mirror of
https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird.git
synced 2026-10-10 07:29:06 +02:00
* [client] Force interactive login when extending the auth session A session extend must be answered from the account the peer is registered under. With a silent PKCE flow (DisablePromptLogin or max_age=0) the IdP answers from whatever session it already holds, which need not be the peer's account when several are signed in; the token then fails the user match in ExtendAuthSession with no way to pick another account. Mark the PKCE flow request as a session extend so the management server can force prompt=login for it, overriding the configured silent flow. * [client] Reduce cognitive complexity of Server.Login Login sat at cognitive complexity 27, over the 25 the linter allows. Extract the interactive SSO branch into startSSOLogin, and split the nested in-flight-flow reuse check out of it into reuseOAuthFlow, which flattens the original if/else into early returns: it returns the cached auth info when the previous flow targets the same client and still has more than 90s left, otherwise cancels the stale wait and returns nil so the caller requests a fresh flow. The helpers take the contextState through a small statusSetter interface, since internal.contextState is unexported and re-deriving it with CtxGetState inside the helper would resolve against callerCtx rather than rootCtx. No behavior change: same ordering of state transitions, same mutex scope around the oauthAuthFlow write, same error paths. Login is now at 21. * [client] Respect DisablePromptLogin when extending the auth session Forcing prompt=login on a session extend overrode DisablePromptLogin, which is set for IdPs that break on it: Authentik triggers a double authentication and social logins fail outright. Overriding it there trades a recoverable extend for a login that cannot complete at all. Keep the LoginFlag override, which only replaces max_age=0 or none with prompt=login so the IdP honours login_hint, and leave DisablePromptLogin as configured. Those deployments keep the silent flow, and with several accounts signed in an extend answered from the wrong one still fails the user match. * [client] Guard the shared OAuth flow state with the server mutex reuseOAuthFlow read flow, expiresAt, waitCancel and info without holding s.mutex, while startSSOLogin and WaitSSOLogin write them under it. Reading the fields one at a time could also answer with auth info from a flow that was already replaced, or cancel a wait that no longer belongs to the flow just judged stale. Take one snapshot under the lock and decide from it. WaitSSOLogin read oauthAuthFlow.flow twice outside the lock; both now use a value snapshotted in the critical section that already installs actCancel. Its stale waitCancel was read and called in a separate section from the one installing the new one, so two racing calls could read the same predecessor and leave one wait uncancelled. Swap the two in a single critical section. Both cancels run after unlocking: the displaced wait takes s.mutex as it unwinds. * [client] Verify the SSO login came back for the hinted account login_hint is a suggestion the IdP may ignore: with a silent flow configured (DisablePromptLogin or max_age=0) and a live IdP session for another account, the login completes with that account's token. On a registered peer the management server rejects it as a user mismatch, but on a fresh profile the peer silently registers under the wrong account and the profile is then bound to it — every later login follows the stored hint straight back. After the token exchange, compare the ID token's email against the hint the flow was sent with. On a mismatch, do not log in to management with the token; run one more round asking the IdP to re-decide the account (prompt=login, via ForceAccountPrompt — DisablePromptLogin still wins there). If the prompted round also comes back different, proceed with a warning: the address may legitimately have changed, and refusing forever would lock the user out of the profile while the management server still rejects a token that does not own the peer. A token or profile with no email to compare is not judged. The retry differs per platform because of who opens the browser: - CLI (netbird login foreground) and Android run the whole flow in one process, so the mismatch retries automatically: the browser reopens with the account prompt within the same login attempt. - On desktop the login is split between the daemon and the GUI: Login hands the authorize URL to the GUI, WaitSSOLogin blocks for the token, and only the GUI can open a browser. A new URL cannot be handed out from inside WaitSSOLogin (its response has no field for one, kept that way to avoid a proto change), so the daemon arms forceAccountPrompt, fails the round with "connect again to choose the account", and builds the next Login's flow with the prompt — the user's next connect is the retry. The flag and the flow annotations live in daemon memory only; SwitchProfile drops them so the previous profile's hint cannot judge the next profile's token. The device code flow has no prompt parameter (RFC 8628), so a prompted round there runs as-is and a repeated mismatch is let through with the warning rather than looping. * [client] Address review comments on PKCE session extend flow Fail the PKCE authorization flow test on request error instead of continuing into a nil dereference, and make the godoc comments on the touched exported symbols identifier-leading full sentences. * [client] Match accounts only on the email claim of the ID token The name-claim fallback in the ID token parsing is kept for the login hint and display, but account matching now only considers a value that came from the email claim, so a token without one no longer produces a false account mismatch. * [client] Drop the pending session extend on a profile switch The profile-switch cleanup dropped the pending login flow and the account-prompt flag, but left extendAuthSessionFlow untouched. Its device code was issued by the previous profile's IdP client, so a WaitExtendAuthSession still parked on the browser leg would submit the resulting token against the new profile's engine. * [client] Judge the SSO account against the flow that produced the token WaitSSOLogin snapshotted the flow on entry but re-read the info, hint and accountPrompted from the live s.oauthAuthFlow afterwards, in separate critical sections. WaitToken blocks for the whole browser leg, so a concurrent Login or RequestJWTAuth could replace the flow meanwhile and the mismatch check would compare this wait's token against another flow's account: either arming the prompt spuriously or letting a wrong-account token through against an unrelated profile's hint. Take all of it in the entry snapshot. * [client] Keep the forced account prompt from being lost to flow reuse startSSOLogin consumed forceAccountPrompt and applied the prompt to the freshly built flow, but reuseOAuthFlow could then answer from a cached flow for the same client — one built without prompt=login, e.g. by RequestJWTAuth. The user got the same silent authorization URL that produced the mismatch, with the flag already spent, so no later round asked either. Rule reuse out when the prompt is forced, while still cancelling the predecessor's wait. RequestJWTAuth also wrote the flow fields one by one, leaving the previous login's hint and accountPrompted behind for WaitSSOLogin to judge a later token against. Both sites now replace the whole record. * [client] Consume the forced account prompt after the retry forceAccountPrompt was never cleared, so a flow that outlived the retry it was armed for kept sending prompt=login on every later authorization request and re-authenticated the user each time. RequestAuthInfo now takes the flag as it builds the request. * [client] Cancel the caller context in the SSO login tests WaitSSOLogin parks a goroutine on the caller's context for the whole browser leg. The tests passed context.Background(), which never cancels, so each left one goroutine behind for the lifetime of the test binary. * [client] Cancel the wait displaced by an OAuth flow replacement Replacing the shared record with a whole struct value dropped the previous flow's waitCancel, so an SSO browser wait still parked on it lost its cancel: nothing could preempt it, and it could go on to run attemptLogin or mutate the record behind the new flow. Both replacement sites now take the displaced cancel over in the same critical section, via a shared replaceOAuthFlow, and invoke it after the unlock. * [client] Guard OAuth flow mutations by the flow that owns the wait * [client] Arm the account prompt only from the wait that owns the flow * [client] Adopt the three-value parseEmailFromIDToken in the device flow The main merge brought in the device flow's email extraction from #7193, which still used the two-value signature this branch replaced when account matching was narrowed to the email claim. Git merged the files without a textual conflict, so the branch stopped compiling. Take the fromEmailClaim result and fill EmailClaim from it, the same way the PKCE path does, so device-flow clients get the same account matching. * [client] Populate the pending extend flow in the test server helper SwitchProfile cancels and clears the pending session extend flow unconditionally, the same way it clears the SSH JWT cache. New always populates the field, but the hand-assembled test server did not, so TestSwitchProfile_ClearsJWTCache panicked on a nil PendingFlow.
652 lines
19 KiB
Go
652 lines
19 KiB
Go
//go:build android
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package android
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
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gossh "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
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"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal"
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"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/auth"
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"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
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nbssh "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh"
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"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/detection"
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)
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const (
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sshDialTimeout = 30 * time.Second
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sshDetectionTimeout = 5 * time.Second
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)
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// PasswordRequiredMarker tells Java to prompt for a password and retry. It is
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// a string because gomobile flattens errors to their message, so a sentinel
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// value would not survive the binding.
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//
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//nolint:gosec // G101 false positive: a sentinel marker, not a credential
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const PasswordRequiredMarker = "netbird-ssh-password-required"
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// HostKeyUnknownMarker tells Java to show the fingerprint and, on confirmation,
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// retry with TrustHostKey set. The presented fingerprint is appended after the
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// marker so the prompt can display it and the retry can guard against a key
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// that changed between the two connects. Only regular (non-NetBird) servers
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// reach this: NetBird peers verify against the registry.
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const HostKeyUnknownMarker = "netbird-ssh-hostkey-unknown"
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var (
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errPasswordRequired = errors.New(PasswordRequiredMarker)
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errClientClosed = errors.New("ssh client closed")
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)
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// errHostKeyUnknown carries the presented fingerprint so Connect can build the
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// marker message the Java side parses.
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type errHostKeyUnknown struct {
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fingerprint string
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}
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func (e *errHostKeyUnknown) Error() string {
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return HostKeyUnknownMarker + ":" + e.fingerprint
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}
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// SSHTerminalListener receives SSH session events. It is implemented in Java.
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//
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// All callbacks are invoked from goroutines and may run concurrently with each
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// other; the implementation must be safe to call from any thread.
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type SSHTerminalListener interface {
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OnConnected()
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OnData(data []byte)
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OnClose(reason string)
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OnError(message string)
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}
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// SSHClient is a NetBird-aware SSH client exposed to Java via gomobile.
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//
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// It dials through the running NetBird tunnel and runs a standard SSH session
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// on top with PTY enabled. Host-key verification uses the NetBird-provided
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// peer SSH host keys, identical to the desktop client.
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type SSHClient struct {
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nb *Client
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mu sync.Mutex
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listener SSHTerminalListener
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urlOpener URLOpener
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sshClient *gossh.Client
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session *gossh.Session
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stdin io.WriteCloser
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closed bool
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// gen identifies the current connection attempt. Connect and Close bump it,
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// so an in-flight dial or a reader left over from a previous connection
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// finds itself stale and stays silent instead of publishing OnConnected or
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// OnClose for a connection the caller already abandoned.
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gen uint64
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dialCancel context.CancelFunc
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// knownHostsConfigDir and knownHostsProfile locate the TOFU store for
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// regular SSH servers in the profile's preferences. Java supplies them,
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// since an overlay IP is a different host under a different profile. Empty
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// until set: without them a regular server cannot be verified and Connect
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// refuses one.
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knownHostsConfigDir string
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knownHostsProfile string
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// trustHostKey carries the fingerprint the user confirmed on a previous
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// attempt, so the retry accepts exactly that key and persists it.
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trustHostKey string
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}
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// NewSSHClient creates a new SSH client bound to the running NetBird Client.
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func NewSSHClient(c *Client) *SSHClient {
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return &SSHClient{nb: c}
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}
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// SetListener registers the Java listener. Must be called before Connect to
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// receive any events.
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func (s *SSHClient) SetListener(l SSHTerminalListener) {
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s.mu.Lock()
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s.listener = l
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s.mu.Unlock()
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}
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// SetURLOpener registers the Java URL opener used to display the device-code
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// authorization page in a Custom Tabs window when the target peer requires
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// JWT authentication. Must be set before Connect to be effective.
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func (s *SSHClient) SetURLOpener(opener URLOpener) {
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s.mu.Lock()
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s.urlOpener = opener
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s.mu.Unlock()
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}
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// SetKnownHostsStore points the TOFU host-key store at a profile's preferences.
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// Must be set before connecting to a regular SSH server; without it such a
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// server cannot be verified and Connect refuses one.
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func (s *SSHClient) SetKnownHostsStore(configDir, profileID string) {
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s.mu.Lock()
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s.knownHostsConfigDir = configDir
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s.knownHostsProfile = profileID
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s.mu.Unlock()
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}
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// TrustHostKey records the fingerprint the user confirmed for a regular server,
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// so the next Connect accepts that exact key and adds it to the known-hosts
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// store. Passing a fingerprint that no longer matches makes the connect fail
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// rather than trust a key that changed since the prompt.
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func (s *SSHClient) TrustHostKey(fingerprint string) {
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s.mu.Lock()
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s.trustHostKey = fingerprint
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s.mu.Unlock()
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}
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// Connect dials the SSH server through the NetBird tunnel and performs the
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// SSH handshake. It auto-detects the server type via SSH banner inspection
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// and selects the appropriate authentication path:
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//
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// - NetBird-SSH server requiring JWT: launches the OAuth 2.0 device-code
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// flow, opens the verification URL through the registered URLOpener, and
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// uses the resulting token as the SSH password. Host-key verification
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// uses the NetBird peer registry.
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// - NetBird-SSH server without JWT: authenticates with the NetBird SSH
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// private key. Host-key verification uses the NetBird peer registry.
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// - Regular SSH server (e.g. OpenSSH): authenticates with the NetBird key
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// first (so a user-installed NetBird public key works), then falls back
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// to the supplied password if non-empty. Host-key verification is
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// trust-on-first-use against the per-profile known-hosts store.
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//
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// The password parameter is only consulted for regular SSH servers.
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func (s *SSHClient) Connect(host string, port int, user, password string) error {
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if port < 1 || port > 65535 {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid port: %d", port)
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}
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cfg, cfgPath, cc := s.nb.authSnapshot()
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if cc == nil {
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return errors.New("netbird client not running")
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}
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if cfg == nil {
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return errors.New("netbird config not loaded")
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}
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engine := cc.Engine()
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if engine == nil {
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return errors.New("netbird engine not available")
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}
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s.mu.Lock()
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s.gen++
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gen := s.gen
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s.mu.Unlock()
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serverType := detectServerType(host, port)
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log.Debugf("SSH server type: %s", serverType)
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authMethods, hostKeyCallback, err := s.buildAuth(cfg, cfgPath, engine, serverType, password)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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clientConfig := &gossh.ClientConfig{
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User: user,
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Auth: authMethods,
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HostKeyCallback: hostKeyCallback,
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Timeout: sshDialTimeout,
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}
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err = s.dialAndHandshake(gen, host, port, clientConfig)
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// An unknown host key is a prompt, not a failure: return the marker intact
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// (rootCause would unwrap it) so Java can show the fingerprint and retry.
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var unknownHost *errHostKeyUnknown
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if errors.As(err, &unknownHost) {
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return errors.New(unknownHost.Error())
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}
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// A regular server may still accept a password, so let the caller ask for
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// one instead of failing. NetBird servers never use a password, so a
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// failure there is genuine.
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if err != nil && serverType != detection.ServerTypeNetBirdJWT &&
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serverType != detection.ServerTypeNetBirdNoJWT && isAuthFailure(err) &&
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passwordCouldHelp(err, password != "") {
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return errPasswordRequired
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}
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if err != nil {
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return rootCause(err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// StartSession requests a PTY and starts an interactive shell. Output from
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// the session is forwarded to the listener via OnData.
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func (s *SSHClient) StartSession(cols, rows int) error {
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err := s.startSession(cols, rows)
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if err != nil {
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log.Infof("SSH: start session failed: %v", err)
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return rootCause(err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// Write sends data to the SSH session stdin.
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func (s *SSHClient) Write(data []byte) error {
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s.mu.Lock()
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stdin := s.stdin
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s.mu.Unlock()
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if stdin == nil {
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return errors.New("ssh session not started")
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}
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if _, err := stdin.Write(data); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("write stdin: %w", err)
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}
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return nil
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}
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// Resize updates the PTY window size.
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func (s *SSHClient) Resize(cols, rows int) error {
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s.mu.Lock()
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session := s.session
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s.mu.Unlock()
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if session == nil {
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return errors.New("ssh session not started")
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}
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return session.WindowChange(rows, cols)
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}
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// Reset makes a closed client usable for another Connect: Close leaves the
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// one-shot guard set, and clearing it lets the same client back a reconnect.
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func (s *SSHClient) Reset() {
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s.mu.Lock()
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defer s.mu.Unlock()
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s.closed = false
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}
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// Close terminates the SSH session and underlying connection. Safe to call
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// multiple times.
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func (s *SSHClient) Close() error {
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s.mu.Lock()
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s.gen++
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if s.dialCancel != nil {
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s.dialCancel()
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s.dialCancel = nil
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}
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sshClient := s.sshClient
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session := s.session
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stdin := s.stdin
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s.sshClient = nil
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s.session = nil
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s.stdin = nil
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notify := !s.closed
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s.closed = true
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listener := s.listener
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s.mu.Unlock()
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if stdin != nil {
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if err := stdin.Close(); err != nil {
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log.Debugf("ssh: stdin close: %v", err)
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}
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}
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if session != nil {
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if err := session.Close(); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
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log.Debugf("ssh: session close: %v", err)
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}
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}
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var firstErr error
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if sshClient != nil {
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if err := sshClient.Close(); err != nil {
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firstErr = err
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}
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}
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if notify && listener != nil {
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listener.OnClose("closed by client")
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}
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return firstErr
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}
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func (s *SSHClient) startSession(cols, rows int) error {
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log.Debugf("SSH: starting session %dx%d", cols, rows)
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s.mu.Lock()
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sshClient := s.sshClient
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gen := s.gen
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s.mu.Unlock()
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if sshClient == nil {
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return errors.New("ssh client not connected")
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}
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pty, err := nbssh.StartPTYSession(sshClient, cols, rows)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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s.mu.Lock()
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if gen != s.gen {
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s.mu.Unlock()
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closeQuiet(pty.Session, "stale session")
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return errClientClosed
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}
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s.session = pty.Session
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s.stdin = pty.Stdin
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s.mu.Unlock()
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readerDone := make(chan string, 2)
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go func() { readerDone <- s.readLoop(pty.Stdout, "stdout") }()
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go func() { readerDone <- s.readLoop(pty.Stderr, "stderr") }()
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go func() {
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reason := <-readerDone
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if second := <-readerDone; reason == "" {
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reason = second
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}
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s.notifyClose(gen, reason)
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}()
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log.Debug("SSH: session started, shell running")
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return nil
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}
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func (s *SSHClient) buildAuth(cfg *profilemanager.Config, cfgPath string, engine *internal.Engine,
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serverType detection.ServerType, password string) ([]gossh.AuthMethod, gossh.HostKeyCallback, error) {
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switch serverType {
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case detection.ServerTypeNetBirdJWT:
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token, err := s.requestJWTToken(cfg, cfgPath)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("jwt: %w", err)
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}
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auths := []gossh.AuthMethod{gossh.Password(token)}
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return auths, nbssh.CreateHostKeyCallback(nbssh.PeerKeyLookup(engine.GetPeerSSHKey)), nil
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case detection.ServerTypeNetBirdNoJWT:
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if cfg.SSHKey == "" {
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return nil, nil, errors.New("no NetBird SSH key available")
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}
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signer, err := gossh.ParsePrivateKey([]byte(cfg.SSHKey))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("parse netbird ssh key: %w", err)
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}
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auths := []gossh.AuthMethod{gossh.PublicKeys(signer)}
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return auths, nbssh.CreateHostKeyCallback(nbssh.PeerKeyLookup(engine.GetPeerSSHKey)), nil
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case detection.ServerTypeRegular:
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var auths []gossh.AuthMethod
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if cfg.SSHKey != "" {
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if signer, err := gossh.ParsePrivateKey([]byte(cfg.SSHKey)); err == nil {
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auths = append(auths, gossh.PublicKeys(signer))
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} else {
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log.Debugf("ssh: parse netbird key for regular auth: %v", err)
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}
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}
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if password != "" {
|
|
pw := password
|
|
auths = append(auths, gossh.Password(pw))
|
|
auths = append(auths, gossh.KeyboardInteractive(func(_, _ string, questions []string, _ []bool) ([]string, error) {
|
|
answers := make([]string, len(questions))
|
|
for i := range questions {
|
|
answers[i] = pw
|
|
}
|
|
return answers, nil
|
|
}))
|
|
}
|
|
if len(auths) == 0 {
|
|
// Nothing to offer at all: ask for a password rather than failing,
|
|
// so the caller can retry once the user supplies one.
|
|
return nil, nil, errPasswordRequired
|
|
}
|
|
callback, err := s.tofuHostKeyCallback()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
return auths, callback, nil
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("unsupported SSH server type: %v", serverType)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// tofuHostKeyCallback verifies a regular server's host key against the
|
|
// per-profile known-hosts store. An unknown host returns errHostKeyUnknown so
|
|
// Java can show the fingerprint and, once confirmed, retry with the key
|
|
// trusted; a changed key is rejected outright, as OpenSSH does. When the user
|
|
// has confirmed a fingerprint, the callback accepts exactly that key and
|
|
// appends it to the store.
|
|
func (s *SSHClient) tofuHostKeyCallback() (gossh.HostKeyCallback, error) {
|
|
s.mu.Lock()
|
|
configDir := s.knownHostsConfigDir
|
|
profileID := s.knownHostsProfile
|
|
trusted := s.trustHostKey
|
|
s.mu.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
if configDir == "" || profileID == "" {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("no known-hosts store configured for regular SSH")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
store, err := openKnownHostsStore(configDir, profileID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, fmt.Errorf("load known-hosts store: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return func(hostname string, remote net.Addr, key gossh.PublicKey) error {
|
|
verdict, err := store.verify(hostname, remote, key)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if verdict == hostKeyMatched {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
if verdict == hostKeyChanged {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("SSH host key changed for %s (possible attack)", hostname)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fingerprint := gossh.FingerprintSHA256(key)
|
|
if trusted == "" {
|
|
return &errHostKeyUnknown{fingerprint: fingerprint}
|
|
}
|
|
if trusted != fingerprint {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("SSH host key changed since it was confirmed for %s", hostname)
|
|
}
|
|
if err := store.append(hostname, remote, key); err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("persist trusted host key: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
// The confirmation is spent: now that the key is stored, a later
|
|
// reconnect must verify against the file, not re-accept this fingerprint.
|
|
s.mu.Lock()
|
|
s.trustHostKey = ""
|
|
s.mu.Unlock()
|
|
return nil
|
|
}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *SSHClient) requestJWTToken(cfg *profilemanager.Config, cfgPath string) (string, error) {
|
|
s.mu.Lock()
|
|
urlOpener := s.urlOpener
|
|
s.mu.Unlock()
|
|
if urlOpener == nil {
|
|
return "", errors.New("URL opener not configured for JWT auth")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Minute)
|
|
defer cancel()
|
|
|
|
flow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, cfg, false, true, profileLoginHint(cfgPath), false)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", fmt.Errorf("create oauth flow: %w", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// The status callback covers the browser round-trip, which would
|
|
// otherwise leave the terminal blank.
|
|
tokenInfo, err := runOAuthFlow(ctx, flow, urlOpener, func() {
|
|
s.notifyStatus("Waiting for browser authentication...")
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
token := tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse()
|
|
if token == "" {
|
|
return "", errors.New("empty token returned by IdP")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Tells the client the browser round-trip is over so it can dismiss the
|
|
// surface it opened, the same way the login and session-extend flows do.
|
|
// Without it the Custom Tab stays in front of the terminal even though the
|
|
// token has already been collected.
|
|
urlOpener.OnLoginSuccess()
|
|
|
|
return token, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *SSHClient) dialAndHandshake(gen uint64, host string, port int, clientConfig *gossh.ClientConfig) error {
|
|
addr := net.JoinHostPort(host, strconv.Itoa(port))
|
|
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), sshDialTimeout)
|
|
defer cancel()
|
|
|
|
s.mu.Lock()
|
|
if gen != s.gen {
|
|
s.mu.Unlock()
|
|
return errClientClosed
|
|
}
|
|
s.dialCancel = cancel
|
|
s.mu.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
var dialer net.Dialer
|
|
conn, err := dialer.DialContext(ctx, "tcp", addr)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf("dial %s: %w", addr, err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
client, err := nbssh.Handshake(ctx, conn, addr, clientConfig)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s.mu.Lock()
|
|
if gen != s.gen {
|
|
s.mu.Unlock()
|
|
closeQuiet(client, "stale ssh client")
|
|
return errClientClosed
|
|
}
|
|
s.sshClient = client
|
|
listener := s.listener
|
|
s.mu.Unlock()
|
|
|
|
if listener != nil {
|
|
listener.OnConnected()
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *SSHClient) readLoop(r io.Reader, name string) string {
|
|
buf := make([]byte, 4096)
|
|
for {
|
|
n, err := r.Read(buf)
|
|
if n > 0 {
|
|
s.mu.Lock()
|
|
listener := s.listener
|
|
s.mu.Unlock()
|
|
if listener != nil {
|
|
chunk := make([]byte, n)
|
|
copy(chunk, buf[:n])
|
|
listener.OnData(chunk)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
// EOF is a normal shell exit, so report it without a reason.
|
|
if errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
log.Debugf("ssh %s read: %v", name, err)
|
|
return rootCause(err).Error()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// notifyStatus writes a progress line to the terminal through the normal
|
|
// output path, so long steps are visible while nothing else is arriving.
|
|
func (s *SSHClient) notifyStatus(text string) {
|
|
s.mu.Lock()
|
|
listener := s.listener
|
|
s.mu.Unlock()
|
|
if listener != nil {
|
|
listener.OnData([]byte("\r\n\x1b[33m" + text + "\x1b[0m\r\n"))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *SSHClient) notifyClose(gen uint64, reason string) {
|
|
s.mu.Lock()
|
|
if gen != s.gen || s.closed {
|
|
s.mu.Unlock()
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
s.closed = true
|
|
listener := s.listener
|
|
s.mu.Unlock()
|
|
if listener != nil {
|
|
listener.OnClose(reason)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func closeQuiet(c io.Closer, label string) {
|
|
if c == nil {
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if err := c.Close(); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
|
|
log.Debugf("ssh: close %s: %v", label, err)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func detectServerType(host string, port int) detection.ServerType {
|
|
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), sshDetectionTimeout)
|
|
defer cancel()
|
|
|
|
dialer := &net.Dialer{}
|
|
serverType, err := detection.DetectSSHServerType(ctx, dialer, host, port)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
log.Debugf("ssh: server detection failed: %v (assuming regular SSH)", err)
|
|
return detection.ServerTypeRegular
|
|
}
|
|
return serverType
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// rootCause returns the innermost error of a %w chain, so the terminal shows
|
|
// "i/o timeout" rather than every layer that added context on the way up.
|
|
func rootCause(err error) error {
|
|
for {
|
|
// A joined error has no single root, so keep it as-is.
|
|
if _, ok := err.(interface{ Unwrap() []error }); ok {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
next := errors.Unwrap(err)
|
|
if next == nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
err = next
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// isAuthFailure distinguishes credential rejection from dial, timeout and
|
|
// host-key errors, which retrying with a password would not fix.
|
|
func isAuthFailure(err error) bool {
|
|
if errors.Is(err, errPasswordRequired) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
var partial *gossh.PartialSuccessError
|
|
if errors.As(err, &partial) {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
return strings.Contains(err.Error(), "unable to authenticate")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// passwordCouldHelp reports whether prompting for a password again can change
|
|
// the outcome. gossh lists a method under "attempted methods" only when the
|
|
// server offered it, so a supplied password that was never attempted means the
|
|
// server does not accept passwords and the real error should surface instead.
|
|
func passwordCouldHelp(err error, passwordOffered bool) bool {
|
|
if !passwordOffered {
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
msg := err.Error()
|
|
return strings.Contains(msg, "password") || strings.Contains(msg, "keyboard-interactive")
|
|
}
|