept: true, ViewOnly: true}))
select {
case r := <-done:
assert.NoError(t, r.err)
assert.True(t, r.d.Accept)
assert.True(t, r.d.ViewOnly, "ViewOnly must survive the round-trip")
case <-time.After(time.Second):
t.Fatal("view-only request did not resolve")
}
}

View File

@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
package approval
import "testing"
// TestShortKeyFingerprint locks in the format the VNC approval prompt
// shows to the user. The fingerprint is the user's only cryptographic
// anchor against a malicious management server that pushes a spoofed
// display name, so accidental changes to its format would silently
// undermine that defence.
func TestShortKeyFingerprint(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
in string
want string
}{
{
name: "full_32_byte_pubkey",
in: "0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210ffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100",
want: "0123-4567-89ab-cdef",
},
{
name: "exactly_16_chars",
in: "0123456789abcdef",
want: "0123-4567-89ab-cdef",
},
{
name: "borderline_8_chars",
in: "01234567",
want: "0123-4567",
},
{
name: "too_short_returns_empty",
in: "0123",
want: "",
},
{
name: "empty_returns_empty",
in: "",
want: "",
},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := ShortKeyFingerprint(tc.in)
if got != tc.want {
t.Fatalf("ShortKeyFingerprint(%q) = %q, want %q", tc.in, got, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
// TestShortKeyFingerprint_DistinctKeysDistinctOutputs guards against a
// formatting bug that would collapse different prefixes onto the same
// displayed fingerprint and let an attacker substitute their pubkey for
// a victim's while keeping the prompt visually identical.
func TestShortKeyFingerprint_DistinctKeysDistinctOutputs(t *testing.T) {
a := ShortKeyFingerprint("0123456789abcdef" + "rest_of_pubkey_ignored")
b := ShortKeyFingerprint("0123456789abcde0" + "rest_of_pubkey_ignored")
if a == b {
t.Fatalf("expected distinct outputs for distinct prefixes, both = %q", a)
}
}

View File

@@ -344,7 +344,6 @@ func (a *Auth) setSystemInfoFlags(info *system.Info) {
a.config.RosenpassEnabled,
a.config.RosenpassPermissive,
a.config.ServerSSHAllowed,
a.config.ServerVNCAllowed,
a.config.DisableClientRoutes,
a.config.DisableServerRoutes,
a.config.DisableDNS,

View File

@@ -113,11 +113,14 @@ func (c *ConnectClient) RunOnAndroid(
stateFilePath string,
cacheDir string,
) error {
notifier := tunnelnotifier.New(networkChangeListener, nil)
defer notifier.Close()
// in case of non Android os these variables will be nil
mobileDependency := MobileDependency{
TunAdapter: tunAdapter,
IFaceDiscover: iFaceDiscover,
NetworkChangeListener: networkChangeListener,
NetworkChangeListener: notifier,
HostDNSAddresses: dnsAddresses,
DnsReadyListener: dnsReadyListener,
StateFilePath: stateFilePath,
@@ -611,8 +614,6 @@ func createEngineConfig(key wgtypes.Key, config *profilemanager.Config, peerConf
RosenpassEnabled: config.RosenpassEnabled,
RosenpassPermissive: config.RosenpassPermissive,
ServerSSHAllowed: util.ReturnBoolWithDefaultTrue(config.ServerSSHAllowed),
ServerVNCAllowed: config.ServerVNCAllowed != nil && *config.ServerVNCAllowed,
DisableVNCApproval: config.DisableVNCApproval,
EnableSSHRoot: config.EnableSSHRoot,
EnableSSHSFTP: config.EnableSSHSFTP,
EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding: config.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding,
@@ -696,7 +697,6 @@ func loginToManagement(ctx context.Context, client mgm.Client, pubSSHKey []byte,
config.RosenpassEnabled,
config.RosenpassPermissive,
config.ServerSSHAllowed,
config.ServerVNCAllowed,
config.DisableClientRoutes,
config.DisableServerRoutes,
config.DisableDNS,

View File

@@ -229,6 +229,7 @@ scutil_dns.txt (macOS only):
const (
clientLogFile = "client.log"
uiLogFile = "gui-client.log"
errorLogFile = "netbird.err"
stdoutLogFile = "netbird.out"
@@ -247,20 +248,6 @@ type MetricsExporter interface {
Export(w io.Writer) error
}
// LogOpener opens a log file for inclusion in the bundle. It exists so that log
// files whose path was supplied by an IPC caller can be opened under a check
// the daemon defines, instead of being opened with the daemon's privileges
// unconditionally.
type LogOpener func(path string) (*os.File, error)
func openLogFile(path string) (*os.File, error) {
f, err := os.Open(path)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("open %s: %w", path, err)
}
return f, nil
}
type BundleGenerator struct {
anonymizer *anonymize.Anonymizer
@@ -270,7 +257,6 @@ type BundleGenerator struct {
syncResponse *mgmProto.SyncResponse
logPath string
uiLogPath string
uiLogOpener LogOpener
tempDir string
statePath string
cpuProfile []byte
@@ -299,20 +285,14 @@ type GeneratorDependencies struct {
SyncResponse *mgmProto.SyncResponse
LogPath string
UILogPath string // Absolute path to the desktop UI's gui-client.log, reported via RegisterUILog. Empty if no UI registered one.
// UILogOpener opens the UI log and its rotated siblings. The path comes from
// a local IPC caller, so the daemon must not open it with plain os.Open: the
// opener is where the caller's right to that file is enforced. Defaults to
// os.Open, which is only correct where the path is not caller-supplied
// (mobile).
UILogOpener LogOpener
TempDir string // Directory for temporary bundle zip files. If empty, os.TempDir() is used.
StatePath string // Path to the state file. If empty, the ServiceManager default path is used.
CPUProfile []byte
CapturePath string
RefreshStatus func()
ClientMetrics MetricsExporter
DaemonVersion string
CliVersion string
TempDir string // Directory for temporary bundle zip files. If empty, os.TempDir() is used.
StatePath string // Path to the state file. If empty, the ServiceManager default path is used.
CPUProfile []byte
CapturePath string
RefreshStatus func()
ClientMetrics MetricsExporter
DaemonVersion string
CliVersion string
}
func NewBundleGenerator(deps GeneratorDependencies, cfg BundleConfig) *BundleGenerator {
@@ -322,11 +302,6 @@ func NewBundleGenerator(deps GeneratorDependencies, cfg BundleConfig) *BundleGen
logFileCount = 1
}
uiLogOpener := deps.UILogOpener
if uiLogOpener == nil {
uiLogOpener = openLogFile
}
return &BundleGenerator{
anonymizer: anonymize.NewAnonymizer(anonymize.DefaultAddresses()),
@@ -335,7 +310,6 @@ func NewBundleGenerator(deps GeneratorDependencies, cfg BundleConfig) *BundleGen
syncResponse: deps.SyncResponse,
logPath: deps.LogPath,
uiLogPath: deps.UILogPath,
uiLogOpener: uiLogOpener,
tempDir: deps.TempDir,
statePath: deps.StatePath,
cpuProfile: deps.CPUProfile,
@@ -694,12 +668,6 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addCommonConfigFields(configContent *strings.Builder)
if g.internalConfig.SSHJWTCacheTTL != nil {
configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("SSHJWTCacheTTL: %d\n", *g.internalConfig.SSHJWTCacheTTL))
}
if g.internalConfig.ServerVNCAllowed != nil {
configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("ServerVNCAllowed: %v\n", *g.internalConfig.ServerVNCAllowed))
}
if g.internalConfig.DisableVNCApproval != nil {
configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("DisableVNCApproval: %v\n", *g.internalConfig.DisableVNCApproval))
}
configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("DisableClientRoutes: %v\n", g.internalConfig.DisableClientRoutes))
configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("DisableServerRoutes: %v\n", g.internalConfig.DisableServerRoutes))
@@ -1028,11 +996,11 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addLogfile() error {
logDir := filepath.Dir(g.logPath)
if err := g.addSingleLogfile(openLogFile, g.logPath, clientLogFile); err != nil {
if err := g.addSingleLogfile(g.logPath, clientLogFile); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("add client log file to zip: %w", err)
}
g.addRotatedLogFiles(openLogFile, logDir, clientLogPrefix)
g.addRotatedLogFiles(logDir, clientLogPrefix)
stdErrLogPath := filepath.Join(logDir, errorLogFile)
stdoutLogPath := filepath.Join(logDir, stdoutLogFile)
@@ -1041,11 +1009,11 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addLogfile() error {
stdoutLogPath = darwinStdoutLogPath
}
if err := g.addSingleLogfile(openLogFile, stdErrLogPath, errorLogFile); err != nil {
if err := g.addSingleLogfile(stdErrLogPath, errorLogFile); err != nil {
log.Warnf("Failed to add %s to zip: %v", errorLogFile, err)
}
if err := g.addSingleLogfile(openLogFile, stdoutLogPath, stdoutLogFile); err != nil {
if err := g.addSingleLogfile(stdoutLogPath, stdoutLogFile); err != nil {
log.Warnf("Failed to add %s to zip: %v", stdoutLogFile, err)
}
@@ -1062,18 +1030,18 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addUILog() error {
return nil
}
if err := g.addSingleLogfile(g.uiLogOpener, g.uiLogPath, configs.UILogFile); err != nil {
if err := g.addSingleLogfile(g.uiLogPath, uiLogFile); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("add UI log file to zip: %w", err)
}
g.addRotatedLogFiles(g.uiLogOpener, filepath.Dir(g.uiLogPath), uiLogPrefix)
g.addRotatedLogFiles(filepath.Dir(g.uiLogPath), uiLogPrefix)
return nil
}
// addSingleLogfile adds a single log file to the archive
func (g *BundleGenerator) addSingleLogfile(open LogOpener, logPath, targetName string) error {
logFile, err := open(logPath)
func (g *BundleGenerator) addSingleLogfile(logPath, targetName string) error {
logFile, err := os.Open(logPath)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("open log file %s: %w", targetName, err)
}
@@ -1098,8 +1066,8 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addSingleLogfile(open LogOpener, logPath, targetName s
}
// addSingleLogFileGz adds a single gzipped log file to the archive
func (g *BundleGenerator) addSingleLogFileGz(open LogOpener, logPath, targetName string) error {
f, err := open(logPath)
func (g *BundleGenerator) addSingleLogFileGz(logPath, targetName string) error {
f, err := os.Open(logPath)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("open gz log file %s: %w", targetName, err)
}
@@ -1146,7 +1114,7 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addSingleLogFileGz(open LogOpener, logPath, targetName
// addRotatedLogFiles adds rotated log files to the bundle based on logFileCount.
// prefix is the base log name without extension (e.g. "client", "gui-client");
// the glob matches both files rotated by us and by logrotate on linux.
func (g *BundleGenerator) addRotatedLogFiles(open LogOpener, logDir, prefix string) {
func (g *BundleGenerator) addRotatedLogFiles(logDir, prefix string) {
if g.logFileCount == 0 {
return
}
@@ -1186,9 +1154,9 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addRotatedLogFiles(open LogOpener, logDir, prefix stri
for i := 0; i < maxFiles; i++ {
name := filepath.Base(files[i])
if strings.HasSuffix(name, ".gz") {
err = g.addSingleLogFileGz(open, files[i], name)
err = g.addSingleLogFileGz(files[i], name)
} else {
err = g.addSingleLogfile(open, files[i], name)
err = g.addSingleLogfile(files[i], name)
}
if err != nil {
log.Warnf("failed to add rotated log %s: %v", name, err)

View File

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addPlatformLog() error {
}
swiftLogPath := filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(g.logPath), swiftLogFile)
if err := g.addSingleLogfile(openLogFile, swiftLogPath, swiftLogFile); err != nil {
if err := g.addSingleLogfile(swiftLogPath, swiftLogFile); err != nil {
// The Swift log is best-effort: the app may not have written it yet.
log.Warnf("failed to add %s to debug bundle: %v", swiftLogFile, err)
}

View File

@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ func runAddRotatedLogFilesPrefix(t *testing.T, dir, prefix string, logFileCount
archive: zip.NewWriter(&buf),
logFileCount: logFileCount,
}
g.addRotatedLogFiles(openLogFile, dir, prefix)
g.addRotatedLogFiles(dir, prefix)
require.NoError(t, g.archive.Close())
zr, err := zip.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(buf.Bytes()), int64(buf.Len()))

View File

@@ -864,8 +864,6 @@ func TestAddConfig_AllFieldsCovered(t *testing.T) {
RosenpassEnabled: true,
RosenpassPermissive: true,
ServerSSHAllowed: &bTrue,
ServerVNCAllowed: &bTrue,
DisableVNCApproval: &bTrue,
EnableSSHRoot: &bTrue,
EnableSSHSFTP: &bTrue,
EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding: &bTrue,

View File

@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
package debug
import (
"archive/zip"
"bytes"
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/configs"
)
// bundleEntries generates a bundle with the given generator and returns the
// set of entry names in the resulting archive.
func bundleEntries(t *testing.T, g *BundleGenerator) map[string]struct{} {
t.Helper()
path, err := g.Generate()
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.Remove(path) })
data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
require.NoError(t, err)
zr, err := zip.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(data), int64(len(data)))
require.NoError(t, err)
names := make(map[string]struct{}, len(zr.File))
for _, f := range zr.File {
names[f.Name] = struct{}{}
}
return names
}
func TestBundleIncludesUILogWhenOpenerAllows(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), configs.UILogFile)
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(path, []byte("gui log"), 0600))
g := NewBundleGenerator(GeneratorDependencies{
UILogPath: path,
UILogOpener: openLogFile,
}, BundleConfig{})
require.Contains(t, bundleEntries(t, g), configs.UILogFile)
}
// A UILogOpener that refuses (as the ownership check does for a foreign file)
// keeps the UI log out of the bundle without failing bundle generation.
func TestBundleExcludesUILogWhenOpenerRefuses(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), configs.UILogFile)
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(path, []byte("secret"), 0600))
g := NewBundleGenerator(GeneratorDependencies{
UILogPath: path,
UILogOpener: func(string) (*os.File, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("not owned by the caller")
},
}, BundleConfig{})
require.NotContains(t, bundleEntries(t, g), configs.UILogFile)
}

View File

@@ -3,12 +3,10 @@ package debug
import (
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/tls"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
neturl "net/url"
"os"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/upload-server/types"
@@ -16,80 +14,20 @@ import (
const maxBundleUploadSize = 50 * 1024 * 1024
// requireHTTPS refuses any URL the daemon would fetch or upload to that is not
// https. The daemon runs as root and the bundle carries its logs and state, so a
// plaintext hop is a place to intercept the bundle or the presigned redirect.
// The server-side gate already enforces this for the desktop path; this also
// covers the mobile and job-runner callers that reach this package directly.
// Skipped when the caller opted into an insecure upload (self-hosted server).
func requireHTTPS(what, rawURL string) error {
parsed, err := neturl.Parse(rawURL)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("parse %s: %w", what, err)
}
if parsed.Scheme != "https" {
return fmt.Errorf("%s must use https, got scheme %q", what, parsed.Scheme)
}
return nil
}
// uploadClient returns the HTTP client for the upload requests. The default
// client verifies TLS and refuses a redirect that would downgrade to a non-https
// hop, so a bundle can never leave over http after an https start. The insecure
// variant accepts http and untrusted certificates, and is only reachable for a
// privileged caller that passed --upload-bundle-insecure (see
// requirePrivilegeForUploadURL).
func uploadClient(insecure bool) *http.Client {
if !insecure {
return &http.Client{CheckRedirect: rejectInsecureRedirect}
}
return &http.Client{
Transport: &http.Transport{
//nolint:gosec // opt-in, privileged, self-hosted upload servers
TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true, MinVersion: tls.VersionTLS12},
},
}
}
// rejectInsecureRedirect refuses a redirect to a non-https target and keeps the
// standard library's 10-hop limit that a custom CheckRedirect would otherwise
// disable.
func rejectInsecureRedirect(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
if req.URL.Scheme != "https" {
return fmt.Errorf("refusing redirect to non-https URL %s", req.URL.Redacted())
}
if len(via) >= 10 {
return fmt.Errorf("stopped after 10 redirects")
}
return nil
}
func UploadDebugBundle(ctx context.Context, url, managementURL, filePath string, insecure bool) (key string, err error) {
if !insecure {
if err := requireHTTPS("upload service URL", url); err != nil {
return "", err
}
}
response, err := getUploadURL(ctx, url, managementURL, insecure)
func UploadDebugBundle(ctx context.Context, url, managementURL, filePath string) (key string, err error) {
response, err := getUploadURL(ctx, url, managementURL)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if !insecure {
if err := requireHTTPS("upload URL from service", response.URL); err != nil {
return "", err
}
}
err = upload(ctx, filePath, response, insecure)
err = upload(ctx, filePath, response)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
return response.Key, nil
}
func upload(ctx context.Context, filePath string, response *types.GetURLResponse, insecure bool) error {
func upload(ctx context.Context, filePath string, response *types.GetURLResponse) error {
fileData, err := os.Open(filePath)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("open file: %w", err)
@@ -114,7 +52,7 @@ func upload(ctx context.Context, filePath string, response *types.GetURLResponse
req.ContentLength = stat.Size()
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/octet-stream")
putResp, err := uploadClient(insecure).Do(req)
putResp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("upload failed: %v", err)
}
@@ -127,23 +65,16 @@ func upload(ctx context.Context, filePath string, response *types.GetURLResponse
return nil
}
func getUploadURL(ctx context.Context, serviceURL string, managementURL string, insecure bool) (*types.GetURLResponse, error) {
parsed, err := neturl.Parse(serviceURL)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse upload service URL: %w", err)
}
q := parsed.Query()
q.Set("id", getURLHash(managementURL))
parsed.RawQuery = q.Encode()
getReq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", parsed.String(), nil)
func getUploadURL(ctx context.Context, url string, managementURL string) (*types.GetURLResponse, error) {
id := getURLHash(managementURL)
getReq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, "GET", url+"?id="+id, nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("create GET request: %w", err)
}
getReq.Header.Set(types.ClientHeader, types.ClientHeaderValue)
resp, err := uploadClient(insecure).Do(getReq)
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(getReq)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("get presigned URL: %w", err)
}

View File

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import (
"errors"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
@@ -44,7 +43,7 @@ func TestUpload(t *testing.T) {
fileContent := []byte("test file content")
err := os.WriteFile(file, fileContent, 0640)
require.NoError(t, err)
key, err := UploadDebugBundle(context.Background(), testURL+types.GetURLPath, testURL, file, true)
key, err := UploadDebugBundle(context.Background(), testURL+types.GetURLPath, testURL, file)
require.NoError(t, err)
id := getURLHash(testURL)
require.Contains(t, key, id+"/")
@@ -80,47 +79,3 @@ func waitForServer(t *testing.T, addr string) {
}
t.Fatalf("server did not start listening on %s in time", addr)
}
func TestRequireHTTPS(t *testing.T) {
require.NoError(t, requireHTTPS("upload URL", "https://upload.example/path"))
require.Error(t, requireHTTPS("upload URL", "http://upload.example/path"))
require.Error(t, requireHTTPS("upload URL", "ftp://upload.example/path"))
require.Error(t, requireHTTPS("upload URL", "://malformed"))
}
func TestRejectInsecureRedirect(t *testing.T) {
httpsReq, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "https://a.example/", nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, rejectInsecureRedirect(httpsReq, nil), "https redirect target must be allowed")
httpReq, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://a.example/", nil)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Error(t, rejectInsecureRedirect(httpReq, nil), "http redirect target must be refused")
require.Error(t, rejectInsecureRedirect(httpsReq, make([]*http.Request, 10)), "the 10-redirect limit must be enforced")
}
// The secure client refuses to follow an https response that redirects to http,
// so a bundle can't be downgraded onto plaintext mid-flight.
func TestUploadClientRefusesHTTPSToHTTPRedirect(t *testing.T) {
plain := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}))
t.Cleanup(plain.Close)
secure := httptest.NewTLSServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
http.Redirect(w, r, plain.URL, http.StatusFound)
}))
t.Cleanup(secure.Close)
client := uploadClient(false)
// Trust the test server's cert without disabling verification globally.
client.Transport = secure.Client().Transport
resp, err := client.Get(secure.URL)
if resp != nil {
_ = resp.Body.Close()
}
require.Error(t, err, "redirect from https to http must be refused")
require.Contains(t, err.Error(), "non-https")
}

View File

@@ -51,7 +51,5 @@ func (n *notifier) notify() {
return
}
go func(l listener.NetworkChangeListener) {
l.OnNetworkChanged("")
}(n.listener)
n.listener.OnNetworkChanged("")
}

View File

@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ func NewDefaultServerPermanentUpstream(
ds.hostsDNSHolder.set(hostsDnsList)
ds.permanent = true
ds.currentConfig = dnsConfigToHostDNSConfig(config, ds.service.RuntimeIP(), ds.service.RuntimePort())
ds.searchDomainNotifier = newNotifier(ds.SearchDomains())
ds.searchDomainNotifier = newNotifier(ds.searchDomains())
ds.searchDomainNotifier.setListener(listener)
setServerDns(ds)
return ds
@@ -602,6 +602,12 @@ func (s *DefaultServer) UpdateDNSServer(serial uint64, update nbdns.Config) erro
}
func (s *DefaultServer) SearchDomains() []string {
s.mux.Lock()
defer s.mux.Unlock()
return s.searchDomains()
}
func (s *DefaultServer) searchDomains() []string {
var searchDomains []string
for _, dConf := range s.currentConfig.Domains {
@@ -686,7 +692,7 @@ func (s *DefaultServer) applyConfiguration(update nbdns.Config) error {
}()
if s.searchDomainNotifier != nil {
s.searchDomainNotifier.onNewSearchDomains(s.SearchDomains())
s.searchDomainNotifier.onNewSearchDomains(s.searchDomains())
}
s.updateNSGroupStates(update.NameServerGroups)

View File

@@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/udpmux"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/acl"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/approval"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/debug"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns"
dnsconfig "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns/config"
@@ -136,8 +135,6 @@ type EngineConfig struct {
RosenpassPermissive bool
ServerSSHAllowed bool
ServerVNCAllowed bool
DisableVNCApproval *bool
EnableSSHRoot *bool
EnableSSHSFTP *bool
EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding *bool
@@ -236,9 +233,7 @@ type Engine struct {
networkMonitor *networkmonitor.NetworkMonitor
sshServer sshServer
vncSrv vncServer
approvalBroker *approval.Broker
sshServer sshServer
statusRecorder *peer.Status
@@ -345,7 +340,6 @@ func NewEngine(
TURNs: []*stun.URI{},
networkSerial: 0,
statusRecorder: services.StatusRecorder,
approvalBroker: approval.New(services.StatusRecorder),
stateManager: services.StateManager,
portForwardManager: portforward.NewManager(),
checks: services.Checks,
@@ -420,10 +414,6 @@ func (e *Engine) stopLocked() {
log.Warnf("failed to stop SSH server: %v", err)
}
if err := e.stopVNCServer(); err != nil {
log.Warnf("failed to stop VNC server: %v", err)
}
e.cleanupSSHConfig()
if e.ingressGatewayMgr != nil {
@@ -582,12 +572,7 @@ func (e *Engine) Start(netbirdConfig *mgmProto.NetbirdConfig, mgmtURL *url.URL)
}
e.stateManager.Start()
initialRoutes, dnsConfig, dnsFeatureFlag, err := e.readInitialSettings()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("read initial settings: %w", err)
}
dnsServer, err := e.newDnsServer(dnsConfig)
dnsServer, err := e.newDnsServer()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create dns server: %w", err)
}
@@ -605,10 +590,8 @@ func (e *Engine) Start(netbirdConfig *mgmProto.NetbirdConfig, mgmtURL *url.URL)
WGInterface: e.wgInterface,
StatusRecorder: e.statusRecorder,
RelayManager: e.relayManager,
InitialRoutes: initialRoutes,
StateManager: e.stateManager,
DNSServer: dnsServer,
DNSFeatureFlag: dnsFeatureFlag,
PeerStore: e.peerStore,
DisableClientRoutes: e.config.DisableClientRoutes,
DisableServerRoutes: e.config.DisableServerRoutes,
@@ -1254,7 +1237,6 @@ func (e *Engine) applyInfoFlags(info *system.Info) {
e.config.RosenpassEnabled,
e.config.RosenpassPermissive,
&e.config.ServerSSHAllowed,
&e.config.ServerVNCAllowed,
e.config.DisableClientRoutes,
e.config.DisableServerRoutes,
e.config.DisableDNS,
@@ -1310,10 +1292,6 @@ func (e *Engine) updateConfig(conf *mgmProto.PeerConfig) error {
}
}
if err := e.updateVNC(); err != nil {
log.Warnf("failed handling VNC server setup: %v", err)
}
state := e.statusRecorder.GetLocalPeerState()
state.IP = e.wgInterface.Address().String()
state.IPv6 = e.wgInterface.Address().IPv6String()
@@ -1614,11 +1592,6 @@ func (e *Engine) reconcilePeers(networkMap *mgmProto.NetworkMap) ([]*mgmProto.Re
}
}
// VNC auth: always sync, including nil so cleared auth on the management
// side is applied locally, and so it isn't skipped on the RemotePeersIsEmpty
// cleanup path.
e.updateVNCServerAuth(networkMap.GetVncAuth())
// cleanup request, most likely our peer has been deleted
if networkMap.GetRemotePeersIsEmpty() {
err := e.removeAllPeers()
@@ -2122,43 +2095,6 @@ func (e *Engine) close() {
}
}
func (e *Engine) readInitialSettings() ([]*route.Route, *nbdns.Config, bool, error) {
if runtime.GOOS != "android" {
// nolint:nilnil
return nil, nil, false, nil
}
info := system.GetInfo(e.ctx)
info.SetFlags(
e.config.RosenpassEnabled,
e.config.RosenpassPermissive,
&e.config.ServerSSHAllowed,
&e.config.ServerVNCAllowed,
e.config.DisableClientRoutes,
e.config.DisableServerRoutes,
e.config.DisableDNS,
e.config.DisableFirewall,
e.config.BlockLANAccess,
e.config.BlockInbound,
e.config.DisableIPv6,
e.config.SyncMessageVersion,
e.config.EnableSSHRoot,
e.config.EnableSSHSFTP,
e.config.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding,
e.config.EnableSSHRemotePortForwarding,
e.config.DisableSSHAuth,
)
netMap, err := e.mgmClient.GetNetworkMap(info)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, false, err
}
routes := toRoutes(netMap.GetRoutes())
dnsCfg := toDNSConfig(netMap.GetDNSConfig(), e.wgInterface.Address())
dnsFeatureFlag := toDNSFeatureFlag(netMap)
return routes, &dnsCfg, dnsFeatureFlag, nil
}
func (e *Engine) newWgIface() (*iface.WGIface, error) {
transportNet, err := e.newStdNet()
if err != nil {
@@ -2193,7 +2129,7 @@ func (e *Engine) newWgIface() (*iface.WGIface, error) {
func (e *Engine) wgInterfaceCreate() (err error) {
switch runtime.GOOS {
case "android":
err = e.wgInterface.CreateOnAndroid(e.routeManager.InitialRouteRange(), e.dnsServer.DnsIP().String(), e.dnsServer.SearchDomains())
err = e.wgInterface.CreateOnAndroid(e.routeManager.CurrentRouteRange(), e.dnsServer.DnsIP().String(), e.dnsServer.SearchDomains())
case "ios":
e.mobileDep.NetworkChangeListener.SetInterfaceIP(e.config.WgAddr.String())
if e.config.WgAddr.HasIPv6() {
@@ -2206,7 +2142,7 @@ func (e *Engine) wgInterfaceCreate() (err error) {
return err
}
func (e *Engine) newDnsServer(dnsConfig *nbdns.Config) (dns.Server, error) {
func (e *Engine) newDnsServer() (dns.Server, error) {
// due to tests where we are using a mocked version of the DNS server
if e.dnsServer != nil {
return e.dnsServer, nil
@@ -2218,7 +2154,7 @@ func (e *Engine) newDnsServer(dnsConfig *nbdns.Config) (dns.Server, error) {
e.ctx,
e.wgInterface,
e.mobileDep.HostDNSAddresses,
*dnsConfig,
nbdns.Config{},
e.mobileDep.NetworkChangeListener,
e.statusRecorder,
e.config.DisableDNS,
@@ -2937,16 +2873,3 @@ func decodeRelayIP(b []byte) netip.Addr {
}
return ip.Unmap()
}
// RespondApproval relays the user's decision for a pending approval to
// the broker. viewOnly is honoured only when accept is true. Returns
// true when the request_id matched a live prompt.
func (e *Engine) RespondApproval(requestID string, accept, viewOnly bool) bool {
if e == nil || e.approvalBroker == nil {
return false
}
return e.approvalBroker.Respond(requestID, approval.Decision{
Accept: accept,
ViewOnly: accept && viewOnly,
})
}

View File

@@ -12,10 +12,10 @@ import (
firewallManager "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/netstack"
nftypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/netflow/types"
sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/auth"
sshconfig "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/config"
sshserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/server"
mgmProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sessionauth"
sshuserhash "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sshauth"
)
@@ -237,18 +237,22 @@ func (e *Engine) startSSHServer(jwtConfig *sshserver.JWTConfig) error {
return errors.New("wg interface not initialized")
}
wgAddr := e.wgInterface.Address()
serverConfig := &sshserver.Config{
HostKeyPEM: e.config.SSHKey,
JWT: jwtConfig,
NetstackNet: e.wgInterface.GetNet(),
NetworkValidation: wgAddr,
HostKeyPEM: e.config.SSHKey,
JWT: jwtConfig,
}
server := sshserver.New(serverConfig)
wgAddr := e.wgInterface.Address()
server.SetNetworkValidation(wgAddr)
netbirdIP := wgAddr.IP
listenAddr := netip.AddrPortFrom(netbirdIP, sshserver.InternalSSHPort)
if netstackNet := e.wgInterface.GetNet(); netstackNet != nil {
server.SetNetstackNet(netstackNet)
}
e.configureSSHServer(server)
if err := server.Start(e.ctx, listenAddr); err != nil {

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
package internal
func (e *Engine) TunSettings() ([]string, []string) {
e.syncMsgMux.Lock()
routeManager := e.routeManager
dnsServer := e.dnsServer
e.syncMsgMux.Unlock()
var routes []string
if routeManager != nil {
routes = routeManager.CurrentRouteRange()
}
var searchDomains []string
if dnsServer != nil {
searchDomains = dnsServer.SearchDomains()
}
return routes, searchDomains
}

View File

@@ -1,329 +0,0 @@
//go:build !js && !ios && !android
package internal
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/netip"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
firewallManager "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/approval"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/metrics"
nftypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/netflow/types"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc"
vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
mgmProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sessionauth"
sshuserhash "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sshauth"
)
type vncServer interface {
Start(ctx context.Context, addr netip.AddrPort, network netip.Prefix) error
AddListener(ctx context.Context, addr netip.AddrPort, network netip.Prefix) error
Stop() error
ActiveSessions() []vncserver.ActiveSessionInfo
}
func (e *Engine) setupVNCPortRedirection() error {
if e.firewall == nil || e.wgInterface == nil {
return nil
}
localAddr := e.wgInterface.Address().IP
if !localAddr.IsValid() {
return errors.New("invalid local NetBird address")
}
if err := e.firewall.AddInboundDNAT(localAddr, firewallManager.ProtocolTCP, vnc.ExternalPort, vnc.InternalPort); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("add VNC port redirection: %w", err)
}
log.Infof("VNC port redirection: %s:%d -> %s:%d", localAddr, vnc.ExternalPort, localAddr, vnc.InternalPort)
if wgAddr := e.wgInterface.Address(); wgAddr.HasIPv6() {
v6 := wgAddr.IPv6
if err := e.firewall.AddInboundDNAT(v6, firewallManager.ProtocolTCP, vnc.ExternalPort, vnc.InternalPort); err != nil {
log.Warnf("failed to add IPv6 VNC port redirection: %v", err)
} else {
log.Infof("VNC port redirection: [%s]:%d -> [%s]:%d", v6, vnc.ExternalPort, v6, vnc.InternalPort)
}
}
return nil
}
func (e *Engine) cleanupVNCPortRedirection() error {
if e.firewall == nil || e.wgInterface == nil {
return nil
}
localAddr := e.wgInterface.Address().IP
if !localAddr.IsValid() {
return errors.New("invalid local NetBird address")
}
if err := e.firewall.RemoveInboundDNAT(localAddr, firewallManager.ProtocolTCP, vnc.ExternalPort, vnc.InternalPort); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("remove VNC port redirection: %w", err)
}
if wgAddr := e.wgInterface.Address(); wgAddr.HasIPv6() {
if err := e.firewall.RemoveInboundDNAT(wgAddr.IPv6, firewallManager.ProtocolTCP, vnc.ExternalPort, vnc.InternalPort); err != nil {
log.Debugf("failed to remove IPv6 VNC port redirection: %v", err)
}
}
return nil
}
// updateVNC handles starting/stopping the VNC server based on the config flag.
func (e *Engine) updateVNC() error {
if !e.config.ServerVNCAllowed {
if e.vncSrv != nil {
log.Info("VNC server disabled, stopping")
}
return e.stopVNCServer()
}
if e.config.BlockInbound {
log.Info("VNC server disabled because inbound connections are blocked")
return e.stopVNCServer()
}
if e.vncSrv != nil {
return nil
}
return e.startVNCServer()
}
func (e *Engine) startVNCServer() error {
if e.wgInterface == nil {
return errors.New("wg interface not initialized")
}
capturer, injector, ok := newPlatformVNC()
if !ok {
log.Debug("VNC server not supported on this platform")
return nil
}
netbirdIP := e.wgInterface.Address().IP
var sessionRecorder func(vncserver.SessionTick)
if e.clientMetrics != nil {
sessionRecorder = func(t vncserver.SessionTick) {
e.clientMetrics.RecordVNCSessionTick(e.ctx, metrics.VNCSessionTick{
Period: t.Period,
BytesOut: t.BytesOut,
Writes: t.Writes,
FBUs: t.FBUs,
MaxFBUBytes: t.MaxFBUBytes,
MaxFBURects: t.MaxFBURects,
MaxWriteBytes: t.MaxWriteBytes,
WriteNanos: t.WriteNanos,
})
}
}
serviceMode := vncNeedsServiceMode()
if serviceMode {
log.Info("VNC: running as system service, enabling service mode (per-session agent proxy)")
}
requireApproval := e.config.DisableVNCApproval == nil || !*e.config.DisableVNCApproval
srv := vncserver.New(vncserver.Config{
Capturer: capturer,
Injector: injector,
IdentityKey: e.config.WgPrivateKey[:],
ServiceMode: serviceMode,
SessionRecorder: sessionRecorder,
NetstackNet: e.wgInterface.GetNet(),
RequireApproval: requireApproval,
Approver: &vncApprover{broker: e.approvalBroker, statusRecorder: e.statusRecorder},
// Session start/stop is invisible to the peer status recorder, so push a
// snapshot ourselves; otherwise the UI's session list goes stale until an
// unrelated peer change happens to fire one.
OnSessionsChanged: e.statusRecorder.NotifyStateChange,
})
listenAddr := netip.AddrPortFrom(netbirdIP, vnc.InternalPort)
network := e.wgInterface.Address().Network
if err := srv.Start(e.ctx, listenAddr, network); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("start VNC server: %w", err)
}
if wgAddr := e.wgInterface.Address(); wgAddr.HasIPv6() {
v6Addr := netip.AddrPortFrom(wgAddr.IPv6, vnc.InternalPort)
if err := srv.AddListener(e.ctx, v6Addr, wgAddr.IPv6Net); err != nil {
log.Warnf("failed to add IPv6 VNC listener: %v", err)
}
}
e.vncSrv = srv
if netstackNet := e.wgInterface.GetNet(); netstackNet != nil {
if registrar, ok := e.firewall.(interface {
RegisterNetstackService(protocol nftypes.Protocol, port uint16)
}); ok {
registrar.RegisterNetstackService(nftypes.TCP, vnc.InternalPort)
log.Debugf("registered VNC service with netstack for TCP:%d", vnc.InternalPort)
}
}
if err := e.setupVNCPortRedirection(); err != nil {
log.Warnf("setup VNC port redirection: %v", err)
}
log.Info("VNC server enabled")
return nil
}
// updateVNCServerAuth updates VNC fine-grained access control from management.
// A nil vncAuth clears all authorized users and session pubkeys so management
// can revoke access by omitting the field on the next sync.
func (e *Engine) updateVNCServerAuth(vncAuth *mgmProto.VNCAuth) {
if e.vncSrv == nil {
return
}
vncSrv, ok := e.vncSrv.(*vncserver.Server)
if !ok {
return
}
if vncAuth == nil {
vncSrv.UpdateVNCAuth(&sshauth.Config{})
return
}
protoUsers := vncAuth.GetAuthorizedUsers()
authorizedUsers := make([]sshuserhash.UserIDHash, len(protoUsers))
for i, hash := range protoUsers {
if len(hash) != 16 {
log.Warnf("invalid VNC auth hash length %d, expected 16", len(hash))
return
}
authorizedUsers[i] = sshuserhash.UserIDHash(hash)
}
machineUsers := make(map[string][]uint32)
for osUser, indexes := range vncAuth.GetMachineUsers() {
machineUsers[osUser] = indexes.GetIndexes()
}
sessionPubKeys := make([]sshauth.SessionPubKey, 0, len(vncAuth.GetSessionPubKeys()))
for _, pk := range vncAuth.GetSessionPubKeys() {
pub := pk.GetPubKey()
if len(pub) != 32 {
log.Warnf("VNC session pubkey wrong length %d", len(pub))
continue
}
hash := pk.GetUserIdHash()
if len(hash) != 16 {
log.Warnf("VNC session user id hash wrong length %d", len(hash))
continue
}
sessionPubKeys = append(sessionPubKeys, sshauth.SessionPubKey{
PubKey: pub,
UserIDHash: sshuserhash.UserIDHash(hash),
DisplayName: pk.GetDisplayName(),
})
}
vncSrv.UpdateVNCAuth(&sshauth.Config{
AuthorizedUsers: authorizedUsers,
MachineUsers: machineUsers,
SessionPubKeys: sessionPubKeys,
})
}
// GetVNCServerStatus returns whether the VNC server is running and the list
// of active VNC sessions. The pointer is captured under syncMsgMux so a
// concurrent updateVNC/stopVNCServer cannot swap it out between the nil
// check and the ActiveSessions call.
func (e *Engine) GetVNCServerStatus() (enabled bool, sessions []vncserver.ActiveSessionInfo) {
e.syncMsgMux.Lock()
vncSrv := e.vncSrv
e.syncMsgMux.Unlock()
if vncSrv == nil {
return false, nil
}
return true, vncSrv.ActiveSessions()
}
func (e *Engine) stopVNCServer() error {
if e.vncSrv == nil {
return nil
}
if err := e.cleanupVNCPortRedirection(); err != nil {
log.Warnf("cleanup VNC port redirection: %v", err)
}
if e.wgInterface != nil && e.wgInterface.GetNet() != nil {
if registrar, ok := e.firewall.(interface {
UnregisterNetstackService(protocol nftypes.Protocol, port uint16)
}); ok {
registrar.UnregisterNetstackService(nftypes.TCP, vnc.InternalPort)
}
}
log.Info("stopping VNC server")
err := e.vncSrv.Stop()
e.vncSrv = nil
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("stop VNC server: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// vncApprover adapts the generic approval.Broker for the VNC server.
type vncApprover struct {
broker *approval.Broker
statusRecorder *peer.Status
}
func (a *vncApprover) Request(ctx context.Context, info vncserver.ApprovalInfo) (vncserver.ApprovalDecision, error) {
// Resolve the source overlay IP to a peer FQDN for the prompt label.
if info.PeerName == "" && info.SourceIP != "" && a.statusRecorder != nil {
if fqdn, ok := a.statusRecorder.PeerByIP(info.SourceIP); ok {
info.PeerName = fqdn
}
}
subject := fmt.Sprintf("VNC connection from %s", displayPeer(info))
meta := map[string]string{
"peer_name": info.PeerName,
"peer_pubkey": info.PeerPubKey,
"source_ip": info.SourceIP,
"mode": info.Mode,
"username": info.Username,
"initiator": info.Initiator,
}
d, err := a.broker.Request(ctx, approval.Prompt{
Kind: approval.KindVNC,
Subject: subject,
Metadata: meta,
})
if err != nil {
return vncserver.ApprovalDecision{}, err
}
return vncserver.ApprovalDecision{ViewOnly: d.ViewOnly}, nil
}
func displayPeer(info vncserver.ApprovalInfo) string {
if info.Initiator != "" {
return info.Initiator
}
if info.PeerName != "" {
return info.PeerName
}
if info.SourceIP != "" {
return info.SourceIP
}
if info.PeerPubKey != "" {
return info.PeerPubKey
}
return "unknown peer"
}

View File

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
//go:build freebsd
package internal
import (
"fmt"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
)
// newConsoleVNC builds the FreeBSD console fallback: vt(4) framebuffer
// for capture, /dev/uinput for input. The uinput device requires the
// `uinput` kernel module (`kldload uinput`); without it, input init
// fails and we drop to a stub injector so the user still gets a
// view-only screen mirror.
func newConsoleVNC() (vncserver.ScreenCapturer, vncserver.InputInjector, error) {
poller := vncserver.NewFBPoller("")
w, h := poller.Width(), poller.Height()
if w == 0 || h == 0 {
poller.Close()
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("vt framebuffer init failed (vt may not allow mmap on this driver)")
}
if inj, err := vncserver.NewUInputInjector(w, h); err == nil {
return poller, inj, nil
} else {
log.Infof("VNC console: uinput unavailable (%v); view-only mode. Run `kldload uinput` to enable input.", err)
return poller, &vncserver.StubInputInjector{}, nil
}
}

View File

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
//go:build linux && !android
package internal
import (
"fmt"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
)
// newConsoleVNC builds a framebuffer + uinput VNC backend for boxes
// without a running X server. Used as the auto-fallback when
// newPlatformVNC can't reach X. Returns an error when /dev/fb0 or
// /dev/uinput aren't usable so the caller can drop back to a stub.
func newConsoleVNC() (vncserver.ScreenCapturer, vncserver.InputInjector, error) {
poller := vncserver.NewFBPoller("")
w, h := poller.Width(), poller.Height()
if w == 0 || h == 0 {
poller.Close()
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("framebuffer capturer init failed (is /dev/fb0 readable?)")
}
inj, err := vncserver.NewUInputInjector(w, h)
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("uinput unavailable, falling back to view-only VNC: %v", err)
return poller, &vncserver.StubInputInjector{}, nil
}
return poller, inj, nil
}

View File

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
//go:build darwin && !ios
package internal
import (
"os"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
)
func newPlatformVNC() (vncserver.ScreenCapturer, vncserver.InputInjector, bool) {
capturer := vncserver.NewMacPoller()
// Prompt for Screen Recording at server-enable time rather than first
// client-connect. The native prompt is far easier for users to act on
// in the moment they toggled VNC on than later when "the screen looks
// like wallpaper" would otherwise be the only clue.
vncserver.PrimeScreenCapturePermission()
injector, err := vncserver.NewMacInputInjector()
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("VNC: macOS input injector: %v", err)
return capturer, &vncserver.StubInputInjector{}, true
}
return capturer, injector, true
}
// vncNeedsServiceMode reports whether the running process is a system
// LaunchDaemon (root, parented by launchd). Daemons sit in the global
// bootstrap namespace and cannot talk to WindowServer; we route capture
// through a per-user agent in that case.
func vncNeedsServiceMode() bool {
return os.Geteuid() == 0 && os.Getppid() == 1
}

View File

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
//go:build js || ios || android
package internal
import (
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
mgmProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
)
type vncServer interface{}
func (e *Engine) updateVNC() error { return nil }
func (e *Engine) updateVNCServerAuth(auth *mgmProto.VNCAuth) {
if auth == nil {
return
}
log.Debugf("ignoring VNC auth push on platform without a VNC server: %d session pubkeys, %d authorized users",
len(auth.GetSessionPubKeys()), len(auth.GetAuthorizedUsers()))
}
func (e *Engine) stopVNCServer() error { return nil }

View File

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
//go:build windows
package internal
import vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
func newPlatformVNC() (vncserver.ScreenCapturer, vncserver.InputInjector, bool) {
return vncserver.NewDesktopCapturer(), vncserver.NewWindowsInputInjector(), true
}
func vncNeedsServiceMode() bool {
return vncserver.GetCurrentSessionID() == 0
}

View File

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
//go:build (linux && !android) || freebsd
package internal
import (
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
)
func newPlatformVNC() (vncserver.ScreenCapturer, vncserver.InputInjector, bool) {
// Prefer X11 when an X server is reachable. NewX11InputInjector probes
// DISPLAY (and /proc) eagerly, so a non-nil error here means no X.
injector, err := vncserver.NewX11InputInjector("", "", "")
if err == nil {
return vncserver.NewX11Poller("", ""), injector, true
}
log.Debugf("VNC: X11 not available: %v", err)
// Fallback for headless / pre-X states (kernel console, login manager
// without X, physical server in recovery): stream the framebuffer and
// inject input via /dev/uinput.
consoleCap, consoleInj, err := newConsoleVNC()
if err == nil {
log.Infof("VNC: using framebuffer console capture (%dx%d)", consoleCap.Width(), consoleCap.Height())
return consoleCap, consoleInj, true
}
log.Debugf("VNC: framebuffer console fallback unavailable: %v", err)
return &vncserver.StubCapturer{}, &vncserver.StubInputInjector{}, false
}
func vncNeedsServiceMode() bool {
return false
}

View File

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
package ipcauth
import (
"fmt"
"os"
)
// OpenOwnedFile opens path for reading on behalf of the IPC caller identified by
// id, and fails unless the opened file is a regular file that id owns.
//
// It exists for the paths a local caller hands to the daemon over the IPC. The
// daemon runs as root, so opening such a path unchecked lets any local user read
// any file through it. Ownership is the invariant that keeps the daemon from
// reading, with its own privileges, a file the caller could not read itself: a
// symlink or hard link planted at the path resolves to a file someone else owns
// and is refused.
//
// The check is made against the open descriptor rather than the path, so
// swapping the path between the check and the read cannot change the answer.
//
// A privileged caller is exempt: it can read the file directly, so refusing it
// here would protect nothing. The regular-file requirement still applies to
// everyone, since a fifo or device planted at the path is never a log file.
func OpenOwnedFile(id Identity, path string) (*os.File, error) {
f, err := openForRead(path)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := checkOwnership(id, f); err != nil {
if cerr := f.Close(); cerr != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w (close: %v)", err, cerr)
}
return nil, err
}
return f, nil
}
func checkOwnership(id Identity, f *os.File) error {
info, err := f.Stat()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("stat %s: %w", f.Name(), err)
}
if !info.Mode().IsRegular() {
return fmt.Errorf("%s is not a regular file", f.Name())
}
if IsPrivilegedCaller(id) {
return nil
}
owned, err := fileOwnedBy(id, f)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("read owner of %s: %w", f.Name(), err)
}
if !owned {
return fmt.Errorf("%s is not owned by the caller (%s)", f.Name(), id)
}
return nil
}

View File

@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
package ipcauth
import (
"io"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// otherIdentity is an unprivileged caller that owns nothing the test creates.
func otherIdentity(t *testing.T) Identity {
t.Helper()
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
return Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-1-2-3-1001"}
}
return Identity{UID: uint32(os.Geteuid() + 1), GID: uint32(os.Getegid() + 1)}
}
func TestOpenOwnedFileReadsFileOwnedByCaller(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "gui-client.log")
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(path, []byte("hello"), 0600))
id, err := CurrentProcessIdentity()
require.NoError(t, err)
f, err := OpenOwnedFile(id, path)
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = f.Close() })
content, err := io.ReadAll(f)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, "hello", string(content))
}
func TestOpenOwnedFileRefusesFileOwnedByAnother(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "gui-client.log")
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(path, []byte("secret"), 0600))
_, err := OpenOwnedFile(otherIdentity(t), path)
require.ErrorContains(t, err, "not owned by the caller")
}
func TestOpenOwnedFileRefusesNonRegularFile(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
// The caller owns the directory, so this is the regular-file requirement
// talking, not the ownership check.
id, err := CurrentProcessIdentity()
require.NoError(t, err)
_, err = OpenOwnedFile(id, dir)
require.ErrorContains(t, err, "not a regular file")
}
func TestOpenOwnedFileRefusesMissingFile(t *testing.T) {
id, err := CurrentProcessIdentity()
require.NoError(t, err)
_, err = OpenOwnedFile(id, filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "absent.log"))
require.Error(t, err)
}

View File

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
//go:build !windows
package ipcauth
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"syscall"
)
// openForRead opens a caller-supplied path without following a symlink at its
// final component and without blocking: a fifo planted at the path would
// otherwise stall the open until a writer appears, and the daemon holds a lock
// while it collects the file.
func openForRead(path string) (*os.File, error) {
f, err := os.OpenFile(path, os.O_RDONLY|syscall.O_NOFOLLOW|syscall.O_NONBLOCK, 0)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("open %s: %w", path, err)
}
return f, nil
}
func fileOwnedBy(id Identity, f *os.File) (bool, error) {
info, err := f.Stat()
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
stat, ok := info.Sys().(*syscall.Stat_t)
if !ok {
return false, fmt.Errorf("no owner information in %T", info.Sys())
}
return stat.Uid == id.UID, nil
}

View File

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
//go:build !windows
package ipcauth
import (
"errors"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"syscall"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// A symlink is the shape the arbitrary-read attempt takes: the caller owns the
// link, the file it points at belongs to someone else.
func TestOpenOwnedFileRefusesSymlink(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
target := filepath.Join(dir, "target.log")
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(target, []byte("secret"), 0600))
link := filepath.Join(dir, "gui-client.log")
require.NoError(t, os.Symlink(target, link))
id, err := CurrentProcessIdentity()
require.NoError(t, err)
_, err = OpenOwnedFile(id, link)
// O_NOFOLLOW on a symlink reports ELOOP on Linux/Darwin and EMLINK on FreeBSD.
if !errors.Is(err, syscall.ELOOP) && !errors.Is(err, syscall.EMLINK) {
t.Fatalf("symlink open: got %v, want ELOOP or EMLINK", err)
}
}
// A fifo would block the open until a writer showed up, stalling the daemon
// while it holds its lock.
func TestOpenOwnedFileRefusesFifoWithoutBlocking(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "gui-client.log")
require.NoError(t, syscall.Mkfifo(path, 0600))
id, err := CurrentProcessIdentity()
require.NoError(t, err)
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
_, err := OpenOwnedFile(id, path)
done <- err
}()
select {
case err := <-done:
require.ErrorContains(t, err, "not a regular file")
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("opening a fifo blocked")
}
}

View File

@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
//go:build windows
package ipcauth
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
)
// openForRead opens a caller-supplied path without following a reparse point at
// it. FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT is the Windows analogue of O_NOFOLLOW: it
// opens a symlink/junction itself rather than its target, so the regular-file
// check in checkOwnership refuses a link the caller planted to redirect the
// read. FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS lets a directory open too (as os.Open does),
// so a directory planted at the path is refused as non-regular rather than
// erroring here. The share mode matches os.Open so a log being written stays
// openable.
func openForRead(path string) (*os.File, error) {
p, err := windows.UTF16PtrFromString(path)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("convert path %s: %w", path, err)
}
handle, err := windows.CreateFile(
p,
windows.GENERIC_READ,
windows.FILE_SHARE_READ|windows.FILE_SHARE_WRITE|windows.FILE_SHARE_DELETE,
nil,
windows.OPEN_EXISTING,
windows.FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT|windows.FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS,
0,
)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("open %s: %w", path, err)
}
return os.NewFile(uintptr(handle), path), nil
}
// fileOwnedBy compares the file's owner SID with the caller's. Files an elevated
// process creates are owned by BUILTIN\Administrators rather than by the user,
// but such a caller is privileged and never reaches this check.
func fileOwnedBy(id Identity, f *os.File) (bool, error) {
// x/sys/windows GetSecurityInfo frees the OS buffer itself and returns a
// Go-heap copy, so there is nothing to LocalFree here.
sd, err := windows.GetSecurityInfo(windows.Handle(f.Fd()), windows.SE_FILE_OBJECT, windows.OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION)
if err != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("read security info: %w", err)
}
owner, _, err := sd.Owner()
if err != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("read owner: %w", err)
}
return id.SID != "" && owner.String() == id.SID, nil
}

View File

@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
//go:build windows
package ipcauth
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
)
// fileOwnerSID reads the owner SID of path the same way OpenOwnedFile does, so
// the test can construct an Identity that matches (or deliberately does not).
func fileOwnerSID(t *testing.T, path string) string {
t.Helper()
f, err := os.Open(path)
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = f.Close() })
sd, err := windows.GetSecurityInfo(windows.Handle(f.Fd()), windows.SE_FILE_OBJECT, windows.OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION)
require.NoError(t, err)
owner, _, err := sd.Owner()
require.NoError(t, err)
return owner.String()
}
// The allow branch of fileOwnedBy is the SID-equality path the legitimate GUI
// flow depends on. Running elevated, a created file is owned by
// BUILTIN\Administrators; an Identity carrying that SID with Elevated=false and
// no groups is unprivileged by IsPrivileged (which reads the token, not the
// SID's RID), so this exercises the real GetSecurityInfo equality rather than
// the privileged-caller shortcut.
func TestOpenOwnedFileWindowsOwnerMatchAllows(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "gui-client.log")
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(path, []byte("hello"), 0600))
ownerSID := fileOwnerSID(t, path)
id := Identity{SID: ownerSID}
require.False(t, id.IsPrivileged(), "identity built from the owner SID must be unprivileged for this to test the match path")
f, err := OpenOwnedFile(id, path)
require.NoError(t, err)
_ = f.Close()
}
func TestOpenOwnedFileWindowsOwnerMismatchRefuses(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "gui-client.log")
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(path, []byte("secret"), 0600))
other := Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-9-9-9-9999"}
require.False(t, other.IsPrivileged())
_, err := OpenOwnedFile(other, path)
require.ErrorContains(t, err, "not owned by the caller")
}
// FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT must make OpenOwnedFile refuse a symlink the same
// way O_NOFOLLOW does on Unix, so a planted link can't redirect the read to
// another file. Creating a symlink needs a privilege the runner may lack, so the
// test skips rather than fails when it can't.
func TestOpenOwnedFileWindowsRefusesSymlink(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
target := filepath.Join(dir, "target.log")
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(target, []byte("secret"), 0600))
link := filepath.Join(dir, "gui-client.log")
if err := os.Symlink(target, link); err != nil {
t.Skipf("cannot create symlink (privilege not held?): %v", err)
}
id, err := CurrentProcessIdentity()
require.NoError(t, err)
_, err = OpenOwnedFile(id, link)
require.Error(t, err, "a symlink must be refused")
}

View File

@@ -120,36 +120,6 @@ func (m *influxDBMetrics) RecordSyncDuration(_ context.Context, agentInfo AgentI
m.trimLocked()
}
func (m *influxDBMetrics) RecordVNCSessionTick(_ context.Context, agentInfo AgentInfo, tick VNCSessionTick) {
tags := fmt.Sprintf("deployment_type=%s,version=%s,os=%s,arch=%s,peer_id=%s",
agentInfo.DeploymentType.String(),
agentInfo.Version,
agentInfo.OS,
agentInfo.Arch,
agentInfo.peerID,
)
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
m.samples = append(m.samples, influxSample{
measurement: "netbird_vnc_traffic",
tags: tags,
fields: map[string]float64{
"period_seconds": tick.Period.Seconds(),
"bytes_out": float64(tick.BytesOut),
"writes": float64(tick.Writes),
"fbus": float64(tick.FBUs),
"max_fbu_bytes": float64(tick.MaxFBUBytes),
"max_fbu_rects": float64(tick.MaxFBURects),
"max_write_bytes": float64(tick.MaxWriteBytes),
"write_time_seconds": float64(tick.WriteNanos) / 1e9,
},
timestamp: time.Now(),
})
m.trimLocked()
}
func (m *influxDBMetrics) RecordSyncPhase(_ context.Context, agentInfo AgentInfo, phase string, duration time.Duration) {
tags := fmt.Sprintf("deployment_type=%s,version=%s,os=%s,arch=%s,peer_id=%s,phase=%s",
agentInfo.DeploymentType.String(),

View File

@@ -63,11 +63,6 @@ type metricsImplementation interface {
// RecordLoginDuration records how long the login to management took
RecordLoginDuration(ctx context.Context, agentInfo AgentInfo, duration time.Duration, success bool)
// RecordVNCSessionTick records a periodic snapshot of one VNC
// session's wire activity. Called once per metricsConn tick interval
// (and once at session close), only when the tick saw activity.
RecordVNCSessionTick(ctx context.Context, agentInfo AgentInfo, tick VNCSessionTick)
// Export exports metrics in InfluxDB line protocol format
Export(w io.Writer) error
@@ -87,21 +82,6 @@ type ClientMetrics struct {
pushCancel context.CancelFunc
}
// VNCSessionTick is one sampling slice of a VNC session's wire activity.
// BytesOut / Writes / FBUs / WriteNanos are deltas observed during this
// tick; Max* fields are the high-water marks observed during the tick.
// Period is the wall-clock duration the deltas cover.
type VNCSessionTick struct {
Period time.Duration
BytesOut uint64
Writes uint64
FBUs uint64
MaxFBUBytes uint64
MaxFBURects uint64
MaxWriteBytes uint64
WriteNanos uint64
}
// ConnectionStageTimestamps holds timestamps for each connection stage
type ConnectionStageTimestamps struct {
SignalingReceived time.Time // First signal received from remote peer (both initial and reconnection)
@@ -151,18 +131,6 @@ func (c *ClientMetrics) RecordSyncDuration(ctx context.Context, duration time.Du
c.impl.RecordSyncDuration(ctx, agentInfo, duration)
}
// RecordVNCSessionTick records a periodic snapshot of one VNC session.
func (c *ClientMetrics) RecordVNCSessionTick(ctx context.Context, tick VNCSessionTick) {
if c == nil {
return
}
c.mu.RLock()
agentInfo := c.agentInfo
c.mu.RUnlock()
c.impl.RecordVNCSessionTick(ctx, agentInfo, tick)
}
// RecordSyncPhase records the duration of a single sub-phase of sync processing
func (c *ClientMetrics) RecordSyncPhase(ctx context.Context, phase string, duration time.Duration) {
if c == nil {

View File

@@ -76,9 +76,6 @@ func (m *mockMetrics) RecordSyncPhase(_ context.Context, _ AgentInfo, _ string,
func (m *mockMetrics) RecordLoginDuration(_ context.Context, _ AgentInfo, _ time.Duration, _ bool) {
}
func (m *mockMetrics) RecordVNCSessionTick(_ context.Context, _ AgentInfo, _ VNCSessionTick) {
}
func (m *mockMetrics) Export(w io.Writer) error {
if m.exportData != "" {
_, err := w.Write([]byte(m.exportData))

View File

@@ -1330,15 +1330,6 @@ func (d *Status) SubscribeToEvents() *EventSubscription {
}
}
// HasEventSubscribers reports whether any client is currently subscribed
// to the daemon's SystemEvent stream. Used by the VNC approval broker to
// fail closed when no UI is connected to prompt the user.
func (d *Status) HasEventSubscribers() bool {
d.eventMux.Lock()
defer d.eventMux.Unlock()
return len(d.eventStreams) > 0
}
// UnsubscribeFromEvents removes an event subscription
func (d *Status) UnsubscribeFromEvents(sub *EventSubscription) {
if sub == nil {

View File

@@ -70,8 +70,6 @@ type ConfigInput struct {
StateFilePath string
PreSharedKey *string
ServerSSHAllowed *bool
ServerVNCAllowed *bool
DisableVNCApproval *bool
EnableSSHRoot *bool
EnableSSHSFTP *bool
EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding *bool
@@ -126,8 +124,6 @@ type Config struct {
RosenpassEnabled bool
RosenpassPermissive bool
ServerSSHAllowed *bool
ServerVNCAllowed *bool
DisableVNCApproval *bool
EnableSSHRoot *bool
EnableSSHSFTP *bool
EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding *bool
@@ -460,33 +456,6 @@ func (config *Config) apply(input ConfigInput) (updated bool, err error) {
updated = true
}
if input.ServerVNCAllowed != nil {
if config.ServerVNCAllowed == nil || *input.ServerVNCAllowed != *config.ServerVNCAllowed {
if *input.ServerVNCAllowed {
log.Infof("enabling VNC server")
} else {
log.Infof("disabling VNC server")
}
config.ServerVNCAllowed = input.ServerVNCAllowed
updated = true
}
} else if config.ServerVNCAllowed == nil {
config.ServerVNCAllowed = util.False()
updated = true
}
if input.DisableVNCApproval != nil {
if config.DisableVNCApproval == nil || *input.DisableVNCApproval != *config.DisableVNCApproval {
if *input.DisableVNCApproval {
log.Infof("disabling VNC connection approval prompt")
} else {
log.Infof("enabling VNC connection approval prompt")
}
config.DisableVNCApproval = input.DisableVNCApproval
updated = true
}
}
if input.EnableSSHRoot != nil && (config.EnableSSHRoot == nil || *input.EnableSSHRoot != *config.EnableSSHRoot) {
if *input.EnableSSHRoot {
log.Infof("enabling SSH root login")
@@ -743,8 +712,6 @@ func (config *Config) applyMDMPolicy(policy *mdm.Policy) {
}
applyBool(mdm.KeyAllowServerSSH, func(v bool) { bv := v; config.ServerSSHAllowed = &bv })
applyBool(mdm.KeyAllowServerVNC, func(v bool) { bv := v; config.ServerVNCAllowed = &bv })
applyBool(mdm.KeyDisableVNCApproval, func(v bool) { bv := v; config.DisableVNCApproval = &bv })
applyBool(mdm.KeyDisableClientRoutes, func(v bool) { config.DisableClientRoutes = v })
applyBool(mdm.KeyDisableServerRoutes, func(v bool) { config.DisableServerRoutes = v })
applyBool(mdm.KeyBlockInbound, func(v bool) { config.BlockInbound = v })

View File

@@ -130,36 +130,6 @@ func TestApply_MDMBoolKeysOverrideOnDiskValue(t *testing.T) {
assert.True(t, cfg.Policy().HasKey(mdm.KeyRosenpassEnabled))
}
func TestApply_MDMVNCKeys(t *testing.T) {
tmp := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
// Seed without MDM: VNC off, approval prompt on.
withMDMPolicy(t, mdm.NewPolicy(nil))
_, err := UpdateOrCreateConfig(ConfigInput{
ConfigPath: tmp,
ServerVNCAllowed: boolPtr(false),
DisableVNCApproval: boolPtr(false),
})
require.NoError(t, err)
// MDM enforces VNC on and disables the approval prompt.
withMDMPolicy(t, mdm.NewPolicy(map[string]any{
mdm.KeyAllowServerVNC: true,
mdm.KeyDisableVNCApproval: true,
}))
cfg, err := UpdateOrCreateConfig(ConfigInput{ConfigPath: tmp})
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, cfg)
require.NotNil(t, cfg.ServerVNCAllowed)
assert.True(t, *cfg.ServerVNCAllowed, "MDM override should flip on-disk false to true")
require.NotNil(t, cfg.DisableVNCApproval)
assert.True(t, *cfg.DisableVNCApproval)
assert.True(t, cfg.Policy().HasKey(mdm.KeyAllowServerVNC))
assert.True(t, cfg.Policy().HasKey(mdm.KeyDisableVNCApproval))
}
func TestApply_MDMLazyConnection(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string

View File

@@ -45,12 +45,35 @@ func (pm *ProfileManager) GetProfileState(id ID) (*ProfileState, error) {
return &state, nil
}
func (pm *ProfileManager) SetActiveProfileState(state *ProfileState) error {
// SetProfileState writes the state file of the profile identified by id. Prefer
// it over SetActiveProfileState whenever the caller knows which profile the data
// belongs to: an SSO login spans seconds of user interaction, and the active
// profile can change during it, which would file the account email under
// whichever profile happened to be active when the flow returned.
func (pm *ProfileManager) SetProfileState(id ID, state *ProfileState) error {
configDir, err := getConfigDir()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("get config directory: %w", err)
}
if id == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("empty profile ID")
}
if id != defaultProfileName && !IsValidProfileFilenameStem(id) {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid profile ID: %q", id)
}
stateFile := filepath.Join(configDir, id.String()+".state.json")
if err := util.WriteJsonWithRestrictedPermission(context.Background(), stateFile, state); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write profile state: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// SetActiveProfileState writes the state file of whichever profile is active at
// call time. Use SetProfileState when the target profile is known.
func (pm *ProfileManager) SetActiveProfileState(state *ProfileState) error {
activeProf, err := pm.GetActiveProfile()
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, ErrNoActiveProfile) {
@@ -59,18 +82,7 @@ func (pm *ProfileManager) SetActiveProfileState(state *ProfileState) error {
return fmt.Errorf("get active profile: %w", err)
}
id := activeProf.ID
if id != defaultProfileName && !IsValidProfileFilenameStem(id) {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid active profile ID: %q", id)
}
stateFile := filepath.Join(configDir, id.String()+".state.json")
err = util.WriteJsonWithRestrictedPermission(context.Background(), stateFile, state)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write profile state: %w", err)
}
return nil
return pm.SetProfileState(activeProf.ID, state)
}
// RemoveProfileState deletes the per-profile state file (which holds the

View File

@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ func (d *DnsInterceptor) removeDNATMappings(realPrefixes []netip.Prefix, logger
// internalDnatFw checks if the firewall supports internal DNAT
func (d *DnsInterceptor) internalDnatFw() (internalDNATer, bool) {
if d.firewall == nil || runtime.GOOS != "android" {
if d.firewall == nil || d.fakeIPManager == nil || runtime.GOOS != "android" {
return nil, false
}
fw, ok := d.firewall.(internalDNATer)

View File

@@ -8,14 +8,13 @@ import (
"net/netip"
"net/url"
"runtime"
"slices"
"sort"
"strings"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"syscall"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/hashicorp/go-multierror"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"golang.org/x/exp/maps"
@@ -62,7 +61,7 @@ type Manager interface {
GetActiveClientRoutes() route.HAMap
GetClientRoutesWithNetID() map[route.NetID][]*route.Route
SetRouteChangeListener(listener listener.NetworkChangeListener)
InitialRouteRange() []string
CurrentRouteRange() []string
SetFirewall(firewall.Manager) error
SetDNSForwarderPort(port uint16)
ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs(peerKey string) error
@@ -76,10 +75,8 @@ type ManagerConfig struct {
WGInterface iface.WGIface
StatusRecorder *peer.Status
RelayManager *relayClient.Manager
InitialRoutes []*route.Route
StateManager *statemanager.Manager
DNSServer dns.Server
DNSFeatureFlag bool
PeerStore *peerstore.Store
DisableClientRoutes bool
DisableServerRoutes bool
@@ -149,45 +146,12 @@ func NewManager(config ManagerConfig) *DefaultManager {
useNoop := netstack.IsEnabled() || config.DisableClientRoutes
dm.setupRefCounters(useNoop)
// don't proceed with client routes if it is disabled
if config.DisableClientRoutes {
return dm
}
if runtime.GOOS == "android" {
dm.setupAndroidRoutes(config)
}
return dm
}
func (m *DefaultManager) setupAndroidRoutes(config ManagerConfig) {
cr := m.initialClientRoutes(config.InitialRoutes)
routesForComparison := slices.Clone(cr)
if config.DNSFeatureFlag {
m.fakeIPManager = fakeip.NewManager()
v4ID := uuid.NewString()
fakeIPRoute := &route.Route{
ID: route.ID(v4ID),
Network: m.fakeIPManager.GetFakeIPBlock(),
NetID: route.NetID(v4ID),
Peer: m.pubKey,
NetworkType: route.IPv4Network,
}
v6ID := uuid.NewString()
fakeIPv6Route := &route.Route{
ID: route.ID(v6ID),
Network: m.fakeIPManager.GetFakeIPv6Block(),
NetID: route.NetID(v6ID),
Peer: m.pubKey,
NetworkType: route.IPv6Network,
}
cr = append(cr, fakeIPRoute, fakeIPv6Route)
m.notifier.SetFakeIPRoutes([]*route.Route{fakeIPRoute, fakeIPv6Route})
}
m.notifier.SetInitialClientRoutes(cr, routesForComparison)
func (m *DefaultManager) enableFakeIPRoutes() {
m.fakeIPManager = fakeip.NewManager()
m.notifier.NotifyRouteChange()
}
func (m *DefaultManager) setupRefCounters(useNoop bool) {
@@ -464,6 +428,9 @@ func (m *DefaultManager) UpdateRoutes(
var merr *multierror.Error
if !m.disableClientRoutes {
if runtime.GOOS == "android" && useNewDNSRoute && m.fakeIPManager == nil {
m.enableFakeIPRoutes()
}
// Update route selector based on management server's isSelected status
m.updateRouteSelectorFromManagement(clientRoutes)
@@ -500,9 +467,32 @@ func (m *DefaultManager) SetRouteChangeListener(listener listener.NetworkChangeL
m.notifier.SetListener(listener)
}
// InitialRouteRange return the list of initial routes. It used by mobile systems
func (m *DefaultManager) InitialRouteRange() []string {
return m.notifier.GetInitialRouteRanges()
// CurrentRouteRange returns the current TUN route list. It is used by mobile systems
func (m *DefaultManager) CurrentRouteRange() []string {
m.mux.Lock()
defer m.mux.Unlock()
if m.disableClientRoutes {
return nil
}
filtered := m.routeSelector.FilterSelectedExitNodes(m.clientRoutes)
var nets []string
for _, routes := range filtered {
for _, r := range routes {
if r.IsDynamic() {
continue
}
nets = append(nets, r.NetString())
}
}
if m.fakeIPManager != nil {
nets = append(nets, m.fakeIPManager.GetFakeIPBlock().String(), m.fakeIPManager.GetFakeIPv6Block().String())
}
sort.Strings(nets)
return nets
}
// GetRouteSelector returns the route selector
@@ -700,16 +690,6 @@ func (m *DefaultManager) ClassifyRoutes(newRoutes []*route.Route) (map[route.ID]
return newServerRoutesMap, newClientRoutesIDMap
}
func (m *DefaultManager) initialClientRoutes(initialRoutes []*route.Route) []*route.Route {
_, crMap := m.ClassifyRoutes(initialRoutes)
rs := make([]*route.Route, 0, len(crMap))
for _, routes := range crMap {
rs = append(rs, routes...)
}
return rs
}
func isRouteSupported(route *route.Route) bool {
if netstack.IsEnabled() || !nbnet.CustomRoutingDisabled() || route.IsDynamic() {
return true

View File

@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@ func (m *MockManager) Init() error {
return nil
}
// InitialRouteRange mock implementation of InitialRouteRange from Manager interface
func (m *MockManager) InitialRouteRange() []string {
// CurrentRouteRange mock implementation of CurrentRouteRange from Manager interface
func (m *MockManager) CurrentRouteRange() []string {
return nil
}

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
"net/netip"
"slices"
"sort"
"strings"
"sync"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/listener"
@@ -14,12 +13,15 @@ import (
)
type Notifier struct {
initialRoutes []*route.Route
currentRoutes []*route.Route
fakeIPRoutes []*route.Route
mu sync.Mutex
listener listener.NetworkChangeListener
listenerMux sync.Mutex
// currentRoutes is the last announced route set. It exists only to
// suppress noise: without it every network map sync would trigger the
// Java side, even when the routes did not change. The actual TUN route
// state is owned by the route manager and pulled from there.
currentRoutes []*route.Route
listener listener.NetworkChangeListener
}
func NewNotifier() *Notifier {
@@ -27,20 +29,15 @@ func NewNotifier() *Notifier {
}
func (n *Notifier) SetListener(listener listener.NetworkChangeListener) {
n.listenerMux.Lock()
defer n.listenerMux.Unlock()
n.mu.Lock()
defer n.mu.Unlock()
n.listener = listener
}
// SetInitialClientRoutes stores the initial route sets for TUN configuration.
func (n *Notifier) SetInitialClientRoutes(initialRoutes []*route.Route, routesForComparison []*route.Route) {
n.initialRoutes = filterStatic(initialRoutes)
n.currentRoutes = filterStatic(routesForComparison)
}
// SetFakeIPRoutes stores the fake IP routes to be included in every TUN rebuild.
func (n *Notifier) SetFakeIPRoutes(routes []*route.Route) {
n.fakeIPRoutes = routes
func (n *Notifier) NotifyRouteChange() {
n.mu.Lock()
defer n.mu.Unlock()
n.notifyLocked()
}
func (n *Notifier) OnNewRoutes(idMap route.HAMap) {
@@ -54,46 +51,32 @@ func (n *Notifier) OnNewRoutes(idMap route.HAMap) {
}
}
if !n.hasRouteDiff(n.currentRoutes, newRoutes) {
n.mu.Lock()
defer n.mu.Unlock()
if !hasRouteDiff(n.currentRoutes, newRoutes) {
return
}
n.currentRoutes = newRoutes
n.notify()
n.notifyLocked()
}
func (n *Notifier) OnNewPrefixes([]netip.Prefix) {
// Not used on Android
}
func (n *Notifier) notify() {
n.listenerMux.Lock()
defer n.listenerMux.Unlock()
func (n *Notifier) notifyLocked() {
if n.listener == nil {
return
}
allRoutes := slices.Clone(n.currentRoutes)
allRoutes = append(allRoutes, n.fakeIPRoutes...)
routeStrings := n.routesToStrings(allRoutes)
sort.Strings(routeStrings)
go func(l listener.NetworkChangeListener) {
l.OnNetworkChanged(strings.Join(routeStrings, ","))
}(n.listener)
n.listener.OnNetworkChanged("")
}
func filterStatic(routes []*route.Route) []*route.Route {
out := make([]*route.Route, 0, len(routes))
for _, r := range routes {
if !r.IsDynamic() {
out = append(out, r)
}
}
return out
func (n *Notifier) Close() {
// unused
}
func (n *Notifier) routesToStrings(routes []*route.Route) []string {
func routesToStrings(routes []*route.Route) []string {
nets := make([]string, 0, len(routes))
for _, r := range routes {
nets = append(nets, r.NetString())
@@ -101,25 +84,10 @@ func (n *Notifier) routesToStrings(routes []*route.Route) []string {
return nets
}
func (n *Notifier) hasRouteDiff(a []*route.Route, b []*route.Route) bool {
slices.SortFunc(a, func(x, y *route.Route) int {
return strings.Compare(x.NetString(), y.NetString())
})
slices.SortFunc(b, func(x, y *route.Route) int {
return strings.Compare(x.NetString(), y.NetString())
})
return !slices.EqualFunc(a, b, func(x, y *route.Route) bool {
return x.NetString() == y.NetString()
})
}
func (n *Notifier) GetInitialRouteRanges() []string {
initialStrings := n.routesToStrings(n.initialRoutes)
sort.Strings(initialStrings)
return initialStrings
}
func (n *Notifier) Close() {
// unused
func hasRouteDiff(a []*route.Route, b []*route.Route) bool {
as := routesToStrings(a)
bs := routesToStrings(b)
sort.Strings(as)
sort.Strings(bs)
return !slices.Equal(as, bs)
}

View File

@@ -29,11 +29,7 @@ func (n *Notifier) SetListener(listener listener.NetworkChangeListener) {
n.listener = listener
}
func (n *Notifier) SetInitialClientRoutes([]*route.Route, []*route.Route) {
// iOS doesn't care about initial routes
}
func (n *Notifier) SetFakeIPRoutes([]*route.Route) {
func (n *Notifier) NotifyRouteChange() {
// Not used on iOS
}

View File

@@ -19,11 +19,7 @@ func (n *Notifier) SetListener(listener listener.NetworkChangeListener) {
// Not used on non-mobile platforms
}
func (n *Notifier) SetInitialClientRoutes([]*route.Route, []*route.Route) {
// Not used on non-mobile platforms
}
func (n *Notifier) SetFakeIPRoutes([]*route.Route) {
func (n *Notifier) NotifyRouteChange() {
// Not used on non-mobile platforms
}
@@ -35,10 +31,6 @@ func (n *Notifier) OnNewPrefixes(prefixes []netip.Prefix) {
// Not used on non-mobile platforms
}
func (n *Notifier) GetInitialRouteRanges() []string {
return []string{}
}
func (n *Notifier) Close() {
// unused
}

View File

@@ -75,14 +75,6 @@ func New(filePath string) *Manager {
}
}
// FilePath returns the path of the underlying state file.
func (m *Manager) FilePath() string {
if m == nil {
return ""
}
return m.filePath
}
// Start starts the state manager periodic save routine
func (m *Manager) Start() {
if m == nil {

View File

@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ func (c *Client) DebugBundle(anonymize bool) (string, error) {
uploadCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Minute)
defer cancel()
key, err := debug.UploadDebugBundle(uploadCtx, types.DefaultBundleURL, cfg.ManagementURL.String(), path, false)
key, err := debug.UploadDebugBundle(uploadCtx, types.DefaultBundleURL, cfg.ManagementURL.String(), path)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("upload debug bundle: %w", err)
}

View File

@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ func (e *Executor) BundleJob(ctx context.Context, debugBundleDependencies debug.
}
}()
key, err := debug.UploadDebugBundle(ctx, types.DefaultBundleURL, mgmURL, path, false)
key, err := debug.UploadDebugBundle(ctx, types.DefaultBundleURL, mgmURL, path)
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("failed to upload debug bundle: %v", err)
return "", fmt.Errorf("upload debug bundle: %w", err)

View File

@@ -21,8 +21,6 @@ var allKeys = []string{
KeyBlockInbound,
KeyDisableMetricsCollection,
KeyAllowServerSSH,
KeyAllowServerVNC,
KeyDisableVNCApproval,
KeyDisableAutoConnect,
KeyDisableAutostart,
KeyPreSharedKey,

View File

@@ -36,8 +36,6 @@ const (
KeyBlockInbound = "blockInbound"
KeyDisableMetricsCollection = "disableMetricsCollection"
KeyAllowServerSSH = "allowServerSSH"
KeyAllowServerVNC = "allowServerVNC"
KeyDisableVNCApproval = "disableVNCApproval"
KeyDisableAutoConnect = "disableAutoConnect"
// KeyDisableAutostart suppresses the GUI's fresh-install
// launch-on-login default and marks the Settings toggle as

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -1099,30 +1099,6 @@ func request_DaemonService_ExposeService_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtim
return stream, metadata, nil
}
func request_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, client DaemonServiceClient, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
var (
protoReq RespondApprovalRequest
metadata runtime.ServerMetadata
)
if err := marshaler.NewDecoder(req.Body).Decode(&protoReq); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
return nil, metadata, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "%v", err)
}
msg, err := client.RespondApproval(ctx, &protoReq, grpc.Header(&metadata.HeaderMD), grpc.Trailer(&metadata.TrailerMD))
return msg, metadata, err
}
func local_request_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, server DaemonServiceServer, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
var (
protoReq RespondApprovalRequest
metadata runtime.ServerMetadata
)
if err := marshaler.NewDecoder(req.Body).Decode(&protoReq); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
return nil, metadata, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "%v", err)
}
msg, err := server.RespondApproval(ctx, &protoReq)
return msg, metadata, err
}
func request_DaemonService_WailsUIReady_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, client DaemonServiceClient, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
var (
protoReq WailsUIReadyRequest
@@ -2001,26 +1977,6 @@ func RegisterDaemonServiceHandlerServer(ctx context.Context, mux *runtime.ServeM
runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
})
mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
defer cancel()
var stream runtime.ServerTransportStream
ctx = grpc.NewContextWithServerTransportStream(ctx, &stream)
inboundMarshaler, outboundMarshaler := runtime.MarshalerForRequest(mux, req)
annotatedContext, err := runtime.AnnotateIncomingContext(ctx, mux, req, "/daemon.DaemonService/RespondApproval", runtime.WithHTTPPathPattern("/daemon.DaemonService/RespondApproval"))
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
resp, md, err := local_request_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0(annotatedContext, inboundMarshaler, server, req, pathParams)
md.HeaderMD, md.TrailerMD = metadata.Join(md.HeaderMD, stream.Header()), metadata.Join(md.TrailerMD, stream.Trailer())
annotatedContext = runtime.NewServerMetadataContext(annotatedContext, md)
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
forward_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
})
mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_WailsUIReady_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
defer cancel()
@@ -2846,23 +2802,6 @@ func RegisterDaemonServiceHandlerClient(ctx context.Context, mux *runtime.ServeM
}
forward_DaemonService_ExposeService_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, func() (proto.Message, error) { return resp.Recv() }, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
})
mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
defer cancel()
inboundMarshaler, outboundMarshaler := runtime.MarshalerForRequest(mux, req)
annotatedContext, err := runtime.AnnotateContext(ctx, mux, req, "/daemon.DaemonService/RespondApproval", runtime.WithHTTPPathPattern("/daemon.DaemonService/RespondApproval"))
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
resp, md, err := request_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0(annotatedContext, inboundMarshaler, client, req, pathParams)
annotatedContext = runtime.NewServerMetadataContext(annotatedContext, md)
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
forward_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
})
mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_WailsUIReady_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
defer cancel()
@@ -2929,7 +2868,6 @@ var (
pattern_DaemonService_StopCPUProfile_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "StopCPUProfile"}, ""))
pattern_DaemonService_GetInstallerResult_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "GetInstallerResult"}, ""))
pattern_DaemonService_ExposeService_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "ExposeService"}, ""))
pattern_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "RespondApproval"}, ""))
pattern_DaemonService_WailsUIReady_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "WailsUIReady"}, ""))
)
@@ -2979,6 +2917,5 @@ var (
forward_DaemonService_StopCPUProfile_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
forward_DaemonService_GetInstallerResult_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
forward_DaemonService_ExposeService_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseStream
forward_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
forward_DaemonService_WailsUIReady_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
)

View File

@@ -152,14 +152,6 @@ service DaemonService {
// ExposeService exposes a local port via the NetBird reverse proxy
rpc ExposeService(ExposeServiceRequest) returns (stream ExposeServiceEvent) {}
// RespondApproval delivers the user's accept/deny decision for a
// pending user-approval prompt. The daemon pushes the prompt as a
// SystemEvent with category APPROVAL and metadata key "request_id";
// the UI calls this RPC with the same request_id to unblock whichever
// subsystem (VNC, SSH, ...) is waiting. The "kind" metadata key tells
// the UI which subsystem the prompt belongs to.
rpc RespondApproval(RespondApprovalRequest) returns (RespondApprovalResponse) {}
// WailsUIReady is a no-op probe the Wails UI calls once at startup. The UI
// only cares whether the daemon implements it: an Unimplemented response
// means the daemon predates this UI and is too old to drive it.
@@ -250,10 +242,6 @@ message LoginRequest {
optional bool disableSSHAuth = 38;
optional int32 sshJWTCacheTTL = 39;
optional bool disable_ipv6 = 40;
optional bool serverVNCAllowed = 41;
optional bool disableVNCApproval = 42;
}
message LoginResponse {
@@ -374,16 +362,12 @@ message GetConfigResponse {
bool disable_ipv6 = 27;
bool serverVNCAllowed = 28;
bool disableVNCApproval = 29;
// mDMManagedFields lists the names of configuration keys whose value is
// currently enforced by an MDM policy. Names match mdm.Key* constants
// (e.g. "managementURL", "disableClientRoutes"). UI/CLI clients should
// render the corresponding inputs as read-only and display a "managed
// by MDM" indicator.
repeated string mDMManagedFields = 30;
repeated string mDMManagedFields = 28;
}
// PeerState contains the latest state of a peer
@@ -468,25 +452,6 @@ message SSHServerState {
repeated SSHSessionInfo sessions = 2;
}
// VNCSessionInfo contains information about an active VNC session
message VNCSessionInfo {
string remoteAddress = 1;
string mode = 2;
string username = 3;
// userID is the Noise-verified session identity (hashed user ID from
// the ACL session-key entry), empty when auth is disabled.
string userID = 4;
// initiator is the human-readable display name of the dashboard user
// who minted the SessionPubKey, when known.
string initiator = 5;
}
// VNCServerState contains the latest state of the VNC server
message VNCServerState {
bool enabled = 1;
repeated VNCSessionInfo sessions = 2;
}
// FullStatus contains the full state held by the Status instance
message FullStatus {
ManagementState managementState = 1;
@@ -507,7 +472,6 @@ message FullStatus {
// on it to know when to re-fetch ListNetworks via the push stream, instead
// of polling on every status snapshot.
uint64 networksRevision = 11;
VNCServerState vncServerState = 12;
}
// Networks
@@ -572,10 +536,6 @@ message DebugBundleRequest {
string uploadURL = 4;
uint32 logFileCount = 5;
string cliVersion = 6;
// uploadInsecure allows uploading to an http endpoint or one with an
// untrusted TLS certificate. Restricted to privileged callers; for
// self-hosted upload servers.
bool uploadInsecure = 7;
}
message DebugBundleResponse {
@@ -707,7 +667,6 @@ message SystemEvent {
AUTHENTICATION = 2;
CONNECTIVITY = 3;
SYSTEM = 4;
APPROVAL = 5;
}
string id = 1;
@@ -798,10 +757,6 @@ message SetConfigRequest {
optional bool disableSSHAuth = 33;
optional int32 sshJWTCacheTTL = 34;
optional bool disable_ipv6 = 35;
optional bool serverVNCAllowed = 36;
optional bool disableVNCApproval = 37;
}
message SetConfigResponse{}
@@ -1091,18 +1046,3 @@ message StartBundleCaptureRequest {
message StartBundleCaptureResponse {}
message StopBundleCaptureRequest {}
message StopBundleCaptureResponse {}
message RespondApprovalRequest {
// request_id matches the SystemEvent metadata key emitted by the daemon
// when a subsystem awaits user approval for an inbound connection.
string request_id = 1;
// accept is true if the user approved the request, false if they
// denied it. A missing or unknown request_id is treated as a no-op.
bool accept = 2;
// view_only signals that the user granted the connection but withheld
// input control. Only meaningful when accept is true; ignored when
// accept is false.
bool view_only = 3;
}
message RespondApprovalResponse {}

View File

@@ -64,7 +64,6 @@ const (
DaemonService_StopCPUProfile_FullMethodName = "/daemon.DaemonService/StopCPUProfile"
DaemonService_GetInstallerResult_FullMethodName = "/daemon.DaemonService/GetInstallerResult"
DaemonService_ExposeService_FullMethodName = "/daemon.DaemonService/ExposeService"
DaemonService_RespondApproval_FullMethodName = "/daemon.DaemonService/RespondApproval"
DaemonService_WailsUIReady_FullMethodName = "/daemon.DaemonService/WailsUIReady"
)
@@ -168,13 +167,6 @@ type DaemonServiceClient interface {
GetInstallerResult(ctx context.Context, in *InstallerResultRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*InstallerResultResponse, error)
// ExposeService exposes a local port via the NetBird reverse proxy
ExposeService(ctx context.Context, in *ExposeServiceRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (grpc.ServerStreamingClient[ExposeServiceEvent], error)
// RespondApproval delivers the user's accept/deny decision for a
// pending user-approval prompt. The daemon pushes the prompt as a
// SystemEvent with category APPROVAL and metadata key "request_id";
// the UI calls this RPC with the same request_id to unblock whichever
// subsystem (VNC, SSH, ...) is waiting. The "kind" metadata key tells
// the UI which subsystem the prompt belongs to.
RespondApproval(ctx context.Context, in *RespondApprovalRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*RespondApprovalResponse, error)
// WailsUIReady is a no-op probe the Wails UI calls once at startup. The UI
// only cares whether the daemon implements it: an Unimplemented response
// means the daemon predates this UI and is too old to drive it.
@@ -675,16 +667,6 @@ func (c *daemonServiceClient) ExposeService(ctx context.Context, in *ExposeServi
// This type alias is provided for backwards compatibility with existing code that references the prior non-generic stream type by name.
type DaemonService_ExposeServiceClient = grpc.ServerStreamingClient[ExposeServiceEvent]
func (c *daemonServiceClient) RespondApproval(ctx context.Context, in *RespondApprovalRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*RespondApprovalResponse, error) {
cOpts := append([]grpc.CallOption{grpc.StaticMethod()}, opts...)
out := new(RespondApprovalResponse)
err := c.cc.Invoke(ctx, DaemonService_RespondApproval_FullMethodName, in, out, cOpts...)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return out, nil
}
func (c *daemonServiceClient) WailsUIReady(ctx context.Context, in *WailsUIReadyRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*WailsUIReadyResponse, error) {
cOpts := append([]grpc.CallOption{grpc.StaticMethod()}, opts...)
out := new(WailsUIReadyResponse)
@@ -795,13 +777,6 @@ type DaemonServiceServer interface {
GetInstallerResult(context.Context, *InstallerResultRequest) (*InstallerResultResponse, error)
// ExposeService exposes a local port via the NetBird reverse proxy
ExposeService(*ExposeServiceRequest, grpc.ServerStreamingServer[ExposeServiceEvent]) error
// RespondApproval delivers the user's accept/deny decision for a
// pending user-approval prompt. The daemon pushes the prompt as a
// SystemEvent with category APPROVAL and metadata key "request_id";
// the UI calls this RPC with the same request_id to unblock whichever
// subsystem (VNC, SSH, ...) is waiting. The "kind" metadata key tells
// the UI which subsystem the prompt belongs to.
RespondApproval(context.Context, *RespondApprovalRequest) (*RespondApprovalResponse, error)
// WailsUIReady is a no-op probe the Wails UI calls once at startup. The UI
// only cares whether the daemon implements it: an Unimplemented response
// means the daemon predates this UI and is too old to drive it.
@@ -951,9 +926,6 @@ func (UnimplementedDaemonServiceServer) GetInstallerResult(context.Context, *Ins
func (UnimplementedDaemonServiceServer) ExposeService(*ExposeServiceRequest, grpc.ServerStreamingServer[ExposeServiceEvent]) error {
return status.Error(codes.Unimplemented, "method ExposeService not implemented")
}
func (UnimplementedDaemonServiceServer) RespondApproval(context.Context, *RespondApprovalRequest) (*RespondApprovalResponse, error) {
return nil, status.Error(codes.Unimplemented, "method RespondApproval not implemented")
}
func (UnimplementedDaemonServiceServer) WailsUIReady(context.Context, *WailsUIReadyRequest) (*WailsUIReadyResponse, error) {
return nil, status.Error(codes.Unimplemented, "method WailsUIReady not implemented")
}
@@ -1760,24 +1732,6 @@ func _DaemonService_ExposeService_Handler(srv interface{}, stream grpc.ServerStr
// This type alias is provided for backwards compatibility with existing code that references the prior non-generic stream type by name.
type DaemonService_ExposeServiceServer = grpc.ServerStreamingServer[ExposeServiceEvent]
func _DaemonService_RespondApproval_Handler(srv interface{}, ctx context.Context, dec func(interface{}) error, interceptor grpc.UnaryServerInterceptor) (interface{}, error) {
in := new(RespondApprovalRequest)
if err := dec(in); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if interceptor == nil {
return srv.(DaemonServiceServer).RespondApproval(ctx, in)
}
info := &grpc.UnaryServerInfo{
Server: srv,
FullMethod: DaemonService_RespondApproval_FullMethodName,
}
handler := func(ctx context.Context, req interface{}) (interface{}, error) {
return srv.(DaemonServiceServer).RespondApproval(ctx, req.(*RespondApprovalRequest))
}
return interceptor(ctx, in, info, handler)
}
func _DaemonService_WailsUIReady_Handler(srv interface{}, ctx context.Context, dec func(interface{}) error, interceptor grpc.UnaryServerInterceptor) (interface{}, error) {
in := new(WailsUIReadyRequest)
if err := dec(in); err != nil {
@@ -1967,10 +1921,6 @@ var DaemonService_ServiceDesc = grpc.ServiceDesc{
MethodName: "GetInstallerResult",
Handler: _DaemonService_GetInstallerResult_Handler,
},
{
MethodName: "RespondApproval",
Handler: _DaemonService_RespondApproval_Handler,
},
{
MethodName: "WailsUIReady",
Handler: _DaemonService_WailsUIReady_Handler,

View File

@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ func (s *Server) StartCapture(req *proto.StartCaptureRequest, stream proto.Daemo
return status.Errorf(codes.Internal, "create capture session: %v", err)
}
engine, err := s.claimCapture(sess, func() { pw.Close() })
engine, err := s.claimCapture(sess)
if err != nil {
sess.Stop()
pw.Close()
@@ -190,7 +190,10 @@ func (s *Server) StartBundleCapture(_ context.Context, req *proto.StartBundleCap
s.stopBundleCaptureLocked()
s.cleanupBundleCapture()
s.evictActiveCaptureLocked()
if s.activeCapture != nil {
return nil, status.Error(codes.FailedPrecondition, "another capture is already running")
}
engine, err := s.getCaptureEngineLocked()
if err != nil {
@@ -301,58 +304,29 @@ func (s *Server) cleanupBundleCapture() {
s.bundleCapture = nil
}
// claimCapture reserves the engine's capture slot for sess. If another
// capture is already running it is evicted: a previous streaming session
// whose gRPC client died and never freed the slot stays stuck otherwise,
// and a bundle capture is just informational state.
func (s *Server) claimCapture(sess *capture.Session, cancel func()) (*internal.Engine, error) {
// claimCapture reserves the engine's capture slot for sess. Returns
// FailedPrecondition if another capture is already active.
func (s *Server) claimCapture(sess *capture.Session) (*internal.Engine, error) {
s.mutex.Lock()
defer s.mutex.Unlock()
s.evictActiveCaptureLocked()
if s.activeCapture != nil {
return nil, status.Error(codes.FailedPrecondition, "another capture is already running")
}
engine, err := s.getCaptureEngineLocked()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
s.activeCapture = sess
s.activeCaptureCancel = cancel
return engine, nil
}
// evictActiveCaptureLocked tears down whatever capture currently owns
// the engine slot so a fresh claim can succeed. Caller must hold mutex.
func (s *Server) evictActiveCaptureLocked() {
if s.activeCapture == nil {
return
}
if s.bundleCapture != nil && s.bundleCapture.sess == s.activeCapture {
log.Infof("evicting running bundle capture to start a new capture")
s.stopBundleCaptureLocked()
return
}
log.Infof("evicting previous streaming capture to start a new one")
prev := s.activeCapture
cancel := s.activeCaptureCancel
if engine, err := s.getCaptureEngineLocked(); err == nil {
if err := engine.SetCapture(nil); err != nil {
log.Debugf("clear previous capture: %v", err)
}
}
s.activeCapture = nil
s.activeCaptureCancel = nil
prev.Stop()
if cancel != nil {
cancel()
}
}
// releaseCapture clears the active-capture owner if it still matches sess.
func (s *Server) releaseCapture(sess *capture.Session) {
s.mutex.Lock()
defer s.mutex.Unlock()
if s.activeCapture == sess {
s.activeCapture = nil
s.activeCaptureCancel = nil
}
}
@@ -367,7 +341,6 @@ func (s *Server) clearCaptureIfOwner(sess *capture.Session, engine *internal.Eng
log.Debugf("clear capture: %v", err)
}
s.activeCapture = nil
s.activeCaptureCancel = nil
}
func (s *Server) getCaptureEngineLocked() (*internal.Engine, error) {

View File

@@ -7,62 +7,18 @@ import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"path/filepath"
"runtime/pprof"
"strings"
"time"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
gstatus "google.golang.org/grpc/status"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/debug"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
mgmProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/version"
)
// DebugBundle creates a debug bundle and returns the location.
func (s *Server) DebugBundle(callerCtx context.Context, req *proto.DebugBundleRequest) (resp *proto.DebugBundleResponse, err error) {
if err := requirePrivilegeForUploadURL(callerCtx, req.GetUploadURL(), req.GetUploadInsecure()); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// The UI log is opened as whoever asked for this bundle, so a caller only
// collects a log it owns (privileged callers excepted). ok is false on a
// socket that carries no identity, which skips the UI log.
callerID, callerIdentified := ipcauth.CallerIdentity(callerCtx)
path, managementURL, err := s.generateDebugBundle(req, uiLogOpener(callerID, callerIdentified))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if req.GetUploadURL() == "" {
return &proto.DebugBundleResponse{Path: path}, nil
}
// The upload runs without s.mutex held: it does network I/O to a possibly
// slow destination and must not block the other RPCs that take the lock. The
// bounded context is a backstop against a hung connection.
uploadCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Minute)
defer cancel()
key, err := debug.UploadDebugBundle(uploadCtx, req.GetUploadURL(), managementURL, path, req.GetUploadInsecure())
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("failed to upload debug bundle to %s: %v", req.GetUploadURL(), err)
return &proto.DebugBundleResponse{Path: path, UploadFailureReason: err.Error()}, nil
}
log.Infof("debug bundle uploaded to %s with key %s", req.GetUploadURL(), key)
return &proto.DebugBundleResponse{Path: path, UploadedKey: key}, nil
}
// generateDebugBundle builds the bundle under s.mutex and returns its path plus
// the management URL captured under the lock, so the caller can run the upload
// without holding the lock.
func (s *Server) generateDebugBundle(req *proto.DebugBundleRequest, uiOpener debug.LogOpener) (path string, managementURL string, err error) {
func (s *Server) DebugBundle(_ context.Context, req *proto.DebugBundleRequest) (resp *proto.DebugBundleResponse, err error) {
s.mutex.Lock()
defer s.mutex.Unlock()
@@ -112,7 +68,6 @@ func (s *Server) generateDebugBundle(req *proto.DebugBundleRequest, uiOpener deb
SyncResponse: syncResponse,
LogPath: s.logFile,
UILogPath: s.uiLogPath,
UILogOpener: uiOpener,
CPUProfile: cpuProfileData,
CapturePath: capturePath,
RefreshStatus: refreshStatus,
@@ -127,16 +82,23 @@ func (s *Server) generateDebugBundle(req *proto.DebugBundleRequest, uiOpener deb
},
)
path, err = bundleGenerator.Generate()
path, err := bundleGenerator.Generate()
if err != nil {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("generate debug bundle: %w", err)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("generate debug bundle: %w", err)
}
if s.config != nil && s.config.ManagementURL != nil {
managementURL = s.config.ManagementURL.String()
if req.GetUploadURL() == "" {
return &proto.DebugBundleResponse{Path: path}, nil
}
key, err := debug.UploadDebugBundle(context.Background(), req.GetUploadURL(), s.config.ManagementURL.String(), path)
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("failed to upload debug bundle to %s: %v", req.GetUploadURL(), err)
return &proto.DebugBundleResponse{Path: path, UploadFailureReason: err.Error()}, nil
}
return path, managementURL, nil
log.Infof("debug bundle uploaded to %s with key %s", req.GetUploadURL(), key)
return &proto.DebugBundleResponse{Path: path, UploadedKey: key}, nil
}
// GetLogLevel gets the current logging level for the server.
@@ -176,34 +138,12 @@ func (s *Server) SetLogLevel(_ context.Context, req *proto.SetLogLevelRequest) (
// RegisterUILog records the desktop UI's absolute log path so DebugBundle can
// collect the GUI log. The daemon runs as root and can't resolve the user's
// config dir, so the UI reports it. Last-writer-wins (one UI per socket).
//
// The path arrives over an IPC any local user can reach and is later opened by
// a root daemon, so it is constrained to the file name the UI writes and to a
// local absolute path. Authorization happens when DebugBundle opens it: the
// bundle refuses a file its requester does not own. A caller the daemon cannot
// identify cannot register a path at all.
func (s *Server) RegisterUILog(callerCtx context.Context, req *proto.RegisterUILogRequest) (*proto.RegisterUILogResponse, error) {
if _, ok := ipcauth.CallerIdentity(callerCtx); !ok {
return nil, gstatus.Error(codes.PermissionDenied,
"registering a UI log path requires a control channel that carries the caller's identity")
}
path := filepath.Clean(req.GetPath())
if !filepath.IsAbs(path) || filepath.Base(path) != uiLogFileName {
return nil, gstatus.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "UI log path must be an absolute path ending in %s", uiLogFileName)
}
// filepath.IsAbs accepts a Windows UNC path (\\host\share\...) and a device
// path (\\.\, \\?\); opening one would make the root daemon reach a remote
// or device namespace. Require a plain local path.
if strings.HasPrefix(path, `\\`) {
return nil, gstatus.Error(codes.InvalidArgument, "UI log path must be a local path, not a UNC or device path")
}
func (s *Server) RegisterUILog(_ context.Context, req *proto.RegisterUILogRequest) (*proto.RegisterUILogResponse, error) {
s.mutex.Lock()
defer s.mutex.Unlock()
s.uiLogPath = path
log.Infof("registered UI log path %s", s.uiLogPath)
s.uiLogPath = req.GetPath()
log.Infof("registered UI log path: %s", s.uiLogPath)
return &proto.RegisterUILogResponse{}, nil
}

View File

@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
//go:build !android && !ios
package server
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"net/url"
"os"
"strings"
"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
gstatus "google.golang.org/grpc/status"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/configs"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/debug"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/upload-server/types"
)
// uiLogFileName is the only file name the daemon accepts as a UI log path. The
// UI (writer), this validation, and the bundle collector all read it from
// configs so they cannot drift.
const uiLogFileName = configs.UILogFile
// uiLogOpener opens the registered UI log, and its rotated siblings, on behalf
// of the caller requesting the bundle: OpenOwnedFile then collects the log only
// when that caller owns it (or is privileged). identified is false on a socket
// that carries no caller identity, in which case nothing is opened.
func uiLogOpener(id ipcauth.Identity, identified bool) debug.LogOpener {
return func(path string) (*os.File, error) {
if !identified {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("bundle requester has no verified identity")
}
return ipcauth.OpenOwnedFile(id, path)
}
}
// requirePrivilegeForUploadURL restricts where the daemon may send a debug
// bundle. The bundle holds the daemon's own logs and state, and the daemon
// fetches the upload URL itself, so an unrestricted endpoint turns the daemon
// into both an exfiltration channel and a request forwarder that reaches
// services only it can talk to.
//
// The upload service NetBird publishes is open to any caller, since that is what
// the CLI and the desktop UI use. Any other endpoint, self-hosted upload servers
// included, requires a privileged caller. Plaintext is refused for everyone: the
// daemon fetches the URL and then PUTs the bundle to whatever that fetch returns,
// so an http hop is a place to intercept the bundle or the redirect.
//
// insecure relaxes transport security (http, or an untrusted TLS certificate)
// for a self-hosted server. It weakens a root-privileged upload, so it is
// refused for an unprivileged caller regardless of the host.
func requirePrivilegeForUploadURL(ctx context.Context, rawURL string, insecure bool) error {
if rawURL == "" {
return nil
}
parsed, err := url.Parse(rawURL)
if err != nil {
return gstatus.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "parse upload URL: %v", err)
}
// --insecure relaxes https to http or an untrusted certificate; it does not
// widen the URL to arbitrary schemes, so a host and http/https are required
// before the insecure branch takes over.
if parsed.Host == "" || (parsed.Scheme != "https" && parsed.Scheme != "http") {
return gstatus.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "upload URL must be http or https with a host")
}
if insecure {
return denyPrivileged(ctx,
"uploading a debug bundle without transport security (--upload-bundle-insecure)",
ipcauth.ElevatedCommand("netbird debug bundle -U --upload-bundle-insecure --upload-bundle-url <url>"))
}
if parsed.Scheme != "https" {
return gstatus.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "upload URL must use https, got scheme %q", parsed.Scheme)
}
if isDefaultUploadService(parsed) {
return nil
}
return denyPrivileged(ctx,
"uploading a debug bundle to an upload service other than the default one",
ipcauth.ElevatedCommand("netbird debug bundle -U --upload-bundle-url <url>"))
}
// isDefaultUploadService reports whether the URL points at the upload service
// NetBird runs. Only the host is compared: the service's path may differ between
// releases, and the host is what decides who receives the bundle.
func isDefaultUploadService(parsed *url.URL) bool {
defaultURL, err := url.Parse(types.DefaultBundleURL)
if err != nil {
return false
}
return parsed.Scheme == defaultURL.Scheme && strings.EqualFold(parsed.Host, defaultURL.Host)
}

View File

@@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
//go:build !android && !ios
package server
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"testing"
"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
gstatus "google.golang.org/grpc/status"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/upload-server/types"
)
func TestRegisterUILogRefusesUnidentifiedCaller(t *testing.T) {
s := &Server{}
_, err := s.RegisterUILog(noIdentityCtx(), &proto.RegisterUILogRequest{
Path: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), uiLogFileName),
})
if gstatus.Code(err) != codes.PermissionDenied {
t.Fatalf("code = %v, want PermissionDenied", gstatus.Code(err))
}
}
func TestRegisterUILogRefusesForeignPath(t *testing.T) {
secret := "/etc/shadow"
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
secret = `C:\Windows\System32\config\SAM`
}
tests := []struct {
name string
path string
}{
{"empty", ""},
{"relative", filepath.Join("netbird", uiLogFileName)},
{"another file", secret},
{"directory of the log", t.TempDir()},
{"unc path", `\\attacker\share\` + uiLogFileName},
{"device path", `\\.\C:\` + uiLogFileName},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
s := &Server{}
_, err := s.RegisterUILog(userCtx(), &proto.RegisterUILogRequest{Path: tc.path})
if gstatus.Code(err) != codes.InvalidArgument {
t.Fatalf("code = %v, want InvalidArgument", gstatus.Code(err))
}
if s.uiLogPath != "" {
t.Fatalf("path %q was recorded despite the refusal", s.uiLogPath)
}
})
}
}
func TestRegisterUILogRecordsPath(t *testing.T) {
s := &Server{}
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), uiLogFileName)
if _, err := s.RegisterUILog(userCtx(), &proto.RegisterUILogRequest{Path: path}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("register: %v", err)
}
if s.uiLogPath != path {
t.Fatalf("path = %q, want %q", s.uiLogPath, path)
}
}
// The UI log is opened as the bundle requester, so a second local user cannot
// collect a log they do not own, and an unidentified requester collects nothing.
func TestUILogOpenerBindsToRequester(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), uiLogFileName)
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("log line"), 0600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write log: %v", err)
}
// A different unprivileged user than the file's owner: refused.
if _, err := uiLogOpener(unprivilegedIdentity(), true)(path); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected a file the requester does not own to be refused")
}
// No verified identity: refused.
if _, err := uiLogOpener(ipcauth.Identity{}, false)(path); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected an unidentified requester to be refused")
}
// The requester that owns the file: allowed. The test process created it, so
// its own identity is the owner (and a privileged runner is exempt anyway).
owner, err := ipcauth.CurrentProcessIdentity()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("current identity: %v", err)
}
f, err := uiLogOpener(owner, true)(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected the owning requester to be allowed, got %v", err)
}
_ = f.Close()
}
func TestRequirePrivilegeForUploadURL(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
url string
insecure bool
unprivOK bool
invalid bool
rootAlso bool
}{
{name: "no upload", url: "", unprivOK: true},
{name: "default service", url: types.DefaultBundleURL, unprivOK: true},
{name: "default service, other path", url: "https://upload.debug.netbird.io/other", unprivOK: true},
{name: "loopback exfiltration endpoint", url: "https://127.0.0.1:8080/upload-url", rootAlso: true},
{name: "custom upload service", url: "https://attacker.example/upload-url", rootAlso: true},
{name: "plaintext default host", url: "http://upload.debug.netbird.io/upload-url", invalid: true},
{name: "plaintext custom host", url: "http://attacker.example/upload-url", invalid: true},
{name: "unsupported scheme", url: "file:///etc/shadow", invalid: true},
// insecure relaxes transport security; privileged only, whatever the host.
{name: "insecure http custom", url: "http://selfhosted.local/upload-url", insecure: true, rootAlso: true},
{name: "insecure https custom", url: "https://selfhosted.local/upload-url", insecure: true, rootAlso: true},
{name: "insecure default host", url: types.DefaultBundleURL, insecure: true, rootAlso: true},
// --insecure must not widen the URL to non-http(s) schemes or a hostless URL.
{name: "insecure file scheme", url: "file:///etc/shadow", insecure: true, invalid: true},
{name: "insecure hostless", url: "https:///upload-url", insecure: true, invalid: true},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
err := requirePrivilegeForUploadURL(userCtx(), tc.url, tc.insecure)
switch {
case tc.invalid:
if gstatus.Code(err) != codes.InvalidArgument {
t.Fatalf("code = %v, want InvalidArgument", gstatus.Code(err))
}
return
case tc.unprivOK:
assertAllowed(t, err)
return
default:
assertDenied(t, err)
}
if tc.rootAlso {
assertAllowed(t, requirePrivilegeForUploadURL(rootCtx(), tc.url, tc.insecure))
}
})
}
}

View File

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
package server
import (
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
)
// The daemon takes guardedConfigMu before s.mutex. authorizeAndPrepareLogin
// takes s.mutex while holding guardedConfigMu, so a SetConfig that grabbed
// s.mutex first and then waited for guardedConfigMu would deadlock the daemon
// against a concurrent login: two unprivileged IPC calls are enough.
//
// The held guardedConfigMu below stands in for that login. While SetConfig waits
// for it, s.mutex must stay free, otherwise the login waiting for s.mutex could
// never release guardedConfigMu.
func TestSetConfig_TakesGuardedConfigMuBeforeServerMutex(t *testing.T) {
s, ctx, profName, username, _ := setupServerWithProfile(t)
s.guardedConfigMu.Lock()
done := make(chan error, 1)
go func() {
_, err := s.SetConfig(ctx, &proto.SetConfigRequest{
ProfileName: profName,
Username: username,
})
done <- err
}()
require.Never(t, func() bool {
if !s.mutex.TryLock() {
return true
}
s.mutex.Unlock()
return false
}, 500*time.Millisecond, 10*time.Millisecond,
"SetConfig held s.mutex while waiting for guardedConfigMu, which deadlocks against a concurrent login")
s.guardedConfigMu.Unlock()
select {
case err := <-done:
require.NoError(t, err)
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("SetConfig did not finish after guardedConfigMu was released")
}
}

View File

@@ -297,8 +297,6 @@ func mdmManagedFieldConflicts(msg *proto.SetConfigRequest, policy *mdm.Policy) [
conflictBool(mdm.KeyRosenpassPermissive, msg.RosenpassPermissive),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableAutoConnect, msg.DisableAutoConnect),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyAllowServerSSH, msg.ServerSSHAllowed),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyAllowServerVNC, msg.ServerVNCAllowed),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableVNCApproval, msg.DisableVNCApproval),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableClientRoutes, msg.DisableClientRoutes),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableServerRoutes, msg.DisableServerRoutes),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyBlockInbound, msg.BlockInbound),
@@ -334,8 +332,6 @@ func setConfigRequestHasConfigOverrides(msg *proto.SetConfigRequest) bool {
msg.Mtu != nil ||
msg.DisableAutoConnect != nil ||
msg.ServerSSHAllowed != nil ||
msg.ServerVNCAllowed != nil ||
msg.DisableVNCApproval != nil ||
msg.NetworkMonitor != nil ||
msg.DisableClientRoutes != nil ||
msg.DisableServerRoutes != nil ||
@@ -374,8 +370,6 @@ func loginRequestHasConfigOverrides(msg *proto.LoginRequest) bool {
msg.WireguardPort != nil ||
msg.DisableAutoConnect != nil ||
msg.ServerSSHAllowed != nil ||
msg.ServerVNCAllowed != nil ||
msg.DisableVNCApproval != nil ||
msg.RosenpassPermissive != nil ||
len(msg.ExtraIFaceBlacklist) > 0 ||
msg.NetworkMonitor != nil ||
@@ -424,8 +418,6 @@ func loginRequestMDMConflicts(msg *proto.LoginRequest, policy *mdm.Policy) []str
conflictBool(mdm.KeyRosenpassPermissive, msg.RosenpassPermissive),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableAutoConnect, msg.DisableAutoConnect),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyAllowServerSSH, msg.ServerSSHAllowed),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyAllowServerVNC, msg.ServerVNCAllowed),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableVNCApproval, msg.DisableVNCApproval),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableClientRoutes, msg.DisableClientRoutes),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableServerRoutes, msg.DisableServerRoutes),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyBlockInbound, msg.BlockInbound),

View File

@@ -72,9 +72,6 @@ type Server struct {
// RegisterUILog. Guarded by mutex. Consumed by DebugBundle so the bundle
// can collect the GUI log even though the daemon runs as root and can't
// resolve the user's config dir. Last-writer-wins (one UI per socket).
// DebugBundle opens it on behalf of the bundle requester and refuses a file
// that caller does not own, so a local user cannot read another user's log
// or a root-only file through it.
uiLogPath string
oauthAuthFlow oauthAuthFlow
@@ -122,12 +119,8 @@ type Server struct {
captureEnabled bool
bundleCapture *bundleCapture
// activeCapture is the session currently installed on the engine; guarded by s.mutex.
activeCapture *capture.Session
// activeCaptureCancel tears down the streaming pipe/cancel for the
// active streaming capture so eviction unblocks the StartCapture RPC
// handler. Nil for bundle captures (they own their own context).
activeCaptureCancel func()
networksDisabled bool
activeCapture *capture.Session
networksDisabled bool
sleepHandler *sleephandler.SleepHandler
@@ -400,16 +393,6 @@ func (s *Server) loginAttempt(ctx context.Context, setupKey, jwtToken string) (i
// Login uses setup key to prepare configuration for the daemon.
func (s *Server) SetConfig(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.SetConfigRequest) (*proto.SetConfigResponse, error) {
// Privilege gate: refuse the parts of the request that would let a local
// user turn the root daemon into a root shell. Held across the write so the
// config cannot gain the SSH server between the decision and the update.
//
// Taken before s.mutex: authorizeAndPrepareLogin takes s.mutex while holding
// guardedConfigMu, so acquiring the two in the other order here would let a
// concurrent login deadlock the daemon.
s.guardedConfigMu.Lock()
defer s.guardedConfigMu.Unlock()
s.mutex.Lock()
defer s.mutex.Unlock()
@@ -434,6 +417,12 @@ func (s *Server) SetConfig(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.SetConfigReques
return nil, err
}
// Privilege gate: refuse the parts of the request that would let a local
// user turn the root daemon into a root shell. Held across the write so the
// config cannot gain the SSH server between the decision and the update.
s.guardedConfigMu.Lock()
defer s.guardedConfigMu.Unlock()
stored, err := s.storedProfileConfig(msg.ProfileName, msg.Username)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -523,8 +512,6 @@ func (s *Server) setConfigInputFromRequest(msg *proto.SetConfigRequest) (profile
config.RosenpassPermissive = msg.RosenpassPermissive
config.DisableAutoConnect = msg.DisableAutoConnect
config.ServerSSHAllowed = msg.ServerSSHAllowed
config.ServerVNCAllowed = msg.ServerVNCAllowed
config.DisableVNCApproval = msg.DisableVNCApproval
config.NetworkMonitor = msg.NetworkMonitor
config.DisableClientRoutes = msg.DisableClientRoutes
config.DisableServerRoutes = msg.DisableServerRoutes
@@ -1532,7 +1519,6 @@ func (s *Server) buildStatusResponse(ctx context.Context, msg *proto.StatusReque
pbFullStatus := fullStatus.ToProto()
pbFullStatus.Events = s.statusRecorder.GetEventHistory()
pbFullStatus.SshServerState = s.getSSHServerState()
pbFullStatus.VncServerState = s.getVNCServerState()
pbFullStatus.NetworksRevision = s.statusRecorder.GetNetworksRevision()
statusResponse.FullStatus = pbFullStatus
}
@@ -1573,38 +1559,6 @@ func (s *Server) getSSHServerState() *proto.SSHServerState {
return sshServerState
}
// getVNCServerState retrieves the current VNC server state.
func (s *Server) getVNCServerState() *proto.VNCServerState {
s.mutex.Lock()
connectClient := s.connectClient
s.mutex.Unlock()
if connectClient == nil {
return nil
}
engine := connectClient.Engine()
if engine == nil {
return nil
}
enabled, sessions := engine.GetVNCServerStatus()
pbSessions := make([]*proto.VNCSessionInfo, 0, len(sessions))
for _, sess := range sessions {
pbSessions = append(pbSessions, &proto.VNCSessionInfo{
RemoteAddress: sess.RemoteAddress,
Mode: sess.Mode,
Username: sess.Username,
UserID: sess.UserID,
Initiator: sess.Initiator,
})
}
return &proto.VNCServerState{
Enabled: enabled,
Sessions: pbSessions,
}
}
// GetPeerSSHHostKey retrieves SSH host key for a specific peer
func (s *Server) GetPeerSSHHostKey(
ctx context.Context,
@@ -1990,30 +1944,6 @@ func (s *Server) ExposeService(req *proto.ExposeServiceRequest, srv proto.Daemon
return nil
}
// RespondApproval relays the user's accept/deny decision for a pending
// approval prompt to the engine's broker. Unknown or already-resolved
// request_ids are silently no-op'd so a slow UI cannot deny a prompt the
// user already handled (or that already timed out).
func (s *Server) RespondApproval(_ context.Context, msg *proto.RespondApprovalRequest) (*proto.RespondApprovalResponse, error) {
if msg.GetRequestId() == "" {
return nil, gstatus.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "request_id is required")
}
s.mutex.Lock()
connectClient := s.connectClient
s.mutex.Unlock()
if connectClient == nil {
return nil, gstatus.Errorf(codes.FailedPrecondition, "client not initialized")
}
engine := connectClient.Engine()
if engine == nil {
return nil, gstatus.Errorf(codes.FailedPrecondition, "engine not running")
}
if !engine.RespondApproval(msg.GetRequestId(), msg.GetAccept(), msg.GetViewOnly()) {
log.Debugf("approval response for unknown request_id %s", msg.GetRequestId())
}
return &proto.RespondApprovalResponse{}, nil
}
func isUnixRunningDesktop() bool {
if runtime.GOOS != "linux" && runtime.GOOS != "freebsd" {
return false
@@ -2121,8 +2051,6 @@ func (s *Server) GetConfig(ctx context.Context, req *proto.GetConfigRequest) (*p
Mtu: int64(cfg.MTU),
DisableAutoConnect: cfg.DisableAutoConnect,
ServerSSHAllowed: *cfg.ServerSSHAllowed,
ServerVNCAllowed: cfg.ServerVNCAllowed != nil && *cfg.ServerVNCAllowed,
DisableVNCApproval: cfg.DisableVNCApproval != nil && *cfg.DisableVNCApproval,
RosenpassEnabled: cfg.RosenpassEnabled,
RosenpassPermissive: cfg.RosenpassPermissive,
BlockInbound: cfg.BlockInbound,

View File

@@ -109,30 +109,6 @@ func TestSetConfig_MDMReject_SingleField(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, []string{mdm.KeyManagementURL}, v.GetFields())
}
func TestSetConfig_MDMReject_VNCFields(t *testing.T) {
withMDMPolicy(t, mdm.NewPolicy(map[string]any{
mdm.KeyAllowServerVNC: true,
mdm.KeyDisableVNCApproval: false,
}))
s, ctx, profName, username, _ := setupServerWithProfile(t)
vncAllowed := false
disableApproval := true
_, err := s.SetConfig(ctx, &proto.SetConfigRequest{
ProfileName: profName,
Username: username,
ServerVNCAllowed: &vncAllowed,
DisableVNCApproval: &disableApproval,
})
v := extractViolation(t, err)
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []string{
mdm.KeyAllowServerVNC,
mdm.KeyDisableVNCApproval,
}, v.GetFields())
}
func TestSetConfig_MDMReject_MultipleFields(t *testing.T) {
withMDMPolicy(t, mdm.NewPolicy(map[string]any{
mdm.KeyManagementURL: "https://mdm.example.com:443",

View File

@@ -61,8 +61,6 @@ func TestSetConfig_AllFieldsSaved(t *testing.T) {
rosenpassEnabled := true
rosenpassPermissive := true
serverSSHAllowed := true
serverVNCAllowed := true
disableVNCApproval := true
interfaceName := "utun100"
wireguardPort := int64(51820)
preSharedKey := "test-psk"
@@ -87,8 +85,6 @@ func TestSetConfig_AllFieldsSaved(t *testing.T) {
RosenpassEnabled: &rosenpassEnabled,
RosenpassPermissive: &rosenpassPermissive,
ServerSSHAllowed: &serverSSHAllowed,
ServerVNCAllowed: &serverVNCAllowed,
DisableVNCApproval: &disableVNCApproval,
InterfaceName: &interfaceName,
WireguardPort: &wireguardPort,
OptionalPreSharedKey: &preSharedKey,
@@ -132,10 +128,6 @@ func TestSetConfig_AllFieldsSaved(t *testing.T) {
require.Equal(t, rosenpassPermissive, cfg.RosenpassPermissive)
require.NotNil(t, cfg.ServerSSHAllowed)
require.Equal(t, serverSSHAllowed, *cfg.ServerSSHAllowed)
require.NotNil(t, cfg.ServerVNCAllowed)
require.Equal(t, serverVNCAllowed, *cfg.ServerVNCAllowed)
require.NotNil(t, cfg.DisableVNCApproval)
require.Equal(t, disableVNCApproval, *cfg.DisableVNCApproval)
require.Equal(t, interfaceName, cfg.WgIface)
require.Equal(t, int(wireguardPort), cfg.WgPort)
require.Equal(t, preSharedKey, cfg.PreSharedKey)
@@ -188,8 +180,6 @@ func verifyAllFieldsCovered(t *testing.T, req *proto.SetConfigRequest) {
"RosenpassEnabled": true,
"RosenpassPermissive": true,
"ServerSSHAllowed": true,
"ServerVNCAllowed": true,
"DisableVNCApproval": true,
"InterfaceName": true,
"WireguardPort": true,
"OptionalPreSharedKey": true,
@@ -250,8 +240,6 @@ func TestCLIFlags_MappedToSetConfig(t *testing.T) {
"enable-rosenpass": "RosenpassEnabled",
"rosenpass-permissive": "RosenpassPermissive",
"allow-server-ssh": "ServerSSHAllowed",
"allow-server-vnc": "ServerVNCAllowed",
"disable-vnc-approval": "DisableVNCApproval",
"interface-name": "InterfaceName",
"wireguard-port": "WireguardPort",
"preshared-key": "OptionalPreSharedKey",

View File

@@ -26,51 +26,40 @@ import (
// daemon's SSH server into a root (or unauthenticated) shell.
// - Enabling the SSH server at all is what makes the above reachable, and a
// profile the caller owns is not a privilege they hold.
// - Enabling the VNC server exposes the console session, which on a
// multi-user host belongs to another user, and disabling its approval
// prompt removes that user's only say in it.
// - While a remote-access server (SSH or VNC) is enabled, repointing the
// profile at another management identity hands authorization decisions,
// including which keys and users are accepted, to whoever controls that
// identity. Changing the management URL and deregistering the peer are both
// ways to do that.
// - While the SSH server is enabled, repointing the profile at another
// management identity hands SSH authorization decisions, including which
// keys and users are accepted, to whoever controls that identity. Changing
// the management URL and deregistering the peer are both ways to do that.
//
// Everything else stays unauthenticated, so this is not an authorization model:
// it only refuses the changes that would let a local user become root, or reach
// another user's desktop. A caller whose identity cannot be established is
// refused as well.
// it only refuses the changes that would let a local user become root. A caller
// whose identity cannot be established is refused as well.
// privilegedConfigChange is the subset of a config request that crosses the
// user-to-root boundary. Fields are nil or empty when the request leaves them
// untouched.
type privilegedConfigChange struct {
managementURL string
serverSSHAllowed *bool
enableSSHRoot *bool
disableSSHAuth *bool
serverVNCAllowed *bool
disableVNCApproval *bool
managementURL string
serverSSHAllowed *bool
enableSSHRoot *bool
disableSSHAuth *bool
}
func privilegedChangeFromSetConfig(msg *proto.SetConfigRequest) privilegedConfigChange {
return privilegedConfigChange{
managementURL: msg.GetManagementUrl(),
serverSSHAllowed: msg.ServerSSHAllowed,
enableSSHRoot: msg.EnableSSHRoot,
disableSSHAuth: msg.DisableSSHAuth,
serverVNCAllowed: msg.ServerVNCAllowed,
disableVNCApproval: msg.DisableVNCApproval,
managementURL: msg.GetManagementUrl(),
serverSSHAllowed: msg.ServerSSHAllowed,
enableSSHRoot: msg.EnableSSHRoot,
disableSSHAuth: msg.DisableSSHAuth,
}
}
func privilegedChangeFromLogin(msg *proto.LoginRequest) privilegedConfigChange {
return privilegedConfigChange{
managementURL: msg.GetManagementUrl(),
serverSSHAllowed: msg.ServerSSHAllowed,
enableSSHRoot: msg.EnableSSHRoot,
disableSSHAuth: msg.DisableSSHAuth,
serverVNCAllowed: msg.ServerVNCAllowed,
disableVNCApproval: msg.DisableVNCApproval,
managementURL: msg.GetManagementUrl(),
serverSSHAllowed: msg.ServerSSHAllowed,
enableSSHRoot: msg.EnableSSHRoot,
disableSSHAuth: msg.DisableSSHAuth,
}
}
@@ -94,21 +83,15 @@ func requirePrivilegeForConfigChange(ctx context.Context, stored *profilemanager
return denyPrivileged(ctx, "enabling the NetBird SSH server", ipcauth.UpCommand("--allow-server-ssh"))
}
if err := requirePrivilegeForVNCChange(ctx, stored, change); err != nil {
return err
}
// Only guard the management binding while a remote-access server is enabled:
// that is when the management identity decides who may open a shell or reach
// the desktop here.
server, enabled := enabledRemoteAccessServer(stored)
if !enabled {
// Only guard the management binding while the SSH server is enabled: that is
// when the management identity decides who may open a shell here.
if !sshServerEnabled(stored) {
return nil
}
if change.managementURL != "" && !sameManagementURL(stored.ManagementURL, change.managementURL) {
return denyPrivileged(ctx,
fmt.Sprintf("changing the management URL while the NetBird %s server is enabled", server),
"changing the management URL while the NetBird SSH server is enabled",
ipcauth.UpCommand("-m "+change.managementURL))
}
@@ -116,21 +99,20 @@ func requirePrivilegeForConfigChange(ctx context.Context, stored *profilemanager
}
// requirePrivilegeForDeregistration refuses to deregister the peer from the
// management server when the caller is not privileged and the profile has a
// remote-access server enabled. Deregistering frees the peer's key to be
// registered against another management identity, which is the same handover the
// management server when the caller is not privileged and the profile has the
// SSH server enabled. Deregistering frees the peer's key to be registered
// against another management identity, which is the same handover the
// management URL check refuses.
//
// Callers that treat deregistration as best-effort (profile removal) continue
// without it; callers that were asked to deregister surface the error.
func requirePrivilegeForDeregistration(ctx context.Context, cfg *profilemanager.Config) error {
server, enabled := enabledRemoteAccessServer(cfg)
if !enabled {
if !sshServerEnabled(cfg) {
return nil
}
return denyPrivileged(ctx,
fmt.Sprintf("deregistering this peer while the NetBird %s server is enabled", server),
"deregistering this peer while the NetBird SSH server is enabled",
ipcauth.ElevatedCommand("netbird logout"))
}

View File

@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
package server
import (
"context"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
)
// The VNC half of the privilege gate described in ssh_gate.go. The daemon runs
// as root/LocalSystem and the VNC server it hosts attaches to the console
// session, so both of these cross the user-to-root boundary:
//
// - Enabling the VNC server publishes the console desktop, keyboard and
// mouse to whoever the account authorizes. On a multi-user host that
// desktop belongs to another user, and the profile the caller owns is not a
// privilege they hold over it.
// - Disabling the approval prompt removes the console user's per-connection
// consent, turning an authorized VNC session into a silent one.
func requirePrivilegeForVNCChange(ctx context.Context, stored *profilemanager.Config, change privilegedConfigChange) error {
if enables(storedFlag(stored, func(c *profilemanager.Config) *bool { return c.DisableVNCApproval }), change.disableVNCApproval) {
return denyPrivileged(ctx, "disabling VNC connection approval", ipcauth.UpCommand("--disable-vnc-approval"))
}
if enables(storedFlag(stored, func(c *profilemanager.Config) *bool { return c.ServerVNCAllowed }), change.serverVNCAllowed) {
return denyPrivileged(ctx, "enabling the NetBird VNC server", ipcauth.UpCommand("--allow-server-vnc"))
}
return nil
}
// vncServerEnabled reports whether the profile currently runs the VNC server.
//
// Unlike the SSH server, VNC defaults to off: the flag was introduced with the
// server itself, so a nil value is a config written before VNC existed and
// means the server is not running.
func vncServerEnabled(cfg *profilemanager.Config) bool {
if cfg == nil || cfg.ServerVNCAllowed == nil {
return false
}
return *cfg.ServerVNCAllowed
}
// enabledRemoteAccessServer names a remote-access server the profile currently
// runs, and whether it runs any. It decides whether the management-binding and
// deregistration guards apply, since either server hands authorization
// decisions to the management identity the profile points at. SSH is reported
// first when both are on: it is the more privileged of the two.
func enabledRemoteAccessServer(cfg *profilemanager.Config) (string, bool) {
switch {
case sshServerEnabled(cfg):
return "SSH", true
case vncServerEnabled(cfg):
return "VNC", true
default:
return "", false
}
}

View File

@@ -1,178 +0,0 @@
package server
import (
"testing"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
)
func TestRequirePrivilegeForConfigChange_VNCFlags(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
stored *profilemanager.Config
change privilegedConfigChange
privileged bool
wantDeny bool
}{
{
name: "enabling the vnc server unprivileged is refused",
stored: &profilemanager.Config{ServerVNCAllowed: boolPtr(false)},
change: privilegedConfigChange{serverVNCAllowed: boolPtr(true)},
wantDeny: true,
},
{
name: "enabling the vnc server as root is allowed",
stored: &profilemanager.Config{ServerVNCAllowed: boolPtr(false)},
change: privilegedConfigChange{serverVNCAllowed: boolPtr(true)},
privileged: true,
},
{
name: "restating an already enabled vnc server is not a change",
stored: &profilemanager.Config{ServerVNCAllowed: boolPtr(true)},
change: privilegedConfigChange{serverVNCAllowed: boolPtr(true)},
},
{
name: "turning the vnc server off is not guarded",
stored: &profilemanager.Config{ServerVNCAllowed: boolPtr(true)},
change: privilegedConfigChange{serverVNCAllowed: boolPtr(false)},
},
{
// Unlike SSH, a nil flag means off: the flag shipped with the server.
name: "a config written before vnc existed counts as off, so enabling is refused",
stored: &profilemanager.Config{},
change: privilegedConfigChange{serverVNCAllowed: boolPtr(true)},
wantDeny: true,
},
{
name: "a profile with no config yet counts as off, so enabling is refused",
stored: nil,
change: privilegedConfigChange{serverVNCAllowed: boolPtr(true)},
wantDeny: true,
},
{
name: "disabling the vnc approval prompt unprivileged is refused",
stored: &profilemanager.Config{DisableVNCApproval: boolPtr(false)},
change: privilegedConfigChange{disableVNCApproval: boolPtr(true)},
wantDeny: true,
},
{
name: "disabling the vnc approval prompt as root is allowed",
stored: &profilemanager.Config{DisableVNCApproval: boolPtr(false)},
change: privilegedConfigChange{disableVNCApproval: boolPtr(true)},
privileged: true,
},
{
name: "re-enabling the vnc approval prompt is not guarded",
stored: &profilemanager.Config{DisableVNCApproval: boolPtr(true)},
change: privilegedConfigChange{disableVNCApproval: boolPtr(false)},
},
{
name: "restating a disabled approval prompt is not a change",
stored: &profilemanager.Config{DisableVNCApproval: boolPtr(true)},
change: privilegedConfigChange{disableVNCApproval: boolPtr(true)},
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
ctx := userCtx()
if tt.privileged {
ctx = rootCtx()
}
err := requirePrivilegeForConfigChange(ctx, tt.stored, tt.change)
if tt.wantDeny {
assertDenied(t, err)
return
}
assertAllowed(t, err)
})
}
}
// The management binding and deregistration guards protect either remote-access
// server, so the VNC server alone must arm them even with SSH off.
func TestRequirePrivilegeForConfigChange_ManagementURLWithVNCOnly(t *testing.T) {
vncOnly := &profilemanager.Config{
ServerSSHAllowed: boolPtr(false),
ServerVNCAllowed: boolPtr(true),
ManagementURL: mustURL(t, "https://api.netbird.io:443"),
DisableVNCApproval: boolPtr(false),
}
err := requirePrivilegeForConfigChange(userCtx(), vncOnly,
privilegedConfigChange{managementURL: "https://attacker.example.com:443"})
assertDenied(t, err)
// The same move is the administrator's to make.
assertAllowed(t, requirePrivilegeForConfigChange(rootCtx(), vncOnly,
privilegedConfigChange{managementURL: "https://selfhosted.example.com:443"}))
// Restating the stored binding is not a change, so it is never refused.
assertAllowed(t, requirePrivilegeForConfigChange(userCtx(), vncOnly,
privilegedConfigChange{managementURL: "https://api.netbird.io"}))
}
func TestRequirePrivilegeForDeregistration_VNCOnly(t *testing.T) {
vncOnly := &profilemanager.Config{ServerSSHAllowed: boolPtr(false), ServerVNCAllowed: boolPtr(true)}
assertDenied(t, requirePrivilegeForDeregistration(userCtx(), vncOnly))
assertAllowed(t, requirePrivilegeForDeregistration(rootCtx(), vncOnly))
bothOff := &profilemanager.Config{ServerSSHAllowed: boolPtr(false), ServerVNCAllowed: boolPtr(false)}
assertAllowed(t, requirePrivilegeForDeregistration(userCtx(), bothOff))
}
// enabledRemoteAccessServer names the server in the refusal, so the user is told
// which one is holding the binding down. SSH wins when both are on: it is the
// more privileged of the two.
func TestEnabledRemoteAccessServer(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
cfg *profilemanager.Config
wantServer string
wantOn bool
}{
{
name: "ssh only",
cfg: &profilemanager.Config{ServerSSHAllowed: boolPtr(true), ServerVNCAllowed: boolPtr(false)},
wantServer: "SSH",
wantOn: true,
},
{
name: "vnc only",
cfg: &profilemanager.Config{ServerSSHAllowed: boolPtr(false), ServerVNCAllowed: boolPtr(true)},
wantServer: "VNC",
wantOn: true,
},
{
name: "both on reports ssh",
cfg: &profilemanager.Config{ServerSSHAllowed: boolPtr(true), ServerVNCAllowed: boolPtr(true)},
wantServer: "SSH",
wantOn: true,
},
{
name: "both off",
cfg: &profilemanager.Config{ServerSSHAllowed: boolPtr(false), ServerVNCAllowed: boolPtr(false)},
},
{
// A nil SSH flag means on (legacy configs), so it still arms the guard.
name: "legacy config with no flags at all reports ssh",
cfg: &profilemanager.Config{},
wantServer: "SSH",
wantOn: true,
},
{
name: "no config",
cfg: nil,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
server, on := enabledRemoteAccessServer(tt.cfg)
if on != tt.wantOn || server != tt.wantServer {
t.Fatalf("enabledRemoteAccessServer() = (%q, %v), want (%q, %v)", server, on, tt.wantServer, tt.wantOn)
}
})
}
}

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package sessionauth
package auth
import (
"errors"
@@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ const (
DefaultUserIDClaim = "sub"
// Wildcard is a special user ID that matches all users
Wildcard = "*"
// sessionPubKeyLen is the size of an X25519 static public key in bytes.
sessionPubKeyLen = 32
)
var (
@@ -24,7 +22,6 @@ var (
ErrUserNotAuthorized = errors.New("user is not authorized to access this peer")
ErrNoMachineUserMapping = errors.New("no authorization mapping for OS user")
ErrUserNotMappedToOSUser = errors.New("user is not authorized to login as OS user")
ErrSessionKeyNotKnown = errors.New("session pubkey not registered")
)
// Authorizer handles SSH fine-grained access control authorization
@@ -38,17 +35,6 @@ type Authorizer struct {
// machineUsers maps OS login usernames to lists of authorized user indexes
machineUsers map[string][]uint32
// sessionPubKeys maps an X25519 static public key (as map-safe
// array) to the hashed user identity that key authenticates as.
// Populated from management's temporary-access flow; used by VNC to
// authenticate via the Noise_IK handshake.
sessionPubKeys map[[sessionPubKeyLen]byte]sshuserhash.UserIDHash
// sessionDisplayNames mirrors sessionPubKeys with the optional
// human-readable display name management associated with each
// session key. Used by the per-connection UI approval prompt; not
// consulted by any authorization decision.
sessionDisplayNames map[[sessionPubKeyLen]byte]string
// mu protects the list of users
mu sync.RWMutex
}
@@ -64,29 +50,13 @@ type Config struct {
// MachineUsers maps OS login usernames to indexes in AuthorizedUsers
// If a user wants to login as a specific OS user, their index must be in the corresponding list
MachineUsers map[string][]uint32
// SessionPubKeys binds ephemeral X25519 static public keys to hashed
// user identities. Populated for VNC; ignored on the SSH side.
SessionPubKeys []SessionPubKey
}
// SessionPubKey is a single ephemeral-key entry: the 32-byte X25519
// static public key plus the hashed user identity it authenticates as,
// optionally plus a human-readable display name for the UI approval
// prompt to identify the requester.
type SessionPubKey struct {
PubKey []byte
UserIDHash sshuserhash.UserIDHash
DisplayName string
}
// NewAuthorizer creates a new SSH authorizer with empty configuration
func NewAuthorizer() *Authorizer {
a := &Authorizer{
userIDClaim: DefaultUserIDClaim,
machineUsers: make(map[string][]uint32),
sessionPubKeys: make(map[[sessionPubKeyLen]byte]sshuserhash.UserIDHash),
sessionDisplayNames: make(map[[sessionPubKeyLen]byte]string),
userIDClaim: DefaultUserIDClaim,
machineUsers: make(map[string][]uint32),
}
return a
@@ -102,8 +72,6 @@ func (a *Authorizer) Update(config *Config) {
a.userIDClaim = DefaultUserIDClaim
a.authorizedUsers = []sshuserhash.UserIDHash{}
a.machineUsers = make(map[string][]uint32)
a.sessionPubKeys = make(map[[sessionPubKeyLen]byte]sshuserhash.UserIDHash)
a.sessionDisplayNames = make(map[[sessionPubKeyLen]byte]string)
log.Info("SSH authorization cleared")
return
}
@@ -126,35 +94,8 @@ func (a *Authorizer) Update(config *Config) {
}
a.machineUsers = machineUsers
sessionPubKeys := make(map[[sessionPubKeyLen]byte]sshuserhash.UserIDHash, len(config.SessionPubKeys))
sessionDisplayNames := make(map[[sessionPubKeyLen]byte]string, len(config.SessionPubKeys))
conflicted := make(map[[sessionPubKeyLen]byte]struct{})
for _, e := range config.SessionPubKeys {
if len(e.PubKey) != sessionPubKeyLen {
continue
}
var key [sessionPubKeyLen]byte
copy(key[:], e.PubKey)
if _, bad := conflicted[key]; bad {
continue
}
if existing, ok := sessionPubKeys[key]; ok && existing != e.UserIDHash {
log.Warnf("SSH auth: session pubkey bound to conflicting user hashes; dropping binding")
delete(sessionPubKeys, key)
delete(sessionDisplayNames, key)
conflicted[key] = struct{}{}
continue
}
sessionPubKeys[key] = e.UserIDHash
if e.DisplayName != "" {
sessionDisplayNames[key] = e.DisplayName
}
}
a.sessionPubKeys = sessionPubKeys
a.sessionDisplayNames = sessionDisplayNames
log.Debugf("SSH auth: updated with %d authorized users, %d machine user mappings, %d session pubkeys",
len(config.AuthorizedUsers), len(machineUsers), len(sessionPubKeys))
log.Debugf("SSH auth: updated with %d authorized users, %d machine user mappings",
len(config.AuthorizedUsers), len(machineUsers))
}
// Authorize validates if a user is authorized to login as the specified OS user.
@@ -214,54 +155,6 @@ func (a *Authorizer) GetUserIDClaim() string {
return a.userIDClaim
}
// LookupSessionKey resolves a Noise-verified static public key to the
// hashed user identity registered with it. Fails closed when the key is
// unknown.
func (a *Authorizer) LookupSessionKey(pubKey []byte) (sshuserhash.UserIDHash, error) {
var zero sshuserhash.UserIDHash
if len(pubKey) != sessionPubKeyLen {
return zero, fmt.Errorf("session pubkey wrong length: %d", len(pubKey))
}
var key [sessionPubKeyLen]byte
copy(key[:], pubKey)
a.mu.RLock()
hash, ok := a.sessionPubKeys[key]
a.mu.RUnlock()
if !ok {
return zero, ErrSessionKeyNotKnown
}
return hash, nil
}
// LookupSessionDisplayName returns the human-readable display name
// management associated with a session pubkey, or empty string when none
// is recorded. Never returns an error: a missing/unknown key reports as
// "" and the caller falls back to other identifiers.
func (a *Authorizer) LookupSessionDisplayName(pubKey []byte) string {
if len(pubKey) != sessionPubKeyLen {
return ""
}
var key [sessionPubKeyLen]byte
copy(key[:], pubKey)
a.mu.RLock()
name := a.sessionDisplayNames[key]
a.mu.RUnlock()
return name
}
// AuthorizeOSUserBySessionKey resolves the OS-user mapping for a session
// key. Mirrors Authorize but skips the JWT-hash step since the key has
// already been verified and the user identity hash is in hand.
func (a *Authorizer) AuthorizeOSUserBySessionKey(userIDHash sshuserhash.UserIDHash, osUsername string) (string, error) {
a.mu.RLock()
defer a.mu.RUnlock()
userIndex, found := a.findUserIndex(userIDHash)
if !found {
return "", fmt.Errorf("session user (hash: %s) not in authorized list for OS user %q: %w", userIDHash, osUsername, ErrUserNotAuthorized)
}
return a.checkMachineUserMapping("session", osUsername, userIndex)
}
// findUserIndex finds the index of a hashed user ID in the authorized users list
// Returns the index and true if found, 0 and false if not found
func (a *Authorizer) findUserIndex(hashedUserID sshuserhash.UserIDHash) (int, bool) {

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
package sessionauth
package auth
import (
"errors"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
@@ -611,61 +610,3 @@ func TestAuthorizer_Wildcard_WithPartialIndexes_AllowsAllUsers(t *testing.T) {
assert.Error(t, err)
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrUserNotAuthorized, "unauthorized user should be denied")
}
func TestAuthorizer_LookupSessionKey_Valid(t *testing.T) {
pub := bytesRepeat(0x11, sessionPubKeyLen)
userHash, err := sshauth.HashUserID("alice")
require.NoError(t, err)
a := NewAuthorizer()
a.Update(&Config{
AuthorizedUsers: []sshauth.UserIDHash{userHash},
MachineUsers: map[string][]uint32{Wildcard: {0}},
SessionPubKeys: []SessionPubKey{{PubKey: pub, UserIDHash: userHash}},
})
got, err := a.LookupSessionKey(pub)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, userHash, got)
if _, err := a.AuthorizeOSUserBySessionKey(got, "alice"); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("AuthorizeOSUserBySessionKey: %v", err)
}
}
func TestAuthorizer_LookupSessionKey_UnknownPub(t *testing.T) {
a := NewAuthorizer()
a.Update(&Config{})
_, err := a.LookupSessionKey(bytesRepeat(0x22, sessionPubKeyLen))
require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrSessionKeyNotKnown)
}
func TestAuthorizer_LookupSessionKey_WrongLength(t *testing.T) {
a := NewAuthorizer()
_, err := a.LookupSessionKey([]byte("short"))
require.Error(t, err)
}
func TestAuthorizer_LookupSessionKey_UpdateClears(t *testing.T) {
pub := bytesRepeat(0x33, sessionPubKeyLen)
userHash, err := sshauth.HashUserID("alice")
require.NoError(t, err)
a := NewAuthorizer()
a.Update(&Config{SessionPubKeys: []SessionPubKey{{PubKey: pub, UserIDHash: userHash}}})
if _, err := a.LookupSessionKey(pub); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("setup lookup: %v", err)
}
a.Update(&Config{})
if _, err := a.LookupSessionKey(pub); !errors.Is(err, ErrSessionKeyNotKnown) {
t.Fatalf("expected ErrSessionKeyNotKnown, got %v", err)
}
}
func bytesRepeat(b byte, n int) []byte {
out := make([]byte, n)
for i := range out {
out[i] = b
}
return out
}

View File

@@ -26,10 +26,10 @@ import (
cryptossh "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
nbssh "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh"
sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/auth"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/server"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/testutil"
nbjwt "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/auth/jwt"
sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sessionauth"
sshuserhash "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sshauth"
)

View File

@@ -23,11 +23,11 @@ import (
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
nbssh "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh"
sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/auth"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/client"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/detection"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/testutil"
nbjwt "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/auth/jwt"
sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sessionauth"
sshuserhash "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sshauth"
)

View File

@@ -23,10 +23,10 @@ import (
"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/tun/netstack"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/auth"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/detection"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/auth"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/auth/jwt"
sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sessionauth"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util/netrelay"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/version"
)
@@ -197,14 +197,6 @@ type Config struct {
// HostKey is the SSH server host key in PEM format
HostKeyPEM []byte
// NetstackNet, when non-nil, makes the SSH server listen via the
// supplied userspace network stack instead of an OS socket.
NetstackNet *netstack.Net
// NetworkValidation, when non-zero, restricts inbound connections to
// peers inside the NetBird overlay defined by this WireGuard address.
NetworkValidation wgaddr.Address
}
// SessionInfo contains information about an active SSH session
@@ -216,15 +208,12 @@ type SessionInfo struct {
PortForwards []string
}
// New creates an SSH server instance from the supplied Config. Fields are
// read once at construction; mutating Config afterwards has no effect.
// JWT == nil disables JWT authentication.
// New creates an SSH server instance with the provided host key and optional JWT configuration
// If jwtConfig is nil, JWT authentication is disabled
func New(config *Config) *Server {
s := &Server{
mu: sync.RWMutex{},
hostKeyPEM: config.HostKeyPEM,
netstackNet: config.NetstackNet,
wgAddress: config.NetworkValidation,
sessions: make(map[sessionKey]*sessionState),
pendingAuthJWT: make(map[authKey]string),
remoteForwardListeners: make(map[forwardKey]net.Listener),
@@ -445,6 +434,20 @@ func (s *Server) buildSessionInfo(state *sessionState) SessionInfo {
return info
}
// SetNetstackNet sets the netstack network for userspace networking
func (s *Server) SetNetstackNet(net *netstack.Net) {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
s.netstackNet = net
}
// SetNetworkValidation configures network-based connection filtering
func (s *Server) SetNetworkValidation(addr wgaddr.Address) {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
s.wgAddress = addr
}
// UpdateSSHAuth updates the SSH fine-grained access control configuration
// This should be called when network map updates include new SSH auth configuration
func (s *Server) UpdateSSHAuth(config *sshauth.Config) {

View File

@@ -136,19 +136,6 @@ type SSHServerStateOutput struct {
Sessions []SSHSessionOutput `json:"sessions" yaml:"sessions"`
}
type VNCSessionOutput struct {
RemoteAddress string `json:"remoteAddress" yaml:"remoteAddress"`
Mode string `json:"mode" yaml:"mode"`
Username string `json:"username,omitempty" yaml:"username,omitempty"`
UserID string `json:"userID,omitempty" yaml:"userID,omitempty"`
Initiator string `json:"initiator,omitempty" yaml:"initiator,omitempty"`
}
type VNCServerStateOutput struct {
Enabled bool `json:"enabled" yaml:"enabled"`
Sessions []VNCSessionOutput `json:"sessions" yaml:"sessions"`
}
type OutputOverview struct {
Peers PeersStateOutput `json:"peers" yaml:"peers"`
CliVersion string `json:"cliVersion" yaml:"cliVersion"`
@@ -172,7 +159,6 @@ type OutputOverview struct {
LazyConnectionEnabled bool `json:"lazyConnectionEnabled" yaml:"lazyConnectionEnabled"`
ProfileName string `json:"profileName" yaml:"profileName"`
SSHServerState SSHServerStateOutput `json:"sshServer" yaml:"sshServer"`
VNCServerState VNCServerStateOutput `json:"vncServer" yaml:"vncServer"`
// SessionExpiresAt is the absolute UTC instant at which the peer's SSO
// session expires. nil when the peer is not SSO-tracked or login
// expiration is disabled. Pointer (rather than zero-value time.Time) so
@@ -198,7 +184,6 @@ func ConvertToStatusOutputOverview(pbFullStatus *proto.FullStatus, opts ConvertO
relayOverview := mapRelays(pbFullStatus.GetRelays())
sshServerOverview := mapSSHServer(pbFullStatus.GetSshServerState())
vncServerOverview := mapVNCServer(pbFullStatus.GetVncServerState())
peersOverview := mapPeers(pbFullStatus.GetPeers(), opts.StatusFilter, opts.PrefixNamesFilter, opts.PrefixNamesFilterMap, opts.IPsFilter, opts.ConnectionTypeFilter)
overview := OutputOverview{
@@ -224,7 +209,6 @@ func ConvertToStatusOutputOverview(pbFullStatus *proto.FullStatus, opts ConvertO
LazyConnectionEnabled: pbFullStatus.GetLazyConnectionEnabled(),
ProfileName: opts.ProfileName,
SSHServerState: sshServerOverview,
VNCServerState: vncServerOverview,
}
if !opts.SessionExpiresAt.IsZero() {
t := opts.SessionExpiresAt
@@ -310,26 +294,6 @@ func mapSSHServer(sshServerState *proto.SSHServerState) SSHServerStateOutput {
}
}
func mapVNCServer(state *proto.VNCServerState) VNCServerStateOutput {
if state == nil {
return VNCServerStateOutput{Sessions: []VNCSessionOutput{}}
}
sessions := make([]VNCSessionOutput, 0, len(state.GetSessions()))
for _, sess := range state.GetSessions() {
sessions = append(sessions, VNCSessionOutput{
RemoteAddress: sess.GetRemoteAddress(),
Mode: sess.GetMode(),
Username: sess.GetUsername(),
UserID: sess.GetUserID(),
Initiator: sess.GetInitiator(),
})
}
return VNCServerStateOutput{
Enabled: state.GetEnabled(),
Sessions: sessions,
}
}
func mapPeers(
peers []*proto.PeerState,
statusFilter string,
@@ -594,26 +558,6 @@ func (o *OutputOverview) GeneralSummary(showURL bool, showRelays bool, showNameS
}
}
vncServerStatus := "Disabled"
if o.VNCServerState.Enabled {
vncSessionCount := len(o.VNCServerState.Sessions)
if vncSessionCount > 0 {
sessionWord := "session"
if vncSessionCount > 1 {
sessionWord = "sessions"
}
vncServerStatus = fmt.Sprintf("Enabled (%d active %s)", vncSessionCount, sessionWord)
} else {
vncServerStatus = "Enabled"
}
if showSSHSessions && vncSessionCount > 0 {
for _, sess := range o.VNCServerState.Sessions {
vncServerStatus += "\n " + formatVNCSessionLine(sess)
}
}
}
peersCountString := fmt.Sprintf("%d/%d Connected", o.Peers.Connected, o.Peers.Total)
var sessionExpiryString string
@@ -669,7 +613,6 @@ func (o *OutputOverview) GeneralSummary(showURL bool, showRelays bool, showNameS
"Quantum resistance: %s\n"+
"Lazy connection: %s\n"+
"SSH Server: %s\n"+
"VNC Server: %s\n"+
"Networks: %s\n"+
"%s"+
"%s"+
@@ -690,7 +633,6 @@ func (o *OutputOverview) GeneralSummary(showURL bool, showRelays bool, showNameS
rosenpassEnabledStatus,
lazyConnectionEnabledStatus,
sshServerStatus,
vncServerStatus,
networks,
forwardingRulesString,
sessionExpiryString,
@@ -1053,26 +995,6 @@ func anonymizePeerDetail(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, peer *PeerStateDetailOutput) {
}
}
// formatVNCSessionLine renders a single VNC session row for the detailed
// status output. The leading slot identifies the initiator (display name
// when known, hashed UserID otherwise); the post-arrow slot is the OS
// user the session targets and is omitted in attach mode where the
// destination is the current console user (unknown to the daemon).
func formatVNCSessionLine(sess VNCSessionOutput) string {
who := sess.Initiator
if who == "" {
who = sess.UserID
}
prefix := sess.RemoteAddress
if who != "" {
prefix = fmt.Sprintf("%s@%s", who, sess.RemoteAddress)
}
if sess.Username != "" {
return fmt.Sprintf("[%s -> %s] mode=%s", prefix, sess.Username, sess.Mode)
}
return fmt.Sprintf("[%s] mode=%s", prefix, sess.Mode)
}
func anonymizeOverview(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, overview *OutputOverview) {
for i, peer := range overview.Peers.Details {
peer := peer
@@ -1093,19 +1015,6 @@ func anonymizeOverview(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, overview *OutputOverview) {
overview.Relays.Details[i] = detail
}
anonymizeNSServerGroups(a, overview)
for i, route := range overview.Networks {
overview.Networks[i] = a.AnonymizeRoute(route)
}
overview.FQDN = a.AnonymizeDomain(overview.FQDN)
anonymizeEvents(a, overview)
anonymizeServerSessions(a, overview)
}
func anonymizeNSServerGroups(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, overview *OutputOverview) {
for i, nsGroup := range overview.NSServerGroups {
for j, domain := range nsGroup.Domains {
overview.NSServerGroups[i].Domains[j] = a.AnonymizeDomain(domain)
@@ -1117,9 +1026,13 @@ func anonymizeNSServerGroups(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, overview *OutputOverview)
}
}
}
}
func anonymizeEvents(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, overview *OutputOverview) {
for i, route := range overview.Networks {
overview.Networks[i] = a.AnonymizeRoute(route)
}
overview.FQDN = a.AnonymizeDomain(overview.FQDN)
for i, event := range overview.Events {
overview.Events[i].Message = a.AnonymizeString(event.Message)
overview.Events[i].UserMessage = a.AnonymizeString(event.UserMessage)
@@ -1128,26 +1041,15 @@ func anonymizeEvents(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, overview *OutputOverview) {
event.Metadata[k] = a.AnonymizeString(v)
}
}
}
func anonymizeRemoteAddress(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, addr string) string {
if host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr); err == nil {
return fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", a.AnonymizeIPString(host), port)
}
return a.AnonymizeIPString(addr)
}
func anonymizeServerSessions(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, overview *OutputOverview) {
for i, session := range overview.SSHServerState.Sessions {
overview.SSHServerState.Sessions[i].RemoteAddress = anonymizeRemoteAddress(a, session.RemoteAddress)
if host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(session.RemoteAddress); err == nil {
overview.SSHServerState.Sessions[i].RemoteAddress = fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", a.AnonymizeIPString(host), port)
} else {
overview.SSHServerState.Sessions[i].RemoteAddress = a.AnonymizeIPString(session.RemoteAddress)
}
overview.SSHServerState.Sessions[i].Command = a.AnonymizeString(session.Command)
}
for i, sess := range overview.VNCServerState.Sessions {
overview.VNCServerState.Sessions[i].RemoteAddress = anonymizeRemoteAddress(a, sess.RemoteAddress)
overview.VNCServerState.Sessions[i].Username = a.AnonymizeString(sess.Username)
overview.VNCServerState.Sessions[i].UserID = a.AnonymizeString(sess.UserID)
overview.VNCServerState.Sessions[i].Initiator = a.AnonymizeString(sess.Initiator)
}
}
// FormatRemainingDuration renders a time.Duration for the "Session expires"

View File

@@ -242,10 +242,6 @@ var overview = OutputOverview{
Enabled: false,
Sessions: []SSHSessionOutput{},
},
VNCServerState: VNCServerStateOutput{
Enabled: false,
Sessions: []VNCSessionOutput{},
},
}
func TestConversionFromFullStatusToOutputOverview(t *testing.T) {
@@ -411,10 +407,6 @@ func TestParsingToJSON(t *testing.T) {
"sshServer":{
"enabled":false,
"sessions":[]
},
"vncServer":{
"enabled":false,
"sessions":[]
}
}`
// @formatter:on
@@ -525,9 +517,6 @@ profileName: ""
sshServer:
enabled: false
sessions: []
vncServer:
enabled: false
sessions: []
`
assert.Equal(t, expectedYAML, yaml)
@@ -598,7 +587,6 @@ Wireguard port: %d
Quantum resistance: false
Lazy connection: false
SSH Server: Disabled
VNC Server: Disabled
Networks: 10.10.0.0/24
Peers count: 2/2 Connected
`, lastConnectionUpdate1, lastHandshake1, lastConnectionUpdate2, lastHandshake2, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH, overview.CliVersion, overview.WgPort)
@@ -625,7 +613,6 @@ Wireguard port: 51820
Quantum resistance: false
Lazy connection: false
SSH Server: Disabled
VNC Server: Disabled
Networks: 10.10.0.0/24
Peers count: 2/2 Connected
`

View File

@@ -65,7 +65,6 @@ type Info struct {
RosenpassEnabled bool
RosenpassPermissive bool
ServerSSHAllowed bool
ServerVNCAllowed bool
DisableClientRoutes bool
DisableServerRoutes bool
@@ -87,7 +86,6 @@ type Info struct {
func (i *Info) SetFlags(
rosenpassEnabled, rosenpassPermissive bool,
serverSSHAllowed *bool,
serverVNCAllowed *bool,
disableClientRoutes, disableServerRoutes,
disableDNS, disableFirewall, blockLANAccess, blockInbound, disableIPv6 bool, syncMessageVersion *int,
enableSSHRoot, enableSSHSFTP, enableSSHLocalPortForwarding, enableSSHRemotePortForwarding *bool,
@@ -98,9 +96,6 @@ func (i *Info) SetFlags(
if serverSSHAllowed != nil {
i.ServerSSHAllowed = *serverSSHAllowed
}
if serverVNCAllowed != nil {
i.ServerVNCAllowed = *serverVNCAllowed
}
i.DisableClientRoutes = disableClientRoutes
i.DisableServerRoutes = disableServerRoutes

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ import ReactDOM from "react-dom/client";
import "./globals.css";
import { HashRouter, Navigate, Route, Routes } from "react-router-dom";
import SessionExpirationDialog from "@/modules/session/SessionExpirationDialog.tsx";
import ApprovalDialog from "@/modules/approval/ApprovalDialog.tsx";
import UpdateInProgressDialog from "@/modules/auto-update/UpdateInProgressDialog.tsx";
import WelcomeDialog from "@/modules/welcome/WelcomeDialog.tsx";
import ErrorDialog from "@/modules/error/ErrorDialog.tsx";
@@ -49,7 +48,6 @@ Promise.all([
path={"session-expiration"}
element={<SessionExpirationDialog />}
/>
<Route path={"approval"} element={<ApprovalDialog />} />
<Route path={"welcome"} element={<WelcomeDialog />} />
<Route path={"error"} element={<ErrorDialog />} />
</Route>

View File

@@ -43,7 +43,12 @@ function buildSsoCancelPromise(state: SsoState, signal?: AbortSignal): Promise<v
}
async function runSsoLogin(
result: { verificationUri: string; verificationUriComplete: string; userCode: string },
result: {
verificationUri: string;
verificationUriComplete: string;
userCode: string;
profileId: string;
},
state: SsoState,
signal?: AbortSignal,
): Promise<void> {
@@ -56,7 +61,7 @@ async function runSsoLogin(
// suspended, so a frontend-driven Up (a promise continuation) would not
// fire until the user woke the window (e.g. hovering the tray icon).
const waitPromise = Connection.WaitSSOLoginAndUp(
{ userCode: result.userCode, hostname: "" },
{ userCode: result.userCode, hostname: "", profileId: result.profileId },
{ profileName: "", username: "" },
);

View File

@@ -1,170 +0,0 @@
import { useCallback, useEffect, useMemo, useRef, useState } from "react";
import { useTranslation } from "react-i18next";
import { useSearchParams } from "react-router-dom";
import { MonitorIcon } from "lucide-react";
import { Button } from "@/components/buttons/Button";
import { ConfirmDialog } from "@/components/dialog/ConfirmDialog";
import { DialogActions } from "@/components/dialog/DialogActions";
import { DialogHeading } from "@/components/dialog/DialogHeading";
import { SquareIcon } from "@/components/SquareIcon";
import { Approval, WindowManager } from "@bindings/services";
import { useAutoSizeWindow } from "@/hooks/useAutoSizeWindow";
const WINDOW_WIDTH = 360;
// Fallback window so a missing/unparseable expires_at can't leave the prompt open forever.
const FALLBACK_SECONDS = 13;
// shortFingerprint groups a hex key as XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX (16 chars). Mirrors the
// daemon's approval.ShortKeyFingerprint so the value matches an out-of-band reference.
function shortFingerprint(hexKey: string): string {
if (hexKey.length < 8) return "";
const src = hexKey.slice(0, 16);
return src.match(/.{1,4}/g)?.join("-") ?? src;
}
type Row = { label: string; value: string; mono?: boolean };
export default function ApprovalDialog() {
const { t } = useTranslation();
const contentRef = useAutoSizeWindow<HTMLDivElement>(WINDOW_WIDTH);
const [params] = useSearchParams();
const [busy, setBusy] = useState(false);
const requestID = params.get("request_id") ?? "";
const kind = params.get("kind") ?? "";
const initiator = params.get("initiator") ?? "";
const peerName = params.get("peer_name") ?? "";
const sourceIP = params.get("source_ip") ?? "";
const username = params.get("username") ?? "";
const peerPubKey = params.get("peer_pubkey") ?? "";
const expiresAt = params.get("expires_at") ?? "";
const deadline = useMemo(() => {
const parsed = Date.parse(expiresAt);
return Number.isFinite(parsed) ? parsed : Date.now() + FALLBACK_SECONDS * 1000;
}, [expiresAt]);
const title = useMemo(() => {
switch (kind) {
case "vnc":
return t("approval.title.vnc");
case "ssh":
return t("approval.title.ssh");
default:
return t("approval.title.default");
}
}, [kind, t]);
const rows = useMemo<Row[]>(() => {
const out: Row[] = [];
// The display name is dashboard-supplied and not cryptographically
// asserted; the key fingerprint below IS, so show both.
if (initiator) out.push({ label: t("approval.field.user"), value: initiator });
const fp = shortFingerprint(peerPubKey);
if (fp) out.push({ label: t("approval.field.keyFingerprint"), value: fp, mono: true });
if (peerName) out.push({ label: t("approval.field.peer"), value: peerName });
if (sourceIP && sourceIP !== peerName)
out.push({ label: t("approval.field.sourceIp"), value: sourceIP, mono: true });
if (username) out.push({ label: t("approval.field.osUser"), value: username });
return out;
}, [initiator, peerPubKey, peerName, sourceIP, username, t]);
const respond = useCallback(
async (accept: boolean, viewOnly: boolean) => {
if (busy) return;
setBusy(true);
try {
if (requestID) {
await Approval.Respond(requestID, accept, viewOnly);
}
} catch (e) {
console.error("respond approval failed", e);
} finally {
WindowManager.CloseApproval().catch(console.error);
}
},
[busy, requestID],
);
const secondsLeft = () => Math.max(0, Math.ceil((deadline - Date.now()) / 1000));
const [remaining, setRemaining] = useState(secondsLeft);
const closedRef = useRef(false);
useEffect(() => {
const id = globalThis.setInterval(() => {
const left = secondsLeft();
setRemaining(left);
// On the deadline the daemon auto-denies; just close the prompt.
if (left <= 0 && !closedRef.current) {
closedRef.current = true;
WindowManager.CloseApproval().catch(console.error);
}
}, 1000);
return () => globalThis.clearInterval(id);
// eslint-disable-next-line react-hooks/exhaustive-deps
}, [deadline]);
const showViewOnly = kind === "vnc";
return (
<ConfirmDialog ref={contentRef} aria-labelledby={"nb-approval-title"}>
<SquareIcon icon={MonitorIcon} />
<DialogHeading id={"nb-approval-title"}>{title}</DialogHeading>
{rows.length > 0 && (
<dl className={"w-full space-y-1 text-left text-sm"}>
{rows.map((row) => (
<div key={row.label} className={"flex justify-between gap-4"}>
<dt className={"shrink-0 text-nb-gray-400"}>{row.label}</dt>
<dd
className={`min-w-0 truncate text-nb-gray-100 ${
row.mono ? "font-mono" : ""
}`}
title={row.value}
>
{row.value}
</dd>
</div>
))}
</dl>
)}
<div className={"text-sm tabular-nums text-nb-gray-400"} aria-live={"polite"}>
{t("approval.countdown", { seconds: remaining })}
</div>
<DialogActions>
<Button
autoFocus
variant={"primary"}
size={"md"}
className={"w-full"}
onClick={() => respond(true, false)}
disabled={busy}
>
{t("approval.action.allow")}
</Button>
{showViewOnly && (
<Button
variant={"secondary"}
size={"md"}
className={"w-full"}
onClick={() => respond(true, true)}
disabled={busy}
>
{t("approval.action.allowViewOnly")}
</Button>
)}
<Button
variant={"danger"}
size={"md"}
className={"w-full"}
onClick={() => respond(false, false)}
disabled={busy}
>
{t("approval.action.deny")}
</Button>
</DialogActions>
</ConfirmDialog>
);
}

View File

@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
import { useTranslation } from "react-i18next";
import { CircleAlert } from "lucide-react";
import { Tooltip } from "@/components/Tooltip";
import { useStatus } from "@/contexts/StatusContext.tsx";
import { cn } from "@/lib/cn.ts";
import { type ReactNode } from "react";
// ActiveSessionIndicator marks that someone is attached to this machine over
// VNC right now, and warns that disconnecting ends that session — which may be
// the session the person reading it is using.
//
// An alert glyph rather than an info one: this is not neutral context, it is a
// state that changes what the disconnect button does to you.
//
// Only a warning, never a block. Input injected by the VNC agent is
// indistinguishable from local input, so we cannot tell whether this UI is being
// driven remotely, and the owner may want to disconnect on purpose either way.
//
// Renders nothing when no session is attached.
export function ActiveSessionIndicator({ className }: { className?: string }): ReactNode {
const { t } = useTranslation();
const { status } = useStatus();
const sessions = status?.vncSessions ?? [];
if (sessions.length === 0) return null;
// The initiator is the dashboard user who started the session, which is more
// use than a source address. Absent when the session carries no identity.
const who = sessions
.map((s) => s.initiator)
.filter((name): name is string => !!name)
.join(", ");
const message = who
? t("connect.activeSession.tooltipNamed", { sessionCount: sessions.length, who })
: t("connect.activeSession.tooltip", { sessionCount: sessions.length });
return (
<Tooltip content={<span className={"block max-w-64"}>{message}</span>}>
<span
role={"status"}
aria-label={message}
className={cn(
"inline-flex items-center gap-1 rounded-full border border-yellow-700/50 bg-yellow-900/20 px-2 py-0.5 text-yellow-300",
className,
)}
>
<CircleAlert size={12} aria-hidden={true} />
<span className={"text-[0.7rem] leading-none"}>
{t("connect.activeSession.badge")}
</span>
</span>
</Tooltip>
);
}

View File

@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ import { useFocusVisible } from "@/hooks/useFocusVisible";
import { Check as CheckIcon, ChevronDownIcon, Copy as CopyIcon } from "lucide-react";
import * as Popover from "@radix-ui/react-popover";
import netbirdFullLogo from "@/assets/logos/netbird-full.svg";
import { ActiveSessionIndicator } from "@/modules/main/ActiveSessionIndicator.tsx";
enum ConnectionState {
Disconnected = "disconnected",
@@ -273,9 +272,6 @@ export const MainConnectionStatusSwitch = () => {
/>
</CopyToClipboard>
<LocalIpLine ip={ip} ipv6={ipv6} show={show} />
{connState === ConnectionState.Connected && (
<ActiveSessionIndicator className={"mt-3"} />
)}
</div>
</div>
);

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