Files
netbird/client/server/debug_gate_test.go
T
riccardom d5a9f5b0ff [client] Do not refuse a caller's upload URL that an MDM policy overrides anyway
The privilege gate ran on the URL the caller named before the resolver applied
the MDM policy, so on a managed device an unprivileged `netbird debug bundle -U
--upload-bundle-url <host>` was refused with "requires root" — even though the
policy would have discarded that URL and uploaded to the pinned destination.
Gating a value that has no effect only turns a working bundle into a denial.

Read the policy before the gate and tell the gate the destination is pinned, so
it skips the caller-URL branch. --upload-bundle-insecure stays gated either way:
relaxing TLS towards the pinned host is a real weakening, and that one is the
caller's doing.

Reported by cubic on #7514.
2026-09-29 14:29:27 +02:00

171 lines
6.0 KiB
Go

//go:build !android && !ios
package server
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"testing"
"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
gstatus "google.golang.org/grpc/status"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/upload-server/types"
)
func TestRegisterUILogRefusesUnidentifiedCaller(t *testing.T) {
s := &Server{}
_, err := s.RegisterUILog(noIdentityCtx(), &proto.RegisterUILogRequest{
Path: filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), uiLogFileName),
})
if gstatus.Code(err) != codes.PermissionDenied {
t.Fatalf("code = %v, want PermissionDenied", gstatus.Code(err))
}
}
func TestRegisterUILogRefusesForeignPath(t *testing.T) {
secret := "/etc/shadow"
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
secret = `C:\Windows\System32\config\SAM`
}
tests := []struct {
name string
path string
}{
{"empty", ""},
{"relative", filepath.Join("netbird", uiLogFileName)},
{"another file", secret},
{"directory of the log", t.TempDir()},
{"unc path", `\\attacker\share\` + uiLogFileName},
{"device path", `\\.\C:\` + uiLogFileName},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
s := &Server{}
_, err := s.RegisterUILog(userCtx(), &proto.RegisterUILogRequest{Path: tc.path})
if gstatus.Code(err) != codes.InvalidArgument {
t.Fatalf("code = %v, want InvalidArgument", gstatus.Code(err))
}
if s.uiLogPath != "" {
t.Fatalf("path %q was recorded despite the refusal", s.uiLogPath)
}
})
}
}
func TestRegisterUILogRecordsPath(t *testing.T) {
s := &Server{}
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), uiLogFileName)
if _, err := s.RegisterUILog(userCtx(), &proto.RegisterUILogRequest{Path: path}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("register: %v", err)
}
if s.uiLogPath != path {
t.Fatalf("path = %q, want %q", s.uiLogPath, path)
}
}
// The UI log is opened as the bundle requester, so a second local user cannot
// collect a log they do not own, and an unidentified requester collects nothing.
func TestUILogOpenerBindsToRequester(t *testing.T) {
path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), uiLogFileName)
if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("log line"), 0600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write log: %v", err)
}
// A different unprivileged user than the file's owner: refused.
if _, err := uiLogOpener(unprivilegedIdentity(), true)(path); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected a file the requester does not own to be refused")
}
// No verified identity: refused.
if _, err := uiLogOpener(ipcauth.Identity{}, false)(path); err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected an unidentified requester to be refused")
}
// The requester that owns the file: allowed. The test process created it, so
// its own identity is the owner (and a privileged runner is exempt anyway).
owner, err := ipcauth.CurrentProcessIdentity()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("current identity: %v", err)
}
f, err := uiLogOpener(owner, true)(path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected the owning requester to be allowed, got %v", err)
}
_ = f.Close()
}
func TestRequirePrivilegeForUploadURL(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
url string
insecure bool
noUpload bool
mdmPinned bool
unprivOK bool
invalid bool
rootAlso bool
}{
{name: "no upload", url: "", unprivOK: true},
// An empty URL resolves to the destination management published, so
// relaxing TLS towards it needs the same privilege as naming a host.
{name: "insecure with no URL", url: "", insecure: true, rootAlso: true},
// insecure only weakens an upload; a local-only bundle must still pass.
{name: "insecure with no URL and no upload", url: "", insecure: true, noUpload: true, unprivOK: true},
{name: "default service", url: types.DefaultBundleURL, unprivOK: true},
{name: "default service, other path", url: "https://upload.debug.netbird.io/other", unprivOK: true},
{name: "loopback exfiltration endpoint", url: "https://127.0.0.1:8080/upload-url", rootAlso: true},
{name: "custom upload service", url: "https://attacker.example/upload-url", rootAlso: true},
// With MDM pinning the destination the caller's URL is discarded before
// the upload, so refusing it would only turn a bundle that was going to
// the pinned host anyway into a denial.
{name: "custom URL ignored when MDM pins the destination", url: "https://attacker.example/upload-url", mdmPinned: true, unprivOK: true},
// Transport security is still the caller's to weaken, pinned or not.
{name: "insecure still gated when MDM pins the destination", url: "https://attacker.example/upload-url", insecure: true, mdmPinned: true, rootAlso: true},
{name: "plaintext default host", url: "http://upload.debug.netbird.io/upload-url", invalid: true},
{name: "plaintext custom host", url: "http://attacker.example/upload-url", invalid: true},
{name: "unsupported scheme", url: "file:///etc/shadow", invalid: true},
// insecure relaxes transport security; privileged only, whatever the host.
{name: "insecure http custom", url: "http://selfhosted.local/upload-url", insecure: true, rootAlso: true},
{name: "insecure https custom", url: "https://selfhosted.local/upload-url", insecure: true, rootAlso: true},
{name: "insecure default host", url: types.DefaultBundleURL, insecure: true, rootAlso: true},
// --insecure must not widen the URL to non-http(s) schemes or a hostless URL.
{name: "insecure file scheme", url: "file:///etc/shadow", insecure: true, invalid: true},
{name: "insecure hostless", url: "https:///upload-url", insecure: true, invalid: true},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
err := requirePrivilegeForUploadURL(userCtx(), tc.url, tc.insecure, !tc.noUpload, tc.mdmPinned)
switch {
case tc.invalid:
if gstatus.Code(err) != codes.InvalidArgument {
t.Fatalf("code = %v, want InvalidArgument", gstatus.Code(err))
}
return
case tc.unprivOK:
assertAllowed(t, err)
return
default:
assertDenied(t, err)
}
if tc.rootAlso {
assertAllowed(t, requirePrivilegeForUploadURL(rootCtx(), tc.url, tc.insecure, !tc.noUpload, tc.mdmPinned))
}
})
}
}