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3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
mlsmaycon
f22b25a091 ci: temporarily run agent-network e2e on push to this branch
Add a push trigger scoped to agent-network-per-policy-model-allowlist so
the e2e suite runs on each push while the branch is under review. Marked
temporary; remove before merge.
2026-07-24 11:57:44 +00:00
mlsmaycon
b7e4f153c0 agentnetwork: scope model allowlist per policy/group and provider
The model-allowlist guardrail was merged into one account-wide union
and enforced flat on every request, independent of which policy,
group, or provider actually authorised it. With multiple policies —
especially a mix of guardrailed and un-guardrailed ones — this
produced two defects:

  - false-allow: a model allowlisted for one group/provider leaked to
    any caller, because the flat union ignored which policy authorised
    the request; and
  - false-deny: a policy with no guardrail (intended unrestricted) had
    its traffic blocked by an unrelated policy's allowlist.

Make enforcement policy/group-aware, mirroring how llm_limit_check
already resolves caps:

  - Management (SelectPolicyForRequest) is authoritative. It now uses
    the request model (already carried on the wire in
    CheckLLMPolicyLimitsRequest.model, previously ignored) to keep only
    the applicable policies whose guardrails permit the model; a policy
    with no allowlist-enabled guardrail is unrestricted. When policies
    govern the (provider, groups) but none permits the model it denies
    with llm_policy.model_blocked. No proto change — the field already
    existed and the proxy already sends it.

  - The proxy llm_guardrail becomes a per-provider fail-closed backstop.
    The synthesiser emits a per-provider allowlist only when every
    policy authorising that provider restricts models; a provider
    reachable by any un-guardrailed policy is omitted (unrestricted).
    The middleware keys the allowlist by the resolved provider id and
    keeps the unknown/undetermined-model fail-closed behaviour so
    path-routed providers stay enforced when management is unreachable.

Unit tests cover the selector gate (block, allow, cross-group no-leak,
un-guardrailed policy unrestricted, undetermined-model fail-closed) and
the per-provider synthesis; an e2e proves all three properties end to
end over the tunnel. Docs updated for the new config shape and the
two-layer enforcement.
2026-07-24 11:42:33 +00:00
Maycon Santos
12c44701d7 [e2e] guardrail blocks the unselected model for path-routed providers
Add an always-on (no-credentials) e2e regression guard for the report
that a model-allowlist guardrail attached to a policy has no effect for
PATH-ROUTED providers, where the model travels in the URL rather than the
JSON body: Google Vertex (…/models/{model}:rawPredict) and AWS Bedrock
(/model/{id}/invoke) — the shape the customer actually hits.

Through the real management API it creates a Vertex and a Bedrock
provider (both catch-all, so the router forwards any model and a 403 can
only be the guardrail, never model_not_routable) and one guardrail whose
allowlist selects a single model per provider, attached to the policy.
Over the tunnel, for each provider the selected model (in the URL path)
is served 200 and an unselected model is denied 403 by the guardrail
(llm_policy.model_blocked) before the upstream. The Bedrock case sends a
region-prefixed, versioned inference-profile id, so URL-path model
normalization is exercised too.

Only the upstream LLM is mocked (the vLLM nginx answers any path 200);
management synth/reconcile, the proxy middleware chain (URL-path model
extraction, router, guardrail) and the tunnel are all real, and the
guardrail denies before the upstream is dialed so the mock cannot
influence the block. Providers use a static bearer api key so the router
injects a static Authorization header instead of minting a GCP token —
the only reason path-routed providers normally need live credentials —
so the test runs with none and always executes in CI.
2026-07-23 06:59:24 +00:00
77 changed files with 1698 additions and 1176 deletions

View File

@@ -5,6 +5,11 @@ on:
schedule:
- cron: "0 3 * * *"
workflow_dispatch:
# TEMPORARY: run on every push to the per-policy model-allowlist branch while
# it is under review. Remove this push trigger before merge.
push:
branches:
- agent-network-per-policy-model-allowlist
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
@@ -51,9 +56,6 @@ jobs:
# token (and URL, for gateways) is unset, so partial coverage is fine.
OPENAI_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.E2E_OPENAI_TOKEN }}
ANTHROPIC_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.E2E_ANTHROPIC_TOKEN }}
# Moonshot AI platform key (platform.kimi.ai); drives both Kimi wire
# shapes (OpenAI /v1 and Anthropic /anthropic) through kimi_api.
KIMI_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.E2E_KIMI_TOKEN }}
VERCEL_URL: ${{ secrets.E2E_VERCEL_URL }}
VERCEL_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.E2E_VERCEL_TOKEN }}
OPENROUTER_URL: ${{ secrets.E2E_OPENROUTER_URL }}

View File

@@ -464,8 +464,6 @@ func Test_RemovePeer(t *testing.T) {
}
func Test_ConnectPeers(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("NB_DISABLE_EBPF_WG_PROXY", "true")
peer1ifaceName := fmt.Sprintf("utun%d", WgIntNumber+400)
peer1wgIP := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.99.99.17/30")
peer1Key, _ := wgtypes.GeneratePrivateKey()
@@ -507,8 +505,12 @@ func Test_ConnectPeers(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
localIP1 := "127.0.0.1"
peer1endpoint, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", localIP1, peer1wgPort))
localIP, err := getLocalIP()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
peer1endpoint, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", localIP, peer1wgPort))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
@@ -544,8 +546,7 @@ func Test_ConnectPeers(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
localIP2 := "127.0.0.1"
peer2endpoint, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", localIP2, peer2wgPort))
peer2endpoint, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", localIP, peer2wgPort))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
@@ -568,17 +569,17 @@ func Test_ConnectPeers(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// The peers use userspace WireGuard (stdnet transport). A tight busy-loop
// here starves the wireguard-go goroutines that process the handshake, so
// poll on a ticker instead and yield the CPU between checks. WireGuard also
// only retries a lost handshake initiation every REKEY_TIMEOUT (5s), which
// is why the overall wait can occasionally stretch to tens of seconds.
// todo: investigate why in some tests execution we need 30s
timeout := 30 * time.Second
timeoutChannel := time.After(timeout)
ticker := time.NewTicker(500 * time.Millisecond)
defer ticker.Stop()
for {
select {
case <-timeoutChannel:
t.Fatalf("waiting for peer handshake timeout after %s", timeout.String())
default:
}
peer, gpErr := getPeer(peer1ifaceName, peer2Key.PublicKey().String())
if gpErr != nil {
t.Fatal(gpErr)
@@ -587,12 +588,6 @@ func Test_ConnectPeers(t *testing.T) {
t.Log("peers successfully handshake")
break
}
select {
case <-timeoutChannel:
t.Fatalf("waiting for peer handshake timeout after %s", timeout.String())
case <-ticker.C:
}
}
}
@@ -620,3 +615,28 @@ func getPeer(ifaceName, peerPubKey string) (wgtypes.Peer, error) {
}
return wgtypes.Peer{}, fmt.Errorf("peer not found")
}
func getLocalIP() (string, error) {
// Get all interfaces
addrs, err := net.InterfaceAddrs()
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
for _, addr := range addrs {
ipNet, ok := addr.(*net.IPNet)
if !ok {
continue
}
if ipNet.IP.IsLoopback() {
continue
}
if ipNet.IP.To4() == nil {
continue
}
return ipNet.IP.String(), nil
}
return "", fmt.Errorf("no local IP found")
}

View File

@@ -49,21 +49,11 @@ type ConnMgr struct {
// engine.syncMsgMux; all other reads stay under engine.syncMsgMux only.
lazyConnMgrMu sync.RWMutex
// reconcileRoutedIPs re-applies a peer's routed allowed IPs after its lazy wake endpoint is
// (re)armed (Mode A at arm time). Injected by the engine; nil disables the reconcile.
reconcileRoutedIPs func(peerKey string) error
wg sync.WaitGroup
lazyCtx context.Context
lazyCtxCancel context.CancelFunc
}
// SetRoutedIPsReconciler injects the callback used to re-apply a peer's routed allowed IPs when
// its lazy wake endpoint is (re)armed. Must be called before the lazy manager starts.
func (e *ConnMgr) SetRoutedIPsReconciler(fn func(peerKey string) error) {
e.reconcileRoutedIPs = fn
}
func NewConnMgr(engineConfig *EngineConfig, statusRecorder *peer.Status, peerStore *peerstore.Store, iface lazyconn.WGIface) *ConnMgr {
e := &ConnMgr{
peerStore: peerStore,
@@ -301,7 +291,6 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) Close() {
func (e *ConnMgr) initLazyManager(engineCtx context.Context) {
cfg := manager.Config{
InactivityThreshold: inactivityThresholdEnv(),
ReconcileAllowedIPs: e.reconcileRoutedIPs,
}
e.lazyConnMgrMu.Lock()

View File

@@ -52,14 +52,11 @@ int xdp_dns_fwd(struct iphdr *ip, struct udphdr *udp) {
if (udp->dest == GENERAL_DNS_PORT && ip->daddr == dns_ip) {
udp->dest = dns_port;
// Clear the now-stale checksum; zero means "not computed" for IPv4.
udp->check = 0;
return XDP_PASS;
}
if (udp->source == dns_port && ip->saddr == dns_ip) {
udp->source = GENERAL_DNS_PORT;
udp->check = 0;
return XDP_PASS;
}

View File

@@ -50,11 +50,5 @@ int xdp_wg_proxy(struct iphdr *ip, struct udphdr *udp) {
__be16 new_dst_port = htons(proxy_port);
udp->dest = new_dst_port;
udp->source = new_src_port;
// The ports are covered by the UDP checksum. This is an IPv4 loopback hop
// and the payload is already integrity-protected, so clear the checksum (a
// zero UDP checksum means "not computed" for IPv4) rather than leave a
// stale value the kernel would drop as UDP_CSUM.
udp->check = 0;
return XDP_PASS;
}

View File

@@ -663,12 +663,6 @@ func (e *Engine) Start(netbirdConfig *mgmProto.NetbirdConfig, mgmtURL *url.URL)
iceCfg := e.createICEConfig()
e.connMgr = NewConnMgr(e.config, e.statusRecorder, e.peerStore, wgIface)
e.connMgr.SetRoutedIPsReconciler(func(peerKey string) error {
if e.routeManager == nil {
return nil
}
return e.routeManager.ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs(peerKey)
})
e.connMgr.Start(e.ctx)
// Wire DNS-time lazy-connection warm-up now that the connection manager

View File

@@ -29,11 +29,6 @@ type managedPeer struct {
type Config struct {
InactivityThreshold *time.Duration
// ReconcileAllowedIPs re-applies a peer's routed allowed IPs after its wake endpoint is
// armed. The activity listener creates the wake peer with the overlay /32 only; without the
// routed prefixes WireGuard would not steer subnet-bound traffic to the wake endpoint, so an
// idle routing peer could never be woken by that traffic. Optional; nil disables the reconcile.
ReconcileAllowedIPs func(peerKey string) error
}
// Manager manages lazy connections
@@ -61,9 +56,6 @@ type Manager struct {
peerToHAGroups map[string][]route.HAUniqueID // peer ID -> HA groups they belong to
haGroupToPeers map[route.HAUniqueID][]string // HA group -> peer IDs in the group
routesMu sync.RWMutex
// reconcileAllowedIPs re-applies a peer's routed allowed IPs after its wake endpoint is armed.
reconcileAllowedIPs func(peerKey string) error
}
// NewManager creates a new lazy connection manager
@@ -81,7 +73,6 @@ func NewManager(config Config, engineCtx context.Context, peerStore *peerstore.S
activityManager: activity.NewManager(wgIface),
peerToHAGroups: make(map[string][]route.HAUniqueID),
haGroupToPeers: make(map[route.HAUniqueID][]string),
reconcileAllowedIPs: config.ReconcileAllowedIPs,
}
if wgIface.IsUserspaceBind() {
@@ -210,7 +201,7 @@ func (m *Manager) AddPeer(peerCfg lazyconn.PeerConfig) (bool, error) {
return false, nil
}
if err := m.armActivityListener(peerCfg); err != nil {
if err := m.activityManager.MonitorPeerActivity(peerCfg); err != nil {
return false, err
}
@@ -297,7 +288,7 @@ func (m *Manager) DeactivatePeer(peerID peerid.ConnID) {
m.inactivityManager.RemovePeer(mp.peerCfg.PublicKey)
if err := m.armActivityListener(*mp.peerCfg); err != nil {
if err := m.activityManager.MonitorPeerActivity(*mp.peerCfg); err != nil {
mp.peerCfg.Log.Errorf("failed to create activity monitor: %v", err)
return
}
@@ -474,31 +465,6 @@ func (m *Manager) close() {
}
// shouldDeferIdleForHA checks if peer should stay connected due to HA group requirements
// armRoutedAllowedIPs re-applies the peer's routed allowed IPs onto its freshly armed wake
// endpoint. The activity listener creates the wake peer with the overlay /32 only, so without
// this the routed prefixes would be missing and traffic to a routed subnet could not wake the
// idle routing peer. It is a no-op when no reconciler is configured.
// armActivityListener (re)arms the peer's wake endpoint via the activity manager and then
// re-applies its routed allowed IPs, so traffic to a routed subnet can wake an idle routing
// peer. The routed prefixes must be re-applied after the wake endpoint exists because the
// listener creates it with the overlay /32 only.
func (m *Manager) armActivityListener(peerCfg lazyconn.PeerConfig) error {
if err := m.activityManager.MonitorPeerActivity(peerCfg); err != nil {
return err
}
m.armRoutedAllowedIPs(&peerCfg)
return nil
}
func (m *Manager) armRoutedAllowedIPs(peerCfg *lazyconn.PeerConfig) {
if m.reconcileAllowedIPs == nil {
return
}
if err := m.reconcileAllowedIPs(peerCfg.PublicKey); err != nil {
peerCfg.Log.Errorf("failed to reconcile routed allowed IPs on wake endpoint: %v", err)
}
}
func (m *Manager) shouldDeferIdleForHA(inactivePeers map[string]struct{}, peerID string) bool {
m.routesMu.RLock()
defer m.routesMu.RUnlock()
@@ -611,7 +577,7 @@ func (m *Manager) onPeerInactivityTimedOut(peerIDs map[string]struct{}) {
mp.peerCfg.Log.Infof("start activity monitor")
if err := m.armActivityListener(*mp.peerCfg); err != nil {
if err := m.activityManager.MonitorPeerActivity(*mp.peerCfg); err != nil {
mp.peerCfg.Log.Errorf("failed to create activity monitor: %v", err)
continue
}

View File

@@ -61,7 +61,6 @@ type Manager interface {
InitialRouteRange() []string
SetFirewall(firewall.Manager) error
SetDNSForwarderPort(port uint16)
ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs(peerKey string) error
Stop(stateManager *statemanager.Manager)
}
@@ -233,30 +232,6 @@ func (m *DefaultManager) setupRefCounters(useNoop bool) {
)
}
// ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs re-applies every routed allowed IP currently tracked for the peer
// onto the WireGuard device. The allowed-IP refcounter only calls its AddFunc (which pushes to
// the device) on a prefix's 0->1 transition, so a peer whose device entry was rebuilt without a
// matching refcounter change — e.g. a lazy connection cycling through idle->wake, which recreates
// the WireGuard peer with the overlay /32 only — ends up missing routed prefixes the refcounter
// still considers installed, and nothing retries. Calling this when the peer's WireGuard entry is
// (re)created restores convergence. It is add-only and idempotent: AddAllowedIP is update-only, so
// prefixes are re-added to an existing peer and an absent peer is left untouched.
func (m *DefaultManager) ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs(peerKey string) error {
if m.allowedIPsRefCounter == nil {
return nil
}
return m.allowedIPsRefCounter.ReapplyMatching(
func(out string) bool { return out == peerKey },
func(prefix netip.Prefix) error {
if err := m.wgInterface.AddAllowedIP(peerKey, prefix); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("add allowed IP %s for peer %s: %w", prefix, peerKey, err)
}
return nil
},
)
}
// Init sets up the routing
func (m *DefaultManager) Init() error {
m.routeSelector = m.initSelector()

View File

@@ -112,11 +112,6 @@ func (m *MockManager) SetFirewall(firewall.Manager) error {
func (m *MockManager) SetDNSForwarderPort(port uint16) {
}
// ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs mock implementation of ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs from Manager interface
func (m *MockManager) ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs(peerKey string) error {
return nil
}
// Stop mock implementation of Stop from Manager interface
func (m *MockManager) Stop(stateManager *statemanager.Manager) {
if m.StopFunc != nil {

View File

@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
//go:build !windows
package routemanager
import (
"net"
"net/netip"
"sync"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/tun/netstack"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/device"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/routemanager/refcounter"
)
// reconcileWGMock is a minimal iface.WGIface that only records AddAllowedIP calls; every other
// method is an inert stub because ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs exercises none of them.
type reconcileWGMock struct {
mu sync.Mutex
adds map[string][]netip.Prefix
}
func (m *reconcileWGMock) AddAllowedIP(peerKey string, allowedIP netip.Prefix) error {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
if m.adds == nil {
m.adds = map[string][]netip.Prefix{}
}
m.adds[peerKey] = append(m.adds[peerKey], allowedIP)
return nil
}
func (m *reconcileWGMock) added(peerKey string) []netip.Prefix {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
return m.adds[peerKey]
}
func (m *reconcileWGMock) RemoveAllowedIP(string, netip.Prefix) error { return nil }
func (m *reconcileWGMock) Name() string { return "utun-test" }
func (m *reconcileWGMock) Address() wgaddr.Address { return wgaddr.Address{} }
func (m *reconcileWGMock) ToInterface() *net.Interface { return nil }
func (m *reconcileWGMock) IsUserspaceBind() bool { return false }
func (m *reconcileWGMock) GetFilter() device.PacketFilter { return nil }
func (m *reconcileWGMock) GetDevice() *device.FilteredDevice { return nil }
func (m *reconcileWGMock) GetNet() *netstack.Net { return nil }
// TestReconcilePeerAllowedIPs verifies the declarative reconcile re-applies every routed prefix
// tracked for the peer (self-heal, independent of refcount level) and stays scoped to that peer.
func TestReconcilePeerAllowedIPs(t *testing.T) {
wg := &reconcileWGMock{}
m := &DefaultManager{wgInterface: wg}
m.allowedIPsRefCounter = refcounter.New[netip.Prefix, string, string](
func(_ netip.Prefix, peerKey string) (string, error) { return peerKey, nil },
func(netip.Prefix, string) error { return nil },
)
peerA1 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/24")
peerA2 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.1.0.0/24")
peerB1 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.2.0.0/24")
for prefix, peer := range map[netip.Prefix]string{peerA1: "peerA", peerA2: "peerA", peerB1: "peerB"} {
_, err := m.allowedIPsRefCounter.Increment(prefix, peer)
require.NoError(t, err)
}
// Extra reference: reconcile must still re-apply the prefix even though its refcount never
// hit 0 again (the exact case the plain incremental path skips).
_, err := m.allowedIPsRefCounter.Increment(peerA1, "peerA")
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, m.ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs("peerA"))
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []netip.Prefix{peerA1, peerA2}, wg.added("peerA"),
"reconcile must re-apply all routed prefixes of the peer")
assert.Empty(t, wg.added("peerB"), "reconcile must not touch another peer's prefixes")
}
// TestReconcilePeerAllowedIPsNoCounter verifies reconcile is a safe no-op before the refcounter is
// set up.
func TestReconcilePeerAllowedIPsNoCounter(t *testing.T) {
wg := &reconcileWGMock{}
m := &DefaultManager{wgInterface: wg}
require.NoError(t, m.ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs("peerA"))
assert.Empty(t, wg.added("peerA"))
}

View File

@@ -94,26 +94,6 @@ func (rm *Counter[Key, I, O]) Get(key Key) (Ref[O], bool) {
return ref, ok
}
// ReapplyMatching calls apply for every key whose stored Out satisfies pred, holding the
// counter lock for the whole pass. Running apply under the lock keeps it atomic with respect
// to Increment/Decrement: a prefix dropped to zero is removed from the map (and had its
// RemoveFunc called) before this pass observes it, so a stale key can never be re-applied.
// pred and apply are invoked under the lock, so they must not call back into the counter.
func (rm *Counter[Key, I, O]) ReapplyMatching(pred func(out O) bool, apply func(key Key) error) error {
rm.mu.Lock()
defer rm.mu.Unlock()
var merr *multierror.Error
for key, ref := range rm.refCountMap {
if pred(ref.Out) {
if err := apply(key); err != nil {
merr = multierror.Append(merr, err)
}
}
}
return nberrors.FormatErrorOrNil(merr)
}
// Increment increments the reference count for the given key.
// If this is the first reference to the key, the AddFunc is called.
func (rm *Counter[Key, I, O]) Increment(key Key, in I) (Ref[O], error) {

View File

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
package refcounter
import (
"net/netip"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// TestReapplyMatching verifies ReapplyMatching invokes apply for exactly the keys whose stored
// Out satisfies the predicate (no duplicates for multiply-referenced keys) — the primitive
// ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs relies on to re-apply a single peer's routed prefixes.
func TestReapplyMatching(t *testing.T) {
rc := New[netip.Prefix, string, string](
func(_ netip.Prefix, peerKey string) (string, error) { return peerKey, nil },
func(netip.Prefix, string) error { return nil },
)
peerA1 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/24")
peerA2 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.1.0.0/24")
peerB1 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.2.0.0/24")
for prefix, peer := range map[netip.Prefix]string{peerA1: "peerA", peerA2: "peerA", peerB1: "peerB"} {
_, err := rc.Increment(prefix, peer)
require.NoError(t, err)
}
// a second reference must not make the key applied twice
_, err := rc.Increment(peerA1, "peerA")
require.NoError(t, err)
var applied []netip.Prefix
err = rc.ReapplyMatching(
func(out string) bool { return out == "peerA" },
func(key netip.Prefix) error { applied = append(applied, key); return nil },
)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []netip.Prefix{peerA1, peerA2}, applied)
var none []netip.Prefix
err = rc.ReapplyMatching(
func(out string) bool { return out == "missing" },
func(key netip.Prefix) error { none = append(none, key); return nil },
)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, none)
}

View File

@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ sequenceDiagram
Chk->>Inj: continue
Inj->>Inj: inject NetBird identity headers per provider config
Inj->>Grd: continue
Grd->>Grd: enforce model allowlist
Grd->>Grd: enforce per-provider allowlist (fail-closed backstop)
Grd->>Up: forward (over WireGuard)
Up-->>Resp: response (JSON or SSE stream)
Resp->>Resp: parse usage tokens, completion
@@ -135,6 +135,15 @@ sequenceDiagram
(`redact_pii = settings.RedactPii`). Phones, emails, credit cards,
PII names — see `redact.go` for the full set. See
[`modules/31-proxy-middleware-builtin.md`](modules/31-proxy-middleware-builtin.md).
- The model allowlist is enforced in TWO places. `CheckLLMPolicyLimits`
is authoritative: it resolves the policy that governs this
(provider, caller-groups) and denies (`deny_code = llm_policy.model_blocked`)
when no applicable policy permits the model — so an allowlist scoped to
one group/provider never leaks to another, and an un-guardrailed policy
is genuinely unrestricted. `llm_guardrail` is a per-provider fail-closed
backstop: it only carries an allowlist for a provider every authorising
policy restricts, and blocks unknown/undetermined models even when
management is unreachable.
- SSE streaming requires special handling on the response side; the
parser must handle partial chunks without buffering the whole
stream. See [`modules/32-proxy-llm-parsers.md`](modules/32-proxy-llm-parsers.md).

View File

@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ At request time the path is independent: the proxy calls `SelectPolicyForRequest
| on_request | 1 | `llm_router` | `{"providers":[{id, models[], upstream_*, auth_header_*, allowed_group_ids[]}]}` | **true** |
| on_request | 2 | `llm_limit_check` | `{}` | |
| on_request | 3 | `llm_identity_inject` | `{"providers":[{provider_id, header_pair?, json_metadata?, extra_headers?}]}` | **true** |
| on_request | 4 | `llm_guardrail` | `{"model_allowlist"?, "prompt_capture":{enabled,redact_pii}}` | |
| on_request | 4 | `llm_guardrail` | `{"provider_allowlists"?: {providerID: []model}, "prompt_capture":{enabled,redact_pii}}` | |
| on_response | 5 | `llm_limit_record` | `{}` (runs LAST at runtime) | |
| on_response | 6 | `cost_meter` | `{}` | |
| on_response | 7 | `llm_response_parser` | `{"capture_completion": <bool>, "redact_pii"?: true}` | |

View File

@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ no mocks. Tests: `TestChain_AllowPath_StampsAttributionAndRecordsCounter`
| `llm_router` | `{providers: [{id, models, upstream_scheme, upstream_host, upstream_path?, auth_header_name, auth_header_value, allowed_group_ids}]}` |
| `llm_limit_check` | `{}` — pulls `MgmtClient` from `FactoryContext` |
| `llm_identity_inject` | `{providers: [{provider_id, header_pair?|json_metadata?, extra_headers?}]}` |
| `llm_guardrail` | `{model_allowlist: []string, prompt_capture: {enabled, redact_pii}}` |
| `llm_guardrail` | `{provider_allowlists: {providerID: []string}, prompt_capture: {enabled, redact_pii}}` — allowlist keyed by resolved provider id; a provider absent from the map is unrestricted (fail-closed backstop; authoritative per-policy/group check is management's `CheckLLMPolicyLimits`) |
| `llm_response_parser` | `{redact_pii?, capture_completion?: *bool}` |
| `cost_meter` | `{pricing_path?}` (basename inside data-dir; defaults `pricing.yaml`) |
| `llm_limit_record` | `{}` — same pattern as `llm_limit_check` |

View File

@@ -20,15 +20,14 @@ import (
// covers whatever credentials are present (source ~/.llm-keys locally / set the
// Actions secrets in CI).
type providerCase struct {
name string
catalogID string
upstream string
apiKey string
model string // body model (chat/messages) or path model@version (vertex)
kind string // harness.WireChat, harness.WireMessages, or harness.WireVertex
project string // vertex only: GCP project for the rawPredict path
region string // vertex only: GCP region for the rawPredict path
pathPrefix string // base-URL path prefix the agent carries (e.g. "/anthropic" for Kimi)
name string
catalogID string
upstream string
apiKey string
model string // body model (chat/messages) or path model@version (vertex)
kind string // harness.WireChat, harness.WireMessages, or harness.WireVertex
project string // vertex only: GCP project for the rawPredict path
region string // vertex only: GCP region for the rawPredict path
}
// availableProviders builds the matrix from the provider env vars that are set.
@@ -40,24 +39,6 @@ func availableProviders() []providerCase {
if k := os.Getenv("ANTHROPIC_TOKEN"); k != "" {
ps = append(ps, providerCase{name: "anthropic", catalogID: "anthropic_api", upstream: "https://api.anthropic.com", apiKey: k, model: "claude-haiku-4-5", kind: harness.WireMessages})
}
if k := os.Getenv("KIMI_TOKEN"); k != "" {
// Kimi (Moonshot AI) serves two body shapes from the same key: OpenAI
// Chat Completions on the bare host (/v1/...) and the Anthropic
// Messages API under the /anthropic path prefix (the endpoint
// Moonshot's Claude Code guide uses). The provider keeps the bare
// default upstream and the AGENT carries the /anthropic prefix in
// its base URL — exactly the documented Claude Code / Kimi CLI
// setup (ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=https://<endpoint>/anthropic) — so one
// provider serves both shapes and the prefix rides through to
// Moonshot. Run the Anthropic shape, the flagship Claude Code path;
// the OpenAI wire shape is covered live by the other chat-shaped
// matrix providers, and Kimi-over-chat passed with kimi-k3 before
// the single-model constraint surfaced (run #73 on the kimi feature
// branch). The platform serves this account exactly ONE model —
// kimi-k3 (kimi-k2-thinking and even kimi-latest return
// resource_not_found_error on both surfaces).
ps = append(ps, providerCase{name: "kimi", catalogID: "kimi_api", upstream: "https://api.moonshot.ai", apiKey: k, model: "kimi-k3", kind: harness.WireMessages, pathPrefix: "/anthropic"})
}
if k, u := os.Getenv("VERCEL_TOKEN"), os.Getenv("VERCEL_URL"); k != "" && u != "" {
ps = append(ps, providerCase{name: "vercel", catalogID: "vercel_ai_gateway", upstream: u, apiKey: k, model: "openai/gpt-4o-mini", kind: harness.WireChat})
}
@@ -103,18 +84,12 @@ func availableProviders() []providerCase {
}
}
// Bedrock: path-routed, bearer auth. Model is the FULL cross-region
// inference-profile id exactly as AWS issues it — region-family prefix
// plus the date/version suffix. A bare or wrong-region id makes Bedrock
// reject the request with "The provided model identifier is invalid"
// before any inference runs. The proxy normalizes this id to the catalog
// key (anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5) for routing/pricing/allowlists.
// Defaults pair eu-central-1 with the eu.* profile; AWS_REGION overrides
// the region and the prefix follows its family.
// Bedrock: path-routed, bearer auth. Model is a cross-region inference
// profile id (distinct string from the first-party Anthropic case).
if k := os.Getenv("AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK"); k != "" {
region := os.Getenv("AWS_REGION")
if region == "" {
region = "eu-central-1"
region = "us-east-1"
}
// A valid Bedrock inference-profile id (region prefix + date + version),
// overridable per account. `global.` profiles can be invoked from any
@@ -271,7 +246,7 @@ func TestProvidersMatrix(t *testing.T) {
case harness.WireBedrock:
c, b, cerr = cl.Bedrock(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc.model, "Reply with exactly: pong", sessionID)
default:
c, b, cerr = cl.ChatPrefixed(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc.pathPrefix, pc.kind, pc.model, "Reply with exactly: pong", sessionID)
c, b, cerr = cl.Chat(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc.kind, pc.model, "Reply with exactly: pong", sessionID)
}
if cerr == nil {
code, body = c, b

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
//go:build e2e
package agentnetwork
import (
"context"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/e2e/harness"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/api"
)
// TestGuardrailBlocksUnselectedModel_PathRouted is the end-to-end regression
// guard for the customer report that a model-allowlist guardrail attached to a
// policy "has no effect" for PATH-ROUTED providers — where the model travels in
// the URL, not the JSON body (Google Vertex `…/models/{model}:rawPredict`, AWS
// Bedrock `/model/{id}/invoke`). This is the shape the customer actually hits.
//
// Through the real management API it creates a Vertex and a Bedrock provider
// (both catch-all, so the router forwards any model — a 403 can only come from
// the guardrail, never model_not_routable) and one guardrail whose allowlist
// selects a single model per provider, attached to the policy. Over the tunnel,
// for each provider:
//
// - the SELECTED model (in the URL path) is served (200), and
// - an UNSELECTED model (in the URL path) is denied 403 by the guardrail
// (llm_policy.model_blocked) before it reaches the upstream.
//
// Only the upstream LLM is mocked (the vLLM nginx answers any path with 200);
// management synth/reconcile, the proxy middleware chain (URL-path model
// extraction in llm_request_parser, llm_router, llm_guardrail), and the tunnel
// are all real. The guardrail denies before the upstream is dialed, so the mock
// cannot influence the block. Providers use a static bearer api key (not
// "keyfile::…") so the router injects a static Authorization header instead of
// minting a GCP OAuth token — that is the only reason path-routed providers
// normally need live credentials, so this test runs with none and is always on.
//
// If the guardrail were inert for path-routed requests (its middleware dropped
// by the proxy, the allowlist not synthesized, or the URL-path model not
// extracted so the allowlist can't match), the unselected model would reach the
// mock and return 200 — the fail-open this test catches.
func TestGuardrailBlocksUnselectedModel_PathRouted(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 15*time.Minute)
defer cancel()
const (
vertexProject = "e2e-project"
vertexRegion = "global"
// Vertex catalog ids travel bare in the rawPredict path.
vertexSelected = "claude-sonnet-4-5"
vertexUnselected = "claude-opus-4-6"
// Bedrock request ids travel as region-prefixed, versioned
// inference-profile ids; the parser normalizes them to the catalog key
// the allowlist holds — so this also exercises Bedrock normalization.
bedrockSelectedPath = "us.anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-5-v1:0"
bedrockSelectedCatalog = "anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-5"
bedrockUnselectedPath = "us.anthropic.claude-opus-4-8-v1:0"
)
vllm, err := harness.StartVLLM(ctx, srv)
require.NoError(t, err, "start mock upstream")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = vllm.Terminate(context.Background()) })
grp, err := srv.API().Groups.Create(ctx, api.PostApiGroupsJSONRequestBody{Name: "e2e-guardrail-path"})
require.NoError(t, err, "create group")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.API().Groups.Delete(context.Background(), grp.Id) })
ephemeral := false
sk, err := srv.API().SetupKeys.Create(ctx, api.PostApiSetupKeysJSONRequestBody{
Name: "e2e-guardrail-path-client",
Type: "reusable",
ExpiresIn: 86400,
UsageLimit: 0,
AutoGroups: []string{grp.Id},
Ephemeral: &ephemeral,
})
require.NoError(t, err, "mint setup key")
require.NotEmpty(t, sk.Key, "setup key plaintext")
// Static bearer (not "keyfile::…") so the router injects a static auth header
// instead of minting a GCP token. Both providers are catch-all (no Models)
// and point at the mock upstream. Create both up front, enabled, before the
// proxy starts (provider changes after connect don't reconcile to the proxy).
staticKey := "static-e2e-token"
vertexProv, err := srv.CreateProvider(ctx, api.AgentNetworkProviderRequest{
Name: "vertex",
ProviderId: "vertex_ai_api",
UpstreamUrl: vllm.URL,
ApiKey: &staticKey,
Enabled: ptr(true),
BootstrapCluster: ptr(harness.AgentNetworkCluster),
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create vertex provider")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteProvider(context.Background(), vertexProv.Id) })
bedrockProv, err := srv.CreateProvider(ctx, api.AgentNetworkProviderRequest{
Name: "bedrock",
ProviderId: "bedrock_api",
UpstreamUrl: vllm.URL,
ApiKey: &staticKey,
Enabled: ptr(true),
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create bedrock provider")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteProvider(context.Background(), bedrockProv.Id) })
// One guardrail allowlisting exactly the selected model per provider.
var gr api.AgentNetworkGuardrailRequest
gr.Name = "e2e-guardrail-path"
gr.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Enabled = true
gr.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Models = []string{vertexSelected, bedrockSelectedCatalog}
guard, err := srv.CreateGuardrail(ctx, gr)
require.NoError(t, err, "create guardrail")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteGuardrail(context.Background(), guard.Id) })
enabled := true
pol, err := srv.CreatePolicy(ctx, api.AgentNetworkPolicyRequest{
Name: "e2e-guardrail-path",
Enabled: &enabled,
SourceGroups: []string{grp.Id},
DestinationProviderIds: []string{vertexProv.Id, bedrockProv.Id},
GuardrailIds: &[]string{guard.Id},
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create policy")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeletePolicy(context.Background(), pol.Id) })
settings, err := srv.GetSettings(ctx)
require.NoError(t, err, "read settings")
require.NotEmpty(t, settings.Endpoint, "endpoint must be assigned")
proxyToken, err := srv.CreateProxyTokenCLI(ctx, "e2e-guardrail-path-proxy")
require.NoError(t, err, "mint proxy token")
px, err := harness.StartProxy(ctx, srv, proxyToken)
require.NoError(t, err, "start proxy")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = px.Terminate(context.Background()) })
cl, err := harness.StartClient(ctx, srv, sk.Key)
require.NoError(t, err, "start client")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = cl.Terminate(context.Background()) })
require.NoError(t, cl.WaitConnected(ctx, 90*time.Second), "client must connect to management")
// Probe first: the GET resolves the endpoint and its first packet wakes the
// lazy proxy peer, so WaitProxyPeer then observes it connected.
proxyIP, err := cl.ResolveProxyIP(ctx, settings.Endpoint)
require.NoError(t, err, "resolve endpoint to proxy IP")
if err := cl.WaitProxyPeer(ctx, 180*time.Second); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("client did not see the proxy peer: %v\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", err, px.Logs(context.Background()))
}
// vertexSend / bedrockSend drive one path-routed request and return status+body.
vertexSend := func(model string) (int, string) {
code, body, cerr := cl.Vertex(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, vertexProject, vertexRegion, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
require.NoError(t, cerr, "vertex request must reach the proxy")
return code, body
}
bedrockSend := func(model string) (int, string) {
code, body, cerr := cl.Bedrock(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
require.NoError(t, cerr, "bedrock request must reach the proxy")
return code, body
}
t.Run("vertex", func(t *testing.T) {
// Selected model (in the URL path) is served. Retry to absorb tunnel/DNS
// jitter on the first call over the freshly warmed tunnel.
var code int
var body string
deadline := time.Now().Add(90 * time.Second)
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
code, body = vertexSend(vertexSelected)
if code == 200 {
break
}
time.Sleep(5 * time.Second)
}
assert.Equal(t, 200, code,
"selected Vertex model (URL path) must be served; body: %s\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", body, px.Logs(context.Background()))
// Unselected model (in the URL path) must be blocked by the guardrail.
code, body = vertexSend(vertexUnselected)
assert.Equal(t, 403, code,
"unselected Vertex model (URL path) must be denied, not served; body: %s\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", body, px.Logs(context.Background()))
assert.Contains(t, body, "llm_policy.model_blocked",
"Vertex denial must come from the guardrail allowlist, not routing; body: %s", body)
})
t.Run("bedrock", func(t *testing.T) {
var code int
var body string
deadline := time.Now().Add(90 * time.Second)
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
code, body = bedrockSend(bedrockSelectedPath)
if code == 200 {
break
}
time.Sleep(5 * time.Second)
}
assert.Equal(t, 200, code,
"selected Bedrock model (URL path, normalized) must be served; body: %s\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", body, px.Logs(context.Background()))
code, body = bedrockSend(bedrockUnselectedPath)
assert.Equal(t, 403, code,
"unselected Bedrock model (URL path) must be denied, not served; body: %s\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", body, px.Logs(context.Background()))
assert.Contains(t, body, "llm_policy.model_blocked",
"Bedrock denial must come from the guardrail allowlist, not routing; body: %s", body)
})
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
//go:build e2e
package agentnetwork
import (
"context"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/e2e/harness"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/api"
)
// TestGuardrailMultiPolicyModelAllowlist is the end-to-end regression guard for
// the multi-policy interactions of the model-allowlist guardrail: what happens
// when several enabled policies govern an account and some carry a guardrail
// while others don't. The earlier implementation merged every policy's allowlist
// into ONE account-wide union enforced flat on every request, which produced two
// defects this test pins:
//
// - false-ALLOW (cross-group leak): a model allowlisted only for another
// group's policy became usable by any caller, because the union ignored
// which policy/group actually authorised the request; and
// - false-DENY: a policy with NO guardrail (intended unrestricted) still had
// its traffic blocked by some other policy's allowlist.
//
// The fix scopes enforcement to the matched policy/group in management
// (SelectPolicyForRequest) with a per-provider fail-closed backstop at the
// proxy. The account here has one client in grpMain and three policies over two
// catch-all upstreams (the mock vLLM answers any model 200, so a 403 can only be
// a policy decision, never a routing miss):
//
// - polMain : grpMain -> pRestricted, guardrail allowlisting modelSelected
// - polOther: grpOther -> pRestricted, guardrail allowlisting modelOther
// - polOpen : grpMain -> pOpen, NO guardrail (unrestricted)
//
// Providers declare their models so routing is deterministic. Over the tunnel,
// as the grpMain client:
//
// - modelSelected on pRestricted is served (200) — allowed by grpMain's policy;
// - modelOther on pRestricted is denied 403 (llm_policy.model_blocked) — it is
// allowlisted only for grpOther and must NOT leak to grpMain; and
// - openModel on pOpen is served (200) — the un-guardrailed policy leaves that
// provider unrestricted and must NOT be blocked by another policy's list.
//
// Under the old account-wide union the middle case returned 200 (the leak) and
// the last case returned 403 (the false-deny); both are inverted here.
func TestGuardrailMultiPolicyModelAllowlist(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 15*time.Minute)
defer cancel()
const (
modelSelected = "e2e-selected"
modelOther = "e2e-other"
openModel = "e2e-open"
)
vllm, err := harness.StartVLLM(ctx, srv)
require.NoError(t, err, "start mock upstream")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = vllm.Terminate(context.Background()) })
grpMain, err := srv.API().Groups.Create(ctx, api.PostApiGroupsJSONRequestBody{Name: "e2e-guardrail-mp-main"})
require.NoError(t, err, "create main group")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.API().Groups.Delete(context.Background(), grpMain.Id) })
grpOther, err := srv.API().Groups.Create(ctx, api.PostApiGroupsJSONRequestBody{Name: "e2e-guardrail-mp-other"})
require.NoError(t, err, "create other group")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.API().Groups.Delete(context.Background(), grpOther.Id) })
ephemeral := false
sk, err := srv.API().SetupKeys.Create(ctx, api.PostApiSetupKeysJSONRequestBody{
Name: "e2e-guardrail-mp-client",
Type: "reusable",
ExpiresIn: 86400,
UsageLimit: 0,
AutoGroups: []string{grpMain.Id}, // client joins grpMain only
Ephemeral: &ephemeral,
})
require.NoError(t, err, "mint setup key")
require.NotEmpty(t, sk.Key, "setup key plaintext")
staticKey := "static-e2e-token"
models := func(ids ...string) *[]api.AgentNetworkProviderModel {
out := make([]api.AgentNetworkProviderModel, 0, len(ids))
for _, id := range ids {
out = append(out, api.AgentNetworkProviderModel{Id: id, InputPer1k: 0.001, OutputPer1k: 0.001})
}
return &out
}
// pRestricted declares the two guardrailed models so routing is deterministic
// (model -> provider). Created first, so it carries the bootstrap cluster.
pRestricted, err := srv.CreateProvider(ctx, api.AgentNetworkProviderRequest{
Name: "restricted",
ProviderId: "openai_api",
UpstreamUrl: vllm.URL,
ApiKey: &staticKey,
Enabled: ptr(true),
Models: models(modelSelected, modelOther),
BootstrapCluster: ptr(harness.AgentNetworkCluster),
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create restricted provider")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteProvider(context.Background(), pRestricted.Id) })
pOpen, err := srv.CreateProvider(ctx, api.AgentNetworkProviderRequest{
Name: "open",
ProviderId: "openai_api",
UpstreamUrl: vllm.URL,
ApiKey: &staticKey,
Enabled: ptr(true),
Models: models(openModel),
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create open provider")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteProvider(context.Background(), pOpen.Id) })
mkGuardrail := func(name, model string) api.AgentNetworkGuardrail {
var gr api.AgentNetworkGuardrailRequest
gr.Name = name
gr.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Enabled = true
gr.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Models = []string{model}
g, gerr := srv.CreateGuardrail(ctx, gr)
require.NoError(t, gerr, "create guardrail %s", name)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteGuardrail(context.Background(), g.Id) })
return g
}
gMain := mkGuardrail("e2e-guardrail-mp-main", modelSelected)
gOther := mkGuardrail("e2e-guardrail-mp-other", modelOther)
enabled := true
// polMain: grpMain restricted to modelSelected on pRestricted.
polMain, err := srv.CreatePolicy(ctx, api.AgentNetworkPolicyRequest{
Name: "e2e-guardrail-mp-main",
Enabled: &enabled,
SourceGroups: []string{grpMain.Id},
DestinationProviderIds: []string{pRestricted.Id},
GuardrailIds: &[]string{gMain.Id},
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create main policy")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeletePolicy(context.Background(), polMain.Id) })
// polOther: grpOther restricted to modelOther on the SAME provider. The
// client is not in grpOther, so modelOther must never be usable by it.
polOther, err := srv.CreatePolicy(ctx, api.AgentNetworkPolicyRequest{
Name: "e2e-guardrail-mp-other",
Enabled: &enabled,
SourceGroups: []string{grpOther.Id},
DestinationProviderIds: []string{pRestricted.Id},
GuardrailIds: &[]string{gOther.Id},
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create other policy")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeletePolicy(context.Background(), polOther.Id) })
// polOpen: grpMain on pOpen with NO guardrail — unrestricted.
polOpen, err := srv.CreatePolicy(ctx, api.AgentNetworkPolicyRequest{
Name: "e2e-guardrail-mp-open",
Enabled: &enabled,
SourceGroups: []string{grpMain.Id},
DestinationProviderIds: []string{pOpen.Id},
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create open policy")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeletePolicy(context.Background(), polOpen.Id) })
settings, err := srv.GetSettings(ctx)
require.NoError(t, err, "read settings")
require.NotEmpty(t, settings.Endpoint, "endpoint must be assigned")
proxyToken, err := srv.CreateProxyTokenCLI(ctx, "e2e-guardrail-mp-proxy")
require.NoError(t, err, "mint proxy token")
px, err := harness.StartProxy(ctx, srv, proxyToken)
require.NoError(t, err, "start proxy")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = px.Terminate(context.Background()) })
cl, err := harness.StartClient(ctx, srv, sk.Key)
require.NoError(t, err, "start client")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = cl.Terminate(context.Background()) })
require.NoError(t, cl.WaitConnected(ctx, 90*time.Second), "client must connect to management")
proxyIP, err := cl.ResolveProxyIP(ctx, settings.Endpoint)
require.NoError(t, err, "resolve endpoint to proxy IP")
if err := cl.WaitProxyPeer(ctx, 180*time.Second); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("client did not see the proxy peer: %v\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", err, px.Logs(context.Background()))
}
send := func(model string) (int, string) {
code, body, cerr := cl.Chat(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, harness.WireChat, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
require.NoError(t, cerr, "request must reach the proxy")
return code, body
}
// sendUntil200 absorbs first-call tunnel/DNS jitter on the freshly warmed tunnel.
sendUntil200 := func(model string) (int, string) {
var code int
var body string
deadline := time.Now().Add(90 * time.Second)
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
code, body = send(model)
if code == 200 {
break
}
time.Sleep(5 * time.Second)
}
return code, body
}
t.Run("selected model allowed for its group", func(t *testing.T) {
code, body := sendUntil200(modelSelected)
assert.Equal(t, 200, code,
"grpMain's allowlisted model must be served; body: %s\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", body, px.Logs(context.Background()))
})
t.Run("other group's model does not leak", func(t *testing.T) {
// modelOther is allowlisted only for grpOther. The grpMain client must be
// denied by management's per-policy/group check — not waved through by an
// account-wide union. This is the security-critical wrong-ALLOW guard.
code, body := send(modelOther)
assert.Equal(t, 403, code,
"another group's allowlisted model must be denied for this caller; body: %s\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", body, px.Logs(context.Background()))
assert.Contains(t, body, "llm_policy.model_blocked",
"denial must be a model-allowlist decision; body: %s", body)
})
t.Run("unguarded policy leaves its provider unrestricted", func(t *testing.T) {
// polOpen carries no guardrail, so pOpen is unrestricted for grpMain. The
// old account-wide union would have blocked openModel (it is on no
// allowlist); it must now be served — the false-DENY guard.
code, body := sendUntil200(openModel)
assert.Equal(t, 200, code,
"an un-guardrailed policy's provider must not be blocked by another policy's allowlist; body: %s\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", body, px.Logs(context.Background()))
})
}

View File

@@ -52,9 +52,7 @@ func catalogModel(pc providerCase) string {
func disallowedModel(pc providerCase) string {
switch pc.kind {
case harness.WireBedrock:
// Same profile prefix as the allowed model so only the model name
// differs; the guardrail must deny it before it reaches AWS.
return strings.SplitN(pc.model, ".", 2)[0] + ".anthropic.claude-opus-4-8"
return "us.anthropic.claude-opus-4-8"
case harness.WireVertex:
return "claude-opus-4-8@20250101"
default:
@@ -74,7 +72,7 @@ func sendModel(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, cl *harness.Client, endpoint,
case harness.WireVertex:
code, _, err = cl.Vertex(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, pc.project, pc.region, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
default:
code, _, err = cl.ChatPrefixed(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, pc.pathPrefix, pc.kind, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
code, _, err = cl.Chat(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, pc.kind, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
}
require.NoError(t, err, "request must reach the proxy for %s", pc.name)
return code

View File

@@ -239,17 +239,6 @@ const (
// the wire shape: WireChat (OpenAI) or WireMessages (Anthropic). A non-empty
// sessionID is sent as the universal x-session-id header the proxy records.
func (cl *Client) Chat(ctx context.Context, endpoint, proxyIP, kind, model, prompt, sessionID string) (int, string, error) {
return cl.ChatPrefixed(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, "", kind, model, prompt, sessionID)
}
// ChatPrefixed is Chat with a base-URL path prefix prepended to the wire
// path, mirroring agents whose base URL carries a shape-selecting prefix that
// rides through to the upstream — e.g. Claude Code against a Kimi provider
// sets ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=https://<endpoint>/anthropic so the proxy forwards
// /anthropic/v1/messages to Moonshot's Anthropic surface while the provider's
// upstream URL stays the bare https://api.moonshot.ai. Empty prefix is plain
// Chat.
func (cl *Client) ChatPrefixed(ctx context.Context, endpoint, proxyIP, pathPrefix, kind, model, prompt, sessionID string) (int, string, error) {
var path, body string
var headers []string
switch kind {
@@ -261,7 +250,7 @@ func (cl *Client) ChatPrefixed(ctx context.Context, endpoint, proxyIP, pathPrefi
path = "/v1/chat/completions"
body = fmt.Sprintf(`{"model":%q,"messages":[{"role":"user","content":%q}]}`, model, prompt)
}
return cl.post(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, pathPrefix+path, body, withSessionID(headers, sessionID))
return cl.post(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, path, body, withSessionID(headers, sessionID))
}
// Vertex issues an Anthropic-on-Vertex rawPredict POST over the tunnel. Unlike

View File

@@ -234,6 +234,9 @@ init_environment() {
NETBIRD_LICENSE_KEY=$(read_secret "Enter license key (input hidden)")
GHCR_USERNAME="netbirdExtAccess1"
GHCR_TOKEN=$(read_secret "Enter GHCR token (input hidden)")
POSTGRES_USER="netbird"
POSTGRES_DB="netbird"
POSTGRES_PASSWORD=$(rand_secret)
@@ -260,6 +263,10 @@ init_environment() {
install -m 600 /dev/null config.yaml
render_config_yaml >> config.yaml
echo "Logging in to ghcr.io ..."
printf '%s' "$GHCR_TOKEN" | docker login ghcr.io -u "$GHCR_USERNAME" --password-stdin
unset GHCR_TOKEN
echo ""
echo "Pulling images ..."
$DOCKER_COMPOSE_COMMAND pull

View File

@@ -490,6 +490,8 @@ init_migration() {
echo ""
echo "Step 1: Image swap (community → Enterprise). License key required."
NB_LICENSE_KEY=$(read_secret " License key")
GHCR_USERNAME="netbirdExtAccess1"
GHCR_TOKEN=$(read_secret " GHCR token (input hidden)")
# Step 2 — optional
echo ""
@@ -586,6 +588,11 @@ apply_changes() {
fi
} >> "$ENV_FILE"
echo ""
echo "Logging in to ghcr.io ..."
printf '%s' "$GHCR_TOKEN" | docker login ghcr.io -u "$GHCR_USERNAME" --password-stdin
unset GHCR_TOKEN
echo ""
echo "Pulling enterprise images ..."
$DOCKER_COMPOSE_COMMAND pull

View File

@@ -420,47 +420,6 @@ var providers = []Provider{
{ID: "mistral-embed", Label: "Mistral Embed", InputPer1k: 0.0001, OutputPer1k: 0, ContextWindow: 8192},
},
},
{
ID: "kimi_api",
Kind: KindProvider,
Name: "Kimi (Moonshot AI) API",
Description: "Kimi K3 / K2 models via the Moonshot AI platform",
DefaultHost: "api.moonshot.ai",
AuthHeaderName: "Authorization",
AuthHeaderTemplate: "Bearer ${API_KEY}",
DefaultContentType: "application/json",
BrandColor: "#1A1A2E",
// ParserID empty on purpose: Moonshot serves two body shapes on
// the same host and key, and the proxy's URL sniffer dispatches
// both (same pattern as Bifrost). /v1/chat/completions matches
// OpenAIParser; the Anthropic-compatible endpoint the official
// Claude Code guide uses (/anthropic/v1/messages) contains
// "/v1/messages" and matches AnthropicParser. Pinning "openai"
// here would misparse the Claude Code path — the primary way
// teams consume Kimi for coding today. Both endpoints accept the
// same Moonshot key via Authorization: Bearer (Claude Code's
// ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN rides that header too).
//
// api.moonshot.ai is the international platform; mainland-China
// accounts live on api.moonshot.cn with separate billing —
// operators there override the host on the provider record. The
// kimi.com subscription coding endpoint (api.kimi.com/coding,
// model id "k3") is account-bound seat licensing rather than a
// meterable platform key, so it's deliberately not the default.
ParserID: "",
// Pricing per Moonshot's platform rates at K3 launch (July 2026):
// $3/$15 per MTok with $0.30 cached input, flat across the 1M-token
// window. kimi-k3 is the ONLY model the platform serves newer
// accounts — K2-era ids (kimi-k2-thinking) and even the kimi-latest
// alias return resource_not_found_error, verified live 2026-07-21 —
// so it's the only catalog entry. Grandfathered accounts with K2
// access can still type those ids on the provider's model rows.
// The consumer app's "K3 Swarm Max" mode is not an API SKU, so it
// doesn't appear here.
Models: []Model{
{ID: "kimi-k3", Label: "Kimi K3", InputPer1k: 0.003, OutputPer1k: 0.015, ContextWindow: 1000000},
},
},
{
ID: "litellm_proxy",
Kind: KindGateway,

View File

@@ -86,12 +86,20 @@ type Manager interface {
// PolicySelectionInput is the per-request selection envelope. The
// proxy populates it from CapturedData (account, user, groups) plus
// the provider llm_router resolved.
// the provider llm_router resolved and the model it extracted.
type PolicySelectionInput struct {
AccountID string
UserID string
GroupIDs []string
ProviderID string
// Model is the (already-normalised) upstream model identifier the proxy
// extracted from the request. The proxy's request parser strips
// path-routed provider decoration (Bedrock region/version, Vertex
// @version) before emitting it, so a plain case-insensitive compare
// against a guardrail allowlist is sufficient here. Empty when the model
// could not be determined — treated as "not permitted" by any policy that
// restricts models (fail closed), mirroring the proxy guardrail.
Model string
}
// PolicySelectionResult names the policy that "pays" for this request

View File

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
"fmt"
"math"
"sort"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/types"
@@ -35,6 +36,11 @@ const (
denyCodeAccountTokenCapExceeded = "llm_account.token_cap_exceeded"
//nolint:gosec // account deny code label, not a credential
denyCodeAccountBudgetCapExceeded = "llm_account.budget_cap_exceeded"
// denyCodeModelBlocked is returned when policies govern the request's
// (provider, caller-groups) but none of them permits the requested model
// under its guardrail allowlist. Matches the proxy guardrail's code so the
// two enforcement layers surface the same label.
denyCodeModelBlocked = "llm_policy.model_blocked"
)
// consumptionCache holds the consumption counters prefetched for one
@@ -159,6 +165,34 @@ func (m *managerImpl) SelectPolicyForRequest(ctx context.Context, in PolicySelec
}
candidates := filterApplicablePolicies(policies, in)
// Model-allowlist gate (per-policy, per-group). Among the policies that
// authorise this (provider, caller-groups), keep only those whose guardrails
// permit the requested model; a policy with no allowlist-enabled guardrail is
// unrestricted and always permits. When policies govern this request but none
// permits the model, deny. This is the authoritative allowlist decision:
// because it is scoped to the matched policies, a model allowlisted for one
// group/provider never leaks to another (no account-wide union), and a policy
// that carries no guardrail is genuinely unrestricted rather than being caught
// by some other policy's allowlist.
// Only consult guardrails when at least one candidate policy references one;
// a policy with no guardrail is unrestricted, so when none of them carries a
// guardrail the gate is a no-op and we skip the store read entirely.
if len(candidates) > 0 && anyPolicyHasGuardrails(candidates) {
guardrailsByID, gErr := m.loadGuardrailsByID(ctx, in.AccountID)
if gErr != nil {
return nil, gErr
}
permitted := filterModelPermittedPolicies(candidates, guardrailsByID, in.Model)
if len(permitted) == 0 {
return &PolicySelectionResult{
Allow: false,
DenyCode: denyCodeModelBlocked,
DenyReason: modelBlockedReason(in.Model),
}, nil
}
candidates = permitted
}
// Prefetch every consumption counter the ceiling + candidate policies will
// read, in a single store round-trip, then score against the cache.
cache, err := m.prefetchConsumption(ctx, in, rules, candidates, now)
@@ -250,6 +284,93 @@ func filterApplicablePolicies(policies []*types.Policy, in PolicySelectionInput)
return out
}
// anyPolicyHasGuardrails reports whether any policy references at least one
// guardrail, so the selector can skip loading guardrails when none do.
func anyPolicyHasGuardrails(policies []*types.Policy) bool {
for _, p := range policies {
if p != nil && len(p.GuardrailIDs) > 0 {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// loadGuardrailsByID loads the account's guardrails indexed by ID. Used by the
// model-allowlist gate to resolve each candidate policy's attached guardrails.
func (m *managerImpl) loadGuardrailsByID(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (map[string]*types.Guardrail, error) {
guardrails, err := m.store.GetAccountAgentNetworkGuardrails(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, accountID)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("list account guardrails: %w", err)
}
byID := make(map[string]*types.Guardrail, len(guardrails))
for _, g := range guardrails {
if g != nil {
byID[g.ID] = g
}
}
return byID, nil
}
// filterModelPermittedPolicies returns the subset of policies whose guardrails
// permit the model. Order is preserved so downstream scoring is unaffected.
func filterModelPermittedPolicies(policies []*types.Policy, byID map[string]*types.Guardrail, model string) []*types.Policy {
out := make([]*types.Policy, 0, len(policies))
for _, p := range policies {
if policyPermitsModel(p, byID, model) {
out = append(out, p)
}
}
return out
}
// policyPermitsModel reports whether a policy permits the requested model under
// its attached guardrails. A policy with no allowlist-enabled guardrail is
// unrestricted (permits any model, including an empty/undetermined one). A
// policy with one or more allowlist-enabled guardrails permits the model only
// when it appears in the union of those allowlists; an empty/undetermined model
// never matches a non-empty allowlist, so such a policy fails closed — the same
// contract the proxy guardrail enforces for path-routed providers.
func policyPermitsModel(p *types.Policy, byID map[string]*types.Guardrail, model string) bool {
if p == nil {
return false
}
wanted := normaliseModelID(model)
restricted := false
for _, gID := range p.GuardrailIDs {
g, ok := byID[gID]
if !ok || g == nil || !g.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Enabled {
continue
}
restricted = true
if wanted == "" {
continue
}
for _, allowed := range g.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Models {
if normaliseModelID(allowed) == wanted {
return true
}
}
}
return !restricted
}
// normaliseModelID lowercases and trims a model identifier so the allowlist
// compare is case-insensitive and trim-tolerant. Mirrors the proxy guardrail's
// normaliseModel so both layers agree on what "same model" means.
func normaliseModelID(model string) string {
return strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(model))
}
// modelBlockedReason builds the human-readable deny reason for a model-allowlist
// rejection. The model is quoted when known; an undetermined model is reported
// as such so the access log distinguishes "wrong model" from "no model".
func modelBlockedReason(model string) string {
if normaliseModelID(model) == "" {
return "request model could not be determined for the policy allowlist"
}
return fmt.Sprintf("model %q is not permitted by any applicable policy allowlist", model)
}
// candidate is the per-policy intermediate the selector ranks. A
// policy that's been exhausted on any enabled cap never makes it
// into this slice; the selector's deny envelope carries the latest

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
package agentnetwork
import (
"context"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/golang/mock/gomock"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/types"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/store"
)
// guardedPolicy builds an enabled, uncapped policy that authorises sourceGroups
// to reach providerID under the given guardrails. Uncapped keeps the selector's
// headroom scoring trivial so these tests isolate the model-allowlist gate.
func guardedPolicy(id, account string, sourceGroups []string, providerID string, guardrailIDs ...string) *types.Policy {
return &types.Policy{
ID: id,
AccountID: account,
Enabled: true,
SourceGroups: sourceGroups,
DestinationProviderIDs: []string{providerID},
GuardrailIDs: guardrailIDs,
CreatedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
}
}
// allowlistGuardrail builds a guardrail whose model allowlist is enabled and
// carries the given models.
func allowlistGuardrail(id, account string, models ...string) *types.Guardrail {
return &types.Guardrail{
ID: id,
AccountID: account,
Checks: types.GuardrailChecks{
ModelAllowlist: types.GuardrailModelAllowlist{Enabled: true, Models: models},
},
}
}
func expectPolicies(mockStore *store.MockStore, account string, policies ...*types.Policy) {
mockStore.EXPECT().
GetAccountAgentNetworkPolicies(gomock.Any(), gomock.Any(), account).
Return(policies, nil)
}
func expectGuardrails(mockStore *store.MockStore, account string, guardrails ...*types.Guardrail) {
mockStore.EXPECT().
GetAccountAgentNetworkGuardrails(gomock.Any(), gomock.Any(), account).
Return(guardrails, nil)
}
// TestSelectPolicy_ModelBlockedByAllowlist proves the authoritative allowlist
// decision: a policy authorises the (provider, group) but restricts the model,
// and the requested model isn't on the list, so the request is denied.
func TestSelectPolicy_ModelBlockedByAllowlist(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1")
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1", allowlistGuardrail("g-1", "acc-1", "gpt-4o"))
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
UserID: "user-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "claude-opus-4",
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, res.Allow, "a model outside the only applicable policy's allowlist must be denied")
assert.Equal(t, denyCodeModelBlocked, res.DenyCode, "deny code must be model_blocked")
assert.NotEmpty(t, res.DenyReason, "deny reason must be populated")
}
// TestSelectPolicy_ModelAllowedByAllowlist is the allow counterpart: the model
// is on the applicable policy's allowlist, so selection proceeds normally.
func TestSelectPolicy_ModelAllowedByAllowlist(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1")
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1", allowlistGuardrail("g-1", "acc-1", "gpt-4o", "claude-opus-4"))
expectConsumptionBatch(mockStore, nil)
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
UserID: "user-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "claude-opus-4",
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, res.Allow, "a model on the applicable policy's allowlist must be allowed")
assert.Equal(t, "pol-A", res.SelectedPolicyID)
}
// TestSelectPolicy_CaseInsensitiveModelMatch proves the compare tolerates case
// and surrounding whitespace, matching the proxy guardrail's normalisation.
func TestSelectPolicy_CaseInsensitiveModelMatch(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1")
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1", allowlistGuardrail("g-1", "acc-1", " GPT-4o "))
expectConsumptionBatch(mockStore, nil)
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "gpt-4o",
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, res.Allow, "case/whitespace variants must match the allowlist entry")
}
// TestSelectPolicy_UnguardedPolicyIsUnrestricted is the false-deny fix: when
// two policies authorise the same (provider, group) and one carries no
// guardrail, that un-guardrailed policy makes the request unrestricted — it is
// NOT caught by the other policy's allowlist.
func TestSelectPolicy_UnguardedPolicyIsUnrestricted(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
restricted := guardedPolicy("pol-restricted", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1")
open := guardedPolicy("pol-open", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1") // no guardrail
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", restricted, open)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1", allowlistGuardrail("g-1", "acc-1", "gpt-4o"))
expectConsumptionBatch(mockStore, nil)
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "claude-opus-4",
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, res.Allow, "an un-guardrailed policy for the same (provider, group) must leave the request unrestricted")
assert.Equal(t, "pol-open", res.SelectedPolicyID, "the unrestricted policy must be the one that pays")
}
// TestSelectPolicy_AllowlistDoesNotLeakAcrossGroups is the false-allow fix: a
// model allowlisted only for grp-b must not be usable by a caller in grp-a,
// even though both groups' policies target the same provider. The selector only
// considers policies applicable to the caller's groups, so grp-b's allowlist
// never enters grp-a's decision.
func TestSelectPolicy_AllowlistDoesNotLeakAcrossGroups(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
polA := guardedPolicy("pol-a", "acc-1", []string{"grp-a"}, "prov-1", "g-a")
polB := guardedPolicy("pol-b", "acc-1", []string{"grp-b"}, "prov-1", "g-b")
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", polA, polB)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1",
allowlistGuardrail("g-a", "acc-1", "gpt-4o"),
allowlistGuardrail("g-b", "acc-1", "claude-opus-4"),
)
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-a"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "claude-opus-4", // only allowed for grp-b
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, res.Allow, "grp-b's allowlisted model must not leak to a grp-a caller")
assert.Equal(t, denyCodeModelBlocked, res.DenyCode)
}
// TestSelectPolicy_UndeterminedModelFailsClosed proves the fail-closed contract
// mirrors the proxy: with a restricted applicable policy and an empty model
// (e.g. a path-routed shape the parser couldn't map), the request is denied.
func TestSelectPolicy_UndeterminedModelFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1")
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1", allowlistGuardrail("g-1", "acc-1", "gpt-4o"))
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "", // undetermined
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, res.Allow, "an undetermined model must fail closed against a restricted policy")
assert.Equal(t, denyCodeModelBlocked, res.DenyCode)
}
// TestSelectPolicy_DisabledAllowlistDoesNotRestrict proves a guardrail whose
// model allowlist is disabled imposes no model restriction, even though the
// policy references it.
func TestSelectPolicy_DisabledAllowlistDoesNotRestrict(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1")
disabled := &types.Guardrail{
ID: "g-1",
AccountID: "acc-1",
Checks: types.GuardrailChecks{
ModelAllowlist: types.GuardrailModelAllowlist{Enabled: false, Models: []string{"gpt-4o"}},
},
}
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1", disabled)
expectConsumptionBatch(mockStore, nil)
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "anything-goes",
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, res.Allow, "a disabled allowlist must not restrict the model")
assert.Equal(t, "pol-A", res.SelectedPolicyID)
}

View File

@@ -235,7 +235,14 @@ func SynthesizeServices(ctx context.Context, s store.Store, accountID string) ([
mergedGuardrails := mergeGuardrails(enabledPolicies, guardrailsByID)
applyAccountCollectionControls(&mergedGuardrails, settings)
guardrailJSON, err := marshalGuardrailConfig(mergedGuardrails)
// The proxy guardrail is the fail-closed backstop, scoped per provider so it
// never applies one policy's allowlist to another provider's traffic. The
// authoritative per-policy/group model decision lives in management's
// SelectPolicyForRequest; a provider only lands in this map when EVERY policy
// authorising it restricts models, so an un-guardrailed policy leaves its
// providers unrestricted here.
providerAllowlists := buildProviderAllowlists(enabledPolicies, guardrailsByID)
guardrailJSON, err := marshalGuardrailConfig(providerAllowlists, mergedGuardrails.PromptCapture)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -780,10 +787,12 @@ func buildMiddlewareChain(routerCfgJSON, identityInjectJSON, guardrailJSON []byt
// guardrailConfig is the JSON shape the proxy-side llm_guardrail
// middleware expects. Mirrors the proxy registration documented in
// the management→proxy contract.
// the management→proxy contract. provider_allowlists is keyed by the
// resolved provider id llm_router stamps; a provider absent from the map is
// unrestricted at the proxy layer.
type guardrailConfig struct {
ModelAllowlist []string `json:"model_allowlist,omitempty"`
PromptCapture guardrailPromptCapture `json:"prompt_capture"`
ProviderAllowlists map[string][]string `json:"provider_allowlists,omitempty"`
PromptCapture guardrailPromptCapture `json:"prompt_capture"`
}
type guardrailPromptCapture struct {
@@ -828,12 +837,12 @@ func applyAccountCollectionControls(merged *MergedGuardrails, settings *types.Se
merged.PromptCapture.RedactPii = settings.RedactPii || merged.PromptCapture.RedactPii
}
func marshalGuardrailConfig(merged MergedGuardrails) ([]byte, error) {
func marshalGuardrailConfig(providerAllowlists map[string][]string, capture MergedPromptCapture) ([]byte, error) {
cfg := guardrailConfig{
ModelAllowlist: merged.ModelAllowlist,
ProviderAllowlists: providerAllowlists,
PromptCapture: guardrailPromptCapture{
Enabled: merged.PromptCapture.Enabled,
RedactPii: merged.PromptCapture.RedactPii,
Enabled: capture.Enabled,
RedactPii: capture.RedactPii,
},
}
out, err := json.Marshal(cfg)
@@ -843,6 +852,81 @@ func marshalGuardrailConfig(merged MergedGuardrails) ([]byte, error) {
return out, nil
}
// buildProviderAllowlists computes the per-provider model allowlist the proxy
// guardrail enforces as a fail-closed backstop. A provider is included ONLY when
// every enabled policy that authorises it restricts models (has at least one
// allowlist-enabled guardrail); its list is then the union of those policies'
// allowed models. If any authorising policy leaves models unrestricted, the
// provider is omitted entirely — the proxy treats an absent provider as
// unrestricted and defers to management's per-policy/group decision, so a
// mixed set of policies can neither leak a model across providers nor wrongly
// block an un-guardrailed policy's traffic.
func buildProviderAllowlists(policies []*types.Policy, byID map[string]*types.Guardrail) map[string][]string {
type providerAcc struct {
models map[string]struct{}
anyUnrestricted bool
}
accs := make(map[string]*providerAcc)
for _, p := range policies {
if p == nil {
continue
}
restricted, models := policyModelAllowlist(p, byID)
for _, providerID := range p.DestinationProviderIDs {
if providerID == "" {
continue
}
acc, ok := accs[providerID]
if !ok {
acc = &providerAcc{models: make(map[string]struct{})}
accs[providerID] = acc
}
if !restricted {
acc.anyUnrestricted = true
continue
}
for _, m := range models {
acc.models[m] = struct{}{}
}
}
}
out := make(map[string][]string, len(accs))
for providerID, acc := range accs {
if acc.anyUnrestricted {
continue
}
models := make([]string, 0, len(acc.models))
for m := range acc.models {
models = append(models, m)
}
sort.Strings(models)
out[providerID] = models
}
return out
}
// policyModelAllowlist reports whether a policy restricts models (has at least
// one allowlist-enabled guardrail) and the union of allowed models across those
// guardrails. Models are returned verbatim; the proxy factory lowercases and
// trims them at decode time, matching the runtime compare.
func policyModelAllowlist(p *types.Policy, byID map[string]*types.Guardrail) (bool, []string) {
restricted := false
var models []string
for _, gID := range p.GuardrailIDs {
g, ok := byID[gID]
if !ok || g == nil || !g.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Enabled {
continue
}
restricted = true
for _, m := range g.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Models {
if m != "" {
models = append(models, m)
}
}
}
return restricted, models
}
// buildAccountService composes the per-account gateway Service. The
// target carries the noop placeholder URL — the router middleware
// rewrites every request to the matched provider's upstream before the
@@ -991,11 +1075,10 @@ func unionSourceGroups(policies []*types.Policy) []string {
// expectations and is intentionally distinct from
// types.GuardrailChecks so we can evolve either side independently.
type MergedGuardrails struct {
ModelAllowlist []string `json:"model_allowlist,omitempty"`
TokenLimits MergedTokenLimits `json:"token_limits"`
Budget MergedBudget `json:"budget"`
PromptCapture MergedPromptCapture `json:"prompt_capture"`
Retention MergedRetention `json:"retention"`
TokenLimits MergedTokenLimits `json:"token_limits"`
Budget MergedBudget `json:"budget"`
PromptCapture MergedPromptCapture `json:"prompt_capture"`
Retention MergedRetention `json:"retention"`
}
type MergedTokenLimits struct {
@@ -1030,59 +1113,38 @@ type MergedRetention struct {
Days int `json:"days"`
}
// mergeGuardrails computes the effective guardrail spec applied at the
// proxy, given the referencing policies and the account's guardrail
// catalogue. Policy enabled-ness is the caller's responsibility — only
// enabled policies should be passed in.
// mergeGuardrails computes the prompt-capture portion of the effective
// guardrail spec, given the referencing policies and the account's guardrail
// catalogue. Policy enabled-ness is the caller's responsibility — only enabled
// policies should be passed in.
//
// Merge rules:
// - Model allowlist: union of allowlists across policies that enable it.
// - Token / Budget: most-restrictive (min of non-zero caps) per window.
// - Prompt capture: enabled if any policy enables it; redact_pii sticks
// if any enabling policy turns it on.
// - Retention: enabled if any enables it; smallest non-zero days wins.
// The model allowlist is NOT merged here: it is enforced per-policy/group in
// management (SelectPolicyForRequest) and shipped to the proxy per-provider via
// buildProviderAllowlists, so a single account-wide union would be both
// incorrect (leaks a model across groups/providers) and redundant. Token,
// budget, and retention likewise live off guardrails now (Policy.Limits and
// account Settings), so prompt capture is all that remains to merge.
//
// Merge rule — prompt capture: enabled if any policy enables it; redact_pii
// sticks if any enabling policy turns it on.
func mergeGuardrails(policies []*types.Policy, byID map[string]*types.Guardrail) MergedGuardrails {
merged := MergedGuardrails{}
allowlist := make(map[string]struct{})
allowlistEnabled := false
for _, policy := range policies {
for _, gID := range policy.GuardrailIDs {
g, ok := byID[gID]
if !ok || g == nil {
continue
}
mergeGuardrail(g, &merged, allowlist, &allowlistEnabled)
mergeGuardrail(g, &merged)
}
}
if allowlistEnabled {
merged.ModelAllowlist = make([]string, 0, len(allowlist))
for m := range allowlist {
merged.ModelAllowlist = append(merged.ModelAllowlist, m)
}
sort.Strings(merged.ModelAllowlist)
}
return merged
}
// mergeGuardrail folds a single guardrail's enabled checks into the
// running merge: model-allowlist models join the shared set (and flip
// allowlistEnabled), and prompt-capture / redact-pii stick once any
// enabling guardrail turns them on.
//
// TokenLimits, Budget, and Retention have moved off guardrails — token
// and budget caps now live on the Policy itself (Policy.Limits) and
// retention moves to account-level Settings — so they are not merged here.
func mergeGuardrail(g *types.Guardrail, merged *MergedGuardrails, allowlist map[string]struct{}, allowlistEnabled *bool) {
if g.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Enabled {
*allowlistEnabled = true
for _, m := range g.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Models {
if m != "" {
allowlist[m] = struct{}{}
}
}
}
// mergeGuardrail folds a single guardrail's prompt-capture settings into the
// running merge: enabled / redact-pii stick once any enabling guardrail turns
// them on.
func mergeGuardrail(g *types.Guardrail, merged *MergedGuardrails) {
if g.Checks.PromptCapture.Enabled {
merged.PromptCapture.Enabled = true
if g.Checks.PromptCapture.RedactPii {

View File

@@ -81,8 +81,8 @@ func TestSynthesizeServices_RealStore_PromptCaptureAccountIsSoleControl(t *testi
require.Len(t, services, 1)
cfg := decodeServiceGuardrailConfig(t, services[0])
assert.Equal(t, []string{"gpt-5.4"}, cfg.ModelAllowlist,
"model allowlist is a pure policy guardrail and must always reach the config")
assert.Equal(t, map[string][]string{"prov-1": {"gpt-5.4"}}, cfg.ProviderAllowlists,
"model allowlist is a pure policy guardrail and must reach the per-provider config")
assert.False(t, cfg.PromptCapture.Enabled,
"prompt capture must be off when the account toggle is off, even with a capture-enabled guardrail")
}
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ func TestSynthesizeServices_RealStore_NoGuardrail_CaptureOff(t *testing.T) {
require.Len(t, services, 1, "exactly one synth service expected")
cfg := decodeServiceGuardrailConfig(t, services[0])
assert.Empty(t, cfg.ModelAllowlist, "no guardrail → no allowlist")
assert.Empty(t, cfg.ProviderAllowlists, "no guardrail → provider unrestricted (absent from map)")
assert.False(t, cfg.PromptCapture.Enabled, "no guardrail → prompt capture off by default")
assert.False(t, cfg.PromptCapture.RedactPii, "no guardrail → redact off by default")
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
package agentnetwork
import (
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/types"
)
// policyForProviders builds an enabled policy authorising the given providers
// under the given guardrails (both optional). Groups are irrelevant to
// buildProviderAllowlists, which keys purely on destination provider.
func policyForProviders(id string, guardrailIDs []string, providerIDs ...string) *types.Policy {
return &types.Policy{
ID: id,
Enabled: true,
DestinationProviderIDs: providerIDs,
GuardrailIDs: guardrailIDs,
}
}
func TestBuildProviderAllowlists(t *testing.T) {
byID := map[string]*types.Guardrail{
"g-4o": allowlistGuardrail("g-4o", "acc-1", "gpt-4o"),
"g-opus": allowlistGuardrail("g-opus", "acc-1", "claude-opus-4"),
"g-disabled": {ID: "g-disabled", Checks: types.GuardrailChecks{ModelAllowlist: types.GuardrailModelAllowlist{Enabled: false, Models: []string{"gpt-4o"}}}},
}
t.Run("all authorising policies restrict yields per-provider union", func(t *testing.T) {
policies := []*types.Policy{
policyForProviders("p1", []string{"g-4o"}, "prov-x"),
policyForProviders("p2", []string{"g-opus"}, "prov-x"),
}
got := buildProviderAllowlists(policies, byID)
assert.Equal(t, map[string][]string{"prov-x": {"claude-opus-4", "gpt-4o"}}, got,
"a provider every policy restricts carries the sorted union of their models")
})
t.Run("any un-guardrailed policy leaves the provider unrestricted (omitted)", func(t *testing.T) {
policies := []*types.Policy{
policyForProviders("p1", []string{"g-4o"}, "prov-x"),
policyForProviders("p2", nil, "prov-x"), // no guardrail
}
got := buildProviderAllowlists(policies, byID)
assert.NotContains(t, got, "prov-x",
"a provider reachable by an un-guardrailed policy must be omitted so the proxy treats it as unrestricted")
})
t.Run("a disabled allowlist counts as unrestricted", func(t *testing.T) {
policies := []*types.Policy{
policyForProviders("p1", []string{"g-disabled"}, "prov-x"),
}
got := buildProviderAllowlists(policies, byID)
assert.NotContains(t, got, "prov-x",
"a policy whose only guardrail has a disabled allowlist is unrestricted")
})
t.Run("providers are isolated from one another", func(t *testing.T) {
policies := []*types.Policy{
policyForProviders("p1", []string{"g-4o"}, "prov-x"),
policyForProviders("p2", []string{"g-opus"}, "prov-y"),
}
got := buildProviderAllowlists(policies, byID)
assert.Equal(t, []string{"gpt-4o"}, got["prov-x"], "prov-x keeps only its own model")
assert.Equal(t, []string{"claude-opus-4"}, got["prov-y"], "prov-y keeps only its own model")
})
t.Run("one policy authorising two providers restricts both", func(t *testing.T) {
policies := []*types.Policy{
policyForProviders("p1", []string{"g-4o"}, "prov-x", "prov-y"),
}
got := buildProviderAllowlists(policies, byID)
assert.Equal(t, []string{"gpt-4o"}, got["prov-x"])
assert.Equal(t, []string{"gpt-4o"}, got["prov-y"])
})
}

View File

@@ -1031,8 +1031,14 @@ func TestSynthesizeServices_GuardrailMerge_AllowlistUnion_LimitsRestrictive(t *t
var cfg guardrailConfig
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(guardrailJSON, &cfg), "guardrail config must unmarshal cleanly")
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []string{"gpt-5.4-mini", "gpt-5.4-pro"}, cfg.ModelAllowlist,
"model allowlist union must keep both models")
// Both policies restrict the same provider, so the proxy-side per-provider
// backstop carries the union of their models. This coarse union is
// deliberate: it can still let grp-a reach grp-b's model at the proxy layer,
// which management's per-policy/group check (SelectPolicyForRequest) is the
// one that rejects. The backstop only guarantees nothing outside the
// provider's union slips through when management is unreachable.
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []string{"gpt-5.4-mini", "gpt-5.4-pro"}, cfg.ProviderAllowlists["prov-1"],
"per-provider allowlist union must keep both models")
}
func TestSynthesizeServices_BackfillsMissingSessionKeys(t *testing.T) {

View File

@@ -5,6 +5,9 @@ import (
"strconv"
nbdns "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/dns"
resourceTypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/networks/resources/types"
routerTypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/networks/routers/types"
nbpeer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
nbroute "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/networkmap"
@@ -163,7 +166,7 @@ func (e *componentEncoder) indexAllPeers() {
}
}
func (e *componentEncoder) appendPeer(p *types.ComponentPeer) uint32 {
func (e *componentEncoder) appendPeer(p *nbpeer.Peer) uint32 {
if idx, ok := e.peerOrder[p.ID]; ok {
return idx
}
@@ -177,7 +180,7 @@ func (e *componentEncoder) appendPeer(p *types.ComponentPeer) uint32 {
// (c.RouterPeers may contain peers not in c.Peers when validation rules drop
// them) and returns their wire indexes for the RouterPeerIndexes field. Must
// run before any encoder that resolves peer ids via e.peerOrder.
func (e *componentEncoder) indexRouterPeers(routers map[string]*types.ComponentPeer) []uint32 {
func (e *componentEncoder) indexRouterPeers(routers map[string]*nbpeer.Peer) []uint32 {
if len(routers) == 0 {
return nil
}
@@ -511,7 +514,7 @@ func encodeCustomZones(zones []nbdns.CustomZone) []*proto.CustomZone {
return out
}
func (e *componentEncoder) encodeNetworkResources(resources []*types.ComponentResource) []*proto.NetworkResourceRaw {
func (e *componentEncoder) encodeNetworkResources(resources []*resourceTypes.NetworkResource) []*proto.NetworkResourceRaw {
if len(resources) == 0 {
return nil
}
@@ -540,7 +543,7 @@ func (e *componentEncoder) encodeNetworkResources(resources []*types.ComponentRe
return out
}
func (e *componentEncoder) encodeRoutersMap(routersMap map[string]map[string]*types.ComponentRouter) map[string]*proto.NetworkRouterList {
func (e *componentEncoder) encodeRoutersMap(routersMap map[string]map[string]*routerTypes.NetworkRouter) map[string]*proto.NetworkRouterList {
if len(routersMap) == 0 {
return nil
}
@@ -689,20 +692,20 @@ func toAccountNetwork(n *types.Network) *proto.AccountNetwork {
return out
}
func toPeerCompact(p *types.ComponentPeer) *proto.PeerCompact {
func toPeerCompact(p *nbpeer.Peer) *proto.PeerCompact {
pc := &proto.PeerCompact{
WgPubKey: decodeWgKey(p.Key),
SshPubKey: []byte(p.SSHKey),
DnsLabel: p.DNSLabel,
AgentVersion: p.AgentVersion,
AddedWithSsoLogin: p.AddedWithSSOLogin,
AgentVersion: p.Meta.WtVersion,
AddedWithSsoLogin: p.UserID != "",
LoginExpirationEnabled: p.LoginExpirationEnabled,
SshEnabled: p.SSHEnabled,
SupportsIpv6: p.SupportsIPv6,
SupportsSourcePrefixes: p.SupportsSourcePrefixes,
ServerSshAllowed: p.ServerSSHAllowed,
SupportsIpv6: p.SupportsIPv6(),
SupportsSourcePrefixes: p.SupportsSourcePrefixes(),
ServerSshAllowed: p.Meta.Flags.ServerSSHAllowed,
}
if !p.LastLogin.IsZero() {
if p.LastLogin != nil {
pc.LastLoginUnixNano = p.LastLogin.UnixNano()
}
switch {

View File

@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@ import (
goproto "google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"
nbdns "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/dns"
resourceTypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/networks/resources/types"
routerTypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/networks/routers/types"
nbpeer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
nbroute "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
@@ -152,28 +155,29 @@ func envelopesEquivalent(a, b *proto.NetworkMapEnvelope) bool {
}
func newTestComponents() *types.NetworkMapComponents {
peerA := &types.ComponentPeer{
ID: "peer-a",
Key: testWgKeyA,
IP: netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{100, 64, 0, 1}),
DNSLabel: "peera",
SSHKey: "ssh-a",
AgentVersion: "0.40.0",
peerA := &nbpeer.Peer{
ID: "peer-a",
Key: testWgKeyA,
IP: netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{100, 64, 0, 1}),
DNSLabel: "peera",
SSHKey: "ssh-a",
Status: &nbpeer.PeerStatus{Connected: true, LastSeen: time.Now()},
Meta: nbpeer.PeerSystemMeta{WtVersion: "0.40.0"},
}
peerB := &types.ComponentPeer{
ID: "peer-b",
Key: testWgKeyB,
IP: netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{100, 64, 0, 2}),
IPv6: netip.AddrFrom16([16]byte{0xfd, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2}),
DNSLabel: "peerb",
AgentVersion: "0.25.0",
peerB := &nbpeer.Peer{
ID: "peer-b",
Key: testWgKeyB,
IP: netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{100, 64, 0, 2}),
IPv6: netip.AddrFrom16([16]byte{0xfd, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2}),
DNSLabel: "peerb",
Meta: nbpeer.PeerSystemMeta{WtVersion: "0.25.0"},
}
peerC := &types.ComponentPeer{
ID: "peer-c",
Key: testWgKeyC,
IP: netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{100, 64, 0, 3}),
DNSLabel: "peerc",
AgentVersion: "0.40.0",
peerC := &nbpeer.Peer{
ID: "peer-c",
Key: testWgKeyC,
IP: netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{100, 64, 0, 3}),
DNSLabel: "peerc",
Meta: nbpeer.PeerSystemMeta{WtVersion: "0.40.0"},
}
return &types.NetworkMapComponents{
@@ -187,12 +191,12 @@ func newTestComponents() *types.NetworkMapComponents {
PeerLoginExpirationEnabled: true,
PeerLoginExpiration: 2 * time.Hour,
},
Peers: map[string]*types.ComponentPeer{
Peers: map[string]*nbpeer.Peer{
"peer-a": peerA,
"peer-b": peerB,
"peer-c": peerC,
},
Groups: map[string]*types.ComponentGroup{
Groups: map[string]*types.Group{
"group-src": {ID: "group-src", PublicID: "1", Name: "Src", Peers: []string{"peer-a"}},
"group-dst": {ID: "group-dst", PublicID: "2", Name: "Dst", Peers: []string{"peer-b", "peer-c"}},
},
@@ -211,7 +215,7 @@ func newTestComponents() *types.NetworkMapComponents {
}},
},
},
RouterPeers: map[string]*types.ComponentPeer{"peer-c": peerC},
RouterPeers: map[string]*nbpeer.Peer{"peer-c": peerC},
}
}
@@ -377,12 +381,12 @@ func TestEncodeNetworkMapEnvelope_MalformedWgKey(t *testing.T) {
func TestEncodeNetworkMapEnvelope_IPv6OnlyPeer(t *testing.T) {
c := newTestComponents()
v6Only := &types.ComponentPeer{
ID: "peer-v6",
Key: testWgKeyA,
IPv6: netip.AddrFrom16([16]byte{0xfd, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 9}),
DNSLabel: "peerv6",
AgentVersion: "0.40.0",
v6Only := &nbpeer.Peer{
ID: "peer-v6",
Key: testWgKeyA,
IPv6: netip.AddrFrom16([16]byte{0xfd, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 9}),
DNSLabel: "peerv6",
Meta: nbpeer.PeerSystemMeta{WtVersion: "0.40.0"},
}
c.Peers["peer-v6"] = v6Only
@@ -401,11 +405,11 @@ func TestEncodeNetworkMapEnvelope_IPv6OnlyPeer(t *testing.T) {
func TestEncodeNetworkMapEnvelope_PeerWithoutIP(t *testing.T) {
c := newTestComponents()
c.Peers["peer-noip"] = &types.ComponentPeer{
ID: "peer-noip",
Key: testWgKeyA,
DNSLabel: "peernoip",
AgentVersion: "0.40.0",
c.Peers["peer-noip"] = &nbpeer.Peer{
ID: "peer-noip",
Key: testWgKeyA,
DNSLabel: "peernoip",
Meta: nbpeer.PeerSystemMeta{WtVersion: "0.40.0"},
}
full := EncodeNetworkMapEnvelope(ComponentsEnvelopeInput{Components: c}).GetFull()
@@ -440,9 +444,9 @@ func TestEncodeNetworkMapEnvelope_EmptyInput(t *testing.T) {
func TestEncodeNetworkMapEnvelope_PeerLoginExpirationFields(t *testing.T) {
c := newTestComponents()
now := time.Date(2024, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 0, time.UTC)
c.Peers["peer-a"].AddedWithSSOLogin = true
c.Peers["peer-a"].UserID = "user-1"
c.Peers["peer-a"].LoginExpirationEnabled = true
c.Peers["peer-a"].LastLogin = now
c.Peers["peer-a"].LastLogin = &now
full := EncodeNetworkMapEnvelope(ComponentsEnvelopeInput{Components: c}).GetFull()
@@ -553,7 +557,7 @@ func TestEncodeNetworkMapEnvelope_ResourceOnlyPolicyShippedAndIndexed(t *testing
}
// Resource must appear in components.NetworkResources with a seq id —
// encoder uses that to translate the xid map key to uint32.
c.NetworkResources = []*types.ComponentResource{
c.NetworkResources = []*resourceTypes.NetworkResource{
{ID: "resource-x", PublicID: "77", Name: "res-x", Enabled: true},
}
@@ -621,11 +625,11 @@ func TestEncodeNetworkMapEnvelope_PostureFailedPeers(t *testing.T) {
func TestEncodeNetworkMapEnvelope_RoutersMap(t *testing.T) {
c := newTestComponents()
c.NetworkXIDToPublicID = map[string]string{"net-1": "5"}
c.RoutersMap = map[string]map[string]*types.ComponentRouter{
c.RoutersMap = map[string]map[string]*routerTypes.NetworkRouter{
"net-1": {
"peer-c": {
PublicID: "200",
Peer: "peer-c", Masquerade: true, Metric: 10, Enabled: true,
ID: "router-1", PublicID: "200",
Peer: "peer-c", Masquerade: true, Metric: 10, Enabled: true,
},
},
}
@@ -651,14 +655,14 @@ func TestEncodeNetworkMapEnvelope_RouterPeerNotInComponentsPeers(t *testing.T) {
// peer_index reference must still resolve.
c := newTestComponents()
delete(c.Peers, "peer-c")
routerPeer := &types.ComponentPeer{
routerPeer := &nbpeer.Peer{
ID: "peer-c", Key: testWgKeyC, IP: netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{100, 64, 0, 3}),
DNSLabel: "peerc", AgentVersion: "0.40.0",
DNSLabel: "peerc", Meta: nbpeer.PeerSystemMeta{WtVersion: "0.40.0"},
}
c.RouterPeers = map[string]*types.ComponentPeer{"peer-c": routerPeer}
c.RouterPeers = map[string]*nbpeer.Peer{"peer-c": routerPeer}
c.NetworkXIDToPublicID = map[string]string{"net-1": "5"}
c.RoutersMap = map[string]map[string]*types.ComponentRouter{
"net-1": {"peer-c": {PublicID: "1", Peer: "peer-c", Enabled: true}},
c.RoutersMap = map[string]map[string]*routerTypes.NetworkRouter{
"net-1": {"peer-c": {ID: "r-1", PublicID: "1", Peer: "peer-c", Enabled: true}},
}
full := EncodeNetworkMapEnvelope(ComponentsEnvelopeInput{Components: c}).GetFull()
@@ -691,9 +695,9 @@ func TestToProxyPatch_EmptyInputReturnsNil(t *testing.T) {
func TestToProxyPatch_PopulatesAllFields(t *testing.T) {
nm := &types.NetworkMap{
Peers: []*types.ComponentPeer{{
Peers: []*nbpeer.Peer{{
ID: "ext-peer", Key: testWgKeyA, IP: netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{100, 64, 0, 9}),
DNSLabel: "extpeer", AgentVersion: "0.40.0",
DNSLabel: "extpeer", Meta: nbpeer.PeerSystemMeta{WtVersion: "0.40.0"},
}},
FirewallRules: []*types.FirewallRule{{
PeerIP: "100.64.0.9", Action: "accept", Direction: 0, Protocol: "tcp",
@@ -776,6 +780,6 @@ func TestEncodeNetworkMapEnvelope_AccountSettingsAlwaysEmitted(t *testing.T) {
func emptyNetworkMapComponents() *types.NetworkMapComponents {
return types.EmptyNetworkMapComponents(
&types.NetworkMapComponents{
PeerID: "peer-id", Peers: map[string]*types.ComponentPeer{"peer-id": {}}},
PeerID: "peer-id", Peers: map[string]*nbpeer.Peer{"peer-id": {}}},
)
}

View File

@@ -19,10 +19,10 @@ func TestComputeSSHEnabledForPeer(t *testing.T) {
mkComponents := func(rule *types.PolicyRule, sshEnabled bool) (*types.NetworkMapComponents, *nbpeer.Peer) {
peer := &nbpeer.Peer{ID: targetPeerID, SSHEnabled: sshEnabled}
group := &types.ComponentGroup{ID: targetGroupID, Name: "dst", Peers: []string{targetPeerID}}
group := &types.Group{ID: targetGroupID, Name: "dst", Peers: []string{targetPeerID}}
return &types.NetworkMapComponents{
Peers: map[string]*types.ComponentPeer{targetPeerID: peer.ToComponent()},
Groups: map[string]*types.ComponentGroup{targetGroupID: group},
Peers: map[string]*nbpeer.Peer{targetPeerID: peer},
Groups: map[string]*types.Group{targetGroupID: group},
Policies: []*types.Policy{{
ID: "p",
Enabled: true,
@@ -158,8 +158,8 @@ func TestComputeSSHEnabledForPeer(t *testing.T) {
func TestComputeSSHEnabledForPeer_TargetMissingFromComponents(t *testing.T) {
peer := &nbpeer.Peer{ID: "missing", SSHEnabled: true}
c := &types.NetworkMapComponents{
Peers: map[string]*types.ComponentPeer{}, // target peer NOT present
Groups: map[string]*types.ComponentGroup{
Peers: map[string]*nbpeer.Peer{}, // target peer NOT present
Groups: map[string]*types.Group{
"g": {ID: "g", Peers: []string{"missing"}},
},
Policies: []*types.Policy{{

View File

@@ -285,6 +285,7 @@ func (s *ProxyServiceServer) CheckLLMPolicyLimits(ctx context.Context, req *prot
UserID: req.GetUserId(),
GroupIDs: req.GetGroupIds(),
ProviderID: req.GetProviderId(),
Model: req.GetModel(),
})
if err != nil {
log.WithContext(ctx).Errorf("select policy for request: %v", err)

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/account"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/activity"
resourceTypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/networks/resources/types"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/permissions"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/permissions/modules"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/permissions/operations"
@@ -31,10 +30,6 @@ type managerImpl struct {
accountManager account.Manager
}
func eventMetaResource(group *types.Group, resource *resourceTypes.NetworkResource) map[string]any {
return map[string]any{"name": group.Name, "id": group.ID, "resource_name": resource.Name, "resource_id": resource.ID, "resource_type": resource.Type}
}
type mockManager struct {
}
@@ -114,7 +109,7 @@ func (m *managerImpl) AddResourceToGroupInTransaction(ctx context.Context, trans
}
event := func() {
m.accountManager.StoreEvent(ctx, userID, groupID, accountID, activity.ResourceAddedToGroup, eventMetaResource(group, networkResource))
m.accountManager.StoreEvent(ctx, userID, groupID, accountID, activity.ResourceAddedToGroup, group.EventMetaResource(networkResource))
}
return event, nil
@@ -138,7 +133,7 @@ func (m *managerImpl) RemoveResourceFromGroupInTransaction(ctx context.Context,
}
event := func() {
m.accountManager.StoreEvent(ctx, userID, groupID, accountID, activity.ResourceRemovedFromGroup, eventMetaResource(group, networkResource))
m.accountManager.StoreEvent(ctx, userID, groupID, accountID, activity.ResourceRemovedFromGroup, group.EventMetaResource(networkResource))
}
return event, nil

View File

@@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ func (h *Handler) GetAccessiblePeers(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
netMap := account.GetPeerNetworkMapFromComponents(ctx, peerID, dns.CustomZone{}, nil, validPeers, account.GetResourcePoliciesMap(), account.GetResourceRoutersMap(), nil, account.GetActiveGroupUsers())
util.WriteJSONObject(ctx, w, toAccessiblePeers(netMap, account.Peers, dnsDomain))
util.WriteJSONObject(ctx, w, toAccessiblePeers(netMap, dnsDomain))
}
func (h *Handler) CreateTemporaryAccess(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
@@ -534,20 +534,15 @@ func (h *Handler) CreateTemporaryAccess(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request)
util.WriteJSONObject(r.Context(), w, resp)
}
// toAccessiblePeers rehydrates the calculated map's component peers into the
// account's full peer objects, which carry the location/status/meta fields
// the API response needs.
func toAccessiblePeers(netMap *types.NetworkMap, accountPeers map[string]*nbpeer.Peer, dnsDomain string) []api.AccessiblePeer {
func toAccessiblePeers(netMap *types.NetworkMap, dnsDomain string) []api.AccessiblePeer {
accessiblePeers := make([]api.AccessiblePeer, 0, len(netMap.Peers)+len(netMap.OfflinePeers))
add := func(peers []*types.ComponentPeer) {
for _, p := range peers {
if peer := accountPeers[p.ID]; peer != nil {
accessiblePeers = append(accessiblePeers, peerToAccessiblePeer(peer, dnsDomain))
}
}
for _, p := range netMap.Peers {
accessiblePeers = append(accessiblePeers, peerToAccessiblePeer(p, dnsDomain))
}
for _, p := range netMap.OfflinePeers {
accessiblePeers = append(accessiblePeers, peerToAccessiblePeer(p, dnsDomain))
}
add(netMap.Peers)
add(netMap.OfflinePeers)
return accessiblePeers
}

View File

@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ import (
nbDomain "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/api"
sharedTypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/types"
)
type NetworkResourceType string
@@ -65,27 +64,6 @@ func NewNetworkResource(accountID, networkID, name, description, address string,
}, nil
}
// ToComponent converts the resource to its self-contained components
// representation. Returns nil for a nil resource.
func (n *NetworkResource) ToComponent() *sharedTypes.ComponentResource {
if n == nil {
return nil
}
return &sharedTypes.ComponentResource{
ID: n.ID,
PublicID: n.PublicID,
NetworkID: n.NetworkID,
AccountID: n.AccountID,
Name: n.Name,
Description: n.Description,
Type: sharedTypes.ComponentResourceType(n.Type),
Address: n.Address,
Domain: n.Domain,
Prefix: n.Prefix,
Enabled: n.Enabled,
}
}
func (n *NetworkResource) ToAPIResponse(groups []api.GroupMinimum) *api.NetworkResource {
addr := n.Prefix.String()
if n.Type == Domain {

View File

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/networks/types"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/api"
sharedTypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/types"
)
type NetworkRouter struct {
@@ -22,36 +21,6 @@ type NetworkRouter struct {
Enabled bool
}
// ToComponent converts the router to its self-contained components
// representation. Returns nil for a nil router.
func (n *NetworkRouter) ToComponent() *sharedTypes.ComponentRouter {
if n == nil {
return nil
}
return &sharedTypes.ComponentRouter{
NetworkID: n.NetworkID,
PublicID: n.PublicID,
Peer: n.Peer,
PeerGroups: n.PeerGroups,
Masquerade: n.Masquerade,
Metric: n.Metric,
Enabled: n.Enabled,
}
}
// ToComponentMap converts a peer-keyed router map to its components
// representation.
func ToComponentMap(routers map[string]*NetworkRouter) map[string]*sharedTypes.ComponentRouter {
if routers == nil {
return nil
}
out := make(map[string]*sharedTypes.ComponentRouter, len(routers))
for id, r := range routers {
out[id] = r.ToComponent()
}
return out
}
func NewNetworkRouter(accountID string, networkID string, peer string, peerGroups []string, masquerade bool, metric int, enabled bool) (*NetworkRouter, error) {
r := &NetworkRouter{
ID: xid.New().String(),

View File

@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ func (am *DefaultAccountManager) CreatePeerJob(ctx context.Context, accountID, p
return status.NewPeerNotPartOfAccountError()
}
meetMinVer, err := version.MeetsMinVersion(remoteJobsMinVer, p.Meta.WtVersion)
meetMinVer, err := posture.MeetsMinVersion(remoteJobsMinVer, p.Meta.WtVersion)
if !version.IsDevelopmentVersion(p.Meta.WtVersion) && (!meetMinVer || err != nil) {
return status.Errorf(status.PreconditionFailed, "peer version %s does not meet the minimum required version %s for remote jobs", p.Meta.WtVersion, remoteJobsMinVer)
}
@@ -1588,7 +1588,7 @@ func affectedPeerIDsFromNetworkMap(nmap *types.NetworkMap, selfPeerID string) []
}
seen := make(map[string]struct{}, len(nmap.Peers)+len(nmap.OfflinePeers))
ids := make([]string, 0, len(nmap.Peers)+len(nmap.OfflinePeers))
add := func(peers []*types.ComponentPeer) {
add := func(peers []*nbpeer.Peer) {
for _, p := range peers {
if p == nil || p.ID == "" || p.ID == selfPeerID {
continue

View File

@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/util"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/api"
sharedTypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/types"
)
// Peer capability constants mirror the proto enum values.
@@ -206,35 +205,6 @@ func (p *Peer) AddedWithSSOLogin() bool {
return p.UserID != ""
}
// ToComponent converts the peer to its self-contained components
// representation, carrying exactly the subset of peer data that crosses the
// components wire format. Returns nil for a nil peer so callers can convert
// possibly-missing peers without guarding.
func (p *Peer) ToComponent() *sharedTypes.ComponentPeer {
if p == nil {
return nil
}
cp := &sharedTypes.ComponentPeer{
ID: p.ID,
Key: p.Key,
IP: p.IP,
IPv6: p.IPv6,
DNSLabel: p.DNSLabel,
SSHKey: p.SSHKey,
SSHEnabled: p.SSHEnabled,
ServerSSHAllowed: p.Meta.Flags.ServerSSHAllowed,
AgentVersion: p.Meta.WtVersion,
SupportsSourcePrefixes: p.SupportsSourcePrefixes(),
SupportsIPv6: p.SupportsIPv6(),
LoginExpirationEnabled: p.LoginExpirationEnabled,
AddedWithSSOLogin: p.AddedWithSSOLogin(),
}
if p.LastLogin != nil {
cp.LastLogin = *p.LastLogin
}
return cp
}
// HasCapability reports whether the peer has the given capability.
func (p *Peer) HasCapability(capability int32) bool {
return slices.Contains(p.Meta.Capabilities, capability)

View File

@@ -1092,14 +1092,14 @@ func TestToSyncResponse(t *testing.T) {
}
networkMap := &types.NetworkMap{
Network: &types.Network{Net: *ipnet, Serial: 1000},
Peers: []*types.ComponentPeer{{
Peers: []*nbpeer.Peer{{
IP: netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.2"),
IPv6: netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::2"),
Key: "peer2-key",
DNSLabel: "peer2",
SSHEnabled: true,
SSHKey: "peer2-ssh-key"}},
OfflinePeers: []*types.ComponentPeer{{
OfflinePeers: []*nbpeer.Peer{{
IP: netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.3"),
IPv6: netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::3"),
Key: "peer3-key",

View File

@@ -3,9 +3,11 @@ package posture
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"strings"
"github.com/hashicorp/go-version"
nbpeer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
nbversion "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/version"
)
type NBVersionCheck struct {
@@ -14,8 +16,14 @@ type NBVersionCheck struct {
var _ Check = (*NBVersionCheck)(nil)
// sanitizeVersion removes anything after the pre-release tag (e.g., "-dev", "-alpha", etc.)
func sanitizeVersion(version string) string {
parts := strings.Split(version, "-")
return parts[0]
}
func (n *NBVersionCheck) Check(ctx context.Context, peer nbpeer.Peer) (bool, error) {
meetsMin, err := nbversion.MeetsMinVersion(n.MinVersion, peer.Meta.WtVersion)
meetsMin, err := MeetsMinVersion(n.MinVersion, peer.Meta.WtVersion)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
@@ -40,3 +48,21 @@ func (n *NBVersionCheck) Validate() error {
}
return nil
}
// MeetsMinVersion checks if the peer's version meets or exceeds the minimum required version
func MeetsMinVersion(minVer, peerVer string) (bool, error) {
peerVer = sanitizeVersion(peerVer)
minVer = sanitizeVersion(minVer)
peerNBVer, err := version.NewVersion(peerVer)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
constraints, err := version.NewConstraint(">= " + minVer)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
return constraints.Check(peerNBVer), nil
}

View File

@@ -139,3 +139,68 @@ func TestNBVersionCheck_Validate(t *testing.T) {
})
}
}
func TestMeetsMinVersion(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
minVer string
peerVer string
want bool
wantErr bool
}{
{
name: "Peer version greater than min version",
minVer: "0.26.0",
peerVer: "0.60.1",
want: true,
wantErr: false,
},
{
name: "Peer version equals min version",
minVer: "1.0.0",
peerVer: "1.0.0",
want: true,
wantErr: false,
},
{
name: "Peer version less than min version",
minVer: "1.0.0",
peerVer: "0.9.9",
want: false,
wantErr: false,
},
{
name: "Peer version with pre-release tag greater than min version",
minVer: "1.0.0",
peerVer: "1.0.1-alpha",
want: true,
wantErr: false,
},
{
name: "Invalid peer version format",
minVer: "1.0.0",
peerVer: "dev",
want: false,
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "Invalid min version format",
minVer: "invalid.version",
peerVer: "1.0.0",
want: false,
wantErr: true,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got, err := MeetsMinVersion(tt.minVer, tt.peerVer)
if tt.wantErr {
assert.Error(t, err)
} else {
assert.NoError(t, err)
}
assert.Equal(t, tt.want, got)
})
}
}

View File

@@ -283,8 +283,8 @@ func (a *Account) SynthesizePrivateServiceZones(peerID string) []nbdns.CustomZon
// it, adding a single private service would black-hole every
// other name under the zone apex.
zone = &nbdns.CustomZone{
Domain: dns.Fqdn(serviceDomainZone),
Records: []nbdns.SimpleRecord{},
Domain: dns.Fqdn(serviceDomainZone),
Records: []nbdns.SimpleRecord{},
NonAuthoritative: true,
SearchDomainDisabled: true,
}
@@ -1082,7 +1082,6 @@ func (a *Account) connResourcesGenerator(ctx context.Context, targetPeer *nbpeer
peersExists := make(map[string]struct{})
rules := make([]*FirewallRule, 0)
peers := make([]*nbpeer.Peer, 0)
targetComponent := targetPeer.ToComponent()
return func(rule *PolicyRule, groupPeers []*nbpeer.Peer, direction int) {
for _, peer := range groupPeers {
@@ -1118,10 +1117,10 @@ func (a *Account) connResourcesGenerator(ctx context.Context, targetPeer *nbpeer
if len(rule.Ports) == 0 && len(rule.PortRanges) == 0 {
rules = append(rules, &fr)
} else {
rules = append(rules, ExpandPortsAndRanges(fr, rule, targetComponent)...)
rules = append(rules, ExpandPortsAndRanges(fr, rule, targetPeer)...)
}
rules = AppendIPv6FirewallRule(rules, rulesExists, peer.ToComponent(), targetComponent, rule, FirewallRuleContext{
rules = AppendIPv6FirewallRule(rules, rulesExists, peer, targetPeer, rule, FirewallRuleContext{
Direction: direction,
DirStr: strconv.Itoa(direction),
ProtocolStr: string(protocol),
@@ -1281,7 +1280,7 @@ func (a *Account) getRouteFirewallRules(ctx context.Context, peerID string, poli
return fwRules
}
func (a *Account) getRulePeers(rule *PolicyRule, postureChecks []string, peerID string, distributionPeers map[string]struct{}, validatedPeersMap map[string]struct{}) []*ComponentPeer {
func (a *Account) getRulePeers(rule *PolicyRule, postureChecks []string, peerID string, distributionPeers map[string]struct{}, validatedPeersMap map[string]struct{}) []*nbpeer.Peer {
distPeersWithPolicy := make(map[string]struct{})
for _, id := range rule.Sources {
group := a.Groups[id]
@@ -1308,13 +1307,13 @@ func (a *Account) getRulePeers(rule *PolicyRule, postureChecks []string, peerID
}
}
distributionGroupPeers := make([]*ComponentPeer, 0, len(distPeersWithPolicy))
distributionGroupPeers := make([]*nbpeer.Peer, 0, len(distPeersWithPolicy))
for pID := range distPeersWithPolicy {
peer := a.Peers[pID]
if peer == nil {
continue
}
distributionGroupPeers = append(distributionGroupPeers, peer.ToComponent())
distributionGroupPeers = append(distributionGroupPeers, peer)
}
return distributionGroupPeers
}

View File

@@ -9,7 +9,9 @@ import (
nbdns "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/dns"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/zones"
resourceTypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/networks/resources/types"
routerTypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/networks/routers/types"
nbpeer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/telemetry"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
)
@@ -111,7 +113,7 @@ func (a *Account) GetPeerNetworkMapComponents(
PeerID: peerID,
Network: a.Network.Copy(),
// must include the target peer as it's required on the client
Peers: map[string]*ComponentPeer{peerID: peer.ToComponent()},
Peers: map[string]*nbpeer.Peer{peerID: peer},
})
}
@@ -124,7 +126,7 @@ func (a *Account) GetPeerNetworkMapComponents(
PeerID: peerID,
Network: a.Network.Copy(),
// must include the target peer as it's required on the client
Peers: map[string]*ComponentPeer{peerID: peer.ToComponent()},
Peers: map[string]*nbpeer.Peer{peerID: peer},
})
}
@@ -134,10 +136,10 @@ func (a *Account) GetPeerNetworkMapComponents(
NameServerGroups: make([]*nbdns.NameServerGroup, 0),
CustomZoneDomain: peersCustomZone.Domain,
ResourcePoliciesMap: make(map[string][]*Policy),
RoutersMap: make(map[string]map[string]*ComponentRouter),
NetworkResources: make([]*ComponentResource, 0),
RoutersMap: make(map[string]map[string]*routerTypes.NetworkRouter),
NetworkResources: make([]*resourceTypes.NetworkResource, 0),
PostureFailedPeers: make(map[string]map[string]struct{}, len(a.PostureChecks)),
RouterPeers: make(map[string]*ComponentPeer),
RouterPeers: make(map[string]*nbpeer.Peer),
NetworkXIDToPublicID: make(map[string]string, len(a.Networks)),
PostureCheckXIDToPublicID: make(map[string]string, len(a.PostureChecks)),
}
@@ -172,7 +174,7 @@ func (a *Account) GetPeerNetworkMapComponents(
}
components.Peers = relevantPeers
components.Groups = GroupsToComponent(relevantGroups)
components.Groups = relevantGroups
components.Policies = relevantPolicies
components.Routes = relevantRoutes
components.AllDNSRecords = filterDNSRecordsByPeers(peersCustomZone.Records, relevantPeers, peer.SupportsIPv6() && peer.IPv6.IsValid())
@@ -221,7 +223,7 @@ func (a *Account) GetPeerNetworkMapComponents(
}
for _, pID := range a.getPostureValidPeersSaveFailed(peers, policy.SourcePostureChecks, validatedPeersMap, &components.PostureFailedPeers) {
if _, exists := components.Peers[pID]; !exists {
components.Peers[pID] = a.GetPeer(pID).ToComponent()
components.Peers[pID] = a.GetPeer(pID)
}
}
} else {
@@ -254,14 +256,14 @@ func (a *Account) GetPeerNetworkMapComponents(
for _, srcGroupID := range rule.Sources {
if g := a.Groups[srcGroupID]; g != nil {
if _, exists := components.Groups[srcGroupID]; !exists {
components.Groups[srcGroupID] = g.ToComponent()
components.Groups[srcGroupID] = g
}
}
}
for _, dstGroupID := range rule.Destinations {
if g := a.Groups[dstGroupID]; g != nil {
if _, exists := components.Groups[dstGroupID]; !exists {
components.Groups[dstGroupID] = g.ToComponent()
components.Groups[dstGroupID] = g
}
}
}
@@ -276,22 +278,20 @@ func (a *Account) GetPeerNetworkMapComponents(
// network in the account — accounts with many tenants/networks
// shipped tens of unrelated peers in `peers[]` and `routers_map`.
if addSourcePeers {
components.RoutersMap[resource.NetworkID] = routerTypes.ToComponentMap(networkRoutingPeers)
components.RoutersMap[resource.NetworkID] = networkRoutingPeers
for peerIDKey := range networkRoutingPeers {
if p := a.Peers[peerIDKey]; p != nil {
cp := components.RouterPeers[peerIDKey]
if cp == nil {
cp = p.ToComponent()
components.RouterPeers[peerIDKey] = cp
if _, exists := components.RouterPeers[peerIDKey]; !exists {
components.RouterPeers[peerIDKey] = p
}
if _, exists := components.Peers[peerIDKey]; !exists {
if _, validated := validatedPeersMap[peerIDKey]; validated {
components.Peers[peerIDKey] = cp
components.Peers[peerIDKey] = p
}
}
}
}
components.NetworkResources = append(components.NetworkResources, resource.ToComponent())
components.NetworkResources = append(components.NetworkResources, resource)
}
}
@@ -312,14 +312,14 @@ func (a *Account) getPeersGroupsPoliciesRoutes(
peerSSHEnabled bool,
validatedPeersMap map[string]struct{},
postureFailedPeers *map[string]map[string]struct{},
) (map[string]*ComponentPeer, map[string]*Group, []*Policy, []*route.Route, sshRequirements) {
relevantPeerIDs := make(map[string]*ComponentPeer, len(a.Peers)/4)
) (map[string]*nbpeer.Peer, map[string]*Group, []*Policy, []*route.Route, sshRequirements) {
relevantPeerIDs := make(map[string]*nbpeer.Peer, len(a.Peers)/4)
relevantGroupIDs := make(map[string]*Group, len(a.Groups)/4)
relevantPolicies := make([]*Policy, 0, len(a.Policies))
relevantRoutes := make([]*route.Route, 0, len(a.Routes))
sshReqs := sshRequirements{neededGroupIDs: make(map[string]struct{})}
relevantPeerIDs[peerID] = a.GetPeer(peerID).ToComponent()
relevantPeerIDs[peerID] = a.GetPeer(peerID)
peerGroupSet := make(map[string]struct{}, 8)
for groupID, group := range a.Groups {
@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ func (a *Account) getPeersGroupsPoliciesRoutes(
if r.Peer != "" {
if _, ok := validatedPeersMap[r.Peer]; ok {
if p := a.GetPeer(r.Peer); p != nil {
relevantPeerIDs[r.Peer] = p.ToComponent()
relevantPeerIDs[r.Peer] = p
}
}
}
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ func (a *Account) getPeersGroupsPoliciesRoutes(
continue
}
if p := a.GetPeer(pid); p != nil {
relevantPeerIDs[pid] = p.ToComponent()
relevantPeerIDs[pid] = p
}
}
}
@@ -458,9 +458,7 @@ func (a *Account) getPeersGroupsPoliciesRoutes(
if peerInSources {
policyRelevant = true
for _, pid := range destinationPeers {
if _, exists := relevantPeerIDs[pid]; !exists {
relevantPeerIDs[pid] = a.GetPeer(pid).ToComponent()
}
relevantPeerIDs[pid] = a.GetPeer(pid)
}
for _, dstGroupID := range rule.Destinations {
relevantGroupIDs[dstGroupID] = a.GetGroup(dstGroupID)
@@ -470,9 +468,7 @@ func (a *Account) getPeersGroupsPoliciesRoutes(
if peerInDestinations {
policyRelevant = true
for _, pid := range sourcePeers {
if _, exists := relevantPeerIDs[pid]; !exists {
relevantPeerIDs[pid] = a.GetPeer(pid).ToComponent()
}
relevantPeerIDs[pid] = a.GetPeer(pid)
}
for _, srcGroupID := range rule.Sources {
relevantGroupIDs[srcGroupID] = a.GetGroup(srcGroupID)
@@ -628,7 +624,7 @@ func (a *Account) getPostureValidPeersSaveFailed(inputPeers []string, postureChe
// that name them. Calculate() tolerates groups with empty Peers (the inner
// loops simply iterate zero times), so retaining them is behaviourally a
// no-op for the legacy path that consumes the same NetworkMapComponents.
func filterGroupPeers(groups *map[string]*ComponentGroup, peers map[string]*ComponentPeer) {
func filterGroupPeers(groups *map[string]*Group, peers map[string]*nbpeer.Peer) {
for groupID, groupInfo := range *groups {
filteredPeers := make([]string, 0, len(groupInfo.Peers))
for _, pid := range groupInfo.Peers {
@@ -638,14 +634,14 @@ func filterGroupPeers(groups *map[string]*ComponentGroup, peers map[string]*Comp
}
if len(filteredPeers) != len(groupInfo.Peers) {
ng := *groupInfo
ng := groupInfo.Copy()
ng.Peers = filteredPeers
(*groups)[groupID] = &ng
(*groups)[groupID] = ng
}
}
}
func filterPostureFailedPeers(postureFailedPeers *map[string]map[string]struct{}, policies []*Policy, resourcePoliciesMap map[string][]*Policy, peers map[string]*ComponentPeer) {
func filterPostureFailedPeers(postureFailedPeers *map[string]map[string]struct{}, policies []*Policy, resourcePoliciesMap map[string][]*Policy, peers map[string]*nbpeer.Peer) {
if len(*postureFailedPeers) == 0 {
return
}
@@ -680,7 +676,7 @@ func filterPostureFailedPeers(postureFailedPeers *map[string]map[string]struct{}
}
}
func filterDNSRecordsByPeers(records []nbdns.SimpleRecord, peers map[string]*ComponentPeer, includeIPv6 bool) []nbdns.SimpleRecord {
func filterDNSRecordsByPeers(records []nbdns.SimpleRecord, peers map[string]*nbpeer.Peer, includeIPv6 bool) []nbdns.SimpleRecord {
if len(records) == 0 || len(peers) == 0 {
return nil
}

View File

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
nbdns "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/dns"
nbpeer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
)
func TestPrivateService_NetworkMap_UserPeer_AndProxyPeer(t *testing.T) {
@@ -48,7 +49,7 @@ func TestPrivateService_NetworkMap_UserPeer_AndProxyPeer(t *testing.T) {
})
}
func netmapPeerIDs(peers []*ComponentPeer) []string {
func netmapPeerIDs(peers []*nbpeer.Peer) []string {
ids := make([]string, 0, len(peers))
for _, p := range peers {
if p == nil {

View File

@@ -666,7 +666,7 @@ func Test_ExpandPortsAndRanges_SSHRuleExpansion(t *testing.T) {
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
result := ExpandPortsAndRanges(tt.base, tt.rule, tt.peer.ToComponent())
result := ExpandPortsAndRanges(tt.base, tt.rule, tt.peer)
var ports []string
for _, fr := range result {

View File

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
"net"
"net/netip"
nbpeer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
nbroute "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
sharedtypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/types"
)
@@ -17,6 +18,9 @@ type DNSSettings = sharedtypes.DNSSettings
type FirewallRule = sharedtypes.FirewallRule
type Group = sharedtypes.Group
type GroupPeer = sharedtypes.GroupPeer
type Network = sharedtypes.Network
type NetworkMap = sharedtypes.NetworkMap
type ForwardingRule = sharedtypes.ForwardingRule
@@ -38,18 +42,6 @@ type RouteFirewallRule = sharedtypes.RouteFirewallRule
type NetworkMapComponents = sharedtypes.NetworkMapComponents
type ComponentPeer = sharedtypes.ComponentPeer
type ComponentGroup = sharedtypes.ComponentGroup
type ComponentRouter = sharedtypes.ComponentRouter
type ComponentResource = sharedtypes.ComponentResource
type ComponentResourceType = sharedtypes.ComponentResourceType
const (
ComponentResourceHost = sharedtypes.ComponentResourceHost
ComponentResourceSubnet = sharedtypes.ComponentResourceSubnet
ComponentResourceDomain = sharedtypes.ComponentResourceDomain
)
var EmptyNetworkMapComponents = sharedtypes.EmptyNetworkMapComponents
type AccountSettingsInfo = sharedtypes.AccountSettingsInfo
@@ -60,7 +52,12 @@ type NetworkMapComponentsCompact = sharedtypes.NetworkMapComponentsCompact
type LookupMap = sharedtypes.LookupMap
type FirewallRuleContext = sharedtypes.FirewallRuleContext
const GroupAllName = sharedtypes.GroupAllName
const (
GroupIssuedAPI = sharedtypes.GroupIssuedAPI
GroupIssuedJWT = sharedtypes.GroupIssuedJWT
GroupIssuedIntegration = sharedtypes.GroupIssuedIntegration
GroupAllName = sharedtypes.GroupAllName
)
// Function forwarders preserve types.X(...) call sites that previously
// resolved to package-local funcs. Plain forwarders (not var aliases) keep
@@ -70,11 +67,11 @@ func PolicyRuleImpliesLegacySSH(rule *PolicyRule) bool {
return sharedtypes.PolicyRuleImpliesLegacySSH(rule)
}
func ExpandPortsAndRanges(base FirewallRule, rule *PolicyRule, peer *ComponentPeer) []*FirewallRule {
func ExpandPortsAndRanges(base FirewallRule, rule *PolicyRule, peer *nbpeer.Peer) []*FirewallRule {
return sharedtypes.ExpandPortsAndRanges(base, rule, peer)
}
func AppendIPv6FirewallRule(rules []*FirewallRule, rulesExists map[string]struct{}, peer, targetPeer *ComponentPeer, rule *PolicyRule, rc FirewallRuleContext) []*FirewallRule {
func AppendIPv6FirewallRule(rules []*FirewallRule, rulesExists map[string]struct{}, peer, targetPeer *nbpeer.Peer, rule *PolicyRule, rc FirewallRuleContext) []*FirewallRule {
return sharedtypes.AppendIPv6FirewallRule(rules, rulesExists, peer, targetPeer, rule, rc)
}
@@ -82,7 +79,7 @@ func CalculateNetworkMapFromComponents(ctx context.Context, components *NetworkM
return sharedtypes.CalculateNetworkMapFromComponents(ctx, components)
}
func GenerateRouteFirewallRules(ctx context.Context, route *nbroute.Route, rule *PolicyRule, groupPeers []*ComponentPeer, direction int, includeIPv6 bool) []*RouteFirewallRule {
func GenerateRouteFirewallRules(ctx context.Context, route *nbroute.Route, rule *PolicyRule, groupPeers []*nbpeer.Peer, direction int, includeIPv6 bool) []*RouteFirewallRule {
return sharedtypes.GenerateRouteFirewallRules(ctx, route, rule, groupPeers, direction, includeIPv6)
}

View File

@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import (
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
nbpeer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
)
func TestNetworkMapComponents_IPv6EndToEnd(t *testing.T) {
@@ -105,7 +104,7 @@ func TestNetworkMapComponents_RemotePeerWithoutCapability(t *testing.T) {
require.NotNil(t, nm)
t.Run("AllowedIPs include remote v6", func(t *testing.T) {
var dst *types.ComponentPeer
var dst *nbpeer.Peer
for _, p := range nm.Peers {
if p.ID == "peer-dst-1" {
dst = p

View File

@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ func allPeersValidated(account *types.Account, excludePeerIDs ...string) map[str
return validated
}
func peerIDs(peers []*types.ComponentPeer) []string {
func peerIDs(peers []*nbpeer.Peer) []string {
ids := make([]string, len(peers))
for i, p := range peers {
ids[i] = p.ID

View File

@@ -19,3 +19,34 @@ func Difference(a, b []string) []string {
func ToPtr[T any](value T) *T {
return &value
}
type comparableObject[T any] interface {
Equal(other T) bool
}
func MergeUnique[T comparableObject[T]](arr1, arr2 []T) []T {
var result []T
for _, item := range arr1 {
if !contains(result, item) {
result = append(result, item)
}
}
for _, item := range arr2 {
if !contains(result, item) {
result = append(result, item)
}
}
return result
}
func contains[T comparableObject[T]](slice []T, element T) bool {
for _, item := range slice {
if item.Equal(element) {
return true
}
}
return false
}

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
package types
package util
import (
"testing"
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ func (t testObject) Equal(other testObject) bool {
func Test_MergeUniqueArraysWithoutDuplicates(t *testing.T) {
arr1 := []testObject{{value: 1}, {value: 2}}
arr2 := []testObject{{value: 2}, {value: 3}}
result := mergeUnique(arr1, arr2)
result := MergeUnique(arr1, arr2)
assert.Len(t, result, 3)
assert.Contains(t, result, testObject{value: 1})
assert.Contains(t, result, testObject{value: 2})
@@ -27,14 +27,14 @@ func Test_MergeUniqueArraysWithoutDuplicates(t *testing.T) {
func Test_MergeUniqueHandlesEmptyArrays(t *testing.T) {
arr1 := []testObject{}
arr2 := []testObject{}
result := mergeUnique(arr1, arr2)
result := MergeUnique(arr1, arr2)
assert.Empty(t, result)
}
func Test_MergeUniqueHandlesOneEmptyArray(t *testing.T) {
arr1 := []testObject{{value: 1}, {value: 2}}
arr2 := []testObject{}
result := mergeUnique(arr1, arr2)
result := MergeUnique(arr1, arr2)
assert.Len(t, result, 2)
assert.Contains(t, result, testObject{value: 1})
assert.Contains(t, result, testObject{value: 2})

View File

@@ -161,16 +161,6 @@ openai:
input_per_1k: 0.0001
output_per_1k: 0
# Kimi / Moonshot AI (kimi_api) — OpenAI-compatible /v1 endpoint. Moonshot
# reports cache hits OpenAI-style when present; cached input is 10% of
# input ($0.30 vs $3.00 per MTok). kimi-k3 is the only model the platform
# serves newer accounts (K2-era ids and kimi-latest 404), matching the
# management catalog.
kimi-k3:
input_per_1k: 0.003
output_per_1k: 0.015
cached_input_per_1k: 0.0003
anthropic:
# Claude 4.x family — cache reads ≈10% of input, cache writes ≈125% of input.
# Pricing source: Anthropic's current published rates per million tokens,
@@ -216,20 +206,6 @@ anthropic:
cache_read_per_1k: 0.0001
cache_creation_per_1k: 0.00125
# Kimi / Moonshot AI (kimi_api) via the Anthropic-compatible endpoint
# (/anthropic/v1/messages — the official Claude Code setup). Same rates
# as the OpenAI-shape entry above. "kimi-k3[1m]" is the model id some
# Claude Code guides set for the 1M-context alias; priced identically so
# cost metering doesn't silently skip those requests.
kimi-k3:
input_per_1k: 0.003
output_per_1k: 0.015
cache_read_per_1k: 0.0003
"kimi-k3[1m]":
input_per_1k: 0.003
output_per_1k: 0.015
cache_read_per_1k: 0.0003
bedrock:
# AWS Bedrock model ids, normalised by the request parser (cross-region
# inference-profile prefix + version/throughput suffix stripped), e.g.

View File

@@ -10,11 +10,22 @@ import (
)
// Config is the JSON-decoded shape accepted by the factory. The
// runtime path consumes the normalised allowlist; raw config is not
// runtime path consumes the normalised allowlists; raw config is not
// retained beyond construction.
type Config struct {
ModelAllowlist []string `json:"model_allowlist"`
PromptCapture PromptCapture `json:"prompt_capture"`
// ProviderAllowlists maps a resolved provider id (the value llm_router
// stamps as KeyLLMResolvedProviderID) to that provider's model allowlist. A
// provider present here is restricted to the listed models; a provider
// absent is unrestricted. The synthesiser only lists a provider when EVERY
// policy authorising it enables an allowlist, so a provider reachable by any
// un-guardrailed policy is intentionally absent (unrestricted) here and the
// precise per-policy/group decision is left to management. Keeping the gate
// per-provider — rather than one account-wide union — is what stops a model
// allowlisted for one provider from leaking onto another and stops an
// un-guardrailed policy's traffic from being blocked by an unrelated
// policy's allowlist.
ProviderAllowlists map[string][]string `json:"provider_allowlists,omitempty"`
PromptCapture PromptCapture `json:"prompt_capture"`
}
// PromptCapture toggles the optional prompt capture + redaction step
@@ -55,20 +66,28 @@ func isEmptyJSON(raw []byte) bool {
}
// normaliseConfig lowercases and trims allowlist entries so the runtime
// match is case-insensitive. Empty entries are dropped.
// match is case-insensitive. Empty entries are dropped. A provider whose
// entries all drop out keeps an empty (non-nil) list — an allowlist that
// permits nothing — which is the intended "deny every model" for that
// provider, distinct from the provider being absent (unrestricted).
func normaliseConfig(cfg Config) Config {
if len(cfg.ModelAllowlist) == 0 {
if len(cfg.ProviderAllowlists) == 0 {
cfg.ProviderAllowlists = nil
return cfg
}
cleaned := make([]string, 0, len(cfg.ModelAllowlist))
for _, entry := range cfg.ModelAllowlist {
n := normaliseModel(entry)
if n == "" {
continue
cleaned := make(map[string][]string, len(cfg.ProviderAllowlists))
for provider, models := range cfg.ProviderAllowlists {
list := make([]string, 0, len(models))
for _, entry := range models {
n := normaliseModel(entry)
if n == "" {
continue
}
list = append(list, n)
}
cleaned = append(cleaned, n)
cleaned[provider] = list
}
cfg.ModelAllowlist = cleaned
cfg.ProviderAllowlists = cleaned
return cfg
}

View File

@@ -83,8 +83,9 @@ func (m *Middleware) MutationsSupported() bool { return false }
// prompt capture only affects the metadata emitted alongside an allow.
func (m *Middleware) Invoke(_ context.Context, in *middleware.Input) (*middleware.Output, error) {
model, modelPresent := lookupMetadata(in.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMModel)
providerID, _ := lookupMetadata(in.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMResolvedProviderID)
if denial := m.evaluateAllowlist(model, modelPresent); denial != nil {
if denial := m.evaluateAllowlist(providerID, model, modelPresent); denial != nil {
return denial, nil
}
@@ -110,20 +111,38 @@ func (m *Middleware) Invoke(_ context.Context, in *middleware.Input) (*middlewar
// is a no-op.
func (m *Middleware) Close() error { return nil }
// evaluateAllowlist returns a deny Output when the configured allowlist
// rejects the model. A nil return means the request should proceed.
func (m *Middleware) evaluateAllowlist(model string, modelPresent bool) *middleware.Output {
if len(m.cfg.ModelAllowlist) == 0 {
// evaluateAllowlist returns a deny Output when the allowlist for the request's
// resolved provider rejects the model. A nil return means the request should
// proceed. The allowlist is scoped to the provider llm_router resolved: a
// provider absent from the config is unrestricted, so an un-guardrailed policy's
// traffic is never caught by an unrelated provider's allowlist.
func (m *Middleware) evaluateAllowlist(providerID, model string, modelPresent bool) *middleware.Output {
if len(m.cfg.ProviderAllowlists) == 0 {
return nil
}
// Fail closed: with an allowlist configured, a request whose model the
// upstream parser could not extract (absent or empty) must be denied rather
// than allowed. This is what enforces the allowlist for URL/path-routed
// providers (Bedrock, Vertex, ...) whose model lives outside the JSON body.
// Restrictions exist for this account but the resolved provider is unknown,
// so we cannot tell whether this request is bound for a restricted provider.
// Fail closed rather than wave it through. In practice llm_router always
// stamps the resolved provider before the guardrail runs (or denies first),
// so this is a defensive guard, not the common path.
if providerID == "" {
return denyModel("", denyCodeModelUnknown, denyMessageModelUnknown, denyReasonModelUnknown)
}
allowlist, restricted := m.cfg.ProviderAllowlists[providerID]
if !restricted {
// This provider has no allowlist (some authorising policy left it
// unrestricted); management owns any per-policy/group decision.
return nil
}
// Fail closed: with an allowlist in effect for this provider, a request whose
// model the upstream parser could not extract (absent or empty) must be
// denied rather than allowed. This is what enforces the allowlist for
// URL/path-routed providers (Bedrock, Vertex, ...) whose model lives outside
// the JSON body.
if !modelPresent || normaliseModel(model) == "" {
return denyModel("", denyCodeModelUnknown, denyMessageModelUnknown, denyReasonModelUnknown)
}
if m.modelInAllowlist(model) {
if modelInAllowlist(allowlist, model) {
return nil
}
return denyModel(model, denyCodeModel, denyMessageModel, denyReasonModel)
@@ -151,14 +170,15 @@ func denyModel(model, code, message, reason string) *middleware.Output {
}
}
// modelInAllowlist reports whether the model matches any allowlist
// entry under the case-insensitive, trim-tolerant comparison rule.
func (m *Middleware) modelInAllowlist(model string) bool {
// modelInAllowlist reports whether the model matches any entry in the supplied
// (already-normalised) allowlist under the case-insensitive, trim-tolerant
// comparison rule.
func modelInAllowlist(allowlist []string, model string) bool {
normalised := normaliseModel(model)
if normalised == "" {
return false
}
for _, allowed := range m.cfg.ModelAllowlist {
for _, allowed := range allowlist {
if allowed == normalised {
return true
}

View File

@@ -26,6 +26,25 @@ func newInput(meta ...middleware.KV) *middleware.Input {
return &middleware.Input{Slot: middleware.SlotOnRequest, Metadata: meta}
}
const (
testProvider = "prov-1"
otherProvider = "prov-2"
)
// providerCfg builds a Config restricting testProvider to the given models.
func providerCfg(models ...string) Config {
return Config{ProviderAllowlists: map[string][]string{testProvider: models}}
}
// newInputProvider builds an input that carries a resolved provider id (as
// llm_router would stamp) plus any extra metadata.
func newInputProvider(provider string, meta ...middleware.KV) *middleware.Input {
all := make([]middleware.KV, 0, len(meta)+1)
all = append(all, middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMResolvedProviderID, Value: provider})
all = append(all, meta...)
return &middleware.Input{Slot: middleware.SlotOnRequest, Metadata: all}
}
func TestMiddlewareIdentity(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(Config{})
assert.Equal(t, ID, mw.ID(), "middleware ID must be llm_guardrail")
@@ -47,12 +66,12 @@ func TestMiddlewareIdentity(t *testing.T) {
func TestAllowlistEmptyAllowsAnyModel(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(Config{})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "empty allowlist must allow any model")
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "no provider allowlists must allow any model")
v, ok := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMPolicyDecision)
require.True(t, ok, "decision metadata must be emitted")
assert.Equal(t, "allow", v, "decision must be allow")
@@ -62,8 +81,8 @@ func TestAllowlistEmptyAllowsAnyModel(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestAllowlistMatchAllows(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(Config{ModelAllowlist: []string{"gpt-4o", "claude-opus-4"}})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o", "claude-opus-4"))
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
@@ -71,8 +90,8 @@ func TestAllowlistMatchAllows(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestAllowlistMissDenies(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(Config{ModelAllowlist: []string{"gpt-4o"}})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o"))
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "claude-opus-4"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
@@ -91,10 +110,10 @@ func TestAllowlistMissDenies(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestAllowlistCaseInsensitive(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(Config{ModelAllowlist: []string{" GPT-4o ", "Claude-OPUS-4"}})
mw := New(providerCfg(" GPT-4o ", "Claude-OPUS-4"))
cases := []string{"gpt-4o", "GPT-4O", " claude-opus-4 "}
for _, model := range cases {
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: model},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
@@ -103,14 +122,15 @@ func TestAllowlistCaseInsensitive(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestAllowlistMissingModelKeyDenies(t *testing.T) {
// Fail closed: with an allowlist configured, a request whose model the
// parser could not extract (URL/path-routed providers such as Bedrock or
// Vertex whose shape wasn't recognised) must be denied, not allowed.
mw := New(Config{ModelAllowlist: []string{"gpt-4o"}})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput())
// Fail closed: with an allowlist in effect for the resolved provider, a
// request whose model the parser could not extract (URL/path-routed
// providers such as Bedrock or Vertex whose shape wasn't recognised) must be
// denied, not allowed.
mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o"))
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "absent model must be denied when an allowlist is set")
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "absent model must be denied when the provider is restricted")
assert.Equal(t, 403, out.DenyStatus, "deny status must be 403")
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason, "deny reason must be populated")
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_unknown", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must be model_unknown")
@@ -122,26 +142,72 @@ func TestAllowlistMissingModelKeyDenies(t *testing.T) {
func TestAllowlistEmptyModelValueDenies(t *testing.T) {
// A present-but-empty model is as undeterminable as an absent one.
mw := New(Config{ModelAllowlist: []string{"gpt-4o"}})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o"))
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: " "},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "empty model must be denied when an allowlist is set")
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "empty model must be denied when the provider is restricted")
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason, "deny reason must be populated")
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_unknown", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must be model_unknown")
}
func TestAllowlistEmptyListAllowsMissingModel(t *testing.T) {
// Without an allowlist there is nothing to enforce, so a missing model is
// still allowed — the fail-closed rule only applies when a list is set.
// Without any provider allowlists there is nothing to enforce, so a missing
// model is still allowed — the fail-closed rule only applies when a
// restriction is in effect.
mw := New(Config{})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput())
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "no allowlist must allow even without a model")
}
func TestUnrestrictedProviderAllowsAnyModel(t *testing.T) {
// testProvider is restricted, but the request resolved to otherProvider,
// which carries no allowlist. Its traffic must not be caught by the other
// provider's restriction — this is the cross-provider-leak / false-deny
// guard. Management owns any per-policy/group decision for otherProvider.
mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o"))
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(otherProvider,
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "claude-opus-4"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "an unrestricted provider must not inherit another provider's allowlist")
}
func TestPerProviderAllowlistsAreIsolated(t *testing.T) {
// gpt-4o is allowed only on testProvider; claude-opus-4 only on
// otherProvider. A model allowlisted for one provider must not be usable on
// the other — the fail-closed layer never unions allowlists across providers.
mw := New(Config{ProviderAllowlists: map[string][]string{
testProvider: {"gpt-4o"},
otherProvider: {"claude-opus-4"},
}})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "claude-opus-4"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "claude-opus-4 is allowed only on otherProvider, not testProvider")
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason)
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_blocked", out.DenyReason.Code, "cross-provider model must be blocked, not model_unknown")
}
func TestRestrictionsButNoResolvedProviderFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
// Restrictions exist for the account but the resolved provider id is absent,
// so the request cannot be scoped to a provider. Fail closed rather than
// wave it through.
mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o"))
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "missing resolved provider must fail closed when restrictions exist")
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason)
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_unknown", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must be model_unknown")
}
func TestPromptCaptureDisabledEmitsNoPrompt(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(Config{})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
@@ -217,8 +283,8 @@ func TestFactoryAcceptsZeroConfigs(t *testing.T) {
func TestFactoryDecodesValidConfig(t *testing.T) {
cfg := Config{
ModelAllowlist: []string{"gpt-4o"},
PromptCapture: PromptCapture{Enabled: true, RedactPii: true},
ProviderAllowlists: map[string][]string{testProvider: {"gpt-4o"}},
PromptCapture: PromptCapture{Enabled: true, RedactPii: true},
}
raw, err := json.Marshal(cfg)
require.NoError(t, err, "marshalling test config must succeed")
@@ -234,15 +300,15 @@ func TestFactoryRejectsMalformedJSON(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestFactoryNormalisesAllowlist(t *testing.T) {
raw := []byte(`{"model_allowlist":[" GPT-4o ","",""," Claude-3 "]}`)
raw := []byte(`{"provider_allowlists":{"prov-1":[" GPT-4o ","",""," Claude-3 "]}}`)
mw, err := Factory{}.New(raw)
require.NoError(t, err)
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "factory must lowercase + trim allowlist entries")
out2, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
out2, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "claude-3"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)

View File

@@ -25,10 +25,17 @@ func runParserGuardrail(t *testing.T, url string, body []byte, allowlist []strin
})
require.NoError(t, err, "parser must not error")
guard := llm_guardrail.New(llm_guardrail.Config{ModelAllowlist: allowlist})
const providerID = "prov-under-test"
guard := llm_guardrail.New(llm_guardrail.Config{
ProviderAllowlists: map[string][]string{providerID: allowlist},
})
// The real chain has llm_router stamp the resolved provider id before the
// guardrail runs; the parser doesn't, so add it here so the guardrail can
// scope the allowlist to this provider.
meta := append([]middleware.KV{{Key: middleware.KeyLLMResolvedProviderID, Value: providerID}}, parsed.Metadata...)
out, err := guard.Invoke(context.Background(), &middleware.Input{
Slot: middleware.SlotOnRequest,
Metadata: parsed.Metadata,
Metadata: meta,
})
require.NoError(t, err, "guardrail must not error")
require.NotNil(t, out, "guardrail must return an output")

View File

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@
# FreeBSD Port Diff Generator for NetBird
#
# This script generates the diff file required for submitting a FreeBSD port update.
# It works on macOS, Linux, and FreeBSD by fetching files from the FreeBSD ports
# GitHub mirror and computing checksums from the Go module proxy.
# It works on macOS, Linux, and FreeBSD by fetching files from FreeBSD cgit and
# computing checksums from the Go module proxy.
#
# Usage: ./freebsd-port-diff.sh [new_version]
# Example: ./freebsd-port-diff.sh 0.60.7
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
set -e
GITHUB_REPO="netbirdio/netbird"
PORTS_MIRROR_BASE="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/freebsd/freebsd-ports/main/security/netbird"
PORTS_CGIT_BASE="https://cgit.freebsd.org/ports/plain/security/netbird"
GO_PROXY="https://proxy.golang.org/github.com/netbirdio/netbird/@v"
OUTPUT_DIR="${OUTPUT_DIR:-.}"
AWK_FIRST_FIELD='{print $1}'
@@ -30,17 +30,10 @@ fetch_all_tags() {
fetch_current_ports_version() {
echo "Fetching current version from FreeBSD ports..." >&2
local makefile version
makefile=$(fetch_ports_file "Makefile") || return 1
version=$(echo "$makefile" | \
curl -sL "${PORTS_CGIT_BASE}/Makefile" 2>/dev/null | \
grep -E "^DISTVERSION=" | \
sed 's/DISTVERSION=[[:space:]]*//' | \
tr -d '\t ')
if [[ -z "$version" ]]; then
echo "Error: Could not extract DISTVERSION from ports Makefile" >&2
return 1
fi
echo "$version"
tr -d '\t '
return 0
}
@@ -52,16 +45,7 @@ fetch_latest_github_release() {
fetch_ports_file() {
local filename="$1"
local content
if ! content=$(curl -fsL --proto '=https' --proto-redir '=https' --retry 3 "${PORTS_MIRROR_BASE}/${filename}" 2>/dev/null); then
echo "Error: Could not fetch ${filename} from ${PORTS_MIRROR_BASE}" >&2
return 1
fi
if [[ "$content" == \<* ]]; then
echo "Error: Received HTML instead of ${filename} from ${PORTS_MIRROR_BASE}" >&2
return 1
fi
printf '%s' "$content"
curl -sL "${PORTS_CGIT_BASE}/${filename}" 2>/dev/null
return 0
}

View File

@@ -9,22 +9,18 @@
# Example: ./freebsd-port-issue-body.sh 0.56.0 0.59.1
#
# If no versions are provided, the script will:
# - Fetch OLD version from the FreeBSD ports GitHub mirror (current version in ports tree)
# - Fetch OLD version from FreeBSD ports cgit (current version in ports tree)
# - Fetch NEW version from latest NetBird GitHub release tag
set -e
GITHUB_REPO="netbirdio/netbird"
PORTS_MAKEFILE_URL="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/freebsd/freebsd-ports/main/security/netbird/Makefile"
PORTS_CGIT_URL="https://cgit.freebsd.org/ports/plain/security/netbird/Makefile"
fetch_current_ports_version() {
echo "Fetching current version from FreeBSD ports..." >&2
local makefile_content
makefile_content=$(curl -fsL --proto '=https' --proto-redir '=https' --retry 3 "$PORTS_MAKEFILE_URL" 2>/dev/null) || makefile_content=""
if [[ "$makefile_content" == \<* ]]; then
echo "Error: Received HTML instead of Makefile from ${PORTS_MAKEFILE_URL}" >&2
return 1
fi
makefile_content=$(curl -sL "$PORTS_CGIT_URL" 2>/dev/null)
if [[ -z "$makefile_content" ]]; then
echo "Error: Could not fetch Makefile from FreeBSD ports" >&2
return 1

View File

@@ -187,16 +187,16 @@ func (c *GrpcClient) ready() bool {
// Sync wraps the real client's Sync endpoint call and takes care of retries and encryption/decryption of messages
// Blocking request. The result will be sent via msgHandler callback function
func (c *GrpcClient) Sync(ctx context.Context, sysInfo *system.Info, msgHandler func(msg *proto.SyncResponse) error) error {
return c.withMgmtStream(ctx, func(ctx context.Context, serverPubKey wgtypes.Key, backOff backoff.BackOff) error {
return c.handleSyncStream(ctx, serverPubKey, sysInfo, msgHandler, backOff)
return c.withMgmtStream(ctx, func(ctx context.Context, serverPubKey wgtypes.Key) error {
return c.handleSyncStream(ctx, serverPubKey, sysInfo, msgHandler)
})
}
// Job wraps the real client's Job endpoint call and takes care of retries and encryption/decryption of messages
// Blocking request. The result will be sent via msgHandler callback function
func (c *GrpcClient) Job(ctx context.Context, msgHandler func(msg *proto.JobRequest) *proto.JobResponse) error {
return c.withMgmtStream(ctx, func(ctx context.Context, serverPubKey wgtypes.Key, backOff backoff.BackOff) error {
return c.handleJobStream(ctx, serverPubKey, msgHandler, backOff)
return c.withMgmtStream(ctx, func(ctx context.Context, serverPubKey wgtypes.Key) error {
return c.handleJobStream(ctx, serverPubKey, msgHandler)
})
}
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ func (c *GrpcClient) Job(ctx context.Context, msgHandler func(msg *proto.JobRequ
// It takes care of retries, connection readiness, and fetching server public key.
func (c *GrpcClient) withMgmtStream(
ctx context.Context,
handler func(ctx context.Context, serverPubKey wgtypes.Key, backOff backoff.BackOff) error,
handler func(ctx context.Context, serverPubKey wgtypes.Key) error,
) error {
backOff := defaultBackoff(ctx)
operation := func() error {
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ func (c *GrpcClient) withMgmtStream(
return err
}
return handler(ctx, *serverPubKey, backOff)
return handler(ctx, *serverPubKey)
}
err := backoff.Retry(operation, backOff)
@@ -239,7 +239,6 @@ func (c *GrpcClient) handleJobStream(
ctx context.Context,
serverPubKey wgtypes.Key,
msgHandler func(msg *proto.JobRequest) *proto.JobResponse,
backOff backoff.BackOff,
) error {
ctx, cancelStream := context.WithCancel(ctx)
defer cancelStream()
@@ -257,19 +256,6 @@ func (c *GrpcClient) handleJobStream(
log.Debug("job stream handshake sent successfully")
// The stream is up, so reset the backoff. This matters for two reasons,
// both caused by the backoff lib not resetting its state on a successful
// connection:
// 1. Without a reset, after a connect followed by an error the next retry
// starts from the accumulated (large) interval instead of retrying
// promptly, delaying reconnection.
// 2. Worse, once the accumulated elapsed time exceeds MaxElapsedTime, the
// next stream error makes NextBackOff() return Stop, so the retry loop
// exits immediately. That error is then mislabeled unrecoverable and
// bubbles up to trigger a full engine restart / data-plane teardown
// instead of a silent reconnection.
backOff.Reset()
// Main loop: receive, process, respond
for {
jobReq, err := c.receiveJobRequest(ctx, stream, serverPubKey)
@@ -385,7 +371,7 @@ func (c *GrpcClient) sendJobResponse(
return nil
}
func (c *GrpcClient) handleSyncStream(ctx context.Context, serverPubKey wgtypes.Key, sysInfo *system.Info, msgHandler func(msg *proto.SyncResponse) error, backOff backoff.BackOff) error {
func (c *GrpcClient) handleSyncStream(ctx context.Context, serverPubKey wgtypes.Key, sysInfo *system.Info, msgHandler func(msg *proto.SyncResponse) error) error {
ctx, cancelStream := context.WithCancel(ctx)
defer cancelStream()
@@ -404,19 +390,6 @@ func (c *GrpcClient) handleSyncStream(ctx context.Context, serverPubKey wgtypes.
c.notifyConnected()
c.setSyncStreamConnected()
// The stream is up, so reset the backoff. This matters for two reasons,
// both caused by the backoff lib not resetting its state on a successful
// connection:
// 1. Without a reset, after a connect followed by an error the next retry
// starts from the accumulated (large) interval instead of retrying
// promptly, delaying reconnection.
// 2. Worse, once the accumulated elapsed time exceeds MaxElapsedTime, the
// next stream error makes NextBackOff() return Stop, so the retry loop
// exits immediately. That error is then mislabeled unrecoverable and
// bubbles up to trigger a full engine restart / data-plane teardown
// instead of a silent reconnection.
backOff.Reset()
// blocking until error
err = c.receiveUpdatesEvents(stream, serverPubKey, msgHandler)
if err != nil {

View File

@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@ import (
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
nbdns "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/dns"
resourceTypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/networks/resources/types"
routerTypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/networks/routers/types"
nbpeer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
nbroute "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
@@ -35,17 +38,17 @@ func DecodeEnvelope(env *proto.NetworkMapEnvelope) (*types.NetworkMapComponents,
Network: decodeAccountNetwork(full.Network),
AccountSettings: decodeAccountSettings(full.AccountSettings),
CustomZoneDomain: full.CustomZoneDomain,
Peers: make(map[string]*types.ComponentPeer, len(full.Peers)),
Groups: make(map[string]*types.ComponentGroup, len(full.Groups)),
Peers: make(map[string]*nbpeer.Peer, len(full.Peers)),
Groups: make(map[string]*types.Group, len(full.Groups)),
Policies: make([]*types.Policy, 0, len(full.Policies)),
Routes: make([]*nbroute.Route, 0, len(full.Routes)),
NameServerGroups: make([]*nbdns.NameServerGroup, 0, len(full.NameserverGroups)),
AllDNSRecords: decodeSimpleRecords(full.AllDnsRecords),
AccountZones: decodeCustomZones(full.AccountZones),
ResourcePoliciesMap: make(map[string][]*types.Policy),
RoutersMap: make(map[string]map[string]*types.ComponentRouter),
NetworkResources: make([]*types.ComponentResource, 0, len(full.NetworkResources)),
RouterPeers: make(map[string]*types.ComponentPeer),
RoutersMap: make(map[string]map[string]*routerTypes.NetworkRouter),
NetworkResources: make([]*resourceTypes.NetworkResource, 0, len(full.NetworkResources)),
RouterPeers: make(map[string]*nbpeer.Peer),
AllowedUserIDs: stringSliceToSet(full.AllowedUserIds),
PostureFailedPeers: make(map[string]map[string]struct{}, len(full.PostureFailedPeers)),
GroupIDToUserIDs: make(map[string][]string, len(full.GroupIdToUserIds)),
@@ -98,7 +101,7 @@ func DecodeEnvelope(env *proto.NetworkMapEnvelope) (*types.NetworkMapComponents,
log.WithField("peer idx", idx).Error("unrecognized peer idx during decoding")
}
}
group := &types.ComponentGroup{
group := &types.Group{
ID: groupID,
PublicID: gc.Id,
Peers: peerIDs,
@@ -148,7 +151,7 @@ func DecodeEnvelope(env *proto.NetworkMapEnvelope) (*types.NetworkMapComponents,
// Phase 7: routers_map (outer key = network seq id, inner key = peer-id
// reconstructed from peer_index). Synthesized network id is "net_<seq>".
for networkID, list := range full.RoutersMap {
inner := make(map[string]*types.ComponentRouter, len(list.Entries))
inner := make(map[string]*routerTypes.NetworkRouter, len(list.Entries))
for _, entry := range list.Entries {
if !entry.PeerIndexSet {
continue
@@ -158,7 +161,8 @@ func DecodeEnvelope(env *proto.NetworkMapEnvelope) (*types.NetworkMapComponents,
continue
}
peerID := peerIDByIndex[entry.PeerIndex]
inner[peerID] = &types.ComponentRouter{
inner[peerID] = &routerTypes.NetworkRouter{
ID: "",
NetworkID: networkID,
PublicID: entry.Id,
Peer: peerID,
@@ -260,22 +264,40 @@ func decodeAccountSettings(as *proto.AccountSettingsCompact) *types.AccountSetti
}
}
func decodePeerCompact(pc *proto.PeerCompact, peerID string) *types.ComponentPeer {
peer := &types.ComponentPeer{
func decodePeerCompact(pc *proto.PeerCompact, peerID string) *nbpeer.Peer {
var caps []int32
if pc.SupportsSourcePrefixes {
caps = append(caps, nbpeer.PeerCapabilitySourcePrefixes)
}
if pc.SupportsIpv6 {
caps = append(caps, nbpeer.PeerCapabilityIPv6Overlay)
}
peer := &nbpeer.Peer{
ID: peerID,
Key: peerID,
SSHKey: string(pc.SshPubKey),
SSHEnabled: pc.SshEnabled,
DNSLabel: pc.DnsLabel,
LoginExpirationEnabled: pc.LoginExpirationEnabled,
AgentVersion: pc.AgentVersion,
SupportsSourcePrefixes: pc.SupportsSourcePrefixes,
SupportsIPv6: pc.SupportsIpv6,
ServerSSHAllowed: pc.ServerSshAllowed,
AddedWithSSOLogin: pc.AddedWithSsoLogin,
Meta: nbpeer.PeerSystemMeta{
WtVersion: pc.AgentVersion,
Capabilities: caps,
Flags: nbpeer.Flags{
ServerSSHAllowed: pc.ServerSshAllowed,
},
},
}
if pc.AddedWithSsoLogin {
// Set a non-empty UserID so (*Peer).AddedWithSSOLogin() returns true.
// The original UserID isn't on the wire; the value is intentionally
// visibly synthetic so any future consumer that mistakes UserID for a
// real account user xid won't silently match (or worse, write the
// sentinel into a downstream record).
peer.UserID = "<env-sso>"
}
if pc.LastLoginUnixNano != 0 {
peer.LastLogin = time.Unix(0, pc.LastLoginUnixNano)
t := time.Unix(0, pc.LastLoginUnixNano)
peer.LastLogin = &t
}
switch len(pc.Ip) {
case 4:
@@ -402,14 +424,14 @@ func decodeNameServerGroupRaw(nsg *proto.NameServerGroupRaw) *nbdns.NameServerGr
return out
}
func decodeNetworkResource(nr *proto.NetworkResourceRaw) *types.ComponentResource {
out := &types.ComponentResource{
func decodeNetworkResource(nr *proto.NetworkResourceRaw) *resourceTypes.NetworkResource {
out := &resourceTypes.NetworkResource{
ID: nr.Id,
PublicID: nr.Id,
NetworkID: nr.NetworkSeq,
Name: nr.Name,
Description: nr.Description,
Type: types.ComponentResourceType(nr.Type),
Type: resourceTypes.NetworkResourceType(nr.Type),
Address: nr.Address,
Domain: nr.DomainValue,
Enabled: nr.Enabled,

View File

@@ -20,9 +20,10 @@ import (
nbdns "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/dns"
"net/netip"
nbpeer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/types"
nbroute "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/types"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/netiputil"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/sshauth"
)
@@ -273,7 +274,7 @@ func ToProtocolDNSConfig(update nbdns.Config, cache DNSConfigCache, forwardPort
// AppendRemotePeerConfig appends typed peers as proto.RemotePeerConfig
// entries to dst and returns the result.
func AppendRemotePeerConfig(dst []*proto.RemotePeerConfig, peers []*types.ComponentPeer, dnsName string, includeIPv6 bool) []*proto.RemotePeerConfig {
func AppendRemotePeerConfig(dst []*proto.RemotePeerConfig, peers []*nbpeer.Peer, dnsName string, includeIPv6 bool) []*proto.RemotePeerConfig {
for _, rPeer := range peers {
allowedIPs := []string{rPeer.IP.String() + "/32"}
if includeIPv6 && rPeer.IPv6.IsValid() {
@@ -284,7 +285,7 @@ func AppendRemotePeerConfig(dst []*proto.RemotePeerConfig, peers []*types.Compon
AllowedIps: allowedIPs,
SshConfig: &proto.SSHConfig{SshPubKey: []byte(rPeer.SSHKey)},
Fqdn: rPeer.FQDN(dnsName),
AgentVersion: rPeer.AgentVersion,
AgentVersion: rPeer.Meta.WtVersion,
})
}
return dst

View File

@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ func EnvelopeToNetworkMap(ctx context.Context, env *proto.NetworkMapEnvelope, lo
}
components.PeerID = canonicalKey
includeIPv6 := localPeer.SupportsIPv6 && localPeer.IPv6.IsValid()
useSourcePrefixes := localPeer.SupportsSourcePrefixes
includeIPv6 := localPeer.SupportsIPv6() && localPeer.IPv6.IsValid()
useSourcePrefixes := localPeer.SupportsSourcePrefixes()
typedNM := components.Calculate(ctx)

View File

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import (
goproto "google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"
mgmtgrpc "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/shared/grpc"
nbpeer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
nbnetworkmap "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/networkmap"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
@@ -143,14 +144,14 @@ func TestDecodeEnvelope_MalformedWgKeyPeerSkipped(t *testing.T) {
func TestEnvelopeRoundTrip_AllGroupShortCircuitParity(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
peers := map[string]*types.ComponentPeer{}
peers := map[string]*nbpeer.Peer{}
for i, id := range []string{"peer-T", "peer-S", "peer-ALL", "peer-O"} {
peers[id] = &types.ComponentPeer{
ID: id,
Key: randomWgKey(t),
IP: netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{100, 64, 0, byte(i + 1)}),
DNSLabel: id,
AgentVersion: "0.40.0",
peers[id] = &nbpeer.Peer{
ID: id,
Key: randomWgKey(t),
IP: netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{100, 64, 0, byte(i + 1)}),
DNSLabel: id,
Meta: nbpeer.PeerSystemMeta{WtVersion: "0.40.0"},
}
}
@@ -164,7 +165,7 @@ func TestEnvelopeRoundTrip_AllGroupShortCircuitParity(t *testing.T) {
AccountSettings: &types.AccountSettingsInfo{},
DNSSettings: &types.DNSSettings{},
Peers: peers,
Groups: map[string]*types.ComponentGroup{
Groups: map[string]*types.Group{
"g-src": {ID: "g-src", PublicID: "1", Name: "staff", Peers: []string{"peer-T", "peer-S"}},
"g-all": {ID: "g-all", PublicID: "2", Name: "All", Peers: []string{"peer-ALL"}},
"g-two": {ID: "g-two", PublicID: "3", Name: "second", Peers: []string{"peer-T", "peer-O"}},
@@ -231,22 +232,22 @@ func buildSmokeComponents(t *testing.T) (*types.NetworkMapComponents, string) {
peerAKey := randomWgKey(t)
peerBKey := randomWgKey(t)
peerA := &types.ComponentPeer{
ID: "peer-A",
Key: peerAKey,
IP: netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{100, 64, 0, 1}),
DNSLabel: "peerA",
AgentVersion: "0.40.0",
peerA := &nbpeer.Peer{
ID: "peer-A",
Key: peerAKey,
IP: netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{100, 64, 0, 1}),
DNSLabel: "peerA",
Meta: nbpeer.PeerSystemMeta{WtVersion: "0.40.0"},
}
peerB := &types.ComponentPeer{
ID: "peer-B",
Key: peerBKey,
IP: netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{100, 64, 0, 2}),
DNSLabel: "peerB",
AgentVersion: "0.40.0",
peerB := &nbpeer.Peer{
ID: "peer-B",
Key: peerBKey,
IP: netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{100, 64, 0, 2}),
DNSLabel: "peerB",
Meta: nbpeer.PeerSystemMeta{WtVersion: "0.40.0"},
}
group := &types.ComponentGroup{
group := &types.Group{
ID: "group-all", PublicID: "1", Name: "All",
Peers: []string{"peer-A", "peer-B"},
}
@@ -273,11 +274,11 @@ func buildSmokeComponents(t *testing.T) (*types.NetworkMapComponents, string) {
},
AccountSettings: &types.AccountSettingsInfo{},
DNSSettings: &types.DNSSettings{},
Peers: map[string]*types.ComponentPeer{
Peers: map[string]*nbpeer.Peer{
"peer-A": peerA,
"peer-B": peerB,
},
Groups: map[string]*types.ComponentGroup{
Groups: map[string]*types.Group{
"group-all": group,
},
Policies: []*types.Policy{policy},

View File

@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
package types
import (
"net/netip"
"time"
)
// ComponentPeer is the self-contained peer representation used by
// NetworkMapComponents and the calculated NetworkMap. It carries exactly the
// subset of peer data that crosses the components wire format, so the shared
// calculation layer stays independent of the management server's domain
// types.
type ComponentPeer struct {
ID string
Key string
IP netip.Addr
IPv6 netip.Addr
DNSLabel string
SSHKey string
SSHEnabled bool
ServerSSHAllowed bool
AgentVersion string
SupportsSourcePrefixes bool
SupportsIPv6 bool
LoginExpirationEnabled bool
AddedWithSSOLogin bool
LastLogin time.Time
}
// FQDN returns the peer's FQDN combined of the peer's DNS label and the system's DNS domain.
func (p *ComponentPeer) FQDN(dnsDomain string) string {
if dnsDomain == "" {
return ""
}
return p.DNSLabel + "." + dnsDomain
}
// LoginExpired indicates whether the peer's login has expired, mirroring the
// server-side peer semantics: only SSO-added peers with login expiration
// enabled can expire.
func (p *ComponentPeer) LoginExpired(expiresIn time.Duration) (bool, time.Duration) {
if !p.AddedWithSSOLogin || !p.LoginExpirationEnabled {
return false, 0
}
timeLeft := time.Until(p.LastLogin.Add(expiresIn))
return timeLeft <= 0, timeLeft
}
// GroupAllName is the reserved name of the default group that contains every peer in an account.
const GroupAllName = "All"
// ComponentGroup is the self-contained group representation used by
// NetworkMapComponents: just the membership view the network-map calculation
// needs, without the server's storage fields.
type ComponentGroup struct {
ID string
PublicID string
Name string
Peers []string
}
// IsGroupAll checks if the group is a default "All" group.
func (g *ComponentGroup) IsGroupAll() bool {
return g.Name == GroupAllName
}
// ComponentRouter is the self-contained network-router representation used by
// NetworkMapComponents.
type ComponentRouter struct {
NetworkID string
PublicID string
Peer string
PeerGroups []string
Masquerade bool
Metric int
Enabled bool
}
// ComponentResourceType mirrors the network-resource type enum on the
// components wire format.
type ComponentResourceType string
const (
ComponentResourceHost ComponentResourceType = "host"
ComponentResourceSubnet ComponentResourceType = "subnet"
ComponentResourceDomain ComponentResourceType = "domain"
)
// ComponentResource is the self-contained network-resource representation
// used by NetworkMapComponents.
type ComponentResource struct {
ID string
PublicID string
NetworkID string
AccountID string
Name string
Description string
Type ComponentResourceType
Address string
Domain string
Prefix netip.Prefix
Enabled bool
}

View File

@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ package types
import (
"strconv"
nbpeer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/posture"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/version"
)
@@ -46,8 +48,8 @@ func portsIncludesSSH(ports []string) bool {
}
// ExpandPortsAndRanges expands Ports and PortRanges of a rule into individual firewall rules.
func ExpandPortsAndRanges(base FirewallRule, rule *PolicyRule, peer *ComponentPeer) []*FirewallRule {
features := peerSupportedFirewallFeatures(peer.AgentVersion)
func ExpandPortsAndRanges(base FirewallRule, rule *PolicyRule, peer *nbpeer.Peer) []*FirewallRule {
features := peerSupportedFirewallFeatures(peer.Meta.WtVersion)
var expanded []*FirewallRule
@@ -104,8 +106,8 @@ func isPortInRule(portString string, portInt uint16, rule *FirewallRule) bool {
return rule.Port == portString || (rule.PortRange.Start <= portInt && portInt <= rule.PortRange.End)
}
func shouldCheckRulesForNativeSSH(supportsNative bool, rule *PolicyRule, peer *ComponentPeer) bool {
return supportsNative && peer.SSHEnabled && peer.ServerSSHAllowed && rule.Protocol == PolicyRuleProtocolTCP
func shouldCheckRulesForNativeSSH(supportsNative bool, rule *PolicyRule, peer *nbpeer.Peer) bool {
return supportsNative && peer.SSHEnabled && peer.Meta.Flags.ServerSSHAllowed && rule.Protocol == PolicyRuleProtocolTCP
}
func peerSupportedFirewallFeatures(peerVer string) supportedFeatures {
@@ -115,13 +117,13 @@ func peerSupportedFirewallFeatures(peerVer string) supportedFeatures {
var features supportedFeatures
meetMinVer, err := version.MeetsMinVersion(firewallRuleMinNativeSSHVer, peerVer)
meetMinVer, err := posture.MeetsMinVersion(firewallRuleMinNativeSSHVer, peerVer)
features.nativeSSH = err == nil && meetMinVer
if features.nativeSSH {
features.portRanges = true
} else {
meetMinVer, err = version.MeetsMinVersion(firewallRuleMinPortRangesVer, peerVer)
meetMinVer, err = posture.MeetsMinVersion(firewallRuleMinPortRangesVer, peerVer)
features.portRanges = err == nil && meetMinVer
}

View File

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import (
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
nbpeer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
nbroute "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
)
@@ -50,7 +51,7 @@ func (r *FirewallRule) Equal(other *FirewallRule) bool {
// For static routes, source ranges match the destination family (v4 or v6).
// For dynamic routes (domain-based), separate v4 and v6 rules are generated
// so the routing peer's forwarding chain allows both address families.
func GenerateRouteFirewallRules(ctx context.Context, route *nbroute.Route, rule *PolicyRule, groupPeers []*ComponentPeer, direction int, includeIPv6 bool) []*RouteFirewallRule {
func GenerateRouteFirewallRules(ctx context.Context, route *nbroute.Route, rule *PolicyRule, groupPeers []*nbpeer.Peer, direction int, includeIPv6 bool) []*RouteFirewallRule {
rulesExists := make(map[string]struct{})
rules := make([]*RouteFirewallRule, 0)
@@ -106,7 +107,7 @@ func GenerateRouteFirewallRules(ctx context.Context, route *nbroute.Route, rule
}
// splitPeerSourcesByFamily separates peer IPs into v4 (/32) and v6 (/128) source ranges.
func splitPeerSourcesByFamily(groupPeers []*ComponentPeer) (v4, v6 []string) {
func splitPeerSourcesByFamily(groupPeers []*nbpeer.Peer) (v4, v6 []string) {
v4 = make([]string, 0, len(groupPeers))
v6 = make([]string, 0, len(groupPeers))
for _, peer := range groupPeers {

View File

@@ -8,12 +8,13 @@ import (
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
nbpeer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
)
func TestSplitPeerSourcesByFamily(t *testing.T) {
peers := []*ComponentPeer{
peers := []*nbpeer.Peer{
{
IP: netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1"),
IPv6: netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::1"),
@@ -35,7 +36,7 @@ func TestSplitPeerSourcesByFamily(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestGenerateRouteFirewallRules_V4Route(t *testing.T) {
peers := []*ComponentPeer{
peers := []*nbpeer.Peer{
{
IP: netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1"),
IPv6: netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::1"),
@@ -64,7 +65,7 @@ func TestGenerateRouteFirewallRules_V4Route(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestGenerateRouteFirewallRules_V6Route(t *testing.T) {
peers := []*ComponentPeer{
peers := []*nbpeer.Peer{
{
IP: netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1"),
IPv6: netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::1"),
@@ -92,7 +93,7 @@ func TestGenerateRouteFirewallRules_V6Route(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestGenerateRouteFirewallRules_DynamicRoute_DualStack(t *testing.T) {
peers := []*ComponentPeer{
peers := []*nbpeer.Peer{
{
IP: netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1"),
IPv6: netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::1"),
@@ -125,7 +126,7 @@ func TestGenerateRouteFirewallRules_DynamicRoute_DualStack(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestGenerateRouteFirewallRules_DynamicRoute_NoV6Peers(t *testing.T) {
peers := []*ComponentPeer{
peers := []*nbpeer.Peer{
{IP: netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1")},
{IP: netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.2")},
}
@@ -149,7 +150,7 @@ func TestGenerateRouteFirewallRules_DynamicRoute_NoV6Peers(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestGenerateRouteFirewallRules_IncludeIPv6False(t *testing.T) {
peers := []*ComponentPeer{
peers := []*nbpeer.Peer{
{
IP: netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1"),
IPv6: netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::1"),

View File

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package types
import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/integration_reference"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/networks/resources/types"
)
const (
@@ -67,6 +68,10 @@ func (g *Group) EventMeta() map[string]any {
return map[string]any{"name": g.Name}
}
func (g *Group) EventMetaResource(resource *types.NetworkResource) map[string]any {
return map[string]any{"name": g.Name, "id": g.ID, "resource_name": resource.Name, "resource_id": resource.ID, "resource_type": resource.Type}
}
func (g *Group) Copy() *Group {
group := &Group{
ID: g.ID,
@@ -90,39 +95,14 @@ func (g *Group) HasPeers() bool {
return len(g.Peers) > 0
}
// GroupAllName is the reserved name of the default group that contains every peer in an account.
const GroupAllName = "All"
// IsGroupAll checks if the group is a default "All" group.
func (g *Group) IsGroupAll() bool {
return g.Name == GroupAllName
}
// ToComponent converts the group to its self-contained components
// representation. The Peers slice is shared, not copied — components are
// treated as immutable snapshots. Returns nil for a nil group.
func (g *Group) ToComponent() *ComponentGroup {
if g == nil {
return nil
}
return &ComponentGroup{
ID: g.ID,
PublicID: g.PublicID,
Name: g.Name,
Peers: g.Peers,
}
}
// GroupsToComponent converts an id-keyed group map to its components
// representation, preserving nil entries.
func GroupsToComponent(groups map[string]*Group) map[string]*ComponentGroup {
if groups == nil {
return nil
}
out := make(map[string]*ComponentGroup, len(groups))
for id, g := range groups {
out[id] = g.ToComponent()
}
return out
}
// AddPeer adds peerID to Peers if not present, returning true if added.
func (g *Group) AddPeer(peerID string) bool {
if peerID == "" {

View File

@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ import (
"golang.org/x/exp/maps"
nbdns "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/dns"
nbpeer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/util"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/status"
@@ -37,11 +39,11 @@ const (
)
type NetworkMap struct {
Peers []*ComponentPeer
Peers []*nbpeer.Peer
Network *Network
Routes []*route.Route
DNSConfig nbdns.Config
OfflinePeers []*ComponentPeer
OfflinePeers []*nbpeer.Peer
FirewallRules []*FirewallRule
RoutesFirewallRules []*RouteFirewallRule
ForwardingRules []*ForwardingRule
@@ -51,46 +53,15 @@ type NetworkMap struct {
func (nm *NetworkMap) Merge(other *NetworkMap) {
nm.Peers = mergeUniquePeersByID(nm.Peers, other.Peers)
nm.Routes = mergeUnique(nm.Routes, other.Routes)
nm.Routes = util.MergeUnique(nm.Routes, other.Routes)
nm.OfflinePeers = mergeUniquePeersByID(nm.OfflinePeers, other.OfflinePeers)
nm.FirewallRules = mergeUnique(nm.FirewallRules, other.FirewallRules)
nm.RoutesFirewallRules = mergeUnique(nm.RoutesFirewallRules, other.RoutesFirewallRules)
nm.ForwardingRules = mergeUnique(nm.ForwardingRules, other.ForwardingRules)
nm.FirewallRules = util.MergeUnique(nm.FirewallRules, other.FirewallRules)
nm.RoutesFirewallRules = util.MergeUnique(nm.RoutesFirewallRules, other.RoutesFirewallRules)
nm.ForwardingRules = util.MergeUnique(nm.ForwardingRules, other.ForwardingRules)
}
type comparableObject[T any] interface {
Equal(other T) bool
}
func mergeUnique[T comparableObject[T]](arr1, arr2 []T) []T {
var result []T
for _, item := range arr1 {
if !containsEqual(result, item) {
result = append(result, item)
}
}
for _, item := range arr2 {
if !containsEqual(result, item) {
result = append(result, item)
}
}
return result
}
func containsEqual[T comparableObject[T]](slice []T, element T) bool {
for _, item := range slice {
if item.Equal(element) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func mergeUniquePeersByID(peers1, peers2 []*ComponentPeer) []*ComponentPeer {
result := make(map[string]*ComponentPeer)
func mergeUniquePeersByID(peers1, peers2 []*nbpeer.Peer) []*nbpeer.Peer {
result := make(map[string]*nbpeer.Peer)
for _, peer := range peers1 {
result[peer.ID] = peer
}

View File

@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/auth"
nbdns "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/dns"
resourceTypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/networks/resources/types"
routerTypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/networks/routers/types"
nbpeer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
)
@@ -24,22 +27,22 @@ type NetworkMapComponents struct {
DNSSettings *DNSSettings
CustomZoneDomain string
Peers map[string]*ComponentPeer
Groups map[string]*ComponentGroup
Peers map[string]*nbpeer.Peer
Groups map[string]*Group
Policies []*Policy
Routes []*route.Route
NameServerGroups []*nbdns.NameServerGroup
AllDNSRecords []nbdns.SimpleRecord
AccountZones []nbdns.CustomZone
ResourcePoliciesMap map[string][]*Policy
RoutersMap map[string]map[string]*ComponentRouter
NetworkResources []*ComponentResource
RoutersMap map[string]map[string]*routerTypes.NetworkRouter
NetworkResources []*resourceTypes.NetworkResource
GroupIDToUserIDs map[string][]string
AllowedUserIDs map[string]struct{}
PostureFailedPeers map[string]map[string]struct{}
RouterPeers map[string]*ComponentPeer
RouterPeers map[string]*nbpeer.Peer
// NetworkXIDToPublicID maps Network.ID (xid) → PublicID.
// Consumed by the envelope encoder to
@@ -75,15 +78,15 @@ func EmptyNetworkMapComponents(nm *NetworkMapComponents) *NetworkMapComponents {
return nm
}
func (c *NetworkMapComponents) GetPeerInfo(peerID string) *ComponentPeer {
func (c *NetworkMapComponents) GetPeerInfo(peerID string) *nbpeer.Peer {
return c.Peers[peerID]
}
func (c *NetworkMapComponents) GetRouterPeerInfo(peerID string) *ComponentPeer {
func (c *NetworkMapComponents) GetRouterPeerInfo(peerID string) *nbpeer.Peer {
return c.RouterPeers[peerID]
}
func (c *NetworkMapComponents) GetGroupInfo(groupID string) *ComponentGroup {
func (c *NetworkMapComponents) GetGroupInfo(groupID string) *Group {
return c.Groups[groupID]
}
@@ -139,7 +142,7 @@ func (c *NetworkMapComponents) Calculate(ctx context.Context) *NetworkMap {
includeIPv6 := false
if p := c.Peers[targetPeerID]; p != nil {
includeIPv6 = p.SupportsIPv6 && p.IPv6.IsValid()
includeIPv6 = p.SupportsIPv6() && p.IPv6.IsValid()
}
routesUpdate := filterAndExpandRoutes(c.getRoutesToSync(targetPeerID, peersToConnect, peerGroups), includeIPv6)
routesFirewallRules := c.getPeerRoutesFirewallRules(ctx, targetPeerID, includeIPv6)
@@ -197,7 +200,7 @@ func (c *NetworkMapComponents) IsEmpty() bool {
return c.empty
}
func (c *NetworkMapComponents) getPeerConnectionResources(targetPeerID string) ([]*ComponentPeer, []*FirewallRule, map[string]map[string]struct{}, bool) {
func (c *NetworkMapComponents) getPeerConnectionResources(targetPeerID string) ([]*nbpeer.Peer, []*FirewallRule, map[string]map[string]struct{}, bool) {
targetPeer := c.GetPeerInfo(targetPeerID)
if targetPeer == nil {
return nil, nil, nil, false
@@ -217,7 +220,7 @@ func (c *NetworkMapComponents) getPeerConnectionResources(targetPeerID string) (
continue
}
var sourcePeers, destinationPeers []*ComponentPeer
var sourcePeers, destinationPeers []*nbpeer.Peer
var peerInSources, peerInDestinations bool
if rule.SourceResource.Type == ResourceTypePeer && rule.SourceResource.ID != "" {
@@ -300,13 +303,13 @@ func (c *NetworkMapComponents) getAllowedUserIDs() map[string]struct{} {
return make(map[string]struct{})
}
func (c *NetworkMapComponents) connResourcesGenerator(targetPeer *ComponentPeer) (func(*PolicyRule, []*ComponentPeer, int), func() ([]*ComponentPeer, []*FirewallRule)) {
func (c *NetworkMapComponents) connResourcesGenerator(targetPeer *nbpeer.Peer) (func(*PolicyRule, []*nbpeer.Peer, int), func() ([]*nbpeer.Peer, []*FirewallRule)) {
rulesExists := make(map[string]struct{})
peersExists := make(map[string]struct{})
rules := make([]*FirewallRule, 0)
peers := make([]*ComponentPeer, 0)
peers := make([]*nbpeer.Peer, 0)
return func(rule *PolicyRule, groupPeers []*ComponentPeer, direction int) {
return func(rule *PolicyRule, groupPeers []*nbpeer.Peer, direction int) {
protocol := rule.Protocol
if protocol == PolicyRuleProtocolNetbirdSSH {
protocol = PolicyRuleProtocolTCP
@@ -358,15 +361,15 @@ func (c *NetworkMapComponents) connResourcesGenerator(targetPeer *ComponentPeer)
PortsJoined: portsJoined,
})
}
}, func() ([]*ComponentPeer, []*FirewallRule) {
}, func() ([]*nbpeer.Peer, []*FirewallRule) {
return peers, rules
}
}
func (c *NetworkMapComponents) getAllPeersFromGroups(groups []string, peerID string, sourcePostureChecksIDs []string) ([]*ComponentPeer, bool) {
func (c *NetworkMapComponents) getAllPeersFromGroups(groups []string, peerID string, sourcePostureChecksIDs []string) ([]*nbpeer.Peer, bool) {
peerInGroups := false
uniquePeerIDs := c.getUniquePeerIDsFromGroupsIDs(groups)
filteredPeers := make([]*ComponentPeer, 0, len(uniquePeerIDs))
filteredPeers := make([]*nbpeer.Peer, 0, len(uniquePeerIDs))
for _, p := range uniquePeerIDs {
peerInfo := c.GetPeerInfo(p)
@@ -418,22 +421,22 @@ func (c *NetworkMapComponents) getUniquePeerIDsFromGroupsIDs(groups []string) []
return ids
}
func (c *NetworkMapComponents) getPeerFromResource(resource Resource, peerID string) ([]*ComponentPeer, bool) {
func (c *NetworkMapComponents) getPeerFromResource(resource Resource, peerID string) ([]*nbpeer.Peer, bool) {
if resource.ID == peerID {
return []*ComponentPeer{}, true
return []*nbpeer.Peer{}, true
}
peerInfo := c.GetPeerInfo(resource.ID)
if peerInfo == nil {
return []*ComponentPeer{}, false
return []*nbpeer.Peer{}, false
}
return []*ComponentPeer{peerInfo}, false
return []*nbpeer.Peer{peerInfo}, false
}
func (c *NetworkMapComponents) filterPeersByLoginExpiration(aclPeers []*ComponentPeer) ([]*ComponentPeer, []*ComponentPeer) {
peersToConnect := make([]*ComponentPeer, 0, len(aclPeers))
var expiredPeers []*ComponentPeer
func (c *NetworkMapComponents) filterPeersByLoginExpiration(aclPeers []*nbpeer.Peer) ([]*nbpeer.Peer, []*nbpeer.Peer) {
peersToConnect := make([]*nbpeer.Peer, 0, len(aclPeers))
var expiredPeers []*nbpeer.Peer
for _, p := range aclPeers {
expired, _ := p.LoginExpired(c.AccountSettings.PeerLoginExpiration)
@@ -515,7 +518,7 @@ func filterAndExpandRoutes(routes []*route.Route, includeIPv6 bool) []*route.Rou
return filtered
}
func (c *NetworkMapComponents) getRoutesToSync(peerID string, aclPeers []*ComponentPeer, peerGroups LookupMap) []*route.Route {
func (c *NetworkMapComponents) getRoutesToSync(peerID string, aclPeers []*nbpeer.Peer, peerGroups LookupMap) []*route.Route {
routes, peerDisabledRoutes := c.getRoutingPeerRoutes(peerID)
peerRoutesMembership := make(LookupMap)
for _, r := range append(routes, peerDisabledRoutes...) {
@@ -729,7 +732,7 @@ func (c *NetworkMapComponents) getRouteFirewallRules(ctx context.Context, peerID
return fwRules
}
func (c *NetworkMapComponents) getRulePeers(rule *PolicyRule, postureChecks []string, peerID string, distributionPeers map[string]struct{}) []*ComponentPeer {
func (c *NetworkMapComponents) getRulePeers(rule *PolicyRule, postureChecks []string, peerID string, distributionPeers map[string]struct{}) []*nbpeer.Peer {
distPeersWithPolicy := make(map[string]struct{})
for _, id := range rule.Sources {
group := c.GetGroupInfo(id)
@@ -756,7 +759,7 @@ func (c *NetworkMapComponents) getRulePeers(rule *PolicyRule, postureChecks []st
}
}
distributionGroupPeers := make([]*ComponentPeer, 0, len(distPeersWithPolicy))
distributionGroupPeers := make([]*nbpeer.Peer, 0, len(distPeersWithPolicy))
for pID := range distPeersWithPolicy {
peerInfo := c.GetPeerInfo(pID)
if peerInfo == nil {
@@ -796,8 +799,8 @@ func (c *NetworkMapComponents) getNetworkResourcesRoutesToSync(peerID string) (b
func (c *NetworkMapComponents) processResourcePolicies(
peerID string,
resource *ComponentResource,
networkRoutingPeers map[string]*ComponentRouter,
resource *resourceTypes.NetworkResource,
networkRoutingPeers map[string]*routerTypes.NetworkRouter,
addSourcePeers bool,
allSourcePeers map[string]struct{},
) []*route.Route {
@@ -830,7 +833,7 @@ func (c *NetworkMapComponents) getResourcePolicyPeers(policy *Policy) []string {
return c.getUniquePeerIDsFromGroupsIDs(policy.SourceGroups())
}
func (c *NetworkMapComponents) getNetworkResourcesRoutes(resource *ComponentResource, peerID string, router *ComponentRouter) []*route.Route {
func (c *NetworkMapComponents) getNetworkResourcesRoutes(resource *resourceTypes.NetworkResource, peerID string, router *routerTypes.NetworkRouter) []*route.Route {
resourceAppliedPolicies := c.ResourcePoliciesMap[resource.ID]
var routes []*route.Route
@@ -844,7 +847,7 @@ func (c *NetworkMapComponents) getNetworkResourcesRoutes(resource *ComponentReso
return routes
}
func (c *NetworkMapComponents) networkResourceToRoute(resource *ComponentResource, peer *ComponentPeer, router *ComponentRouter) *route.Route {
func (c *NetworkMapComponents) networkResourceToRoute(resource *resourceTypes.NetworkResource, peer *nbpeer.Peer, router *routerTypes.NetworkRouter) *route.Route {
r := &route.Route{
ID: route.ID(resource.ID + ":" + peer.ID),
AccountID: resource.AccountID,
@@ -858,7 +861,7 @@ func (c *NetworkMapComponents) networkResourceToRoute(resource *ComponentResourc
Description: resource.Description,
}
if resource.Type == ComponentResourceHost || resource.Type == ComponentResourceSubnet {
if resource.Type == resourceTypes.Host || resource.Type == resourceTypes.Subnet {
r.Network = resource.Prefix
r.NetworkType = route.IPv4Network
@@ -867,7 +870,7 @@ func (c *NetworkMapComponents) networkResourceToRoute(resource *ComponentResourc
}
}
if resource.Type == ComponentResourceDomain {
if resource.Type == resourceTypes.Domain {
domainList, err := domain.FromStringList([]string{resource.Domain})
if err == nil {
r.Domains = domainList
@@ -945,11 +948,11 @@ func (c *NetworkMapComponents) getPoliciesSourcePeers(policies []*Policy) map[st
func (c *NetworkMapComponents) addNetworksRoutingPeers(
networkResourcesRoutes []*route.Route,
peerID string,
peersToConnect []*ComponentPeer,
expiredPeers []*ComponentPeer,
peersToConnect []*nbpeer.Peer,
expiredPeers []*nbpeer.Peer,
isRouter bool,
sourcePeers map[string]struct{},
) []*ComponentPeer {
) []*nbpeer.Peer {
networkRoutesPeers := make(map[string]struct{}, len(networkResourcesRoutes))
for _, r := range networkResourcesRoutes {
@@ -999,8 +1002,8 @@ type FirewallRuleContext struct {
PortsJoined string
}
func AppendIPv6FirewallRule(rules []*FirewallRule, rulesExists map[string]struct{}, peer, targetPeer *ComponentPeer, rule *PolicyRule, rc FirewallRuleContext) []*FirewallRule {
if !peer.IPv6.IsValid() || !targetPeer.SupportsIPv6 || !targetPeer.IPv6.IsValid() {
func AppendIPv6FirewallRule(rules []*FirewallRule, rulesExists map[string]struct{}, peer, targetPeer *nbpeer.Peer, rule *PolicyRule, rc FirewallRuleContext) []*FirewallRule {
if !peer.IPv6.IsValid() || !targetPeer.SupportsIPv6() || !targetPeer.IPv6.IsValid() {
return rules
}

View File

@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@ package types
import (
nbdns "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/dns"
resourceTypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/networks/resources/types"
routerTypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/networks/routers/types"
nbpeer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
)
@@ -18,7 +21,7 @@ type NetworkMapComponentsCompact struct {
DNSSettings *DNSSettings
CustomZoneDomain string
AllPeers []*ComponentPeer
AllPeers []*nbpeer.Peer
PeerIndexes []int
RouterPeerIndexes []int
@@ -31,8 +34,8 @@ type NetworkMapComponentsCompact struct {
AllDNSRecords []nbdns.SimpleRecord
AccountZones []nbdns.CustomZone
RoutersMap map[string]map[string]*ComponentRouter
NetworkResources []*ComponentResource
RoutersMap map[string]map[string]*routerTypes.NetworkRouter
NetworkResources []*resourceTypes.NetworkResource
GroupIDToUserIDs map[string][]string
AllowedUserIDs map[string]struct{}
@@ -41,7 +44,7 @@ type NetworkMapComponentsCompact struct {
func (c *NetworkMapComponents) ToCompact() *NetworkMapComponentsCompact {
peerToIndex := make(map[string]int)
var allPeers []*ComponentPeer
var allPeers []*nbpeer.Peer
for id, peer := range c.Peers {
if _, exists := peerToIndex[id]; !exists {
@@ -147,7 +150,7 @@ func (c *NetworkMapComponents) ToCompact() *NetworkMapComponentsCompact {
}
func (c *NetworkMapComponentsCompact) ToFull() *NetworkMapComponents {
peers := make(map[string]*ComponentPeer, len(c.PeerIndexes))
peers := make(map[string]*nbpeer.Peer, len(c.PeerIndexes))
for _, idx := range c.PeerIndexes {
if idx >= 0 && idx < len(c.AllPeers) {
peer := c.AllPeers[idx]
@@ -155,7 +158,7 @@ func (c *NetworkMapComponentsCompact) ToFull() *NetworkMapComponents {
}
}
routerPeers := make(map[string]*ComponentPeer, len(c.RouterPeerIndexes))
routerPeers := make(map[string]*nbpeer.Peer, len(c.RouterPeerIndexes))
for _, idx := range c.RouterPeerIndexes {
if idx >= 0 && idx < len(c.AllPeers) {
peer := c.AllPeers[idx]
@@ -163,7 +166,7 @@ func (c *NetworkMapComponentsCompact) ToFull() *NetworkMapComponents {
}
}
groups := make(map[string]*ComponentGroup, len(c.Groups))
groups := make(map[string]*Group, len(c.Groups))
for id, gc := range c.Groups {
peerIDs := make([]string, 0, len(gc.PeerIndexes))
for _, idx := range gc.PeerIndexes {
@@ -171,7 +174,7 @@ func (c *NetworkMapComponentsCompact) ToFull() *NetworkMapComponents {
peerIDs = append(peerIDs, c.AllPeers[idx].ID)
}
}
groups[id] = &ComponentGroup{
groups[id] = &Group{
ID: id,
Name: gc.Name,
Peers: peerIDs,

View File

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ import (
)
// ErrSharedSockStopped indicates that shared socket has been stopped
var ErrSharedSockStopped = fmt.Errorf("shared socket stopped")
var ErrSharedSockStopped = fmt.Errorf("shared socked stopped")
// SharedSocket is a net.PacketConn that initiates two raw sockets (ipv4 and ipv6) and listens to UDP packets filtered
// by BPF instructions (e.g., IncomingSTUNFilter that checks and sends only STUN packets to the listeners (ReadFrom)).

View File

@@ -71,30 +71,6 @@ func NetbirdCommit() string {
return revision
}
// sanitizeVersion removes anything after the pre-release tag (e.g., "-dev", "-alpha", etc.)
func sanitizeVersion(version string) string {
parts := strings.Split(version, "-")
return parts[0]
}
// MeetsMinVersion checks if the peer's version meets or exceeds the minimum required version
func MeetsMinVersion(minVer, peerVer string) (bool, error) {
peerVer = sanitizeVersion(peerVer)
minVer = sanitizeVersion(minVer)
peerNBVer, err := v.NewVersion(peerVer)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
constraints, err := v.NewConstraint(">= " + minVer)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
return constraints.Check(peerNBVer), nil
}
// IsDevelopmentVersion reports whether the given version string identifies
// a non-release / development build. It is the single source of truth for
// "is this a dev build" checks across the codebase; use it instead of

View File

@@ -1,10 +1,6 @@
package version
import (
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
)
import "testing"
func TestIsDevelopmentVersion(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
@@ -30,68 +26,3 @@ func TestIsDevelopmentVersion(t *testing.T) {
})
}
}
func TestMeetsMinVersion(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
minVer string
peerVer string
want bool
wantErr bool
}{
{
name: "Peer version greater than min version",
minVer: "0.26.0",
peerVer: "0.60.1",
want: true,
wantErr: false,
},
{
name: "Peer version equals min version",
minVer: "1.0.0",
peerVer: "1.0.0",
want: true,
wantErr: false,
},
{
name: "Peer version less than min version",
minVer: "1.0.0",
peerVer: "0.9.9",
want: false,
wantErr: false,
},
{
name: "Peer version with pre-release tag greater than min version",
minVer: "1.0.0",
peerVer: "1.0.1-alpha",
want: true,
wantErr: false,
},
{
name: "Invalid peer version format",
minVer: "1.0.0",
peerVer: "dev",
want: false,
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "Invalid min version format",
minVer: "invalid.version",
peerVer: "1.0.0",
want: false,
wantErr: true,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got, err := MeetsMinVersion(tt.minVer, tt.peerVer)
if tt.wantErr {
assert.Error(t, err)
} else {
assert.NoError(t, err)
}
assert.Equal(t, tt.want, got)
})
}
}