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73 changed files with 2507 additions and 3021 deletions

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@@ -121,7 +121,6 @@ type Manager struct {
udpTracker *conntrack.UDPTracker
icmpTracker *conntrack.ICMPTracker
tcpTracker *conntrack.TCPTracker
fragments *fragmentTracker
forwarder atomic.Pointer[forwarder.Forwarder]
pendingCapture atomic.Pointer[forwarder.PacketCapture]
logger *nblog.Logger
@@ -184,41 +183,6 @@ func (d *decoder) decodePacket(data []byte) error {
}
}
// decodeTransport decodes the transport header of a first fragment (which
// gopacket leaves undecoded) into the decoder and appends its layer type to
// decoded, so the ACL pipeline can evaluate it like a normal packet. It returns
// false if the protocol is unsupported or the header is truncated.
func (d *decoder) decodeTransport(proto layers.IPProtocol, payload []byte) bool {
var l4 gopacket.DecodingLayer
var layerType gopacket.LayerType
var minLen int
switch proto {
case layers.IPProtocolTCP:
l4, layerType, minLen = &d.tcp, layers.LayerTypeTCP, 20
case layers.IPProtocolUDP:
l4, layerType, minLen = &d.udp, layers.LayerTypeUDP, 8
case layers.IPProtocolICMPv4:
l4, layerType, minLen = &d.icmp4, layers.LayerTypeICMPv4, 8
case layers.IPProtocolICMPv6:
l4, layerType, minLen = &d.icmp6, layers.LayerTypeICMPv6, 8
default:
return false
}
// Reject a fragment too small to hold the full transport header before
// decoding: it can't be ACL-evaluated (tiny-fragment attack), and skipping
// the decode avoids gopacket allocating an error on the drop path.
if len(payload) < minLen {
return false
}
if err := l4.DecodeFromBytes(payload, gopacket.NilDecodeFeedback); err != nil {
return false
}
d.decoded = append(d.decoded, layerType)
return true
}
// Create userspace firewall manager constructor
func Create(iface common.IFaceMapper, disableServerRoutes bool, flowLogger nftypes.FlowLogger, mtu uint16) (*Manager, error) {
return create(iface, nil, disableServerRoutes, flowLogger, mtu)
@@ -322,8 +286,6 @@ func create(iface common.IFaceMapper, nativeFirewall firewall.Manager, disableSe
if err := m.localipmanager.UpdateLocalIPs(iface); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("update local IPs: %w", err)
}
m.fragments = newFragmentTracker(m.logger)
if disableConntrack {
log.Info("conntrack is disabled")
} else {
@@ -337,7 +299,6 @@ func create(iface common.IFaceMapper, nativeFirewall firewall.Manager, disableSe
}
}
if err := iface.SetFilter(m); err != nil {
m.fragments.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("set filter: %w", err)
}
return m, nil
@@ -733,10 +694,6 @@ func (m *Manager) resetState() {
m.tcpTracker.Close()
}
if m.fragments != nil {
m.fragments.Close()
}
if fwder := m.forwarder.Load(); fwder != nil {
fwder.SetCapture(nil)
fwder.Stop()
@@ -1089,20 +1046,19 @@ func (m *Manager) filterInbound(packetData []byte, size int) bool {
return true
}
// gopacket does not decode the transport header of any IP fragment, so
// fragments take a dedicated path: the first fragment's header is decoded
// and ACL-evaluated here, and the remaining fragments inherit its verdict.
// TODO: pass fragments of routed packets to forwarder
if fragment {
return m.filterInboundFragment(d, srcIP, dstIP, size)
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
if d.decoded[0] == layers.LayerTypeIPv4 {
m.logger.Trace4("packet is a fragment: src=%v dst=%v id=%v flags=%v",
srcIP, dstIP, d.ip4.Id, d.ip4.Flags)
} else {
m.logger.Trace2("packet is an IPv6 fragment: src=%v dst=%v", srcIP, dstIP)
}
}
return false
}
return m.filterInboundDecoded(d, srcIP, dstIP, packetData, size)
}
// filterInboundDecoded runs the ACL, DNAT and conntrack pipeline on a fully
// decoded (non-fragment) inbound packet. It returns true if the packet should
// be dropped.
func (m *Manager) filterInboundDecoded(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, packetData []byte, size int) bool {
// TODO: optimize port DNAT by caching matched rules in conntrack
if translated := m.translateInboundPortDNAT(packetData, d, srcIP, dstIP); translated {
// Re-decode after port DNAT translation to update port information
@@ -1133,226 +1089,33 @@ func (m *Manager) filterInboundDecoded(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, pack
return m.handleRoutedTraffic(d, srcIP, dstIP, packetData, size)
}
// fragmentMeta holds the reassembly identity and layout of an IP fragment,
// extracted uniformly for IPv4 and IPv6.
type fragmentMeta struct {
key fragmentKey
// offset is the fragment offset in 8-byte units (zero for the first
// fragment).
offset uint16
// moreFragments is the More Fragments bit. A first fragment with it unset is
// an IPv6 atomic fragment (a complete datagram, RFC 6946): it has no trailing
// fragments to inherit a verdict, so it must not be recorded.
moreFragments bool
proto layers.IPProtocol
// l4payload is the fragmentable payload of this fragment. For the first
// fragment it starts with the transport header.
l4payload []byte
// headerEndOctets is the first fragment's payload length in 8-byte units:
// the smallest offset a trailing fragment may start at without overlapping
// the inspected transport header.
headerEndOctets uint16
}
// fragmentMetadata extracts the fragment identity and layout from a decoded IP
// fragment. It returns false for fragments it can't interpret (e.g. an IPv6
// fragment header shorter than 8 bytes), which are then dropped.
func fragmentMetadata(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr) (fragmentMeta, bool) {
switch d.decoded[0] {
case layers.LayerTypeIPv4:
payload := d.ip4.Payload
return fragmentMeta{
key: fragmentKey{srcIP: srcIP, dstIP: dstIP, id: uint32(d.ip4.Id), proto: uint8(d.ip4.Protocol)},
offset: d.ip4.FragOffset,
moreFragments: d.ip4.Flags&layers.IPv4MoreFragments != 0,
proto: d.ip4.Protocol,
l4payload: payload,
headerEndOctets: octets(len(payload)),
}, true
case layers.LayerTypeIPv6:
// IPv6 fragment extension header: 8 bytes, followed by the fragmentable
// payload. Layout: next header (1), reserved (1), offset+flags (2), id (4).
payload := d.ip6.Payload
if len(payload) < 8 {
return fragmentMeta{}, false
}
nextHeader := layers.IPProtocol(payload[0])
offsetFlags := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(payload[2:4])
id := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(payload[4:8])
l4 := payload[8:]
return fragmentMeta{
key: fragmentKey{srcIP: srcIP, dstIP: dstIP, id: id, proto: uint8(nextHeader)},
offset: offsetFlags >> 3,
moreFragments: offsetFlags&1 != 0,
proto: nextHeader,
l4payload: l4,
headerEndOctets: octets(len(l4)),
}, true
default:
return fragmentMeta{}, false
}
}
// octets rounds a byte length up to whole 8-byte units, the granularity of the
// IP fragment offset field.
func octets(nbytes int) uint16 {
return uint16((nbytes + 7) / 8)
}
// filterInboundFragment decides the fate of an IP fragment. gopacket stops
// decoding at the network layer for every fragment, so the first fragment's
// transport header is decoded and ACL-evaluated here and its verdict recorded;
// the remaining (headerless) fragments inherit that verdict. Anything that
// cannot be tied to an allowed, non-overlapping first fragment is dropped.
func (m *Manager) filterInboundFragment(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, size int) bool {
meta, ok := fragmentMetadata(d, srcIP, dstIP)
if !ok {
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
m.logger.Trace2("dropping unsupported fragment: src=%v dst=%v", srcIP, dstIP)
}
return true
}
if meta.offset != 0 {
return m.filterTrailingFragment(meta, srcIP, dstIP)
}
// A new first fragment supersedes any recorded verdict for this datagram, so
// a re-sent or overlapping offset-zero fragment can't inherit the old one.
m.fragments.poison(meta.key)
// First fragment: decode its transport header so the ACL can evaluate it. A
// decode failure means the fragment is too small to hold the full transport
// header (RFC 1858 §3 tiny-fragment attack); it can't be evaluated, so drop it.
if !d.decodeTransport(meta.proto, meta.l4payload) {
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
m.logger.Trace3("dropping first fragment without full L4 header: src=%v dst=%v id=%v",
srcIP, dstIP, meta.key.id)
}
return true
}
return m.filterFirstFragment(d, meta, srcIP, dstIP, size)
}
// filterTrailingFragment applies a recorded first-fragment verdict to a
// non-first fragment.
func (m *Manager) filterTrailingFragment(meta fragmentMeta, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr) bool {
switch m.fragments.verdict(meta.key, meta.offset) {
case fragmentAllow:
return false
case fragmentOverlap:
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
m.logger.Trace3("dropping overlapping fragment rewriting inspected header: src=%v dst=%v id=%v",
srcIP, dstIP, meta.key.id)
}
return true
default:
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
m.logger.Trace3("dropping fragment with no allowed first fragment: src=%v dst=%v id=%v",
srcIP, dstIP, meta.key.id)
}
return true
}
}
// filterFirstFragment runs the verdict part of the inbound pipeline on a first
// fragment with its transport header decoded. It mirrors filterInboundDecoded
// but skips DNAT (port rewriting on fragments is unsupported) and forwarder
// injection (fragments are left to the stack to reassemble, not forwarded).
// Allowed fragments have their verdict recorded so the datagram's trailing
// fragments inherit it.
func (m *Manager) filterFirstFragment(d *decoder, meta fragmentMeta, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, size int) bool {
if m.stateful && m.isValidTrackedConnection(d, srcIP, dstIP, size) {
m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
return false
}
if m.localipmanager.IsLocalIP(dstIP) {
ruleID, blocked := m.peerACLsBlock(srcIP, d, nil)
if blocked {
m.storeDropFlow("Dropping local first fragment (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
return true
}
m.trackInbound(d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
return false
}
if !m.routingEnabled.Load() {
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
m.logger.Trace2("Dropping routed fragment (routing disabled): src=%s dst=%s", srcIP, dstIP)
}
return true
}
if m.nativeRouter.Load() {
m.trackInbound(d, srcIP, dstIP, nil, size)
m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
return false
}
// TODO: pass fragments of routed packets to the forwarder; until then
// allowed routed fragments go to the native stack.
srcPort, dstPort := getPortsFromPacket(d)
ruleID, pass := m.routeACLsPass(srcIP, dstIP, d.decoded[1], srcPort, dstPort)
if !pass {
m.storeDropFlow("Dropping routed first fragment (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
return true
}
m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
return false
}
// recordFirstFragment caches an allowed first fragment's verdict for its
// trailing fragments to inherit. Atomic fragments (no More Fragments bit) are
// complete datagrams with no trailing fragments, so they are not cached and
// cannot exhaust the verdict table.
func (m *Manager) recordFirstFragment(meta fragmentMeta) {
if !meta.moreFragments {
return
}
m.fragments.recordAllowed(meta.key, meta.headerEndOctets)
}
// storeDropFlow logs and records a netflow drop event for an inbound packet
// denied by the ACLs. msg is the trace format taking rule id, protocol, source
// and destination.
func (m *Manager) storeDropFlow(msg string, d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, ruleID []byte, size int) {
pnum := getProtocolFromPacket(d)
srcPort, dstPort := getPortsFromPacket(d)
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
m.logger.Trace6(msg, ruleID, pnum, srcIP, srcPort, dstIP, dstPort)
}
m.flowLogger.StoreEvent(nftypes.EventFields{
FlowID: uuid.New(),
Type: nftypes.TypeDrop,
RuleID: ruleID,
Direction: nftypes.Ingress,
Protocol: pnum,
SourceIP: srcIP,
DestIP: dstIP,
SourcePort: srcPort,
DestPort: dstPort,
// TODO: icmp type/code
RxPackets: 1,
RxBytes: uint64(size),
})
}
// handleLocalTraffic handles local traffic.
// If it returns true, the packet should be dropped.
func (m *Manager) handleLocalTraffic(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, packetData []byte, size int) bool {
ruleID, blocked := m.peerACLsBlock(srcIP, d, packetData)
if blocked {
m.storeDropFlow("Dropping local packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
pnum := getProtocolFromPacket(d)
srcPort, dstPort := getPortsFromPacket(d)
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
m.logger.Trace6("Dropping local packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
ruleID, pnum, srcIP, srcPort, dstIP, dstPort)
}
m.flowLogger.StoreEvent(nftypes.EventFields{
FlowID: uuid.New(),
Type: nftypes.TypeDrop,
RuleID: ruleID,
Direction: nftypes.Ingress,
Protocol: pnum,
SourceIP: srcIP,
DestIP: dstIP,
SourcePort: srcPort,
DestPort: dstPort,
// TODO: icmp type/code
RxPackets: 1,
RxBytes: uint64(size),
})
return true
}
@@ -1405,8 +1168,27 @@ func (m *Manager) handleRoutedTraffic(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, packe
ruleID, pass := m.routeACLsPass(srcIP, dstIP, protoLayer, srcPort, dstPort)
if !pass {
m.storeDropFlow("Dropping routed packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
proto := getProtocolFromPacket(d)
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
m.logger.Trace6("Dropping routed packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
ruleID, proto, srcIP, srcPort, dstIP, dstPort)
}
m.flowLogger.StoreEvent(nftypes.EventFields{
FlowID: uuid.New(),
Type: nftypes.TypeDrop,
RuleID: ruleID,
Direction: nftypes.Ingress,
Protocol: proto,
SourceIP: srcIP,
DestIP: dstIP,
SourcePort: srcPort,
DestPort: dstPort,
// TODO: icmp type/code
RxPackets: 1,
RxBytes: uint64(size),
})
return true
}

View File

@@ -5,9 +5,7 @@ import (
"fmt"
"net"
"net/netip"
"os"
"runtime"
"strconv"
"sync"
"time"
@@ -33,11 +31,6 @@ const (
defaultMaxInFlight = 1024
iosReceiveWindow = 16384
iosMaxInFlight = 256
// envForceTCPRACK overrides the platform default for gVisor's RACK loss
// detection. Set to a truthy value to force RACK on, or a falsy value to
// force it off, on any platform.
envForceTCPRACK = "NB_FORCE_TCP_RACK"
)
type Forwarder struct {
@@ -159,8 +152,6 @@ func New(iface common.IFaceMapper, logger *nblog.Logger, flowLogger nftypes.Flow
maxInFlight = iosMaxInFlight
}
configureTCPRecovery(s)
tcpForwarder := tcp.NewForwarder(s, receiveWindow, maxInFlight, f.handleTCP)
s.SetTransportProtocolHandler(tcp.ProtocolNumber, tcpForwarder.HandlePacket)
@@ -475,31 +466,3 @@ func probeRawICMP(network, addr string, logger *nblog.Logger) bool {
logger.Debug1("forwarder: raw %s socket access available", network)
return true
}
// configureTCPRecovery disables gVisor's RACK loss detection on Windows, where
// it interacts poorly with the host and collapses throughput on routed TCP
// connections (gVisor issue #9778). Other platforms keep the default. The
// EnvForceTCPRACK environment variable overrides the platform default.
func configureTCPRecovery(s *stack.Stack) {
disableRACK := runtime.GOOS == "windows"
if val := os.Getenv(envForceTCPRACK); val != "" {
force, err := strconv.ParseBool(val)
if err != nil {
log.Warnf("parse %s: %v", envForceTCPRACK, err)
} else {
disableRACK = !force
}
}
if !disableRACK {
return
}
opt := tcpip.TCPRecovery(0)
if err := s.SetTransportProtocolOption(tcp.ProtocolNumber, &opt); err != nil {
log.Warnf("disable TCP RACK loss detection: %v", err)
return
}
log.Info("forwarder: TCP RACK loss detection disabled")
}

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@@ -1,204 +0,0 @@
package uspfilter
import (
"context"
"net/netip"
"os"
"strconv"
"sync"
"time"
nblog "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/uspfilter/log"
)
const (
// defaultFragmentTimeout bounds how long a first-fragment verdict is kept
// while the remaining fragments arrive. It mirrors the Linux IP reassembly
// timeout (net.ipv4.ipfrag_time).
defaultFragmentTimeout = 30 * time.Second
// fragmentCleanupInterval is how often expired verdicts are purged.
fragmentCleanupInterval = 10 * time.Second
// defaultMaxFragmentEntries caps the number of concurrently tracked
// fragmented datagrams. The table stays bounded because each datagram is a
// single small entry regardless of how many fragments it is split into, and
// the 13-bit IPv4 fragment-offset field limits any datagram to 64 KiB.
defaultMaxFragmentEntries = 16384
// EnvFragmentMaxEntries overrides defaultMaxFragmentEntries.
EnvFragmentMaxEntries = "NB_FRAGMENT_MAX_ENTRIES"
)
// fragmentVerdict is the decision for a trailing (headerless) fragment.
type fragmentVerdict int
const (
// fragmentDeny drops the fragment: no allowed first fragment is on record.
fragmentDeny fragmentVerdict = iota
// fragmentAllow passes the fragment: it belongs to an allowed datagram and
// does not overlap the already-inspected transport header.
fragmentAllow
// fragmentOverlap drops the fragment and poisons its datagram: it overlaps
// the transport header the ACL inspected (RFC 1858 §4, RFC 3128; RFC 5722
// requires discarding the whole datagram on overlap for IPv6).
fragmentOverlap
)
// fragmentKey identifies a fragmented datagram. It matches the RFC 791 / RFC
// 8200 reassembly key: source, destination, protocol and identification. The id
// is 32-bit to hold both the IPv4 (16-bit) and IPv6 (32-bit) identification.
type fragmentKey struct {
srcIP netip.Addr
dstIP netip.Addr
id uint32
proto uint8
}
// fragmentEntry records the verdict of an allowed first fragment.
type fragmentEntry struct {
// headerEndOctets is the offset, in 8-byte units, at which the first
// fragment's payload ended. A trailing fragment starting before this
// overlaps bytes the ACL already inspected and is rejected.
headerEndOctets uint16
// recordedAt is when the first fragment was accepted. The verdict expires a
// fixed timeout later and is not refreshed, mirroring the kernel reassembly
// timer so a trailing-fragment flood can't keep a datagram alive.
recordedAt time.Time
}
// fragmentTracker records the ACL verdict of a datagram's first fragment so the
// remaining fragments, which carry no L4 header, can inherit the decision
// without reassembling the datagram. Only allowed first fragments are stored;
// anything that cannot be tied to an allowed, non-overlapping first fragment is
// dropped (fail closed).
type fragmentTracker struct {
logger *nblog.Logger
mutex sync.Mutex
entries map[fragmentKey]fragmentEntry
timeout time.Duration
// maxEntries caps the table; atCapacity dedups the capacity warning until
// the table drains below the cap again.
maxEntries int
atCapacity bool
cleanupTicker *time.Ticker
cancel context.CancelFunc
}
func newFragmentTracker(logger *nblog.Logger) *fragmentTracker {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
t := &fragmentTracker{
logger: logger,
entries: make(map[fragmentKey]fragmentEntry),
timeout: defaultFragmentTimeout,
maxEntries: fragmentMaxEntries(logger),
cleanupTicker: time.NewTicker(fragmentCleanupInterval),
cancel: cancel,
}
go t.cleanupRoutine(ctx)
return t
}
func fragmentMaxEntries(logger *nblog.Logger) int {
v := os.Getenv(EnvFragmentMaxEntries)
if v == "" {
return defaultMaxFragmentEntries
}
n, err := strconv.Atoi(v)
if err != nil || n <= 0 {
logger.Warn2("invalid %s=%q, using default", EnvFragmentMaxEntries, v)
return defaultMaxFragmentEntries
}
return n
}
// recordAllowed stores the verdict of an allowed first fragment. headerEndOctets
// is the first fragment's payload length in 8-byte units. When the table is full
// the record is dropped, which fails closed: the datagram's trailing fragments
// will be denied.
func (t *fragmentTracker) recordAllowed(key fragmentKey, headerEndOctets uint16) {
t.mutex.Lock()
defer t.mutex.Unlock()
if t.entries == nil {
return
}
if _, ok := t.entries[key]; !ok && len(t.entries) >= t.maxEntries {
if !t.atCapacity {
t.atCapacity = true
t.logger.Warn2("fragment verdict table at capacity (%d/%d): trailing fragments of new datagrams will be dropped",
len(t.entries), t.maxEntries)
}
return
}
t.entries[key] = fragmentEntry{
headerEndOctets: headerEndOctets,
recordedAt: time.Now(),
}
}
// poison drops any recorded verdict for a datagram, so its later fragments are
// denied until a new allowed first fragment is recorded. Called on every
// offset-zero fragment to defeat offset-zero overlap rewrites (RFC 3128).
func (t *fragmentTracker) poison(key fragmentKey) {
t.mutex.Lock()
defer t.mutex.Unlock()
delete(t.entries, key)
}
// verdict decides the fate of a trailing fragment at fragOffsetOctets (the IPv4
// fragment offset, in 8-byte units). A fragment overlapping the inspected
// header poisons the datagram: the entry is removed so all further fragments of
// that datagram are denied too.
func (t *fragmentTracker) verdict(key fragmentKey, fragOffsetOctets uint16) fragmentVerdict {
t.mutex.Lock()
defer t.mutex.Unlock()
entry, ok := t.entries[key]
if !ok {
return fragmentDeny
}
if time.Since(entry.recordedAt) > t.timeout {
delete(t.entries, key)
return fragmentDeny
}
if fragOffsetOctets < entry.headerEndOctets {
delete(t.entries, key)
return fragmentOverlap
}
return fragmentAllow
}
func (t *fragmentTracker) cleanupRoutine(ctx context.Context) {
defer t.cleanupTicker.Stop()
for {
select {
case <-t.cleanupTicker.C:
t.cleanup()
case <-ctx.Done():
return
}
}
}
func (t *fragmentTracker) cleanup() {
t.mutex.Lock()
defer t.mutex.Unlock()
for key, entry := range t.entries {
if time.Since(entry.recordedAt) > t.timeout {
delete(t.entries, key)
}
}
if len(t.entries) < t.maxEntries {
t.atCapacity = false
}
}
// Close stops the cleanup routine and releases resources.
func (t *fragmentTracker) Close() {
t.cancel()
t.mutex.Lock()
t.entries = nil
t.mutex.Unlock()
}

View File

@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
package uspfilter
import (
"encoding/binary"
"testing"
)
// benchFilterInbound drives filterInbound over a fixed packet in a tight loop.
// Packets are built once, outside the timed region, so the benchmark measures
// only pipeline cost, which is what an attacker can amplify.
func benchFilterInbound(b *testing.B, pkt []byte) {
b.Helper()
b.ReportAllocs()
b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkt)))
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
m := benchManager
m.filterInbound(pkt, len(pkt))
}
}
// benchManager is a package-level manager reused across fragment benchmarks so
// setup cost stays out of the timed region.
var benchManager *Manager
func setupBenchManager(b *testing.B) *Manager {
b.Helper()
m := newFragmentTestManager(b)
allowUDP(b, m, 8080)
// Disable conntrack so the allowed-first-fragment path measures transport
// decode + ACL every iteration instead of matching the connection tracked
// on the first iteration.
m.stateful = false
benchManager = m
return m
}
// BenchmarkInbound_NormalPacket is the baseline: a full, non-fragmented UDP
// packet that passes the ACL. Fragment paths should stay comparable to this.
func BenchmarkInbound_NormalPacket(b *testing.B) {
setupBenchManager(b)
pkt := normalUDPPacket(b, 8080, 32)
benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
}
// BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentAllowed measures the first-fragment path:
// transport decode + ACL evaluation + verdict record.
func BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentAllowed(b *testing.B) {
setupBenchManager(b)
pkt := firstFragmentUDP(b, 0x2000, 8080, 32)
benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
}
// BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentAllowed measures the common trailing-fragment
// path: a single map lookup after the first fragment is on record.
func BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentAllowed(b *testing.B) {
m := setupBenchManager(b)
first := firstFragmentUDP(b, 0x3000, 8080, 32)
m.filterInbound(first, len(first))
pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x3000, 5, false, 24)
benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
}
// BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentNoFirst is the primary DoS vector: an
// attacker floods trailing fragments with no first fragment on record. Each is
// a map miss and must be cheap.
func BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentNoFirst(b *testing.B) {
setupBenchManager(b)
pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x4000, 185, false, 40)
benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
}
// BenchmarkInbound_TinyFirstFragment measures the tiny-fragment drop path: a
// first fragment too small to decode a transport header.
func BenchmarkInbound_TinyFirstFragment(b *testing.B) {
setupBenchManager(b)
pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x5000, 0, true, 4)
benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
}
// BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentDistinctIDs is the worst case for the
// verdict table: an attacker varies the datagram id on every packet so no first
// fragment ever matches. Verdict lookups always miss and nothing is recorded,
// so the table cannot grow. Each iteration rewrites the id field in place.
func BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentDistinctIDs(b *testing.B) {
setupBenchManager(b)
pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x6000, 185, false, 40)
m := benchManager
b.ReportAllocs()
b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkt)))
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
// IPv4 identification field is at bytes 4:6.
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], uint16(i))
m.filterInbound(pkt, len(pkt))
}
}
// BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentDistinctIDs measures sustained first-fragment
// pressure with distinct ids: transport decode + ACL + verdict insert until the
// table caps, exercising the map growth and capacity guard.
func BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentDistinctIDs(b *testing.B) {
setupBenchManager(b)
pkt := firstFragmentUDP(b, 0x7000, 8080, 32)
m := benchManager
b.ReportAllocs()
b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkt)))
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], uint16(i))
m.filterInbound(pkt, len(pkt))
}
}

View File

@@ -1,554 +0,0 @@
package uspfilter
import (
"encoding/binary"
"net"
"net/netip"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/google/gopacket"
"github.com/google/gopacket/layers"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
fw "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
nbiface "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/device"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
)
const (
fragTestSrc = "100.10.0.1"
fragTestDst = "100.10.0.100"
fragTestSrcV6 = "fd00::1"
fragTestDstV6 = "fd00::100"
)
func newFragmentTestManager(tb testing.TB) *Manager {
tb.Helper()
ifaceMock := &IFaceMock{
SetFilterFunc: func(device.PacketFilter) error { return nil },
AddressFunc: func() wgaddr.Address {
return wgaddr.Address{
IP: netip.MustParseAddr(fragTestDst),
Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("100.10.0.0/16"),
IPv6: netip.MustParseAddr(fragTestDstV6),
IPv6Net: netip.MustParsePrefix("fd00::/64"),
}
},
}
m, err := Create(ifaceMock, false, flowLogger, nbiface.DefaultMTU)
require.NoError(tb, err)
require.NoError(tb, m.UpdateLocalIPs())
tb.Cleanup(func() { require.NoError(tb, m.Close(nil)) })
return m
}
// firstFragmentUDPTo builds the first fragment of a fragmented UDP datagram to
// the given destination: it carries the full UDP header plus payloadLen bytes
// of data, with the More Fragments flag set and offset zero.
func firstFragmentUDPTo(tb testing.TB, dst string, id uint16, dstPort uint16, payloadLen int) []byte {
tb.Helper()
ip := &layers.IPv4{
Version: 4,
TTL: 64,
Id: id,
Protocol: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
SrcIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
DstIP: net.ParseIP(dst),
Flags: layers.IPv4MoreFragments,
}
udp := &layers.UDP{SrcPort: 40000, DstPort: layers.UDPPort(dstPort)}
require.NoError(tb, udp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, udp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, payloadLen))))
return buf.Bytes()
}
func firstFragmentUDP(tb testing.TB, id uint16, dstPort uint16, payloadLen int) []byte {
tb.Helper()
return firstFragmentUDPTo(tb, fragTestDst, id, dstPort, payloadLen)
}
// firstFragmentTCP builds the first fragment of a fragmented TCP datagram: the
// full 20-byte TCP header plus 12 bytes of data, with the More Fragments flag
// set and offset zero.
func firstFragmentTCP(tb testing.TB, id uint16, dstPort uint16) []byte {
tb.Helper()
ip := &layers.IPv4{
Version: 4,
TTL: 64,
Id: id,
Protocol: layers.IPProtocolTCP,
SrcIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
DstIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestDst),
Flags: layers.IPv4MoreFragments,
}
tcp := &layers.TCP{SrcPort: 40000, DstPort: layers.TCPPort(dstPort), SYN: true, Window: 64240}
require.NoError(tb, tcp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, tcp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, 12))))
return buf.Bytes()
}
// trailingFragmentTo builds a non-first fragment to the given destination: an
// IPv4 header at the given fragment offset (in 8-byte units) carrying raw
// payload and no L4 header.
func trailingFragmentTo(tb testing.TB, dst string, proto layers.IPProtocol, id uint16, fragOffsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, payloadLen int) []byte {
tb.Helper()
ip := &layers.IPv4{
Version: 4,
TTL: 64,
Id: id,
Protocol: proto,
SrcIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
DstIP: net.ParseIP(dst),
FragOffset: fragOffsetOctets,
}
if moreFragments {
ip.Flags = layers.IPv4MoreFragments
}
buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{FixLengths: true}
require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, payloadLen))))
return buf.Bytes()
}
func trailingFragment(tb testing.TB, id uint16, fragOffsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, payloadLen int) []byte {
tb.Helper()
return trailingFragmentTo(tb, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolUDP, id, fragOffsetOctets, moreFragments, payloadLen)
}
// outboundUDPPacket builds a complete outbound UDP packet from the local
// address, used to establish conntrack state for reply-direction tests.
func outboundUDPPacket(tb testing.TB, srcPort, dstPort uint16) []byte {
tb.Helper()
ip := &layers.IPv4{
Version: 4,
TTL: 64,
Id: 1,
Protocol: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
SrcIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestDst),
DstIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
}
udp := &layers.UDP{SrcPort: layers.UDPPort(srcPort), DstPort: layers.UDPPort(dstPort)}
require.NoError(tb, udp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, udp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, 16))))
return buf.Bytes()
}
// normalUDPPacket builds a complete, non-fragmented UDP packet for baseline
// comparisons against the fragment paths.
func normalUDPPacket(tb testing.TB, dstPort uint16, payloadLen int) []byte {
tb.Helper()
ip := &layers.IPv4{
Version: 4,
TTL: 64,
Id: 1,
Protocol: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
SrcIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
DstIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestDst),
}
udp := &layers.UDP{SrcPort: 40000, DstPort: layers.UDPPort(dstPort)}
require.NoError(tb, udp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, udp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, payloadLen))))
return buf.Bytes()
}
func allowUDP(tb testing.TB, m *Manager, dstPort uint16) {
tb.Helper()
_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolUDP, nil,
&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{dstPort}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
require.NoError(tb, err)
}
// TestFragment_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped is the core bypass repro: a trailing
// fragment with no allowed first fragment on record must be dropped. Before the
// fix, filterInbound returned false (allow) for any fragment.
func TestFragment_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
frag := trailingFragment(t, 0x1234, 185, false, 40)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(frag, len(frag)),
"trailing fragment without an allowed first fragment must be dropped")
}
// TestFragment_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing verifies that once a first fragment
// passes the ACL, its trailing fragments inherit the allow verdict.
func TestFragment_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
// First fragment: UDP header (8) + 32 payload = 40 octets -> headerEnd = 5.
first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x2222, 8080, 32)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
"allowed first fragment should pass and be recorded")
trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x2222, 5, false, 24)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
"trailing fragment of an allowed datagram should pass")
}
// TestFragment_DeniedFirstDropsTrailing verifies that a first fragment blocked
// by the ACL leaves no verdict, so its trailing fragments are dropped.
func TestFragment_DeniedFirstDropsTrailing(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
// No accept rule: local traffic defaults to deny.
first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x3333, 9999, 32)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
"first fragment to a blocked port should be dropped by the ACL")
trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x3333, 5, false, 24)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
"trailing fragment of a denied datagram must be dropped")
}
// TestFragment_OverlappingHeaderDropped covers the RFC 1858 §4 / RFC 3128
// overlapping-fragment rewrite: a trailing fragment starting inside the range
// the ACL already inspected is dropped and poisons the datagram. TCP is used so
// the overlap lands on real header bytes (the flags at byte 13).
func TestFragment_OverlappingHeaderDropped(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolTCP, nil,
&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
require.NoError(t, err)
// First fragment: TCP header (20) + 12 data = 32 bytes -> headerEnd = 4 octets.
first := firstFragmentTCP(t, 0x4444, 8080)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)))
// Overlapping fragment at offset 1 (byte 8) falls inside the inspected TCP
// header, so it could rewrite the flags or port on reassembly.
overlap := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x4444, 1, true, 32)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(overlap, len(overlap)),
"fragment overlapping the inspected header must be dropped")
// The datagram is now poisoned: a later, non-overlapping fragment is also
// dropped because the verdict was removed.
later := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x4444, 4, false, 24)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(later, len(later)),
"fragments after an overlap must be dropped (datagram poisoned)")
}
// TestFragment_OffsetZeroOverlapPoisons covers the RFC 3128 offset-zero rewrite:
// an allowed first fragment followed by a denied offset-zero fragment for the
// same datagram must not leave the earlier allow verdict in place.
func TestFragment_OffsetZeroOverlapPoisons(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
allowed := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x5A5A, 8080, 32)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(allowed, len(allowed)),
"allowed first fragment should pass and be recorded")
// A second offset-zero fragment to a denied port supersedes the datagram's
// verdict; it is dropped and must not leave the allow in place.
denied := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x5A5A, 9999, 32)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(denied, len(denied)),
"denied offset-zero fragment must be dropped")
trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x5A5A, 5, false, 24)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
"trailing fragment must be denied after the datagram was poisoned")
}
// TestFragment_TinyFirstDropped covers the tiny-fragment attack: a first
// fragment too small to contain the full transport header can't be
// ACL-evaluated and must be dropped.
func TestFragment_TinyFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
// IPv4 header + 4 raw bytes, MF set, offset 0: too small for the 8-byte UDP
// header, so it decodes to L3 only.
tiny := trailingFragment(t, 0x5555, 0, true, 4)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(tiny, len(tiny)),
"tiny first fragment without a full L4 header must be dropped")
}
// TestFragment_TCPFirstFragment verifies the TCP arm of the transport decode: a
// first fragment carrying the full 20-byte TCP header is ACL-evaluated and its
// trailing fragments inherit the verdict.
func TestFragment_TCPFirstFragment(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolTCP, nil,
&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
require.NoError(t, err)
// TCP header (20) + 12 data = 32 bytes -> headerEnd = 4 octets.
first := firstFragmentTCP(t, 0x6666, 8080)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
"allowed TCP first fragment should pass and be recorded")
trailing := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x6666, 4, false, 24)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
"trailing fragment of an allowed TCP datagram should pass")
}
// TestFragment_TCPTinyFirstDropped verifies the TCP minimum header length: 12
// bytes would satisfy a UDP header but falls short of the 20-byte TCP header.
func TestFragment_TCPTinyFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolTCP, nil,
&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
require.NoError(t, err)
tiny := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x7777, 0, true, 12)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(tiny, len(tiny)),
"first fragment shorter than the TCP header must be dropped")
}
// TestFragment_ConntrackAllowsFirstFragment verifies the conntrack branch: reply
// fragments of an outbound-established UDP flow pass without any inbound rule.
func TestFragment_ConntrackAllowsFirstFragment(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
out := outboundUDPPacket(t, 12345, 40000)
require.False(t, m.filterOutbound(out, len(out)))
first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x8888, 12345, 32)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
"reply first fragment should pass via conntrack")
trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x8888, 5, false, 24)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
"trailing fragment of a tracked flow should pass")
}
// TestFragment_RoutingDisabledDropsFragment verifies routed first fragments are
// dropped when routing is disabled.
func TestFragment_RoutingDisabledDropsFragment(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
m.routingEnabled.Store(false)
first := firstFragmentUDPTo(t, "198.51.100.10", 0x9999, 8080, 32)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
"routed first fragment must be dropped when routing is disabled")
}
// TestFragment_RouteACL verifies the route-ACL branch: fragments to a non-local
// destination follow the route rules, allowed datagrams pass their trailing
// fragments and denied ones don't.
func TestFragment_RouteACL(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
m.routingEnabled.Store(true)
m.nativeRouter.Store(false)
_, err := m.AddRouteFiltering(
[]byte("rt-1"),
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("100.10.0.0/16")},
fw.Network{Prefix: netip.MustParsePrefix("198.51.100.0/24")},
fw.ProtocolUDP,
nil,
&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}},
fw.ActionAccept,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
first := firstFragmentUDPTo(t, "198.51.100.10", 0xAAAA, 8080, 32)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
"route-ACL-allowed first fragment should pass")
trailing := trailingFragmentTo(t, "198.51.100.10", layers.IPProtocolUDP, 0xAAAA, 5, false, 24)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
"trailing fragment of an allowed routed datagram should pass")
denied := firstFragmentUDPTo(t, "198.51.100.10", 0xBBBB, 9999, 32)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(denied, len(denied)),
"route-ACL-denied first fragment must be dropped")
deniedTrailing := trailingFragmentTo(t, "198.51.100.10", layers.IPProtocolUDP, 0xBBBB, 5, false, 24)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(deniedTrailing, len(deniedTrailing)),
"trailing fragment of a denied routed datagram must be dropped")
}
// TestFragment_ExpiredVerdictDropsTrailing verifies a verdict older than the
// tracker timeout no longer admits trailing fragments.
func TestFragment_ExpiredVerdictDropsTrailing(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0xCCCC, 8080, 32)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)))
m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
for key, entry := range m.fragments.entries {
entry.recordedAt = time.Now().Add(-defaultFragmentTimeout - time.Second)
m.fragments.entries[key] = entry
}
m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0xCCCC, 5, false, 24)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
"trailing fragment after verdict expiry must be dropped")
}
// TestFragment_CapacityFailsClosed verifies the table cap: at capacity, new
// datagram verdicts are not recorded (their trailing fragments are dropped)
// while already-recorded datagrams keep working.
func TestFragment_CapacityFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
m.fragments.maxEntries = 1
m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
first1 := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x0101, 8080, 32)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first1, len(first1)))
first2 := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x0202, 8080, 32)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first2, len(first2)),
"first fragment itself still passes at capacity")
trailing2 := trailingFragment(t, 0x0202, 5, false, 24)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing2, len(trailing2)),
"trailing fragment of an unrecorded datagram must be dropped at capacity")
trailing1 := trailingFragment(t, 0x0101, 5, false, 24)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing1, len(trailing1)),
"already-recorded datagram should keep passing at capacity")
}
// v6FragmentHeader builds the 8-byte IPv6 fragment extension header for the
// given inner protocol, offset (8-byte units), More Fragments bit and id.
func v6FragmentHeader(proto layers.IPProtocol, offsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, id uint32) []byte {
offsetFlags := offsetOctets << 3
if moreFragments {
offsetFlags |= 1
}
hdr := make([]byte, 8)
hdr[0] = uint8(proto)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[2:4], offsetFlags)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(hdr[4:8], id)
return hdr
}
func v6UDPHeader(dstPort uint16, dataLen int) []byte {
hdr := make([]byte, 8)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[0:2], 40000)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[2:4], dstPort)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[4:6], uint16(8+dataLen))
return hdr
}
// firstFragmentUDPv6 builds the first fragment of a fragmented IPv6 UDP
// datagram: fragment header (offset 0, More Fragments set) + full UDP header +
// data.
func firstFragmentUDPv6(tb testing.TB, id uint32, dstPort uint16, dataLen int) []byte {
tb.Helper()
return fragmentUDPv6(tb, id, dstPort, dataLen, true)
}
// fragmentUDPv6 builds an offset-zero IPv6 UDP fragment. With moreFragments
// false it is an atomic fragment (a complete datagram, RFC 6946).
func fragmentUDPv6(tb testing.TB, id uint32, dstPort uint16, dataLen int, moreFragments bool) []byte {
tb.Helper()
ip := &layers.IPv6{
Version: 6,
NextHeader: layers.IPProtocolIPv6Fragment,
HopLimit: 64,
SrcIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6),
DstIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestDstV6),
}
payload := append(v6FragmentHeader(layers.IPProtocolUDP, 0, moreFragments, id), v6UDPHeader(dstPort, dataLen)...)
payload = append(payload, make([]byte, dataLen)...)
buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, gopacket.SerializeOptions{FixLengths: true}, ip, gopacket.Payload(payload)))
return buf.Bytes()
}
// trailingFragmentV6 builds a non-first IPv6 fragment: fragment header at the
// given offset carrying raw data and no transport header.
func trailingFragmentV6(tb testing.TB, id uint32, offsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, dataLen int) []byte {
tb.Helper()
ip := &layers.IPv6{
Version: 6,
NextHeader: layers.IPProtocolIPv6Fragment,
HopLimit: 64,
SrcIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6),
DstIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestDstV6),
}
payload := append(v6FragmentHeader(layers.IPProtocolUDP, offsetOctets, moreFragments, id), make([]byte, dataLen)...)
buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, gopacket.SerializeOptions{FixLengths: true}, ip, gopacket.Payload(payload)))
return buf.Bytes()
}
// TestFragmentV6_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped verifies the IPv6 bypass is closed:
// a trailing fragment with no allowed first fragment is dropped.
func TestFragmentV6_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
frag := trailingFragmentV6(t, 0xAABBCCDD, 100, false, 40)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(frag, len(frag)),
"IPv6 trailing fragment without an allowed first fragment must be dropped")
}
// TestFragmentV6_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing verifies IPv6 fragments are
// evaluated like IPv4: an allowed first fragment lets its trailing fragments
// through.
func TestFragmentV6_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6), fw.ProtocolUDP, nil,
&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
require.NoError(t, err)
// First fragment: UDP header (8) + 32 data = 40 octets -> headerEnd = 5.
first := firstFragmentUDPv6(t, 0xAABBCCDD, 8080, 32)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
"allowed IPv6 first fragment should pass and be recorded")
trailing := trailingFragmentV6(t, 0xAABBCCDD, 5, false, 24)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
"trailing fragment of an allowed IPv6 datagram should pass")
}
// TestFragmentV6_AtomicNotCached verifies an IPv6 atomic fragment (fragment
// header with offset 0 and no More Fragments, a complete datagram per RFC 6946)
// is evaluated but not recorded, so a flood of allowed atomic fragments can't
// exhaust the verdict table.
func TestFragmentV6_AtomicNotCached(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6), fw.ProtocolUDP, nil,
&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
require.NoError(t, err)
atomic := fragmentUDPv6(t, 0xA70301C, 8080, 16, false)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(atomic, len(atomic)),
"allowed IPv6 atomic fragment should pass")
m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
n := len(m.fragments.entries)
m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
require.Zero(t, n, "atomic fragment must not create a verdict entry")
// A genuine fragmented datagram (More Fragments set) is still recorded.
first := fragmentUDPv6(t, 0xBEEF, 8080, 32, true)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)))
m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
n = len(m.fragments.entries)
m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
require.Equal(t, 1, n, "genuine first fragment must record a verdict")
}

View File

@@ -3,31 +3,14 @@
package netstack
import (
"net"
"fmt"
"os"
"strconv"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
)
const (
EnvUseNetstackMode = "NB_USE_NETSTACK_MODE"
// EnvSocks5ListenerPort overrides the port the SOCKS5 proxy listens on.
EnvSocks5ListenerPort = "NB_SOCKS5_LISTENER_PORT"
// EnvSocks5ListenerAddress overrides the host/IP the SOCKS5 proxy binds to.
// The proxy is a bridge for local host applications into the userspace
// WireGuard netstack, so it binds to loopback by default. Override this only
// when the proxy must be reachable from other hosts (e.g. a container
// gateway); doing so exposes an unauthenticated SOCKS5 proxy on that
// address.
EnvSocks5ListenerAddress = "NB_SOCKS5_LISTENER_ADDRESS"
// defaultSocks5Host is the loopback address the SOCKS5 proxy binds to unless
// overridden via EnvSocks5ListenerAddress.
defaultSocks5Host = "127.0.0.1"
)
const EnvUseNetstackMode = "NB_USE_NETSTACK_MODE"
// IsEnabled todo: move these function to cmd layer
func IsEnabled() bool {
@@ -35,40 +18,24 @@ func IsEnabled() bool {
}
func ListenAddr() string {
return net.JoinHostPort(listenHost(), strconv.Itoa(listenPort()))
}
// listenHost returns the host/IP the SOCKS5 proxy binds to. It defaults to
// loopback and only honors EnvSocks5ListenerAddress when it holds a valid IP.
func listenHost() string {
addr := os.Getenv(EnvSocks5ListenerAddress)
if addr == "" {
return defaultSocks5Host
}
if net.ParseIP(addr) == nil {
log.Warnf("invalid socks5 listener address %q, falling back to default: %s", addr, defaultSocks5Host)
return defaultSocks5Host
}
return addr
}
// listenPort returns the port the SOCKS5 proxy binds to, defaulting to
// DefaultSocks5Port when EnvSocks5ListenerPort is unset or invalid.
func listenPort() int {
sPort := os.Getenv(EnvSocks5ListenerPort)
sPort := os.Getenv("NB_SOCKS5_LISTENER_PORT")
if sPort == "" {
return DefaultSocks5Port
return listenAddr(DefaultSocks5Port)
}
port, err := strconv.Atoi(sPort)
if err != nil {
log.Warnf("invalid socks5 listener port, unable to convert it to int, falling back to default: %d", DefaultSocks5Port)
return DefaultSocks5Port
return listenAddr(DefaultSocks5Port)
}
if port < 1 || port > 65535 {
log.Warnf("invalid socks5 listener port, it should be in the range 1-65535, falling back to default: %d", DefaultSocks5Port)
return DefaultSocks5Port
return listenAddr(DefaultSocks5Port)
}
return port
return listenAddr(port)
}
func listenAddr(port int) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("0.0.0.0:%d", port)
}

View File

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
//go:build !js
package netstack
import (
"net"
"strconv"
"testing"
)
func TestListenAddr_DefaultsToLoopback(t *testing.T) {
// No env overrides: must bind loopback, never all interfaces.
got := ListenAddr()
want := net.JoinHostPort("127.0.0.1", strconv.Itoa(DefaultSocks5Port))
if got != want {
t.Fatalf("ListenAddr() = %q, want %q", got, want)
}
}
func TestListenAddr_AddressOverride(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
env string
want string
}{
{name: "valid override honored", env: "0.0.0.0", want: "0.0.0.0"},
{name: "valid specific ip honored", env: "10.0.0.5", want: "10.0.0.5"},
{name: "ipv6 loopback bracketed", env: "::1", want: "::1"},
{name: "invalid falls back to loopback", env: "not-an-ip", want: "127.0.0.1"},
{name: "empty falls back to loopback", env: "", want: "127.0.0.1"},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(EnvSocks5ListenerAddress, tc.env)
want := net.JoinHostPort(tc.want, strconv.Itoa(DefaultSocks5Port))
if got := ListenAddr(); got != want {
t.Fatalf("ListenAddr() = %q, want %q", got, want)
}
})
}
}
func TestListenAddr_PortOverride(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
env string
want int
}{
{name: "valid port honored", env: "1081", want: 1081},
{name: "non-numeric falls back", env: "abc", want: DefaultSocks5Port},
{name: "out of range falls back", env: "70000", want: DefaultSocks5Port},
{name: "zero falls back", env: "0", want: DefaultSocks5Port},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(EnvSocks5ListenerPort, tc.env)
want := net.JoinHostPort("127.0.0.1", strconv.Itoa(tc.want))
if got := ListenAddr(); got != want {
t.Fatalf("ListenAddr() = %q, want %q", got, want)
}
})
}
}

View File

@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ func (d *DeviceAuthorizationFlow) WaitToken(ctx context.Context, info AuthFlowIn
UseIDToken: d.providerConfig.UseIDToken,
}
err = validateTokenAudience(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), d.providerConfig.Audience)
err = isValidAccessToken(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), d.providerConfig.Audience)
if err != nil {
return TokenInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("validate access token failed with error: %v", err)
}

View File

@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) parseOAuthToken(token *oauth2.Token) (TokenInfo,
audience = p.providerConfig.ClientID
}
if err := validateTokenAudience(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), audience); err != nil {
if err := isValidAccessToken(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), audience); err != nil {
return TokenInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("authentication failed: invalid access token - %w", err)
}
@@ -310,11 +310,6 @@ func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) parseOAuthToken(token *oauth2.Token) (TokenInfo,
return tokenInfo, nil
}
// parseEmailFromIDToken extracts the email (or name) claim from an ID token
// without verifying its signature. The value is best-effort and used only as a
// UX convenience (login hint prefill and display); it never drives an
// authorization decision. The authoritative identity is established server-side
// from the signature-verified token.
func parseEmailFromIDToken(token string) (string, error) {
parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
if len(parts) < 2 {

View File

@@ -20,26 +20,14 @@ func randomBytesInHex(count int) (string, error) {
return hex.EncodeToString(buf), nil
}
// validateTokenAudience checks that the token is a well-formed JWT whose
// audience claim matches the expected audience.
//
// It does NOT verify the token's cryptographic signature and therefore must not
// be treated as an authenticity check. The token is obtained by the client
// directly from the IdP token endpoint over TLS, and its signature is verified
// server-side by the management server against the IdP's JWKS
// (see shared/auth/jwt/validator.go). This function is only a client-side
// sanity check that the returned token targets the expected audience.
func validateTokenAudience(token string, audience string) error {
// isValidAccessToken is a simple validation of the access token
func isValidAccessToken(token string, audience string) error {
if token == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("token received is empty")
}
parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
if len(parts) != 3 {
return fmt.Errorf("token is not a well-formed JWT")
}
claimsString, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1])
encodedClaims := strings.Split(token, ".")[1]
claimsString, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(encodedClaims)
if err != nil {
return err
}

View File

@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
package auth
import (
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"testing"
)
// makeJWT builds an unsigned JWT-shaped string (header.payload.signature) with
// the given claims payload. The signature part is arbitrary because
// validateTokenAudience intentionally does not verify it.
func makeJWT(t *testing.T, claims map[string]interface{}) string {
t.Helper()
header := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(`{"alg":"RS256","typ":"JWT"}`))
payloadBytes, err := json.Marshal(claims)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("marshal claims: %v", err)
}
payload := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(payloadBytes)
return header + "." + payload + ".unverified-signature"
}
func TestValidateTokenAudience(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
token string
audience string
wantErr bool
}{
{
name: "empty token",
token: "",
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "not a JWT - no dots",
token: "notajwt",
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "not a JWT - two parts only",
token: "header.payload",
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "matching string audience",
token: makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": "netbird"}),
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: false,
},
{
name: "mismatching string audience",
token: makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": "other"}),
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "matching audience in array",
token: makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": []interface{}{"other", "netbird"}}),
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: false,
},
{
name: "mismatching audience array",
token: makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": []interface{}{"a", "b"}}),
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "missing audience claim",
token: makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"sub": "user"}),
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "invalid base64 payload",
token: "header.!!!not-base64!!!.sig",
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: true,
},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
err := validateTokenAudience(tc.token, tc.audience)
if tc.wantErr && err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected error, got nil")
}
if !tc.wantErr && err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected no error, got %v", err)
}
})
}
}
// TestValidateTokenAudienceNoPanic guards the regression where a non-empty
// token without the JWT dot structure caused an index-out-of-range panic.
func TestValidateTokenAudienceNoPanic(t *testing.T) {
inputs := []string{"a", ".", "a.", "aaaa", "no-dots-here"}
for _, in := range inputs {
if err := validateTokenAudience(in, "netbird"); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected error for malformed token %q, got nil", in)
}
}
}

View File

@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ func (e *Engine) Start(netbirdConfig *mgmProto.NetbirdConfig, mgmtURL *url.URL)
} else {
log.Infof("running rosenpass in strict mode")
}
e.rpManager, err = rosenpass.NewManager(e.config.PreSharedKey, e.config.WgIfaceName, publicKey)
e.rpManager, err = rosenpass.NewManager(e.config.PreSharedKey, e.config.WgIfaceName)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create rosenpass manager: %w", err)
}

View File

@@ -30,11 +30,6 @@ import (
relayClient "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/relay/client"
)
// wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold is the number of consecutive WireGuard
// handshake timeouts after which the rosenpass state for the peer is
// considered desynced and gets reset.
const wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold = 3
// MetricsRecorder is an interface for recording peer connection metrics
type MetricsRecorder interface {
RecordConnectionStages(
@@ -123,9 +118,6 @@ type Conn struct {
wgWatcher *WGWatcher
wgWatcherWg sync.WaitGroup
wgWatcherCancel context.CancelFunc
// wgTimeouts counts consecutive WireGuard handshake timeouts without a
// successful handshake in between. Guarded by mu.
wgTimeouts int
// used to store the remote Rosenpass key for Relayed connection in case of connection update from ice
rosenpassRemoteKey []byte
@@ -691,29 +683,6 @@ func (conn *Conn) onWGDisconnected() {
default:
conn.Log.Debugf("No active connection to close on WG timeout")
}
conn.escalateWGTimeoutLocked()
}
// escalateWGTimeoutLocked resets the peer's rosenpass state after repeated
// handshake timeouts. With rosenpass enabled, persistent timeouts mean the
// preshared keys have desynced; the renewal exchange runs over the dead
// tunnel and cannot resync them. Reporting the peer disconnected drops its
// rosenpass state, so the next connection configuration programs the
// rendezvous key and the tunnel can bootstrap again. Callers must hold mu.
func (conn *Conn) escalateWGTimeoutLocked() {
if conn.config.RosenpassConfig.PubKey == nil {
return
}
conn.wgTimeouts++
if conn.wgTimeouts < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold || conn.onDisconnected == nil {
return
}
conn.wgTimeouts = 0
conn.Log.Warnf("%d consecutive WireGuard handshake timeouts, resetting rosenpass state for peer", wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold)
conn.onDisconnected(conn.config.WgConfig.RemoteKey)
}
func (conn *Conn) updateRelayStatus(relayServerAddr string, rosenpassPubKey []byte, updateTime time.Time) {
@@ -843,7 +812,7 @@ func (conn *Conn) enableWgWatcherIfNeeded(enabledTime time.Time) {
conn.wgWatcherWg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer conn.wgWatcherWg.Done()
conn.wgWatcher.EnableWgWatcher(wgWatcherCtx, enabledTime, conn.onWGDisconnected, conn.onWGHandshakeSuccess, conn.onWGCheckSuccess)
conn.wgWatcher.EnableWgWatcher(wgWatcherCtx, enabledTime, conn.onWGDisconnected, conn.onWGHandshakeSuccess)
}()
}
@@ -923,15 +892,6 @@ func (conn *Conn) onWGHandshakeSuccess(when time.Time) {
conn.recordConnectionMetrics()
}
// onWGCheckSuccess is called for every watcher check that observed a fresh
// handshake, including handshakes of connections that were already up when
// the watcher started.
func (conn *Conn) onWGCheckSuccess() {
conn.mu.Lock()
conn.wgTimeouts = 0
conn.mu.Unlock()
}
// recordConnectionMetrics records connection stage timestamps as metrics
func (conn *Conn) recordConnectionMetrics() {
if conn.metricsRecorder == nil {

View File

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface"
@@ -305,84 +304,3 @@ func TestConn_presharedKey_RosenpassManaged(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("expected non-nil presharedKey before Rosenpass manages PSK")
}
}
func newWGTimeoutTestConn(rosenpassEnabled bool, disconnected *[]string) *Conn {
cfg := ConnConfig{
Key: "LLHf3Ma6z6mdLbriAJbqhX7+nM/B71lgw2+91q3LfhU=",
LocalKey: "RRHf3Ma6z6mdLbriAJbqhX7+nM/B71lgw2+91q3LfhU=",
WgConfig: WgConfig{RemoteKey: "LLHf3Ma6z6mdLbriAJbqhX7+nM/B71lgw2+91q3LfhU="},
}
if rosenpassEnabled {
cfg.RosenpassConfig = RosenpassConfig{PubKey: []byte("dummykey")}
}
conn := &Conn{
ctx: context.Background(),
config: cfg,
Log: log.WithField("peer", cfg.Key),
metricsStages: &MetricsStages{},
}
conn.SetOnDisconnected(func(remotePeer string) {
*disconnected = append(*disconnected, remotePeer)
})
return conn
}
// TestConn_onWGDisconnected_EscalatesToRosenpassReset: repeated handshake
// timeouts with rosenpass enabled mean the preshared keys have desynced. The
// renewal exchange runs over the dead tunnel and cannot resync them, so after
// wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold consecutive timeouts the conn must report the
// peer disconnected, dropping its rosenpass state so the next configuration
// programs the rendezvous key.
func TestConn_onWGDisconnected_EscalatesToRosenpassReset(t *testing.T) {
var disconnected []string
conn := newWGTimeoutTestConn(true, &disconnected)
for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
conn.onWGDisconnected()
}
assert.Empty(t, disconnected, "escalation must not fire below the threshold")
conn.onWGDisconnected()
assert.Equal(t, []string{conn.config.WgConfig.RemoteKey}, disconnected,
"reaching the threshold must report the peer disconnected once")
for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
conn.onWGDisconnected()
}
assert.Len(t, disconnected, 1, "escalation must restart counting after firing")
conn.onWGDisconnected()
assert.Len(t, disconnected, 2, "continued timeouts must escalate again")
}
// TestConn_onWGDisconnected_CheckSuccessResetsEscalation: a successful
// handshake between timeouts means the tunnel recovered; the counter must
// start over.
func TestConn_onWGDisconnected_CheckSuccessResetsEscalation(t *testing.T) {
var disconnected []string
conn := newWGTimeoutTestConn(true, &disconnected)
for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
conn.onWGDisconnected()
}
conn.onWGCheckSuccess()
for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
conn.onWGDisconnected()
}
assert.Empty(t, disconnected, "handshake success must reset the timeout count")
}
// TestConn_onWGDisconnected_NoEscalationWithoutRosenpass: without rosenpass
// there is no per-peer key state to reset; repeated timeouts must not report
// disconnects.
func TestConn_onWGDisconnected_NoEscalationWithoutRosenpass(t *testing.T) {
var disconnected []string
conn := newWGTimeoutTestConn(false, &disconnected)
for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold*3; i++ {
conn.onWGDisconnected()
}
assert.Empty(t, disconnected, "escalation must be limited to rosenpass connections")
}

View File

@@ -71,11 +71,9 @@ func (w *WGWatcher) PrepareInitialHandshake() (ok bool) {
// EnableWgWatcher runs the WireGuard watcher loop using the handshake baseline captured by
// PrepareInitialHandshake. The watcher runs until ctx is cancelled. Caller is responsible
// for context lifecycle management. onHandshakeSuccessFn is called only for the first
// handshake observed by this run, onCheckSuccessFn for every check that observed a fresh
// handshake, including the first.
func (w *WGWatcher) EnableWgWatcher(ctx context.Context, enabledTime time.Time, onDisconnectedFn func(), onHandshakeSuccessFn func(when time.Time), onCheckSuccessFn func()) {
w.periodicHandshakeCheck(ctx, onDisconnectedFn, onHandshakeSuccessFn, onCheckSuccessFn, enabledTime, w.initialHandshake)
// for context lifecycle management.
func (w *WGWatcher) EnableWgWatcher(ctx context.Context, enabledTime time.Time, onDisconnectedFn func(), onHandshakeSuccessFn func(when time.Time)) {
w.periodicHandshakeCheck(ctx, onDisconnectedFn, onHandshakeSuccessFn, enabledTime, w.initialHandshake)
w.muEnabled.Lock()
w.enabled = false
@@ -92,7 +90,7 @@ func (w *WGWatcher) Reset() {
}
// wgStateCheck help to check the state of the WireGuard handshake and relay connection
func (w *WGWatcher) periodicHandshakeCheck(ctx context.Context, onDisconnectedFn func(), onHandshakeSuccessFn func(when time.Time), onCheckSuccessFn func(), enabledTime time.Time, initialHandshake time.Time) {
func (w *WGWatcher) periodicHandshakeCheck(ctx context.Context, onDisconnectedFn func(), onHandshakeSuccessFn func(when time.Time), enabledTime time.Time, initialHandshake time.Time) {
w.log.Infof("WireGuard watcher started")
timer := time.NewTimer(wgHandshakeOvertime)
@@ -119,10 +117,6 @@ func (w *WGWatcher) periodicHandshakeCheck(ctx context.Context, onDisconnectedFn
}
}
if onCheckSuccessFn != nil && ctx.Err() == nil {
onCheckSuccessFn()
}
lastHandshake = *handshake
resetTime := time.Until(handshake.Add(checkPeriod))

View File

@@ -24,72 +24,6 @@ func (m *MocWgIface) disconnect() {
m.stop = true
}
type mockHandshakeStats struct {
mu sync.Mutex
handshake time.Time
}
func (m *mockHandshakeStats) GetStats() (map[string]configurer.WGStats, error) {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
return map[string]configurer.WGStats{"": {LastHandshake: m.handshake}}, nil
}
func (m *mockHandshakeStats) advance() {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
m.handshake = time.Now()
}
// TestWGWatcher_CheckSuccessCallback: onCheckSuccessFn must fire for a fresh
// handshake even when the watcher started with an existing handshake baseline,
// the case where onHandshakeSuccessFn stays silent.
func TestWGWatcher_CheckSuccessCallback(t *testing.T) {
// checkPeriod bounds how stale a handshake may be before the watcher treats it
// as a suspended-machine timeout. The first check fires after wgHandshakeOvertime,
// so keep checkPeriod well above any scheduling jitter to avoid a false timeout
// converting the expected success into a disconnect on a loaded runner.
checkPeriod = 1 * time.Minute
wgHandshakeOvertime = 1 * time.Second
mlog := log.WithField("peer", "tet")
// Use an old baseline so advance() yields a strictly newer handshake even on
// platforms with coarse clock resolution (Windows), where two time.Now() calls
// microseconds apart can return the same instant and read as a timed-out handshake.
stats := &mockHandshakeStats{handshake: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)}
watcher := NewWGWatcher(mlog, stats, "", newStateDump("peer", mlog, &Status{}))
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
require.True(t, watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake())
firstHandshake := make(chan struct{}, 1)
checkSuccess := make(chan struct{}, 1)
go watcher.EnableWgWatcher(ctx, time.Now(), func() {}, func(when time.Time) {
firstHandshake <- struct{}{}
}, func() {
select {
case checkSuccess <- struct{}{}:
default:
}
})
stats.advance()
select {
case <-checkSuccess:
case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
t.Errorf("timeout waiting for check success callback")
}
select {
case <-firstHandshake:
t.Errorf("first-handshake callback must not fire for a non-zero baseline")
default:
}
}
func TestWGWatcher_EnableWgWatcher(t *testing.T) {
checkPeriod = 5 * time.Second
wgHandshakeOvertime = 1 * time.Second
@@ -110,7 +44,7 @@ func TestWGWatcher_EnableWgWatcher(t *testing.T) {
onDisconnected <- struct{}{}
}, func(when time.Time) {
mlog.Infof("onHandshakeSuccess: %v", when)
}, nil)
})
// wait for initial reading
time.Sleep(2 * time.Second)
@@ -139,7 +73,7 @@ func TestWGWatcher_ReEnable(t *testing.T) {
wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
watcher.EnableWgWatcher(ctx, time.Now(), func() {}, func(when time.Time) {}, nil)
watcher.EnableWgWatcher(ctx, time.Now(), func() {}, func(when time.Time) {})
}()
cancel()
@@ -155,7 +89,7 @@ func TestWGWatcher_ReEnable(t *testing.T) {
onDisconnected := make(chan struct{}, 1)
go watcher.EnableWgWatcher(ctx, time.Now(), func() {
onDisconnected <- struct{}{}
}, func(when time.Time) {}, nil)
}, func(when time.Time) {})
time.Sleep(2 * time.Second)
mocWgIface.disconnect()

View File

@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ type rpServer interface {
type Manager struct {
ifaceName string
localWgKey wgtypes.Key
spk []byte
ssk []byte
rpKeyHash string
@@ -52,9 +51,8 @@ type Manager struct {
wgIface PresharedKeySetter
}
// NewManager creates a new Rosenpass manager. localWgKey is the local
// WireGuard public key, used to derive the per-peer rendezvous key.
func NewManager(preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key, wgIfaceName string, localWgKey wgtypes.Key) (*Manager, error) {
// NewManager creates a new Rosenpass manager
func NewManager(preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key, wgIfaceName string) (*Manager, error) {
public, secret, err := rp.GenerateKeyPair()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -64,7 +62,6 @@ func NewManager(preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key, wgIfaceName string, localWgKey wgtype
log.Tracef("generated new rosenpass key pair with public key %s", rpKeyHash)
return &Manager{
ifaceName: wgIfaceName,
localWgKey: localWgKey,
rpKeyHash: rpKeyHash,
spk: public,
ssk: secret,
@@ -76,7 +73,7 @@ func NewManager(preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key, wgIfaceName string, localWgKey wgtype
// nil receiver in addPeer -> m.rpWgHandler.AddPeer. generateConfig will
// replace it with a fresh handler on each Run() to clear stale peer
// state from previous engine sessions.
rpWgHandler: NewNetbirdHandler((*[32]byte)(preSharedKey), localWgKey),
rpWgHandler: NewNetbirdHandler(),
lock: sync.Mutex{},
}, nil
}
@@ -164,7 +161,7 @@ func (m *Manager) generateConfig() (rp.Config, error) {
cfg.Peers = []rp.PeerConfig{}
m.lock.Lock()
m.rpWgHandler = NewNetbirdHandler(m.preSharedKey, m.localWgKey)
m.rpWgHandler = NewNetbirdHandler()
if m.wgIface != nil {
m.rpWgHandler.SetInterface(m.wgIface)
}

View File

@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ func newTestManager(spkFirstByte byte, mock *mockServer) *Manager {
ssk: make([]byte, 32),
rpKeyHash: "test-hash",
rpPeerIDs: make(map[string]*rp.PeerID),
rpWgHandler: NewNetbirdHandler(nil, wgtypes.Key{0x01}),
rpWgHandler: NewNetbirdHandler(),
server: mock,
}
}
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ func TestAddPeer_NilServer_ReturnsErrorNoCrash(t *testing.T) {
// issue #4341 cannot occur in the window between NewManager and Run().
func TestNewManager_PreInitializesHandler(t *testing.T) {
psk := wgtypes.Key{}
m, err := NewManager(&psk, "wt0", wgtypes.Key{0x01})
m, err := NewManager(&psk, "wt0")
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, m.rpWgHandler, "rpWgHandler must be initialized in NewManager")
}
@@ -329,10 +329,10 @@ func TestIsPresharedKeyInitialized_AddedButNotHandshaken_ReturnsFalse(t *testing
require.False(t, m.IsPresharedKeyInitialized(wgKey))
}
// --- NetbirdHandler.applyKey ----------------------------------------------
// --- NetbirdHandler.outputKey ----------------------------------------------
func TestHandler_ApplyKey_FirstCallUsesUpdateOnlyFalse(t *testing.T) {
h := NewNetbirdHandler(nil, wgtypes.Key{0x01})
func TestHandler_OutputKey_FirstCallUsesUpdateOnlyFalse(t *testing.T) {
h := NewNetbirdHandler()
iface := &mockIface{}
h.SetInterface(iface)
@@ -348,8 +348,8 @@ func TestHandler_ApplyKey_FirstCallUsesUpdateOnlyFalse(t *testing.T) {
require.Equal(t, wgKey.String(), iface.calls[0].peerKey)
}
func TestHandler_ApplyKey_SubsequentCallsUseUpdateOnlyTrue(t *testing.T) {
h := NewNetbirdHandler(nil, wgtypes.Key{0x01})
func TestHandler_OutputKey_SubsequentCallsUseUpdateOnlyTrue(t *testing.T) {
h := NewNetbirdHandler()
iface := &mockIface{}
h.SetInterface(iface)
@@ -364,8 +364,8 @@ func TestHandler_ApplyKey_SubsequentCallsUseUpdateOnlyTrue(t *testing.T) {
require.True(t, iface.calls[1].updateOnly, "subsequent rotations must use updateOnly=true")
}
func TestHandler_ApplyKey_NilInterface_NoCrashNoCall(t *testing.T) {
h := NewNetbirdHandler(nil, wgtypes.Key{0x01})
func TestHandler_OutputKey_NilInterface_NoCrashNoCall(t *testing.T) {
h := NewNetbirdHandler()
// no SetInterface — iface remains nil
pid := rp.PeerID{0x03}
h.AddPeer(pid, "wt0", rp.Key(wgtypes.Key{}))
@@ -374,8 +374,8 @@ func TestHandler_ApplyKey_NilInterface_NoCrashNoCall(t *testing.T) {
h.HandshakeCompleted(pid, rp.Key{})
}
func TestHandler_ApplyKey_UnknownPeer_NoCall(t *testing.T) {
h := NewNetbirdHandler(nil, wgtypes.Key{0x01})
func TestHandler_OutputKey_UnknownPeer_NoCall(t *testing.T) {
h := NewNetbirdHandler()
iface := &mockIface{}
h.SetInterface(iface)
@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ func TestHandler_ApplyKey_UnknownPeer_NoCall(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestHandler_RemovePeer_ClearsInitializedState(t *testing.T) {
h := NewNetbirdHandler(nil, wgtypes.Key{0x01})
h := NewNetbirdHandler()
iface := &mockIface{}
h.SetInterface(iface)
@@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ func TestHandler_RemovePeer_ClearsInitializedState(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestHandler_SetInterfaceAfterAddPeer_StillReceivesKey(t *testing.T) {
h := NewNetbirdHandler(nil, wgtypes.Key{0x01})
h := NewNetbirdHandler()
pid := rp.PeerID{0x05}
wgKey := wgtypes.Key{0xEE}
h.AddPeer(pid, "wt0", rp.Key(wgKey))

View File

@@ -18,34 +18,19 @@ type PresharedKeySetter interface {
type wireGuardPeer struct {
Interface string
PublicKey rp.Key
// initialized is true once a completed exchange has set a
// Rosenpass-managed PSK for this peer.
initialized bool
// chainKey is the key output by the last completed exchange, advanced by
// one ratchet step on expiry. Nil until the first exchange completes and
// after the peer has fallen back to the rendezvous key.
chainKey *wgtypes.Key
// expiries counts failed renewals since the last completed exchange.
expiries int
}
type NetbirdHandler struct {
mu sync.Mutex
iface PresharedKeySetter
// preSharedKey is the account-level preshared key, used as the rendezvous
// key when set. Nil means the deterministic seed key is used instead.
preSharedKey *[32]byte
// localWgKey is the local WireGuard public key, one of the two inputs to
// the deterministic seed key.
localWgKey wgtypes.Key
peers map[rp.PeerID]*wireGuardPeer
mu sync.Mutex
iface PresharedKeySetter
peers map[rp.PeerID]wireGuardPeer
initializedPeers map[rp.PeerID]bool
}
func NewNetbirdHandler(preSharedKey *[32]byte, localWgKey wgtypes.Key) *NetbirdHandler {
func NewNetbirdHandler() *NetbirdHandler {
return &NetbirdHandler{
preSharedKey: preSharedKey,
localWgKey: localWgKey,
peers: map[rp.PeerID]*wireGuardPeer{},
peers: map[rp.PeerID]wireGuardPeer{},
initializedPeers: map[rp.PeerID]bool{},
}
}
@@ -57,16 +42,10 @@ func (h *NetbirdHandler) SetInterface(iface PresharedKeySetter) {
h.iface = iface
}
// AddPeer registers a peer with the handler. Re-adding a known peer (every
// reconnection does) keeps its key recovery state.
func (h *NetbirdHandler) AddPeer(pid rp.PeerID, intf string, pk rp.Key) {
h.mu.Lock()
defer h.mu.Unlock()
if existing, ok := h.peers[pid]; ok && existing.PublicKey == pk {
existing.Interface = intf
return
}
h.peers[pid] = &wireGuardPeer{
h.peers[pid] = wireGuardPeer{
Interface: intf,
PublicKey: pk,
}
@@ -76,6 +55,7 @@ func (h *NetbirdHandler) RemovePeer(pid rp.PeerID) {
h.mu.Lock()
defer h.mu.Unlock()
delete(h.peers, pid)
delete(h.initializedPeers, pid)
}
// IsPeerInitialized returns true if Rosenpass has completed a handshake
@@ -83,120 +63,50 @@ func (h *NetbirdHandler) RemovePeer(pid rp.PeerID) {
func (h *NetbirdHandler) IsPeerInitialized(pid rp.PeerID) bool {
h.mu.Lock()
defer h.mu.Unlock()
peer, ok := h.peers[pid]
return ok && peer.initialized
return h.initializedPeers[pid]
}
// HandshakeCompleted programs the freshly exchanged output key and resets the
// peer's key recovery state.
func (h *NetbirdHandler) HandshakeCompleted(pid rp.PeerID, key rp.Key) {
psk := wgtypes.Key(key)
h.mu.Lock()
defer h.mu.Unlock()
peer, ok := h.peers[pid]
if !ok {
return
}
if peer.expiries > 0 {
log.Infof("rosenpass exchange completed for peer %s after %d expired renewals", wgtypes.Key(peer.PublicKey), peer.expiries)
}
// chainKey tracks the shared exchange output regardless of the local write
// outcome, so both ends still converge on the next expiry.
peer.chainKey = &psk
peer.expiries = 0
if !h.applyKeyLocked(pid, psk, peer.initialized) {
return
}
peer.initialized = true
h.outputKey(rp.KeyOutputReasonStale, pid, key)
}
// HandshakeExpired replaces the expired key. The renewal exchange runs over
// the tunnel keyed by the PSK itself, so the replacement must be derivable on
// both ends without communication: the first expiry ratchets the last shared
// key forward, repeated expiries (and expiries without a completed exchange)
// fall back to the rendezvous key and drop the peer out of the initialized
// state so connection reconfigurations reprogram the rendezvous key as well.
func (h *NetbirdHandler) HandshakeExpired(pid rp.PeerID) {
key, _ := rp.GeneratePresharedKey()
h.outputKey(rp.KeyOutputReasonStale, pid, key)
}
func (h *NetbirdHandler) outputKey(_ rp.KeyOutputReason, pid rp.PeerID, psk rp.Key) {
h.mu.Lock()
defer h.mu.Unlock()
iface := h.iface
wg, ok := h.peers[pid]
isInitialized := h.initializedPeers[pid]
h.mu.Unlock()
peer, ok := h.peers[pid]
if !ok {
return
}
peer.expiries++
var psk wgtypes.Key
if peer.chainKey != nil && peer.expiries == 1 {
log.Infof("rosenpass key for peer %s expired without renewal, advancing to ratcheted key", wgtypes.Key(peer.PublicKey))
psk = RatchetKey(*peer.chainKey)
peer.chainKey = &psk
} else {
rendezvous, err := h.rendezvousKey(peer)
if err != nil {
// Fail closed: without a rendezvous key the expired key must
// still be rotated out, even if the replacement is unusable.
log.Errorf("failed to derive rendezvous key, replacing expired key with a random one: %v", err)
h.applyRandomKeyLocked(pid)
return
}
log.Warnf("rosenpass key for peer %s expired %d times without renewal, falling back to the rendezvous key", wgtypes.Key(peer.PublicKey), peer.expiries)
psk = rendezvous
peer.chainKey = nil
peer.initialized = false
}
h.applyKeyLocked(pid, psk, true)
}
// rendezvousKey returns the key both ends converge on without communication:
// the account-level preshared key when configured, the deterministic seed key
// otherwise. It mirrors the key that peer connections program when Rosenpass
// does not manage the peer yet.
func (h *NetbirdHandler) rendezvousKey(peer *wireGuardPeer) (wgtypes.Key, error) {
if h.preSharedKey != nil {
return *h.preSharedKey, nil
}
seed, err := DeterministicSeedKey(h.localWgKey.String(), wgtypes.Key(peer.PublicKey).String())
if err != nil {
return wgtypes.Key{}, err
}
return *seed, nil
}
// applyKeyLocked writes the preshared key for the peer to the WireGuard
// interface and reports whether the write succeeded. Callers must hold h.mu
// for the whole state-mutation-plus-write so that a concurrent completion and
// expiry cannot reorder their writes relative to the in-memory chain key.
func (h *NetbirdHandler) applyKeyLocked(pid rp.PeerID, psk wgtypes.Key, updateOnly bool) bool {
peer, ok := h.peers[pid]
if !ok {
return false
}
if h.iface == nil {
if iface == nil {
log.Warn("rosenpass: interface not set, cannot update preshared key")
return false
}
peerKey := wgtypes.Key(peer.PublicKey).String()
if err := h.iface.SetPresharedKey(peerKey, psk, updateOnly); err != nil {
log.Errorf("Failed to apply rosenpass key: %v", err)
return false
}
return true
}
func (h *NetbirdHandler) applyRandomKeyLocked(pid rp.PeerID) {
key, err := rp.GeneratePresharedKey()
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("failed to generate random preshared key: %v", err)
return
}
h.applyKeyLocked(pid, wgtypes.Key(key), true)
if !ok {
return
}
peerKey := wgtypes.Key(wg.PublicKey).String()
pskKey := wgtypes.Key(psk)
// Use updateOnly=true for later rotations (peer already has Rosenpass PSK)
// Use updateOnly=false for first rotation (peer has original/empty PSK)
if err := iface.SetPresharedKey(peerKey, pskKey, isInitialized); err != nil {
log.Errorf("Failed to apply rosenpass key: %v", err)
return
}
// Mark peer as isInitialized after the successful first rotation
if !isInitialized {
h.mu.Lock()
if _, exists := h.peers[pid]; exists {
h.initializedPeers[pid] = true
}
h.mu.Unlock()
}
}

View File

@@ -1,250 +0,0 @@
package rosenpass
import (
"testing"
rp "cunicu.li/go-rosenpass"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
)
// handlerTestLink wires two NetbirdHandlers as the two ends of a single
// tunnel: handler A manages the rosenpass peer B and vice versa, the way two
// NetBird clients see each other.
type handlerTestLink struct {
handlerA, handlerB *NetbirdHandler
ifaceA, ifaceB *mockIface
pidA, pidB rp.PeerID
wgKeyA, wgKeyB wgtypes.Key
}
func newHandlerTestLink(t *testing.T, preSharedKey *[32]byte) *handlerTestLink {
t.Helper()
link := &handlerTestLink{
ifaceA: &mockIface{},
ifaceB: &mockIface{},
}
link.pidA[0] = 0xaa
link.pidB[0] = 0xbb
link.wgKeyA[31] = 1
link.wgKeyB[31] = 2
link.handlerA = NewNetbirdHandler(preSharedKey, link.wgKeyA)
link.handlerB = NewNetbirdHandler(preSharedKey, link.wgKeyB)
link.handlerA.SetInterface(link.ifaceA)
link.handlerB.SetInterface(link.ifaceB)
link.handlerA.AddPeer(link.pidB, "wt0", rp.Key(link.wgKeyB))
link.handlerB.AddPeer(link.pidA, "wt0", rp.Key(link.wgKeyA))
return link
}
// complete simulates a completed rosenpass exchange: both ends derive the
// same output key.
func (l *handlerTestLink) complete(osk rp.Key) {
l.handlerA.HandshakeCompleted(l.pidB, osk)
l.handlerB.HandshakeCompleted(l.pidA, osk)
}
// expire simulates a failed key renewal on both ends.
func (l *handlerTestLink) expire() {
l.handlerA.HandshakeExpired(l.pidB)
l.handlerB.HandshakeExpired(l.pidA)
}
func lastPSK(t *testing.T, m *mockIface) wgtypes.Key {
t.Helper()
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
require.NotEmpty(t, m.calls, "expected at least one SetPresharedKey call")
return m.calls[len(m.calls)-1].psk
}
func TestHandshakeCompleted_SetsKeyAndInitializes(t *testing.T) {
link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
var osk rp.Key
osk[0] = 0x42
link.complete(osk)
require.Equal(t, wgtypes.Key(osk), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA), "completed exchange must program the osk")
require.False(t, link.ifaceA.calls[0].updateOnly, "first rotation must not be update-only")
require.True(t, link.handlerA.IsPeerInitialized(link.pidB), "peer must be initialized after first completed exchange")
link.complete(osk)
require.True(t, link.ifaceA.calls[1].updateOnly, "later rotations must be update-only")
}
// TestHandshakeExpired_BothSidesConverge encodes the core recovery invariant:
// rosenpass renewals run over the tunnel that the PSK itself keys, so when a
// renewal fails on both ends, both ends must fall back to the same key or the
// tunnel can never handshake again.
func TestHandshakeExpired_BothSidesConverge(t *testing.T) {
link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
var osk rp.Key
osk[0] = 0x42
link.complete(osk)
link.expire()
keyA := lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA)
keyB := lastPSK(t, link.ifaceB)
require.NotEqual(t, wgtypes.Key(osk), keyA, "expired key must be rotated out")
require.Equal(t, keyA, keyB, "both ends must converge on the same key after expiry")
link.expire()
require.Equal(t, lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceB),
"both ends must still converge after repeated expiries")
}
// TestHandshakeExpired_ExpiryWithoutCompletionConverges covers the bootstrap
// case: the initial exchange never completed (the tunnel ran on the rendezvous
// key), so an expiry must not replace the working key with an unrecoverable
// one on either end.
func TestHandshakeExpired_ExpiryWithoutCompletionConverges(t *testing.T) {
link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
link.expire()
require.Equal(t, lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceB),
"both ends must converge when the exchange never completed")
}
// TestHandshakeExpired_RepeatedExpiryClearsInitialized: once renewals keep
// failing, the peer must drop out of the initialized state so the next
// connection reconfiguration reprograms the rendezvous key instead of
// preserving a poisoned rosenpass-managed key.
func TestHandshakeExpired_RepeatedExpiryClearsInitialized(t *testing.T) {
link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
var osk rp.Key
osk[0] = 0x42
link.complete(osk)
link.expire()
link.expire()
require.False(t, link.handlerA.IsPeerInitialized(link.pidB),
"repeated expiries must clear the initialized state")
require.False(t, link.handlerB.IsPeerInitialized(link.pidA),
"repeated expiries must clear the initialized state")
}
// TestHandshakeCompleted_AfterExpiryRecovers: a completed exchange after a
// desync must fully reset the recovery state.
func TestHandshakeCompleted_AfterExpiryRecovers(t *testing.T) {
link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
var osk1, osk2 rp.Key
osk1[0] = 1
osk2[0] = 2
link.complete(osk1)
link.expire()
link.expire()
link.complete(osk2)
require.Equal(t, wgtypes.Key(osk2), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA), "new exchange must program the fresh osk")
require.True(t, link.handlerA.IsPeerInitialized(link.pidB), "peer must be initialized again after recovery")
link.expire()
require.Equal(t, lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceB),
"recovered link must converge again on the next expiry")
require.NotEqual(t, wgtypes.Key(osk2), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA), "expired key must be rotated out")
}
// TestHandshakeExpired_FirstExpiryRatchetsLastKey: the first expiry must
// derive the replacement from the last shared key, so an attacker who only
// blocks the renewal exchange gains nothing over the previous key.
func TestHandshakeExpired_FirstExpiryRatchetsLastKey(t *testing.T) {
link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
var osk rp.Key
osk[0] = 0x42
link.complete(osk)
link.expire()
require.Equal(t, RatchetKey(wgtypes.Key(osk)), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA),
"first expiry must program the ratcheted key")
require.True(t, link.handlerA.IsPeerInitialized(link.pidB),
"ratchet step must keep the peer initialized so reconfigurations preserve the key")
}
// TestHandshakeExpired_RepeatedExpiryFallsBackToSeed: once the ratchet key
// also fails, both ends must land on the same key that peer connections
// program for uninitialized peers, so a reconnect completes the recovery.
func TestHandshakeExpired_RepeatedExpiryFallsBackToSeed(t *testing.T) {
link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
var osk rp.Key
osk[0] = 0x42
link.complete(osk)
link.expire()
link.expire()
seed, err := DeterministicSeedKey(link.wgKeyA.String(), link.wgKeyB.String())
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, *seed, lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA), "repeated expiry must fall back to the seed key")
require.Equal(t, *seed, lastPSK(t, link.ifaceB), "repeated expiry must fall back to the seed key")
}
// TestHandshakeExpired_ConfiguredPSKUsedAsRendezvous: with an account-level
// preshared key configured, the fallback must be that key, matching what peer
// connections program for uninitialized peers.
func TestHandshakeExpired_ConfiguredPSKUsedAsRendezvous(t *testing.T) {
psk := &[32]byte{0x77}
link := newHandlerTestLink(t, psk)
var osk rp.Key
osk[0] = 0x42
link.complete(osk)
link.expire()
link.expire()
require.Equal(t, wgtypes.Key(*psk), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA),
"fallback must be the configured preshared key")
require.Equal(t, wgtypes.Key(*psk), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceB),
"fallback must be the configured preshared key on both ends")
}
// TestHandshakeExpired_ExpiryWritesAreUpdateOnly: expiry replacements must
// never create a WireGuard peer that connection management has removed.
func TestHandshakeExpired_ExpiryWritesAreUpdateOnly(t *testing.T) {
link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
var osk rp.Key
osk[0] = 0x42
link.complete(osk)
link.expire()
link.expire()
for _, call := range link.ifaceA.calls[1:] {
require.True(t, call.updateOnly, "expiry writes must be update-only")
}
}
// TestAddPeer_ReAddKeepsRecoveryState: reconnections re-add the peer on every
// OnConnected; that must not reset the expiry chain state.
func TestAddPeer_ReAddKeepsRecoveryState(t *testing.T) {
link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
var osk rp.Key
osk[0] = 0x42
link.complete(osk)
link.expire()
link.handlerA.AddPeer(link.pidB, "wt0", rp.Key(link.wgKeyB))
require.True(t, link.handlerA.IsPeerInitialized(link.pidB),
"re-adding a known peer must keep its state")
link.expire()
seed, err := DeterministicSeedKey(link.wgKeyA.String(), link.wgKeyB.String())
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, *seed, lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA),
"second expiry after re-add must continue to the seed fallback")
}

View File

@@ -1,28 +1,11 @@
package rosenpass
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"fmt"
"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
)
// ratchetLabel domain-separates the expiry ratchet from other uses of the
// rosenpass output key.
const ratchetLabel = "netbird-rosenpass-expiry-ratchet"
// RatchetKey derives the successor preshared key from the previous Rosenpass
// output key. When a key expires without a completed renewal, both peers
// advance their last shared key by one ratchet step: the expired key is
// rotated out while both ends still converge on an identical, non-public
// replacement without communicating.
func RatchetKey(prev wgtypes.Key) wgtypes.Key {
input := make([]byte, 0, len(ratchetLabel)+len(prev))
input = append(input, ratchetLabel...)
input = append(input, prev[:]...)
return sha256.Sum256(input)
}
// DeterministicSeedKey derives a 32-byte WireGuard preshared key from a pair
// of peer public keys. Both peers, given the same key pair, produce the same
// output regardless of which side runs the function: the inputs are ordered

View File

@@ -44,25 +44,10 @@ type Auth struct {
// NewAuth instantiate Auth struct and validate the management URL
func NewAuth(cfgPath string, mgmURL string) (*Auth, error) {
inputCfg := profilemanager.ConfigInput{
ConfigPath: cfgPath,
ManagementURL: mgmURL,
}
// Load the existing config when a config file is already present so an
// interactive re-login reuses the peer's persisted WireGuard private key
// (and thus its identity) instead of generating a fresh one. Generating a
// new key registers a brand-new peer on the management server on every
// re-auth (named after the fallback hostname). Only fall back to a fresh
// in-memory config for the first-time login when no config file exists yet.
// DirectUpdateOrCreateConfig uses non-atomic writes so it also works inside
// the tvOS App Group sandbox where atomic temp-file+rename is blocked.
var cfg *profilemanager.Config
var err error
if cfgPath != "" {
cfg, err = profilemanager.DirectUpdateOrCreateConfig(inputCfg)
} else {
cfg, err = profilemanager.CreateInMemoryConfig(inputCfg)
}
cfg, err := profilemanager.CreateInMemoryConfig(inputCfg)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package server
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"net/url"
"time"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
@@ -182,37 +181,6 @@ func conflictBool(key string, p *bool) conflictCheck {
}
}
func canonicalURL(s string) string {
u, err := url.ParseRequestURI(s)
if err != nil {
return s
}
if u.Port() == "" {
switch u.Scheme {
case "https":
u.Host += ":443"
case "http":
u.Host += ":80"
}
}
return u.String()
}
// conflictURL is conflictString for URL-typed keys: both sides are
// normalized via canonicalURL before comparison.
func conflictURL(key, got string) conflictCheck {
return conflictCheck{
key: key,
check: func(pol *mdm.Policy) bool {
if got == "" {
return true
}
want, ok := pol.GetString(key)
return ok && canonicalURL(want) == canonicalURL(got)
},
}
}
// conflictString builds a conflictCheck for a string MDM key. An empty
// `got` is treated as "field not set" (no override requested); otherwise
// the check returns true only when the policy contains the key and its
@@ -288,7 +256,7 @@ func mdmManagedFieldConflicts(msg *proto.SetConfigRequest, policy *mdm.Policy) [
}
return resolveConflicts(policy, []conflictCheck{
conflictURL(mdm.KeyManagementURL, msg.ManagementUrl),
conflictString(mdm.KeyManagementURL, msg.ManagementUrl),
conflictString(mdm.KeyPreSharedKey, pskGot),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyRosenpassEnabled, msg.RosenpassEnabled),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyRosenpassPermissive, msg.RosenpassPermissive),
@@ -409,7 +377,7 @@ func loginRequestMDMConflicts(msg *proto.LoginRequest, policy *mdm.Policy) []str
}
return resolveConflicts(policy, []conflictCheck{
conflictURL(mdm.KeyManagementURL, msg.ManagementUrl),
conflictString(mdm.KeyManagementURL, msg.ManagementUrl),
conflictString(mdm.KeyPreSharedKey, pskGot),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyRosenpassEnabled, msg.RosenpassEnabled),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyRosenpassPermissive, msg.RosenpassPermissive),

View File

@@ -181,43 +181,6 @@ func TestSetConfig_MDMAllow_NonManagedFields(t *testing.T) {
require.NotNil(t, resp)
}
// TestSetConfig_MDMAllow_ManagementURLPortNormalized covers the
// regression from discussion #6483: MDM URL without explicit port vs
// UI echo with the parseURL-appended default port must be treated as
// a no-op echo, not a conflict.
func TestSetConfig_MDMAllow_ManagementURLPortNormalized(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
mdmURL string
submitURL string
}{
{"policy_no_port_submit_with_443", "https://netbird.corp.example", "https://netbird.corp.example:443"},
{"policy_with_443_submit_no_port", "https://netbird.corp.example:443", "https://netbird.corp.example"},
{"http_policy_no_port_submit_with_80", "http://netbird.corp.example", "http://netbird.corp.example:80"},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
withMDMPolicy(t, mdm.NewPolicy(map[string]any{
mdm.KeyManagementURL: tc.mdmURL,
}))
s, ctx, profName, username, _ := setupServerWithProfile(t)
rosenpassEnabled := true
resp, err := s.SetConfig(ctx, &proto.SetConfigRequest{
ProfileName: profName,
Username: username,
ManagementUrl: tc.submitURL,
RosenpassEnabled: &rosenpassEnabled,
})
require.NoError(t, err, "port-normalized URL echo must not trip MDM conflict gate")
require.NotNil(t, resp)
})
}
}
func TestSetConfig_MDMEmpty_NoEnforcement(t *testing.T) {
// No MDM policy active: any field can be written.
withMDMPolicy(t, mdm.NewPolicy(nil))

View File

@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ import (
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
nbssh "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
)
const (
@@ -219,20 +218,11 @@ func (m *Manager) buildHostPatterns(peer PeerSSHInfo) []string {
if peer.IPv6.IsValid() {
hostPatterns = append(hostPatterns, peer.IPv6.String())
}
// Peer FQDNs and hostnames originate from remote peers, so they must be
// validated as plain DNS names before being embedded in the ssh_config
// "Match host" pattern list. This prevents injection of arbitrary
// ssh_config directives via embedded quotes, whitespace, newlines, the
// comma pattern separator, or the "*"/"?" pattern metacharacters.
if domain.IsValidDomainNoWildcard(peer.FQDN) {
if peer.FQDN != "" {
hostPatterns = append(hostPatterns, peer.FQDN)
} else if peer.FQDN != "" {
log.Warnf("skipping peer FQDN with invalid characters in SSH config: %q", peer.FQDN)
}
if peer.Hostname != peer.FQDN && domain.IsValidDomainNoWildcard(peer.Hostname) {
if peer.Hostname != "" && peer.Hostname != peer.FQDN {
hostPatterns = append(hostPatterns, peer.Hostname)
} else if peer.Hostname != "" && peer.Hostname != peer.FQDN {
log.Warnf("skipping peer hostname with invalid characters in SSH config: %q", peer.Hostname)
}
return hostPatterns
}

View File

@@ -148,45 +148,6 @@ func TestManager_MatchHostFormat(t *testing.T) {
"should use Match host with comma-separated patterns")
}
func TestManager_HostPatternInjection(t *testing.T) {
tempDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "netbird-ssh-config-test")
require.NoError(t, err)
defer func() { assert.NoError(t, os.RemoveAll(tempDir)) }()
manager := &Manager{
sshConfigDir: filepath.Join(tempDir, "ssh_config.d"),
sshConfigFile: "99-netbird.conf",
}
// A malicious peer FQDN/hostname attempts to break out of the Match host
// directive and inject arbitrary ssh_config (a ProxyCommand executing a
// command). It must be rejected, not written to the config.
peers := []PeerSSHInfo{
{
Hostname: "evil\"\n ProxyCommand touch /tmp/pwned\nHost x",
IP: netip.MustParseAddr("100.125.1.1"),
FQDN: "evil\"\n ProxyCommand touch /tmp/pwned\nHost x.nb.internal",
},
{Hostname: "peer2", IP: netip.MustParseAddr("100.125.1.2"), FQDN: "peer2.nb.internal"},
}
err = manager.SetupSSHClientConfig(peers)
require.NoError(t, err)
configPath := filepath.Join(manager.sshConfigDir, manager.sshConfigFile)
content, err := os.ReadFile(configPath)
require.NoError(t, err)
configStr := string(content)
assert.NotContains(t, configStr, "ProxyCommand touch /tmp/pwned",
"injected directive must not appear in generated config")
assert.NotContains(t, configStr, "evil",
"malicious pattern must be dropped entirely")
// The valid peer must still be present, on a single Match host line.
assert.Contains(t, configStr, "Match host \"100.125.1.1,100.125.1.2,peer2.nb.internal,peer2\"",
"valid peers must survive, injected patterns dropped")
}
func TestManager_ForcedSSHConfig(t *testing.T) {
// Set force environment variable
t.Setenv(EnvForceSSHConfig, "true")

View File

@@ -69,8 +69,7 @@ func parseGetentPasswd(output string) (*user.User, string, error) {
// validateGetentInput checks that the input is safe to pass to getent or id.
// Allows POSIX usernames, numeric UIDs, and common NSS extensions
// (@ for Kerberos, $ for Samba, + for NIS compat). A leading hyphen is
// rejected so the input can never be parsed as a command-line flag.
// (@ for Kerberos, $ for Samba, + for NIS compat).
func validateGetentInput(input string) bool {
maxLen := 32
if runtime.GOOS == "linux" {
@@ -81,10 +80,6 @@ func validateGetentInput(input string) bool {
return false
}
if input[0] == '-' {
return false
}
for _, r := range input {
if isAllowedGetentChar(r) {
continue

View File

@@ -157,9 +157,6 @@ func TestValidateGetentInput(t *testing.T) {
{"numeric UID", "1001", true},
{"dots and underscores", "alice.bob_test", true},
{"hyphen", "alice-bob", true},
{"leading hyphen rejected", "-i", false},
{"leading double hyphen rejected", "--no-idn", false},
{"lone hyphen rejected", "-", false},
{"kerberos principal", "user@REALM", true},
{"samba machine account", "MACHINE$", true},
{"NIS compat", "+user", true},

View File

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import (
"os"
"slices"
"github.com/shirou/gopsutil/v4/process"
"github.com/shirou/gopsutil/v3/process"
)
// getRunningProcesses returns a list of running process paths. The context bounds the work:

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import (
"context"
"testing"
"github.com/shirou/gopsutil/v4/process"
"github.com/shirou/gopsutil/v3/process"
)
func Benchmark_getRunningProcesses(b *testing.B) {

151
combined/cmd/admin.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
package cmd
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"github.com/dexidp/dex/storage"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/formatter/hook"
admincmd "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/cmd/admin"
tokencmd "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/cmd/token"
nbconfig "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/server/config"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/activity"
activitystore "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/activity/store"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/store"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
)
// newAdminCommands creates the admin command tree with combined-specific resource openers.
func newAdminCommands() *cobra.Command {
return admincmd.NewCommands(admincmd.Openers{
Resources: withAdminResources,
Store: withAdminStoreOnly,
IDP: withAdminIDPOnly,
})
}
func newLegacyTokenCommand() *cobra.Command {
cmd := tokencmd.NewCommands(tokencmd.StoreOpener(withAdminStoreOnly))
cmd.Deprecated = "use 'admin token' instead"
return cmd
}
// withAdminResources loads the combined YAML config, initializes stores, and calls fn.
func withAdminResources(cmd *cobra.Command, fn func(ctx context.Context, resources admincmd.Resources) error) error {
return withAdminConfig(cmd, func(ctx context.Context, cfg *CombinedConfig) error {
mgmtConfig, err := adminManagementConfig(cfg)
if err != nil {
return err
}
managementStore, err := openAdminStore(ctx, cfg)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer admincmd.CloseStore(ctx, managementStore)
idpStorage, idpStorageFile, err := admincmd.OpenIDPStorage(mgmtConfig)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer admincmd.CloseIDPStorage(idpStorage)
eventStore, esErr := openAdminEventStore(ctx, cfg, mgmtConfig)
if esErr != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(cmd.ErrOrStderr(), "Warning: audit events will not be recorded: %v\n", esErr)
}
if eventStore != nil {
defer func() {
if err := eventStore.Close(ctx); err != nil {
log.Debugf("close activity event store: %v", err)
}
}()
}
return fn(ctx, admincmd.Resources{Store: managementStore, IDPStorage: idpStorage, IDPStorageFile: idpStorageFile, EventStore: eventStore})
})
}
// withAdminStoreOnly opens only the management store for admin subcommands that do not
// need embedded IdP storage.
func withAdminStoreOnly(cmd *cobra.Command, fn func(ctx context.Context, s store.Store) error) error {
return withAdminConfig(cmd, func(ctx context.Context, cfg *CombinedConfig) error {
managementStore, err := openAdminStore(ctx, cfg)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer admincmd.CloseStore(ctx, managementStore)
return fn(ctx, managementStore)
})
}
func withAdminIDPOnly(cmd *cobra.Command, fn func(ctx context.Context, idpStorage storage.Storage, storageFile string) error) error {
return withAdminConfig(cmd, func(ctx context.Context, cfg *CombinedConfig) error {
mgmtConfig, err := adminManagementConfig(cfg)
if err != nil {
return err
}
idpStorage, idpStorageFile, err := admincmd.OpenIDPStorage(mgmtConfig)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer admincmd.CloseIDPStorage(idpStorage)
return fn(ctx, idpStorage, idpStorageFile)
})
}
func withAdminConfig(cmd *cobra.Command, fn func(ctx context.Context, cfg *CombinedConfig) error) error {
if err := util.InitLog("error", "console"); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("init log: %w", err)
}
ctx := context.WithValue(cmd.Context(), hook.ExecutionContextKey, hook.SystemSource) //nolint:staticcheck
cfg, err := LoadConfig(configPath)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("load config: %w", err)
}
cfg.ApplyAdminDefaults()
applyServerStoreEnv(cfg.Server.Store)
return fn(ctx, cfg)
}
func adminManagementConfig(cfg *CombinedConfig) (*nbconfig.Config, error) {
mgmtConfig, err := cfg.ToManagementConfig()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("create management config: %w", err)
}
return mgmtConfig, nil
}
func openAdminStore(ctx context.Context, cfg *CombinedConfig) (store.Store, error) {
managementStore, err := store.NewStore(ctx, types.Engine(cfg.Management.Store.Engine), cfg.Management.DataDir, nil, true)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("create store: %w", err)
}
return managementStore, nil
}
func openAdminEventStore(ctx context.Context, cfg *CombinedConfig, config *nbconfig.Config) (activity.Store, error) {
if config.DataStoreEncryptionKey == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("data store encryption key is not configured")
}
if err := applyActivityStoreEnv(cfg.Server.ActivityStore); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("configure activity event store: %w", err)
}
eventStore, err := activitystore.NewSqlStore(ctx, config.Datadir, config.DataStoreEncryptionKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("open activity event store: %w", err)
}
if eventStore == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("open activity event store: returned nil store")
}
return eventStore, nil
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
package cmd
import (
"context"
"os"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
nbconfig "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/server/config"
)
func TestApplyAdminDefaultsCopiesServerStoreWithoutExposedAddress(t *testing.T) {
cfg := DefaultConfig()
cfg.Server.ExposedAddress = ""
cfg.Server.DataDir = "/srv/netbird"
cfg.Server.Store = StoreConfig{
Engine: "postgres",
DSN: "postgres://user:pass@example.com/netbird",
}
cfg.ApplyAdminDefaults()
require.Equal(t, "/srv/netbird", cfg.Management.DataDir)
require.Equal(t, "postgres", cfg.Management.Store.Engine)
require.Equal(t, cfg.Server.Store.DSN, cfg.Management.Store.DSN)
}
func TestOpenAdminEventStoreMissingEncryptionKeyReturnsNilInterface(t *testing.T) {
eventStore, err := openAdminEventStore(context.Background(), &CombinedConfig{}, &nbconfig.Config{})
require.Error(t, err)
require.Contains(t, err.Error(), "encryption key")
require.Nil(t, eventStore)
}
func TestApplyServerStoreEnv(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_POSTGRES_DSN", "")
t.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_MYSQL_DSN", "")
t.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_SQLITE_FILE", "")
applyServerStoreEnv(StoreConfig{Engine: "postgres", DSN: "postgres-dsn", File: "store.db"})
require.Equal(t, "postgres-dsn", os.Getenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_POSTGRES_DSN"))
require.Equal(t, "store.db", os.Getenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_SQLITE_FILE"))
applyServerStoreEnv(StoreConfig{Engine: "mysql", DSN: "mysql-dsn"})
require.Equal(t, "mysql-dsn", os.Getenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_MYSQL_DSN"))
}

View File

@@ -6,8 +6,7 @@ import (
"net"
"net/netip"
"os"
"path"
"path/filepath"
filePath "path/filepath"
"strings"
"time"
@@ -299,6 +298,19 @@ func (c *CombinedConfig) ApplySimplifiedDefaults() {
c.autoConfigureClientSettings(exposedProto, exposedHost, exposedHostPort, hasExternalStuns, hasExternalRelay, hasExternalSignal)
}
// ApplyAdminDefaults applies the management settings needed by admin commands even
// when the full server config is invalid and ApplySimplifiedDefaults cannot run.
func (c *CombinedConfig) ApplyAdminDefaults() {
if c.Management.DataDir == "" || c.Management.DataDir == "/var/lib/netbird/" {
c.Management.DataDir = c.Server.DataDir
}
if c.Management.Store.Engine == "" || c.Management.Store.Engine == "sqlite" {
if c.Server.Store.Engine != "" || c.Server.Store.File != "" || c.Server.Store.DSN != "" {
c.Management.Store = c.Server.Store
}
}
}
// applyRelayDefaults configures the relay service if no external relay is configured.
func (c *CombinedConfig) applyRelayDefaults(exposedProto, exposedHostPort string, hasExternalRelay, hasExternalStuns bool) {
if hasExternalRelay {
@@ -576,11 +588,11 @@ func (c *CombinedConfig) buildEmbeddedIdPConfig(mgmt ManagementConfig) (*idp.Emb
return nil, fmt.Errorf("authStore.dsn is required when authStore.engine is postgres")
}
} else {
authStorageFile = path.Join(mgmt.DataDir, "idp.db")
authStorageFile = filePath.Join(mgmt.DataDir, "idp.db")
if c.Server.AuthStore.File != "" {
authStorageFile = c.Server.AuthStore.File
if !filepath.IsAbs(authStorageFile) {
authStorageFile = filepath.Join(mgmt.DataDir, authStorageFile)
if !filePath.IsAbs(authStorageFile) {
authStorageFile = filePath.Join(mgmt.DataDir, authStorageFile)
}
}
}
@@ -727,7 +739,7 @@ func ApplyEmbeddedIdPConfig(ctx context.Context, cfg *nbconfig.Config, mgmtPort
cfg.EmbeddedIdP.Storage.Type = "sqlite3"
}
if cfg.EmbeddedIdP.Storage.Config.File == "" && cfg.Datadir != "" {
cfg.EmbeddedIdP.Storage.Config.File = path.Join(cfg.Datadir, "idp.db")
cfg.EmbeddedIdP.Storage.Config.File = filePath.Join(cfg.Datadir, "idp.db")
}
issuer := cfg.EmbeddedIdP.Issuer

View File

@@ -64,7 +64,8 @@ func init() {
rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVarP(&configPath, "config", "c", "", "path to YAML configuration file (required)")
_ = rootCmd.MarkPersistentFlagRequired("config")
rootCmd.AddCommand(newTokenCommands())
rootCmd.AddCommand(newAdminCommands())
rootCmd.AddCommand(newLegacyTokenCommand())
}
func RootCmd() *cobra.Command {
@@ -122,6 +123,37 @@ func execute(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
}
// initializeConfig loads and validates the configuration, then initializes logging.
func applyServerStoreEnv(storeConfig StoreConfig) {
if dsn := storeConfig.DSN; dsn != "" {
switch strings.ToLower(storeConfig.Engine) {
case "postgres":
os.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_POSTGRES_DSN", dsn)
case "mysql":
os.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_MYSQL_DSN", dsn)
}
}
if file := storeConfig.File; file != "" {
os.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_SQLITE_FILE", file)
}
}
func applyActivityStoreEnv(storeConfig StoreConfig) error {
if engine := storeConfig.Engine; engine != "" {
engineLower := strings.ToLower(engine)
if engineLower == "postgres" && storeConfig.DSN == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("activityStore.dsn is required when activityStore.engine is postgres")
}
os.Setenv("NB_ACTIVITY_EVENT_STORE_ENGINE", engineLower)
if dsn := storeConfig.DSN; dsn != "" {
os.Setenv("NB_ACTIVITY_EVENT_POSTGRES_DSN", dsn)
}
}
if file := storeConfig.File; file != "" {
os.Setenv("NB_ACTIVITY_EVENT_SQLITE_FILE", file)
}
return nil
}
func initializeConfig() error {
var err error
config, err = LoadConfig(configPath)
@@ -137,30 +169,10 @@ func initializeConfig() error {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to initialize log: %w", err)
}
if dsn := config.Server.Store.DSN; dsn != "" {
switch strings.ToLower(config.Server.Store.Engine) {
case "postgres":
os.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_POSTGRES_DSN", dsn)
case "mysql":
os.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_MYSQL_DSN", dsn)
}
}
if file := config.Server.Store.File; file != "" {
os.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_SQLITE_FILE", file)
}
applyServerStoreEnv(config.Server.Store)
if engine := config.Server.ActivityStore.Engine; engine != "" {
engineLower := strings.ToLower(engine)
if engineLower == "postgres" && config.Server.ActivityStore.DSN == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("activityStore.dsn is required when activityStore.engine is postgres")
}
os.Setenv("NB_ACTIVITY_EVENT_STORE_ENGINE", engineLower)
if dsn := config.Server.ActivityStore.DSN; dsn != "" {
os.Setenv("NB_ACTIVITY_EVENT_POSTGRES_DSN", dsn)
}
}
if file := config.Server.ActivityStore.File; file != "" {
os.Setenv("NB_ACTIVITY_EVENT_SQLITE_FILE", file)
if err := applyActivityStoreEnv(config.Server.ActivityStore); err != nil {
return err
}
log.Infof("Starting combined NetBird server")

View File

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
package cmd
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"os"
"strings"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/formatter/hook"
tokencmd "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/cmd/token"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/store"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
)
// newTokenCommands creates the token command tree with combined-specific store opener.
func newTokenCommands() *cobra.Command {
return tokencmd.NewCommands(withTokenStore)
}
// withTokenStore loads the combined YAML config, initializes the store, and calls fn.
func withTokenStore(cmd *cobra.Command, fn func(ctx context.Context, s store.Store) error) error {
if err := util.InitLog("error", "console"); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("init log: %w", err)
}
ctx := context.WithValue(cmd.Context(), hook.ExecutionContextKey, hook.SystemSource) //nolint:staticcheck
cfg, err := LoadConfig(configPath)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("load config: %w", err)
}
if dsn := cfg.Server.Store.DSN; dsn != "" {
switch strings.ToLower(cfg.Server.Store.Engine) {
case "postgres":
os.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_POSTGRES_DSN", dsn)
case "mysql":
os.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_MYSQL_DSN", dsn)
}
}
if file := cfg.Server.Store.File; file != "" {
os.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_SQLITE_FILE", file)
}
datadir := cfg.Management.DataDir
engine := types.Engine(cfg.Management.Store.Engine)
s, err := store.NewStore(ctx, engine, datadir, nil, true)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create store: %w", err)
}
defer func() {
if err := s.Close(ctx); err != nil {
log.Debugf("close store: %v", err)
}
}()
return fn(ctx, s)
}

View File

@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ func availableProviders() []providerCase {
if region == "" {
region = "us-east-1"
}
ps = append(ps, providerCase{name: "bedrock", catalogID: "bedrock_api", upstream: "https://bedrock-runtime." + region + ".amazonaws.com", apiKey: k, model: "us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5", kind: harness.WireBedrock})
ps = append(ps, providerCase{name: "bedrock", catalogID: "bedrock_api", upstream: "https://bedrock-runtime." + region + ".amazonaws.com", apiKey: k, model: "us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5", kind: harness.WireMessages})
}
return ps
}
@@ -224,12 +224,9 @@ func TestProvidersMatrix(t *testing.T) {
var c int
var b string
var cerr error
switch pc.kind {
case harness.WireVertex:
if pc.kind == harness.WireVertex {
c, b, cerr = cl.Vertex(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc.project, pc.region, pc.model, "Reply with exactly: pong", sessionID)
case harness.WireBedrock:
c, b, cerr = cl.Bedrock(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc.model, "Reply with exactly: pong", sessionID)
default:
} else {
c, b, cerr = cl.Chat(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc.kind, pc.model, "Reply with exactly: pong", sessionID)
}
if cerr == nil {

View File

@@ -1,168 +0,0 @@
//go:build e2e
package agentnetwork
import (
"context"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/e2e/harness"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/api"
)
// catalogModel returns the normalized catalog id the proxy stamps for a
// path-routed provider's configured model — the form the guardrail allowlist is
// compared against (region prefix / @version stripped).
func catalogModel(pc providerCase) string {
switch pc.kind {
case harness.WireBedrock:
return strings.TrimPrefix(pc.model, "us.")
case harness.WireVertex:
return strings.SplitN(pc.model, "@", 2)[0]
default:
return pc.model
}
}
// disallowedModel returns a valid-shaped model id for the provider that is NOT
// the configured/allowed one, so the guardrail must reject it before the
// request ever reaches the upstream.
func disallowedModel(pc providerCase) string {
switch pc.kind {
case harness.WireBedrock:
return "us.anthropic.claude-opus-4-8"
case harness.WireVertex:
return "claude-opus-4-8@20250101"
default:
return "unlisted-model"
}
}
// sendModel drives one request for the given model through the provider's native
// wire shape and returns the HTTP status.
func sendModel(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, cl *harness.Client, endpoint, proxyIP string, pc providerCase, model string) int {
t.Helper()
var code int
var err error
switch pc.kind {
case harness.WireBedrock:
code, _, err = cl.Bedrock(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
case harness.WireVertex:
code, _, err = cl.Vertex(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, pc.project, pc.region, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
default:
code, _, err = cl.Chat(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, pc.kind, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
}
require.NoError(t, err, "request must reach the proxy for %s", pc.name)
return code
}
// TestModelAllowlistEnforced provisions a Model Allowlist guardrail limiting each
// path-routed provider (Bedrock, Vertex) to its configured model, then drives
// requests over the tunnel: the allowed model returns 200 while a model outside
// the allowlist is denied 403 by the guardrail before it reaches the upstream.
// This is the coverage missing for #6751 — the model for these providers travels
// in the URL path, and the allowlist must be enforced there.
func TestModelAllowlistEnforced(t *testing.T) {
var providers []providerCase
for _, pc := range availableProviders() {
if pc.kind == harness.WireBedrock || pc.kind == harness.WireVertex {
providers = append(providers, pc)
}
}
if len(providers) == 0 {
t.Skip("no path-routed provider keys set (AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK / GOOGLE_VERTEX_*); source ~/.llm-keys")
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 20*time.Minute)
defer cancel()
grp, err := srv.API().Groups.Create(ctx, api.PostApiGroupsJSONRequestBody{Name: "e2e-allowlist"})
require.NoError(t, err, "create group")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.API().Groups.Delete(context.Background(), grp.Id) })
ephemeral := false
sk, err := srv.API().SetupKeys.Create(ctx, api.PostApiSetupKeysJSONRequestBody{
Name: "e2e-allowlist-client",
Type: "reusable",
ExpiresIn: 86400,
UsageLimit: 0,
AutoGroups: []string{grp.Id},
Ephemeral: &ephemeral,
})
require.NoError(t, err, "mint setup key")
// Providers with their configured (allowed) models; the first bootstraps the cluster.
ids := make([]string, 0, len(providers))
allowed := make([]string, 0, len(providers))
for i, pc := range providers {
req := providerRequest(pc)
if i == 0 {
req.BootstrapCluster = ptr(harness.AgentNetworkCluster)
}
prov, perr := srv.CreateProvider(ctx, req)
require.NoError(t, perr, "create provider %s", pc.name)
id := prov.Id
ids = append(ids, id)
allowed = append(allowed, catalogModel(pc))
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteProvider(context.Background(), id) })
}
// Guardrail allowlisting exactly the configured models.
var gr api.AgentNetworkGuardrailRequest
gr.Name = "e2e-allowlist"
gr.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Enabled = true
gr.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Models = allowed
guard, err := srv.CreateGuardrail(ctx, gr)
require.NoError(t, err, "create guardrail")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteGuardrail(context.Background(), guard.Id) })
enabled := true
pol, err := srv.CreatePolicy(ctx, api.AgentNetworkPolicyRequest{
Name: "e2e-allowlist",
Enabled: &enabled,
SourceGroups: []string{grp.Id},
DestinationProviderIds: ids,
GuardrailIds: &[]string{guard.Id},
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create policy")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeletePolicy(context.Background(), pol.Id) })
settings, err := srv.GetSettings(ctx)
require.NoError(t, err, "read settings for endpoint")
require.NotEmpty(t, settings.Endpoint, "agent-network endpoint must be assigned")
proxyToken, err := srv.CreateProxyTokenCLI(ctx, "e2e-proxy-allowlist")
require.NoError(t, err, "mint proxy token via CLI")
px, err := harness.StartProxy(ctx, srv, proxyToken)
require.NoError(t, err, "start proxy")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = px.Terminate(context.Background()) })
cl, err := harness.StartClient(ctx, srv, sk.Key)
require.NoError(t, err, "start client")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = cl.Terminate(context.Background()) })
require.NoError(t, cl.WaitConnected(ctx, 90*time.Second), "client must connect to management")
if err := cl.WaitProxyPeer(ctx, 180*time.Second); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("client did not see the proxy peer: %v\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", err, px.Logs(context.Background()))
}
proxyIP, err := cl.ResolveProxyIP(ctx, settings.Endpoint)
require.NoError(t, err, "resolve agent-network endpoint to proxy IP")
for _, pc := range providers {
pc := pc
t.Run(pc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// The admin's allowlisted model is served end to end.
assert.Equal(t, 200, sendModel(ctx, t, cl, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc, pc.model),
"allowlisted model must be permitted for %s", pc.name)
// A model outside the allowlist is rejected by the guardrail (before
// the upstream), regardless of whether it is a real catalog model.
assert.Equal(t, 403, sendModel(ctx, t, cl, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc, disallowedModel(pc)),
"model outside the allowlist must be denied for %s", pc.name)
})
}
}

View File

@@ -107,17 +107,6 @@ func (c *Combined) DeletePolicy(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
return anDelete(ctx, c, "/api/agent-network/policies/"+id)
}
// CreateGuardrail creates an agent-network guardrail (e.g. a model allowlist)
// that can then be attached to a policy via its GuardrailIds.
func (c *Combined) CreateGuardrail(ctx context.Context, req api.AgentNetworkGuardrailRequest) (api.AgentNetworkGuardrail, error) {
return anRequest[api.AgentNetworkGuardrail](ctx, c, http.MethodPost, "/api/agent-network/guardrails", req)
}
// DeleteGuardrail removes a guardrail by id.
func (c *Combined) DeleteGuardrail(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
return anDelete(ctx, c, "/api/agent-network/guardrails/"+id)
}
// GetSettings returns the account's agent-network settings row. It exists only
// after the first provider create bootstraps it.
func (c *Combined) GetSettings(ctx context.Context) (api.AgentNetworkSettings, error) {

View File

@@ -194,11 +194,6 @@ const (
// WireVertex is the Anthropic-on-Vertex rawPredict shape: the client posts
// the full Vertex model path and the proxy mints the SA OAuth token.
WireVertex = "vertex"
// WireBedrock is the native AWS Bedrock InvokeModel shape: the model id
// travels in the URL path (/model/{id}/invoke), not the body, so the proxy
// routes by path. This is what a Bedrock SDK client sends and the shape the
// model-allowlist guardrail must enforce.
WireBedrock = "bedrock"
)
// Chat issues a chat-completion POST to the agent-network endpoint over the
@@ -231,17 +226,6 @@ func (cl *Client) Vertex(ctx context.Context, endpoint, proxyIP, project, region
return cl.post(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, path, body, withSessionID(nil, sessionID))
}
// Bedrock issues a native AWS Bedrock InvokeModel POST over the tunnel. The
// model id is carried in the request path (/model/{id}/invoke), so the proxy
// routes by path; the body uses the bedrock anthropic_version rather than a
// model field. A non-empty sessionID is sent as the universal x-session-id
// header the proxy records.
func (cl *Client) Bedrock(ctx context.Context, endpoint, proxyIP, model, prompt, sessionID string) (int, string, error) {
path := "/model/" + model + "/invoke"
body := fmt.Sprintf(`{"anthropic_version":"bedrock-2023-05-31","max_tokens":64,"messages":[{"role":"user","content":%q}]}`, prompt)
return cl.post(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, path, body, withSessionID(nil, sessionID))
}
// withSessionID appends the x-session-id header when sessionID is non-empty.
func withSessionID(headers []string, sessionID string) []string {
if sessionID == "" {

22
go.mod
View File

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ module github.com/netbirdio/netbird
go 1.25.5
toolchain go1.25.12
toolchain go1.25.11
require (
cunicu.li/go-rosenpass v0.5.42
@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ require (
github.com/spf13/cobra v1.10.2
github.com/spf13/pflag v1.0.9
github.com/vishvananda/netlink v1.3.1
golang.org/x/crypto v0.54.0
golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0
golang.org/x/crypto v0.50.0
golang.org/x/sys v0.43.0
golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard v0.0.0-20231211153847-12269c276173
golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl v0.0.0-20241231184526-a9ab2273dd10
golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/windows v0.5.3
@@ -104,7 +104,6 @@ require (
github.com/redis/go-redis/v9 v9.7.3
github.com/rs/xid v1.3.0
github.com/shirou/gopsutil/v3 v3.24.4
github.com/shirou/gopsutil/v4 v4.25.8
github.com/skratchdot/open-golang v0.0.0-20200116055534-eef842397966
github.com/songgao/water v0.0.0-20200317203138-2b4b6d7c09d8
github.com/stretchr/testify v1.11.1
@@ -128,11 +127,11 @@ require (
goauthentik.io/api/v3 v3.2023051.3
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20250620022241-b7579e27df2b
golang.org/x/mobile v0.0.0-20251113184115-a159579294ab
golang.org/x/mod v0.37.0
golang.org/x/net v0.56.0
golang.org/x/mod v0.34.0
golang.org/x/net v0.53.0
golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.36.0
golang.org/x/sync v0.22.0
golang.org/x/term v0.45.0
golang.org/x/sync v0.20.0
golang.org/x/term v0.42.0
golang.org/x/time v0.15.0
google.golang.org/api v0.276.0
gopkg.in/yaml.v3 v3.0.1
@@ -309,6 +308,7 @@ require (
github.com/russellhaering/goxmldsig v1.6.0 // indirect
github.com/ryanuber/go-glob v1.0.0 // indirect
github.com/rymdport/portal v0.4.2 // indirect
github.com/shirou/gopsutil/v4 v4.25.8 // indirect
github.com/shoenig/go-m1cpu v0.2.1 // indirect
github.com/shopspring/decimal v1.4.0 // indirect
github.com/spf13/cast v1.7.0 // indirect
@@ -332,8 +332,8 @@ require (
go.uber.org/multierr v1.11.0 // indirect
go.yaml.in/yaml/v2 v2.4.3 // indirect
golang.org/x/image v0.33.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/text v0.40.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/tools v0.47.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/text v0.36.0 // indirect
golang.org/x/tools v0.43.0 // indirect
golang.zx2c4.com/wintun v0.0.0-20230126152724-0fa3db229ce2 // indirect
google.golang.org/genproto/googleapis/rpc v0.0.0-20260401024825-9d38bb4040a9 // indirect
gopkg.in/square/go-jose.v2 v2.6.0 // indirect
@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ replace github.com/kardianos/service => github.com/netbirdio/service v0.0.0-2024
replace github.com/getlantern/systray => github.com/netbirdio/systray v0.0.0-20231030152038-ef1ed2a27949
replace golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard => github.com/netbirdio/wireguard-go v0.0.0-20260717071248-8ec1ad32882f
replace golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard => github.com/netbirdio/wireguard-go v0.0.0-20260628102922-2834bebf6c1a
replace github.com/cloudflare/circl => codeberg.org/cunicu/circl v0.0.0-20230801113412-fec58fc7b5f6

36
go.sum
View File

@@ -518,8 +518,8 @@ github.com/netbirdio/service v0.0.0-20240911161631-f62744f42502 h1:3tHlFmhTdX9ax
github.com/netbirdio/service v0.0.0-20240911161631-f62744f42502/go.mod h1:CIMRFEJVL+0DS1a3Nx06NaMn4Dz63Ng6O7dl0qH0zVM=
github.com/netbirdio/signal-dispatcher/dispatcher v0.0.0-20250805121659-6b4ac470ca45 h1:ujgviVYmx243Ksy7NdSwrdGPSRNE3pb8kEDSpH0QuAQ=
github.com/netbirdio/signal-dispatcher/dispatcher v0.0.0-20250805121659-6b4ac470ca45/go.mod h1:5/sjFmLb8O96B5737VCqhHyGRzNFIaN/Bu7ZodXc3qQ=
github.com/netbirdio/wireguard-go v0.0.0-20260717071248-8ec1ad32882f h1:yRb7dsTh5BXYiVoQE1MMni62TcRjlJPA82QFoRcXIWg=
github.com/netbirdio/wireguard-go v0.0.0-20260717071248-8ec1ad32882f/go.mod h1:rpwXGsirqLqN2L0JDJQlwOboGHmptD5ZD6T2VmcqhTw=
github.com/netbirdio/wireguard-go v0.0.0-20260628102922-2834bebf6c1a h1:3CWK+yTvRKOcC0Q8VCTGy4l60TEb27CQVS7LkMxwjmw=
github.com/netbirdio/wireguard-go v0.0.0-20260628102922-2834bebf6c1a/go.mod h1:rpwXGsirqLqN2L0JDJQlwOboGHmptD5ZD6T2VmcqhTw=
github.com/nfnt/resize v0.0.0-20180221191011-83c6a9932646 h1:zYyBkD/k9seD2A7fsi6Oo2LfFZAehjjQMERAvZLEDnQ=
github.com/nfnt/resize v0.0.0-20180221191011-83c6a9932646/go.mod h1:jpp1/29i3P1S/RLdc7JQKbRpFeM1dOBd8T9ki5s+AY8=
github.com/nicksnyder/go-i18n/v2 v2.5.1 h1:IxtPxYsR9Gp60cGXjfuR/llTqV8aYMsC472zD0D1vHk=
@@ -781,8 +781,8 @@ golang.org/x/crypto v0.18.0/go.mod h1:R0j02AL6hcrfOiy9T4ZYp/rcWeMxM3L6QYxlOuEG1m
golang.org/x/crypto v0.19.0/go.mod h1:Iy9bg/ha4yyC70EfRS8jz+B6ybOBKMaSxLj6P6oBDfU=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.23.0/go.mod h1:CKFgDieR+mRhux2Lsu27y0fO304Db0wZe70UKqHu0v8=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.31.0/go.mod h1:kDsLvtWBEx7MV9tJOj9bnXsPbxwJQ6csT/x4KIN4Ssk=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.54.0 h1:YLIA59K4fiNzHzjnZt2tUJQjQtUWfWbeHBqKtk3eScw=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.54.0/go.mod h1:KWL8ny2AZdGR2cWmzeHrp2azQPGogOv+HeQaVEXC2dk=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.50.0 h1:zO47/JPrL6vsNkINmLoo/PH1gcxpls50DNogFvB5ZGI=
golang.org/x/crypto v0.50.0/go.mod h1:3muZ7vA7PBCE6xgPX7nkzzjiUq87kRItoJQM1Yo8S+Q=
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20250620022241-b7579e27df2b h1:M2rDM6z3Fhozi9O7NWsxAkg/yqS/lQJ6PmkyIV3YP+o=
golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20250620022241-b7579e27df2b/go.mod h1:3//PLf8L/X+8b4vuAfHzxeRUl04Adcb341+IGKfnqS8=
golang.org/x/image v0.33.0 h1:LXRZRnv1+zGd5XBUVRFmYEphyyKJjQjCRiOuAP3sZfQ=
@@ -799,8 +799,8 @@ golang.org/x/mod v0.8.0/go.mod h1:iBbtSCu2XBx23ZKBPSOrRkjjQPZFPuis4dIYUhu/chs=
golang.org/x/mod v0.12.0/go.mod h1:iBbtSCu2XBx23ZKBPSOrRkjjQPZFPuis4dIYUhu/chs=
golang.org/x/mod v0.15.0/go.mod h1:hTbmBsO62+eylJbnUtE2MGJUyE7QWk4xUqPFrRgJ+7c=
golang.org/x/mod v0.17.0/go.mod h1:hTbmBsO62+eylJbnUtE2MGJUyE7QWk4xUqPFrRgJ+7c=
golang.org/x/mod v0.37.0 h1:vF1DjpVEshcIqoEaauuHebaLk1O1forxjxBaVn884JQ=
golang.org/x/mod v0.37.0/go.mod h1:m8S8VeM9r4dzDwjrKO0a1sZP3YjeMamRRlD+fmR2Q/0=
golang.org/x/mod v0.34.0 h1:xIHgNUUnW6sYkcM5Jleh05DvLOtwc6RitGHbDk4akRI=
golang.org/x/mod v0.34.0/go.mod h1:ykgH52iCZe79kzLLMhyCUzhMci+nQj+0XkbXpNYtVjY=
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20180906233101-161cd47e91fd/go.mod h1:mL1N/T3taQHkDXs73rZJwtUhF3w3ftmwwsq0BUmARs4=
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20190404232315-eb5bcb51f2a3/go.mod h1:t9HGtf8HONx5eT2rtn7q6eTqICYqUVnKs3thJo3Qplg=
golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20190603091049-60506f45cf65/go.mod h1:HSz+uSET+XFnRR8LxR5pz3Of3rY3CfYBVs4xY44aLks=
@@ -819,8 +819,8 @@ golang.org/x/net v0.15.0/go.mod h1:idbUs1IY1+zTqbi8yxTbhexhEEk5ur9LInksu6HrEpk=
golang.org/x/net v0.20.0/go.mod h1:z8BVo6PvndSri0LbOE3hAn0apkU+1YvI6E70E9jsnvY=
golang.org/x/net v0.21.0/go.mod h1:bIjVDfnllIU7BJ2DNgfnXvpSvtn8VRwhlsaeUTyUS44=
golang.org/x/net v0.25.0/go.mod h1:JkAGAh7GEvH74S6FOH42FLoXpXbE/aqXSrIQjXgsiwM=
golang.org/x/net v0.56.0 h1:Rw8j/hFzGvJUZwNBXnAtf5sVDVt+65SK2C7IxCxZt5o=
golang.org/x/net v0.56.0/go.mod h1:D3Ku6r+V6JROoZK144D2XfMHFcMq/0zSfLelVTCFKec=
golang.org/x/net v0.53.0 h1:d+qAbo5L0orcWAr0a9JweQpjXF19LMXJE8Ey7hwOdUA=
golang.org/x/net v0.53.0/go.mod h1:JvMuJH7rrdiCfbeHoo3fCQU24Lf5JJwT9W3sJFulfgs=
golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.8.0/go.mod h1:yr7u4HXZRm1R1kBWqr/xKNqewf0plRYoB7sla+BCIXE=
golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.36.0 h1:peZ/1z27fi9hUOFCAZaHyrpWG5lwe0RJEEEeH0ThlIs=
golang.org/x/oauth2 v0.36.0/go.mod h1:YDBUJMTkDnJS+A4BP4eZBjCqtokkg1hODuPjwiGPO7Q=
@@ -835,8 +835,8 @@ golang.org/x/sync v0.3.0/go.mod h1:FU7BRWz2tNW+3quACPkgCx/L+uEAv1htQ0V83Z9Rj+Y=
golang.org/x/sync v0.6.0/go.mod h1:Czt+wKu1gCyEFDUtn0jG5QVvpJ6rzVqr5aXyt9drQfk=
golang.org/x/sync v0.7.0/go.mod h1:Czt+wKu1gCyEFDUtn0jG5QVvpJ6rzVqr5aXyt9drQfk=
golang.org/x/sync v0.10.0/go.mod h1:Czt+wKu1gCyEFDUtn0jG5QVvpJ6rzVqr5aXyt9drQfk=
golang.org/x/sync v0.22.0 h1:SZjpbeLmrCk4xhRSZFNZW5gFUeCeFgjekvI/+gfScek=
golang.org/x/sync v0.22.0/go.mod h1:9xrNwdLfx4jkKbNva9FpL6vEN7evnE43NNNJQ2LF3+0=
golang.org/x/sync v0.20.0 h1:e0PTpb7pjO8GAtTs2dQ6jYa5BWYlMuX047Dco/pItO4=
golang.org/x/sync v0.20.0/go.mod h1:9xrNwdLfx4jkKbNva9FpL6vEN7evnE43NNNJQ2LF3+0=
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20180909124046-d0be0721c37e/go.mod h1:STP8DvDyc/dI5b8T5hshtkjS+E42TnysNCUPdjciGhY=
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20190215142949-d0b11bdaac8a/go.mod h1:STP8DvDyc/dI5b8T5hshtkjS+E42TnysNCUPdjciGhY=
golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20190412213103-97732733099d/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7wpKNCjG9DtNlClVuFLEZdDNbEs=
@@ -872,8 +872,8 @@ golang.org/x/sys v0.17.0/go.mod h1:/VUhepiaJMQUp4+oa/7Zr1D23ma6VTLIYjOOTFZPUcA=
golang.org/x/sys v0.19.0/go.mod h1:/VUhepiaJMQUp4+oa/7Zr1D23ma6VTLIYjOOTFZPUcA=
golang.org/x/sys v0.20.0/go.mod h1:/VUhepiaJMQUp4+oa/7Zr1D23ma6VTLIYjOOTFZPUcA=
golang.org/x/sys v0.28.0/go.mod h1:/VUhepiaJMQUp4+oa/7Zr1D23ma6VTLIYjOOTFZPUcA=
golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0 h1:o7XGOvZQCADBQQ4Y7VNq2dRWQR7JmOUW8Kxx4ZsNgWs=
golang.org/x/sys v0.47.0/go.mod h1:4GL1E5IUh+htKOUEOaiffhrAeqysfVGipDYzABqnCmw=
golang.org/x/sys v0.43.0 h1:Rlag2XtaFTxp19wS8MXlJwTvoh8ArU6ezoyFsMyCTNI=
golang.org/x/sys v0.43.0/go.mod h1:4GL1E5IUh+htKOUEOaiffhrAeqysfVGipDYzABqnCmw=
golang.org/x/telemetry v0.0.0-20240228155512-f48c80bd79b2/go.mod h1:TeRTkGYfJXctD9OcfyVLyj2J3IxLnKwHJR8f4D8a3YE=
golang.org/x/term v0.0.0-20201126162022-7de9c90e9dd1/go.mod h1:bj7SfCRtBDWHUb9snDiAeCFNEtKQo2Wmx5Cou7ajbmo=
golang.org/x/term v0.0.0-20210927222741-03fcf44c2211/go.mod h1:jbD1KX2456YbFQfuXm/mYQcufACuNUgVhRMnK/tPxf8=
@@ -886,8 +886,8 @@ golang.org/x/term v0.16.0/go.mod h1:yn7UURbUtPyrVJPGPq404EukNFxcm/foM+bV/bfcDsY=
golang.org/x/term v0.17.0/go.mod h1:lLRBjIVuehSbZlaOtGMbcMncT+aqLLLmKrsjNrUguwk=
golang.org/x/term v0.20.0/go.mod h1:8UkIAJTvZgivsXaD6/pH6U9ecQzZ45awqEOzuCvwpFY=
golang.org/x/term v0.27.0/go.mod h1:iMsnZpn0cago0GOrHO2+Y7u7JPn5AylBrcoWkElMTSM=
golang.org/x/term v0.45.0 h1:NwWyBmoJCbfTHpxrWoZ9C6/VxOf7ic219I8xZZFdrf0=
golang.org/x/term v0.45.0/go.mod h1:9aqxs0blBcrm/n0L9QW0aRVD+ktan8ssZromtqJC43w=
golang.org/x/term v0.42.0 h1:UiKe+zDFmJobeJ5ggPwOshJIVt6/Ft0rcfrXZDLWAWY=
golang.org/x/term v0.42.0/go.mod h1:Dq/D+snpsbazcBG5+F9Q1n2rXV8Ma+71xEjTRufARgY=
golang.org/x/text v0.3.0/go.mod h1:NqM8EUOU14njkJ3fqMW+pc6Ldnwhi/IjpwHt7yyuwOQ=
golang.org/x/text v0.3.2/go.mod h1:bEr9sfX3Q8Zfm5fL9x+3itogRgK3+ptLWKqgva+5dAk=
golang.org/x/text v0.3.3/go.mod h1:5Zoc/QRtKVWzQhOtBMvqHzDpF6irO9z98xDceosuGiQ=
@@ -899,8 +899,8 @@ golang.org/x/text v0.13.0/go.mod h1:TvPlkZtksWOMsz7fbANvkp4WM8x/WCo/om8BMLbz+aE=
golang.org/x/text v0.14.0/go.mod h1:18ZOQIKpY8NJVqYksKHtTdi31H5itFRjB5/qKTNYzSU=
golang.org/x/text v0.15.0/go.mod h1:18ZOQIKpY8NJVqYksKHtTdi31H5itFRjB5/qKTNYzSU=
golang.org/x/text v0.21.0/go.mod h1:4IBbMaMmOPCJ8SecivzSH54+73PCFmPWxNTLm+vZkEQ=
golang.org/x/text v0.40.0 h1:Ub2Z6/xjgF1WrYQz2nuITOEegKFtiIy+rieRJ5lHZKs=
golang.org/x/text v0.40.0/go.mod h1:hpnzDAfGV753zIKo+wk3u1bVKCGPbrnF7+7LBF/UHVY=
golang.org/x/text v0.36.0 h1:JfKh3XmcRPqZPKevfXVpI1wXPTqbkE5f7JA92a55Yxg=
golang.org/x/text v0.36.0/go.mod h1:NIdBknypM8iqVmPiuco0Dh6P5Jcdk8lJL0CUebqK164=
golang.org/x/time v0.15.0 h1:bbrp8t3bGUeFOx08pvsMYRTCVSMk89u4tKbNOZbp88U=
golang.org/x/time v0.15.0/go.mod h1:Y4YMaQmXwGQZoFaVFk4YpCt4FLQMYKZe9oeV/f4MSno=
golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20180917221912-90fa682c2a6e/go.mod h1:n7NCudcB/nEzxVGmLbDWY5pfWTLqBcC2KZ6jyYvM4mQ=
@@ -914,8 +914,8 @@ golang.org/x/tools v0.1.12/go.mod h1:hNGJHUnrk76NpqgfD5Aqm5Crs+Hm0VOH/i9J2+nxYbc
golang.org/x/tools v0.6.0/go.mod h1:Xwgl3UAJ/d3gWutnCtw505GrjyAbvKui8lOU390QaIU=
golang.org/x/tools v0.13.0/go.mod h1:HvlwmtVNQAhOuCjW7xxvovg8wbNq7LwfXh/k7wXUl58=
golang.org/x/tools v0.21.1-0.20240508182429-e35e4ccd0d2d/go.mod h1:aiJjzUbINMkxbQROHiO6hDPo2LHcIPhhQsa9DLh0yGk=
golang.org/x/tools v0.47.0 h1:7Kn5x/d1svx/PzryTsqeoZN4TZwqeH5pGWjefhLi/1Q=
golang.org/x/tools v0.47.0/go.mod h1:dFHnyTvFWY212G+h7ZY4Vsp/K3U4/7W9TyVaAul8uCA=
golang.org/x/tools v0.43.0 h1:12BdW9CeB3Z+J/I/wj34VMl8X+fEXBxVR90JeMX5E7s=
golang.org/x/tools v0.43.0/go.mod h1:uHkMso649BX2cZK6+RpuIPXS3ho2hZo4FVwfoy1vIk0=
golang.org/x/xerrors v0.0.0-20190717185122-a985d3407aa7/go.mod h1:I/5z698sn9Ka8TeJc9MKroUUfqBBauWjQqLJ2OPfmY0=
golang.org/x/xerrors v0.0.0-20191011141410-1b5146add898/go.mod h1:I/5z698sn9Ka8TeJc9MKroUUfqBBauWjQqLJ2OPfmY0=
golang.org/x/xerrors v0.0.0-20191204190536-9bdfabe68543/go.mod h1:I/5z698sn9Ka8TeJc9MKroUUfqBBauWjQqLJ2OPfmY0=

View File

@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ type Config struct {
GRPCAddr string
}
const localConnectorID = "local"
const LocalConnectorID = "local"
// Provider wraps a Dex server
type Provider struct {
@@ -495,18 +495,60 @@ func (p *Provider) Storage() storage.Storage {
return p.storage
}
// SetClientsMFAChain updates the MFAChain field on OAuth2 clients in Dex storage.
// Pass a non-empty slice (e.g. []string{"default-totp"}) to enable MFA, or nil to disable it.
func SetClientsMFAChain(ctx context.Context, st storage.Storage, clientIDs []string, mfaChain []string) error {
previousChains := make(map[string][]string, len(clientIDs))
for _, clientID := range clientIDs {
client, err := st.GetClient(ctx, clientID)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get client %s before MFA chain update: %w", clientID, err)
}
previousChains[clientID] = cloneMFAChain(client.MFAChain)
}
updatedClientIDs := make([]string, 0, len(clientIDs))
for _, clientID := range clientIDs {
if err := st.UpdateClient(ctx, clientID, func(old storage.Client) (storage.Client, error) {
old.MFAChain = cloneMFAChain(mfaChain)
return old, nil
}); err != nil {
if rollbackErr := rollbackClientsMFAChain(ctx, st, updatedClientIDs, previousChains); rollbackErr != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to update MFA chain on client %s: %w (also failed to roll back previous MFA chains: %v)", clientID, err, rollbackErr)
}
return fmt.Errorf("failed to update MFA chain on client %s: %w", clientID, err)
}
updatedClientIDs = append(updatedClientIDs, clientID)
}
return nil
}
func rollbackClientsMFAChain(ctx context.Context, st storage.Storage, clientIDs []string, previousChains map[string][]string) error {
var rollbackErrs []error
for i := len(clientIDs) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
clientID := clientIDs[i]
previousChain := cloneMFAChain(previousChains[clientID])
if err := st.UpdateClient(ctx, clientID, func(old storage.Client) (storage.Client, error) {
old.MFAChain = previousChain
return old, nil
}); err != nil {
rollbackErrs = append(rollbackErrs, fmt.Errorf("client %s: %w", clientID, err))
}
}
return errors.Join(rollbackErrs...)
}
func cloneMFAChain(chain []string) []string {
if chain == nil {
return nil
}
return append([]string(nil), chain...)
}
// SetClientsMFAChain updates the MFAChain field on the dashboard and CLI OAuth2 clients.
// Pass a non-empty slice (e.g. []string{"default-totp"}) to enable MFA, or nil to disable it.
func (p *Provider) SetClientsMFAChain(ctx context.Context, clientIDs []string, mfaChain []string) error {
for _, clientID := range clientIDs {
if err := p.storage.UpdateClient(ctx, clientID, func(old storage.Client) (storage.Client, error) {
old.MFAChain = mfaChain
return old, nil
}); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to update MFA chain on client %s: %w", clientID, err)
}
}
return nil
return SetClientsMFAChain(ctx, p.storage, clientIDs, mfaChain)
}
// Handler returns the Dex server as an http.Handler for embedding in another server.
@@ -546,7 +588,7 @@ func (p *Provider) CreateUser(ctx context.Context, email, username, password str
// Encode the user ID in Dex's format: base64(protobuf{user_id, connector_id})
// This matches the format Dex uses in JWT tokens
encodedID := EncodeDexUserID(userID, localConnectorID)
encodedID := EncodeDexUserID(userID, LocalConnectorID)
return encodedID, nil
}
@@ -625,7 +667,7 @@ func DecodeDexUserID(encodedID string) (userID, connectorID string, err error) {
// local password connector.
func IsLocalUserID(encodedID string) bool {
_, connectorID, err := DecodeDexUserID(encodedID)
return err == nil && connectorID == localConnectorID
return err == nil && connectorID == LocalConnectorID
}
// GetUser returns a user by email

View File

@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ package dex
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"io"
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
@@ -11,11 +13,44 @@ import (
"testing"
"github.com/dexidp/dex/storage"
"github.com/dexidp/dex/storage/memory"
sqllib "github.com/dexidp/dex/storage/sql"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
type updateFailingStorage struct {
storage.Storage
failClientID string
}
func (s *updateFailingStorage) UpdateClient(ctx context.Context, id string, updater func(storage.Client) (storage.Client, error)) error {
if id == s.failClientID {
return errors.New("forced update failure")
}
return s.Storage.UpdateClient(ctx, id, updater)
}
func TestSetClientsMFAChainRollsBackUpdatedClients(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
st := memory.New(slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)))
require.NoError(t, st.CreateClient(ctx, storage.Client{ID: "client-1", MFAChain: []string{"old-1"}}))
require.NoError(t, st.CreateClient(ctx, storage.Client{ID: "client-2", MFAChain: []string{"old-2"}}))
err := SetClientsMFAChain(ctx, &updateFailingStorage{Storage: st, failClientID: "client-2"}, []string{"client-1", "client-2"}, []string{"new"})
require.Error(t, err)
require.Contains(t, err.Error(), "failed to update MFA chain on client client-2")
client1, err := st.GetClient(ctx, "client-1")
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, []string{"old-1"}, client1.MFAChain)
client2, err := st.GetClient(ctx, "client-2")
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, []string{"old-2"}, client2.MFAChain)
}
func TestUserCreationFlow(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()

View File

@@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ start_services_and_show_instructions() {
echo "Creating proxy access token..."
# Use docker exec with bash to run the token command directly
PROXY_TOKEN=$($DOCKER_COMPOSE_COMMAND exec -T netbird-server \
/go/bin/netbird-server token create --name "default-proxy" --config /etc/netbird/config.yaml 2>/dev/null | grep "^Token:" | awk '{print $2}')
/go/bin/netbird-server admin token create --name "default-proxy" --config /etc/netbird/config.yaml 2>/dev/null | grep "^Token:" | awk '{print $2}')
if [[ -z "$PROXY_TOKEN" ]]; then
echo "ERROR: Failed to create proxy token. Check netbird-server logs." > /dev/stderr

177
management/cmd/admin.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
package cmd
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"path"
"path/filepath"
"github.com/dexidp/dex/storage"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/formatter/hook"
admincmd "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/cmd/admin"
tokencmd "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/cmd/token"
nbconfig "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/server/config"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/activity"
activitystore "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/activity/store"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/store"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
)
var adminDatadir string
// newAdminCommands creates the admin command tree with management-specific resource openers.
func newAdminCommands() *cobra.Command {
cmd := admincmd.NewCommands(admincmd.Openers{
Resources: withAdminResources,
Store: withAdminStoreOnly,
IDP: withAdminIDPOnly,
})
cmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&adminDatadir, "datadir", "", "Override the data directory from config (used for store.db and the default idp.db)")
return cmd
}
func newLegacyTokenCommand() *cobra.Command {
cmd := tokencmd.NewCommands(tokencmd.StoreOpener(withAdminStoreOnly))
cmd.Deprecated = "use 'admin token' instead"
cmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&nbconfig.MgmtConfigPath, "config", defaultMgmtConfig, "Netbird config file location")
return cmd
}
// withAdminResources initializes logging, loads config, opens the management store
// and embedded IdP storage, and calls fn.
func withAdminResources(cmd *cobra.Command, fn func(ctx context.Context, resources admincmd.Resources) error) error {
return withAdminConfig(cmd, true, func(ctx context.Context, config *nbconfig.Config, datadir string) error {
managementStore, err := openAdminStore(ctx, config, datadir)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer admincmd.CloseStore(ctx, managementStore)
idpStorage, idpStorageFile, err := admincmd.OpenIDPStorage(config)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer admincmd.CloseIDPStorage(idpStorage)
eventStore, esErr := openAdminEventStore(ctx, config, datadir)
if esErr != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(cmd.ErrOrStderr(), "Warning: audit events will not be recorded: %v\n", esErr)
}
if eventStore != nil {
defer func() {
if err := eventStore.Close(ctx); err != nil {
log.Debugf("close activity event store: %v", err)
}
}()
}
return fn(ctx, admincmd.Resources{Store: managementStore, IDPStorage: idpStorage, IDPStorageFile: idpStorageFile, EventStore: eventStore})
})
}
// withAdminStoreOnly opens only the management store for admin subcommands that do not
// need embedded IdP storage.
func withAdminStoreOnly(cmd *cobra.Command, fn func(ctx context.Context, s store.Store) error) error {
return withAdminConfig(cmd, false, func(ctx context.Context, config *nbconfig.Config, datadir string) error {
managementStore, err := openAdminStore(ctx, config, datadir)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer admincmd.CloseStore(ctx, managementStore)
return fn(ctx, managementStore)
})
}
func withAdminIDPOnly(cmd *cobra.Command, fn func(ctx context.Context, idpStorage storage.Storage, storageFile string) error) error {
return withAdminConfig(cmd, true, func(ctx context.Context, config *nbconfig.Config, _ string) error {
idpStorage, idpStorageFile, err := admincmd.OpenIDPStorage(config)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer admincmd.CloseIDPStorage(idpStorage)
return fn(ctx, idpStorage, idpStorageFile)
})
}
func withAdminConfig(cmd *cobra.Command, applyIDPDefaults bool, fn func(ctx context.Context, config *nbconfig.Config, datadir string) error) error {
if err := util.InitLog("error", "console"); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("init log: %w", err)
}
ctx := context.WithValue(cmd.Context(), hook.ExecutionContextKey, hook.SystemSource) //nolint:staticcheck
config, datadir, err := loadAdminMgmtConfig(ctx, applyIDPDefaults)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("load config: %w", err)
}
return fn(ctx, config, datadir)
}
func loadAdminMgmtConfig(ctx context.Context, applyIDPDefaults bool) (*nbconfig.Config, string, error) {
config := &nbconfig.Config{}
if _, err := util.ReadJsonWithEnvSub(nbconfig.MgmtConfigPath, config); err != nil {
return nil, "", err
}
if applyIDPDefaults {
if err := ApplyEmbeddedIdPConfig(ctx, config); err != nil {
return nil, "", err
}
}
datadir := config.Datadir
applyAdminDatadirOverride(config, &datadir)
return config, datadir, nil
}
func applyAdminDatadirOverride(config *nbconfig.Config, datadir *string) {
if adminDatadir == "" {
return
}
oldDatadir := *datadir
*datadir = adminDatadir
if config.EmbeddedIdP != nil && config.EmbeddedIdP.Storage.Type == "sqlite3" && isDefaultIDPStorageFile(config.EmbeddedIdP.Storage.Config.File, oldDatadir) {
config.EmbeddedIdP.Storage.Config.File = filepath.Join(*datadir, "idp.db")
}
}
func isDefaultIDPStorageFile(file, datadir string) bool {
if file == "" {
return true
}
defaultFile := filepath.Join(datadir, "idp.db")
legacyDefaultFile := path.Join(datadir, "idp.db")
legacySlashDefaultFile := path.Join(filepath.ToSlash(datadir), "idp.db")
return filepath.Clean(file) == filepath.Clean(defaultFile) ||
file == legacyDefaultFile ||
filepath.ToSlash(file) == legacySlashDefaultFile
}
func openAdminStore(ctx context.Context, config *nbconfig.Config, datadir string) (store.Store, error) {
managementStore, err := store.NewStore(ctx, config.StoreConfig.Engine, datadir, nil, true)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("create store: %w", err)
}
return managementStore, nil
}
func openAdminEventStore(ctx context.Context, config *nbconfig.Config, datadir string) (activity.Store, error) {
if config.DataStoreEncryptionKey == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("data store encryption key is not configured")
}
eventStore, err := activitystore.NewSqlStore(ctx, datadir, config.DataStoreEncryptionKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("open activity event store: %w", err)
}
if eventStore == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("open activity event store: returned nil store")
}
return eventStore, nil
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,577 @@
// Package admincmd provides reusable cobra commands for self-hosted administrator helpers.
// Both the management and combined binaries use these commands, each providing
// their own opener to handle config loading and storage initialization.
package admincmd
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"log/slog"
"os"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/dexidp/dex/storage"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/formatter/hook"
nbdex "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/idp/dex"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/cmd/proxy"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/cmd/token"
nbconfig "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/server/config"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/activity"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/idp"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/store"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
)
// Resources contains the storages required by the admin commands.
type Resources struct {
Store store.Store
IDPStorage storage.Storage
IDPStorageFile string
EventStore activity.Store
}
// Opener initializes command resources from the command context and calls fn.
type Opener func(cmd *cobra.Command, fn func(ctx context.Context, resources Resources) error) error
// StoreOpener initializes only the management store from the command context and calls fn.
type StoreOpener func(cmd *cobra.Command, fn func(ctx context.Context, s store.Store) error) error
// IDPOpener initializes only the embedded IdP storage from the command context and calls fn.
type IDPOpener func(cmd *cobra.Command, fn func(ctx context.Context, idpStorage storage.Storage, storageFile string) error) error
// Openers contains the resource openers needed by the admin command tree.
type Openers struct {
Resources Opener
Store StoreOpener
IDP IDPOpener
}
type userSelector struct {
email string
userID string
}
func (s userSelector) normalized() userSelector {
return userSelector{
email: strings.TrimSpace(s.email),
userID: strings.TrimSpace(s.userID),
}
}
func (s userSelector) validate() error {
s = s.normalized()
if (s.email == "") == (s.userID == "") {
return fmt.Errorf("provide exactly one of --email or --user-id")
}
return nil
}
// NewCommands creates the admin command tree with the given resource openers.
func NewCommands(openers Openers) *cobra.Command {
adminCmd := &cobra.Command{
Use: "admin",
Short: "Self-hosted administrator helpers",
Long: "Administrative helpers for self-hosted deployments using the embedded identity provider.",
}
userCmd := &cobra.Command{
Use: "user",
Short: "Manage local embedded IdP users",
}
var passwordSelector userSelector
var password string
var passwordFile string
passwordCmd := &cobra.Command{
Use: "change-password (--email email | --user-id id) (--password password | --password-file path)",
Aliases: []string{"set-password"},
Short: "Change a local user's password",
Args: cobra.NoArgs,
RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
if err := passwordSelector.validate(); err != nil {
return err
}
newPassword, err := resolvePasswordInput(cmd, password, passwordFile)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return openers.IDP(cmd, func(ctx context.Context, idpStorage storage.Storage, storageFile string) error {
return runChangePassword(ctx, idpStorage, cmd.OutOrStdout(), passwordSelector, newPassword, storageFile)
})
},
}
addUserSelectorFlags(passwordCmd, &passwordSelector)
passwordCmd.Flags().StringVar(&password, "password", "", "New password for the user")
passwordCmd.Flags().StringVar(&passwordFile, "password-file", "", "Read new password from file ('-' for stdin)")
var resetSelector userSelector
resetMFACmd := &cobra.Command{
Use: "reset-mfa (--email email | --user-id id)",
Short: "Reset a local user's MFA enrollment",
Args: cobra.NoArgs,
RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
if err := resetSelector.validate(); err != nil {
return err
}
return openers.IDP(cmd, func(ctx context.Context, idpStorage storage.Storage, storageFile string) error {
return runResetMFA(ctx, idpStorage, cmd.OutOrStdout(), resetSelector, storageFile)
})
},
}
addUserSelectorFlags(resetMFACmd, &resetSelector)
userCmd.AddCommand(passwordCmd, resetMFACmd)
mfaCmd := &cobra.Command{
Use: "mfa",
Short: "Manage local MFA for embedded IdP users",
}
enableCmd := &cobra.Command{
Use: "enable",
Short: "Enable MFA for local embedded IdP users",
Args: cobra.NoArgs,
RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
return openers.Resources(cmd, func(ctx context.Context, resources Resources) error {
return runSetMFAEnabled(ctx, resources, cmd.OutOrStdout(), true)
})
},
}
disableCmd := &cobra.Command{
Use: "disable",
Short: "Disable MFA for local embedded IdP users",
Args: cobra.NoArgs,
RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
return openers.Resources(cmd, func(ctx context.Context, resources Resources) error {
return runSetMFAEnabled(ctx, resources, cmd.OutOrStdout(), false)
})
},
}
statusCmd := &cobra.Command{
Use: "status",
Short: "Show local MFA status",
Args: cobra.NoArgs,
RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
return openers.Resources(cmd, func(ctx context.Context, resources Resources) error {
return runMFAStatus(ctx, resources, cmd.OutOrStdout())
})
},
}
mfaCmd.AddCommand(enableCmd, disableCmd, statusCmd)
adminCmd.AddCommand(userCmd, mfaCmd)
if openers.Store != nil {
adminCmd.AddCommand(tokencmd.NewCommands(tokencmd.StoreOpener(openers.Store)))
adminCmd.AddCommand(proxycmd.NewCommands(proxycmd.StoreOpener(openers.Store)))
}
return adminCmd
}
// OpenEmbeddedIDPStorage opens the Dex storage configured for the embedded IdP.
func OpenEmbeddedIDPStorage(cfg *idp.EmbeddedIdPConfig) (storage.Storage, error) {
if cfg == nil || !cfg.Enabled {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("admin commands require the embedded IdP to be enabled")
}
yamlConfig, err := cfg.ToYAMLConfig()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("build embedded IdP config: %w", err)
}
logger := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil))
st, err := yamlConfig.Storage.OpenStorage(logger)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("open embedded IdP storage: %w", err)
}
return st, nil
}
// CloseStore closes the management store and logs cleanup errors at debug level.
func CloseStore(ctx context.Context, s store.Store) {
if s == nil {
return
}
if err := s.Close(ctx); err != nil {
log.Debugf("close store: %v", err)
}
}
// OpenIDPStorage opens embedded IdP storage and returns its sqlite file path when applicable.
func OpenIDPStorage(config *nbconfig.Config) (storage.Storage, string, error) {
if config == nil {
return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("management config is required")
}
idpStorage, err := OpenEmbeddedIDPStorage(config.EmbeddedIdP)
if err != nil {
return nil, "", err
}
return idpStorage, embeddedIDPStorageFile(config), nil
}
func embeddedIDPStorageFile(config *nbconfig.Config) string {
if config.EmbeddedIdP == nil || config.EmbeddedIdP.Storage.Type != "sqlite3" {
return ""
}
return config.EmbeddedIdP.Storage.Config.File
}
// CloseIDPStorage closes embedded IdP storage and logs cleanup errors at debug level.
func CloseIDPStorage(s storage.Storage) {
if s == nil {
return
}
if err := s.Close(); err != nil {
log.Debugf("close embedded IdP storage: %v", err)
}
}
func addUserSelectorFlags(cmd *cobra.Command, selector *userSelector) {
cmd.Flags().StringVar(&selector.email, "email", "", "User email")
cmd.Flags().StringVar(&selector.userID, "user-id", "", "User ID")
}
func resolvePasswordInput(cmd *cobra.Command, password, passwordFile string) (string, error) {
if password != "" && passwordFile != "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("provide only one of --password or --password-file")
}
if passwordFile == "" {
return password, nil
}
var data []byte
var err error
if passwordFile == "-" {
data, err = io.ReadAll(cmd.InOrStdin())
} else {
data, err = os.ReadFile(passwordFile)
}
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("read password: %w", err)
}
return strings.TrimRight(string(data), "\r\n"), nil
}
func runChangePassword(ctx context.Context, idpStorage storage.Storage, w io.Writer, selector userSelector, password string, idpStorageFile string) error {
if idpStorage == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("embedded IdP storage is required")
}
selector = selector.normalized()
if err := selector.validate(); err != nil {
return err
}
if password == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("password is required")
}
if err := server.ValidatePassword(password); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid password: %w", err)
}
user, err := findLocalUser(ctx, idpStorage, selector, idpStorageFile)
if err != nil {
return err
}
hash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(password), bcrypt.DefaultCost)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("hash password: %w", err)
}
if err := idpStorage.UpdatePassword(ctx, user.Email, func(old storage.Password) (storage.Password, error) {
old.Hash = hash
return old, nil
}); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("update password for %s: %w", user.Email, err)
}
if err := deleteLocalAuthSession(ctx, idpStorage, user.UserID); err != nil {
return err
}
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, "Password updated for %s.\n", user.Email)
return nil
}
func runResetMFA(ctx context.Context, idpStorage storage.Storage, w io.Writer, selector userSelector, idpStorageFile string) error {
if idpStorage == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("embedded IdP storage is required")
}
selector = selector.normalized()
if err := selector.validate(); err != nil {
return err
}
user, err := findLocalUser(ctx, idpStorage, selector, idpStorageFile)
if err != nil {
return err
}
reset := false
err = idpStorage.UpdateUserIdentity(ctx, user.UserID, idp.LocalConnectorID, func(old storage.UserIdentity) (storage.UserIdentity, error) {
reset = reset || len(old.MFASecrets) > 0 || len(old.WebAuthnCredentials) > 0
old.MFASecrets = map[string]*storage.MFASecret{}
old.WebAuthnCredentials = map[string][]storage.WebAuthnCredential{}
return old, nil
})
if errors.Is(err, storage.ErrNotFound) {
if err := deleteLocalAuthSession(ctx, idpStorage, user.UserID); err != nil {
return err
}
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, "No MFA enrollment found for %s.\n", user.Email)
return nil
}
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("reset MFA for %s: %w", user.Email, err)
}
if err := deleteLocalAuthSession(ctx, idpStorage, user.UserID); err != nil {
return err
}
if reset {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, "MFA reset for %s. The user will re-enroll at next login.\n", user.Email)
} else {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, "No MFA enrollment found for %s.\n", user.Email)
}
return nil
}
func runSetMFAEnabled(ctx context.Context, resources Resources, w io.Writer, enabled bool) error {
if resources.Store == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("management store is required")
}
if resources.IDPStorage == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("embedded IdP storage is required")
}
accountID, settings, err := getSingleAccountSettings(ctx, resources.Store)
if err != nil {
return err
}
oldEnabled := settings.LocalMfaEnabled
newSettings := settings.Copy()
newSettings.LocalMfaEnabled = enabled
if err := setIDPClientsMFA(ctx, resources.IDPStorage, enabled); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := resources.Store.SaveAccountSettings(ctx, accountID, newSettings); err != nil {
if rollbackErr := setIDPClientsMFA(ctx, resources.IDPStorage, oldEnabled); rollbackErr != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("save local MFA account setting: %w (also failed to roll back embedded IdP MFA state: %v)", err, rollbackErr)
}
return fmt.Errorf("save local MFA account setting: %w", err)
}
if err := storeMFAActivity(ctx, resources.EventStore, accountID, enabled); err != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, "Warning: failed to record audit event: %v\n", err)
}
state := "disabled"
if enabled {
state = "enabled"
}
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, "Local MFA %s.\n", state)
return nil
}
func runMFAStatus(ctx context.Context, resources Resources, w io.Writer) error {
if resources.Store == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("management store is required")
}
if resources.IDPStorage == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("embedded IdP storage is required")
}
_, settings, err := getSingleAccountSettings(ctx, resources.Store)
if err != nil {
return err
}
accountStatus := "disabled"
if settings.LocalMfaEnabled {
accountStatus = "enabled"
}
clientStatus, err := idpClientsMFAStatus(ctx, resources.IDPStorage)
if err != nil {
return err
}
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, "Account setting: %s\n", accountStatus)
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, "Embedded IdP clients: %s\n", clientStatus)
return nil
}
func getSingleAccountSettings(ctx context.Context, s store.Store) (string, *types.Settings, error) {
count, err := s.GetAccountsCounter(ctx)
if err != nil {
return "", nil, fmt.Errorf("count accounts: %w", err)
}
if count != 1 {
return "", nil, fmt.Errorf("expected exactly one account, got %d; local MFA is supported only in single-account embedded IdP deployments", count)
}
accountID, err := s.GetAnyAccountID(ctx)
if err != nil {
return "", nil, fmt.Errorf("get account ID: %w", err)
}
settings, err := s.GetAccountSettings(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, accountID)
if err != nil {
return "", nil, fmt.Errorf("get account settings: %w", err)
}
if settings == nil {
settings = &types.Settings{}
}
return accountID, settings, nil
}
func storeMFAActivity(ctx context.Context, eventStore activity.Store, accountID string, enabled bool) error {
if eventStore == nil {
return nil
}
event := activity.AccountLocalMfaDisabled
if enabled {
event = activity.AccountLocalMfaEnabled
}
_, err := eventStore.Save(ctx, &activity.Event{
Timestamp: time.Now().UTC(),
Activity: event,
InitiatorID: string(hook.SystemSource),
TargetID: accountID,
AccountID: accountID,
})
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("save local MFA audit event: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
func findLocalUser(ctx context.Context, idpStorage storage.Storage, selector userSelector, idpStorageFile string) (storage.Password, error) {
selector = selector.normalized()
if err := selector.validate(); err != nil {
return storage.Password{}, err
}
if selector.email != "" {
user, err := idpStorage.GetPassword(ctx, selector.email)
if errors.Is(err, storage.ErrNotFound) {
if empty, listErr := localUsersEmpty(ctx, idpStorage); listErr != nil {
return storage.Password{}, listErr
} else if empty {
return storage.Password{}, noLocalUsersError(idpStorageFile)
}
return storage.Password{}, fmt.Errorf("local user with email %q not found", selector.email)
}
if err != nil {
return storage.Password{}, fmt.Errorf("get local user by email %q: %w", selector.email, err)
}
return user, nil
}
rawUserID := selector.userID
if decodedUserID, _, err := nbdex.DecodeDexUserID(selector.userID); err == nil && decodedUserID != "" {
rawUserID = decodedUserID
}
users, err := idpStorage.ListPasswords(ctx)
if err != nil {
return storage.Password{}, fmt.Errorf("list local users: %w", err)
}
for _, user := range users {
if user.UserID == rawUserID || user.UserID == selector.userID {
return user, nil
}
}
if len(users) == 0 {
return storage.Password{}, noLocalUsersError(idpStorageFile)
}
return storage.Password{}, fmt.Errorf("local user with ID %q not found", selector.userID)
}
func localUsersEmpty(ctx context.Context, idpStorage storage.Storage) (bool, error) {
users, err := idpStorage.ListPasswords(ctx)
if err != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("list local users: %w", err)
}
return len(users) == 0, nil
}
func noLocalUsersError(idpStorageFile string) error {
location := ""
if idpStorageFile != "" {
location = fmt.Sprintf(" (%s)", idpStorageFile)
}
return fmt.Errorf("no local users exist in the embedded IdP storage%s; the management server may never have started with this config, or --datadir points at the wrong location", location)
}
func deleteLocalAuthSession(ctx context.Context, idpStorage storage.Storage, userID string) error {
err := idpStorage.DeleteAuthSession(ctx, userID, idp.LocalConnectorID)
if err == nil || errors.Is(err, storage.ErrNotFound) {
return nil
}
return fmt.Errorf("delete local auth session for user %s: %w", userID, err)
}
func setIDPClientsMFA(ctx context.Context, idpStorage storage.Storage, enabled bool) error {
var mfaChain []string
if enabled {
mfaChain = []string{idp.DefaultTOTPAuthenticatorID}
}
clientIDs := []string{idp.StaticClientCLI, idp.StaticClientDashboard}
if err := nbdex.SetClientsMFAChain(ctx, idpStorage, clientIDs, mfaChain); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, storage.ErrNotFound) {
return fmt.Errorf("embedded IdP client not found; start the management server once before toggling MFA: %w", err)
}
return fmt.Errorf("update MFA chain on embedded IdP clients: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
func idpClientsMFAStatus(ctx context.Context, idpStorage storage.Storage) (string, error) {
clientIDs := []string{idp.StaticClientCLI, idp.StaticClientDashboard}
enabledCount := 0
for _, clientID := range clientIDs {
client, err := idpStorage.GetClient(ctx, clientID)
if errors.Is(err, storage.ErrNotFound) {
return "unknown", fmt.Errorf("embedded IdP client %q not found", clientID)
}
if err != nil {
return "unknown", fmt.Errorf("get embedded IdP client %q: %w", clientID, err)
}
if hasAuthenticator(client.MFAChain, idp.DefaultTOTPAuthenticatorID) {
enabledCount++
}
}
switch enabledCount {
case 0:
return "disabled", nil
case len(clientIDs):
return "enabled", nil
default:
return "partially enabled", nil
}
}
func hasAuthenticator(chain []string, authenticatorID string) bool {
for _, id := range chain {
if id == authenticatorID {
return true
}
}
return false
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
package admincmd
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"io"
"log/slog"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/dexidp/dex/storage"
"github.com/dexidp/dex/storage/memory"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
nbdex "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/idp/dex"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/idp"
mgmtstore "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/store"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
)
func newTestIDPStorage(t *testing.T) storage.Storage {
t.Helper()
st := memory.New(slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)))
hash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte("OldPass1!"), bcrypt.DefaultCost)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, st.CreatePassword(context.Background(), storage.Password{
Email: "user@example.com",
Username: "User",
UserID: "user-1",
Hash: hash,
}))
require.NoError(t, st.CreateUserIdentity(context.Background(), storage.UserIdentity{
UserID: "user-1",
ConnectorID: idp.LocalConnectorID,
MFASecrets: map[string]*storage.MFASecret{
idp.DefaultTOTPAuthenticatorID: {
AuthenticatorID: idp.DefaultTOTPAuthenticatorID,
Type: "TOTP",
Secret: "otpauth://totp/NetBird:user@example.com?secret=ABC",
Confirmed: true,
CreatedAt: time.Now(),
},
},
WebAuthnCredentials: map[string][]storage.WebAuthnCredential{
"webauthn": {{CredentialID: []byte("credential")}},
},
}))
require.NoError(t, st.CreateAuthSession(context.Background(), storage.AuthSession{
UserID: "user-1",
ConnectorID: idp.LocalConnectorID,
Nonce: "nonce",
}))
require.NoError(t, st.CreateClient(context.Background(), storage.Client{ID: idp.StaticClientCLI, Name: "CLI"}))
require.NoError(t, st.CreateClient(context.Background(), storage.Client{ID: idp.StaticClientDashboard, Name: "Dashboard"}))
return st
}
func TestRunChangePassword(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
st := newTestIDPStorage(t)
var out bytes.Buffer
err := runChangePassword(ctx, st, &out, userSelector{email: "user@example.com"}, "NewPass1!", "")
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Contains(t, out.String(), "Password updated")
user, err := st.GetPassword(ctx, "user@example.com")
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword(user.Hash, []byte("NewPass1!")))
_, err = st.GetAuthSession(ctx, "user-1", idp.LocalConnectorID)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, storage.ErrNotFound)
}
func TestRunChangePasswordValidatesPassword(t *testing.T) {
st := newTestIDPStorage(t)
err := runChangePassword(context.Background(), st, io.Discard, userSelector{email: "user@example.com"}, "short", "")
require.Error(t, err)
require.Contains(t, err.Error(), "invalid password")
}
func TestRunResetMFA(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
st := newTestIDPStorage(t)
var out bytes.Buffer
encodedUserID := nbdex.EncodeDexUserID("user-1", idp.LocalConnectorID)
err := runResetMFA(ctx, st, &out, userSelector{userID: encodedUserID}, "")
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Contains(t, out.String(), "MFA reset")
identity, err := st.GetUserIdentity(ctx, "user-1", idp.LocalConnectorID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Empty(t, identity.MFASecrets)
require.Empty(t, identity.WebAuthnCredentials)
_, err = st.GetAuthSession(ctx, "user-1", idp.LocalConnectorID)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, storage.ErrNotFound)
}
func TestRunResetMFAWithoutEnrollment(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
st := newTestIDPStorage(t)
require.NoError(t, st.UpdateUserIdentity(ctx, "user-1", idp.LocalConnectorID, func(old storage.UserIdentity) (storage.UserIdentity, error) {
old.MFASecrets = nil
old.WebAuthnCredentials = nil
return old, nil
}))
var out bytes.Buffer
err := runResetMFA(ctx, st, &out, userSelector{email: "user@example.com"}, "")
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Contains(t, out.String(), "No MFA enrollment found")
}
func TestSetIDPClientsMFA(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
st := newTestIDPStorage(t)
require.NoError(t, setIDPClientsMFA(ctx, st, true))
status, err := idpClientsMFAStatus(ctx, st)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, "enabled", status)
require.NoError(t, setIDPClientsMFA(ctx, st, false))
status, err = idpClientsMFAStatus(ctx, st)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, "disabled", status)
}
func newTestManagementStore(t *testing.T, localMFAEnabled bool) mgmtstore.Store {
t.Helper()
ctx := context.Background()
st, err := mgmtstore.NewStore(ctx, types.SqliteStoreEngine, t.TempDir(), nil, false)
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(func() { require.NoError(t, st.Close(ctx)) })
require.NoError(t, st.SaveAccount(ctx, &types.Account{
Id: "account-1",
Settings: &types.Settings{LocalMfaEnabled: localMFAEnabled},
}))
return st
}
func TestRunSetMFAEnabledDoesNotSaveWhenIDPUpdateFails(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
managementStore := newTestManagementStore(t, false)
idpStorage := memory.New(slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)))
err := runSetMFAEnabled(ctx, Resources{Store: managementStore, IDPStorage: idpStorage}, io.Discard, true)
require.Error(t, err)
require.Contains(t, err.Error(), "embedded IdP client")
settings, err := managementStore.GetAccountSettings(ctx, mgmtstore.LockingStrengthNone, "account-1")
require.NoError(t, err)
require.False(t, settings.LocalMfaEnabled)
}
func TestRunSetMFAEnabledUpdatesSettingsAfterIDP(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
managementStore := newTestManagementStore(t, false)
idpStorage := newTestIDPStorage(t)
err := runSetMFAEnabled(ctx, Resources{Store: managementStore, IDPStorage: idpStorage}, io.Discard, true)
require.NoError(t, err)
settings, err := managementStore.GetAccountSettings(ctx, mgmtstore.LockingStrengthNone, "account-1")
require.NoError(t, err)
require.True(t, settings.LocalMfaEnabled)
clientStatus, err := idpClientsMFAStatus(ctx, idpStorage)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, "enabled", clientStatus)
}
func TestRunSetMFAEnabledSucceedsWithNilEventStore(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
managementStore := newTestManagementStore(t, false)
idpStorage := newTestIDPStorage(t)
var out bytes.Buffer
var err error
require.NotPanics(t, func() {
err = runSetMFAEnabled(ctx, Resources{Store: managementStore, IDPStorage: idpStorage, EventStore: nil}, &out, true)
})
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Contains(t, out.String(), "Local MFA enabled")
settings, err := managementStore.GetAccountSettings(ctx, mgmtstore.LockingStrengthNone, "account-1")
require.NoError(t, err)
require.True(t, settings.LocalMfaEnabled)
}
func TestUserSelectorValidate(t *testing.T) {
require.NoError(t, userSelector{email: " user@example.com "}.validate())
require.NoError(t, userSelector{userID: "user-1"}.validate())
require.Error(t, userSelector{}.validate())
require.Error(t, userSelector{email: "user@example.com", userID: "user-1"}.validate())
}
func TestFindLocalUserNotFound(t *testing.T) {
st := newTestIDPStorage(t)
_, err := findLocalUser(context.Background(), st, userSelector{email: "missing@example.com"}, "")
require.Error(t, err)
require.True(t, strings.Contains(err.Error(), "not found"))
}
func TestFindLocalUserZeroUsersIncludesStoragePath(t *testing.T) {
st := memory.New(slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(io.Discard, nil)))
_, err := findLocalUser(context.Background(), st, userSelector{email: "missing@example.com"}, "/var/lib/netbird/idp.db")
require.Error(t, err)
require.Contains(t, err.Error(), "no local users exist")
require.Contains(t, err.Error(), "/var/lib/netbird/idp.db")
}
func TestUserCommandValidatesSelectorBeforeOpeningStorage(t *testing.T) {
opened := false
cmd := NewCommands(Openers{
IDP: func(cmd *cobra.Command, fn func(ctx context.Context, idpStorage storage.Storage, storageFile string) error) error {
opened = true
return nil
},
})
cmd.SetArgs([]string{"user", "change-password", "--password", "NewPass1!"})
cmd.SetOut(io.Discard)
cmd.SetErr(io.Discard)
err := cmd.Execute()
require.Error(t, err)
require.Contains(t, err.Error(), "provide exactly one")
require.False(t, opened)
}
func TestResolvePasswordInputFromStdin(t *testing.T) {
cmd := &cobra.Command{}
cmd.SetIn(strings.NewReader("NewPass1!\n"))
password, err := resolvePasswordInput(cmd, "", "-")
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, "NewPass1!", password)
}
func TestResolvePasswordInputRejectsMultipleSources(t *testing.T) {
_, err := resolvePasswordInput(&cobra.Command{}, "NewPass1!", "-")
require.Error(t, err)
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
package cmd
import (
"context"
"path"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
nbconfig "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/server/config"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/idp"
)
func TestApplyAdminDatadirOverrideRelocatesDefaultIDPStorage(t *testing.T) {
oldDatadir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "old")
newDatadir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "new")
for _, defaultFile := range []string{
"",
filepath.Join(oldDatadir, "idp.db"),
path.Join(oldDatadir, "idp.db"),
} {
t.Run(defaultFile, func(t *testing.T) {
cfg := &nbconfig.Config{
EmbeddedIdP: &idp.EmbeddedIdPConfig{
Enabled: true,
Storage: idp.EmbeddedStorageConfig{
Type: "sqlite3",
Config: idp.EmbeddedStorageTypeConfig{
File: defaultFile,
},
},
},
}
datadir := oldDatadir
oldAdminDatadir := adminDatadir
adminDatadir = newDatadir
t.Cleanup(func() { adminDatadir = oldAdminDatadir })
applyAdminDatadirOverride(cfg, &datadir)
require.Equal(t, newDatadir, datadir)
require.Equal(t, filepath.Join(newDatadir, "idp.db"), cfg.EmbeddedIdP.Storage.Config.File)
})
}
}
func TestOpenAdminEventStoreMissingEncryptionKeyReturnsNilInterface(t *testing.T) {
eventStore, err := openAdminEventStore(context.Background(), &nbconfig.Config{}, t.TempDir())
require.Error(t, err)
require.Contains(t, err.Error(), "encryption key")
require.Nil(t, eventStore)
}
func TestApplyAdminDatadirOverrideKeepsExplicitIDPStorage(t *testing.T) {
oldDatadir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "old")
newDatadir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "new")
explicitFile := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "custom-idp.db")
cfg := &nbconfig.Config{
EmbeddedIdP: &idp.EmbeddedIdPConfig{
Enabled: true,
Storage: idp.EmbeddedStorageConfig{
Type: "sqlite3",
Config: idp.EmbeddedStorageTypeConfig{
File: explicitFile,
},
},
},
}
datadir := oldDatadir
oldAdminDatadir := adminDatadir
adminDatadir = newDatadir
t.Cleanup(func() { adminDatadir = oldAdminDatadir })
applyAdminDatadirOverride(cfg, &datadir)
require.Equal(t, newDatadir, datadir)
require.Equal(t, explicitFile, cfg.EmbeddedIdP.Storage.Config.File)
}

View File

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import (
"os"
"os/signal"
"path"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"syscall"
@@ -209,7 +210,7 @@ func ApplyEmbeddedIdPConfig(ctx context.Context, cfg *nbconfig.Config) error {
cfg.EmbeddedIdP.Storage.Type = "sqlite3"
}
if cfg.EmbeddedIdP.Storage.Config.File == "" && cfg.Datadir != "" {
cfg.EmbeddedIdP.Storage.Config.File = path.Join(cfg.Datadir, "idp.db")
cfg.EmbeddedIdP.Storage.Config.File = filepath.Join(cfg.Datadir, "idp.db")
}
issuer := cfg.EmbeddedIdP.Issuer

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
// Package proxycmd provides reusable cobra commands for managing reverse proxy instances.
// Both the management and combined binaries use these commands, each providing
// their own StoreOpener to handle config loading and store initialization.
package proxycmd
import (
"bufio"
"context"
"fmt"
"io"
"strings"
"text/tabwriter"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
rpproxy "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/proxy"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/store"
)
// StoreOpener initializes a store from the command context and calls fn.
type StoreOpener func(cmd *cobra.Command, fn func(ctx context.Context, s store.Store) error) error
const disconnectAllConfirmation = "disconnect all proxies"
// NewCommands creates the proxy command tree with the given store opener.
// Returns the parent "proxy" command with the disconnect-all subcommand.
func NewCommands(opener StoreOpener) *cobra.Command {
var dryRun bool
var force bool
proxyCmd := &cobra.Command{
Use: "proxy",
Short: "Manage reverse proxy instances",
Long: "Commands for inspecting and repairing the reverse proxy instances registered with the management server.",
}
disconnectAllCmd := &cobra.Command{
Use: "disconnect-all",
Short: "Force-mark all reverse proxy instances as disconnected",
Long: "Lists all reverse proxy instances and force-marks them as disconnected, regardless of their session state. " +
"Use this to repair stale connection state, e.g. after an unclean management server shutdown. " +
"By default, it asks for manual confirmation before changing state. Use --dry-run to preview without changing state, or --force to skip confirmation. " +
"Run during a maintenance window; affected live proxies may stay hidden until their next heartbeat or reconnect/re-register.",
Args: cobra.NoArgs,
RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
return opener(cmd, func(ctx context.Context, s store.Store) error {
return runDisconnectAll(ctx, s, cmd.OutOrStdout(), cmd.InOrStdin(), dryRun, force)
})
},
}
disconnectAllCmd.Flags().BoolVar(&dryRun, "dry-run", false, "List reverse proxy instances that would be disconnected without changing state")
disconnectAllCmd.Flags().BoolVar(&force, "force", false, "Skip the confirmation prompt and apply the repair")
proxyCmd.AddCommand(disconnectAllCmd)
return proxyCmd
}
func runDisconnectAll(ctx context.Context, s store.Store, out io.Writer, in io.Reader, dryRun, force bool) error {
proxies, err := s.GetAllProxies(ctx)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("list proxies: %w", err)
}
if len(proxies) == 0 {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(out, "No reverse proxy instances found.")
return nil
}
toDisconnect := 0
w := tabwriter.NewWriter(out, 0, 0, 2, ' ', 0)
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(w, "ID\tCLUSTER\tIP\tACCOUNT\tSTATUS\tLAST SEEN")
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(w, "--\t-------\t--\t-------\t------\t---------")
for _, p := range proxies {
if p.Status != rpproxy.StatusDisconnected {
toDisconnect++
}
account := "-"
if p.AccountID != nil {
account = *p.AccountID
}
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s\t%s\t%s\t%s\t%s\t%s\n",
p.ID,
p.ClusterAddress,
p.IPAddress,
account,
p.Status,
p.LastSeen.Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05"),
)
}
if err := w.Flush(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write proxy list: %w", err)
}
if dryRun {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(out, "\nDry run: would force-mark %d of %d reverse proxy instance(s) as disconnected.\n", toDisconnect, len(proxies))
return nil
}
if !force {
confirmed, err := confirmDisconnectAll(out, in)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if !confirmed {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(out, "Aborted. No reverse proxy instances were changed.")
return nil
}
}
disconnected, err := s.DisconnectAllProxies(ctx)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("disconnect proxies: %w", err)
}
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(out, "\nForce-marked %d of %d reverse proxy instance(s) as disconnected.\n", disconnected, len(proxies))
return nil
}
func confirmDisconnectAll(out io.Writer, in io.Reader) (bool, error) {
if in == nil {
in = strings.NewReader("")
}
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(out, "\nWARNING: This command changes stored reverse proxy state for every non-disconnected instance.")
_, _ = fmt.Fprintln(out, "Run it during a maintenance window; affected live proxies may stay hidden until "+
"their next heartbeat or reconnect/re-register.")
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(out, "Type %q to continue: ", disconnectAllConfirmation)
scanner := bufio.NewScanner(in)
if !scanner.Scan() {
if err := scanner.Err(); err != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("read confirmation: %w", err)
}
return false, nil
}
return strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(scanner.Text()), disconnectAllConfirmation), nil
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
package proxycmd
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
rpproxy "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/proxy"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/store"
)
func newTestStore(t *testing.T) store.Store {
t.Helper()
s, cleanup, err := store.NewTestStoreFromSQL(context.Background(), "", t.TempDir())
require.NoError(t, err)
t.Cleanup(cleanup)
return s
}
func seedProxies(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, s store.Store) {
t.Helper()
accountID := "account-1"
alreadyDisconnectedAt := time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)
seed := []*rpproxy.Proxy{
{
ID: "proxy-1",
SessionID: "session-1",
ClusterAddress: "cluster-a.example.com",
IPAddress: "10.0.0.1",
LastSeen: time.Now(),
Status: rpproxy.StatusConnected,
},
{
ID: "proxy-2",
SessionID: "session-2",
ClusterAddress: "cluster-b.example.com",
IPAddress: "10.0.0.2",
AccountID: &accountID,
LastSeen: time.Now(),
Status: rpproxy.StatusConnected,
},
{
ID: "proxy-3",
SessionID: "session-3",
ClusterAddress: "cluster-a.example.com",
IPAddress: "10.0.0.3",
LastSeen: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour),
Status: rpproxy.StatusDisconnected,
DisconnectedAt: &alreadyDisconnectedAt,
},
}
for _, p := range seed {
require.NoError(t, s.SaveProxy(ctx, p))
}
}
func proxiesByID(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, s store.Store) map[string]*rpproxy.Proxy {
t.Helper()
proxies, err := s.GetAllProxies(ctx)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, proxies, 3)
byID := make(map[string]*rpproxy.Proxy, len(proxies))
for _, p := range proxies {
byID[p.ID] = p
}
return byID
}
func TestRunDisconnectAllWithConfirmation(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
s := newTestStore(t)
seedProxies(t, ctx, s)
var out bytes.Buffer
require.NoError(t, runDisconnectAll(ctx, s, &out, strings.NewReader(disconnectAllConfirmation+"\n"), false, false))
output := out.String()
require.Contains(t, output, "proxy-1")
require.Contains(t, output, "proxy-2")
require.Contains(t, output, "proxy-3")
require.Contains(t, output, "cluster-a.example.com")
require.Contains(t, output, "account-1")
require.Contains(t, output, "Type \"disconnect all proxies\" to continue")
require.Contains(t, output, "Force-marked 2 of 3 reverse proxy instance(s) as disconnected.")
for _, p := range proxiesByID(t, ctx, s) {
require.Equal(t, rpproxy.StatusDisconnected, p.Status, "proxy %s should be disconnected", p.ID)
require.NotNil(t, p.DisconnectedAt, "proxy %s should have a disconnected timestamp", p.ID)
}
}
func TestRunDisconnectAllForceSkipsConfirmation(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
s := newTestStore(t)
seedProxies(t, ctx, s)
var out bytes.Buffer
require.NoError(t, runDisconnectAll(ctx, s, &out, strings.NewReader(""), false, true))
output := out.String()
require.NotContains(t, output, "Type \"disconnect all proxies\" to continue")
require.Contains(t, output, "Force-marked 2 of 3 reverse proxy instance(s) as disconnected.")
}
func TestRunDisconnectAllAbortLeavesProxiesUnchanged(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
s := newTestStore(t)
seedProxies(t, ctx, s)
var out bytes.Buffer
require.NoError(t, runDisconnectAll(ctx, s, &out, strings.NewReader("no\n"), false, false))
output := out.String()
require.Contains(t, output, "Type \"disconnect all proxies\" to continue")
require.Contains(t, output, "Aborted. No reverse proxy instances were changed.")
byID := proxiesByID(t, ctx, s)
require.Equal(t, rpproxy.StatusConnected, byID["proxy-1"].Status)
require.Equal(t, rpproxy.StatusConnected, byID["proxy-2"].Status)
require.Equal(t, rpproxy.StatusDisconnected, byID["proxy-3"].Status)
}
func TestRunDisconnectAllDryRunLeavesProxiesUnchanged(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
s := newTestStore(t)
seedProxies(t, ctx, s)
var out bytes.Buffer
require.NoError(t, runDisconnectAll(ctx, s, &out, strings.NewReader(""), true, false))
output := out.String()
require.Contains(t, output, "Dry run: would force-mark 2 of 3 reverse proxy instance(s) as disconnected.")
require.NotContains(t, output, "Type \"disconnect all proxies\" to continue")
byID := proxiesByID(t, ctx, s)
require.Equal(t, rpproxy.StatusConnected, byID["proxy-1"].Status)
require.Equal(t, rpproxy.StatusConnected, byID["proxy-2"].Status)
require.Equal(t, rpproxy.StatusDisconnected, byID["proxy-3"].Status)
}
func TestNewCommandsDisconnectAllDryRun(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
s := newTestStore(t)
seedProxies(t, ctx, s)
opened := false
cmd := NewCommands(func(cmd *cobra.Command, fn func(ctx context.Context, s store.Store) error) error {
opened = true
return fn(cmd.Context(), s)
})
var out bytes.Buffer
cmd.SetOut(&out)
cmd.SetErr(&out)
cmd.SetIn(strings.NewReader(""))
cmd.SetArgs([]string{"disconnect-all", "--dry-run"})
require.NoError(t, cmd.ExecuteContext(ctx))
require.True(t, opened)
require.Contains(t, out.String(), "Dry run: would force-mark 2 of 3 reverse proxy instance(s) as disconnected.")
}
func TestRunDisconnectAllEmpty(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
s := newTestStore(t)
var out bytes.Buffer
require.NoError(t, runDisconnectAll(ctx, s, &out, strings.NewReader(""), false, false))
require.Contains(t, out.String(), "No reverse proxy instances found.")
}

View File

@@ -83,7 +83,8 @@ func init() {
rootCmd.AddCommand(migrationCmd)
tc := newTokenCommands()
tc.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&nbconfig.MgmtConfigPath, "config", defaultMgmtConfig, "Netbird config file location")
rootCmd.AddCommand(tc)
ac := newAdminCommands()
ac.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&nbconfig.MgmtConfigPath, "config", defaultMgmtConfig, "Netbird config file location")
rootCmd.AddCommand(ac)
rootCmd.AddCommand(newLegacyTokenCommand())
}

View File

@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
package cmd
import (
"context"
"fmt"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/formatter/hook"
tokencmd "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/cmd/token"
nbconfig "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/server/config"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/store"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
)
var tokenDatadir string
// newTokenCommands creates the token command tree with management-specific store opener.
func newTokenCommands() *cobra.Command {
cmd := tokencmd.NewCommands(withTokenStore)
cmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&tokenDatadir, "datadir", "", "Override the data directory from config (where store.db is located)")
return cmd
}
// withTokenStore initializes logging, loads config, opens the store, and calls fn.
func withTokenStore(cmd *cobra.Command, fn func(ctx context.Context, s store.Store) error) error {
if err := util.InitLog("error", "console"); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("init log: %w", err)
}
ctx := context.WithValue(cmd.Context(), hook.ExecutionContextKey, hook.SystemSource) //nolint:staticcheck
config, err := LoadMgmtConfig(ctx, nbconfig.MgmtConfigPath)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("load config: %w", err)
}
datadir := config.Datadir
if tokenDatadir != "" {
datadir = tokenDatadir
}
s, err := store.NewStore(ctx, config.StoreConfig.Engine, datadir, nil, true)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create store: %w", err)
}
defer func() {
if err := s.Close(ctx); err != nil {
log.Debugf("close store: %v", err)
}
}()
return fn(ctx, s)
}

View File

@@ -224,6 +224,30 @@ func (m *managerImpl) CreateProxyPeer(ctx context.Context, accountID string, pee
return nil
}
// Dedupe stale embedded peer records for the same (account, cluster).
// The proxy generates a fresh WireGuard keypair on every startup
// (proxy/internal/roundtrip/netbird.go), so without this sweep the
// prior embedded peer would linger forever — holding its CGNAT IP
// allocation, polluting other peers' rosters, and (most visibly)
// leaving the synth DNS pointing at the dead address. The
// (account, cluster) tuple identifies "the embedded peer for this
// proxy instance at this cluster"; any record matching that tuple
// with a different pubkey is by definition stale and must go.
staleIDs, err := m.findStaleEmbeddedProxyPeers(ctx, accountID, cluster, peerKey)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("scan for stale embedded proxy peers: %w", err)
}
if len(staleIDs) > 0 {
// userID="" + checkConnected=false: the deletion is initiated
// by management itself on behalf of the freshly-registering
// proxy, not by an end user; the stale peer may still be
// marked Connected from its prior session, but its session is
// dead by definition (its key no longer exists).
if err := m.DeletePeers(ctx, accountID, staleIDs, "", false); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("delete stale embedded proxy peers %v: %w", staleIDs, err)
}
}
name := fmt.Sprintf("proxy-%s", xid.New().String())
newPeer := &peer.Peer{
Ephemeral: true,
@@ -249,3 +273,29 @@ func (m *managerImpl) CreateProxyPeer(ctx context.Context, accountID string, pee
return nil
}
// findStaleEmbeddedProxyPeers returns the peer IDs of embedded proxy peer
// records in accountID that target the same cluster but carry a different
// WireGuard pubkey than the freshly-registering one. Used by CreateProxyPeer
// to garbage-collect stale records left behind when the proxy restarts with a
// regenerated keypair.
func (m *managerImpl) findStaleEmbeddedProxyPeers(ctx context.Context, accountID, cluster, newKey string) ([]string, error) {
account, err := m.store.GetAccount(ctx, accountID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var stale []string
for _, p := range account.Peers {
if p == nil || !p.ProxyMeta.Embedded {
continue
}
if p.ProxyMeta.Cluster != cluster {
continue
}
if p.Key == newKey {
continue
}
stale = append(stale, p.ID)
}
return stale, nil
}

View File

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ import (
"go.opentelemetry.io/otel/metric"
"golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert"
"golang.org/x/net/http2"
"golang.org/x/net/http2/h2c" //nolint:staticcheck
"golang.org/x/net/http2/h2c"
"google.golang.org/grpc"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/encryption"
@@ -382,7 +382,6 @@ func (s *BaseServer) serveGRPCWithHTTP(ctx context.Context, listener net.Listene
// the following magic is needed to support HTTP2 without TLS
// and still share a single port between gRPC and HTTP APIs
h1s := &http.Server{
//nolint:staticcheck // h2c also handles the HTTP/1 Upgrade mechanism, which http.Server's UnencryptedHTTP2 does not
Handler: h2c.NewHandler(handler, &http2.Server{}),
}
err = h1s.Serve(listener)

View File

@@ -608,11 +608,11 @@ func (s *ProxyServiceServer) disconnectProxy(conn *proxyConnection) {
if err := s.proxyController.UnregisterProxyFromCluster(context.Background(), conn.address, conn.proxyID); err != nil {
log.Warnf("Failed to unregister proxy %s from cluster: %v", conn.proxyID, err)
}
conn.cancel()
if err := s.proxyManager.Disconnect(context.Background(), conn.proxyID, conn.sessionID); err != nil {
log.Warnf("Failed to mark proxy %s as disconnected: %v", conn.proxyID, err)
}
conn.cancel()
log.Infof("Proxy %s session %s disconnected", conn.proxyID, conn.sessionID)
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
package server
import (
"context"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/peers"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork"
agenttypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/types"
nbpeer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/permissions"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/store"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
)
// TestAgentNetwork_ProxyRestart_PropagatesNewPeerAndDropsStale is the no-mock
// regression guard for the bug the user reported: restarting the proxy creates
// a fresh embedded peer with a NEW WireGuard public key (the proxy generates
// the keypair on every startup at proxy/internal/roundtrip/netbird.go:312).
// The PRIOR embedded peer record is never deleted on management, so the
// account accumulates a stale peer holding a stale CGNAT IP. Other peers
// in the account either keep routing to the dead IP, or — if synth DNS
// picks the wrong record — never see the new IP at all.
//
// What this test exercises (no mocks):
// - real SQLite test store
// - real DefaultAccountManager, network-map controller, peer-update channels
// - real peers.Manager.CreateProxyPeer path (the very method the proxy
// invokes over gRPC on every startup)
// - real agentnetwork.Manager + synth chain so the client receives a
// concrete DNS record that must point at the LATEST proxy peer.
//
// Pre-fix expected behavior (red): two embedded peers exist after the
// "restart"; the synth DNS record points at the stale one; the client
// receives an update reflecting the new peer but the old one lingers.
// Post-fix expected behavior (green): exactly one embedded peer exists
// after restart (with the new key) AND the client's network map carries
// the synth DNS pointing at that new peer's CGNAT IP.
func TestAgentNetwork_ProxyRestart_PropagatesNewPeerAndDropsStale(t *testing.T) {
am, updateManager, err := createManager(t)
require.NoError(t, err, "createManager must succeed")
ctx := context.Background()
const (
accountID = "an-restart-acct"
adminUserID = "an-restart-admin"
groupAID = "an-restart-grp-A"
clusterAddr = "eu.proxy.netbird.io"
clientKey = "BhRPtynAAYRDy08+q4HTMsos8fs4plTP4NOSh7C1ry8="
// Two different proxy pubkeys — the "before" and "after" of a
// proxy-process restart with fresh-keypair generation.
proxyKey1 = "Aaaaa1aaaaYRDy08+q4HTMsos8fs4plTP4NOSh7C1ry8="
proxyKey2 = "Bbbbb2bbbbYRDy08+q4HTMsos8fs4plTP4NOSh7C1ry8="
)
// --- Account scaffold ---
account := newAccountWithId(ctx, accountID, adminUserID, "an-restart.test", "", "", false)
require.NoError(t, am.Store.SaveAccount(ctx, account))
clientPeer := &nbpeer.Peer{
Key: clientKey,
Name: "an-restart-client",
DNSLabel: "an-restart-client",
Meta: nbpeer.PeerSystemMeta{Hostname: "an-restart-client", GoOS: "linux", WtVersion: "development"},
}
addedClient, _, _, _, err := am.AddPeer(ctx, "", "", adminUserID, clientPeer, false)
require.NoError(t, err, "AddPeer for client must succeed")
require.NoError(t, am.MarkPeerConnected(ctx, clientKey, accountID, time.Now().UnixNano(), &types.NetworkMap{}),
"MarkPeerConnected for the client peer must succeed (affected-peer fan-out skips disconnected peers)")
// Place the client in group A so the synth policy reaches it.
account, err = am.Store.GetAccount(ctx, accountID)
require.NoError(t, err)
account.Groups[groupAID] = &types.Group{ID: groupAID, Name: "groupA", Peers: []string{addedClient.ID}}
require.NoError(t, am.Store.SaveAccount(ctx, account), "SaveAccount must persist group A")
// --- Real peers + agent-network managers ---
permMgr := permissions.NewManager(am.Store)
peersMgr := peers.NewManager(am.Store, permMgr)
peersMgr.SetAccountManager(am)
peersMgr.SetNetworkMapController(am.networkMapController)
agentMgr := agentnetwork.NewManager(am.Store, permMgr, am, nil)
// Subscribe BEFORE any state-mutating call so we don't lose the update
// that contains the synth DNS record.
clientCh := updateManager.CreateChannel(ctx, addedClient.ID)
t.Cleanup(func() { updateManager.CloseChannel(ctx, addedClient.ID) })
drain(clientCh)
// --- First proxy startup: register peer key K1, then mark it
// connected. In production the proxy follows CreateProxyPeer with the
// regular sync stream which lands on MarkPeerConnected; the synth DNS
// path filters out peers that aren't Connected (types/account.go:323),
// so without this step no DNS record would be emitted.
require.NoError(t, peersMgr.CreateProxyPeer(ctx, accountID, proxyKey1, clusterAddr),
"first CreateProxyPeer (proxy startup) must succeed")
peer1ID, err := am.Store.GetPeerIDByKey(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, proxyKey1)
require.NoError(t, err, "proxy peer for K1 must be persisted after CreateProxyPeer")
require.NotEmpty(t, peer1ID)
require.NoError(t, am.MarkPeerConnected(ctx, proxyKey1, accountID, time.Now().UnixNano(), &types.NetworkMap{}),
"MarkPeerConnected for K1 must succeed")
account, err = am.Store.GetAccount(ctx, accountID)
require.NoError(t, err)
proxyIP1 := account.Peers[peer1ID].IP.String()
require.NotEmpty(t, proxyIP1, "K1 must have an assigned overlay IP")
// --- Provider + policy. CreateProvider / CreatePolicy trigger the
// agentnetwork reconcile which runs UpdateAccountPeers; the resulting
// NetworkMap delivered to the client carries the synth DNS record
// pointing at K1's IP. ---
provider, err := agentMgr.CreateProvider(ctx, adminUserID, &agenttypes.Provider{
AccountID: accountID,
ProviderID: "openai_api",
Name: "openai-test",
UpstreamURL: "https://api.openai.com",
APIKey: "sk-test-key",
Enabled: true,
Models: []agenttypes.ProviderModel{{ID: "gpt-5.4"}},
}, clusterAddr)
require.NoError(t, err, "CreateProvider must succeed")
_, err = agentMgr.CreatePolicy(ctx, adminUserID, &agenttypes.Policy{
AccountID: accountID,
Name: "p1",
Enabled: true,
SourceGroups: []string{groupAID},
DestinationProviderIDs: []string{provider.ID},
})
require.NoError(t, err, "CreatePolicy must succeed")
settings, err := am.Store.GetAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, accountID)
require.NoError(t, err)
fqdn := settings.Endpoint()
rdata1 := awaitZoneRData(clientCh, clusterAddr, fqdn, true)
require.Equal(t, proxyIP1, rdata1,
"client must receive a synth DNS record pointing at K1's overlay IP after the synth path runs")
drain(clientCh)
// --- Proxy restart: NEW keypair K2, same account, same cluster ---
require.NoError(t, peersMgr.CreateProxyPeer(ctx, accountID, proxyKey2, clusterAddr),
"second CreateProxyPeer (proxy restart with fresh keypair) must succeed")
peer2ID, err := am.Store.GetPeerIDByKey(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, proxyKey2)
require.NoError(t, err, "proxy peer for K2 must be persisted after restart")
require.NotEmpty(t, peer2ID)
require.NoError(t, am.MarkPeerConnected(ctx, proxyKey2, accountID, time.Now().UnixNano(), &types.NetworkMap{}),
"MarkPeerConnected for K2 must succeed")
// In production the agent's sync stream pulls a fresh NetworkMap as
// part of its normal reconcile cadence; in this isolated test
// MarkPeerConnected's affected-peer fan-out can race the channel-side
// buffer in a way that swallows the synth-DNS-bearing update before
// our await reads it. Trigger an explicit account-wide fan-out so the
// assertion below tests what production actually delivers, not the
// in-test buffer race.
am.UpdateAccountPeers(ctx, accountID, types.UpdateReason{Resource: types.UpdateResourcePeer, Operation: types.UpdateOperationUpdate})
account, err = am.Store.GetAccount(ctx, accountID)
require.NoError(t, err)
proxyIP2 := account.Peers[peer2ID].IP.String()
require.NotEmpty(t, proxyIP2, "K2 must have an assigned overlay IP")
require.NotEqual(t, proxyIP1, proxyIP2, "K2 must get a different overlay IP than K1 (sanity)")
// CRITICAL ASSERTION 1: K1 must no longer be in the store. The SqlStore
// returns ("", nil) for a missing key rather than NotFound, so assert
// on the returned ID being empty.
staleID, err := am.Store.GetPeerIDByKey(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, proxyKey1)
require.NoError(t, err, "GetPeerIDByKey for a missing peer must not error")
assert.Empty(t, staleID,
"stale embedded proxy peer K1 must be removed when a new embedded peer registers for the same (account, cluster); pre-fix this assertion fails because management never cleans up the prior peer record")
// CRITICAL ASSERTION 2: exactly one embedded proxy peer remains, and it
// is K2.
account, err = am.Store.GetAccount(ctx, accountID)
require.NoError(t, err)
embeddedKeys := []string{}
for _, p := range account.Peers {
if p.ProxyMeta.Embedded {
embeddedKeys = append(embeddedKeys, p.Key)
}
}
assert.Equal(t, []string{proxyKey2}, embeddedKeys,
"after a proxy restart exactly one embedded proxy peer should remain — the one with the new key K2")
// CRITICAL ASSERTION 3: the synth DNS record the client receives now
// points at K2's IP, not K1's.
rdata2 := awaitZoneRData(clientCh, clusterAddr, fqdn, true)
assert.Equal(t, proxyIP2, rdata2,
"after proxy restart, the client's synth DNS record must point at the NEW embedded peer's IP, not the stale K1 IP")
}

View File

@@ -21,8 +21,11 @@ import (
)
const (
staticClientDashboard = "netbird-dashboard"
staticClientCLI = "netbird-cli"
StaticClientDashboard = "netbird-dashboard"
StaticClientCLI = "netbird-cli"
DefaultTOTPAuthenticatorID = "default-totp"
LocalConnectorID = dex.LocalConnectorID
defaultCLIRedirectURL1 = "http://localhost:53000/"
defaultCLIRedirectURL2 = "http://localhost:54000/"
defaultScopes = "openid profile email groups"
@@ -185,14 +188,14 @@ func (c *EmbeddedIdPConfig) ToYAMLConfig() (*dex.YAMLConfig, error) {
EnablePasswordDB: true,
StaticClients: []storage.Client{
{
ID: staticClientDashboard,
ID: StaticClientDashboard,
Name: "NetBird Dashboard",
Public: true,
RedirectURIs: redirectURIs,
PostLogoutRedirectURIs: sanitizePostLogoutRedirectURIs(dashboardPostLogoutRedirectURIs),
},
{
ID: staticClientCLI,
ID: StaticClientCLI,
Name: "NetBird CLI",
Public: true,
RedirectURIs: redirectURIs,
@@ -254,13 +257,13 @@ func sanitizePostLogoutRedirectURIs(uris []string) []string {
func configureMFA(cfg *dex.YAMLConfig, sessionMaxLifetime, sessionIdleTimeout string, rememberMe bool, sessionCookieEncryptionKey string) error {
cfg.MFA.Authenticators = []dex.MFAAuthenticator{{
ID: "default-totp",
ID: DefaultTOTPAuthenticatorID,
// Has to be caps otherwise it will fail
Type: "TOTP",
Config: map[string]interface{}{
"issuer": "NetBird",
},
ConnectorTypes: []string{"local"},
ConnectorTypes: []string{LocalConnectorID},
}}
if sessionMaxLifetime == "" {
@@ -736,7 +739,7 @@ func (m *EmbeddedIdPManager) GetDefaultScopes() string {
// GetCLIClientID returns the client ID for CLI authentication.
func (m *EmbeddedIdPManager) GetCLIClientID() string {
return staticClientCLI
return StaticClientCLI
}
// GetCLIRedirectURLs returns the redirect URLs configured for the CLI client.
@@ -775,7 +778,7 @@ func (m *EmbeddedIdPManager) GetLocalKeysLocation() string {
// GetClientIDs returns the OAuth2 client IDs configured for this provider.
func (m *EmbeddedIdPManager) GetClientIDs() []string {
return []string{staticClientDashboard, staticClientCLI}
return []string{StaticClientDashboard, StaticClientCLI}
}
// GetUserIDClaim returns the JWT claim name used for user identification.
@@ -792,11 +795,11 @@ func (m *EmbeddedIdPManager) IsLocalAuthDisabled() bool {
func (m *EmbeddedIdPManager) SetMFAEnabled(ctx context.Context, enabled bool) error {
var mfaChain []string
if enabled {
mfaChain = []string{"default-totp"}
mfaChain = []string{DefaultTOTPAuthenticatorID}
}
if err := m.provider.SetClientsMFAChain(ctx, []string{
staticClientCLI,
staticClientDashboard,
StaticClientCLI,
StaticClientDashboard,
}, mfaChain); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to set MFA enabled=%v: %w", enabled, err)
}

View File

@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ func TestEmbeddedIdPConfig_ToYAMLConfig_IncludesDeviceCallbackRedirectURI(t *tes
var cliRedirectURIs []string
for _, client := range yamlConfig.StaticClients {
if client.ID == staticClientCLI {
if client.ID == StaticClientCLI {
cliRedirectURIs = client.RedirectURIs
break
}

View File

@@ -6088,6 +6088,37 @@ func (s *SqlStore) DisconnectProxy(ctx context.Context, proxyID, sessionID strin
return nil
}
// GetAllProxies returns all reverse proxy instance rows.
func (s *SqlStore) GetAllProxies(ctx context.Context) ([]*proxy.Proxy, error) {
var proxies []*proxy.Proxy
result := s.db.Order("cluster_address, id").Find(&proxies)
if result.Error != nil {
log.WithContext(ctx).Errorf("failed to get proxies: %v", result.Error)
return nil, status.Errorf(status.Internal, "failed to get proxies")
}
return proxies, nil
}
// DisconnectAllProxies force-marks every proxy that is not already disconnected
// as disconnected, regardless of session ID. Unlike DisconnectProxy it is not
// session-guarded: it is an administrative repair helper, not part of the
// connection lifecycle. last_seen is left untouched so the stale-proxy reaper
// keeps working off the real last heartbeat. Returns the number of proxies updated.
func (s *SqlStore) DisconnectAllProxies(ctx context.Context) (int64, error) {
result := s.db.
Model(&proxy.Proxy{}).
Where("status != ?", proxy.StatusDisconnected).
Updates(map[string]any{
"status": proxy.StatusDisconnected,
"disconnected_at": time.Now(),
})
if result.Error != nil {
log.WithContext(ctx).Errorf("failed to disconnect all proxies: %v", result.Error)
return 0, status.Errorf(status.Internal, "failed to disconnect all proxies")
}
return result.RowsAffected, nil
}
// UpdateProxyHeartbeat updates the last_seen timestamp for the proxy's current session.
func (s *SqlStore) UpdateProxyHeartbeat(ctx context.Context, p *proxy.Proxy) error {
now := time.Now()
@@ -6095,7 +6126,11 @@ func (s *SqlStore) UpdateProxyHeartbeat(ctx context.Context, p *proxy.Proxy) err
result := s.db.
Model(&proxy.Proxy{}).
Where("id = ? AND session_id = ?", p.ID, p.SessionID).
Update("last_seen", now)
Updates(map[string]any{
"last_seen": now,
"status": proxy.StatusConnected,
"disconnected_at": nil,
})
if result.Error != nil {
log.WithContext(ctx).Errorf("failed to update proxy heartbeat: %v", result.Error)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
package store
import (
"context"
"os"
"runtime"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
rpproxy "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/proxy"
)
// TestSqlStore_DisconnectAllProxies guards the administrative
// force-disconnect helper:
//
// 1. Every proxy that is not already disconnected is marked
// disconnected regardless of its session ID (unlike
// DisconnectProxy, which is session-guarded).
// 2. Rows that are already disconnected are left untouched, so their
// original disconnected_at is preserved and the returned count
// reflects only the rows that actually changed.
// 3. last_seen is not modified — the stale-proxy reaper keeps working
// off the real last heartbeat.
func TestSqlStore_DisconnectAllProxies(t *testing.T) {
if (os.Getenv("CI") == "true" && runtime.GOOS == "darwin") || runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
t.Skip("skip CI tests on darwin and windows")
}
runTestForAllEngines(t, "", func(t *testing.T, store Store) {
ctx := context.Background()
lastSeenFresh := time.Now().Add(-30 * time.Second)
lastSeenStale := time.Now().Add(-30 * time.Minute)
oldDisconnectedAt := time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)
accountID := "acct-disconnect"
proxies := []*rpproxy.Proxy{
{
ID: "p-connected-fresh",
SessionID: "sess-1",
ClusterAddress: "cluster-a.example.com",
IPAddress: "10.0.0.1",
LastSeen: lastSeenFresh,
Status: rpproxy.StatusConnected,
},
{
ID: "p-connected-stale",
SessionID: "sess-2",
ClusterAddress: "cluster-b.example.com",
IPAddress: "10.0.0.2",
AccountID: &accountID,
LastSeen: lastSeenStale,
Status: rpproxy.StatusConnected,
},
{
ID: "p-already-disconnected",
SessionID: "sess-3",
ClusterAddress: "cluster-a.example.com",
IPAddress: "10.0.0.3",
LastSeen: lastSeenStale,
Status: rpproxy.StatusDisconnected,
DisconnectedAt: &oldDisconnectedAt,
},
}
for _, p := range proxies {
require.NoError(t, store.SaveProxy(ctx, p))
}
all, err := store.GetAllProxies(ctx)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, all, 3)
disconnected, err := store.DisconnectAllProxies(ctx)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, int64(2), disconnected)
all, err = store.GetAllProxies(ctx)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, all, 3)
byID := make(map[string]*rpproxy.Proxy, len(all))
for _, p := range all {
byID[p.ID] = p
}
for id, p := range byID {
assert.Equal(t, rpproxy.StatusDisconnected, p.Status, "proxy %s should be disconnected", id)
require.NotNil(t, p.DisconnectedAt, "proxy %s should have disconnected_at set", id)
}
// force-marked rows carry a fresh disconnected_at; the untouched row keeps its original one
assert.WithinDuration(t, time.Now(), *byID["p-connected-fresh"].DisconnectedAt, 10*time.Second)
assert.WithinDuration(t, time.Now(), *byID["p-connected-stale"].DisconnectedAt, 10*time.Second)
assert.WithinDuration(t, oldDisconnectedAt, *byID["p-already-disconnected"].DisconnectedAt, time.Second)
// last_seen is preserved so the stale reaper schedule is unaffected
assert.WithinDuration(t, lastSeenFresh, byID["p-connected-fresh"].LastSeen, time.Second)
assert.WithinDuration(t, lastSeenStale, byID["p-connected-stale"].LastSeen, time.Second)
// idempotent: a second run has nothing left to update
disconnected, err = store.DisconnectAllProxies(ctx)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, int64(0), disconnected)
})
}
func TestSqlStore_UpdateProxyHeartbeatRestoresDisconnectedCurrentSession(t *testing.T) {
if (os.Getenv("CI") == "true" && runtime.GOOS == "darwin") || runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
t.Skip("skip CI tests on darwin and windows")
}
runTestForAllEngines(t, "", func(t *testing.T, store Store) {
ctx := context.Background()
proxy := &rpproxy.Proxy{
ID: "p-heartbeat",
SessionID: "sess-heartbeat",
ClusterAddress: "cluster-heartbeat.example.com",
IPAddress: "10.0.0.10",
LastSeen: time.Now().Add(-30 * time.Second),
Status: rpproxy.StatusConnected,
}
require.NoError(t, store.SaveProxy(ctx, proxy))
disconnected, err := store.DisconnectAllProxies(ctx)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, int64(1), disconnected)
require.NoError(t, store.UpdateProxyHeartbeat(ctx, &rpproxy.Proxy{ID: proxy.ID, SessionID: proxy.SessionID}))
all, err := store.GetAllProxies(ctx)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, all, 1)
assert.Equal(t, rpproxy.StatusConnected, all[0].Status)
assert.Nil(t, all[0].DisconnectedAt)
assert.WithinDuration(t, time.Now(), all[0].LastSeen, 10*time.Second)
addresses, err := store.GetActiveProxyClusterAddresses(ctx)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Contains(t, addresses, proxy.ClusterAddress)
})
}
func TestSqlStore_GetAllProxies_Empty(t *testing.T) {
if (os.Getenv("CI") == "true" && runtime.GOOS == "darwin") || runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
t.Skip("skip CI tests on darwin and windows")
}
runTestForAllEngines(t, "", func(t *testing.T, store Store) {
all, err := store.GetAllProxies(context.Background())
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, all)
})
}

View File

@@ -323,6 +323,8 @@ type Store interface {
GetClusterSupportsCrowdSec(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
GetClusterSupportsPrivate(ctx context.Context, clusterAddr string) *bool
CleanupStaleProxies(ctx context.Context, inactivityDuration time.Duration) error
GetAllProxies(ctx context.Context) ([]*proxy.Proxy, error)
DisconnectAllProxies(ctx context.Context) (int64, error)
GetProxyByAccountID(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (*proxy.Proxy, error)
CountProxiesByAccountID(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (int64, error)
IsClusterAddressConflicting(ctx context.Context, clusterAddress, accountID string) (bool, error)

View File

@@ -745,6 +745,21 @@ func (mr *MockStoreMockRecorder) DeleteZoneDNSRecords(ctx, accountID, zoneID int
return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "DeleteZoneDNSRecords", reflect.TypeOf((*MockStore)(nil).DeleteZoneDNSRecords), ctx, accountID, zoneID)
}
// DisconnectAllProxies mocks base method.
func (m *MockStore) DisconnectAllProxies(ctx context.Context) (int64, error) {
m.ctrl.T.Helper()
ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "DisconnectAllProxies", ctx)
ret0, _ := ret[0].(int64)
ret1, _ := ret[1].(error)
return ret0, ret1
}
// DisconnectAllProxies indicates an expected call of DisconnectAllProxies.
func (mr *MockStoreMockRecorder) DisconnectAllProxies(ctx interface{}) *gomock.Call {
mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "DisconnectAllProxies", reflect.TypeOf((*MockStore)(nil).DisconnectAllProxies), ctx)
}
// DisconnectProxy mocks base method.
func (m *MockStore) DisconnectProxy(ctx context.Context, proxyID, sessionID string) error {
m.ctrl.T.Helper()
@@ -1389,6 +1404,21 @@ func (mr *MockStoreMockRecorder) GetAllEphemeralPeers(ctx, lockStrength interfac
return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "GetAllEphemeralPeers", reflect.TypeOf((*MockStore)(nil).GetAllEphemeralPeers), ctx, lockStrength)
}
// GetAllProxies mocks base method.
func (m *MockStore) GetAllProxies(ctx context.Context) ([]*proxy.Proxy, error) {
m.ctrl.T.Helper()
ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "GetAllProxies", ctx)
ret0, _ := ret[0].([]*proxy.Proxy)
ret1, _ := ret[1].(error)
return ret0, ret1
}
// GetAllProxies indicates an expected call of GetAllProxies.
func (mr *MockStoreMockRecorder) GetAllProxies(ctx interface{}) *gomock.Call {
mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "GetAllProxies", reflect.TypeOf((*MockStore)(nil).GetAllProxies), ctx)
}
// GetAllProxyAccessTokens mocks base method.
func (m *MockStore) GetAllProxyAccessTokens(ctx context.Context, lockStrength LockingStrength) ([]*types2.ProxyAccessToken, error) {
m.ctrl.T.Helper()
@@ -1521,6 +1551,21 @@ func (mr *MockStoreMockRecorder) GetDNSRecordByID(ctx, lockStrength, accountID,
return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "GetDNSRecordByID", reflect.TypeOf((*MockStore)(nil).GetDNSRecordByID), ctx, lockStrength, accountID, zoneID, recordID)
}
// GetEmbeddedProxyPeerIDsByCluster mocks base method.
func (m *MockStore) GetEmbeddedProxyPeerIDsByCluster(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (map[string][]string, error) {
m.ctrl.T.Helper()
ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "GetEmbeddedProxyPeerIDsByCluster", ctx, accountID)
ret0, _ := ret[0].(map[string][]string)
ret1, _ := ret[1].(error)
return ret0, ret1
}
// GetEmbeddedProxyPeerIDsByCluster indicates an expected call of GetEmbeddedProxyPeerIDsByCluster.
func (mr *MockStoreMockRecorder) GetEmbeddedProxyPeerIDsByCluster(ctx, accountID interface{}) *gomock.Call {
mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "GetEmbeddedProxyPeerIDsByCluster", reflect.TypeOf((*MockStore)(nil).GetEmbeddedProxyPeerIDsByCluster), ctx, accountID)
}
// GetExpiredEphemeralServices mocks base method.
func (m *MockStore) GetExpiredEphemeralServices(ctx context.Context, ttl time.Duration, limit int) ([]*service.Service, error) {
m.ctrl.T.Helper()
@@ -1566,6 +1611,21 @@ func (mr *MockStoreMockRecorder) GetGroupByName(ctx, lockStrength, accountID, gr
return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "GetGroupByName", reflect.TypeOf((*MockStore)(nil).GetGroupByName), ctx, lockStrength, accountID, groupName)
}
// GetGroupIDsByPeerIDs mocks base method.
func (m *MockStore) GetGroupIDsByPeerIDs(ctx context.Context, accountID string, peerIDs []string) ([]string, error) {
m.ctrl.T.Helper()
ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "GetGroupIDsByPeerIDs", ctx, accountID, peerIDs)
ret0, _ := ret[0].([]string)
ret1, _ := ret[1].(error)
return ret0, ret1
}
// GetGroupIDsByPeerIDs indicates an expected call of GetGroupIDsByPeerIDs.
func (mr *MockStoreMockRecorder) GetGroupIDsByPeerIDs(ctx, accountID, peerIDs interface{}) *gomock.Call {
mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "GetGroupIDsByPeerIDs", reflect.TypeOf((*MockStore)(nil).GetGroupIDsByPeerIDs), ctx, accountID, peerIDs)
}
// GetGroupsByIDs mocks base method.
func (m *MockStore) GetGroupsByIDs(ctx context.Context, lockStrength LockingStrength, accountID string, groupIDs []string) (map[string]*types2.Group, error) {
m.ctrl.T.Helper()
@@ -1850,6 +1910,21 @@ func (mr *MockStoreMockRecorder) GetPeerIDByKey(ctx, lockStrength, key interface
return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "GetPeerIDByKey", reflect.TypeOf((*MockStore)(nil).GetPeerIDByKey), ctx, lockStrength, key)
}
// GetPeerIDsByGroups mocks base method.
func (m *MockStore) GetPeerIDsByGroups(ctx context.Context, accountID string, groupIDs []string) ([]string, error) {
m.ctrl.T.Helper()
ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "GetPeerIDsByGroups", ctx, accountID, groupIDs)
ret0, _ := ret[0].([]string)
ret1, _ := ret[1].(error)
return ret0, ret1
}
// GetPeerIDsByGroups indicates an expected call of GetPeerIDsByGroups.
func (mr *MockStoreMockRecorder) GetPeerIDsByGroups(ctx, accountID, groupIDs interface{}) *gomock.Call {
mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "GetPeerIDsByGroups", reflect.TypeOf((*MockStore)(nil).GetPeerIDsByGroups), ctx, accountID, groupIDs)
}
// GetPeerIdByLabel mocks base method.
func (m *MockStore) GetPeerIdByLabel(ctx context.Context, lockStrength LockingStrength, accountID, hostname string) (string, error) {
m.ctrl.T.Helper()
@@ -1925,51 +2000,6 @@ func (mr *MockStoreMockRecorder) GetPeersByGroupIDs(ctx, accountID, groupIDs int
return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "GetPeersByGroupIDs", reflect.TypeOf((*MockStore)(nil).GetPeersByGroupIDs), ctx, accountID, groupIDs)
}
// GetPeerIDsByGroups mocks base method.
func (m *MockStore) GetPeerIDsByGroups(ctx context.Context, accountID string, groupIDs []string) ([]string, error) {
m.ctrl.T.Helper()
ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "GetPeerIDsByGroups", ctx, accountID, groupIDs)
ret0, _ := ret[0].([]string)
ret1, _ := ret[1].(error)
return ret0, ret1
}
// GetPeerIDsByGroups indicates an expected call of GetPeerIDsByGroups.
func (mr *MockStoreMockRecorder) GetPeerIDsByGroups(ctx, accountID, groupIDs interface{}) *gomock.Call {
mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "GetPeerIDsByGroups", reflect.TypeOf((*MockStore)(nil).GetPeerIDsByGroups), ctx, accountID, groupIDs)
}
// GetGroupIDsByPeerIDs mocks base method.
func (m *MockStore) GetGroupIDsByPeerIDs(ctx context.Context, accountID string, peerIDs []string) ([]string, error) {
m.ctrl.T.Helper()
ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "GetGroupIDsByPeerIDs", ctx, accountID, peerIDs)
ret0, _ := ret[0].([]string)
ret1, _ := ret[1].(error)
return ret0, ret1
}
// GetGroupIDsByPeerIDs indicates an expected call of GetGroupIDsByPeerIDs.
func (mr *MockStoreMockRecorder) GetGroupIDsByPeerIDs(ctx, accountID, peerIDs interface{}) *gomock.Call {
mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "GetGroupIDsByPeerIDs", reflect.TypeOf((*MockStore)(nil).GetGroupIDsByPeerIDs), ctx, accountID, peerIDs)
}
// GetEmbeddedProxyPeerIDsByCluster mocks base method.
func (m *MockStore) GetEmbeddedProxyPeerIDsByCluster(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (map[string][]string, error) {
m.ctrl.T.Helper()
ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "GetEmbeddedProxyPeerIDsByCluster", ctx, accountID)
ret0, _ := ret[0].(map[string][]string)
ret1, _ := ret[1].(error)
return ret0, ret1
}
// GetEmbeddedProxyPeerIDsByCluster indicates an expected call of GetEmbeddedProxyPeerIDsByCluster.
func (mr *MockStoreMockRecorder) GetEmbeddedProxyPeerIDsByCluster(ctx, accountID interface{}) *gomock.Call {
mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "GetEmbeddedProxyPeerIDsByCluster", reflect.TypeOf((*MockStore)(nil).GetEmbeddedProxyPeerIDsByCluster), ctx, accountID)
}
// GetPeersByIDs mocks base method.
func (m *MockStore) GetPeersByIDs(ctx context.Context, lockStrength LockingStrength, accountID string, peerIDs []string) (map[string]*peer.Peer, error) {
m.ctrl.T.Helper()

View File

@@ -305,8 +305,7 @@ func (a *Account) SynthesizePrivateServiceZones(peerID string) []nbdns.CustomZon
zone = &nbdns.CustomZone{
Domain: dns.Fqdn(serviceDomainZone),
Records: []nbdns.SimpleRecord{},
NonAuthoritative: true,
SearchDomainDisabled: true,
NonAuthoritative: true,
}
zonesByApex[serviceDomainZone] = zone
}

View File

@@ -1849,12 +1849,17 @@ func (am *DefaultAccountManager) DeleteUserInvite(ctx context.Context, accountID
const minPasswordLength = 8
// validatePassword checks password strength requirements:
// validatePassword checks password strength requirements.
func validatePassword(password string) error {
return ValidatePassword(password)
}
// ValidatePassword checks password strength requirements:
// - Minimum 8 characters
// - At least 1 digit
// - At least 1 uppercase letter
// - At least 1 special character
func validatePassword(password string) error {
func ValidatePassword(password string) error {
if len(password) < minPasswordLength {
return errors.New("password must be at least 8 characters long")
}

View File

@@ -25,14 +25,6 @@ const (
denyCodeModel = "llm_policy.model_blocked"
denyReasonModel = "model_blocked"
denyMessageModel = "model is not in the policy allowlist"
// Deny reason used when an allowlist is configured but the request model
// could not be determined. URL/path-routed providers (AWS Bedrock, Google
// Vertex, ...) carry the model outside the JSON body, so a request shape the
// parser does not recognise reaches the guardrail with no model. Such a
// request must be denied (fail closed), never waved through.
denyCodeModelUnknown = "llm_policy.model_unknown"
denyReasonModelUnknown = "model_unknown"
denyMessageModelUnknown = "request model could not be determined for the policy allowlist"
)
// Middleware enforces the model allowlist and optionally captures the
@@ -116,37 +108,23 @@ func (m *Middleware) evaluateAllowlist(model string, modelPresent bool) *middlew
if len(m.cfg.ModelAllowlist) == 0 {
return nil
}
// Fail closed: with an allowlist configured, a request whose model the
// upstream parser could not extract (absent or empty) must be denied rather
// than allowed. This is what enforces the allowlist for URL/path-routed
// providers (Bedrock, Vertex, ...) whose model lives outside the JSON body.
if !modelPresent || normaliseModel(model) == "" {
return denyModel("", denyCodeModelUnknown, denyMessageModelUnknown, denyReasonModelUnknown)
if !modelPresent {
return nil
}
if m.modelInAllowlist(model) {
return nil
}
return denyModel(model, denyCodeModel, denyMessageModel, denyReasonModel)
}
// denyModel builds a 403 deny Output for a model-allowlist rejection. model is
// included in the details only when non-empty.
func denyModel(model, code, message, reason string) *middleware.Output {
details := map[string]string{}
if model != "" {
details["model"] = model
}
return &middleware.Output{
Decision: middleware.DecisionDeny,
DenyStatus: 403,
DenyReason: &middleware.DenyReason{
Code: code,
Message: message,
Details: details,
Code: denyCodeModel,
Message: denyMessageModel,
Details: map[string]string{"model": model},
},
Metadata: []middleware.KV{
{Key: middleware.KeyLLMPolicyDecision, Value: "deny"},
{Key: middleware.KeyLLMPolicyReason, Value: reason},
{Key: middleware.KeyLLMPolicyReason, Value: denyReasonModel},
},
}
}

View File

@@ -102,44 +102,13 @@ func TestAllowlistCaseInsensitive(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestAllowlistMissingModelKeyDenies(t *testing.T) {
// Fail closed: with an allowlist configured, a request whose model the
// parser could not extract (URL/path-routed providers such as Bedrock or
// Vertex whose shape wasn't recognised) must be denied, not allowed.
func TestAllowlistMissingModelKeyAllows(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(Config{ModelAllowlist: []string{"gpt-4o"}})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput())
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "absent model must be denied when an allowlist is set")
assert.Equal(t, 403, out.DenyStatus, "deny status must be 403")
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason, "deny reason must be populated")
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_unknown", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must be model_unknown")
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "missing model key must allow even with non-empty allowlist")
dec, _ := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMPolicyDecision)
assert.Equal(t, "deny", dec, "decision must be deny when model key is absent")
reason, _ := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMPolicyReason)
assert.Equal(t, "model_unknown", reason, "reason metadata must be model_unknown")
}
func TestAllowlistEmptyModelValueDenies(t *testing.T) {
// A present-but-empty model is as undeterminable as an absent one.
mw := New(Config{ModelAllowlist: []string{"gpt-4o"}})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: " "},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "empty model must be denied when an allowlist is set")
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason, "deny reason must be populated")
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_unknown", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must be model_unknown")
}
func TestAllowlistEmptyListAllowsMissingModel(t *testing.T) {
// Without an allowlist there is nothing to enforce, so a missing model is
// still allowed — the fail-closed rule only applies when a list is set.
mw := New(Config{})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput())
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "no allowlist must allow even without a model")
assert.Equal(t, "allow", dec, "decision must be allow when model key is absent")
}
func TestPromptCaptureDisabledEmitsNoPrompt(t *testing.T) {

View File

@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
package llm_request_parser
import (
"context"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/middleware"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/middleware/builtin/llm_guardrail"
)
// runParserGuardrail runs the request parser then the model-allowlist guardrail
// in SlotOnRequest order, threading the parser's metadata into the guardrail the
// same way the real chain does. It returns the guardrail decision so tests can
// assert allowlist enforcement for URL/path-routed providers end to end.
func runParserGuardrail(t *testing.T, url string, body []byte, allowlist []string) *middleware.Output {
t.Helper()
parser := newMiddleware(t)
parsed, err := parser.Invoke(context.Background(), &middleware.Input{
Slot: middleware.SlotOnRequest,
URL: url,
Body: body,
})
require.NoError(t, err, "parser must not error")
guard := llm_guardrail.New(llm_guardrail.Config{ModelAllowlist: allowlist})
out, err := guard.Invoke(context.Background(), &middleware.Input{
Slot: middleware.SlotOnRequest,
Metadata: parsed.Metadata,
})
require.NoError(t, err, "guardrail must not error")
require.NotNil(t, out, "guardrail must return an output")
return out
}
// TestModelAllowlist_URLRoutedProviders validates that the model allowlist is
// enforced for providers whose model travels in the URL path (AWS Bedrock,
// Google Vertex) rather than the JSON body. The "unknown action" case is the
// regression guard for #6751: a Bedrock request shape the parser cannot map to a
// model must fail closed under an allowlist instead of bypassing it.
func TestModelAllowlist_URLRoutedProviders(t *testing.T) {
const bedrockBody = `{"anthropic_version":"bedrock-2023-05-31","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}`
const vertexBody = `{"anthropic_version":"vertex-2023-10-16","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}`
tests := []struct {
name string
url string
body string
allowlist []string
decision middleware.Decision
denyCode string
}{
{
name: "bedrock allowed model passes",
url: "https://bedrock-runtime.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/model/us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-v1:0/invoke",
body: bedrockBody,
allowlist: []string{"anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5"},
decision: middleware.DecisionAllow,
},
{
name: "bedrock disallowed model denied",
url: "https://bedrock-runtime.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/model/us.anthropic.claude-opus-4-8-v1:0/invoke",
body: bedrockBody,
allowlist: []string{"anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5"},
decision: middleware.DecisionDeny,
denyCode: "llm_policy.model_blocked",
},
{
name: "bedrock unknown action fails closed",
url: "https://bedrock-runtime.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/model/us.anthropic.claude-opus-4-8-v1:0/some-future-action",
body: bedrockBody,
allowlist: []string{"anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5"},
decision: middleware.DecisionDeny,
denyCode: "llm_policy.model_unknown",
},
{
name: "vertex disallowed model denied",
url: "/v1/projects/p/locations/global/publishers/anthropic/models/claude-opus-4-8@20250101:rawPredict",
body: vertexBody,
allowlist: []string{"claude-haiku-4-5"},
decision: middleware.DecisionDeny,
denyCode: "llm_policy.model_blocked",
},
{
name: "vertex allowed model passes",
url: "/v1/projects/p/locations/global/publishers/anthropic/models/claude-haiku-4-5@20250101:rawPredict",
body: vertexBody,
allowlist: []string{"claude-haiku-4-5"},
decision: middleware.DecisionAllow,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
out := runParserGuardrail(t, tt.url, []byte(tt.body), tt.allowlist)
assert.Equal(t, tt.decision, out.Decision, "unexpected decision for %s", tt.name)
if tt.decision == middleware.DecisionDeny {
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason, "deny reason must be set for %s", tt.name)
assert.Equal(t, 403, out.DenyStatus, "deny status must be 403 for %s", tt.name)
assert.Equal(t, tt.denyCode, out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code for %s", tt.name)
}
})
}
}

View File

@@ -51,10 +51,7 @@ func (l *Listener) Listen(acceptFn func(conn relaylistener.Conn)) error {
log.Infof("QUIC client connected from: %s", session.RemoteAddr())
conn := NewConn(session)
// Run the accept handler (which performs the pre-auth handshake) in its
// own goroutine so a slow or stalled handshake cannot block accepting
// further connections.
go acceptFn(conn)
acceptFn(conn)
}
}

View File

@@ -30,16 +30,11 @@ type RelayTrack struct {
relayClient *Client
err error
created time.Time
// ready is closed once the dial started by openConnVia finishes (relayClient
// or err is set). Callers reusing a track wait on this instead of the track
// lock, so the dial never runs under rt.Lock.
ready chan struct{}
}
func NewRelayTrack() *RelayTrack {
return &RelayTrack{
created: time.Now(),
ready: make(chan struct{}),
}
}
@@ -331,24 +326,34 @@ func (m *Manager) openConnVia(ctx context.Context, serverAddress, peerKey string
// check if already has a connection to the desired relay server
m.relayClientsMutex.RLock()
rt, ok := m.relayClients[serverAddress]
m.relayClientsMutex.RUnlock()
if ok {
return m.openConnOnTrack(ctx, rt, peerKey)
rt.RLock()
m.relayClientsMutex.RUnlock()
defer rt.RUnlock()
if rt.err != nil {
return nil, rt.err
}
return rt.relayClient.OpenConn(ctx, peerKey)
}
m.relayClientsMutex.RUnlock()
// if not, establish a new connection but check it again (because changed the lock type) before starting the
// connection
m.relayClientsMutex.Lock()
rt, ok = m.relayClients[serverAddress]
if ok {
rt.RLock()
m.relayClientsMutex.Unlock()
return m.openConnOnTrack(ctx, rt, peerKey)
defer rt.RUnlock()
if rt.err != nil {
return nil, rt.err
}
return rt.relayClient.OpenConn(ctx, peerKey)
}
// Publish the track and release the map lock BEFORE dialing, so the dial does
// not run under rt.Lock (which would block RelayStates and the cleanup loop
// for the full dial). Concurrent callers find this track and wait on rt.ready.
// create a new relay client and store it in the relayClients map
rt = NewRelayTrack()
rt.Lock()
m.relayClients[serverAddress] = rt
m.relayClientsMutex.Unlock()
@@ -356,10 +361,8 @@ func (m *Manager) openConnVia(ctx context.Context, serverAddress, peerKey string
relayClient.SetTransportFallback(m.transportFallback)
err := relayClient.Connect(m.ctx)
if err != nil {
rt.Lock()
rt.err = err
rt.Unlock()
close(rt.ready)
m.relayClientsMutex.Lock()
delete(m.relayClients, serverAddress)
m.relayClientsMutex.Unlock()
@@ -367,34 +370,14 @@ func (m *Manager) openConnVia(ctx context.Context, serverAddress, peerKey string
}
// if connection closed then delete the relay client from the list
relayClient.SetOnDisconnectListener(m.onServerDisconnected)
rt.Lock()
rt.relayClient = relayClient
rt.Unlock()
close(rt.ready)
return relayClient.OpenConn(ctx, peerKey)
}
// openConnOnTrack opens a peer connection through an existing relay track,
// waiting for the dial started by another openConnVia call to finish. It waits
// on rt.ready rather than the track lock, so it neither holds nor contends the
// track lock across the dial.
func (m *Manager) openConnOnTrack(ctx context.Context, rt *RelayTrack, peerKey string) (net.Conn, error) {
select {
case <-rt.ready:
case <-ctx.Done():
return nil, ctx.Err()
conn, err := relayClient.OpenConn(ctx, peerKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
rt.RLock()
defer rt.RUnlock()
if rt.err != nil {
return nil, rt.err
}
if rt.relayClient == nil {
return nil, ErrRelayClientNotConnected
}
return rt.relayClient.OpenConn(ctx, peerKey)
return conn, nil
}
func (m *Manager) onServerConnected() {
@@ -493,13 +476,6 @@ func (m *Manager) cleanUpUnusedRelays() {
continue
}
// dial still in progress (openConnVia publishes the track before Connect
// completes and no longer holds rt.Lock during it), nothing to clean up.
if rt.relayClient == nil {
rt.Unlock()
continue
}
if time.Since(rt.created) <= m.keepUnusedServerTime {
rt.Unlock()
continue

View File

@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
package client
import (
"context"
"net/netip"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// TestCleanUpUnusedRelays_DoesNotBlockOnRealHangingDial drives a real, hanging foreign
// relay dial and asserts cleanUpUnusedRelays does not stall behind it.
func TestCleanUpUnusedRelays_DoesNotBlockOnRealHangingDial(t *testing.T) {
serverAddr := stallingRelayListener(t)
mCtx, mCancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
t.Cleanup(mCancel)
m := NewManager(mCtx, nil, "alice", 1280)
dialDone := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
defer close(dialDone)
_, _ = m.openConnVia(mCtx, serverAddr, "peerKey", netip.Addr{})
}()
// The track appears in the map once the dial is in flight.
require.Eventually(t, func() bool {
m.relayClientsMutex.RLock()
defer m.relayClientsMutex.RUnlock()
_, ok := m.relayClients[serverAddr]
return ok
}, 5*time.Second, 5*time.Millisecond, "relay dial did not start")
cleanupDone := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
defer close(cleanupDone)
m.cleanUpUnusedRelays()
}()
select {
case <-cleanupDone:
case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("cleanUpUnusedRelays blocked on an in-progress relay dial while holding the relay map lock")
}
m.relayClientsMutex.RLock()
_, stillTracked := m.relayClients[serverAddr]
m.relayClientsMutex.RUnlock()
require.True(t, stillTracked, "an in-progress relay dial must not be evicted by cleanup")
// Release the hanging dial so the goroutine can exit cleanly.
mCancel()
select {
case <-dialDone:
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("openConnVia did not return after context cancellation")
}
}

View File

@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
package client
import (
"context"
"net"
"net/netip"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// stallingRelayListener accepts TCP connections and holds them open without ever
// responding, so a relay handshake dialed against it blocks until its context is
// cancelled. It returns the "rel://host:port" URL to dial.
func stallingRelayListener(t *testing.T) string {
t.Helper()
ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
require.NoError(t, err)
var mu sync.Mutex
var conns []net.Conn
go func() {
for {
c, err := ln.Accept()
if err != nil {
return
}
mu.Lock()
conns = append(conns, c)
mu.Unlock()
}
}()
t.Cleanup(func() {
_ = ln.Close()
mu.Lock()
for _, c := range conns {
_ = c.Close()
}
mu.Unlock()
})
return "rel://" + ln.Addr().String()
}
// TestRelayStates_DoesNotBlockOnRealHangingDial is a regression test for
// RelayStates() called by a "status -d command" hanging behind an in-progress
// relay dial.
func TestRelayStates_DoesNotBlockOnRealHangingDial(t *testing.T) {
serverAddr := stallingRelayListener(t)
mCtx, mCancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
t.Cleanup(mCancel)
m := NewManager(mCtx, nil, "alice", 1280)
dialDone := make(chan struct{})
go func() {
defer close(dialDone)
_, _ = m.openConnVia(mCtx, serverAddr, "peerKey", netip.Addr{})
}()
require.Eventually(t, func() bool {
m.relayClientsMutex.RLock()
defer m.relayClientsMutex.RUnlock()
_, ok := m.relayClients[serverAddr]
return ok
}, 5*time.Second, 5*time.Millisecond, "relay dial did not start")
done := make(chan []RelayConnState, 1)
go func() {
done <- m.RelayStates()
}()
select {
case states := <-done:
require.Empty(t, states, "a relay still being dialed carries no state and must be omitted")
case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("RelayStates blocked on a foreign relay whose Connect() is in progress")
}
// Release the hanging dial so the goroutine can exit cleanly.
mCancel()
select {
case <-dialDone:
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("openConnVia did not return after context cancellation")
}
}

View File

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ import (
"go.opentelemetry.io/otel/metric"
"golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert"
"golang.org/x/net/http2"
"golang.org/x/net/http2/h2c" //nolint:staticcheck
"golang.org/x/net/http2/h2c"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/metrics"
@@ -281,7 +281,6 @@ func serveHTTP(httpListener net.Listener, handler http.Handler) {
go func() {
// Use h2c to support HTTP/2 without TLS (needed for gRPC)
h1s := &http.Server{
//nolint:staticcheck // h2c also handles the HTTP/1 Upgrade mechanism, which http.Server's UnencryptedHTTP2 does not
Handler: h2c.NewHandler(handler, &http2.Server{}),
}
err := h1s.Serve(httpListener)