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2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Zoltán Papp
9e9e33ae68 [client] Reduce cognitive complexity of Server.Login
Login sat at cognitive complexity 27, over the 25 the linter allows.

Extract the interactive SSO branch into startSSOLogin, and split the
nested in-flight-flow reuse check out of it into reuseOAuthFlow, which
flattens the original if/else into early returns: it returns the cached
auth info when the previous flow targets the same client and still has
more than 90s left, otherwise cancels the stale wait and returns nil so
the caller requests a fresh flow.

The helpers take the contextState through a small statusSetter
interface, since internal.contextState is unexported and re-deriving it
with CtxGetState inside the helper would resolve against callerCtx
rather than rootCtx.

No behavior change: same ordering of state transitions, same mutex scope
around the oauthAuthFlow write, same error paths. Login is now at 21.
2026-08-17 10:12:42 +02:00
Zoltán Papp
0738734b6e [client] Force interactive login when extending the auth session
A session extend must be answered from the account the peer is registered
under. With a silent PKCE flow (DisablePromptLogin or max_age=0) the IdP
answers from whatever session it already holds, which need not be the
peer's account when several are signed in; the token then fails the
user match in ExtendAuthSession with no way to pick another account.

Mark the PKCE flow request as a session extend so the management server
can force prompt=login for it, overriding the configured silent flow.
2026-08-15 10:33:50 +02:00
16 changed files with 924 additions and 741 deletions

View File

@@ -199,7 +199,15 @@ type loginHintSetter interface {
}
func (a *Auth) foregroundGetTokenInfo(authClient *auth.Auth, urlOpener URLOpener, isAndroidTV bool) (*auth.TokenInfo, error) {
oAuthFlow, err := authClient.GetOAuthFlow(a.ctx, isAndroidTV)
return a.foregroundGetTokenInfoFlow(authClient, urlOpener, isAndroidTV, false)
}
// foregroundGetTokenInfoFlow runs the interactive flow. sessionExtend tells the
// server the token will renew this peer's session rather than log a peer in, so
// it can rule out a silent authorization the IdP could answer from an unrelated
// account. See PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest.
func (a *Auth) foregroundGetTokenInfoFlow(authClient *auth.Auth, urlOpener URLOpener, isAndroidTV bool, sessionExtend bool) (*auth.TokenInfo, error) {
oAuthFlow, err := authClient.GetOAuthFlow(a.ctx, isAndroidTV, sessionExtend)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get OAuth flow: %v", err)
}

View File

@@ -293,11 +293,13 @@ func (c *Client) extendAuthSession(ctx context.Context, urlOpener URLOpener, isA
}
defer authClient.Close()
// Passing the config path makes the flow pick up the login_hint: an extend
// renews the session of the account already signed in, so it must not stop to
// offer a choice.
// Passing the config path makes the flow pick up the login_hint. That alone
// cannot keep the IdP on this profile's account though — a hint is only a
// suggestion, and a silent authorization is answered from whatever session the
// IdP already has, which need not be this peer's when several accounts are
// signed in. Marking the flow as an extend lets the server rule that out.
a := NewAuthWithConfig(ctx, cfg, cfgPath)
tokenInfo, err := a.foregroundGetTokenInfo(authClient, urlOpener, isAndroidTV)
tokenInfo, err := a.foregroundGetTokenInfoFlow(authClient, urlOpener, isAndroidTV, true)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("interactive sso login failed: %v", err)
}

View File

@@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ func foregroundGetTokenInfo(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, config *pro
hint = profileState.Email
}
oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, config, util.HasGraphicalSession(), false, hint)
oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, config, util.HasGraphicalSession(), false, hint, false)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}

View File

@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ func (a *Auth) IsSSOSupported(ctx context.Context) (bool, error) {
err := a.withRetry(ctx, func(client *mgm.GrpcClient) error {
// Try PKCE flow first
_, err := a.getPKCEFlow(client)
_, err := a.getPKCEFlow(client, false)
if err == nil {
supportsSSO = true
return nil
@@ -138,7 +138,11 @@ func (a *Auth) IsSSOSupported(ctx context.Context) (bool, error) {
// GetOAuthFlow returns an OAuth flow (PKCE or Device) using the existing management connection
// This avoids creating a new connection to the management server
func (a *Auth) GetOAuthFlow(ctx context.Context, forceDeviceAuth bool) (OAuthFlow, error) {
//
// sessionExtend marks the flow as renewing an existing peer's session rather than
// logging one in; the server needs it to rule out a silent authorization that the
// IdP could answer from another account. See PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest.
func (a *Auth) GetOAuthFlow(ctx context.Context, forceDeviceAuth bool, sessionExtend bool) (OAuthFlow, error) {
var flow OAuthFlow
var err error
@@ -149,7 +153,7 @@ func (a *Auth) GetOAuthFlow(ctx context.Context, forceDeviceAuth bool) (OAuthFlo
}
// Try PKCE flow first
flow, err = a.getPKCEFlow(client)
flow, err = a.getPKCEFlow(client, sessionExtend)
if err != nil {
// If PKCE not supported, try Device flow
if s, ok := status.FromError(err); ok && (s.Code() == codes.NotFound || s.Code() == codes.Unimplemented) {
@@ -229,8 +233,8 @@ func (a *Auth) Login(ctx context.Context, setupKey string, jwtToken string) (err
}
// getPKCEFlow retrieves PKCE authorization flow configuration and creates a flow instance
func (a *Auth) getPKCEFlow(client *mgm.GrpcClient) (*PKCEAuthorizationFlow, error) {
protoFlow, err := client.GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow()
func (a *Auth) getPKCEFlow(client *mgm.GrpcClient, sessionExtend bool) (*PKCEAuthorizationFlow, error) {
protoFlow, err := client.GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow(sessionExtend)
if err != nil {
if s, ok := status.FromError(err); ok && s.Code() == codes.NotFound {
log.Warnf("server couldn't find pkce flow, contact admin: %v", err)

View File

@@ -70,12 +70,15 @@ func shouldUseDeviceFlow(force bool, isUnixDesktopClient bool) bool {
//
// On Linux distros without desktop environment support, it only tries to initialize the Device Code Flow
// forceDeviceCodeFlow can be used to skip PKCE and go directly to Device Code Flow (e.g., for Android TV)
func NewOAuthFlow(ctx context.Context, config *profilemanager.Config, isUnixDesktopClient bool, forceDeviceCodeFlow bool, hint string) (OAuthFlow, error) {
//
// sessionExtend marks the flow as renewing an existing peer's session rather than
// logging one in; see PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest for what the server makes of it.
func NewOAuthFlow(ctx context.Context, config *profilemanager.Config, isUnixDesktopClient bool, forceDeviceCodeFlow bool, hint string, sessionExtend bool) (OAuthFlow, error) {
if shouldUseDeviceFlow(forceDeviceCodeFlow, isUnixDesktopClient) {
return authenticateWithDeviceCodeFlow(ctx, config, hint)
}
pkceFlow, err := authenticateWithPKCEFlow(ctx, config, hint)
pkceFlow, err := authenticateWithPKCEFlow(ctx, config, hint, sessionExtend)
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("failed to initialize pkce authentication with error: %v\n", err)
log.Debug("falling back to device code flow")
@@ -85,14 +88,14 @@ func NewOAuthFlow(ctx context.Context, config *profilemanager.Config, isUnixDesk
}
// authenticateWithPKCEFlow initializes the Proof Key for Code Exchange flow auth flow
func authenticateWithPKCEFlow(ctx context.Context, config *profilemanager.Config, hint string) (OAuthFlow, error) {
func authenticateWithPKCEFlow(ctx context.Context, config *profilemanager.Config, hint string, sessionExtend bool) (OAuthFlow, error) {
authClient, err := NewAuth(ctx, config.PrivateKey, config.ManagementURL, config)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create auth client: %v", err)
}
defer authClient.Close()
pkceFlowInfo, err := authClient.getPKCEFlow(authClient.client)
pkceFlowInfo, err := authClient.getPKCEFlow(authClient.client, sessionExtend)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("getting pkce authorization flow info failed with error: %v", err)
}

View File

@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ func (c *Client) LoginForMobile() string {
return fmt.Sprintf("failed to load config: %v", err)
}
oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, cfg, false, false, "")
oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, cfg, false, false, "", false)
if err != nil {
return err.Error()
}

View File

@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ func (a *Auth) login(urlOpener URLOpener, forceDeviceAuth bool, deviceName strin
const authInfoRequestTimeout = 30 * time.Second
func (a *Auth) foregroundGetTokenInfo(authClient *auth.Auth, urlOpener URLOpener, forceDeviceAuth bool) (*auth.TokenInfo, error) {
oAuthFlow, err := authClient.GetOAuthFlow(a.ctx, forceDeviceAuth)
oAuthFlow, err := authClient.GetOAuthFlow(a.ctx, forceDeviceAuth, false)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get OAuth flow: %v", err)
}

View File

@@ -61,6 +61,10 @@ const (
var ErrServiceNotUp = errors.New("service is not up")
type statusSetter interface {
Set(update internal.StatusType)
}
// Server for service control.
type Server struct {
rootCtx context.Context
@@ -675,54 +679,7 @@ func (s *Server) Login(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.LoginRequest) (*pro
}
if msg.SetupKey == "" {
hint := ""
if msg.Hint != nil {
hint = *msg.Hint
}
oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, config, msg.IsUnixDesktopClient, false, hint)
if err != nil {
state.Set(internal.StatusLoginFailed)
return nil, err
}
if s.oauthAuthFlow.flow != nil && s.oauthAuthFlow.flow.GetClientID(ctx) == oAuthFlow.GetClientID(ctx) {
if s.oauthAuthFlow.expiresAt.After(time.Now().Add(90 * time.Second)) {
log.Debugf("using previous oauth flow info")
state.Set(internal.StatusNeedsLogin)
return &proto.LoginResponse{
NeedsSSOLogin: true,
VerificationURI: s.oauthAuthFlow.info.VerificationURI,
VerificationURIComplete: s.oauthAuthFlow.info.VerificationURIComplete,
UserCode: s.oauthAuthFlow.info.UserCode,
}, nil
} else {
log.Warnf("canceling previous waiting execution")
if s.oauthAuthFlow.waitCancel != nil {
s.oauthAuthFlow.waitCancel()
}
}
}
authInfo, err := oAuthFlow.RequestAuthInfo(ctx)
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("getting a request OAuth flow failed: %v", err)
return nil, err
}
s.mutex.Lock()
s.oauthAuthFlow.flow = oAuthFlow
s.oauthAuthFlow.info = authInfo
s.oauthAuthFlow.expiresAt = time.Now().Add(time.Duration(authInfo.ExpiresIn) * time.Second)
s.mutex.Unlock()
state.Set(internal.StatusNeedsLogin)
return &proto.LoginResponse{
NeedsSSOLogin: true,
VerificationURI: authInfo.VerificationURI,
VerificationURIComplete: authInfo.VerificationURIComplete,
UserCode: authInfo.UserCode,
}, nil
return s.startSSOLogin(ctx, msg, config, state)
}
// Setup-key path: we are about to dial Management with the key, so the
@@ -738,6 +695,72 @@ func (s *Server) Login(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.LoginRequest) (*pro
return &proto.LoginResponse{}, nil
}
// startSSOLogin opens the interactive leg of a login: it reuses the in-flight
// OAuth flow when one is still valid for the same client, and otherwise
// requests fresh auth info and parks the daemon on StatusNeedsLogin.
func (s *Server) startSSOLogin(ctx context.Context, msg *proto.LoginRequest, config *profilemanager.Config, state statusSetter) (*proto.LoginResponse, error) {
hint := ""
if msg.Hint != nil {
hint = *msg.Hint
}
oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, config, msg.IsUnixDesktopClient, false, hint, false)
if err != nil {
state.Set(internal.StatusLoginFailed)
return nil, err
}
if resp := s.reuseOAuthFlow(ctx, oAuthFlow, state); resp != nil {
return resp, nil
}
authInfo, err := oAuthFlow.RequestAuthInfo(ctx)
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("getting a request OAuth flow failed: %v", err)
return nil, err
}
s.mutex.Lock()
s.oauthAuthFlow.flow = oAuthFlow
s.oauthAuthFlow.info = authInfo
s.oauthAuthFlow.expiresAt = time.Now().Add(time.Duration(authInfo.ExpiresIn) * time.Second)
s.mutex.Unlock()
state.Set(internal.StatusNeedsLogin)
return &proto.LoginResponse{
NeedsSSOLogin: true,
VerificationURI: authInfo.VerificationURI,
VerificationURIComplete: authInfo.VerificationURIComplete,
UserCode: authInfo.UserCode,
}, nil
}
// reuseOAuthFlow returns the cached auth info when the previous flow targets
// the same client and still has enough life left, and otherwise cancels the
// stale wait and returns nil so the caller requests a fresh flow.
func (s *Server) reuseOAuthFlow(ctx context.Context, oAuthFlow auth.OAuthFlow, state statusSetter) *proto.LoginResponse {
if s.oauthAuthFlow.flow == nil || s.oauthAuthFlow.flow.GetClientID(ctx) != oAuthFlow.GetClientID(ctx) {
return nil
}
if !s.oauthAuthFlow.expiresAt.After(time.Now().Add(90 * time.Second)) {
log.Warnf("canceling previous waiting execution")
if s.oauthAuthFlow.waitCancel != nil {
s.oauthAuthFlow.waitCancel()
}
return nil
}
log.Debugf("using previous oauth flow info")
state.Set(internal.StatusNeedsLogin)
return &proto.LoginResponse{
NeedsSSOLogin: true,
VerificationURI: s.oauthAuthFlow.info.VerificationURI,
VerificationURIComplete: s.oauthAuthFlow.info.VerificationURIComplete,
UserCode: s.oauthAuthFlow.info.UserCode,
}
}
// WaitSSOLogin validates the supplied userCode against the in-flight OAuth
// device/PKCE flow and blocks until the user finishes the browser leg.
//
@@ -1724,7 +1747,7 @@ func (s *Server) RequestJWTAuth(
}
// the daemon has no graphical session of its own, only the caller can answer this
oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, config, msg.GetHasGraphicalSession(), false, hint)
oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, config, msg.GetHasGraphicalSession(), false, hint, false)
if err != nil {
return nil, gstatus.Errorf(codes.Internal, "failed to create OAuth flow: %v", err)
}
@@ -1828,7 +1851,7 @@ func (s *Server) RequestExtendAuthSession(
}
// the daemon has no graphical session of its own, only the caller can answer this
oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, config, msg.GetHasGraphicalSession(), false, hint)
oAuthFlow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, config, msg.GetHasGraphicalSession(), false, hint, true)
if err != nil {
return nil, gstatus.Errorf(codes.Internal, "failed to create OAuth flow: %v", err)
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
package grpc
import (
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/client/common"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
)
func TestApplySessionExtendFlowPolicy(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
flow *proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow
sessionExtend bool
disablePromptLogin bool
loginFlag uint32
}{
{
name: "extend forces prompt=login over a silent flow",
flow: &proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow{
ProviderConfig: &proto.ProviderConfig{
DisablePromptLogin: true,
LoginFlag: uint32(common.LoginFlagMaxAge0),
},
},
sessionExtend: true,
disablePromptLogin: false,
loginFlag: uint32(common.LoginFlagPromptLogin),
},
{
name: "extend replaces max_age=0 so login_hint is honoured",
flow: &proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow{
ProviderConfig: &proto.ProviderConfig{
DisablePromptLogin: false,
LoginFlag: uint32(common.LoginFlagMaxAge0),
},
},
sessionExtend: true,
disablePromptLogin: false,
loginFlag: uint32(common.LoginFlagPromptLogin),
},
{
name: "login keeps the configured flow untouched",
flow: &proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow{
ProviderConfig: &proto.ProviderConfig{
DisablePromptLogin: true,
LoginFlag: uint32(common.LoginFlagMaxAge0),
},
},
sessionExtend: false,
disablePromptLogin: true,
loginFlag: uint32(common.LoginFlagMaxAge0),
},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
applySessionExtendFlowPolicy(tc.flow, tc.sessionExtend)
cfg := tc.flow.GetProviderConfig()
assert.Equal(t, tc.disablePromptLogin, cfg.GetDisablePromptLogin())
assert.Equal(t, tc.loginFlag, cfg.GetLoginFlag())
})
}
}
// A provider config is not guaranteed to be present on the response; clearing
// the flag must not panic when the validator returned an empty flow.
func TestApplySessionExtendFlowPolicyWithoutProviderConfig(t *testing.T) {
assert.NotPanics(t, func() {
applySessionExtendFlowPolicy(&proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow{}, true)
applySessionExtendFlowPolicy(nil, true)
})
}

View File

@@ -1180,7 +1180,8 @@ func (s *Server) GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow(ctx context.Context, req *proto.Encryp
return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Internal, "failed to get server key")
}
err = encryption.DecryptMessage(peerKey, key, req.Body, &proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest{})
flowReq := &proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest{}
err = encryption.DecryptMessage(peerKey, key, req.Body, flowReq)
if err != nil {
errMSG := fmt.Sprintf("error while decrypting peer's message with Wireguard public key %s.", req.WgPubKey)
log.WithContext(ctx).Warn(errMSG)
@@ -1224,6 +1225,7 @@ func (s *Server) GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow(ctx context.Context, req *proto.Encryp
}
flowInfoResp := s.integratedPeerValidator.ValidateFlowResponse(ctx, peerKey.String(), initInfoFlow)
applySessionExtendFlowPolicy(flowInfoResp, flowReq.GetSessionExtend())
encryptedResp, err := encryption.EncryptMessage(peerKey, key, flowInfoResp)
if err != nil {
@@ -1236,6 +1238,32 @@ func (s *Server) GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow(ctx context.Context, req *proto.Encryp
}, nil
}
// applySessionExtendFlowPolicy forces a prompt=login flow for a session extend.
//
// An extend renews the session of one specific peer, so its token has to come
// from the account that peer is registered under. A flow that does not prompt
// leaves the choice to the IdP, which answers a silent authorization from any
// session it already holds — not necessarily this peer's account when several
// are signed in, and login_hint is a suggestion the IdP may ignore. The token
// then fails the jwt.UserID == peer.UserID check in ExtendAuthSession, and the
// user is given no opportunity to pick a different account.
//
// LoginFlagPromptLogin rather than max_age=0: both re-authenticate, but with
// prompt=login the IdP honours login_hint and offers the peer's own account,
// whereas max_age=0 leaves the user to find it among every account signed in.
//
// Called after ValidateFlowResponse so that a per-peer override cannot reinstate
// the silent flow for an extend.
func applySessionExtendFlowPolicy(flow *proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow, sessionExtend bool) {
if !sessionExtend {
return
}
if cfg := flow.GetProviderConfig(); cfg != nil {
cfg.DisablePromptLogin = false
cfg.LoginFlag = uint32(common.LoginFlagPromptLogin)
}
}
// SyncMeta endpoint is used to synchronize peer's system metadata and notifies the connected,
// peer's under the same account of any updates.
func (s *Server) SyncMeta(ctx context.Context, req *proto.EncryptedMessage) (*proto.Empty, error) {

View File

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ type Client interface {
// is not eligible for session extension.
ExtendAuthSession(sysInfo *system.Info, jwtToken string) (*proto.ExtendAuthSessionResponse, error)
GetDeviceAuthorizationFlow() (*proto.DeviceAuthorizationFlow, error)
GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow() (*proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow, error)
GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow(sessionExtend bool) (*proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow, error)
GetServerURL() string
// IsHealthy returns the current connection status without blocking.
// Used by the engine to monitor connectivity in the background.

View File

@@ -595,7 +595,12 @@ func Test_GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow(t *testing.T) {
},
}
var gotRequest mgmtProto.PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest
mgmtMockServer.GetPKCEAuthorizationFlowFunc = func(ctx context.Context, req *mgmtProto.EncryptedMessage) (*mgmtProto.EncryptedMessage, error) {
if err := encryption.DecryptMessage(client.key.PublicKey(), serverKey, req.Body, &gotRequest); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
encryptedResp, err := encryption.EncryptMessage(client.key.PublicKey(), serverKey, expectedFlowInfo)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -608,11 +613,13 @@ func Test_GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow(t *testing.T) {
}, nil
}
flowInfo, err := client.GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow()
flowInfo, err := client.GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow(true)
if err != nil {
t.Error("error while retrieving pkce auth flow information")
}
assert.True(t, gotRequest.GetSessionExtend(), "session extend should reach the server")
assert.Equal(t, expectedFlowInfo.ProviderConfig.ClientID, flowInfo.ProviderConfig.ClientID, "provider configured client ID should match")
assert.Equal(t, expectedFlowInfo.ProviderConfig.ClientSecret, flowInfo.ProviderConfig.ClientSecret, "provider configured client secret should match") //nolint:staticcheck
}

View File

@@ -701,7 +701,11 @@ func (c *GrpcClient) GetDeviceAuthorizationFlow() (*proto.DeviceAuthorizationFlo
// GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow returns a pkce authorization flow information.
// It also takes care of encrypting and decrypting messages.
func (c *GrpcClient) GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow() (*proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow, error) {
//
// sessionExtend tells the server the flow will renew an existing peer's session
// rather than log one in, so it can rule out a configuration that would let the
// IdP answer from an unrelated account. See PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest.
func (c *GrpcClient) GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow(sessionExtend bool) (*proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow, error) {
if !c.ready() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("no connection to management in order to get pkce authorization flow")
}
@@ -714,7 +718,7 @@ func (c *GrpcClient) GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow() (*proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow, e
mgmCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(c.ctx, time.Second*2)
defer cancel()
message := &proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest{}
message := &proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest{SessionExtend: sessionExtend}
encryptedMSG, err := encryption.EncryptMessage(*serverKey, c.key, message)
if err != nil {
return nil, err

View File

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ type MockClient struct {
LoginFunc func(info *system.Info, sshKey []byte, dnsLabels domain.List) (*proto.LoginResponse, error)
ExtendAuthSessionFunc func(info *system.Info, jwtToken string) (*proto.ExtendAuthSessionResponse, error)
GetDeviceAuthorizationFlowFunc func() (*proto.DeviceAuthorizationFlow, error)
GetPKCEAuthorizationFlowFunc func() (*proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow, error)
GetPKCEAuthorizationFlowFunc func(sessionExtend bool) (*proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow, error)
GetServerURLFunc func() string
HealthCheckFunc func() error
SyncMetaFunc func(sysInfo *system.Info) error
@@ -80,11 +80,11 @@ func (m *MockClient) GetDeviceAuthorizationFlow() (*proto.DeviceAuthorizationFlo
return m.GetDeviceAuthorizationFlowFunc()
}
func (m *MockClient) GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow() (*proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow, error) {
func (m *MockClient) GetPKCEAuthorizationFlow(sessionExtend bool) (*proto.PKCEAuthorizationFlow, error) {
if m.GetPKCEAuthorizationFlowFunc == nil {
return nil, nil
}
return m.GetPKCEAuthorizationFlowFunc()
return m.GetPKCEAuthorizationFlowFunc(sessionExtend)
}
func (m *MockClient) HealthCheck() error {

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -530,8 +530,18 @@ message DeviceAuthorizationFlow {
}
}
// PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest empty struct for future expansion
message PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest {}
// PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest asks for the PKCE flow configuration to use for
// an upcoming authorization request.
message PKCEAuthorizationFlowRequest {
// SessionExtend indicates the flow will renew the SSO session of a peer that
// is already registered, rather than log in or register one. An extend is
// bound to the account that peer belongs to, so the server must not answer it
// with a configuration that lets the IdP reply from whatever session is
// already active: with several accounts signed in at the IdP that need not be
// the peer's own, and the resulting token is rejected as a peer/user mismatch
// with no way for the user to correct it.
bool SessionExtend = 1;
}
// PKCEAuthorizationFlow represents Authorization Code Flow information
// that can be used by the client to login initiate a Oauth 2.0 authorization code grant flow