Files
netbird/client/ios/NetBirdSDK/login.go
T
Zoltan Papp 515a01dd11 [client] Force interactive login when extending the auth session (#7216)
* [client] Force interactive login when extending the auth session

A session extend must be answered from the account the peer is registered
under. With a silent PKCE flow (DisablePromptLogin or max_age=0) the IdP
answers from whatever session it already holds, which need not be the
peer's account when several are signed in; the token then fails the
user match in ExtendAuthSession with no way to pick another account.

Mark the PKCE flow request as a session extend so the management server
can force prompt=login for it, overriding the configured silent flow.

* [client] Reduce cognitive complexity of Server.Login

Login sat at cognitive complexity 27, over the 25 the linter allows.

Extract the interactive SSO branch into startSSOLogin, and split the
nested in-flight-flow reuse check out of it into reuseOAuthFlow, which
flattens the original if/else into early returns: it returns the cached
auth info when the previous flow targets the same client and still has
more than 90s left, otherwise cancels the stale wait and returns nil so
the caller requests a fresh flow.

The helpers take the contextState through a small statusSetter
interface, since internal.contextState is unexported and re-deriving it
with CtxGetState inside the helper would resolve against callerCtx
rather than rootCtx.

No behavior change: same ordering of state transitions, same mutex scope
around the oauthAuthFlow write, same error paths. Login is now at 21.

* [client] Respect DisablePromptLogin when extending the auth session

Forcing prompt=login on a session extend overrode DisablePromptLogin, which
is set for IdPs that break on it: Authentik triggers a double authentication
and social logins fail outright. Overriding it there trades a recoverable
extend for a login that cannot complete at all.

Keep the LoginFlag override, which only replaces max_age=0 or none with
prompt=login so the IdP honours login_hint, and leave DisablePromptLogin as
configured. Those deployments keep the silent flow, and with several accounts
signed in an extend answered from the wrong one still fails the user match.

* [client] Guard the shared OAuth flow state with the server mutex

reuseOAuthFlow read flow, expiresAt, waitCancel and info without holding
s.mutex, while startSSOLogin and WaitSSOLogin write them under it. Reading the
fields one at a time could also answer with auth info from a flow that was
already replaced, or cancel a wait that no longer belongs to the flow just
judged stale. Take one snapshot under the lock and decide from it.

WaitSSOLogin read oauthAuthFlow.flow twice outside the lock; both now use a
value snapshotted in the critical section that already installs actCancel.

Its stale waitCancel was read and called in a separate section from the one
installing the new one, so two racing calls could read the same predecessor and
leave one wait uncancelled. Swap the two in a single critical section. Both
cancels run after unlocking: the displaced wait takes s.mutex as it unwinds.

* [client] Verify the SSO login came back for the hinted account

login_hint is a suggestion the IdP may ignore: with a silent flow configured
(DisablePromptLogin or max_age=0) and a live IdP session for another account,
the login completes with that account's token. On a registered peer the
management server rejects it as a user mismatch, but on a fresh profile the
peer silently registers under the wrong account and the profile is then bound
to it — every later login follows the stored hint straight back.

After the token exchange, compare the ID token's email against the hint the
flow was sent with. On a mismatch, do not log in to management with the token;
run one more round asking the IdP to re-decide the account (prompt=login, via
ForceAccountPrompt — DisablePromptLogin still wins there). If the prompted
round also comes back different, proceed with a warning: the address may
legitimately have changed, and refusing forever would lock the user out of the
profile while the management server still rejects a token that does not own
the peer. A token or profile with no email to compare is not judged.

The retry differs per platform because of who opens the browser:

- CLI (netbird login foreground) and Android run the whole flow in one
  process, so the mismatch retries automatically: the browser reopens with
  the account prompt within the same login attempt.
- On desktop the login is split between the daemon and the GUI: Login hands
  the authorize URL to the GUI, WaitSSOLogin blocks for the token, and only
  the GUI can open a browser. A new URL cannot be handed out from inside
  WaitSSOLogin (its response has no field for one, kept that way to avoid a
  proto change), so the daemon arms forceAccountPrompt, fails the round with
  "connect again to choose the account", and builds the next Login's flow
  with the prompt — the user's next connect is the retry.

The flag and the flow annotations live in daemon memory only; SwitchProfile
drops them so the previous profile's hint cannot judge the next profile's
token. The device code flow has no prompt parameter (RFC 8628), so a prompted
round there runs as-is and a repeated mismatch is let through with the
warning rather than looping.

* [client] Address review comments on PKCE session extend flow

Fail the PKCE authorization flow test on request error instead of
continuing into a nil dereference, and make the godoc comments on the
touched exported symbols identifier-leading full sentences.

* [client] Match accounts only on the email claim of the ID token

The name-claim fallback in the ID token parsing is kept for the login
hint and display, but account matching now only considers a value that
came from the email claim, so a token without one no longer produces a
false account mismatch.

* [client] Drop the pending session extend on a profile switch

The profile-switch cleanup dropped the pending login flow and the
account-prompt flag, but left extendAuthSessionFlow untouched. Its device
code was issued by the previous profile's IdP client, so a
WaitExtendAuthSession still parked on the browser leg would submit the
resulting token against the new profile's engine.

* [client] Judge the SSO account against the flow that produced the token

WaitSSOLogin snapshotted the flow on entry but re-read the info, hint and
accountPrompted from the live s.oauthAuthFlow afterwards, in separate
critical sections. WaitToken blocks for the whole browser leg, so a
concurrent Login or RequestJWTAuth could replace the flow meanwhile and
the mismatch check would compare this wait's token against another flow's
account: either arming the prompt spuriously or letting a wrong-account
token through against an unrelated profile's hint. Take all of it in the
entry snapshot.

* [client] Keep the forced account prompt from being lost to flow reuse

startSSOLogin consumed forceAccountPrompt and applied the prompt to the
freshly built flow, but reuseOAuthFlow could then answer from a cached
flow for the same client — one built without prompt=login, e.g. by
RequestJWTAuth. The user got the same silent authorization URL that
produced the mismatch, with the flag already spent, so no later round
asked either. Rule reuse out when the prompt is forced, while still
cancelling the predecessor's wait.

RequestJWTAuth also wrote the flow fields one by one, leaving the previous
login's hint and accountPrompted behind for WaitSSOLogin to judge a later
token against. Both sites now replace the whole record.

* [client] Consume the forced account prompt after the retry

forceAccountPrompt was never cleared, so a flow that outlived the retry it
was armed for kept sending prompt=login on every later authorization
request and re-authenticated the user each time. RequestAuthInfo now takes
the flag as it builds the request.

* [client] Cancel the caller context in the SSO login tests

WaitSSOLogin parks a goroutine on the caller's context for the whole
browser leg. The tests passed context.Background(), which never cancels,
so each left one goroutine behind for the lifetime of the test binary.

* [client] Cancel the wait displaced by an OAuth flow replacement

Replacing the shared record with a whole struct value dropped the previous
flow's waitCancel, so an SSO browser wait still parked on it lost its
cancel: nothing could preempt it, and it could go on to run attemptLogin
or mutate the record behind the new flow. Both replacement sites now take
the displaced cancel over in the same critical section, via a shared
replaceOAuthFlow, and invoke it after the unlock.

* [client] Guard OAuth flow mutations by the flow that owns the wait

* [client] Arm the account prompt only from the wait that owns the flow

* [client] Adopt the three-value parseEmailFromIDToken in the device flow

The main merge brought in the device flow's email extraction from #7193,
which still used the two-value signature this branch replaced when account
matching was narrowed to the email claim. Git merged the files without a
textual conflict, so the branch stopped compiling.

Take the fromEmailClaim result and fill EmailClaim from it, the same way the
PKCE path does, so device-flow clients get the same account matching.

* [client] Populate the pending extend flow in the test server helper

SwitchProfile cancels and clears the pending session extend flow
unconditionally, the same way it clears the SSH JWT cache. New always
populates the field, but the hand-assembled test server did not, so
TestSwitchProfile_ClearsJWTCache panicked on a nil PendingFlow.
2026-10-08 15:40:39 +02:00

430 lines
14 KiB
Go

//go:build ios
package NetBirdSDK
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"time"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/auth"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/mdm"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/mobile"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/system"
)
// SSOListener is async listener for mobile framework
type SSOListener interface {
OnSuccess(bool)
OnError(error)
}
// ErrListener is async listener for mobile framework
type ErrListener interface {
OnSuccess()
OnError(error)
}
// URLOpener it is a callback interface. The Open function will be triggered if
// the backend want to show an url for the user
type URLOpener interface {
Open(url string, userCode string)
OnLoginSuccess()
}
// Auth can register or login new client
type Auth struct {
ctx context.Context
cancel context.CancelFunc
config *profilemanager.Config
base *profilemanager.Config
policy *mdm.Policy
cfgPath string
}
// NewAuth instantiate Auth struct and validate the management URL.
// Auth is constructed under the active MDM policy: the policy is overlaid on
// the resolved config so the login runs against the enforced values, while
// the persisted config keeps the caller-supplied ones; a caller-supplied
// management URL is ignored while MDM manages that key. A nil fetcher
// disables MDM enforcement.
func NewAuth(cfgPath string, mgmURL string, fetcher PolicyFetcher) (*Auth, error) {
policy := loaderFor(fetcher).Load()
inputCfg := profilemanager.ConfigInput{ConfigPath: cfgPath}
if _, managed := policy.GetString(mdm.KeyManagementURL); !managed {
inputCfg.ManagementURL = mgmURL
}
// Load the existing config when a config file is already present so an
// interactive re-login reuses the peer's persisted WireGuard private key
// (and thus its identity) instead of generating a fresh one. Generating a
// new key registers a brand-new peer on the management server on every
// re-auth (named after the fallback hostname). Only fall back to a fresh
// in-memory config for the first-time login when no config file exists yet.
// DirectUpdateOrCreateConfig uses non-atomic writes so it also works inside
// the tvOS App Group sandbox where atomic temp-file+rename is blocked.
var cfg *profilemanager.Config
var err error
if cfgPath != "" {
cfg, err = profilemanager.DirectUpdateOrCreateConfig(inputCfg)
} else {
cfg, err = profilemanager.CreateInMemoryConfig(inputCfg)
}
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
a := &Auth{policy: policy, cfgPath: cfgPath}
if err := a.setBaseConfig(cfg); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Use a cancellable context so Stop() can abort an in-progress interactive
// login. The PKCE flow's WaitToken blocks (and keeps its loopback HTTP server
// bound to a port) until the OAuth callback arrives or the flow expires;
// cancelling the context unblocks WaitToken, which then shuts that server down
// and frees the port for the next login attempt. iOS runs login in the main-app
// process (decoupled from the network extension), so without this the server
// lingers after the user dismisses the browser and the next connect stalls
// trying to bind the same port.
a.ctx, a.cancel = context.WithCancel(context.Background())
return a, nil
}
// NewAuthWithConfig instantiate Auth based on existing config
func NewAuthWithConfig(ctx context.Context, config *profilemanager.Config) *Auth {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(ctx)
return &Auth{
ctx: ctx,
cancel: cancel,
config: config,
}
}
// Stop aborts an in-progress interactive login started via Login/LoginWithDeviceName.
// It cancels the auth context, which unblocks the PKCE WaitToken and shuts down its
// loopback HTTP server, freeing the redirect port. Safe to call multiple times and
// safe to call when no login is running.
func (a *Auth) Stop() {
if a.cancel != nil {
a.cancel()
}
}
// SaveConfigIfSSOSupported reports whether the management server supports SSO; the config is already persisted by NewAuth.
func (a *Auth) SaveConfigIfSSOSupported(listener SSOListener) {
if listener == nil {
log.Errorf("SaveConfigIfSSOSupported: listener is nil")
return
}
go func() {
sso, err := a.saveConfigIfSSOSupported()
if err != nil {
listener.OnError(err)
} else {
listener.OnSuccess(sso)
}
}()
}
func (a *Auth) saveConfigIfSSOSupported() (bool, error) {
authClient, err := auth.NewAuth(a.ctx, a.config.PrivateKey, a.config.ManagementURL, a.config)
if err != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("failed to create auth client: %v", err)
}
defer authClient.Close()
supportsSSO, err := authClient.IsSSOSupported(a.ctx)
if err != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("failed to check SSO support: %v", err)
}
return supportsSSO, nil
}
// LoginWithSetupKeyAndSaveConfig registers the peer with the setup key; the config is already persisted by NewAuth.
func (a *Auth) LoginWithSetupKeyAndSaveConfig(resultListener ErrListener, setupKey string, deviceName string) {
if resultListener == nil {
log.Errorf("LoginWithSetupKeyAndSaveConfig: resultListener is nil")
return
}
go func() {
err := a.loginWithSetupKeyAndSaveConfig(setupKey, deviceName)
if err != nil {
resultListener.OnError(err)
} else {
resultListener.OnSuccess()
}
}()
}
func (a *Auth) loginWithSetupKeyAndSaveConfig(setupKey string, deviceName string) error {
authClient, err := auth.NewAuth(a.ctx, a.config.PrivateKey, a.config.ManagementURL, a.config)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create auth client: %v", err)
}
defer authClient.Close()
//nolint
ctxWithValues := context.WithValue(a.ctx, system.DeviceNameCtxKey, deviceName)
err, _ = authClient.Login(ctxWithValues, setupKey, "")
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("login failed: %v", err)
}
return nil
}
// LoginSync performs a synchronous login check without UI interaction
// Used for background VPN connection where user should already be authenticated
func (a *Auth) LoginSync() error {
authClient, err := auth.NewAuth(a.ctx, a.config.PrivateKey, a.config.ManagementURL, a.config)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create auth client: %v", err)
}
defer authClient.Close()
// check if we need to generate JWT token
needsLogin, err := authClient.IsLoginRequired(a.ctx)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to check login requirement: %v", err)
}
jwtToken := ""
if needsLogin {
return fmt.Errorf("not authenticated")
}
err, isAuthError := authClient.Login(a.ctx, "", jwtToken)
if err != nil {
if isAuthError {
// PermissionDenied means registration is required or peer is blocked
return fmt.Errorf("authentication error: %v", err)
}
return fmt.Errorf("login failed: %v", err)
}
return nil
}
// Login performs interactive login with device authentication support
// Deprecated: Use LoginWithDeviceName instead to ensure proper device naming on tvOS
func (a *Auth) Login(resultListener ErrListener, urlOpener URLOpener, forceDeviceAuth bool) {
// Use empty device name - system will use hostname as fallback
a.LoginWithDeviceName(resultListener, urlOpener, forceDeviceAuth, "")
}
// LoginWithDeviceName performs interactive login with device authentication support
// The deviceName parameter allows specifying a custom device name (required for tvOS)
func (a *Auth) LoginWithDeviceName(resultListener ErrListener, urlOpener URLOpener, forceDeviceAuth bool, deviceName string) {
a.startLogin(resultListener, urlOpener, forceDeviceAuth, deviceName, false)
}
// LoginInteractive performs the same interactive login as LoginWithDeviceName but skips the
// IsLoginRequired() pre-flight and goes straight to the browser / device-code flow.
//
// IsLoginRequired() is itself a full Login RPC against the management server, so when the
// caller has ALREADY established that login is required it is a pure duplicate. On iOS the
// main app decides to show the browser based on its own isLoginRequired() check and then
// calls straight into this method, so re-asking the server would add another Login RPC to
// every interactive login.
//
// Use LoginWithDeviceName when the auth state is unknown and a silent (browser-less) login
// must still be possible; use this when the browser is going to be shown regardless.
func (a *Auth) LoginInteractive(resultListener ErrListener, urlOpener URLOpener, forceDeviceAuth bool, deviceName string) {
a.startLogin(resultListener, urlOpener, forceDeviceAuth, deviceName, true)
}
func (a *Auth) startLogin(resultListener ErrListener, urlOpener URLOpener, forceDeviceAuth bool, deviceName string, skipLoginCheck bool) {
if resultListener == nil {
log.Errorf("startLogin: resultListener is nil")
return
}
if urlOpener == nil {
log.Errorf("startLogin: urlOpener is nil")
resultListener.OnError(fmt.Errorf("urlOpener is nil"))
return
}
go func() {
err := a.login(urlOpener, forceDeviceAuth, deviceName, skipLoginCheck)
if err != nil {
resultListener.OnError(err)
} else {
resultListener.OnSuccess()
}
}()
}
func (a *Auth) login(urlOpener URLOpener, forceDeviceAuth bool, deviceName string, skipLoginCheck bool) error {
// Create context with device name if provided
ctx := a.ctx
if deviceName != "" {
//nolint:staticcheck
ctx = context.WithValue(a.ctx, system.DeviceNameCtxKey, deviceName)
}
authClient, err := auth.NewAuth(ctx, a.config.PrivateKey, a.config.ManagementURL, a.config)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to create auth client: %v", err)
}
defer authClient.Close()
// check if we need to generate JWT token (skipped when the caller already knows)
needsLogin := true
if !skipLoginCheck {
needsLogin, err = authClient.IsLoginRequired(ctx)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to check login requirement: %v", err)
}
}
jwtToken := ""
email := ""
if needsLogin {
tokenInfo, err := a.foregroundGetTokenInfo(authClient, urlOpener, forceDeviceAuth)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("interactive sso login failed: %v", err)
}
jwtToken = tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse()
email = tokenInfo.Email
}
err, isAuthError := authClient.Login(ctx, "", jwtToken)
if err != nil {
if isAuthError {
// PermissionDenied means registration is required or peer is blocked
return fmt.Errorf("authentication error: %v", err)
}
return fmt.Errorf("login failed: %v", err)
}
// Stored after Login, not before: a rejected token must not leave a hint
// pointing at an account that cannot be used.
if email != "" && a.cfgPath != "" {
if err := mobile.WriteProfileEmail(a.cfgPath, email); err != nil {
log.Warnf("failed to store profile account email: %v", err)
}
}
// Notify caller of successful login synchronously before returning
urlOpener.OnLoginSuccess()
return nil
}
// profileLoginHint returns the stored account email for the profile at cfgPath,
// so a re-login targets the account the profile already belongs to instead of
// whatever session the shared browser cookie jar happens to hold.
//
// An empty hint is deliberate, not a fallback: a fresh profile leaves the
// choice to the IdP. Switching accounts is done by switching or removing
// profiles, not by logging out — logout keeps the email.
func profileLoginHint(cfgPath string) string {
if cfgPath == "" {
return ""
}
return mobile.ReadProfileEmail(cfgPath)
}
const authInfoRequestTimeout = 30 * time.Second
func (a *Auth) foregroundGetTokenInfo(authClient *auth.Auth, urlOpener URLOpener, forceDeviceAuth bool) (*auth.TokenInfo, error) {
oAuthFlow, err := authClient.GetOAuthFlow(a.ctx, forceDeviceAuth, false, profileLoginHint(a.cfgPath))
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get OAuth flow: %v", err)
}
// Use a bounded timeout for the auth info request to prevent indefinite hangs
authInfoCtx, authInfoCancel := context.WithTimeout(a.ctx, authInfoRequestTimeout)
defer authInfoCancel()
flowInfo, err := oAuthFlow.RequestAuthInfo(authInfoCtx)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("getting a request OAuth flow info failed: %v", err)
}
urlOpener.Open(flowInfo.VerificationURIComplete, flowInfo.UserCode)
waitTimeout := time.Duration(flowInfo.ExpiresIn) * time.Second
waitCTX, cancel := context.WithTimeout(a.ctx, waitTimeout)
defer cancel()
tokenInfo, err := oAuthFlow.WaitToken(waitCTX, flowInfo)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("waiting for browser login failed: %v", err)
}
return &tokenInfo, nil
}
// GetConfigJSON returns the config without the MDM overlay as JSON, for persisting it outside the config file (tvOS).
func (a *Auth) GetConfigJSON() (string, error) {
cfg := a.base
if cfg == nil {
cfg = a.config
}
if cfg == nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("no config available")
}
return profilemanager.ConfigToJSON(cfg)
}
// SetConfigFromJSON replaces the config from JSON; the MDM overlay is applied on top for the login.
func (a *Auth) SetConfigFromJSON(jsonStr string) error {
cfg, err := profilemanager.ConfigFromJSON(jsonStr)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return a.setBaseConfig(cfg)
}
func (a *Auth) setBaseConfig(base *profilemanager.Config) error {
// A logged-out profile carries no keys: the mobile logout clears them in
// place so the next login registers a new peer instead of resurrecting the
// old one. This is that login, and auth.NewAuth parses the WireGuard key
// before the SSO flow even starts, so an absent identity fails the login on
// key size rather than asking the user to sign in.
//
// Minted on the base config, which is the one GetConfigJSON hands back for
// the caller to store — the overlaid copy below is runtime-only.
generated, err := base.EnsureIdentity()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("ensure profile identity: %w", err)
}
if generated {
if a.cfgPath != "" {
// Non-atomic, like NewAuth's own write: the tvOS App Group sandbox
// blocks the temp-file-and-rename an atomic write needs.
if err := profilemanager.DirectWriteOutConfig(a.cfgPath, base); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write out profile config: %w", err)
}
} else {
// No file to write to — this is the tvOS path, where the profile
// lives in the caller's own store. It persists the new identity by
// calling GetConfigJSON once the login completes; until then the
// keys exist only here, and a login that never completes leaves
// nothing behind.
log.Infof("provisioned a peer identity for a config with no file on disk")
}
}
overlaid, err := copyConfig(base)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if a.policy != nil {
overlaid.ApplyMDMPolicy(a.policy)
}
a.base = base
a.config = overlaid
return nil
}
func copyConfig(cfg *profilemanager.Config) (*profilemanager.Config, error) {
raw, err := profilemanager.ConfigToJSON(cfg)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return profilemanager.ConfigFromJSON(raw)
}