[doc] Agent network docs update (#7020)

* [docs] Update agent-network docs for management-owned pricing

  The docs still described the retired proxy-side pricing: pricing.Loader,
  pricing_path, MiddlewareDataDir, embedded defaults_pricing.yaml, and the
  symlink-safe Unix loader. Rewrite them for the current design — management
  synthesizes the whole table and ships it in cost_meter's ConfigJSON, so the
  proxy carries no price list and has nothing to reload.

.git-branches.toml

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 [branches]
 main = "main"
 perennials = []
-perennial-regex = ""
+perennial-regex = "^release-"
 
 [create]
 new-branch-type = "feature"

.github/workflows/check-license-dependencies.yml

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ name: Check License Dependencies
 
 on:
   push:
-    branches: [main]
+    branches: [main, "release-*"]
     paths:
       - "go.mod"
       - "go.sum"

.github/workflows/docs-ack.yml

@@ -12,8 +12,6 @@ jobs:
   docs-ack:
     name: Require docs PR URL or explicit "not needed"
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    # Crowdin's translation-sync service PRs are auto-generated without the PR template.
-    if: github.event.pull_request.user.login != 'netbirddev'
 
     steps:
       - name: Read PR body

.github/workflows/frontend-ui.yml

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ on:
   push:
     branches:
       - main
+      - "release-*"
     paths:
       - "client/ui/frontend/**"
       - "client/ui/i18n/**"

.github/workflows/golang-test-darwin.yml

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ on:
   push:
     branches:
       - main
+      - "release-*"
   pull_request:
 
 concurrency:

.github/workflows/golang-test-freebsd.yml

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ on:
   push:
     branches:
       - main
+      - "release-*"
   pull_request:
 
 concurrency:

.github/workflows/golang-test-linux.yml

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ on:
   push:
     branches:
       - main
+      - "release-*"
   pull_request:
 
 concurrency:

.github/workflows/golang-test-windows.yml

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ on:
   push:
     branches:
       - main
+      - "release-*"
   pull_request:
 
 env:

.github/workflows/install-script-test.yml

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ on:
   push:
     branches:
       - main
+      - "release-*"
   pull_request:
     paths:
       - "release_files/install.sh"

.github/workflows/mobile-build-validation.yml

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ on:
   push:
     branches:
       - main
+      - "release-*"
   pull_request:
 
 concurrency:

.github/workflows/pr-title-check.yml

@@ -7,8 +7,6 @@ on:
 jobs:
   check-title:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    # Crowdin's translation-sync service PRs are auto-generated with a fixed title.
-    if: github.event.pull_request.user.login != 'netbirddev'
     steps:
       - name: Validate PR title prefix
         uses: actions/github-script@3a2844b7e9c422d3c10d287c895573f7108da1b3 # v9.0.0

.github/workflows/release.yml

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ on:
       - "v*"
     branches:
       - main
+      - "release-*"
   pull_request:
 
 env:
@@ -254,15 +255,23 @@ jobs:
         id: tag_and_push_images
         if: |
           (github.event_name == 'pull_request' && github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name == github.repository) ||
-          (github.event_name == 'push' && github.ref == 'refs/heads/main')
+          (github.event_name == 'push' && (github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' || startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/heads/release-')))
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
 
+          # $GITHUB_REF / $GITHUB_EVENT_NAME are read from the runner
+          # environment rather than substituted into this script with the
+          # workflow expression syntax: branch names may legally contain
+          # $(…), and interpolating github.ref would execute it.
           resolve_tags() {
-            if [[ "${{ github.event_name }}" == "pull_request" ]]; then
+            if [[ "$GITHUB_EVENT_NAME" == "pull_request" ]]; then
               echo "pr-${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}"
-            else
+            elif [[ "$GITHUB_REF" == "refs/heads/main" ]]; then
               echo "main sha-$(git rev-parse --short HEAD)"
+            else
+              # Release branches get an immutable sha-* tag only — the floating
+              # "main" tag must never move from a release branch.
+              echo "sha-$(git rev-parse --short HEAD)"
             fi
           }
 

.github/workflows/sync-tag.yml

@@ -9,21 +9,9 @@ concurrency:
   group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}-${{ github.head_ref || github.actor_id }}
   cancel-in-progress: true
 
-# Receiving workflows (cloud sync-tag, mobile bump-netbird) expect the short
-# tag form (e.g. v0.30.0), not refs/tags/v0.30.0 — github.ref_name, not github.ref.
+# The receiving bump-netbird workflows expect the short tag form
+# (e.g. v0.30.0), not refs/tags/v0.30.0 — github.ref_name, not github.ref.
 jobs:
-  trigger_sync_tag:
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    steps:
-      - name: Trigger release tag sync
-        uses: benc-uk/workflow-dispatch@31e2b3319479a63f0ab15bf800eff9e913504e26 # v1.3.2
-        with:
-          workflow: sync-tag.yml
-          ref: main
-          repo: ${{ secrets.UPSTREAM_REPO }}
-          token: ${{ secrets.NC_GITHUB_TOKEN }}
-          inputs: '{ "tag": "${{ github.ref_name }}" }'
-
   trigger_android_bump:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     if: github.event.created && !github.event.deleted && startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') && !contains(github.ref_name, '-')

.github/workflows/test-infrastructure-files.yml

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ on:
   push:
     branches:
       - main
+      - "release-*"
   pull_request:
     paths:
       - "infrastructure_files/**"

.github/workflows/ui-translations.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+name: UI Translations
+
+on:
+  pull_request:
+    paths:
+      - "client/ui/i18n/locales/**"
+      - "client/ui/i18n/check-translations.mjs"
+      - ".github/workflows/ui-translations.yml"
+  push:
+    branches:
+      - main
+    paths:
+      - "client/ui/i18n/locales/**"
+      - "client/ui/i18n/check-translations.mjs"
+
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
+concurrency:
+  group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}-${{ github.head_ref || github.actor_id }}
+  cancel-in-progress: true
+
+jobs:
+  check-translations:
+    name: Check translation key parity
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 5
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout repository
+        uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6.0.2
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      - name: Set up Node.js
+        uses: actions/setup-node@v4
+        with:
+          node-version: "22"
+
+      # English (en) is the source of truth for translation keys; every other
+      # locale declared in _index.json must carry the exact same key set.
+      - name: Check translation key parity
+        run: node client/ui/i18n/check-translations.mjs

.github/workflows/wasm-build-validation.yml

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ on:
   push:
     branches:
       - main
+      - "release-*"
   pull_request:
 
 concurrency:

.goreleaser.yaml

@@ -468,6 +468,13 @@ checksum:
     - glob: ./infrastructure_files/migrate-to-enterprise.sh
 
 release:
+  # The signing pipeline (netbirdio/sign-pipelines, dispatched by
+  # trigger_signer) marks the release latest once the Windows and macOS
+  # artifacts are signed. Without this override goreleaser marks it latest
+  # at publish time, while those artifacts are still unsigned.
+  make_latest: false
+  # Mark x.y.z-rc.* and other prerelease tags as prereleases on GitHub.
+  prerelease: auto
   extra_files:
     - glob: ./infrastructure_files/getting-started-with-zitadel.sh
     - glob: ./release_files/install.sh

.goreleaser_ui.yaml

@@ -144,3 +144,11 @@ uploads:
     target: https://pkgs.wiretrustee.com/yum/{{ .Arch }}{{ if .Arm }}{{ .Arm }}{{ end }}
     username: dev@wiretrustee.com
     method: PUT
+
+release:
+  # Uploads into the release created by the main .goreleaser.yaml run.
+  # make_latest stays false everywhere: the signing pipeline
+  # (netbirdio/sign-pipelines) marks the release latest after the Windows
+  # and macOS artifacts are signed.
+  make_latest: false
+  prerelease: auto

.goreleaser_ui_darwin.yaml

@@ -43,3 +43,11 @@ checksum:
   name_template: "{{ .ProjectName }}_darwin_checksums.txt"
 changelog:
   disable: true
+
+release:
+  # Uploads into the release created by the main .goreleaser.yaml run.
+  # make_latest stays false everywhere: the signing pipeline
+  # (netbirdio/sign-pipelines) marks the release latest after the Windows
+  # and macOS artifacts are signed.
+  make_latest: false
+  prerelease: auto

.goreleaser_ui_gtk3.yaml

@@ -43,19 +43,17 @@ archives:
       - netbird-ui-gtk3
 
 nfpms:
-  # Same package_name as the GTK4 packages -- the two are mutually-exclusive
-  # alternatives served from separate repo paths (see uploads below); a given
-  # distro points at exactly one of them. The file names must still differ:
-  # the Debian pool is shared storage keyed by file name, so a default-named
-  # gtk3 .deb would overwrite the stable one.
+  # Mutually-exclusive alternative to the GTK4 netbird-ui package -- both
+  # ship the same /usr/bin/netbird-ui from the shared stable/yum repos, so
+  # this one carries its own name and conflicts with the GTK4 package.
   - maintainer: Netbird <dev@netbird.io>
     description: Netbird client UI.
     homepage: https://netbird.io/
     license: BSD-3-Clause
     vendor: NetBird
     id: netbird_ui_deb_gtk3
-    package_name: netbird-ui
-    file_name_template: "{{ .PackageName }}-gtk3_{{ .Version }}_{{ .Os }}_{{ .Arch }}"
+    package_name: netbird-ui-gtk3
+    file_name_template: "{{ .PackageName }}_{{ .Version }}_{{ .Os }}_{{ .Arch }}"
     builds:
       - netbird-ui-gtk3
     formats:
@@ -67,6 +65,10 @@ nfpms:
         dst: /usr/share/applications/org.wails.netbird.desktop
       - src: client/ui/build/appicon.png
         dst: /usr/share/pixmaps/netbird.png
+    conflicts:
+      - netbird-ui
+    replaces:
+      - netbird-ui
     dependencies:
       - netbird (>= 0.75.0)
       - libgtk-3-0
@@ -79,8 +81,8 @@ nfpms:
     license: BSD-3-Clause
     vendor: NetBird
     id: netbird_ui_rpm_gtk3
-    package_name: netbird-ui
-    file_name_template: "{{ .PackageName }}-gtk3_{{ .Version }}_{{ .Os }}_{{ .Arch }}"
+    package_name: netbird-ui-gtk3
+    file_name_template: "{{ .PackageName }}_{{ .Version }}_{{ .Os }}_{{ .Arch }}"
     builds:
       - netbird-ui-gtk3
     formats:
@@ -92,6 +94,10 @@ nfpms:
         dst: /usr/share/applications/org.wails.netbird.desktop
       - src: client/ui/build/appicon.png
         dst: /usr/share/pixmaps/netbird.png
+    # No `replaces` here: nfpm maps it to rpm Obsoletes, which would make
+    # dnf swap installed GTK4 netbird-ui packages for this one on upgrade.
+    conflicts:
+      - netbird-ui
     dependencies:
       - netbird >= 0.75.0
       - (gtk3 or libgtk-3-0)
@@ -111,32 +117,28 @@ changelog:
   disable: true
 
 uploads:
-  # The gtk3 packages reuse the netbird-ui package name, so they live in
-  # dedicated repo paths (deb distribution `gtk3`, yum path `yum-gtk3`) that
-  # legacy distros point their repo config at.
-  #
-  # GoReleaser derives the credential env var from the upload name, so these
-  # would look for UPLOAD_DEBIAN-GTK3_SECRET / UPLOAD_YUM-GTK3_SECRET. The
-  # release workflow only exports UPLOAD_DEBIAN_SECRET / UPLOAD_YUM_SECRET, and
-  # a missing secret is a silent skip rather than a failure -- the packages
-  # reached the GitHub release but never the package repositories. Point
-  # `password` at the exported vars so both uploads authenticate.
-  - name: debian-gtk3
+  - name: debian
     skip: "{{ .Env.SKIP_PUBLISH }}"
     ids:
       - netbird_ui_deb_gtk3
     mode: archive
-    target: https://pkgs.wiretrustee.com/debian/pool/{{ .ArtifactName }};deb.distribution=gtk3;deb.component=main;deb.architecture={{ if .Arm }}armhf{{ else }}{{ .Arch }}{{ end }};deb.package=
+    target: https://pkgs.wiretrustee.com/debian/pool/{{ .ArtifactName }};deb.distribution=stable;deb.component=main;deb.architecture={{ if .Arm }}armhf{{ else }}{{ .Arch }}{{ end }};deb.package=
     username: dev@wiretrustee.com
-    password: "{{ .Env.UPLOAD_DEBIAN_SECRET }}"
     method: PUT
 
-  - name: yum-gtk3
+  - name: yum
     skip: "{{ .Env.SKIP_PUBLISH }}"
     ids:
       - netbird_ui_rpm_gtk3
     mode: archive
-    target: https://pkgs.wiretrustee.com/yum-gtk3/{{ .Arch }}{{ if .Arm }}{{ .Arm }}{{ end }}
+    target: https://pkgs.wiretrustee.com/yum/{{ .Arch }}{{ if .Arm }}{{ .Arm }}{{ end }}
     username: dev@wiretrustee.com
-    password: "{{ .Env.UPLOAD_YUM_SECRET }}"
     method: PUT
+
+release:
+  # Uploads into the release created by the main .goreleaser.yaml run.
+  # make_latest stays false everywhere: the signing pipeline
+  # (netbirdio/sign-pipelines) marks the release latest after the Windows
+  # and macOS artifacts are signed.
+  make_latest: false
+  prerelease: auto

AGENTS.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # NetBird Agent Guidelines
 
-**NetBird** is an open-source connectivity platform: a WireGuard®-based overlay
+**NetBird** is an open source connectivity platform: a WireGuard®-based overlay
 network with a control plane. The **agent** (`client/`) runs on user machines as
 a privileged daemon and manages the WireGuard interface, routing, firewall, and
 DNS. **Management** (`management/`) is the control plane and REST/gRPC API,

CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ go test -race ./client/internal/dns/...
 
 ## Checklist before submitting a PR
 
-As a critical network service and open-source project, we must enforce a few
+As a critical network service and open source project, we must enforce a few
 things before submitting a pull request. The
 [pull request template](/.github/pull_request_template.md) mirrors this list —
 fill it in rather than deleting it.

README.md

@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ In November 2022, NetBird joined the [StartUpSecure program](https://www.forschu
 ![CISPA_Logo_BLACK_EN_RZ_RGB (1)](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/700848/203091324-c6d311a0-22b5-4b05-a288-91cbc6cdcc46.png)
 
 ### Acknowledgements
-We build on open-source technologies like [WireGuard®](https://www.wireguard.com/), [Pion ICE](https://github.com/pion/ice), and [Rosenpass](https://rosenpass.eu). We greatly appreciate the work these projects are doing, and we'd love it if you could support them too (e.g., by starring or contributing).
+We build on open source technologies like [WireGuard®](https://www.wireguard.com/), [Pion ICE](https://github.com/pion/ice), and [Rosenpass](https://rosenpass.eu). We greatly appreciate the work these projects are doing, and we'd love it if you could support them too (e.g., by starring or contributing).
 
 ### Legal
 This repository is licensed under the BSD-3-Clause license, which applies to all parts of the repository except for the directories management/, signal/ and relay/.

SECURITY.md

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ Report security issues one of these two ways:
   on this repository. This is the preferred route: it keeps the discussion, the draft advisory, and the credit in one place.
 - **Email** — `security@netbird.io`.
 
-If the finding affects NetBird Cloud or our hosted infrastructure rather than the open-source code, email us rather than
+If the finding affects NetBird Cloud or our hosted infrastructure rather than the open source code, email us rather than
 filing a repository report.
 
 ### What to include

client/android/login.go

@@ -204,8 +204,9 @@ func (a *Auth) foregroundGetTokenInfo(authClient *auth.Auth, urlOpener URLOpener
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get OAuth flow: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	// An empty hint is deliberate, not a fallback: a fresh or logged-out profile
-	// leaves the choice to the IdP, which is how accounts get switched.
+	// An empty hint is deliberate, not a fallback: a fresh profile leaves the
+	// choice to the IdP. Switching accounts is done by switching or removing
+	// profiles, not by logging out — logout keeps the email.
 	if a.cfgPath != "" {
 		if hint := readProfileEmail(a.cfgPath); hint != "" {
 			if setter, ok := oAuthFlow.(loginHintSetter); ok {

client/android/profile_manager.go

@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@ type Profile struct {
 	ID   string
 	Name string
 	// Email is the account this profile last logged in with, "" if it never
-	// completed an SSO login or was logged out. See profile_state.go.
+	// completed an SSO login. Kept across logouts; cleared when the profile is
+	// removed. See profile_state.go.
 	Email    string
 	IsActive bool
 }
@@ -200,11 +201,9 @@ func (pm *ProfileManager) LogoutProfile(id string) error {
 		return fmt.Errorf("failed to save config: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	// Not fatal: a stale hint costs an account switch, not the logout itself.
-	if err := removeProfileEmail(configPath); err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("failed to clear stored account email for profile %s: %v", id, err)
-	}
-
+	// The stored account email is kept on purpose, matching the desktop and CLI
+	// logout semantics: the next login passes it as the login_hint so the IdP
+	// preselects the account. Removing the profile is what deletes it.
 	log.Infof("logged out from profile: %s", id)
 	return nil
 }
@@ -224,11 +223,24 @@ func (pm *ProfileManager) RenameProfile(id string, newName string) error {
 
 // RemoveProfile deletes a profile
 func (pm *ProfileManager) RemoveProfile(id string) error {
+	configPath, err := pm.getProfileConfigPath(id)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
 	// Use ServiceManager (removes profile from profiles/ directory)
 	if err := pm.serviceMgr.RemoveProfile(profilemanager.ID(id), androidUsername); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("failed to remove profile: %w", err)
 	}
 
+	// The account file is this package's, not the ServiceManager's, so it must
+	// go here. The default profile has a fixed filename, so a recreated one
+	// would otherwise inherit the deleted profile's email as its login_hint.
+	// Not fatal: the profile itself is gone.
+	if err := removeProfileEmail(configPath); err != nil {
+		log.Warnf("failed to remove stored account email for profile %s: %v", id, err)
+	}
+
 	log.Infof("removed profile: %s", id)
 	return nil
 }

client/android/profile_state.go

@@ -90,10 +90,10 @@ func writeProfileEmail(configPath string, email string) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-// removeProfileEmail drops the stored account email. Called on logout: while the
-// email is on disk it goes out as a login_hint, which would steer the next login
-// straight back into the account just logged out of. Mirrors the desktop UI's
-// RemoveProfileState call.
+// removeProfileEmail drops the stored account email. Called on profile removal,
+// not on logout: a logged-out profile keeps its email so the next login passes
+// it as the login_hint, matching the desktop and CLI semantics. Mirrors the
+// desktop UI's RemoveProfileState call.
 func removeProfileEmail(configPath string) error {
 	accountPath, err := profileAccountPathFor(configPath)
 	if err != nil {

client/android/profile_state_test.go

@@ -127,10 +127,10 @@ func TestWriteThenReadProfileEmail(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("remove: %v", err)
 	}
 	if got := readProfileEmail(configPath); got != "" {
-		t.Errorf("expected no email after logout, got %q", got)
+		t.Errorf("expected no email after removal, got %q", got)
 	}
 
-	// Logout may run on a never-logged-in profile, so a second remove must pass.
+	// Removal may run on a never-logged-in profile, so a second remove must pass.
 	if err := removeProfileEmail(configPath); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("second remove should be a no-op: %v", err)
 	}

client/anonymize/anonymize.go

@@ -305,6 +305,12 @@ func (a *Anonymizer) AnonymizeDomain(domain string) string {
 		return domain
 	}
 
+	// A reverse zone names an address prefix, so it follows the address rules,
+	// which also keeps its digit labels intact.
+	if zone, ok := a.anonymizeReverseZone(baseDomain); ok {
+		return withTrailingDot(zone, hasDot)
+	}
+
 	if suffix := protectedSuffix(baseDomain); suffix != "" {
 		if a.level < LevelStrict || baseDomain == suffix || suffix == infraDomain {
 			return domain
@@ -405,6 +411,10 @@ func (a *Anonymizer) AnonymizeString(str string) string {
 	ipv4Regex := regexp.MustCompile(`\b(?:[0-9]{1,3}\.){3}[0-9]{1,3}\b`)
 	ipv6Regex := regexp.MustCompile(`\b([0-9a-fA-F:]+:+[0-9a-fA-F]{0,4})(?:%[0-9a-zA-Z]+)?(?:\/[0-9]{1,3})?(?::[0-9]{1,5})?\b`)
 
+	// Reverse zones go first and are then held out of the passes below: their
+	// labels are digits, which the address patterns would otherwise consume.
+	str, restoreZones := a.replaceReverseZones(str)
+
 	str = ipv4Regex.ReplaceAllStringFunc(str, a.AnonymizeIPString)
 	str = ipv6Regex.ReplaceAllStringFunc(str, a.AnonymizeIPString)
 
@@ -425,7 +435,7 @@ func (a *Anonymizer) AnonymizeString(str string) string {
 		str = wgKeyRegex.ReplaceAllStringFunc(str, a.AnonymizeWGKey)
 	}
 
-	return str
+	return restoreZones(str)
 }
 
 // sortedDomains returns the domain mappings longest-first, so a full-FQDN

client/anonymize/reverse_zone.go

@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+package anonymize
+
+import (
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"net/netip"
+	"regexp"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+const (
+	reverseZoneSuffixV4 = ".in-addr.arpa"
+	reverseZoneSuffixV6 = ".ip6.arpa"
+
+	v6Nibbles = 32
+	v4Octets  = 4
+)
+
+// reverseZoneRegexes match a reverse zone or a full reverse name in free text.
+// They are applied before the address passes of AnonymizeString, whose IPv4
+// pattern would otherwise consume the digit labels of a zone and replace parts
+// of it with unrelated addresses.
+var reverseZoneRegexes = []*regexp.Regexp{
+	regexp.MustCompile(`(?:[0-9]{1,3}\.){1,4}in-addr\.arpa\b`),
+	regexp.MustCompile(`(?:[0-9a-fA-F]\.){1,32}ip6\.arpa\b`),
+}
+
+// anonymizeReverseZone maps a reverse zone to the zone of the anonymized form
+// of the prefix it encodes, so it follows the address rules rather than the
+// domain ones: the zone of an address that is preserved is preserved too, and
+// the zone of one that is replaced names the replacement. This keeps a reverse
+// zone recognizable as such, and consistent with the addresses it belongs to
+// elsewhere in the same output. It reports false for anything that is not a
+// reverse zone.
+func (a *Anonymizer) anonymizeReverseZone(domain string) (string, bool) {
+	prefix, labelCount, suffix, ok := parseReverseZone(domain)
+	if !ok {
+		return "", false
+	}
+
+	anonymized := a.AnonymizeIP(prefix)
+	if anonymized == prefix {
+		return domain, true
+	}
+
+	return reverseZoneName(anonymized, labelCount) + suffix, true
+}
+
+// replaceReverseZones anonymizes every reverse zone in str and swaps each one
+// for a placeholder, returning a function that puts the anonymized zones back.
+// The placeholders carry no dots, digits or colons, so no later pass matches
+// them.
+func (a *Anonymizer) replaceReverseZones(str string) (string, func(string) string) {
+	var zones []string
+
+	for _, re := range reverseZoneRegexes {
+		str = re.ReplaceAllStringFunc(str, func(match string) string {
+			zone, ok := a.anonymizeReverseZone(match)
+			if !ok {
+				return match
+			}
+
+			zones = append(zones, zone)
+			return reverseZonePlaceholder(len(zones) - 1)
+		})
+	}
+
+	if len(zones) == 0 {
+		return str, func(s string) string { return s }
+	}
+
+	return str, func(s string) string {
+		for i, zone := range zones {
+			s = strings.ReplaceAll(s, reverseZonePlaceholder(i), zone)
+		}
+		return s
+	}
+}
+
+func reverseZonePlaceholder(index int) string {
+	return "\x00reversezone" + strconv.Itoa(index) + "\x00"
+}
+
+// parseReverseZone turns a reverse zone into the address of the prefix its
+// labels spell backwards, padding the absent low-order part with zeroes, and
+// returns the label count and zone suffix so the name can be rebuilt.
+func parseReverseZone(domain string) (netip.Addr, int, string, bool) {
+	lower := strings.ToLower(domain)
+
+	switch {
+	case strings.HasSuffix(lower, reverseZoneSuffixV4):
+		labels := strings.Split(strings.TrimSuffix(lower, reverseZoneSuffixV4), ".")
+		addr, ok := reverseZoneAddrV4(labels)
+		return addr, len(labels), reverseZoneSuffixV4, ok
+	case strings.HasSuffix(lower, reverseZoneSuffixV6):
+		labels := strings.Split(strings.TrimSuffix(lower, reverseZoneSuffixV6), ".")
+		addr, ok := reverseZoneAddrV6(labels)
+		return addr, len(labels), reverseZoneSuffixV6, ok
+	default:
+		return netip.Addr{}, 0, "", false
+	}
+}
+
+func reverseZoneAddrV4(labels []string) (netip.Addr, bool) {
+	if len(labels) == 0 || len(labels) > v4Octets {
+		return netip.Addr{}, false
+	}
+
+	var octets [v4Octets]byte
+	for i, label := range labels {
+		octet, err := strconv.ParseUint(label, 10, 8)
+		if err != nil {
+			return netip.Addr{}, false
+		}
+		octets[len(labels)-1-i] = byte(octet)
+	}
+
+	return netip.AddrFrom4(octets), true
+}
+
+func reverseZoneAddrV6(labels []string) (netip.Addr, bool) {
+	if len(labels) == 0 || len(labels) > v6Nibbles {
+		return netip.Addr{}, false
+	}
+
+	nibbles := make([]byte, 0, v6Nibbles)
+	for i := len(labels) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
+		if len(labels[i]) != 1 || !isHexDigit(labels[i][0]) {
+			return netip.Addr{}, false
+		}
+		nibbles = append(nibbles, labels[i][0])
+	}
+	for len(nibbles) < v6Nibbles {
+		nibbles = append(nibbles, '0')
+	}
+
+	var groups []string
+	for i := 0; i < len(nibbles); i += 4 {
+		groups = append(groups, string(nibbles[i:i+4]))
+	}
+
+	addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(strings.Join(groups, ":"))
+	if err != nil {
+		return netip.Addr{}, false
+	}
+
+	return addr, true
+}
+
+// reverseZoneName spells the first labelCount labels of addr backwards, the
+// inverse of parseReverseZone, without the zone suffix.
+func reverseZoneName(addr netip.Addr, labelCount int) string {
+	labels := make([]string, 0, labelCount)
+
+	if addr.Is4() {
+		octets := addr.As4()
+		for i := labelCount - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
+			labels = append(labels, strconv.Itoa(int(octets[i])))
+		}
+		return strings.Join(labels, ".")
+	}
+
+	address := addr.As16()
+	nibbles := hex.EncodeToString(address[:])
+	for i := labelCount - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
+		labels = append(labels, string(nibbles[i]))
+	}
+
+	return strings.Join(labels, ".")
+}
+
+func isHexDigit(c byte) bool {
+	return c >= '0' && c <= '9' || c >= 'a' && c <= 'f' || c >= 'A' && c <= 'F'
+}

client/anonymize/reverse_zone_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+package anonymize
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+func newLeveledAnonymizer(level Level) *Anonymizer {
+	a := NewAnonymizer(DefaultAddresses())
+	a.SetLevel(level)
+	return a
+}
+
+// TestAnonymizeDomainReverseZone covers reverse zones going through the address
+// rules instead of the domain ones, so a zone stays a zone and an address that
+// is preserved keeps the zone that names it.
+func TestAnonymizeDomainReverseZone(t *testing.T) {
+	// 100.64.0.0/10 is the overlay range, which is CGNAT: preserved at the
+	// default level and replaced from the internal pool at the strict one
+	const overlayZone = "64.100.in-addr.arpa"
+
+	t.Run("overlay zone preserved at the default level", func(t *testing.T) {
+		a := newLeveledAnonymizer(LevelDefault)
+		assert.Equal(t, overlayZone, a.AnonymizeDomain(overlayZone), "should keep the zone of a preserved address")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("private zone preserved at the default level", func(t *testing.T) {
+		a := newLeveledAnonymizer(LevelDefault)
+		assert.Equal(t, "168.192.in-addr.arpa", a.AnonymizeDomain("168.192.in-addr.arpa"), "should keep the zone of a private address")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("overlay zone replaced at the strict level", func(t *testing.T) {
+		a := newLeveledAnonymizer(LevelStrict)
+
+		got := a.AnonymizeDomain(overlayZone)
+		require.True(t, strings.HasSuffix(got, reverseZoneSuffixV4), "should stay a reverse zone, got %q", got)
+		assert.NotEqual(t, overlayZone, got, "should replace the encoded prefix")
+		assert.Len(t, strings.Split(strings.TrimSuffix(got, reverseZoneSuffixV4), "."), 2,
+			"should keep the label count, got %q", got)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("public zone replaced at the default level", func(t *testing.T) {
+		a := newLeveledAnonymizer(LevelDefault)
+
+		got := a.AnonymizeDomain("113.0.203.in-addr.arpa")
+		require.True(t, strings.HasSuffix(got, reverseZoneSuffixV4), "should stay a reverse zone, got %q", got)
+		assert.NotEqual(t, "113.0.203.in-addr.arpa", got, "should replace a public prefix")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("zone of an address keeps that address mapping", func(t *testing.T) {
+		a := newLeveledAnonymizer(LevelDefault)
+
+		anonymizedAddr := a.AnonymizeIPString("203.0.113.7")
+		got := a.AnonymizeDomain("7.113.0.203.in-addr.arpa")
+
+		octets := strings.Split(anonymizedAddr, ".")
+		want := octets[3] + "." + octets[2] + "." + octets[1] + "." + octets[0] + reverseZoneSuffixV4
+		assert.Equal(t, want, got, "should name the same replacement as the address itself")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("ipv6 nibble labels stay single digits", func(t *testing.T) {
+		a := newLeveledAnonymizer(LevelDefault)
+
+		zone := "0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.2.0.0.0" + reverseZoneSuffixV6
+		got := a.AnonymizeDomain(zone)
+
+		require.True(t, strings.HasSuffix(got, reverseZoneSuffixV6), "should stay a reverse zone, got %q", got)
+		labels := strings.Split(strings.TrimSuffix(got, reverseZoneSuffixV6), ".")
+		assert.Len(t, labels, 28, "should keep every nibble label, got %q", got)
+		for _, label := range labels {
+			assert.Len(t, label, 1, "nibble label %q should stay a single digit", label)
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("trailing dot is kept", func(t *testing.T) {
+		a := newLeveledAnonymizer(LevelDefault)
+		assert.Equal(t, "64.100.in-addr.arpa.", a.AnonymizeDomain("64.100.in-addr.arpa."), "should keep the trailing dot")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("a domain that only looks like a zone is anonymized as a domain", func(t *testing.T) {
+		a := newLeveledAnonymizer(LevelDefault)
+
+		got := a.AnonymizeDomain("not-a-zone.in-addr.arpa")
+		assert.NotContains(t, got, "in-addr.arpa", "should fall back to domain anonymization")
+	})
+}
+
+// TestAnonymizeStringReverseZone verifies that a zone inside free text, such as
+// a DNS log line, is not chewed up by the address passes. The IPv4 pattern
+// matches any run of dotted digits, which a reverse zone is made of.
+func TestAnonymizeStringReverseZone(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("ipv6 zone survives the address passes", func(t *testing.T) {
+		a := newLeveledAnonymizer(LevelDefault)
+
+		zone := "0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.2.0.0.0" + reverseZoneSuffixV6
+		got := a.AnonymizeString("question: domain=" + zone + " type=PTR")
+
+		assert.Contains(t, got, "type=PTR", "should keep the rest of the line")
+		assert.NotContains(t, got, "198.51.100", "should not rewrite nibble labels as an address")
+
+		labels := strings.Split(strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimPrefix(got, "question: domain="), reverseZoneSuffixV6+" type=PTR"), ".")
+		assert.Len(t, labels, 28, "should keep every nibble label, got %q", got)
+	})
+
+	t.Run("preserved ipv4 zone is untouched", func(t *testing.T) {
+		a := newLeveledAnonymizer(LevelDefault)
+
+		line := "reverse zone 64.100.in-addr.arpa registered"
+		assert.Equal(t, line, a.AnonymizeString(line), "should keep the zone of a preserved address")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("public ipv4 zone is replaced consistently", func(t *testing.T) {
+		a := newLeveledAnonymizer(LevelDefault)
+
+		got := a.AnonymizeString("zone 113.0.203.in-addr.arpa and address 203.0.113.7")
+		assert.NotContains(t, got, "113.0.203.in-addr.arpa", "should replace the zone")
+		assert.NotContains(t, got, "203.0.113.7", "should replace the address")
+		assert.Contains(t, got, reverseZoneSuffixV4, "should keep the zone suffix")
+	})
+}
+
+func TestParseReverseZone(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name   string
+		zone   string
+		addr   string
+		labels int
+	}{
+		{name: "v4 two labels", zone: "0.100" + reverseZoneSuffixV4, addr: "100.0.0.0", labels: 2},
+		{name: "v4 three labels", zone: "1.168.192" + reverseZoneSuffixV4, addr: "192.168.1.0", labels: 3},
+		{name: "v4 full address", zone: "7.113.0.203" + reverseZoneSuffixV4, addr: "203.0.113.7", labels: 4},
+		{
+			name:   "v6 prefix",
+			zone:   "0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.2.0.0.0" + reverseZoneSuffixV6,
+			addr:   "2::",
+			labels: 28,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			addr, labels, suffix, ok := parseReverseZone(tc.zone)
+			require.True(t, ok, "should decode the reverse zone")
+			assert.Equal(t, tc.addr, addr.String(), "should decode to the encoded prefix")
+			assert.Equal(t, tc.labels, labels, "should count the labels")
+			assert.Equal(t, tc.zone, reverseZoneName(addr, labels)+suffix, "should re-encode to the original zone")
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestParseReverseZoneRejectsNonZones(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []string{
+		"example.com",
+		"in-addr.arpa",
+		"x.100" + reverseZoneSuffixV4,
+		"256" + reverseZoneSuffixV4,
+		"1.2.3.4.5" + reverseZoneSuffixV4,
+		"ab" + reverseZoneSuffixV6,
+		"g" + reverseZoneSuffixV6,
+	}
+
+	for _, zone := range tests {
+		t.Run(zone, func(t *testing.T) {
+			_, _, _, ok := parseReverseZone(zone)
+			assert.False(t, ok, "should reject %q", zone)
+		})
+	}
+}

client/cmd/login.go

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"os"
 	"os/user"
-	"runtime"
 	"strings"
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
@@ -121,7 +120,7 @@ func doDaemonLogin(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, providedSetupKey str
 	loginRequest := proto.LoginRequest{
 		SetupKey:            providedSetupKey,
 		ManagementUrl:       managementURL,
-		IsUnixDesktopClient: isUnixRunningDesktop(),
+		IsUnixDesktopClient: util.HasGraphicalSession(),
 		Hostname:            hostName,
 		DnsLabels:           dnsLabelsReq,
 		ProfileName:         &handle,
@@ -189,7 +188,8 @@ func doExtendSession(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command) error {
 
 	client := proto.NewDaemonServiceClient(conn)
 
-	req := &proto.RequestExtendAuthSessionRequest{}
+	// the CLI runs in the user's session, the daemon does not: tell it what we can see
+	req := &proto.RequestExtendAuthSessionRequest{HasGraphicalSession: util.HasGraphicalSession()}
 	// Pre-fill the IdP login hint from the active profile so the user
 	// doesn't have to retype their email. Best-effort: we still proceed
 	// without a hint if the lookup fails.
@@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ func foregroundGetTokenInfo(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, config *pro
 		hint = profileState.Email
 	}
 
-	oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, config, isUnixRunningDesktop(), false, hint)
+	oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, config, util.HasGraphicalSession(), false, hint)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
@@ -458,14 +458,6 @@ func openURL(cmd *cobra.Command, verificationURIComplete, userCode string, noBro
 	}
 }
 
-// isUnixRunningDesktop checks if a Linux OS is running desktop environment
-func isUnixRunningDesktop() bool {
-	if runtime.GOOS != "linux" && runtime.GOOS != "freebsd" {
-		return false
-	}
-	return os.Getenv("DESKTOP_SESSION") != "" || os.Getenv("XDG_CURRENT_DESKTOP") != ""
-}
-
 func setEnvAndFlags(cmd *cobra.Command) error {
 	SetFlagsFromEnvVars(rootCmd)
 

client/cmd/up.go

@@ -21,8 +21,8 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
 	nbnet "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/net"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/server"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/system"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
@@ -626,7 +626,7 @@ func setupLoginRequest(providedSetupKey string, customDNSAddressConverted []byte
 		NatExternalIPs:      natExternalIPs,
 		CleanNATExternalIPs: natExternalIPs != nil && len(natExternalIPs) == 0,
 		CustomDNSAddress:    customDNSAddressConverted,
-		IsUnixDesktopClient: isUnixRunningDesktop(),
+		IsUnixDesktopClient: util.HasGraphicalSession(),
 		Hostname:            hostName,
 		ExtraIFaceBlacklist: extraIFaceBlackList,
 		DnsLabels:           dnsLabels,

client/firewall/iptables/acl_linux.go

@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ type aclManager struct {
 	optionalEntries map[string][]entry
 	ipsetStore      *ipsetStore
 	v6              bool
+	ipsetSupported  bool
 
 	stateManager *statemanager.Manager
 }
@@ -60,6 +61,8 @@ func newAclManager(iptablesClient *iptables.IPTables, wgIface iFaceMapper) (*acl
 func (m *aclManager) init(stateManager *statemanager.Manager) error {
 	m.stateManager = stateManager
 
+	m.ipsetSupported = m.probeIPSetSupport()
+
 	m.seedInitialEntries()
 	m.seedInitialOptionalEntries()
 
@@ -91,6 +94,12 @@ func (m *aclManager) AddPeerFiltering(
 	if m.v6 && ipsetName != "" {
 		ipsetName += "-v6"
 	}
+	// When the kernel lacks the required ipset hash module, fall back to
+	// per-IP iptables rules (pre-0.68 behavior) so ACLs keep working instead
+	// of silently leaving the chain empty.
+	if ipsetName != "" && !m.ipsetSupported {
+		ipsetName = ""
+	}
 	proto := protoForFamily(protocol, m.v6)
 	specs := filterRuleSpecs(ip, proto, sPort, dPort, action, ipsetName)
 
@@ -498,6 +507,40 @@ func transformIPsetName(ipsetName string, sPort, dPort *firewall.Port, action fi
 	}
 }
 
+// probeIPSetSupport checks whether the kernel can create the ipset type used for
+// ACL rules. On kernels lacking the required ipset hash module, ipset creation
+// fails (e.g. "invalid argument"), which would otherwise leave the ACL chain
+// empty and silently drop all policy-permitted inbound traffic. When unsupported,
+// the manager falls back to per-IP iptables rules.
+func (m *aclManager) probeIPSetSupport() bool {
+	// Use a unique name so concurrent processes don't collide and we only ever
+	// destroy the set we created ourselves. ipset names are limited to 31 chars,
+	// so use a short random suffix.
+	probeName := "nb-probe-" + uuid.New().String()[:8]
+
+	opts := ipset.CreateOptions{
+		Replace: true,
+	}
+	if m.v6 {
+		opts.Family = ipset.FamilyIPV6
+	}
+
+	if err := ipset.Create(probeName, ipset.TypeHashNet, opts); err != nil {
+		log.Warnf("ipset is not available (failed to create probe set: %v); "+
+			"falling back to per-IP iptables ACL rules. Ensure the kernel provides "+
+			"the ipset hash:net module (ip_set_hash_net) for better performance with large rule sets", err)
+		return false
+	}
+
+	defer func() {
+		if err := ipset.Destroy(probeName); err != nil {
+			log.Debugf("destroy ipset probe set %q: %v", probeName, err)
+		}
+	}()
+
+	return true
+}
+
 func (m *aclManager) createIPSet(name string) error {
 	opts := ipset.CreateOptions{
 		Replace: true,

client/firewall/iptables/dnat_refcount_linux_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+//go:build privileged
+
+package iptables
+
+import (
+	"net/netip"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	fw "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
+)
+
+func iptRefcountIfaceV4() *iFaceMock {
+	return &iFaceMock{
+		NameFunc: func() string { return "wt-refcount" },
+		AddressFunc: func() wgaddr.Address {
+			return wgaddr.Address{
+				IP:      netip.MustParseAddr("10.20.0.1"),
+				Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("10.20.0.0/24"),
+			}
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+func iptRefcountIfaceDual() *iFaceMock {
+	return &iFaceMock{
+		NameFunc: func() string { return "wt-refcount" },
+		AddressFunc: func() wgaddr.Address {
+			return wgaddr.Address{
+				IP:      netip.MustParseAddr("10.20.0.1"),
+				Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("10.20.0.0/24"),
+				IPv6:    netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::1"),
+				IPv6Net: netip.MustParsePrefix("fd00::/64"),
+			}
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+func newIptRefcountManager(t *testing.T, dual bool) *Manager {
+	t.Helper()
+	var ifMock *iFaceMock
+	if dual {
+		ifMock = iptRefcountIfaceDual()
+	} else {
+		ifMock = iptRefcountIfaceV4()
+	}
+	m, err := Create(ifMock, iface.DefaultMTU)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "create manager")
+	require.NoError(t, m.Init(nil), "init manager")
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		require.NoError(t, m.Close(nil), "close manager")
+	})
+	return m
+}
+
+func iptDnatV4(port uint16) fw.ForwardRule {
+	return fw.ForwardRule{
+		Protocol:          fw.ProtocolTCP,
+		DestinationPort:   fw.Port{Values: []uint16{port}},
+		TranslatedAddress: netip.MustParseAddr("10.20.0.2"),
+		TranslatedPort:    fw.Port{Values: []uint16{80}},
+	}
+}
+
+func iptDnatV6(port uint16) fw.ForwardRule {
+	return fw.ForwardRule{
+		Protocol:          fw.ProtocolTCP,
+		DestinationPort:   fw.Port{Values: []uint16{port}},
+		TranslatedAddress: netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::2"),
+		TranslatedPort:    fw.Port{Values: []uint16{80}},
+	}
+}
+
+// TestIptablesRouting_RepeatedEnableSingleReference verifies that EnableRouting
+// (called on every network-map update) holds at most one reference per family
+// and a single DisableRouting drops both back to zero.
+func TestIptablesRouting_RepeatedEnableSingleReference(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newIptRefcountManager(t, true)
+	state := m.router.ipFwdState
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.EnableRouting(), "first enable")
+	require.NoError(t, m.EnableRouting(), "second enable")
+	require.NoError(t, m.EnableRouting(), "third enable")
+	v4, v6 := state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "repeated enable holds a single v4 reference")
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v6, "repeated enable holds a single v6 reference")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DisableRouting(), "disable")
+	v4, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "single disable releases the v4 reference")
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "single disable releases the v6 reference")
+}
+
+// TestIptablesRouting_DisableKeepsDNATReference verifies that an unpaired
+// DisableRouting does not release references held by active DNAT rules.
+func TestIptablesRouting_DisableKeepsDNATReference(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newIptRefcountManager(t, true)
+	state := m.router.ipFwdState
+
+	r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(iptDnatV6(9095))
+	require.NoError(t, err, "add v6 dnat")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DisableRouting(), "unpaired disable")
+	_, v6 := state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v6, "DNAT-held reference survives unpaired DisableRouting")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1), "delete v6 dnat")
+	_, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "delete releases the DNAT reference")
+}
+
+// TestIptablesDNAT_RefcountBalancedV4 covers a Balanced Add/Delete pair on v4.
+func TestIptablesDNAT_RefcountBalancedV4(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newIptRefcountManager(t, false)
+	state := m.router.ipFwdState
+
+	r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(iptDnatV4(7081))
+	require.NoError(t, err, "add v4 dnat 1")
+	v4, v6 := state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "v4 refcount after first add")
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount unchanged")
+
+	r2, err := m.AddDNATRule(iptDnatV4(7082))
+	require.NoError(t, err, "add v4 dnat 2")
+	v4, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 2, v4, "v4 refcount after second add")
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount unchanged")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1))
+	v4, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "v4 refcount after first delete")
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount unchanged")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r2))
+	v4, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "v4 refcount after second delete")
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount unchanged")
+}
+
+// TestIptablesDNAT_RefcountBalancedV6 checks the v6 path increments v6 only and
+// decrements back to zero.
+func TestIptablesDNAT_RefcountBalancedV6(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newIptRefcountManager(t, true)
+	require.NotNil(t, m.router6, "v6 router")
+	require.Same(t, m.router.ipFwdState, m.router6.ipFwdState, "shared state")
+	state := m.router.ipFwdState
+
+	r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(iptDnatV6(9081))
+	require.NoError(t, err, "add v6 dnat 1")
+	v4, v6 := state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4)
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v6, "v6 refcount after first add")
+
+	r2, err := m.AddDNATRule(iptDnatV6(9082))
+	require.NoError(t, err, "add v6 dnat 2")
+	v4, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "v4 refcount unchanged")
+	assert.Equal(t, 2, v6, "v6 refcount after second add")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1))
+	v4, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "v4 refcount unchanged")
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v6, "v6 refcount after first delete")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r2))
+	v4, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4)
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount after second delete")
+}
+
+// TestIptablesDNAT_DuplicateAddNoLeak verifies the duplicate-rule path returns
+// without bumping the refcount.
+func TestIptablesDNAT_DuplicateAddNoLeak(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newIptRefcountManager(t, true)
+	state := m.router.ipFwdState
+
+	rule := iptDnatV4(7083)
+	r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(rule)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	v4, _ := state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v4)
+
+	_, err = m.AddDNATRule(rule)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "duplicate add")
+	v4, _ = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "duplicate add must not increment")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1))
+	v4, _ = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "single delete must drop to zero")
+}
+
+// TestIptablesDNAT_DeleteMissingNoUnderflow verifies Delete on an unknown rule
+// neither errors nor releases the refcount.
+func TestIptablesDNAT_DeleteMissingNoUnderflow(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newIptRefcountManager(t, true)
+	state := m.router.ipFwdState
+
+	phantom := iptDnatV4(7099)
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(&phantom), "delete missing v4")
+	v4, v6 := state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4)
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6)
+
+	phantom6 := iptDnatV6(9099)
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(&phantom6), "delete missing v6")
+	v4, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4)
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6)
+
+	r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(iptDnatV4(7100))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	v4, _ = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "real add still increments after phantom delete")
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1))
+}
+
+// TestIptablesDNAT_DoubleDeleteNoUnderflow verifies a second Delete on the same
+// rule is a no-op.
+func TestIptablesDNAT_DoubleDeleteNoUnderflow(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newIptRefcountManager(t, true)
+	state := m.router.ipFwdState
+
+	r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(iptDnatV6(9083))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	_, v6 := state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v6)
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1), "first delete")
+	_, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6)
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1), "second delete must be no-op")
+	_, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "double delete must not underflow")
+}

client/firewall/iptables/manager_linux.go

@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ func (m *Manager) createIPv6Components(wgIface iFaceMapper, mtu uint16) error {
 	}
 
 	// Share the same IP forwarding state with the v4 router, since
-	// EnableIPForwarding controls both v4 and v6 sysctls.
+	// Forwarding refcounter is per-family but shared between v4 and v6 routers.
 	m.router6.ipFwdState = m.router.ipFwdState
 
 	m.aclMgr6, err = newAclManager(ip6Client, wgIface)
@@ -402,17 +402,12 @@ func (m *Manager) SetLogLevel(log.Level) {
 }
 
 func (m *Manager) EnableRouting() error {
-	if err := m.router.ipFwdState.RequestForwarding(); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("enable IP forwarding: %w", err)
-	}
-	return nil
+	// v6 only when the overlay actually has v6.
+	return m.router.ipFwdState.RequestRouting(m.router6 != nil)
 }
 
 func (m *Manager) DisableRouting() error {
-	if err := m.router.ipFwdState.ReleaseForwarding(); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("disable IP forwarding: %w", err)
-	}
-	return nil
+	return m.router.ipFwdState.ReleaseRouting()
 }
 
 // AddDNATRule adds a DNAT rule

client/firewall/iptables/manager_linux_test.go

@@ -291,3 +291,40 @@ func TestIptablesCreatePerformance(t *testing.T) {
 		})
 	}
 }
+
+// TestIptablesACLIPSetFallback verifies that when the kernel lacks ipset support,
+// the ACL manager falls back to per-IP iptables rules (-s <ip>) instead of
+// silently leaving the chain empty. See discussion #6125.
+func TestIptablesACLIPSetFallback(t *testing.T) {
+	ipv4Client, err := iptables.NewWithProtocol(iptables.ProtocolIPv4)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	// Use Create()/Init() so the router-owned chains (chainRTFWDIN/OUT) are
+	// created before the ACL manager's createDefaultChains() references them.
+	manager, err := Create(ifaceMock, iface.DefaultMTU)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NoError(t, manager.Init(nil))
+
+	aclMgr := manager.aclMgr
+	// Simulate a kernel without the ipset hash module.
+	aclMgr.ipsetSupported = false
+
+	defer func() {
+		require.NoError(t, manager.Close(nil))
+	}()
+
+	ip := netip.MustParseAddr("10.20.0.42")
+	port := &fw.Port{Values: []uint16{22}}
+
+	rules, err := aclMgr.AddPeerFiltering(nil, ip.AsSlice(), "tcp", nil, port, fw.ActionAccept, "nb0000001")
+	require.NoError(t, err, "AddPeerFiltering should succeed via fallback")
+	require.NotEmpty(t, rules)
+
+	rule := rules[0].(*Rule)
+	require.Empty(t, rule.ipsetName, "fallback rule must not reference an ipset")
+	require.Contains(t, strings.Join(rule.specs, " "), "-s 10.20.0.42", "fallback rule must match by source IP")
+	require.NotContains(t, strings.Join(rule.specs, " "), "--match-set", "fallback rule must not use ipset matching")
+
+	// The rule must actually be present in the ACL chain (not silently dropped).
+	checkRuleSpecs(t, ipv4Client, rule.chain, true, rule.specs...)
+}

client/firewall/iptables/router_linux.go

@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ func newRouter(iptablesClient *iptables.IPTables, wgIface iFaceMapper, mtu uint1
 		wgIface:        wgIface,
 		mtu:            mtu,
 		v6:             iptablesClient.Proto() == iptables.ProtocolIPv6,
-		ipFwdState:     ipfwdstate.NewIPForwardingState(),
+		ipFwdState:     ipfwdstate.NewIPForwardingState(wgIface.Name()),
 	}
 
 	r.ipsetCounter = refcounter.New(
@@ -770,10 +770,6 @@ func (r *router) updateState() {
 }
 
 func (r *router) AddDNATRule(rule firewall.ForwardRule) (firewall.Rule, error) {
-	if err := r.ipFwdState.RequestForwarding(); err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-
 	ruleKey := rule.ID()
 	if _, exists := r.rules[ruleKey+dnatSuffix]; exists {
 		return rule, nil
@@ -840,18 +836,34 @@ func (r *router) AddDNATRule(rule firewall.ForwardRule) (firewall.Rule, error) {
 
 	for key, ruleInfo := range rules {
 		if err := r.iptablesClient.Append(ruleInfo.table, ruleInfo.chain, ruleInfo.rule...); err != nil {
-			if rollbackErr := r.rollbackRules(rules); rollbackErr != nil {
-				log.Errorf("rollback failed: %v", rollbackErr)
-			}
+			r.cleanupFailedDNATAdd(rules)
 			return nil, fmt.Errorf("add rule %s: %w", key, err)
 		}
 		r.rules[key] = ruleInfo.rule
 	}
 
+	if err := r.ipFwdState.RequestForwarding(r.v6); err != nil {
+		r.cleanupFailedDNATAdd(rules)
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("enable forwarding: %w", err)
+	}
+
 	r.updateState()
 	return rule, nil
 }
 
+// cleanupFailedDNATAdd removes the bookkeeping written by a partially applied
+// AddDNATRule before rolling back the kernel rules, so no entries remain that
+// never got a forwarding refcount. rollbackRules re-adds entries it failed to
+// remove from the kernel.
+func (r *router) cleanupFailedDNATAdd(rules map[string]ruleInfo) {
+	for key := range rules {
+		delete(r.rules, key)
+	}
+	if err := r.rollbackRules(rules); err != nil {
+		log.Errorf("rollback failed: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
 func (r *router) rollbackRules(rules map[string]ruleInfo) error {
 	var merr *multierror.Error
 	for key, ruleInfo := range rules {
@@ -868,32 +880,47 @@ func (r *router) rollbackRules(rules map[string]ruleInfo) error {
 }
 
 func (r *router) DeleteDNATRule(rule firewall.Rule) error {
-	if err := r.ipFwdState.ReleaseForwarding(); err != nil {
-		log.Errorf("%v", err)
-	}
-
 	ruleKey := rule.ID()
 
+	_, hadDNAT := r.rules[ruleKey+dnatSuffix]
+	_, hadSNAT := r.rules[ruleKey+snatSuffix]
+	_, hadFWD := r.rules[ruleKey+fwdSuffix]
+	if !hadDNAT && !hadSNAT && !hadFWD {
+		return nil
+	}
+
 	var merr *multierror.Error
 	if dnatRule, exists := r.rules[ruleKey+dnatSuffix]; exists {
 		if err := r.iptablesClient.Delete(tableNat, chainRTRDR, dnatRule...); err != nil {
 			merr = multierror.Append(merr, fmt.Errorf("delete DNAT rule: %w", err))
+		} else {
+			delete(r.rules, ruleKey+dnatSuffix)
 		}
-		delete(r.rules, ruleKey+dnatSuffix)
 	}
 
 	if snatRule, exists := r.rules[ruleKey+snatSuffix]; exists {
 		if err := r.iptablesClient.Delete(tableNat, chainRTNAT, snatRule...); err != nil {
 			merr = multierror.Append(merr, fmt.Errorf("delete SNAT rule: %w", err))
+		} else {
+			delete(r.rules, ruleKey+snatSuffix)
 		}
-		delete(r.rules, ruleKey+snatSuffix)
 	}
 
 	if fwdRule, exists := r.rules[ruleKey+fwdSuffix]; exists {
 		if err := r.iptablesClient.Delete(tableFilter, chainRTFWDOUT, fwdRule...); err != nil {
 			merr = multierror.Append(merr, fmt.Errorf("delete forward rule: %w", err))
+		} else {
+			delete(r.rules, ruleKey+fwdSuffix)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Release the refcount only once all rules are gone from the kernel. On
+	// partial failure the failed entries stay in r.rules so a retry can remove
+	// them and release then.
+	if merr == nil {
+		if err := r.ipFwdState.ReleaseForwarding(r.v6); err != nil {
+			log.Errorf("%v", err)
 		}
-		delete(r.rules, ruleKey+fwdSuffix)
 	}
 
 	r.updateState()

client/firewall/nftables/dnat_refcount_linux_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
+//go:build privileged
+
+package nftables
+
+import (
+	"net/netip"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	fw "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
+)
+
+func nftRefcountIfaceV4() *iFaceMock {
+	return &iFaceMock{
+		NameFunc: func() string { return "wt-refcount" },
+		AddressFunc: func() wgaddr.Address {
+			return wgaddr.Address{
+				IP:      netip.MustParseAddr("100.96.0.1"),
+				Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("100.96.0.0/16"),
+			}
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+func nftRefcountIfaceDual() *iFaceMock {
+	return &iFaceMock{
+		NameFunc: func() string { return "wt-refcount" },
+		AddressFunc: func() wgaddr.Address {
+			return wgaddr.Address{
+				IP:      netip.MustParseAddr("100.96.0.1"),
+				Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("100.96.0.0/16"),
+				IPv6:    netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::1"),
+				IPv6Net: netip.MustParsePrefix("fd00::/64"),
+			}
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+func newNftRefcountManager(t *testing.T, dual bool) *Manager {
+	t.Helper()
+	if check() != NFTABLES {
+		t.Skip("nftables not supported on this system")
+	}
+	var ifMock *iFaceMock
+	if dual {
+		ifMock = nftRefcountIfaceDual()
+	} else {
+		ifMock = nftRefcountIfaceV4()
+	}
+	m, err := Create(ifMock, iface.DefaultMTU)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "create manager")
+	require.NoError(t, m.Init(nil), "init manager")
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		require.NoError(t, m.Close(nil), "close manager")
+	})
+	return m
+}
+
+func dnatV4(port uint16) fw.ForwardRule {
+	return fw.ForwardRule{
+		Protocol:          fw.ProtocolTCP,
+		DestinationPort:   fw.Port{Values: []uint16{port}},
+		TranslatedAddress: netip.MustParseAddr("100.96.0.2"),
+		TranslatedPort:    fw.Port{Values: []uint16{80}},
+	}
+}
+
+func dnatV6(port uint16) fw.ForwardRule {
+	return fw.ForwardRule{
+		Protocol:          fw.ProtocolTCP,
+		DestinationPort:   fw.Port{Values: []uint16{port}},
+		TranslatedAddress: netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::2"),
+		TranslatedPort:    fw.Port{Values: []uint16{80}},
+	}
+}
+
+// TestNftablesDNAT_RefcountBalancedV4 verifies that Add/Delete pairs leave the
+// v4 refcount at zero.
+func TestNftablesDNAT_RefcountBalancedV4(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newNftRefcountManager(t, false)
+	state := m.router.ipFwdState
+
+	r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(dnatV4(8081))
+	require.NoError(t, err, "add v4 dnat 1")
+	v4, v6 := state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "v4 refcount after first add")
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount unchanged")
+
+	r2, err := m.AddDNATRule(dnatV4(8082))
+	require.NoError(t, err, "add v4 dnat 2")
+	v4, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 2, v4, "v4 refcount after second add")
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount unchanged")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1), "delete v4 dnat 1")
+	v4, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "v4 refcount after first delete")
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount unchanged")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r2), "delete v4 dnat 2")
+	v4, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "v4 refcount after second delete")
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount unchanged")
+}
+
+// TestNftablesDNAT_RefcountBalancedV6 verifies the v6 path increments v6 only
+// and decrements back to zero on Delete.
+func TestNftablesDNAT_RefcountBalancedV6(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newNftRefcountManager(t, true)
+	require.NotNil(t, m.router6, "v6 router")
+	require.Same(t, m.router.ipFwdState, m.router6.ipFwdState, "shared state")
+	state := m.router.ipFwdState
+
+	r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(dnatV6(9091))
+	require.NoError(t, err, "add v6 dnat 1")
+	v4, v6 := state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "v4 refcount unchanged")
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v6, "v6 refcount after first add")
+
+	r2, err := m.AddDNATRule(dnatV6(9092))
+	require.NoError(t, err, "add v6 dnat 2")
+	v4, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4)
+	assert.Equal(t, 2, v6, "v6 refcount after second add")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1), "delete v6 dnat 1")
+	v4, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "v4 refcount unchanged")
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v6, "v6 refcount after first delete")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r2), "delete v6 dnat 2")
+	v4, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4)
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount after second delete")
+}
+
+// TestNftablesDNAT_DuplicateAddNoLeak verifies that a duplicate Add (same
+// ForwardRule) does not double-increment the refcount.
+func TestNftablesDNAT_DuplicateAddNoLeak(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newNftRefcountManager(t, true)
+	state := m.router.ipFwdState
+
+	rule := dnatV4(8083)
+	r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(rule)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "add v4 dnat")
+	v4, _ := state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v4)
+
+	// duplicate add: same rule ID, must be a no-op for the refcount.
+	_, err = m.AddDNATRule(rule)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "duplicate add")
+	v4, _ = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "duplicate add must not increment")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1), "delete v4 dnat")
+	v4, _ = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "single delete must drop to zero")
+}
+
+// TestNftablesDNAT_DeleteMissingNoUnderflow verifies deleting a rule that was
+// never added does not underflow the refcount.
+func TestNftablesDNAT_DeleteMissingNoUnderflow(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newNftRefcountManager(t, true)
+	state := m.router.ipFwdState
+
+	// Construct a Rule reference for something never added. The router stores
+	// rules by ID(), and DeleteDNATRule looks them up in r.rules; a missing
+	// entry must be a no-op rather than calling Release.
+	phantom := dnatV4(8099)
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(&phantom), "delete missing v4 dnat")
+	v4, v6 := state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "v4 refcount unaffected by missing delete")
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount unaffected")
+
+	phantom6 := dnatV6(9099)
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(&phantom6), "delete missing v6 dnat")
+	v4, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4)
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount unaffected by missing delete")
+
+	// And after a phantom delete, a real add still results in count=1.
+	r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(dnatV4(8100))
+	require.NoError(t, err, "add v4 dnat after phantom delete")
+	v4, _ = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "real add still increments after phantom delete")
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1))
+}
+
+// TestNftablesRouting_RepeatedEnableSingleReference verifies that EnableRouting
+// (called on every network-map update) holds at most one reference per family
+// and a single DisableRouting drops both back to zero.
+func TestNftablesRouting_RepeatedEnableSingleReference(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newNftRefcountManager(t, true)
+	state := m.router.ipFwdState
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.EnableRouting(), "first enable")
+	require.NoError(t, m.EnableRouting(), "second enable")
+	require.NoError(t, m.EnableRouting(), "third enable")
+	v4, v6 := state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "repeated enable holds a single v4 reference")
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v6, "repeated enable holds a single v6 reference")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DisableRouting(), "disable")
+	v4, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "single disable releases the v4 reference")
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "single disable releases the v6 reference")
+}
+
+// TestNftablesRouting_DisableKeepsDNATReference verifies that an unpaired
+// DisableRouting does not release references held by active DNAT rules.
+func TestNftablesRouting_DisableKeepsDNATReference(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newNftRefcountManager(t, true)
+	state := m.router.ipFwdState
+
+	r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(dnatV6(9095))
+	require.NoError(t, err, "add v6 dnat")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DisableRouting(), "unpaired disable")
+	_, v6 := state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v6, "DNAT-held reference survives unpaired DisableRouting")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1), "delete v6 dnat")
+	_, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "delete releases the DNAT reference")
+}
+
+// TestNftablesDNAT_DoubleDeleteNoUnderflow verifies that deleting the same rule
+// twice does not underflow the refcount (the second delete is a no-op).
+func TestNftablesDNAT_DoubleDeleteNoUnderflow(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newNftRefcountManager(t, true)
+	state := m.router.ipFwdState
+
+	r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(dnatV6(9093))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	_, v6 := state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v6)
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1), "first delete")
+	_, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6)
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1), "second delete must be no-op")
+	_, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "double delete must not underflow")
+}

client/firewall/nftables/manager_linux.go

@@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ func (m *Manager) createIPv6Components(tableName string, wgIface iFaceMapper, mt
 		return fmt.Errorf("create v6 router: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	// Share the same IP forwarding state with the v4 router, since
-	// EnableIPForwarding controls both v4 and v6 sysctls.
+	// Share the per-family forwarding refcounter with the v4 router so a v4
+	// rule and a v6 rule against the same state machine cooperate cleanly.
 	m.router6.ipFwdState = m.router.ipFwdState
 
 	m.aclManager6, err = newAclManager(workTable6, wgIface, chainNameRoutingFw)
@@ -530,17 +530,12 @@ func (m *Manager) SetLogLevel(log.Level) {
 }
 
 func (m *Manager) EnableRouting() error {
-	if err := m.router.ipFwdState.RequestForwarding(); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("enable IP forwarding: %w", err)
-	}
-	return nil
+	// v6 only when the overlay actually has v6.
+	return m.router.ipFwdState.RequestRouting(m.router6 != nil)
 }
 
 func (m *Manager) DisableRouting() error {
-	if err := m.router.ipFwdState.ReleaseForwarding(); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("disable IP forwarding: %w", err)
-	}
-	return nil
+	return m.router.ipFwdState.ReleaseRouting()
 }
 
 // Flush rule/chain/set operations from the buffer

client/firewall/nftables/router_linux.go

@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ func newRouter(workTable *nftables.Table, wgIface iFaceMapper, mtu uint16) (*rou
 		rules:      make(map[string]*nftables.Rule),
 		af:         familyForAddr(workTable.Family == nftables.TableFamilyIPv4),
 		wgIface:    wgIface,
-		ipFwdState: ipfwdstate.NewIPForwardingState(),
+		ipFwdState: ipfwdstate.NewIPForwardingState(wgIface.Name()),
 		mtu:        mtu,
 	}
 
@@ -1553,10 +1553,6 @@ func (r *router) refreshRulesMap() error {
 }
 
 func (r *router) AddDNATRule(rule firewall.ForwardRule) (firewall.Rule, error) {
-	if err := r.ipFwdState.RequestForwarding(); err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-
 	ruleKey := rule.ID()
 	if _, exists := r.rules[ruleKey+dnatSuffix]; exists {
 		return rule, nil
@@ -1567,7 +1563,18 @@ func (r *router) AddDNATRule(rule firewall.ForwardRule) (firewall.Rule, error) {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("convert protocol to number: %w", err)
 	}
 
+	// Request forwarding before queueing rules: addDnatRedirect/addDnatMasq
+	// buffer netlink messages on r.conn that the next caller's Flush would
+	// commit if we returned without flushing them ourselves.
+	v6 := r.af.tableFamily == nftables.TableFamilyIPv6
+	if err := r.ipFwdState.RequestForwarding(v6); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("enable forwarding: %w", err)
+	}
+
 	if err := r.addDnatRedirect(rule, protoNum, ruleKey); err != nil {
+		if rerr := r.ipFwdState.ReleaseForwarding(v6); rerr != nil {
+			log.Warnf("rollback forwarding refcount: %v", rerr)
+		}
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
@@ -1579,6 +1586,11 @@ func (r *router) AddDNATRule(rule firewall.ForwardRule) (firewall.Rule, error) {
 	// TODO: find chains with drop policies and add rules there
 
 	if err := r.conn.Flush(); err != nil {
+		if rerr := r.ipFwdState.ReleaseForwarding(v6); rerr != nil {
+			log.Warnf("rollback forwarding refcount: %v", rerr)
+		}
+		delete(r.rules, ruleKey+dnatSuffix)
+		delete(r.rules, ruleKey+snatSuffix)
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("flush rules: %w", err)
 	}
 
@@ -1781,16 +1793,18 @@ func (r *router) addDnatMasq(rule firewall.ForwardRule, protoNum uint8, ruleKey
 }
 
 func (r *router) DeleteDNATRule(rule firewall.Rule) error {
-	if err := r.ipFwdState.ReleaseForwarding(); err != nil {
-		log.Errorf("%v", err)
-	}
-
 	ruleKey := rule.ID()
 
 	if err := r.refreshRulesMap(); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf(refreshRulesMapError, err)
 	}
 
+	_, hadDNAT := r.rules[ruleKey+dnatSuffix]
+	_, hadSNAT := r.rules[ruleKey+snatSuffix]
+	if !hadDNAT && !hadSNAT {
+		return nil
+	}
+
 	var merr *multierror.Error
 	var needsFlush bool
 
@@ -1822,9 +1836,16 @@ func (r *router) DeleteDNATRule(rule firewall.Rule) error {
 		}
 	}
 
+	// Release the refcount only once the rules are gone from the kernel. On
+	// failure (including the refreshRulesMap error above) the rules and their
+	// map entries remain, keeping forwarding on until a retry removes them.
 	if merr == nil {
 		delete(r.rules, ruleKey+dnatSuffix)
 		delete(r.rules, ruleKey+snatSuffix)
+
+		if err := r.ipFwdState.ReleaseForwarding(r.af.tableFamily == nftables.TableFamilyIPv6); err != nil {
+			log.Errorf("%v", err)
+		}
 	}
 
 	return nberrors.FormatErrorOrNil(merr)

client/installer.nsis

@@ -22,8 +22,6 @@
 !define UI_REG_APP_PATH "Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\${UI_APP_EXE}"
 !define UI_UNINSTALL_PATH "Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\${UI_APP_NAME}"
 
-!define AUTOSTART_REG_KEY "Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"
-
 !define NETBIRD_DATA_DIR "$COMMONPROGRAMDATA\Netbird"
 
 Unicode True
@@ -228,13 +226,6 @@ WriteRegStr ${REG_ROOT} "${UNINSTALL_PATH}"  "Publisher" "${COMP_NAME}"
 
 WriteRegStr ${REG_ROOT} "${UI_REG_APP_PATH}" "" "$INSTDIR\${UI_APP_EXE}"
 
-; Autostart is owned by the UI's per-user setting (HKCU\...\Run via Wails),
-; not the installer. Drop the machine-wide entry older installers wrote so the
-; toggle is the single source of truth. HKCU is left untouched -- it may hold
-; the user's own toggle state, which must survive upgrades.
-DetailPrint "Removing installer-managed autostart registry entry if present..."
-DeleteRegValue HKLM "${AUTOSTART_REG_KEY}" "${APP_NAME}"
-
 EnVar::SetHKLM
 EnVar::AddValueEx "path" "$INSTDIR"
 
@@ -299,15 +290,6 @@ ExecWait '"$INSTDIR\${MAIN_APP_EXE}" service uninstall'
 DetailPrint "Terminating Netbird UI process..."
 ExecWait `taskkill /im ${UI_APP_EXE}.exe /f`
 
-; Remove autostart registry entries
-DetailPrint "Removing autostart registry entries if they exist..."
-; Legacy machine-wide entry written by older installers.
-DeleteRegValue HKLM "${AUTOSTART_REG_KEY}" "${APP_NAME}"
-; Per-user entry the UI toggle writes via Wails (value name is the lowercase
-; app-name slug). Uninstall removes the app, so drop it too.
-DeleteRegValue HKCU "${AUTOSTART_REG_KEY}" "${APP_NAME}"
-DeleteRegValue HKCU "${AUTOSTART_REG_KEY}" "netbird"
-
 ; Handle data deletion based on checkbox
 DetailPrint "Checking if user requested data deletion..."
 ${If} $DeleteDataEnabled == "1"

client/internal/debug/debug.go

@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ nftables.txt: Anonymized nftables rules with packet counters across all families
 sysctls.txt: Forwarding, reverse-path filter, source-validation, and conntrack accounting sysctl values that the NetBird client may read or modify, if --system-info flag was provided (Linux only).
 resolv.conf: DNS resolver configuration from /etc/resolv.conf (Unix systems only), if --system-info flag was provided.
 scutil_dns.txt: DNS configuration from scutil --dns (macOS only), if --system-info flag was provided.
+dns_windows.txt: Anonymized NRPT rules and policy table in effect, DNS client policy, and per-interface and per-adapter DNS configuration (Windows only), if --system-info flag was provided.
 resolved_domains.txt: Anonymized resolved domain IP addresses from the status recorder.
 config.txt: Anonymized configuration information of the NetBird client.
 network_map.json: Anonymized sync response containing peer configurations, routes, DNS settings, and firewall rules.
@@ -237,6 +238,13 @@ scutil_dns.txt (macOS only):
 - Shows DNS configuration for all network interfaces
 - Includes search domains, nameservers, and DNS resolver settings
 - All IP addresses and domain names are anonymized
+
+dns_windows.txt (Windows only):
+- Lists the NRPT rules of both policy stores, the local one and the group policy one, marking the rules the client created
+- Follows them with the policy table the resolver has loaded, which differs from the rules while a change has not been picked up yet
+- Includes the DNS client group policy, the global TCP/IP and Dnscache parameters, and the DNS values of every interface that has any
+- Ends with the resolver configuration in effect per adapter, from GetAdaptersAddresses
+- All IP addresses and domain names are anonymized
 `
 
 const (

client/internal/debug/debug_linux.go

@@ -844,6 +844,10 @@ func collectSysctls() string {
 		[]string{"net.ipv4.conf.all.src_valid_mark", "net.ipv4.conf.default.src_valid_mark"},
 		listInterfaceSysctls("ipv4", "src_valid_mark")...,
 	))
+	writeSysctlGroup(&builder, "accept_ra", append(
+		[]string{"net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra", "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra"},
+		listInterfaceSysctls("ipv6", "accept_ra")...,
+	))
 	writeSysctlGroup(&builder, "conntrack", []string{
 		"net.netfilter.nf_conntrack_acct",
 		"net.netfilter.nf_conntrack_tcp_loose",

client/internal/debug/debug_nonunix.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-//go:build !unix
+//go:build !unix && !windows
 
 package debug
 

client/internal/debug/debug_windows.go

@@ -0,0 +1,443 @@
+//go:build windows
+
+package debug
+
+import (
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/netip"
+	"strings"
+	"unsafe"
+
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+	"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
+	"golang.org/x/sys/windows/registry"
+
+	nbdns "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns"
+)
+
+const dnsInfoFileName = "dns_windows.txt"
+
+const (
+	gpoDNSClientRoot = `SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\DNSClient`
+	tcpipParamsPath  = `SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters`
+	dnscacheParams   = `SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Dnscache\Parameters`
+)
+
+// interfaceDNSValues are the per-interface values that decide how a name is
+// resolved and registered. Everything the DNS host manager writes is in here,
+// so a bundle shows both what we set and what it replaced.
+var interfaceDNSValues = []string{
+	"NameServer",
+	"DhcpNameServer",
+	"Domain",
+	"DhcpDomain",
+	"SearchList",
+	"RegistrationEnabled",
+	"DisableDynamicUpdate",
+	"MaxNumberOfAddressesToRegister",
+	"EnableDHCP",
+}
+
+// addDNSInfo collects and adds DNS configuration information to the archive
+func (g *BundleGenerator) addDNSInfo() error {
+	if err := g.addFileToZip(strings.NewReader(g.collectDNSInfo()), dnsInfoFileName); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("add DNS info to zip: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// collectDNSInfo renders the report. Everything below it reaches the platform
+// through COM and through lazily resolved procedures, which panic when a
+// procedure is missing rather than returning an error, and a debug bundle is not
+// allowed to take the daemon down. The panic is contained here, and whatever was
+// collected before it is kept and reported with it.
+func (g *BundleGenerator) collectDNSInfo() (content string) {
+	var sb strings.Builder
+
+	defer func() {
+		if r := recover(); r != nil {
+			log.Errorf("collecting Windows DNS configuration panicked: %v", r)
+			fmt.Fprintf(&sb, "\nerror: collection stopped: %v\n", r)
+		}
+		content = sb.String()
+	}()
+
+	sb.WriteString("Windows DNS configuration\n")
+	sb.WriteString("=========================\n")
+
+	adapters, adaptersErr := adapterAddresses()
+
+	g.writeNRPTRules(&sb, "NRPT rules, local policy store", nbdns.DNSPolicyConfigRoot)
+	g.writeNRPTRules(&sb, "NRPT rules, group policy store", nbdns.GPODNSPolicyConfigRoot)
+	g.writeEffectiveNRPTPolicies(&sb)
+	g.writeRegistryKey(&sb, "DNS client group policy", gpoDNSClientRoot)
+	g.writeRegistryKey(&sb, "Global TCP/IP parameters", tcpipParamsPath)
+	g.writeRegistryKey(&sb, "Dnscache parameters", dnscacheParams)
+	g.writeInterfaceDNS(&sb, "Per-interface DNS, IPv4", nbdns.InterfaceConfigPath, adapterNames(adapters))
+	g.writeInterfaceDNS(&sb, "Per-interface DNS, IPv6", nbdns.InterfaceConfigPathV6, adapterNames(adapters))
+	g.writeAdapterDNS(&sb, adapters, adaptersErr)
+
+	return sb.String()
+}
+
+// writeNRPTRules lists every rule in a policy store, ours and any other
+// product's, since a foreign rule for the same namespace decides resolution
+// just as ours does. Rules the client wrote are marked.
+func (g *BundleGenerator) writeNRPTRules(sb *strings.Builder, title, root string) {
+	writeSection(sb, title, root)
+
+	names, err := subKeyNames(root)
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(sb, "error: %v\n", err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	if len(names) == 0 {
+		sb.WriteString("no rules\n")
+		return
+	}
+
+	for _, name := range names {
+		owner := ""
+		if strings.HasPrefix(strings.ToLower(name), strings.ToLower(nbdns.NRPTKeyPrefix)) {
+			owner = "  (netbird)"
+		}
+		fmt.Fprintf(sb, "%s%s\n", name, owner)
+		g.writeValues(sb, root+`\`+name, nil, "  ")
+	}
+}
+
+// writeEffectiveNRPTPolicies reports the table the resolver answers from, which
+// the registry cannot show: a rule is written before it is loaded, and it keeps
+// being enforced after its key is gone until the resolver reloads its policy.
+func (g *BundleGenerator) writeEffectiveNRPTPolicies(sb *strings.Builder) {
+	writeSection(sb, "NRPT policy table in effect", nrptPolicyClass+"."+nrptPolicyMethod+" in "+nrptPolicyNamespace)
+
+	entries, err := effectiveNRPTPolicies()
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(sb, "error: %v\n", err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	if len(entries) == 0 {
+		sb.WriteString("no policies\n")
+		return
+	}
+
+	for _, entry := range entries {
+		fmt.Fprintf(sb, "%s\n", g.anonymizeValue("Namespace", entry.namespace))
+		for _, value := range entry.values {
+			fmt.Fprintf(sb, "  %s: %s\n", value.name, g.anonymizeValue(value.name, value.value))
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// writeInterfaceDNS reports the DNS values of every interface that has any, so
+// the netbird interface can be compared against the physical ones. The registry
+// keys the values by GUID, so each is named from the adapter list; a GUID with
+// no adapter is a leftover key of an interface that no longer exists.
+func (g *BundleGenerator) writeInterfaceDNS(sb *strings.Builder, title, root string, names map[string]string) {
+	writeSection(sb, title, root)
+
+	guids, err := subKeyNames(root)
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(sb, "error: %v\n", err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	var reported int
+	for _, guid := range guids {
+		var iface strings.Builder
+		g.writeValues(&iface, root+`\`+guid, interfaceDNSValues, "  ")
+		if iface.Len() == 0 {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		name, ok := names[strings.ToLower(guid)]
+		if !ok {
+			name = "no adapter with this GUID"
+		}
+
+		reported++
+		fmt.Fprintf(sb, "%s (%s)\n%s", guid, name, iface.String())
+	}
+
+	if reported == 0 {
+		sb.WriteString("no interface holds DNS values\n")
+	}
+}
+
+// writeRegistryKey reports the values of a single key, without its subkeys.
+func (g *BundleGenerator) writeRegistryKey(sb *strings.Builder, title, path string) {
+	writeSection(sb, title, path)
+
+	var values strings.Builder
+	g.writeValues(&values, path, nil, "")
+	if values.Len() == 0 {
+		sb.WriteString("no values\n")
+		return
+	}
+
+	sb.WriteString(values.String())
+}
+
+// writeValues renders the values of a key. A nil names list reports every
+// value, otherwise only those named and present.
+func (g *BundleGenerator) writeValues(sb *strings.Builder, path string, names []string, indent string) {
+	k, err := registry.OpenKey(registry.LOCAL_MACHINE, path, registry.QUERY_VALUE)
+	switch {
+	case errors.Is(err, registry.ErrNotExist), errors.Is(err, windows.ERROR_PATH_NOT_FOUND):
+		// an absent key is the normal state for the GPO store and for
+		// interfaces without DNS settings
+		log.Debugf("HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\%s does not exist", path)
+		return
+	case err != nil:
+		fmt.Fprintf(sb, "%serror: open HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\%s: %v\n", indent, path, err)
+		return
+	}
+	defer closeKey(k)
+
+	if names == nil {
+		names, err = k.ReadValueNames(-1)
+		if err != nil {
+			fmt.Fprintf(sb, "%serror: read value names: %v\n", indent, err)
+			return
+		}
+	}
+
+	for _, name := range names {
+		value, err := readRegistryValue(k, name)
+		switch {
+		case errors.Is(err, registry.ErrNotExist):
+			// the caller asks for a fixed set of values, most of which a
+			// given interface does not carry
+			continue
+		case err != nil:
+			// report rather than omit: a value that is there but cannot be
+			// read reads as unset otherwise
+			fmt.Fprintf(sb, "%s%s: error: %v\n", indent, name, err)
+			continue
+		}
+
+		fmt.Fprintf(sb, "%s%s: %s\n", indent, name, g.anonymizeValue(name, value))
+	}
+}
+
+// anonymizeValue redacts a registry value according to what its name says it
+// holds. Domains and addresses are handled per entry rather than by the string
+// pass: the pass only replaces domains something else in the bundle already
+// seeded, and its address regex would eat the digit labels of a reverse zone.
+func (g *BundleGenerator) anonymizeValue(name, value string) string {
+	if !g.anonymize || value == "" {
+		return value
+	}
+
+	switch {
+	case holdsDomains(name):
+		return joinValueEntries(splitValueEntries(value), g.anonymizeDomain)
+	case holdsAddresses(name):
+		return joinValueEntries(splitValueEntries(value), g.anonymizer.AnonymizeIPString)
+	default:
+		return g.anonymizer.AnonymizeString(value)
+	}
+}
+
+// holdsDomains reports whether a value name holds domains: the domain list of
+// an NRPT rule (Name) or of the policy table (Namespace), a search list, the
+// DNS suffix values of the TCP/IP and policy keys, which all end in "Domain"
+// (Domain, DhcpDomain, NV Domain, ICSDomain), and a proxy host name.
+func holdsDomains(name string) bool {
+	lower := strings.ToLower(name)
+	return lower == "name" || lower == "namespace" || lower == "searchlist" ||
+		strings.HasSuffix(lower, "domain") || strings.HasSuffix(lower, "proxyname")
+}
+
+// holdsAddresses reports whether a value name holds DNS server addresses
+// (NameServer, DhcpNameServer, GenericDNSServers, NameServers).
+func holdsAddresses(name string) bool {
+	lower := strings.ToLower(name)
+	return strings.Contains(lower, "nameserver") || strings.Contains(lower, "dnsserver")
+}
+
+// adapterNames maps adapter GUIDs, as the registry keys the interfaces, to the
+// names an operator sees.
+func adapterNames(adapters []*windows.IpAdapterAddresses) map[string]string {
+	names := make(map[string]string, len(adapters))
+	for _, adapter := range adapters {
+		guid := windows.BytePtrToString(adapter.AdapterName)
+		names[strings.ToLower(guid)] = windows.UTF16PtrToString(adapter.FriendlyName)
+	}
+	return names
+}
+
+// writeAdapterDNS reports the resolver configuration in effect per adapter,
+// which is what the resolver uses for a name no NRPT rule matches.
+func (g *BundleGenerator) writeAdapterDNS(sb *strings.Builder, adapters []*windows.IpAdapterAddresses, err error) {
+	writeSection(sb, "Adapter DNS configuration", "GetAdaptersAddresses")
+
+	if err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(sb, "error: %v\n", err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	for _, adapter := range adapters {
+		name := windows.UTF16PtrToString(adapter.FriendlyName)
+		suffix := g.anonymizeDomain(windows.UTF16PtrToString(adapter.DnsSuffix))
+
+		fmt.Fprintf(sb, "%s (index %d, oper status %d)\n", name, adapter.IfIndex, adapter.OperStatus)
+		fmt.Fprintf(sb, "  DNS suffix: %s\n", suffix)
+
+		var servers []string
+		for server := adapter.FirstDnsServerAddress; server != nil; server = server.Next {
+			addr, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(server.Address.IP())
+			if !ok {
+				continue
+			}
+
+			addr = addr.Unmap()
+			if g.anonymize {
+				addr = g.anonymizer.AnonymizeIP(addr)
+			}
+			servers = append(servers, addr.String())
+		}
+
+		fmt.Fprintf(sb, "  DNS servers: %s\n", strings.Join(servers, ", "))
+	}
+}
+
+// anonymizeDomain anonymizes a single domain, keeping the leading dot an NRPT
+// match domain carries.
+func (g *BundleGenerator) anonymizeDomain(entry string) string {
+	if !g.anonymize {
+		return entry
+	}
+
+	domain, dot := strings.CutPrefix(entry, ".")
+	if domain == "" {
+		return entry
+	}
+
+	anonymized := g.anonymizer.AnonymizeDomain(domain)
+	if dot {
+		anonymized = "." + anonymized
+	}
+	return anonymized
+}
+
+// splitValueEntries splits a registry value that holds a list. The separator
+// differs per value: a REG_MULTI_SZ arrives joined with ", ", a SearchList is
+// comma separated and a NameServer may use commas or spaces.
+func splitValueEntries(value string) []string {
+	return strings.FieldsFunc(value, func(r rune) bool {
+		return r == ',' || r == ';' || r == ' ' || r == '\t'
+	})
+}
+
+func joinValueEntries(entries []string, anonymize func(string) string) string {
+	for i, entry := range entries {
+		entries[i] = anonymize(entry)
+	}
+	return strings.Join(entries, ", ")
+}
+
+func writeSection(sb *strings.Builder, title, source string) {
+	fmt.Fprintf(sb, "\n%s\n%s\n%s\n", title, strings.Repeat("-", len(title)), source)
+}
+
+func subKeyNames(root string) ([]string, error) {
+	k, err := registry.OpenKey(registry.LOCAL_MACHINE, root, registry.ENUMERATE_SUB_KEYS)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("open HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\%s: %w", root, err)
+	}
+	defer closeKey(k)
+
+	names, err := k.ReadSubKeyNames(-1)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("read subkey names: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	return names, nil
+}
+
+// readRegistryValue renders a value as text regardless of its type, so an
+// unexpected type in a policy key still shows up instead of being dropped.
+func readRegistryValue(k registry.Key, name string) (string, error) {
+	_, valueType, err := k.GetValue(name, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("get value %s: %w", name, err)
+	}
+
+	switch valueType {
+	case registry.SZ, registry.EXPAND_SZ:
+		value, _, err := k.GetStringValue(name)
+		if err != nil {
+			return "", fmt.Errorf("get string value %s: %w", name, err)
+		}
+		return value, nil
+	case registry.MULTI_SZ:
+		values, _, err := k.GetStringsValue(name)
+		if err != nil {
+			return "", fmt.Errorf("get strings value %s: %w", name, err)
+		}
+		return strings.Join(values, ", "), nil
+	case registry.DWORD, registry.QWORD:
+		value, _, err := k.GetIntegerValue(name)
+		if err != nil {
+			return "", fmt.Errorf("get integer value %s: %w", name, err)
+		}
+		return fmt.Sprintf("%d (0x%x)", value, value), nil
+	case registry.BINARY:
+		value, _, err := k.GetBinaryValue(name)
+		if err != nil {
+			return "", fmt.Errorf("get binary value %s: %w", name, err)
+		}
+		return hex.EncodeToString(value), nil
+	default:
+		return fmt.Sprintf("<unhandled registry type %d>", valueType), nil
+	}
+}
+
+// adapterAddresses returns the adapter list including DNS servers. The call
+// reports the size it needs, so grow the buffer and retry until it fits.
+func adapterAddresses() (adapters []*windows.IpAdapterAddresses, err error) {
+	// GetAdaptersAddresses is resolved on first use and panics when it is
+	// missing, so this reports it as an error and leaves the rest of the
+	// report intact.
+	defer func() {
+		if r := recover(); r != nil {
+			adapters, err = nil, fmt.Errorf("GetAdaptersAddresses: %v", r)
+		}
+	}()
+
+	const flags = windows.GAA_FLAG_SKIP_ANYCAST | windows.GAA_FLAG_SKIP_MULTICAST
+
+	size := uint32(15000)
+	for range 3 {
+		buf := make([]byte, size)
+		first := (*windows.IpAdapterAddresses)(unsafe.Pointer(&buf[0]))
+
+		err := windows.GetAdaptersAddresses(windows.AF_UNSPEC, flags, 0, first, &size)
+		if errors.Is(err, windows.ERROR_BUFFER_OVERFLOW) {
+			continue
+		}
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("GetAdaptersAddresses: %w", err)
+		}
+
+		for adapter := first; adapter != nil; adapter = adapter.Next {
+			adapters = append(adapters, adapter)
+		}
+		return adapters, nil
+	}
+
+	return nil, fmt.Errorf("GetAdaptersAddresses: buffer kept growing")
+}
+
+func closeKey(k registry.Key) {
+	if err := k.Close(); err != nil {
+		log.Debugf("close registry key: %v", err)
+	}
+}

client/internal/debug/debug_windows_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+//go:build windows
+
+package debug
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/anonymize"
+)
+
+func newDNSValueGenerator(level anonymize.Level) *BundleGenerator {
+	anonymizer := anonymize.NewAnonymizer(anonymize.DefaultAddresses())
+	anonymizer.SetLevel(level)
+
+	return &BundleGenerator{
+		anonymize:      true,
+		anonymizeLevel: level,
+		anonymizer:     anonymizer,
+	}
+}
+
+// TestAnonymizeValueByName covers the value kinds of the DNS registry keys. The
+// names decide the treatment, because the string pass alone replaces only
+// domains another part of the bundle already seeded.
+func TestAnonymizeValueByName(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name      string
+		valueName string
+		value     string
+		assert    func(t *testing.T, got string)
+	}{
+		{
+			name:      "NRPT match domains keep the leading dot",
+			valueName: "Name",
+			value:     ".internal.example.com, .corp.example.org",
+			assert: func(t *testing.T, got string) {
+				t.Helper()
+				for _, entry := range strings.Split(got, ", ") {
+					assert.True(t, strings.HasPrefix(entry, "."), "entry %q should keep its leading dot", entry)
+					assert.NotContains(t, entry, "example", "entry %q should not keep the original domain", entry)
+				}
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			name:      "any value name ending in Domain is treated as a domain",
+			valueName: "ICSDomain",
+			value:     "mshome.net",
+			assert: func(t *testing.T, got string) {
+				t.Helper()
+				assert.NotContains(t, got, "mshome", "should anonymize a domain suffix value")
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			name:      "search list is a comma separated domain list",
+			valueName: "SearchList",
+			value:     "corp.example.com,branch.example.com",
+			assert: func(t *testing.T, got string) {
+				t.Helper()
+				assert.NotContains(t, got, "example", "should anonymize every search domain")
+				assert.Len(t, strings.Split(got, ", "), 2, "should keep both search domains")
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			name:      "name servers are anonymized as addresses",
+			valueName: "DhcpNameServer",
+			value:     "203.0.113.10 8.8.8.8",
+			assert: func(t *testing.T, got string) {
+				t.Helper()
+				assert.NotContains(t, got, "203.0.113.10", "should anonymize a public resolver address")
+				// well-known resolvers stay readable at every level
+				assert.Contains(t, got, "8.8.8.8", "should keep a well-known resolver address")
+			},
+		},
+		{
+			name:      "opaque values are left to the string pass",
+			valueName: "DataBasePath",
+			value:     `%SystemRoot%\System32\drivers\etc`,
+			assert: func(t *testing.T, got string) {
+				t.Helper()
+				assert.Equal(t, `%SystemRoot%\System32\drivers\etc`, got, "should not alter a path")
+			},
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			g := newDNSValueGenerator(anonymize.LevelDefault)
+			tc.assert(t, g.anonymizeValue(tc.valueName, tc.value))
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestParseNRPTPolicyTable parses the MOF text of the policy table out
+// parameters, as the provider on a client with one NRPT rule renders it.
+func TestParseNRPTPolicyTable(t *testing.T) {
+	const text = `[abstract]
+class __PARAMETERS
+{
+	[Out, EmbeddedInstance("DnsClientPolicyConfiguration"): ToSubClass, ID(2): DisableOverride ToInstance] DnsClientPolicyConfiguration cmdletOutput[] = {
+instance of DnsClientPolicyConfiguration
+{
+	DirectAccessProxyType = "NoProxy";
+	DirectAccessQueryIPsecRequired = FALSE;
+	NameEncoding = "Utf8WithoutMapping";
+	Namespace = ".0.100.in-addr.arpa";
+}, 
+instance of DnsClientPolicyConfiguration
+{
+	DirectAccessProxyType = "NoProxy";
+	NameEncoding = "Utf8WithoutMapping";
+	NameServers = {"100.0.255.254", "100.0.255.253"};
+	Namespace = ".nb.internal";
+}};
+	[in] boolean Effective;
+	[out] uint32 ReturnValue = 0;
+};
+`
+
+	entries := parseNRPTPolicyTable(text)
+	require.Len(t, entries, 2, "should parse both embedded instances")
+
+	assert.Equal(t, ".0.100.in-addr.arpa", entries[0].namespace, "should read the namespace of the first instance")
+	assert.Equal(t, ".nb.internal", entries[1].namespace, "should read the namespace of the second instance")
+
+	assert.Equal(t, []registryValue{
+		{name: "DirectAccessProxyType", value: "NoProxy"},
+		{name: "DirectAccessQueryIPsecRequired", value: "FALSE"},
+		{name: "NameEncoding", value: "Utf8WithoutMapping"},
+	}, entries[0].values, "should keep the remaining values in order")
+
+	assert.Contains(t, entries[1].values, registryValue{name: "NameServers", value: "100.0.255.254, 100.0.255.253"},
+		"should flatten a MOF array")
+
+	for _, value := range entries[1].values {
+		assert.NotContains(t, value.name, "ReturnValue", "should not read the class level parameters as values")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestParseNRPTPolicyTableEmpty(t *testing.T) {
+	assert.Empty(t, parseNRPTPolicyTable(""), "should parse no entries from empty text")
+	assert.Empty(t, parseNRPTPolicyTable("class __PARAMETERS\n{\n};\n"), "should parse no entries from a table with no instances")
+}

client/internal/debug/nrpt_windows.go

@@ -0,0 +1,317 @@
+//go:build windows
+
+package debug
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"runtime"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/go-ole/go-ole"
+	"github.com/go-ole/go-ole/oleutil"
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+)
+
+const (
+	// The NRPT policy table is reachable through the CIM class that backs
+	// Get-DnsClientNrptPolicy. Unlike the rules in the registry, the table is
+	// what the resolver currently has loaded, which is the only way to tell an
+	// applied rule from one that is merely written, in either direction.
+	nrptPolicyNamespace = `root\Microsoft\Windows\DNS`
+	nrptPolicyClass     = "PS_DnsClientNrptPolicy"
+	nrptPolicyMethod    = "Get"
+
+	// The class has no instances, so the table comes from the out parameters
+	// of a static method call, rendered as MOF text: the embedded instances
+	// arrive as a safe array of objects, which cannot be read back through the
+	// COM bindings, and the text form carries all of them.
+	nrptPolicyInstanceKeyword = "instance of DnsClientPolicyConfiguration"
+
+	nrptPolicyTimeout = 15 * time.Second
+)
+
+// COM initialization results that leave the calling thread usable: S_FALSE for
+// a thread this process already initialized, RPC_E_CHANGED_MODE for one that
+// belongs to another apartment.
+const (
+	sFalse          = 0x00000001
+	rpcEChangedMode = 0x80010106
+)
+
+// nrptQueryInFlight admits one read of the policy table at a time. A provider
+// that stops answering keeps its goroutine and the OS thread that goroutine
+// pinned, so a later bundle reports that instead of pinning another one.
+var nrptQueryInFlight = make(chan struct{}, 1)
+
+// nrptPolicyEntry is one namespace of the effective policy table, holding the
+// values of an embedded DnsClientPolicyConfiguration instance in the order the
+// provider reported them.
+type nrptPolicyEntry struct {
+	namespace string
+	values    []registryValue
+}
+
+// registryValue is a name and its rendered value, shared by the registry and
+// policy table readers so both anonymize by value name the same way.
+type registryValue struct {
+	name  string
+	value string
+}
+
+// effectiveNRPTPolicies reads the effective NRPT table. The call is bounded
+// because a WMI provider can block indefinitely and a debug bundle must not.
+func effectiveNRPTPolicies() ([]nrptPolicyEntry, error) {
+	type result struct {
+		text string
+		err  error
+	}
+
+	select {
+	case nrptQueryInFlight <- struct{}{}:
+	default:
+		return nil, errors.New("an earlier read of the policy table has not returned")
+	}
+
+	done := make(chan result, 1)
+	go func() {
+		// the slot is released here rather than by the caller, so a read that
+		// outlives the timeout holds it until the provider answers
+		defer func() { <-nrptQueryInFlight }()
+
+		text, err := nrptPolicyTableText()
+		done <- result{text: text, err: err}
+	}()
+
+	select {
+	case res := <-done:
+		if res.err != nil {
+			return nil, res.err
+		}
+		return parseNRPTPolicyTable(res.text), nil
+	case <-time.After(nrptPolicyTimeout):
+		return nil, errors.New("read of the policy table timed out")
+	}
+}
+
+// nrptPolicyTableText calls the policy table method and returns the MOF text of
+// its out parameters.
+func nrptPolicyTableText() (text string, err error) {
+	// COM is per thread, and the collection is short lived, so the thread is
+	// pinned for the duration rather than initialized for the process.
+	runtime.LockOSThread()
+	defer runtime.UnlockOSThread()
+
+	defer func() {
+		// The COM call chain is dynamically typed, so a provider that answers
+		// with an unexpected shape must not take the daemon down with it.
+		if r := recover(); r != nil {
+			err = fmt.Errorf("read NRPT policy table: %v", r)
+		}
+	}()
+
+	owns, err := coInitialize()
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	if owns {
+		defer ole.CoUninitialize()
+	}
+
+	locator, err := oleutil.CreateObject("WbemScripting.SWbemLocator")
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("create WMI locator: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer locator.Release()
+
+	dispatch, err := locator.QueryInterface(ole.IID_IDispatch)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("query WMI locator interface: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer dispatch.Release()
+
+	service, err := dispatchCall(dispatch, "ConnectServer", nil, nrptPolicyNamespace)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("connect to %s: %w", nrptPolicyNamespace, err)
+	}
+	defer service.Release()
+
+	inParams, err := spawnMethodInParams(service)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	defer inParams.Release()
+
+	// The effective table is the merge of the local and the group policy
+	// store, which is what the resolver answers from.
+	if _, err := oleutil.PutProperty(inParams, "Effective", true); err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("set Effective parameter: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	outParams, err := dispatchCall(service, "ExecMethod", nrptPolicyClass, nrptPolicyMethod, inParams)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("call %s.%s: %w", nrptPolicyClass, nrptPolicyMethod, err)
+	}
+	defer outParams.Release()
+
+	textVariant, err := oleutil.CallMethod(outParams, "GetObjectText_")
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("render policy table: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer func() {
+		if err := textVariant.Clear(); err != nil {
+			log.Debugf("clear policy table variant: %v", err)
+		}
+	}()
+
+	return textVariant.ToString(), nil
+}
+
+// spawnMethodInParams builds the in parameters instance the method needs. The
+// provider rejects the call without one, even when every parameter is optional.
+func spawnMethodInParams(service *ole.IDispatch) (*ole.IDispatch, error) {
+	class, err := dispatchCall(service, "Get", nrptPolicyClass)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("get class %s: %w", nrptPolicyClass, err)
+	}
+	defer class.Release()
+
+	methods, err := dispatchProperty(class, "Methods_")
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("get class methods: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer methods.Release()
+
+	method, err := dispatchCall(methods, "Item", nrptPolicyMethod)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("get method %s: %w", nrptPolicyMethod, err)
+	}
+	defer method.Release()
+
+	params, err := dispatchProperty(method, "InParameters")
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("get method parameters: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer params.Release()
+
+	inParams, err := dispatchCall(params, "SpawnInstance_")
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("spawn parameter instance: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	return inParams, nil
+}
+
+// parseNRPTPolicyTable pulls the embedded instances out of the MOF text. Each
+// instance is a namespace of the table, with one name and value per line.
+func parseNRPTPolicyTable(text string) []nrptPolicyEntry {
+	var entries []nrptPolicyEntry
+	var current *nrptPolicyEntry
+
+	for _, line := range strings.Split(text, "\n") {
+		line = strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimSpace(line), ";"))
+
+		switch {
+		case strings.HasPrefix(line, nrptPolicyInstanceKeyword):
+			entries = append(entries, nrptPolicyEntry{})
+			current = &entries[len(entries)-1]
+			continue
+		case strings.HasPrefix(line, "}"):
+			// closes an instance, and the array with the last one, so the
+			// class level parameters that follow are not read as values
+			current = nil
+			continue
+		case current == nil, line == "{":
+			continue
+		}
+
+		name, value, ok := strings.Cut(line, " = ")
+		if !ok {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		value = unquoteMOFValue(value)
+		if name == "Namespace" {
+			current.namespace = value
+			continue
+		}
+
+		current.values = append(current.values, registryValue{name: name, value: value})
+	}
+
+	return entries
+}
+
+// unquoteMOFValue renders a MOF scalar or array as plain text: "a" becomes a,
+// and {"a", "b"} becomes a, b.
+func unquoteMOFValue(value string) string {
+	value = strings.TrimSpace(value)
+
+	if inner, ok := strings.CutPrefix(value, "{"); ok {
+		value = strings.TrimSuffix(inner, "}")
+
+		entries := strings.Split(value, ",")
+		for i, entry := range entries {
+			entries[i] = strings.Trim(strings.TrimSpace(entry), `"`)
+		}
+		return strings.Join(entries, ", ")
+	}
+
+	return strings.Trim(value, `"`)
+}
+
+// coInitialize prepares the calling thread for COM and reports whether this
+// call owns the initialization, which decides whether it may be balanced with
+// CoUninitialize. S_FALSE took a reference on a thread this process had already
+// initialized and so has to be released, while RPC_E_CHANGED_MODE took none:
+// the thread belongs to another apartment, which is usable but is not ours to
+// uninitialize.
+func coInitialize() (bool, error) {
+	err := ole.CoInitializeEx(0, ole.COINIT_MULTITHREADED)
+	if err == nil {
+		return true, nil
+	}
+
+	var oleErr *ole.OleError
+	if errors.As(err, &oleErr) {
+		switch oleErr.Code() {
+		case sFalse:
+			return true, nil
+		case rpcEChangedMode:
+			return false, nil
+		}
+	}
+
+	return false, fmt.Errorf("initialize COM: %w", err)
+}
+
+// dispatchCall calls a COM method that returns an object.
+func dispatchCall(dispatch *ole.IDispatch, method string, params ...any) (*ole.IDispatch, error) {
+	variant, err := oleutil.CallMethod(dispatch, method, params...)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	object := variant.ToIDispatch()
+	if object == nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s returned no object", method)
+	}
+
+	return object, nil
+}
+
+// dispatchProperty reads a COM property that holds an object.
+func dispatchProperty(dispatch *ole.IDispatch, property string) (*ole.IDispatch, error) {
+	variant, err := oleutil.GetProperty(dispatch, property)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	object := variant.ToIDispatch()
+	if object == nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("property %s holds no object", property)
+	}
+
+	return object, nil
+}

client/internal/dns/host_darwin.go

@@ -267,18 +267,38 @@ func (s *systemConfigurator) getSystemDNSSettings() (SystemDNSSettings, error) {
 		return SystemDNSSettings{}, fmt.Errorf("sending the command: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	var dnsSettings SystemDNSSettings
+	dnsSettings, serverAddresses, err := parseSystemDNSSettings(b)
+	if err != nil {
+		return dnsSettings, err
+	}
+
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	s.origNameservers = serverAddresses
+	s.mu.Unlock()
+
+	return dnsSettings, nil
+}
+
+// parseSystemDNSSettings parses the output of `scutil show State:/Network/Service/<id>/DNS`.
+// Lines that don't match the expected "index : value" shape are skipped: hosts with unusual
+// network services (e.g. orphaned hardware ports) can produce entries without a value.
+func parseSystemDNSSettings(out []byte) (SystemDNSSettings, []netip.Addr, error) {
+	// port is not exposed by scutil, default to 53
+	dnsSettings := SystemDNSSettings{ServerPort: DefaultPort}
 	var serverAddresses []netip.Addr
 	inSearchDomainsArray := false
 	inServerAddressesArray := false
 
-	scanner := bufio.NewScanner(bytes.NewReader(b))
+	scanner := bufio.NewScanner(bytes.NewReader(out))
 	for scanner.Scan() {
 		line := strings.TrimSpace(scanner.Text())
 		switch {
 		case strings.HasPrefix(line, "DomainName :"):
-			domainName := strings.TrimSpace(strings.Split(line, ":")[1])
-			dnsSettings.Domains = append(dnsSettings.Domains, domainName)
+			domainName := strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(line, "DomainName :"))
+			if domainName != "" {
+				dnsSettings.Domains = append(dnsSettings.Domains, domainName)
+			}
+			continue
 		case line == "SearchDomains : <array> {":
 			inSearchDomainsArray = true
 			continue
@@ -288,36 +308,45 @@ func (s *systemConfigurator) getSystemDNSSettings() (SystemDNSSettings, error) {
 		case line == "}":
 			inSearchDomainsArray = false
 			inServerAddressesArray = false
+			continue
+		}
+
+		if !inSearchDomainsArray && !inServerAddressesArray {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		parts := strings.SplitN(line, " : ", 2)
+		if len(parts) != 2 {
+			log.Debugf("skipping unexpected scutil DNS line %q", line)
+			continue
+		}
+		value := strings.TrimSpace(parts[1])
+		if value == "" {
+			continue
 		}
 
 		if inSearchDomainsArray {
-			searchDomain := strings.Split(line, " : ")[1]
-			dnsSettings.Domains = append(dnsSettings.Domains, searchDomain)
-		} else if inServerAddressesArray {
-			address := strings.Split(line, " : ")[1]
-			if ip, err := netip.ParseAddr(address); err == nil && !ip.IsUnspecified() {
-				ip = ip.Unmap()
-				serverAddresses = append(serverAddresses, ip)
-				// Prefer the first IPv4 server as ServerIP since our DNS listener is IPv4.
-				if !dnsSettings.ServerIP.IsValid() && ip.Is4() {
-					dnsSettings.ServerIP = ip
-				}
-			}
+			dnsSettings.Domains = append(dnsSettings.Domains, value)
+			continue
+		}
+
+		ip, err := netip.ParseAddr(value)
+		if err != nil || ip.IsUnspecified() {
+			continue
+		}
+		ip = ip.Unmap()
+		serverAddresses = append(serverAddresses, ip)
+		// Prefer the first IPv4 server as ServerIP since our DNS listener is IPv4.
+		if !dnsSettings.ServerIP.IsValid() && ip.Is4() {
+			dnsSettings.ServerIP = ip
 		}
 	}
 
 	if err := scanner.Err(); err != nil {
-		return dnsSettings, err
+		return dnsSettings, serverAddresses, err
 	}
 
-	// default to 53 port
-	dnsSettings.ServerPort = DefaultPort
-
-	s.mu.Lock()
-	s.origNameservers = serverAddresses
-	s.mu.Unlock()
-
-	return dnsSettings, nil
+	return dnsSettings, serverAddresses, nil
 }
 
 func (s *systemConfigurator) getOriginalNameservers() []netip.Addr {
@@ -435,11 +464,15 @@ func (s *systemConfigurator) getPrimaryService() (string, string, error) {
 	router := ""
 	for scanner.Scan() {
 		text := scanner.Text()
+		parts := strings.SplitN(text, ":", 2)
+		if len(parts) != 2 {
+			continue
+		}
 		if strings.Contains(text, "PrimaryService") {
-			primaryService = strings.TrimSpace(strings.Split(text, ":")[1])
+			primaryService = strings.TrimSpace(parts[1])
 		}
 		if strings.Contains(text, "Router") {
-			router = strings.TrimSpace(strings.Split(text, ":")[1])
+			router = strings.TrimSpace(parts[1])
 		}
 	}
 	if err := scanner.Err(); err != nil && err != io.EOF {

client/internal/dns/host_darwin_test.go

@@ -328,6 +328,120 @@ func removeTestDNSKey(key string) error {
 	return err
 }
 
+func TestParseSystemDNSSettings(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name            string
+		output          string
+		expectedDomains []string
+		expectedServers []netip.Addr
+		expectedIP      netip.Addr
+	}{
+		{
+			name: "well_formed",
+			output: `<dictionary> {
+  DomainName : example.com
+  SearchDomains : <array> {
+    0 : example.com
+    1 : corp.example.com
+  }
+  ServerAddresses : <array> {
+    0 : 192.168.1.1
+    1 : fd00::53
+  }
+}
+`,
+			expectedDomains: []string{"example.com", "example.com", "corp.example.com"},
+			expectedServers: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1"), netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::53")},
+			expectedIP:      netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1"),
+		},
+		{
+			// entries without a value after the separator used to panic with
+			// "index out of range [1] with length 1"
+			name: "malformed_array_entries_skipped",
+			output: `<dictionary> {
+  SearchDomains : <array> {
+    0 :
+    (null)
+
+    1 : corp.example.com
+  }
+  ServerAddresses : <array> {
+    0 :
+    1 : 192.168.1.1
+  }
+}
+`,
+			expectedDomains: []string{"corp.example.com"},
+			expectedServers: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1")},
+			expectedIP:      netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1"),
+		},
+		{
+			name: "domain_name_without_value_skipped",
+			output: `<dictionary> {
+  DomainName :
+  ServerAddresses : <array> {
+    0 : 192.168.1.1
+  }
+}
+`,
+			expectedServers: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1")},
+			expectedIP:      netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1"),
+		},
+		{
+			name: "ipv6_first_prefers_ipv4_server_ip",
+			output: `<dictionary> {
+  ServerAddresses : <array> {
+    0 : fd00::53
+    1 : 192.168.1.1
+  }
+}
+`,
+			expectedServers: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::53"), netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1")},
+			expectedIP:      netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1"),
+		},
+		{
+			name: "invalid_and_unspecified_addresses_skipped",
+			output: `<dictionary> {
+  ServerAddresses : <array> {
+    0 : (null)
+    1 : 0.0.0.0
+    2 : 192.168.1.1
+  }
+}
+`,
+			expectedServers: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1")},
+			expectedIP:      netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1"),
+		},
+		{
+			name: "v4_mapped_address_unmapped",
+			output: `<dictionary> {
+  ServerAddresses : <array> {
+    0 : ::ffff:192.168.1.1
+  }
+}
+`,
+			expectedServers: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1")},
+			expectedIP:      netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1"),
+		},
+		{
+			name:   "empty_output",
+			output: "",
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			settings, servers, err := parseSystemDNSSettings([]byte(tc.output))
+			require.NoError(t, err, "parsing should not fail")
+
+			assert.Equal(t, tc.expectedDomains, settings.Domains, "domains should match")
+			assert.Equal(t, tc.expectedServers, servers, "server addresses should match")
+			assert.Equal(t, tc.expectedIP, settings.ServerIP, "server IP should match")
+			assert.Equal(t, DefaultPort, settings.ServerPort, "server port should default to 53")
+		})
+	}
+}
+
 func TestGetOriginalNameservers(t *testing.T) {
 	configurator := &systemConfigurator{
 		createdKeys: make(map[string]struct{}),

client/internal/dns/host_windows.go

@@ -31,10 +31,28 @@ var (
 	dnsFlushResolverCacheFn = dnsapi.NewProc("DnsFlushResolverCache")
 )
 
+// Registry locations of the host DNS configuration this package programs,
+// exported so a diagnostic reader reports the same locations that are written.
 const (
-	dnsPolicyConfigMatchPath    = `SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Dnscache\Parameters\DnsPolicyConfig\NetBird-Match`
-	gpoDnsPolicyRoot            = `SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\DNSClient\DnsPolicyConfig`
-	gpoDnsPolicyConfigMatchPath = gpoDnsPolicyRoot + `\NetBird-Match`
+	// NRPTKeyPrefix starts the name of every NRPT rule key this client creates.
+	NRPTKeyPrefix = "NetBird-Match"
+
+	// DNSPolicyConfigRoot holds the NRPT rules of the local policy store.
+	DNSPolicyConfigRoot = `SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Dnscache\Parameters\DnsPolicyConfig`
+
+	// GPODNSPolicyConfigRoot holds the NRPT rules of the group policy store,
+	// which takes precedence over the local one when it is present.
+	GPODNSPolicyConfigRoot = `SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\DNSClient\DnsPolicyConfig`
+
+	// InterfaceConfigPath and InterfaceConfigPathV6 hold the per-interface DNS
+	// settings, keyed by interface GUID, in separate hives per address family.
+	InterfaceConfigPath   = `SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Interfaces`
+	InterfaceConfigPathV6 = `SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip6\Parameters\Interfaces`
+)
+
+const (
+	dnsPolicyConfigMatchPath    = DNSPolicyConfigRoot + `\` + NRPTKeyPrefix
+	gpoDnsPolicyConfigMatchPath = GPODNSPolicyConfigRoot + `\` + NRPTKeyPrefix
 
 	dnsPolicyConfigVersionKey           = "Version"
 	dnsPolicyConfigVersionValue         = 2
@@ -45,8 +63,6 @@ const (
 
 	nrptMaxDomainsPerRule = 50
 
-	interfaceConfigPath           = `SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters\Interfaces`
-	interfaceConfigPathV6         = `SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip6\Parameters\Interfaces`
 	interfaceConfigNameServerKey  = "NameServer"
 	interfaceConfigDhcpNameSrvKey = "DhcpNameServer"
 	interfaceConfigSearchListKey  = "SearchList"
@@ -84,7 +100,7 @@ func newHostManager(wgInterface WGIface) (*registryConfigurator, error) {
 	}
 
 	var useGPO bool
-	k, err := registry.OpenKey(registry.LOCAL_MACHINE, gpoDnsPolicyRoot, registry.QUERY_VALUE)
+	k, err := registry.OpenKey(registry.LOCAL_MACHINE, GPODNSPolicyConfigRoot, registry.QUERY_VALUE)
 	if err != nil {
 		log.Debugf("failed to open GPO DNS policy root: %v", err)
 	} else {
@@ -123,7 +139,7 @@ func (r *registryConfigurator) captureOriginalNameservers() ([]netip.Addr, error
 	seen := make(map[netip.Addr]struct{})
 	var out []netip.Addr
 	var merr *multierror.Error
-	for _, root := range []string{interfaceConfigPath, interfaceConfigPathV6} {
+	for _, root := range []string{InterfaceConfigPath, InterfaceConfigPathV6} {
 		addrs, err := r.captureFromTcpipRoot(root)
 		if err != nil {
 			merr = multierror.Append(merr, fmt.Errorf("%s: %w", root, err))
@@ -496,7 +512,7 @@ func (r *registryConfigurator) deleteInterfaceRegistryKeyProperty(propertyKey st
 }
 
 func (r *registryConfigurator) getInterfaceRegistryKey() (registry.Key, error) {
-	regKeyPath := interfaceConfigPath + "\\" + r.guid
+	regKeyPath := InterfaceConfigPath + "\\" + r.guid
 	regKey, err := registry.OpenKey(registry.LOCAL_MACHINE, regKeyPath, registry.SET_VALUE)
 	if err != nil {
 		return regKey, fmt.Errorf("open HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\%s: %w", regKeyPath, err)

client/internal/profilemanager/state.go

@@ -87,9 +87,10 @@ func (pm *ProfileManager) SetActiveProfileState(state *ProfileState) error {
 
 // RemoveProfileState deletes the per-profile state file (which holds the
 // account email used for the SSO login hint and the UI display). Called after
-// a successful logout so a logged-out profile no longer shows a stale account
-// email. The state file only stores the email, so deleting it is equivalent to
-// clearing it; the next SSO login recreates it. A missing file is not an error.
+// profile removal; logout keeps the file so the next login can pass the email
+// as the login_hint. The state file only stores the email, so deleting it is
+// equivalent to clearing it; the next SSO login recreates it. A missing file
+// is not an error.
 func (pm *ProfileManager) RemoveProfileState(profileName string) error {
 	configDir, err := getConfigDir()
 	if err != nil {

client/internal/routemanager/ipfwdstate/ipfwdstate.go

@@ -2,54 +2,183 @@ package ipfwdstate
 
 import (
 	"fmt"
+	"sync"
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/routemanager/systemops"
 )
 
-// IPForwardingState is a struct that keeps track of the IP forwarding state.
-// todo: read initial state of the IP forwarding from the system and reset the state based on it.
-// todo: separate v4/v6 forwarding state, since the sysctls are independent
-// (net.ipv4.ip_forward vs net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding). Currently the nftables
-// manager shares one instance between both routers, which works only because
-// EnableIPForwarding enables both sysctls in a single call.
+// IPForwardingState tracks v4 and v6 IP-forwarding sysctl enables with
+// independent refcounts so a v4-only routing setup doesn't flip v6 sysctls.
 type IPForwardingState struct {
-	enabledCounter int
+	mu sync.Mutex
+
+	v4Count int
+	v6Count int
+
+	// routingV4/routingV6 track whether the routing path currently holds a
+	// reference, so repeated EnableRouting calls (one per network-map update)
+	// hold at most one reference per family and an unpaired DisableRouting
+	// can't release references held by DNAT rules.
+	routingV4 bool
+	routingV6 bool
+
+	wgIfaceName string
+	v6Saved     map[string]int
 }
 
-func NewIPForwardingState() *IPForwardingState {
-	return &IPForwardingState{}
+// NewIPForwardingState returns a state tracker for the IP-forwarding sysctls.
+// wgIfaceName is excluded from the per-interface accept_ra handling.
+func NewIPForwardingState(wgIfaceName string) *IPForwardingState {
+	return &IPForwardingState{wgIfaceName: wgIfaceName}
 }
 
-func (f *IPForwardingState) RequestForwarding() error {
-	if f.enabledCounter != 0 {
-		f.enabledCounter++
+// Counts returns the current v4 and v6 refcounts. Intended for diagnostics
+// and tests.
+func (f *IPForwardingState) Counts() (v4, v6 int) {
+	f.mu.Lock()
+	defer f.mu.Unlock()
+	return f.v4Count, f.v6Count
+}
+
+// RequestRouting takes the forwarding references for the routing path. It is
+// idempotent: while routing already holds a reference, further calls don't
+// increment the refcounts, and a v4-only request releases a previously held v6
+// reference. A v6 sysctl failure is logged and not returned so it can't take
+// down v4 routing (the sysctl may be unwritable, e.g. read-only /proc/sys or
+// IPv6 disabled on the kernel command line); v6 is retried on the next call.
+func (f *IPForwardingState) RequestRouting(v6 bool) error {
+	f.mu.Lock()
+	defer f.mu.Unlock()
+
+	if !f.routingV4 {
+		if err := f.requestV4(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		f.routingV4 = true
+	}
+
+	if !v6 {
+		if !f.routingV6 {
+			return nil
+		}
+		f.routingV6 = false
+		return f.releaseV6()
+	}
+
+	if f.routingV6 {
 		return nil
 	}
-
-	if err := systemops.EnableIPForwarding(); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("failed to enable IP forwarding with sysctl: %w", err)
+	if err := f.requestV6(); err != nil {
+		log.Warnf("enable IPv6 forwarding for routing: %v", err)
+		return nil
 	}
-	f.enabledCounter = 1
-	log.Info("IP forwarding enabled")
-
+	f.routingV6 = true
 	return nil
 }
 
-func (f *IPForwardingState) ReleaseForwarding() error {
-	if f.enabledCounter == 0 {
-		return nil
+// ReleaseRouting releases the references RequestRouting holds. Calls without a
+// held reference are no-ops.
+func (f *IPForwardingState) ReleaseRouting() error {
+	f.mu.Lock()
+	defer f.mu.Unlock()
+
+	if f.routingV4 {
+		f.routingV4 = false
+		f.releaseV4()
 	}
-
-	if f.enabledCounter > 1 {
-		f.enabledCounter--
-		return nil
+	if f.routingV6 {
+		f.routingV6 = false
+		return f.releaseV6()
 	}
-
-	// if failed to disable IP forwarding we anyway decrement the counter
-	f.enabledCounter = 0
-
-	// todo call systemops.DisableIPForwarding()
+	return nil
+}
+
+// RequestForwarding enables the family's forwarding sysctl on first request.
+func (f *IPForwardingState) RequestForwarding(v6 bool) error {
+	f.mu.Lock()
+	defer f.mu.Unlock()
+
+	if v6 {
+		return f.requestV6()
+	}
+	return f.requestV4()
+}
+
+// ReleaseForwarding decrements the family counter. The last v6 release restores
+// what enable captured. v4 stays on: net.ipv4.ip_forward is co-owned by other
+// tooling (docker, k8s, libvirt).
+func (f *IPForwardingState) ReleaseForwarding(v6 bool) error {
+	f.mu.Lock()
+	defer f.mu.Unlock()
+
+	if v6 {
+		return f.releaseV6()
+	}
+	f.releaseV4()
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (f *IPForwardingState) requestV4() error {
+	if f.v4Count == 0 {
+		if err := systemops.EnableV4IPForwarding(); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("enable IPv4 forwarding: %w", err)
+		}
+		log.Info("IPv4 forwarding enabled")
+	}
+	f.v4Count++
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (f *IPForwardingState) releaseV4() {
+	if f.v4Count > 0 {
+		f.v4Count--
+	}
+}
+
+func (f *IPForwardingState) requestV6() error {
+	if f.v6Count == 0 {
+		saved, err := systemops.EnableV6IPForwarding(f.wgIfaceName)
+		if err != nil {
+			if rerr := systemops.DisableV6IPForwarding(saved); rerr != nil {
+				log.Warnf("rollback partial v6 sysctls: %v", rerr)
+			}
+			return fmt.Errorf("enable IPv6 forwarding: %w", err)
+		}
+		// A failed restore on a previous release keeps its saved values; those
+		// are the true originals, so keep them over what this enable captured.
+		if f.v6Saved == nil {
+			f.v6Saved = saved
+		} else {
+			for k, v := range saved {
+				if _, ok := f.v6Saved[k]; !ok {
+					f.v6Saved[k] = v
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		log.Info("IPv6 forwarding enabled")
+	}
+	f.v6Count++
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (f *IPForwardingState) releaseV6() error {
+	if f.v6Count == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	f.v6Count--
+	if f.v6Count > 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// Keep the saved values on failure so a later release or enable/release
+	// cycle can still restore them; re-restoring an already-restored key is a
+	// no-op since the sysctl already holds the desired value.
+	if err := systemops.DisableV6IPForwarding(f.v6Saved); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("disable IPv6 forwarding: %w", err)
+	}
+	f.v6Saved = nil
+	log.Info("IPv6 forwarding disabled")
 	return nil
 }

client/internal/routemanager/ipfwdstate/ipfwdstate_privileged_linux_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+//go:build privileged
+
+package ipfwdstate
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// TestRequestRoutingV6ToV4Transition verifies that a v4-only routing request
+// releases a previously held routing-owned v6 reference without touching
+// references held by DNAT rules.
+func TestRequestRoutingV6ToV4Transition(t *testing.T) {
+	f := NewIPForwardingState("wt-fwd-test")
+
+	require.NoError(t, f.RequestRouting(true), "request routing with v6")
+	v4, v6 := f.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "v4 reference held")
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v6, "v6 reference held")
+
+	require.NoError(t, f.RequestRouting(false), "request routing v4-only")
+	v4, v6 = f.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "v4 reference kept")
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "routing-owned v6 reference released")
+
+	// A DNAT-held reference survives a v4-only routing request.
+	require.NoError(t, f.RequestForwarding(true), "dnat v6 reference")
+	require.NoError(t, f.RequestRouting(false), "repeat v4-only request")
+	_, v6 = f.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v6, "dnat-held v6 reference survives")
+	require.NoError(t, f.ReleaseForwarding(true), "release dnat v6 reference")
+
+	require.NoError(t, f.ReleaseRouting(), "release routing")
+	v4, v6 = f.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "all v4 references released")
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "all v6 references released")
+}

client/internal/routemanager/sysctl/sysctl_linux.go

@@ -58,11 +58,7 @@ func Setup(wgIface iface) (map[string]int, error) {
 			continue
 		}
 
-		// Escape '%' and '.' so they survive the dot-to-slash conversion in Set()
-		safeName := strings.ReplaceAll(intf.Name, "%", percentEscape)
-		safeName = strings.ReplaceAll(safeName, ".", dotEscape)
-
-		i := fmt.Sprintf(rpFilterInterfacePath, safeName)
+		i := fmt.Sprintf(rpFilterInterfacePath, EscapeInterfaceName(intf.Name))
 		oldVal, err := Set(i, 2, true)
 		if err != nil {
 			result = multierror.Append(result, err)
@@ -74,6 +70,13 @@ func Setup(wgIface iface) (map[string]int, error) {
 	return keys, nberrors.FormatErrorOrNil(result)
 }
 
+// EscapeInterfaceName escapes '%' and '.' in an interface name (e.g. VLANs
+// like eth0.100) so the name survives the dot-to-slash conversion in Set.
+func EscapeInterfaceName(name string) string {
+	safe := strings.ReplaceAll(name, "%", percentEscape)
+	return strings.ReplaceAll(safe, ".", dotEscape)
+}
+
 // Set sets a sysctl configuration, if onlyIfOne is true it will only set the new value if it's set to 1
 func Set(key string, desiredValue int, onlyIfOne bool) (int, error) {
 	path := strings.ReplaceAll(key, ".", "/")

client/internal/routemanager/systemops/routeselection_windows_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+//go:build windows
+
+package systemops
+
+import (
+	"math"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+)
+
+func TestSortRouteCandidates(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name       string
+		candidates []candidateRoute
+		wantOrder  []uint32
+	}{
+		{
+			name: "longest prefix wins over metrics",
+			candidates: []candidateRoute{
+				{interfaceIndex: 1, prefixLength: 0, routeMetric: 0, interfaceMetric: 5},
+				{interfaceIndex: 2, prefixLength: 24, routeMetric: 100, interfaceMetric: 50},
+			},
+			wantOrder: []uint32{2, 1},
+		},
+		{
+			// Windows ranks equal-length prefixes by route metric + interface metric,
+			// so a higher route metric on a low metric interface can still win.
+			name: "combined metric beats route metric alone",
+			candidates: []candidateRoute{
+				{interfaceIndex: 8, prefixLength: 0, routeMetric: 0, interfaceMetric: 100},
+				{interfaceIndex: 5, prefixLength: 0, routeMetric: 10, interfaceMetric: 5},
+			},
+			wantOrder: []uint32{5, 8},
+		},
+		{
+			name: "lower combined metric wins",
+			candidates: []candidateRoute{
+				{interfaceIndex: 5, prefixLength: 0, routeMetric: 300, interfaceMetric: 5},
+				{interfaceIndex: 8, prefixLength: 0, routeMetric: 0, interfaceMetric: 100},
+			},
+			wantOrder: []uint32{8, 5},
+		},
+		{
+			name: "equal combined metric falls back to route metric",
+			candidates: []candidateRoute{
+				{interfaceIndex: 1, prefixLength: 0, routeMetric: 20, interfaceMetric: 10},
+				{interfaceIndex: 2, prefixLength: 0, routeMetric: 5, interfaceMetric: 25},
+			},
+			wantOrder: []uint32{2, 1},
+		},
+		{
+			// The metrics are uint32 on the Windows side, so the sum must not wrap.
+			name: "combined metric beyond the uint32 range",
+			candidates: []candidateRoute{
+				{interfaceIndex: 1, prefixLength: 0, routeMetric: math.MaxUint32, interfaceMetric: 5},
+				{interfaceIndex: 2, prefixLength: 0, routeMetric: math.MaxUint32 - 10, interfaceMetric: 5},
+			},
+			wantOrder: []uint32{2, 1},
+		},
+		{
+			name: "unknown interface metric ranks on route metric only",
+			candidates: []candidateRoute{
+				{interfaceIndex: 1, prefixLength: 0, routeMetric: 30, interfaceMetric: -1},
+				{interfaceIndex: 2, prefixLength: 0, routeMetric: 5, interfaceMetric: 10},
+			},
+			wantOrder: []uint32{2, 1},
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			sortRouteCandidates(tt.candidates)
+
+			got := make([]uint32, 0, len(tt.candidates))
+			for _, c := range tt.candidates {
+				got = append(got, c.interfaceIndex)
+			}
+			assert.Equal(t, tt.wantOrder, got)
+		})
+	}
+}

client/internal/routemanager/systemops/systemops_android.go

@@ -32,8 +32,17 @@ func (r *SysOps) removeFromRouteTable(netip.Prefix, Nexthop) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-func EnableIPForwarding() error {
-	log.Infof("Enable IP forwarding is not implemented on %s", runtime.GOOS)
+func EnableV4IPForwarding() error {
+	log.Infof("Enable IPv4 forwarding is not implemented on %s", runtime.GOOS)
+	return nil
+}
+
+func EnableV6IPForwarding(string) (map[string]int, error) {
+	log.Infof("Enable IPv6 forwarding is not implemented on %s", runtime.GOOS)
+	return map[string]int{}, nil
+}
+
+func DisableV6IPForwarding(map[string]int) error {
 	return nil
 }
 

client/internal/routemanager/systemops/systemops_ios.go

@@ -58,8 +58,17 @@ func (r *SysOps) removeFromRouteTable(netip.Prefix, Nexthop) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-func EnableIPForwarding() error {
-	log.Infof("Enable IP forwarding is not implemented on %s", runtime.GOOS)
+func EnableV4IPForwarding() error {
+	log.Infof("Enable IPv4 forwarding is not implemented on %s", runtime.GOOS)
+	return nil
+}
+
+func EnableV6IPForwarding(string) (map[string]int, error) {
+	log.Infof("Enable IPv6 forwarding is not implemented on %s", runtime.GOOS)
+	return map[string]int{}, nil
+}
+
+func DisableV6IPForwarding(map[string]int) error {
 	return nil
 }
 

client/internal/routemanager/systemops/systemops_linux.go

@@ -763,13 +763,10 @@ func flushRoutes(tableID, family int) error {
 	return nberrors.FormatErrorOrNil(result)
 }
 
-func EnableIPForwarding() error {
+func EnableV4IPForwarding() error {
 	if _, err := sysctl.Set(ipv4ForwardingPath, 1, false); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
-	if _, err := sysctl.Set(ipv6ForwardingPath, 1, false); err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("failed to enable IPv6 forwarding: %v", err)
-	}
 	return nil
 }
 

client/internal/routemanager/systemops/systemops_nonlinux.go

@@ -43,8 +43,17 @@ func (r *SysOps) RemoveVPNRoute(prefix netip.Prefix, intf *net.Interface) error
 	return r.genericRemoveVPNRoute(prefix, intf)
 }
 
-func EnableIPForwarding() error {
-	log.Infof("Enable IP forwarding is not implemented on %s", runtime.GOOS)
+func EnableV4IPForwarding() error {
+	log.Infof("Enable IPv4 forwarding is not implemented on %s", runtime.GOOS)
+	return nil
+}
+
+func EnableV6IPForwarding(string) (map[string]int, error) {
+	log.Infof("Enable IPv6 forwarding is not implemented on %s", runtime.GOOS)
+	return map[string]int{}, nil
+}
+
+func DisableV6IPForwarding(map[string]int) error {
 	return nil
 }
 

client/internal/routemanager/systemops/systemops_windows.go

@@ -882,26 +882,40 @@ func getInterfaceMetric(interfaceIndex uint32, family int16) int {
 	return int(ipInterfaceRow.Metric)
 }
 
-// sortRouteCandidates sorts route candidates by priority: prefix length -> route metric -> interface metric
+// sortRouteCandidates sorts route candidates by priority: prefix length -> combined metric -> route metric.
+// Windows prefers the longest matching prefix and, among prefixes of the same length, the lowest metric, see
+// https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/customize/desktop/unattend/microsoft-windows-tcpip-interfaces-interface-routes-route-metric
 func sortRouteCandidates(candidates []candidateRoute) {
 	sort.Slice(candidates, func(i, j int) bool {
 		if candidates[i].prefixLength != candidates[j].prefixLength {
 			return candidates[i].prefixLength > candidates[j].prefixLength
 		}
-		if candidates[i].routeMetric != candidates[j].routeMetric {
-			return candidates[i].routeMetric < candidates[j].routeMetric
+		mi, mj := combinedMetric(candidates[i]), combinedMetric(candidates[j])
+		if mi != mj {
+			return mi < mj
 		}
-		return candidates[i].interfaceMetric < candidates[j].interfaceMetric
+		return candidates[i].routeMetric < candidates[j].routeMetric
 	})
 }
 
+// combinedMetric returns the effective metric Windows uses to rank routes with an equal prefix length:
+// the sum of the route metric and the metric of the interface the route is on, see
+// https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/networking/technologies/network-subsystem/net-sub-interface-metric
+// An unknown interface metric contributes nothing.
+func combinedMetric(candidate candidateRoute) uint64 {
+	if candidate.interfaceMetric < 0 {
+		return uint64(candidate.routeMetric)
+	}
+	return uint64(candidate.routeMetric) + uint64(candidate.interfaceMetric)
+}
+
 // GetBestInterface finds the best interface for reaching a destination,
 // excluding the VPN interface to avoid routing loops.
 //
 // Route selection priority:
 // 1. Longest prefix match (most specific route)
-// 2. Lowest route metric
-// 3. Lowest interface metric
+// 2. Lowest combined metric (route metric + interface metric)
+// 3. Lowest route metric.
 func GetBestInterface(dest netip.Addr, vpnIntf string) (*net.Interface, error) {
 	var skipInterfaceIndex int
 	if vpnIntf != "" {
@@ -925,7 +939,6 @@ func GetBestInterface(dest netip.Addr, vpnIntf string) (*net.Interface, error) {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("no route to %s", dest)
 	}
 
-	// Sort routes: prefix length -> route metric -> interface metric
 	sortRouteCandidates(candidates)
 
 	for _, candidate := range candidates {

client/internal/routemanager/systemops/v6forwarding_linux.go

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+//go:build !android
+
+package systemops
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"net"
+	"os"
+
+	"github.com/hashicorp/go-multierror"
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+
+	nberrors "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/errors"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/routemanager/sysctl"
+)
+
+const (
+	// 1 (default) accepts RAs only while forwarding is off; 2 keeps RA
+	// acceptance on regardless, so RA-installed host defaults survive our
+	// v6 forwarding flip.
+	acceptRAInterfacePath  = "net.ipv6.conf.%s.accept_ra"
+	acceptRADefaultPath    = "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra"
+	acceptRAProcPathFormat = "/proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/%s/accept_ra"
+)
+
+// EnableV6IPForwarding bumps accept_ra=2 on host v6 interfaces before flipping
+// forwarding=1, so RA-installed host defaults survive. Returns the prior values
+// of sysctls we actually changed; entries already at the target are omitted.
+func EnableV6IPForwarding(wgIfaceName string) (map[string]int, error) {
+	saved := map[string]int{}
+	bumpAcceptRA(saved, wgIfaceName)
+
+	oldVal, err := sysctl.Set(ipv6ForwardingPath, 1, false)
+	if err != nil {
+		return saved, err
+	}
+	if oldVal != 1 {
+		saved[ipv6ForwardingPath] = oldVal
+	}
+	return saved, nil
+}
+
+// DisableV6IPForwarding restores what EnableV6IPForwarding captured.
+func DisableV6IPForwarding(saved map[string]int) error {
+	var result *multierror.Error
+	for key, value := range saved {
+		if _, err := sysctl.Set(key, value, false); err != nil {
+			result = multierror.Append(result, fmt.Errorf("restore %s: %w", key, err))
+		}
+	}
+	return nberrors.FormatErrorOrNil(result)
+}
+
+func bumpAcceptRA(saved map[string]int, wgIfaceName string) {
+	// Also bump conf.default so interfaces created while forwarding is on
+	// (hotplug, new Wi-Fi/dock) inherit accept_ra=2 and keep accepting RAs.
+	bumpAcceptRAKey(saved, acceptRADefaultPath)
+
+	interfaces, err := net.Interfaces()
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Warnf("list interfaces for accept_ra: %v", err)
+		return
+	}
+	for _, intf := range interfaces {
+		if intf.Name == "lo" || intf.Name == wgIfaceName {
+			continue
+		}
+		bumpAcceptRAForInterface(saved, intf.Name)
+	}
+}
+
+func bumpAcceptRAForInterface(saved map[string]int, name string) {
+	// Build procfs path from name, not the dotted key: VLAN names like eth0.100.
+	if _, err := os.Stat(fmt.Sprintf(acceptRAProcPathFormat, name)); err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	bumpAcceptRAKey(saved, fmt.Sprintf(acceptRAInterfacePath, sysctl.EscapeInterfaceName(name)))
+}
+
+func bumpAcceptRAKey(saved map[string]int, key string) {
+	// onlyIfOne=true: leave admin overrides (0, 2) alone.
+	oldVal, err := sysctl.Set(key, 2, true)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Warnf("bump %s: %v", key, err)
+		return
+	}
+	// With onlyIfOne, a write only happened when the old value was 1; values
+	// left untouched (0, 2) must not be recorded for restore.
+	if oldVal == 1 {
+		saved[key] = oldVal
+	}
+}

client/internal/routemanager/systemops/v6route_linux_test.go

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ package systemops
 import (
 	"errors"
 	"net"
+	"net/netip"
 	"syscall"
 	"testing"
 
@@ -29,6 +30,7 @@ func ensureIPv6DefaultRoute(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	if err := netlink.RouteAdd(route); err != nil {
 		if errors.Is(err, syscall.EEXIST) {
+			requireUsableIPv6Nexthop(t)
 			return
 		}
 		t.Skipf("install IPv6 fallback default route: %v", err)
@@ -38,4 +40,36 @@ func ensureIPv6DefaultRoute(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Logf("delete IPv6 fallback default route: %v", err)
 		}
 	})
+
+	requireUsableIPv6Nexthop(t)
+}
+
+// requireUsableIPv6Nexthop skips the test unless the resolved IPv6 default
+// nexthop can actually carry a route. Installing the default route succeeding
+// does not imply the kernel accepts it as a nexthop for a concrete prefix.
+func requireUsableIPv6Nexthop(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	nexthop, err := GetNextHop(netip.IPv6Unspecified())
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Skipf("resolve IPv6 default nexthop: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	probe := &netlink.Route{
+		Scope:  netlink.SCOPE_UNIVERSE,
+		Table:  syscall.RT_TABLE_MAIN,
+		Family: netlink.FAMILY_V6,
+		Dst:    &net.IPNet{IP: net.ParseIP("100::64"), Mask: net.CIDRMask(128, 128)},
+	}
+	require.NoError(t, addNextHop(nexthop, probe), "build IPv6 probe route")
+
+	switch err := netlink.RouteAdd(probe); {
+	case err == nil:
+		if err := netlink.RouteDel(probe); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, syscall.ESRCH) {
+			t.Logf("delete IPv6 probe route: %v", err)
+		}
+	case errors.Is(err, syscall.EEXIST):
+	default:
+		t.Skipf("IPv6 nexthop %s unusable for route installation: %v", nexthop, err)
+	}
 }

client/proto/daemon.pb.go

@@ -5628,9 +5628,13 @@ func (x *GetPeerSSHHostKeyResponse) GetFound() bool {
 type RequestJWTAuthRequest struct {
 	state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"`
 	// hint for OIDC login_hint parameter (typically email address)
-	Hint          *string `protobuf:"bytes,1,opt,name=hint,proto3,oneof" json:"hint,omitempty"`
-	unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields
-	sizeCache     protoimpl.SizeCache
+	Hint *string `protobuf:"bytes,1,opt,name=hint,proto3,oneof" json:"hint,omitempty"`
+	// hasGraphicalSession tells the daemon that the caller has a graphical session,
+	// which decides whether PKCE or the device code flow is preferred. The daemon
+	// cannot detect this itself: it does not inherit the session environment.
+	HasGraphicalSession bool `protobuf:"varint,2,opt,name=hasGraphicalSession,proto3" json:"hasGraphicalSession,omitempty"`
+	unknownFields       protoimpl.UnknownFields
+	sizeCache           protoimpl.SizeCache
 }
 
 func (x *RequestJWTAuthRequest) Reset() {
@@ -5670,6 +5674,13 @@ func (x *RequestJWTAuthRequest) GetHint() string {
 	return ""
 }
 
+func (x *RequestJWTAuthRequest) GetHasGraphicalSession() bool {
+	if x != nil {
+		return x.HasGraphicalSession
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
 // RequestJWTAuthResponse contains authentication flow information
 type RequestJWTAuthResponse struct {
 	state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"`
@@ -5894,9 +5905,13 @@ type RequestExtendAuthSessionRequest struct {
 	state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"`
 	// Optional OIDC login_hint (typically the user's email) to pre-fill the
 	// IdP login form.
-	Hint          *string `protobuf:"bytes,1,opt,name=hint,proto3,oneof" json:"hint,omitempty"`
-	unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields
-	sizeCache     protoimpl.SizeCache
+	Hint *string `protobuf:"bytes,1,opt,name=hint,proto3,oneof" json:"hint,omitempty"`
+	// hasGraphicalSession tells the daemon that the caller has a graphical session,
+	// which decides whether PKCE or the device code flow is preferred. The daemon
+	// cannot detect this itself: it does not inherit the session environment.
+	HasGraphicalSession bool `protobuf:"varint,2,opt,name=hasGraphicalSession,proto3" json:"hasGraphicalSession,omitempty"`
+	unknownFields       protoimpl.UnknownFields
+	sizeCache           protoimpl.SizeCache
 }
 
 func (x *RequestExtendAuthSessionRequest) Reset() {
@@ -5936,6 +5951,13 @@ func (x *RequestExtendAuthSessionRequest) GetHint() string {
 	return ""
 }
 
+func (x *RequestExtendAuthSessionRequest) GetHasGraphicalSession() bool {
+	if x != nil {
+		return x.HasGraphicalSession
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
 // RequestExtendAuthSessionResponse carries the verification URI the UI
 // should open in a browser. The daemon retains the flow state and resolves
 // it via WaitExtendAuthSession.
@@ -7503,9 +7525,10 @@ const file_daemon_proto_rawDesc = "" +
 	"sshHostKey\x12\x16\n" +
 	"\x06peerIP\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\x06peerIP\x12\x1a\n" +
 	"\bpeerFQDN\x18\x03 \x01(\tR\bpeerFQDN\x12\x14\n" +
-	"\x05found\x18\x04 \x01(\bR\x05found\"9\n" +
+	"\x05found\x18\x04 \x01(\bR\x05found\"k\n" +
 	"\x15RequestJWTAuthRequest\x12\x17\n" +
-	"\x04hint\x18\x01 \x01(\tH\x00R\x04hint\x88\x01\x01B\a\n" +
+	"\x04hint\x18\x01 \x01(\tH\x00R\x04hint\x88\x01\x01\x120\n" +
+	"\x13hasGraphicalSession\x18\x02 \x01(\bR\x13hasGraphicalSessionB\a\n" +
 	"\x05_hint\"\x9a\x02\n" +
 	"\x16RequestJWTAuthResponse\x12(\n" +
 	"\x0fverificationURI\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x0fverificationURI\x128\n" +
@@ -7525,9 +7548,10 @@ const file_daemon_proto_rawDesc = "" +
 	"\x14WaitJWTTokenResponse\x12\x14\n" +
 	"\x05token\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x05token\x12\x1c\n" +
 	"\ttokenType\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\ttokenType\x12\x1c\n" +
-	"\texpiresIn\x18\x03 \x01(\x03R\texpiresIn\"C\n" +
+	"\texpiresIn\x18\x03 \x01(\x03R\texpiresIn\"u\n" +
 	"\x1fRequestExtendAuthSessionRequest\x12\x17\n" +
-	"\x04hint\x18\x01 \x01(\tH\x00R\x04hint\x88\x01\x01B\a\n" +
+	"\x04hint\x18\x01 \x01(\tH\x00R\x04hint\x88\x01\x01\x120\n" +
+	"\x13hasGraphicalSession\x18\x02 \x01(\bR\x13hasGraphicalSessionB\a\n" +
 	"\x05_hint\"\xe0\x01\n" +
 	" RequestExtendAuthSessionResponse\x12(\n" +
 	"\x0fverificationURI\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x0fverificationURI\x128\n" +

client/proto/daemon.proto

@@ -894,6 +894,10 @@ message GetPeerSSHHostKeyResponse {
 message RequestJWTAuthRequest {
   // hint for OIDC login_hint parameter (typically email address)
   optional string hint = 1;
+  // hasGraphicalSession tells the daemon that the caller has a graphical session,
+  // which decides whether PKCE or the device code flow is preferred. The daemon
+  // cannot detect this itself: it does not inherit the session environment.
+  bool hasGraphicalSession = 2;
 }
 
 // RequestJWTAuthResponse contains authentication flow information
@@ -937,6 +941,10 @@ message RequestExtendAuthSessionRequest {
   // Optional OIDC login_hint (typically the user's email) to pre-fill the
   // IdP login form.
   optional string hint = 1;
+  // hasGraphicalSession tells the daemon that the caller has a graphical session,
+  // which decides whether PKCE or the device code flow is preferred. The daemon
+  // cannot detect this itself: it does not inherit the session environment.
+  bool hasGraphicalSession = 2;
 }
 
 // RequestExtendAuthSessionResponse carries the verification URI the UI

client/server/server.go

@@ -1723,8 +1723,8 @@ func (s *Server) RequestJWTAuth(
 		hint = profilemanager.GetLoginHint()
 	}
 
-	isDesktop := isUnixRunningDesktop()
-	oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, config, isDesktop, false, hint)
+	// the daemon has no graphical session of its own, only the caller can answer this
+	oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, config, msg.GetHasGraphicalSession(), false, hint)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, gstatus.Errorf(codes.Internal, "failed to create OAuth flow: %v", err)
 	}
@@ -1827,8 +1827,8 @@ func (s *Server) RequestExtendAuthSession(
 		hint = profilemanager.GetLoginHint()
 	}
 
-	isDesktop := isUnixRunningDesktop()
-	oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, config, isDesktop, false, hint)
+	// the daemon has no graphical session of its own, only the caller can answer this
+	oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, config, msg.GetHasGraphicalSession(), false, hint)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, gstatus.Errorf(codes.Internal, "failed to create OAuth flow: %v", err)
 	}
@@ -2000,13 +2000,6 @@ func (s *Server) ExposeService(req *proto.ExposeServiceRequest, srv proto.Daemon
 	return nil
 }
 
-func isUnixRunningDesktop() bool {
-	if runtime.GOOS != "linux" && runtime.GOOS != "freebsd" {
-		return false
-	}
-	return os.Getenv("DESKTOP_SESSION") != "" || os.Getenv("XDG_CURRENT_DESKTOP") != ""
-}
-
 func (s *Server) runProbes(ctx context.Context, waitForProbeResult bool) {
 	if s.connectClient == nil {
 		return

client/ssh/common.go

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import (
 	"golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
 )
 
 const (
@@ -92,7 +93,8 @@ func printAuthInstructions(stderr io.Writer, authResponse *proto.RequestJWTAuthR
 
 // RequestJWTToken requests or retrieves a JWT token for SSH authentication
 func RequestJWTToken(ctx context.Context, client proto.DaemonServiceClient, stdout, stderr io.Writer, useCache bool, hint string, openBrowser func(string) error) (string, error) {
-	req := &proto.RequestJWTAuthRequest{}
+	// the ssh client runs in the user's session, the daemon does not: tell it what we can see
+	req := &proto.RequestJWTAuthRequest{HasGraphicalSession: util.HasGraphicalSession()}
 	if hint != "" {
 		req.Hint = &hint
 	}
@@ -193,4 +195,3 @@ func buildAddressList(hostname string, remote net.Addr) []string {
 	}
 	return addresses
 }
-

client/ssh/server/command_execution_windows.go

@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ func (s *Server) setUserEnvironmentVariables(envMap map[string]string, userProfi
 
 // prepareCommandEnv prepares environment variables for command execution on Windows
 func (s *Server) prepareCommandEnv(logger *log.Entry, localUser *user.User, session ssh.Session) []string {
-	username, domain := s.parseUsername(localUser.Username)
+	username, domain := parseUsername(localUser.Username)
 	userEnv, err := s.getUserEnvironment(logger, username, domain)
 	if err != nil {
 		log.Debugf("failed to get user environment for %s\\%s, using fallback: %v", domain, username, err)
@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ func (s *Server) executeCommandWithPty(logger *log.Entry, session ssh.Session, _
 		return false
 	}
 
-	username, domain := s.parseUsername(localUser.Username)
+	username, domain := parseUsername(localUser.Username)
 	shell := getUserShell(localUser.Uid)
 
 	req := PtyExecutionRequest{

client/ssh/server/port_forwarding.go

@@ -133,7 +133,12 @@ func (s *Server) checkPrivilegedPortAccess(forwardType string, port uint32, resu
 		return nil
 	}
 
-	if result.User != nil && isPrivilegedUsername(result.User.Username) {
+	// Only uid 0 may bind below the threshold, which is the kernel's own rule and
+	// is asked directly rather than through isPrivilegedOrUnknown: that helper
+	// reports an account it cannot evaluate as privileged, which is safe for a
+	// refusal and unsafe for a grant such as this one. Windows has returned
+	// above, so Uid here is a Unix uid and never a SID.
+	if result.User != nil && result.User.Uid == "0" {
 		return nil
 	}
 

client/ssh/server/privileges_other.go

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+//go:build !windows
+
+package server
+
+// isProcessElevated is only meaningful on Windows; other platforms use the
+// effective UID check in isCurrentProcessPrivileged.
+func isProcessElevated() bool {
+	return false
+}
+
+// isWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown is only reachable on Windows. Report
+// privileged on other platforms so a caller refusing privileged accounts fails
+// closed.
+func isWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown(string) bool {
+	return true
+}

client/ssh/server/privileges_windows.go

@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+//go:build windows
+
+package server
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"strings"
+	"unsafe"
+
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+	"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
+)
+
+var (
+	netapi32                  = windows.NewLazySystemDLL("netapi32.dll")
+	procNetUserGetLocalGroups = netapi32.NewProc("NetUserGetLocalGroups")
+)
+
+const (
+	// lgIncludeIndirect makes NetUserGetLocalGroups also return local groups
+	// the user belongs to through a global group.
+	lgIncludeIndirect  = 0x1
+	maxPreferredLength = 0xFFFFFFFF
+)
+
+// localGroupUsersInfo0 mirrors LOCALGROUP_USERS_INFO_0.
+type localGroupUsersInfo0 struct {
+	name *uint16
+}
+
+// isProcessElevated reports whether the current process token is elevated
+// (TokenElevation): true for elevated administrators, the built-in
+// Administrator, administrators with UAC disabled, and SYSTEM; false for
+// standard users and administrators running with a UAC-filtered token.
+func isProcessElevated() bool {
+	return windows.GetCurrentProcessToken().IsElevated()
+}
+
+// isWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown reports whether the account is privileged
+// on this machine: a well-known service account, a built-in Administrator
+// (RID 500), or a member of the local Administrators group, directly or through
+// nested groups.
+//
+// An account whose privilege cannot be determined counts as privileged, which
+// is why the name says "or unknown". That is fail-closed for a caller that
+// refuses privileged accounts, and fail-open for a caller that grants something
+// to them, so only the former may use this.
+func isWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown(username string) bool {
+	sid, _, _, err := windows.LookupSID("", username)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Warnf("privilege check: SID lookup for %q failed, treating as privileged: %v", username, err)
+		return true
+	}
+
+	if isPrivilegedUserSID(sid) {
+		return true
+	}
+
+	member, err := isLocalAdminsMember(username)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Warnf("privilege check: cannot determine Administrators membership for %q, treating as privileged: %v", username, err)
+		return true
+	}
+	return member
+}
+
+// isPrivilegedUserSID reports whether the SID itself identifies a privileged
+// principal, without consulting group membership.
+func isPrivilegedUserSID(sid *windows.SID) bool {
+	wellKnown := []windows.WELL_KNOWN_SID_TYPE{
+		windows.WinLocalSystemSid,
+		windows.WinLocalServiceSid,
+		windows.WinNetworkServiceSid,
+		windows.WinBuiltinAdministratorsSid,
+	}
+	for _, sidType := range wellKnown {
+		if sid.IsWellKnown(sidType) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return isBuiltinAdministratorSID(sid)
+}
+
+// isBuiltinAdministratorSID reports whether the SID is a machine or domain
+// built-in Administrator account (S-1-5-21-...-500). RID 500 is reserved for
+// that account; it can be renamed but cannot be removed from the
+// Administrators group.
+func isBuiltinAdministratorSID(sid *windows.SID) bool {
+	if sid.IdentifierAuthority() != windows.SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY {
+		return false
+	}
+	count := sid.SubAuthorityCount()
+	if count < 2 || sid.SubAuthority(0) != 21 {
+		return false
+	}
+	return sid.SubAuthority(uint32(count-1)) == 500
+}
+
+// isLocalAdminsMember reports whether the account is a member of the local
+// Administrators group.
+//
+// Local accounts are checked against the local SAM, which is authoritative for
+// them and, unlike a token, cannot under-report: UAC filters the tokens of
+// local administrators, and a filtered token carries Administrators as
+// deny-only, which a membership check on the token would read as "not a
+// member". Domain accounts are exempt from that filtering, so for them an S4U
+// token is preferred because its group list is LSA's transitive expansion and
+// therefore covers nested and universal groups plus the machine's own local
+// groups. NetUserGetLocalGroups expands only one global-group hop but needs no
+// logon, so it serves as the fallback when no token can be obtained.
+func isLocalAdminsMember(username string) (bool, error) {
+	adminSid, err := windows.CreateWellKnownSid(windows.WinBuiltinAdministratorsSid)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, fmt.Errorf("create Administrators SID: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	account, domain := parseUsername(username)
+	if NewPrivilegeDropper().isLocalUser(domain) {
+		return localGroupsContainSID(account, adminSid)
+	}
+
+	member, s4uErr := s4uTokenIsMember(account, domain, adminSid)
+	if s4uErr == nil {
+		return member, nil
+	}
+	log.Debugf("privilege check: S4U membership check for %q failed, falling back to local group enumeration: %v", username, s4uErr)
+
+	member, err = localGroupsContainSID(buildUserCpn(account, domain), adminSid)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, fmt.Errorf("S4U check: %w; local group enumeration: %w", s4uErr, err)
+	}
+	return member, nil
+}
+
+// s4uTokenIsMember obtains an S4U token for the account and checks whether the
+// given SID is enabled in it.
+func s4uTokenIsMember(account, domain string, sid *windows.SID) (bool, error) {
+	token, err := generateS4UUserToken(log.NewEntry(log.StandardLogger()), account, domain)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, err
+	}
+	defer func() {
+		if err := windows.CloseHandle(token); err != nil {
+			log.Debugf("close S4U token: %v", err)
+		}
+	}()
+	return windows.Token(token).IsMember(sid)
+}
+
+// localGroupsContainSID reports whether the wanted group is among the local
+// groups the account belongs to, directly or through a global group.
+//
+// The wanted SID is resolved to its group name once and compared against the
+// enumerated names. Well-known SIDs resolve from a static table, so that lookup
+// needs no domain controller, and it keeps the comparison correct for a renamed
+// or localized group because both sides then carry the new name. Resolving each
+// enumerated name back to a SID instead would add a lookup per group that can
+// block until it times out while a domain controller is unreachable, and cannot
+// change the outcome: the names enumerated here are local groups of this
+// machine, whose names are unique, so a name match identifies the group.
+//
+// A failure to resolve the wanted SID is returned rather than reported as
+// "not a member", so a privilege check built on this fails closed.
+func localGroupsContainSID(username string, want *windows.SID) (bool, error) {
+	wantName, _, _, err := want.LookupAccount("")
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, fmt.Errorf("resolve group SID %s to a name: %w", want, err)
+	}
+
+	groups, err := netUserGetLocalGroups(username)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, err
+	}
+
+	for _, group := range groups {
+		if strings.EqualFold(group, wantName) {
+			return true, nil
+		}
+	}
+	return false, nil
+}
+
+// netUserGetLocalGroups returns the names of the local groups the account is a
+// member of, including indirect membership through global groups.
+func netUserGetLocalGroups(username string) ([]string, error) {
+	name16, err := windows.UTF16PtrFromString(username)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("convert username: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	var buf *byte
+	var entriesRead, totalEntries uint32
+	status, _, _ := procNetUserGetLocalGroups.Call(
+		0, // local server
+		uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(name16)),
+		0, // level 0: LOCALGROUP_USERS_INFO_0
+		lgIncludeIndirect,
+		uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&buf)),
+		maxPreferredLength,
+		uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&entriesRead)),
+		uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&totalEntries)),
+	)
+	if status != 0 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("NetUserGetLocalGroups for %q: status %d", username, status)
+	}
+	if buf == nil {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	defer func() {
+		if err := windows.NetApiBufferFree(buf); err != nil {
+			log.Debugf("free NetApi buffer: %v", err)
+		}
+	}()
+
+	// MAX_PREFERRED_LENGTH makes the API allocate as much as it needs, so a
+	// short read is not expected. Report it rather than silently returning a
+	// subset of the account's groups.
+	if entriesRead != totalEntries {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("NetUserGetLocalGroups for %q returned %d of %d groups", username, entriesRead, totalEntries)
+	}
+
+	entries := unsafe.Slice((*localGroupUsersInfo0)(unsafe.Pointer(buf)), entriesRead)
+	groups := make([]string, 0, entriesRead)
+	for _, entry := range entries {
+		groups = append(groups, windows.UTF16PtrToString(entry.name))
+	}
+	return groups, nil
+}

client/ssh/server/privileges_windows_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+//go:build windows
+
+package server
+
+import (
+	"os/user"
+	"testing"
+	"unsafe"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
+)
+
+// filterNormalAccount limits NetUserEnum to normal user accounts.
+const filterNormalAccount = 0x2
+
+// TOKEN_ELEVATION_TYPE values.
+const (
+	tokenElevationTypeDefault = 1
+	tokenElevationTypeFull    = 2
+	tokenElevationTypeLimited = 3
+)
+
+// tokenElevationType reads TokenElevationType from a token.
+func tokenElevationType(token windows.Token) (uint32, error) {
+	var elevationType, returnedLen uint32
+	err := windows.GetTokenInformation(token, windows.TokenElevationType,
+		(*byte)(unsafe.Pointer(&elevationType)), uint32(unsafe.Sizeof(elevationType)), &returnedLen)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+	return elevationType, nil
+}
+
+// userInfo0 mirrors USER_INFO_0.
+type userInfo0 struct {
+	name *uint16
+}
+
+func mustParseSID(t *testing.T, s string) *windows.SID {
+	t.Helper()
+	sid, err := windows.StringToSid(s)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "parse SID %s", s)
+	return sid
+}
+
+// localAccountNames returns the names of the local user accounts.
+func localAccountNames(t *testing.T) []string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var buf *byte
+	var entriesRead, totalEntries, resume uint32
+	err := windows.NetUserEnum(nil, 0, filterNormalAccount, &buf, maxPreferredLength,
+		&entriesRead, &totalEntries, &resume)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "enumerate local users")
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		require.NoError(t, windows.NetApiBufferFree(buf), "free NetApi buffer")
+	})
+
+	entries := unsafe.Slice((*userInfo0)(unsafe.Pointer(buf)), entriesRead)
+	names := make([]string, 0, entriesRead)
+	for _, entry := range entries {
+		names = append(names, windows.UTF16PtrToString(entry.name))
+	}
+	return names
+}
+
+// localAccountNameByRID returns the name of the local account carrying the
+// given RID. Accounts such as Administrator and Guest can be renamed and are
+// localized, so tests must not name them literally.
+func localAccountNameByRID(t *testing.T, rid uint32) string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	for _, name := range localAccountNames(t) {
+		sid, _, _, err := windows.LookupSID("", name)
+		if err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		if sid.IdentifierAuthority() != windows.SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY {
+			continue
+		}
+		count := sid.SubAuthorityCount()
+		if count < 2 || sid.SubAuthority(0) != 21 {
+			continue
+		}
+		if sid.SubAuthority(uint32(count-1)) == rid {
+			return name
+		}
+	}
+
+	t.Fatalf("no local account with RID %d", rid)
+	return ""
+}
+
+// wellKnownAccountName resolves a well-known SID to the qualified account name
+// the local system uses for it, which is localized.
+func wellKnownAccountName(t *testing.T, sidType windows.WELL_KNOWN_SID_TYPE) string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	sid, err := windows.CreateWellKnownSid(sidType)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "create well-known SID")
+	name, domain, _, err := sid.LookupAccount("")
+	require.NoError(t, err, "resolve %s to an account name", sid)
+	if domain == "" {
+		return name
+	}
+	return domain + `\` + name
+}
+
+func TestIsBuiltinAdministratorSID(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name string
+		sid  string
+		want bool
+	}{
+		{"machine_administrator", "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-500", true},
+		{"domain_administrator", "S-1-5-21-3390233681-4087452608-412898826-500", true},
+		{"regular_user", "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-1001", false},
+		{"guest_account", "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-501", false},
+		{"domain_admins_group", "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-512", false},
+		{"system", "S-1-5-18", false},
+		{"administrators_group", "S-1-5-32-544", false},
+		{"non_nt_authority", "S-1-1-0", false},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			result := isBuiltinAdministratorSID(mustParseSID(t, tt.sid))
+			assert.Equal(t, tt.want, result, "RID 500 detection for %s", tt.sid)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIsPrivilegedUserSID(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name string
+		sid  string
+		want bool
+	}{
+		{"local_system", "S-1-5-18", true},
+		{"local_service", "S-1-5-19", true},
+		{"network_service", "S-1-5-20", true},
+		{"administrators_group", "S-1-5-32-544", true},
+		{"builtin_administrator", "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-500", true},
+		{"regular_user", "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-1001", false},
+		{"users_group", "S-1-5-32-545", false},
+		{"everyone", "S-1-1-0", false},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			result := isPrivilegedUserSID(mustParseSID(t, tt.sid))
+			assert.Equal(t, tt.want, result, "SID privilege classification for %s", tt.sid)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIsWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name     string
+		username string
+		want     bool
+	}{
+		{"system", wellKnownAccountName(t, windows.WinLocalSystemSid), true},
+		{"local_service", wellKnownAccountName(t, windows.WinLocalServiceSid), true},
+		{"network_service", wellKnownAccountName(t, windows.WinNetworkServiceSid), true},
+		{"administrators_group", wellKnownAccountName(t, windows.WinBuiltinAdministratorsSid), true},
+		// The built-in Administrator (RID 500) and Guest (RID 501) accounts
+		// exist on every Windows installation, though they may be disabled.
+		{"builtin_administrator", localAccountNameByRID(t, 500), true},
+		{"guest", localAccountNameByRID(t, 501), false},
+		// Unresolvable accounts fail closed.
+		{"nonexistent_user", "netbird-no-such-user", true},
+		{"empty_username", "", true},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			result := isWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown(tt.username)
+			assert.Equal(t, tt.want, result, "account privilege classification for %q", tt.username)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIsProcessElevated(t *testing.T) {
+	elevated := isProcessElevated()
+
+	// TokenElevationType is a second, independent view of the same token:
+	// Full means elevated and Limited means a filtered administrator, while
+	// Default covers both a standard user and an administrator with no linked
+	// token (UAC off, the built-in Administrator, SYSTEM), so it implies nothing.
+	elevationType, err := tokenElevationType(windows.GetCurrentProcessToken())
+	require.NoError(t, err, "read token elevation type")
+
+	adminSid, err := windows.CreateWellKnownSid(windows.WinBuiltinAdministratorsSid)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "create Administrators SID")
+
+	// Token(0) makes CheckTokenMembership evaluate the caller's own token. It
+	// counts only enabled SIDs, so a filtered administrator reports false here.
+	member, err := windows.Token(0).IsMember(adminSid)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "check own Administrators membership")
+
+	t.Logf("elevated=%v elevationType=%d memberOfAdministrators=%v", elevated, elevationType, member)
+
+	switch elevationType {
+	case tokenElevationTypeFull:
+		assert.True(t, elevated, "a token of elevation type Full must report elevated")
+	case tokenElevationTypeLimited:
+		assert.False(t, elevated, "a filtered administrator token must not report elevated")
+	}
+
+	// Administrators enabled in the token means the token wields administrative
+	// rights, which is what elevation reports.
+	if member {
+		assert.True(t, elevated, "token with enabled Administrators membership must report elevated")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestS4UMembershipAgreesWithLocalGroups exercises the S4U token path used
+// for domain accounts. S4U logons need the TCB privilege, so the test runs
+// only as SYSTEM (which is how CI executes the suite). For local accounts the
+// token's Administrators membership must agree with the SAM enumeration.
+func TestS4UMembershipAgreesWithLocalGroups(t *testing.T) {
+	system, err := windows.CreateWellKnownSid(windows.WinLocalSystemSid)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "create SYSTEM SID")
+	current, err := user.Current()
+	require.NoError(t, err, "get current user")
+	if current.Uid != system.String() {
+		t.Skipf("S4U logon requires SYSTEM (running as %s)", current.Username)
+	}
+
+	adminSid, err := windows.CreateWellKnownSid(windows.WinBuiltinAdministratorsSid)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "create Administrators SID")
+
+	checked := 0
+	for _, name := range localAccountNames(t) {
+		viaToken, err := s4uTokenIsMember(name, ".", adminSid)
+		if err != nil {
+			// Disabled or logon-restricted accounts cannot get an S4U logon.
+			t.Logf("skipping %s: %v", name, err)
+			continue
+		}
+		viaSAM, err := localGroupsContainSID(name, adminSid)
+		require.NoError(t, err, "enumerate local groups for %s", name)
+
+		assert.Equal(t, viaSAM, viaToken, "S4U token and SAM enumeration must agree on Administrators membership for %s", name)
+		checked++
+	}
+	// Ineligible accounts are skipped, so without this the test could report
+	// success while comparing nothing at all.
+	require.Positive(t, checked, "no local account completed an S4U logon, so nothing was compared")
+	t.Logf("checked %d local accounts via S4U", checked)
+}
+
+// TestLocalGroupsContainSID_Administrator checks the positive case against the
+// built-in Administrator, a member of Administrators on every installation.
+func TestLocalGroupsContainSID_Administrator(t *testing.T) {
+	adminSid, err := windows.CreateWellKnownSid(windows.WinBuiltinAdministratorsSid)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "create Administrators SID")
+
+	administrator := localAccountNameByRID(t, 500)
+	member, err := localGroupsContainSID(administrator, adminSid)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "enumerate local groups for %s", administrator)
+	assert.True(t, member, "%s is a member of the Administrators group", administrator)
+}
+
+// TestLocalGroupsContainSID_UnresolvableGroupFailsClosed covers a wanted SID
+// that resolves to no group: the error must surface rather than being reported
+// as "not a member", so the privilege check treats the account as privileged.
+func TestLocalGroupsContainSID_UnresolvableGroupFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
+	unknown := mustParseSID(t, "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-4444")
+
+	_, err := localGroupsContainSID(localAccountNameByRID(t, 500), unknown)
+	require.Error(t, err, "must report an error when the wanted group cannot be identified")
+}
+
+func TestLocalGroupsContainSID_Guest(t *testing.T) {
+	guestsSid, err := windows.CreateWellKnownSid(windows.WinBuiltinGuestsSid)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "create Guests SID")
+	adminsSid, err := windows.CreateWellKnownSid(windows.WinBuiltinAdministratorsSid)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "create Administrators SID")
+
+	guest := localAccountNameByRID(t, 501)
+
+	inGuests, err := localGroupsContainSID(guest, guestsSid)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "enumerate local groups for %s", guest)
+	assert.True(t, inGuests, "%s is a member of the Guests group", guest)
+
+	inAdmins, err := localGroupsContainSID(guest, adminsSid)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "enumerate local groups for %s", guest)
+	assert.False(t, inAdmins, "%s is not a member of the Administrators group", guest)
+}

client/ssh/server/server_config_test.go

@@ -239,6 +239,7 @@ func TestServer_PrivilegedPortAccess(t *testing.T) {
 		forwardType   string
 		port          uint32
 		username      string
+		uid           string
 		expectError   bool
 		errorMsg      string
 		skipOnWindows bool
@@ -248,6 +249,7 @@ func TestServer_PrivilegedPortAccess(t *testing.T) {
 			forwardType:   "remote",
 			port:          80,
 			username:      "testuser",
+			uid:           "1000",
 			expectError:   true,
 			errorMsg:      "cannot bind to privileged port",
 			skipOnWindows: true,
@@ -257,6 +259,7 @@ func TestServer_PrivilegedPortAccess(t *testing.T) {
 			forwardType:   "tcpip-forward",
 			port:          443,
 			username:      "testuser",
+			uid:           "1000",
 			expectError:   true,
 			errorMsg:      "cannot bind to privileged port",
 			skipOnWindows: true,
@@ -266,6 +269,7 @@ func TestServer_PrivilegedPortAccess(t *testing.T) {
 			forwardType: "remote",
 			port:        8080,
 			username:    "testuser",
+			uid:         "1000",
 			expectError: false,
 		},
 		{
@@ -273,6 +277,7 @@ func TestServer_PrivilegedPortAccess(t *testing.T) {
 			forwardType: "remote",
 			port:        0,
 			username:    "testuser",
+			uid:         "1000",
 			expectError: false,
 		},
 		{
@@ -280,13 +285,35 @@ func TestServer_PrivilegedPortAccess(t *testing.T) {
 			forwardType: "remote",
 			port:        22,
 			username:    "root",
+			uid:         "0",
 			expectError: false,
 		},
+		{
+			// Only uid 0 is privileged, whatever the account is called.
+			name:          "uid 0 under another name may bind a privileged port",
+			forwardType:   "remote",
+			port:          22,
+			username:      "toor",
+			uid:           "0",
+			expectError:   false,
+			skipOnWindows: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:          "account named root without uid 0 may not",
+			forwardType:   "remote",
+			port:          22,
+			username:      "root",
+			uid:           "1000",
+			expectError:   true,
+			errorMsg:      "cannot bind to privileged port",
+			skipOnWindows: true,
+		},
 		{
 			name:        "local forward privileged port allowed for non-root",
 			forwardType: "local",
 			port:        80,
 			username:    "testuser",
+			uid:         "1000",
 			expectError: false,
 		},
 	}
@@ -299,7 +326,7 @@ func TestServer_PrivilegedPortAccess(t *testing.T) {
 
 			result := PrivilegeCheckResult{
 				Allowed: true,
-				User:    &user.User{Username: tt.username},
+				User:    &user.User{Username: tt.username, Uid: tt.uid},
 			}
 
 			err := server.checkPrivilegedPortAccess(tt.forwardType, tt.port, result)
@@ -420,6 +447,13 @@ func TestServer_PortConflictHandling(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestServer_IsPrivilegedUser(t *testing.T) {
 
+	// Windows classification depends on account SIDs and group membership, and
+	// the accounts involved carry localized, renameable names. It is covered by
+	// TestIsWindowsAccountPrivileged, which resolves them from well-known SIDs.
+	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
+		t.Skip("covered by TestIsWindowsAccountPrivileged")
+	}
+
 	tests := []struct {
 		username    string
 		expected    bool
@@ -440,44 +474,16 @@ func TestServer_IsPrivilegedUser(t *testing.T) {
 			expected:    false,
 			description: "empty username should not be privileged",
 		},
-	}
-
-	// Add Windows-specific tests
-	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
-		tests = append(tests, []struct {
-			username    string
-			expected    bool
-			description string
-		}{
-			{
-				username:    "Administrator",
-				expected:    true,
-				description: "Administrator should be considered privileged on Windows",
-			},
-			{
-				username:    "administrator",
-				expected:    true,
-				description: "administrator should be considered privileged on Windows (case insensitive)",
-			},
-		}...)
-	} else {
-		// On non-Windows systems, Administrator should not be privileged
-		tests = append(tests, []struct {
-			username    string
-			expected    bool
-			description string
-		}{
-			{
-				username:    "Administrator",
-				expected:    false,
-				description: "Administrator should not be privileged on non-Windows systems",
-			},
-		}...)
+		{
+			username:    "Administrator",
+			expected:    false,
+			description: "Administrator should not be privileged on non-Windows systems",
+		},
 	}
 
 	for _, tt := range tests {
 		t.Run(tt.description, func(t *testing.T) {
-			result := isPrivilegedUsername(tt.username)
+			result := isPrivilegedOrUnknown(tt.username)
 			assert.Equal(t, tt.expected, result, tt.description)
 		})
 	}

client/ssh/server/sftp_windows.go

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ import (
 // createSftpCommand creates a Windows SFTP command with user switching.
 // The caller must close the returned token handle after starting the process.
 func (s *Server) createSftpCommand(targetUser *user.User, sess ssh.Session) (*exec.Cmd, windows.Token, error) {
-	username, domain := s.parseUsername(targetUser.Username)
+	username, domain := parseUsername(targetUser.Username)
 
 	netbirdPath, err := os.Executable()
 	if err != nil {

client/ssh/server/user_utils.go

@@ -16,11 +16,6 @@ var (
 	ErrPrivilegedUserSwitch = errors.New("cannot switch to privileged user - current user lacks required privileges")
 )
 
-// isPlatformUnix returns true for Unix-like platforms (Linux, macOS, etc.)
-func isPlatformUnix() bool {
-	return getCurrentOS() != "windows"
-}
-
 // Dependency injection variables for testing - allows mocking dynamic runtime checks
 var (
 	getCurrentUser         = currentUserWithGetent
@@ -29,6 +24,9 @@ var (
 	getIsProcessPrivileged = isCurrentProcessPrivileged
 
 	getEuid = os.Geteuid
+
+	getProcessElevated                   = isProcessElevated
+	getWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown = isWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown
 )
 
 const (
@@ -65,6 +63,13 @@ type PrivilegeCheckResult struct {
 	RequiresUserSwitching bool
 }
 
+// privilegeCheckContext holds all context needed for privilege checking
+type privilegeCheckContext struct {
+	currentUser           *user.User
+	currentUserPrivileged bool
+	allowRoot             bool
+}
+
 // CheckPrivileges performs comprehensive privilege checking for all SSH features.
 // This is the single source of truth for privilege decisions across the SSH server.
 func (s *Server) CheckPrivileges(req PrivilegeCheckRequest) PrivilegeCheckResult {
@@ -75,7 +80,7 @@ func (s *Server) CheckPrivileges(req PrivilegeCheckRequest) PrivilegeCheckResult
 
 	// Handle empty username case - but still check root access controls
 	if req.RequestedUsername == "" {
-		if isPrivilegedUsername(context.currentUser.Username) && !context.allowRoot {
+		if isPrivilegedOrUnknown(context.currentUser.Username) && !context.allowRoot {
 			return PrivilegeCheckResult{
 				Allowed: false,
 				Error:   &PrivilegedUserError{Username: context.currentUser.Username},
@@ -135,7 +140,7 @@ func (s *Server) checkUserRequest(ctx *privilegeCheckContext, req PrivilegeCheck
 
 	needsUserSwitching := !isSameResolvedUser(resolvedUser, ctx.currentUser)
 
-	if isPrivilegedUsername(resolvedUser.Username) && !ctx.allowRoot {
+	if isPrivilegedOrUnknown(resolvedUser.Username) && !ctx.allowRoot {
 		return PrivilegeCheckResult{
 			Allowed:               false,
 			Error:                 &PrivilegedUserError{Username: resolvedUser.Username},
@@ -175,6 +180,42 @@ func (s *Server) resolveRequestedUser(requestedUsername string) (*user.User, err
 	return u, nil
 }
 
+// SetAllowRootLogin configures root login access
+func (s *Server) SetAllowRootLogin(allow bool) {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	s.allowRootLogin = allow
+}
+
+// userNameLookup performs user lookup with root login permission check
+func (s *Server) userNameLookup(username string) (*user.User, error) {
+	result, err := s.userPrivilegeCheck(username)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return result.User, nil
+}
+
+// userPrivilegeCheck performs user lookup with full privilege check result
+func (s *Server) userPrivilegeCheck(username string) (PrivilegeCheckResult, error) {
+	result := s.CheckPrivileges(PrivilegeCheckRequest{
+		RequestedUsername:         username,
+		FeatureSupportsUserSwitch: true,
+		FeatureName:               FeatureSSHLogin,
+	})
+
+	if !result.Allowed {
+		return result, result.Error
+	}
+
+	return result, nil
+}
+
+// isPlatformUnix returns true for Unix-like platforms (Linux, macOS, etc.)
+func isPlatformUnix() bool {
+	return getCurrentOS() != "windows"
+}
+
 // isSameResolvedUser compares two resolved user identities
 func isSameResolvedUser(user1, user2 *user.User) bool {
 	if user1 == nil || user2 == nil {
@@ -183,13 +224,6 @@ func isSameResolvedUser(user1, user2 *user.User) bool {
 	return user1.Uid == user2.Uid
 }
 
-// privilegeCheckContext holds all context needed for privilege checking
-type privilegeCheckContext struct {
-	currentUser           *user.User
-	currentUserPrivileged bool
-	allowRoot             bool
-}
-
 // isSameUser checks if two usernames refer to the same user
 // SECURITY: This function must be conservative - it should only return true
 // when we're certain both usernames refer to the exact same user identity
@@ -253,159 +287,30 @@ func isWindowsSameUser(requestedUsername, currentUsername string) bool {
 	return strings.EqualFold(reqDomain, curDomain)
 }
 
-// SetAllowRootLogin configures root login access
-func (s *Server) SetAllowRootLogin(allow bool) {
-	s.mu.Lock()
-	defer s.mu.Unlock()
-	s.allowRootLogin = allow
-}
-
-// userNameLookup performs user lookup with root login permission check
-func (s *Server) userNameLookup(username string) (*user.User, error) {
-	result := s.CheckPrivileges(PrivilegeCheckRequest{
-		RequestedUsername:         username,
-		FeatureSupportsUserSwitch: true,
-		FeatureName:               FeatureSSHLogin,
-	})
-
-	if !result.Allowed {
-		return nil, result.Error
-	}
-
-	return result.User, nil
-}
-
-// userPrivilegeCheck performs user lookup with full privilege check result
-func (s *Server) userPrivilegeCheck(username string) (PrivilegeCheckResult, error) {
-	result := s.CheckPrivileges(PrivilegeCheckRequest{
-		RequestedUsername:         username,
-		FeatureSupportsUserSwitch: true,
-		FeatureName:               FeatureSSHLogin,
-	})
-
-	if !result.Allowed {
-		return result, result.Error
-	}
-
-	return result, nil
-}
-
-// isPrivilegedUsername checks if the given username represents a privileged user across platforms.
-// On Unix: root
-// On Windows: Administrator, SYSTEM (case-insensitive)
-// Handles domain-qualified usernames like "DOMAIN\Administrator" or "user@domain.com"
-func isPrivilegedUsername(username string) bool {
+// isPrivilegedOrUnknown reports whether the given username represents a
+// privileged user, or on Windows an account whose privilege could not be
+// determined.
+// On Unix: root.
+// On Windows: well-known service accounts, built-in Administrator accounts,
+// and members of the local Administrators group; handles domain-qualified
+// usernames like "DOMAIN\user" or "user@domain.com". An account that cannot be
+// resolved or evaluated is reported as privileged.
+//
+// Use this to refuse privileged accounts, never to grant them anything: the
+// undetermined case is safe for a refusal and unsafe for a grant.
+func isPrivilegedOrUnknown(username string) bool {
 	if getCurrentOS() != "windows" {
 		return username == "root"
 	}
-
-	bareUsername := username
-	// Handle Windows domain format: DOMAIN\username
-	if idx := strings.LastIndex(username, `\`); idx != -1 {
-		bareUsername = username[idx+1:]
-	}
-	// Handle email-style format: username@domain.com
-	if idx := strings.Index(bareUsername, "@"); idx != -1 {
-		bareUsername = bareUsername[:idx]
-	}
-
-	return isWindowsPrivilegedUser(bareUsername)
-}
-
-// isWindowsPrivilegedUser checks if a bare username (domain already stripped) represents a Windows privileged account
-func isWindowsPrivilegedUser(bareUsername string) bool {
-	// common privileged usernames (case insensitive)
-	privilegedNames := []string{
-		"administrator",
-		"admin",
-		"root",
-		"system",
-		"localsystem",
-		"networkservice",
-		"localservice",
-	}
-
-	usernameLower := strings.ToLower(bareUsername)
-	for _, privilegedName := range privilegedNames {
-		if usernameLower == privilegedName {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-
-	// computer accounts (ending with $) are not privileged by themselves
-	// They only gain privileges through group membership or specific SIDs
-
-	if targetUser, err := lookupUser(bareUsername); err == nil {
-		return isWindowsPrivilegedSID(targetUser.Uid)
-	}
-
-	return false
-}
-
-// isWindowsPrivilegedSID checks if a Windows SID represents a privileged account
-func isWindowsPrivilegedSID(sid string) bool {
-	privilegedSIDs := []string{
-		"S-1-5-18",     // Local System (SYSTEM)
-		"S-1-5-19",     // Local Service (NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE)
-		"S-1-5-20",     // Network Service (NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE)
-		"S-1-5-32-544", // Administrators group (BUILTIN\Administrators)
-		"S-1-5-500",    // Built-in Administrator account (local machine RID 500)
-	}
-
-	for _, privilegedSID := range privilegedSIDs {
-		if sid == privilegedSID {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-
-	// Check for domain administrator accounts (RID 500 in any domain)
-	// Format: S-1-5-21-domain-domain-domain-500
-	// This is reliable as RID 500 is reserved for the domain Administrator account
-	if strings.HasPrefix(sid, "S-1-5-21-") && strings.HasSuffix(sid, "-500") {
-		return true
-	}
-
-	// Check for other well-known privileged RIDs in domain contexts
-	// RID 512 = Domain Admins group, RID 516 = Domain Controllers group
-	if strings.HasPrefix(sid, "S-1-5-21-") {
-		if strings.HasSuffix(sid, "-512") || // Domain Admins group
-			strings.HasSuffix(sid, "-516") || // Domain Controllers group
-			strings.HasSuffix(sid, "-519") { // Enterprise Admins group
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-
-	return false
+	return getWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown(username)
 }
 
 // isCurrentProcessPrivileged checks if the current process is running with elevated privileges.
 // On Unix systems, this means running as root (UID 0).
-// On Windows, this means running as Administrator or SYSTEM.
+// On Windows, this means the process token is elevated (administrators, SYSTEM).
 func isCurrentProcessPrivileged() bool {
 	if getCurrentOS() == "windows" {
-		return isWindowsElevated()
+		return getProcessElevated()
 	}
 	return getEuid() == 0
 }
-
-// isWindowsElevated checks if the current process is running with elevated privileges on Windows
-func isWindowsElevated() bool {
-	currentUser, err := getCurrentUser()
-	if err != nil {
-		log.Errorf("failed to get current user for privilege check, assuming non-privileged: %v", err)
-		return false
-	}
-
-	if isWindowsPrivilegedSID(currentUser.Uid) {
-		log.Debugf("Windows user switching supported: running as privileged SID %s", currentUser.Uid)
-		return true
-	}
-
-	if isPrivilegedUsername(currentUser.Username) {
-		log.Debugf("Windows user switching supported: running as privileged username %s", currentUser.Username)
-		return true
-	}
-
-	log.Debugf("Windows user switching not supported: not running as privileged user (current: %s)", currentUser.Uid)
-	return false
-}

client/ssh/server/user_utils_test.go

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
 	"errors"
 	"os/user"
 	"runtime"
+	"strings"
 	"testing"
 
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
@@ -27,8 +28,8 @@ func setupTestDependencies(currentUser *user.User, currentUserErr error, os stri
 	originalLookupUser := lookupUser
 	originalGetCurrentOS := getCurrentOS
 	originalGetEuid := getEuid
-
-	// Reset caches to ensure clean test state
+	originalGetProcessElevated := getProcessElevated
+	originalGetWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown := getWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown
 
 	// Set test values - inject platform dependencies
 	getCurrentUser = func() (*user.User, error) {
@@ -53,16 +54,31 @@ func setupTestDependencies(currentUser *user.User, currentUserErr error, os stri
 		return euid
 	}
 
-	// Mock privilege detection based on the test user
-	getIsProcessPrivileged = func() bool {
+	// Simulate the Windows token elevation check based on the fixture user:
+	// the built-in Administrator (RID 500) and SYSTEM run elevated.
+	getProcessElevated = func() bool {
 		if currentUser == nil {
 			return false
 		}
-		// Check both username and SID for Windows systems
-		if os == "windows" && isWindowsPrivilegedSID(currentUser.Uid) {
+		return currentUser.Uid == "S-1-5-18" || strings.HasSuffix(currentUser.Uid, "-500")
+	}
+
+	// Simulate the Windows account classifier for the fixture accounts.
+	// "root" does not exist on Windows; the real classifier fails closed on
+	// unresolvable accounts, so it counts as privileged here too.
+	getWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown = func(username string) bool {
+		bare := username
+		if idx := strings.LastIndex(bare, `\`); idx != -1 {
+			bare = bare[idx+1:]
+		}
+		if idx := strings.Index(bare, "@"); idx != -1 {
+			bare = bare[:idx]
+		}
+		switch strings.ToLower(bare) {
+		case "administrator", "system", "root":
 			return true
 		}
-		return isPrivilegedUsername(currentUser.Username)
+		return false
 	}
 
 	// Return cleanup function
@@ -71,10 +87,8 @@ func setupTestDependencies(currentUser *user.User, currentUserErr error, os stri
 		lookupUser = originalLookupUser
 		getCurrentOS = originalGetCurrentOS
 		getEuid = originalGetEuid
-
-		getIsProcessPrivileged = isCurrentProcessPrivileged
-
-		// Reset caches after test
+		getProcessElevated = originalGetProcessElevated
+		getWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown = originalGetWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown
 	}
 }
 
@@ -421,6 +435,9 @@ func TestUsedFallback_MeansNoPrivilegeDropping(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestPrivilegedUsernameDetection(t *testing.T) {
+	// Windows classification is syscall-backed (SID resolution, group
+	// membership) and is covered by privileges_windows_test.go; here only the
+	// Unix logic and the platform dispatch are exercised.
 	tests := []struct {
 		name       string
 		username   string
@@ -432,25 +449,9 @@ func TestPrivilegedUsernameDetection(t *testing.T) {
 		{"unix_regular_user", "alice", "linux", false},
 		{"unix_root_capital", "Root", "linux", false}, // Case-sensitive
 
-		// Windows tests
+		// Windows dispatch to the (mocked) account classifier
 		{"windows_administrator", "Administrator", "windows", true},
-		{"windows_system", "SYSTEM", "windows", true},
-		{"windows_admin", "admin", "windows", true},
-		{"windows_admin_lowercase", "administrator", "windows", true}, // Case-insensitive
-		{"windows_domain_admin", "DOMAIN\\Administrator", "windows", true},
-		{"windows_email_admin", "admin@domain.com", "windows", true},
 		{"windows_regular_user", "alice", "windows", false},
-		{"windows_domain_user", "DOMAIN\\alice", "windows", false},
-		{"windows_localsystem", "localsystem", "windows", true},
-		{"windows_networkservice", "networkservice", "windows", true},
-		{"windows_localservice", "localservice", "windows", true},
-
-		// Computer accounts (these depend on current user context in real implementation)
-		{"windows_computer_account", "WIN2K19-C2$", "windows", false},      // Computer account by itself not privileged
-		{"windows_domain_computer", "DOMAIN\\COMPUTER$", "windows", false}, // Domain computer account
-
-		// Cross-platform
-		{"root_on_windows", "root", "windows", true}, // Root should be privileged everywhere
 	}
 
 	for _, tt := range tests {
@@ -459,50 +460,8 @@ func TestPrivilegedUsernameDetection(t *testing.T) {
 			cleanup := setupTestDependencies(nil, nil, tt.platform, 1000, nil, nil)
 			defer cleanup()
 
-			result := isPrivilegedUsername(tt.username)
-			assert.Equal(t, tt.privileged, result)
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-func TestWindowsPrivilegedSIDDetection(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name        string
-		sid         string
-		privileged  bool
-		description string
-	}{
-		// Well-known system accounts
-		{"system_account", "S-1-5-18", true, "Local System (SYSTEM)"},
-		{"local_service", "S-1-5-19", true, "Local Service"},
-		{"network_service", "S-1-5-20", true, "Network Service"},
-		{"administrators_group", "S-1-5-32-544", true, "Administrators group"},
-		{"builtin_administrator", "S-1-5-500", true, "Built-in Administrator"},
-
-		// Domain accounts
-		{"domain_administrator", "S-1-5-21-1234567890-1234567890-1234567890-500", true, "Domain Administrator (RID 500)"},
-		{"domain_admins_group", "S-1-5-21-1234567890-1234567890-1234567890-512", true, "Domain Admins group"},
-		{"domain_controllers_group", "S-1-5-21-1234567890-1234567890-1234567890-516", true, "Domain Controllers group"},
-		{"enterprise_admins_group", "S-1-5-21-1234567890-1234567890-1234567890-519", true, "Enterprise Admins group"},
-
-		// Regular users
-		{"regular_user", "S-1-5-21-1234567890-1234567890-1234567890-1001", false, "Regular domain user"},
-		{"another_regular_user", "S-1-5-21-1234567890-1234567890-1234567890-1234", false, "Another regular user"},
-		{"local_user", "S-1-5-21-1234567890-1234567890-1234567890-1000", false, "Local regular user"},
-
-		// Groups that are not privileged
-		{"domain_users", "S-1-5-21-1234567890-1234567890-1234567890-513", false, "Domain Users group"},
-		{"power_users", "S-1-5-32-547", false, "Power Users group"},
-
-		// Invalid SIDs
-		{"malformed_sid", "S-1-5-invalid", false, "Malformed SID"},
-		{"empty_sid", "", false, "Empty SID"},
-	}
-
-	for _, tt := range tests {
-		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			result := isWindowsPrivilegedSID(tt.sid)
-			assert.Equal(t, tt.privileged, result, "Failed for %s: %s", tt.description, tt.sid)
+			result := isPrivilegedOrUnknown(tt.username)
+			assert.Equal(t, tt.privileged, result, "privilege classification for %s on %s", tt.username, tt.platform)
 		})
 	}
 }

client/ssh/server/userswitching_windows.go

@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ func validateUsernameFormat(username string) error {
 func (s *Server) createExecutorCommand(logger *log.Entry, session ssh.Session, localUser *user.User, hasPty bool) (*exec.Cmd, func(), error) {
 	logger.Debugf("creating Windows executor command for user %s (Pty: %v)", localUser.Username, hasPty)
 
-	username, _ := s.parseUsername(localUser.Username)
+	username, _ := parseUsername(localUser.Username)
 	if err := validateUsername(username); err != nil {
 		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid username %q: %w", username, err)
 	}
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ func (s *Server) createExecutorCommand(logger *log.Entry, session ssh.Session, l
 // createUserSwitchCommand creates a command with Windows user switching.
 // Returns the command and a cleanup function that must be called after starting the process.
 func (s *Server) createUserSwitchCommand(logger *log.Entry, session ssh.Session, localUser *user.User) (*exec.Cmd, func(), error) {
-	username, domain := s.parseUsername(localUser.Username)
+	username, domain := parseUsername(localUser.Username)
 
 	shell := getUserShell(localUser.Uid)
 
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ func (s *Server) createUserSwitchCommand(logger *log.Entry, session ssh.Session,
 }
 
 // parseUsername extracts username and domain from a Windows username
-func (s *Server) parseUsername(fullUsername string) (username, domain string) {
+func parseUsername(fullUsername string) (username, domain string) {
 	// Handle DOMAIN\username format
 	if idx := strings.LastIndex(fullUsername, `\`); idx != -1 {
 		domain = fullUsername[:idx]

client/ui/authsession/service.go

@@ -6,9 +6,11 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"time"
 
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 	"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
 	gstatus "google.golang.org/grpc/status"
 
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
 )
 
@@ -58,10 +60,21 @@ func (s *Session) RequestExtend(ctx context.Context, p ExtendStartParams) (Exten
 		return ExtendStartResult{}, err
 	}
 
-	req := &proto.RequestExtendAuthSessionRequest{}
-	if p.Hint != "" {
-		h := p.Hint
-		req.Hint = &h
+	// a request from the UI implies a graphical session, which the daemon cannot detect itself
+	req := &proto.RequestExtendAuthSessionRequest{HasGraphicalSession: true}
+	hint := p.Hint
+	if hint == "" {
+		pm := profilemanager.NewProfileManager()
+		if active, perr := pm.GetActiveProfile(); perr != nil {
+			log.Debugf("failed to get active profile for login hint: %v", perr)
+		} else if state, serr := pm.GetProfileState(active.ID); serr != nil {
+			log.Debugf("failed to get profile state for login hint: %v", serr)
+		} else {
+			hint = state.Email
+		}
+	}
+	if hint != "" {
+		req.Hint = &hint
 	}
 
 	resp, err := cli.RequestExtendAuthSession(ctx, req)

client/ui/frontend/package.json

@@ -15,7 +15,8 @@
     "lint": "eslint \"src/**/*.{ts,tsx}\"",
     "lint:fix": "eslint \"src/**/*.{ts,tsx}\" --fix",
     "check": "pnpm lint && pnpm typecheck && pnpm format:check",
-    "check:fix": "pnpm lint:fix && pnpm format && pnpm typecheck"
+    "check:fix": "pnpm lint:fix && pnpm format && pnpm typecheck",
+    "i18n:check": "node ../i18n/check-translations.mjs"
   },
   "dependencies": {
     "@radix-ui/react-dialog": "^1.1.15",

client/ui/i18n/check-translations.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+// Validates that every shipped translation bundle carries exactly the same set
+// of keys as the English source of truth. English (en) defines the keys; every
+// other locale declared in _index.json must match it 1:1:
+//
+//   - no missing keys — a missing key silently falls back to English at runtime
+//     (see i18n bundle fallback), so the gap never surfaces to users or CI
+//     without this check;
+//   - no orphaned keys — keys left behind after an English key is renamed or
+//     removed are dead weight and a sign the locale is drifting.
+//
+// Pure Node, no dependencies, so it runs without installing the frontend
+// toolchain.
+//
+//   Local:  node client/ui/i18n/check-translations.mjs   (or: pnpm i18n:check)
+//   CI:     .github/workflows/ui-translations.yml
+
+import { readdirSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs";
+import { dirname, join } from "node:path";
+import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+
+const SOURCE = "en";
+const localesDir = join(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "locales");
+const isCI = Boolean(process.env.GITHUB_ACTIONS);
+
+function readJSON(path) {
+    return JSON.parse(readFileSync(path, "utf8"));
+}
+
+function keysOf(langCode) {
+    return Object.keys(readJSON(join(localesDir, langCode, "common.json")));
+}
+
+// Emit a GitHub Actions annotation so failures render inline on the PR diff.
+function annotate(file, message) {
+    if (isCI) console.log(`::error file=${file}::${message}`);
+}
+
+const index = readJSON(join(localesDir, "_index.json"));
+const declared = index.languages.map((l) => l.code);
+
+if (!declared.includes(SOURCE)) {
+    console.error(`FATAL: source language "${SOURCE}" is not declared in _index.json`);
+    process.exit(1);
+}
+
+const sourceKeys = keysOf(SOURCE);
+const sourceSet = new Set(sourceKeys);
+console.log(`Source of truth: ${SOURCE}/common.json — ${sourceKeys.length} keys\n`);
+
+let failed = false;
+
+for (const code of declared) {
+    if (code === SOURCE) continue;
+    const file = `client/ui/i18n/locales/${code}/common.json`;
+
+    let keys;
+    try {
+        keys = keysOf(code);
+    } catch (e) {
+        failed = true;
+        const msg = `bundle is declared in _index.json but common.json is missing or invalid (${e.message})`;
+        console.error(`✗ ${code}: ${msg}`);
+        annotate("client/ui/i18n/locales/_index.json", `${code}: ${msg}`);
+        continue;
+    }
+
+    const set = new Set(keys);
+    const missing = sourceKeys.filter((k) => !set.has(k));
+    const extra = keys.filter((k) => !sourceSet.has(k));
+
+    if (missing.length === 0 && extra.length === 0) {
+        console.log(`✓ ${code}: ${keys.length} keys`);
+        continue;
+    }
+
+    failed = true;
+    console.error(`✗ ${code}: ${keys.length} keys (expected ${sourceKeys.length})`);
+    if (missing.length) {
+        console.error(`    missing ${missing.length}: ${missing.join(", ")}`);
+        annotate(file, `Missing ${missing.length} key(s) present in ${SOURCE}: ${missing.join(", ")}`);
+    }
+    if (extra.length) {
+        console.error(`    extra ${extra.length}: ${extra.join(", ")}`);
+        annotate(file, `Has ${extra.length} key(s) not present in ${SOURCE}: ${extra.join(", ")}`);
+    }
+}
+
+// Locale directories present on disk but not declared in _index.json are never
+// loaded by the app — surface them so dead translation files don't rot silently.
+const onDisk = readdirSync(localesDir, { withFileTypes: true })
+    .filter((e) => e.isDirectory())
+    .map((e) => e.name);
+const undeclared = onDisk.filter((d) => !declared.includes(d));
+if (undeclared.length) {
+    console.warn(`\n⚠ locale directories not declared in _index.json (not shipped): ${undeclared.join(", ")}`);
+}
+
+console.log();
+if (failed) {
+    console.error("Translation check FAILED — every locale must match the English key set.");
+    process.exit(1);
+}
+console.log("Translation check passed — all locales match the English key set.");

client/ui/i18n/locales/ja/common.json

@@ -1312,6 +1312,9 @@
     "daemon.outdated.description": {
         "message": "このアプリを使用するには NetBird サービスを更新してください。"
     },
+    "daemon.outdated.download": {
+        "message": "最新版をダウンロード"
+    },
     "error.jwt_clock_skew": {
         "message": "サインインに失敗しました: このデバイスの時計がサーバーと同期していません。システムの時計を同期してからもう一度お試しください。"
     },

client/ui/services/connection.go

@@ -108,10 +108,11 @@ func (s *Connection) Login(ctx context.Context, p LoginParams) (LoginResult, err
 	}
 
 	req := &proto.LoginRequest{
-		ManagementUrl:       p.ManagementURL,
-		SetupKey:            p.SetupKey,
-		Hostname:            p.Hostname,
-		IsUnixDesktopClient: runtime.GOOS == "linux",
+		ManagementUrl: p.ManagementURL,
+		SetupKey:      p.SetupKey,
+		Hostname:      p.Hostname,
+		// a login driven by the UI always has a graphical session available
+		IsUnixDesktopClient: true,
 	}
 	if profileName != "" {
 		req.ProfileName = ptrStr(profileName)
@@ -122,8 +123,16 @@ func (s *Connection) Login(ctx context.Context, p LoginParams) (LoginResult, err
 	if p.PreSharedKey != "" {
 		req.OptionalPreSharedKey = ptrStr(p.PreSharedKey)
 	}
-	if p.Hint != "" {
-		req.Hint = ptrStr(p.Hint)
+	hint := p.Hint
+	if hint == "" && profileID != "" {
+		if state, serr := profilemanager.NewProfileManager().GetProfileState(profilemanager.ID(profileID)); serr == nil {
+			hint = state.Email
+		} else {
+			log.Debugf("failed to get profile state for login hint: %v", serr)
+		}
+	}
+	if hint != "" {
+		req.Hint = ptrStr(hint)
 	}
 
 	resp, err := cli.Login(ctx, req)
@@ -227,16 +236,6 @@ func (s *Connection) Logout(ctx context.Context, p LogoutParams) error {
 		return s.classifyDaemonError(err)
 	}
 
-	// The daemon runs as root and can't reach the user-owned per-profile state
-	// file holding the account email (see Profiles.List), so clear the stale
-	// email here; the next SSO login recreates it.
-	if p.ProfileName != "" {
-		if err := profilemanager.NewProfileManager().RemoveProfileState(p.ProfileName); err != nil {
-			// Non-fatal: the logout itself succeeded.
-			log.Warnf("failed to remove profile state for %s: %v", p.ProfileName, err)
-		}
-	}
-
 	return nil
 }
 
@@ -260,7 +259,7 @@ func (s *Connection) waitSSOLogin(ctx context.Context, p WaitSSOParams) (string,
 
 	// Persist the account email the same way the CLI does after its own
 	// WaitSSOLogin: the daemon returns it but cannot store it, since it runs as
-	// root and the per-profile state file is user-owned (see Logout below).
+	// root and the per-profile state file is user-owned (see Profiles.List).
 	// Without this the profile has no email, so Profiles.List shows no account
 	// and later logins and session extends go out without a login_hint —
 	// leaving the IdP to guess which account was meant.

client/ui/services/profile.go

@@ -162,8 +162,9 @@ func (s *Profiles) Remove(ctx context.Context, p ProfileRef) error {
 	}
 
 	// The daemon deletes what it owns but runs as root, so it leaves the
-	// user-owned state file holding the account email behind (same split as
-	// Connection.Logout). Legacy profiles are keyed by name rather than by a
+	// user-owned state file holding the account email behind. Logout keeps the
+	// email on purpose so later logins can pass it as the login_hint; profile
+	// removal is what deletes it. Legacy profiles are keyed by name rather than by a
 	// generated ID, so a recreated profile of the same name would inherit the
 	// deleted one's email and offer it as the login_hint.
 	//

docs/agent-networks/01-end-to-end-flows.md

@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ sequenceDiagram
         Resp->>Resp: parse usage tokens, completion
         Note over Resp: capture_completion gates raw<br/>completion capture
         Resp->>Cost: tokens
-        Cost->>Cost: lookup pricing.yaml + compute cost
+        Cost->>Cost: lookup rates from config-delivered<br/>pricing table + compute cost
         Cost->>Rec: tokens + cost
         Rec->>MgmtGrpc: RecordLLMUsage(provider, model, prompt_t, completion_t, cost, groups, user)
         Rec-->>Log: emit access-log entry<br/>(if EnableLogCollection)

docs/agent-networks/modules/21-management-agentnetwork.md

@@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ Inside the package: `manager.go` is the CRUD + permissions-gated facade; `synthe
 | ---- | ---- |
 | `agentnetwork/manager.go` | Manager interface + CRUD + permission gates + bootstrap-settings + reconcile trigger |
 | `agentnetwork/synthesizer.go` | Settings/policy → wire-format synthesis; sole writer of the proxy middleware chain |
+| `agentnetwork/synthesizer_pricing.go` | `buildCostMeterConfigJSON` — default table + per-provider prices → `cost_meter` config |
+| `agentnetwork/pricing/defaults.go` | Default pricing table derived from the catalog + supplementals; `DefaultTable`, `LookupDefault`, wire `Entry` |
+| `agentnetwork/pricing/override.go` | `LoadFile`/`StartReloader` for `AgentNetwork.PricingDefaultsFile` (mtime poll, merge over compiled-in base) |
+| `agentnetwork/pricing/{exampleyaml,gen}.go` | Generates `defaults_llm_pricing.example.yaml` from the compiled-in table (golden-tested) |
 | `agentnetwork/policyselect.go` | Per-request policy attribution + account-budget ceiling (min-wins) |
 | `agentnetwork/reconcile.go` | Per-account synth diff vs in-memory cache → Create/Update/Delete |
 | `agentnetwork/catalog/catalog.go` | Static provider catalogue (auth headers, identity-injection shapes) |
@@ -48,6 +52,8 @@ flowchart TD
     I --> J[indexProviderGroups: providerID -> sorted source groups]
     J --> K[buildRouterConfigJSON drops orphan providers]
     J --> L[buildIdentityInjectConfigJSON per catalog entry]
+    J --> K2[buildCostMeterConfigJSON: default table + per-provider prices]
+    K2 --> P
     H --> M[mergeGuardrails: union allowlist, OR redact]
     M --> N[applyAccountCollectionControls account toggle = SOLE capture control]
     N --> O[marshalGuardrailConfig]
@@ -60,6 +66,84 @@ flowchart TD
     R --> T[accountManager.UpdateAccountPeers — fans synth ACLs into network map]
 ```
 
+### LLM pricing (management is the sole authority)
+
+**The proxy carries no price list.** Management synthesizes the entire pricing
+table and ships it inside `cost_meter`'s `ConfigJSON`, so a price change reaches
+the proxies as an ordinary mapping push — the chain rebuild installs a fresh
+table and there is nothing to reload on the proxy side.
+
+```mermaid
+flowchart TD
+    A[catalog.All — PricingSurfaces x Models] --> B[buildDefaultTable + supplementalDefaults]
+    B --> C{AgentNetwork.PricingDefaultsFile}
+    C -- absent --> D[compiled-in table serves]
+    C -- loaded --> E[LoadFile: merge file entries WHOLE over compiled base]
+    E --> F[mergedTable atomic.Pointer]
+    D --> G[DefaultTable]
+    F --> G
+    G --> H[buildCostMeterConfigJSON — pricing.defaults]
+    I[types.Provider.Models operator prices] --> J[normalizePricingModelID<br/>bedrock ARN/region/version, vertex @version]
+    J --> K[materializeEntry: default entry as base,<br/>operator input/output verbatim,<br/>cache pointers only when non-nil]
+    K --> L[pricing.providers keyed by provider record ID]
+    H --> M[cost_meter ConfigJSON]
+    L --> M
+    G --> N[GET /catalog — applyDefaultPricing prefills dashboard rows]
+    O[StartReloader: mtime poll every ReloadInterval 1m] --> E
+```
+
+**Two tiers, resolved per request on the proxy** (`synthesizer_pricing.go:22-35`):
+
+- `pricing.defaults` — surface (`openai`/`anthropic`/`bedrock`) → normalized model
+  id → rates. The **full** default table ships to every account: it is small
+  (~10 KB) and it is what keeps gateway-style providers (which enumerate no
+  models, so they claim every model) priced.
+- `pricing.providers` — provider **record** id → normalized model id → rates,
+  matched against the `llm.resolved_provider_id` the router stamps. Entries are
+  **fully materialized here**, at synth time: `materializeEntry` starts from the
+  default entry for that model so cache rates the operator didn't state are
+  inherited, overlays operator `input`/`output` verbatim (**including an explicit
+  0**, which prices a self-hosted or internal endpoint as free rather than
+  silently reverting to list price), and overlays cache-rate **pointers only when
+  non-nil** — `nil` means "inherit the default", an explicit `0` means "no
+  discount, bill this bucket at the input rate". The proxy therefore does two map
+  lookups and no merging.
+
+Same orphan rule as the router: a provider no enabled policy authorises is
+unreachable, so its prices aren't shipped. Model ids are normalized with the
+**same** functions the request parser uses (`NormalizeBedrockModel` /
+`NormalizeVertexModel`), which is what makes the per-record lookup key compare
+equal to the `llm.model` the proxy meters. Post-normalization duplicates resolve
+first-occurrence-wins, matching the routing dedup order.
+
+**`AgentNetwork.PricingDefaultsFile`** (`config.go:190-207`) lets an operator
+replace default rates without a rebuild. Schema is `surface → model → rates`
+(`input_per_1k`, `output_per_1k`, and optional `cached_input_per_1k` /
+`cache_read_per_1k` / `cache_creation_per_1k`). Semantics:
+
+- A **relative** path resolves against `<Datadir>`, so a bare filename lands
+  alongside the store. Empty config probes `<Datadir>/defaults_llm_pricing.yaml`.
+- An **explicitly configured** path is *required to load*: a typo or malformed
+  file fails startup, because the operator believes those rates are live. The
+  conventional probe is optional — an absent file just serves compiled-in
+  defaults, and the path stays watched in case it appears later.
+- File entries **replace** the compiled-in entry for the same (surface, model)
+  **whole** — they are not field-merged, so an entry must repeat the cache rates
+  it wants to keep. Everything the file doesn't mention keeps built-in rates.
+- Unknown YAML fields are rejected (`KnownFields(true)`) and every rate must be
+  finite and non-negative — the same constraints the HTTP API enforces on
+  operator per-provider prices.
+- Reload is an mtime poll (`ReloadInterval`, 1 min) and is **lenient at runtime**:
+  a parse error keeps the previous table, a deleted file reverts to compiled-in
+  defaults. A mid-edit save can never take pricing down.
+
+The live table feeds **both** consumers, which is what keeps them consistent: the
+synthesizer (what proxies actually bill with) and `GET /api/agent-network/catalog`
+via `applyDefaultPricing` (what the dashboard's model-row prices prefill with).
+`defaults_llm_pricing.example.yaml` is generated from the compiled-in table
+(`go generate ./management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/pricing`) and
+golden-tested, so operators start from a file matching the built-in rates exactly.
+
 ### Budget rule resolution (min-wins, group+user bound)
 
 ```mermaid
@@ -124,7 +208,7 @@ At request time the path is independent: the proxy calls `SelectPolicyForRequest
   | on_request | 3 | `llm_identity_inject` | `{"providers":[{provider_id, header_pair?, json_metadata?, extra_headers?}]}` | **true** |
   | on_request | 4 | `llm_guardrail` | `{"provider_allowlists"?: {providerID: []model}, "prompt_capture":{enabled,redact_pii}}` | – |
   | on_response | 5 | `llm_limit_record` | `{}` (runs LAST at runtime) | – |
-  | on_response | 6 | `cost_meter` | `{}` | – |
+  | on_response | 6 | `cost_meter` | `{"pricing":{"defaults":{surface:{model:rates}},"providers"?:{providerRecordID:{model:rates}}}}` — rates are `{input_per_1k, output_per_1k, cached_input_per_1k?, cache_read_per_1k?, cache_creation_per_1k?}` | – |
   | on_response | 7 | `llm_response_parser` | `{"capture_completion": <bool>, "redact_pii"?: true}` | – |
 - **Synthesized service shape** (`synthesizer.go:739`): `Mode=HTTP`, `Private=true`, `Domain=<subdomain>.<cluster>`, `AccessGroups=unionSourceGroups(enabledPolicies)`, one `TargetTypeCluster` target with `Host=noop.invalid:443` (router rewrites per request), `Options.{DirectUpstream,AgentNetwork}=true`, `DisableAccessLog=!settings.EnableLogCollection`, `CaptureMax{Req,Resp}Bytes=1<<20`, `CaptureContentTypes=["application/json","text/event-stream"]`.
 
@@ -139,6 +223,12 @@ At request time the path is independent: the proxy calls `SelectPolicyForRequest
 - **Orphan providers (no enabled policy authorises them) NEVER reach the router** (`synthesizer.go:351-357`); skipped from `identity_inject` for symmetry.
 - **Provider creation refuses empty `api_key`** (`manager.go:175`); **deletion refuses while any policy still references it** (`manager.go:265-273`).
 - **Session keypair stability across provider edits** (`manager.go:226-228`) — server-managed, copied through every `UpdateProvider`, never API-surfaced.
+- **Management is the sole pricing authority.** The proxy has no embedded price list, so an account whose `cost_meter` config carries no `pricing` block bills **nothing** (`cost.skipped=unknown_model`, $0) rather than falling back to stale built-ins. The top-level `pricing` wrapper is also the feature-detection signal in both directions: an old proxy ignores it as an unknown field, and a new proxy reads its absence as "old management".
+- **Per-provider prices are materialized at synth time, not merged on the proxy** (`synthesizer_pricing.go:114-131`). A per-record entry is always complete, so the proxy's lookup is per-record-then-defaults with no field-level fallback between tiers.
+- **An explicit operator price of `0` prices the model as free** — it must not be treated as "unset" and reverted to list price (`synthesizer_pricing.go:49-54`). Only *cache*-rate fields distinguish unset from zero, via `*float64`.
+- **Pricing model ids are normalized with the same functions the request parser uses** (`normalizePricingModelID`). If the two ever diverge, per-record prices silently stop matching and every request falls through to surface defaults.
+- **The default table's coverage is structural, not curated.** It is derived from the catalog via each provider's `PricingSurfaces`; `TestDefaultTable_CoversEveryCatalogModel` fails on an unpriced catalog model and `TestDefaultTable_NoConflictingContributions` fails if two providers contribute the same (surface, model) at different rates.
+- **A pricing-defaults file failure is fatal only at startup, and only for an explicitly configured path.** Runtime reload failures keep the previous table; a deleted file reverts to compiled-in defaults (`pricing/override.go:62-81, 113-148`).
 
 ## Things to scrutinize
 
@@ -176,10 +266,12 @@ At request time the path is independent: the proxy calls `SelectPolicyForRequest
 - **Capture-pointer semantics (restated):** non-agent-network callers see no field → legacy nil-default emit, identical to pre-PR. Agent-network targets always carry an explicit `capture_*` value.
 - **`TestSynthesizeServices_HappyPath` was updated:** request-parser config moved from `{}` to `{"capture_prompt":false}` (`synthesizer_test.go:174`). External snapshot tests against synth output need updating.
 - **`MergedGuardrails` retains zeroed `TokenLimits`/`Budget`/`Retention`** even though `Policy.Limits` carries the real values now; `llm_limit_check` is the authoritative enforcement. Comment at `synthesizer.go:940-948` calls this out.
+- **`cost_meter`'s `pricing` block is version-skew-safe in both directions.** A proxy predating config-delivered pricing ignores the field as unknown JSON (it previously priced from its own embedded table, so it keeps billing — at its own rates, which is the skew to be aware of during a rolling upgrade). A current proxy paired with old management sees no `pricing` block, logs one warning at chain-build time, and records `cost.skipped=unknown_model` — token counting and cap enforcement are unaffected, only the USD annotation goes to $0.
 
 ### Performance
 
 - **`SynthesizeServices` runs on every controller tick / mutation reconcile.** Cost: 4 store reads + optional per-provider keypair backfill. Sort + index + merge are O(N log N) / O(P × G); dominant cost is JSON marshalling. No nested loops escape these dimensions.
+- **The full default pricing table is marshalled into every account's `cost_meter` config on every synth** (~10 KB serialized). This is a deliberate trade: it keeps gateway-style providers priced for every catalog model, and it is the largest single contributor to the synth JSON. `DefaultTable()` itself is a pointer load (or a `sync.Once`-built map) — the cost is the marshal, not the build.
 - **`reconcile.diffMappings` is O(N + M)** with N=M=1 per account today — effectively constant.
 - **`SynthesizeServicesForCluster`** (`synthesizer.go:71`) walks every account on a cluster; per-account failures are **swallowed** (`synthesizer.go:91-93`) so a single misconfigured account doesn't drop the cluster. Runs per proxy reconnect.
 
@@ -188,6 +280,7 @@ At request time the path is independent: the proxy calls `SelectPolicyForRequest
 - **Activity codes:** `AgentNetwork{Provider,Policy,Guardrail,BudgetRule}{Created,Updated,Deleted}`; `AgentNetworkSettingsUpdated` with `log_collection/prompt_collection/redact_pii` payload (`manager.go:567-571`). **No activity code for `SelectPolicyForRequest` denies** — surfaced via proxy access log only (likely intentional given volume).
 - **Deny codes** namespaced: `llm_policy.{token,budget}_cap_exceeded`, `llm_account.{token,budget}_cap_exceeded` (`policyselect.go:18-26`).
 - **Reconcile failures are logged at warn and swallowed** (`reconcile.go:42-44`). Persistent synth failures (e.g. unknown catalog id) silently keep the proxy out of sync — consider a manager-level synth-health surface if this becomes a support burden.
+- **Pricing-file lifecycle logs at info** (load, reload, revert-to-built-ins) and **at warn** for a runtime reload failure; the mtime check itself is `Debugf`. There is no metric on reload failures, so an operator who breaks the file mid-flight keeps billing at the previous table with only a log line to show it (`pricing/override.go:113-148`).
 
 ## Test coverage
 
@@ -198,6 +291,9 @@ At request time the path is independent: the proxy calls `SelectPolicyForRequest
 | `synthesizer_guardrail_realstore_test.go` | `PromptCaptureAccountIsSoleControl`; `PromptCaptureFlowsWhenAccountOptsIn`; `AccountRedactWithoutGuardrailRedact`; `NoGuardrail_CaptureOff`. |
 | `synthesizer_log_collection_realstore_test.go` | `LogCollection{Off_SuppressesAccessLog,On_PermitsAccessLog}` — verifies `DisableAccessLog` propagation through `ToProtoMapping`. |
 | `synthesizer_parser_redact_realstore_test.go` | **Capture-pointer regression suite:** `ParserConfigsCarryRedactPii`; `ParserConfigsSuppressCaptureWhenLogCollectionOnly` (log=on/prompt=off ⇒ both capture flags false); `ParserConfigsOmitRedactPiiWhenOff`. |
+| `synthesizer_pricing_test.go` | `BuildCostMeterConfig_{BedrockModelNormalization,CacheRateNilVsZero,OrphanAndGatewayProviders}` — the per-record tier's three load-bearing rules: keys normalized like the parser's, `nil` cache pointer inherits vs explicit `0` bills at input rate, and orphan / gateway (empty `Models`) providers ship no per-record entry. |
+| `pricing/defaults_test.go` | `DefaultTable_{CoversEveryCatalogModel,NoConflictingContributions,AllRatesFiniteNonNegative,PinnedRates}`; `LookupDefault_SurfaceOrder`. Catalog-derived coverage + rate sanity are structural, not curated. |
+| `pricing/override_test.go` | `LoadFile_{MergesOverCompiledDefaults,MissingPath,RejectsInvalid}`; `Reload_LifeCycle` (mtime detect, parse error keeps previous, delete reverts to built-ins); `ExampleYAML_InSyncWithBuiltins` golden. |
 | `policyselect_test.go` | Mock-store: `NoApplicablePolicies`; `AllowWithLowestGroupAttribution`; `LargerPoolWinsAcrossUsageLevels`; `StaysOnLargerPoolAfterPartialDrain`; `FallsThroughToSmallerPoolWhenLargerExhausted`; `TiebreakBy{LargerGroupPool,CreatedAt}`; `DeniesWhenAllExhausted`; `UncappedPolicyAlwaysWinsAgainstCapped`; `DisabledPolicyIgnored`; `StoreErrorPropagates`; `RejectsEmptyAccount`; `SharesGroupCounterAcrossPolicies`; `AntiFallThroughOnLowestGroup`; `BudgetOnlyExhaustionDenies`; `BudgetTighterThanTokenWins`. |
 | `policyselect_realstore_test.go` | Real-sqlite regression guard: `NoApplicablePolicies`; `AllowAndLowestGroupAttribution`; `LargerPoolWins_FallsThroughWhenExhausted`; `BudgetCapDenies`; `GroupCounterSharedAcrossPolicies`; `DisabledPolicyIgnored`. |
 | `policyselect_account_realstore_test.go` | Account budget rules: `AccountCeilingBindsEvenWithUncappedPolicy` (min-wins); `AccountGroupCeiling`; `AccountTargetUsersBindsOnlyThatUser`; `AccountRuleRecordsToOwnWindow`. |

docs/agent-networks/modules/31-proxy-middleware-builtin.md

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ LLM request. The two highest-blast-radius areas are the **capture-pointer
 semantics** and the **limit_check ⇒ limit_record** record-once invariant.
 
 Sibling module: [32-proxy-llm-parsers.md](./32-proxy-llm-parsers.md) — the SDK
-adapters + pricing catalog this chain delegates to.
+adapters + pricing table and cost formula this chain delegates to.
 
 ---
 
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ rewrites.
 | `llm_identity_inject` | OnRequest | `llm.{resolved_provider_id,authorising_groups}`, `Input.{UserEmail,UserID,UserGroups,UserGroupNames}` | none | header strip/inject + optional body rewrite |
 | `llm_guardrail` | OnRequest | `llm.{model,request_prompt_raw}` | `llm_policy.{decision,reason}`, `llm.request_prompt` | none (model allowlist deny) |
 | `llm_response_parser` | OnResponse | `llm.provider`, `Input.{RespHeaders,RespBody,Status}` | `llm.{input,output,total,cached_input,cache_creation}_tokens`, `llm.response_completion` | none |
-| `cost_meter` | OnResponse | `llm.{provider,model}`, token buckets | `cost.usd_total` or `cost.skipped` | pricing lookup |
+| `cost_meter` | OnResponse | `llm.{provider,model,resolved_provider_id}`, token buckets | `cost.usd_{input,cached_input,cache_creation,output,total,cache}` or `cost.skipped` | none (in-memory pricing lookup) |
 | `llm_limit_record` | OnResponse | `llm.{attribution_group_id,attribution_window_seconds,input_tokens,output_tokens}`, `cost.usd_total` | none | gRPC `RecordLLMUsage` |
 
 [all_test.go:26–40](../../../proxy/internal/middleware/builtin/all_test.go)
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ locks the ID set; adding or removing one is a conscious extension.
 
 | File | LOC | Notes |
 |---|---:|---|
-| `builtin.go` | 86 | Registry + `FactoryContext` (ctx, data dir, meter, logger, mgmt client) |
+| `builtin.go` | 90 | Registry + `FactoryContext` (ctx, meter, logger, mgmt client) |
 | `all_test.go` | 41 | Locks the 8-ID registry surface |
 | `agentnetwork_chain_integration_test.go` | 319 | Live sqlite + real gRPC bufconn; gate→recorder wire path |
 | `llm_request_parser/*` | 162 / 66 / 356 | Provider detection, body parse, prompt extraction with capture-pointer gating |
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ locks the ID set; adding or removing one is a conscious extension.
 | `llm_identity_inject/*` | 440 / 108 / 666 | HeaderPair (LiteLLM) + JSONMetadata (Portkey) + ExtraHeaders |
 | `llm_guardrail/*` | 176 / 82 / 75 / 219 / 217 | Model allowlist + optional prompt capture with PII redaction |
 | `llm_response_parser/*` | 258 / 222 / 43 / 433 / 169 / 111 | Buffered + SSE accumulation; AWS event-stream accumulator (`streaming_bedrock.go`) for Bedrock; capture-pointer gates completion emit |
-| `cost_meter/*` | 181 / 84 / 439 | Token → USD via `proxy/internal/llm/pricing` |
+| `cost_meter/*` | 236 / 98 / 586 | Token → USD via `proxy/internal/llm/pricing`; both pricing tiers arrive in the middleware config |
 | `llm_limit_record/*` | 144 / 35 / 191 | Post-flight `RecordLLMUsage` (5s, debug-on-error) |
 
 ## Per-middleware
@@ -168,12 +168,46 @@ token schema.
 
 ### cost_meter
 
-Reads `llm.provider` + `llm.model` + token buckets, looks up per-1k rate via
-`pricing.Loader`, emits `cost.usd_total` or a closed-set `cost.skipped`
-reason (`missing_provider/model/tokens`, `unparseable_tokens`, `zero_tokens`,
-`unknown_model`). Loader's hot-reload goroutine is bound to proxy-lifetime
-context via `startReloader`. **Key invariant:** provider-shape switch lives
-in `pricing.Table.Cost` (sibling doc) — `cost_meter` stays provider-agnostic.
+Reads `llm.provider` + `llm.model` + token buckets, looks up the per-1k rates,
+and emits the full `cost.usd_*` breakdown (four per-bucket values plus the
+`_total` and `_cache` aggregates) or a closed-set `cost.skipped` reason
+(`missing_provider/model/tokens`, `unparseable_tokens`, `zero_tokens`,
+`unknown_model`).
+
+**Management owns pricing.** The proxy carries no embedded price list: the whole
+table arrives in this middleware's `ConfigJSON` as
+`{pricing: {defaults, providers}}`, synthesized by management from the catalog
+plus the operator's stored per-provider prices
+([factory.go:13–34](../../../proxy/internal/middleware/builtin/cost_meter/factory.go)).
+Both tiers are validated by `pricing.NewTable` / `pricing.NewEntries` at
+construction, so a non-finite or negative rate fails the chain build. A price
+change is an ordinary mapping push — the chain rebuild yields a fresh instance
+over a fresh immutable table, so there is no data dir, no pricing file, no
+reload goroutine, and nothing to invalidate.
+
+**Two-tier lookup**
+([middleware.go:165–183](../../../proxy/internal/middleware/builtin/cost_meter/middleware.go)):
+
+1. **Per-provider-record** — the operator's stored price for the route that
+   actually served the request, keyed by the `llm.resolved_provider_id` that
+   `llm_router` stamped on the allow path, then by normalized model id. Entries
+   arrive fully materialized (management folds default cache rates in at synth
+   time), so there is no merging here. Absent metadata — no router in the chain
+   — skips this tier.
+2. **Surface defaults** — the catalog-derived table keyed by `llm.provider`
+   (`openai`/`anthropic`/`bedrock`). This is also what prices gateway-style
+   providers, which enumerate no models and therefore get no per-record entry.
+
+**Backward compatibility:** a config with no `pricing` block means management
+predates config-delivered pricing. The factory logs one warning at build time
+and the instance records `cost.skipped=unknown_model` ($0) for every request
+rather than falling back to a stale built-in price list
+([factory.go:55–60](../../../proxy/internal/middleware/builtin/cost_meter/factory.go)).
+
+**Key invariant:** the provider-shape switch lives in `pricing.EntryCosts`
+(sibling doc) and is selected by the **surface**, not by which tier the entry
+came from — `cost_meter` stays provider-agnostic, and a per-record override on
+an Anthropic route still bills its cache buckets additively.
 
 ### llm_limit_record
 
@@ -246,12 +280,14 @@ no mocks. Tests: `TestChain_AllowPath_StampsAttributionAndRecordsCounter`
 | `llm_identity_inject` | `{providers: [{provider_id, header_pair?|json_metadata?, extra_headers?}]}` |
 | `llm_guardrail` | `{provider_allowlists: {providerID: []string}, prompt_capture: {enabled, redact_pii}}` — allowlist keyed by resolved provider id; a provider absent from the map is unrestricted (fail-closed backstop; authoritative per-policy/group check is management's `CheckLLMPolicyLimits`) |
 | `llm_response_parser` | `{redact_pii?, capture_completion?: *bool}` |
-| `cost_meter` | `{pricing_path?}` (basename inside data-dir; defaults `pricing.yaml`) |
+| `cost_meter` | `{pricing: {defaults: {surface: {model: rates}}, providers: {providerRecordID: {model: rates}}}}` — rates are `{input_per_1k, output_per_1k, cached_input_per_1k?, cache_read_per_1k?, cache_creation_per_1k?}`. A missing `pricing` key means "management predates config-delivered pricing": every request records `cost.skipped=unknown_model` |
 | `llm_limit_record` | `{}` — same pattern as `llm_limit_check` |
 
 All factories accept empty / null / `{}` / whitespace as zero-value config;
 only structurally invalid JSON is rejected so misconfig surfaces at chain
-build time.
+build time. `cost_meter` adds a semantic check on top of that: a `pricing`
+block carrying a negative or non-finite rate fails the build too, rather than
+mispricing live traffic.
 
 ## Invariants
 
@@ -320,10 +356,11 @@ non-object `metadata` field
 — header path still attributes, but body-level tag-budget enforcement
 doesn't run for that request.
 
-**Concurrency.** `cost_meter` shares a `pricing.Loader` via
-`atomic.Pointer[Table]`; readers always see a consistent table. Every
-middleware is a stateless value receiver. Integration test uses real bufconn
-gRPC — race detector is the meaningful bar.
+**Concurrency.** `cost_meter`'s two pricing tables are built once from the
+middleware config and never mutated, so the lookup path needs no lock or atomic
+swap — a price change replaces the whole instance. Every middleware is
+otherwise a stateless value receiver. Integration test uses real bufconn gRPC —
+race detector is the meaningful bar.
 
 **Perf.** Hot path is `lookupKV` linear scan over <10 KVs; `cost_meter.Cost`
 is O(1); SSE accumulation is single-pass. No map allocation per call.
@@ -349,13 +386,13 @@ counter accuracy.
 | `llm_guardrail/redact_test.go` | 15 | Email, SSN, phone (E.164 + NA), bearer, IPv4; fixture-driven |
 | `llm_response_parser/middleware_test.go` | 18 | Buffered OAI+Anthro, capture-pointer, redact, truncation |
 | `llm_response_parser/streaming_test.go` | 7 | OAI usage frame, Anthro message_delta, truncated body best-effort |
-| `cost_meter/middleware_test.go` | 17 | Each skip reason, provider-shape, pricing loader integration |
+| `cost_meter/middleware_test.go` | 22 | Each skip reason, provider-shape formulas, config-delivered defaults, per-record-beats-defaults + miss-falls-back, per-record uses surface formula, nil-pricing skips everything, invalid-rate rejection |
 | `llm_limit_record/middleware_test.go` | 7 | Skip-on-no-signal, skip-on-missing-attribution, RPC failure swallowed |
 
 ## Cross-references
 
 - Sibling: [32-proxy-llm-parsers.md](./32-proxy-llm-parsers.md) — SDK adapters
-  + SSE framer + pricing loader.
+  + SSE framer + pricing table and cost formula.
 - Path-routed providers (Vertex AI + Bedrock), `keyfile::` credential, GCP
   token minting, `/bedrock` prefix:
   [50-path-routed-providers.md](./50-path-routed-providers.md).

docs/agent-networks/modules/32-proxy-llm-parsers.md

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ pricing table's per-provider cost formula is the highest-leverage place a
 small bug would silently mis-bill operators.
 
 Sibling module: [31-proxy-middleware-builtin.md](./31-proxy-middleware-builtin.md)
-— the 8 middlewares that consume this package's parsers + pricing loader.
+— the 8 middlewares that consume this package's parsers + pricing table.
 
 ---
 
@@ -24,8 +24,9 @@ proxy-framework dependencies:
 - `openai.go` / `anthropic.go` / `bedrock.go` — per-provider `Parser` impls.
 - `sse.go` — SSE scanner (`Scanner`, `Event`, `NewScanner`).
 - `errors.go` — sentinels callers branch on with `errors.Is`.
-- `pricing/` — embedded-default + hot-reload override table with
-  symlink-safe Unix loader (build-tagged stub elsewhere).
+- `pricing/` — immutable pricing table + the per-surface cost formula. The
+  rates themselves come from management inside `cost_meter`'s middleware
+  config; this package holds no price list and reads no files.
 - `fixtures/` — captured request/response/stream bodies the tests replay.
 
 The package carries zero proxy-framework dependencies so the same parsers can
@@ -47,12 +48,9 @@ be reused later by a WASM adapter
 | `sse_test.go` | 175 | 12 tests; fixture replay + multiline + size limits |
 | `parser_test.go` | 53 | `Parsers()`, `DetectParser`, provider enum values |
 | `errors.go` | 31 | 6 sentinels: `Err{Unknown,Unsupported}Provider/Model`, `Err{NotLLM,Malformed}Response`, `ErrStreamingUnsupported`, `ErrMalformedRequest` |
-| `pricing/pricing.go` | 421 | `Loader`, `Table`, `Entry`; embedded defaults + atomic swap + mtime reload |
-| `pricing/pricing_unix.go` | 69 | `O_NOFOLLOW` + fstat-from-FD + 1 MiB cap |
-| `pricing/pricing_other.go` | 21 | Stub returning "not supported on this platform" |
-| `pricing/pricing_test.go` | 432 | 21 tests — symlink rejection, reload race, path traversal, oversize |
-| `pricing/defaults_pricing.yaml` | 85 | go:embed source of truth |
-| `fixtures/*` | 21–59 | OAI chat/responses/stream + Anthro messages/stream + pricing starter |
+| `pricing/pricing.go` | 234 | `Table`, `Entry`, `EntryJSON`, `Costs`; `NewTable`/`NewEntries` validation + `EntryCosts` formula. No I/O, no reload, no embedded rates |
+| `pricing/pricing_test.go` | 177 | 10 tests — provider-shape formulas, cached clamp, rate fallback, nil-safety, rate validation |
+| `fixtures/*` | 21–59 | OAI chat/responses/stream + Anthro messages/stream |
 
 ## Request body → parser dispatch
 
@@ -188,9 +186,11 @@ response leg, covering both Bedrock body shapes:
   `totalTokens`). `firstNonZero` folds the two naming conventions into one
   `Usage`; when Converse omits `totalTokens` the parser sums the buckets.
 
-`ProviderName()` returns `"bedrock"` — its own `defaults_pricing.yaml` block,
-keyed by the **normalised** model id (region prefix + version suffix stripped by
-the request parser). `ParseResponse` returns `ErrStreamingUnsupported` for an
+`ProviderName()` returns `"bedrock"` — its own pricing surface in the table
+management ships, keyed by the **normalised** model id (region prefix + version
+suffix stripped by the request parser; management normalises its keys the same
+way at synth time so the two compare equal). `ParseResponse` returns
+`ErrStreamingUnsupported` for an
 AWS binary event-stream content-type (`application/vnd.amazon.eventstream`,
 `isAWSEventStream`) so the caller routes to the streaming accumulator instead.
 
@@ -205,11 +205,34 @@ response body. Streaming accumulators live in the middleware package
 ([llm_response_parser/streaming.go](../../../proxy/internal/middleware/builtin/llm_response_parser/streaming.go))
 but use `llm.NewScanner` so the framing contract stays here.
 
-### Pricing catalog
+### Pricing table
 
-`Table.Cost`
-([pricing.go:129–174](../../../proxy/internal/llm/pricing/pricing.go))
-is the cost formula — most security-relevant math in this module:
+**Management is the sole pricing authority.** The proxy carries no embedded
+price list and reads no pricing file: the whole table arrives inside
+`cost_meter`'s `ConfigJSON` on the ordinary mapping push, and a price change
+is just another push — the chain rebuild constructs a fresh `Table`, so there
+is nothing to reload
+([pricing.go:1–7](../../../proxy/internal/llm/pricing/pricing.go)). The
+management side of the contract (catalog defaults, the operator's stored
+per-provider prices, and `AgentNetwork.PricingDefaultsFile`) is covered in the
+management-side module guide; `cost_meter`'s wire shape is in
+[31-proxy-middleware-builtin.md](./31-proxy-middleware-builtin.md).
+
+`EntryJSON`
+([pricing.go:36–45](../../../proxy/internal/llm/pricing/pricing.go)) is the
+management→proxy contract — five USD-per-1k rates under `input_per_1k`,
+`output_per_1k`, `cached_input_per_1k`, `cache_read_per_1k`,
+`cache_creation_per_1k`. Management's `pricing.Entry` marshals the identical
+names, and `EntryJSON`/`Entry` are field-identical so `NewEntries` converts by
+direct struct conversion rather than field-by-field copying (a new rate can't
+be silently dropped in transit).
+
+`EntryCosts`
+([pricing.go:183–234](../../../proxy/internal/llm/pricing/pricing.go))
+is the cost formula — most security-relevant math in this module. The
+**surface** (the `llm.provider` value the request parser stamped) selects the
+formula, never the tier the entry came from: a per-provider-record override on
+an Anthropic route still bills its cache buckets additively.
 
 | Provider | Formula |
 |---|---|
@@ -218,7 +241,7 @@ is the cost formula — most security-relevant math in this module:
 | default | `inTokens × InputPer1K + outTokens × OutputPer1K` |
 
 `bedrock` shares the Anthropic additive-cache formula
-([pricing.go:172-174](../../../proxy/internal/llm/pricing/pricing.go)):
+([pricing.go:214–229](../../../proxy/internal/llm/pricing/pricing.go)):
 Anthropic-on-Bedrock reports the same additive cache buckets, while non-Anthropic
 Bedrock models (Nova, Llama) simply report zero in those buckets so cost reduces
 to `input + output`.
@@ -226,15 +249,12 @@ to `input + output`.
 Each per-bucket rate falls back to `InputPer1K` when zero — operators opt in
 to discounts by setting the field.
 
-`Loader`
-([pricing.go:212–268](../../../proxy/internal/llm/pricing/pricing.go))
-overlays an optional `pricing.yaml` from data-dir on top of the go:embed
-defaults. Atomic pointer swap means readers never observe a partial update.
-The mtime-poll reloader (30s default cadence) keeps the previous table on
-parse failure so cost annotation never goes blank during a botched edit.
-
-`defaults_pricing.yaml` is the source of truth for built-in pricing.
-Operator overrides only carry the entries they want to change.
+`Costs`
+([pricing.go:143–163](../../../proxy/internal/llm/pricing/pricing.go)) is the
+per-request split. The four per-bucket fields are the base; `TotalUSD` and
+`CacheUSD` are **derived** in `newCosts` so the aggregates can never drift from
+the breakdown. `InputUSD` is always the non-cached input bucket on both
+provider shapes, so input and cached-input never double-count.
 
 ## Public contracts
 
@@ -264,29 +284,38 @@ Order matters: `DetectFromURL` ties resolve by registration order.
 `ProviderBedrock = 3`. Numeric values are persisted in nothing today but treat
 them as wire-stable — new providers must take fresh numbers.
 
-**`Pricing` lookup**
-([pricing.go:129](../../../proxy/internal/llm/pricing/pricing.go)):
+**`Pricing` construction + lookup**
+([pricing.go:60–130](../../../proxy/internal/llm/pricing/pricing.go)):
 
 ```go
+func NewEntries(raw map[string]map[string]EntryJSON) (map[string]map[string]Entry, error)
+func NewTable(raw map[string]map[string]EntryJSON) (*Table, error)
+
+func (t *Table) Lookup(provider, model string) (Entry, bool)
 func (t *Table) Cost(provider, model string, inTokens, outTokens, cachedInput, cacheCreation int64) (float64, bool)
+func (t *Table) Costs(provider, model string, inTokens, outTokens, cachedInput, cacheCreation int64) (Costs, bool)
+func EntryCosts(entry Entry, surface string, inTokens, outTokens, cachedInput, cacheCreation int64) Costs
 ```
 
-Nil-safe: `t.Cost` on a nil receiver returns `(0, false)`
-([pricing.go:130–132](../../../proxy/internal/llm/pricing/pricing.go)).
-`ok=false` means provider or model is absent from the loaded table; the caller
-emits `cost.skipped=unknown_model`.
+`NewTable` is the surface-keyed defaults table; `NewEntries` returns the raw
+two-level map `cost_meter` uses for the per-provider-record tier (it looks up an
+`Entry` directly and calls `EntryCosts`, so it needs no `Table` wrapper). Both
+reject any non-finite or negative rate, so a corrupt config fails the chain
+build rather than mispricing silently. Nil input yields an empty,
+never-matching table.
+
+Nil-safe: `t.Cost`/`t.Lookup` on a nil receiver returns `ok=false`
+([pricing.go:96–99](../../../proxy/internal/llm/pricing/pricing.go)).
+`ok=false` means the surface or model is absent from the table management sent;
+the caller emits `cost.skipped=unknown_model`.
 
 ## Invariants
 
-1. **Cross-platform pricing build.** `pricing_unix.go` carries the only
-   functional `loadPricing` (uses `syscall.O_NOFOLLOW` and `f.Stat()` on an
-   open descriptor — both Unix-only). `pricing_other.go` is a build-tag
-   fallback that returns `"not supported on this platform"`
-   ([pricing_other.go:14–16](../../../proxy/internal/llm/pricing/pricing_other.go)).
-   The proxy is Linux-only in production today; a Windows port needs an
-   equivalent path-as-handle implementation. Reviewers building on Windows
-   should expect this surface to return an error at startup if an override
-   file is configured.
+1. **The pricing package is pure and platform-independent.** No file I/O, no
+   `//go:embed`, no goroutines, no build tags — the rates arrive as config, so
+   there is nothing platform-specific left to port. Anything reintroducing a
+   read-from-disk path here re-splits pricing authority between management and
+   the proxy, which is exactly what this design removed.
 
 2. **SSE scanner handles partial chunks.** A buffered prefix that doesn't end
    in `\n\n` still yields its accumulated event before `io.EOF`
@@ -298,38 +327,45 @@ emits `cost.skipped=unknown_model`.
    usage rather than aborting
    ([streaming.go:68–73, 144–150](../../../proxy/internal/middleware/builtin/llm_response_parser/streaming.go)).
 
-3. **`defaults_pricing.yaml` is the source of truth.** Compiled into the
-   binary via `//go:embed`
-   ([pricing.go:29–30](../../../proxy/internal/llm/pricing/pricing.go)).
-   `DefaultTable()` parses once and panics on parse failure
-   ([pricing.go:42–49](../../../proxy/internal/llm/pricing/pricing.go))
-   — by design: a broken embedded YAML must not ship to production.
+3. **Management is the only source of rates.** `Table` has no constructor that
+   invents prices: the only way in is `NewTable`/`NewEntries` over the wire map
+   management sent. A missing or empty `pricing` block therefore means *no
+   prices at all* (`cost_meter` records `cost.skipped=unknown_model`, $0) —
+   never a stale built-in fallback that would silently bill list price.
 
-4. **Loader path validation.** `resolveMiddlewareDataPath`
-   ([pricing.go:370–394](../../../proxy/internal/llm/pricing/pricing.go))
-   rejects absolute paths, traversal segments, and basenames that fail
-   `basenameRegex = ^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$`. The resolved path must remain
-   inside `baseDir` even after `filepath.Clean`. Tests:
-   `TestNewLoader_PathValidation`, `TestNewLoader_PathValidation_Extended`,
-   `TestNewLoader_SymlinkOutsideBaseDirRejected`, `TestNewLoader_SymlinkRejected`.
+4. **Tables are immutable once built.** `Table.entries` is written only in
+   `NewEntries` and never mutated afterwards, and `cost_meter`'s `perRecord`
+   map is likewise build-time-only
+   ([pricing.go:47–52](../../../proxy/internal/llm/pricing/pricing.go)). This
+   is what makes the no-reload design safe: a price change arrives as a mapping
+   push that builds a new middleware instance over a new table, so concurrent
+   readers can't observe a half-updated price list and no atomic swap or lock
+   is needed on the hot path.
 
-5. **Unix loader symlink safety.** `O_NOFOLLOW` on open, `f.Stat()` on the
-   open descriptor (never re-stat by path), `info.Mode().IsRegular()` check,
-   `io.LimitReader(f, maxPricingBytes+1)` with a final size assertion
-   ([pricing_unix.go:25–57](../../../proxy/internal/llm/pricing/pricing_unix.go)).
-   A mid-read symlink swap is detected because the fstat is on the original
-   fd. Test: `TestNewLoader_RejectsOversizedFile_FixesM4`.
+5. **Rate validation happens at chain-build time, not per request.**
+   `NewEntries` rejects negative, NaN, and ±Inf rates field by field
+   ([pricing.go:60–83](../../../proxy/internal/llm/pricing/pricing.go)), naming
+   the offending surface/model/field in the error. Management enforces the same
+   constraints at its API boundary and in its YAML parser, so this is
+   defense-in-depth — but it means a corrupt push fails loudly at build instead
+   of producing negative costs on live traffic. Test:
+   `TestNewTable_ValidatesRates`.
 
-6. **`yaml.NewDecoder(...).KnownFields(true)`**
-   ([pricing.go:397–398](../../../proxy/internal/llm/pricing/pricing.go))
-   rejects YAML files that carry fields not in the schema. A typo in an
-   operator override file fails loud instead of silently zeroing rates.
+6. **New rates must be added to `Entry`, `EntryJSON`, *and* management's
+   `pricing.Entry` together.** `NewEntries` converts by direct struct
+   conversion `Entry(e)`
+   ([pricing.go:76–78](../../../proxy/internal/llm/pricing/pricing.go)), which
+   only compiles while the two structs stay field-identical — so the proxy half
+   is compiler-enforced. The management half is not: a rate added there but not
+   here unmarshals into nothing and prices that bucket at `InputPer1K`.
 
 ## Things to scrutinise
 
-**Correctness.** Verify OpenAI cached-prompt clamp at
-[pricing.go:147–149](../../../proxy/internal/llm/pricing/pricing.go)
-short-circuits before subtraction. `Anthropic.TotalTokens` sums all four
+**Correctness.** Verify the OpenAI cached-prompt clamp at
+[pricing.go:203–206](../../../proxy/internal/llm/pricing/pricing.go)
+short-circuits before subtraction. Negative token counts are clamped to zero up
+front ([pricing.go:186–197](../../../proxy/internal/llm/pricing/pricing.go)) so
+no formula can yield a negative cost. `Anthropic.TotalTokens` sums all four
 buckets (in + out + cache_read + cache_creation) — downstream dashboards
 need to know this differs from `input + output`.
 `OpenAIParser.ExtractPrompt` falls through `messages → input → prompt`; a
@@ -338,22 +374,27 @@ noting).
 
 **Security.** `Scanner.maxLine = 1 MiB`; a 2 MiB single-line `data:` event
 errors from `Scanner.Next` and both accumulators stop with partial usage.
-Pricing file 1 MiB cap is orders of magnitude larger than realistic. Confirm
-new schema additions are mirrored in both `pricingFile` and `Entry`;
-`KnownFields(true)` will reject silently-typo'd operator overrides
-otherwise.
+Pricing is no longer file-backed, so the loader's path-traversal / symlink /
+oversize surface is gone entirely — the config channel (an authenticated
+mapping push from management) is now the only way rates enter the proxy, and
+`NewEntries` is the validation boundary on it. A new rate added to management's
+`pricing.Entry` but not to `EntryJSON` here is the remaining silent-mispricing
+path (see invariant 6).
 
-**Concurrency.** `Loader.table` is `atomic.Pointer[Table]`; readers never
-block or see a torn table. `Loader.Reload` is one goroutine, cancelled via
-context (`TestLoader_ReloadBackgroundLoopCancellation`). `DefaultTable()`
-uses `sync.Once`. Per-call `Scanner` instances mean no shared state across
-concurrent response-parser calls.
+**Concurrency.** Nothing in this package is shared mutable state: tables are
+built once and never written again, so `cost_meter`'s hot path is lock-free by
+construction rather than by atomic swap. Per-call `Scanner` instances mean no
+shared state across concurrent response-parser calls.
 
-**Perf.** `Table.Cost` is two map lookups + multiplications, O(1).
-`Scanner.Next` is one `ReadString('\n')` per line. Pricing reload poll 30s.
+**Perf.** `Table.Cost` is two map lookups + multiplications, O(1); the
+per-provider-record tier adds at most one more lookup. `Scanner.Next` is one
+`ReadString('\n')` per line. No background goroutines and no per-request
+allocation of pricing state.
 
-**Observability.** Reload failures count via `metric.Int64Counter` keyed
-`plugin`; warning log rate-limited at 5 min so a broken file doesn't flood.
+**Observability.** A config carrying no `pricing` block logs one warning at
+chain-build time (`cost_meter` factory) and then records
+`cost.skipped=unknown_model` per request, so an old-management deployment is
+visible in both logs and the access log rather than quietly reporting $0.
 Parser errors return sentinels — middleware uses `errors.Is` to map to the
 right `cost.skipped` reason.
 
@@ -365,7 +406,7 @@ right `cost.skipped` reason.
 | `openai_test.go` | 11 | Chat Completions + Responses API + legacy `prompt`; cached-tokens subset for both naming conventions; fixture replays |
 | `anthropic_test.go` | 7 | Messages + legacy `/v1/complete`; streaming REJECTED on `ParseResponse` (must use scanner); fixture replays |
 | `sse_test.go` | 12 | Fixture replay both providers; multiline `data:`; CRLF; comment skip; trailing-event-without-blank-line; oversize rejection |
-| `pricing/pricing_test.go` | 21 | Provider-shape switch; cached-rate fallback; cached-clamp; symlink rejection (target outside basedir + symlink to file); path validation matrix; oversize rejection; reload-keeps-previous-on-parse-error; mtime change detection; goroutine cancellation |
+| `pricing/pricing_test.go` | 10 | Provider-shape switch (surface selects the formula); cached-rate + cache-read/creation fallback to `InputPer1K`; cached-clamp; negative-token clamp; nil-receiver safety; rate validation (negative / NaN / Inf rejected); nil + empty table |
 
 **Fixtures** ([proxy/internal/llm/fixtures/](../../../proxy/internal/llm/fixtures/)):
 `openai_chat_completion.json` (chat.completions with usage),
@@ -373,14 +414,15 @@ right `cost.skipped` reason.
 `openai_stream.txt` (3 deltas + usage + `[DONE]`),
 `anthropic_messages.json` (Messages API non-streaming),
 `anthropic_stream.txt` (full 7-event sequence: message_start →
-content_block_{start,delta×2,stop} → message_delta (usage) → message_stop),
-`pricing.yaml` (realistic-pricing starter for operator overrides).
+content_block_{start,delta×2,stop} → message_delta (usage) → message_stop).
+No pricing fixture: the table is config-delivered, so pricing tests construct
+it in-process from a wire-shape map.
 
 ## Cross-references
 
 - Sibling: [31-proxy-middleware-builtin.md](./31-proxy-middleware-builtin.md)
   — the chain that calls `llm.Parsers()`, `llm.ParserByName`,
-  `llm.NewScanner`, `pricing.NewLoader`.
+  `llm.NewScanner`, `pricing.NewTable` / `pricing.NewEntries`.
 - Path-routed providers (Vertex AI + Bedrock), credential syntax, and the
   Bedrock AWS event-stream accumulator:
   [50-path-routed-providers.md](./50-path-routed-providers.md).

docs/agent-networks/modules/33-proxy-runtime.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # proxy/runtime — translate + serve + log
 
 > **Risk level:** High — every config push from management is translated here, and the chain runs on every HTTP request to a synth target.
-> **Backward-compat impact:** Additive at the wire (`PathTargetOptions.middlewares`, `agent_network`, `disable_access_log`, capture caps) and on the proxy `Server` struct (`MiddlewareDataDir`, `MiddlewareCaptureBudgetBytes`). Non-agent-network targets stay on the no-middleware fast path.
+> **Backward-compat impact:** Additive at the wire (`PathTargetOptions.middlewares`, `agent_network`, `disable_access_log`, capture caps) and on the proxy `Server` struct (`MiddlewareCaptureBudgetBytes`). Non-agent-network targets stay on the no-middleware fast path. Middleware config is entirely wire-delivered — no proxy-side data dir is involved, including for LLM pricing, which management ships inside `cost_meter`'s config.
 
 ## Module boundary
 
@@ -114,8 +114,7 @@ At **request time** the access-log middleware stamps `CapturedData`; the auth ch
 
 ## Public contracts touched
 
-- `proxy.Server.MiddlewareDataDir` (string) — base dir for file-backed middleware config (server.go:238-241).
-- `proxy.Server.MiddlewareCaptureBudgetBytes` (int64) — process-wide capture cap; defaults to 256 MiB (server.go:248-250).
+- `proxy.Server.MiddlewareCaptureBudgetBytes` (int64) — process-wide capture cap; defaults to 256 MiB (server.go:249-253). There is no `MiddlewareDataDir`: no built-in middleware reads config from disk, so `builtin.FactoryContext` carries only the proxy-lifetime context, meter, logger, and management client.
 - `proxy/internal/proxy.WithMiddlewareManager(*middleware.Manager) Option` — new option on `NewReverseProxy`; nil keeps the fast path (reverseproxy.go:48-56).
 - `proxy/internal/proxy.PathTarget` adds `Middlewares`, `CaptureConfig`, `AgentNetwork`, `DisableAccessLog` (servicemapping.go:27-51), all zero-default.
 - `proxy/internal/proxy.CapturedData` adds `agentNetwork`, `suppressAccessLog`, `userGroupNames` behind `sync.RWMutex`; slices deep-copied (context.go:47-66, 183-258).

docs/agent-networks/modules/50-path-routed-providers.md

@@ -87,9 +87,9 @@ strips the `@version` suffix from the model, and maps the publisher to a parser
 surface via `vertexPublisherVendor`:
 
 - `anthropic` → `llm.provider="anthropic"` → metered through the Anthropic
-  parser, priced under the **`anthropic`** block in `defaults_pricing.yaml`
-  (the parser emits the standard Anthropic provider label, so Vertex Claude
-  reuses first-party Anthropic prices).
+  parser, priced under the **`anthropic`** surface of the pricing table
+  management ships (the parser emits the standard Anthropic provider label, so
+  Vertex Claude reuses first-party Anthropic prices).
 - `openai` → `llm.provider="openai"` (reserved; not in the catalog lineup
   today).
 - anything else (notably `google` / Gemini) → empty vendor → **no parser**.
@@ -104,8 +104,9 @@ is omitted from the catalog.
 
 > Caveat: cross-region inference profiles in `eu` / `apac` carry a ~10% price
 > premium that the base per-token rates do **not** model — cost annotations for
-> those regions read low. Operators who need exact regional billing override
-> the affected entries in `pricing.yaml`.
+> those regions read low. Operators who need exact regional billing set the
+> affected models' prices on the provider record, or replace the default entries
+> via management's `AgentNetwork.PricingDefaultsFile`.
 
 ## AWS Bedrock (`bedrock_api`)
 
@@ -211,15 +212,19 @@ so a model-listing call can't be rewritten onto an upstream that would 404 it.
 ## Catalog ↔ pricing cross-check
 
 Catalog prices and context windows are cross-checked against LiteLLM's
-`model_prices_and_context_window.json`. The proxy's embedded
-`defaults_pricing.yaml` covers **every metered first-party model** the catalog
-enumerates — guarded by
-`TestDefaultTable_FirstPartyModelCoverage`
-([pricing/defaults_coverage_test.go](../../../proxy/internal/llm/pricing/defaults_coverage_test.go)),
-which fails if a catalog model has no embedded price. Bedrock entries are keyed
-by the **normalised** id the request parser emits (region prefix + version
-suffix stripped). Vertex Claude carries no Bedrock-style prefix, so it prices
-straight off the `anthropic` block.
+`model_prices_and_context_window.json`. The **catalog is the source of default
+prices**: management's `pricing.DefaultTable` folds every catalog provider's
+models into the surfaces that provider declares (`PricingSurfaces`), so coverage
+is structural rather than maintained in a parallel file
+([pricing/defaults.go](../../../management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/pricing/defaults.go)).
+`TestDefaultTable_CoversEveryCatalogModel` fails if a catalog model ends up
+unpriced, and `TestDefaultTable_NoConflictingContributions` fails if two
+providers contribute the same (surface, model) at different rates. Bedrock
+entries are keyed by the **normalised** id the request parser emits (region
+prefix + version suffix stripped) — management applies the same normalisation to
+per-provider prices at synth time, so the two keys compare equal. Vertex Claude
+carries no Bedrock-style prefix, so it prices straight off the `anthropic`
+surface.
 
 ## Things to scrutinise
 
@@ -232,16 +237,17 @@ operator-misconfigured Vertex provider and unmetered Gemini traffic; verify
 publishers).
 
 **Correctness.** `normalizeBedrockModel` is the join between the wire id and the
-pricing key — a model that normalises to something not in `defaults_pricing.yaml`
-meters at `cost.skipped=unknown_model` rather than failing the request. The
+pricing key — a model that normalises to something absent from the shipped
+pricing table meters at `cost.skipped=unknown_model` rather than failing the
+request. The
 `/bedrock` prefix strip must run on both the parser side (so the model is
 extracted) and the router side (so the upstream path is native); a regression in
 either silently breaks the other.
 
 **Metering caveats.** eu/apac cross-region Bedrock + Vertex profiles carry a
-~10% premium not modelled by base pricing — flagged in both the catalog comment
-and `defaults_pricing.yaml`. Operators needing exact regional billing override
-the relevant entries.
+~10% premium not modelled by base pricing — flagged in the catalog comment.
+Operators needing exact regional billing set per-provider prices on the model
+rows (or replace the default entries via `AgentNetwork.PricingDefaultsFile`).
 
 ## Cross-references
 

e2e/harness/Dockerfile.client

@@ -20,5 +20,9 @@ ENV NETBIRD_BIN="/usr/local/bin/netbird" \
     NB_ENABLE_CAPTURE="false" \
     NB_ENTRYPOINT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT="30"
 ENTRYPOINT [ "/usr/local/bin/netbird-entrypoint.sh" ]
-COPY client/netbird-entrypoint.sh /usr/local/bin/netbird-entrypoint.sh
+# --chmod because the build context is not always a git checkout. A suite in
+# another module builds from this module's extracted copy in the module cache,
+# where every file is 0444 — the cache drops the executable bit git records — and
+# a bare COPY then produces an entrypoint the runtime cannot exec.
+COPY --chmod=0755 client/netbird-entrypoint.sh /usr/local/bin/netbird-entrypoint.sh
 COPY --from=builder /out/netbird /usr/local/bin/netbird

e2e/harness/client.go

@@ -32,12 +32,36 @@ type Client struct {
 	container testcontainers.Container
 }
 
+// clientOptions is what the ClientOption values assemble.
+type clientOptions struct {
+	name string
+}
+
+// ClientOption adjusts how StartClient runs the agent.
+type ClientOption func(*clientOptions)
+
+// WithClientName names the agent, which sets both its network alias and its
+// container hostname. The hostname matters beyond addressing: the agent reports
+// it to management at registration, so it is the name the peer appears under in
+// the API.
+//
+// Required to run more than one agent against the same server — the default name
+// is shared, and two containers cannot hold the same alias on one network.
+func WithClientName(name string) ClientOption {
+	return func(o *clientOptions) { o.name = name }
+}
+
 // StartClient builds the client image and runs it on the combined server's
 // network, joining via the given setup key. The image entrypoint brings the
 // daemon up automatically; callers wait for connectivity with WaitConnected /
 // WaitProxyPeer.
-func StartClient(ctx context.Context, c *Combined, setupKey string) (*Client, error) {
-	root, err := repoRoot()
+func StartClient(ctx context.Context, c *Combined, setupKey string, opts ...ClientOption) (*Client, error) {
+	o := clientOptions{name: clientAlias}
+	for _, opt := range opts {
+		opt(&o)
+	}
+
+	root, err := repoRoot(ctx)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
@@ -47,9 +71,13 @@ func StartClient(ctx context.Context, c *Combined, setupKey string) (*Client, er
 	}
 
 	req := testcontainers.ContainerRequest{
-		Image:          clientImage,
+		Image: clientImage,
+		// The agent reports the container's hostname to management, so this is
+		// the name the peer is addressable by in the API as well as on the
+		// network. The entrypoint takes no hostname flag of its own.
+		Hostname:       o.name,
 		Networks:       []string{c.network.Name},
-		NetworkAliases: map[string][]string{c.network.Name: {clientAlias}},
+		NetworkAliases: map[string][]string{c.network.Name: {o.name}},
 		Env: map[string]string{
 			"NB_MANAGEMENT_URL": combinedExposedURL,
 			"NB_SETUP_KEY":      setupKey,

e2e/harness/combined.go

@@ -61,11 +61,68 @@ type Combined struct {
 	workDir string
 }
 
+// combinedOptions is what the CombinedOption values assemble.
+type combinedOptions struct {
+	geolocation bool
+	env         map[string]string
+}
+
+// CombinedOption adjusts how StartCombined boots the server. The defaults suit a
+// suite that only drives the API; the options exist for the ones that need more
+// of the product than that.
+type CombinedOption func(*combinedOptions)
+
+// WithGeolocation leaves the GeoLite database download enabled. It is off by
+// default because the download adds startup latency that most suites get nothing
+// for. A suite asserting on location-based posture checks needs it: management
+// evaluates those rules against the database, and without it the rule fails
+// instead of passing without having been checked.
+func WithGeolocation() CombinedOption {
+	return func(o *combinedOptions) { o.geolocation = true }
+}
+
+// WithServerEnv adds environment variables to the combined container, overriding
+// the defaults on a key collision. For settings this harness does not model
+// directly, so a suite needing one does not have to fork the harness to get it.
+func WithServerEnv(env map[string]string) CombinedOption {
+	return func(o *combinedOptions) {
+		if o.env == nil {
+			o.env = map[string]string{}
+		}
+		for k, v := range env {
+			o.env[k] = v
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// combinedEnv is the combined container's environment: setup-PAT enabled so the
+// caller can mint an admin token through /api/setup, geolocation off unless the
+// suite asked for it, and whatever the suite added on top.
+func combinedEnv(o combinedOptions) map[string]string {
+	env := map[string]string{
+		"NB_SETUP_PAT_ENABLED": "true",
+	}
+	if !o.geolocation {
+		// Skip the GeoLite DB download — it blocks startup and agent-network
+		// ingest doesn't use geolocation.
+		env["NB_DISABLE_GEOLOCATION"] = "true"
+	}
+	for k, v := range o.env {
+		env[k] = v
+	}
+	return env
+}
+
 // StartCombined builds the combined server from its multistage Dockerfile and
 // boots it with setup-PAT enabled on a fresh shared network, returning once the
 // API is serving. The caller still owns minting the admin PAT via Bootstrap.
-func StartCombined(ctx context.Context) (*Combined, error) {
-	root, err := repoRoot()
+func StartCombined(ctx context.Context, opts ...CombinedOption) (*Combined, error) {
+	var o combinedOptions
+	for _, opt := range opts {
+		opt(&o)
+	}
+
+	root, err := repoRoot(ctx)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
@@ -88,7 +145,7 @@ func StartCombined(ctx context.Context) (*Combined, error) {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("create work dir: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	cfg := fmt.Sprintf(combinedConfigYAML, combinedExposedURL, containerIssuer)
+	cfg := fmt.Sprintf(combinedConfigYAML, combinedExposedURL, !o.geolocation, containerIssuer)
 	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(workDir, "config.yaml"), []byte(cfg), 0o644); err != nil { //nolint:gosec // non-secret config, bind-mounted and read by the container
 		_ = net.Remove(ctx)
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("write combined config: %w", err)
@@ -112,13 +169,8 @@ func StartCombined(ctx context.Context) (*Combined, error) {
 		ExposedPorts:   []string{combinedHTTPPort},
 		Networks:       []string{net.Name},
 		NetworkAliases: map[string][]string{net.Name: {combinedAlias}},
-		Env: map[string]string{
-			"NB_SETUP_PAT_ENABLED": "true",
-			// Skip the GeoLite DB download — it blocks startup and agent-network
-			// ingest doesn't use geolocation.
-			"NB_DISABLE_GEOLOCATION": "true",
-		},
-		Cmd: []string{"--config", "/nb/config.yaml"},
+		Env:            combinedEnv(o),
+		Cmd:            []string{"--config", "/nb/config.yaml"},
 		HostConfigModifier: func(hc *container.HostConfig) {
 			hc.Binds = append(hc.Binds, workDir+":/nb")
 		},

e2e/harness/config.go

@@ -15,6 +15,11 @@ package harness
 // server is required to load it — a broken path or malformed file fails startup
 // rather than silently falling back to the compiled-in rates, and TestMain then
 // fails with the container logs.
+//
+// disableGeoliteUpdate is a parameter rather than a fixed true because a suite
+// that exercises geolocation needs the database: management can only evaluate a
+// location rule with GeoLite loaded, and a rule it cannot evaluate fails rather
+// than passing vacuously. See WithGeolocation.
 const combinedConfigYAML = `server:
   listenAddress: ":8080"
   exposedAddress: "%s"
@@ -25,7 +30,7 @@ const combinedConfigYAML = `server:
   authSecret: "e2e-relay-secret"
   dataDir: "/nb/data"
   disableAnonymousMetrics: true
-  disableGeoliteUpdate: true
+  disableGeoliteUpdate: %t
   auth:
     issuer: "%s"
   store:

e2e/harness/options_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+//go:build e2e
+
+package harness
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"os/exec"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// The options exist so a suite can ask for a deployment this harness would not
+// otherwise give it. What they configure is a container environment and a config
+// file, both assembled before anything is started, so they are checkable without
+// Docker — which is the point: a wiring mistake here would otherwise only show up
+// as a puzzling failure minutes into a container run.
+
+func TestCombinedEnvGeolocation(t *testing.T) {
+	var off combinedOptions
+	assert.Equal(t, "true", combinedEnv(off)["NB_DISABLE_GEOLOCATION"],
+		"geolocation should be off by default")
+
+	var on combinedOptions
+	WithGeolocation()(&on)
+	assert.NotContains(t, combinedEnv(on), "NB_DISABLE_GEOLOCATION",
+		"WithGeolocation must leave NB_DISABLE_GEOLOCATION unset, so the server downloads the database")
+	assert.Equal(t, "true", combinedEnv(on)["NB_SETUP_PAT_ENABLED"],
+		"the setup PAT must stay enabled whatever else is configured; Bootstrap depends on it")
+}
+
+// The config file carries the same decision as the environment variable, and the
+// server needs both to agree: disableGeoliteUpdate suppresses the download even
+// when geolocation itself is enabled.
+func TestCombinedConfigGeolocation(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name string
+		opts []CombinedOption
+		want string
+	}{
+		{name: "default", want: "disableGeoliteUpdate: true"},
+		{name: "with geolocation", opts: []CombinedOption{WithGeolocation()}, want: "disableGeoliteUpdate: false"},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			var o combinedOptions
+			for _, opt := range tc.opts {
+				opt(&o)
+			}
+			cfg := fmt.Sprintf(combinedConfigYAML, combinedExposedURL, !o.geolocation, containerIssuer)
+			assert.Contains(t, cfg, tc.want, "geolocation not rendered as expected")
+			// The issuer is the last verb; a mis-ordered argument list would put
+			// the boolean here instead and the server would fail to start.
+			assert.Contains(t, cfg, `issuer: "`+containerIssuer+`"`, "issuer not rendered")
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestWithServerEnvOverrides(t *testing.T) {
+	var o combinedOptions
+	WithServerEnv(map[string]string{"NB_LOG_LEVEL": "debug"})(&o)
+	WithServerEnv(map[string]string{"NB_SETUP_PAT_ENABLED": "false"})(&o)
+
+	env := combinedEnv(o)
+	assert.Equal(t, "debug", env["NB_LOG_LEVEL"], "added variable missing")
+	assert.Equal(t, "false", env["NB_SETUP_PAT_ENABLED"], "a suite must be able to override a default")
+}
+
+// Two agents on one network cannot share an alias, so the name has to reach both
+// the alias and the hostname. The hostname is the one management records, so it is
+// also what the peer is addressable by through the API.
+func TestWithClientName(t *testing.T) {
+	o := clientOptions{name: clientAlias}
+	require.Equal(t, "client", o.name, "unexpected default client name")
+
+	WithClientName("peer2")(&o)
+	assert.Equal(t, "peer2", o.name, "WithClientName did not take")
+}
+
+// repoRoot has to recognise this module rather than merely finding a go.mod, or a
+// suite in another module gets its own root and a build context without the
+// component Dockerfiles in it.
+func TestIsModule(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+
+	other := filepath.Join(dir, "go.mod")
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(other, []byte("module example.com/other\n\ngo 1.25\n"), 0o600))
+	assert.False(t, isModule(other, modulePath), "another module's go.mod must not be taken for this repo")
+
+	ours := filepath.Join(dir, "ours.mod")
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(ours, []byte("// a comment\n\nmodule "+modulePath+"\n\ngo 1.25\n"), 0o600))
+	assert.True(t, isModule(ours, modulePath), "this repo's go.mod was not recognised")
+
+	assert.False(t, isModule(filepath.Join(dir, "absent.mod"), modulePath),
+		"a missing go.mod must not report a match")
+}
+
+// Running from inside the repo, repoRoot finds it by walking up — the module
+// lookup is only the fallback, and this asserts the walk still wins so an in-repo
+// run never depends on the module cache.
+func TestRepoRootFindsThisRepo(t *testing.T) {
+	root, err := repoRoot(context.Background())
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.True(t, isModule(filepath.Join(root, "go.mod"), modulePath),
+		"repoRoot returned %s, which is not this module", root)
+
+	for _, f := range []string{combinedDockerfile, clientDockerfile} {
+		_, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(root, f))
+		assert.NoError(t, err, "%s is not present under the reported root %s", f, root)
+	}
+}
+
+// A caller that vendors its dependencies puts the go command in automatic vendor
+// mode, where `go list -m -f {{.Dir}}` succeeds and reports an EMPTY directory:
+// vendor/ holds packages, not module source. Without -mod=readonly the lookup
+// would come back empty and the harness would report a missing module for a
+// dependency that is present.
+func TestModuleDirResolvesUnderVendorMode(t *testing.T) {
+	if _, err := exec.LookPath("go"); err != nil {
+		t.Skip("no go tool on PATH")
+	}
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	base := t.TempDir()
+	dep := filepath.Join(base, "dep")
+	main := filepath.Join(base, "main")
+	require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(dep, 0o750))
+	require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(main, 0o750))
+
+	// A local replacement rather than a real dependency, so this needs no network.
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dep, "go.mod"),
+		[]byte("module example.com/dep\n\ngo 1.25\n"), 0o600))
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dep, "dep.go"),
+		[]byte("package dep\n"), 0o600))
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(main, "go.mod"),
+		[]byte("module example.com/main\n\ngo 1.25\n\nrequire example.com/dep v0.0.0\n\nreplace example.com/dep v0.0.0 => ../dep\n"), 0o600))
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(main, "main.go"),
+		[]byte("package main\n\nimport _ \"example.com/dep\"\n\nfunc main() {}\n"), 0o600))
+
+	t.Chdir(main)
+	vendor := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "go", "mod", "vendor")
+	out, err := vendor.CombinedOutput()
+	require.NoError(t, err, "go mod vendor: %s", out)
+
+	dir, err := moduleDir(ctx, "example.com/dep")
+	require.NoError(t, err, "the module must still resolve with a vendor directory present")
+	assert.Equal(t, dep, dir, "resolved the wrong directory")
+}
+
+// A cancelled context has to stop the lookup rather than leaving the caller
+// waiting on a subprocess it has already given up on.
+func TestModuleDirHonoursContext(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	cancel()
+
+	_, err := moduleDir(ctx, modulePath)
+	assert.ErrorIs(t, err, context.Canceled, "a cancelled context must stop the lookup")
+}

e2e/harness/paths.go

@@ -3,27 +3,82 @@
 package harness
 
 import (
+	"context"
 	"fmt"
 	"os"
+	"os/exec"
 	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
 )
 
-// repoRoot walks up from the working directory to the module root (the
-// directory holding go.mod), so the Docker build context is correct no matter
-// which package the test runs from.
-func repoRoot() (string, error) {
+// modulePath is this module, used both to recognise the repo when walking up
+// from the working directory and to locate it when the suite lives elsewhere.
+const modulePath = "github.com/netbirdio/netbird"
+
+// repoRoot returns the directory the component Dockerfiles are built from.
+//
+// Walking up from the working directory finds it for any test inside this repo,
+// no matter which package it runs from. A suite in another module gets a
+// different answer that way — its own module root, where combined/Dockerfile
+// does not exist — so the ancestor has to be this module and not merely some
+// module. When it is not, the build context is the extracted module directory of
+// whichever version that suite depends on, which is the right one: the server it
+// tests against is then built from the same revision as the client library it
+// was compiled with.
+func repoRoot(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
 	dir, err := os.Getwd()
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", err
 	}
 	for {
-		if _, statErr := os.Stat(filepath.Join(dir, "go.mod")); statErr == nil {
+		if isModule(filepath.Join(dir, "go.mod"), modulePath) {
 			return dir, nil
 		}
 		parent := filepath.Dir(dir)
 		if parent == dir {
-			return "", fmt.Errorf("go.mod not found above %s", dir)
+			break
 		}
 		dir = parent
 	}
+	return moduleDir(ctx, modulePath)
+}
+
+// isModule reports whether the go.mod at path declares the given module.
+func isModule(path, want string) bool {
+	b, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	for _, line := range strings.Split(string(b), "\n") {
+		if rest, ok := strings.CutPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(line), "module "); ok {
+			return strings.TrimSpace(rest) == want
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// moduleDir asks the go tool where a module's source is, which for a dependent
+// module is its extracted copy in the module cache. The cache is read-only, and
+// a Docker build context is only ever read.
+//
+// -mod=readonly is required rather than cosmetic. A caller that vendors its
+// dependencies puts the go command in automatic vendor mode, where this lookup
+// succeeds with an EMPTY directory — vendor/ holds packages, not module source,
+// so there is nothing to report. Asking in readonly mode resolves against the
+// module graph instead, which answers for both a cached module and a local
+// replacement, and neither writes to go.mod.
+func moduleDir(ctx context.Context, module string) (string, error) {
+	cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "go", "list", "-mod=readonly", "-m", "-f", "{{.Dir}}", module)
+	out, err := cmd.Output()
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("locate %s: %w", module, err)
+	}
+	dir := strings.TrimSpace(string(out))
+	if dir == "" {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("locate %s: the go tool reported no directory; run `go mod download %s`", module, module)
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(dir); err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("locate %s: %w", module, err)
+	}
+	return dir, nil
 }

e2e/harness/proxy.go

@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ type Proxy struct {
 // or override any NB_PROXY_* var (e.g. NB_PROXY_TUNNEL_CACHE_TTL for tests that
 // need a short authorization-cache window).
 func StartProxy(ctx context.Context, c *Combined, proxyToken string, envOverrides ...map[string]string) (*Proxy, error) {
-	root, err := repoRoot()
+	root, err := repoRoot(ctx)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}

funding.json

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
     "name": "NetBird GmbH",
     "email": "hello@netbird.io",
     "phone": "",
-    "description": "NetBird GmbH is a Berlin-based software company specializing in the development of open-source network security solutions. Network security is utterly complex and expensive, accessible only to companies with multi-million dollar IT budgets. In contrast, there are millions of companies left behind. Our mission is to create an advanced network and cybersecurity platform that is both easy-to-use and affordable for teams of all sizes and budgets. By leveraging the open-source strategy and technological advancements, NetBird aims to set the industry standard for connecting and securing IT infrastructure.",
+    "description": "NetBird GmbH is a Berlin-based software company specializing in the development of open source network security solutions. Network security is utterly complex and expensive, accessible only to companies with multi-million dollar IT budgets. In contrast, there are millions of companies left behind. Our mission is to create an advanced network and cybersecurity platform that is both easy-to-use and affordable for teams of all sizes and budgets. By leveraging the open source strategy and technological advancements, NetBird aims to set the industry standard for connecting and securing IT infrastructure.",
     "webpageUrl": {
       "url": "https://github.com/netbirdio"
     }
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
     {
       "guid": "netbird",
       "name": "NetBird",
-      "description": "NetBird is a configuration-free peer-to-peer private network and a centralized access control system combined in a single open-source platform. It makes it easy to create secure WireGuard-based private networks for your organization or home.",
+      "description": "NetBird is a configuration-free peer-to-peer private network and a centralized access control system combined in a single open source platform. It makes it easy to create secure WireGuard-based private networks for your organization or home.",
       "webpageUrl": {
         "url": "https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird"
       },
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@
         "guid": "support-yearly",
         "status": "active",
         "name": "Support Open Source Development and Maintenance - Yearly",
-        "description": "This will help us partially cover the yearly cost of maintaining the open-source NetBird project.",
+        "description": "This will help us partially cover the yearly cost of maintaining the open source NetBird project.",
         "amount": 100000,
         "currency": "USD",
         "frequency": "yearly",
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@
         "guid": "support-one-time-year",
         "status": "active",
         "name": "Support Open Source Development and Maintenance - One Year",
-        "description": "This will help us partially cover the yearly cost of maintaining the open-source NetBird project.",
+        "description": "This will help us partially cover the yearly cost of maintaining the open source NetBird project.",
         "amount": 100000,
         "currency": "USD",
         "frequency": "one-time",
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@
         "guid": "support-one-time-monthly",
         "status": "active",
         "name": "Support Open Source Development and Maintenance - Monthly",
-        "description": "This will help us partially cover the monthly cost of maintaining the open-source NetBird project.",
+        "description": "This will help us partially cover the monthly cost of maintaining the open source NetBird project.",
         "amount": 10000,
         "currency": "USD",
         "frequency": "monthly",
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@
         "guid": "support-monthly",
         "status": "active",
         "name": "Support Open Source Development and Maintenance - One Month",
-        "description": "This will help us partially cover the monthly cost of maintaining the open-source NetBird project.",
+        "description": "This will help us partially cover the monthly cost of maintaining the open source NetBird project.",
         "amount": 10000,
         "currency": "USD",
         "frequency": "monthly",

go.mod

@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ require (
 	github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify v1.9.0
 	github.com/gliderlabs/ssh v0.3.8
 	github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4 v4.1.4
+	github.com/go-ole/go-ole v1.3.0
 	github.com/gobwas/ws v1.4.0
 	github.com/goccy/go-yaml v1.18.0
 	github.com/godbus/dbus/v5 v5.2.2
@@ -199,7 +200,6 @@ require (
 	github.com/go-ldap/ldap/v3 v3.4.13 // indirect
 	github.com/go-logr/logr v1.4.3 // indirect
 	github.com/go-logr/stdr v1.2.2 // indirect
-	github.com/go-ole/go-ole v1.3.0 // indirect
 	github.com/go-openapi/analysis v0.23.0 // indirect
 	github.com/go-openapi/errors v0.22.2 // indirect
 	github.com/go-openapi/jsonpointer v0.21.1 // indirect

infrastructure_files/getting-started.sh

@@ -111,6 +111,59 @@ check_nb_domain() {
   return 0
 }
 
+# Non-interactive configuration
+# ------------------------------
+# Every prompt below can be pre-answered with an environment variable, so the
+# script runs unattended (cloud-init, CI, Terraform, curl | bash). resolve()
+# is the single place that decides env var vs prompt vs default; the read_*
+# helpers stay pure prompts.
+#
+# Supported env vars:
+#   NETBIRD_DOMAIN                    domain/FQDN (required)
+#   NETBIRD_LETSENCRYPT_EMAIL         ACME email (required for built-in Traefik)
+#   NETBIRD_AGENT_NETWORK             true enables the agent-network preset
+#   NETBIRD_REVERSE_PROXY_TYPE        0-5 (default 0 = built-in Traefik)
+#   NETBIRD_ENABLE_PROXY              true/false (default false)
+#   NETBIRD_ENABLE_CROWDSEC           true/false (default false)
+#   NETBIRD_TRAEFIK_EXTERNAL_NETWORK  external-Traefik network (type 1)
+#   NETBIRD_TRAEFIK_ENTRYPOINT        external-Traefik entrypoint (type 1, default websecure)
+#   NETBIRD_TRAEFIK_CERTRESOLVER      external-Traefik cert resolver (type 1)
+#   NETBIRD_BIND_LOCALHOST_ONLY       true/false (default true, types 2-5)
+#   NETBIRD_EXTERNAL_PROXY_NETWORK    docker network to join (types 2-4)
+#   NETBIRD_NON_INTERACTIVE           true forces unattended mode even with a TTY
+
+# tty_available succeeds only when we may prompt: never when the operator has
+# set NETBIRD_NON_INTERACTIVE=true, otherwise only when /dev/tty can actually
+# be opened. A PTY can be attached in automation (CI runners, some
+# provisioners), so the env override is the authoritative signal and the
+# /dev/tty probe is the fallback. /dev/tty is a world-rw device node even with
+# no terminal, so a permission test ([ -r ]) is not enough - we must open it.
+tty_available() {
+  [[ "${NETBIRD_NON_INTERACTIVE:-}" == "true" ]] && return 1
+  { true < /dev/tty; } 2>/dev/null
+}
+
+# resolve ENV_VAR_NAME DEFAULT PROMPT_FN [prompt args...]
+#   env var set and non-empty -> its value
+#   interactive               -> PROMPT_FN "$@" (prompt behavior unchanged)
+#   otherwise                 -> DEFAULT, or abort when DEFAULT is "required"
+resolve() {
+  local env_name="$1" default="$2" prompt_fn="$3"
+  shift 3
+  local env_value="${!env_name:-}"
+  if [[ -n "$env_value" ]]; then
+    echo "$env_value"
+  elif tty_available; then
+    "$prompt_fn" "$@"
+  elif [[ "$default" == "required" ]]; then
+    echo "$env_name is required for a non-interactive install." > /dev/stderr
+    exit 1
+  else
+    echo "$default"
+  fi
+  return 0
+}
+
 read_nb_domain() {
   READ_NETBIRD_DOMAIN=""
   echo -n "Enter the domain you want to use for NetBird (e.g. netbird.my-domain.com): " > /dev/stderr
@@ -383,7 +436,14 @@ initialize_default_values() {
 }
 
 configure_domain() {
+  # Domain is validated (not a free-form value), so it keeps its own guard
+  # rather than going through resolve(): a valid NETBIRD_DOMAIN is used as-is,
+  # otherwise we prompt, or abort when there is no terminal to prompt on.
   if ! check_nb_domain "$NETBIRD_DOMAIN"; then
+    if ! tty_available; then
+      echo "NETBIRD_DOMAIN is required for a non-interactive install." > /dev/stderr
+      exit 1
+    fi
     NETBIRD_DOMAIN=$(read_nb_domain)
   fi
 
@@ -411,11 +471,7 @@ apply_agent_network_preset() {
   ENABLE_PROXY="true"
   ENABLE_CROWDSEC="false"
 
-  if [[ -n "${NETBIRD_LETSENCRYPT_EMAIL}" ]]; then
-    TRAEFIK_ACME_EMAIL="${NETBIRD_LETSENCRYPT_EMAIL}"
-  else
-    TRAEFIK_ACME_EMAIL=$(read_traefik_acme_email)
-  fi
+  TRAEFIK_ACME_EMAIL=$(resolve NETBIRD_LETSENCRYPT_EMAIL required read_traefik_acme_email)
 
   echo "" > /dev/stderr
   echo "Agent-network preset enabled (NETBIRD_AGENT_NETWORK=true):" > /dev/stderr
@@ -437,35 +493,35 @@ configure_reverse_proxy() {
     return 0
   fi
 
-  # Prompt for reverse proxy type
-  REVERSE_PROXY_TYPE=$(read_reverse_proxy_type)
+  # Reverse proxy type (env NETBIRD_REVERSE_PROXY_TYPE, else prompt, else 0)
+  REVERSE_PROXY_TYPE=$(resolve NETBIRD_REVERSE_PROXY_TYPE 0 read_reverse_proxy_type)
 
   # Handle built-in Traefik prompts (option 0)
   if [[ "$REVERSE_PROXY_TYPE" == "0" ]]; then
-    TRAEFIK_ACME_EMAIL=$(read_traefik_acme_email)
-    ENABLE_PROXY=$(read_enable_proxy)
+    TRAEFIK_ACME_EMAIL=$(resolve NETBIRD_LETSENCRYPT_EMAIL required read_traefik_acme_email)
+    ENABLE_PROXY=$(resolve NETBIRD_ENABLE_PROXY false read_enable_proxy)
     if [[ "$ENABLE_PROXY" == "true" ]]; then
-      ENABLE_CROWDSEC=$(read_enable_crowdsec)
+      ENABLE_CROWDSEC=$(resolve NETBIRD_ENABLE_CROWDSEC false read_enable_crowdsec)
     fi
   fi
 
   # Handle external Traefik-specific prompts (option 1)
   if [[ "$REVERSE_PROXY_TYPE" == "1" ]]; then
-    TRAEFIK_EXTERNAL_NETWORK=$(read_traefik_network)
-    TRAEFIK_ENTRYPOINT=$(read_traefik_entrypoint)
-    TRAEFIK_CERTRESOLVER=$(read_traefik_certresolver)
+    TRAEFIK_EXTERNAL_NETWORK=$(resolve NETBIRD_TRAEFIK_EXTERNAL_NETWORK "" read_traefik_network)
+    TRAEFIK_ENTRYPOINT=$(resolve NETBIRD_TRAEFIK_ENTRYPOINT websecure read_traefik_entrypoint)
+    TRAEFIK_CERTRESOLVER=$(resolve NETBIRD_TRAEFIK_CERTRESOLVER "" read_traefik_certresolver)
   fi
 
   # Handle port binding for external proxy options (2-5)
   if [[ "$REVERSE_PROXY_TYPE" -ge 2 ]]; then
-    BIND_LOCALHOST_ONLY=$(read_port_binding_preference)
+    BIND_LOCALHOST_ONLY=$(resolve NETBIRD_BIND_LOCALHOST_ONLY true read_port_binding_preference)
   fi
 
   # Handle Docker network prompts for external proxies (options 2-4)
   case "$REVERSE_PROXY_TYPE" in
-    2) EXTERNAL_PROXY_NETWORK=$(read_proxy_docker_network "Nginx") ;;
-    3) EXTERNAL_PROXY_NETWORK=$(read_proxy_docker_network "Nginx Proxy Manager") ;;
-    4) EXTERNAL_PROXY_NETWORK=$(read_proxy_docker_network "Caddy") ;;
+    2) EXTERNAL_PROXY_NETWORK=$(resolve NETBIRD_EXTERNAL_PROXY_NETWORK "" read_proxy_docker_network "Nginx") ;;
+    3) EXTERNAL_PROXY_NETWORK=$(resolve NETBIRD_EXTERNAL_PROXY_NETWORK "" read_proxy_docker_network "Nginx Proxy Manager") ;;
+    4) EXTERNAL_PROXY_NETWORK=$(resolve NETBIRD_EXTERNAL_PROXY_NETWORK "" read_proxy_docker_network "Caddy") ;;
     *) ;; # No network prompt for other options
   esac
   return 0
@@ -643,8 +699,13 @@ start_services_and_show_instructions() {
     print_post_setup_instructions
 
     echo ""
-    echo -n "Press Enter when your reverse proxy is configured (or Ctrl+C to exit)... "
-    read -r < /dev/tty
+    if tty_available; then
+      echo -n "Press Enter when your reverse proxy is configured (or Ctrl+C to exit)... "
+      read -r < /dev/tty
+    else
+      echo "Non-interactive mode: starting NetBird containers now. Finish configuring"
+      echo "your reverse proxy using the instructions above so it can reach them."
+    fi
 
     echo -e "$MSG_STARTING_SERVICES"
     $DOCKER_COMPOSE_COMMAND up -d

shared/management/http/api/openapi.yml

@@ -1433,13 +1433,14 @@ components:
           enum: [ "all", "tcp", "udp", "icmp", "netbird-ssh" ]
           example: "tcp"
         ports:
-          description: Policy rule affected ports
+          description: Policy rule affected ports. Mutually exclusive with `port_ranges`. A rule accepts either individual ports or port ranges, not both.
+          x-omit-from-example: true
           type: array
           items:
             type: string
             example: "80"
         port_ranges:
-          description: Policy rule affected ports ranges list
+          description: Policy rule affected ports ranges list. Mutually exclusive with `ports`. To mix individual ports with ranges in one rule, express each single port as a range with identical start and end values (for example, start 443, end 443).
           type: array
           items:
             $ref: '#/components/schemas/RulePortRange'
@@ -1459,7 +1460,7 @@ components:
         - action
 
     RulePortRange:
-      description: Policy rule affected ports range
+      description: Policy rule affected ports range. A range with identical start and end values represents a single port.
       type: object
       properties:
         start:
@@ -4607,7 +4608,7 @@ components:
 
     FleetDMMatchAttributes:
       type: object
-      description: Attribute conditions to match when approving FleetDM hosts. Most attributes work with FleetDM's free/open-source version. Premium-only attributes are marked accordingly
+      description: Attribute conditions to match when approving FleetDM hosts. Most attributes work with FleetDM's free/open source version. Premium-only attributes are marked accordingly
       additionalProperties: false
       properties:
         disk_encryption_enabled: