Files
netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/service/service.go
mlsmaycon 167ee08e14 feat(private-service): expose NetBird-only services over tunnel peers
Adds a new "private" service mode for the reverse proxy: services
reachable exclusively over the embedded WireGuard tunnel, gated by
per-peer group membership instead of operator auth schemes.

Wire contract
- ProxyMapping.private (field 13): the proxy MUST call
  ValidateTunnelPeer and fail closed; operator schemes are bypassed.
- ProxyCapabilities.private (4) + supports_private_service (5):
  capability gate. Management never streams private mappings to
  proxies that don't claim the capability; the broadcast path applies
  the same filter via filterMappingsForProxy.
- ValidateTunnelPeer RPC: resolves an inbound tunnel IP to a peer,
  checks the peer's groups against service.AccessGroups, and mints
  a session JWT on success. checkPeerGroupAccess fails closed when
  a private service has empty AccessGroups.
- ValidateSession/ValidateTunnelPeer responses now carry
  peer_group_ids + peer_group_names so the proxy can authorise
  policy-aware middlewares without an extra management round-trip.
- ProxyInboundListener + SendStatusUpdate.inbound_listener: per-account
  inbound listener state surfaced to dashboards.
- PathTargetOptions.direct_upstream (11): bypass the embedded NetBird
  client and dial the target via the proxy host's network stack for
  upstreams reachable without WireGuard.

Data model
- Service.Private (bool) + Service.AccessGroups ([]string, JSON-
  serialised). Validate() rejects bearer auth on private services.
  Copy() deep-copies AccessGroups. pgx getServices loads the columns.
- DomainConfig.Private threaded into the proxy auth middleware.
  Request handler routes private services through forwardWithTunnelPeer
  and returns 403 on validation failure.
- Account-level SynthesizePrivateServiceZones (synthetic DNS) and
  injectPrivateServicePolicies (synthetic ACL) gate on
  len(svc.AccessGroups) > 0.

Proxy
- /netbird proxy --private (embedded mode) flag; Config.Private in
  proxy/lifecycle.go.
- Per-account inbound listener (proxy/inbound.go) binding HTTP/HTTPS
  on the embedded NetBird client's WireGuard tunnel netstack.
- proxy/internal/auth/tunnel_cache: ValidateTunnelPeer response cache
  with single-flight de-duplication and per-account eviction.
- Local peerstore short-circuit: when the inbound IP isn't in the
  account roster, deny fast without an RPC.
- proxy/server.go reports SupportsPrivateService=true and redacts the
  full ProxyMapping JSON from info logs (auth_token + header-auth
  hashed values now only at debug level).

Identity forwarding
- ValidateSessionJWT returns user_id, email, method, groups,
  group_names. sessionkey.Claims carries Email + Groups + GroupNames
  so the proxy can stamp identity onto upstream requests without an
  extra management round-trip on every cookie-bearing request.
- CapturedData carries userEmail / userGroups / userGroupNames; the
  proxy stamps X-NetBird-User and X-NetBird-Groups on r.Out from the
  authenticated identity (strips client-supplied values first to
  prevent spoofing).
- AccessLog.UserGroups: access-log enrichment captures the user's
  group memberships at write time so the dashboard can render group
  context without reverse-resolving stale memberships.

OpenAPI/dashboard surface
- ReverseProxyService gains private + access_groups; ReverseProxyCluster
  gains private + supports_private. ReverseProxyTarget target_type
  enum gains "cluster". ServiceTargetOptions gains direct_upstream.
  ProxyAccessLog gains user_groups.
2026-05-20 22:46:18 +02:00

1514 lines
44 KiB
Go

package service
import (
"crypto/rand"
"errors"
"fmt"
"math/big"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/netip"
"net/url"
"regexp"
"slices"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/rs/xid"
"google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/durationpb"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/proxy"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/hash/argon2id"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util/crypt"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/api"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
)
type Operation string
const (
Create Operation = "create"
Update Operation = "update"
Delete Operation = "delete"
)
type Status string
type TargetType string
const (
StatusPending Status = "pending"
StatusActive Status = "active"
StatusTunnelNotCreated Status = "tunnel_not_created"
StatusCertificatePending Status = "certificate_pending"
StatusCertificateFailed Status = "certificate_failed"
StatusError Status = "error"
TargetTypePeer TargetType = "peer"
TargetTypeHost TargetType = "host"
TargetTypeDomain TargetType = "domain"
TargetTypeSubnet TargetType = "subnet"
TargetTypeCluster TargetType = "cluster"
SourcePermanent = "permanent"
SourceEphemeral = "ephemeral"
)
type TargetOptions struct {
SkipTLSVerify bool `json:"skip_tls_verify"`
RequestTimeout time.Duration `json:"request_timeout,omitempty"`
SessionIdleTimeout time.Duration `json:"session_idle_timeout,omitempty"`
PathRewrite PathRewriteMode `json:"path_rewrite,omitempty"`
CustomHeaders map[string]string `gorm:"serializer:json" json:"custom_headers,omitempty"`
// DirectUpstream bypasses the proxy's embedded NetBird client and dials
// the target via the proxy host's network stack. Useful for upstreams
// reachable without WireGuard (public APIs, LAN services, localhost
// sidecars). Default false.
DirectUpstream bool `json:"direct_upstream,omitempty"`
}
type Target struct {
ID uint `gorm:"primaryKey" json:"-"`
AccountID string `gorm:"index:idx_target_account;not null" json:"-"`
ServiceID string `gorm:"index:idx_service_targets;not null" json:"-"`
Path *string `json:"path,omitempty"`
// Host carries the upstream address. For TargetTypeSubnet it is the only
// source — operator-supplied. For TargetTypePeer / TargetTypeHost /
// TargetTypeDomain it is overwritten by replaceHostByLookup with the
// resolved peer IP / resource address, *unless* Options.DirectUpstream
// is true and the operator supplied a non-empty value — then the
// operator value is preserved so they can dial the upstream via the
// host's network stack at an address other than the WG tunnel IP
// (e.g. a LAN IP, localhost sidecar, or DNS name).
Host string `json:"host"`
Port uint16 `gorm:"index:idx_target_port" json:"port"`
Protocol string `gorm:"index:idx_target_protocol" json:"protocol"`
TargetId string `gorm:"index:idx_target_id" json:"target_id"`
TargetType TargetType `gorm:"index:idx_target_type" json:"target_type"`
Enabled bool `gorm:"index:idx_target_enabled" json:"enabled"`
Options TargetOptions `gorm:"embedded" json:"options"`
ProxyProtocol bool `json:"proxy_protocol"`
}
type PasswordAuthConfig struct {
Enabled bool `json:"enabled"`
Password string `json:"password"`
}
type PINAuthConfig struct {
Enabled bool `json:"enabled"`
Pin string `json:"pin"`
}
type BearerAuthConfig struct {
Enabled bool `json:"enabled"`
DistributionGroups []string `json:"distribution_groups,omitempty" gorm:"serializer:json"`
}
// HeaderAuthConfig defines a static header-value auth check.
// The proxy compares the incoming header value against the stored hash.
type HeaderAuthConfig struct {
Enabled bool `json:"enabled"`
Header string `json:"header"`
Value string `json:"value"`
}
type AuthConfig struct {
PasswordAuth *PasswordAuthConfig `json:"password_auth,omitempty" gorm:"serializer:json"`
PinAuth *PINAuthConfig `json:"pin_auth,omitempty" gorm:"serializer:json"`
BearerAuth *BearerAuthConfig `json:"bearer_auth,omitempty" gorm:"serializer:json"`
HeaderAuths []*HeaderAuthConfig `json:"header_auths,omitempty" gorm:"serializer:json"`
}
// AccessRestrictions controls who can connect to the service based on IP or geography.
type AccessRestrictions struct {
AllowedCIDRs []string `json:"allowed_cidrs,omitempty" gorm:"serializer:json"`
BlockedCIDRs []string `json:"blocked_cidrs,omitempty" gorm:"serializer:json"`
AllowedCountries []string `json:"allowed_countries,omitempty" gorm:"serializer:json"`
BlockedCountries []string `json:"blocked_countries,omitempty" gorm:"serializer:json"`
CrowdSecMode string `json:"crowdsec_mode,omitempty" gorm:"serializer:json"`
}
// Copy returns a deep copy of the AccessRestrictions.
func (r AccessRestrictions) Copy() AccessRestrictions {
return AccessRestrictions{
AllowedCIDRs: slices.Clone(r.AllowedCIDRs),
BlockedCIDRs: slices.Clone(r.BlockedCIDRs),
AllowedCountries: slices.Clone(r.AllowedCountries),
BlockedCountries: slices.Clone(r.BlockedCountries),
CrowdSecMode: r.CrowdSecMode,
}
}
func (a *AuthConfig) HashSecrets() error {
if a.PasswordAuth != nil && a.PasswordAuth.Enabled && a.PasswordAuth.Password != "" {
hashedPassword, err := argon2id.Hash(a.PasswordAuth.Password)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("hash password: %w", err)
}
a.PasswordAuth.Password = hashedPassword
}
if a.PinAuth != nil && a.PinAuth.Enabled && a.PinAuth.Pin != "" {
hashedPin, err := argon2id.Hash(a.PinAuth.Pin)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("hash pin: %w", err)
}
a.PinAuth.Pin = hashedPin
}
for i, h := range a.HeaderAuths {
if h != nil && h.Enabled && h.Value != "" {
hashedValue, err := argon2id.Hash(h.Value)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("hash header auth[%d] value: %w", i, err)
}
h.Value = hashedValue
}
}
return nil
}
func (a *AuthConfig) ClearSecrets() {
if a.PasswordAuth != nil {
a.PasswordAuth.Password = ""
}
if a.PinAuth != nil {
a.PinAuth.Pin = ""
}
for _, h := range a.HeaderAuths {
if h != nil {
h.Value = ""
}
}
}
type Meta struct {
CreatedAt time.Time
CertificateIssuedAt *time.Time
Status string
LastRenewedAt *time.Time
}
type Service struct {
ID string `gorm:"primaryKey"`
AccountID string `gorm:"index"`
Name string
Domain string `gorm:"type:varchar(255);uniqueIndex"`
ProxyCluster string `gorm:"index"`
Targets []*Target `gorm:"foreignKey:ServiceID;constraint:OnDelete:CASCADE"`
Enabled bool
Terminated bool
PassHostHeader bool
RewriteRedirects bool
Auth AuthConfig `gorm:"serializer:json"`
Restrictions AccessRestrictions `gorm:"serializer:json"`
Meta Meta `gorm:"embedded;embeddedPrefix:meta_"`
SessionPrivateKey string `gorm:"column:session_private_key"`
SessionPublicKey string `gorm:"column:session_public_key"`
Source string `gorm:"default:'permanent';index:idx_service_source_peer"`
SourcePeer string `gorm:"index:idx_service_source_peer"`
// Mode determines the service type: "http", "tcp", "udp", or "tls".
Mode string `gorm:"default:'http'"`
ListenPort uint16
PortAutoAssigned bool
// Private marks the service as NetBird-only: auth via ValidateTunnelPeer against AccessGroups instead of SSO. HTTP-only.
Private bool
// AccessGroups is the group ID allowlist for inbound peers on private services. Mutually exclusive with bearer SSO.
AccessGroups []string `json:"access_groups,omitempty" gorm:"serializer:json"`
}
// InitNewRecord generates a new unique ID and resets metadata for a newly created
// Service record. This overwrites any existing ID and Meta fields and should
// only be called during initial creation, not for updates.
func (s *Service) InitNewRecord() {
s.ID = xid.New().String()
s.Meta = Meta{
CreatedAt: time.Now(),
Status: string(StatusPending),
}
}
func (s *Service) ToAPIResponse() *api.Service {
authConfig := api.ServiceAuthConfig{}
if s.Auth.PasswordAuth != nil {
authConfig.PasswordAuth = &api.PasswordAuthConfig{
Enabled: s.Auth.PasswordAuth.Enabled,
}
}
if s.Auth.PinAuth != nil {
authConfig.PinAuth = &api.PINAuthConfig{
Enabled: s.Auth.PinAuth.Enabled,
}
}
if s.Auth.BearerAuth != nil {
authConfig.BearerAuth = &api.BearerAuthConfig{
Enabled: s.Auth.BearerAuth.Enabled,
DistributionGroups: &s.Auth.BearerAuth.DistributionGroups,
}
}
if len(s.Auth.HeaderAuths) > 0 {
apiHeaders := make([]api.HeaderAuthConfig, 0, len(s.Auth.HeaderAuths))
for _, h := range s.Auth.HeaderAuths {
if h == nil {
continue
}
apiHeaders = append(apiHeaders, api.HeaderAuthConfig{
Enabled: h.Enabled,
Header: h.Header,
})
}
authConfig.HeaderAuths = &apiHeaders
}
// Convert internal targets to API targets
apiTargets := make([]api.ServiceTarget, 0, len(s.Targets))
for _, target := range s.Targets {
st := api.ServiceTarget{
Path: target.Path,
Host: &target.Host,
Port: int(target.Port),
Protocol: api.ServiceTargetProtocol(target.Protocol),
TargetId: target.TargetId,
TargetType: api.ServiceTargetTargetType(target.TargetType),
Enabled: target.Enabled && !s.Terminated,
}
opts := targetOptionsToAPI(target.Options)
if opts == nil {
opts = &api.ServiceTargetOptions{}
}
if target.ProxyProtocol {
opts.ProxyProtocol = &target.ProxyProtocol
}
st.Options = opts
apiTargets = append(apiTargets, st)
}
meta := api.ServiceMeta{
CreatedAt: s.Meta.CreatedAt,
Status: api.ServiceMetaStatus(s.Meta.Status),
}
if s.Meta.CertificateIssuedAt != nil {
meta.CertificateIssuedAt = s.Meta.CertificateIssuedAt
}
mode := api.ServiceMode(s.Mode)
listenPort := int(s.ListenPort)
resp := &api.Service{
Id: s.ID,
Name: s.Name,
Domain: s.Domain,
Targets: apiTargets,
Enabled: s.Enabled && !s.Terminated,
Terminated: &s.Terminated,
PassHostHeader: &s.PassHostHeader,
RewriteRedirects: &s.RewriteRedirects,
Auth: authConfig,
AccessRestrictions: restrictionsToAPI(s.Restrictions),
Meta: meta,
Mode: &mode,
ListenPort: &listenPort,
PortAutoAssigned: &s.PortAutoAssigned,
Private: &s.Private,
}
if len(s.AccessGroups) > 0 {
groups := append([]string(nil), s.AccessGroups...)
resp.AccessGroups = &groups
}
if s.ProxyCluster != "" {
resp.ProxyCluster = &s.ProxyCluster
}
return resp
}
// ToProtoMapping converts the service into the wire format the proxy consumes.
func (s *Service) ToProtoMapping(operation Operation, authToken string, oidcConfig proxy.OIDCValidationConfig) *proto.ProxyMapping {
pathMappings := s.buildPathMappings()
auth := &proto.Authentication{
SessionKey: s.SessionPublicKey,
MaxSessionAgeSeconds: int64((time.Hour * 24).Seconds()),
}
if s.Auth.PasswordAuth != nil && s.Auth.PasswordAuth.Enabled {
auth.Password = true
}
if s.Auth.PinAuth != nil && s.Auth.PinAuth.Enabled {
auth.Pin = true
}
if s.Auth.BearerAuth != nil && s.Auth.BearerAuth.Enabled {
auth.Oidc = true
}
for _, h := range s.Auth.HeaderAuths {
if h != nil && h.Enabled {
auth.HeaderAuths = append(auth.HeaderAuths, &proto.HeaderAuth{
Header: h.Header,
HashedValue: h.Value,
})
}
}
mapping := &proto.ProxyMapping{
Type: operationToProtoType(operation),
Id: s.ID,
Domain: s.Domain,
Path: pathMappings,
AuthToken: authToken,
Auth: auth,
AccountId: s.AccountID,
PassHostHeader: s.PassHostHeader,
RewriteRedirects: s.RewriteRedirects,
Mode: s.Mode,
ListenPort: int32(s.ListenPort), //nolint:gosec
Private: s.Private,
}
if r := restrictionsToProto(s.Restrictions); r != nil {
mapping.AccessRestrictions = r
}
return mapping
}
// buildPathMappings constructs PathMapping entries from targets.
// For HTTP/HTTPS, each target becomes a path-based route with a full URL.
// For L4/TLS, a single target maps to a host:port address.
func (s *Service) buildPathMappings() []*proto.PathMapping {
pathMappings := make([]*proto.PathMapping, 0, len(s.Targets))
for _, target := range s.Targets {
if !target.Enabled {
continue
}
if IsL4Protocol(s.Mode) {
pm := &proto.PathMapping{
Target: net.JoinHostPort(target.Host, strconv.FormatUint(uint64(target.Port), 10)),
}
opts := l4TargetOptionsToProto(target)
if opts != nil {
pm.Options = opts
}
pathMappings = append(pathMappings, pm)
continue
}
// HTTP/HTTPS: build full URL
hostNoBrackets := strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimPrefix(target.Host, "["), "]")
targetURL := url.URL{
Scheme: target.Protocol,
Host: bracketIPv6Host(hostNoBrackets),
Path: "/",
}
if target.Port > 0 && !isDefaultPort(target.Protocol, target.Port) {
targetURL.Host = net.JoinHostPort(hostNoBrackets, strconv.FormatUint(uint64(target.Port), 10))
}
path := "/"
if target.Path != nil {
path = *target.Path
}
pm := &proto.PathMapping{
Path: path,
Target: targetURL.String(),
}
pm.Options = targetOptionsToProto(target.Options)
pathMappings = append(pathMappings, pm)
}
return pathMappings
}
// bracketIPv6Host wraps host in square brackets when it is an IPv6 literal, as
// required for the Host field of net/url.URL (RFC 3986 §3.2.2). v4-mapped IPv6
// addresses are bracketed too since their textual form contains colons.
func bracketIPv6Host(host string) string {
if strings.HasPrefix(host, "[") {
return host
}
if addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(host); err == nil && addr.Is6() {
return "[" + host + "]"
}
return host
}
func operationToProtoType(op Operation) proto.ProxyMappingUpdateType {
switch op {
case Create:
return proto.ProxyMappingUpdateType_UPDATE_TYPE_CREATED
case Update:
return proto.ProxyMappingUpdateType_UPDATE_TYPE_MODIFIED
case Delete:
return proto.ProxyMappingUpdateType_UPDATE_TYPE_REMOVED
default:
panic(fmt.Sprintf("unknown operation type: %v", op))
}
}
// isDefaultPort reports whether port is the standard default for the given scheme
// (443 for https, 80 for http).
func isDefaultPort(scheme string, port uint16) bool {
return (scheme == TargetProtoHTTPS && port == 443) || (scheme == TargetProtoHTTP && port == 80)
}
// PathRewriteMode controls how the request path is rewritten before forwarding.
type PathRewriteMode string
const (
PathRewritePreserve PathRewriteMode = "preserve"
)
func pathRewriteToProto(mode PathRewriteMode) proto.PathRewriteMode {
switch mode {
case PathRewritePreserve:
return proto.PathRewriteMode_PATH_REWRITE_PRESERVE
default:
return proto.PathRewriteMode_PATH_REWRITE_DEFAULT
}
}
func targetOptionsToAPI(opts TargetOptions) *api.ServiceTargetOptions {
if !opts.SkipTLSVerify && opts.RequestTimeout == 0 && opts.SessionIdleTimeout == 0 &&
opts.PathRewrite == "" && len(opts.CustomHeaders) == 0 && !opts.DirectUpstream {
return nil
}
apiOpts := &api.ServiceTargetOptions{}
if opts.SkipTLSVerify {
apiOpts.SkipTlsVerify = &opts.SkipTLSVerify
}
if opts.RequestTimeout != 0 {
s := opts.RequestTimeout.String()
apiOpts.RequestTimeout = &s
}
if opts.SessionIdleTimeout != 0 {
s := opts.SessionIdleTimeout.String()
apiOpts.SessionIdleTimeout = &s
}
if opts.PathRewrite != "" {
pr := api.ServiceTargetOptionsPathRewrite(opts.PathRewrite)
apiOpts.PathRewrite = &pr
}
if len(opts.CustomHeaders) > 0 {
apiOpts.CustomHeaders = &opts.CustomHeaders
}
if opts.DirectUpstream {
apiOpts.DirectUpstream = &opts.DirectUpstream
}
return apiOpts
}
func targetOptionsToProto(opts TargetOptions) *proto.PathTargetOptions {
if !opts.SkipTLSVerify && opts.PathRewrite == "" && opts.RequestTimeout == 0 &&
len(opts.CustomHeaders) == 0 && !opts.DirectUpstream {
return nil
}
popts := &proto.PathTargetOptions{
SkipTlsVerify: opts.SkipTLSVerify,
PathRewrite: pathRewriteToProto(opts.PathRewrite),
CustomHeaders: opts.CustomHeaders,
DirectUpstream: opts.DirectUpstream,
}
if opts.RequestTimeout != 0 {
popts.RequestTimeout = durationpb.New(opts.RequestTimeout)
}
return popts
}
// l4TargetOptionsToProto converts L4-relevant target options to proto.
func l4TargetOptionsToProto(target *Target) *proto.PathTargetOptions {
if !target.ProxyProtocol && target.Options.RequestTimeout == 0 && target.Options.SessionIdleTimeout == 0 {
return nil
}
opts := &proto.PathTargetOptions{
ProxyProtocol: target.ProxyProtocol,
}
if target.Options.RequestTimeout > 0 {
opts.RequestTimeout = durationpb.New(target.Options.RequestTimeout)
}
if target.Options.SessionIdleTimeout > 0 {
opts.SessionIdleTimeout = durationpb.New(target.Options.SessionIdleTimeout)
}
return opts
}
func targetOptionsFromAPI(idx int, o *api.ServiceTargetOptions) (TargetOptions, error) {
var opts TargetOptions
if o.SkipTlsVerify != nil {
opts.SkipTLSVerify = *o.SkipTlsVerify
}
if o.RequestTimeout != nil {
d, err := time.ParseDuration(*o.RequestTimeout)
if err != nil {
return opts, fmt.Errorf("target %d: parse request_timeout %q: %w", idx, *o.RequestTimeout, err)
}
opts.RequestTimeout = d
}
if o.SessionIdleTimeout != nil {
d, err := time.ParseDuration(*o.SessionIdleTimeout)
if err != nil {
return opts, fmt.Errorf("target %d: parse session_idle_timeout %q: %w", idx, *o.SessionIdleTimeout, err)
}
opts.SessionIdleTimeout = d
}
if o.PathRewrite != nil {
opts.PathRewrite = PathRewriteMode(*o.PathRewrite)
}
if o.CustomHeaders != nil {
opts.CustomHeaders = *o.CustomHeaders
}
if o.DirectUpstream != nil {
opts.DirectUpstream = *o.DirectUpstream
}
return opts, nil
}
func (s *Service) FromAPIRequest(req *api.ServiceRequest, accountID string) error {
s.Name = req.Name
s.Domain = req.Domain
s.AccountID = accountID
if req.Mode != nil {
s.Mode = string(*req.Mode)
}
if req.ListenPort != nil {
s.ListenPort = uint16(*req.ListenPort) //nolint:gosec
}
if req.Private != nil {
s.Private = *req.Private
}
if req.AccessGroups != nil {
s.AccessGroups = append([]string(nil), *req.AccessGroups...)
} else {
s.AccessGroups = nil
}
targets, err := targetsFromAPI(accountID, req.Targets)
if err != nil {
return err
}
s.Targets = targets
s.Enabled = req.Enabled
if req.PassHostHeader != nil {
s.PassHostHeader = *req.PassHostHeader
}
if req.RewriteRedirects != nil {
s.RewriteRedirects = *req.RewriteRedirects
}
if req.Auth != nil {
s.Auth = authFromAPI(req.Auth)
}
if req.AccessRestrictions != nil {
restrictions, err := restrictionsFromAPI(req.AccessRestrictions)
if err != nil {
return err
}
s.Restrictions = restrictions
}
return nil
}
func targetsFromAPI(accountID string, apiTargetsPtr *[]api.ServiceTarget) ([]*Target, error) {
var apiTargets []api.ServiceTarget
if apiTargetsPtr != nil {
apiTargets = *apiTargetsPtr
}
targets := make([]*Target, 0, len(apiTargets))
for i, apiTarget := range apiTargets {
target := &Target{
AccountID: accountID,
Path: apiTarget.Path,
Port: uint16(apiTarget.Port), //nolint:gosec // validated by API layer
Protocol: string(apiTarget.Protocol),
TargetId: apiTarget.TargetId,
TargetType: TargetType(apiTarget.TargetType),
Enabled: apiTarget.Enabled,
}
if apiTarget.Host != nil {
target.Host = *apiTarget.Host
}
if apiTarget.Options != nil {
opts, err := targetOptionsFromAPI(i, apiTarget.Options)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
target.Options = opts
if apiTarget.Options.ProxyProtocol != nil {
target.ProxyProtocol = *apiTarget.Options.ProxyProtocol
}
}
targets = append(targets, target)
}
return targets, nil
}
func authFromAPI(reqAuth *api.ServiceAuthConfig) AuthConfig {
var auth AuthConfig
if reqAuth.PasswordAuth != nil {
auth.PasswordAuth = &PasswordAuthConfig{
Enabled: reqAuth.PasswordAuth.Enabled,
Password: reqAuth.PasswordAuth.Password,
}
}
if reqAuth.PinAuth != nil {
auth.PinAuth = &PINAuthConfig{
Enabled: reqAuth.PinAuth.Enabled,
Pin: reqAuth.PinAuth.Pin,
}
}
if reqAuth.BearerAuth != nil {
bearerAuth := &BearerAuthConfig{
Enabled: reqAuth.BearerAuth.Enabled,
}
if reqAuth.BearerAuth.DistributionGroups != nil {
bearerAuth.DistributionGroups = *reqAuth.BearerAuth.DistributionGroups
}
auth.BearerAuth = bearerAuth
}
if reqAuth.HeaderAuths != nil {
for _, h := range *reqAuth.HeaderAuths {
auth.HeaderAuths = append(auth.HeaderAuths, &HeaderAuthConfig{
Enabled: h.Enabled,
Header: h.Header,
Value: h.Value,
})
}
}
return auth
}
func restrictionsFromAPI(r *api.AccessRestrictions) (AccessRestrictions, error) {
if r == nil {
return AccessRestrictions{}, nil
}
var res AccessRestrictions
if r.AllowedCidrs != nil {
res.AllowedCIDRs = *r.AllowedCidrs
}
if r.BlockedCidrs != nil {
res.BlockedCIDRs = *r.BlockedCidrs
}
if r.AllowedCountries != nil {
res.AllowedCountries = *r.AllowedCountries
}
if r.BlockedCountries != nil {
res.BlockedCountries = *r.BlockedCountries
}
if r.CrowdsecMode != nil {
if !r.CrowdsecMode.Valid() {
return AccessRestrictions{}, fmt.Errorf("invalid crowdsec_mode %q", *r.CrowdsecMode)
}
res.CrowdSecMode = string(*r.CrowdsecMode)
}
return res, nil
}
func restrictionsToAPI(r AccessRestrictions) *api.AccessRestrictions {
if len(r.AllowedCIDRs) == 0 && len(r.BlockedCIDRs) == 0 &&
len(r.AllowedCountries) == 0 && len(r.BlockedCountries) == 0 &&
r.CrowdSecMode == "" {
return nil
}
res := &api.AccessRestrictions{}
if len(r.AllowedCIDRs) > 0 {
res.AllowedCidrs = &r.AllowedCIDRs
}
if len(r.BlockedCIDRs) > 0 {
res.BlockedCidrs = &r.BlockedCIDRs
}
if len(r.AllowedCountries) > 0 {
res.AllowedCountries = &r.AllowedCountries
}
if len(r.BlockedCountries) > 0 {
res.BlockedCountries = &r.BlockedCountries
}
if r.CrowdSecMode != "" {
mode := api.AccessRestrictionsCrowdsecMode(r.CrowdSecMode)
res.CrowdsecMode = &mode
}
return res
}
func restrictionsToProto(r AccessRestrictions) *proto.AccessRestrictions {
if len(r.AllowedCIDRs) == 0 && len(r.BlockedCIDRs) == 0 &&
len(r.AllowedCountries) == 0 && len(r.BlockedCountries) == 0 &&
r.CrowdSecMode == "" {
return nil
}
return &proto.AccessRestrictions{
AllowedCidrs: r.AllowedCIDRs,
BlockedCidrs: r.BlockedCIDRs,
AllowedCountries: r.AllowedCountries,
BlockedCountries: r.BlockedCountries,
CrowdsecMode: r.CrowdSecMode,
}
}
func (s *Service) Validate() error {
if s.Name == "" {
return errors.New("service name is required")
}
if len(s.Name) > 255 {
return errors.New("service name exceeds maximum length of 255 characters")
}
if len(s.Targets) == 0 {
return errors.New("at least one target is required")
}
if s.Mode == "" {
s.Mode = ModeHTTP
}
if err := validateHeaderAuths(s.Auth.HeaderAuths); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := validateAccessRestrictions(&s.Restrictions); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := s.validatePrivateRequirements(); err != nil {
return err
}
switch s.Mode {
case ModeHTTP:
return s.validateHTTPMode()
case ModeTCP, ModeUDP:
return s.validateTCPUDPMode()
case ModeTLS:
return s.validateTLSMode()
default:
return fmt.Errorf("unsupported mode %q", s.Mode)
}
}
// validatePrivateRequirements enforces the private-service contract: HTTP mode, ≥1 access group, no bearer auth.
func (s *Service) validatePrivateRequirements() error {
if !s.Private {
return nil
}
if s.Mode != "" && s.Mode != ModeHTTP {
return fmt.Errorf("private services only support HTTP mode, got %q", s.Mode)
}
if len(s.AccessGroups) == 0 {
return errors.New("private services require at least one access group")
}
if s.Auth.BearerAuth != nil && s.Auth.BearerAuth.Enabled {
return errors.New("private services cannot enable bearer auth (SSO): NetBird-only access and SSO are mutually exclusive")
}
return nil
}
func (s *Service) validateHTTPMode() error {
if s.Domain == "" {
return errors.New("service domain is required")
}
if s.ListenPort != 0 {
return errors.New("listen_port is not supported for HTTP services")
}
return s.validateHTTPTargets()
}
func (s *Service) validateTCPUDPMode() error {
if s.Domain == "" {
return errors.New("domain is required for TCP/UDP services (used for cluster derivation)")
}
if s.isAuthEnabled() {
return errors.New("auth is not supported for TCP/UDP services")
}
if len(s.Targets) != 1 {
return errors.New("TCP/UDP services must have exactly one target")
}
if s.Mode == ModeUDP && s.Targets[0].ProxyProtocol {
return errors.New("proxy_protocol is not supported for UDP services")
}
return s.validateL4Target(s.Targets[0])
}
func (s *Service) validateTLSMode() error {
if s.Domain == "" {
return errors.New("domain is required for TLS services (used for SNI matching)")
}
if s.isAuthEnabled() {
return errors.New("auth is not supported for TLS services")
}
if s.ListenPort == 0 {
return errors.New("listen_port is required for TLS services")
}
if len(s.Targets) != 1 {
return errors.New("TLS services must have exactly one target")
}
return s.validateL4Target(s.Targets[0])
}
func (s *Service) validateHTTPTargets() error {
for i, target := range s.Targets {
switch target.TargetType {
case TargetTypePeer, TargetTypeHost, TargetTypeDomain:
// Host is normally overwritten by replaceHostByLookup with the
// resolved peer IP / resource address; operator-supplied values
// are honored only when DirectUpstream is set. Validate the
// override here so misconfigured hosts fail fast at API time.
if err := validateDirectUpstreamHost(i, target); err != nil {
return err
}
case TargetTypeSubnet:
if target.Host == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("target %d has empty host but target_type is %q", i, target.TargetType)
}
case TargetTypeCluster:
// target_id carries the cluster address; the proxy resolves
// the upstream at request time. Host/port may be empty.
default:
return fmt.Errorf("target %d has invalid target_type %q", i, target.TargetType)
}
if target.TargetId == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("target %d has empty target_id", i)
}
if target.ProxyProtocol {
return fmt.Errorf("target %d: proxy_protocol is not supported for HTTP services", i)
}
if err := validateTargetOptions(i, &target.Options); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// validateDirectUpstreamHost validates the operator-supplied Host on a
// peer/host/domain target when DirectUpstream is set. Empty Host is
// allowed — the lookup fills in the default peer IP / resource address.
// Without DirectUpstream the Host value is silently overwritten by
// replaceHostByLookup, so we don't validate it (preserves the historical
// behaviour where APIs accepted any value and dropped it). Non-empty
// Host with DirectUpstream must look like a hostname or IP and must
// not carry a port (port lives on Target.Port).
func validateDirectUpstreamHost(idx int, target *Target) error {
if !target.Options.DirectUpstream {
return nil
}
host := strings.TrimSpace(target.Host)
if host == "" {
return nil
}
if strings.ContainsAny(host, " \t/") {
return fmt.Errorf("target %d: host %q contains invalid characters", idx, host)
}
if _, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(host); err == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("target %d: host %q must not include a port (set target.port instead)", idx, host)
}
return nil
}
func (s *Service) validateL4Target(target *Target) error {
// L4 services have a single target; per-target disable is meaningless
// (use the service-level Enabled flag instead). Force it on so that
// buildPathMappings always includes the target in the proto.
target.Enabled = true
if target.TargetId == "" {
return errors.New("target_id is required for L4 services")
}
if target.TargetType != TargetTypeCluster && target.Port == 0 {
return errors.New("target port is required for L4 services")
}
switch target.TargetType {
case TargetTypePeer, TargetTypeHost, TargetTypeDomain:
if err := validateDirectUpstreamHost(0, target); err != nil {
return err
}
case TargetTypeSubnet:
if target.Host == "" {
return errors.New("target host is required for subnet targets")
}
case TargetTypeCluster:
// target_id carries the cluster address; the proxy resolves
// the upstream at request time.
default:
return fmt.Errorf("invalid target_type %q for L4 service", target.TargetType)
}
if target.Path != nil && *target.Path != "" && *target.Path != "/" {
return errors.New("path is not supported for L4 services")
}
if target.Options.SessionIdleTimeout < 0 {
return errors.New("session_idle_timeout must be positive for L4 services")
}
if target.Options.RequestTimeout < 0 {
return errors.New("request_timeout must be positive for L4 services")
}
if target.Options.SkipTLSVerify {
return errors.New("skip_tls_verify is not supported for L4 services")
}
if target.Options.PathRewrite != "" {
return errors.New("path_rewrite is not supported for L4 services")
}
if len(target.Options.CustomHeaders) > 0 {
return errors.New("custom_headers is not supported for L4 services")
}
return nil
}
// Service mode constants.
const (
ModeHTTP = "http"
ModeTCP = "tcp"
ModeUDP = "udp"
ModeTLS = "tls"
)
// Target protocol constants (URL scheme for backend connections).
const (
TargetProtoHTTP = "http"
TargetProtoHTTPS = "https"
TargetProtoTCP = "tcp"
TargetProtoUDP = "udp"
)
// IsL4Protocol returns true if the mode requires port-based routing (TCP, UDP, or TLS).
func IsL4Protocol(mode string) bool {
return mode == ModeTCP || mode == ModeUDP || mode == ModeTLS
}
// IsPortBasedProtocol returns true if the mode relies on dedicated port allocation.
// TLS is excluded because it uses SNI routing and can share ports with other TLS services.
func IsPortBasedProtocol(mode string) bool {
return mode == ModeTCP || mode == ModeUDP
}
const (
maxCustomHeaders = 16
maxHeaderKeyLen = 128
maxHeaderValueLen = 4096
)
// httpHeaderNameRe matches valid HTTP header field names per RFC 7230 token definition.
var httpHeaderNameRe = regexp.MustCompile(`^[!#$%&'*+\-.^_` + "`" + `|~0-9A-Za-z]+$`)
// hopByHopHeaders are headers that must not be set as custom headers
// because they are connection-level and stripped by the proxy.
var hopByHopHeaders = map[string]struct{}{
"Connection": {},
"Keep-Alive": {},
"Proxy-Authenticate": {},
"Proxy-Authorization": {},
"Proxy-Connection": {},
"Te": {},
"Trailer": {},
"Transfer-Encoding": {},
"Upgrade": {},
}
// reservedHeaders are set authoritatively by the proxy or control HTTP framing
// and cannot be overridden.
var reservedHeaders = map[string]struct{}{
"Content-Length": {},
"Content-Type": {},
"Cookie": {},
"Forwarded": {},
"X-Forwarded-For": {},
"X-Forwarded-Host": {},
"X-Forwarded-Port": {},
"X-Forwarded-Proto": {},
"X-Real-Ip": {},
}
func validateTargetOptions(idx int, opts *TargetOptions) error {
if opts.PathRewrite != "" && opts.PathRewrite != PathRewritePreserve {
return fmt.Errorf("target %d: unknown path_rewrite mode %q", idx, opts.PathRewrite)
}
if opts.RequestTimeout < 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("target %d: request_timeout must be positive", idx)
}
if opts.SessionIdleTimeout < 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("target %d: session_idle_timeout must be positive", idx)
}
if err := validateCustomHeaders(idx, opts.CustomHeaders); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func validateCustomHeaders(idx int, headers map[string]string) error {
if len(headers) > maxCustomHeaders {
return fmt.Errorf("target %d: custom_headers count %d exceeds maximum of %d", idx, len(headers), maxCustomHeaders)
}
seen := make(map[string]string, len(headers))
for key, value := range headers {
if !httpHeaderNameRe.MatchString(key) {
return fmt.Errorf("target %d: custom header key %q is not a valid HTTP header name", idx, key)
}
if len(key) > maxHeaderKeyLen {
return fmt.Errorf("target %d: custom header key %q exceeds maximum length of %d", idx, key, maxHeaderKeyLen)
}
if len(value) > maxHeaderValueLen {
return fmt.Errorf("target %d: custom header %q value exceeds maximum length of %d", idx, key, maxHeaderValueLen)
}
if containsCRLF(key) || containsCRLF(value) {
return fmt.Errorf("target %d: custom header %q contains invalid characters", idx, key)
}
canonical := http.CanonicalHeaderKey(key)
if prev, ok := seen[canonical]; ok {
return fmt.Errorf("target %d: custom header keys %q and %q collide (both canonicalize to %q)", idx, prev, key, canonical)
}
seen[canonical] = key
if _, ok := hopByHopHeaders[canonical]; ok {
return fmt.Errorf("target %d: custom header %q is a hop-by-hop header and cannot be set", idx, key)
}
if _, ok := reservedHeaders[canonical]; ok {
return fmt.Errorf("target %d: custom header %q is managed by the proxy and cannot be overridden", idx, key)
}
if canonical == "Host" {
return fmt.Errorf("target %d: use pass_host_header instead of setting Host as a custom header", idx)
}
}
return nil
}
func containsCRLF(s string) bool {
return strings.ContainsAny(s, "\r\n")
}
func validateHeaderAuths(headers []*HeaderAuthConfig) error {
for i, h := range headers {
if h == nil || !h.Enabled {
continue
}
if h.Header == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("header_auths[%d]: header name is required", i)
}
if !httpHeaderNameRe.MatchString(h.Header) {
return fmt.Errorf("header_auths[%d]: header name %q is not a valid HTTP header name", i, h.Header)
}
canonical := http.CanonicalHeaderKey(h.Header)
if _, ok := hopByHopHeaders[canonical]; ok {
return fmt.Errorf("header_auths[%d]: header %q is a hop-by-hop header and cannot be used for auth", i, h.Header)
}
if _, ok := reservedHeaders[canonical]; ok {
return fmt.Errorf("header_auths[%d]: header %q is managed by the proxy and cannot be used for auth", i, h.Header)
}
if canonical == "Host" {
return fmt.Errorf("header_auths[%d]: Host header cannot be used for auth", i)
}
if len(h.Value) > maxHeaderValueLen {
return fmt.Errorf("header_auths[%d]: value exceeds maximum length of %d", i, maxHeaderValueLen)
}
}
return nil
}
const (
maxCIDREntries = 200
maxCountryEntries = 50
)
// validateAccessRestrictions validates and normalizes access restriction
// entries. Country codes are uppercased in place.
func validateCrowdSecMode(mode string) error {
switch mode {
case "", "off", "enforce", "observe":
return nil
default:
return fmt.Errorf("crowdsec_mode %q is invalid", mode)
}
}
func validateAccessRestrictions(r *AccessRestrictions) error {
if err := validateCrowdSecMode(r.CrowdSecMode); err != nil {
return err
}
if len(r.AllowedCIDRs) > maxCIDREntries {
return fmt.Errorf("allowed_cidrs: exceeds maximum of %d entries", maxCIDREntries)
}
if len(r.BlockedCIDRs) > maxCIDREntries {
return fmt.Errorf("blocked_cidrs: exceeds maximum of %d entries", maxCIDREntries)
}
if len(r.AllowedCountries) > maxCountryEntries {
return fmt.Errorf("allowed_countries: exceeds maximum of %d entries", maxCountryEntries)
}
if len(r.BlockedCountries) > maxCountryEntries {
return fmt.Errorf("blocked_countries: exceeds maximum of %d entries", maxCountryEntries)
}
if err := validateCIDRList("allowed_cidrs", r.AllowedCIDRs); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := validateCIDRList("blocked_cidrs", r.BlockedCIDRs); err != nil {
return err
}
if err := normalizeCountryList("allowed_countries", r.AllowedCountries); err != nil {
return err
}
return normalizeCountryList("blocked_countries", r.BlockedCountries)
}
func validateCIDRList(field string, cidrs []string) error {
for i, raw := range cidrs {
prefix, err := netip.ParsePrefix(raw)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("%s[%d]: %w", field, i, err)
}
if prefix != prefix.Masked() {
return fmt.Errorf("%s[%d]: %q has host bits set, use %s instead", field, i, raw, prefix.Masked())
}
}
return nil
}
func normalizeCountryList(field string, codes []string) error {
for i, code := range codes {
if len(code) != 2 {
return fmt.Errorf("%s[%d]: %q must be a 2-letter ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code", field, i, code)
}
codes[i] = strings.ToUpper(code)
}
return nil
}
func (s *Service) EventMeta() map[string]any {
meta := map[string]any{
"name": s.Name,
"domain": s.Domain,
"proxy_cluster": s.ProxyCluster,
"source": s.Source,
"auth": s.isAuthEnabled(),
"mode": s.Mode,
}
if s.ListenPort != 0 {
meta["listen_port"] = s.ListenPort
}
if len(s.Targets) > 0 {
t := s.Targets[0]
if t.ProxyProtocol {
meta["proxy_protocol"] = true
}
if t.Options.RequestTimeout != 0 {
meta["request_timeout"] = t.Options.RequestTimeout.String()
}
if t.Options.SessionIdleTimeout != 0 {
meta["session_idle_timeout"] = t.Options.SessionIdleTimeout.String()
}
}
return meta
}
func (s *Service) isAuthEnabled() bool {
if (s.Auth.PasswordAuth != nil && s.Auth.PasswordAuth.Enabled) ||
(s.Auth.PinAuth != nil && s.Auth.PinAuth.Enabled) ||
(s.Auth.BearerAuth != nil && s.Auth.BearerAuth.Enabled) {
return true
}
for _, h := range s.Auth.HeaderAuths {
if h != nil && h.Enabled {
return true
}
}
return false
}
func (s *Service) Copy() *Service {
targets := make([]*Target, len(s.Targets))
for i, target := range s.Targets {
targetCopy := *target
if target.Path != nil {
p := *target.Path
targetCopy.Path = &p
}
if len(target.Options.CustomHeaders) > 0 {
targetCopy.Options.CustomHeaders = make(map[string]string, len(target.Options.CustomHeaders))
for k, v := range target.Options.CustomHeaders {
targetCopy.Options.CustomHeaders[k] = v
}
}
targets[i] = &targetCopy
}
authCopy := s.Auth
if s.Auth.PasswordAuth != nil {
pa := *s.Auth.PasswordAuth
authCopy.PasswordAuth = &pa
}
if s.Auth.PinAuth != nil {
pa := *s.Auth.PinAuth
authCopy.PinAuth = &pa
}
if s.Auth.BearerAuth != nil {
ba := *s.Auth.BearerAuth
if len(s.Auth.BearerAuth.DistributionGroups) > 0 {
ba.DistributionGroups = make([]string, len(s.Auth.BearerAuth.DistributionGroups))
copy(ba.DistributionGroups, s.Auth.BearerAuth.DistributionGroups)
}
authCopy.BearerAuth = &ba
}
if len(s.Auth.HeaderAuths) > 0 {
authCopy.HeaderAuths = make([]*HeaderAuthConfig, len(s.Auth.HeaderAuths))
for i, h := range s.Auth.HeaderAuths {
if h == nil {
continue
}
hCopy := *h
authCopy.HeaderAuths[i] = &hCopy
}
}
var accessGroups []string
if len(s.AccessGroups) > 0 {
accessGroups = append([]string(nil), s.AccessGroups...)
}
return &Service{
ID: s.ID,
AccountID: s.AccountID,
Name: s.Name,
Domain: s.Domain,
ProxyCluster: s.ProxyCluster,
Targets: targets,
Enabled: s.Enabled,
Terminated: s.Terminated,
PassHostHeader: s.PassHostHeader,
RewriteRedirects: s.RewriteRedirects,
Auth: authCopy,
Restrictions: s.Restrictions.Copy(),
Meta: s.Meta,
SessionPrivateKey: s.SessionPrivateKey,
SessionPublicKey: s.SessionPublicKey,
Source: s.Source,
SourcePeer: s.SourcePeer,
Mode: s.Mode,
ListenPort: s.ListenPort,
PortAutoAssigned: s.PortAutoAssigned,
Private: s.Private,
AccessGroups: accessGroups,
}
}
func (s *Service) EncryptSensitiveData(enc *crypt.FieldEncrypt) error {
if enc == nil {
return nil
}
if s.SessionPrivateKey != "" {
var err error
s.SessionPrivateKey, err = enc.Encrypt(s.SessionPrivateKey)
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
func (s *Service) DecryptSensitiveData(enc *crypt.FieldEncrypt) error {
if enc == nil {
return nil
}
if s.SessionPrivateKey != "" {
var err error
s.SessionPrivateKey, err = enc.Decrypt(s.SessionPrivateKey)
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
var pinRegexp = regexp.MustCompile(`^\d{6}$`)
const alphanumCharset = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789"
var validNamePrefix = regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-z0-9]([a-z0-9-]{0,30}[a-z0-9])?$`)
// ExposeServiceRequest contains the parameters for creating a peer-initiated expose service.
type ExposeServiceRequest struct {
NamePrefix string
Port uint16
Mode string
// TargetProtocol is the protocol used to connect to the peer backend.
// For HTTP mode: "http" (default) or "https". For L4 modes: "tcp" or "udp".
TargetProtocol string
Domain string
Pin string
Password string
UserGroups []string
ListenPort uint16
}
// Validate checks all fields of the expose request.
func (r *ExposeServiceRequest) Validate() error {
if r == nil {
return errors.New("request cannot be nil")
}
if r.Port == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("port must be between 1 and 65535, got %d", r.Port)
}
switch r.Mode {
case ModeHTTP, ModeTCP, ModeUDP, ModeTLS:
default:
return fmt.Errorf("unsupported mode %q", r.Mode)
}
if IsL4Protocol(r.Mode) {
if r.Pin != "" || r.Password != "" || len(r.UserGroups) > 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("authentication is not supported for %s mode", r.Mode)
}
}
if r.Pin != "" && !pinRegexp.MatchString(r.Pin) {
return errors.New("invalid pin: must be exactly 6 digits")
}
for _, g := range r.UserGroups {
if g == "" {
return errors.New("user group name cannot be empty")
}
}
if r.NamePrefix != "" && !validNamePrefix.MatchString(r.NamePrefix) {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid name prefix %q: must be lowercase alphanumeric with optional hyphens, 1-32 characters", r.NamePrefix)
}
return nil
}
// ToService builds a Service from the expose request.
func (r *ExposeServiceRequest) ToService(accountID, peerID, serviceName string) *Service {
svc := &Service{
AccountID: accountID,
Name: serviceName,
Mode: r.Mode,
Enabled: true,
}
// If domain is empty, CreateServiceFromPeer generates a unique subdomain.
// When explicitly provided, the service name is prepended as a subdomain.
if r.Domain != "" {
svc.Domain = serviceName + "." + r.Domain
}
if IsL4Protocol(r.Mode) {
svc.ListenPort = r.Port
if r.ListenPort > 0 {
svc.ListenPort = r.ListenPort
}
}
var targetProto string
switch {
case !IsL4Protocol(r.Mode):
targetProto = TargetProtoHTTP
if r.TargetProtocol != "" {
targetProto = r.TargetProtocol
}
case r.Mode == ModeUDP:
targetProto = TargetProtoUDP
default:
targetProto = TargetProtoTCP
}
svc.Targets = []*Target{
{
AccountID: accountID,
Port: r.Port,
Protocol: targetProto,
TargetId: peerID,
TargetType: TargetTypePeer,
Enabled: true,
},
}
if r.Pin != "" {
svc.Auth.PinAuth = &PINAuthConfig{
Enabled: true,
Pin: r.Pin,
}
}
if r.Password != "" {
svc.Auth.PasswordAuth = &PasswordAuthConfig{
Enabled: true,
Password: r.Password,
}
}
if len(r.UserGroups) > 0 {
svc.Auth.BearerAuth = &BearerAuthConfig{
Enabled: true,
DistributionGroups: r.UserGroups,
}
}
return svc
}
// ExposeServiceResponse contains the result of a successful peer expose creation.
type ExposeServiceResponse struct {
ServiceName string
ServiceURL string
Domain string
PortAutoAssigned bool
}
// GenerateExposeName generates a random service name for peer-exposed services.
// The prefix, if provided, must be a valid DNS label component (lowercase alphanumeric and hyphens).
func GenerateExposeName(prefix string) (string, error) {
if prefix != "" && !validNamePrefix.MatchString(prefix) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid name prefix %q: must be lowercase alphanumeric with optional hyphens, 1-32 characters", prefix)
}
suffixLen := 12
if prefix != "" {
suffixLen = 4
}
suffix, err := randomAlphanumeric(suffixLen)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("generate random name: %w", err)
}
if prefix == "" {
return suffix, nil
}
return prefix + "-" + suffix, nil
}
func randomAlphanumeric(n int) (string, error) {
result := make([]byte, n)
charsetLen := big.NewInt(int64(len(alphanumCharset)))
for i := range result {
idx, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, charsetLen)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
result[i] = alphanumCharset[idx.Int64()]
}
return string(result), nil
}