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* [client] Bind the cached SSH JWT to the local caller that obtained it Record the identity that obtained the token and return it only to that same identity, comparing the account alone: the group set and the elevation flag describe what a token may do rather than who it belongs to, and the same user may call once elevated and once not. A control channel that carries no caller identity gets a miss on read and stores nothing on write, matching how the other ipcauth consumers fail closed. Clear the entry when the session it speaks for ends: logout, down and profile switch. * [client] Cover the profile-switch path of the SSH JWT cache The cache being correct buys nothing if a handler around it forgets to clear it, and SwitchProfile had no test at all. Point the profile globals at a temp dir holding a single default profile, which is the one ActiveProfileState.FilePath resolves without consulting the current OS user, and call SwitchProfile with no request so neither the switch itself nor the profile-list event is involved. * [client] Report the SSH JWT cache in the no-identity startup warning daemonServerOptions already warns once, at startup, about what a control channel with no caller identity gives up. Name the SSH JWT cache there too, on both the TCP and the no-peer-identity-primitive paths. The per-request logs in cachedJWT and WaitJWTToken drop to Debug: the condition is expected and handled on such a channel, the caller simply re-authenticates, and repeating it on every SSH authentication buried the one message that is actionable. * [client] Stop the local-metrics manager leaking out of the profile test localmetrics.NewManager runs a goroutine until its context is done, and the test handed it context.Background(), so the manager outlived the test and stayed in the test binary for every case that followed. * [client] Keep the cached SSH JWT across a down/up cycle Clearing the cache in cleanupConnection also caught Down, which ends the connection and not the session: the peer stays enrolled, `up` reconnects without going back to the IdP, and the token still belongs to the same NetBird identity. With a long cache TTL that cost the owner a fresh device-code flow for nothing, since the owner binding is what keeps the token away from other local accounts. Clear it on the two paths where the session really ends and the next one may belong to a different NetBird user: profile logout when the profile is the active one, and active-profile logout. SwitchProfile already cleared it on its own. * [client] Resolve the merge conflict in the profile-logout cleanup main extracted the inline profile-logout cleanup into cleanupAfterProfileLogout, which this branch had edited in place to clear the SSH JWT cache. Take main's helper and move the clear inside it. The helper returns early when the profile that was deregistered is not the active one, so the cache is still only cleared when the session that owns the token actually ends. * [client] Do not cache an SSH JWT obtained under a session that ended WaitJWTToken polls the IdP with s.mutex released, and that wait can run for as long as the user takes in the browser. A logout or a profile switch in the meantime clears the cache, but the poll then completed and stored its token anyway, so the entry the next session read belonged to the previous one. Give the cache a generation that clear advances. WaitJWTToken takes the generation before the wait and hands it back to store, which keeps the token only while the generation still matches. The two mutexes are distinct, so this was never a data race and the race detector could not have found it: the window is between two separately locked sections. * [client] Make the profile-switch test switch a profile SwitchProfile with a nil request skips switchProfileIfNeeded, so the test only covered the no-op path and would have passed with profile-transition invalidation broken. Create a second profile and name it in the request, then assert the active profile actually moved before checking the cache. Also correct the comment on the Down test: the logout handlers do call cleanupConnection. What changed is that clearing the cache is no longer one of the things cleanupConnection does. * [client] Take the SSH JWT cache generation when the flow is created WaitJWTToken read the generation after validating the device code, but the flow it belongs to is created earlier, in RequestJWTAuth, and SwitchProfile does not reset s.oauthAuthFlow. A profile switch between the two therefore advanced the generation before it was ever read: the guard compared the new session against itself and let the token through, which is the case it exists to stop. Record the generation on the flow when RequestJWTAuth creates it, and read it from there. The whole span from the request to the IdP answering now counts as one session for the cache. * [client] Correct two test comments the clear-on-Down change invalidated Moving the clear out of cleanupConnection left two comments describing the old behaviour: newTestServer said cleanupConnection clears the cache, and the comment above TestJWTCache_ClearDropsTheEntry listed Down among the callers of clear. Neither is true any more. * [client] Read the SSH JWT cache generation before the IdP round trip RequestJWTAuth read the generation where it stored the flow, which is after RequestAuthInfo has talked to the IdP. A logout or a profile switch during that call advanced the generation first, so the flow recorded the new session's value and the later store was accepted: the window moved rather than closed. Read it with the config, under the same s.mutex section. SwitchProfile holds that mutex across its own clear(), so the config and the generation cannot be torn apart by a switch.
Start using NetBird at netbird.io
See Documentation
Join our Slack channel or our Community forum
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🤖 NetBird Agent Network (Beta)
Identity-aware access control for AI agents — keyless access to LLM APIs and private resources over the encrypted NetBird tunnel. See
agent-network/or read the docs at netbird.ai.
NetBird combines a configuration-free peer-to-peer private network and a centralized access control system in a single platform, making it easy to create secure private networks for your organization or home.
Connect. NetBird creates a WireGuard-based overlay network that automatically connects your machines over an encrypted tunnel, leaving behind the hassle of opening ports, complex firewall rules, VPN gateways, and so forth.
Secure. NetBird enables secure remote access by applying granular access policies while allowing you to manage them intuitively from a single place. Works universally on any infrastructure.
https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/10cec749-bb56-4ab3-97af-4e38850108d2
Self-host NetBird (video)
Key features
Quickstart with NetBird Cloud
- Download and install NetBird at https://app.netbird.io/install.
- Follow the steps to sign up with Google, Microsoft, GitHub or your email address.
- Check the NetBird admin UI.
Quickstart with self-hosted NetBird
This is the quickest way to try self-hosted NetBird. It should take around 5 minutes to get started if you already have a public domain and a VM. Follow the Advanced guide with a custom identity provider for installations with different IdPs.
Infrastructure requirements:
- A Linux VM with at least 1 CPU and 2 GB of memory.
- The VM should be publicly accessible on TCP ports 80 and 443 and UDP port 3478.
- A public domain name pointing to the VM.
Software requirements:
- Docker with the Compose plugin (Compose v2 or higher). See the Docker installation guide.
Steps
- Download and run the installation script:
export NETBIRD_DOMAIN=netbird.example.com; curl -fsSL https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/releases/latest/download/getting-started.sh | bash
A bit on NetBird internals
- Every machine in the network runs the NetBird agent, which manages WireGuard.
- Every agent connects to the Management Service, which holds network state, manages peer IPs, and distributes updates to agents.
- Agents use ICE (via pion/ice) to discover connection candidates for peer-to-peer connections.
- Candidates are discovered with the help of STUN servers.
- Agents negotiate a connection through the Signal Service, exchanging end-to-end encrypted messages with candidates.
- When NAT traversal fails (e.g. mobile carrier-grade NAT) and a direct p2p connection isn't possible, the system falls back to a Relay Service and a secure WireGuard tunnel is established through it.
See a complete architecture overview for details.
Community projects
- NetBird installer script
- netbird-tui - terminal UI for managing NetBird peers, routes, and settings
- caddy-netbird - Caddy plugin that embeds a NetBird client for proxying HTTP and TCP/UDP traffic through NetBird networks
Note: The main branch may be in an unstable or even broken state during development.
For stable versions, see releases.
Support acknowledgement
In November 2022, NetBird joined the StartUpSecure program sponsored by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research of the Federal Republic of Germany. Together with the CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security, NetBird brings security best practices and simplicity to private networking.
Acknowledgements
We build on open source technologies like WireGuard®, Pion ICE, and Rosenpass. We greatly appreciate the work these projects are doing, and we'd love it if you could support them too (e.g., by starring or contributing).
Legal
This repository is licensed under the BSD-3-Clause license, which applies to all parts of the repository except for the directories management/, signal/ and relay/. Those directories are licensed under the GNU Affero General Public License version 3.0 (AGPLv3). See the respective LICENSE files inside each directory.
WireGuard and the WireGuard logo are registered trademarks of Jason A. Donenfeld.