Add VNC allow and approval settings to MDM policy

* [management] Add agent_network_only account setting

* [management] Load agent_network_only in pgx account loader and cover persistence

client/cmd/up.go

@@ -401,6 +401,12 @@ func setupSetConfigReq(customDNSAddressConverted []byte, cmd *cobra.Command, pro
 	if cmd.Flag(serverSSHAllowedFlag).Changed {
 		req.ServerSSHAllowed = &serverSSHAllowed
 	}
+	if cmd.Flag(serverVNCAllowedFlag).Changed {
+		req.ServerVNCAllowed = &serverVNCAllowed
+	}
+	if cmd.Flag(disableVNCApprovalFlag).Changed {
+		req.DisableVNCApproval = &disableVNCApproval
+	}
 	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRootFlag).Changed {
 		req.EnableSSHRoot = &enableSSHRoot
 	}
@@ -503,30 +509,14 @@ func setupConfig(customDNSAddressConverted []byte, cmd *cobra.Command, configFil
 	if cmd.Flag(serverSSHAllowedFlag).Changed {
 		ic.ServerSSHAllowed = &serverSSHAllowed
 	}
-
-	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRootFlag).Changed {
-		ic.EnableSSHRoot = &enableSSHRoot
+	if cmd.Flag(serverVNCAllowedFlag).Changed {
+		ic.ServerVNCAllowed = &serverVNCAllowed
+	}
+	if cmd.Flag(disableVNCApprovalFlag).Changed {
+		ic.DisableVNCApproval = &disableVNCApproval
 	}
 
-	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHSFTPFlag).Changed {
-		ic.EnableSSHSFTP = &enableSSHSFTP
-	}
-
-	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHLocalPortForwardFlag).Changed {
-		ic.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding = &enableSSHLocalPortForward
-	}
-
-	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRemotePortForwardFlag).Changed {
-		ic.EnableSSHRemotePortForwarding = &enableSSHRemotePortForward
-	}
-
-	if cmd.Flag(disableSSHAuthFlag).Changed {
-		ic.DisableSSHAuth = &disableSSHAuth
-	}
-
-	if cmd.Flag(sshJWTCacheTTLFlag).Changed {
-		ic.SSHJWTCacheTTL = &sshJWTCacheTTL
-	}
+	applySSHFlagsToConfig(cmd, &ic)
 
 	if cmd.Flag(interfaceNameFlag).Changed {
 		if err := parseInterfaceName(interfaceName); err != nil {
@@ -599,6 +589,49 @@ func setupConfig(customDNSAddressConverted []byte, cmd *cobra.Command, configFil
 	return &ic, nil
 }
 
+func applySSHFlagsToConfig(cmd *cobra.Command, ic *profilemanager.ConfigInput) {
+	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRootFlag).Changed {
+		ic.EnableSSHRoot = &enableSSHRoot
+	}
+	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHSFTPFlag).Changed {
+		ic.EnableSSHSFTP = &enableSSHSFTP
+	}
+	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHLocalPortForwardFlag).Changed {
+		ic.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding = &enableSSHLocalPortForward
+	}
+	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRemotePortForwardFlag).Changed {
+		ic.EnableSSHRemotePortForwarding = &enableSSHRemotePortForward
+	}
+	if cmd.Flag(disableSSHAuthFlag).Changed {
+		ic.DisableSSHAuth = &disableSSHAuth
+	}
+	if cmd.Flag(sshJWTCacheTTLFlag).Changed {
+		ic.SSHJWTCacheTTL = &sshJWTCacheTTL
+	}
+}
+
+func applySSHFlagsToLogin(cmd *cobra.Command, req *proto.LoginRequest) {
+	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRootFlag).Changed {
+		req.EnableSSHRoot = &enableSSHRoot
+	}
+	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHSFTPFlag).Changed {
+		req.EnableSSHSFTP = &enableSSHSFTP
+	}
+	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHLocalPortForwardFlag).Changed {
+		req.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding = &enableSSHLocalPortForward
+	}
+	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRemotePortForwardFlag).Changed {
+		req.EnableSSHRemotePortForwarding = &enableSSHRemotePortForward
+	}
+	if cmd.Flag(disableSSHAuthFlag).Changed {
+		req.DisableSSHAuth = &disableSSHAuth
+	}
+	if cmd.Flag(sshJWTCacheTTLFlag).Changed {
+		ttl := int32(sshJWTCacheTTL)
+		req.SshJWTCacheTTL = &ttl
+	}
+}
+
 func setupLoginRequest(providedSetupKey string, customDNSAddressConverted []byte, cmd *cobra.Command) (*proto.LoginRequest, error) {
 	loginRequest := proto.LoginRequest{
 		SetupKey:            providedSetupKey,
@@ -628,31 +661,14 @@ func setupLoginRequest(providedSetupKey string, customDNSAddressConverted []byte
 	if cmd.Flag(serverSSHAllowedFlag).Changed {
 		loginRequest.ServerSSHAllowed = &serverSSHAllowed
 	}
-
-	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRootFlag).Changed {
-		loginRequest.EnableSSHRoot = &enableSSHRoot
+	if cmd.Flag(serverVNCAllowedFlag).Changed {
+		loginRequest.ServerVNCAllowed = &serverVNCAllowed
+	}
+	if cmd.Flag(disableVNCApprovalFlag).Changed {
+		loginRequest.DisableVNCApproval = &disableVNCApproval
 	}
 
-	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHSFTPFlag).Changed {
-		loginRequest.EnableSSHSFTP = &enableSSHSFTP
-	}
-
-	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHLocalPortForwardFlag).Changed {
-		loginRequest.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding = &enableSSHLocalPortForward
-	}
-
-	if cmd.Flag(enableSSHRemotePortForwardFlag).Changed {
-		loginRequest.EnableSSHRemotePortForwarding = &enableSSHRemotePortForward
-	}
-
-	if cmd.Flag(disableSSHAuthFlag).Changed {
-		loginRequest.DisableSSHAuth = &disableSSHAuth
-	}
-
-	if cmd.Flag(sshJWTCacheTTLFlag).Changed {
-		sshJWTCacheTTL32 := int32(sshJWTCacheTTL)
-		loginRequest.SshJWTCacheTTL = &sshJWTCacheTTL32
-	}
+	applySSHFlagsToLogin(cmd, &loginRequest)
 
 	if cmd.Flag(disableAutoConnectFlag).Changed {
 		loginRequest.DisableAutoConnect = &autoConnectDisabled

client/cmd/vnc_agent.go

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+//go:build windows || (darwin && !ios)
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"net"
+	"net/netip"
+	"os"
+
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
+
+	vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
+)
+
+var (
+	vncAgentSocket    string
+	vncAgentTargetUID uint32
+)
+
+func init() {
+	vncAgentCmd.Flags().StringVar(&vncAgentSocket, "socket", "", "Unix-domain socket path the agent listens on (required)")
+	vncAgentCmd.Flags().Uint32Var(&vncAgentTargetUID, "target-uid", 0, "uid the agent should drop privileges to before listening (darwin only; 0 = stay as current uid)")
+	rootCmd.AddCommand(vncAgentCmd)
+}
+
+// vncAgentCmd runs a VNC server inside the user's interactive session,
+// listening on a Unix-domain socket. The NetBird service spawns it: on
+// Windows via CreateProcessAsUser into the console session, on macOS via
+// launchctl asuser into the Aqua session.
+var vncAgentCmd = &cobra.Command{
+	Use:    "vnc-agent",
+	Short:  "Run VNC capture agent (internal, spawned by service)",
+	Hidden: true,
+	RunE: func(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
+		log.SetReportCaller(true)
+		log.SetFormatter(&log.JSONFormatter{})
+		log.SetOutput(os.Stderr)
+
+		if vncAgentSocket == "" {
+			return fmt.Errorf("--socket is required")
+		}
+
+		token := os.Getenv("NB_VNC_AGENT_TOKEN")
+		if token == "" {
+			return fmt.Errorf("NB_VNC_AGENT_TOKEN not set; agent requires a token from the service")
+		}
+		// Purge the token from env so it doesn't leak via /proc/<pid>/environ.
+		if err := os.Unsetenv("NB_VNC_AGENT_TOKEN"); err != nil {
+			log.Debugf("unset NB_VNC_AGENT_TOKEN: %v", err)
+		}
+
+		// Drop root privileges to the target console user BEFORE creating
+		// the listening socket: keeps a post-auth bug in the encoder /
+		// input / capture paths confined to the user's own privileges
+		// rather than escalating to host root, and makes the daemon's
+		// LOCAL_PEERCRED check see the right uid. No-op on Windows
+		// (both processes run as SYSTEM) and when --target-uid is 0.
+		if vncAgentTargetUID != 0 {
+			if err := dropAgentPrivileges(vncAgentTargetUID); err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("drop privileges to uid %d: %w", vncAgentTargetUID, err)
+			}
+		}
+
+		if err := os.Remove(vncAgentSocket); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
+			log.Debugf("remove stale socket %s: %v", vncAgentSocket, err)
+		}
+		ln, err := net.Listen("unix", vncAgentSocket)
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("listen on %s: %w", vncAgentSocket, err)
+		}
+		if err := os.Chmod(vncAgentSocket, 0o600); err != nil {
+			log.Debugf("chmod %s: %v", vncAgentSocket, err)
+		}
+
+		capturer, injector, err := newAgentResources()
+		if err != nil {
+			_ = ln.Close()
+			return err
+		}
+		srv := vncserver.New(vncserver.Config{
+			Capturer:      capturer,
+			Injector:      injector,
+			DisableAuth:   true,
+			AgentTokenHex: token,
+			Listener:      ln,
+		})
+
+		if err := srv.Start(cmd.Context(), netip.AddrPort{}, netip.Prefix{}); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("start vnc server: %w", err)
+		}
+		log.Infof("vnc-agent listening on %s, ready", vncAgentSocket)
+
+		<-cmd.Context().Done()
+		log.Info("vnc-agent context cancelled, shutting down")
+		return srv.Stop()
+	},
+	SilenceUsage: true,
+}

client/cmd/vnc_agent_darwin.go

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+//go:build darwin && !ios
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+
+	vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
+)
+
+func newAgentResources() (vncserver.ScreenCapturer, vncserver.InputInjector, error) {
+	capturer := vncserver.NewMacPoller()
+	injector, err := vncserver.NewMacInputInjector()
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("macOS input injector: %w", err)
+	}
+	return capturer, injector, nil
+}

client/cmd/vnc_agent_dropprivs_darwin.go

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+//go:build darwin && !ios
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"os/user"
+	"strconv"
+	"syscall"
+)
+
+// dropAgentPrivileges drops the vnc-agent process from root (its
+// launchctl-asuser-inherited starting uid) to the target console user
+// before any other initialisation runs. Without this the agent runs as
+// root for the lifetime of the session; any post-auth memory-safety
+// issue in the capture/input/encode paths would then be a root-level
+// RCE on the host instead of a user-level one. Also makes the daemon's
+// LOCAL_PEERCRED check correctly identify the agent as the console user,
+// not as root.
+//
+// Returns an error when the agent is running as a non-root uid that
+// differs from targetUID: non-root can only setuid to itself, so a
+// mismatch here means the spawn went to the wrong session.
+func dropAgentPrivileges(targetUID uint32) error {
+	if targetUID == 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("refusing to keep agent running as root (target uid 0)")
+	}
+	cur := uint32(os.Getuid())
+	if cur == targetUID {
+		return nil
+	}
+	if cur != 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("agent uid %d does not match expected %d and we lack root to fix it", cur, targetUID)
+	}
+	// Resolve the target user's real primary group rather than reusing
+	// targetUID as the gid: a user's primary group on macOS is typically
+	// staff(20), not gid==uid. Fail closed if the lookup fails.
+	targetGID, err := primaryGroupID(targetUID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	// Drop supplementary groups first: setgid alone doesn't touch the
+	// auxiliary group list, leaving root's groups attached would let the
+	// dropped process write to root-only group-writable files.
+	if err := syscall.Setgroups([]int{}); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("setgroups([]): %w", err)
+	}
+	if err := syscall.Setgid(targetGID); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("setgid(%d): %w", targetGID, err)
+	}
+	if os.Getgid() != targetGID || os.Getegid() != targetGID {
+		return fmt.Errorf("setgid verification: gid=%d egid=%d, expected %d", os.Getgid(), os.Getegid(), targetGID)
+	}
+	if err := syscall.Setuid(int(targetUID)); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("setuid(%d): %w", targetUID, err)
+	}
+	if uint32(os.Getuid()) != targetUID || uint32(os.Geteuid()) != targetUID {
+		return fmt.Errorf("setuid verification: uid=%d euid=%d, expected %d", os.Getuid(), os.Geteuid(), targetUID)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// primaryGroupID resolves the real primary group id of the user with the
+// given uid. Fails closed: a lookup or parse error returns an error so the
+// caller never falls back to using uid as the gid.
+func primaryGroupID(targetUID uint32) (int, error) {
+	u, err := user.LookupId(strconv.Itoa(int(targetUID)))
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("look up uid %d: %w", targetUID, err)
+	}
+	gid, err := strconv.Atoi(u.Gid)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("parse gid %q for uid %d: %w", u.Gid, targetUID, err)
+	}
+	return gid, nil
+}

client/cmd/vnc_agent_dropprivs_darwin_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+//go:build darwin && !ios
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// TestDropAgentPrivileges_RefusesRootTarget locks in the contract that
+// dropAgentPrivileges must never be a no-op when asked to keep the
+// agent as root (target uid 0). A future caller that passes 0 by
+// mistake would otherwise leave the post-auth attack surface running
+// with full root privileges.
+func TestDropAgentPrivileges_RefusesRootTarget(t *testing.T) {
+	err := dropAgentPrivileges(0)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected refusal for target uid 0, got nil")
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "root") {
+		t.Fatalf("error should mention root, got: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestDropAgentPrivileges_NoOpWhenAlreadyTarget covers the dev path
+// where the agent is launched by hand as the target user (no root
+// available, no setuid needed). The helper must succeed silently
+// instead of trying (and failing) a setuid to its current uid.
+func TestDropAgentPrivileges_NoOpWhenAlreadyTarget(t *testing.T) {
+	// Skip when running as root: the early-return path we want to
+	// cover only fires when current uid == target uid.
+	uid := currentUIDForTest()
+	if uid == 0 {
+		t.Skip("test must not run as root; cannot exercise the no-op early-return")
+	}
+	if err := dropAgentPrivileges(uid); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("expected no-op when current uid == target, got: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestDropAgentPrivileges_RefusesMismatchedNonRoot guards the "non-root
+// caller tries to setuid to a different uid" path: setuid would fail
+// with EPERM anyway, but the helper should surface a clear error
+// before issuing the syscall so a misconfigured spawn (wrong --target-uid
+// flag) is debuggable.
+func TestDropAgentPrivileges_RefusesMismatchedNonRoot(t *testing.T) {
+	uid := currentUIDForTest()
+	if uid == 0 {
+		t.Skip("test must not run as root; covered case requires non-root caller")
+	}
+	err := dropAgentPrivileges(uid + 1)
+	if err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected refusal when non-root caller asks to setuid elsewhere")
+	}
+}

client/cmd/vnc_agent_dropprivs_testhelpers_darwin.go

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+//go:build darwin && !ios
+
+package cmd
+
+import "os"
+
+// currentUIDForTest exposes os.Getuid for the darwin dropprivs tests
+// without leaking an os import into the test file itself.
+func currentUIDForTest() uint32 {
+	return uint32(os.Getuid())
+}

client/cmd/vnc_agent_dropprivs_windows.go

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+//go:build windows
+
+package cmd
+
+// dropAgentPrivileges is a no-op on Windows: the agent and the daemon
+// both run as SYSTEM (the daemon spawns the agent into the interactive
+// session via CreateProcessAsUser with an impersonation token, but the
+// resulting process still runs under SYSTEM, not under the user's
+// account). The Windows path relies on the DACL-restricted socket
+// directory, the unpredictable per-spawn socket name, the listen-readiness
+// gate, and the per-spawn token for integrity instead.
+func dropAgentPrivileges(_ uint32) error {
+	return nil
+}

client/cmd/vnc_agent_windows.go

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+//go:build windows
+
+package cmd
+
+import (
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+
+	vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
+)
+
+func newAgentResources() (vncserver.ScreenCapturer, vncserver.InputInjector, error) {
+	sessionID := vncserver.GetCurrentSessionID()
+	log.Infof("VNC agent running in Windows session %d", sessionID)
+	return vncserver.NewDesktopCapturer(), vncserver.NewWindowsInputInjector(), nil
+}

client/cmd/vnc_flags.go

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+package cmd
+
+const (
+	serverVNCAllowedFlag   = "allow-server-vnc"
+	disableVNCApprovalFlag = "disable-vnc-approval"
+)
+
+var (
+	serverVNCAllowed   bool
+	disableVNCApproval bool
+)
+
+func init() {
+	upCmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVar(&serverVNCAllowed, serverVNCAllowedFlag, false, "Allow embedded VNC server on peer")
+	upCmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVar(&disableVNCApproval, disableVNCApprovalFlag, false, "Disable per-connection user approval prompts for the embedded VNC server")
+}

client/configs/configs.go

@@ -6,19 +6,30 @@ import (
 	"runtime"
 )
 
-var StateDir string
+var (
+	// StateDir holds persistent state (config, profiles, install metadata).
+	StateDir string
+	// RuntimeDir holds ephemeral artifacts that should not survive reboot,
+	// such as Unix sockets for daemon and per-session IPC. Empty on
+	// platforms without a conventional /var/run-style location.
+	RuntimeDir string
+)
 
 func init() {
-	StateDir = os.Getenv("NB_STATE_DIR")
-	if StateDir != "" {
-		return
-	}
 	switch runtime.GOOS {
 	case "windows":
 		StateDir = filepath.Join(os.Getenv("PROGRAMDATA"), "Netbird")
 	case "darwin", "linux":
 		StateDir = "/var/lib/netbird"
+		RuntimeDir = "/var/run/netbird"
 	case "freebsd", "openbsd", "netbsd", "dragonfly":
 		StateDir = "/var/db/netbird"
+		RuntimeDir = "/var/run/netbird"
+	}
+	if v := os.Getenv("NB_STATE_DIR"); v != "" {
+		StateDir = v
+	}
+	if v := os.Getenv("NB_RUNTIME_DIR"); v != "" {
+		RuntimeDir = v
 	}
 }

client/internal/approval/broker.go

@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
+// Package approval brokers per-attempt user-accept prompts for inbound
+// remote access (VNC today, SSH and others in the future). A caller pushes
+// a Prompt; the broker emits a SystemEvent on the daemon→UI stream and
+// blocks until the UI calls the daemon's RespondApproval RPC, the per-
+// request timeout fires, or no subscriber is connected. The latter case
+// fails closed so a backgrounded UI cannot silently bypass the gate.
+package approval
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/google/uuid"
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
+)
+
+// Metadata keys the broker reserves on the emitted SystemEvent. Callers
+// should not set these themselves; values in Prompt.Metadata that collide
+// are overwritten by the broker.
+const (
+	MetaRequestID = "request_id"
+	MetaKind      = "kind"
+	MetaExpiresAt = "expires_at"
+)
+
+// ShortKeyFingerprint formats a hex-encoded Noise_IK static pubkey as a
+// short, eyeball-able fingerprint to display in the approval dialog.
+// The dashboard-supplied display name attached to a SessionPubKey isn't
+// cryptographically asserted by the connecting client, so the prompt
+// must also show something that IS: the key fingerprint, a hash of
+// the static public key the client just proved possession of during the
+// Noise handshake. Returns the empty string when the input is too short
+// to plausibly be a hex pubkey, so the row is omitted rather than
+// rendered as a misleading partial.
+//
+// Output format: 16 hex chars grouped as XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX (64 bits of
+// fingerprint, resistant to random-prefix collisions and easy for a human
+// to compare with an out-of-band reference).
+func ShortKeyFingerprint(hexKey string) string {
+	if len(hexKey) < 8 {
+		return ""
+	}
+	src := hexKey
+	if len(src) > 16 {
+		src = src[:16]
+	}
+	var out []byte
+	for i, c := range src {
+		if i > 0 && i%4 == 0 {
+			out = append(out, '-')
+		}
+		out = append(out, byte(c))
+	}
+	return string(out)
+}
+
+// Kind values for the well-known prompt subjects. New subsystems should
+// add a constant here so the UI can dispatch on a known string.
+const (
+	KindVNC = "vnc"
+	KindSSH = "ssh"
+)
+
+// DefaultTimeout is the wall-clock window the user has to accept or deny a
+// pending approval before the broker fails closed and returns ErrTimeout.
+// Kept well under typical VNC client and dashboard connection timeouts so
+// the RFB rejection actually reaches the browser instead of racing the
+// browser's own "connection timed out" message.
+const DefaultTimeout = 15 * time.Second
+
+// timeoutValue returns the active timeout. It's a var so tests in this
+// package can shorten the wait without exposing a setter on the public
+// API. Production code always sees DefaultTimeout.
+var timeoutValue = func() time.Duration { return DefaultTimeout }
+
+// ErrNoSubscriber indicates no UI is connected to consume the prompt.
+// The caller must reject the underlying connection (fail-closed).
+var ErrNoSubscriber = errors.New("no UI subscriber connected for approval")
+
+// ErrTimeout indicates the user did not respond within DefaultTimeout.
+var ErrTimeout = errors.New("approval timed out")
+
+// ErrDenied indicates the user explicitly denied the connection.
+var ErrDenied = errors.New("approval denied")
+
+// EventPublisher is the subset of peer.Status used to emit prompts.
+type EventPublisher interface {
+	PublishEvent(
+		severity proto.SystemEvent_Severity,
+		category proto.SystemEvent_Category,
+		msg string,
+		userMsg string,
+		metadata map[string]string,
+	)
+	HasEventSubscribers() bool
+}
+
+// Prompt describes the pending request shown to the user. Kind selects
+// the UI dispatch path (e.g. "vnc", "ssh"). Subject is the human-readable
+// one-liner the UI may show as a title or notification body. Metadata is
+// passed through verbatim and is the subsystem-specific payload (peer
+// name, source IP, mode, etc.).
+type Prompt struct {
+	Kind     string
+	Subject  string
+	Metadata map[string]string
+}
+
+// Decision carries the user's response to an approval prompt. ViewOnly is
+// only meaningful when Accept is true; it lets the host grant the
+// connection but signal the requester that input control is withheld.
+type Decision struct {
+	Accept   bool
+	ViewOnly bool
+}
+
+// Broker holds in-flight approval requests keyed by request ID.
+type Broker struct {
+	pub EventPublisher
+
+	mu      sync.Mutex
+	pending map[string]chan Decision
+}
+
+// New returns a broker that publishes prompts via pub.
+func New(pub EventPublisher) *Broker {
+	return &Broker{
+		pub:     pub,
+		pending: make(map[string]chan Decision),
+	}
+}
+
+// Request emits a SystemEvent for p and blocks until the UI calls Respond,
+// ctx is cancelled, or DefaultTimeout elapses. Returns a Decision when
+// the user replied; ErrDenied / ErrTimeout / ErrNoSubscriber / ctx.Err
+// otherwise. Callers must treat any non-nil error as a deny.
+func (b *Broker) Request(ctx context.Context, p Prompt) (Decision, error) {
+	var zero Decision
+	if b == nil || b.pub == nil {
+		return zero, fmt.Errorf("approval broker not configured")
+	}
+	if !b.pub.HasEventSubscribers() {
+		return zero, ErrNoSubscriber
+	}
+
+	id := uuid.NewString()
+	resp := make(chan Decision, 1)
+
+	b.mu.Lock()
+	b.pending[id] = resp
+	b.mu.Unlock()
+
+	defer b.dropPending(id)
+
+	timeout := timeoutValue()
+	expiresAt := time.Now().Add(timeout)
+	meta := make(map[string]string, len(p.Metadata)+3)
+	for k, v := range p.Metadata {
+		meta[k] = v
+	}
+	meta[MetaRequestID] = id
+	meta[MetaKind] = p.Kind
+	meta[MetaExpiresAt] = expiresAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)
+
+	subject := p.Subject
+	if subject == "" {
+		subject = fmt.Sprintf("%s connection requires approval", p.Kind)
+	}
+	b.pub.PublishEvent(proto.SystemEvent_INFO, proto.SystemEvent_APPROVAL, subject, subject, meta)
+	log.Debugf("approval request %s (%s) emitted: %s", id, p.Kind, subject)
+
+	timer := time.NewTimer(timeout)
+	defer timer.Stop()
+
+	select {
+	case d := <-resp:
+		if !d.Accept {
+			return zero, ErrDenied
+		}
+		return d, nil
+	case <-timer.C:
+		return zero, ErrTimeout
+	case <-ctx.Done():
+		return zero, ctx.Err()
+	}
+}
+
+// Respond delivers the user's decision for id. Returns true when a pending
+// request matched and was woken, false when id was unknown or already done.
+func (b *Broker) Respond(id string, d Decision) bool {
+	if b == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	b.mu.Lock()
+	ch, ok := b.pending[id]
+	if ok {
+		delete(b.pending, id)
+	}
+	b.mu.Unlock()
+	if !ok {
+		return false
+	}
+	select {
+	case ch <- d:
+	default:
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+func (b *Broker) dropPending(id string) {
+	b.mu.Lock()
+	delete(b.pending, id)
+	b.mu.Unlock()
+}

client/internal/approval/broker_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,434 @@
+package approval
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
+)
+
+// fakePublisher records published events and reports whether subscribers
+// are connected. The subscribers flag is the security-critical signal:
+// when false the broker must refuse to emit and the gate must fail closed.
+type fakePublisher struct {
+	mu          sync.Mutex
+	subscribers bool
+	events      []*proto.SystemEvent
+}
+
+func (p *fakePublisher) PublishEvent(
+	severity proto.SystemEvent_Severity,
+	category proto.SystemEvent_Category,
+	msg string,
+	userMsg string,
+	metadata map[string]string,
+) {
+	p.mu.Lock()
+	p.events = append(p.events, &proto.SystemEvent{
+		Severity:    severity,
+		Category:    category,
+		Message:     msg,
+		UserMessage: userMsg,
+		Metadata:    metadata,
+	})
+	p.mu.Unlock()
+}
+
+func (p *fakePublisher) HasEventSubscribers() bool {
+	p.mu.Lock()
+	defer p.mu.Unlock()
+	return p.subscribers
+}
+
+func (p *fakePublisher) lastEvent(t *testing.T) *proto.SystemEvent {
+	t.Helper()
+	p.mu.Lock()
+	defer p.mu.Unlock()
+	require.NotEmpty(t, p.events, "publisher saw no events")
+	return p.events[len(p.events)-1]
+}
+
+func (p *fakePublisher) eventCount() int {
+	p.mu.Lock()
+	defer p.mu.Unlock()
+	return len(p.events)
+}
+
+// TestRequestNoSubscriberFailsClosed is the core fail-closed invariant:
+// when the UI is not subscribed, the broker must refuse without emitting
+// an event or arming a waiter. A regression here is a silent bypass.
+func TestRequestNoSubscriberFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
+	pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: false}
+	b := New(pub)
+
+	_, err := b.Request(context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC, Subject: "test"})
+	assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrNoSubscriber)
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, pub.eventCount(), "no event must be emitted when fail-closed")
+
+	b.mu.Lock()
+	pending := len(b.pending)
+	b.mu.Unlock()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, pending, "no waiter must be registered on fail-closed")
+}
+
+// TestRequestTimeoutDenies verifies that a request without a UI response
+// returns ErrTimeout (deny) rather than nil (silent accept). Uses a short
+// per-test broker timeout via Respond after the fact to keep the test fast.
+func TestRequestTimeoutDenies(t *testing.T) {
+	// Replace DefaultTimeout for the lifetime of this test.
+	orig := DefaultTimeout
+	defaultTimeout(t, 60*time.Millisecond)
+	defer defaultTimeout(t, orig)
+
+	pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
+	b := New(pub)
+
+	start := time.Now()
+	_, err := b.Request(context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC, Subject: "test"})
+	assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrTimeout, "missing user response must yield ErrTimeout, not nil")
+	assert.GreaterOrEqual(t, time.Since(start), 50*time.Millisecond, "timeout fired prematurely")
+}
+
+// TestRequestDenied returns ErrDenied when the UI responds with false.
+func TestRequestDenied(t *testing.T) {
+	pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
+	b := New(pub)
+
+	var requestID string
+	done := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() {
+		done <- requestErr(b, context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC, Subject: "test"})
+	}()
+
+	requestID = waitForRequestID(t, pub)
+	require.True(t, b.Respond(requestID, Decision{Accept: false}))
+
+	select {
+	case err := <-done:
+		assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrDenied)
+	case <-time.After(time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("Request did not return after Respond(false)")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestRequestAccepted is the happy path. Failure here doesn't bypass the
+// gate but breaks the feature.
+func TestRequestAccepted(t *testing.T) {
+	pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
+	b := New(pub)
+
+	done := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() {
+		done <- requestErr(b, context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC, Subject: "test"})
+	}()
+
+	id := waitForRequestID(t, pub)
+	require.True(t, b.Respond(id, Decision{Accept: true}))
+
+	select {
+	case err := <-done:
+		assert.NoError(t, err)
+	case <-time.After(time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("Request did not return after Respond(true)")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestRequestCtxCancelDenies verifies that an upstream cancel (e.g. the
+// engine shutting down mid-prompt) returns the cancel error rather than
+// nil. A nil here would be a silent bypass on shutdown races.
+func TestRequestCtxCancelDenies(t *testing.T) {
+	pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
+	b := New(pub)
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	done := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() {
+		done <- requestErr(b, ctx, Prompt{Kind: KindVNC, Subject: "test"})
+	}()
+
+	// Wait until the prompt is in flight so cancel races a live waiter.
+	_ = waitForRequestID(t, pub)
+	cancel()
+
+	select {
+	case err := <-done:
+		assert.ErrorIs(t, err, context.Canceled)
+	case <-time.After(time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("Request did not return after ctx cancel")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestRespondUnknownIsNoop ensures a stray RespondApproval RPC cannot
+// affect or accidentally accept any in-flight request whose id it doesn't
+// match. Also confirms it doesn't panic.
+func TestRespondUnknownIsNoop(t *testing.T) {
+	pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
+	b := New(pub)
+
+	// No in-flight prompts: Respond returns false.
+	assert.False(t, b.Respond("does-not-exist", Decision{Accept: true}))
+
+	// With an in-flight prompt, a wrong id still returns false and the
+	// prompt remains armed (eventually timing out as a deny).
+	defaultTimeout(t, 60*time.Millisecond)
+	defer defaultTimeout(t, DefaultTimeout)
+
+	done := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() {
+		done <- requestErr(b, context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC})
+	}()
+	realID := waitForRequestID(t, pub)
+	assert.False(t, b.Respond("totally-bogus", Decision{Accept: true}), "unknown id must not match")
+	assert.NotEqual(t, "totally-bogus", realID)
+
+	select {
+	case err := <-done:
+		assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrTimeout, "armed prompt must still time out, not accept")
+	case <-time.After(time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("prompt did not resolve")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestRespondAfterTimeoutNoop confirms a late accept response can't
+// retroactively flip a denied (timed-out) request. The dropPending defer
+// in Request must have removed the entry by the time Respond races in.
+func TestRespondAfterTimeoutNoop(t *testing.T) {
+	defaultTimeout(t, 30*time.Millisecond)
+	defer defaultTimeout(t, DefaultTimeout)
+
+	pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
+	b := New(pub)
+
+	done := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() {
+		done <- requestErr(b, context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC})
+	}()
+	id := waitForRequestID(t, pub)
+
+	select {
+	case err := <-done:
+		require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrTimeout)
+	case <-time.After(time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("prompt did not time out")
+	}
+
+	assert.False(t, b.Respond(id, Decision{Accept: true}), "late respond must be no-op")
+}
+
+// TestRespondDoubleNoop ensures a duplicate ack from the UI doesn't leak
+// past the matched waiter or panic on a closed/full channel.
+func TestRespondDoubleNoop(t *testing.T) {
+	pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
+	b := New(pub)
+
+	done := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() {
+		done <- requestErr(b, context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC})
+	}()
+	id := waitForRequestID(t, pub)
+	require.True(t, b.Respond(id, Decision{Accept: true}))
+	assert.False(t, b.Respond(id, Decision{Accept: false}), "second response must be no-op")
+
+	select {
+	case err := <-done:
+		assert.NoError(t, err)
+	case <-time.After(time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("prompt did not resolve")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestNilBrokerRequestErrors guards the engine pre-init path where the
+// broker may not yet exist (or its publisher is nil): Request must
+// error, never silently accept.
+func TestNilBrokerRequestErrors(t *testing.T) {
+	var b *Broker
+	_, err := b.Request(context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC})
+	assert.Error(t, err, "nil broker must error, never silently accept")
+
+	b2 := New(nil)
+	_, err = b2.Request(context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC})
+	assert.Error(t, err, "broker with nil publisher must error, never silently accept")
+}
+
+// TestPromptMetadataInjected confirms the broker stamps request_id, kind,
+// and expires_at on the emitted event. The UI relies on these keys; if
+// they are dropped, the user cannot route the prompt and the response
+// path breaks (which fails closed via timeout).
+func TestPromptMetadataInjected(t *testing.T) {
+	pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
+	b := New(pub)
+
+	done := make(chan error, 1)
+	go func() {
+		done <- requestErr(b, context.Background(), Prompt{
+			Kind:     KindVNC,
+			Subject:  "VNC connection from peerA",
+			Metadata: map[string]string{"peer_name": "peerA"},
+		})
+	}()
+
+	id := waitForRequestID(t, pub)
+	ev := pub.lastEvent(t)
+
+	assert.Equal(t, proto.SystemEvent_APPROVAL, ev.Category)
+	assert.Equal(t, KindVNC, ev.Metadata[MetaKind])
+	assert.Equal(t, id, ev.Metadata[MetaRequestID])
+	assert.NotEmpty(t, ev.Metadata[MetaExpiresAt])
+	assert.Equal(t, "peerA", ev.Metadata["peer_name"], "caller metadata must pass through")
+
+	require.True(t, b.Respond(id, Decision{Accept: true}))
+	<-done
+}
+
+// TestConcurrentRequests verifies that two concurrent prompts are tracked
+// independently. A bug that aliases ids would let one Respond unblock
+// the wrong waiter (a silent accept across prompts).
+func TestConcurrentRequests(t *testing.T) {
+	pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
+	b := New(pub)
+
+	const n = 20
+	results := make(chan error, n)
+	for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
+		go func() {
+			results <- requestErr(b, context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC})
+		}()
+	}
+
+	ids := waitForNRequestIDs(t, pub, n)
+	require.Len(t, ids, n)
+
+	// Deny exactly half, accept the rest. Track outcome per id so we can
+	// match each Request's return value against the response we sent.
+	denySet := make(map[string]bool, n)
+	for i, id := range ids {
+		deny := i%2 == 0
+		denySet[id] = deny
+		require.True(t, b.Respond(id, Decision{Accept: !deny}))
+	}
+
+	// Collect all returns and check no nil errors slipped past a deny.
+	var accepted, denied atomic.Int32
+	for i := 0; i < n; i++ {
+		select {
+		case err := <-results:
+			if err == nil {
+				accepted.Add(1)
+			} else {
+				assert.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrDenied)
+				denied.Add(1)
+			}
+		case <-time.After(2 * time.Second):
+			t.Fatalf("only got %d/%d responses", i, n)
+		}
+	}
+	assert.Equal(t, int32(n/2), denied.Load())
+	assert.Equal(t, int32(n/2), accepted.Load())
+}
+
+// waitForRequestID blocks until the publisher sees its next event and
+// returns the request_id stamped on it.
+func waitForRequestID(t *testing.T, pub *fakePublisher) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(2 * time.Second)
+	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
+		pub.mu.Lock()
+		count := len(pub.events)
+		var id string
+		if count > 0 {
+			id = pub.events[count-1].Metadata[MetaRequestID]
+		}
+		pub.mu.Unlock()
+		if id != "" {
+			return id
+		}
+		time.Sleep(2 * time.Millisecond)
+	}
+	t.Fatal("timeout waiting for emitted event")
+	return ""
+}
+
+func waitForNRequestIDs(t *testing.T, pub *fakePublisher, n int) []string {
+	t.Helper()
+	deadline := time.Now().Add(2 * time.Second)
+	for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
+		pub.mu.Lock()
+		count := len(pub.events)
+		pub.mu.Unlock()
+		if count >= n {
+			break
+		}
+		time.Sleep(2 * time.Millisecond)
+	}
+	pub.mu.Lock()
+	defer pub.mu.Unlock()
+	out := make([]string, 0, len(pub.events))
+	seen := make(map[string]struct{}, len(pub.events))
+	for _, ev := range pub.events {
+		id := ev.Metadata[MetaRequestID]
+		if id == "" {
+			continue
+		}
+		if _, dup := seen[id]; dup {
+			continue
+		}
+		seen[id] = struct{}{}
+		out = append(out, id)
+	}
+	if len(out) < n {
+		t.Fatalf("only got %d/%d request ids", len(out), n)
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+// defaultTimeout swaps the broker's per-request wall-clock window so the
+// timeout tests run quickly. Restores the prior value on the next call.
+func defaultTimeout(t *testing.T, d time.Duration) {
+	t.Helper()
+	if d <= 0 {
+		t.Fatal("defaultTimeout must be > 0")
+	}
+	timeoutValue = func() time.Duration { return d }
+}
+
+// requestErr wraps Broker.Request to drop the Decision when tests only
+// care about the error path. Keeps the goroutine bodies tight.
+func requestErr(b *Broker, ctx context.Context, p Prompt) error {
+	_, err := b.Request(ctx, p)
+	return err
+}
+
+// TestRequestViewOnly checks the view-only outcome flows through Request's
+// Decision return without being silently swallowed.
+func TestRequestViewOnly(t *testing.T) {
+	pub := &fakePublisher{subscribers: true}
+	b := New(pub)
+
+	type result struct {
+		d   Decision
+		err error
+	}
+	done := make(chan result, 1)
+	go func() {
+		d, err := b.Request(context.Background(), Prompt{Kind: KindVNC})
+		done <- result{d, err}
+	}()
+
+	id := waitForRequestID(t, pub)
+	require.True(t, b.Respond(id, Decision{Accept: true, ViewOnly: true}))
+
+	select {
+	case r := <-done:
+		assert.NoError(t, r.err)
+		assert.True(t, r.d.Accept)
+		assert.True(t, r.d.ViewOnly, "ViewOnly must survive the round-trip")
+	case <-time.After(time.Second):
+		t.Fatal("view-only request did not resolve")
+	}
+}

client/internal/approval/fingerprint_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+package approval
+
+import "testing"
+
+// TestShortKeyFingerprint locks in the format the VNC approval prompt
+// shows to the user. The fingerprint is the user's only cryptographic
+// anchor against a malicious management server that pushes a spoofed
+// display name, so accidental changes to its format would silently
+// undermine that defence.
+func TestShortKeyFingerprint(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		name string
+		in   string
+		want string
+	}{
+		{
+			name: "full_32_byte_pubkey",
+			in:   "0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210ffeeddccbbaa99887766554433221100",
+			want: "0123-4567-89ab-cdef",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "exactly_16_chars",
+			in:   "0123456789abcdef",
+			want: "0123-4567-89ab-cdef",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "borderline_8_chars",
+			in:   "01234567",
+			want: "0123-4567",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "too_short_returns_empty",
+			in:   "0123",
+			want: "",
+		},
+		{
+			name: "empty_returns_empty",
+			in:   "",
+			want: "",
+		},
+	}
+	for _, tc := range cases {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			got := ShortKeyFingerprint(tc.in)
+			if got != tc.want {
+				t.Fatalf("ShortKeyFingerprint(%q) = %q, want %q", tc.in, got, tc.want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestShortKeyFingerprint_DistinctKeysDistinctOutputs guards against a
+// formatting bug that would collapse different prefixes onto the same
+// displayed fingerprint and let an attacker substitute their pubkey for
+// a victim's while keeping the prompt visually identical.
+func TestShortKeyFingerprint_DistinctKeysDistinctOutputs(t *testing.T) {
+	a := ShortKeyFingerprint("0123456789abcdef" + "rest_of_pubkey_ignored")
+	b := ShortKeyFingerprint("0123456789abcde0" + "rest_of_pubkey_ignored")
+	if a == b {
+		t.Fatalf("expected distinct outputs for distinct prefixes, both = %q", a)
+	}
+}

client/internal/auth/auth.go

@@ -344,6 +344,7 @@ func (a *Auth) setSystemInfoFlags(info *system.Info) {
 		a.config.RosenpassEnabled,
 		a.config.RosenpassPermissive,
 		a.config.ServerSSHAllowed,
+		a.config.ServerVNCAllowed,
 		a.config.DisableClientRoutes,
 		a.config.DisableServerRoutes,
 		a.config.DisableDNS,

client/internal/connect.go

@@ -604,6 +604,8 @@ func createEngineConfig(key wgtypes.Key, config *profilemanager.Config, peerConf
 		RosenpassEnabled:              config.RosenpassEnabled,
 		RosenpassPermissive:           config.RosenpassPermissive,
 		ServerSSHAllowed:              util.ReturnBoolWithDefaultTrue(config.ServerSSHAllowed),
+		ServerVNCAllowed:              config.ServerVNCAllowed != nil && *config.ServerVNCAllowed,
+		DisableVNCApproval:            config.DisableVNCApproval,
 		EnableSSHRoot:                 config.EnableSSHRoot,
 		EnableSSHSFTP:                 config.EnableSSHSFTP,
 		EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding:  config.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding,
@@ -686,6 +688,7 @@ func loginToManagement(ctx context.Context, client mgm.Client, pubSSHKey []byte,
 		config.RosenpassEnabled,
 		config.RosenpassPermissive,
 		config.ServerSSHAllowed,
+		config.ServerVNCAllowed,
 		config.DisableClientRoutes,
 		config.DisableServerRoutes,
 		config.DisableDNS,

client/internal/debug/debug.go

@@ -669,6 +669,12 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addCommonConfigFields(configContent *strings.Builder)
 	if g.internalConfig.SSHJWTCacheTTL != nil {
 		configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("SSHJWTCacheTTL: %d\n", *g.internalConfig.SSHJWTCacheTTL))
 	}
+	if g.internalConfig.ServerVNCAllowed != nil {
+		configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("ServerVNCAllowed: %v\n", *g.internalConfig.ServerVNCAllowed))
+	}
+	if g.internalConfig.DisableVNCApproval != nil {
+		configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("DisableVNCApproval: %v\n", *g.internalConfig.DisableVNCApproval))
+	}
 
 	configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("DisableClientRoutes: %v\n", g.internalConfig.DisableClientRoutes))
 	configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("DisableServerRoutes: %v\n", g.internalConfig.DisableServerRoutes))

client/internal/debug/debug_test.go

@@ -864,6 +864,8 @@ func TestAddConfig_AllFieldsCovered(t *testing.T) {
 		RosenpassEnabled:              true,
 		RosenpassPermissive:           true,
 		ServerSSHAllowed:              &bTrue,
+		ServerVNCAllowed:              &bTrue,
+		DisableVNCApproval:            &bTrue,
 		EnableSSHRoot:                 &bTrue,
 		EnableSSHSFTP:                 &bTrue,
 		EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding:  &bTrue,

client/internal/engine.go

@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/udpmux"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/acl"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/approval"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/debug"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns"
 	dnsconfig "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns/config"
@@ -48,7 +49,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/guard"
 	icemaker "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/ice"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/signaling"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peerstore"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/portforward"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
@@ -133,6 +133,8 @@ type EngineConfig struct {
 	RosenpassPermissive bool
 
 	ServerSSHAllowed              bool
+	ServerVNCAllowed              bool
+	DisableVNCApproval            *bool
 	EnableSSHRoot                 *bool
 	EnableSSHSFTP                 *bool
 	EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding  *bool
@@ -183,7 +185,7 @@ type EngineServices struct {
 type Engine struct {
 	// signal is a Signal Service client
 	signal   signal.Client
-	signaler *signaling.Signaler
+	signaler *peer.Signaler
 	// mgmClient is a Management Service client
 	mgmClient mgm.Client
 	// peerConns is a map that holds all the peers that are known to this peer
@@ -223,7 +225,9 @@ type Engine struct {
 
 	networkMonitor *networkmonitor.NetworkMonitor
 
-	sshServer sshServer
+	sshServer      sshServer
+	vncSrv         vncServer
+	approvalBroker *approval.Broker
 
 	statusRecorder *peer.Status
 
@@ -319,7 +323,7 @@ func NewEngine(
 		ctx:                ctx,
 		cancel:             cancel,
 		signal:             services.SignalClient,
-		signaler:           signaling.NewSignaler(services.SignalClient, config.WgPrivateKey),
+		signaler:           peer.NewSignaler(services.SignalClient, config.WgPrivateKey),
 		mgmClient:          services.MgmClient,
 		relayManager:       services.RelayManager,
 		peerStore:          peerstore.NewConnStore(),
@@ -330,6 +334,7 @@ func NewEngine(
 		TURNs:              []*stun.URI{},
 		networkSerial:      0,
 		statusRecorder:     services.StatusRecorder,
+		approvalBroker:     approval.New(services.StatusRecorder),
 		stateManager:       services.StateManager,
 		portForwardManager: portforward.NewManager(),
 		checks:             services.Checks,
@@ -404,6 +409,10 @@ func (e *Engine) stopLocked() {
 		log.Warnf("failed to stop SSH server: %v", err)
 	}
 
+	if err := e.stopVNCServer(); err != nil {
+		log.Warnf("failed to stop VNC server: %v", err)
+	}
+
 	e.cleanupSSHConfig()
 
 	if e.ingressGatewayMgr != nil {
@@ -1158,6 +1167,7 @@ func (e *Engine) applyInfoFlags(info *system.Info) {
 		e.config.RosenpassEnabled,
 		e.config.RosenpassPermissive,
 		&e.config.ServerSSHAllowed,
+		&e.config.ServerVNCAllowed,
 		e.config.DisableClientRoutes,
 		e.config.DisableServerRoutes,
 		e.config.DisableDNS,
@@ -1212,6 +1222,10 @@ func (e *Engine) updateConfig(conf *mgmProto.PeerConfig) error {
 		}
 	}
 
+	if err := e.updateVNC(); err != nil {
+		log.Warnf("failed handling VNC server setup: %v", err)
+	}
+
 	state := e.statusRecorder.GetLocalPeerState()
 	state.IP = e.wgInterface.Address().String()
 	state.IPv6 = e.wgInterface.Address().IPv6String()
@@ -1512,6 +1526,11 @@ func (e *Engine) reconcilePeers(networkMap *mgmProto.NetworkMap) ([]*mgmProto.Re
 		}
 	}
 
+	// VNC auth: always sync, including nil so cleared auth on the management
+	// side is applied locally, and so it isn't skipped on the RemotePeersIsEmpty
+	// cleanup path.
+	e.updateVNCServerAuth(networkMap.GetVncAuth())
+
 	// cleanup request, most likely our peer has been deleted
 	if networkMap.GetRemotePeersIsEmpty() {
 		err := e.removeAllPeers()
@@ -2026,6 +2045,7 @@ func (e *Engine) readInitialSettings() ([]*route.Route, *nbdns.Config, bool, err
 		e.config.RosenpassEnabled,
 		e.config.RosenpassPermissive,
 		&e.config.ServerSSHAllowed,
+		&e.config.ServerVNCAllowed,
 		e.config.DisableClientRoutes,
 		e.config.DisableServerRoutes,
 		e.config.DisableDNS,
@@ -2748,7 +2768,7 @@ func createFile(path string) error {
 	return file.Close()
 }
 
-func convertToOfferAnswer(msg *sProto.Message) (*signaling.OfferAnswer, error) {
+func convertToOfferAnswer(msg *sProto.Message) (*peer.OfferAnswer, error) {
 	remoteCred, err := signal.UnMarshalCredential(msg)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
@@ -2764,9 +2784,9 @@ func convertToOfferAnswer(msg *sProto.Message) (*signaling.OfferAnswer, error) {
 	}
 
 	// Handle optional SessionID
-	var sessionID *icemaker.SessionID
+	var sessionID *peer.ICESessionID
 	if sessionBytes := msg.GetBody().GetSessionId(); sessionBytes != nil {
-		if id, err := icemaker.SessionIDFromBytes(sessionBytes); err != nil {
+		if id, err := peer.ICESessionIDFromBytes(sessionBytes); err != nil {
 			log.Warnf("Invalid session ID in message: %v", err)
 			sessionID = nil // Set to nil if conversion fails
 		} else {
@@ -2776,8 +2796,8 @@ func convertToOfferAnswer(msg *sProto.Message) (*signaling.OfferAnswer, error) {
 
 	relayIP := decodeRelayIP(msg.GetBody().GetRelayServerIP())
 
-	offerAnswer := signaling.OfferAnswer{
-		IceCredentials: signaling.IceCredentials{
+	offerAnswer := peer.OfferAnswer{
+		IceCredentials: peer.IceCredentials{
 			UFrag: remoteCred.UFrag,
 			Pwd:   remoteCred.Pwd,
 		},
@@ -2806,3 +2826,16 @@ func decodeRelayIP(b []byte) netip.Addr {
 	}
 	return ip.Unmap()
 }
+
+// RespondApproval relays the user's decision for a pending approval to
+// the broker. viewOnly is honoured only when accept is true. Returns
+// true when the request_id matched a live prompt.
+func (e *Engine) RespondApproval(requestID string, accept, viewOnly bool) bool {
+	if e == nil || e.approvalBroker == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	return e.approvalBroker.Respond(requestID, approval.Decision{
+		Accept:   accept,
+		ViewOnly: accept && viewOnly,
+	})
+}

client/internal/engine_ssh.go

@@ -12,10 +12,10 @@ import (
 	firewallManager "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/netstack"
 	nftypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/netflow/types"
-	sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/auth"
 	sshconfig "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/config"
 	sshserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/server"
 	mgmProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
+	sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sessionauth"
 	sshuserhash "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sshauth"
 )
 
@@ -237,22 +237,18 @@ func (e *Engine) startSSHServer(jwtConfig *sshserver.JWTConfig) error {
 		return errors.New("wg interface not initialized")
 	}
 
+	wgAddr := e.wgInterface.Address()
 	serverConfig := &sshserver.Config{
-		HostKeyPEM: e.config.SSHKey,
-		JWT:        jwtConfig,
+		HostKeyPEM:        e.config.SSHKey,
+		JWT:               jwtConfig,
+		NetstackNet:       e.wgInterface.GetNet(),
+		NetworkValidation: wgAddr,
 	}
 	server := sshserver.New(serverConfig)
 
-	wgAddr := e.wgInterface.Address()
-	server.SetNetworkValidation(wgAddr)
-
 	netbirdIP := wgAddr.IP
 	listenAddr := netip.AddrPortFrom(netbirdIP, sshserver.InternalSSHPort)
 
-	if netstackNet := e.wgInterface.GetNet(); netstackNet != nil {
-		server.SetNetstackNet(netstackNet)
-	}
-
 	e.configureSSHServer(server)
 
 	if err := server.Start(e.ctx, listenAddr); err != nil {

client/internal/engine_vnc.go

@@ -0,0 +1,325 @@
+//go:build !js && !ios && !android
+
+package internal
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/netip"
+
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+
+	firewallManager "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/approval"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/metrics"
+	nftypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/netflow/types"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc"
+	vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
+	mgmProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
+	sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sessionauth"
+	sshuserhash "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sshauth"
+)
+
+type vncServer interface {
+	Start(ctx context.Context, addr netip.AddrPort, network netip.Prefix) error
+	AddListener(ctx context.Context, addr netip.AddrPort, network netip.Prefix) error
+	Stop() error
+	ActiveSessions() []vncserver.ActiveSessionInfo
+}
+
+func (e *Engine) setupVNCPortRedirection() error {
+	if e.firewall == nil || e.wgInterface == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	localAddr := e.wgInterface.Address().IP
+	if !localAddr.IsValid() {
+		return errors.New("invalid local NetBird address")
+	}
+
+	if err := e.firewall.AddInboundDNAT(localAddr, firewallManager.ProtocolTCP, vnc.ExternalPort, vnc.InternalPort); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("add VNC port redirection: %w", err)
+	}
+	log.Infof("VNC port redirection: %s:%d -> %s:%d", localAddr, vnc.ExternalPort, localAddr, vnc.InternalPort)
+
+	if wgAddr := e.wgInterface.Address(); wgAddr.HasIPv6() {
+		v6 := wgAddr.IPv6
+		if err := e.firewall.AddInboundDNAT(v6, firewallManager.ProtocolTCP, vnc.ExternalPort, vnc.InternalPort); err != nil {
+			log.Warnf("failed to add IPv6 VNC port redirection: %v", err)
+		} else {
+			log.Infof("VNC port redirection: [%s]:%d -> [%s]:%d", v6, vnc.ExternalPort, v6, vnc.InternalPort)
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (e *Engine) cleanupVNCPortRedirection() error {
+	if e.firewall == nil || e.wgInterface == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	localAddr := e.wgInterface.Address().IP
+	if !localAddr.IsValid() {
+		return errors.New("invalid local NetBird address")
+	}
+
+	if err := e.firewall.RemoveInboundDNAT(localAddr, firewallManager.ProtocolTCP, vnc.ExternalPort, vnc.InternalPort); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("remove VNC port redirection: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	if wgAddr := e.wgInterface.Address(); wgAddr.HasIPv6() {
+		if err := e.firewall.RemoveInboundDNAT(wgAddr.IPv6, firewallManager.ProtocolTCP, vnc.ExternalPort, vnc.InternalPort); err != nil {
+			log.Debugf("failed to remove IPv6 VNC port redirection: %v", err)
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// updateVNC handles starting/stopping the VNC server based on the config flag.
+func (e *Engine) updateVNC() error {
+	if !e.config.ServerVNCAllowed {
+		if e.vncSrv != nil {
+			log.Info("VNC server disabled, stopping")
+		}
+		return e.stopVNCServer()
+	}
+
+	if e.config.BlockInbound {
+		log.Info("VNC server disabled because inbound connections are blocked")
+		return e.stopVNCServer()
+	}
+
+	if e.vncSrv != nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	return e.startVNCServer()
+}
+
+func (e *Engine) startVNCServer() error {
+	if e.wgInterface == nil {
+		return errors.New("wg interface not initialized")
+	}
+
+	capturer, injector, ok := newPlatformVNC()
+	if !ok {
+		log.Debug("VNC server not supported on this platform")
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	netbirdIP := e.wgInterface.Address().IP
+
+	var sessionRecorder func(vncserver.SessionTick)
+	if e.clientMetrics != nil {
+		sessionRecorder = func(t vncserver.SessionTick) {
+			e.clientMetrics.RecordVNCSessionTick(e.ctx, metrics.VNCSessionTick{
+				Period:        t.Period,
+				BytesOut:      t.BytesOut,
+				Writes:        t.Writes,
+				FBUs:          t.FBUs,
+				MaxFBUBytes:   t.MaxFBUBytes,
+				MaxFBURects:   t.MaxFBURects,
+				MaxWriteBytes: t.MaxWriteBytes,
+				WriteNanos:    t.WriteNanos,
+			})
+		}
+	}
+	serviceMode := vncNeedsServiceMode()
+	if serviceMode {
+		log.Info("VNC: running as system service, enabling service mode (per-session agent proxy)")
+	}
+	requireApproval := e.config.DisableVNCApproval == nil || !*e.config.DisableVNCApproval
+	srv := vncserver.New(vncserver.Config{
+		Capturer:        capturer,
+		Injector:        injector,
+		IdentityKey:     e.config.WgPrivateKey[:],
+		ServiceMode:     serviceMode,
+		SessionRecorder: sessionRecorder,
+		NetstackNet:     e.wgInterface.GetNet(),
+		RequireApproval: requireApproval,
+		Approver:        &vncApprover{broker: e.approvalBroker, statusRecorder: e.statusRecorder},
+	})
+
+	listenAddr := netip.AddrPortFrom(netbirdIP, vnc.InternalPort)
+	network := e.wgInterface.Address().Network
+	if err := srv.Start(e.ctx, listenAddr, network); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("start VNC server: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	if wgAddr := e.wgInterface.Address(); wgAddr.HasIPv6() {
+		v6Addr := netip.AddrPortFrom(wgAddr.IPv6, vnc.InternalPort)
+		if err := srv.AddListener(e.ctx, v6Addr, wgAddr.IPv6Net); err != nil {
+			log.Warnf("failed to add IPv6 VNC listener: %v", err)
+		}
+	}
+
+	e.vncSrv = srv
+
+	if netstackNet := e.wgInterface.GetNet(); netstackNet != nil {
+		if registrar, ok := e.firewall.(interface {
+			RegisterNetstackService(protocol nftypes.Protocol, port uint16)
+		}); ok {
+			registrar.RegisterNetstackService(nftypes.TCP, vnc.InternalPort)
+			log.Debugf("registered VNC service with netstack for TCP:%d", vnc.InternalPort)
+		}
+	}
+
+	if err := e.setupVNCPortRedirection(); err != nil {
+		log.Warnf("setup VNC port redirection: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	log.Info("VNC server enabled")
+	return nil
+}
+
+// updateVNCServerAuth updates VNC fine-grained access control from management.
+// A nil vncAuth clears all authorized users and session pubkeys so management
+// can revoke access by omitting the field on the next sync.
+func (e *Engine) updateVNCServerAuth(vncAuth *mgmProto.VNCAuth) {
+	if e.vncSrv == nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	vncSrv, ok := e.vncSrv.(*vncserver.Server)
+	if !ok {
+		return
+	}
+
+	if vncAuth == nil {
+		vncSrv.UpdateVNCAuth(&sshauth.Config{})
+		return
+	}
+
+	protoUsers := vncAuth.GetAuthorizedUsers()
+	authorizedUsers := make([]sshuserhash.UserIDHash, len(protoUsers))
+	for i, hash := range protoUsers {
+		if len(hash) != 16 {
+			log.Warnf("invalid VNC auth hash length %d, expected 16", len(hash))
+			return
+		}
+		authorizedUsers[i] = sshuserhash.UserIDHash(hash)
+	}
+
+	machineUsers := make(map[string][]uint32)
+	for osUser, indexes := range vncAuth.GetMachineUsers() {
+		machineUsers[osUser] = indexes.GetIndexes()
+	}
+
+	sessionPubKeys := make([]sshauth.SessionPubKey, 0, len(vncAuth.GetSessionPubKeys()))
+	for _, pk := range vncAuth.GetSessionPubKeys() {
+		pub := pk.GetPubKey()
+		if len(pub) != 32 {
+			log.Warnf("VNC session pubkey wrong length %d", len(pub))
+			continue
+		}
+		hash := pk.GetUserIdHash()
+		if len(hash) != 16 {
+			log.Warnf("VNC session user id hash wrong length %d", len(hash))
+			continue
+		}
+		sessionPubKeys = append(sessionPubKeys, sshauth.SessionPubKey{
+			PubKey:      pub,
+			UserIDHash:  sshuserhash.UserIDHash(hash),
+			DisplayName: pk.GetDisplayName(),
+		})
+	}
+
+	vncSrv.UpdateVNCAuth(&sshauth.Config{
+		AuthorizedUsers: authorizedUsers,
+		MachineUsers:    machineUsers,
+		SessionPubKeys:  sessionPubKeys,
+	})
+}
+
+// GetVNCServerStatus returns whether the VNC server is running and the list
+// of active VNC sessions. The pointer is captured under syncMsgMux so a
+// concurrent updateVNC/stopVNCServer cannot swap it out between the nil
+// check and the ActiveSessions call.
+func (e *Engine) GetVNCServerStatus() (enabled bool, sessions []vncserver.ActiveSessionInfo) {
+	e.syncMsgMux.Lock()
+	vncSrv := e.vncSrv
+	e.syncMsgMux.Unlock()
+	if vncSrv == nil {
+		return false, nil
+	}
+	return true, vncSrv.ActiveSessions()
+}
+
+func (e *Engine) stopVNCServer() error {
+	if e.vncSrv == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	if err := e.cleanupVNCPortRedirection(); err != nil {
+		log.Warnf("cleanup VNC port redirection: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if e.wgInterface != nil && e.wgInterface.GetNet() != nil {
+		if registrar, ok := e.firewall.(interface {
+			UnregisterNetstackService(protocol nftypes.Protocol, port uint16)
+		}); ok {
+			registrar.UnregisterNetstackService(nftypes.TCP, vnc.InternalPort)
+		}
+	}
+
+	log.Info("stopping VNC server")
+	err := e.vncSrv.Stop()
+	e.vncSrv = nil
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("stop VNC server: %w", err)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// vncApprover adapts the generic approval.Broker for the VNC server.
+type vncApprover struct {
+	broker         *approval.Broker
+	statusRecorder *peer.Status
+}
+
+func (a *vncApprover) Request(ctx context.Context, info vncserver.ApprovalInfo) (vncserver.ApprovalDecision, error) {
+	// Resolve the source overlay IP to a peer FQDN for the prompt label.
+	if info.PeerName == "" && info.SourceIP != "" && a.statusRecorder != nil {
+		if fqdn, ok := a.statusRecorder.PeerByIP(info.SourceIP); ok {
+			info.PeerName = fqdn
+		}
+	}
+	subject := fmt.Sprintf("VNC connection from %s", displayPeer(info))
+	meta := map[string]string{
+		"peer_name":   info.PeerName,
+		"peer_pubkey": info.PeerPubKey,
+		"source_ip":   info.SourceIP,
+		"mode":        info.Mode,
+		"username":    info.Username,
+		"initiator":   info.Initiator,
+	}
+	d, err := a.broker.Request(ctx, approval.Prompt{
+		Kind:     approval.KindVNC,
+		Subject:  subject,
+		Metadata: meta,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		return vncserver.ApprovalDecision{}, err
+	}
+	return vncserver.ApprovalDecision{ViewOnly: d.ViewOnly}, nil
+}
+
+func displayPeer(info vncserver.ApprovalInfo) string {
+	if info.Initiator != "" {
+		return info.Initiator
+	}
+	if info.PeerName != "" {
+		return info.PeerName
+	}
+	if info.SourceIP != "" {
+		return info.SourceIP
+	}
+	if info.PeerPubKey != "" {
+		return info.PeerPubKey
+	}
+	return "unknown peer"
+}

client/internal/engine_vnc_console_freebsd.go

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+//go:build freebsd
+
+package internal
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+
+	vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
+)
+
+// newConsoleVNC builds the FreeBSD console fallback: vt(4) framebuffer
+// for capture, /dev/uinput for input. The uinput device requires the
+// `uinput` kernel module (`kldload uinput`); without it, input init
+// fails and we drop to a stub injector so the user still gets a
+// view-only screen mirror.
+func newConsoleVNC() (vncserver.ScreenCapturer, vncserver.InputInjector, error) {
+	poller := vncserver.NewFBPoller("")
+	w, h := poller.Width(), poller.Height()
+	if w == 0 || h == 0 {
+		poller.Close()
+		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("vt framebuffer init failed (vt may not allow mmap on this driver)")
+	}
+	if inj, err := vncserver.NewUInputInjector(w, h); err == nil {
+		return poller, inj, nil
+	} else {
+		log.Infof("VNC console: uinput unavailable (%v); view-only mode. Run `kldload uinput` to enable input.", err)
+		return poller, &vncserver.StubInputInjector{}, nil
+	}
+}

client/internal/engine_vnc_console_linux.go

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+//go:build linux && !android
+
+package internal
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+
+	vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
+)
+
+// newConsoleVNC builds a framebuffer + uinput VNC backend for boxes
+// without a running X server. Used as the auto-fallback when
+// newPlatformVNC can't reach X. Returns an error when /dev/fb0 or
+// /dev/uinput aren't usable so the caller can drop back to a stub.
+func newConsoleVNC() (vncserver.ScreenCapturer, vncserver.InputInjector, error) {
+	poller := vncserver.NewFBPoller("")
+	w, h := poller.Width(), poller.Height()
+	if w == 0 || h == 0 {
+		poller.Close()
+		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("framebuffer capturer init failed (is /dev/fb0 readable?)")
+	}
+	inj, err := vncserver.NewUInputInjector(w, h)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Debugf("uinput unavailable, falling back to view-only VNC: %v", err)
+		return poller, &vncserver.StubInputInjector{}, nil
+	}
+	return poller, inj, nil
+}

client/internal/engine_vnc_darwin.go

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+//go:build darwin && !ios
+
+package internal
+
+import (
+	"os"
+
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+
+	vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
+)
+
+func newPlatformVNC() (vncserver.ScreenCapturer, vncserver.InputInjector, bool) {
+	capturer := vncserver.NewMacPoller()
+	// Prompt for Screen Recording at server-enable time rather than first
+	// client-connect. The native prompt is far easier for users to act on
+	// in the moment they toggled VNC on than later when "the screen looks
+	// like wallpaper" would otherwise be the only clue.
+	vncserver.PrimeScreenCapturePermission()
+	injector, err := vncserver.NewMacInputInjector()
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Debugf("VNC: macOS input injector: %v", err)
+		return capturer, &vncserver.StubInputInjector{}, true
+	}
+	return capturer, injector, true
+}
+
+// vncNeedsServiceMode reports whether the running process is a system
+// LaunchDaemon (root, parented by launchd). Daemons sit in the global
+// bootstrap namespace and cannot talk to WindowServer; we route capture
+// through a per-user agent in that case.
+func vncNeedsServiceMode() bool {
+	return os.Geteuid() == 0 && os.Getppid() == 1
+}

client/internal/engine_vnc_stub.go

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+//go:build js || ios || android
+
+package internal
+
+import (
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+
+	mgmProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
+)
+
+type vncServer interface{}
+
+func (e *Engine) updateVNC() error { return nil }
+
+func (e *Engine) updateVNCServerAuth(auth *mgmProto.VNCAuth) {
+	if auth == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	log.Debugf("ignoring VNC auth push on platform without a VNC server: %d session pubkeys, %d authorized users",
+		len(auth.GetSessionPubKeys()), len(auth.GetAuthorizedUsers()))
+}
+
+func (e *Engine) stopVNCServer() error { return nil }

client/internal/engine_vnc_windows.go

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+//go:build windows
+
+package internal
+
+import vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
+
+func newPlatformVNC() (vncserver.ScreenCapturer, vncserver.InputInjector, bool) {
+	return vncserver.NewDesktopCapturer(), vncserver.NewWindowsInputInjector(), true
+}
+
+func vncNeedsServiceMode() bool {
+	return vncserver.GetCurrentSessionID() == 0
+}

client/internal/engine_vnc_x11.go

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+//go:build (linux && !android) || freebsd
+
+package internal
+
+import (
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+
+	vncserver "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/vnc/server"
+)
+
+func newPlatformVNC() (vncserver.ScreenCapturer, vncserver.InputInjector, bool) {
+	// Prefer X11 when an X server is reachable. NewX11InputInjector probes
+	// DISPLAY (and /proc) eagerly, so a non-nil error here means no X.
+	injector, err := vncserver.NewX11InputInjector("", "", "")
+	if err == nil {
+		return vncserver.NewX11Poller("", ""), injector, true
+	}
+	log.Debugf("VNC: X11 not available: %v", err)
+
+	// Fallback for headless / pre-X states (kernel console, login manager
+	// without X, physical server in recovery): stream the framebuffer and
+	// inject input via /dev/uinput.
+	consoleCap, consoleInj, err := newConsoleVNC()
+	if err == nil {
+		log.Infof("VNC: using framebuffer console capture (%dx%d)", consoleCap.Width(), consoleCap.Height())
+		return consoleCap, consoleInj, true
+	}
+	log.Debugf("VNC: framebuffer console fallback unavailable: %v", err)
+
+	return &vncserver.StubCapturer{}, &vncserver.StubInputInjector{}, false
+}
+
+func vncNeedsServiceMode() bool {
+	return false
+}

client/internal/metrics/influxdb.go

@@ -120,6 +120,36 @@ func (m *influxDBMetrics) RecordSyncDuration(_ context.Context, agentInfo AgentI
 	m.trimLocked()
 }
 
+func (m *influxDBMetrics) RecordVNCSessionTick(_ context.Context, agentInfo AgentInfo, tick VNCSessionTick) {
+	tags := fmt.Sprintf("deployment_type=%s,version=%s,os=%s,arch=%s,peer_id=%s",
+		agentInfo.DeploymentType.String(),
+		agentInfo.Version,
+		agentInfo.OS,
+		agentInfo.Arch,
+		agentInfo.peerID,
+	)
+
+	m.mu.Lock()
+	defer m.mu.Unlock()
+
+	m.samples = append(m.samples, influxSample{
+		measurement: "netbird_vnc_traffic",
+		tags:        tags,
+		fields: map[string]float64{
+			"period_seconds":     tick.Period.Seconds(),
+			"bytes_out":          float64(tick.BytesOut),
+			"writes":             float64(tick.Writes),
+			"fbus":               float64(tick.FBUs),
+			"max_fbu_bytes":      float64(tick.MaxFBUBytes),
+			"max_fbu_rects":      float64(tick.MaxFBURects),
+			"max_write_bytes":    float64(tick.MaxWriteBytes),
+			"write_time_seconds": float64(tick.WriteNanos) / 1e9,
+		},
+		timestamp: time.Now(),
+	})
+	m.trimLocked()
+}
+
 func (m *influxDBMetrics) RecordSyncPhase(_ context.Context, agentInfo AgentInfo, phase string, duration time.Duration) {
 	tags := fmt.Sprintf("deployment_type=%s,version=%s,os=%s,arch=%s,peer_id=%s,phase=%s",
 		agentInfo.DeploymentType.String(),

client/internal/metrics/metrics.go

@@ -63,6 +63,11 @@ type metricsImplementation interface {
 	// RecordLoginDuration records how long the login to management took
 	RecordLoginDuration(ctx context.Context, agentInfo AgentInfo, duration time.Duration, success bool)
 
+	// RecordVNCSessionTick records a periodic snapshot of one VNC
+	// session's wire activity. Called once per metricsConn tick interval
+	// (and once at session close), only when the tick saw activity.
+	RecordVNCSessionTick(ctx context.Context, agentInfo AgentInfo, tick VNCSessionTick)
+
 	// Export exports metrics in InfluxDB line protocol format
 	Export(w io.Writer) error
 
@@ -82,6 +87,21 @@ type ClientMetrics struct {
 	pushCancel context.CancelFunc
 }
 
+// VNCSessionTick is one sampling slice of a VNC session's wire activity.
+// BytesOut / Writes / FBUs / WriteNanos are deltas observed during this
+// tick; Max* fields are the high-water marks observed during the tick.
+// Period is the wall-clock duration the deltas cover.
+type VNCSessionTick struct {
+	Period        time.Duration
+	BytesOut      uint64
+	Writes        uint64
+	FBUs          uint64
+	MaxFBUBytes   uint64
+	MaxFBURects   uint64
+	MaxWriteBytes uint64
+	WriteNanos    uint64
+}
+
 // ConnectionStageTimestamps holds timestamps for each connection stage
 type ConnectionStageTimestamps struct {
 	SignalingReceived  time.Time // First signal received from remote peer (both initial and reconnection)
@@ -131,6 +151,18 @@ func (c *ClientMetrics) RecordSyncDuration(ctx context.Context, duration time.Du
 	c.impl.RecordSyncDuration(ctx, agentInfo, duration)
 }
 
+// RecordVNCSessionTick records a periodic snapshot of one VNC session.
+func (c *ClientMetrics) RecordVNCSessionTick(ctx context.Context, tick VNCSessionTick) {
+	if c == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	c.mu.RLock()
+	agentInfo := c.agentInfo
+	c.mu.RUnlock()
+
+	c.impl.RecordVNCSessionTick(ctx, agentInfo, tick)
+}
+
 // RecordSyncPhase records the duration of a single sub-phase of sync processing
 func (c *ClientMetrics) RecordSyncPhase(ctx context.Context, phase string, duration time.Duration) {
 	if c == nil {

client/internal/metrics/push_test.go

@@ -76,6 +76,9 @@ func (m *mockMetrics) RecordSyncPhase(_ context.Context, _ AgentInfo, _ string,
 func (m *mockMetrics) RecordLoginDuration(_ context.Context, _ AgentInfo, _ time.Duration, _ bool) {
 }
 
+func (m *mockMetrics) RecordVNCSessionTick(_ context.Context, _ AgentInfo, _ VNCSessionTick) {
+}
+
 func (m *mockMetrics) Export(w io.Writer) error {
 	if m.exportData != "" {
 		_, err := w.Write([]byte(m.exportData))

client/internal/peer/conn_status.go

@@ -1,5 +1,18 @@
 package peer
 
+import (
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+)
+
+const (
+	// StatusIdle indicate the peer is in disconnected state
+	StatusIdle ConnStatus = iota
+	// StatusConnecting indicate the peer is in connecting state
+	StatusConnecting
+	// StatusConnected indicate the peer is in connected state
+	StatusConnected
+)
+
 // connStatusInputs is the primitive-valued snapshot of the state that drives the
 // tri-state connection classification. Extracted so the decision logic can be unit-tested
 // without constructing full Worker/Handshaker objects.
@@ -8,7 +21,24 @@ type connStatusInputs struct {
 	peerUsesRelay       bool // remote peer advertises relay support AND local has relay
 	relayConnected      bool // statusRelay reports Connected (independent of whether peer uses relay)
 	remoteSupportsICE   bool // remote peer sent ICE credentials
-	iceWorkerCreated    bool // local ICE worker exists (false in force-relay mode)
+	iceWorkerCreated    bool // local WorkerICE exists (false in force-relay mode)
 	iceStatusConnecting bool // statusICE is anything other than Disconnected
 	iceInProgress       bool // a negotiation is currently in flight
 }
+
+// ConnStatus describe the status of a peer's connection
+type ConnStatus int32
+
+func (s ConnStatus) String() string {
+	switch s {
+	case StatusConnecting:
+		return "Connecting"
+	case StatusConnected:
+		return "Connected"
+	case StatusIdle:
+		return "Idle"
+	default:
+		log.Errorf("unknown status: %d", s)
+		return "INVALID_PEER_CONNECTION_STATUS"
+	}
+}

client/internal/peer/conn_status_test.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package status
+package peer
 
 import (
 	"testing"

client/internal/peer/conn_test.go

@@ -3,33 +3,28 @@ package peer
 import (
 	"context"
 	"fmt"
-	"net/netip"
 	"os"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/dispatcher"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/guard"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/ice"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/metricsstages"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/signaling"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/status"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/stdnet"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
 )
 
+var testDispatcher = dispatcher.NewConnectionDispatcher()
+
 var connConf = ConnConfig{
 	Key:         "LLHf3Ma6z6mdLbriAJbqhX7+nM/B71lgw2+91q3LfhU=",
 	LocalKey:    "RRHf3Ma6z6mdLbriAJbqhX7+nM/B71lgw2+91q3LfhU=",
 	Timeout:     time.Second,
 	LocalWgPort: 51820,
-	WgConfig: WgConfig{
-		AllowedIps: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("100.64.0.1/32")},
-	},
 	ICEConfig: ice.Config{
 		InterfaceBlackList: nil,
 	},
@@ -57,37 +52,92 @@ func TestConn_GetKey(t *testing.T) {
 	swWatcher := guard.NewSRWatcher(nil, nil, nil, connConf.ICEConfig)
 
 	sd := ServiceDependencies{
-		SrWatcher: swWatcher,
+		SrWatcher:          swWatcher,
+		PeerConnDispatcher: testDispatcher,
 	}
 	conn, err := NewConn(connConf, sd)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
 
 	got := conn.GetKey()
 
 	assert.Equal(t, got, connConf.Key, "they should be equal")
 }
 
-// TestConn_DiscardMessagesWhenNotOpened: signal messages posted to a not yet
-// opened connection must be discarded without blocking or panicking.
-func TestConn_DiscardMessagesWhenNotOpened(t *testing.T) {
+func TestConn_OnRemoteOffer(t *testing.T) {
 	swWatcher := guard.NewSRWatcher(nil, nil, nil, connConf.ICEConfig)
 	sd := ServiceDependencies{
-		StatusRecorder: status.NewRecorder("https://mgm"),
-		SrWatcher:      swWatcher,
+		StatusRecorder:     NewRecorder("https://mgm"),
+		SrWatcher:          swWatcher,
+		PeerConnDispatcher: testDispatcher,
 	}
 	conn, err := NewConn(connConf, sd)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
 
-	offerAnswer := signaling.OfferAnswer{
-		IceCredentials: signaling.IceCredentials{
+	onNewOfferChan := make(chan struct{})
+
+	conn.handshaker.AddRelayListener(func(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) {
+		onNewOfferChan <- struct{}{}
+	})
+
+	conn.OnRemoteOffer(OfferAnswer{
+		IceCredentials: IceCredentials{
 			UFrag: "test",
 			Pwd:   "test",
 		},
+		WgListenPort: 0,
+		Version:      "",
+	})
+
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+
+	select {
+	case <-onNewOfferChan:
+		// success
+	case <-ctx.Done():
+		t.Error("expected to receive a new offer notification, but timed out")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestConn_OnRemoteAnswer(t *testing.T) {
+	swWatcher := guard.NewSRWatcher(nil, nil, nil, connConf.ICEConfig)
+	sd := ServiceDependencies{
+		StatusRecorder:     NewRecorder("https://mgm"),
+		SrWatcher:          swWatcher,
+		PeerConnDispatcher: testDispatcher,
+	}
+	conn, err := NewConn(connConf, sd)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	onNewOfferChan := make(chan struct{})
+
+	conn.handshaker.AddRelayListener(func(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) {
+		onNewOfferChan <- struct{}{}
+	})
+
+	conn.OnRemoteAnswer(OfferAnswer{
+		IceCredentials: IceCredentials{
+			UFrag: "test",
+			Pwd:   "test",
+		},
+		WgListenPort: 0,
+		Version:      "",
+	})
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+
+	select {
+	case <-onNewOfferChan:
+		// success
+	case <-ctx.Done():
+		t.Error("expected to receive a new offer notification, but timed out")
 	}
-	conn.OnRemoteOffer(offerAnswer)
-	conn.OnRemoteAnswer(offerAnswer)
-	conn.OnRemoteCandidate(nil, nil)
-	conn.Close(false)
 }
 
 func TestConn_presharedKey(t *testing.T) {
@@ -270,7 +320,7 @@ func newWGTimeoutTestConn(rosenpassEnabled bool, disconnected *[]string) *Conn {
 		ctx:           context.Background(),
 		config:        cfg,
 		Log:           log.WithField("peer", cfg.Key),
-		metricsStages: &metricsstages.MetricsStages{},
+		metricsStages: &MetricsStages{},
 	}
 	conn.SetOnDisconnected(func(remotePeer string) {
 		*disconnected = append(*disconnected, remotePeer)
@@ -289,20 +339,20 @@ func TestConn_onWGDisconnected_EscalatesToRosenpassReset(t *testing.T) {
 	conn := newWGTimeoutTestConn(true, &disconnected)
 
 	for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
-		conn.handleWGTimeout()
+		conn.onWGDisconnected()
 	}
 	assert.Empty(t, disconnected, "escalation must not fire below the threshold")
 
-	conn.handleWGTimeout()
+	conn.onWGDisconnected()
 	assert.Equal(t, []string{conn.config.WgConfig.RemoteKey}, disconnected,
 		"reaching the threshold must report the peer disconnected once")
 
 	for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
-		conn.handleWGTimeout()
+		conn.onWGDisconnected()
 	}
 	assert.Len(t, disconnected, 1, "escalation must restart counting after firing")
 
-	conn.handleWGTimeout()
+	conn.onWGDisconnected()
 	assert.Len(t, disconnected, 2, "continued timeouts must escalate again")
 }
 
@@ -314,12 +364,12 @@ func TestConn_onWGDisconnected_CheckSuccessResetsEscalation(t *testing.T) {
 	conn := newWGTimeoutTestConn(true, &disconnected)
 
 	for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
-		conn.handleWGTimeout()
+		conn.onWGDisconnected()
 	}
-	conn.handleWGCheckSuccess()
+	conn.onWGCheckSuccess()
 
 	for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
-		conn.handleWGTimeout()
+		conn.onWGDisconnected()
 	}
 	assert.Empty(t, disconnected, "handshake success must reset the timeout count")
 }
@@ -332,7 +382,7 @@ func TestConn_onWGDisconnected_NoEscalationWithoutRosenpass(t *testing.T) {
 	conn := newWGTimeoutTestConn(false, &disconnected)
 
 	for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold*3; i++ {
-		conn.handleWGTimeout()
+		conn.onWGDisconnected()
 	}
 	assert.Empty(t, disconnected, "escalation must be limited to rosenpass connections")
 }

client/internal/peer/conntype/priority.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package worker
+package conntype
 
 import (
 	"fmt"

client/internal/peer/dispatcher/dispatcher.go

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+package dispatcher
+
+import (
+	"sync"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/id"
+)
+
+type ConnectionListener struct {
+	OnConnected    func(peerID id.ConnID)
+	OnDisconnected func(peerID id.ConnID)
+}
+
+type ConnectionDispatcher struct {
+	listeners map[*ConnectionListener]struct{}
+	mu        sync.Mutex
+}
+
+func NewConnectionDispatcher() *ConnectionDispatcher {
+	return &ConnectionDispatcher{
+		listeners: make(map[*ConnectionListener]struct{}),
+	}
+}
+
+func (e *ConnectionDispatcher) AddListener(listener *ConnectionListener) {
+	e.mu.Lock()
+	defer e.mu.Unlock()
+	e.listeners[listener] = struct{}{}
+}
+
+func (e *ConnectionDispatcher) RemoveListener(listener *ConnectionListener) {
+	e.mu.Lock()
+	defer e.mu.Unlock()
+
+	delete(e.listeners, listener)
+}
+
+func (e *ConnectionDispatcher) NotifyConnected(peerConnID id.ConnID) {
+	e.mu.Lock()
+	defer e.mu.Unlock()
+	for listener := range e.listeners {
+		listener.OnConnected(peerConnID)
+	}
+}
+
+func (e *ConnectionDispatcher) NotifyDisconnected(peerConnID id.ConnID) {
+	e.mu.Lock()
+	defer e.mu.Unlock()
+	for listener := range e.listeners {
+		listener.OnDisconnected(peerConnID)
+	}
+}

client/internal/peer/event.go

@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
-package peer
-
-import (
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/pion/ice/v4"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/signaling"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/worker"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
-)
-
-// event is a message processed by the Conn event loop. All mutable Conn state
-// is owned by that loop; producers deliver events through the mailbox and
-// never mutate Conn state directly.
-type event any
-
-// evClose asks the event loop to tear down the connection. done is closed
-// once the teardown finished.
-type evClose struct {
-	signalToRemote bool
-	done           chan struct{}
-}
-
-type evRemoteOffer struct {
-	offer signaling.OfferAnswer
-}
-
-type evRemoteAnswer struct {
-	answer signaling.OfferAnswer
-}
-
-type evRemoteCandidate struct {
-	candidate ice.Candidate
-	haRoutes  route.HAMap
-}
-
-type evICEReady struct {
-	priority worker.ConnPriority
-	info     worker.ICEConnInfo
-}
-
-type evICEDown struct {
-	sessionChanged bool
-}
-
-type evRelayReady struct {
-	info worker.RelayConnInfo
-}
-
-type evRelayDown struct{}
-
-// evRelayDialDone reports that the relay dial helper goroutine finished,
-// successfully or not, so the loop may dispatch a pending offer.
-type evRelayDialDone struct{}
-
-type evWGTimeout struct{}
-
-// evWGHandshake reports the first WireGuard handshake of the current watcher run.
-type evWGHandshake struct {
-	when time.Time
-}
-
-// evWGCheckOK reports a watcher check that observed a fresh handshake,
-// including handshakes of connections that were already up.
-type evWGCheckOK struct{}
-
-// evGuardTick asks the loop to send a new offer to restore connectivity.
-type evGuardTick struct{}

client/internal/peer/guard/ice_monitor.go

@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ const (
 )
 
 type ICEMonitor struct {
+	ReconnectCh chan struct{}
+
 	iFaceDiscover stdnet.ExternalIFaceDiscover
 	iceConfig     icemaker.Config
 	tickerPeriod  time.Duration
@@ -32,6 +34,7 @@ type ICEMonitor struct {
 func NewICEMonitor(iFaceDiscover stdnet.ExternalIFaceDiscover, config icemaker.Config, period time.Duration) *ICEMonitor {
 	log.Debugf("prepare ICE monitor with period: %s", period)
 	cm := &ICEMonitor{
+		ReconnectCh:   make(chan struct{}, 1),
 		iFaceDiscover: iFaceDiscover,
 		iceConfig:     config,
 		tickerPeriod:  period,

client/internal/peer/handshaker.go

@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
+package peer
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"net/netip"
+	"sync"
+	"sync/atomic"
+
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/version"
+)
+
+var (
+	ErrSignalIsNotReady = errors.New("signal is not ready")
+)
+
+// IceCredentials ICE protocol credentials struct
+type IceCredentials struct {
+	UFrag string
+	Pwd   string
+}
+
+// OfferAnswer represents a session establishment offer or answer
+type OfferAnswer struct {
+	IceCredentials IceCredentials
+	// WgListenPort is a remote WireGuard listen port.
+	// This field is used when establishing a direct WireGuard connection without any proxy.
+	// We can set the remote peer's endpoint with this port.
+	WgListenPort int
+
+	// Version of NetBird Agent
+	Version string
+	// RosenpassPubKey is the Rosenpass public key of the remote peer when receiving this message
+	// This value is the local Rosenpass server public key when sending the message
+	RosenpassPubKey []byte
+	// RosenpassAddr is the Rosenpass server address (IP:port) of the remote peer when receiving this message
+	// This value is the local Rosenpass server address when sending the message
+	RosenpassAddr string
+
+	// relay server address
+	RelaySrvAddress string
+	// RelaySrvIP is the IP the remote peer is connected to on its
+	// relay server. Used as a dial target if DNS for RelaySrvAddress
+	// fails. Zero value if the peer did not advertise an IP.
+	RelaySrvIP netip.Addr
+	// SessionID is the unique identifier of the session, used to discard old messages
+	SessionID *ICESessionID
+}
+
+func (o *OfferAnswer) hasICECredentials() bool {
+	return o.IceCredentials.UFrag != "" && o.IceCredentials.Pwd != ""
+}
+
+type Handshaker struct {
+	mu            sync.Mutex
+	log           *log.Entry
+	config        ConnConfig
+	signaler      *Signaler
+	ice           *WorkerICE
+	relay         *WorkerRelay
+	metricsStages *MetricsStages
+	// relayListener is not blocking because the listener is using a goroutine to process the messages
+	// and it will only keep the latest message if multiple offers are received in a short time
+	// this is to avoid blocking the handshaker if the listener is doing some heavy processing
+	// and also to avoid processing old offers if multiple offers are received in a short time
+	// the listener will always process the latest offer
+	relayListener *AsyncOfferListener
+	iceListener   func(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer)
+
+	// remoteICESupported tracks whether the remote peer includes ICE credentials in its offers/answers.
+	// When false, the local side skips ICE listener dispatch and suppresses ICE credentials in responses.
+	remoteICESupported atomic.Bool
+
+	// remoteOffersCh is a channel used to wait for remote credentials to proceed with the connection
+	remoteOffersCh chan OfferAnswer
+	// remoteAnswerCh is a channel used to wait for remote credentials answer (confirmation of our offer) to proceed with the connection
+	remoteAnswerCh chan OfferAnswer
+}
+
+func NewHandshaker(log *log.Entry, config ConnConfig, signaler *Signaler, ice *WorkerICE, relay *WorkerRelay, metricsStages *MetricsStages) *Handshaker {
+	h := &Handshaker{
+		log:            log,
+		config:         config,
+		signaler:       signaler,
+		ice:            ice,
+		relay:          relay,
+		metricsStages:  metricsStages,
+		remoteOffersCh: make(chan OfferAnswer),
+		remoteAnswerCh: make(chan OfferAnswer),
+	}
+	// assume remote supports ICE until we learn otherwise from received offers
+	h.remoteICESupported.Store(ice != nil)
+	return h
+}
+
+func (h *Handshaker) RemoteICESupported() bool {
+	return h.remoteICESupported.Load()
+}
+
+func (h *Handshaker) AddRelayListener(offer func(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer)) {
+	h.relayListener = NewAsyncOfferListener(offer)
+}
+
+func (h *Handshaker) AddICEListener(offer func(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer)) {
+	h.iceListener = offer
+}
+
+func (h *Handshaker) Listen(ctx context.Context) {
+	for {
+		select {
+		case remoteOfferAnswer := <-h.remoteOffersCh:
+			h.log.Infof("received offer, running version %s, remote WireGuard listen port %d, session id: %s, remote ICE supported: %t", remoteOfferAnswer.Version, remoteOfferAnswer.WgListenPort, remoteOfferAnswer.SessionIDString(), remoteOfferAnswer.hasICECredentials())
+
+			// Record signaling received for reconnection attempts
+			if h.metricsStages != nil {
+				h.metricsStages.RecordSignalingReceived()
+			}
+
+			h.updateRemoteICEState(&remoteOfferAnswer)
+
+			if h.relayListener != nil {
+				h.relayListener.Notify(&remoteOfferAnswer)
+			}
+
+			if h.iceListener != nil && h.RemoteICESupported() {
+				h.iceListener(&remoteOfferAnswer)
+			}
+
+			if err := h.sendAnswer(); err != nil {
+				h.log.Errorf("failed to send remote offer confirmation: %s", err)
+				continue
+			}
+		case remoteOfferAnswer := <-h.remoteAnswerCh:
+			h.log.Infof("received answer, running version %s, remote WireGuard listen port %d, session id: %s, remote ICE supported: %t", remoteOfferAnswer.Version, remoteOfferAnswer.WgListenPort, remoteOfferAnswer.SessionIDString(), remoteOfferAnswer.hasICECredentials())
+
+			// Record signaling received for reconnection attempts
+			if h.metricsStages != nil {
+				h.metricsStages.RecordSignalingReceived()
+			}
+
+			h.updateRemoteICEState(&remoteOfferAnswer)
+
+			if h.relayListener != nil {
+				h.relayListener.Notify(&remoteOfferAnswer)
+			}
+
+			if h.iceListener != nil && h.RemoteICESupported() {
+				h.iceListener(&remoteOfferAnswer)
+			}
+		case <-ctx.Done():
+			h.log.Infof("stop listening for remote offers and answers")
+			return
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func (h *Handshaker) SendOffer() error {
+	h.mu.Lock()
+	defer h.mu.Unlock()
+	return h.sendOffer()
+}
+
+// OnRemoteOffer handles an offer from the remote peer and returns true if the message was accepted, false otherwise
+// doesn't block, discards the message if connection wasn't ready
+func (h *Handshaker) OnRemoteOffer(offer OfferAnswer) {
+	select {
+	case h.remoteOffersCh <- offer:
+		return
+	default:
+		h.log.Warnf("skipping remote offer message because receiver not ready")
+		// connection might not be ready yet to receive so we ignore the message
+		return
+	}
+}
+
+// OnRemoteAnswer handles an offer from the remote peer and returns true if the message was accepted, false otherwise
+// doesn't block, discards the message if connection wasn't ready
+func (h *Handshaker) OnRemoteAnswer(answer OfferAnswer) {
+	select {
+	case h.remoteAnswerCh <- answer:
+		return
+	default:
+		// connection might not be ready yet to receive so we ignore the message
+		h.log.Warnf("skipping remote answer message because receiver not ready")
+		return
+	}
+}
+
+// sendOffer prepares local user credentials and signals them to the remote peer
+func (h *Handshaker) sendOffer() error {
+	if !h.signaler.Ready() {
+		return ErrSignalIsNotReady
+	}
+
+	offer := h.buildOfferAnswer()
+	h.log.Debugf("sending offer with serial: %s", offer.SessionIDString())
+
+	return h.signaler.SignalOffer(offer, h.config.Key)
+}
+
+func (h *Handshaker) sendAnswer() error {
+	answer := h.buildOfferAnswer()
+	h.log.Debugf("sending answer with serial: %s", answer.SessionIDString())
+
+	return h.signaler.SignalAnswer(answer, h.config.Key)
+}
+
+func (h *Handshaker) buildOfferAnswer() OfferAnswer {
+	answer := OfferAnswer{
+		WgListenPort:    h.config.LocalWgPort,
+		Version:         version.NetbirdVersion(),
+		RosenpassPubKey: h.config.RosenpassConfig.PubKey,
+		RosenpassAddr:   h.config.RosenpassConfig.Addr,
+	}
+
+	if h.ice != nil && h.RemoteICESupported() {
+		uFrag, pwd := h.ice.GetLocalUserCredentials()
+		sid := h.ice.SessionID()
+		answer.IceCredentials = IceCredentials{uFrag, pwd}
+		answer.SessionID = &sid
+	}
+
+	if addr, ip, err := h.relay.RelayInstanceAddress(); err == nil {
+		answer.RelaySrvAddress = addr
+		answer.RelaySrvIP = ip
+	}
+
+	return answer
+}
+
+func (h *Handshaker) updateRemoteICEState(offer *OfferAnswer) {
+	hasICE := offer.hasICECredentials()
+	prev := h.remoteICESupported.Swap(hasICE)
+	if prev != hasICE {
+		if hasICE {
+			h.log.Infof("remote peer started sending ICE credentials")
+		} else {
+			h.log.Infof("remote peer stopped sending ICE credentials")
+			if h.ice != nil {
+				h.ice.Close()
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}

client/internal/peer/handshaker_listener.go

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+package peer
+
+import (
+	"sync"
+)
+
+type callbackFunc func(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer)
+
+func (oa *OfferAnswer) SessionIDString() string {
+	if oa.SessionID == nil {
+		return "unknown"
+	}
+	return oa.SessionID.String()
+}
+
+type AsyncOfferListener struct {
+	fn      callbackFunc
+	running bool
+	latest  *OfferAnswer
+	mu      sync.Mutex
+}
+
+func NewAsyncOfferListener(fn callbackFunc) *AsyncOfferListener {
+	return &AsyncOfferListener{
+		fn: fn,
+	}
+}
+
+func (o *AsyncOfferListener) Notify(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) {
+	o.mu.Lock()
+	defer o.mu.Unlock()
+
+	// Store the latest offer
+	o.latest = remoteOfferAnswer
+
+	// If already running, the running goroutine will pick up this latest value
+	if o.running {
+		return
+	}
+
+	// Start processing
+	o.running = true
+
+	// Process in a goroutine to avoid blocking the caller
+	go func(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) {
+		for {
+			o.fn(remoteOfferAnswer)
+
+			o.mu.Lock()
+			if o.latest == nil {
+				// No more work to do
+				o.running = false
+				o.mu.Unlock()
+				return
+			}
+			remoteOfferAnswer = o.latest
+			// Clear the latest to mark it as being processed
+			o.latest = nil
+			o.mu.Unlock()
+		}
+	}(remoteOfferAnswer)
+}

client/internal/peer/handshaker_listener_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+package peer
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+func Test_newOfferListener(t *testing.T) {
+	dummyOfferAnswer := &OfferAnswer{}
+	runChan := make(chan struct{}, 10)
+
+	longRunningFn := func(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) {
+		time.Sleep(1 * time.Second)
+		runChan <- struct{}{}
+	}
+
+	hl := NewAsyncOfferListener(longRunningFn)
+
+	hl.Notify(dummyOfferAnswer)
+	hl.Notify(dummyOfferAnswer)
+	hl.Notify(dummyOfferAnswer)
+
+	// Wait for exactly 2 callbacks
+	for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
+		select {
+		case <-runChan:
+		case <-time.After(3 * time.Second):
+			t.Fatal("Timeout waiting for callback")
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Verify no additional callbacks happen
+	select {
+	case <-runChan:
+		t.Fatal("Unexpected additional callback")
+	case <-time.After(100 * time.Millisecond):
+		t.Log("Correctly received exactly 2 callbacks")
+	}
+}

client/internal/peer/iface.go

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+package peer
+
+import (
+	"net"
+	"net/netip"
+	"time"
+
+	"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/configurer"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgproxy"
+)
+
+type WGIface interface {
+	UpdatePeer(peerKey string, allowedIps []netip.Prefix, keepAlive time.Duration, endpoint *net.UDPAddr, preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key) error
+	RemovePeer(peerKey string) error
+	GetStats() (map[string]configurer.WGStats, error)
+	GetProxy() wgproxy.Proxy
+	Address() wgaddr.Address
+	RemoveEndpointAddress(key string) error
+}

client/internal/peer/listener.go

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+package peer
+
+// Listener is a callback type about the NetBird network connection state
+type Listener interface {
+	OnConnected()
+	OnDisconnected()
+	OnConnecting()
+	OnDisconnecting()
+	OnAddressChanged(string, string)
+	OnPeersListChanged(int)
+}

client/internal/peer/mailbox.go

@@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
-package peer
-
-import (
-	"sync"
-)
-
-// maxQueuedCandidates bounds the remote candidate queue; on overflow the
-// oldest candidate is dropped. Lost candidates are recovered by the next
-// offer exchange triggered by the guard.
-const maxQueuedCandidates = 128
-
-// mailbox is the coalescing inbox of the Conn event loop. Posting never
-// blocks. Per message kind either the latest value wins (offer, answer,
-// guard tick), the values queue in bounded FIFO order (candidates) or in
-// unbounded FIFO order (lifecycle and transport state changes, which are
-// low-volume and must not be lost). A new offer flushes the queued
-// candidates because they belong to the superseded session.
-type mailbox struct {
-	mu     sync.Mutex
-	closed bool
-
-	lifecycle  []event
-	transport  []event
-	offer      *evRemoteOffer
-	answer     *evRemoteAnswer
-	candidates []evRemoteCandidate
-	guardTick  bool
-
-	wake chan struct{}
-}
-
-func newMailbox() *mailbox {
-	return &mailbox{
-		wake: make(chan struct{}, 1),
-	}
-}
-
-// post stores the event and wakes the loop. It reports false if the mailbox
-// is already closed and the event was not accepted.
-func (m *mailbox) post(ev event) bool {
-	m.mu.Lock()
-	if m.closed {
-		m.mu.Unlock()
-		return false
-	}
-
-	switch e := ev.(type) {
-	case evClose:
-		m.lifecycle = append(m.lifecycle, e)
-	case evRemoteOffer:
-		m.offer = &e
-		m.candidates = nil
-	case evRemoteAnswer:
-		m.answer = &e
-	case evRemoteCandidate:
-		if len(m.candidates) >= maxQueuedCandidates {
-			m.candidates = m.candidates[1:]
-		}
-		m.candidates = append(m.candidates, e)
-	case evGuardTick:
-		m.guardTick = true
-	default:
-		m.transport = append(m.transport, ev)
-	}
-	m.mu.Unlock()
-
-	select {
-	case m.wake <- struct{}{}:
-	default:
-	}
-	return true
-}
-
-// drain returns the pending events in processing order: lifecycle first,
-// then transport state changes, the coalesced offer and answer, the queued
-// candidates and finally the guard tick.
-func (m *mailbox) drain() []event {
-	m.mu.Lock()
-	defer m.mu.Unlock()
-	return m.drainLocked()
-}
-
-// closeAndDrain marks the mailbox closed so further posts are rejected and
-// returns the events that were still pending.
-func (m *mailbox) closeAndDrain() []event {
-	m.mu.Lock()
-	defer m.mu.Unlock()
-	m.closed = true
-	return m.drainLocked()
-}
-
-func (m *mailbox) drainLocked() []event {
-	evs := make([]event, 0, len(m.lifecycle)+len(m.transport)+len(m.candidates)+3)
-	evs = append(evs, m.lifecycle...)
-	evs = append(evs, m.transport...)
-	if m.offer != nil {
-		evs = append(evs, *m.offer)
-	}
-	if m.answer != nil {
-		evs = append(evs, *m.answer)
-	}
-	for _, c := range m.candidates {
-		evs = append(evs, c)
-	}
-	if m.guardTick {
-		evs = append(evs, evGuardTick{})
-	}
-
-	m.lifecycle = nil
-	m.transport = nil
-	m.offer = nil
-	m.answer = nil
-	m.candidates = nil
-	m.guardTick = false
-	return evs
-}

client/internal/peer/mailbox_test.go

@@ -1,128 +0,0 @@
-package peer
-
-import (
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/signaling"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-)
-
-func TestMailbox_OfferCoalescing(t *testing.T) {
-	mb := newMailbox()
-
-	require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteOffer{offer: signaling.OfferAnswer{WgListenPort: 1}}))
-	require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteOffer{offer: signaling.OfferAnswer{WgListenPort: 2}}))
-	require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteOffer{offer: signaling.OfferAnswer{WgListenPort: 3}}))
-
-	evs := mb.drain()
-	require.Len(t, evs, 1, "consecutive offers must coalesce to a single event")
-	offer, ok := evs[0].(evRemoteOffer)
-	require.True(t, ok, "coalesced event must be an offer")
-	assert.Equal(t, 3, offer.offer.WgListenPort, "the newest offer must win")
-}
-
-func TestMailbox_OfferFlushesCandidates(t *testing.T) {
-	mb := newMailbox()
-
-	require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteCandidate{}))
-	require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteCandidate{}))
-	require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteOffer{offer: signaling.OfferAnswer{}}))
-
-	evs := mb.drain()
-	require.Len(t, evs, 1, "candidates of the superseded session must be flushed")
-	_, ok := evs[0].(evRemoteOffer)
-	assert.True(t, ok, "only the offer must remain after the flush")
-}
-
-func TestMailbox_CandidatesKeepOrderAfterOffer(t *testing.T) {
-	mb := newMailbox()
-
-	require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteOffer{offer: signaling.OfferAnswer{}}))
-	require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteCandidate{haRoutes: nil}))
-	require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteCandidate{haRoutes: nil}))
-
-	evs := mb.drain()
-	require.Len(t, evs, 3)
-	_, ok := evs[0].(evRemoteOffer)
-	assert.True(t, ok, "offer must be processed before the candidates")
-	for _, ev := range evs[1:] {
-		_, ok := ev.(evRemoteCandidate)
-		assert.True(t, ok, "candidates posted after the offer must survive")
-	}
-}
-
-func TestMailbox_CandidateQueueBounded(t *testing.T) {
-	mb := newMailbox()
-
-	for i := 0; i < maxQueuedCandidates+10; i++ {
-		require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteCandidate{}))
-	}
-
-	evs := mb.drain()
-	assert.Len(t, evs, maxQueuedCandidates, "candidate queue must stay bounded")
-}
-
-func TestMailbox_DrainOrder(t *testing.T) {
-	mb := newMailbox()
-
-	require.True(t, mb.post(evGuardTick{}))
-	require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteAnswer{answer: signaling.OfferAnswer{}}))
-	require.True(t, mb.post(evRemoteOffer{offer: signaling.OfferAnswer{}}))
-	require.True(t, mb.post(evRelayDown{}))
-	require.True(t, mb.post(evICEDown{sessionChanged: true}))
-	require.True(t, mb.post(evClose{}))
-
-	evs := mb.drain()
-	require.Len(t, evs, 6)
-
-	_, ok := evs[0].(evClose)
-	assert.True(t, ok, "lifecycle events must come first")
-	_, ok = evs[1].(evRelayDown)
-	assert.True(t, ok, "transport events must keep FIFO order")
-	_, ok = evs[2].(evICEDown)
-	assert.True(t, ok, "transport events must keep FIFO order")
-	_, ok = evs[3].(evRemoteOffer)
-	assert.True(t, ok, "offer must come after transport events")
-	_, ok = evs[4].(evRemoteAnswer)
-	assert.True(t, ok, "answer must come after the offer")
-	_, ok = evs[5].(evGuardTick)
-	assert.True(t, ok, "guard tick must come last")
-}
-
-func TestMailbox_GuardTickCoalesced(t *testing.T) {
-	mb := newMailbox()
-
-	require.True(t, mb.post(evGuardTick{}))
-	require.True(t, mb.post(evGuardTick{}))
-	require.True(t, mb.post(evGuardTick{}))
-
-	evs := mb.drain()
-	assert.Len(t, evs, 1, "guard ticks must coalesce to a single event")
-}
-
-func TestMailbox_PostAfterCloseRejected(t *testing.T) {
-	mb := newMailbox()
-
-	require.True(t, mb.post(evRelayDown{}))
-	leftovers := mb.closeAndDrain()
-	assert.Len(t, leftovers, 1, "pending events must be returned on close")
-
-	assert.False(t, mb.post(evRelayDown{}), "posts must be rejected after close")
-	assert.Empty(t, mb.drain(), "no events must remain after close")
-}
-
-func TestMailbox_WakeSignal(t *testing.T) {
-	mb := newMailbox()
-
-	require.True(t, mb.post(evRelayDown{}))
-	require.True(t, mb.post(evGuardTick{}))
-
-	select {
-	case <-mb.wake:
-	default:
-		t.Fatal("wake signal must be pending after posts")
-	}
-
-	assert.Len(t, mb.drain(), 2, "a single wake must deliver all pending events")
-}

client/internal/peer/metrics_saver.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package metricsstages
+package peer
 
 import (
 	"sync"

client/internal/peer/metrics_saver_test.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package metricsstages
+package peer
 
 import (
 	"testing"

client/internal/peer/notifier.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package status
+package peer
 
 import (
 	"sync"
@@ -11,16 +11,6 @@ const (
 	stateDisconnecting
 )
 
-// Listener is a callback type about the NetBird network connection state
-type Listener interface {
-	OnConnected()
-	OnDisconnected()
-	OnConnecting()
-	OnDisconnecting()
-	OnAddressChanged(string, string)
-	OnPeersListChanged(int)
-}
-
 type notifier struct {
 	serverStateLock    sync.Mutex
 	listenersLock      sync.Mutex

client/internal/peer/notifier_test.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package status
+package peer
 
 import (
 	"sync"

client/internal/peer/route.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package status
+package peer
 
 import (
 	"net/netip"

client/internal/peer/session_id.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package ice
+package peer
 
 import (
 	"crypto/rand"
@@ -9,26 +9,26 @@ import (
 
 const sessionIDSize = 5
 
-type SessionID string
+type ICESessionID string
 
-// NewSessionID generates a new session ID for distinguishing sessions
-func NewSessionID() (SessionID, error) {
+// NewICESessionID generates a new session ID for distinguishing sessions
+func NewICESessionID() (ICESessionID, error) {
 	b := make([]byte, sessionIDSize)
 	if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, b); err != nil {
 		return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to generate session ID: %w", err)
 	}
-	return SessionID(hex.EncodeToString(b)), nil
+	return ICESessionID(hex.EncodeToString(b)), nil
 }
 
-func SessionIDFromBytes(b []byte) (SessionID, error) {
+func ICESessionIDFromBytes(b []byte) (ICESessionID, error) {
 	if len(b) != sessionIDSize {
 		return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid session ID length: %d", len(b))
 	}
-	return SessionID(hex.EncodeToString(b)), nil
+	return ICESessionID(hex.EncodeToString(b)), nil
 }
 
 // Bytes returns the raw bytes of the session ID for protobuf serialization
-func (id SessionID) Bytes() ([]byte, error) {
+func (id ICESessionID) Bytes() ([]byte, error) {
 	if len(id) == 0 {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("ICE session ID is empty")
 	}
@@ -42,6 +42,6 @@ func (id SessionID) Bytes() ([]byte, error) {
 	return b, nil
 }
 
-func (id SessionID) String() string {
+func (id ICESessionID) String() string {
 	return string(id)
 }

client/internal/peer/signaler.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package signaling
+package peer
 
 import (
 	"github.com/pion/ice/v4"

client/internal/peer/signaling/handshaker.go

@@ -1,189 +0,0 @@
-package signaling
-
-import (
-	"errors"
-	"net/netip"
-	"sync"
-	"sync/atomic"
-
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-
-	icemaker "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/ice"
-	relayClient "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/relay/client"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/version"
-)
-
-var (
-	ErrSignalIsNotReady = errors.New("signal is not ready")
-)
-
-// IceCredentials ICE protocol credentials struct
-type IceCredentials struct {
-	UFrag string
-	Pwd   string
-}
-
-// OfferAnswer represents a session establishment offer or answer
-type OfferAnswer struct {
-	IceCredentials IceCredentials
-	// WgListenPort is a remote WireGuard listen port.
-	// This field is used when establishing a direct WireGuard connection without any proxy.
-	// We can set the remote peer's endpoint with this port.
-	WgListenPort int
-
-	// Version of NetBird Agent
-	Version string
-	// RosenpassPubKey is the Rosenpass public key of the remote peer when receiving this message
-	// This value is the local Rosenpass server public key when sending the message
-	RosenpassPubKey []byte
-	// RosenpassAddr is the Rosenpass server address (IP:port) of the remote peer when receiving this message
-	// This value is the local Rosenpass server address when sending the message
-	RosenpassAddr string
-
-	// relay server address
-	RelaySrvAddress string
-	// RelaySrvIP is the IP the remote peer is connected to on its
-	// relay server. Used as a dial target if DNS for RelaySrvAddress
-	// fails. Zero value if the peer did not advertise an IP.
-	RelaySrvIP netip.Addr
-	// SessionID is the unique identifier of the session, used to discard old messages
-	SessionID *icemaker.SessionID
-}
-
-func (o *OfferAnswer) HasICECredentials() bool {
-	return o.IceCredentials.UFrag != "" && o.IceCredentials.Pwd != ""
-}
-
-func (o *OfferAnswer) SessionIDString() string {
-	if o.SessionID == nil {
-		return "unknown"
-	}
-	return o.SessionID.String()
-}
-
-// Config carries the peer-specific values the Handshaker embeds into offers
-// and answers.
-type Config struct {
-	Key             string
-	LocalWgPort     int
-	RosenpassPubKey []byte
-	RosenpassAddr   string
-}
-
-// Credentials are the local ICE credentials and session id the Handshaker embeds in offers.
-type Credentials struct {
-	UFrag     string
-	Pwd       string
-	SessionID icemaker.SessionID
-}
-
-// ICEWorker is the subset of the ICE worker the Handshaker needs to build offers.
-type ICEWorker interface {
-	Credentials() Credentials
-	Close()
-}
-
-// Handshaker keeps the signaling protocol logic: building and sending offers
-// and answers and tracking whether the remote peer supports ICE. Incoming
-// message processing is driven by the Conn event loop.
-type Handshaker struct {
-	mu           sync.Mutex
-	log          *log.Entry
-	config       Config
-	signaler     *Signaler
-	ice          ICEWorker
-	relayManager *relayClient.Manager
-
-	// remoteICESupported tracks whether the remote peer includes ICE credentials in its offers/answers.
-	// When false, the local side skips ICE dispatch and suppresses ICE credentials in responses.
-	remoteICESupported atomic.Bool
-}
-
-func NewHandshaker(log *log.Entry, config Config, signaler *Signaler, ice ICEWorker, relayManager *relayClient.Manager) *Handshaker {
-	h := &Handshaker{
-		log:          log,
-		config:       config,
-		signaler:     signaler,
-		ice:          ice,
-		relayManager: relayManager,
-	}
-	// assume remote supports ICE until we learn otherwise from received offers
-	h.remoteICESupported.Store(ice != nil)
-	return h
-}
-
-func (h *Handshaker) RemoteICESupported() bool {
-	return h.remoteICESupported.Load()
-}
-
-func (h *Handshaker) SendOffer() error {
-	h.mu.Lock()
-	defer h.mu.Unlock()
-	return h.sendOffer()
-}
-
-func (h *Handshaker) SendAnswer() error {
-	h.mu.Lock()
-	defer h.mu.Unlock()
-	return h.sendAnswer()
-}
-
-// sendOffer prepares local user credentials and signals them to the remote peer
-func (h *Handshaker) sendOffer() error {
-	if !h.signaler.Ready() {
-		return ErrSignalIsNotReady
-	}
-
-	offer := h.buildOfferAnswer()
-	h.log.Debugf("sending offer with serial: %s", offer.SessionIDString())
-
-	return h.signaler.SignalOffer(offer, h.config.Key)
-}
-
-func (h *Handshaker) sendAnswer() error {
-	answer := h.buildOfferAnswer()
-	h.log.Debugf("sending answer with serial: %s", answer.SessionIDString())
-
-	return h.signaler.SignalAnswer(answer, h.config.Key)
-}
-
-func (h *Handshaker) buildOfferAnswer() OfferAnswer {
-	answer := OfferAnswer{
-		WgListenPort:    h.config.LocalWgPort,
-		Version:         version.NetbirdVersion(),
-		RosenpassPubKey: h.config.RosenpassPubKey,
-		RosenpassAddr:   h.config.RosenpassAddr,
-	}
-
-	if h.ice != nil && h.RemoteICESupported() {
-		creds := h.ice.Credentials()
-		answer.IceCredentials = IceCredentials{creds.UFrag, creds.Pwd}
-		sid := creds.SessionID
-		answer.SessionID = &sid
-	}
-
-	if addr, ip, err := h.relayManager.RelayInstanceAddress(); err == nil {
-		answer.RelaySrvAddress = addr
-		answer.RelaySrvIP = ip
-	}
-
-	return answer
-}
-
-// UpdateRemoteICEState refreshes the remote ICE support flag from a received
-// offer or answer and closes the ICE worker when the remote peer stopped
-// sending ICE credentials. Runs on the Conn event loop.
-func (h *Handshaker) UpdateRemoteICEState(offer *OfferAnswer) {
-	hasICE := offer.HasICECredentials()
-	prev := h.remoteICESupported.Swap(hasICE)
-	if prev != hasICE {
-		if hasICE {
-			h.log.Infof("remote peer started sending ICE credentials")
-		} else {
-			h.log.Infof("remote peer stopped sending ICE credentials")
-			if h.ice != nil {
-				h.ice.Close()
-			}
-		}
-	}
-}

client/internal/peer/state_dump.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package state_dump
+package peer
 
 import (
 	"context"
@@ -6,13 +6,11 @@ import (
 	"time"
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/status"
 )
 
-type StateDump struct {
+type stateDump struct {
 	log    *log.Entry
-	status *status.Recorder
+	status *Status
 	key    string
 
 	sentOffer       int
@@ -28,15 +26,15 @@ type StateDump struct {
 	mu sync.Mutex
 }
 
-func NewStateDump(key string, log *log.Entry, statusRecorder *status.Recorder) *StateDump {
-	return &StateDump{
+func newStateDump(key string, log *log.Entry, statusRecorder *Status) *stateDump {
+	return &stateDump{
 		log:    log,
 		status: statusRecorder,
 		key:    key,
 	}
 }
 
-func (s *StateDump) Start(ctx context.Context) {
+func (s *stateDump) Start(ctx context.Context) {
 	ticker := time.NewTicker(10 * time.Minute)
 	defer ticker.Stop()
 
@@ -50,25 +48,25 @@ func (s *StateDump) Start(ctx context.Context) {
 	}
 }
 
-func (s *StateDump) RemoteOffer() {
+func (s *stateDump) RemoteOffer() {
 	s.mu.Lock()
 	defer s.mu.Unlock()
 	s.remoteOffer++
 }
 
-func (s *StateDump) RemoteCandidate() {
+func (s *stateDump) RemoteCandidate() {
 	s.mu.Lock()
 	defer s.mu.Unlock()
 	s.remoteCandidate++
 }
 
-func (s *StateDump) SendOffer() {
+func (s *stateDump) SendOffer() {
 	s.mu.Lock()
 	defer s.mu.Unlock()
 	s.sentOffer++
 }
 
-func (s *StateDump) dumpState() {
+func (s *stateDump) dumpState() {
 	s.mu.Lock()
 	defer s.mu.Unlock()
 
@@ -82,41 +80,41 @@ func (s *StateDump) dumpState() {
 		status, s.sentOffer, s.remoteOffer, s.remoteAnswer, s.remoteCandidate, s.p2pConnected, s.switchToRelay, s.wgCheckSuccess, s.relayConnected, s.localProxies)
 }
 
-func (s *StateDump) RemoteAnswer() {
+func (s *stateDump) RemoteAnswer() {
 	s.mu.Lock()
 	defer s.mu.Unlock()
 	s.remoteAnswer++
 }
 
-func (s *StateDump) P2PConnected() {
+func (s *stateDump) P2PConnected() {
 	s.mu.Lock()
 	defer s.mu.Unlock()
 
 	s.p2pConnected++
 }
 
-func (s *StateDump) SwitchToRelay() {
+func (s *stateDump) SwitchToRelay() {
 	s.mu.Lock()
 	defer s.mu.Unlock()
 
 	s.switchToRelay++
 }
 
-func (s *StateDump) WGcheckSuccess() {
+func (s *stateDump) WGcheckSuccess() {
 	s.mu.Lock()
 	defer s.mu.Unlock()
 
 	s.wgCheckSuccess++
 }
 
-func (s *StateDump) RelayConnected() {
+func (s *stateDump) RelayConnected() {
 	s.mu.Lock()
 	defer s.mu.Unlock()
 
 	s.relayConnected++
 }
 
-func (s *StateDump) NewLocalProxy() {
+func (s *stateDump) NewLocalProxy() {
 	s.mu.Lock()
 	defer s.mu.Unlock()
 

client/internal/peer/status/conn_status.go

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-package status
-
-import (
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-)
-
-const (
-	// StatusIdle indicate the peer is in disconnected state
-	StatusIdle ConnStatus = iota
-	// StatusConnecting indicate the peer is in connecting state
-	StatusConnecting
-	// StatusConnected indicate the peer is in connected state
-	StatusConnected
-)
-
-// ConnStatus describe the status of a peer's connection
-type ConnStatus int32
-
-func (s ConnStatus) String() string {
-	switch s {
-	case StatusConnecting:
-		return "Connecting"
-	case StatusConnected:
-		return "Connected"
-	case StatusIdle:
-		return "Idle"
-	default:
-		log.Errorf("unknown status: %d", s)
-		return "INVALID_PEER_CONNECTION_STATUS"
-	}
-}

client/internal/peer/status/events.go

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-package status
-
-import (
-	"slices"
-	"sync"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
-)
-
-type EventQueue struct {
-	maxSize int
-	events  []*proto.SystemEvent
-	mutex   sync.RWMutex
-}
-
-func NewEventQueue(size int) *EventQueue {
-	return &EventQueue{
-		maxSize: size,
-		events:  make([]*proto.SystemEvent, 0, size),
-	}
-}
-
-func (q *EventQueue) Add(event *proto.SystemEvent) {
-	q.mutex.Lock()
-	defer q.mutex.Unlock()
-
-	q.events = append(q.events, event)
-
-	if len(q.events) > q.maxSize {
-		q.events = q.events[len(q.events)-q.maxSize:]
-	}
-}
-
-func (q *EventQueue) GetAll() []*proto.SystemEvent {
-	q.mutex.RLock()
-	defer q.mutex.RUnlock()
-
-	return slices.Clone(q.events)
-}
-
-type EventSubscription struct {
-	id     string
-	events chan *proto.SystemEvent
-}
-
-func (s *EventSubscription) Events() <-chan *proto.SystemEvent {
-	return s.events
-}

client/internal/peer/status/full_status.go

@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
-package status
-
-import (
-	"golang.org/x/exp/maps"
-	"google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/durationpb"
-	"google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/relay"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
-)
-
-// FullStatus contains the full state held by the Recorder instance
-type FullStatus struct {
-	Peers                 []State
-	ManagementState       ManagementState
-	SignalState           SignalState
-	LocalPeerState        LocalPeerState
-	RosenpassState        RosenpassState
-	Relays                []relay.ProbeResult
-	NSGroupStates         []NSGroupState
-	NumOfForwardingRules  int
-	LazyConnectionEnabled bool
-	Events                []*proto.SystemEvent
-}
-
-// ToProto converts FullStatus to proto.FullStatus.
-func (fs FullStatus) ToProto() *proto.FullStatus {
-	pbFullStatus := proto.FullStatus{
-		ManagementState: &proto.ManagementState{},
-		SignalState:     &proto.SignalState{},
-		LocalPeerState:  &proto.LocalPeerState{},
-		Peers:           []*proto.PeerState{},
-	}
-
-	pbFullStatus.ManagementState.URL = fs.ManagementState.URL
-	pbFullStatus.ManagementState.Connected = fs.ManagementState.Connected
-	if err := fs.ManagementState.Error; err != nil {
-		pbFullStatus.ManagementState.Error = err.Error()
-	}
-
-	pbFullStatus.SignalState.URL = fs.SignalState.URL
-	pbFullStatus.SignalState.Connected = fs.SignalState.Connected
-	if err := fs.SignalState.Error; err != nil {
-		pbFullStatus.SignalState.Error = err.Error()
-	}
-
-	pbFullStatus.LocalPeerState.IP = fs.LocalPeerState.IP
-	pbFullStatus.LocalPeerState.Ipv6 = fs.LocalPeerState.IPv6
-	pbFullStatus.LocalPeerState.PubKey = fs.LocalPeerState.PubKey
-	pbFullStatus.LocalPeerState.KernelInterface = fs.LocalPeerState.KernelInterface
-	pbFullStatus.LocalPeerState.Fqdn = fs.LocalPeerState.FQDN
-	pbFullStatus.LocalPeerState.WgPort = int32(fs.LocalPeerState.WgPort)
-	pbFullStatus.LocalPeerState.RosenpassPermissive = fs.RosenpassState.Permissive
-	pbFullStatus.LocalPeerState.RosenpassEnabled = fs.RosenpassState.Enabled
-	pbFullStatus.NumberOfForwardingRules = int32(fs.NumOfForwardingRules)
-	pbFullStatus.LazyConnectionEnabled = fs.LazyConnectionEnabled
-
-	pbFullStatus.LocalPeerState.Networks = maps.Keys(fs.LocalPeerState.Routes)
-
-	for _, peerState := range fs.Peers {
-		networks := maps.Keys(peerState.GetRoutes())
-
-		pbPeerState := &proto.PeerState{
-			IP:                         peerState.IP,
-			Ipv6:                       peerState.IPv6,
-			PubKey:                     peerState.PubKey,
-			ConnStatus:                 peerState.ConnStatus.String(),
-			ConnStatusUpdate:           timestamppb.New(peerState.ConnStatusUpdate),
-			Relayed:                    peerState.Relayed,
-			LocalIceCandidateType:      peerState.LocalIceCandidateType,
-			RemoteIceCandidateType:     peerState.RemoteIceCandidateType,
-			LocalIceCandidateEndpoint:  peerState.LocalIceCandidateEndpoint,
-			RemoteIceCandidateEndpoint: peerState.RemoteIceCandidateEndpoint,
-			RelayAddress:               peerState.RelayServerAddress,
-			Fqdn:                       peerState.FQDN,
-			LastWireguardHandshake:     timestamppb.New(peerState.LastWireguardHandshake),
-			BytesRx:                    peerState.BytesRx,
-			BytesTx:                    peerState.BytesTx,
-			RosenpassEnabled:           peerState.RosenpassEnabled,
-			Networks:                   networks,
-			Latency:                    durationpb.New(peerState.Latency),
-			SshHostKey:                 peerState.SSHHostKey,
-		}
-		pbFullStatus.Peers = append(pbFullStatus.Peers, pbPeerState)
-	}
-
-	for _, relayState := range fs.Relays {
-		pbRelayState := &proto.RelayState{
-			URI:       relayState.URI,
-			Available: relayState.Err == nil,
-			Transport: relayState.Transport,
-		}
-		if err := relayState.Err; err != nil {
-			pbRelayState.Error = err.Error()
-		}
-		pbFullStatus.Relays = append(pbFullStatus.Relays, pbRelayState)
-	}
-
-	for _, dnsState := range fs.NSGroupStates {
-		var err string
-		if dnsState.Error != nil {
-			err = dnsState.Error.Error()
-		}
-
-		var servers []string
-		for _, server := range dnsState.Servers {
-			servers = append(servers, server.String())
-		}
-
-		pbDnsState := &proto.NSGroupState{
-			Servers: servers,
-			Domains: dnsState.Domains,
-			Enabled: dnsState.Enabled,
-			Error:   err,
-		}
-		pbFullStatus.DnsServers = append(pbFullStatus.DnsServers, pbDnsState)
-	}
-
-	pbFullStatus.Events = fs.Events
-
-	return &pbFullStatus
-}

client/internal/peer/status/peer_state.go

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-package status
-
-import (
-	"sync"
-	"time"
-
-	"golang.org/x/exp/maps"
-)
-
-// State contains the latest state of a peer
-type State struct {
-	Mux                        *sync.RWMutex
-	IP                         string
-	IPv6                       string
-	PubKey                     string
-	FQDN                       string
-	ConnStatus                 ConnStatus
-	ConnStatusUpdate           time.Time
-	Relayed                    bool
-	LocalIceCandidateType      string
-	RemoteIceCandidateType     string
-	LocalIceCandidateEndpoint  string
-	RemoteIceCandidateEndpoint string
-	RelayServerAddress         string
-	LastWireguardHandshake     time.Time
-	BytesTx                    int64
-	BytesRx                    int64
-	Latency                    time.Duration
-	RosenpassEnabled           bool
-	SSHHostKey                 []byte
-	routes                     map[string]struct{}
-}
-
-// AddRoute add a single route to routes map
-func (s *State) AddRoute(network string) {
-	s.Mux.Lock()
-	defer s.Mux.Unlock()
-	if s.routes == nil {
-		s.routes = make(map[string]struct{})
-	}
-	s.routes[network] = struct{}{}
-}
-
-// SetRoutes set state routes
-func (s *State) SetRoutes(routes map[string]struct{}) {
-	s.Mux.Lock()
-	defer s.Mux.Unlock()
-	s.routes = routes
-}
-
-// DeleteRoute removes a route from the network amp
-func (s *State) DeleteRoute(network string) {
-	s.Mux.Lock()
-	defer s.Mux.Unlock()
-	delete(s.routes, network)
-}
-
-// GetRoutes return routes map
-func (s *State) GetRoutes() map[string]struct{} {
-	s.Mux.RLock()
-	defer s.Mux.RUnlock()
-	return maps.Clone(s.routes)
-}

client/internal/peer/status_alias.go

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-package peer
-
-import "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/status"
-
-// Transitional aliases re-exporting the peer status recorder from its own
-// package. Callers are being migrated to reference the status package
-// directly; these aliases will be removed once the migration completes.
-type (
-	Status                   = status.Recorder
-	State                    = status.State
-	ConnStatus               = status.ConnStatus
-	FullStatus               = status.FullStatus
-	RouterState              = status.RouterState
-	LocalPeerState           = status.LocalPeerState
-	SignalState              = status.SignalState
-	ManagementState          = status.ManagementState
-	RosenpassState           = status.RosenpassState
-	NSGroupState             = status.NSGroupState
-	ResolvedDomainInfo       = status.ResolvedDomainInfo
-	StatusChangeSubscription = status.StatusChangeSubscription
-	EventQueue               = status.EventQueue
-	EventSubscription        = status.EventSubscription
-	WGIfaceStatus            = status.WGIfaceStatus
-	Listener                 = status.Listener
-	EventListener            = status.EventListener
-)
-
-const (
-	StatusIdle       = status.StatusIdle
-	StatusConnecting = status.StatusConnecting
-	StatusConnected  = status.StatusConnected
-)
-
-var (
-	NewRecorder = status.NewRecorder
-)

client/internal/peer/status_test.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package status
+package peer
 
 import (
 	"context"

client/internal/peer/wg_watcher.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package wg_watcher
+package peer
 
 import (
 	"context"
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import (
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/configurer"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/state_dump"
 )
 
 const (
@@ -29,7 +28,7 @@ type WGWatcher struct {
 	log           *log.Entry
 	wgIfaceStater WGInterfaceStater
 	peerKey       string
-	stateDump     *state_dump.StateDump
+	stateDump     *stateDump
 
 	enabled   bool
 	muEnabled sync.Mutex
@@ -39,7 +38,7 @@ type WGWatcher struct {
 	resetCh chan struct{}
 }
 
-func NewWGWatcher(log *log.Entry, wgIfaceStater WGInterfaceStater, peerKey string, stateDump *state_dump.StateDump) *WGWatcher {
+func NewWGWatcher(log *log.Entry, wgIfaceStater WGInterfaceStater, peerKey string, stateDump *stateDump) *WGWatcher {
 	return &WGWatcher{
 		log:           log,
 		wgIfaceStater: wgIfaceStater,

client/internal/peer/wg_watcher_test.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package wg_watcher
+package peer
 
 import (
 	"context"
@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/configurer"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/state_dump"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/status"
 )
 
 type MocWgIface struct {
@@ -59,7 +57,7 @@ func TestWGWatcher_CheckSuccessCallback(t *testing.T) {
 	// platforms with coarse clock resolution (Windows), where two time.Now() calls
 	// microseconds apart can return the same instant and read as a timed-out handshake.
 	stats := &mockHandshakeStats{handshake: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)}
-	watcher := NewWGWatcher(mlog, stats, "", state_dump.NewStateDump("peer", mlog, &status.Recorder{}))
+	watcher := NewWGWatcher(mlog, stats, "", newStateDump("peer", mlog, &Status{}))
 
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
 	defer cancel()
@@ -68,18 +66,14 @@ func TestWGWatcher_CheckSuccessCallback(t *testing.T) {
 
 	firstHandshake := make(chan struct{}, 1)
 	checkSuccess := make(chan struct{}, 1)
-	watcherDone := make(chan struct{})
-	go func() {
-		defer close(watcherDone)
-		watcher.EnableWgWatcher(ctx, time.Now(), func() {}, func(when time.Time) {
-			firstHandshake <- struct{}{}
-		}, func() {
-			select {
-			case checkSuccess <- struct{}{}:
-			default:
-			}
-		})
-	}()
+	go watcher.EnableWgWatcher(ctx, time.Now(), func() {}, func(when time.Time) {
+		firstHandshake <- struct{}{}
+	}, func() {
+		select {
+		case checkSuccess <- struct{}{}:
+		default:
+		}
+	})
 
 	stats.advance()
 
@@ -94,11 +88,6 @@ func TestWGWatcher_CheckSuccessCallback(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("first-handshake callback must not fire for a non-zero baseline")
 	default:
 	}
-
-	// Wait for the watcher goroutine to exit so it cannot race with other
-	// tests mutating the package-level check timing variables.
-	cancel()
-	<-watcherDone
 }
 
 func TestWGWatcher_EnableWgWatcher(t *testing.T) {
@@ -107,7 +96,7 @@ func TestWGWatcher_EnableWgWatcher(t *testing.T) {
 
 	mlog := log.WithField("peer", "tet")
 	mocWgIface := &MocWgIface{}
-	watcher := NewWGWatcher(mlog, mocWgIface, "", state_dump.NewStateDump("peer", mlog, &status.Recorder{}))
+	watcher := NewWGWatcher(mlog, mocWgIface, "", newStateDump("peer", mlog, &Status{}))
 
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
 	defer cancel()
@@ -140,7 +129,7 @@ func TestWGWatcher_ReEnable(t *testing.T) {
 
 	mlog := log.WithField("peer", "tet")
 	mocWgIface := &MocWgIface{}
-	watcher := NewWGWatcher(mlog, mocWgIface, "", state_dump.NewStateDump("peer", mlog, &status.Recorder{}))
+	watcher := NewWGWatcher(mlog, mocWgIface, "", newStateDump("peer", mlog, &Status{}))
 
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
 	ok := watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()

client/internal/peer/worker/state.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package peer
+package worker
 
 import (
 	"sync/atomic"
@@ -7,17 +7,17 @@ import (
 )
 
 const (
-	WorkerStatusDisconnected WorkerStatus = iota
-	WorkerStatusConnected
+	StatusDisconnected Status = iota
+	StatusConnected
 )
 
-type WorkerStatus int32
+type Status int32
 
-func (s WorkerStatus) String() string {
+func (s Status) String() string {
 	switch s {
-	case WorkerStatusDisconnected:
+	case StatusDisconnected:
 		return "Disconnected"
-	case WorkerStatusConnected:
+	case StatusConnected:
 		return "Connected"
 	default:
 		log.Errorf("unknown status: %d", s)
@@ -37,16 +37,16 @@ func NewAtomicStatus() *AtomicWorkerStatus {
 }
 
 // Get returns the current connection status
-func (acs *AtomicWorkerStatus) Get() WorkerStatus {
-	return WorkerStatus(acs.status.Load())
+func (acs *AtomicWorkerStatus) Get() Status {
+	return Status(acs.status.Load())
 }
 
 func (acs *AtomicWorkerStatus) SetConnected() {
-	acs.status.Store(int32(WorkerStatusConnected))
+	acs.status.Store(int32(StatusConnected))
 }
 
 func (acs *AtomicWorkerStatus) SetDisconnected() {
-	acs.status.Store(int32(WorkerStatusDisconnected))
+	acs.status.Store(int32(StatusDisconnected))
 }
 
 // String returns the string representation of the current status

client/internal/peer/worker_ice.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package worker
+package peer
 
 import (
 	"context"
@@ -13,9 +13,8 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/udpmux"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/conntype"
 	icemaker "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/ice"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/signaling"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/status"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/portforward"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/stdnet"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
@@ -33,68 +32,57 @@ type ICEConnInfo struct {
 	RelayedOnLocal             bool
 }
 
-type ICEDependencies struct {
-	Signaler           *signaling.Signaler
-	IFaceDiscover      stdnet.ExternalIFaceDiscover
-	StatusRecorder     *status.Recorder
-	PortForwardManager *portforward.Manager
-}
-
-type ICE struct {
-	log                *log.Entry
-	key                string
-	iceConfig          icemaker.Config
-	isController       bool
-	onConnReady        func(priority ConnPriority, iceConnInfo ICEConnInfo)
-	onStatusDisconnect func(sessionChanged bool)
-	signaler           *signaling.Signaler
-	iFaceDiscover      stdnet.ExternalIFaceDiscover
-	statusRecorder     *status.Recorder
-	portForwardManager *portforward.Manager
-	hasRelayOnLocally  bool
+type WorkerICE struct {
+	ctx               context.Context
+	log               *log.Entry
+	config            ConnConfig
+	conn              *Conn
+	signaler          *Signaler
+	iFaceDiscover     stdnet.ExternalIFaceDiscover
+	statusRecorder    *Status
+	hasRelayOnLocally bool
 
 	agent             *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent
 	agentDialerCancel context.CancelFunc
 	agentConnecting   bool      // while it is true, drop all incoming offers
 	lastSuccess       time.Time // with this avoid the too frequent ICE agent recreation
-	// connectedAgent is the agent whose connection was last reported ready; guarded by muxAgent
-	connectedAgent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent
 	// remoteSessionID represents the peer's session identifier from the latest remote offer.
-	remoteSessionID icemaker.SessionID
+	remoteSessionID ICESessionID
 	// sessionID is used to track the current session ID of the ICE agent
 	// increase by one when disconnecting the agent
 	// with it the remote peer can discard the already deprecated offer/answer
 	// Without it the remote peer may recreate a workable ICE connection
-	sessionID            icemaker.SessionID
+	sessionID            ICESessionID
 	remoteSessionChanged bool
 	muxAgent             sync.Mutex
 
 	localUfrag string
 	localPwd   string
 
+	// we record the last known state of the ICE agent to avoid duplicate on disconnected events
+	lastKnownState ice.ConnectionState
+
 	// portForwardAttempted tracks if we've already tried port forwarding this session
 	portForwardAttempted bool
 }
 
-func NewICE(log *log.Entry, key string, iceConfig icemaker.Config, isController bool, onConnReady func(ConnPriority, ICEConnInfo), onStatusDisconnect func(bool), services ICEDependencies, hasRelayOnLocally bool) (*ICE, error) {
-	sessionID, err := icemaker.NewSessionID()
+func NewWorkerICE(ctx context.Context, log *log.Entry, config ConnConfig, conn *Conn, signaler *Signaler, ifaceDiscover stdnet.ExternalIFaceDiscover, statusRecorder *Status, hasRelayOnLocally bool) (*WorkerICE, error) {
+	sessionID, err := NewICESessionID()
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
-	w := &ICE{
-		log:                log,
-		key:                key,
-		iceConfig:          iceConfig,
-		isController:       isController,
-		onConnReady:        onConnReady,
-		onStatusDisconnect: onStatusDisconnect,
-		signaler:           services.Signaler,
-		iFaceDiscover:      services.IFaceDiscover,
-		statusRecorder:     services.StatusRecorder,
-		portForwardManager: services.PortForwardManager,
-		hasRelayOnLocally:  hasRelayOnLocally,
-		sessionID:          sessionID,
+	w := &WorkerICE{
+		ctx:               ctx,
+		log:               log,
+		config:            config,
+		conn:              conn,
+		signaler:          signaler,
+		iFaceDiscover:     ifaceDiscover,
+		statusRecorder:    statusRecorder,
+		hasRelayOnLocally: hasRelayOnLocally,
+		lastKnownState:    ice.ConnectionStateDisconnected,
+		sessionID:         sessionID,
 	}
 
 	localUfrag, localPwd, err := icemaker.GenerateICECredentials()
@@ -106,7 +94,7 @@ func NewICE(log *log.Entry, key string, iceConfig icemaker.Config, isController
 	return w, nil
 }
 
-func (w *ICE) OnNewOffer(ctx context.Context, remoteOfferAnswer *signaling.OfferAnswer) {
+func (w *WorkerICE) OnNewOffer(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) {
 	w.log.Debugf("OnNewOffer for ICE, serial: %s", remoteOfferAnswer.SessionIDString())
 	w.muxAgent.Lock()
 	defer w.muxAgent.Unlock()
@@ -130,7 +118,7 @@ func (w *ICE) OnNewOffer(ctx context.Context, remoteOfferAnswer *signaling.Offer
 			}
 		}
 
-		sessionID, err := icemaker.NewSessionID()
+		sessionID, err := NewICESessionID()
 		if err != nil {
 			w.log.Errorf("failed to create new session ID: %s", err)
 		}
@@ -148,8 +136,8 @@ func (w *ICE) OnNewOffer(ctx context.Context, remoteOfferAnswer *signaling.Offer
 	if remoteOfferAnswer.SessionID != nil {
 		w.log.Debugf("recreate ICE agent: %s / %s", w.sessionID, *remoteOfferAnswer.SessionID)
 	}
-	dialerCtx, dialerCancel := context.WithCancel(ctx)
-	agent, err := w.reCreateAgent(ctx, dialerCancel, preferredCandidateTypes)
+	dialerCtx, dialerCancel := context.WithCancel(w.ctx)
+	agent, err := w.reCreateAgent(dialerCancel, preferredCandidateTypes)
 	if err != nil {
 		w.log.Errorf("failed to recreate ICE Agent: %s", err)
 		return
@@ -163,14 +151,14 @@ func (w *ICE) OnNewOffer(ctx context.Context, remoteOfferAnswer *signaling.Offer
 		w.remoteSessionID = ""
 	}
 
-	go w.connect(dialerCtx, dialerCancel, agent, remoteOfferAnswer)
+	go w.connect(dialerCtx, agent, remoteOfferAnswer)
 }
 
 // OnRemoteCandidate Handles ICE connection Candidate provided by the remote peer.
-func (w *ICE) OnRemoteCandidate(candidate ice.Candidate, haRoutes route.HAMap) {
+func (w *WorkerICE) OnRemoteCandidate(candidate ice.Candidate, haRoutes route.HAMap) {
 	w.muxAgent.Lock()
 	defer w.muxAgent.Unlock()
-	w.log.Debugf("OnRemoteCandidate from peer %s -> %s", w.key, candidate.String())
+	w.log.Debugf("OnRemoteCandidate from peer %s -> %s", w.config.Key, candidate.String())
 	if w.agent == nil {
 		w.log.Warnf("ICE Agent is not initialized yet")
 		return
@@ -197,24 +185,18 @@ func (w *ICE) OnRemoteCandidate(candidate ice.Candidate, haRoutes route.HAMap) {
 	}
 }
 
-func (w *ICE) Credentials() signaling.Credentials {
-	w.muxAgent.Lock()
-	defer w.muxAgent.Unlock()
-	return signaling.Credentials{
-		UFrag:     w.localUfrag,
-		Pwd:       w.localPwd,
-		SessionID: w.sessionID,
-	}
+func (w *WorkerICE) GetLocalUserCredentials() (frag string, pwd string) {
+	return w.localUfrag, w.localPwd
 }
 
-func (w *ICE) InProgress() bool {
+func (w *WorkerICE) InProgress() bool {
 	w.muxAgent.Lock()
 	defer w.muxAgent.Unlock()
 
 	return w.agentConnecting
 }
 
-func (w *ICE) Close() {
+func (w *WorkerICE) Close() {
 	w.muxAgent.Lock()
 	defer w.muxAgent.Unlock()
 
@@ -230,10 +212,10 @@ func (w *ICE) Close() {
 	w.agent = nil
 }
 
-func (w *ICE) reCreateAgent(ctx context.Context, dialerCancel context.CancelFunc, candidates []ice.CandidateType) (*icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, error) {
+func (w *WorkerICE) reCreateAgent(dialerCancel context.CancelFunc, candidates []ice.CandidateType) (*icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, error) {
 	w.portForwardAttempted = false
 
-	agent, err := icemaker.NewAgent(ctx, w.iFaceDiscover, w.iceConfig, candidates, w.localUfrag, w.localPwd)
+	agent, err := icemaker.NewAgent(w.ctx, w.iFaceDiscover, w.config.ICEConfig, candidates, w.localUfrag, w.localPwd)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("create agent: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -255,7 +237,7 @@ func (w *ICE) reCreateAgent(ctx context.Context, dialerCancel context.CancelFunc
 	return agent, nil
 }
 
-func (w *ICE) getSessionID() icemaker.SessionID {
+func (w *WorkerICE) SessionID() ICESessionID {
 	w.muxAgent.Lock()
 	defer w.muxAgent.Unlock()
 
@@ -265,11 +247,11 @@ func (w *ICE) getSessionID() icemaker.SessionID {
 // will block until connection succeeded
 // but it won't release if ICE Agent went into Disconnected or Failed state,
 // so we have to cancel it with the provided context once agent detected a broken connection
-func (w *ICE) connect(ctx context.Context, dialerCancel context.CancelFunc, agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, remoteOfferAnswer *signaling.OfferAnswer) {
+func (w *WorkerICE) connect(ctx context.Context, agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) {
 	w.log.Debugf("gather candidates")
 	if err := agent.GatherCandidates(); err != nil {
 		w.log.Warnf("failed to gather candidates: %s", err)
-		w.closeAgent(agent, dialerCancel)
+		w.closeAgent(agent, w.agentDialerCancel)
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -277,19 +259,19 @@ func (w *ICE) connect(ctx context.Context, dialerCancel context.CancelFunc, agen
 	remoteConn, err := w.turnAgentDial(ctx, agent, remoteOfferAnswer)
 	if err != nil {
 		w.log.Debugf("failed to dial the remote peer: %s", err)
-		w.closeAgent(agent, dialerCancel)
+		w.closeAgent(agent, w.agentDialerCancel)
 		return
 	}
 	w.log.Debugf("agent dial succeeded")
 
 	pair, err := agent.GetSelectedCandidatePair()
 	if err != nil {
-		w.closeAgent(agent, dialerCancel)
+		w.closeAgent(agent, w.agentDialerCancel)
 		return
 	}
 	if pair == nil {
 		w.log.Warnf("selected candidate pair is nil, cannot proceed")
-		w.closeAgent(agent, dialerCancel)
+		w.closeAgent(agent, w.agentDialerCancel)
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -317,22 +299,17 @@ func (w *ICE) connect(ctx context.Context, dialerCancel context.CancelFunc, agen
 	}
 	w.log.Debugf("on ICE conn is ready to use")
 
+	w.log.Infof("connection succeeded with offer session: %s", remoteOfferAnswer.SessionIDString())
 	w.muxAgent.Lock()
-	if w.agent != agent {
-		w.muxAgent.Unlock()
-		w.log.Debugf("agent has been replaced during connect, dropping obsolete connection")
-		return
-	}
 	w.agentConnecting = false
 	w.lastSuccess = time.Now()
-	w.connectedAgent = agent
 	w.muxAgent.Unlock()
 
-	w.log.Infof("connection succeeded with offer session: %s", remoteOfferAnswer.SessionIDString())
-	w.onConnReady(selectedPriority(pair), ci)
+	// todo: the potential problem is a race between the onConnectionStateChange
+	w.conn.onICEConnectionIsReady(selectedPriority(pair), ci)
 }
 
-func (w *ICE) closeAgent(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, cancel context.CancelFunc) bool {
+func (w *WorkerICE) closeAgent(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, cancel context.CancelFunc) bool {
 	cancel()
 	if err := agent.Close(); err != nil {
 		w.log.Warnf("failed to close ICE agent: %s", err)
@@ -346,7 +323,7 @@ func (w *ICE) closeAgent(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, cancel context.CancelF
 
 	if w.agent == agent {
 		// consider to remove from here and move to the OnNewOffer
-		sessionID, err := icemaker.NewSessionID()
+		sessionID, err := NewICESessionID()
 		if err != nil {
 			w.log.Errorf("failed to create new session ID: %s", err)
 		}
@@ -358,7 +335,7 @@ func (w *ICE) closeAgent(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, cancel context.CancelF
 	return sessionChanged
 }
 
-func (w *ICE) punchRemoteWGPort(pair *ice.CandidatePair, remoteWgPort int) {
+func (w *WorkerICE) punchRemoteWGPort(pair *ice.CandidatePair, remoteWgPort int) {
 	// wait local endpoint configuration
 	time.Sleep(time.Second)
 	addr, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", net.JoinHostPort(pair.Remote.Address(), strconv.Itoa(remoteWgPort)))
@@ -367,7 +344,7 @@ func (w *ICE) punchRemoteWGPort(pair *ice.CandidatePair, remoteWgPort int) {
 		return
 	}
 
-	mux, ok := w.iceConfig.UDPMuxSrflx.(*udpmux.UniversalUDPMuxDefault)
+	mux, ok := w.config.ICEConfig.UDPMuxSrflx.(*udpmux.UniversalUDPMuxDefault)
 	if !ok {
 		w.log.Warn("invalid udp mux conversion")
 		return
@@ -380,7 +357,7 @@ func (w *ICE) punchRemoteWGPort(pair *ice.CandidatePair, remoteWgPort int) {
 
 // onICECandidate is a callback attached to an ICE Agent to receive new local connection candidates
 // and then signals them to the remote peer
-func (w *ICE) onICECandidate(candidate ice.Candidate) {
+func (w *WorkerICE) onICECandidate(candidate ice.Candidate) {
 	// nil means candidate gathering has been ended
 	if candidate == nil {
 		return
@@ -389,9 +366,9 @@ func (w *ICE) onICECandidate(candidate ice.Candidate) {
 	// TODO: reported port is incorrect for CandidateTypeHost, makes understanding ICE use via logs confusing as port is ignored
 	w.log.Debugf("discovered local candidate %s", candidate.String())
 	go func() {
-		err := w.signaler.SignalICECandidate(candidate, w.key)
+		err := w.signaler.SignalICECandidate(candidate, w.config.Key)
 		if err != nil {
-			w.log.Errorf("failed signaling candidate to the remote peer %s %s", w.key, err)
+			w.log.Errorf("failed signaling candidate to the remote peer %s %s", w.config.Key, err)
 		}
 	}()
 
@@ -401,8 +378,8 @@ func (w *ICE) onICECandidate(candidate ice.Candidate) {
 }
 
 // injectPortForwardedCandidate signals an additional candidate using the pre-created port mapping.
-func (w *ICE) injectPortForwardedCandidate(srflxCandidate ice.Candidate) {
-	pfManager := w.portForwardManager
+func (w *WorkerICE) injectPortForwardedCandidate(srflxCandidate ice.Candidate) {
+	pfManager := w.conn.portForwardManager
 	if pfManager == nil {
 		return
 	}
@@ -430,7 +407,7 @@ func (w *ICE) injectPortForwardedCandidate(srflxCandidate ice.Candidate) {
 		forwardedCandidate.String(), mapping.InternalPort, mapping.ExternalPort, mapping.NATType, forwardedCandidate.Priority())
 
 	go func() {
-		if err := w.signaler.SignalICECandidate(forwardedCandidate, w.key); err != nil {
+		if err := w.signaler.SignalICECandidate(forwardedCandidate, w.config.Key); err != nil {
 			w.log.Errorf("signal port-forwarded candidate: %v", err)
 		}
 	}()
@@ -438,7 +415,7 @@ func (w *ICE) injectPortForwardedCandidate(srflxCandidate ice.Candidate) {
 
 // createForwardedCandidate creates a new server reflexive candidate with the forwarded port.
 // It uses the NAT gateway's external IP with the forwarded port.
-func (w *ICE) createForwardedCandidate(srflxCandidate ice.Candidate, mapping *portforward.Mapping) (ice.Candidate, error) {
+func (w *WorkerICE) createForwardedCandidate(srflxCandidate ice.Candidate, mapping *portforward.Mapping) (ice.Candidate, error) {
 	var externalIP string
 	if mapping.ExternalIP != nil && !mapping.ExternalIP.IsUnspecified() {
 		externalIP = mapping.ExternalIP.String()
@@ -483,9 +460,9 @@ func (w *ICE) createForwardedCandidate(srflxCandidate ice.Candidate, mapping *po
 	return candidate, nil
 }
 
-func (w *ICE) onICESelectedCandidatePair(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, c1, c2 ice.Candidate) {
+func (w *WorkerICE) onICESelectedCandidatePair(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, c1, c2 ice.Candidate) {
 	w.log.Debugf("selected candidate pair [local <-> remote] -> [%s <-> %s], peer %s", c1.String(), c2.String(),
-		w.key)
+		w.config.Key)
 
 	pairStat, ok := agent.GetSelectedCandidatePairStats()
 	if !ok {
@@ -494,14 +471,14 @@ func (w *ICE) onICESelectedCandidatePair(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, c1, c2
 	}
 
 	duration := time.Duration(pairStat.CurrentRoundTripTime * float64(time.Second))
-	if err := w.statusRecorder.UpdateLatency(w.key, duration); err != nil {
+	if err := w.statusRecorder.UpdateLatency(w.config.Key, duration); err != nil {
 		w.log.Debugf("failed to update latency for peer: %s", err)
 		return
 	}
 }
 
-func (w *ICE) logSuccessfulPaths(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent) {
-	sessionID := w.getSessionID()
+func (w *WorkerICE) logSuccessfulPaths(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent) {
+	sessionID := w.SessionID()
 	stats := agent.GetCandidatePairsStats()
 	localCandidates, _ := agent.GetLocalCandidates()
 	remoteCandidates, _ := agent.GetRemoteCandidates()
@@ -531,44 +508,32 @@ func (w *ICE) logSuccessfulPaths(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent) {
 	}
 }
 
-func (w *ICE) onConnectionStateChange(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, dialerCancel context.CancelFunc) func(ice.ConnectionState) {
-	// per-agent state; pion delivers callbacks of one agent sequentially
-	var connected bool
+func (w *WorkerICE) onConnectionStateChange(agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, dialerCancel context.CancelFunc) func(ice.ConnectionState) {
 	return func(state ice.ConnectionState) {
 		w.log.Debugf("ICE ConnectionState has changed to %s", state.String())
 		switch state {
 		case ice.ConnectionStateConnected:
-			connected = true
+			w.lastKnownState = ice.ConnectionStateConnected
 			w.logSuccessfulPaths(agent)
+			return
 		case ice.ConnectionStateFailed, ice.ConnectionStateDisconnected, ice.ConnectionStateClosed:
 			// ice.ConnectionStateClosed happens when we recreate the agent. For the P2P to TURN switch important to
 			// notify the conn.onICEStateDisconnected changes to update the current used priority
 
 			sessionChanged := w.closeAgent(agent, dialerCancel)
 
-			if !connected {
-				return
+			if w.lastKnownState == ice.ConnectionStateConnected {
+				w.lastKnownState = ice.ConnectionStateDisconnected
+				w.conn.onICEStateDisconnected(sessionChanged)
 			}
-			connected = false
-
-			w.muxAgent.Lock()
-			stale := w.connectedAgent != agent
-			if !stale {
-				w.connectedAgent = nil
-			}
-			w.muxAgent.Unlock()
-
-			if stale {
-				w.log.Debugf("suppress disconnected event of replaced ICE agent")
-				return
-			}
-			w.onStatusDisconnect(sessionChanged)
+		default:
+			return
 		}
 	}
 }
 
-func (w *ICE) turnAgentDial(ctx context.Context, agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, remoteOfferAnswer *signaling.OfferAnswer) (*ice.Conn, error) {
-	if w.isController {
+func (w *WorkerICE) turnAgentDial(ctx context.Context, agent *icemaker.ThreadSafeAgent, remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) (*ice.Conn, error) {
+	if isController(w.config) {
 		return agent.Dial(ctx, remoteOfferAnswer.IceCredentials.UFrag, remoteOfferAnswer.IceCredentials.Pwd)
 	} else {
 		return agent.Accept(ctx, remoteOfferAnswer.IceCredentials.UFrag, remoteOfferAnswer.IceCredentials.Pwd)
@@ -630,10 +595,10 @@ func isRelayed(pair *ice.CandidatePair) bool {
 	return false
 }
 
-func selectedPriority(pair *ice.CandidatePair) ConnPriority {
+func selectedPriority(pair *ice.CandidatePair) conntype.ConnPriority {
 	if isRelayed(pair) {
-		return ICETurn
+		return conntype.ICETurn
 	} else {
-		return ICEP2P
+		return conntype.ICEP2P
 	}
 }

client/internal/peer/worker_relay.go

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-package worker
+package peer
 
 import (
 	"context"
@@ -10,23 +10,22 @@ import (
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/signaling"
 	relayClient "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/relay/client"
 )
 
 type RelayConnInfo struct {
-	RelayedConn     net.Conn
-	RosenpassPubKey []byte
-	RosenpassAddr   string
+	relayedConn     net.Conn
+	rosenpassPubKey []byte
+	rosenpassAddr   string
 }
 
 type WorkerRelay struct {
-	log            *log.Entry
-	key            string
-	isController   bool
-	onConnReady    func(RelayConnInfo)
-	onDisconnected func()
-	relayManager   *relayClient.Manager
+	peerCtx      context.Context
+	log          *log.Entry
+	isController bool
+	config       ConnConfig
+	conn         *Conn
+	relayManager *relayClient.Manager
 
 	relayedConn net.Conn
 	relayLock   sync.Mutex
@@ -34,19 +33,19 @@ type WorkerRelay struct {
 	relaySupportedOnRemotePeer atomic.Bool
 }
 
-func NewWorkerRelay(log *log.Entry, key string, isController bool, onConnReady func(RelayConnInfo), onDisconnected func(), relayManager *relayClient.Manager) *WorkerRelay {
+func NewWorkerRelay(ctx context.Context, log *log.Entry, ctrl bool, config ConnConfig, conn *Conn, relayManager *relayClient.Manager) *WorkerRelay {
 	r := &WorkerRelay{
-		log:            log,
-		key:            key,
-		isController:   isController,
-		onConnReady:    onConnReady,
-		onDisconnected: onDisconnected,
-		relayManager:   relayManager,
+		peerCtx:      ctx,
+		log:          log,
+		isController: ctrl,
+		config:       config,
+		conn:         conn,
+		relayManager: relayManager,
 	}
 	return r
 }
 
-func (w *WorkerRelay) OnNewOffer(ctx context.Context, remoteOfferAnswer *signaling.OfferAnswer) {
+func (w *WorkerRelay) OnNewOffer(remoteOfferAnswer *OfferAnswer) {
 	if !w.isRelaySupported(remoteOfferAnswer) {
 		w.log.Infof("Relay is not supported by remote peer")
 		w.relaySupportedOnRemotePeer.Store(false)
@@ -67,7 +66,7 @@ func (w *WorkerRelay) OnNewOffer(ctx context.Context, remoteOfferAnswer *signali
 		serverIP = remoteOfferAnswer.RelaySrvIP
 	}
 
-	relayedConn, err := w.relayManager.OpenConn(ctx, srv, w.key, serverIP)
+	relayedConn, err := w.relayManager.OpenConn(w.peerCtx, srv, w.config.Key, serverIP)
 	if err != nil {
 		if errors.Is(err, relayClient.ErrConnAlreadyExists) {
 			w.log.Debugf("handled offer by reusing existing relay connection")
@@ -89,10 +88,10 @@ func (w *WorkerRelay) OnNewOffer(ctx context.Context, remoteOfferAnswer *signali
 	}
 
 	w.log.Debugf("peer conn opened via Relay: %s", srv)
-	w.onConnReady(RelayConnInfo{
-		RelayedConn:     relayedConn,
-		RosenpassPubKey: remoteOfferAnswer.RosenpassPubKey,
-		RosenpassAddr:   remoteOfferAnswer.RosenpassAddr,
+	go w.conn.onRelayConnectionIsReady(RelayConnInfo{
+		relayedConn:     relayedConn,
+		rosenpassPubKey: remoteOfferAnswer.RosenpassPubKey,
+		rosenpassAddr:   remoteOfferAnswer.RosenpassAddr,
 	})
 }
 
@@ -120,7 +119,7 @@ func (w *WorkerRelay) CloseConn() {
 	}
 }
 
-func (w *WorkerRelay) isRelaySupported(answer *signaling.OfferAnswer) bool {
+func (w *WorkerRelay) isRelaySupported(answer *OfferAnswer) bool {
 	if !w.relayManager.HasRelayAddress() {
 		return false
 	}
@@ -135,5 +134,5 @@ func (w *WorkerRelay) preferredRelayServer(myRelayAddress, remoteRelayAddress st
 }
 
 func (w *WorkerRelay) onRelayClientDisconnected() {
-	w.onDisconnected()
+	go w.conn.onRelayDisconnected()
 }

client/internal/profilemanager/config.go

@@ -70,6 +70,8 @@ type ConfigInput struct {
 	StateFilePath                 string
 	PreSharedKey                  *string
 	ServerSSHAllowed              *bool
+	ServerVNCAllowed              *bool
+	DisableVNCApproval            *bool
 	EnableSSHRoot                 *bool
 	EnableSSHSFTP                 *bool
 	EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding  *bool
@@ -123,6 +125,8 @@ type Config struct {
 	RosenpassEnabled              bool
 	RosenpassPermissive           bool
 	ServerSSHAllowed              *bool
+	ServerVNCAllowed              *bool
+	DisableVNCApproval            *bool
 	EnableSSHRoot                 *bool
 	EnableSSHSFTP                 *bool
 	EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding  *bool
@@ -454,6 +458,33 @@ func (config *Config) apply(input ConfigInput) (updated bool, err error) {
 		updated = true
 	}
 
+	if input.ServerVNCAllowed != nil {
+		if config.ServerVNCAllowed == nil || *input.ServerVNCAllowed != *config.ServerVNCAllowed {
+			if *input.ServerVNCAllowed {
+				log.Infof("enabling VNC server")
+			} else {
+				log.Infof("disabling VNC server")
+			}
+			config.ServerVNCAllowed = input.ServerVNCAllowed
+			updated = true
+		}
+	} else if config.ServerVNCAllowed == nil {
+		config.ServerVNCAllowed = util.False()
+		updated = true
+	}
+
+	if input.DisableVNCApproval != nil {
+		if config.DisableVNCApproval == nil || *input.DisableVNCApproval != *config.DisableVNCApproval {
+			if *input.DisableVNCApproval {
+				log.Infof("disabling VNC connection approval prompt")
+			} else {
+				log.Infof("enabling VNC connection approval prompt")
+			}
+			config.DisableVNCApproval = input.DisableVNCApproval
+			updated = true
+		}
+	}
+
 	if input.EnableSSHRoot != nil && (config.EnableSSHRoot == nil || *input.EnableSSHRoot != *config.EnableSSHRoot) {
 		if *input.EnableSSHRoot {
 			log.Infof("enabling SSH root login")
@@ -704,6 +735,8 @@ func (config *Config) applyMDMPolicy(policy *mdm.Policy) {
 	}
 
 	applyBool(mdm.KeyAllowServerSSH, func(v bool) { bv := v; config.ServerSSHAllowed = &bv })
+	applyBool(mdm.KeyAllowServerVNC, func(v bool) { bv := v; config.ServerVNCAllowed = &bv })
+	applyBool(mdm.KeyDisableVNCApproval, func(v bool) { bv := v; config.DisableVNCApproval = &bv })
 	applyBool(mdm.KeyDisableClientRoutes, func(v bool) { config.DisableClientRoutes = v })
 	applyBool(mdm.KeyDisableServerRoutes, func(v bool) { config.DisableServerRoutes = v })
 	applyBool(mdm.KeyBlockInbound, func(v bool) { config.BlockInbound = v })

client/internal/profilemanager/config_mdm_test.go

@@ -130,6 +130,36 @@ func TestApply_MDMBoolKeysOverrideOnDiskValue(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.True(t, cfg.Policy().HasKey(mdm.KeyRosenpassEnabled))
 }
 
+func TestApply_MDMVNCKeys(t *testing.T) {
+	tmp := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
+
+	// Seed without MDM: VNC off, approval prompt on.
+	withMDMPolicy(t, mdm.NewPolicy(nil))
+	_, err := UpdateOrCreateConfig(ConfigInput{
+		ConfigPath:         tmp,
+		ServerVNCAllowed:   boolPtr(false),
+		DisableVNCApproval: boolPtr(false),
+	})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	// MDM enforces VNC on and disables the approval prompt.
+	withMDMPolicy(t, mdm.NewPolicy(map[string]any{
+		mdm.KeyAllowServerVNC:     true,
+		mdm.KeyDisableVNCApproval: true,
+	}))
+
+	cfg, err := UpdateOrCreateConfig(ConfigInput{ConfigPath: tmp})
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NotNil(t, cfg)
+
+	require.NotNil(t, cfg.ServerVNCAllowed)
+	assert.True(t, *cfg.ServerVNCAllowed, "MDM override should flip on-disk false to true")
+	require.NotNil(t, cfg.DisableVNCApproval)
+	assert.True(t, *cfg.DisableVNCApproval)
+	assert.True(t, cfg.Policy().HasKey(mdm.KeyAllowServerVNC))
+	assert.True(t, cfg.Policy().HasKey(mdm.KeyDisableVNCApproval))
+}
+
 func TestApply_MDMLazyConnection(t *testing.T) {
 	cases := []struct {
 		name string

client/internal/statemanager/manager.go

@@ -74,6 +74,14 @@ func New(filePath string) *Manager {
 	}
 }
 
+// FilePath returns the path of the underlying state file.
+func (m *Manager) FilePath() string {
+	if m == nil {
+		return ""
+	}
+	return m.filePath
+}
+
 // Start starts the state manager periodic save routine
 func (m *Manager) Start() {
 	if m == nil {

client/mdm/canonical_loaders.go

@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ var allKeys = []string{
 	KeyBlockInbound,
 	KeyDisableMetricsCollection,
 	KeyAllowServerSSH,
+	KeyAllowServerVNC,
+	KeyDisableVNCApproval,
 	KeyDisableAutoConnect,
 	KeyPreSharedKey,
 	KeyRosenpassEnabled,

client/mdm/policy.go

@@ -20,10 +20,10 @@ import (
 // names (lowerCamelCase) so the daemon can map a Policy key directly to a
 // configuration field.
 const (
-	KeyManagementURL            = "managementURL"
-	KeyDisableUpdateSettings    = "disableUpdateSettings"
-	KeyDisableProfiles          = "disableProfiles"
-	KeyDisableNetworks          = "disableNetworks"
+	KeyManagementURL         = "managementURL"
+	KeyDisableUpdateSettings = "disableUpdateSettings"
+	KeyDisableProfiles       = "disableProfiles"
+	KeyDisableNetworks       = "disableNetworks"
 	// KeyDisableAdvancedView gates the advanced-view section in the
 	// upcoming UI revision. UI-only: NOT stored on Config, not
 	// applied by applyMDMPolicy, not rejectable via SetConfig. The
@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ const (
 	KeyBlockInbound             = "blockInbound"
 	KeyDisableMetricsCollection = "disableMetricsCollection"
 	KeyAllowServerSSH           = "allowServerSSH"
+	KeyAllowServerVNC           = "allowServerVNC"
+	KeyDisableVNCApproval       = "disableVNCApproval"
 	KeyDisableAutoConnect       = "disableAutoConnect"
 	KeyPreSharedKey             = "preSharedKey"
 	KeyRosenpassEnabled         = "rosenpassEnabled"

client/proto/daemon.pb.gw.go

@@ -1099,6 +1099,30 @@ func request_DaemonService_ExposeService_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtim
 	return stream, metadata, nil
 }
 
+func request_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, client DaemonServiceClient, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
+	var (
+		protoReq RespondApprovalRequest
+		metadata runtime.ServerMetadata
+	)
+	if err := marshaler.NewDecoder(req.Body).Decode(&protoReq); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
+		return nil, metadata, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "%v", err)
+	}
+	msg, err := client.RespondApproval(ctx, &protoReq, grpc.Header(&metadata.HeaderMD), grpc.Trailer(&metadata.TrailerMD))
+	return msg, metadata, err
+}
+
+func local_request_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, server DaemonServiceServer, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
+	var (
+		protoReq RespondApprovalRequest
+		metadata runtime.ServerMetadata
+	)
+	if err := marshaler.NewDecoder(req.Body).Decode(&protoReq); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
+		return nil, metadata, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "%v", err)
+	}
+	msg, err := server.RespondApproval(ctx, &protoReq)
+	return msg, metadata, err
+}
+
 func request_DaemonService_WailsUIReady_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, client DaemonServiceClient, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
 	var (
 		protoReq WailsUIReadyRequest
@@ -1977,6 +2001,26 @@ func RegisterDaemonServiceHandlerServer(ctx context.Context, mux *runtime.ServeM
 		runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
 		return
 	})
+	mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
+		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
+		defer cancel()
+		var stream runtime.ServerTransportStream
+		ctx = grpc.NewContextWithServerTransportStream(ctx, &stream)
+		inboundMarshaler, outboundMarshaler := runtime.MarshalerForRequest(mux, req)
+		annotatedContext, err := runtime.AnnotateIncomingContext(ctx, mux, req, "/daemon.DaemonService/RespondApproval", runtime.WithHTTPPathPattern("/daemon.DaemonService/RespondApproval"))
+		if err != nil {
+			runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
+			return
+		}
+		resp, md, err := local_request_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0(annotatedContext, inboundMarshaler, server, req, pathParams)
+		md.HeaderMD, md.TrailerMD = metadata.Join(md.HeaderMD, stream.Header()), metadata.Join(md.TrailerMD, stream.Trailer())
+		annotatedContext = runtime.NewServerMetadataContext(annotatedContext, md)
+		if err != nil {
+			runtime.HTTPError(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
+			return
+		}
+		forward_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
+	})
 	mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_WailsUIReady_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
 		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
 		defer cancel()
@@ -2802,6 +2846,23 @@ func RegisterDaemonServiceHandlerClient(ctx context.Context, mux *runtime.ServeM
 		}
 		forward_DaemonService_ExposeService_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, func() (proto.Message, error) { return resp.Recv() }, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
 	})
+	mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
+		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
+		defer cancel()
+		inboundMarshaler, outboundMarshaler := runtime.MarshalerForRequest(mux, req)
+		annotatedContext, err := runtime.AnnotateContext(ctx, mux, req, "/daemon.DaemonService/RespondApproval", runtime.WithHTTPPathPattern("/daemon.DaemonService/RespondApproval"))
+		if err != nil {
+			runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
+			return
+		}
+		resp, md, err := request_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0(annotatedContext, inboundMarshaler, client, req, pathParams)
+		annotatedContext = runtime.NewServerMetadataContext(annotatedContext, md)
+		if err != nil {
+			runtime.HTTPError(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
+			return
+		}
+		forward_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
+	})
 	mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_WailsUIReady_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
 		ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
 		defer cancel()
@@ -2868,6 +2929,7 @@ var (
 	pattern_DaemonService_StopCPUProfile_0             = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "StopCPUProfile"}, ""))
 	pattern_DaemonService_GetInstallerResult_0         = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "GetInstallerResult"}, ""))
 	pattern_DaemonService_ExposeService_0              = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "ExposeService"}, ""))
+	pattern_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0            = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "RespondApproval"}, ""))
 	pattern_DaemonService_WailsUIReady_0               = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "WailsUIReady"}, ""))
 )
 
@@ -2917,5 +2979,6 @@ var (
 	forward_DaemonService_StopCPUProfile_0             = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
 	forward_DaemonService_GetInstallerResult_0         = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
 	forward_DaemonService_ExposeService_0              = runtime.ForwardResponseStream
+	forward_DaemonService_RespondApproval_0            = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
 	forward_DaemonService_WailsUIReady_0               = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
 )

client/proto/daemon.proto

@@ -152,6 +152,14 @@ service DaemonService {
   // ExposeService exposes a local port via the NetBird reverse proxy
   rpc ExposeService(ExposeServiceRequest) returns (stream ExposeServiceEvent) {}
 
+  // RespondApproval delivers the user's accept/deny decision for a
+  // pending user-approval prompt. The daemon pushes the prompt as a
+  // SystemEvent with category APPROVAL and metadata key "request_id";
+  // the UI calls this RPC with the same request_id to unblock whichever
+  // subsystem (VNC, SSH, ...) is waiting. The "kind" metadata key tells
+  // the UI which subsystem the prompt belongs to.
+  rpc RespondApproval(RespondApprovalRequest) returns (RespondApprovalResponse) {}
+
   // WailsUIReady is a no-op probe the Wails UI calls once at startup. The UI
   // only cares whether the daemon implements it: an Unimplemented response
   // means the daemon predates this UI and is too old to drive it.
@@ -242,6 +250,10 @@ message LoginRequest {
   optional bool disableSSHAuth = 38;
   optional int32 sshJWTCacheTTL = 39;
   optional bool disable_ipv6 = 40;
+
+  optional bool serverVNCAllowed = 41;
+
+  optional bool disableVNCApproval = 42;
 }
 
 message LoginResponse {
@@ -362,12 +374,16 @@ message GetConfigResponse {
 
   bool disable_ipv6 = 27;
 
+  bool serverVNCAllowed = 28;
+
+  bool disableVNCApproval = 29;
+
   // mDMManagedFields lists the names of configuration keys whose value is
   // currently enforced by an MDM policy. Names match mdm.Key* constants
   // (e.g. "managementURL", "disableClientRoutes"). UI/CLI clients should
   // render the corresponding inputs as read-only and display a "managed
   // by MDM" indicator.
-  repeated string mDMManagedFields = 28;
+  repeated string mDMManagedFields = 30;
 }
 
 // PeerState contains the latest state of a peer
@@ -452,6 +468,25 @@ message SSHServerState {
   repeated SSHSessionInfo sessions = 2;
 }
 
+// VNCSessionInfo contains information about an active VNC session
+message VNCSessionInfo {
+  string remoteAddress = 1;
+  string mode = 2;
+  string username = 3;
+  // userID is the Noise-verified session identity (hashed user ID from
+  // the ACL session-key entry), empty when auth is disabled.
+  string userID = 4;
+  // initiator is the human-readable display name of the dashboard user
+  // who minted the SessionPubKey, when known.
+  string initiator = 5;
+}
+
+// VNCServerState contains the latest state of the VNC server
+message VNCServerState {
+  bool enabled = 1;
+  repeated VNCSessionInfo sessions = 2;
+}
+
 // FullStatus contains the full state held by the Status instance
 message FullStatus {
   ManagementState managementState = 1;
@@ -472,6 +507,7 @@ message FullStatus {
   // on it to know when to re-fetch ListNetworks via the push stream, instead
   // of polling on every status snapshot.
   uint64 networksRevision = 11;
+  VNCServerState vncServerState = 12;
 }
 
 // Networks
@@ -667,6 +703,7 @@ message SystemEvent {
     AUTHENTICATION = 2;
     CONNECTIVITY = 3;
     SYSTEM = 4;
+    APPROVAL = 5;
   }
 
   string id = 1;
@@ -757,6 +794,10 @@ message SetConfigRequest {
   optional bool disableSSHAuth = 33;
   optional int32 sshJWTCacheTTL = 34;
   optional bool disable_ipv6 = 35;
+
+  optional bool serverVNCAllowed = 36;
+
+  optional bool disableVNCApproval = 37;
 }
 
 message SetConfigResponse{}
@@ -1046,3 +1087,18 @@ message StartBundleCaptureRequest {
 message StartBundleCaptureResponse {}
 message StopBundleCaptureRequest {}
 message StopBundleCaptureResponse {}
+
+message RespondApprovalRequest {
+  // request_id matches the SystemEvent metadata key emitted by the daemon
+  // when a subsystem awaits user approval for an inbound connection.
+  string request_id = 1;
+  // accept is true if the user approved the request, false if they
+  // denied it. A missing or unknown request_id is treated as a no-op.
+  bool accept = 2;
+  // view_only signals that the user granted the connection but withheld
+  // input control. Only meaningful when accept is true; ignored when
+  // accept is false.
+  bool view_only = 3;
+}
+
+message RespondApprovalResponse {}

client/proto/daemon_grpc.pb.go

@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ const (
 	DaemonService_StopCPUProfile_FullMethodName             = "/daemon.DaemonService/StopCPUProfile"
 	DaemonService_GetInstallerResult_FullMethodName         = "/daemon.DaemonService/GetInstallerResult"
 	DaemonService_ExposeService_FullMethodName              = "/daemon.DaemonService/ExposeService"
+	DaemonService_RespondApproval_FullMethodName            = "/daemon.DaemonService/RespondApproval"
 	DaemonService_WailsUIReady_FullMethodName               = "/daemon.DaemonService/WailsUIReady"
 )
 
@@ -167,6 +168,13 @@ type DaemonServiceClient interface {
 	GetInstallerResult(ctx context.Context, in *InstallerResultRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*InstallerResultResponse, error)
 	// ExposeService exposes a local port via the NetBird reverse proxy
 	ExposeService(ctx context.Context, in *ExposeServiceRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (grpc.ServerStreamingClient[ExposeServiceEvent], error)
+	// RespondApproval delivers the user's accept/deny decision for a
+	// pending user-approval prompt. The daemon pushes the prompt as a
+	// SystemEvent with category APPROVAL and metadata key "request_id";
+	// the UI calls this RPC with the same request_id to unblock whichever
+	// subsystem (VNC, SSH, ...) is waiting. The "kind" metadata key tells
+	// the UI which subsystem the prompt belongs to.
+	RespondApproval(ctx context.Context, in *RespondApprovalRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*RespondApprovalResponse, error)
 	// WailsUIReady is a no-op probe the Wails UI calls once at startup. The UI
 	// only cares whether the daemon implements it: an Unimplemented response
 	// means the daemon predates this UI and is too old to drive it.
@@ -667,6 +675,16 @@ func (c *daemonServiceClient) ExposeService(ctx context.Context, in *ExposeServi
 // This type alias is provided for backwards compatibility with existing code that references the prior non-generic stream type by name.
 type DaemonService_ExposeServiceClient = grpc.ServerStreamingClient[ExposeServiceEvent]
 
+func (c *daemonServiceClient) RespondApproval(ctx context.Context, in *RespondApprovalRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*RespondApprovalResponse, error) {
+	cOpts := append([]grpc.CallOption{grpc.StaticMethod()}, opts...)
+	out := new(RespondApprovalResponse)
+	err := c.cc.Invoke(ctx, DaemonService_RespondApproval_FullMethodName, in, out, cOpts...)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return out, nil
+}
+
 func (c *daemonServiceClient) WailsUIReady(ctx context.Context, in *WailsUIReadyRequest, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (*WailsUIReadyResponse, error) {
 	cOpts := append([]grpc.CallOption{grpc.StaticMethod()}, opts...)
 	out := new(WailsUIReadyResponse)
@@ -777,6 +795,13 @@ type DaemonServiceServer interface {
 	GetInstallerResult(context.Context, *InstallerResultRequest) (*InstallerResultResponse, error)
 	// ExposeService exposes a local port via the NetBird reverse proxy
 	ExposeService(*ExposeServiceRequest, grpc.ServerStreamingServer[ExposeServiceEvent]) error
+	// RespondApproval delivers the user's accept/deny decision for a
+	// pending user-approval prompt. The daemon pushes the prompt as a
+	// SystemEvent with category APPROVAL and metadata key "request_id";
+	// the UI calls this RPC with the same request_id to unblock whichever
+	// subsystem (VNC, SSH, ...) is waiting. The "kind" metadata key tells
+	// the UI which subsystem the prompt belongs to.
+	RespondApproval(context.Context, *RespondApprovalRequest) (*RespondApprovalResponse, error)
 	// WailsUIReady is a no-op probe the Wails UI calls once at startup. The UI
 	// only cares whether the daemon implements it: an Unimplemented response
 	// means the daemon predates this UI and is too old to drive it.
@@ -926,6 +951,9 @@ func (UnimplementedDaemonServiceServer) GetInstallerResult(context.Context, *Ins
 func (UnimplementedDaemonServiceServer) ExposeService(*ExposeServiceRequest, grpc.ServerStreamingServer[ExposeServiceEvent]) error {
 	return status.Error(codes.Unimplemented, "method ExposeService not implemented")
 }
+func (UnimplementedDaemonServiceServer) RespondApproval(context.Context, *RespondApprovalRequest) (*RespondApprovalResponse, error) {
+	return nil, status.Error(codes.Unimplemented, "method RespondApproval not implemented")
+}
 func (UnimplementedDaemonServiceServer) WailsUIReady(context.Context, *WailsUIReadyRequest) (*WailsUIReadyResponse, error) {
 	return nil, status.Error(codes.Unimplemented, "method WailsUIReady not implemented")
 }
@@ -1732,6 +1760,24 @@ func _DaemonService_ExposeService_Handler(srv interface{}, stream grpc.ServerStr
 // This type alias is provided for backwards compatibility with existing code that references the prior non-generic stream type by name.
 type DaemonService_ExposeServiceServer = grpc.ServerStreamingServer[ExposeServiceEvent]
 
+func _DaemonService_RespondApproval_Handler(srv interface{}, ctx context.Context, dec func(interface{}) error, interceptor grpc.UnaryServerInterceptor) (interface{}, error) {
+	in := new(RespondApprovalRequest)
+	if err := dec(in); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if interceptor == nil {
+		return srv.(DaemonServiceServer).RespondApproval(ctx, in)
+	}
+	info := &grpc.UnaryServerInfo{
+		Server:     srv,
+		FullMethod: DaemonService_RespondApproval_FullMethodName,
+	}
+	handler := func(ctx context.Context, req interface{}) (interface{}, error) {
+		return srv.(DaemonServiceServer).RespondApproval(ctx, req.(*RespondApprovalRequest))
+	}
+	return interceptor(ctx, in, info, handler)
+}
+
 func _DaemonService_WailsUIReady_Handler(srv interface{}, ctx context.Context, dec func(interface{}) error, interceptor grpc.UnaryServerInterceptor) (interface{}, error) {
 	in := new(WailsUIReadyRequest)
 	if err := dec(in); err != nil {
@@ -1921,6 +1967,10 @@ var DaemonService_ServiceDesc = grpc.ServiceDesc{
 			MethodName: "GetInstallerResult",
 			Handler:    _DaemonService_GetInstallerResult_Handler,
 		},
+		{
+			MethodName: "RespondApproval",
+			Handler:    _DaemonService_RespondApproval_Handler,
+		},
 		{
 			MethodName: "WailsUIReady",
 			Handler:    _DaemonService_WailsUIReady_Handler,

client/server/capture.go

@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ func (s *Server) StartCapture(req *proto.StartCaptureRequest, stream proto.Daemo
 		return status.Errorf(codes.Internal, "create capture session: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	engine, err := s.claimCapture(sess)
+	engine, err := s.claimCapture(sess, func() { pw.Close() })
 	if err != nil {
 		sess.Stop()
 		pw.Close()
@@ -190,10 +190,7 @@ func (s *Server) StartBundleCapture(_ context.Context, req *proto.StartBundleCap
 
 	s.stopBundleCaptureLocked()
 	s.cleanupBundleCapture()
-
-	if s.activeCapture != nil {
-		return nil, status.Error(codes.FailedPrecondition, "another capture is already running")
-	}
+	s.evictActiveCaptureLocked()
 
 	engine, err := s.getCaptureEngineLocked()
 	if err != nil {
@@ -304,29 +301,58 @@ func (s *Server) cleanupBundleCapture() {
 	s.bundleCapture = nil
 }
 
-// claimCapture reserves the engine's capture slot for sess. Returns
-// FailedPrecondition if another capture is already active.
-func (s *Server) claimCapture(sess *capture.Session) (*internal.Engine, error) {
+// claimCapture reserves the engine's capture slot for sess. If another
+// capture is already running it is evicted: a previous streaming session
+// whose gRPC client died and never freed the slot stays stuck otherwise,
+// and a bundle capture is just informational state.
+func (s *Server) claimCapture(sess *capture.Session, cancel func()) (*internal.Engine, error) {
 	s.mutex.Lock()
 	defer s.mutex.Unlock()
 
-	if s.activeCapture != nil {
-		return nil, status.Error(codes.FailedPrecondition, "another capture is already running")
-	}
+	s.evictActiveCaptureLocked()
 	engine, err := s.getCaptureEngineLocked()
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 	s.activeCapture = sess
+	s.activeCaptureCancel = cancel
 	return engine, nil
 }
 
+// evictActiveCaptureLocked tears down whatever capture currently owns
+// the engine slot so a fresh claim can succeed. Caller must hold mutex.
+func (s *Server) evictActiveCaptureLocked() {
+	if s.activeCapture == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	if s.bundleCapture != nil && s.bundleCapture.sess == s.activeCapture {
+		log.Infof("evicting running bundle capture to start a new capture")
+		s.stopBundleCaptureLocked()
+		return
+	}
+	log.Infof("evicting previous streaming capture to start a new one")
+	prev := s.activeCapture
+	cancel := s.activeCaptureCancel
+	if engine, err := s.getCaptureEngineLocked(); err == nil {
+		if err := engine.SetCapture(nil); err != nil {
+			log.Debugf("clear previous capture: %v", err)
+		}
+	}
+	s.activeCapture = nil
+	s.activeCaptureCancel = nil
+	prev.Stop()
+	if cancel != nil {
+		cancel()
+	}
+}
+
 // releaseCapture clears the active-capture owner if it still matches sess.
 func (s *Server) releaseCapture(sess *capture.Session) {
 	s.mutex.Lock()
 	defer s.mutex.Unlock()
 	if s.activeCapture == sess {
 		s.activeCapture = nil
+		s.activeCaptureCancel = nil
 	}
 }
 
@@ -341,6 +367,7 @@ func (s *Server) clearCaptureIfOwner(sess *capture.Session, engine *internal.Eng
 		log.Debugf("clear capture: %v", err)
 	}
 	s.activeCapture = nil
+	s.activeCaptureCancel = nil
 }
 
 func (s *Server) getCaptureEngineLocked() (*internal.Engine, error) {

client/server/mdm.go

@@ -297,6 +297,8 @@ func mdmManagedFieldConflicts(msg *proto.SetConfigRequest, policy *mdm.Policy) [
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyRosenpassPermissive, msg.RosenpassPermissive),
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableAutoConnect, msg.DisableAutoConnect),
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyAllowServerSSH, msg.ServerSSHAllowed),
+		conflictBool(mdm.KeyAllowServerVNC, msg.ServerVNCAllowed),
+		conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableVNCApproval, msg.DisableVNCApproval),
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableClientRoutes, msg.DisableClientRoutes),
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableServerRoutes, msg.DisableServerRoutes),
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyBlockInbound, msg.BlockInbound),
@@ -332,6 +334,8 @@ func setConfigRequestHasConfigOverrides(msg *proto.SetConfigRequest) bool {
 		msg.Mtu != nil ||
 		msg.DisableAutoConnect != nil ||
 		msg.ServerSSHAllowed != nil ||
+		msg.ServerVNCAllowed != nil ||
+		msg.DisableVNCApproval != nil ||
 		msg.NetworkMonitor != nil ||
 		msg.DisableClientRoutes != nil ||
 		msg.DisableServerRoutes != nil ||
@@ -370,6 +374,8 @@ func loginRequestHasConfigOverrides(msg *proto.LoginRequest) bool {
 		msg.WireguardPort != nil ||
 		msg.DisableAutoConnect != nil ||
 		msg.ServerSSHAllowed != nil ||
+		msg.ServerVNCAllowed != nil ||
+		msg.DisableVNCApproval != nil ||
 		msg.RosenpassPermissive != nil ||
 		len(msg.ExtraIFaceBlacklist) > 0 ||
 		msg.NetworkMonitor != nil ||
@@ -418,6 +424,8 @@ func loginRequestMDMConflicts(msg *proto.LoginRequest, policy *mdm.Policy) []str
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyRosenpassPermissive, msg.RosenpassPermissive),
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableAutoConnect, msg.DisableAutoConnect),
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyAllowServerSSH, msg.ServerSSHAllowed),
+		conflictBool(mdm.KeyAllowServerVNC, msg.ServerVNCAllowed),
+		conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableVNCApproval, msg.DisableVNCApproval),
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableClientRoutes, msg.DisableClientRoutes),
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableServerRoutes, msg.DisableServerRoutes),
 		conflictBool(mdm.KeyBlockInbound, msg.BlockInbound),

client/server/server.go

@@ -113,8 +113,12 @@ type Server struct {
 	captureEnabled         bool
 	bundleCapture          *bundleCapture
 	// activeCapture is the session currently installed on the engine; guarded by s.mutex.
-	activeCapture    *capture.Session
-	networksDisabled bool
+	activeCapture *capture.Session
+	// activeCaptureCancel tears down the streaming pipe/cancel for the
+	// active streaming capture so eviction unblocks the StartCapture RPC
+	// handler. Nil for bundle captures (they own their own context).
+	activeCaptureCancel func()
+	networksDisabled    bool
 
 	sleepHandler *sleephandler.SleepHandler
 
@@ -492,6 +496,8 @@ func (s *Server) setConfigInputFromRequest(msg *proto.SetConfigRequest) (profile
 	config.RosenpassPermissive = msg.RosenpassPermissive
 	config.DisableAutoConnect = msg.DisableAutoConnect
 	config.ServerSSHAllowed = msg.ServerSSHAllowed
+	config.ServerVNCAllowed = msg.ServerVNCAllowed
+	config.DisableVNCApproval = msg.DisableVNCApproval
 	config.NetworkMonitor = msg.NetworkMonitor
 	config.DisableClientRoutes = msg.DisableClientRoutes
 	config.DisableServerRoutes = msg.DisableServerRoutes
@@ -1437,6 +1443,7 @@ func (s *Server) buildStatusResponse(ctx context.Context, msg *proto.StatusReque
 		pbFullStatus := fullStatus.ToProto()
 		pbFullStatus.Events = s.statusRecorder.GetEventHistory()
 		pbFullStatus.SshServerState = s.getSSHServerState()
+		pbFullStatus.VncServerState = s.getVNCServerState()
 		pbFullStatus.NetworksRevision = s.statusRecorder.GetNetworksRevision()
 		statusResponse.FullStatus = pbFullStatus
 	}
@@ -1477,6 +1484,38 @@ func (s *Server) getSSHServerState() *proto.SSHServerState {
 	return sshServerState
 }
 
+// getVNCServerState retrieves the current VNC server state.
+func (s *Server) getVNCServerState() *proto.VNCServerState {
+	s.mutex.Lock()
+	connectClient := s.connectClient
+	s.mutex.Unlock()
+
+	if connectClient == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	engine := connectClient.Engine()
+	if engine == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	enabled, sessions := engine.GetVNCServerStatus()
+	pbSessions := make([]*proto.VNCSessionInfo, 0, len(sessions))
+	for _, sess := range sessions {
+		pbSessions = append(pbSessions, &proto.VNCSessionInfo{
+			RemoteAddress: sess.RemoteAddress,
+			Mode:          sess.Mode,
+			Username:      sess.Username,
+			UserID:        sess.UserID,
+			Initiator:     sess.Initiator,
+		})
+	}
+	return &proto.VNCServerState{
+		Enabled:  enabled,
+		Sessions: pbSessions,
+	}
+}
+
 // GetPeerSSHHostKey retrieves SSH host key for a specific peer
 func (s *Server) GetPeerSSHHostKey(
 	ctx context.Context,
@@ -1862,6 +1901,30 @@ func (s *Server) ExposeService(req *proto.ExposeServiceRequest, srv proto.Daemon
 	return nil
 }
 
+// RespondApproval relays the user's accept/deny decision for a pending
+// approval prompt to the engine's broker. Unknown or already-resolved
+// request_ids are silently no-op'd so a slow UI cannot deny a prompt the
+// user already handled (or that already timed out).
+func (s *Server) RespondApproval(_ context.Context, msg *proto.RespondApprovalRequest) (*proto.RespondApprovalResponse, error) {
+	if msg.GetRequestId() == "" {
+		return nil, gstatus.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "request_id is required")
+	}
+	s.mutex.Lock()
+	connectClient := s.connectClient
+	s.mutex.Unlock()
+	if connectClient == nil {
+		return nil, gstatus.Errorf(codes.FailedPrecondition, "client not initialized")
+	}
+	engine := connectClient.Engine()
+	if engine == nil {
+		return nil, gstatus.Errorf(codes.FailedPrecondition, "engine not running")
+	}
+	if !engine.RespondApproval(msg.GetRequestId(), msg.GetAccept(), msg.GetViewOnly()) {
+		log.Debugf("approval response for unknown request_id %s", msg.GetRequestId())
+	}
+	return &proto.RespondApprovalResponse{}, nil
+}
+
 func isUnixRunningDesktop() bool {
 	if runtime.GOOS != "linux" && runtime.GOOS != "freebsd" {
 		return false
@@ -1969,6 +2032,8 @@ func (s *Server) GetConfig(ctx context.Context, req *proto.GetConfigRequest) (*p
 		Mtu:                           int64(cfg.MTU),
 		DisableAutoConnect:            cfg.DisableAutoConnect,
 		ServerSSHAllowed:              *cfg.ServerSSHAllowed,
+		ServerVNCAllowed:              cfg.ServerVNCAllowed != nil && *cfg.ServerVNCAllowed,
+		DisableVNCApproval:            cfg.DisableVNCApproval != nil && *cfg.DisableVNCApproval,
 		RosenpassEnabled:              cfg.RosenpassEnabled,
 		RosenpassPermissive:           cfg.RosenpassPermissive,
 		BlockInbound:                  cfg.BlockInbound,

client/server/setconfig_mdm_test.go

@@ -105,6 +105,30 @@ func TestSetConfig_MDMReject_SingleField(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Equal(t, []string{mdm.KeyManagementURL}, v.GetFields())
 }
 
+func TestSetConfig_MDMReject_VNCFields(t *testing.T) {
+	withMDMPolicy(t, mdm.NewPolicy(map[string]any{
+		mdm.KeyAllowServerVNC:     true,
+		mdm.KeyDisableVNCApproval: false,
+	}))
+
+	s, ctx, profName, username, _ := setupServerWithProfile(t)
+
+	vncAllowed := false
+	disableApproval := true
+	_, err := s.SetConfig(ctx, &proto.SetConfigRequest{
+		ProfileName:        profName,
+		Username:           username,
+		ServerVNCAllowed:   &vncAllowed,
+		DisableVNCApproval: &disableApproval,
+	})
+
+	v := extractViolation(t, err)
+	assert.ElementsMatch(t, []string{
+		mdm.KeyAllowServerVNC,
+		mdm.KeyDisableVNCApproval,
+	}, v.GetFields())
+}
+
 func TestSetConfig_MDMReject_MultipleFields(t *testing.T) {
 	withMDMPolicy(t, mdm.NewPolicy(map[string]any{
 		mdm.KeyManagementURL:    "https://mdm.example.com:443",

client/server/setconfig_test.go

@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ func TestSetConfig_AllFieldsSaved(t *testing.T) {
 	rosenpassEnabled := true
 	rosenpassPermissive := true
 	serverSSHAllowed := true
+	serverVNCAllowed := true
+	disableVNCApproval := true
 	interfaceName := "utun100"
 	wireguardPort := int64(51820)
 	preSharedKey := "test-psk"
@@ -82,6 +84,8 @@ func TestSetConfig_AllFieldsSaved(t *testing.T) {
 		RosenpassEnabled:     &rosenpassEnabled,
 		RosenpassPermissive:  &rosenpassPermissive,
 		ServerSSHAllowed:     &serverSSHAllowed,
+		ServerVNCAllowed:     &serverVNCAllowed,
+		DisableVNCApproval:   &disableVNCApproval,
 		InterfaceName:        &interfaceName,
 		WireguardPort:        &wireguardPort,
 		OptionalPreSharedKey: &preSharedKey,
@@ -125,6 +129,10 @@ func TestSetConfig_AllFieldsSaved(t *testing.T) {
 	require.Equal(t, rosenpassPermissive, cfg.RosenpassPermissive)
 	require.NotNil(t, cfg.ServerSSHAllowed)
 	require.Equal(t, serverSSHAllowed, *cfg.ServerSSHAllowed)
+	require.NotNil(t, cfg.ServerVNCAllowed)
+	require.Equal(t, serverVNCAllowed, *cfg.ServerVNCAllowed)
+	require.NotNil(t, cfg.DisableVNCApproval)
+	require.Equal(t, disableVNCApproval, *cfg.DisableVNCApproval)
 	require.Equal(t, interfaceName, cfg.WgIface)
 	require.Equal(t, int(wireguardPort), cfg.WgPort)
 	require.Equal(t, preSharedKey, cfg.PreSharedKey)
@@ -177,6 +185,8 @@ func verifyAllFieldsCovered(t *testing.T, req *proto.SetConfigRequest) {
 		"RosenpassEnabled":              true,
 		"RosenpassPermissive":           true,
 		"ServerSSHAllowed":              true,
+		"ServerVNCAllowed":              true,
+		"DisableVNCApproval":            true,
 		"InterfaceName":                 true,
 		"WireguardPort":                 true,
 		"OptionalPreSharedKey":          true,
@@ -237,6 +247,8 @@ func TestCLIFlags_MappedToSetConfig(t *testing.T) {
 		"enable-rosenpass":                  "RosenpassEnabled",
 		"rosenpass-permissive":              "RosenpassPermissive",
 		"allow-server-ssh":                  "ServerSSHAllowed",
+		"allow-server-vnc":                  "ServerVNCAllowed",
+		"disable-vnc-approval":              "DisableVNCApproval",
 		"interface-name":                    "InterfaceName",
 		"wireguard-port":                    "WireguardPort",
 		"preshared-key":                     "OptionalPreSharedKey",

client/ssh/proxy/proxy_privileged_test.go

@@ -26,10 +26,10 @@ import (
 	cryptossh "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
 
 	nbssh "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh"
-	sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/auth"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/server"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/testutil"
 	nbjwt "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/auth/jwt"
+	sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sessionauth"
 	sshuserhash "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sshauth"
 )
 

client/ssh/server/jwt_test.go

@@ -23,11 +23,11 @@ import (
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 
 	nbssh "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh"
-	sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/auth"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/client"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/detection"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/testutil"
 	nbjwt "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/auth/jwt"
+	sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sessionauth"
 	sshuserhash "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sshauth"
 )
 

client/ssh/server/server.go

@@ -23,10 +23,10 @@ import (
 	"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/tun/netstack"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
-	sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/auth"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/detection"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/auth"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/auth/jwt"
+	sshauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sessionauth"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util/netrelay"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/version"
 )
@@ -197,6 +197,14 @@ type Config struct {
 
 	// HostKey is the SSH server host key in PEM format
 	HostKeyPEM []byte
+
+	// NetstackNet, when non-nil, makes the SSH server listen via the
+	// supplied userspace network stack instead of an OS socket.
+	NetstackNet *netstack.Net
+
+	// NetworkValidation, when non-zero, restricts inbound connections to
+	// peers inside the NetBird overlay defined by this WireGuard address.
+	NetworkValidation wgaddr.Address
 }
 
 // SessionInfo contains information about an active SSH session
@@ -208,12 +216,15 @@ type SessionInfo struct {
 	PortForwards  []string
 }
 
-// New creates an SSH server instance with the provided host key and optional JWT configuration
-// If jwtConfig is nil, JWT authentication is disabled
+// New creates an SSH server instance from the supplied Config. Fields are
+// read once at construction; mutating Config afterwards has no effect.
+// JWT == nil disables JWT authentication.
 func New(config *Config) *Server {
 	s := &Server{
 		mu:                     sync.RWMutex{},
 		hostKeyPEM:             config.HostKeyPEM,
+		netstackNet:            config.NetstackNet,
+		wgAddress:              config.NetworkValidation,
 		sessions:               make(map[sessionKey]*sessionState),
 		pendingAuthJWT:         make(map[authKey]string),
 		remoteForwardListeners: make(map[forwardKey]net.Listener),
@@ -434,20 +445,6 @@ func (s *Server) buildSessionInfo(state *sessionState) SessionInfo {
 	return info
 }
 
-// SetNetstackNet sets the netstack network for userspace networking
-func (s *Server) SetNetstackNet(net *netstack.Net) {
-	s.mu.Lock()
-	defer s.mu.Unlock()
-	s.netstackNet = net
-}
-
-// SetNetworkValidation configures network-based connection filtering
-func (s *Server) SetNetworkValidation(addr wgaddr.Address) {
-	s.mu.Lock()
-	defer s.mu.Unlock()
-	s.wgAddress = addr
-}
-
 // UpdateSSHAuth updates the SSH fine-grained access control configuration
 // This should be called when network map updates include new SSH auth configuration
 func (s *Server) UpdateSSHAuth(config *sshauth.Config) {

client/status/status.go

@@ -136,6 +136,19 @@ type SSHServerStateOutput struct {
 	Sessions []SSHSessionOutput `json:"sessions" yaml:"sessions"`
 }
 
+type VNCSessionOutput struct {
+	RemoteAddress string `json:"remoteAddress" yaml:"remoteAddress"`
+	Mode          string `json:"mode" yaml:"mode"`
+	Username      string `json:"username,omitempty" yaml:"username,omitempty"`
+	UserID        string `json:"userID,omitempty" yaml:"userID,omitempty"`
+	Initiator     string `json:"initiator,omitempty" yaml:"initiator,omitempty"`
+}
+
+type VNCServerStateOutput struct {
+	Enabled  bool               `json:"enabled" yaml:"enabled"`
+	Sessions []VNCSessionOutput `json:"sessions" yaml:"sessions"`
+}
+
 type OutputOverview struct {
 	Peers                   PeersStateOutput           `json:"peers" yaml:"peers"`
 	CliVersion              string                     `json:"cliVersion" yaml:"cliVersion"`
@@ -159,6 +172,7 @@ type OutputOverview struct {
 	LazyConnectionEnabled   bool                       `json:"lazyConnectionEnabled" yaml:"lazyConnectionEnabled"`
 	ProfileName             string                     `json:"profileName" yaml:"profileName"`
 	SSHServerState          SSHServerStateOutput       `json:"sshServer" yaml:"sshServer"`
+	VNCServerState          VNCServerStateOutput       `json:"vncServer" yaml:"vncServer"`
 	// SessionExpiresAt is the absolute UTC instant at which the peer's SSO
 	// session expires. nil when the peer is not SSO-tracked or login
 	// expiration is disabled. Pointer (rather than zero-value time.Time) so
@@ -184,6 +198,7 @@ func ConvertToStatusOutputOverview(pbFullStatus *proto.FullStatus, opts ConvertO
 
 	relayOverview := mapRelays(pbFullStatus.GetRelays())
 	sshServerOverview := mapSSHServer(pbFullStatus.GetSshServerState())
+	vncServerOverview := mapVNCServer(pbFullStatus.GetVncServerState())
 	peersOverview := mapPeers(pbFullStatus.GetPeers(), opts.StatusFilter, opts.PrefixNamesFilter, opts.PrefixNamesFilterMap, opts.IPsFilter, opts.ConnectionTypeFilter)
 
 	overview := OutputOverview{
@@ -209,6 +224,7 @@ func ConvertToStatusOutputOverview(pbFullStatus *proto.FullStatus, opts ConvertO
 		LazyConnectionEnabled:   pbFullStatus.GetLazyConnectionEnabled(),
 		ProfileName:             opts.ProfileName,
 		SSHServerState:          sshServerOverview,
+		VNCServerState:          vncServerOverview,
 	}
 	if !opts.SessionExpiresAt.IsZero() {
 		t := opts.SessionExpiresAt
@@ -294,6 +310,26 @@ func mapSSHServer(sshServerState *proto.SSHServerState) SSHServerStateOutput {
 	}
 }
 
+func mapVNCServer(state *proto.VNCServerState) VNCServerStateOutput {
+	if state == nil {
+		return VNCServerStateOutput{Sessions: []VNCSessionOutput{}}
+	}
+	sessions := make([]VNCSessionOutput, 0, len(state.GetSessions()))
+	for _, sess := range state.GetSessions() {
+		sessions = append(sessions, VNCSessionOutput{
+			RemoteAddress: sess.GetRemoteAddress(),
+			Mode:          sess.GetMode(),
+			Username:      sess.GetUsername(),
+			UserID:        sess.GetUserID(),
+			Initiator:     sess.GetInitiator(),
+		})
+	}
+	return VNCServerStateOutput{
+		Enabled:  state.GetEnabled(),
+		Sessions: sessions,
+	}
+}
+
 func mapPeers(
 	peers []*proto.PeerState,
 	statusFilter string,
@@ -558,6 +594,26 @@ func (o *OutputOverview) GeneralSummary(showURL bool, showRelays bool, showNameS
 		}
 	}
 
+	vncServerStatus := "Disabled"
+	if o.VNCServerState.Enabled {
+		vncSessionCount := len(o.VNCServerState.Sessions)
+		if vncSessionCount > 0 {
+			sessionWord := "session"
+			if vncSessionCount > 1 {
+				sessionWord = "sessions"
+			}
+			vncServerStatus = fmt.Sprintf("Enabled (%d active %s)", vncSessionCount, sessionWord)
+		} else {
+			vncServerStatus = "Enabled"
+		}
+
+		if showSSHSessions && vncSessionCount > 0 {
+			for _, sess := range o.VNCServerState.Sessions {
+				vncServerStatus += "\n  " + formatVNCSessionLine(sess)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
 	peersCountString := fmt.Sprintf("%d/%d Connected", o.Peers.Connected, o.Peers.Total)
 
 	var sessionExpiryString string
@@ -613,6 +669,7 @@ func (o *OutputOverview) GeneralSummary(showURL bool, showRelays bool, showNameS
 			"Quantum resistance: %s\n"+
 			"Lazy connection: %s\n"+
 			"SSH Server: %s\n"+
+			"VNC Server: %s\n"+
 			"Networks: %s\n"+
 			"%s"+
 			"%s"+
@@ -633,6 +690,7 @@ func (o *OutputOverview) GeneralSummary(showURL bool, showRelays bool, showNameS
 		rosenpassEnabledStatus,
 		lazyConnectionEnabledStatus,
 		sshServerStatus,
+		vncServerStatus,
 		networks,
 		forwardingRulesString,
 		sessionExpiryString,
@@ -993,6 +1051,26 @@ func anonymizePeerDetail(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, peer *PeerStateDetailOutput) {
 	}
 }
 
+// formatVNCSessionLine renders a single VNC session row for the detailed
+// status output. The leading slot identifies the initiator (display name
+// when known, hashed UserID otherwise); the post-arrow slot is the OS
+// user the session targets and is omitted in attach mode where the
+// destination is the current console user (unknown to the daemon).
+func formatVNCSessionLine(sess VNCSessionOutput) string {
+	who := sess.Initiator
+	if who == "" {
+		who = sess.UserID
+	}
+	prefix := sess.RemoteAddress
+	if who != "" {
+		prefix = fmt.Sprintf("%s@%s", who, sess.RemoteAddress)
+	}
+	if sess.Username != "" {
+		return fmt.Sprintf("[%s -> %s] mode=%s", prefix, sess.Username, sess.Mode)
+	}
+	return fmt.Sprintf("[%s] mode=%s", prefix, sess.Mode)
+}
+
 func anonymizeOverview(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, overview *OutputOverview) {
 	for i, peer := range overview.Peers.Details {
 		peer := peer
@@ -1013,6 +1091,19 @@ func anonymizeOverview(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, overview *OutputOverview) {
 		overview.Relays.Details[i] = detail
 	}
 
+	anonymizeNSServerGroups(a, overview)
+
+	for i, route := range overview.Networks {
+		overview.Networks[i] = a.AnonymizeRoute(route)
+	}
+
+	overview.FQDN = a.AnonymizeDomain(overview.FQDN)
+
+	anonymizeEvents(a, overview)
+	anonymizeServerSessions(a, overview)
+}
+
+func anonymizeNSServerGroups(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, overview *OutputOverview) {
 	for i, nsGroup := range overview.NSServerGroups {
 		for j, domain := range nsGroup.Domains {
 			overview.NSServerGroups[i].Domains[j] = a.AnonymizeDomain(domain)
@@ -1024,13 +1115,9 @@ func anonymizeOverview(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, overview *OutputOverview) {
 			}
 		}
 	}
+}
 
-	for i, route := range overview.Networks {
-		overview.Networks[i] = a.AnonymizeRoute(route)
-	}
-
-	overview.FQDN = a.AnonymizeDomain(overview.FQDN)
-
+func anonymizeEvents(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, overview *OutputOverview) {
 	for i, event := range overview.Events {
 		overview.Events[i].Message = a.AnonymizeString(event.Message)
 		overview.Events[i].UserMessage = a.AnonymizeString(event.UserMessage)
@@ -1039,15 +1126,26 @@ func anonymizeOverview(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, overview *OutputOverview) {
 			event.Metadata[k] = a.AnonymizeString(v)
 		}
 	}
+}
 
+func anonymizeRemoteAddress(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, addr string) string {
+	if host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr); err == nil {
+		return fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", a.AnonymizeIPString(host), port)
+	}
+	return a.AnonymizeIPString(addr)
+}
+
+func anonymizeServerSessions(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, overview *OutputOverview) {
 	for i, session := range overview.SSHServerState.Sessions {
-		if host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(session.RemoteAddress); err == nil {
-			overview.SSHServerState.Sessions[i].RemoteAddress = fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", a.AnonymizeIPString(host), port)
-		} else {
-			overview.SSHServerState.Sessions[i].RemoteAddress = a.AnonymizeIPString(session.RemoteAddress)
-		}
+		overview.SSHServerState.Sessions[i].RemoteAddress = anonymizeRemoteAddress(a, session.RemoteAddress)
 		overview.SSHServerState.Sessions[i].Command = a.AnonymizeString(session.Command)
 	}
+	for i, sess := range overview.VNCServerState.Sessions {
+		overview.VNCServerState.Sessions[i].RemoteAddress = anonymizeRemoteAddress(a, sess.RemoteAddress)
+		overview.VNCServerState.Sessions[i].Username = a.AnonymizeString(sess.Username)
+		overview.VNCServerState.Sessions[i].UserID = a.AnonymizeString(sess.UserID)
+		overview.VNCServerState.Sessions[i].Initiator = a.AnonymizeString(sess.Initiator)
+	}
 }
 
 // FormatRemainingDuration renders a time.Duration for the "Session expires"

client/status/status_test.go

@@ -242,6 +242,10 @@ var overview = OutputOverview{
 		Enabled:  false,
 		Sessions: []SSHSessionOutput{},
 	},
+	VNCServerState: VNCServerStateOutput{
+		Enabled:  false,
+		Sessions: []VNCSessionOutput{},
+	},
 }
 
 func TestConversionFromFullStatusToOutputOverview(t *testing.T) {
@@ -407,6 +411,10 @@ func TestParsingToJSON(t *testing.T) {
 		  "sshServer":{
 		    "enabled":false,
 			"sessions":[]
+		  },
+		  "vncServer":{
+		    "enabled":false,
+			"sessions":[]
 		  }
         }`
 	// @formatter:on
@@ -517,6 +525,9 @@ profileName: ""
 sshServer:
     enabled: false
     sessions: []
+vncServer:
+    enabled: false
+    sessions: []
 `
 
 	assert.Equal(t, expectedYAML, yaml)
@@ -587,6 +598,7 @@ Wireguard port: %d
 Quantum resistance: false
 Lazy connection: false
 SSH Server: Disabled
+VNC Server: Disabled
 Networks: 10.10.0.0/24
 Peers count: 2/2 Connected
 `, lastConnectionUpdate1, lastHandshake1, lastConnectionUpdate2, lastHandshake2, runtime.GOOS, runtime.GOARCH, overview.CliVersion, overview.WgPort)
@@ -613,6 +625,7 @@ Wireguard port: 51820
 Quantum resistance: false
 Lazy connection: false
 SSH Server: Disabled
+VNC Server: Disabled
 Networks: 10.10.0.0/24
 Peers count: 2/2 Connected
 `

client/system/info.go

@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ type Info struct {
 	RosenpassEnabled    bool
 	RosenpassPermissive bool
 	ServerSSHAllowed    bool
+	ServerVNCAllowed    bool
 
 	DisableClientRoutes bool
 	DisableServerRoutes bool
@@ -84,6 +85,7 @@ type Info struct {
 func (i *Info) SetFlags(
 	rosenpassEnabled, rosenpassPermissive bool,
 	serverSSHAllowed *bool,
+	serverVNCAllowed *bool,
 	disableClientRoutes, disableServerRoutes,
 	disableDNS, disableFirewall, blockLANAccess, blockInbound, disableIPv6 bool,
 	enableSSHRoot, enableSSHSFTP, enableSSHLocalPortForwarding, enableSSHRemotePortForwarding *bool,
@@ -94,6 +96,9 @@ func (i *Info) SetFlags(
 	if serverSSHAllowed != nil {
 		i.ServerSSHAllowed = *serverSSHAllowed
 	}
+	if serverVNCAllowed != nil {
+		i.ServerVNCAllowed = *serverVNCAllowed
+	}
 
 	i.DisableClientRoutes = disableClientRoutes
 	i.DisableServerRoutes = disableServerRoutes

client/ui/frontend/src/app.tsx

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import ReactDOM from "react-dom/client";
 import "./globals.css";
 import { HashRouter, Navigate, Route, Routes } from "react-router-dom";
 import SessionExpirationDialog from "@/modules/session/SessionExpirationDialog.tsx";
+import ApprovalDialog from "@/modules/approval/ApprovalDialog.tsx";
 import UpdateInProgressDialog from "@/modules/auto-update/UpdateInProgressDialog.tsx";
 import WelcomeDialog from "@/modules/welcome/WelcomeDialog.tsx";
 import ErrorDialog from "@/modules/error/ErrorDialog.tsx";
@@ -48,6 +49,7 @@ Promise.all([
                                 path={"session-expiration"}
                                 element={<SessionExpirationDialog />}
                             />
+                            <Route path={"approval"} element={<ApprovalDialog />} />
                             <Route path={"welcome"} element={<WelcomeDialog />} />
                             <Route path={"error"} element={<ErrorDialog />} />
                         </Route>

client/ui/frontend/src/modules/approval/ApprovalDialog.tsx

@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+import { useCallback, useEffect, useMemo, useRef, useState } from "react";
+import { useTranslation } from "react-i18next";
+import { useSearchParams } from "react-router-dom";
+import { MonitorIcon } from "lucide-react";
+import { Button } from "@/components/buttons/Button";
+import { ConfirmDialog } from "@/components/dialog/ConfirmDialog";
+import { DialogActions } from "@/components/dialog/DialogActions";
+import { DialogHeading } from "@/components/dialog/DialogHeading";
+import { SquareIcon } from "@/components/SquareIcon";
+import { Approval, WindowManager } from "@bindings/services";
+import { useAutoSizeWindow } from "@/hooks/useAutoSizeWindow";
+
+const WINDOW_WIDTH = 360;
+// Fallback window so a missing/unparseable expires_at can't leave the prompt open forever.
+const FALLBACK_SECONDS = 13;
+
+// shortFingerprint groups a hex key as XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-XXXX (16 chars). Mirrors the
+// daemon's approval.ShortKeyFingerprint so the value matches an out-of-band reference.
+function shortFingerprint(hexKey: string): string {
+    if (hexKey.length < 8) return "";
+    const src = hexKey.slice(0, 16);
+    return src.match(/.{1,4}/g)?.join("-") ?? src;
+}
+
+type Row = { label: string; value: string; mono?: boolean };
+
+export default function ApprovalDialog() {
+    const { t } = useTranslation();
+    const contentRef = useAutoSizeWindow<HTMLDivElement>(WINDOW_WIDTH);
+    const [params] = useSearchParams();
+    const [busy, setBusy] = useState(false);
+
+    const requestID = params.get("request_id") ?? "";
+    const kind = params.get("kind") ?? "";
+    const initiator = params.get("initiator") ?? "";
+    const peerName = params.get("peer_name") ?? "";
+    const sourceIP = params.get("source_ip") ?? "";
+    const username = params.get("username") ?? "";
+    const peerPubKey = params.get("peer_pubkey") ?? "";
+    const expiresAt = params.get("expires_at") ?? "";
+
+    const deadline = useMemo(() => {
+        const parsed = Date.parse(expiresAt);
+        return Number.isFinite(parsed) ? parsed : Date.now() + FALLBACK_SECONDS * 1000;
+    }, [expiresAt]);
+
+    const title = useMemo(() => {
+        switch (kind) {
+            case "vnc":
+                return t("approval.title.vnc");
+            case "ssh":
+                return t("approval.title.ssh");
+            default:
+                return t("approval.title.default");
+        }
+    }, [kind, t]);
+
+    const rows = useMemo<Row[]>(() => {
+        const out: Row[] = [];
+        // The display name is dashboard-supplied and not cryptographically
+        // asserted; the key fingerprint below IS, so show both.
+        if (initiator) out.push({ label: t("approval.field.user"), value: initiator });
+        const fp = shortFingerprint(peerPubKey);
+        if (fp) out.push({ label: t("approval.field.keyFingerprint"), value: fp, mono: true });
+        if (peerName) out.push({ label: t("approval.field.peer"), value: peerName });
+        if (sourceIP && sourceIP !== peerName)
+            out.push({ label: t("approval.field.sourceIp"), value: sourceIP, mono: true });
+        if (username) out.push({ label: t("approval.field.osUser"), value: username });
+        return out;
+    }, [initiator, peerPubKey, peerName, sourceIP, username, t]);
+
+    const respond = useCallback(
+        async (accept: boolean, viewOnly: boolean) => {
+            if (busy) return;
+            setBusy(true);
+            try {
+                if (requestID) {
+                    await Approval.Respond(requestID, accept, viewOnly);
+                }
+            } catch (e) {
+                console.error("respond approval failed", e);
+            } finally {
+                WindowManager.CloseApproval().catch(console.error);
+            }
+        },
+        [busy, requestID],
+    );
+
+    const secondsLeft = () => Math.max(0, Math.ceil((deadline - Date.now()) / 1000));
+    const [remaining, setRemaining] = useState(secondsLeft);
+    const closedRef = useRef(false);
+    useEffect(() => {
+        const id = globalThis.setInterval(() => {
+            const left = secondsLeft();
+            setRemaining(left);
+            // On the deadline the daemon auto-denies; just close the prompt.
+            if (left <= 0 && !closedRef.current) {
+                closedRef.current = true;
+                WindowManager.CloseApproval().catch(console.error);
+            }
+        }, 1000);
+        return () => globalThis.clearInterval(id);
+        // eslint-disable-next-line react-hooks/exhaustive-deps
+    }, [deadline]);
+
+    const showViewOnly = kind === "vnc";
+
+    return (
+        <ConfirmDialog ref={contentRef} aria-labelledby={"nb-approval-title"}>
+            <SquareIcon icon={MonitorIcon} />
+
+            <DialogHeading id={"nb-approval-title"}>{title}</DialogHeading>
+
+            {rows.length > 0 && (
+                <dl className={"w-full space-y-1 text-left text-sm"}>
+                    {rows.map((row) => (
+                        <div key={row.label} className={"flex justify-between gap-4"}>
+                            <dt className={"shrink-0 text-nb-gray-400"}>{row.label}</dt>
+                            <dd
+                                className={`min-w-0 truncate text-nb-gray-100 ${
+                                    row.mono ? "font-mono" : ""
+                                }`}
+                                title={row.value}
+                            >
+                                {row.value}
+                            </dd>
+                        </div>
+                    ))}
+                </dl>
+            )}
+
+            <div className={"text-sm tabular-nums text-nb-gray-400"} aria-live={"polite"}>
+                {t("approval.countdown", { seconds: remaining })}
+            </div>
+
+            <DialogActions>
+                <Button
+                    autoFocus
+                    variant={"primary"}
+                    size={"md"}
+                    className={"w-full"}
+                    onClick={() => respond(true, false)}
+                    disabled={busy}
+                >
+                    {t("approval.action.allow")}
+                </Button>
+                {showViewOnly && (
+                    <Button
+                        variant={"secondary"}
+                        size={"md"}
+                        className={"w-full"}
+                        onClick={() => respond(true, true)}
+                        disabled={busy}
+                    >
+                        {t("approval.action.allowViewOnly")}
+                    </Button>
+                )}
+                <Button
+                    variant={"danger"}
+                    size={"md"}
+                    className={"w-full"}
+                    onClick={() => respond(false, false)}
+                    disabled={busy}
+                >
+                    {t("approval.action.deny")}
+                </Button>
+            </DialogActions>
+        </ConfirmDialog>
+    );
+}

client/ui/frontend/src/modules/settings/SettingsNavigation.tsx

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import {
     BoltIcon,
     InfoIcon,
     LifeBuoyIcon,
+    MonitorIcon,
     NetworkIcon,
     ShieldIcon,
     SlidersHorizontalIcon,
@@ -20,6 +21,7 @@ export const SettingsNavigation = () => {
     const { updateAvailable } = useClientVersion();
     const { mdm, features } = useRestrictions();
     const showSsh = mdm.allowServerSSH ?? !features.disableUpdateSettings;
+    const showVnc = mdm.allowServerVNC ?? !features.disableUpdateSettings;
 
     const aboutAdornment = updateAvailable ? (
         <Tooltip content={t("settings.tabs.updateAvailable")} side={"right"}>
@@ -63,6 +65,13 @@ export const SettingsNavigation = () => {
                         title={t("settings.tabs.ssh")}
                     />
                 )}
+                {showVnc && (
+                    <VerticalTabs.Trigger
+                        value={"vnc"}
+                        icon={MonitorIcon}
+                        title={t("settings.tabs.vnc")}
+                    />
+                )}
                 {!features.disableUpdateSettings && (
                     <VerticalTabs.Trigger
                         value={"advanced"}

client/ui/frontend/src/modules/settings/SettingsPage.tsx

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import { SettingsNetwork } from "@/modules/settings/SettingsNetwork.tsx";
 import { SettingsSecurity } from "@/modules/settings/SettingsSecurity.tsx";
 import { ProfilesTab } from "@/modules/profiles/ProfilesTab.tsx";
 import { SettingsSSH } from "@/modules/settings/SettingsSSH.tsx";
+import { SettingsVNC } from "@/modules/settings/SettingsVNC.tsx";
 import { SettingsAdvanced } from "@/modules/settings/SettingsAdvanced.tsx";
 import { SettingsTroubleshooting } from "@/modules/settings/SettingsTroubleshooting.tsx";
 import { SettingsAbout } from "@/modules/settings/SettingsAbout.tsx";
@@ -26,6 +27,7 @@ const enum Tab {
     Security = "security",
     Profiles = "profiles",
     SSH = "ssh",
+    VNC = "vnc",
     Advanced = "advanced",
     Troubleshooting = "troubleshooting",
     About = "about",
@@ -37,6 +39,7 @@ const TAB_CONTENT: Record<Tab, ReactNode> = {
     [Tab.Security]: <SettingsSecurity />,
     [Tab.Profiles]: <ProfilesTab />,
     [Tab.SSH]: <SettingsSSH />,
+    [Tab.VNC]: <SettingsVNC />,
     [Tab.Advanced]: <SettingsAdvanced />,
     [Tab.Troubleshooting]: <SettingsTroubleshooting />,
     [Tab.About]: <SettingsAbout />,
@@ -55,12 +58,18 @@ export const SettingsPage = () => {
             [Tab.Security]: editable,
             [Tab.Profiles]: !features.disableProfiles,
             [Tab.SSH]: mdm.allowServerSSH ?? editable,
+            [Tab.VNC]: mdm.allowServerVNC ?? editable,
             [Tab.Advanced]: editable,
             [Tab.Troubleshooting]: true,
             [Tab.About]: true,
         };
         return (Object.keys(visibility) as Tab[]).filter((t) => visibility[t]);
-    }, [features.disableUpdateSettings, features.disableProfiles, mdm.allowServerSSH]);
+    }, [
+        features.disableUpdateSettings,
+        features.disableProfiles,
+        mdm.allowServerSSH,
+        mdm.allowServerVNC,
+    ]);
 
     const defaultTab = visibleTabs[0];
     const [active, setActive] = useState<string>(() => navState?.tab ?? defaultTab);

client/ui/frontend/src/modules/settings/SettingsVNC.tsx

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+import { useTranslation } from "react-i18next";
+import FancyToggleSwitch from "@/components/switches/FancyToggleSwitch";
+import { SectionGroup } from "@/modules/settings/SettingsSection.tsx";
+import { useSettings } from "@/contexts/SettingsContext.tsx";
+import { useRestrictions } from "@/contexts/RestrictionsContext.tsx";
+
+export function SettingsVNC() {
+    const { t } = useTranslation();
+    const { config, setField } = useSettings();
+    const { mdm } = useRestrictions();
+    const isVNCServerEnabled = config.serverVncAllowed;
+    const vncServerManaged = mdm.allowServerVNC != null;
+
+    return (
+        <>
+            <SectionGroup title={t("settings.vnc.section.server")}>
+                <FancyToggleSwitch
+                    value={config.serverVncAllowed}
+                    onChange={(v) => setField("serverVncAllowed", v)}
+                    label={t("settings.vnc.server.label")}
+                    helpText={t("settings.vnc.server.help")}
+                    disabled={vncServerManaged}
+                />
+            </SectionGroup>
+
+            {!mdm.disableVNCApproval && (
+                <SectionGroup
+                    title={t("settings.vnc.section.approval")}
+                    disabled={!isVNCServerEnabled}
+                >
+                    <FancyToggleSwitch
+                        value={!config.disableVncApproval}
+                        onChange={(v) => setField("disableVncApproval", !v)}
+                        label={t("settings.vnc.approval.label")}
+                        helpText={t("settings.vnc.approval.help")}
+                    />
+                </SectionGroup>
+            )}
+        </>
+    );
+}

client/ui/i18n/locales/de/common.json

@@ -1321,5 +1321,65 @@
     },
     "error.unknown": {
         "message": "Vorgang fehlgeschlagen."
+    },
+    "settings.tabs.vnc": {
+        "message": "VNC"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.section.server": {
+        "message": "Server"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.section.approval": {
+        "message": "Genehmigung"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.server.label": {
+        "message": "VNC-Server aktivieren"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.server.help": {
+        "message": "Den NetBird-VNC-Server auf diesem Host ausführen, damit autorisierte Peers den Bildschirm ansehen oder steuern können."
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.approval.label": {
+        "message": "Verbindungsgenehmigung erforderlich"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.approval.help": {
+        "message": "Auf diesem Host eine Aufforderung anzeigen, die bestätigt werden muss, bevor eine eingehende VNC-Verbindung zugelassen wird."
+    },
+    "window.title.approval": {
+        "message": "Verbindungsanfrage"
+    },
+    "approval.title.vnc": {
+        "message": "VNC-Verbindung zulassen?"
+    },
+    "approval.title.ssh": {
+        "message": "SSH-Verbindung zulassen?"
+    },
+    "approval.title.default": {
+        "message": "Eingehende Verbindung zulassen?"
+    },
+    "approval.field.user": {
+        "message": "Von Benutzer"
+    },
+    "approval.field.keyFingerprint": {
+        "message": "Schlüssel-Fingerabdruck"
+    },
+    "approval.field.peer": {
+        "message": "Über Peer"
+    },
+    "approval.field.sourceIp": {
+        "message": "Quell-IP"
+    },
+    "approval.field.osUser": {
+        "message": "Betriebssystem-Benutzer"
+    },
+    "approval.countdown": {
+        "message": "Automatische Ablehnung in {seconds}s"
+    },
+    "approval.action.allow": {
+        "message": "Zulassen"
+    },
+    "approval.action.allowViewOnly": {
+        "message": "Zulassen (nur ansehen)"
+    },
+    "approval.action.deny": {
+        "message": "Ablehnen"
     }
 }

client/ui/i18n/locales/en/common.json

@@ -683,6 +683,10 @@
         "message": "SSH",
         "description": "Settings tab label: SSH. Acronym — keep as-is."
     },
+    "settings.tabs.vnc": {
+        "message": "VNC",
+        "description": "Settings tab label: VNC. Acronym — keep as-is."
+    },
     "settings.tabs.advanced": {
         "message": "Advanced",
         "description": "Settings tab label: Advanced. Keep short."
@@ -951,6 +955,30 @@
         "message": "Second(s)",
         "description": "Unit suffix shown after the JWT TTL number field. The '(s)' marks an optional plural."
     },
+    "settings.vnc.section.server": {
+        "message": "Server",
+        "description": "Section heading: Server (VNC settings)."
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.section.approval": {
+        "message": "Approval",
+        "description": "Section heading: Approval (VNC connection approval settings)."
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.server.label": {
+        "message": "Enable VNC Server",
+        "description": "Toggle label: enable the embedded VNC server."
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.server.help": {
+        "message": "Run the NetBird VNC server on this host so authorized peers can view or control its screen.",
+        "description": "Helper text for the VNC server toggle."
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.approval.label": {
+        "message": "Require Connection Approval",
+        "description": "Toggle label: prompt for approval before each inbound VNC connection."
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.approval.help": {
+        "message": "Show a prompt on this host that must be accepted before an incoming VNC connection is allowed.",
+        "description": "Helper text for the VNC connection-approval toggle."
+    },
     "settings.advanced.section.interface": {
         "message": "Interface",
         "description": "Section heading: Interface (network-interface settings)."
@@ -1363,6 +1391,58 @@
         "message": "Session Expiring",
         "description": "OS window-chrome title for the session-expiration window."
     },
+    "window.title.approval": {
+        "message": "Connection Request",
+        "description": "OS window-chrome title for the inbound-connection approval window."
+    },
+    "approval.title.vnc": {
+        "message": "Allow VNC Connection?",
+        "description": "Approval dialog heading for an inbound VNC connection."
+    },
+    "approval.title.ssh": {
+        "message": "Allow SSH Connection?",
+        "description": "Approval dialog heading for an inbound SSH connection."
+    },
+    "approval.title.default": {
+        "message": "Allow Incoming Connection?",
+        "description": "Approval dialog heading for an inbound connection of unknown kind."
+    },
+    "approval.field.user": {
+        "message": "From user",
+        "description": "Approval dialog row label: the initiating user's display name."
+    },
+    "approval.field.keyFingerprint": {
+        "message": "Key fingerprint",
+        "description": "Approval dialog row label: the connecting peer's cryptographic key fingerprint."
+    },
+    "approval.field.peer": {
+        "message": "Via peer",
+        "description": "Approval dialog row label: the peer the connection arrives through."
+    },
+    "approval.field.sourceIp": {
+        "message": "Source IP",
+        "description": "Approval dialog row label: the source IP address of the connection."
+    },
+    "approval.field.osUser": {
+        "message": "OS user",
+        "description": "Approval dialog row label: the target operating-system user."
+    },
+    "approval.countdown": {
+        "message": "Auto-deny in {seconds}s",
+        "description": "Approval dialog countdown; {seconds} is the remaining whole seconds before the daemon auto-denies."
+    },
+    "approval.action.allow": {
+        "message": "Allow",
+        "description": "Approval dialog button: allow the connection."
+    },
+    "approval.action.allowViewOnly": {
+        "message": "Allow (view only)",
+        "description": "Approval dialog button: allow the connection in view-only mode."
+    },
+    "approval.action.deny": {
+        "message": "Deny",
+        "description": "Approval dialog button: deny the connection."
+    },
     "window.title.updating": {
         "message": "Updating",
         "description": "OS window-chrome title for the update / install window."

client/ui/i18n/locales/es/common.json

@@ -1321,5 +1321,65 @@
     },
     "error.unknown": {
         "message": "La operación falló."
+    },
+    "settings.tabs.vnc": {
+        "message": "VNC"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.section.server": {
+        "message": "Servidor"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.section.approval": {
+        "message": "Aprobación"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.server.label": {
+        "message": "Habilitar el servidor VNC"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.server.help": {
+        "message": "Ejecuta el servidor VNC de NetBird en este host para que los peers autorizados puedan ver o controlar su pantalla."
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.approval.label": {
+        "message": "Requerir aprobación de conexión"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.approval.help": {
+        "message": "Mostrar en este host una solicitud que debe aceptarse antes de permitir una conexión VNC entrante."
+    },
+    "window.title.approval": {
+        "message": "Solicitud de conexión"
+    },
+    "approval.title.vnc": {
+        "message": "¿Permitir la conexión VNC?"
+    },
+    "approval.title.ssh": {
+        "message": "¿Permitir la conexión SSH?"
+    },
+    "approval.title.default": {
+        "message": "¿Permitir la conexión entrante?"
+    },
+    "approval.field.user": {
+        "message": "Del usuario"
+    },
+    "approval.field.keyFingerprint": {
+        "message": "Huella de la clave"
+    },
+    "approval.field.peer": {
+        "message": "A través del peer"
+    },
+    "approval.field.sourceIp": {
+        "message": "IP de origen"
+    },
+    "approval.field.osUser": {
+        "message": "Usuario del SO"
+    },
+    "approval.countdown": {
+        "message": "Rechazo automático en {seconds}s"
+    },
+    "approval.action.allow": {
+        "message": "Permitir"
+    },
+    "approval.action.allowViewOnly": {
+        "message": "Permitir (solo ver)"
+    },
+    "approval.action.deny": {
+        "message": "Denegar"
     }
 }

client/ui/i18n/locales/fr/common.json

@@ -1321,5 +1321,65 @@
     },
     "error.unknown": {
         "message": "L’opération a échoué."
+    },
+    "settings.tabs.vnc": {
+        "message": "VNC"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.section.server": {
+        "message": "Serveur"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.section.approval": {
+        "message": "Approbation"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.server.label": {
+        "message": "Activer le serveur VNC"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.server.help": {
+        "message": "Exécuter le serveur VNC de NetBird sur cet hôte afin que les pairs autorisés puissent voir ou contrôler son écran."
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.approval.label": {
+        "message": "Exiger l'approbation des connexions"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.approval.help": {
+        "message": "Afficher sur cet hôte une invite qui doit être acceptée avant d'autoriser une connexion VNC entrante."
+    },
+    "window.title.approval": {
+        "message": "Demande de connexion"
+    },
+    "approval.title.vnc": {
+        "message": "Autoriser la connexion VNC ?"
+    },
+    "approval.title.ssh": {
+        "message": "Autoriser la connexion SSH ?"
+    },
+    "approval.title.default": {
+        "message": "Autoriser la connexion entrante ?"
+    },
+    "approval.field.user": {
+        "message": "De l'utilisateur"
+    },
+    "approval.field.keyFingerprint": {
+        "message": "Empreinte de clé"
+    },
+    "approval.field.peer": {
+        "message": "Via le pair"
+    },
+    "approval.field.sourceIp": {
+        "message": "IP source"
+    },
+    "approval.field.osUser": {
+        "message": "Utilisateur du système"
+    },
+    "approval.countdown": {
+        "message": "Refus automatique dans {seconds}s"
+    },
+    "approval.action.allow": {
+        "message": "Autoriser"
+    },
+    "approval.action.allowViewOnly": {
+        "message": "Autoriser (lecture seule)"
+    },
+    "approval.action.deny": {
+        "message": "Refuser"
     }
 }

client/ui/i18n/locales/hu/common.json

@@ -1321,5 +1321,65 @@
     },
     "error.unknown": {
         "message": "A művelet meghiúsult."
+    },
+    "settings.tabs.vnc": {
+        "message": "VNC"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.section.server": {
+        "message": "Szerver"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.section.approval": {
+        "message": "Jóváhagyás"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.server.label": {
+        "message": "VNC szerver engedélyezése"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.server.help": {
+        "message": "A NetBird VNC szerver futtatása ezen a gépen, hogy az arra jogosult partnerek megtekinthessék vagy vezérelhessék a képernyőjét."
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.approval.label": {
+        "message": "Kapcsolat jóváhagyásának megkövetelése"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.approval.help": {
+        "message": "Megerősítést kérő ablak megjelenítése ezen a gépen, amelyet el kell fogadni a bejövő VNC-kapcsolat engedélyezése előtt."
+    },
+    "window.title.approval": {
+        "message": "Kapcsolódási kérés"
+    },
+    "approval.title.vnc": {
+        "message": "Engedélyezi a VNC-kapcsolatot?"
+    },
+    "approval.title.ssh": {
+        "message": "Engedélyezi az SSH-kapcsolatot?"
+    },
+    "approval.title.default": {
+        "message": "Engedélyezi a bejövő kapcsolatot?"
+    },
+    "approval.field.user": {
+        "message": "Felhasználótól"
+    },
+    "approval.field.keyFingerprint": {
+        "message": "Kulcs ujjlenyomata"
+    },
+    "approval.field.peer": {
+        "message": "Partneren keresztül"
+    },
+    "approval.field.sourceIp": {
+        "message": "Forrás IP"
+    },
+    "approval.field.osUser": {
+        "message": "OS-felhasználó"
+    },
+    "approval.countdown": {
+        "message": "Automatikus elutasítás {seconds} mp múlva"
+    },
+    "approval.action.allow": {
+        "message": "Engedélyezés"
+    },
+    "approval.action.allowViewOnly": {
+        "message": "Engedélyezés (csak megtekintés)"
+    },
+    "approval.action.deny": {
+        "message": "Elutasítás"
     }
 }

client/ui/i18n/locales/it/common.json

@@ -1321,5 +1321,65 @@
     },
     "error.unknown": {
         "message": "Operazione non riuscita."
+    },
+    "settings.tabs.vnc": {
+        "message": "VNC"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.section.server": {
+        "message": "Server"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.section.approval": {
+        "message": "Approvazione"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.server.label": {
+        "message": "Abilita server VNC"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.server.help": {
+        "message": "Esegui il server VNC di NetBird su questo host in modo che i peer autorizzati possano visualizzarne o controllarne lo schermo."
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.approval.label": {
+        "message": "Richiedi l'approvazione della connessione"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.approval.help": {
+        "message": "Mostra su questo host una richiesta che deve essere accettata prima di consentire una connessione VNC in entrata."
+    },
+    "window.title.approval": {
+        "message": "Richiesta di connessione"
+    },
+    "approval.title.vnc": {
+        "message": "Consentire la connessione VNC?"
+    },
+    "approval.title.ssh": {
+        "message": "Consentire la connessione SSH?"
+    },
+    "approval.title.default": {
+        "message": "Consentire la connessione in entrata?"
+    },
+    "approval.field.user": {
+        "message": "Dall'utente"
+    },
+    "approval.field.keyFingerprint": {
+        "message": "Impronta della chiave"
+    },
+    "approval.field.peer": {
+        "message": "Tramite peer"
+    },
+    "approval.field.sourceIp": {
+        "message": "IP di origine"
+    },
+    "approval.field.osUser": {
+        "message": "Utente del sistema"
+    },
+    "approval.countdown": {
+        "message": "Rifiuto automatico tra {seconds}s"
+    },
+    "approval.action.allow": {
+        "message": "Consenti"
+    },
+    "approval.action.allowViewOnly": {
+        "message": "Consenti (sola visualizzazione)"
+    },
+    "approval.action.deny": {
+        "message": "Rifiuta"
     }
 }

client/ui/i18n/locales/pt/common.json

@@ -1321,5 +1321,65 @@
     },
     "error.unknown": {
         "message": "A operação falhou."
+    },
+    "settings.tabs.vnc": {
+        "message": "VNC"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.section.server": {
+        "message": "Servidor"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.section.approval": {
+        "message": "Aprovação"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.server.label": {
+        "message": "Ativar servidor VNC"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.server.help": {
+        "message": "Execute o servidor VNC do NetBird neste host para que os peers autorizados possam ver ou controlar a sua tela."
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.approval.label": {
+        "message": "Exigir aprovação de conexão"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.approval.help": {
+        "message": "Mostrar neste host um aviso que precisa ser aceito antes de permitir uma conexão VNC de entrada."
+    },
+    "window.title.approval": {
+        "message": "Solicitação de conexão"
+    },
+    "approval.title.vnc": {
+        "message": "Permitir a conexão VNC?"
+    },
+    "approval.title.ssh": {
+        "message": "Permitir a conexão SSH?"
+    },
+    "approval.title.default": {
+        "message": "Permitir a conexão de entrada?"
+    },
+    "approval.field.user": {
+        "message": "Do usuário"
+    },
+    "approval.field.keyFingerprint": {
+        "message": "Impressão digital da chave"
+    },
+    "approval.field.peer": {
+        "message": "Via peer"
+    },
+    "approval.field.sourceIp": {
+        "message": "IP de origem"
+    },
+    "approval.field.osUser": {
+        "message": "Usuário do SO"
+    },
+    "approval.countdown": {
+        "message": "Negação automática em {seconds}s"
+    },
+    "approval.action.allow": {
+        "message": "Permitir"
+    },
+    "approval.action.allowViewOnly": {
+        "message": "Permitir (somente visualização)"
+    },
+    "approval.action.deny": {
+        "message": "Negar"
     }
 }

client/ui/i18n/locales/ru/common.json

@@ -1321,5 +1321,65 @@
     },
     "error.unknown": {
         "message": "Не удалось выполнить операцию."
+    },
+    "settings.tabs.vnc": {
+        "message": "VNC"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.section.server": {
+        "message": "Сервер"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.section.approval": {
+        "message": "Подтверждение"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.server.label": {
+        "message": "Включить VNC-сервер"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.server.help": {
+        "message": "Запустить VNC-сервер NetBird на этом хосте, чтобы авторизованные пиры могли просматривать его экран или управлять им."
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.approval.label": {
+        "message": "Требовать подтверждение подключения"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.approval.help": {
+        "message": "Показывать на этом хосте запрос, который нужно принять перед разрешением входящего VNC-подключения."
+    },
+    "window.title.approval": {
+        "message": "Запрос на подключение"
+    },
+    "approval.title.vnc": {
+        "message": "Разрешить VNC-подключение?"
+    },
+    "approval.title.ssh": {
+        "message": "Разрешить SSH-подключение?"
+    },
+    "approval.title.default": {
+        "message": "Разрешить входящее подключение?"
+    },
+    "approval.field.user": {
+        "message": "От пользователя"
+    },
+    "approval.field.keyFingerprint": {
+        "message": "Отпечаток ключа"
+    },
+    "approval.field.peer": {
+        "message": "Через пир"
+    },
+    "approval.field.sourceIp": {
+        "message": "IP-адрес источника"
+    },
+    "approval.field.osUser": {
+        "message": "Пользователь ОС"
+    },
+    "approval.countdown": {
+        "message": "Автоотклонение через {seconds} с"
+    },
+    "approval.action.allow": {
+        "message": "Разрешить"
+    },
+    "approval.action.allowViewOnly": {
+        "message": "Разрешить (только просмотр)"
+    },
+    "approval.action.deny": {
+        "message": "Отклонить"
     }
 }

client/ui/i18n/locales/zh-CN/common.json

@@ -1321,5 +1321,65 @@
     },
     "error.unknown": {
         "message": "操作失败。"
+    },
+    "settings.tabs.vnc": {
+        "message": "VNC"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.section.server": {
+        "message": "服务器"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.section.approval": {
+        "message": "批准"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.server.label": {
+        "message": "启用 VNC 服务器"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.server.help": {
+        "message": "在此主机上运行 NetBird VNC 服务器，以便授权的对端可以查看或控制其屏幕。"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.approval.label": {
+        "message": "要求连接批准"
+    },
+    "settings.vnc.approval.help": {
+        "message": "在此主机上显示一个提示，必须先接受该提示才能允许传入的 VNC 连接。"
+    },
+    "window.title.approval": {
+        "message": "连接请求"
+    },
+    "approval.title.vnc": {
+        "message": "允许 VNC 连接？"
+    },
+    "approval.title.ssh": {
+        "message": "允许 SSH 连接？"
+    },
+    "approval.title.default": {
+        "message": "允许传入连接？"
+    },
+    "approval.field.user": {
+        "message": "来自用户"
+    },
+    "approval.field.keyFingerprint": {
+        "message": "密钥指纹"
+    },
+    "approval.field.peer": {
+        "message": "经由对端"
+    },
+    "approval.field.sourceIp": {
+        "message": "源 IP"
+    },
+    "approval.field.osUser": {
+        "message": "操作系统用户"
+    },
+    "approval.countdown": {
+        "message": "{seconds} 秒后自动拒绝"
+    },
+    "approval.action.allow": {
+        "message": "允许"
+    },
+    "approval.action.allowViewOnly": {
+        "message": "允许（仅查看）"
+    },
+    "approval.action.deny": {
+        "message": "拒绝"
     }
 }

client/ui/main.go

@@ -318,6 +318,7 @@ func registerServices(app *application.App, conn *Conn, s registeredServices) {
 	app.RegisterService(application.NewService(s.settings))
 	app.RegisterService(application.NewService(s.networks))
 	app.RegisterService(application.NewService(services.NewForwarding(conn)))
+	app.RegisterService(application.NewService(services.NewApproval(conn)))
 	app.RegisterService(application.NewService(s.profiles))
 	app.RegisterService(application.NewService(services.NewDebug(conn)))
 	app.RegisterService(application.NewService(s.update))