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Maycon Santos 3027130f0f [management] Add Agent Network access roles and self-service endpoints (#7221)
Delegating Agent Network today means handing out full account admin, and
regular users cannot see their own usage or how to connect a local tool.

Add two roles on top of the existing agent_network permission
submodules. agent_network_admin owns the whole area (providers,
policies, guardrails, budgets, usage, logs, settings) with read-only
users, groups, peers, and account info needed to build policies, and
nothing else in the account. usage_viewer is the regular User baseline
plus read on the aggregated usage and cost overview: no provider
configuration, no policies, no request-level logs, which can contain
captured prompts. billing_admin gets a proper permission-map entry with
the User baseline so role resolution stops failing with role-not-found;
its plan and invoice permissions stay enforced cloud-side.

Add the self-service endpoints behind the "My Agent Network" view,
available to every authenticated user because both answers are scoped
strictly to the caller. GET /api/agent-network/me/setup returns the
account endpoint plus the providers and models the caller's own groups
authorize, computed with the same rules the proxy enforces: policy
filtering as in policy selection, model allowlist union intersected
with declared models, orphan and disabled providers omitted. Not set up
and no access are deliberately indistinguishable, and the response
carries display metadata only. GET /api/agent-network/me/consumption
returns the caller's own user-dimension counters.
2026-09-01 14:35:38 +02:00

288 lines
11 KiB
Go

package agentnetwork
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/catalog"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/types"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/store"
)
// GetAgentConfigForUser returns the Agent Network setup the calling user's
// groups authorize. It deliberately performs no role permission check:
// the result is scoped to the caller's own groups, which is strictly
// tighter than any role gate, so every authenticated user (any role) may
// read it. The group source matches enforcement: the proxy authorizes
// each Agent Network request against the calling user's groups as well —
// session validation resolves them from the same user record's
// auto-groups — so this answer and the proxy's verdict are computed from
// the same memberships.
func (m *managerImpl) GetAgentConfigForUser(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID string) (*types.AgentConfig, error) {
user, err := m.store.GetUserByUserID(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, userID)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("get user: %w", err)
}
return m.agentConfigForGroups(ctx, accountID, user.AutoGroups)
}
// agentConfigForGroups computes the effective Agent Network setup for
// a set of caller groups: the account endpoint plus, per authorized
// provider, the effective model set. It mirrors what the proxy enforces
// at request time — the policy filter matches filterApplicablePolicies,
// the model logic matches policyPermitsModel, and orphan providers
// (enabled but referenced by no applicable policy) are omitted just like
// the router synthesizer omits them — so the answer never advertises
// anything the proxy would refuse.
//
// Configured tracks the account, not the caller: once the account has an
// endpoint every member gets it, with Providers empty for those no policy
// covers yet. The dashboard shows each user the same connection config
// regardless of role, and an empty provider list tells them to ask for
// access. Only the account having no Agent Network at all reads as not
// configured. Providers stays caller-scoped either way — the endpoint on
// its own authorizes nothing, and the proxy still refuses every request
// no policy permits.
func (m *managerImpl) agentConfigForGroups(ctx context.Context, accountID string, groupIDs []string) (*types.AgentConfig, error) {
notConfigured := &types.AgentConfig{Providers: []types.AgentConfigProvider{}}
settings, err := m.store.GetAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, accountID)
switch {
case err == nil:
case isNotFound(err):
return notConfigured, nil
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("get agent network settings: %w", err)
}
if settings.Endpoint() == "" {
return notConfigured, nil
}
authorized, applicable, err := m.authorizedProvidersForGroups(ctx, accountID, groupIDs)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
out := &types.AgentConfig{
Configured: true,
Endpoint: "https://" + settings.Endpoint(),
Providers: make([]types.AgentConfigProvider, 0, len(authorized)),
}
if len(authorized) == 0 {
return out, nil
}
var guardrailsByID map[string]*types.Guardrail
if anyPolicyHasGuardrails(applicable) {
guardrailsByID, err = m.loadGuardrailsByID(ctx, accountID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
for _, p := range authorized {
allAllowed, models := effectiveModelsForProvider(p, policiesForProvider(applicable, p.ID), guardrailsByID)
flavor := ""
if entry, ok := catalog.Lookup(p.ProviderID); ok {
flavor = entry.ParserID
}
out.Providers = append(out.Providers, types.AgentConfigProvider{
Name: p.Name,
CatalogID: p.ProviderID,
APIFlavor: flavor,
AllModelsAllowed: allAllowed,
Models: models,
})
}
return out, nil
}
// authorizedProvidersForGroups returns the enabled providers referenced
// by at least one enabled policy whose source groups intersect groupIDs —
// the providers the caller's own policies authorize — in created_at order
// with ID tiebreak, the same deterministic order the router synthesizer
// presents. The applicable policies come back alongside so callers that
// need per-provider policy context (the setup's model computation) don't
// re-filter. Both the self-service setup answer and the caller-scoped
// provider list are built from this selection, so what the dashboard
// offers and what the proxy enforces never diverge.
func (m *managerImpl) authorizedProvidersForGroups(ctx context.Context, accountID string, groupIDs []string) ([]*types.Provider, []*types.Policy, error) {
policies, err := m.store.GetAccountAgentNetworkPolicies(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, accountID)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("list account policies: %w", err)
}
applicable := filterPoliciesByGroups(policies, groupIDs)
if len(applicable) == 0 {
return nil, nil, nil
}
providers, err := m.store.GetAccountAgentNetworkProviders(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, accountID)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("list account providers: %w", err)
}
// filterEnabledProviders carries the enabled filter and the
// created_at/ID order shared with the router synthesizer.
enabled := filterEnabledProviders(providers)
authorized := make([]*types.Provider, 0, len(enabled))
for _, p := range enabled {
if len(policiesForProvider(applicable, p.ID)) == 0 {
continue
}
authorized = append(authorized, p)
}
return authorized, applicable, nil
}
// filterPoliciesByGroups returns the enabled policies whose SourceGroups
// intersect the caller's groups. Same group matching as
// filterApplicablePolicies, without the per-provider filter — the setup
// answer spans every provider the caller can reach.
func filterPoliciesByGroups(policies []*types.Policy, groupIDs []string) []*types.Policy {
groupSet := make(map[string]struct{}, len(groupIDs))
for _, g := range groupIDs {
if g != "" {
groupSet[g] = struct{}{}
}
}
out := make([]*types.Policy, 0, len(policies))
for _, p := range policies {
if p == nil || !p.Enabled {
continue
}
if !anyGroupMatches(p.SourceGroups, groupSet) {
continue
}
out = append(out, p)
}
return out
}
// policiesForProvider returns the subset of policies targeting the
// provider, order preserved.
func policiesForProvider(policies []*types.Policy, providerID string) []*types.Policy {
out := make([]*types.Policy, 0, len(policies))
for _, p := range policies {
if sliceContains(p.DestinationProviderIDs, providerID) {
out = append(out, p)
}
}
return out
}
// effectiveModelsForProvider derives the caller's effective model set for
// one provider from the applicable policies that target it, mirroring
// policyPermitsModel: a policy with no allowlist-enabled guardrail is
// unrestricted, and one unrestricted policy makes the whole provider
// unrestricted (the proxy would admit any model through it). Otherwise
// the union of the policies' allowlists applies, intersected with the
// provider's declared models when the operator declared any — the router
// only claims declared models, so an allowlisted-but-undeclared model is
// unreachable and must not be advertised. With no declared models the
// router claims every model, so the allowlist union stands alone.
func effectiveModelsForProvider(provider *types.Provider, policies []*types.Policy, guardrailsByID map[string]*types.Guardrail) (bool, []string) {
restricted := true
union := make([]string, 0)
seen := make(map[string]struct{})
for _, p := range policies {
policyRestricted := false
for _, gID := range p.GuardrailIDs {
g, ok := guardrailsByID[gID]
if !ok || g == nil || !g.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Enabled {
continue
}
policyRestricted = true
for _, model := range g.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Models {
key := normaliseModelID(model)
if key == "" {
continue
}
if _, dup := seen[key]; dup {
continue
}
seen[key] = struct{}{}
union = append(union, key)
}
}
if !policyRestricted {
restricted = false
}
}
declared := declaredModelIDs(provider)
if !restricted {
return true, declared
}
if len(provider.Models) == 0 {
// No operator declaration: the router claims every model, so the
// allowlist union is the effective set as-is.
return false, union
}
out := make([]string, 0, len(declared))
for _, id := range declared {
// Compare through the canonical id the proxy's parser emits — a
// Bedrock declaration may carry the region/version form
// ("eu.anthropic.claude-...-v1:0") while the allowlist holds the
// stripped id the parser matches at request time, and the raw
// forms would never intersect. The declared id itself is what
// gets advertised, matching the router's route claim.
if _, ok := seen[normaliseModelID(normalizePricingModelID(provider.ProviderID, id))]; ok {
out = append(out, id)
}
}
return false, out
}
// providerModelsByID maps effective model ids (as effectiveModelsForProvider
// returns them) back onto the operator's declared entries, keeping the
// declared casing and prices. With no operator declaration the ids are the
// allowlist union and have no declared entry to map to, so bare entries are
// synthesized — the router claims every model in that case, so those ids are
// reachable and belong in the answer.
func providerModelsByID(provider *types.Provider, ids []string) []types.ProviderModel {
if len(provider.Models) == 0 {
out := make([]types.ProviderModel, 0, len(ids))
for _, id := range ids {
out = append(out, types.ProviderModel{ID: id})
}
return out
}
keep := make(map[string]struct{}, len(ids))
for _, id := range ids {
keep[normaliseModelID(id)] = struct{}{}
}
out := make([]types.ProviderModel, 0, len(ids))
for _, m := range provider.Models {
if _, ok := keep[normaliseModelID(m.ID)]; ok {
out = append(out, m)
}
}
return out
}
// declaredModelIDs returns the models a provider exposes: the operator's
// curated list when present, otherwise the catalog entry's models (an
// empty operator list means "all catalog models"). Gateway/custom catalog
// entries declare no models, so the result may be empty.
func declaredModelIDs(provider *types.Provider) []string {
if ids := providerModelIDs(provider); len(ids) > 0 {
return ids
}
entry, ok := catalog.Lookup(provider.ProviderID)
if !ok {
return []string{}
}
out := make([]string, 0, len(entry.Models))
for _, m := range entry.Models {
if m.ID != "" {
out = append(out, m.ID)
}
}
return out
}
// GetAgentConfigForUser on the mock manager reports "not configured" so tests
// that don't care about setup still compile.
func (*mockManager) GetAgentConfigForUser(_ context.Context, _, _ string) (*types.AgentConfig, error) {
return &types.AgentConfig{Providers: []types.AgentConfigProvider{}}, nil
}