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2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
riccardom
945f8809ee Rework signal protocol to minimize number of exchanged initial RP 512KB keys 2026-07-16 17:25:34 +02:00
riccardom
e3e8dd8cb0 [client] persist Rosenpass static keypair across restarts
The Rosenpass static keypair was regenerated on every engine start
(rp.GenerateKeyPair in NewManager), so the local ~512KB public key —
and its fingerprint — changed on each client restart.

Persist the keypair to <StateDir>/rosenpass_key.json with 0600
permissions (same protection tier as the WireGuard private key), and
reload it on start so the public key stays stable across restarts. A
missing, corrupt, or version-incompatible file degrades gracefully to
generating a fresh ephemeral keypair (previous behaviour); an empty
StateDir keeps the ephemeral path for callers without a state dir.

This is the foundation for fingerprint-based RP pubkey caching over
signalling (NET-1407): a stable local key lets remote peers keep their
cached copy valid across our restart.
2026-07-16 10:18:18 +02:00
288 changed files with 4403 additions and 19672 deletions

View File

@@ -5,13 +5,6 @@ on:
schedule:
- cron: "0 3 * * *"
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
bedrock_model:
description: >-
Bedrock inference-profile id to drive the matrix with, exactly as
AWS issues it. Leave empty for the Sonnet 4.6 default.
required: false
default: ""
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
@@ -58,9 +51,6 @@ jobs:
# token (and URL, for gateways) is unset, so partial coverage is fine.
OPENAI_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.E2E_OPENAI_TOKEN }}
ANTHROPIC_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.E2E_ANTHROPIC_TOKEN }}
# Moonshot AI platform key (platform.kimi.ai); drives both Kimi wire
# shapes (OpenAI /v1 and Anthropic /anthropic) through kimi_api.
KIMI_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.E2E_KIMI_TOKEN }}
VERCEL_URL: ${{ secrets.E2E_VERCEL_URL }}
VERCEL_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.E2E_VERCEL_TOKEN }}
OPENROUTER_URL: ${{ secrets.E2E_OPENROUTER_URL }}
@@ -69,8 +59,6 @@ jobs:
CLOUDFLARE_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.E2E_CLOUDFLARE_TOKEN }}
AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK: ${{ secrets.E2E_AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK }}
AWS_REGION: ${{ secrets.E2E_AWS_REGION }}
# Bedrock model override: dispatch input wins, then the repo variable, else the test default.
AWS_BEDROCK_MODEL: ${{ inputs.bedrock_model || vars.E2E_AWS_BEDROCK_MODEL }}
# Vertex (Anthropic-on-Vertex): SA + project required; region defaults
# to "global", model to a pinned claude snapshot.
GOOGLE_VERTEX_SA_BASE64: ${{ secrets.E2E_GOOGLE_VERTEX_SA_BASE64 }}

View File

@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ jobs:
${{ runner.os }}-pnpm-
- name: Install dependencies
run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile --ignore-scripts
run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
- name: Generate Wails bindings
run: pnpm run bindings

View File

@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ jobs:
display_name: Linux
name: ${{ matrix.display_name }}
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
timeout-minutes: 25
timeout-minutes: 15
steps:
- name: Checkout code
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
@@ -79,4 +79,4 @@ jobs:
skip-cache: true
skip-save-cache: true
cache-invalidation-interval: 0
args: --timeout=20m
args: --timeout=12m

View File

@@ -273,8 +273,8 @@ dockers_v2:
- netbirdio/netbird
- ghcr.io/netbirdio/netbird
tags:
- "{{ .Version }}-rootless"
- "{{ if eq .Env.SKIP_PUBLISH \"false\" }}rootless-latest{{ end }}"
- "v{{ .Version }}-rootless"
- "{{ if eq .Env.SKIP_PUBLISH \"false\" }}latest{{ end }}"
dockerfile: client/Dockerfile-rootless
extra_files:
- client/netbird-entrypoint.sh

View File

@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ builds:
- linux
goarch:
- amd64
- arm64
ldflags:
- -s -w -X github.com/netbirdio/netbird/version.version={{.Version}} -X main.commit={{.Commit}} -X main.date={{.CommitDate}} -X main.builtBy=goreleaser
mod_timestamp: "{{ .CommitTimestamp }}"

View File

@@ -247,9 +247,6 @@ func (c *Client) DebugBundle(platformFiles PlatformFiles, anonymize bool) (strin
deps.SyncResponse = resp
if e := cc.Engine(); e != nil {
deps.RefreshStatus = func() {
e.RunHealthProbes(context.Background(), true)
}
if cm := e.GetClientMetrics(); cm != nil {
deps.ClientMetrics = cm
}

View File

@@ -121,7 +121,6 @@ type Manager struct {
udpTracker *conntrack.UDPTracker
icmpTracker *conntrack.ICMPTracker
tcpTracker *conntrack.TCPTracker
fragments *fragmentTracker
forwarder atomic.Pointer[forwarder.Forwarder]
pendingCapture atomic.Pointer[forwarder.PacketCapture]
logger *nblog.Logger
@@ -184,41 +183,6 @@ func (d *decoder) decodePacket(data []byte) error {
}
}
// decodeTransport decodes the transport header of a first fragment (which
// gopacket leaves undecoded) into the decoder and appends its layer type to
// decoded, so the ACL pipeline can evaluate it like a normal packet. It returns
// false if the protocol is unsupported or the header is truncated.
func (d *decoder) decodeTransport(proto layers.IPProtocol, payload []byte) bool {
var l4 gopacket.DecodingLayer
var layerType gopacket.LayerType
var minLen int
switch proto {
case layers.IPProtocolTCP:
l4, layerType, minLen = &d.tcp, layers.LayerTypeTCP, 20
case layers.IPProtocolUDP:
l4, layerType, minLen = &d.udp, layers.LayerTypeUDP, 8
case layers.IPProtocolICMPv4:
l4, layerType, minLen = &d.icmp4, layers.LayerTypeICMPv4, 8
case layers.IPProtocolICMPv6:
l4, layerType, minLen = &d.icmp6, layers.LayerTypeICMPv6, 8
default:
return false
}
// Reject a fragment too small to hold the full transport header before
// decoding: it can't be ACL-evaluated (tiny-fragment attack), and skipping
// the decode avoids gopacket allocating an error on the drop path.
if len(payload) < minLen {
return false
}
if err := l4.DecodeFromBytes(payload, gopacket.NilDecodeFeedback); err != nil {
return false
}
d.decoded = append(d.decoded, layerType)
return true
}
// Create userspace firewall manager constructor
func Create(iface common.IFaceMapper, disableServerRoutes bool, flowLogger nftypes.FlowLogger, mtu uint16) (*Manager, error) {
return create(iface, nil, disableServerRoutes, flowLogger, mtu)
@@ -322,8 +286,6 @@ func create(iface common.IFaceMapper, nativeFirewall firewall.Manager, disableSe
if err := m.localipmanager.UpdateLocalIPs(iface); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("update local IPs: %w", err)
}
m.fragments = newFragmentTracker(m.logger)
if disableConntrack {
log.Info("conntrack is disabled")
} else {
@@ -337,7 +299,6 @@ func create(iface common.IFaceMapper, nativeFirewall firewall.Manager, disableSe
}
}
if err := iface.SetFilter(m); err != nil {
m.fragments.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("set filter: %w", err)
}
return m, nil
@@ -733,10 +694,6 @@ func (m *Manager) resetState() {
m.tcpTracker.Close()
}
if m.fragments != nil {
m.fragments.Close()
}
if fwder := m.forwarder.Load(); fwder != nil {
fwder.SetCapture(nil)
fwder.Stop()
@@ -1089,20 +1046,19 @@ func (m *Manager) filterInbound(packetData []byte, size int) bool {
return true
}
// gopacket does not decode the transport header of any IP fragment, so
// fragments take a dedicated path: the first fragment's header is decoded
// and ACL-evaluated here, and the remaining fragments inherit its verdict.
// TODO: pass fragments of routed packets to forwarder
if fragment {
return m.filterInboundFragment(d, srcIP, dstIP, size)
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
if d.decoded[0] == layers.LayerTypeIPv4 {
m.logger.Trace4("packet is a fragment: src=%v dst=%v id=%v flags=%v",
srcIP, dstIP, d.ip4.Id, d.ip4.Flags)
} else {
m.logger.Trace2("packet is an IPv6 fragment: src=%v dst=%v", srcIP, dstIP)
}
}
return false
}
return m.filterInboundDecoded(d, srcIP, dstIP, packetData, size)
}
// filterInboundDecoded runs the ACL, DNAT and conntrack pipeline on a fully
// decoded (non-fragment) inbound packet. It returns true if the packet should
// be dropped.
func (m *Manager) filterInboundDecoded(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, packetData []byte, size int) bool {
// TODO: optimize port DNAT by caching matched rules in conntrack
if translated := m.translateInboundPortDNAT(packetData, d, srcIP, dstIP); translated {
// Re-decode after port DNAT translation to update port information
@@ -1133,226 +1089,33 @@ func (m *Manager) filterInboundDecoded(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, pack
return m.handleRoutedTraffic(d, srcIP, dstIP, packetData, size)
}
// fragmentMeta holds the reassembly identity and layout of an IP fragment,
// extracted uniformly for IPv4 and IPv6.
type fragmentMeta struct {
key fragmentKey
// offset is the fragment offset in 8-byte units (zero for the first
// fragment).
offset uint16
// moreFragments is the More Fragments bit. A first fragment with it unset is
// an IPv6 atomic fragment (a complete datagram, RFC 6946): it has no trailing
// fragments to inherit a verdict, so it must not be recorded.
moreFragments bool
proto layers.IPProtocol
// l4payload is the fragmentable payload of this fragment. For the first
// fragment it starts with the transport header.
l4payload []byte
// headerEndOctets is the first fragment's payload length in 8-byte units:
// the smallest offset a trailing fragment may start at without overlapping
// the inspected transport header.
headerEndOctets uint16
}
// fragmentMetadata extracts the fragment identity and layout from a decoded IP
// fragment. It returns false for fragments it can't interpret (e.g. an IPv6
// fragment header shorter than 8 bytes), which are then dropped.
func fragmentMetadata(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr) (fragmentMeta, bool) {
switch d.decoded[0] {
case layers.LayerTypeIPv4:
payload := d.ip4.Payload
return fragmentMeta{
key: fragmentKey{srcIP: srcIP, dstIP: dstIP, id: uint32(d.ip4.Id), proto: uint8(d.ip4.Protocol)},
offset: d.ip4.FragOffset,
moreFragments: d.ip4.Flags&layers.IPv4MoreFragments != 0,
proto: d.ip4.Protocol,
l4payload: payload,
headerEndOctets: octets(len(payload)),
}, true
case layers.LayerTypeIPv6:
// IPv6 fragment extension header: 8 bytes, followed by the fragmentable
// payload. Layout: next header (1), reserved (1), offset+flags (2), id (4).
payload := d.ip6.Payload
if len(payload) < 8 {
return fragmentMeta{}, false
}
nextHeader := layers.IPProtocol(payload[0])
offsetFlags := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(payload[2:4])
id := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(payload[4:8])
l4 := payload[8:]
return fragmentMeta{
key: fragmentKey{srcIP: srcIP, dstIP: dstIP, id: id, proto: uint8(nextHeader)},
offset: offsetFlags >> 3,
moreFragments: offsetFlags&1 != 0,
proto: nextHeader,
l4payload: l4,
headerEndOctets: octets(len(l4)),
}, true
default:
return fragmentMeta{}, false
}
}
// octets rounds a byte length up to whole 8-byte units, the granularity of the
// IP fragment offset field.
func octets(nbytes int) uint16 {
return uint16((nbytes + 7) / 8)
}
// filterInboundFragment decides the fate of an IP fragment. gopacket stops
// decoding at the network layer for every fragment, so the first fragment's
// transport header is decoded and ACL-evaluated here and its verdict recorded;
// the remaining (headerless) fragments inherit that verdict. Anything that
// cannot be tied to an allowed, non-overlapping first fragment is dropped.
func (m *Manager) filterInboundFragment(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, size int) bool {
meta, ok := fragmentMetadata(d, srcIP, dstIP)
if !ok {
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
m.logger.Trace2("dropping unsupported fragment: src=%v dst=%v", srcIP, dstIP)
}
return true
}
if meta.offset != 0 {
return m.filterTrailingFragment(meta, srcIP, dstIP)
}
// A new first fragment supersedes any recorded verdict for this datagram, so
// a re-sent or overlapping offset-zero fragment can't inherit the old one.
m.fragments.poison(meta.key)
// First fragment: decode its transport header so the ACL can evaluate it. A
// decode failure means the fragment is too small to hold the full transport
// header (RFC 1858 §3 tiny-fragment attack); it can't be evaluated, so drop it.
if !d.decodeTransport(meta.proto, meta.l4payload) {
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
m.logger.Trace3("dropping first fragment without full L4 header: src=%v dst=%v id=%v",
srcIP, dstIP, meta.key.id)
}
return true
}
return m.filterFirstFragment(d, meta, srcIP, dstIP, size)
}
// filterTrailingFragment applies a recorded first-fragment verdict to a
// non-first fragment.
func (m *Manager) filterTrailingFragment(meta fragmentMeta, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr) bool {
switch m.fragments.verdict(meta.key, meta.offset) {
case fragmentAllow:
return false
case fragmentOverlap:
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
m.logger.Trace3("dropping overlapping fragment rewriting inspected header: src=%v dst=%v id=%v",
srcIP, dstIP, meta.key.id)
}
return true
default:
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
m.logger.Trace3("dropping fragment with no allowed first fragment: src=%v dst=%v id=%v",
srcIP, dstIP, meta.key.id)
}
return true
}
}
// filterFirstFragment runs the verdict part of the inbound pipeline on a first
// fragment with its transport header decoded. It mirrors filterInboundDecoded
// but skips DNAT (port rewriting on fragments is unsupported) and forwarder
// injection (fragments are left to the stack to reassemble, not forwarded).
// Allowed fragments have their verdict recorded so the datagram's trailing
// fragments inherit it.
func (m *Manager) filterFirstFragment(d *decoder, meta fragmentMeta, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, size int) bool {
if m.stateful && m.isValidTrackedConnection(d, srcIP, dstIP, size) {
m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
return false
}
if m.localipmanager.IsLocalIP(dstIP) {
ruleID, blocked := m.peerACLsBlock(srcIP, d, nil)
if blocked {
m.storeDropFlow("Dropping local first fragment (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
return true
}
m.trackInbound(d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
return false
}
if !m.routingEnabled.Load() {
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
m.logger.Trace2("Dropping routed fragment (routing disabled): src=%s dst=%s", srcIP, dstIP)
}
return true
}
if m.nativeRouter.Load() {
m.trackInbound(d, srcIP, dstIP, nil, size)
m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
return false
}
// TODO: pass fragments of routed packets to the forwarder; until then
// allowed routed fragments go to the native stack.
srcPort, dstPort := getPortsFromPacket(d)
ruleID, pass := m.routeACLsPass(srcIP, dstIP, d.decoded[1], srcPort, dstPort)
if !pass {
m.storeDropFlow("Dropping routed first fragment (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
return true
}
m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
return false
}
// recordFirstFragment caches an allowed first fragment's verdict for its
// trailing fragments to inherit. Atomic fragments (no More Fragments bit) are
// complete datagrams with no trailing fragments, so they are not cached and
// cannot exhaust the verdict table.
func (m *Manager) recordFirstFragment(meta fragmentMeta) {
if !meta.moreFragments {
return
}
m.fragments.recordAllowed(meta.key, meta.headerEndOctets)
}
// storeDropFlow logs and records a netflow drop event for an inbound packet
// denied by the ACLs. msg is the trace format taking rule id, protocol, source
// and destination.
func (m *Manager) storeDropFlow(msg string, d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, ruleID []byte, size int) {
pnum := getProtocolFromPacket(d)
srcPort, dstPort := getPortsFromPacket(d)
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
m.logger.Trace6(msg, ruleID, pnum, srcIP, srcPort, dstIP, dstPort)
}
m.flowLogger.StoreEvent(nftypes.EventFields{
FlowID: uuid.New(),
Type: nftypes.TypeDrop,
RuleID: ruleID,
Direction: nftypes.Ingress,
Protocol: pnum,
SourceIP: srcIP,
DestIP: dstIP,
SourcePort: srcPort,
DestPort: dstPort,
// TODO: icmp type/code
RxPackets: 1,
RxBytes: uint64(size),
})
}
// handleLocalTraffic handles local traffic.
// If it returns true, the packet should be dropped.
func (m *Manager) handleLocalTraffic(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, packetData []byte, size int) bool {
ruleID, blocked := m.peerACLsBlock(srcIP, d, packetData)
if blocked {
m.storeDropFlow("Dropping local packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
pnum := getProtocolFromPacket(d)
srcPort, dstPort := getPortsFromPacket(d)
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
m.logger.Trace6("Dropping local packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
ruleID, pnum, srcIP, srcPort, dstIP, dstPort)
}
m.flowLogger.StoreEvent(nftypes.EventFields{
FlowID: uuid.New(),
Type: nftypes.TypeDrop,
RuleID: ruleID,
Direction: nftypes.Ingress,
Protocol: pnum,
SourceIP: srcIP,
DestIP: dstIP,
SourcePort: srcPort,
DestPort: dstPort,
// TODO: icmp type/code
RxPackets: 1,
RxBytes: uint64(size),
})
return true
}
@@ -1405,8 +1168,27 @@ func (m *Manager) handleRoutedTraffic(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, packe
ruleID, pass := m.routeACLsPass(srcIP, dstIP, protoLayer, srcPort, dstPort)
if !pass {
m.storeDropFlow("Dropping routed packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
proto := getProtocolFromPacket(d)
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
m.logger.Trace6("Dropping routed packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
ruleID, proto, srcIP, srcPort, dstIP, dstPort)
}
m.flowLogger.StoreEvent(nftypes.EventFields{
FlowID: uuid.New(),
Type: nftypes.TypeDrop,
RuleID: ruleID,
Direction: nftypes.Ingress,
Protocol: proto,
SourceIP: srcIP,
DestIP: dstIP,
SourcePort: srcPort,
DestPort: dstPort,
// TODO: icmp type/code
RxPackets: 1,
RxBytes: uint64(size),
})
return true
}

View File

@@ -5,9 +5,7 @@ import (
"fmt"
"net"
"net/netip"
"os"
"runtime"
"strconv"
"sync"
"time"
@@ -33,11 +31,6 @@ const (
defaultMaxInFlight = 1024
iosReceiveWindow = 16384
iosMaxInFlight = 256
// envForceTCPRACK overrides the platform default for gVisor's RACK loss
// detection. Set to a truthy value to force RACK on, or a falsy value to
// force it off, on any platform.
envForceTCPRACK = "NB_FORCE_TCP_RACK"
)
type Forwarder struct {
@@ -159,8 +152,6 @@ func New(iface common.IFaceMapper, logger *nblog.Logger, flowLogger nftypes.Flow
maxInFlight = iosMaxInFlight
}
configureTCPRecovery(s)
tcpForwarder := tcp.NewForwarder(s, receiveWindow, maxInFlight, f.handleTCP)
s.SetTransportProtocolHandler(tcp.ProtocolNumber, tcpForwarder.HandlePacket)
@@ -475,31 +466,3 @@ func probeRawICMP(network, addr string, logger *nblog.Logger) bool {
logger.Debug1("forwarder: raw %s socket access available", network)
return true
}
// configureTCPRecovery disables gVisor's RACK loss detection on Windows, where
// it interacts poorly with the host and collapses throughput on routed TCP
// connections (gVisor issue #9778). Other platforms keep the default. The
// EnvForceTCPRACK environment variable overrides the platform default.
func configureTCPRecovery(s *stack.Stack) {
disableRACK := runtime.GOOS == "windows"
if val := os.Getenv(envForceTCPRACK); val != "" {
force, err := strconv.ParseBool(val)
if err != nil {
log.Warnf("parse %s: %v", envForceTCPRACK, err)
} else {
disableRACK = !force
}
}
if !disableRACK {
return
}
opt := tcpip.TCPRecovery(0)
if err := s.SetTransportProtocolOption(tcp.ProtocolNumber, &opt); err != nil {
log.Warnf("disable TCP RACK loss detection: %v", err)
return
}
log.Info("forwarder: TCP RACK loss detection disabled")
}

View File

@@ -1,204 +0,0 @@
package uspfilter
import (
"context"
"net/netip"
"os"
"strconv"
"sync"
"time"
nblog "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/uspfilter/log"
)
const (
// defaultFragmentTimeout bounds how long a first-fragment verdict is kept
// while the remaining fragments arrive. It mirrors the Linux IP reassembly
// timeout (net.ipv4.ipfrag_time).
defaultFragmentTimeout = 30 * time.Second
// fragmentCleanupInterval is how often expired verdicts are purged.
fragmentCleanupInterval = 10 * time.Second
// defaultMaxFragmentEntries caps the number of concurrently tracked
// fragmented datagrams. The table stays bounded because each datagram is a
// single small entry regardless of how many fragments it is split into, and
// the 13-bit IPv4 fragment-offset field limits any datagram to 64 KiB.
defaultMaxFragmentEntries = 16384
// EnvFragmentMaxEntries overrides defaultMaxFragmentEntries.
EnvFragmentMaxEntries = "NB_FRAGMENT_MAX_ENTRIES"
)
// fragmentVerdict is the decision for a trailing (headerless) fragment.
type fragmentVerdict int
const (
// fragmentDeny drops the fragment: no allowed first fragment is on record.
fragmentDeny fragmentVerdict = iota
// fragmentAllow passes the fragment: it belongs to an allowed datagram and
// does not overlap the already-inspected transport header.
fragmentAllow
// fragmentOverlap drops the fragment and poisons its datagram: it overlaps
// the transport header the ACL inspected (RFC 1858 §4, RFC 3128; RFC 5722
// requires discarding the whole datagram on overlap for IPv6).
fragmentOverlap
)
// fragmentKey identifies a fragmented datagram. It matches the RFC 791 / RFC
// 8200 reassembly key: source, destination, protocol and identification. The id
// is 32-bit to hold both the IPv4 (16-bit) and IPv6 (32-bit) identification.
type fragmentKey struct {
srcIP netip.Addr
dstIP netip.Addr
id uint32
proto uint8
}
// fragmentEntry records the verdict of an allowed first fragment.
type fragmentEntry struct {
// headerEndOctets is the offset, in 8-byte units, at which the first
// fragment's payload ended. A trailing fragment starting before this
// overlaps bytes the ACL already inspected and is rejected.
headerEndOctets uint16
// recordedAt is when the first fragment was accepted. The verdict expires a
// fixed timeout later and is not refreshed, mirroring the kernel reassembly
// timer so a trailing-fragment flood can't keep a datagram alive.
recordedAt time.Time
}
// fragmentTracker records the ACL verdict of a datagram's first fragment so the
// remaining fragments, which carry no L4 header, can inherit the decision
// without reassembling the datagram. Only allowed first fragments are stored;
// anything that cannot be tied to an allowed, non-overlapping first fragment is
// dropped (fail closed).
type fragmentTracker struct {
logger *nblog.Logger
mutex sync.Mutex
entries map[fragmentKey]fragmentEntry
timeout time.Duration
// maxEntries caps the table; atCapacity dedups the capacity warning until
// the table drains below the cap again.
maxEntries int
atCapacity bool
cleanupTicker *time.Ticker
cancel context.CancelFunc
}
func newFragmentTracker(logger *nblog.Logger) *fragmentTracker {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
t := &fragmentTracker{
logger: logger,
entries: make(map[fragmentKey]fragmentEntry),
timeout: defaultFragmentTimeout,
maxEntries: fragmentMaxEntries(logger),
cleanupTicker: time.NewTicker(fragmentCleanupInterval),
cancel: cancel,
}
go t.cleanupRoutine(ctx)
return t
}
func fragmentMaxEntries(logger *nblog.Logger) int {
v := os.Getenv(EnvFragmentMaxEntries)
if v == "" {
return defaultMaxFragmentEntries
}
n, err := strconv.Atoi(v)
if err != nil || n <= 0 {
logger.Warn2("invalid %s=%q, using default", EnvFragmentMaxEntries, v)
return defaultMaxFragmentEntries
}
return n
}
// recordAllowed stores the verdict of an allowed first fragment. headerEndOctets
// is the first fragment's payload length in 8-byte units. When the table is full
// the record is dropped, which fails closed: the datagram's trailing fragments
// will be denied.
func (t *fragmentTracker) recordAllowed(key fragmentKey, headerEndOctets uint16) {
t.mutex.Lock()
defer t.mutex.Unlock()
if t.entries == nil {
return
}
if _, ok := t.entries[key]; !ok && len(t.entries) >= t.maxEntries {
if !t.atCapacity {
t.atCapacity = true
t.logger.Warn2("fragment verdict table at capacity (%d/%d): trailing fragments of new datagrams will be dropped",
len(t.entries), t.maxEntries)
}
return
}
t.entries[key] = fragmentEntry{
headerEndOctets: headerEndOctets,
recordedAt: time.Now(),
}
}
// poison drops any recorded verdict for a datagram, so its later fragments are
// denied until a new allowed first fragment is recorded. Called on every
// offset-zero fragment to defeat offset-zero overlap rewrites (RFC 3128).
func (t *fragmentTracker) poison(key fragmentKey) {
t.mutex.Lock()
defer t.mutex.Unlock()
delete(t.entries, key)
}
// verdict decides the fate of a trailing fragment at fragOffsetOctets (the IPv4
// fragment offset, in 8-byte units). A fragment overlapping the inspected
// header poisons the datagram: the entry is removed so all further fragments of
// that datagram are denied too.
func (t *fragmentTracker) verdict(key fragmentKey, fragOffsetOctets uint16) fragmentVerdict {
t.mutex.Lock()
defer t.mutex.Unlock()
entry, ok := t.entries[key]
if !ok {
return fragmentDeny
}
if time.Since(entry.recordedAt) > t.timeout {
delete(t.entries, key)
return fragmentDeny
}
if fragOffsetOctets < entry.headerEndOctets {
delete(t.entries, key)
return fragmentOverlap
}
return fragmentAllow
}
func (t *fragmentTracker) cleanupRoutine(ctx context.Context) {
defer t.cleanupTicker.Stop()
for {
select {
case <-t.cleanupTicker.C:
t.cleanup()
case <-ctx.Done():
return
}
}
}
func (t *fragmentTracker) cleanup() {
t.mutex.Lock()
defer t.mutex.Unlock()
for key, entry := range t.entries {
if time.Since(entry.recordedAt) > t.timeout {
delete(t.entries, key)
}
}
if len(t.entries) < t.maxEntries {
t.atCapacity = false
}
}
// Close stops the cleanup routine and releases resources.
func (t *fragmentTracker) Close() {
t.cancel()
t.mutex.Lock()
t.entries = nil
t.mutex.Unlock()
}

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@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
package uspfilter
import (
"encoding/binary"
"testing"
)
// benchFilterInbound drives filterInbound over a fixed packet in a tight loop.
// Packets are built once, outside the timed region, so the benchmark measures
// only pipeline cost, which is what an attacker can amplify.
func benchFilterInbound(b *testing.B, pkt []byte) {
b.Helper()
b.ReportAllocs()
b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkt)))
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
m := benchManager
m.filterInbound(pkt, len(pkt))
}
}
// benchManager is a package-level manager reused across fragment benchmarks so
// setup cost stays out of the timed region.
var benchManager *Manager
func setupBenchManager(b *testing.B) *Manager {
b.Helper()
m := newFragmentTestManager(b)
allowUDP(b, m, 8080)
// Disable conntrack so the allowed-first-fragment path measures transport
// decode + ACL every iteration instead of matching the connection tracked
// on the first iteration.
m.stateful = false
benchManager = m
return m
}
// BenchmarkInbound_NormalPacket is the baseline: a full, non-fragmented UDP
// packet that passes the ACL. Fragment paths should stay comparable to this.
func BenchmarkInbound_NormalPacket(b *testing.B) {
setupBenchManager(b)
pkt := normalUDPPacket(b, 8080, 32)
benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
}
// BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentAllowed measures the first-fragment path:
// transport decode + ACL evaluation + verdict record.
func BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentAllowed(b *testing.B) {
setupBenchManager(b)
pkt := firstFragmentUDP(b, 0x2000, 8080, 32)
benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
}
// BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentAllowed measures the common trailing-fragment
// path: a single map lookup after the first fragment is on record.
func BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentAllowed(b *testing.B) {
m := setupBenchManager(b)
first := firstFragmentUDP(b, 0x3000, 8080, 32)
m.filterInbound(first, len(first))
pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x3000, 5, false, 24)
benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
}
// BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentNoFirst is the primary DoS vector: an
// attacker floods trailing fragments with no first fragment on record. Each is
// a map miss and must be cheap.
func BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentNoFirst(b *testing.B) {
setupBenchManager(b)
pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x4000, 185, false, 40)
benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
}
// BenchmarkInbound_TinyFirstFragment measures the tiny-fragment drop path: a
// first fragment too small to decode a transport header.
func BenchmarkInbound_TinyFirstFragment(b *testing.B) {
setupBenchManager(b)
pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x5000, 0, true, 4)
benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
}
// BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentDistinctIDs is the worst case for the
// verdict table: an attacker varies the datagram id on every packet so no first
// fragment ever matches. Verdict lookups always miss and nothing is recorded,
// so the table cannot grow. Each iteration rewrites the id field in place.
func BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentDistinctIDs(b *testing.B) {
setupBenchManager(b)
pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x6000, 185, false, 40)
m := benchManager
b.ReportAllocs()
b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkt)))
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
// IPv4 identification field is at bytes 4:6.
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], uint16(i))
m.filterInbound(pkt, len(pkt))
}
}
// BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentDistinctIDs measures sustained first-fragment
// pressure with distinct ids: transport decode + ACL + verdict insert until the
// table caps, exercising the map growth and capacity guard.
func BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentDistinctIDs(b *testing.B) {
setupBenchManager(b)
pkt := firstFragmentUDP(b, 0x7000, 8080, 32)
m := benchManager
b.ReportAllocs()
b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkt)))
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], uint16(i))
m.filterInbound(pkt, len(pkt))
}
}

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@@ -1,554 +0,0 @@
package uspfilter
import (
"encoding/binary"
"net"
"net/netip"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/google/gopacket"
"github.com/google/gopacket/layers"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
fw "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
nbiface "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/device"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
)
const (
fragTestSrc = "100.10.0.1"
fragTestDst = "100.10.0.100"
fragTestSrcV6 = "fd00::1"
fragTestDstV6 = "fd00::100"
)
func newFragmentTestManager(tb testing.TB) *Manager {
tb.Helper()
ifaceMock := &IFaceMock{
SetFilterFunc: func(device.PacketFilter) error { return nil },
AddressFunc: func() wgaddr.Address {
return wgaddr.Address{
IP: netip.MustParseAddr(fragTestDst),
Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("100.10.0.0/16"),
IPv6: netip.MustParseAddr(fragTestDstV6),
IPv6Net: netip.MustParsePrefix("fd00::/64"),
}
},
}
m, err := Create(ifaceMock, false, flowLogger, nbiface.DefaultMTU)
require.NoError(tb, err)
require.NoError(tb, m.UpdateLocalIPs())
tb.Cleanup(func() { require.NoError(tb, m.Close(nil)) })
return m
}
// firstFragmentUDPTo builds the first fragment of a fragmented UDP datagram to
// the given destination: it carries the full UDP header plus payloadLen bytes
// of data, with the More Fragments flag set and offset zero.
func firstFragmentUDPTo(tb testing.TB, dst string, id uint16, dstPort uint16, payloadLen int) []byte {
tb.Helper()
ip := &layers.IPv4{
Version: 4,
TTL: 64,
Id: id,
Protocol: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
SrcIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
DstIP: net.ParseIP(dst),
Flags: layers.IPv4MoreFragments,
}
udp := &layers.UDP{SrcPort: 40000, DstPort: layers.UDPPort(dstPort)}
require.NoError(tb, udp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, udp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, payloadLen))))
return buf.Bytes()
}
func firstFragmentUDP(tb testing.TB, id uint16, dstPort uint16, payloadLen int) []byte {
tb.Helper()
return firstFragmentUDPTo(tb, fragTestDst, id, dstPort, payloadLen)
}
// firstFragmentTCP builds the first fragment of a fragmented TCP datagram: the
// full 20-byte TCP header plus 12 bytes of data, with the More Fragments flag
// set and offset zero.
func firstFragmentTCP(tb testing.TB, id uint16, dstPort uint16) []byte {
tb.Helper()
ip := &layers.IPv4{
Version: 4,
TTL: 64,
Id: id,
Protocol: layers.IPProtocolTCP,
SrcIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
DstIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestDst),
Flags: layers.IPv4MoreFragments,
}
tcp := &layers.TCP{SrcPort: 40000, DstPort: layers.TCPPort(dstPort), SYN: true, Window: 64240}
require.NoError(tb, tcp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, tcp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, 12))))
return buf.Bytes()
}
// trailingFragmentTo builds a non-first fragment to the given destination: an
// IPv4 header at the given fragment offset (in 8-byte units) carrying raw
// payload and no L4 header.
func trailingFragmentTo(tb testing.TB, dst string, proto layers.IPProtocol, id uint16, fragOffsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, payloadLen int) []byte {
tb.Helper()
ip := &layers.IPv4{
Version: 4,
TTL: 64,
Id: id,
Protocol: proto,
SrcIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
DstIP: net.ParseIP(dst),
FragOffset: fragOffsetOctets,
}
if moreFragments {
ip.Flags = layers.IPv4MoreFragments
}
buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{FixLengths: true}
require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, payloadLen))))
return buf.Bytes()
}
func trailingFragment(tb testing.TB, id uint16, fragOffsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, payloadLen int) []byte {
tb.Helper()
return trailingFragmentTo(tb, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolUDP, id, fragOffsetOctets, moreFragments, payloadLen)
}
// outboundUDPPacket builds a complete outbound UDP packet from the local
// address, used to establish conntrack state for reply-direction tests.
func outboundUDPPacket(tb testing.TB, srcPort, dstPort uint16) []byte {
tb.Helper()
ip := &layers.IPv4{
Version: 4,
TTL: 64,
Id: 1,
Protocol: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
SrcIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestDst),
DstIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
}
udp := &layers.UDP{SrcPort: layers.UDPPort(srcPort), DstPort: layers.UDPPort(dstPort)}
require.NoError(tb, udp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, udp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, 16))))
return buf.Bytes()
}
// normalUDPPacket builds a complete, non-fragmented UDP packet for baseline
// comparisons against the fragment paths.
func normalUDPPacket(tb testing.TB, dstPort uint16, payloadLen int) []byte {
tb.Helper()
ip := &layers.IPv4{
Version: 4,
TTL: 64,
Id: 1,
Protocol: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
SrcIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
DstIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestDst),
}
udp := &layers.UDP{SrcPort: 40000, DstPort: layers.UDPPort(dstPort)}
require.NoError(tb, udp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, udp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, payloadLen))))
return buf.Bytes()
}
func allowUDP(tb testing.TB, m *Manager, dstPort uint16) {
tb.Helper()
_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolUDP, nil,
&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{dstPort}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
require.NoError(tb, err)
}
// TestFragment_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped is the core bypass repro: a trailing
// fragment with no allowed first fragment on record must be dropped. Before the
// fix, filterInbound returned false (allow) for any fragment.
func TestFragment_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
frag := trailingFragment(t, 0x1234, 185, false, 40)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(frag, len(frag)),
"trailing fragment without an allowed first fragment must be dropped")
}
// TestFragment_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing verifies that once a first fragment
// passes the ACL, its trailing fragments inherit the allow verdict.
func TestFragment_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
// First fragment: UDP header (8) + 32 payload = 40 octets -> headerEnd = 5.
first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x2222, 8080, 32)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
"allowed first fragment should pass and be recorded")
trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x2222, 5, false, 24)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
"trailing fragment of an allowed datagram should pass")
}
// TestFragment_DeniedFirstDropsTrailing verifies that a first fragment blocked
// by the ACL leaves no verdict, so its trailing fragments are dropped.
func TestFragment_DeniedFirstDropsTrailing(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
// No accept rule: local traffic defaults to deny.
first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x3333, 9999, 32)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
"first fragment to a blocked port should be dropped by the ACL")
trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x3333, 5, false, 24)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
"trailing fragment of a denied datagram must be dropped")
}
// TestFragment_OverlappingHeaderDropped covers the RFC 1858 §4 / RFC 3128
// overlapping-fragment rewrite: a trailing fragment starting inside the range
// the ACL already inspected is dropped and poisons the datagram. TCP is used so
// the overlap lands on real header bytes (the flags at byte 13).
func TestFragment_OverlappingHeaderDropped(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolTCP, nil,
&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
require.NoError(t, err)
// First fragment: TCP header (20) + 12 data = 32 bytes -> headerEnd = 4 octets.
first := firstFragmentTCP(t, 0x4444, 8080)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)))
// Overlapping fragment at offset 1 (byte 8) falls inside the inspected TCP
// header, so it could rewrite the flags or port on reassembly.
overlap := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x4444, 1, true, 32)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(overlap, len(overlap)),
"fragment overlapping the inspected header must be dropped")
// The datagram is now poisoned: a later, non-overlapping fragment is also
// dropped because the verdict was removed.
later := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x4444, 4, false, 24)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(later, len(later)),
"fragments after an overlap must be dropped (datagram poisoned)")
}
// TestFragment_OffsetZeroOverlapPoisons covers the RFC 3128 offset-zero rewrite:
// an allowed first fragment followed by a denied offset-zero fragment for the
// same datagram must not leave the earlier allow verdict in place.
func TestFragment_OffsetZeroOverlapPoisons(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
allowed := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x5A5A, 8080, 32)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(allowed, len(allowed)),
"allowed first fragment should pass and be recorded")
// A second offset-zero fragment to a denied port supersedes the datagram's
// verdict; it is dropped and must not leave the allow in place.
denied := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x5A5A, 9999, 32)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(denied, len(denied)),
"denied offset-zero fragment must be dropped")
trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x5A5A, 5, false, 24)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
"trailing fragment must be denied after the datagram was poisoned")
}
// TestFragment_TinyFirstDropped covers the tiny-fragment attack: a first
// fragment too small to contain the full transport header can't be
// ACL-evaluated and must be dropped.
func TestFragment_TinyFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
// IPv4 header + 4 raw bytes, MF set, offset 0: too small for the 8-byte UDP
// header, so it decodes to L3 only.
tiny := trailingFragment(t, 0x5555, 0, true, 4)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(tiny, len(tiny)),
"tiny first fragment without a full L4 header must be dropped")
}
// TestFragment_TCPFirstFragment verifies the TCP arm of the transport decode: a
// first fragment carrying the full 20-byte TCP header is ACL-evaluated and its
// trailing fragments inherit the verdict.
func TestFragment_TCPFirstFragment(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolTCP, nil,
&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
require.NoError(t, err)
// TCP header (20) + 12 data = 32 bytes -> headerEnd = 4 octets.
first := firstFragmentTCP(t, 0x6666, 8080)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
"allowed TCP first fragment should pass and be recorded")
trailing := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x6666, 4, false, 24)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
"trailing fragment of an allowed TCP datagram should pass")
}
// TestFragment_TCPTinyFirstDropped verifies the TCP minimum header length: 12
// bytes would satisfy a UDP header but falls short of the 20-byte TCP header.
func TestFragment_TCPTinyFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolTCP, nil,
&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
require.NoError(t, err)
tiny := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x7777, 0, true, 12)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(tiny, len(tiny)),
"first fragment shorter than the TCP header must be dropped")
}
// TestFragment_ConntrackAllowsFirstFragment verifies the conntrack branch: reply
// fragments of an outbound-established UDP flow pass without any inbound rule.
func TestFragment_ConntrackAllowsFirstFragment(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
out := outboundUDPPacket(t, 12345, 40000)
require.False(t, m.filterOutbound(out, len(out)))
first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x8888, 12345, 32)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
"reply first fragment should pass via conntrack")
trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x8888, 5, false, 24)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
"trailing fragment of a tracked flow should pass")
}
// TestFragment_RoutingDisabledDropsFragment verifies routed first fragments are
// dropped when routing is disabled.
func TestFragment_RoutingDisabledDropsFragment(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
m.routingEnabled.Store(false)
first := firstFragmentUDPTo(t, "198.51.100.10", 0x9999, 8080, 32)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
"routed first fragment must be dropped when routing is disabled")
}
// TestFragment_RouteACL verifies the route-ACL branch: fragments to a non-local
// destination follow the route rules, allowed datagrams pass their trailing
// fragments and denied ones don't.
func TestFragment_RouteACL(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
m.routingEnabled.Store(true)
m.nativeRouter.Store(false)
_, err := m.AddRouteFiltering(
[]byte("rt-1"),
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("100.10.0.0/16")},
fw.Network{Prefix: netip.MustParsePrefix("198.51.100.0/24")},
fw.ProtocolUDP,
nil,
&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}},
fw.ActionAccept,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
first := firstFragmentUDPTo(t, "198.51.100.10", 0xAAAA, 8080, 32)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
"route-ACL-allowed first fragment should pass")
trailing := trailingFragmentTo(t, "198.51.100.10", layers.IPProtocolUDP, 0xAAAA, 5, false, 24)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
"trailing fragment of an allowed routed datagram should pass")
denied := firstFragmentUDPTo(t, "198.51.100.10", 0xBBBB, 9999, 32)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(denied, len(denied)),
"route-ACL-denied first fragment must be dropped")
deniedTrailing := trailingFragmentTo(t, "198.51.100.10", layers.IPProtocolUDP, 0xBBBB, 5, false, 24)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(deniedTrailing, len(deniedTrailing)),
"trailing fragment of a denied routed datagram must be dropped")
}
// TestFragment_ExpiredVerdictDropsTrailing verifies a verdict older than the
// tracker timeout no longer admits trailing fragments.
func TestFragment_ExpiredVerdictDropsTrailing(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0xCCCC, 8080, 32)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)))
m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
for key, entry := range m.fragments.entries {
entry.recordedAt = time.Now().Add(-defaultFragmentTimeout - time.Second)
m.fragments.entries[key] = entry
}
m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0xCCCC, 5, false, 24)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
"trailing fragment after verdict expiry must be dropped")
}
// TestFragment_CapacityFailsClosed verifies the table cap: at capacity, new
// datagram verdicts are not recorded (their trailing fragments are dropped)
// while already-recorded datagrams keep working.
func TestFragment_CapacityFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
m.fragments.maxEntries = 1
m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
first1 := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x0101, 8080, 32)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first1, len(first1)))
first2 := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x0202, 8080, 32)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first2, len(first2)),
"first fragment itself still passes at capacity")
trailing2 := trailingFragment(t, 0x0202, 5, false, 24)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing2, len(trailing2)),
"trailing fragment of an unrecorded datagram must be dropped at capacity")
trailing1 := trailingFragment(t, 0x0101, 5, false, 24)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing1, len(trailing1)),
"already-recorded datagram should keep passing at capacity")
}
// v6FragmentHeader builds the 8-byte IPv6 fragment extension header for the
// given inner protocol, offset (8-byte units), More Fragments bit and id.
func v6FragmentHeader(proto layers.IPProtocol, offsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, id uint32) []byte {
offsetFlags := offsetOctets << 3
if moreFragments {
offsetFlags |= 1
}
hdr := make([]byte, 8)
hdr[0] = uint8(proto)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[2:4], offsetFlags)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(hdr[4:8], id)
return hdr
}
func v6UDPHeader(dstPort uint16, dataLen int) []byte {
hdr := make([]byte, 8)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[0:2], 40000)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[2:4], dstPort)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[4:6], uint16(8+dataLen))
return hdr
}
// firstFragmentUDPv6 builds the first fragment of a fragmented IPv6 UDP
// datagram: fragment header (offset 0, More Fragments set) + full UDP header +
// data.
func firstFragmentUDPv6(tb testing.TB, id uint32, dstPort uint16, dataLen int) []byte {
tb.Helper()
return fragmentUDPv6(tb, id, dstPort, dataLen, true)
}
// fragmentUDPv6 builds an offset-zero IPv6 UDP fragment. With moreFragments
// false it is an atomic fragment (a complete datagram, RFC 6946).
func fragmentUDPv6(tb testing.TB, id uint32, dstPort uint16, dataLen int, moreFragments bool) []byte {
tb.Helper()
ip := &layers.IPv6{
Version: 6,
NextHeader: layers.IPProtocolIPv6Fragment,
HopLimit: 64,
SrcIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6),
DstIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestDstV6),
}
payload := append(v6FragmentHeader(layers.IPProtocolUDP, 0, moreFragments, id), v6UDPHeader(dstPort, dataLen)...)
payload = append(payload, make([]byte, dataLen)...)
buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, gopacket.SerializeOptions{FixLengths: true}, ip, gopacket.Payload(payload)))
return buf.Bytes()
}
// trailingFragmentV6 builds a non-first IPv6 fragment: fragment header at the
// given offset carrying raw data and no transport header.
func trailingFragmentV6(tb testing.TB, id uint32, offsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, dataLen int) []byte {
tb.Helper()
ip := &layers.IPv6{
Version: 6,
NextHeader: layers.IPProtocolIPv6Fragment,
HopLimit: 64,
SrcIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6),
DstIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestDstV6),
}
payload := append(v6FragmentHeader(layers.IPProtocolUDP, offsetOctets, moreFragments, id), make([]byte, dataLen)...)
buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, gopacket.SerializeOptions{FixLengths: true}, ip, gopacket.Payload(payload)))
return buf.Bytes()
}
// TestFragmentV6_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped verifies the IPv6 bypass is closed:
// a trailing fragment with no allowed first fragment is dropped.
func TestFragmentV6_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
frag := trailingFragmentV6(t, 0xAABBCCDD, 100, false, 40)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(frag, len(frag)),
"IPv6 trailing fragment without an allowed first fragment must be dropped")
}
// TestFragmentV6_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing verifies IPv6 fragments are
// evaluated like IPv4: an allowed first fragment lets its trailing fragments
// through.
func TestFragmentV6_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6), fw.ProtocolUDP, nil,
&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
require.NoError(t, err)
// First fragment: UDP header (8) + 32 data = 40 octets -> headerEnd = 5.
first := firstFragmentUDPv6(t, 0xAABBCCDD, 8080, 32)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
"allowed IPv6 first fragment should pass and be recorded")
trailing := trailingFragmentV6(t, 0xAABBCCDD, 5, false, 24)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
"trailing fragment of an allowed IPv6 datagram should pass")
}
// TestFragmentV6_AtomicNotCached verifies an IPv6 atomic fragment (fragment
// header with offset 0 and no More Fragments, a complete datagram per RFC 6946)
// is evaluated but not recorded, so a flood of allowed atomic fragments can't
// exhaust the verdict table.
func TestFragmentV6_AtomicNotCached(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6), fw.ProtocolUDP, nil,
&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
require.NoError(t, err)
atomic := fragmentUDPv6(t, 0xA70301C, 8080, 16, false)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(atomic, len(atomic)),
"allowed IPv6 atomic fragment should pass")
m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
n := len(m.fragments.entries)
m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
require.Zero(t, n, "atomic fragment must not create a verdict entry")
// A genuine fragmented datagram (More Fragments set) is still recorded.
first := fragmentUDPv6(t, 0xBEEF, 8080, 32, true)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)))
m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
n = len(m.fragments.entries)
m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
require.Equal(t, 1, n, "genuine first fragment must record a verdict")
}

View File

@@ -464,8 +464,6 @@ func Test_RemovePeer(t *testing.T) {
}
func Test_ConnectPeers(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("NB_DISABLE_EBPF_WG_PROXY", "true")
peer1ifaceName := fmt.Sprintf("utun%d", WgIntNumber+400)
peer1wgIP := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.99.99.17/30")
peer1Key, _ := wgtypes.GeneratePrivateKey()
@@ -507,8 +505,12 @@ func Test_ConnectPeers(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
localIP1 := "127.0.0.1"
peer1endpoint, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", localIP1, peer1wgPort))
localIP, err := getLocalIP()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
peer1endpoint, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", localIP, peer1wgPort))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
@@ -544,8 +546,7 @@ func Test_ConnectPeers(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
localIP2 := "127.0.0.1"
peer2endpoint, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", localIP2, peer2wgPort))
peer2endpoint, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", localIP, peer2wgPort))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
@@ -568,17 +569,17 @@ func Test_ConnectPeers(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// The peers use userspace WireGuard (stdnet transport). A tight busy-loop
// here starves the wireguard-go goroutines that process the handshake, so
// poll on a ticker instead and yield the CPU between checks. WireGuard also
// only retries a lost handshake initiation every REKEY_TIMEOUT (5s), which
// is why the overall wait can occasionally stretch to tens of seconds.
// todo: investigate why in some tests execution we need 30s
timeout := 30 * time.Second
timeoutChannel := time.After(timeout)
ticker := time.NewTicker(500 * time.Millisecond)
defer ticker.Stop()
for {
select {
case <-timeoutChannel:
t.Fatalf("waiting for peer handshake timeout after %s", timeout.String())
default:
}
peer, gpErr := getPeer(peer1ifaceName, peer2Key.PublicKey().String())
if gpErr != nil {
t.Fatal(gpErr)
@@ -587,12 +588,6 @@ func Test_ConnectPeers(t *testing.T) {
t.Log("peers successfully handshake")
break
}
select {
case <-timeoutChannel:
t.Fatalf("waiting for peer handshake timeout after %s", timeout.String())
case <-ticker.C:
}
}
}
@@ -620,3 +615,28 @@ func getPeer(ifaceName, peerPubKey string) (wgtypes.Peer, error) {
}
return wgtypes.Peer{}, fmt.Errorf("peer not found")
}
func getLocalIP() (string, error) {
// Get all interfaces
addrs, err := net.InterfaceAddrs()
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
for _, addr := range addrs {
ipNet, ok := addr.(*net.IPNet)
if !ok {
continue
}
if ipNet.IP.IsLoopback() {
continue
}
if ipNet.IP.To4() == nil {
continue
}
return ipNet.IP.String(), nil
}
return "", fmt.Errorf("no local IP found")
}

View File

@@ -3,31 +3,14 @@
package netstack
import (
"net"
"fmt"
"os"
"strconv"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
)
const (
EnvUseNetstackMode = "NB_USE_NETSTACK_MODE"
// EnvSocks5ListenerPort overrides the port the SOCKS5 proxy listens on.
EnvSocks5ListenerPort = "NB_SOCKS5_LISTENER_PORT"
// EnvSocks5ListenerAddress overrides the host/IP the SOCKS5 proxy binds to.
// The proxy is a bridge for local host applications into the userspace
// WireGuard netstack, so it binds to loopback by default. Override this only
// when the proxy must be reachable from other hosts (e.g. a container
// gateway); doing so exposes an unauthenticated SOCKS5 proxy on that
// address.
EnvSocks5ListenerAddress = "NB_SOCKS5_LISTENER_ADDRESS"
// defaultSocks5Host is the loopback address the SOCKS5 proxy binds to unless
// overridden via EnvSocks5ListenerAddress.
defaultSocks5Host = "127.0.0.1"
)
const EnvUseNetstackMode = "NB_USE_NETSTACK_MODE"
// IsEnabled todo: move these function to cmd layer
func IsEnabled() bool {
@@ -35,40 +18,24 @@ func IsEnabled() bool {
}
func ListenAddr() string {
return net.JoinHostPort(listenHost(), strconv.Itoa(listenPort()))
}
// listenHost returns the host/IP the SOCKS5 proxy binds to. It defaults to
// loopback and only honors EnvSocks5ListenerAddress when it holds a valid IP.
func listenHost() string {
addr := os.Getenv(EnvSocks5ListenerAddress)
if addr == "" {
return defaultSocks5Host
}
if net.ParseIP(addr) == nil {
log.Warnf("invalid socks5 listener address %q, falling back to default: %s", addr, defaultSocks5Host)
return defaultSocks5Host
}
return addr
}
// listenPort returns the port the SOCKS5 proxy binds to, defaulting to
// DefaultSocks5Port when EnvSocks5ListenerPort is unset or invalid.
func listenPort() int {
sPort := os.Getenv(EnvSocks5ListenerPort)
sPort := os.Getenv("NB_SOCKS5_LISTENER_PORT")
if sPort == "" {
return DefaultSocks5Port
return listenAddr(DefaultSocks5Port)
}
port, err := strconv.Atoi(sPort)
if err != nil {
log.Warnf("invalid socks5 listener port, unable to convert it to int, falling back to default: %d", DefaultSocks5Port)
return DefaultSocks5Port
return listenAddr(DefaultSocks5Port)
}
if port < 1 || port > 65535 {
log.Warnf("invalid socks5 listener port, it should be in the range 1-65535, falling back to default: %d", DefaultSocks5Port)
return DefaultSocks5Port
return listenAddr(DefaultSocks5Port)
}
return port
return listenAddr(port)
}
func listenAddr(port int) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("0.0.0.0:%d", port)
}

View File

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
//go:build !js
package netstack
import (
"net"
"strconv"
"testing"
)
func TestListenAddr_DefaultsToLoopback(t *testing.T) {
// No env overrides: must bind loopback, never all interfaces.
got := ListenAddr()
want := net.JoinHostPort("127.0.0.1", strconv.Itoa(DefaultSocks5Port))
if got != want {
t.Fatalf("ListenAddr() = %q, want %q", got, want)
}
}
func TestListenAddr_AddressOverride(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
env string
want string
}{
{name: "valid override honored", env: "0.0.0.0", want: "0.0.0.0"},
{name: "valid specific ip honored", env: "10.0.0.5", want: "10.0.0.5"},
{name: "ipv6 loopback bracketed", env: "::1", want: "::1"},
{name: "invalid falls back to loopback", env: "not-an-ip", want: "127.0.0.1"},
{name: "empty falls back to loopback", env: "", want: "127.0.0.1"},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(EnvSocks5ListenerAddress, tc.env)
want := net.JoinHostPort(tc.want, strconv.Itoa(DefaultSocks5Port))
if got := ListenAddr(); got != want {
t.Fatalf("ListenAddr() = %q, want %q", got, want)
}
})
}
}
func TestListenAddr_PortOverride(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
env string
want int
}{
{name: "valid port honored", env: "1081", want: 1081},
{name: "non-numeric falls back", env: "abc", want: DefaultSocks5Port},
{name: "out of range falls back", env: "70000", want: DefaultSocks5Port},
{name: "zero falls back", env: "0", want: DefaultSocks5Port},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(EnvSocks5ListenerPort, tc.env)
want := net.JoinHostPort("127.0.0.1", strconv.Itoa(tc.want))
if got := ListenAddr(); got != want {
t.Fatalf("ListenAddr() = %q, want %q", got, want)
}
})
}
}

View File

@@ -351,7 +351,6 @@ func (a *Auth) setSystemInfoFlags(info *system.Info) {
a.config.BlockLANAccess,
a.config.BlockInbound,
a.config.DisableIPv6,
a.config.SyncMessageVersion,
a.config.EnableSSHRoot,
a.config.EnableSSHSFTP,
a.config.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding,

View File

@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ func (d *DeviceAuthorizationFlow) WaitToken(ctx context.Context, info AuthFlowIn
UseIDToken: d.providerConfig.UseIDToken,
}
err = validateTokenAudience(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), d.providerConfig.Audience)
err = isValidAccessToken(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), d.providerConfig.Audience)
if err != nil {
return TokenInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("validate access token failed with error: %v", err)
}

View File

@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) parseOAuthToken(token *oauth2.Token) (TokenInfo,
audience = p.providerConfig.ClientID
}
if err := validateTokenAudience(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), audience); err != nil {
if err := isValidAccessToken(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), audience); err != nil {
return TokenInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("authentication failed: invalid access token - %w", err)
}
@@ -320,11 +320,6 @@ func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) parseOAuthToken(token *oauth2.Token) (TokenInfo,
return tokenInfo, nil
}
// parseEmailFromIDToken extracts the email (or name) claim from an ID token
// without verifying its signature. The value is best-effort and used only as a
// UX convenience (login hint prefill and display); it never drives an
// authorization decision. The authoritative identity is established server-side
// from the signature-verified token.
func parseEmailFromIDToken(token string) (string, error) {
parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
if len(parts) < 2 {

View File

@@ -24,7 +24,11 @@ import (
)
const (
maxPastHorizon = 30 * 24 * time.Hour
// Skew tolerates a small clock difference between the management
// server and this peer before treating a deadline as "in the past".
// Slightly above typical NTP drift; tight enough that the UI doesn't
// paint a stale expiry as if it were valid.
Skew = 30 * time.Second
// maxDeadlineHorizon caps how far in the future an accepted deadline
// can sit. A timestamp beyond this is almost certainly a protocol
@@ -53,7 +57,7 @@ var (
ErrDeadlineTooFarFuture = errors.New("session deadline too far in the future")
// ErrDeadlineInPast is returned by Update when the supplied deadline
// is more than maxPastHorizon in the past.
// is more than Skew in the past.
ErrDeadlineInPast = errors.New("session deadline in the past")
)
@@ -62,14 +66,15 @@ var (
// for deadline change/clear, PublishEvent for the two warnings); tests pass
// a fake recorder so the same surface is observable without an engine.
//
// While the watcher runs, it owns the deadline propagated to the recorder:
// every set, clear and sanity-check rejection routes the value through
// SetSessionExpiresAt, so the SubscribeStatus snapshot the UI reads can
// never drift from the watcher's timer state. (SetSessionExpiresAt fans
// out its own state-change notification, so no separate notify is needed.)
// The recorder is server-scoped and outlives this engine-scoped watcher;
// Close deliberately leaves the recorder value in place so transient engine
// restarts don't blank it — the client run loop clears it on real teardown.
// The watcher is the single owner of the deadline propagated to the
// recorder: every set, clear, sanity-check rejection and Close routes the
// value through SetSessionExpiresAt, so the SubscribeStatus snapshot the UI
// reads can never drift from the watcher's timer state. (SetSessionExpiresAt
// fans out its own state-change notification, so no separate notify is
// needed.) The recorder is server-scoped and outlives this engine-scoped
// watcher — without the Close-time clear a teardown (Down, or the Down+Up of
// a profile switch) would leave the next session showing the previous one's
// stale "expires in" value.
//
// PublishEvent's signature mirrors peer.Status.PublishEvent: the watcher
// composes the metadata internally so the wire format (MetaSession*) is
@@ -130,13 +135,10 @@ func NewWithLeads(lead, final time.Duration, recorder StatusRecorder) *Watcher {
// was disabled).
//
// Same-value updates are no-ops. A different non-zero value cancels any
// pending timer, resets the "already fired" guards, and — when the
// deadline lies in the future — arms fresh warning timers. A deadline
// already in the past (within maxPastHorizon) is recorded as-is with no
// timers: the session has expired and consumers render it that way.
// pending timer, resets the "already fired" guard, and arms a new one.
//
// Returns one of the sentinel Err* values when the deadline fails the
// sanity checks (pre-epoch, far future, or past beyond maxPastHorizon).
// sanity checks (pre-epoch, far future, or in the past beyond Skew).
// In every error case the watcher first clears its state so it stays
// consistent with what the caller will push into its other sinks (e.g.
// applySessionDeadline forces a zero deadline into the status recorder
@@ -161,7 +163,7 @@ func (w *Watcher) Update(deadline time.Time) error {
case deadline.After(now.Add(maxDeadlineHorizon)):
w.clearLocked()
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrDeadlineTooFarFuture, deadline)
case deadline.Before(now.Add(-maxPastHorizon)):
case deadline.Before(now.Add(-Skew)):
w.clearLocked()
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %v (now=%v)", ErrDeadlineInPast, deadline, now)
}
@@ -181,9 +183,7 @@ func (w *Watcher) Update(deadline time.Time) error {
w.finalFiredAt = time.Time{}
w.dismissedAt = time.Time{}
if deadline.After(now) {
w.armTimerLocked(deadline)
}
w.armTimerLocked(deadline)
recorder := w.recorder
w.mu.Unlock()
if recorder != nil {
@@ -227,25 +227,30 @@ func (w *Watcher) Dismiss() {
log.Infof("auth session final-warning dismissed for deadline %s", w.current.Format(time.RFC3339))
}
// Close stops any pending timer. Update calls after Close are ignored.
// The recorder keeps its deadline: the watcher is engine-scoped and closes
// on every engine restart (network change, sleep/wake, stream errors)
// while the SSO deadline stays valid across those, so clearing here would
// blank the UI's "expires in" row on every transient reconnect. The
// client run loop clears the server-scoped recorder when it exits for
// real (Down, profile switch, permanent login failure).
// Close stops any pending timer and drops the deadline on the status
// recorder. Update calls after Close are ignored. Clearing the recorder
// here is what keeps a teardown (Down, or the Down+Up of a profile switch)
// from leaving the next session showing this one's stale "expires in"
// value — the recorder is server-scoped and outlives this engine-scoped
// watcher, so nothing else drops the anchor on teardown.
func (w *Watcher) Close() {
w.mu.Lock()
defer w.mu.Unlock()
if w.closed {
w.mu.Unlock()
return
}
w.closed = true
w.stopTimerLocked()
hadDeadline := !w.current.IsZero()
w.current = time.Time{}
w.firedAt = time.Time{}
w.finalFiredAt = time.Time{}
w.dismissedAt = time.Time{}
recorder := w.recorder
w.mu.Unlock()
if recorder != nil && hadDeadline {
recorder.SetSessionExpiresAt(time.Time{})
}
}
// clearLocked drops the tracked deadline and notifies the recorder so

View File

@@ -224,13 +224,11 @@ func TestNewDeadlineCancelsPriorTimer(t *testing.T) {
func TestRefreshAfterFireArmsNewWarning(t *testing.T) {
r := &fakeRecorder{}
lead := 150 * time.Millisecond
lead := 30 * time.Millisecond
w := newWatcher(lead, r)
defer w.Close()
// Warning fires ~20ms in; the deadline itself stays 150ms away so the
// replacement below lands well before it.
first := time.Now().Add(170 * time.Millisecond)
first := time.Now().Add(50 * time.Millisecond)
_ = w.Update(first)
// Wait for stateChange + warning of the first cycle.
@@ -308,29 +306,7 @@ func TestUpdateRejectsTooFarFuture(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestUpdateRecentPastRecordedAsExpired(t *testing.T) {
r := &fakeRecorder{}
w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
defer w.Close()
d := time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour)
if err := w.Update(d); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("recent-past Update should succeed, got %v", err)
}
if !w.Deadline().Equal(d) {
t.Fatalf("expected deadline to be recorded, got %v want %v", w.Deadline(), d)
}
if got := r.deadline(); !got.Equal(d) {
t.Fatalf("recorder deadline = %v, want %v", got, d)
}
time.Sleep(80 * time.Millisecond)
if n := countWhere(r.snapshot(), func(e event) bool { return e.kind == publish }); n != 0 {
t.Fatalf("no warning events may fire for an already-past deadline, got %+v", r.snapshot())
}
}
func TestUpdateAncientPastRejected(t *testing.T) {
func TestUpdateInPastClearsDeadline(t *testing.T) {
r := &fakeRecorder{}
w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
defer w.Close()
@@ -342,12 +318,12 @@ func TestUpdateAncientPastRejected(t *testing.T) {
// Drain the stateChange from the seed.
waitForEvents(t, r, 1)
err := w.Update(time.Now().Add(-31 * 24 * time.Hour))
err := w.Update(time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour))
if !errors.Is(err, ErrDeadlineInPast) {
t.Fatalf("want ErrDeadlineInPast, got %v", err)
}
if !w.Deadline().IsZero() {
t.Fatalf("rejected ancient-past update must clear the deadline, got %v", w.Deadline())
t.Fatalf("in-past update must clear the deadline, got %v", w.Deadline())
}
events := waitForEvents(t, r, 2)
if events[1].kind != stateChange {
@@ -355,25 +331,39 @@ func TestUpdateAncientPastRejected(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestUpdateWithinSkewAccepted(t *testing.T) {
r := &fakeRecorder{}
w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
defer w.Close()
// 5 seconds in the past is within the 30s Skew tolerance — accept it.
d := time.Now().Add(-5 * time.Second)
if err := w.Update(d); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("within-skew Update should succeed, got %v", err)
}
if !w.Deadline().Equal(d) {
t.Fatalf("expected deadline to be applied, got %v want %v", w.Deadline(), d)
}
}
func TestCloseSilencesUpdates(t *testing.T) {
r := &fakeRecorder{}
w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
w.Close()
if err := w.Update(time.Now().Add(time.Hour)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Update after Close: want nil, got %v", err)
}
_ = w.Update(time.Now().Add(time.Hour))
time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond)
if got := r.snapshot(); len(got) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected no events after Close, got %+v", got)
}
}
// TestCloseKeepsRecorderDeadline pins the reconnect-flap fix: the watcher
// closes on every engine restart (network change, sleep/wake) while the
// SSO deadline stays valid across those, so Close must leave the
// server-scoped recorder's value in place. The client run loop clears the
// recorder when it exits for real.
func TestCloseKeepsRecorderDeadline(t *testing.T) {
// TestCloseClearsRecorderDeadline pins the profile-switch fix: a watcher
// holding a live deadline must zero the recorder on Close so the next
// engine's watcher (and the UI reading the shared server-scoped recorder)
// doesn't start out showing the previous session's stale "expires in".
func TestCloseClearsRecorderDeadline(t *testing.T) {
r := &fakeRecorder{}
w := newWatcher(time.Hour, r)
@@ -387,8 +377,8 @@ func TestCloseKeepsRecorderDeadline(t *testing.T) {
w.Close()
if got := r.deadline(); !got.Equal(d) {
t.Fatalf("recorder deadline after Close = %v, want %v", got, d)
if got := r.deadline(); !got.IsZero() {
t.Fatalf("recorder deadline after Close = %v, want zero", got)
}
}

View File

@@ -20,26 +20,14 @@ func randomBytesInHex(count int) (string, error) {
return hex.EncodeToString(buf), nil
}
// validateTokenAudience checks that the token is a well-formed JWT whose
// audience claim matches the expected audience.
//
// It does NOT verify the token's cryptographic signature and therefore must not
// be treated as an authenticity check. The token is obtained by the client
// directly from the IdP token endpoint over TLS, and its signature is verified
// server-side by the management server against the IdP's JWKS
// (see shared/auth/jwt/validator.go). This function is only a client-side
// sanity check that the returned token targets the expected audience.
func validateTokenAudience(token string, audience string) error {
// isValidAccessToken is a simple validation of the access token
func isValidAccessToken(token string, audience string) error {
if token == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("token received is empty")
}
parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
if len(parts) != 3 {
return fmt.Errorf("token is not a well-formed JWT")
}
claimsString, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1])
encodedClaims := strings.Split(token, ".")[1]
claimsString, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(encodedClaims)
if err != nil {
return err
}

View File

@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
package auth
import (
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"testing"
)
// makeJWT builds an unsigned JWT-shaped string (header.payload.signature) with
// the given claims payload. The signature part is arbitrary because
// validateTokenAudience intentionally does not verify it.
func makeJWT(t *testing.T, claims map[string]interface{}) string {
t.Helper()
header := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(`{"alg":"RS256","typ":"JWT"}`))
payloadBytes, err := json.Marshal(claims)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("marshal claims: %v", err)
}
payload := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(payloadBytes)
return header + "." + payload + ".unverified-signature"
}
func TestValidateTokenAudience(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
token string
audience string
wantErr bool
}{
{
name: "empty token",
token: "",
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "not a JWT - no dots",
token: "notajwt",
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "not a JWT - two parts only",
token: "header.payload",
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "matching string audience",
token: makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": "netbird"}),
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: false,
},
{
name: "mismatching string audience",
token: makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": "other"}),
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "matching audience in array",
token: makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": []interface{}{"other", "netbird"}}),
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: false,
},
{
name: "mismatching audience array",
token: makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": []interface{}{"a", "b"}}),
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "missing audience claim",
token: makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"sub": "user"}),
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "invalid base64 payload",
token: "header.!!!not-base64!!!.sig",
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: true,
},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
err := validateTokenAudience(tc.token, tc.audience)
if tc.wantErr && err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected error, got nil")
}
if !tc.wantErr && err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected no error, got %v", err)
}
})
}
}
// TestValidateTokenAudienceNoPanic guards the regression where a non-empty
// token without the JWT dot structure caused an index-out-of-range panic.
func TestValidateTokenAudienceNoPanic(t *testing.T) {
inputs := []string{"a", ".", "a.", "aaaa", "no-dots-here"}
for _, in := range inputs {
if err := validateTokenAudience(in, "netbird"); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected error for malformed token %q, got nil", in)
}
}
}

View File

@@ -34,8 +34,6 @@ const (
// - Handling connection establishment based on peer signaling
//
// The implementation is not thread-safe; it is protected by engine.syncMsgMux.
// The only exception is ActivatePeer, which is safe for concurrent use so the
// DNS warm-up path can call it without contending on the engine mutex.
type ConnMgr struct {
peerStore *peerstore.Store
statusRecorder *peer.Status
@@ -44,26 +42,12 @@ type ConnMgr struct {
rosenpassEnabled bool
lazyConnMgr *manager.Manager
// lazyConnMgrMu guards the lazyConnMgr pointer for readers outside the
// engine loop (ActivatePeer). Writers hold it in addition to
// engine.syncMsgMux; all other reads stay under engine.syncMsgMux only.
lazyConnMgrMu sync.RWMutex
// reconcileRoutedIPs re-applies a peer's routed allowed IPs after its lazy wake endpoint is
// (re)armed (Mode A at arm time). Injected by the engine; nil disables the reconcile.
reconcileRoutedIPs func(peerKey string) error
wg sync.WaitGroup
lazyCtx context.Context
lazyCtxCancel context.CancelFunc
}
// SetRoutedIPsReconciler injects the callback used to re-apply a peer's routed allowed IPs when
// its lazy wake endpoint is (re)armed. Must be called before the lazy manager starts.
func (e *ConnMgr) SetRoutedIPsReconciler(fn func(peerKey string) error) {
e.reconcileRoutedIPs = fn
}
func NewConnMgr(engineConfig *EngineConfig, statusRecorder *peer.Status, peerStore *peerstore.Store, iface lazyconn.WGIface) *ConnMgr {
e := &ConnMgr{
peerStore: peerStore,
@@ -254,20 +238,12 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) RemovePeerConn(peerKey string) {
conn.Log.Infof("removed peer from lazy conn manager")
}
// ActivatePeer wakes an idle lazy connection. Unlike the rest of ConnMgr it is
// safe for concurrent use: the lazy manager pointer is read under lazyConnMgrMu
// and the manager itself is internally synchronized, so callers outside the
// engine loop (DNS warm-up) do not need engine.syncMsgMux.
func (e *ConnMgr) ActivatePeer(ctx context.Context, conn *peer.Conn) {
e.lazyConnMgrMu.RLock()
lazyConnMgr := e.lazyConnMgr
started := lazyConnMgr != nil && e.lazyCtxCancel != nil
e.lazyConnMgrMu.RUnlock()
if !started {
if !e.isStartedWithLazyMgr() {
return
}
if found := lazyConnMgr.ActivatePeer(conn.GetKey()); found {
if found := e.lazyConnMgr.ActivatePeer(conn.GetKey()); found {
if err := conn.Open(ctx); err != nil {
conn.Log.Errorf("failed to open connection: %v", err)
}
@@ -292,22 +268,16 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) Close() {
e.lazyCtxCancel()
e.wg.Wait()
e.lazyConnMgrMu.Lock()
e.lazyConnMgr = nil
e.lazyConnMgrMu.Unlock()
}
func (e *ConnMgr) initLazyManager(engineCtx context.Context) {
cfg := manager.Config{
InactivityThreshold: inactivityThresholdEnv(),
ReconcileAllowedIPs: e.reconcileRoutedIPs,
}
e.lazyConnMgrMu.Lock()
e.lazyConnMgr = manager.NewManager(cfg, engineCtx, e.peerStore, e.iface)
e.lazyCtx, e.lazyCtxCancel = context.WithCancel(engineCtx)
e.lazyConnMgrMu.Unlock()
e.wg.Add(1)
go func() {
@@ -346,10 +316,7 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) closeManager(ctx context.Context) {
e.lazyCtxCancel()
e.wg.Wait()
e.lazyConnMgrMu.Lock()
e.lazyConnMgr = nil
e.lazyConnMgrMu.Unlock()
for _, peerID := range e.peerStore.PeersPubKey() {
e.peerStore.PeerConnOpen(ctx, peerID)

View File

@@ -1,21 +1,10 @@
package internal
import (
"context"
"net"
"net/netip"
"os"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/lazyconn"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peerstore"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/monotime"
)
func TestResolveLazyForce(t *testing.T) {
@@ -49,58 +38,3 @@ func TestResolveLazyForce(t *testing.T) {
})
}
}
type mockLazyWGIface struct{}
func (mockLazyWGIface) RemovePeer(string) error { return nil }
func (mockLazyWGIface) UpdatePeer(string, []netip.Prefix, time.Duration, *net.UDPAddr, *wgtypes.Key) error {
return nil
}
func (mockLazyWGIface) IsUserspaceBind() bool { return false }
func (mockLazyWGIface) Address() wgaddr.Address { return wgaddr.Address{} }
func (mockLazyWGIface) LastActivities() map[string]monotime.Time { return nil }
func (mockLazyWGIface) MTU() uint16 { return 1280 }
// TestConnMgr_ActivatePeerConcurrentWithLifecycle exercises ActivatePeer from
// non-engine goroutines (the DNS warm-up path) racing the manager lifecycle,
// which stays on the engine loop. Run with -race: it fails if ActivatePeer
// still requires engine.syncMsgMux for safety.
func TestConnMgr_ActivatePeerConcurrentWithLifecycle(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(lazyconn.EnvLazyConn, "on")
status := peer.NewRecorder("https://mgm")
store := peerstore.NewConnStore()
connMgr := NewConnMgr(&EngineConfig{}, status, store, mockLazyWGIface{})
conn := newTestPeerConn(t, "peerA")
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
connMgr.Start(ctx)
done := make(chan struct{})
var wg sync.WaitGroup
for range 4 {
wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
for {
select {
case <-done:
return
default:
connMgr.ActivatePeer(ctx, conn)
}
}
}()
}
// Let the activators spin against the started manager, then tear it down
// underneath them and let them spin against the stopped manager.
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
connMgr.Close()
time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
close(done)
wg.Wait()
}

View File

@@ -257,10 +257,7 @@ func (c *ConnectClient) run(mobileDependency MobileDependency, runningChan chan
log.Errorf("failed to clean up temporary installer file: %v", err)
}
defer func() {
c.statusRecorder.SetSessionExpiresAt(time.Time{})
c.statusRecorder.ClientStop()
}()
defer c.statusRecorder.ClientStop()
operation := func() error {
// if context cancelled we not start new backoff cycle
if c.ctx.Err() != nil {
@@ -621,7 +618,6 @@ func createEngineConfig(key wgtypes.Key, config *profilemanager.Config, peerConf
BlockLANAccess: config.BlockLANAccess,
BlockInbound: config.BlockInbound,
DisableIPv6: config.DisableIPv6,
SyncMessageVersion: config.SyncMessageVersion,
LazyConnection: lazyconn.ParseState(config.LazyConnection),
@@ -697,7 +693,6 @@ func loginToManagement(ctx context.Context, client mgm.Client, pubSSHKey []byte,
config.BlockLANAccess,
config.BlockInbound,
config.DisableIPv6,
config.SyncMessageVersion,
config.EnableSSHRoot,
config.EnableSSHSFTP,
config.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding,

View File

@@ -676,7 +676,6 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addCommonConfigFields(configContent *strings.Builder)
configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("BlockLANAccess: %v\n", g.internalConfig.BlockLANAccess))
configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("BlockInbound: %v\n", g.internalConfig.BlockInbound))
configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("DisableIPv6: %v\n", g.internalConfig.DisableIPv6))
configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("SyncMessageVersion: %v\n", g.internalConfig.SyncMessageVersion))
if g.internalConfig.DisableNotifications != nil {
configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("DisableNotifications: %v\n", *g.internalConfig.DisableNotifications))

View File

@@ -887,8 +887,6 @@ func TestAddConfig_AllFieldsCovered(t *testing.T) {
ClientCertKeyPath: "/tmp/key",
LazyConnection: "on",
MTU: 1280,
DisableIPv6: true,
SyncMessageVersion: func(v int) *int { return &v }(1),
}
for _, anonymize := range []bool{false, true} {

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
"fmt"
"net"
"net/netip"
"os"
"slices"
"strings"
"sync"
@@ -37,43 +36,7 @@ type resolver interface {
// record is left alone (it points at something outside our mesh, e.g.
// a non-peer upstream).
type PeerConnectivity interface {
IsConnectedByIP(ip netip.Addr) (known, connected bool)
}
// PeerActivator wakes lazy-connection peers on demand. The local resolver calls
// it with the tunnel IPs an answer points at, so a peer that is idle (lazily
// disconnected) starts connecting at DNS-resolution time rather than racing the
// client's first request packet. nil disables warm-up.
type PeerActivator interface {
// ActivatePeersByIP triggers wake-up for the peer(s) owning addrs and blocks
// until one is connected or ctx (a short per-query budget) expires. It is a
// fast no-op for unknown or already-connected addresses.
ActivatePeersByIP(ctx context.Context, addrs []netip.Addr)
}
const (
defaultLazyWarmupTimeout = 2 * time.Second
envLazyWarmupTimeout = "NB_DNS_LAZY_WARMUP_TIMEOUT"
)
// lazyWarmupTimeoutFromEnv returns the per-query budget for waking a
// lazy-connection peer a DNS answer points at. Tunable via
// NB_DNS_LAZY_WARMUP_TIMEOUT (a Go duration). Parsed once at construction time.
func lazyWarmupTimeoutFromEnv() time.Duration {
v := os.Getenv(envLazyWarmupTimeout)
if v == "" {
return defaultLazyWarmupTimeout
}
d, err := time.ParseDuration(v)
if err != nil {
log.Warnf("invalid %s value %q, using default %s: %v", envLazyWarmupTimeout, v, defaultLazyWarmupTimeout, err)
return defaultLazyWarmupTimeout
}
if d <= 0 {
log.Warnf("non-positive %s value %q, using default %s", envLazyWarmupTimeout, v, defaultLazyWarmupTimeout)
return defaultLazyWarmupTimeout
}
return d
IsConnectedByIP(ip string) (known, connected bool)
}
type Resolver struct {
@@ -88,12 +51,6 @@ type Resolver struct {
// filter and preserves the legacy "return whatever is registered"
// behaviour for callers that never wire a status source.
peerConn PeerConnectivity
// peerActivator, when non-nil, is called at resolution time to warm the
// lazy connection to the peer(s) an answer points at. nil disables warm-up.
peerActivator PeerActivator
// warmupTimeout is the per-query budget for the lazy-connection warm-up
// wait, resolved from the environment once at construction time.
warmupTimeout time.Duration
ctx context.Context
cancel context.CancelFunc
@@ -102,12 +59,11 @@ type Resolver struct {
func NewResolver() *Resolver {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
return &Resolver{
records: make(map[dns.Question][]dns.RR),
domains: make(map[domain.Domain]struct{}),
zones: make(map[domain.Domain]bool),
warmupTimeout: lazyWarmupTimeoutFromEnv(),
ctx: ctx,
cancel: cancel,
records: make(map[dns.Question][]dns.RR),
domains: make(map[domain.Domain]struct{}),
zones: make(map[domain.Domain]bool),
ctx: ctx,
cancel: cancel,
}
}
@@ -120,14 +76,6 @@ func (d *Resolver) SetPeerConnectivity(p PeerConnectivity) {
d.peerConn = p
}
// SetPeerActivator wires the DNS-time lazy-connection warm-up. Pass nil to
// disable. Safe to call multiple times; the latest value wins.
func (d *Resolver) SetPeerActivator(a PeerActivator) {
d.mu.Lock()
defer d.mu.Unlock()
d.peerActivator = a
}
func (d *Resolver) MatchSubdomains() bool {
return true
}
@@ -174,9 +122,6 @@ func (d *Resolver) ServeDNS(w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg) {
replyMessage.RecursionAvailable = true
result := d.lookupRecords(logger, question)
// Warm before filtering: activation flips a lazily-idle target to connected,
// which then lets it survive the disconnected-peer filter below.
d.warmLazyPeers(question, result.records)
result.records = d.filterDisconnectedPeerAnswers(logger, question, result.records)
replyMessage.Authoritative = !result.hasExternalData
replyMessage.Answer = result.records
@@ -550,8 +495,8 @@ func (d *Resolver) filterDisconnectedPeerAnswers(logger *log.Entry, question dns
kept := make([]dns.RR, 0, len(records))
var dropped int
for _, rr := range records {
ip, ok := extractRecordAddr(rr)
if !ok {
ip := extractRecordIP(rr)
if ip == "" {
kept = append(kept, rr)
continue
}
@@ -573,57 +518,22 @@ func (d *Resolver) filterDisconnectedPeerAnswers(logger *log.Entry, question dns
return kept
}
// warmLazyPeers triggers lazy-connection wake-up for the peers a resolved
// answer points at and waits briefly for one to connect, so the caller's first
// request doesn't race the connection establishment. Warm-up is scoped to
// match-only (non-authoritative) zones — the synthesized private-service zones
// and user-created zones whose records point at specific peers. The account's
// peer zone is authoritative, so plain peer-name lookups never trigger warm-up;
// otherwise resolving any peer's name would wake its idle connection, defeating
// laziness mesh-wide. No-op when no activator is wired (lazy connections
// disabled) or the answer carries no peer IPs.
func (d *Resolver) warmLazyPeers(question dns.Question, records []dns.RR) {
if len(records) < 2 {
return
}
d.mu.RLock()
activator := d.peerActivator
var nonAuth, found bool
if activator != nil {
nonAuth, found = d.findZone(question.Name)
}
d.mu.RUnlock()
if activator == nil || !found || !nonAuth {
return
}
var addrs []netip.Addr
for _, rr := range records {
if addr, ok := extractRecordAddr(rr); ok {
addrs = append(addrs, addr)
}
}
if len(addrs) == 0 {
return
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(d.ctx, d.warmupTimeout)
defer cancel()
activator.ActivatePeersByIP(ctx, addrs)
}
// extractRecordAddr returns the IP address carried by an A or AAAA record.
// ok is false for any other record type or a record with no address.
func extractRecordAddr(rr dns.RR) (netip.Addr, bool) {
// extractRecordIP returns the dotted-decimal / colon-hex IP carried by
// an A or AAAA record, or "" for any other record type.
func extractRecordIP(rr dns.RR) string {
switch r := rr.(type) {
case *dns.A:
addr, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(r.A)
return addr.Unmap(), ok
if r.A == nil {
return ""
}
return r.A.String()
case *dns.AAAA:
addr, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(r.AAAA)
return addr.Unmap(), ok
if r.AAAA == nil {
return ""
}
return r.AAAA.String()
}
return netip.Addr{}, false
return ""
}
// Update replaces all zones and their records

View File

@@ -37,8 +37,8 @@ type mockPeerConnectivity struct {
byIP map[string]struct{ known, connected bool }
}
func (m mockPeerConnectivity) IsConnectedByIP(ip netip.Addr) (known, connected bool) {
v, ok := m.byIP[ip.String()]
func (m mockPeerConnectivity) IsConnectedByIP(ip string) (known, connected bool) {
v, ok := m.byIP[ip]
if !ok {
return false, false
}

View File

@@ -1,204 +0,0 @@
package local
import (
"context"
"net"
"net/netip"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/miekg/dns"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns/test"
nbdns "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/dns"
)
// recordingActivator records the addresses it was asked to warm and returns
// immediately, so ServeDNS is not blocked by the test.
type recordingActivator struct {
mu sync.Mutex
called bool
addrs []netip.Addr
}
func (r *recordingActivator) ActivatePeersByIP(_ context.Context, addrs []netip.Addr) {
r.mu.Lock()
defer r.mu.Unlock()
r.called = true
r.addrs = append(r.addrs, addrs...)
}
func serveA(t *testing.T, resolver *Resolver, name string) *dns.Msg {
t.Helper()
var resp *dns.Msg
w := &test.MockResponseWriter{WriteMsgFunc: func(m *dns.Msg) error { resp = m; return nil }}
resolver.ServeDNS(w, new(dns.Msg).SetQuestion(name, dns.TypeA))
return resp
}
// serviceZone registers rec in a match-only (non-authoritative) zone, the shape
// the synthesized private-service zones arrive in.
func serviceZone(t *testing.T, resolver *Resolver, zone string, records ...nbdns.SimpleRecord) {
t.Helper()
resolver.Update([]nbdns.CustomZone{{
Domain: zone,
Records: records,
NonAuthoritative: true,
}})
}
func TestLocalResolver_WarmsLazyPeerOnResolve(t *testing.T) {
// Warm-up fires only for multi-record answers (the HA / round-robin shape of
// the synthesized private-service zones), so register two peer targets.
const name = "svc.proxy.netbird.cloud."
recs := []nbdns.SimpleRecord{
{Name: name, Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "100.64.0.7"},
{Name: name, Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "100.64.0.8"},
}
resolver := NewResolver()
serviceZone(t, resolver, "proxy.netbird.cloud", recs...)
act := &recordingActivator{}
resolver.SetPeerActivator(act)
resp := serveA(t, resolver, name)
require.NotNil(t, resp, "resolver must answer")
require.NotEmpty(t, resp.Answer, "answer must carry the A records")
act.mu.Lock()
defer act.mu.Unlock()
assert.True(t, act.called, "activator must be invoked for a multi-record service-zone answer")
assert.Contains(t, act.addrs, netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.7"), "activator must receive the first peer IP")
assert.Contains(t, act.addrs, netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.8"), "activator must receive the second peer IP")
}
func TestLocalResolver_NoWarmupForSingleRecord(t *testing.T) {
// A single-record answer does not trigger warm-up; the resolver only warms
// multi-record answers.
rec := nbdns.SimpleRecord{Name: "svc.proxy.netbird.cloud.", Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "100.64.0.7"}
resolver := NewResolver()
serviceZone(t, resolver, "proxy.netbird.cloud", rec)
act := &recordingActivator{}
resolver.SetPeerActivator(act)
resp := serveA(t, resolver, rec.Name)
require.NotNil(t, resp, "resolver must answer")
require.NotEmpty(t, resp.Answer, "answer must carry the A record")
act.mu.Lock()
defer act.mu.Unlock()
assert.False(t, act.called, "activator must not be invoked for a single-record answer")
}
func TestLocalResolver_NoActivatorNoWarmup(t *testing.T) {
// With no activator wired the resolver behaves exactly as before.
rec := nbdns.SimpleRecord{Name: "svc.proxy.netbird.cloud.", Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "100.64.0.7"}
resolver := NewResolver()
serviceZone(t, resolver, "proxy.netbird.cloud", rec)
resp := serveA(t, resolver, rec.Name)
require.NotNil(t, resp, "resolver must still answer without an activator")
require.NotEmpty(t, resp.Answer, "answer must carry the A record")
}
func TestLocalResolver_NoWarmupForMissingRecord(t *testing.T) {
// A query that resolves to nothing must not invoke the activator (no IPs).
resolver := NewResolver()
serviceZone(t, resolver, "proxy.netbird.cloud",
nbdns.SimpleRecord{Name: "svc.proxy.netbird.cloud.", Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "100.64.0.7"})
act := &recordingActivator{}
resolver.SetPeerActivator(act)
serveA(t, resolver, "absent.proxy.netbird.cloud.")
act.mu.Lock()
defer act.mu.Unlock()
assert.False(t, act.called, "activator must not be invoked when there is no answer")
}
func TestLocalResolver_NoWarmupInAuthoritativeZone(t *testing.T) {
// The account's peer zone is authoritative; resolving a peer's name there
// must not wake its lazy connection — warm-up is scoped to match-only
// (non-authoritative) zones such as the synthesized private-service zones.
// Use a multi-record answer so the authoritative-zone scoping is the only
// reason warm-up is skipped, not the single-record guard.
const name = "peer.netbird.cloud."
recs := []nbdns.SimpleRecord{
{Name: name, Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "100.64.0.9"},
{Name: name, Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "100.64.0.10"},
}
resolver := NewResolver()
resolver.Update([]nbdns.CustomZone{{
Domain: "netbird.cloud",
Records: recs,
}})
act := &recordingActivator{}
resolver.SetPeerActivator(act)
resp := serveA(t, resolver, name)
require.NotNil(t, resp, "resolver must answer")
require.NotEmpty(t, resp.Answer, "answer must carry the A records")
act.mu.Lock()
defer act.mu.Unlock()
assert.False(t, act.called, "activator must not be invoked for authoritative-zone answers")
}
func TestLazyWarmupTimeoutFromEnv(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
value string
envSet bool
want time.Duration
}{
{name: "unset uses default", want: defaultLazyWarmupTimeout},
{name: "valid overrides", value: "5s", envSet: true, want: 5 * time.Second},
{name: "invalid falls back", value: "not-a-duration", envSet: true, want: defaultLazyWarmupTimeout},
{name: "negative falls back", value: "-1s", envSet: true, want: defaultLazyWarmupTimeout},
{name: "zero falls back", value: "0s", envSet: true, want: defaultLazyWarmupTimeout},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
if tt.envSet {
t.Setenv(envLazyWarmupTimeout, tt.value)
}
assert.Equal(t, tt.want, lazyWarmupTimeoutFromEnv())
assert.Equal(t, tt.want, NewResolver().warmupTimeout, "constructor must resolve the timeout once")
})
}
}
func TestExtractRecordAddr(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("A record yields unmapped v4", func(t *testing.T) {
// net.ParseIP returns the 16-byte v4-in-v6 form, the same shape
// miekg/dns stores after parsing an A record; the extracted address
// must compare equal to a plain v4 netip.Addr.
addr, ok := extractRecordAddr(&dns.A{A: net.ParseIP("100.64.0.7")})
require.True(t, ok)
assert.True(t, addr.Is4())
assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.7"), addr)
})
t.Run("AAAA record yields v6", func(t *testing.T) {
addr, ok := extractRecordAddr(&dns.AAAA{AAAA: net.ParseIP("fd00::1")})
require.True(t, ok)
assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::1"), addr)
})
t.Run("A record without address", func(t *testing.T) {
_, ok := extractRecordAddr(&dns.A{})
assert.False(t, ok)
})
t.Run("non-address record", func(t *testing.T) {
_, ok := extractRecordAddr(&dns.CNAME{Target: "target.netbird.cloud."})
assert.False(t, ok)
})
}

View File

@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import (
"github.com/miekg/dns"
dnsconfig "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns/config"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns/local"
nbdns "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/dns"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
@@ -93,11 +92,6 @@ func (m *MockServer) SetFirewall(Firewall) {
// Mock implementation - no-op
}
// SetPeerActivator mock implementation of SetPeerActivator from Server interface
func (m *MockServer) SetPeerActivator(local.PeerActivator) {
// Mock implementation - no-op
}
// BeginBatch mock implementation of BeginBatch from Server interface
func (m *MockServer) BeginBatch() {
// Mock implementation - no-op

View File

@@ -82,7 +82,6 @@ type Server interface {
PopulateManagementDomain(mgmtURL *url.URL) error
SetRouteSources(selected, active func() route.HAMap)
SetFirewall(Firewall)
SetPeerActivator(local.PeerActivator)
}
type nsGroupsByDomain struct {
@@ -492,13 +491,6 @@ func (s *DefaultServer) SetFirewall(fw Firewall) {
}
}
// SetPeerActivator wires the DNS-time lazy-connection warm-up on the local
// resolver. Injected after the connection manager exists (it does not at
// DNS-server construction time). Pass nil to disable.
func (s *DefaultServer) SetPeerActivator(a local.PeerActivator) {
s.localResolver.SetPeerActivator(a)
}
// Stop stops the server
func (s *DefaultServer) Stop() {
s.ctxCancel()
@@ -1443,11 +1435,11 @@ type localPeerConnectivity struct {
// IsConnectedByIP looks the IP up in the peerstore and surfaces both
// the known and connected bits. Used by Resolver.filterDisconnectedPeerAnswers.
func (l localPeerConnectivity) IsConnectedByIP(ip netip.Addr) (known, connected bool) {
func (l localPeerConnectivity) IsConnectedByIP(ip string) (known, connected bool) {
if l.status == nil {
return false, false
}
state, ok := l.status.PeerStateByIP(ip.String())
state, ok := l.status.PeerStateByIP(ip)
if !ok {
return false, false
}

View File

@@ -292,16 +292,18 @@ func (s *serviceViaListener) generateFreePort() (uint16, error) {
return customPort, nil
}
probeListener, err := net.ListenUDP("udp4", &net.UDPAddr{})
udpAddr := net.UDPAddrFromAddrPort(netip.MustParseAddrPort("0.0.0.0:0"))
probeListener, err := net.ListenUDP("udp", udpAddr)
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("failed to bind random port for DNS: %s", err)
return 0, err
}
port := uint16(probeListener.LocalAddr().(*net.UDPAddr).Port)
if err = probeListener.Close(); err != nil {
addrPort := netip.MustParseAddrPort(probeListener.LocalAddr().String()) // might panic if address is incorrect
err = probeListener.Close()
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("failed to free up DNS port: %s", err)
return 0, err
}
return port, nil
return addrPort.Port(), nil
}

View File

@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
package internal
import (
"context"
"net/netip"
"time"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peerstore"
)
const dnsActivationPollInterval = 50 * time.Millisecond
// dnsPeerActivator wakes lazy-connection peers from the DNS resolution path. It
// implements dns/local.PeerActivator. DNS queries run on their own goroutines,
// so it only touches state that is safe for concurrent use — ConnMgr.ActivatePeer,
// peerstore.Store and peer.Status — and never takes the engine's syncMsgMux,
// keeping DNS resolution from contending with network-map processing.
type dnsPeerActivator struct {
connMgr *ConnMgr
peerStore *peerstore.Store
status *peer.Status
// ctx is the engine's long-lived context. The connection dial is tied to it
// (not the per-query DNS wait budget) so a handshake that outlasts the wait
// still completes in the background rather than being cancelled at the deadline.
ctx context.Context
}
// ActivatePeersByIP triggers wake-up for the peer(s) owning addrs and waits
// until one is connected or ctx (the per-query DNS wait budget) expires.
// Activation itself is tied to the engine's long-lived context so the dial
// survives a wait that times out. Unknown or already-connected addresses are
// skipped, so the steady-state (warm) path adds no latency.
func (a *dnsPeerActivator) ActivatePeersByIP(ctx context.Context, addrs []netip.Addr) {
if a == nil || a.connMgr == nil {
return
}
var pending []string
for _, addr := range addrs {
ip := addr.String()
st, ok := a.status.PeerStateByIP(ip)
if !ok || st.ConnStatus == peer.StatusConnected {
continue
}
conn, ok := a.peerStore.PeerConn(st.PubKey)
if !ok {
continue
}
a.connMgr.ActivatePeer(a.ctx, conn)
pending = append(pending, ip)
}
if len(pending) == 0 {
return
}
a.waitConnected(ctx, pending)
}
// waitConnected blocks until any of ips reports a connected peer or ctx expires.
func (a *dnsPeerActivator) waitConnected(ctx context.Context, ips []string) {
ticker := time.NewTicker(dnsActivationPollInterval)
defer ticker.Stop()
for {
for _, ip := range ips {
if st, ok := a.status.PeerStateByIP(ip); ok && st.ConnStatus == peer.StatusConnected {
return
}
}
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case <-ticker.C:
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
package internal
import (
"context"
"net/netip"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peerstore"
)
func newTestPeerConn(t *testing.T, key string) *peer.Conn {
t.Helper()
conn, err := peer.NewConn(peer.ConnConfig{
Key: key,
LocalKey: "local",
WgConfig: peer.WgConfig{
AllowedIps: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("100.64.0.1/32")},
},
}, peer.ServiceDependencies{})
require.NoError(t, err)
return conn
}
func newTestDNSPeerActivator(t *testing.T) (*dnsPeerActivator, *peer.Status, *peerstore.Store) {
t.Helper()
status := peer.NewRecorder("https://mgm")
store := peerstore.NewConnStore()
// ConnMgr without Start: the lazy manager is nil, so ActivatePeer is a
// no-op — these tests exercise the activator's skip/wait logic.
connMgr := NewConnMgr(&EngineConfig{}, status, store, nil)
return &dnsPeerActivator{
connMgr: connMgr,
peerStore: store,
status: status,
ctx: context.Background(),
}, status, store
}
func TestDNSPeerActivator_NilSafe(t *testing.T) {
var a *dnsPeerActivator
a.ActivatePeersByIP(context.Background(), []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1")})
}
// TestDNSPeerActivator_SkipsUnknownAndConnectedPeers verifies the steady-state
// (warm) path adds no latency: already-connected and unknown addresses never
// enter the wait loop.
func TestDNSPeerActivator_SkipsUnknownAndConnectedPeers(t *testing.T) {
a, status, store := newTestDNSPeerActivator(t)
require.NoError(t, status.AddPeer("peerA", "a.netbird.cloud", "100.64.0.1", "fd00::1"))
require.NoError(t, status.UpdatePeerState(peer.State{PubKey: "peerA", ConnStatus: peer.StatusConnected}))
store.AddPeerConn("peerA", newTestPeerConn(t, "peerA"))
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
start := time.Now()
a.ActivatePeersByIP(ctx, []netip.Addr{
netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1"), // known, connected -> skipped
netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::1"), // known via IPv6, connected -> skipped
netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.99"), // unknown -> skipped
})
require.Less(t, time.Since(start), time.Second, "no pending peer must mean no wait")
}
// TestDNSPeerActivator_WaitsForPendingPeerToConnect verifies the wait loop
// returns as soon as a pending peer reports connected, well before the
// per-query budget expires.
func TestDNSPeerActivator_WaitsForPendingPeerToConnect(t *testing.T) {
a, status, store := newTestDNSPeerActivator(t)
require.NoError(t, status.AddPeer("peerA", "a.netbird.cloud", "100.64.0.1", ""))
store.AddPeerConn("peerA", newTestPeerConn(t, "peerA"))
go func() {
time.Sleep(150 * time.Millisecond)
_ = status.UpdatePeerState(peer.State{PubKey: "peerA", ConnStatus: peer.StatusConnected})
}()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
start := time.Now()
a.ActivatePeersByIP(ctx, []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1")})
elapsed := time.Since(start)
require.GreaterOrEqual(t, elapsed, 100*time.Millisecond, "must wait for the pending peer")
require.Less(t, elapsed, 5*time.Second, "must return on connect, not at the deadline")
}
// TestDNSPeerActivator_ReturnsAtBudgetWhenPeerStaysIdle verifies a peer that
// never connects releases the DNS response at the per-query budget instead of
// blocking it indefinitely.
func TestDNSPeerActivator_ReturnsAtBudgetWhenPeerStaysIdle(t *testing.T) {
a, status, store := newTestDNSPeerActivator(t)
require.NoError(t, status.AddPeer("peerA", "a.netbird.cloud", "100.64.0.1", ""))
store.AddPeerConn("peerA", newTestPeerConn(t, "peerA"))
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 300*time.Millisecond)
defer cancel()
start := time.Now()
a.ActivatePeersByIP(ctx, []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1")})
elapsed := time.Since(start)
require.GreaterOrEqual(t, elapsed, 250*time.Millisecond, "must wait out the budget for a pending peer")
require.Less(t, elapsed, 5*time.Second, "must not block past the budget")
}
// TestDNSPeerActivator_NoWaitWithoutPeerConn verifies a known-but-idle peer
// with no connection object in the store is not waited on: there is nothing to
// activate, so waiting could only ever time out.
func TestDNSPeerActivator_NoWaitWithoutPeerConn(t *testing.T) {
a, status, _ := newTestDNSPeerActivator(t)
require.NoError(t, status.AddPeer("peerA", "a.netbird.cloud", "100.64.0.1", ""))
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
start := time.Now()
a.ActivatePeersByIP(ctx, []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1")})
require.Less(t, time.Since(start), time.Second, "peer without a conn must not be waited on")
}

View File

@@ -52,14 +52,11 @@ int xdp_dns_fwd(struct iphdr *ip, struct udphdr *udp) {
if (udp->dest == GENERAL_DNS_PORT && ip->daddr == dns_ip) {
udp->dest = dns_port;
// Clear the now-stale checksum; zero means "not computed" for IPv4.
udp->check = 0;
return XDP_PASS;
}
if (udp->source == dns_port && ip->saddr == dns_ip) {
udp->source = GENERAL_DNS_PORT;
udp->check = 0;
return XDP_PASS;
}

View File

@@ -50,11 +50,5 @@ int xdp_wg_proxy(struct iphdr *ip, struct udphdr *udp) {
__be16 new_dst_port = htons(proxy_port);
udp->dest = new_dst_port;
udp->source = new_src_port;
// The ports are covered by the UDP checksum. This is an IPv4 loopback hop
// and the payload is already integrity-protected, so clear the checksum (a
// zero UDP checksum means "not computed" for IPv4) rather than leave a
// stale value the kernel would drop as UDP_CSUM.
udp->check = 0;
return XDP_PASS;
}

View File

@@ -64,10 +64,7 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
mgm "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/client"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
sharedgrpc "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/grpc"
nbnetworkmap "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/networkmap"
mgmProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
types "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/types"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/netiputil"
auth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/relay/auth/hmac"
relayClient "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/relay/client"
@@ -150,7 +147,6 @@ type EngineConfig struct {
BlockLANAccess bool
BlockInbound bool
DisableIPv6 bool
SyncMessageVersion *int
// LazyConnection is the MDM-sourced lazy-connection override; StateUnset defers to
// the env var and management feature flag.
@@ -224,13 +220,6 @@ type Engine struct {
// networkSerial is the latest CurrentSerial (state ID) of the network sent by the Management service
networkSerial uint64
// latestComponents is the most-recent NetworkMapComponents decoded from
// a NetworkMapEnvelope (capability=3 peers only). Held alongside the
// NetworkMap that Calculate() produced from it so future incremental
// updates have a base to apply changes against. nil for legacy-format
// peers. Guarded by syncMsgMux.
latestComponents *types.NetworkMapComponents
networkMonitor *networkmonitor.NetworkMonitor
sshServer sshServer
@@ -562,7 +551,7 @@ func (e *Engine) Start(netbirdConfig *mgmProto.NetbirdConfig, mgmtURL *url.URL)
} else {
log.Infof("running rosenpass in strict mode")
}
e.rpManager, err = rosenpass.NewManager(e.config.PreSharedKey, e.config.WgIfaceName, publicKey)
e.rpManager, err = rosenpass.NewManager(e.config.PreSharedKey, e.config.WgIfaceName, publicKey, e.config.StateDir)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create rosenpass manager: %w", err)
}
@@ -663,24 +652,8 @@ func (e *Engine) Start(netbirdConfig *mgmProto.NetbirdConfig, mgmtURL *url.URL)
iceCfg := e.createICEConfig()
e.connMgr = NewConnMgr(e.config, e.statusRecorder, e.peerStore, wgIface)
e.connMgr.SetRoutedIPsReconciler(func(peerKey string) error {
if e.routeManager == nil {
return nil
}
return e.routeManager.ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs(peerKey)
})
e.connMgr.Start(e.ctx)
// Wire DNS-time lazy-connection warm-up now that the connection manager
// exists (it does not at DNS-server construction time). A DNS answer that
// points at an idle peer then wakes it before the client's first request.
e.dnsServer.SetPeerActivator(&dnsPeerActivator{
connMgr: e.connMgr,
peerStore: e.peerStore,
status: e.statusRecorder,
ctx: e.ctx,
})
e.srWatcher = guard.NewSRWatcher(e.signal, e.relayManager, e.mobileDep.IFaceDiscover, iceCfg)
e.srWatcher.Start(peer.IsForceRelayed())
@@ -990,12 +963,8 @@ func (e *Engine) handleSync(update *mgmProto.SyncResponse) error {
e.ApplySessionDeadline(update.GetSessionExpiresAt())
// Envelope sync responses carry PeerConfig at the top level; legacy
// NetworkMap syncs carry it under NetworkMap.PeerConfig.
if pc := update.GetPeerConfig(); pc != nil {
e.handleAutoUpdateVersion(pc.GetAutoUpdate())
} else if nm := update.GetNetworkMap(); nm != nil && nm.GetPeerConfig() != nil {
e.handleAutoUpdateVersion(nm.GetPeerConfig().GetAutoUpdate())
if update.NetworkMap != nil && update.NetworkMap.PeerConfig != nil {
e.handleAutoUpdateVersion(update.NetworkMap.PeerConfig.AutoUpdate)
}
done := e.phase("netbird_config")
@@ -1005,47 +974,12 @@ func (e *Engine) handleSync(update *mgmProto.SyncResponse) error {
return err
}
// Decode the network map from either the components envelope or the
// legacy proto.NetworkMap before the posture-check gating below, so the
// "is there a network map" decision covers both wire shapes.
var (
nm *mgmProto.NetworkMap
components *types.NetworkMapComponents
)
if version := update.GetVersion(); version == int32(sharedgrpc.ComponentNetworkMap) {
// Components-format peer: decode the envelope back to typed
// components, run Calculate() locally, and convert to the wire
// NetworkMap shape the rest of the engine consumes. Components are
// retained so future incremental updates can apply deltas instead
// of doing a full reconstruction.
envelope := update.GetNetworkMapEnvelope()
if envelope == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("received a SyncReponse indicating use of components network map, but components are missing")
}
localKey := e.config.WgPrivateKey.PublicKey().String()
dnsName := ""
if pc := update.GetPeerConfig(); pc != nil {
// PeerConfig.Fqdn = "<dns_label>.<dns_domain>" — extract the
// shared domain by stripping the peer's own label prefix. Falls
// back to empty if the FQDN doesn't have the expected shape.
dnsName = extractDNSDomainFromFQDN(pc.GetFqdn())
}
result, err := nbnetworkmap.EnvelopeToNetworkMap(e.ctx, envelope, localKey, dnsName)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("decode network map envelope: %w", err)
}
nm = result.NetworkMap
components = result.Components
} else {
nm = update.GetNetworkMap()
}
// Posture checks are bound to the network map presence:
// NetworkMap != nil, checks present -> apply the received checks
// NetworkMap != nil, checks nil -> posture checks were removed, clear them
// NetworkMap == nil -> config-only update (e.g. relay token rotation),
// leave the previously applied checks untouched
nm := update.GetNetworkMap()
if nm == nil {
return nil
}
@@ -1058,14 +992,6 @@ func (e *Engine) handleSync(update *mgmProto.SyncResponse) error {
}
done = e.phase("persist")
// Only retain the components view when the server sent the envelope
// path. A legacy proto.NetworkMap means components == nil; writing it
// here would clobber a previously-cached snapshot, breaking the
// incremental-delta base on a future envelope sync.
if components != nil {
e.latestComponents = components
}
e.persistSyncResponse(update)
done()
@@ -1079,19 +1005,6 @@ func (e *Engine) handleSync(update *mgmProto.SyncResponse) error {
return nil
}
// extractDNSDomainFromFQDN returns the trailing dotted domain part of the
// receiving peer's FQDN — the same value the management server fills as
// dnsName when it builds the legacy NetworkMap. "peer42.netbird.cloud" →
// "netbird.cloud". An empty string is returned for unrecognized formats.
func extractDNSDomainFromFQDN(fqdn string) string {
for i := 0; i < len(fqdn); i++ {
if fqdn[i] == '.' && i+1 < len(fqdn) {
return fqdn[i+1:]
}
}
return ""
}
// updateNetbirdConfig applies the management-provided NetBird configuration:
// STUN/TURN and relay servers, flow logging and DNS settings. A nil config is a no-op,
// which is the case for sync updates carrying only a network map.
@@ -1251,7 +1164,6 @@ func (e *Engine) applyInfoFlags(info *system.Info) {
e.config.BlockLANAccess,
e.config.BlockInbound,
e.config.DisableIPv6,
e.config.SyncMessageVersion,
e.config.EnableSSHRoot,
e.config.EnableSSHSFTP,
e.config.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding,
@@ -1897,6 +1809,7 @@ func (e *Engine) createPeerConn(pubKey string, allowedIPs []netip.Prefix, agentV
PubKey: e.getRosenpassPubKey(),
Addr: e.getRosenpassAddr(),
PermissiveMode: e.config.RosenpassPermissive,
KeyResolver: e.rosenpassKeyResolver(),
},
ICEConfig: e.createICEConfig(),
}
@@ -1967,6 +1880,8 @@ func (e *Engine) receiveSignalEvents() error {
log.Debugf("receiveMSG: took %s to get lock for peer %s with session id %s", gotLock, msg.Key, offerAnswer.SessionID)
e.applyRosenpassKeyExchange(msg, offerAnswer)
if msg.Body.Type == sProto.Body_OFFER {
conn.OnRemoteOffer(*offerAnswer)
} else {
@@ -2120,7 +2035,6 @@ func (e *Engine) readInitialSettings() ([]*route.Route, *nbdns.Config, bool, err
e.config.BlockLANAccess,
e.config.BlockInbound,
e.config.DisableIPv6,
e.config.SyncMessageVersion,
e.config.EnableSSHRoot,
e.config.EnableSSHSFTP,
e.config.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding,
@@ -2311,6 +2225,34 @@ func (e *Engine) getRosenpassAddr() string {
return ""
}
// rosenpassKeyResolver returns the Rosenpass manager as the offer/answer key
// resolver, or a true nil interface when Rosenpass is disabled (returning the
// typed-nil *Manager would make the interface non-nil and panic on use).
func (e *Engine) rosenpassKeyResolver() peer.RosenpassKeyResolver {
if e.rpManager == nil {
return nil
}
return e.rpManager
}
// applyRosenpassKeyExchange reconciles the fingerprint/cache fields of an incoming
// offer/answer against the Rosenpass manager's cache: it resolves the remote peer's
// full public key (from the message or the cache) into the OfferAnswer, and records
// whether the peer acknowledged holding our key. No-op when Rosenpass is disabled.
func (e *Engine) applyRosenpassKeyExchange(msg *sProto.Message, oa *peer.OfferAnswer) {
if e.rpManager == nil {
return
}
cfg := msg.GetBody().GetRosenpassConfig()
if cfg == nil {
return
}
remoteWgKey := msg.GetKey()
oa.RosenpassPubKey = e.rpManager.ResolveRemotePubKey(remoteWgKey, cfg.GetRosenpassPubKey(), cfg.GetRosenpassPubKeyHash())
e.rpManager.SetRemoteAck(remoteWgKey, cfg.GetAcknowledgedRosenpassPubKeyHash())
}
// RunHealthProbes executes health checks for Signal, Management, Relay, and WireGuard services
// and updates the status recorder with the latest states.
//

View File

@@ -75,14 +75,4 @@ func TestApplySessionDeadline_ThreeState(t *testing.T) {
require.True(t, e.statusRecorder.GetSessionExpiresAt().IsZero(),
"invalid timestamp must clear the deadline")
})
t.Run("recently expired timestamp stays visible as expired", func(t *testing.T) {
e := newEngine()
expired := time.Now().Add(-5 * time.Minute).UTC().Truncate(time.Second)
e.ApplySessionDeadline(timestamppb.New(expired))
require.True(t, e.statusRecorder.GetSessionExpiresAt().Equal(expired),
"recently-expired deadline must stay on the recorder so consumers render it as expired")
})
}

View File

@@ -29,11 +29,6 @@ type managedPeer struct {
type Config struct {
InactivityThreshold *time.Duration
// ReconcileAllowedIPs re-applies a peer's routed allowed IPs after its wake endpoint is
// armed. The activity listener creates the wake peer with the overlay /32 only; without the
// routed prefixes WireGuard would not steer subnet-bound traffic to the wake endpoint, so an
// idle routing peer could never be woken by that traffic. Optional; nil disables the reconcile.
ReconcileAllowedIPs func(peerKey string) error
}
// Manager manages lazy connections
@@ -61,9 +56,6 @@ type Manager struct {
peerToHAGroups map[string][]route.HAUniqueID // peer ID -> HA groups they belong to
haGroupToPeers map[route.HAUniqueID][]string // HA group -> peer IDs in the group
routesMu sync.RWMutex
// reconcileAllowedIPs re-applies a peer's routed allowed IPs after its wake endpoint is armed.
reconcileAllowedIPs func(peerKey string) error
}
// NewManager creates a new lazy connection manager
@@ -81,7 +73,6 @@ func NewManager(config Config, engineCtx context.Context, peerStore *peerstore.S
activityManager: activity.NewManager(wgIface),
peerToHAGroups: make(map[string][]route.HAUniqueID),
haGroupToPeers: make(map[route.HAUniqueID][]string),
reconcileAllowedIPs: config.ReconcileAllowedIPs,
}
if wgIface.IsUserspaceBind() {
@@ -210,7 +201,7 @@ func (m *Manager) AddPeer(peerCfg lazyconn.PeerConfig) (bool, error) {
return false, nil
}
if err := m.armActivityListener(peerCfg); err != nil {
if err := m.activityManager.MonitorPeerActivity(peerCfg); err != nil {
return false, err
}
@@ -297,7 +288,7 @@ func (m *Manager) DeactivatePeer(peerID peerid.ConnID) {
m.inactivityManager.RemovePeer(mp.peerCfg.PublicKey)
if err := m.armActivityListener(*mp.peerCfg); err != nil {
if err := m.activityManager.MonitorPeerActivity(*mp.peerCfg); err != nil {
mp.peerCfg.Log.Errorf("failed to create activity monitor: %v", err)
return
}
@@ -474,31 +465,6 @@ func (m *Manager) close() {
}
// shouldDeferIdleForHA checks if peer should stay connected due to HA group requirements
// armRoutedAllowedIPs re-applies the peer's routed allowed IPs onto its freshly armed wake
// endpoint. The activity listener creates the wake peer with the overlay /32 only, so without
// this the routed prefixes would be missing and traffic to a routed subnet could not wake the
// idle routing peer. It is a no-op when no reconciler is configured.
// armActivityListener (re)arms the peer's wake endpoint via the activity manager and then
// re-applies its routed allowed IPs, so traffic to a routed subnet can wake an idle routing
// peer. The routed prefixes must be re-applied after the wake endpoint exists because the
// listener creates it with the overlay /32 only.
func (m *Manager) armActivityListener(peerCfg lazyconn.PeerConfig) error {
if err := m.activityManager.MonitorPeerActivity(peerCfg); err != nil {
return err
}
m.armRoutedAllowedIPs(&peerCfg)
return nil
}
func (m *Manager) armRoutedAllowedIPs(peerCfg *lazyconn.PeerConfig) {
if m.reconcileAllowedIPs == nil {
return
}
if err := m.reconcileAllowedIPs(peerCfg.PublicKey); err != nil {
peerCfg.Log.Errorf("failed to reconcile routed allowed IPs on wake endpoint: %v", err)
}
}
func (m *Manager) shouldDeferIdleForHA(inactivePeers map[string]struct{}, peerID string) bool {
m.routesMu.RLock()
defer m.routesMu.RUnlock()
@@ -611,7 +577,7 @@ func (m *Manager) onPeerInactivityTimedOut(peerIDs map[string]struct{}) {
mp.peerCfg.Log.Infof("start activity monitor")
if err := m.armActivityListener(*mp.peerCfg); err != nil {
if err := m.activityManager.MonitorPeerActivity(*mp.peerCfg); err != nil {
mp.peerCfg.Log.Errorf("failed to create activity monitor: %v", err)
continue
}

View File

@@ -65,6 +65,20 @@ type WgConfig struct {
PreSharedKey *wgtypes.Key
}
// RosenpassKeyResolver lets the handshaker fill the fingerprint/cache fields of an
// offer/answer without depending on the Rosenpass manager directly. Implemented by
// rosenpass.Manager and wired in by the engine.
type RosenpassKeyResolver interface {
// LocalPubKeyHash is the SHA256 of our own Rosenpass public key.
LocalPubKeyHash() []byte
// RemotePubKeyAck is the SHA256 of the remote peer's cached key (nil if we do
// not hold it), sent back as an acknowledgement.
RemotePubKeyAck(remoteWgKey string) []byte
// RemoteHasLocalKey reports whether the peer already holds our key, so the full
// key may be omitted.
RemoteHasLocalKey(remoteWgKey string) bool
}
type RosenpassConfig struct {
// RosenpassPubKey is this peer's Rosenpass public key
PubKey []byte
@@ -72,6 +86,10 @@ type RosenpassConfig struct {
Addr string
PermissiveMode bool
// KeyResolver drives fingerprint-based key caching over signalling. Nil when
// Rosenpass is disabled, which makes the handshaker always send the full key.
KeyResolver RosenpassKeyResolver
}
// ConnConfig is a peer Connection configuration

View File

@@ -33,8 +33,13 @@ type OfferAnswer struct {
// Version of NetBird Agent
Version string
// RosenpassPubKey is the Rosenpass public key of the remote peer when receiving this message
// This value is the local Rosenpass server public key when sending the message
// This value is the local Rosenpass server public key when sending the message.
// May be empty on send when the remote peer has acknowledged already holding it (see RosenpassPubKeyAck).
RosenpassPubKey []byte
// RosenpassPubKeyHash is the SHA256 of the sender's own RosenpassPubKey. Always set when Rosenpass is enabled.
RosenpassPubKeyHash []byte
// RosenpassPubKeyAck is the SHA256 of the remote peer's key the sender holds cached; empty means "send it in full".
RosenpassPubKeyAck []byte
// RosenpassAddr is the Rosenpass server address (IP:port) of the remote peer when receiving this message
// This value is the local Rosenpass server address when sending the message
RosenpassAddr string
@@ -209,11 +214,11 @@ func (h *Handshaker) sendAnswer() error {
func (h *Handshaker) buildOfferAnswer() OfferAnswer {
answer := OfferAnswer{
WgListenPort: h.config.LocalWgPort,
Version: version.NetbirdVersion(),
RosenpassPubKey: h.config.RosenpassConfig.PubKey,
RosenpassAddr: h.config.RosenpassConfig.Addr,
WgListenPort: h.config.LocalWgPort,
Version: version.NetbirdVersion(),
RosenpassAddr: h.config.RosenpassConfig.Addr,
}
h.setRosenpassPubKey(&answer)
if h.ice != nil && h.RemoteICESupported() {
uFrag, pwd := h.ice.GetLocalUserCredentials()
@@ -230,6 +235,30 @@ func (h *Handshaker) buildOfferAnswer() OfferAnswer {
return answer
}
// setRosenpassPubKey fills the Rosenpass key fields of an outgoing offer/answer.
// With a resolver wired it advertises our key hash and the ack for the remote key
// we hold, and includes the full public key only when the peer has not yet
// acknowledged holding it. Without a resolver (Rosenpass disabled, or an older
// code path) it always sends the full key, preserving the previous behaviour.
func (h *Handshaker) setRosenpassPubKey(answer *OfferAnswer) {
localKey := h.config.RosenpassConfig.PubKey
if len(localKey) == 0 {
return
}
resolver := h.config.RosenpassConfig.KeyResolver
if resolver == nil {
answer.RosenpassPubKey = localKey
return
}
answer.RosenpassPubKeyHash = resolver.LocalPubKeyHash()
answer.RosenpassPubKeyAck = resolver.RemotePubKeyAck(h.config.Key)
if !resolver.RemoteHasLocalKey(h.config.Key) {
answer.RosenpassPubKey = localKey
}
}
func (h *Handshaker) updateRemoteICEState(offer *OfferAnswer) {
hasICE := offer.hasICECredentials()
prev := h.remoteICESupported.Swap(hasICE)

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
package peer
import (
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
type fakeRPResolver struct {
localHash []byte
ack []byte
hasLocal bool
}
func (f fakeRPResolver) LocalPubKeyHash() []byte { return f.localHash }
func (f fakeRPResolver) RemotePubKeyAck(string) []byte { return f.ack }
func (f fakeRPResolver) RemoteHasLocalKey(remote string) bool { return f.hasLocal }
func TestSetRosenpassPubKey_NoResolverAlwaysSendsFullKey(t *testing.T) {
localKey := []byte{1, 2, 3}
h := &Handshaker{config: ConnConfig{RosenpassConfig: RosenpassConfig{PubKey: localKey}}}
var a OfferAnswer
h.setRosenpassPubKey(&a)
require.Equal(t, localKey, a.RosenpassPubKey)
require.Nil(t, a.RosenpassPubKeyHash)
require.Nil(t, a.RosenpassPubKeyAck)
}
func TestSetRosenpassPubKey_ResolverIncludesFullKeyUntilAcked(t *testing.T) {
localKey := []byte{1, 2, 3}
res := fakeRPResolver{localHash: []byte{9}, ack: []byte{8}, hasLocal: false}
h := &Handshaker{config: ConnConfig{Key: "peerA", RosenpassConfig: RosenpassConfig{PubKey: localKey, KeyResolver: res}}}
var a OfferAnswer
h.setRosenpassPubKey(&a)
require.Equal(t, localKey, a.RosenpassPubKey, "full key must be sent until the peer acks it")
require.Equal(t, []byte{9}, a.RosenpassPubKeyHash)
require.Equal(t, []byte{8}, a.RosenpassPubKeyAck)
}
func TestSetRosenpassPubKey_ResolverOmitsFullKeyOnceAcked(t *testing.T) {
localKey := []byte{1, 2, 3}
res := fakeRPResolver{localHash: []byte{9}, ack: []byte{8}, hasLocal: true}
h := &Handshaker{config: ConnConfig{Key: "peerA", RosenpassConfig: RosenpassConfig{PubKey: localKey, KeyResolver: res}}}
var a OfferAnswer
h.setRosenpassPubKey(&a)
require.Nil(t, a.RosenpassPubKey, "full key must be omitted once the peer holds it")
require.Equal(t, []byte{9}, a.RosenpassPubKeyHash)
require.Equal(t, []byte{8}, a.RosenpassPubKeyAck)
}
func TestSetRosenpassPubKey_DisabledSetsNothing(t *testing.T) {
h := &Handshaker{config: ConnConfig{RosenpassConfig: RosenpassConfig{}}}
var a OfferAnswer
h.setRosenpassPubKey(&a)
require.Nil(t, a.RosenpassPubKey)
require.Nil(t, a.RosenpassPubKeyHash)
}

View File

@@ -61,11 +61,13 @@ func (s *Signaler) signalOfferAnswer(offerAnswer OfferAnswer, remoteKey string,
UFrag: offerAnswer.IceCredentials.UFrag,
Pwd: offerAnswer.IceCredentials.Pwd,
},
RosenpassPubKey: offerAnswer.RosenpassPubKey,
RosenpassAddr: offerAnswer.RosenpassAddr,
RelaySrvAddress: offerAnswer.RelaySrvAddress,
RelaySrvIP: offerAnswer.RelaySrvIP,
SessionID: sessionIDBytes,
RosenpassPubKey: offerAnswer.RosenpassPubKey,
RosenpassPubKeyHash: offerAnswer.RosenpassPubKeyHash,
RosenpassPubKeyAck: offerAnswer.RosenpassPubKeyAck,
RosenpassAddr: offerAnswer.RosenpassAddr,
RelaySrvAddress: offerAnswer.RelaySrvAddress,
RelaySrvIP: offerAnswer.RelaySrvIP,
SessionID: sessionIDBytes,
})
if err != nil {
return err

View File

@@ -813,14 +813,19 @@ func (d *Status) SetSessionExpiresAt(deadline time.Time) {
}
// GetSessionExpiresAt returns the most recently recorded SSO session deadline,
// or the zero value when no deadline is tracked. A deadline in the past is
// returned as-is: it means the session has expired, and consumers (tray row,
// CLI status) render it as "expired" rather than hiding it — masking it as
// "none" would blank the UI at the exact moment it should say the session
// ended.
// or the zero value when no deadline is tracked. A deadline that has already
// slipped into the past reports as "none": once the session has expired it is
// no longer a meaningful countdown, and the sessionwatch.Watcher does not
// arm a timer at the deadline itself to clear it (only the two pre-expiry
// warnings). Without this guard the UI would keep painting a stale
// "expires in …" against a moment that has passed until the next login,
// extend, or teardown rewrote the value.
func (d *Status) GetSessionExpiresAt() time.Time {
d.mux.Lock()
defer d.mux.Unlock()
if !d.sessionExpiresAt.IsZero() && d.sessionExpiresAt.Before(time.Now()) {
return time.Time{}
}
return d.sessionExpiresAt
}

View File

@@ -96,7 +96,6 @@ type ConfigInput struct {
BlockLANAccess *bool
BlockInbound *bool
DisableIPv6 *bool
SyncMessageVersion *int
DisableNotifications *bool
@@ -138,7 +137,6 @@ type Config struct {
BlockLANAccess bool
BlockInbound bool
DisableIPv6 bool
SyncMessageVersion *int
DisableNotifications *bool
@@ -589,12 +587,6 @@ func (config *Config) apply(input ConfigInput) (updated bool, err error) {
updated = true
}
if input.SyncMessageVersion != nil && *input.SyncMessageVersion != *config.SyncMessageVersion {
log.Infof("setting SyncMessageVersion to %v", *input.SyncMessageVersion)
*config.SyncMessageVersion = *input.SyncMessageVersion
updated = true
}
if input.DisableNotifications != nil && (config.DisableNotifications == nil || *input.DisableNotifications != *config.DisableNotifications) {
if *input.DisableNotifications {
log.Infof("disabling notifications")

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
package rosenpass
import (
"bytes"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func newCacheTestManager(spk []byte) *Manager {
return &Manager{
spk: spk,
remotePubKeys: make(map[string][]byte),
remoteHasLocalKey: make(map[string]bool),
}
}
func TestResolveRemotePubKey(t *testing.T) {
m := newCacheTestManager([]byte{0x01, 0x02})
full := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xAB}, 64)
// a received full key is cached and returned
require.Equal(t, full, m.ResolveRemotePubKey("peerA", full, nil))
// a later hash-only message resolves from the cache
require.Equal(t, full, m.ResolveRemotePubKey("peerA", nil, rawRosenpassKeyHash(full)))
// hash mismatch is a cache miss
require.Nil(t, m.ResolveRemotePubKey("peerA", nil, bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x01}, 32)))
// no key and no hash (remote without Rosenpass) resolves to nil
require.Nil(t, m.ResolveRemotePubKey("peerB", nil, nil))
}
func TestRemotePubKeyAck(t *testing.T) {
m := newCacheTestManager([]byte{0x01})
// unknown peer -> no ack (signals "send me the full key")
require.Nil(t, m.RemotePubKeyAck("peerA"))
full := bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x09}, 48)
m.ResolveRemotePubKey("peerA", full, nil)
require.Equal(t, rawRosenpassKeyHash(full), m.RemotePubKeyAck("peerA"))
}
func TestSetRemoteAckAndRemoteHasLocalKey(t *testing.T) {
m := newCacheTestManager(bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x07}, 100))
require.False(t, m.RemoteHasLocalKey("peerA"))
// an ack matching our own key hash marks the peer as holding our key
m.SetRemoteAck("peerA", m.LocalPubKeyHash())
require.True(t, m.RemoteHasLocalKey("peerA"))
// empty ack clears it
m.SetRemoteAck("peerA", nil)
require.False(t, m.RemoteHasLocalKey("peerA"))
// a non-matching ack does not count
m.SetRemoteAck("peerA", bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x01}, 32))
require.False(t, m.RemoteHasLocalKey("peerA"))
}

View File

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
"log/slog"
"net"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
@@ -28,6 +29,11 @@ func hashRosenpassKey(key []byte) string {
return hex.EncodeToString(hasher.Sum(nil))
}
func rawRosenpassKeyHash(key []byte) []byte {
sum := sha256.Sum256(key)
return sum[:]
}
// rpServer is the subset of rp.Server used by Manager. Defined as an interface
// so tests can substitute a mock without spinning up a real UDP server.
type rpServer interface {
@@ -50,12 +56,29 @@ type Manager struct {
lock sync.Mutex
port int
wgIface PresharedKeySetter
// remotePubKeys caches remote peers' full Rosenpass public keys keyed by their
// WireGuard public key, so a peer that already sent us its (large) key over
// signalling need only send its hash on subsequent offers/answers. RAM only —
// never persisted (1000 peers x ~512KB would be ~512MB on disk).
remotePubKeys map[string][]byte
// remoteHasLocalKey tracks, per remote WireGuard key, whether that peer has
// acknowledged holding our current Rosenpass public key, letting us omit it.
remoteHasLocalKey map[string]bool
}
// NewManager creates a new Rosenpass manager. localWgKey is the local
// WireGuard public key, used to derive the per-peer rendezvous key.
func NewManager(preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key, wgIfaceName string, localWgKey wgtypes.Key) (*Manager, error) {
public, secret, err := rp.GenerateKeyPair()
// WireGuard public key, used to derive the per-peer rendezvous key. When stateDir
// is non-empty the static keypair is persisted under it and reused across
// restarts, keeping the public key (and the fingerprint peers cache) stable;
// an empty stateDir keeps the previous behaviour of an ephemeral per-run keypair.
func NewManager(preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key, wgIfaceName string, localWgKey wgtypes.Key, stateDir string) (*Manager, error) {
var keyPath string
if stateDir != "" {
keyPath = filepath.Join(stateDir, keypairFileName)
}
public, secret, err := loadOrGenerateKeypair(keyPath)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -76,8 +99,10 @@ func NewManager(preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key, wgIfaceName string, localWgKey wgtype
// nil receiver in addPeer -> m.rpWgHandler.AddPeer. generateConfig will
// replace it with a fresh handler on each Run() to clear stale peer
// state from previous engine sessions.
rpWgHandler: NewNetbirdHandler((*[32]byte)(preSharedKey), localWgKey),
lock: sync.Mutex{},
rpWgHandler: NewNetbirdHandler((*[32]byte)(preSharedKey), localWgKey),
lock: sync.Mutex{},
remotePubKeys: make(map[string][]byte),
remoteHasLocalKey: make(map[string]bool),
}, nil
}
@@ -90,6 +115,68 @@ func (m *Manager) GetAddress() *net.UDPAddr {
return &net.UDPAddr{Port: m.port}
}
// LocalPubKeyHash returns the raw SHA256 of the local Rosenpass public key. It is
// advertised on every offer/answer so the remote peer can tell (via its cache)
// whether it already holds our full key.
func (m *Manager) LocalPubKeyHash() []byte {
return rawRosenpassKeyHash(m.spk)
}
// RemotePubKeyAck returns the SHA256 of the remote peer's cached public key, used
// as the acknowledgement we send back. Nil means we do not hold the peer's key,
// which signals the peer to include its full key next time.
func (m *Manager) RemotePubKeyAck(remoteWgKey string) []byte {
m.lock.Lock()
defer m.lock.Unlock()
key, ok := m.remotePubKeys[remoteWgKey]
if !ok {
return nil
}
return rawRosenpassKeyHash(key)
}
// RemoteHasLocalKey reports whether the remote peer acknowledged holding our
// current public key, so we may omit the full key from the next offer/answer.
func (m *Manager) RemoteHasLocalKey(remoteWgKey string) bool {
m.lock.Lock()
defer m.lock.Unlock()
return m.remoteHasLocalKey[remoteWgKey]
}
// ResolveRemotePubKey reconciles the Rosenpass key material from a received
// offer/answer: it caches a received full key, or — when only a hash was sent —
// returns the cached key matching that hash. It returns nil when the remote peer
// does not use Rosenpass (no key, no hash) or on a cache miss (hash sent but not
// held); a miss self-heals because our resulting empty ack makes the peer resend
// its full key.
func (m *Manager) ResolveRemotePubKey(remoteWgKey string, full, hash []byte) []byte {
m.lock.Lock()
defer m.lock.Unlock()
if len(full) > 0 {
m.remotePubKeys[remoteWgKey] = full
return full
}
if len(hash) == 0 {
return nil
}
if cached, ok := m.remotePubKeys[remoteWgKey]; ok && bytes.Equal(rawRosenpassKeyHash(cached), hash) {
return cached
}
return nil
}
// SetRemoteAck records whether the remote peer's acknowledgement matches our
// current public key hash, i.e. whether it already holds our key.
func (m *Manager) SetRemoteAck(remoteWgKey string, ack []byte) {
m.lock.Lock()
defer m.lock.Unlock()
m.remoteHasLocalKey[remoteWgKey] = len(ack) > 0 && bytes.Equal(ack, rawRosenpassKeyHash(m.spk))
}
// addPeer adds a new peer to the Rosenpass server
func (m *Manager) addPeer(rosenpassPubKey []byte, rosenpassAddr string, wireGuardIP string, wireGuardPubKey string) error {
// Defense in depth against issue #4341 (Android crash): if Run() has not

View File

@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ func TestAddPeer_NilServer_ReturnsErrorNoCrash(t *testing.T) {
// issue #4341 cannot occur in the window between NewManager and Run().
func TestNewManager_PreInitializesHandler(t *testing.T) {
psk := wgtypes.Key{}
m, err := NewManager(&psk, "wt0", wgtypes.Key{0x01})
m, err := NewManager(&psk, "wt0", wgtypes.Key{0x01}, "")
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, m.rpWgHandler, "rpWgHandler must be initialized in NewManager")
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
package rosenpass
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"os"
rp "cunicu.li/go-rosenpass"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
)
const (
// keypairFileName is the file, relative to the state directory, that holds
// the persisted local Rosenpass static keypair.
keypairFileName = "rosenpass_key.json"
// rpStaticPublicKeySize is the byte length of a Rosenpass (Classic McEliece)
// static public key as produced by the pinned go-rosenpass version. Used as a
// version-compatibility guard: a persisted key of any other size is treated as
// stale and regenerated instead of being fed to go-rosenpass (which would fail).
rpStaticPublicKeySize = 524160
// keypairFormatVersion is bumped whenever the on-disk representation changes so
// old files are discarded and regenerated rather than misparsed.
keypairFormatVersion = 1
)
// persistedKeypair is the on-disk representation of the local Rosenpass static
// keypair. Keys are stored raw (base64 via JSON) with the same restricted 0600
// permission as the WireGuard private key and other client secrets.
type persistedKeypair struct {
Version int `json:"version"`
PublicKey []byte `json:"public_key"`
SecretKey []byte `json:"secret_key"`
}
// loadOrGenerateKeypair returns a Rosenpass static keypair. When keyPath is set
// and holds a valid persisted keypair it is reused, so the local public key —
// and therefore the fingerprint advertised to remote peers over signalling —
// stays stable across restarts. Otherwise a fresh keypair is generated and, when
// keyPath is set, persisted for subsequent runs. A missing or corrupt file is not
// fatal: it degrades to generating an ephemeral keypair, matching the pre-persistence
// behaviour.
func loadOrGenerateKeypair(keyPath string) (public []byte, secret []byte, err error) {
if keyPath != "" {
public, secret, err = loadKeypair(keyPath)
switch {
case err == nil:
return public, secret, nil
case os.IsNotExist(err):
// first run for this state dir; fall through to generate
default:
log.Warnf("failed to load persisted rosenpass keypair, generating a new one: %v", err)
}
}
pub, sec, err := rp.GenerateKeyPair()
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("generate rosenpass key pair: %w", err)
}
if keyPath != "" {
if err := saveKeypair(keyPath, pub, sec); err != nil {
log.Warnf("failed to persist rosenpass keypair, key will be regenerated on next restart: %v", err)
}
}
return pub, sec, nil
}
func loadKeypair(keyPath string) ([]byte, []byte, error) {
var kp persistedKeypair
if _, err := util.ReadJson(keyPath, &kp); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
if kp.Version != keypairFormatVersion || len(kp.PublicKey) != rpStaticPublicKeySize || len(kp.SecretKey) == 0 {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("persisted rosenpass keypair is incompatible (version %d, public %d bytes, secret %d bytes)", kp.Version, len(kp.PublicKey), len(kp.SecretKey))
}
return kp.PublicKey, kp.SecretKey, nil
}
func saveKeypair(keyPath string, public, secret []byte) error {
return util.WriteJsonWithRestrictedPermission(context.Background(), keyPath, persistedKeypair{
Version: keypairFormatVersion,
PublicKey: public,
SecretKey: secret,
})
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
package rosenpass
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestLoadOrGenerateKeypair_EphemeralWhenNoPath(t *testing.T) {
pub, sec, err := loadOrGenerateKeypair("")
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, pub, rpStaticPublicKeySize)
require.NotEmpty(t, sec)
}
func TestLoadOrGenerateKeypair_PersistsAndReloads(t *testing.T) {
keyPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), keypairFileName)
pub1, sec1, err := loadOrGenerateKeypair(keyPath)
require.NoError(t, err)
info, err := os.Stat(keyPath)
require.NoError(t, err, "keypair file must be written")
require.Equal(t, os.FileMode(0600), info.Mode().Perm(), "keypair file must be 0600")
pub2, sec2, err := loadOrGenerateKeypair(keyPath)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.True(t, bytes.Equal(pub1, pub2), "public key must be stable across reloads")
require.True(t, bytes.Equal(sec1, sec2), "secret key must be stable across reloads")
}
func TestLoadOrGenerateKeypair_RegeneratesOnCorruptFile(t *testing.T) {
keyPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), keypairFileName)
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(keyPath, []byte("not json"), 0600))
pub, sec, err := loadOrGenerateKeypair(keyPath)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, pub, rpStaticPublicKeySize)
require.NotEmpty(t, sec)
// the corrupt file must have been overwritten with a valid, reloadable keypair
pub2, _, err := loadOrGenerateKeypair(keyPath)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.True(t, bytes.Equal(pub, pub2))
}
func TestLoadOrGenerateKeypair_RegeneratesOnVersionMismatch(t *testing.T) {
keyPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), keypairFileName)
pub1, _, err := loadOrGenerateKeypair(keyPath)
require.NoError(t, err)
// rewrite with a bumped/unknown format version -> must be discarded
bs, err := json.Marshal(persistedKeypair{Version: keypairFormatVersion + 1, PublicKey: pub1, SecretKey: []byte{0x01}})
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(keyPath, bs, 0600))
pub2, sec2, err := loadOrGenerateKeypair(keyPath)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, pub2, rpStaticPublicKeySize)
require.NotEmpty(t, sec2)
}

View File

@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ func (r *Route) startResolver(ctx context.Context) {
}
func (r *Route) update(ctx context.Context) error {
resolved, err := r.resolveDomains(ctx)
resolved, err := r.resolveDomains()
if err != nil {
if len(resolved) == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("resolve domains: %w", err)
@@ -199,9 +199,9 @@ func (r *Route) update(ctx context.Context) error {
return nil
}
func (r *Route) resolveDomains(ctx context.Context) (domainMap, error) {
func (r *Route) resolveDomains() (domainMap, error) {
results := make(chan resolveResult)
go r.resolve(ctx, results)
go r.resolve(results)
resolved := domainMap{}
var merr *multierror.Error
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ func (r *Route) resolveDomains(ctx context.Context) (domainMap, error) {
return resolved, nberrors.FormatErrorOrNil(merr)
}
func (r *Route) resolve(ctx context.Context, results chan resolveResult) {
func (r *Route) resolve(results chan resolveResult) {
var wg sync.WaitGroup
for _, d := range r.route.Domains {
@@ -225,10 +225,10 @@ func (r *Route) resolve(ctx context.Context, results chan resolveResult) {
go func(domain domain.Domain) {
defer wg.Done()
ips, err := r.getIPsFromResolver(ctx, domain)
ips, err := r.getIPsFromResolver(domain)
if err != nil {
log.Tracef("Failed to resolve domain %s with private resolver: %v", domain.SafeString(), err)
ips, err = lookupHostIPs(ctx, domain)
ips, err = net.LookupIP(domain.PunycodeString())
if err != nil {
results <- resolveResult{domain: domain, err: fmt.Errorf("resolve d %s: %w", domain.SafeString(), err)}
return
@@ -364,20 +364,6 @@ func determinePrefixChanges(oldPrefixes, newPrefixes []netip.Prefix) (toAdd, toR
return
}
// lookupHostIPs resolves d via the system resolver, honoring ctx cancellation.
func lookupHostIPs(ctx context.Context, d domain.Domain) ([]net.IP, error) {
addrs, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, d.PunycodeString())
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
ips := make([]net.IP, 0, len(addrs))
for _, addr := range addrs {
ips = append(ips, addr.IP)
}
return ips, nil
}
func combinePrefixes(oldPrefixes, removedPrefixes, addedPrefixes []netip.Prefix) []netip.Prefix {
prefixSet := make(map[netip.Prefix]struct{})
for _, prefix := range oldPrefixes {

View File

@@ -3,12 +3,11 @@
package dynamic
import (
"context"
"net"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
)
func (r *Route) getIPsFromResolver(ctx context.Context, domain domain.Domain) ([]net.IP, error) {
return lookupHostIPs(ctx, domain)
func (r *Route) getIPsFromResolver(domain domain.Domain) ([]net.IP, error) {
return net.LookupIP(domain.PunycodeString())
}

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
package dynamic
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"net"
"time"
@@ -17,7 +16,7 @@ import (
const dialTimeout = 10 * time.Second
func (r *Route) getIPsFromResolver(ctx context.Context, domain domain.Domain) ([]net.IP, error) {
func (r *Route) getIPsFromResolver(domain domain.Domain) ([]net.IP, error) {
privateClient, err := nbdns.GetClientPrivate(r.wgInterface, r.resolverAddr.Addr(), dialTimeout)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error while creating private client: %s", err)
@@ -33,7 +32,7 @@ func (r *Route) getIPsFromResolver(ctx context.Context, domain domain.Domain) ([
msg := new(dns.Msg)
msg.SetQuestion(fqdn, qtype)
response, _, err := nbdns.ExchangeWithFallback(ctx, privateClient, msg, r.resolverAddr.String())
response, _, err := nbdns.ExchangeWithFallback(nil, privateClient, msg, r.resolverAddr.String())
if err != nil {
if queryErr == nil {
queryErr = fmt.Errorf("DNS query for %s (type %d) after %s: %w", domain.SafeString(), qtype, time.Since(startTime), err)

View File

@@ -61,7 +61,6 @@ type Manager interface {
InitialRouteRange() []string
SetFirewall(firewall.Manager) error
SetDNSForwarderPort(port uint16)
ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs(peerKey string) error
Stop(stateManager *statemanager.Manager)
}
@@ -233,30 +232,6 @@ func (m *DefaultManager) setupRefCounters(useNoop bool) {
)
}
// ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs re-applies every routed allowed IP currently tracked for the peer
// onto the WireGuard device. The allowed-IP refcounter only calls its AddFunc (which pushes to
// the device) on a prefix's 0->1 transition, so a peer whose device entry was rebuilt without a
// matching refcounter change — e.g. a lazy connection cycling through idle->wake, which recreates
// the WireGuard peer with the overlay /32 only — ends up missing routed prefixes the refcounter
// still considers installed, and nothing retries. Calling this when the peer's WireGuard entry is
// (re)created restores convergence. It is add-only and idempotent: AddAllowedIP is update-only, so
// prefixes are re-added to an existing peer and an absent peer is left untouched.
func (m *DefaultManager) ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs(peerKey string) error {
if m.allowedIPsRefCounter == nil {
return nil
}
return m.allowedIPsRefCounter.ReapplyMatching(
func(out string) bool { return out == peerKey },
func(prefix netip.Prefix) error {
if err := m.wgInterface.AddAllowedIP(peerKey, prefix); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("add allowed IP %s for peer %s: %w", prefix, peerKey, err)
}
return nil
},
)
}
// Init sets up the routing
func (m *DefaultManager) Init() error {
m.routeSelector = m.initSelector()

View File

@@ -112,11 +112,6 @@ func (m *MockManager) SetFirewall(firewall.Manager) error {
func (m *MockManager) SetDNSForwarderPort(port uint16) {
}
// ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs mock implementation of ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs from Manager interface
func (m *MockManager) ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs(peerKey string) error {
return nil
}
// Stop mock implementation of Stop from Manager interface
func (m *MockManager) Stop(stateManager *statemanager.Manager) {
if m.StopFunc != nil {

View File

@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
//go:build !windows
package routemanager
import (
"net"
"net/netip"
"sync"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/tun/netstack"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/device"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/routemanager/refcounter"
)
// reconcileWGMock is a minimal iface.WGIface that only records AddAllowedIP calls; every other
// method is an inert stub because ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs exercises none of them.
type reconcileWGMock struct {
mu sync.Mutex
adds map[string][]netip.Prefix
}
func (m *reconcileWGMock) AddAllowedIP(peerKey string, allowedIP netip.Prefix) error {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
if m.adds == nil {
m.adds = map[string][]netip.Prefix{}
}
m.adds[peerKey] = append(m.adds[peerKey], allowedIP)
return nil
}
func (m *reconcileWGMock) added(peerKey string) []netip.Prefix {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
return m.adds[peerKey]
}
func (m *reconcileWGMock) RemoveAllowedIP(string, netip.Prefix) error { return nil }
func (m *reconcileWGMock) Name() string { return "utun-test" }
func (m *reconcileWGMock) Address() wgaddr.Address { return wgaddr.Address{} }
func (m *reconcileWGMock) ToInterface() *net.Interface { return nil }
func (m *reconcileWGMock) IsUserspaceBind() bool { return false }
func (m *reconcileWGMock) GetFilter() device.PacketFilter { return nil }
func (m *reconcileWGMock) GetDevice() *device.FilteredDevice { return nil }
func (m *reconcileWGMock) GetNet() *netstack.Net { return nil }
// TestReconcilePeerAllowedIPs verifies the declarative reconcile re-applies every routed prefix
// tracked for the peer (self-heal, independent of refcount level) and stays scoped to that peer.
func TestReconcilePeerAllowedIPs(t *testing.T) {
wg := &reconcileWGMock{}
m := &DefaultManager{wgInterface: wg}
m.allowedIPsRefCounter = refcounter.New[netip.Prefix, string, string](
func(_ netip.Prefix, peerKey string) (string, error) { return peerKey, nil },
func(netip.Prefix, string) error { return nil },
)
peerA1 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/24")
peerA2 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.1.0.0/24")
peerB1 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.2.0.0/24")
for prefix, peer := range map[netip.Prefix]string{peerA1: "peerA", peerA2: "peerA", peerB1: "peerB"} {
_, err := m.allowedIPsRefCounter.Increment(prefix, peer)
require.NoError(t, err)
}
// Extra reference: reconcile must still re-apply the prefix even though its refcount never
// hit 0 again (the exact case the plain incremental path skips).
_, err := m.allowedIPsRefCounter.Increment(peerA1, "peerA")
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, m.ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs("peerA"))
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []netip.Prefix{peerA1, peerA2}, wg.added("peerA"),
"reconcile must re-apply all routed prefixes of the peer")
assert.Empty(t, wg.added("peerB"), "reconcile must not touch another peer's prefixes")
}
// TestReconcilePeerAllowedIPsNoCounter verifies reconcile is a safe no-op before the refcounter is
// set up.
func TestReconcilePeerAllowedIPsNoCounter(t *testing.T) {
wg := &reconcileWGMock{}
m := &DefaultManager{wgInterface: wg}
require.NoError(t, m.ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs("peerA"))
assert.Empty(t, wg.added("peerA"))
}

View File

@@ -94,26 +94,6 @@ func (rm *Counter[Key, I, O]) Get(key Key) (Ref[O], bool) {
return ref, ok
}
// ReapplyMatching calls apply for every key whose stored Out satisfies pred, holding the
// counter lock for the whole pass. Running apply under the lock keeps it atomic with respect
// to Increment/Decrement: a prefix dropped to zero is removed from the map (and had its
// RemoveFunc called) before this pass observes it, so a stale key can never be re-applied.
// pred and apply are invoked under the lock, so they must not call back into the counter.
func (rm *Counter[Key, I, O]) ReapplyMatching(pred func(out O) bool, apply func(key Key) error) error {
rm.mu.Lock()
defer rm.mu.Unlock()
var merr *multierror.Error
for key, ref := range rm.refCountMap {
if pred(ref.Out) {
if err := apply(key); err != nil {
merr = multierror.Append(merr, err)
}
}
}
return nberrors.FormatErrorOrNil(merr)
}
// Increment increments the reference count for the given key.
// If this is the first reference to the key, the AddFunc is called.
func (rm *Counter[Key, I, O]) Increment(key Key, in I) (Ref[O], error) {

View File

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
package refcounter
import (
"net/netip"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// TestReapplyMatching verifies ReapplyMatching invokes apply for exactly the keys whose stored
// Out satisfies the predicate (no duplicates for multiply-referenced keys) — the primitive
// ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs relies on to re-apply a single peer's routed prefixes.
func TestReapplyMatching(t *testing.T) {
rc := New[netip.Prefix, string, string](
func(_ netip.Prefix, peerKey string) (string, error) { return peerKey, nil },
func(netip.Prefix, string) error { return nil },
)
peerA1 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/24")
peerA2 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.1.0.0/24")
peerB1 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.2.0.0/24")
for prefix, peer := range map[netip.Prefix]string{peerA1: "peerA", peerA2: "peerA", peerB1: "peerB"} {
_, err := rc.Increment(prefix, peer)
require.NoError(t, err)
}
// a second reference must not make the key applied twice
_, err := rc.Increment(peerA1, "peerA")
require.NoError(t, err)
var applied []netip.Prefix
err = rc.ReapplyMatching(
func(out string) bool { return out == "peerA" },
func(key netip.Prefix) error { applied = append(applied, key); return nil },
)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []netip.Prefix{peerA1, peerA2}, applied)
var none []netip.Prefix
err = rc.ReapplyMatching(
func(out string) bool { return out == "missing" },
func(key netip.Prefix) error { none = append(none, key); return nil },
)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, none)
}

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
package statemanager
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
@@ -306,11 +305,6 @@ func (m *Manager) loadStateFile(deleteCorrupt bool) (map[string]json.RawMessage,
var rawStates map[string]json.RawMessage
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &rawStates); err != nil {
if len(bytes.TrimSpace(data)) == 0 {
log.Warnf("state file %s is empty (%d bytes)", m.filePath, len(data))
} else {
log.Warnf("state file %s has malformed content (%d bytes)", m.filePath, len(data))
}
m.handleCorruptedState(deleteCorrupt)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unmarshal states: %w", err)
}

View File

@@ -233,9 +233,6 @@ func (c *Client) DebugBundle(anonymize bool) (string, error) {
deps.SyncResponse = resp
if e := cc.Engine(); e != nil {
deps.RefreshStatus = func() {
e.RunHealthProbes(context.Background(), true)
}
if cm := e.GetClientMetrics(); cm != nil {
deps.ClientMetrics = cm
}

View File

@@ -44,25 +44,10 @@ type Auth struct {
// NewAuth instantiate Auth struct and validate the management URL
func NewAuth(cfgPath string, mgmURL string) (*Auth, error) {
inputCfg := profilemanager.ConfigInput{
ConfigPath: cfgPath,
ManagementURL: mgmURL,
}
// Load the existing config when a config file is already present so an
// interactive re-login reuses the peer's persisted WireGuard private key
// (and thus its identity) instead of generating a fresh one. Generating a
// new key registers a brand-new peer on the management server on every
// re-auth (named after the fallback hostname). Only fall back to a fresh
// in-memory config for the first-time login when no config file exists yet.
// DirectUpdateOrCreateConfig uses non-atomic writes so it also works inside
// the tvOS App Group sandbox where atomic temp-file+rename is blocked.
var cfg *profilemanager.Config
var err error
if cfgPath != "" {
cfg, err = profilemanager.DirectUpdateOrCreateConfig(inputCfg)
} else {
cfg, err = profilemanager.CreateInMemoryConfig(inputCfg)
}
cfg, err := profilemanager.CreateInMemoryConfig(inputCfg)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}

View File

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
//go:build ios
package NetBirdSDK
import "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/version"
// GoClientVersion returns the NetBird Go client version that was baked into
// the framework at compile time via
// -ldflags "-X github.com/netbirdio/netbird/version.version=<version>".
func GoClientVersion() string {
return version.NetbirdVersion()
}

View File

@@ -1081,10 +1081,7 @@ func (s *Server) Down(ctx context.Context, _ *proto.DownRequest) (*proto.DownRes
if err := s.cleanupConnection(); err != nil {
s.mutex.Unlock()
if errors.Is(err, ErrServiceNotUp) {
log.Debugf("Down called while service not up: %v", err)
return nil, err
}
// todo review to update the status in case any type of error
log.Errorf("failed to shut down properly: %v", err)
return nil, err
}
@@ -1157,7 +1154,7 @@ func (s *Server) cleanupConnection() error {
// making the run loop the sole owner of engine shutdown.
if engine != nil {
if err := engine.Stop(); err != nil {
log.Errorf("failed to stop engine during cleanup: %v", err)
return err
}
}

View File

@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ import (
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
nbssh "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
)
const (
@@ -219,20 +218,11 @@ func (m *Manager) buildHostPatterns(peer PeerSSHInfo) []string {
if peer.IPv6.IsValid() {
hostPatterns = append(hostPatterns, peer.IPv6.String())
}
// Peer FQDNs and hostnames originate from remote peers, so they must be
// validated as plain DNS names before being embedded in the ssh_config
// "Match host" pattern list. This prevents injection of arbitrary
// ssh_config directives via embedded quotes, whitespace, newlines, the
// comma pattern separator, or the "*"/"?" pattern metacharacters.
if domain.IsValidDomainNoWildcard(peer.FQDN) {
if peer.FQDN != "" {
hostPatterns = append(hostPatterns, peer.FQDN)
} else if peer.FQDN != "" {
log.Warnf("skipping peer FQDN with invalid characters in SSH config: %q", peer.FQDN)
}
if peer.Hostname != peer.FQDN && domain.IsValidDomainNoWildcard(peer.Hostname) {
if peer.Hostname != "" && peer.Hostname != peer.FQDN {
hostPatterns = append(hostPatterns, peer.Hostname)
} else if peer.Hostname != "" && peer.Hostname != peer.FQDN {
log.Warnf("skipping peer hostname with invalid characters in SSH config: %q", peer.Hostname)
}
return hostPatterns
}

View File

@@ -148,45 +148,6 @@ func TestManager_MatchHostFormat(t *testing.T) {
"should use Match host with comma-separated patterns")
}
func TestManager_HostPatternInjection(t *testing.T) {
tempDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "netbird-ssh-config-test")
require.NoError(t, err)
defer func() { assert.NoError(t, os.RemoveAll(tempDir)) }()
manager := &Manager{
sshConfigDir: filepath.Join(tempDir, "ssh_config.d"),
sshConfigFile: "99-netbird.conf",
}
// A malicious peer FQDN/hostname attempts to break out of the Match host
// directive and inject arbitrary ssh_config (a ProxyCommand executing a
// command). It must be rejected, not written to the config.
peers := []PeerSSHInfo{
{
Hostname: "evil\"\n ProxyCommand touch /tmp/pwned\nHost x",
IP: netip.MustParseAddr("100.125.1.1"),
FQDN: "evil\"\n ProxyCommand touch /tmp/pwned\nHost x.nb.internal",
},
{Hostname: "peer2", IP: netip.MustParseAddr("100.125.1.2"), FQDN: "peer2.nb.internal"},
}
err = manager.SetupSSHClientConfig(peers)
require.NoError(t, err)
configPath := filepath.Join(manager.sshConfigDir, manager.sshConfigFile)
content, err := os.ReadFile(configPath)
require.NoError(t, err)
configStr := string(content)
assert.NotContains(t, configStr, "ProxyCommand touch /tmp/pwned",
"injected directive must not appear in generated config")
assert.NotContains(t, configStr, "evil",
"malicious pattern must be dropped entirely")
// The valid peer must still be present, on a single Match host line.
assert.Contains(t, configStr, "Match host \"100.125.1.1,100.125.1.2,peer2.nb.internal,peer2\"",
"valid peers must survive, injected patterns dropped")
}
func TestManager_ForcedSSHConfig(t *testing.T) {
// Set force environment variable
t.Setenv(EnvForceSSHConfig, "true")

View File

@@ -69,8 +69,7 @@ func parseGetentPasswd(output string) (*user.User, string, error) {
// validateGetentInput checks that the input is safe to pass to getent or id.
// Allows POSIX usernames, numeric UIDs, and common NSS extensions
// (@ for Kerberos, $ for Samba, + for NIS compat). A leading hyphen is
// rejected so the input can never be parsed as a command-line flag.
// (@ for Kerberos, $ for Samba, + for NIS compat).
func validateGetentInput(input string) bool {
maxLen := 32
if runtime.GOOS == "linux" {
@@ -81,10 +80,6 @@ func validateGetentInput(input string) bool {
return false
}
if input[0] == '-' {
return false
}
for _, r := range input {
if isAllowedGetentChar(r) {
continue

View File

@@ -157,9 +157,6 @@ func TestValidateGetentInput(t *testing.T) {
{"numeric UID", "1001", true},
{"dots and underscores", "alice.bob_test", true},
{"hyphen", "alice-bob", true},
{"leading hyphen rejected", "-i", false},
{"leading double hyphen rejected", "--no-idn", false},
{"lone hyphen rejected", "-", false},
{"kerberos principal", "user@REALM", true},
{"samba machine account", "MACHINE$", true},
{"NIS compat", "+user", true},

View File

@@ -79,15 +79,13 @@ type Info struct {
EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding bool
EnableSSHRemotePortForwarding bool
DisableSSHAuth bool
SyncMessageVersion *int
}
func (i *Info) SetFlags(
rosenpassEnabled, rosenpassPermissive bool,
serverSSHAllowed *bool,
disableClientRoutes, disableServerRoutes,
disableDNS, disableFirewall, blockLANAccess, blockInbound, disableIPv6 bool, syncMessageVersion *int,
disableDNS, disableFirewall, blockLANAccess, blockInbound, disableIPv6 bool,
enableSSHRoot, enableSSHSFTP, enableSSHLocalPortForwarding, enableSSHRemotePortForwarding *bool,
disableSSHAuth *bool,
) {
@@ -105,8 +103,6 @@ func (i *Info) SetFlags(
i.BlockInbound = blockInbound
i.DisableIPv6 = disableIPv6
i.SyncMessageVersion = syncMessageVersion
if enableSSHRoot != nil {
i.EnableSSHRoot = *enableSSHRoot
}

View File

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ func autostartDisabledByMDM(policy *mdm.Policy) bool {
// netbirdFootprintExists reports whether the machine already carries NetBird
// daemon config or state, meaning this is not a genuinely fresh install. It is
// the update-safety gate for the autostart default: upgrading users always
// have a footprint, so an update can never trigger a autostart entry write.
// have a footprint, so an update can never trigger a login-item write.
func netbirdFootprintExists() bool {
candidates := []string{
profilemanager.DefaultConfigPath,
@@ -69,23 +69,9 @@ func netbirdFootprintExists() bool {
// applyAutostartDefault runs the one-time launch-on-login default for genuinely
// fresh installs. The autostartInitialized marker is persisted before any
// enable attempt so a crash mid-flow degrades to "never enabled" instead of
// retrying autostart entry writes on every launch. A user's later disable in
// retrying login-item writes on every launch. A user's later disable in
// Settings is never overridden: the marker guarantees at-most-once, ever.
func applyAutostartDefault(ctx context.Context, autostart *services.Autostart, prefs *preferences.Store, prefsFileExisted bool) {
mdmDisabled := autostartDisabledByMDM(mdm.LoadPolicy())
if mdmDisabled {
if enabled, err := autostart.IsEnabled(ctx); err != nil {
log.Warnf("MDM disableAutostart: read autostart state: %v", err)
} else if enabled {
if err := autostart.SetEnabled(ctx, false); err != nil {
log.Warnf("MDM disableAutostart: force off failed: %v", err)
} else {
log.Info("MDM disableAutostart enforced: autostart turned off")
}
}
}
priorFootprint := netbirdFootprintExists() || prefsFileExisted
if prefs.Get().AutostartInitialized {
@@ -98,7 +84,7 @@ func applyAutostartDefault(ctx context.Context, autostart *services.Autostart, p
state := autostartDefaultState{
supported: autostart.Supported(ctx),
mdmDisabled: mdmDisabled,
mdmDisabled: autostartDisabledByMDM(mdm.LoadPolicy()),
priorInstall: priorFootprint,
}
enable, reason := shouldEnableAutostartDefault(state)

View File

@@ -1,13 +1,10 @@
import { useEffect, useState } from "react";
import { useTranslation } from "react-i18next";
import { AlertTriangleIcon, DownloadIcon } from "lucide-react";
import { Browser } from "@wailsio/runtime";
import { Version } from "@bindings/services";
import { Button } from "@/components/buttons/Button";
import { useStatus } from "@/contexts/StatusContext.tsx";
const RELEASES_URL = "https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/releases/latest";
const RC_RELEASES_URL = "https://pkgs.netbird.io/releases/rc";
function openUrl(url: string) {
Browser.OpenURL(url).catch(() => globalThis.open(url, "_blank"));
@@ -15,26 +12,7 @@ function openUrl(url: string) {
export const DaemonOutdatedOverlay = () => {
const { t } = useTranslation();
const { status, isDaemonOutdated } = useStatus();
const [guiVersion, setGuiVersion] = useState<string>("-");
const clientVersion = status?.daemonVersion ?? "—";
const isRc = /-rc/i.test(guiVersion) || /-rc/i.test(clientVersion);
const downloadUrl = isRc ? RC_RELEASES_URL : RELEASES_URL;
useEffect(() => {
if (!isDaemonOutdated) return;
let cancelled = false;
Version.GUI()
.then((v) => {
if (!cancelled) setGuiVersion(v);
})
.catch((err) => console.error("[DaemonOutdatedOverlay] GUI version error", err));
return () => {
cancelled = true;
};
}, [isDaemonOutdated]);
const { isDaemonOutdated } = useStatus();
if (!isDaemonOutdated) return null;
@@ -60,37 +38,10 @@ export const DaemonOutdatedOverlay = () => {
<p className={"text-sm text-nb-gray-300"}>{t("daemon.outdated.description")}</p>
</div>
<div className={"flex flex-col items-center gap-0.5 text-center"}>
<p className={"text-sm font-semibold text-nb-gray-100"}>
{clientVersion === "development" ? (
<span>
{t("settings.about.clientName")}{" "}
<span className={"font-mono text-yellow-400"}>
{t("settings.about.development")}
</span>
</span>
) : (
t("settings.about.client", { version: clientVersion })
)}
</p>
<p className={"text-sm font-medium text-nb-gray-250"}>
{guiVersion === "development" ? (
<span>
{t("settings.about.guiName")}{" "}
<span className={"font-mono text-yellow-400"}>
{t("settings.about.development")}
</span>
</span>
) : (
t("settings.about.gui", { version: guiVersion })
)}
</p>
</div>
<div className={"wails-no-draggable"}>
<Button variant={"primary"} size={"xs"} onClick={() => openUrl(downloadUrl)}>
<Button variant={"primary"} size={"xs"} onClick={() => openUrl(RELEASES_URL)}>
<DownloadIcon size={14} />
{t("daemon.outdated.download")}
{t("update.card.getInstaller")}
</Button>
</div>
</div>

View File

@@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ type ProfileContextValue = {
loaded: boolean;
refresh: () => Promise<void>;
switchProfile: (id: string) => Promise<void>;
switchProfileNoConnect: (id: string) => Promise<void>;
addProfile: (name: string) => Promise<string>;
removeProfile: (id: string) => Promise<void>;
renameProfile: (id: string, newName: string) => Promise<void>;
@@ -113,16 +112,6 @@ export const ProfileProvider = ({ children }: { children: ReactNode }) => {
[username, refresh],
);
// Manage-profiles variant: switches without connecting, so the user can
// still adjust the management URL before bringing the connection up.
const switchProfileNoConnect = useCallback(
async (id: string) => {
await ProfileSwitcher.SwitchActiveNoConnect({ profileName: id, username });
await refresh();
},
[username, refresh],
);
// addProfile creates a profile by display name and returns the
// daemon-generated ID, so the caller can immediately address it by ID.
const addProfile = useCallback(
@@ -169,7 +158,6 @@ export const ProfileProvider = ({ children }: { children: ReactNode }) => {
loaded,
refresh,
switchProfile,
switchProfileNoConnect,
addProfile,
removeProfile,
renameProfile,
@@ -183,7 +171,6 @@ export const ProfileProvider = ({ children }: { children: ReactNode }) => {
loaded,
refresh,
switchProfile,
switchProfileNoConnect,
addProfile,
removeProfile,
renameProfile,

View File

@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ export function ProfilesTab() {
activeProfileId,
loaded,
username,
switchProfileNoConnect,
switchProfile,
addProfile,
removeProfile,
renameProfile,
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ export function ProfilesTab() {
confirmLabel: t("profile.switch.confirm"),
});
if (!ok) return;
await guarded(i18next.t("profile.error.switchTitle"), () => switchProfileNoConnect(id));
await guarded(i18next.t("profile.error.switchTitle"), () => switchProfile(id));
};
const handleDeregister = async (id: string, name: string) => {
@@ -129,13 +129,14 @@ export function ProfilesTab() {
await guarded(i18next.t("profile.error.createTitle"), async () => {
const id = await addProfile(name);
// SetConfig is keyed by the new profile's ID, so it writes the
// not-yet-active profile before the switch makes it current.
// not-yet-active profile. Write before switching so any reconnect
// targets the right deployment.
if (!isNetbirdCloud(managementUrl)) {
await SettingsSvc.SetConfig(
new SetConfigParams({ profileName: id, username, managementUrl }),
);
}
await switchProfileNoConnect(id);
await switchProfile(id);
});
};

View File

@@ -73,13 +73,6 @@ export default function SessionExpirationDialog() {
let offCancel: (() => void) | undefined;
// Return the dialog to its interactive state and dismiss the browser popup
const resetDialog = () => {
offCancel?.();
WindowManager.CloseBrowserLogin().catch(console.error);
setBusy(false);
};
try {
const start = await Session.RequestExtend({ hint: "" });
const uri = start.verificationUriComplete || start.verificationUri;
@@ -112,22 +105,25 @@ export default function SessionExpirationDialog() {
if (outcome.kind === "cancel") {
waitPromise.cancel?.();
waitPromise.catch(() => {});
resetDialog();
return;
}
// Another surface owns this flow; keep the dialog open to retry.
if (outcome.result.preempted) {
resetDialog();
return;
}
WindowManager.CloseRenewFlow().catch(console.error);
// Close before the popup so the restore can't flash this window back.
WindowManager.CloseSessionExpiration().catch(console.error);
} catch (e) {
resetDialog();
await errorDialog({
Title: t("sessionExpiration.extendFailedTitle"),
Message: formatErrorMessage(e),
});
} finally {
offCancel?.();
WindowManager.CloseBrowserLogin().catch(console.error);
setBusy(false);
}
}, [busy, t]);
@@ -143,11 +139,12 @@ export default function SessionExpirationDialog() {
});
WindowManager.CloseSessionExpiration().catch(console.error);
} catch (e) {
setBusy(false);
await errorDialog({
Title: t("sessionExpiration.logoutFailedTitle"),
Message: formatErrorMessage(e),
});
} finally {
setBusy(false);
}
}, [busy, t]);

View File

@@ -22,9 +22,6 @@ type WelcomeStepTrayProps = {
export function WelcomeStepTray({ onContinue }: Readonly<WelcomeStepTrayProps>) {
const { t } = useTranslation();
const trayScreenshot = trayScreenshotForOS();
// macOS has no tray — the icon sits in the menu bar, so the copy says so.
const titleKey = isMacOS() ? "welcome.titleMac" : "welcome.title";
const descriptionKey = isMacOS() ? "welcome.descriptionMac" : "welcome.description";
return (
<>
@@ -39,9 +36,9 @@ export function WelcomeStepTray({ onContinue }: Readonly<WelcomeStepTrayProps>)
<div className={"flex w-full flex-col gap-1"}>
<DialogHeading id={"nb-welcome-title"} align={"left"}>
{t(titleKey)}
{t("welcome.title")}
</DialogHeading>
<DialogDescription align={"left"}>{t(descriptionKey)}</DialogDescription>
<DialogDescription align={"left"}>{t("welcome.description")}</DialogDescription>
</div>
<DialogActions>

View File

@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@
{"code": "fr", "displayName": "Français", "englishName": "French"},
{"code": "it", "displayName": "Italiano", "englishName": "Italian"},
{"code": "pt", "displayName": "Português", "englishName": "Portuguese"},
{"code": "zh-CN", "displayName": "简体中文", "englishName": "Simplified Chinese"},
{"code": "ja", "displayName": "日本語", "englishName": "Japanese"}
{"code": "zh-CN", "displayName": "简体中文", "englishName": "Simplified Chinese"}
]
}

View File

@@ -1034,15 +1034,9 @@
"welcome.title": {
"message": "Suchen Sie NetBird in der Taskleiste"
},
"welcome.titleMac": {
"message": "Suchen Sie NetBird in der Menüleiste"
},
"welcome.description": {
"message": "NetBird läuft in Ihrer Taskleiste. Klicken Sie auf das Symbol, um sich zu verbinden, Profile zu wechseln oder die Einstellungen zu öffnen."
},
"welcome.descriptionMac": {
"message": "NetBird läuft in Ihrer Menüleiste. Klicken Sie auf das Symbol, um sich zu verbinden, Profile zu wechseln oder die Einstellungen zu öffnen."
},
"welcome.continue": {
"message": "Weiter"
},
@@ -1299,13 +1293,10 @@
"message": "Dokumentation"
},
"daemon.outdated.title": {
"message": "NetBird Client ist veraltet"
"message": "NetBird-Dienst ist veraltet"
},
"daemon.outdated.description": {
"message": "Die neue GUI ist nicht mit Ihrem älteren Client kompatibel. Aktualisieren Sie Ihren Client, um die neue Anwendung zu verwenden."
},
"daemon.outdated.download": {
"message": "Neueste Version herunterladen"
"message": "Aktualisieren Sie den NetBird-Dienst, um diese App zu verwenden."
},
"error.jwt_clock_skew": {
"message": "Anmeldung fehlgeschlagen: Die Uhr dieses Geräts ist nicht mit dem Server synchron. Bitte synchronisieren Sie die Systemuhr und versuchen Sie es erneut."

View File

@@ -1377,19 +1377,11 @@
},
"welcome.title": {
"message": "Look for NetBird in your tray",
"description": "Heading on the first onboarding step, pointing the user to the tray icon. Shown on Windows and Linux; macOS uses welcome.titleMac."
},
"welcome.titleMac": {
"message": "Look for NetBird in your menu bar",
"description": "Heading on the first onboarding step on macOS, pointing the user to the menu bar icon. Use your language's Apple term for the macOS menu bar."
"description": "Heading on the first onboarding step, pointing the user to the tray icon. 'tray' = system tray / menu bar."
},
"welcome.description": {
"message": "NetBird lives in your tray. Click the icon to connect, switch profiles, or open settings.",
"description": "Body of the first onboarding step explaining the tray icon. Shown on Windows and Linux; macOS uses welcome.descriptionMac."
},
"welcome.descriptionMac": {
"message": "NetBird lives in your menu bar. Click the icon to connect, switch profiles, or open settings.",
"description": "Body of the first onboarding step on macOS explaining the menu bar icon. Use your language's Apple term for the macOS menu bar."
"description": "Body of the first onboarding step explaining the tray icon."
},
"welcome.continue": {
"message": "Continue",
@@ -1732,16 +1724,12 @@
"description": "Documentation link on the daemon-unavailable overlay."
},
"daemon.outdated.title": {
"message": "NetBird Client Is Outdated",
"description": "Title of the overlay shown when the NetBird client (daemon) is too old to drive this UI."
"message": "NetBird Service Is Outdated",
"description": "Title of the overlay shown when the NetBird background service is too old to drive this UI."
},
"daemon.outdated.description": {
"message": "The new GUI isn't compatible with the older NetBird client. Update your client to use the new application.",
"description": "Body of the daemon-outdated overlay explaining that the GUI is newer than the client and the client must be updated."
},
"daemon.outdated.download": {
"message": "Download Latest",
"description": "Button on the daemon-outdated overlay that opens the download page for the latest release."
"message": "Update the NetBird service to use this app.",
"description": "Body of the daemon-outdated overlay telling the user to upgrade the service."
},
"error.jwt_clock_skew": {
"message": "Sign-in failed: this device's clock is out of sync with the server. Please sync your system clock and try again.",

View File

@@ -1034,15 +1034,9 @@
"welcome.title": {
"message": "Busque NetBird en su bandeja del sistema"
},
"welcome.titleMac": {
"message": "Busque NetBird en su barra de menús"
},
"welcome.description": {
"message": "NetBird reside en su bandeja del sistema. Haga clic en el icono para conectarse, cambiar de perfil o abrir la configuración."
},
"welcome.descriptionMac": {
"message": "NetBird reside en su barra de menús. Haga clic en el icono para conectarse, cambiar de perfil o abrir la configuración."
},
"welcome.continue": {
"message": "Continuar"
},
@@ -1299,13 +1293,10 @@
"message": "Documentación"
},
"daemon.outdated.title": {
"message": "NetBird Client está desactualizado"
"message": "El servicio de NetBird está desactualizado"
},
"daemon.outdated.description": {
"message": "La nueva GUI no es compatible con su cliente anterior. Actualice su cliente para usar la nueva aplicación."
},
"daemon.outdated.download": {
"message": "Descargar la última versión"
"message": "Actualice el servicio de NetBird para usar esta aplicación."
},
"error.jwt_clock_skew": {
"message": "Error al iniciar sesión: el reloj de este dispositivo no está sincronizado con el servidor. Sincronice el reloj del sistema e inténtelo de nuevo."

View File

@@ -1034,15 +1034,9 @@
"welcome.title": {
"message": "Cherchez NetBird dans votre barre détat système"
},
"welcome.titleMac": {
"message": "Cherchez NetBird dans votre barre des menus"
},
"welcome.description": {
"message": "NetBird se trouve dans votre barre détat système. Cliquez sur licône pour vous connecter, changer de profil ou ouvrir les paramètres."
},
"welcome.descriptionMac": {
"message": "NetBird se trouve dans votre barre des menus. Cliquez sur licône pour vous connecter, changer de profil ou ouvrir les paramètres."
},
"welcome.continue": {
"message": "Continuer"
},
@@ -1299,13 +1293,10 @@
"message": "Documentation"
},
"daemon.outdated.title": {
"message": "Le Client NetBird est obsolète"
"message": "Le service NetBird est obsolète"
},
"daemon.outdated.description": {
"message": "La nouvelle GUI n'est pas compatible avec votre ancien client. Mettez à jour votre client pour utiliser la nouvelle application."
},
"daemon.outdated.download": {
"message": "Télécharger la dernière version"
"message": "Mettez à jour le service NetBird pour utiliser cette application."
},
"error.jwt_clock_skew": {
"message": "Échec de la connexion : lhorloge de cet appareil nest pas synchronisée avec le serveur. Veuillez synchroniser lhorloge de votre système et réessayer."

View File

@@ -1034,15 +1034,9 @@
"welcome.title": {
"message": "Keresse a NetBirdöt a tálcán"
},
"welcome.titleMac": {
"message": "Keresse a NetBirdöt a menüsorban"
},
"welcome.description": {
"message": "A NetBird a tálcán fut. Kattintson az ikonra a csatlakozáshoz, profilváltáshoz vagy a beállítások megnyitásához."
},
"welcome.descriptionMac": {
"message": "A NetBird a menüsorban fut. Kattintson az ikonra a csatlakozáshoz, profilváltáshoz vagy a beállítások megnyitásához."
},
"welcome.continue": {
"message": "Folytatás"
},
@@ -1299,13 +1293,10 @@
"message": "Dokumentáció"
},
"daemon.outdated.title": {
"message": "A NetBird Kliens elavult"
"message": "A NetBird szolgáltatás elavult"
},
"daemon.outdated.description": {
"message": "Az új GUI nem kompatibilis a régebbi klienseddel. Frissítsd a klienst az új alkalmazás használatához."
},
"daemon.outdated.download": {
"message": "Legújabb letöltése"
"message": "Frissítsd a NetBird szolgáltatást az alkalmazás használatához."
},
"error.jwt_clock_skew": {
"message": "A bejelentkezés sikertelen: az eszköz órája eltér a szerverétől. Kérjük, szinkronizálja a rendszer óráját, majd próbálja újra."

View File

@@ -1034,15 +1034,9 @@
"welcome.title": {
"message": "Cerchi NetBird nella tray"
},
"welcome.titleMac": {
"message": "Cerchi NetBird nella barra dei menu"
},
"welcome.description": {
"message": "NetBird risiede nella tray. Clicchi sull'icona per connettersi, cambiare profilo o aprire le impostazioni."
},
"welcome.descriptionMac": {
"message": "NetBird risiede nella barra dei menu. Clicchi sull'icona per connettersi, cambiare profilo o aprire le impostazioni."
},
"welcome.continue": {
"message": "Continua"
},
@@ -1299,13 +1293,10 @@
"message": "Documentazione"
},
"daemon.outdated.title": {
"message": "NetBird Client è obsoleto"
"message": "Il servizio NetBird è obsoleto"
},
"daemon.outdated.description": {
"message": "La nuova GUI non è compatibile con il tuo client precedente. Aggiorna il client per usare la nuova applicazione."
},
"daemon.outdated.download": {
"message": "Scarica l'ultima versione"
"message": "Aggiorna il servizio NetBird per usare questa app."
},
"error.jwt_clock_skew": {
"message": "Accesso non riuscito: l'orologio di questo dispositivo non è sincronizzato con il server. Sincronizzi l'orologio di sistema e riprovi."

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -1034,15 +1034,9 @@
"welcome.title": {
"message": "Procure o NetBird na sua bandeja"
},
"welcome.titleMac": {
"message": "Procure o NetBird na sua barra de menus"
},
"welcome.description": {
"message": "O NetBird fica na sua bandeja. Clique no ícone para conectar, alternar perfis ou abrir as configurações."
},
"welcome.descriptionMac": {
"message": "O NetBird fica na sua barra de menus. Clique no ícone para conectar, alternar perfis ou abrir as configurações."
},
"welcome.continue": {
"message": "Continuar"
},
@@ -1299,13 +1293,10 @@
"message": "Documentação"
},
"daemon.outdated.title": {
"message": "O NetBird Client está desatualizado"
"message": "O serviço NetBird está desatualizado"
},
"daemon.outdated.description": {
"message": "A nova GUI não é compatível com o seu cliente mais antigo. Atualize o seu cliente para usar o novo aplicativo."
},
"daemon.outdated.download": {
"message": "Baixar a versão mais recente"
"message": "Atualize o serviço NetBird para usar este aplicativo."
},
"error.jwt_clock_skew": {
"message": "Falha no login: o relógio deste dispositivo está fora de sincronia com o servidor. Sincronize o relógio do sistema e tente novamente."

View File

@@ -1034,15 +1034,9 @@
"welcome.title": {
"message": "Найдите NetBird в системном трее"
},
"welcome.titleMac": {
"message": "Найдите NetBird в строке меню"
},
"welcome.description": {
"message": "NetBird находится в системном трее. Нажмите на значок, чтобы подключиться, переключить профиль или открыть настройки."
},
"welcome.descriptionMac": {
"message": "NetBird находится в строке меню. Нажмите на значок, чтобы подключиться, переключить профиль или открыть настройки."
},
"welcome.continue": {
"message": "Продолжить"
},
@@ -1299,13 +1293,10 @@
"message": "Документация"
},
"daemon.outdated.title": {
"message": "Клиент NetBird устарел"
"message": "Служба NetBird устарела"
},
"daemon.outdated.description": {
"message": "Новый GUI несовместим с вашим более старым клиентом. Обновите клиент, чтобы использовать новое приложение."
},
"daemon.outdated.download": {
"message": "Скачать последнюю версию"
"message": "Обновите службу NetBird, чтобы использовать это приложение."
},
"error.jwt_clock_skew": {
"message": "Не удалось войти: часы этого устройства рассинхронизированы с сервером. Синхронизируйте системные часы и повторите попытку."

View File

@@ -1034,15 +1034,9 @@
"welcome.title": {
"message": "在托盘中查找 NetBird"
},
"welcome.titleMac": {
"message": "在菜单栏中查找 NetBird"
},
"welcome.description": {
"message": "NetBird 驻留在您的托盘中。点击图标即可连接、切换配置文件或打开设置。"
},
"welcome.descriptionMac": {
"message": "NetBird 驻留在您的菜单栏中。点击图标即可连接、切换配置文件或打开设置。"
},
"welcome.continue": {
"message": "继续"
},
@@ -1299,13 +1293,10 @@
"message": "文档"
},
"daemon.outdated.title": {
"message": "NetBird 客户端版本过旧"
"message": "NetBird 服务版本过旧"
},
"daemon.outdated.description": {
"message": "新版 GUI 与您较旧的客户端不兼容。请更新客户端以使用应用。"
},
"daemon.outdated.download": {
"message": "下载最新版本"
"message": "请更新 NetBird 服务以使用应用。"
},
"error.jwt_clock_skew": {
"message": "登录失败:此设备的时钟与服务器不同步。请同步您的系统时钟后重试。"

View File

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import (
"github.com/wailsapp/wails/v3/pkg/application"
)
// Autostart facade over Wails' AutostartManager. The OS autostart entry registration
// Autostart facade over Wails' AutostartManager. The OS login-item registration
// is the single source of truth; nothing is mirrored to preferences.
type Autostart struct {
mgr *application.AutostartManager

View File

@@ -12,15 +12,13 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
)
// ProfileSwitcher holds the switch policy shared by the tray and React
// frontend so both flip profiles identically. SwitchActive (plain selection:
// header dropdown, tray submenu) always connects after the switch;
// SwitchActiveNoConnect (manage-profiles screen) never does, so the user can
// still adjust the management URL before connecting. prevStatus from
// DaemonFeed.Get at entry only decides the teardown:
// ProfileSwitcher holds the reconnect policy shared by the tray and React
// frontend so both flip profiles identically. The policy keys off prevStatus
// from DaemonFeed.Get at SwitchActive entry:
//
// Connected/Connecting/NeedsLogin/LoginFailed/SessionExpired → Down first.
// Idle → no Down.
// Connected/Connecting → Switch + Down + Up; optimistic Connecting paint.
// NeedsLogin/LoginFailed/SessionExpired → Switch + Down; clear stale error for re-login.
// Idle → Switch only.
type ProfileSwitcher struct {
profiles *Profiles
connection *Connection
@@ -31,40 +29,29 @@ func NewProfileSwitcher(profiles *Profiles, connection *Connection, feed *Daemon
return &ProfileSwitcher{profiles: profiles, connection: connection, feed: feed}
}
// SwitchActive switches to the named profile and always connects afterwards.
// SwitchActive switches to the named profile applying the reconnect policy.
func (s *ProfileSwitcher) SwitchActive(ctx context.Context, p ProfileRef) error {
return s.switchActive(ctx, p, true)
}
// SwitchActiveNoConnect switches to the named profile without connecting,
// tearing down any existing connection first.
func (s *ProfileSwitcher) SwitchActiveNoConnect(ctx context.Context, p ProfileRef) error {
return s.switchActive(ctx, p, false)
}
func (s *ProfileSwitcher) switchActive(ctx context.Context, p ProfileRef, connect bool) error {
prevStatus := ""
if s.feed != nil {
if st, err := s.feed.Get(ctx); err == nil {
prevStatus = st.Status
} else {
log.Warnf("profileswitcher: get status: %v", err)
}
if st, err := s.feed.Get(ctx); err == nil {
prevStatus = st.Status
} else {
log.Warnf("profileswitcher: get status: %v", err)
}
needsDown := strings.EqualFold(prevStatus, StatusConnected) ||
strings.EqualFold(prevStatus, StatusConnecting) ||
wasActive := strings.EqualFold(prevStatus, StatusConnected) ||
strings.EqualFold(prevStatus, StatusConnecting)
needsDown := wasActive ||
strings.EqualFold(prevStatus, StatusNeedsLogin) ||
strings.EqualFold(prevStatus, StatusLoginFailed) ||
strings.EqualFold(prevStatus, StatusSessionExpired)
log.Infof("profileswitcher: switch profile=%q prevStatus=%q connect=%v needsDown=%v",
p.ProfileName, prevStatus, connect, needsDown)
log.Infof("profileswitcher: switch profile=%q prevStatus=%q wasActive=%v needsDown=%v",
p.ProfileName, prevStatus, wasActive, needsDown)
// Optimistic Connecting paint plus stale-push suppression during Down (see
// DaemonFeed suppression table); also arms the login-watch that pops
// browser-login when the new profile turns out to need SSO.
if connect && s.feed != nil {
// Optimistic Connecting paint only when wasActive: those prevStatuses emit
// stale Connected + transient Idle pushes during Down that must be
// suppressed until Up resumes the stream (see DaemonFeed suppression table).
if wasActive {
s.feed.BeginProfileSwitch()
}
@@ -89,9 +76,9 @@ func (s *ProfileSwitcher) switchActive(ctx context.Context, p ProfileRef, connec
}
}
if connect {
if wasActive {
if err := s.connection.Up(ctx, UpParams(p)); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("connect %q: %w", p.ProfileName, err)
return fmt.Errorf("reconnect %q: %w", p.ProfileName, err)
}
}

View File

@@ -185,38 +185,37 @@ func (s *WindowManager) OpenBrowserLogin(uri string) {
startURL = "/#/dialog/browser-login?uri=" + url.QueryEscape(uri)
}
s.hideOtherWindowsLocked("browser-login")
// Prefer the main window's screen (multi-monitor); falls back to OS-default centering.
var screen *application.Screen
if s.mainWindow != nil {
if sc, err := s.mainWindow.GetScreen(); err == nil {
screen = sc
}
}
opts := DialogWindowOptions("browser-login", s.title("window.title.signIn"), startURL, s.linuxIcon)
// Not always-on-top: it would obscure the browser tab the user logs in through.
opts.AlwaysOnTop = false
opts.InitialPosition = application.WindowCentered
// Open on the active (where users cursor is) display, like the session-expiration dialog.
opts.Screen = s.getScreenBasedOnCursorPosition()
opts.Screen = screen
s.browserLogin = s.app.Window.NewWithOptions(opts)
bl := s.browserLogin
// Red-X close means cancel: emit the event so startLogin() tears down the SSO wait.
bl.OnWindowEvent(events.Common.WindowClosing, func(_ *application.WindowEvent) {
s.app.Event.Emit(EventBrowserLoginCancel)
s.mu.Lock()
// Only a live user red-X still has this registered; programmatic closers
// nil s.browserLogin first and clean up themselves. Guarding here stops a
// stale close event from wiping a replacement popup's state.
userClosed := s.browserLogin == bl
if userClosed {
s.browserLogin = nil
s.restoreHiddenWindowsLocked()
}
s.browserLogin = nil
s.restoreHiddenWindowsLocked()
s.mu.Unlock()
if userClosed {
s.app.Event.Emit(EventBrowserLoginCancel)
}
})
s.centerOnCursorScreen(s.browserLogin)
s.centerWhenReady(s.browserLogin)
return
}
if uri != "" {
s.browserLogin.SetURL("/#/dialog/browser-login?uri=" + url.QueryEscape(uri))
}
s.centerOnCursorScreen(s.browserLogin)
s.browserLogin.Show()
s.browserLogin.Focus()
s.centerWhenReady(s.browserLogin)
}
// BrowserLoginWindow returns the live SSO popup, or nil. While non-nil it is the
@@ -239,15 +238,6 @@ func (s *WindowManager) CloseBrowserLogin() {
s.mu.Lock()
w := s.browserLogin
s.browserLogin = nil
// The WindowClosing hook no-ops on a programmatic close, so restore here —
// but only if a popup was actually open. The frontend calls this even when no
// popup was ever shown (e.g. resetDialog() after an early RequestExtend failure,
// or connection.ts's catch path), and hiddenForLogin is shared with
// OpenInstallProgress, so an unconditional restore could re-show windows a
// still-running install-progress is hiding.
if w != nil {
s.restoreHiddenWindowsLocked()
}
s.mu.Unlock()
if w != nil {
w.Close()
@@ -289,35 +279,6 @@ func (s *WindowManager) CloseSessionExpiration() {
}
}
// CloseRenewFlow tears down the SSO session-renewal UI in a single call: it
// closes the browser-login popup and the session-expiration window together.
func (s *WindowManager) CloseRenewFlow() {
s.mu.Lock()
bl := s.browserLogin
se := s.sessionExpiration
s.browserLogin = nil
s.sessionExpiration = nil
if se != nil {
kept := s.hiddenForLogin[:0]
for _, w := range s.hiddenForLogin {
if w != se {
kept = append(kept, w)
}
}
s.hiddenForLogin = kept
}
s.restoreHiddenWindowsLocked()
s.mu.Unlock()
// Close after unlock so the re-entrant handlers can take s.mu.
if bl != nil {
bl.Close()
}
if se != nil {
se.Close()
}
}
// OpenInstallProgress shows the install-progress window and hides the rest for the duration
// (restored on close). It owns its own result polling since the daemon restarts mid-install.
func (s *WindowManager) OpenInstallProgress(version string) {

View File

@@ -30,8 +30,6 @@ const (
statusError = "Error"
quitDownTimeout = 5 * time.Second
urlGitHubRepo = "https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird"
urlGitHubReleases = "https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/releases/latest"
urlDocs = "https://docs.netbird.io"
@@ -317,7 +315,8 @@ func (t *Tray) relayoutMenu() {
if sessionDeadline.IsZero() {
t.sessionExpiresItem.SetHidden(true)
} else {
t.sessionExpiresItem.SetLabel(t.sessionRowLabel(sessionDeadline))
remaining := t.formatSessionRemaining(time.Until(sessionDeadline))
t.sessionExpiresItem.SetLabel(t.loc.T("tray.session.expiresIn", "remaining", remaining))
t.sessionExpiresItem.SetHidden(false)
}
}
@@ -447,28 +446,11 @@ func (t *Tray) buildMenu() *application.Menu {
menu.AddSeparator()
menu.Add(t.loc.T("tray.menu.quit")).
SetAccelerator("CmdOrCtrl+Q").
OnClick(func(*application.Context) { t.handleQuit() })
OnClick(func(*application.Context) { t.app.Quit() })
return menu
}
func (t *Tray) handleQuit() {
t.profileMu.Lock()
if t.switchCancel != nil {
t.switchCancel()
t.switchCancel = nil
}
t.profileMu.Unlock()
t.svc.DaemonFeed.CancelProfileSwitch()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), quitDownTimeout)
defer cancel()
if err := t.svc.Connection.Down(ctx); err != nil {
log.Errorf("disconnect on quit: %v", err)
}
t.app.Quit()
}
// handleConnect receives the clicked item from the buildMenu closure —
// t.upItem is menuMu-guarded and must not be read here.
func (t *Tray) handleConnect(upItem *application.MenuItem) {

View File

@@ -64,42 +64,11 @@ func (t *Tray) applySessionExpiry(deadline *time.Time, connected bool) bool {
return changed
}
// runSessionExpiryTicker recomputes the "Expires in …" row label until process exit.
// The interval scales with the remaining time: coarse when the deadline is far off,
// down to 10s in the final two minutes so the label doesn't lag the ceiling-rounded
// countdown near expiry. The cached deadline is re-read every iteration, so an extend
// or reconnect that moves it is picked up on the next tick.
// runSessionExpiryTicker recomputes the "Expires in …" row label every 30s. Runs until process exit.
func (t *Tray) runSessionExpiryTicker() {
tm := time.NewTimer(sessionRefreshInterval(t.sessionRemaining()))
defer tm.Stop()
for range tm.C {
tk := time.NewTicker(30 * time.Second)
for range tk.C {
t.refreshSessionExpiresLabel()
tm.Reset(sessionRefreshInterval(t.sessionRemaining()))
}
}
// sessionRemaining returns the time left on the cached SSO deadline, or 0 when unknown.
func (t *Tray) sessionRemaining() time.Duration {
t.sessionMu.Lock()
deadline := t.sessionExpiresAt
t.sessionMu.Unlock()
if deadline.IsZero() {
return 0
}
return time.Until(deadline)
}
// sessionRefreshInterval picks how long to wait before the next label recompute.
func sessionRefreshInterval(remaining time.Duration) time.Duration {
switch {
case remaining <= 0:
return 30 * time.Second
case remaining <= 2*time.Minute:
return 10 * time.Second
case remaining <= time.Hour:
return 30 * time.Second
default:
return time.Minute
}
}
@@ -118,39 +87,30 @@ func (t *Tray) refreshSessionExpiresLabel() {
if deadline.IsZero() {
return
}
item.SetLabel(t.sessionRowLabel(deadline))
}
func (t *Tray) sessionRowLabel(deadline time.Time) string {
remaining := time.Until(deadline)
if remaining <= 0 {
return t.loc.T("tray.status.sessionExpired")
}
return t.loc.T("tray.session.expiresIn", "remaining", t.formatSessionRemaining(remaining))
remaining := t.formatSessionRemaining(time.Until(deadline))
item.SetLabel(t.loc.T("tray.session.expiresIn", "remaining", remaining))
}
// formatSessionRemaining renders d as a localised long-form string picking the largest non-zero unit.
// Each unit is rounded up so the label never claims less time than actually remains, matching the
// upper-bound sense of the sub-minute "less than a minute" fragment.
// Singular/plural keys are split per language for proper translation.
func (t *Tray) formatSessionRemaining(d time.Duration) string {
switch {
case d < time.Minute:
return t.loc.T("tray.session.unit.lessThanMinute")
case d <= 59*time.Minute:
m := ceilDiv(d, time.Minute)
case d < time.Hour:
m := int(d / time.Minute)
if m == 1 {
return t.loc.T("tray.session.unit.minute")
}
return t.loc.T("tray.session.unit.minutes", "count", strconv.Itoa(m))
case d <= 23*time.Hour:
h := ceilDiv(d, time.Hour)
case d < 24*time.Hour:
h := int((d + 30*time.Minute) / time.Hour)
if h == 1 {
return t.loc.T("tray.session.unit.hour")
}
return t.loc.T("tray.session.unit.hours", "count", strconv.Itoa(h))
default:
days := ceilDiv(d, 24*time.Hour)
days := int((d + 12*time.Hour) / (24 * time.Hour))
if days == 1 {
return t.loc.T("tray.session.unit.day")
}
@@ -158,11 +118,6 @@ func (t *Tray) formatSessionRemaining(d time.Duration) string {
}
}
// ceilDiv divides d by unit rounding up, assuming d > 0.
func ceilDiv(d, unit time.Duration) int {
return int((d + unit - time.Nanosecond) / unit)
}
// registerSessionWarningCategory wires the OS notification category and response handler for the expiry warning.
// Errors are swallowed since the worst case is a plain notification without buttons.
func (t *Tray) registerSessionWarningCategory() {
@@ -297,9 +252,11 @@ func (t *Tray) openSessionExpiration() {
}
// openSessionExtendFlow opens the SessionExpiration window seeded with the cached deadline's remaining time,
// for the "Expires in …" tray row. Once the deadline has elapsed the row reads "Session expired" and the
// click routes to the login flow instead. No-op when the deadline is unknown.
// for the "Expires in …" tray row. No-ops when the deadline is unknown or elapsed.
func (t *Tray) openSessionExtendFlow() {
if t.svc.WindowManager == nil {
return
}
t.sessionMu.Lock()
deadline := t.sessionExpiresAt
t.sessionMu.Unlock()
@@ -308,14 +265,6 @@ func (t *Tray) openSessionExtendFlow() {
}
seconds := int(time.Until(deadline).Seconds())
if seconds <= 0 {
if t.window != nil {
t.window.SetURL("/#/login")
t.window.Show()
t.window.Focus()
}
return
}
if t.svc.WindowManager == nil {
return
}
t.svc.WindowManager.OpenSessionExpiration(seconds)

View File

@@ -1,151 +0,0 @@
package cmd
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"github.com/dexidp/dex/storage"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/formatter/hook"
admincmd "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/cmd/admin"
tokencmd "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/cmd/token"
nbconfig "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/server/config"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/activity"
activitystore "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/activity/store"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/store"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
)
// newAdminCommands creates the admin command tree with combined-specific resource openers.
func newAdminCommands() *cobra.Command {
return admincmd.NewCommands(admincmd.Openers{
Resources: withAdminResources,
Store: withAdminStoreOnly,
IDP: withAdminIDPOnly,
})
}
func newLegacyTokenCommand() *cobra.Command {
cmd := tokencmd.NewCommands(tokencmd.StoreOpener(withAdminStoreOnly))
cmd.Deprecated = "use 'admin token' instead"
return cmd
}
// withAdminResources loads the combined YAML config, initializes stores, and calls fn.
func withAdminResources(cmd *cobra.Command, fn func(ctx context.Context, resources admincmd.Resources) error) error {
return withAdminConfig(cmd, func(ctx context.Context, cfg *CombinedConfig) error {
mgmtConfig, err := adminManagementConfig(cfg)
if err != nil {
return err
}
managementStore, err := openAdminStore(ctx, cfg)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer admincmd.CloseStore(ctx, managementStore)
idpStorage, idpStorageFile, err := admincmd.OpenIDPStorage(mgmtConfig)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer admincmd.CloseIDPStorage(idpStorage)
eventStore, esErr := openAdminEventStore(ctx, cfg, mgmtConfig)
if esErr != nil {
_, _ = fmt.Fprintf(cmd.ErrOrStderr(), "Warning: audit events will not be recorded: %v\n", esErr)
}
if eventStore != nil {
defer func() {
if err := eventStore.Close(ctx); err != nil {
log.Debugf("close activity event store: %v", err)
}
}()
}
return fn(ctx, admincmd.Resources{Store: managementStore, IDPStorage: idpStorage, IDPStorageFile: idpStorageFile, EventStore: eventStore})
})
}
// withAdminStoreOnly opens only the management store for admin subcommands that do not
// need embedded IdP storage.
func withAdminStoreOnly(cmd *cobra.Command, fn func(ctx context.Context, s store.Store) error) error {
return withAdminConfig(cmd, func(ctx context.Context, cfg *CombinedConfig) error {
managementStore, err := openAdminStore(ctx, cfg)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer admincmd.CloseStore(ctx, managementStore)
return fn(ctx, managementStore)
})
}
func withAdminIDPOnly(cmd *cobra.Command, fn func(ctx context.Context, idpStorage storage.Storage, storageFile string) error) error {
return withAdminConfig(cmd, func(ctx context.Context, cfg *CombinedConfig) error {
mgmtConfig, err := adminManagementConfig(cfg)
if err != nil {
return err
}
idpStorage, idpStorageFile, err := admincmd.OpenIDPStorage(mgmtConfig)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer admincmd.CloseIDPStorage(idpStorage)
return fn(ctx, idpStorage, idpStorageFile)
})
}
func withAdminConfig(cmd *cobra.Command, fn func(ctx context.Context, cfg *CombinedConfig) error) error {
if err := util.InitLog("error", "console"); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("init log: %w", err)
}
ctx := context.WithValue(cmd.Context(), hook.ExecutionContextKey, hook.SystemSource) //nolint:staticcheck
cfg, err := LoadConfig(configPath)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("load config: %w", err)
}
cfg.ApplyAdminDefaults()
applyServerStoreEnv(cfg.Server.Store)
return fn(ctx, cfg)
}
func adminManagementConfig(cfg *CombinedConfig) (*nbconfig.Config, error) {
mgmtConfig, err := cfg.ToManagementConfig()
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("create management config: %w", err)
}
return mgmtConfig, nil
}
func openAdminStore(ctx context.Context, cfg *CombinedConfig) (store.Store, error) {
managementStore, err := store.NewStore(ctx, types.Engine(cfg.Management.Store.Engine), cfg.Management.DataDir, nil, true)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("create store: %w", err)
}
return managementStore, nil
}
func openAdminEventStore(ctx context.Context, cfg *CombinedConfig, config *nbconfig.Config) (activity.Store, error) {
if config.DataStoreEncryptionKey == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("data store encryption key is not configured")
}
if err := applyActivityStoreEnv(cfg.Server.ActivityStore); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("configure activity event store: %w", err)
}
eventStore, err := activitystore.NewSqlStore(ctx, config.Datadir, config.DataStoreEncryptionKey)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("open activity event store: %w", err)
}
if eventStore == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("open activity event store: returned nil store")
}
return eventStore, nil
}

View File

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
package cmd
import (
"context"
"os"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
nbconfig "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/server/config"
)
func TestApplyAdminDefaultsCopiesServerStoreWithoutExposedAddress(t *testing.T) {
cfg := DefaultConfig()
cfg.Server.ExposedAddress = ""
cfg.Server.DataDir = "/srv/netbird"
cfg.Server.Store = StoreConfig{
Engine: "postgres",
DSN: "postgres://user:pass@example.com/netbird",
}
cfg.ApplyAdminDefaults()
require.Equal(t, "/srv/netbird", cfg.Management.DataDir)
require.Equal(t, "postgres", cfg.Management.Store.Engine)
require.Equal(t, cfg.Server.Store.DSN, cfg.Management.Store.DSN)
}
func TestOpenAdminEventStoreMissingEncryptionKeyReturnsNilInterface(t *testing.T) {
eventStore, err := openAdminEventStore(context.Background(), &CombinedConfig{}, &nbconfig.Config{})
require.Error(t, err)
require.Contains(t, err.Error(), "encryption key")
require.Nil(t, eventStore)
}
func TestApplyServerStoreEnv(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_POSTGRES_DSN", "")
t.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_MYSQL_DSN", "")
t.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_SQLITE_FILE", "")
applyServerStoreEnv(StoreConfig{Engine: "postgres", DSN: "postgres-dsn", File: "store.db"})
require.Equal(t, "postgres-dsn", os.Getenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_POSTGRES_DSN"))
require.Equal(t, "store.db", os.Getenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_SQLITE_FILE"))
applyServerStoreEnv(StoreConfig{Engine: "mysql", DSN: "mysql-dsn"})
require.Equal(t, "mysql-dsn", os.Getenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_MYSQL_DSN"))
}

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,8 @@ import (
"net"
"net/netip"
"os"
filePath "path/filepath"
"path"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"time"
@@ -73,9 +74,6 @@ type ServerConfig struct {
ActivityStore StoreConfig `yaml:"activityStore"`
AuthStore StoreConfig `yaml:"authStore"`
ReverseProxy ReverseProxyConfig `yaml:"reverseProxy"`
SupportedSyncMessageVersions *int `yaml:"supportedSyncMessageVersions,omitempty"`
PerAccountSupportedSyncMessageVersions map[string]int `yaml:"perAccountSupportedSyncMessageVersions,omitempty"`
}
// TLSConfig contains TLS/HTTPS settings
@@ -147,7 +145,6 @@ type AuthConfig struct {
CLIRedirectURIs []string `yaml:"cliRedirectURIs"`
Owner *AuthOwnerConfig `yaml:"owner,omitempty"`
DashboardPostLogoutRedirectURIs []string `yaml:"dashboardPostLogoutRedirectURIs"`
GrantTypes []string `yaml:"grantTypes"`
}
// AuthStorageConfig contains auth storage settings
@@ -302,19 +299,6 @@ func (c *CombinedConfig) ApplySimplifiedDefaults() {
c.autoConfigureClientSettings(exposedProto, exposedHost, exposedHostPort, hasExternalStuns, hasExternalRelay, hasExternalSignal)
}
// ApplyAdminDefaults applies the management settings needed by admin commands even
// when the full server config is invalid and ApplySimplifiedDefaults cannot run.
func (c *CombinedConfig) ApplyAdminDefaults() {
if c.Management.DataDir == "" || c.Management.DataDir == "/var/lib/netbird/" {
c.Management.DataDir = c.Server.DataDir
}
if c.Management.Store.Engine == "" || c.Management.Store.Engine == "sqlite" {
if c.Server.Store.Engine != "" || c.Server.Store.File != "" || c.Server.Store.DSN != "" {
c.Management.Store = c.Server.Store
}
}
}
// applyRelayDefaults configures the relay service if no external relay is configured.
func (c *CombinedConfig) applyRelayDefaults(exposedProto, exposedHostPort string, hasExternalRelay, hasExternalStuns bool) {
if hasExternalRelay {
@@ -592,11 +576,11 @@ func (c *CombinedConfig) buildEmbeddedIdPConfig(mgmt ManagementConfig) (*idp.Emb
return nil, fmt.Errorf("authStore.dsn is required when authStore.engine is postgres")
}
} else {
authStorageFile = filePath.Join(mgmt.DataDir, "idp.db")
authStorageFile = path.Join(mgmt.DataDir, "idp.db")
if c.Server.AuthStore.File != "" {
authStorageFile = c.Server.AuthStore.File
if !filePath.IsAbs(authStorageFile) {
authStorageFile = filePath.Join(mgmt.DataDir, authStorageFile)
if !filepath.IsAbs(authStorageFile) {
authStorageFile = filepath.Join(mgmt.DataDir, authStorageFile)
}
}
}
@@ -620,7 +604,6 @@ func (c *CombinedConfig) buildEmbeddedIdPConfig(mgmt ManagementConfig) (*idp.Emb
DashboardRedirectURIs: mgmt.Auth.DashboardRedirectURIs,
CLIRedirectURIs: mgmt.Auth.CLIRedirectURIs,
DashboardPostLogoutRedirectURIs: mgmt.Auth.DashboardPostLogoutRedirectURIs,
GrantTypes: mgmt.Auth.GrantTypes,
}
if mgmt.Auth.Owner != nil && mgmt.Auth.Owner.Email != "" {
@@ -711,18 +694,16 @@ func (c *CombinedConfig) ToManagementConfig() (*nbconfig.Config, error) {
httpConfig.AuthCallbackURL = callbackURL + types.ProxyCallbackEndpointFull
return &nbconfig.Config{
Stuns: stuns,
Relay: relayConfig,
Signal: signalConfig,
Datadir: mgmt.DataDir,
DataStoreEncryptionKey: mgmt.Store.EncryptionKey,
HttpConfig: httpConfig,
StoreConfig: storeConfig,
ReverseProxy: reverseProxy,
DisableDefaultPolicy: mgmt.DisableDefaultPolicy,
EmbeddedIdP: embeddedIdP,
HighestSupportedSyncMessageVersion: c.Server.SupportedSyncMessageVersions,
PerAccountHighestSupportedSyncMessageVersion: c.Server.PerAccountSupportedSyncMessageVersions,
Stuns: stuns,
Relay: relayConfig,
Signal: signalConfig,
Datadir: mgmt.DataDir,
DataStoreEncryptionKey: mgmt.Store.EncryptionKey,
HttpConfig: httpConfig,
StoreConfig: storeConfig,
ReverseProxy: reverseProxy,
DisableDefaultPolicy: mgmt.DisableDefaultPolicy,
EmbeddedIdP: embeddedIdP,
}, nil
}
@@ -746,7 +727,7 @@ func ApplyEmbeddedIdPConfig(ctx context.Context, cfg *nbconfig.Config, mgmtPort
cfg.EmbeddedIdP.Storage.Type = "sqlite3"
}
if cfg.EmbeddedIdP.Storage.Config.File == "" && cfg.Datadir != "" {
cfg.EmbeddedIdP.Storage.Config.File = filePath.Join(cfg.Datadir, "idp.db")
cfg.EmbeddedIdP.Storage.Config.File = path.Join(cfg.Datadir, "idp.db")
}
issuer := cfg.EmbeddedIdP.Issuer

View File

@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ import (
relayServer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/relay/server"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/relay/server/listener"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/relay/server/listener/ws"
syncgrpc "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/grpc"
sharedMetrics "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/metrics"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/relay/auth"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/signal/proto"
@@ -65,8 +64,7 @@ func init() {
rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVarP(&configPath, "config", "c", "", "path to YAML configuration file (required)")
_ = rootCmd.MarkPersistentFlagRequired("config")
rootCmd.AddCommand(newAdminCommands())
rootCmd.AddCommand(newLegacyTokenCommand())
rootCmd.AddCommand(newTokenCommands())
}
func RootCmd() *cobra.Command {
@@ -124,37 +122,6 @@ func execute(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
}
// initializeConfig loads and validates the configuration, then initializes logging.
func applyServerStoreEnv(storeConfig StoreConfig) {
if dsn := storeConfig.DSN; dsn != "" {
switch strings.ToLower(storeConfig.Engine) {
case "postgres":
os.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_POSTGRES_DSN", dsn)
case "mysql":
os.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_MYSQL_DSN", dsn)
}
}
if file := storeConfig.File; file != "" {
os.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_SQLITE_FILE", file)
}
}
func applyActivityStoreEnv(storeConfig StoreConfig) error {
if engine := storeConfig.Engine; engine != "" {
engineLower := strings.ToLower(engine)
if engineLower == "postgres" && storeConfig.DSN == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("activityStore.dsn is required when activityStore.engine is postgres")
}
os.Setenv("NB_ACTIVITY_EVENT_STORE_ENGINE", engineLower)
if dsn := storeConfig.DSN; dsn != "" {
os.Setenv("NB_ACTIVITY_EVENT_POSTGRES_DSN", dsn)
}
}
if file := storeConfig.File; file != "" {
os.Setenv("NB_ACTIVITY_EVENT_SQLITE_FILE", file)
}
return nil
}
func initializeConfig() error {
var err error
config, err = LoadConfig(configPath)
@@ -170,10 +137,30 @@ func initializeConfig() error {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to initialize log: %w", err)
}
applyServerStoreEnv(config.Server.Store)
if dsn := config.Server.Store.DSN; dsn != "" {
switch strings.ToLower(config.Server.Store.Engine) {
case "postgres":
os.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_POSTGRES_DSN", dsn)
case "mysql":
os.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_MYSQL_DSN", dsn)
}
}
if file := config.Server.Store.File; file != "" {
os.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_SQLITE_FILE", file)
}
if err := applyActivityStoreEnv(config.Server.ActivityStore); err != nil {
return err
if engine := config.Server.ActivityStore.Engine; engine != "" {
engineLower := strings.ToLower(engine)
if engineLower == "postgres" && config.Server.ActivityStore.DSN == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("activityStore.dsn is required when activityStore.engine is postgres")
}
os.Setenv("NB_ACTIVITY_EVENT_STORE_ENGINE", engineLower)
if dsn := config.Server.ActivityStore.DSN; dsn != "" {
os.Setenv("NB_ACTIVITY_EVENT_POSTGRES_DSN", dsn)
}
}
if file := config.Server.ActivityStore.File; file != "" {
os.Setenv("NB_ACTIVITY_EVENT_SQLITE_FILE", file)
}
log.Infof("Starting combined NetBird server")
@@ -239,7 +226,7 @@ func (s *serverInstances) createRelayServer(cfg *CombinedConfig, tlsSupport bool
}
hashedSecret := sha256.Sum256([]byte(cfg.Relay.AuthSecret))
authenticator := auth.NewTimedHMACValidator(hashedSecret[:])
authenticator := auth.NewTimedHMACValidator(hashedSecret[:], 24*time.Hour)
relayCfg := relayServer.Config{
Meter: s.metricsServer.Meter,
@@ -518,16 +505,6 @@ func createManagementServer(cfg *CombinedConfig, mgmtConfig *nbconfig.Config) (m
}
mgmtPort, _ := strconv.Atoi(portStr)
if err := syncgrpc.ValidateSyncMessageVersion(mgmtConfig.HighestSupportedSyncMessageVersion); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
for accountId, version := range mgmtConfig.PerAccountHighestSupportedSyncMessageVersion {
if err := syncgrpc.ValidateSyncMessageVersion(&version); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unrecognized sync message version in perAccountSupportedSyncMessageVersions for account %s %w", accountId, err)
}
}
mgmtSrv := newServer(
&mgmtServer.Config{
NbConfig: mgmtConfig,

63
combined/cmd/token.go Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
package cmd
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"os"
"strings"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/formatter/hook"
tokencmd "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/cmd/token"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/store"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
)
// newTokenCommands creates the token command tree with combined-specific store opener.
func newTokenCommands() *cobra.Command {
return tokencmd.NewCommands(withTokenStore)
}
// withTokenStore loads the combined YAML config, initializes the store, and calls fn.
func withTokenStore(cmd *cobra.Command, fn func(ctx context.Context, s store.Store) error) error {
if err := util.InitLog("error", "console"); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("init log: %w", err)
}
ctx := context.WithValue(cmd.Context(), hook.ExecutionContextKey, hook.SystemSource) //nolint:staticcheck
cfg, err := LoadConfig(configPath)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("load config: %w", err)
}
if dsn := cfg.Server.Store.DSN; dsn != "" {
switch strings.ToLower(cfg.Server.Store.Engine) {
case "postgres":
os.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_POSTGRES_DSN", dsn)
case "mysql":
os.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_MYSQL_DSN", dsn)
}
}
if file := cfg.Server.Store.File; file != "" {
os.Setenv("NB_STORE_ENGINE_SQLITE_FILE", file)
}
datadir := cfg.Management.DataDir
engine := types.Engine(cfg.Management.Store.Engine)
s, err := store.NewStore(ctx, engine, datadir, nil, true)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create store: %w", err)
}
defer func() {
if err := s.Close(ctx); err != nil {
log.Debugf("close store: %v", err)
}
}()
return fn(ctx, s)
}

View File

@@ -53,7 +53,6 @@ type NameServerGroup struct {
ID string `gorm:"primaryKey"`
// AccountID is a reference to Account that this object belongs
AccountID string `gorm:"index"`
PublicID string `json:"-"`
// Name group name
Name string
// Description group description

View File

@@ -66,9 +66,6 @@
<key>disableAutoConnect</key>
<false/>
<key>disableAutostart</key>
<false/>
<key>disableClientRoutes</key>
<false/>

View File

@@ -103,8 +103,6 @@
<!--
<key>disableAutoConnect</key>
<false/>
<key>disableAutostart</key>
<false/>
<key>disableClientRoutes</key>
<false/>
<key>disableServerRoutes</key>

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