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Author SHA1 Message Date
mlsmaycon
583555b81e [client] Sync Upgrade gopsutil dependency to v4 2026-07-08 11:56:32 +02:00
333 changed files with 4424 additions and 23331 deletions

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@@ -5,13 +5,6 @@ on:
schedule:
- cron: "0 3 * * *"
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
bedrock_model:
description: >-
Bedrock inference-profile id to drive the matrix with, exactly as
AWS issues it. Leave empty for the Sonnet 4.6 default.
required: false
default: ""
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
@@ -58,9 +51,6 @@ jobs:
# token (and URL, for gateways) is unset, so partial coverage is fine.
OPENAI_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.E2E_OPENAI_TOKEN }}
ANTHROPIC_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.E2E_ANTHROPIC_TOKEN }}
# Moonshot AI platform key (platform.kimi.ai); drives both Kimi wire
# shapes (OpenAI /v1 and Anthropic /anthropic) through kimi_api.
KIMI_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.E2E_KIMI_TOKEN }}
VERCEL_URL: ${{ secrets.E2E_VERCEL_URL }}
VERCEL_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.E2E_VERCEL_TOKEN }}
OPENROUTER_URL: ${{ secrets.E2E_OPENROUTER_URL }}
@@ -69,8 +59,6 @@ jobs:
CLOUDFLARE_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.E2E_CLOUDFLARE_TOKEN }}
AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK: ${{ secrets.E2E_AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK }}
AWS_REGION: ${{ secrets.E2E_AWS_REGION }}
# Bedrock model override: dispatch input wins, then the repo variable, else the test default.
AWS_BEDROCK_MODEL: ${{ inputs.bedrock_model || vars.E2E_AWS_BEDROCK_MODEL }}
# Vertex (Anthropic-on-Vertex): SA + project required; region defaults
# to "global", model to a pinned claude snapshot.
GOOGLE_VERTEX_SA_BASE64: ${{ secrets.E2E_GOOGLE_VERTEX_SA_BASE64 }}

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@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ jobs:
${{ runner.os }}-pnpm-
- name: Install dependencies
run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile --ignore-scripts
run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
- name: Generate Wails bindings
run: pnpm run bindings

View File

@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ jobs:
display_name: Linux
name: ${{ matrix.display_name }}
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
timeout-minutes: 25
timeout-minutes: 15
steps:
- name: Checkout code
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
@@ -79,4 +79,4 @@ jobs:
skip-cache: true
skip-save-cache: true
cache-invalidation-interval: 0
args: --timeout=20m
args: --timeout=12m

View File

@@ -1,47 +1,16 @@
# NetBird Agent Network
Agent Network is NetBird's access control layer for AI agents and the people who run them.
It gives every agent a real identity, tied to an identity provider (IdP), and governs what it can reach: LLM APIs and
AI gateways it can call, and the internal resources it can access. Traffic flows only over the encrypted NetBird tunnel,
scoped by policy, with no API keys or other credentials to leak. It also gives you control over cost and token usage.
Agent Network is NetBird's access control layer for AI agents and the people who run
them. It gives every agent a real identity, tied to your identity provider (IdP), and
governs what it can reach — the LLM APIs and AI gateways it can call, and the internal
resources it can access. Traffic flows only over the encrypted NetBird tunnel, scoped by
policy, with no API keys to leak.
Because every LLM request passes through an
identity-aware proxy, you can:
- **Set spending and rate limits** per agent, per user, or per team — with hard caps
that stop requests once a budget is reached.
- **Restrict models and providers** so agents can only call approved (and cost-appropriate)
endpoints, keeping expensive models off-limits unless explicitly allowed.
- **Attribute usage** by tracking token consumption and cost per identity, group, or cost center so every
request is tied back to the agent and person responsible.
- **Reuse your existing AI gateway** — point the proxy at a gateway you already run,
keeping its routing and config in place while it adds identity on top, so you skip
API key distribution.
https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/44d18286-d8ab-49f8-a457-98ccd66f3268
> **Beta.** Agent Network is in beta, but it's stable and already running in
> production environments. It's fully open source and can be self-hosted on your own
> infrastructure, with no vendor lock-in and no data leaving your environment.
> **Beta.** Agent Network is open source and can be self-hosted on your own
> infrastructure.
## How it works
Say you have a simple use case: your Engineering or IT team needs access to Claude Code or Codex, and you want visibility into usage plus the ability to enforce budgets.
How can you do that without creating a dedicated API key for every team?
With Agent Network you get a private endpoint inside your network, for example: https://mirror.netbird.ai
Teams configure their agents to point to that endpoint instead of using individual API keys directly.
This endpoint is only reachable when users are connected to your NetBird network and authenticated through your IdP. Otherwise, it is not accessible from the public internet.
You can then use this private endpoint to configure your AI agents, whether that is Claude Code, Codex, or another tool.
## Quickstart
Full step-by-step setup:
**https://docs.netbird.io/agent-network/quickstart**
## Architecture
Agent Network is built on two existing NetBird capabilities:
- **Overlay network** — the encrypted WireGuard mesh between peers.
@@ -53,9 +22,6 @@ LLM traffic is routed through the proxy's identity-aware pipeline, while interna
resources (databases, internal APIs, self-hosted models) are reached directly over
peer-to-peer WireGuard tunnels, governed by the same identities and access policies.
<img width="4720" height="2218" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1afa5da1-4b82-4f8a-a7a8-f417efadf1eb" />
## Where the code lives
There is no separate "agent-network" service — it reuses the reverse-proxy and management

View File

@@ -247,9 +247,6 @@ func (c *Client) DebugBundle(platformFiles PlatformFiles, anonymize bool) (strin
deps.SyncResponse = resp
if e := cc.Engine(); e != nil {
deps.RefreshStatus = func() {
e.RunHealthProbes(context.Background(), true)
}
if cm := e.GetClientMetrics(); cm != nil {
deps.ClientMetrics = cm
}

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@@ -17,9 +17,7 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/auth"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
nbnet "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/net"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/server"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/system"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
)
@@ -333,14 +331,6 @@ func doForegroundLogin(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, setupKey string,
return fmt.Errorf("read config file %s: %v", configFilePath, err)
}
// Mirror runInForegroundMode: recover residual state (DNS, firewall,
// ssh config, legacy routing) from a previous unclean shutdown and
// enable advanced routing before dialing management.
if err := server.RestoreResidualState(ctx, profilemanager.NewServiceManager(configFilePath).GetStatePath()); err != nil {
log.Warnf("failed to restore residual state: %v", err)
}
nbnet.Init()
err = foregroundLogin(ctx, cmd, config, setupKey, activeProf.ID)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("foreground login failed: %v", err)

View File

@@ -22,8 +22,6 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
nbnet "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/net"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/server"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/system"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
@@ -231,24 +229,6 @@ func runInForegroundMode(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, activeProf *pr
_, _ = profilemanager.UpdateOldManagementURL(ctx, config, configFilePath)
// Restore residual state left by a previous run that did not shut down
// cleanly, mirroring what the daemon does before connecting: it recovers
// DNS config (a stale resolv.conf takeover can make the management
// hostname unresolvable), firewall rules, ssh config and legacy routing.
// Route cleanup itself happens at engine start; nbnet.Init() below lets
// the management dial bypass a leftover fwmark rule until then.
// Foreground mode is particularly exposed in containers: a crashed
// container restarts inside the same (pod) network namespace, so stale
// state survives while the process does not.
if err := server.RestoreResidualState(ctx, profilemanager.NewServiceManager(configPath).GetStatePath()); err != nil {
log.Warnf("failed to restore residual state: %v", err)
}
// Enable advanced routing (as the daemon does on startup) so the
// management dial bypasses a leftover fwmark rule instead of being
// shunted into a stale routing table.
nbnet.Init()
err = foregroundLogin(ctx, cmd, config, providedSetupKey, activeProf.ID)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("foreground login failed: %v", err)

View File

@@ -121,7 +121,6 @@ type Manager struct {
udpTracker *conntrack.UDPTracker
icmpTracker *conntrack.ICMPTracker
tcpTracker *conntrack.TCPTracker
fragments *fragmentTracker
forwarder atomic.Pointer[forwarder.Forwarder]
pendingCapture atomic.Pointer[forwarder.PacketCapture]
logger *nblog.Logger
@@ -184,41 +183,6 @@ func (d *decoder) decodePacket(data []byte) error {
}
}
// decodeTransport decodes the transport header of a first fragment (which
// gopacket leaves undecoded) into the decoder and appends its layer type to
// decoded, so the ACL pipeline can evaluate it like a normal packet. It returns
// false if the protocol is unsupported or the header is truncated.
func (d *decoder) decodeTransport(proto layers.IPProtocol, payload []byte) bool {
var l4 gopacket.DecodingLayer
var layerType gopacket.LayerType
var minLen int
switch proto {
case layers.IPProtocolTCP:
l4, layerType, minLen = &d.tcp, layers.LayerTypeTCP, 20
case layers.IPProtocolUDP:
l4, layerType, minLen = &d.udp, layers.LayerTypeUDP, 8
case layers.IPProtocolICMPv4:
l4, layerType, minLen = &d.icmp4, layers.LayerTypeICMPv4, 8
case layers.IPProtocolICMPv6:
l4, layerType, minLen = &d.icmp6, layers.LayerTypeICMPv6, 8
default:
return false
}
// Reject a fragment too small to hold the full transport header before
// decoding: it can't be ACL-evaluated (tiny-fragment attack), and skipping
// the decode avoids gopacket allocating an error on the drop path.
if len(payload) < minLen {
return false
}
if err := l4.DecodeFromBytes(payload, gopacket.NilDecodeFeedback); err != nil {
return false
}
d.decoded = append(d.decoded, layerType)
return true
}
// Create userspace firewall manager constructor
func Create(iface common.IFaceMapper, disableServerRoutes bool, flowLogger nftypes.FlowLogger, mtu uint16) (*Manager, error) {
return create(iface, nil, disableServerRoutes, flowLogger, mtu)
@@ -322,8 +286,6 @@ func create(iface common.IFaceMapper, nativeFirewall firewall.Manager, disableSe
if err := m.localipmanager.UpdateLocalIPs(iface); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("update local IPs: %w", err)
}
m.fragments = newFragmentTracker(m.logger)
if disableConntrack {
log.Info("conntrack is disabled")
} else {
@@ -337,7 +299,6 @@ func create(iface common.IFaceMapper, nativeFirewall firewall.Manager, disableSe
}
}
if err := iface.SetFilter(m); err != nil {
m.fragments.Close()
return nil, fmt.Errorf("set filter: %w", err)
}
return m, nil
@@ -733,10 +694,6 @@ func (m *Manager) resetState() {
m.tcpTracker.Close()
}
if m.fragments != nil {
m.fragments.Close()
}
if fwder := m.forwarder.Load(); fwder != nil {
fwder.SetCapture(nil)
fwder.Stop()
@@ -1089,20 +1046,19 @@ func (m *Manager) filterInbound(packetData []byte, size int) bool {
return true
}
// gopacket does not decode the transport header of any IP fragment, so
// fragments take a dedicated path: the first fragment's header is decoded
// and ACL-evaluated here, and the remaining fragments inherit its verdict.
// TODO: pass fragments of routed packets to forwarder
if fragment {
return m.filterInboundFragment(d, srcIP, dstIP, size)
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
if d.decoded[0] == layers.LayerTypeIPv4 {
m.logger.Trace4("packet is a fragment: src=%v dst=%v id=%v flags=%v",
srcIP, dstIP, d.ip4.Id, d.ip4.Flags)
} else {
m.logger.Trace2("packet is an IPv6 fragment: src=%v dst=%v", srcIP, dstIP)
}
}
return false
}
return m.filterInboundDecoded(d, srcIP, dstIP, packetData, size)
}
// filterInboundDecoded runs the ACL, DNAT and conntrack pipeline on a fully
// decoded (non-fragment) inbound packet. It returns true if the packet should
// be dropped.
func (m *Manager) filterInboundDecoded(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, packetData []byte, size int) bool {
// TODO: optimize port DNAT by caching matched rules in conntrack
if translated := m.translateInboundPortDNAT(packetData, d, srcIP, dstIP); translated {
// Re-decode after port DNAT translation to update port information
@@ -1133,226 +1089,33 @@ func (m *Manager) filterInboundDecoded(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, pack
return m.handleRoutedTraffic(d, srcIP, dstIP, packetData, size)
}
// fragmentMeta holds the reassembly identity and layout of an IP fragment,
// extracted uniformly for IPv4 and IPv6.
type fragmentMeta struct {
key fragmentKey
// offset is the fragment offset in 8-byte units (zero for the first
// fragment).
offset uint16
// moreFragments is the More Fragments bit. A first fragment with it unset is
// an IPv6 atomic fragment (a complete datagram, RFC 6946): it has no trailing
// fragments to inherit a verdict, so it must not be recorded.
moreFragments bool
proto layers.IPProtocol
// l4payload is the fragmentable payload of this fragment. For the first
// fragment it starts with the transport header.
l4payload []byte
// headerEndOctets is the first fragment's payload length in 8-byte units:
// the smallest offset a trailing fragment may start at without overlapping
// the inspected transport header.
headerEndOctets uint16
}
// fragmentMetadata extracts the fragment identity and layout from a decoded IP
// fragment. It returns false for fragments it can't interpret (e.g. an IPv6
// fragment header shorter than 8 bytes), which are then dropped.
func fragmentMetadata(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr) (fragmentMeta, bool) {
switch d.decoded[0] {
case layers.LayerTypeIPv4:
payload := d.ip4.Payload
return fragmentMeta{
key: fragmentKey{srcIP: srcIP, dstIP: dstIP, id: uint32(d.ip4.Id), proto: uint8(d.ip4.Protocol)},
offset: d.ip4.FragOffset,
moreFragments: d.ip4.Flags&layers.IPv4MoreFragments != 0,
proto: d.ip4.Protocol,
l4payload: payload,
headerEndOctets: octets(len(payload)),
}, true
case layers.LayerTypeIPv6:
// IPv6 fragment extension header: 8 bytes, followed by the fragmentable
// payload. Layout: next header (1), reserved (1), offset+flags (2), id (4).
payload := d.ip6.Payload
if len(payload) < 8 {
return fragmentMeta{}, false
}
nextHeader := layers.IPProtocol(payload[0])
offsetFlags := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(payload[2:4])
id := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(payload[4:8])
l4 := payload[8:]
return fragmentMeta{
key: fragmentKey{srcIP: srcIP, dstIP: dstIP, id: id, proto: uint8(nextHeader)},
offset: offsetFlags >> 3,
moreFragments: offsetFlags&1 != 0,
proto: nextHeader,
l4payload: l4,
headerEndOctets: octets(len(l4)),
}, true
default:
return fragmentMeta{}, false
}
}
// octets rounds a byte length up to whole 8-byte units, the granularity of the
// IP fragment offset field.
func octets(nbytes int) uint16 {
return uint16((nbytes + 7) / 8)
}
// filterInboundFragment decides the fate of an IP fragment. gopacket stops
// decoding at the network layer for every fragment, so the first fragment's
// transport header is decoded and ACL-evaluated here and its verdict recorded;
// the remaining (headerless) fragments inherit that verdict. Anything that
// cannot be tied to an allowed, non-overlapping first fragment is dropped.
func (m *Manager) filterInboundFragment(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, size int) bool {
meta, ok := fragmentMetadata(d, srcIP, dstIP)
if !ok {
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
m.logger.Trace2("dropping unsupported fragment: src=%v dst=%v", srcIP, dstIP)
}
return true
}
if meta.offset != 0 {
return m.filterTrailingFragment(meta, srcIP, dstIP)
}
// A new first fragment supersedes any recorded verdict for this datagram, so
// a re-sent or overlapping offset-zero fragment can't inherit the old one.
m.fragments.poison(meta.key)
// First fragment: decode its transport header so the ACL can evaluate it. A
// decode failure means the fragment is too small to hold the full transport
// header (RFC 1858 §3 tiny-fragment attack); it can't be evaluated, so drop it.
if !d.decodeTransport(meta.proto, meta.l4payload) {
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
m.logger.Trace3("dropping first fragment without full L4 header: src=%v dst=%v id=%v",
srcIP, dstIP, meta.key.id)
}
return true
}
return m.filterFirstFragment(d, meta, srcIP, dstIP, size)
}
// filterTrailingFragment applies a recorded first-fragment verdict to a
// non-first fragment.
func (m *Manager) filterTrailingFragment(meta fragmentMeta, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr) bool {
switch m.fragments.verdict(meta.key, meta.offset) {
case fragmentAllow:
return false
case fragmentOverlap:
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
m.logger.Trace3("dropping overlapping fragment rewriting inspected header: src=%v dst=%v id=%v",
srcIP, dstIP, meta.key.id)
}
return true
default:
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
m.logger.Trace3("dropping fragment with no allowed first fragment: src=%v dst=%v id=%v",
srcIP, dstIP, meta.key.id)
}
return true
}
}
// filterFirstFragment runs the verdict part of the inbound pipeline on a first
// fragment with its transport header decoded. It mirrors filterInboundDecoded
// but skips DNAT (port rewriting on fragments is unsupported) and forwarder
// injection (fragments are left to the stack to reassemble, not forwarded).
// Allowed fragments have their verdict recorded so the datagram's trailing
// fragments inherit it.
func (m *Manager) filterFirstFragment(d *decoder, meta fragmentMeta, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, size int) bool {
if m.stateful && m.isValidTrackedConnection(d, srcIP, dstIP, size) {
m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
return false
}
if m.localipmanager.IsLocalIP(dstIP) {
ruleID, blocked := m.peerACLsBlock(srcIP, d, nil)
if blocked {
m.storeDropFlow("Dropping local first fragment (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
return true
}
m.trackInbound(d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
return false
}
if !m.routingEnabled.Load() {
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
m.logger.Trace2("Dropping routed fragment (routing disabled): src=%s dst=%s", srcIP, dstIP)
}
return true
}
if m.nativeRouter.Load() {
m.trackInbound(d, srcIP, dstIP, nil, size)
m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
return false
}
// TODO: pass fragments of routed packets to the forwarder; until then
// allowed routed fragments go to the native stack.
srcPort, dstPort := getPortsFromPacket(d)
ruleID, pass := m.routeACLsPass(srcIP, dstIP, d.decoded[1], srcPort, dstPort)
if !pass {
m.storeDropFlow("Dropping routed first fragment (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
return true
}
m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
return false
}
// recordFirstFragment caches an allowed first fragment's verdict for its
// trailing fragments to inherit. Atomic fragments (no More Fragments bit) are
// complete datagrams with no trailing fragments, so they are not cached and
// cannot exhaust the verdict table.
func (m *Manager) recordFirstFragment(meta fragmentMeta) {
if !meta.moreFragments {
return
}
m.fragments.recordAllowed(meta.key, meta.headerEndOctets)
}
// storeDropFlow logs and records a netflow drop event for an inbound packet
// denied by the ACLs. msg is the trace format taking rule id, protocol, source
// and destination.
func (m *Manager) storeDropFlow(msg string, d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, ruleID []byte, size int) {
pnum := getProtocolFromPacket(d)
srcPort, dstPort := getPortsFromPacket(d)
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
m.logger.Trace6(msg, ruleID, pnum, srcIP, srcPort, dstIP, dstPort)
}
m.flowLogger.StoreEvent(nftypes.EventFields{
FlowID: uuid.New(),
Type: nftypes.TypeDrop,
RuleID: ruleID,
Direction: nftypes.Ingress,
Protocol: pnum,
SourceIP: srcIP,
DestIP: dstIP,
SourcePort: srcPort,
DestPort: dstPort,
// TODO: icmp type/code
RxPackets: 1,
RxBytes: uint64(size),
})
}
// handleLocalTraffic handles local traffic.
// If it returns true, the packet should be dropped.
func (m *Manager) handleLocalTraffic(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, packetData []byte, size int) bool {
ruleID, blocked := m.peerACLsBlock(srcIP, d, packetData)
if blocked {
m.storeDropFlow("Dropping local packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
pnum := getProtocolFromPacket(d)
srcPort, dstPort := getPortsFromPacket(d)
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
m.logger.Trace6("Dropping local packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
ruleID, pnum, srcIP, srcPort, dstIP, dstPort)
}
m.flowLogger.StoreEvent(nftypes.EventFields{
FlowID: uuid.New(),
Type: nftypes.TypeDrop,
RuleID: ruleID,
Direction: nftypes.Ingress,
Protocol: pnum,
SourceIP: srcIP,
DestIP: dstIP,
SourcePort: srcPort,
DestPort: dstPort,
// TODO: icmp type/code
RxPackets: 1,
RxBytes: uint64(size),
})
return true
}
@@ -1405,8 +1168,27 @@ func (m *Manager) handleRoutedTraffic(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, packe
ruleID, pass := m.routeACLsPass(srcIP, dstIP, protoLayer, srcPort, dstPort)
if !pass {
m.storeDropFlow("Dropping routed packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
proto := getProtocolFromPacket(d)
if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
m.logger.Trace6("Dropping routed packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
ruleID, proto, srcIP, srcPort, dstIP, dstPort)
}
m.flowLogger.StoreEvent(nftypes.EventFields{
FlowID: uuid.New(),
Type: nftypes.TypeDrop,
RuleID: ruleID,
Direction: nftypes.Ingress,
Protocol: proto,
SourceIP: srcIP,
DestIP: dstIP,
SourcePort: srcPort,
DestPort: dstPort,
// TODO: icmp type/code
RxPackets: 1,
RxBytes: uint64(size),
})
return true
}

View File

@@ -5,9 +5,7 @@ import (
"fmt"
"net"
"net/netip"
"os"
"runtime"
"strconv"
"sync"
"time"
@@ -33,11 +31,6 @@ const (
defaultMaxInFlight = 1024
iosReceiveWindow = 16384
iosMaxInFlight = 256
// envForceTCPRACK overrides the platform default for gVisor's RACK loss
// detection. Set to a truthy value to force RACK on, or a falsy value to
// force it off, on any platform.
envForceTCPRACK = "NB_FORCE_TCP_RACK"
)
type Forwarder struct {
@@ -159,8 +152,6 @@ func New(iface common.IFaceMapper, logger *nblog.Logger, flowLogger nftypes.Flow
maxInFlight = iosMaxInFlight
}
configureTCPRecovery(s)
tcpForwarder := tcp.NewForwarder(s, receiveWindow, maxInFlight, f.handleTCP)
s.SetTransportProtocolHandler(tcp.ProtocolNumber, tcpForwarder.HandlePacket)
@@ -475,31 +466,3 @@ func probeRawICMP(network, addr string, logger *nblog.Logger) bool {
logger.Debug1("forwarder: raw %s socket access available", network)
return true
}
// configureTCPRecovery disables gVisor's RACK loss detection on Windows, where
// it interacts poorly with the host and collapses throughput on routed TCP
// connections (gVisor issue #9778). Other platforms keep the default. The
// EnvForceTCPRACK environment variable overrides the platform default.
func configureTCPRecovery(s *stack.Stack) {
disableRACK := runtime.GOOS == "windows"
if val := os.Getenv(envForceTCPRACK); val != "" {
force, err := strconv.ParseBool(val)
if err != nil {
log.Warnf("parse %s: %v", envForceTCPRACK, err)
} else {
disableRACK = !force
}
}
if !disableRACK {
return
}
opt := tcpip.TCPRecovery(0)
if err := s.SetTransportProtocolOption(tcp.ProtocolNumber, &opt); err != nil {
log.Warnf("disable TCP RACK loss detection: %v", err)
return
}
log.Info("forwarder: TCP RACK loss detection disabled")
}

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@@ -1,204 +0,0 @@
package uspfilter
import (
"context"
"net/netip"
"os"
"strconv"
"sync"
"time"
nblog "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/uspfilter/log"
)
const (
// defaultFragmentTimeout bounds how long a first-fragment verdict is kept
// while the remaining fragments arrive. It mirrors the Linux IP reassembly
// timeout (net.ipv4.ipfrag_time).
defaultFragmentTimeout = 30 * time.Second
// fragmentCleanupInterval is how often expired verdicts are purged.
fragmentCleanupInterval = 10 * time.Second
// defaultMaxFragmentEntries caps the number of concurrently tracked
// fragmented datagrams. The table stays bounded because each datagram is a
// single small entry regardless of how many fragments it is split into, and
// the 13-bit IPv4 fragment-offset field limits any datagram to 64 KiB.
defaultMaxFragmentEntries = 16384
// EnvFragmentMaxEntries overrides defaultMaxFragmentEntries.
EnvFragmentMaxEntries = "NB_FRAGMENT_MAX_ENTRIES"
)
// fragmentVerdict is the decision for a trailing (headerless) fragment.
type fragmentVerdict int
const (
// fragmentDeny drops the fragment: no allowed first fragment is on record.
fragmentDeny fragmentVerdict = iota
// fragmentAllow passes the fragment: it belongs to an allowed datagram and
// does not overlap the already-inspected transport header.
fragmentAllow
// fragmentOverlap drops the fragment and poisons its datagram: it overlaps
// the transport header the ACL inspected (RFC 1858 §4, RFC 3128; RFC 5722
// requires discarding the whole datagram on overlap for IPv6).
fragmentOverlap
)
// fragmentKey identifies a fragmented datagram. It matches the RFC 791 / RFC
// 8200 reassembly key: source, destination, protocol and identification. The id
// is 32-bit to hold both the IPv4 (16-bit) and IPv6 (32-bit) identification.
type fragmentKey struct {
srcIP netip.Addr
dstIP netip.Addr
id uint32
proto uint8
}
// fragmentEntry records the verdict of an allowed first fragment.
type fragmentEntry struct {
// headerEndOctets is the offset, in 8-byte units, at which the first
// fragment's payload ended. A trailing fragment starting before this
// overlaps bytes the ACL already inspected and is rejected.
headerEndOctets uint16
// recordedAt is when the first fragment was accepted. The verdict expires a
// fixed timeout later and is not refreshed, mirroring the kernel reassembly
// timer so a trailing-fragment flood can't keep a datagram alive.
recordedAt time.Time
}
// fragmentTracker records the ACL verdict of a datagram's first fragment so the
// remaining fragments, which carry no L4 header, can inherit the decision
// without reassembling the datagram. Only allowed first fragments are stored;
// anything that cannot be tied to an allowed, non-overlapping first fragment is
// dropped (fail closed).
type fragmentTracker struct {
logger *nblog.Logger
mutex sync.Mutex
entries map[fragmentKey]fragmentEntry
timeout time.Duration
// maxEntries caps the table; atCapacity dedups the capacity warning until
// the table drains below the cap again.
maxEntries int
atCapacity bool
cleanupTicker *time.Ticker
cancel context.CancelFunc
}
func newFragmentTracker(logger *nblog.Logger) *fragmentTracker {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
t := &fragmentTracker{
logger: logger,
entries: make(map[fragmentKey]fragmentEntry),
timeout: defaultFragmentTimeout,
maxEntries: fragmentMaxEntries(logger),
cleanupTicker: time.NewTicker(fragmentCleanupInterval),
cancel: cancel,
}
go t.cleanupRoutine(ctx)
return t
}
func fragmentMaxEntries(logger *nblog.Logger) int {
v := os.Getenv(EnvFragmentMaxEntries)
if v == "" {
return defaultMaxFragmentEntries
}
n, err := strconv.Atoi(v)
if err != nil || n <= 0 {
logger.Warn2("invalid %s=%q, using default", EnvFragmentMaxEntries, v)
return defaultMaxFragmentEntries
}
return n
}
// recordAllowed stores the verdict of an allowed first fragment. headerEndOctets
// is the first fragment's payload length in 8-byte units. When the table is full
// the record is dropped, which fails closed: the datagram's trailing fragments
// will be denied.
func (t *fragmentTracker) recordAllowed(key fragmentKey, headerEndOctets uint16) {
t.mutex.Lock()
defer t.mutex.Unlock()
if t.entries == nil {
return
}
if _, ok := t.entries[key]; !ok && len(t.entries) >= t.maxEntries {
if !t.atCapacity {
t.atCapacity = true
t.logger.Warn2("fragment verdict table at capacity (%d/%d): trailing fragments of new datagrams will be dropped",
len(t.entries), t.maxEntries)
}
return
}
t.entries[key] = fragmentEntry{
headerEndOctets: headerEndOctets,
recordedAt: time.Now(),
}
}
// poison drops any recorded verdict for a datagram, so its later fragments are
// denied until a new allowed first fragment is recorded. Called on every
// offset-zero fragment to defeat offset-zero overlap rewrites (RFC 3128).
func (t *fragmentTracker) poison(key fragmentKey) {
t.mutex.Lock()
defer t.mutex.Unlock()
delete(t.entries, key)
}
// verdict decides the fate of a trailing fragment at fragOffsetOctets (the IPv4
// fragment offset, in 8-byte units). A fragment overlapping the inspected
// header poisons the datagram: the entry is removed so all further fragments of
// that datagram are denied too.
func (t *fragmentTracker) verdict(key fragmentKey, fragOffsetOctets uint16) fragmentVerdict {
t.mutex.Lock()
defer t.mutex.Unlock()
entry, ok := t.entries[key]
if !ok {
return fragmentDeny
}
if time.Since(entry.recordedAt) > t.timeout {
delete(t.entries, key)
return fragmentDeny
}
if fragOffsetOctets < entry.headerEndOctets {
delete(t.entries, key)
return fragmentOverlap
}
return fragmentAllow
}
func (t *fragmentTracker) cleanupRoutine(ctx context.Context) {
defer t.cleanupTicker.Stop()
for {
select {
case <-t.cleanupTicker.C:
t.cleanup()
case <-ctx.Done():
return
}
}
}
func (t *fragmentTracker) cleanup() {
t.mutex.Lock()
defer t.mutex.Unlock()
for key, entry := range t.entries {
if time.Since(entry.recordedAt) > t.timeout {
delete(t.entries, key)
}
}
if len(t.entries) < t.maxEntries {
t.atCapacity = false
}
}
// Close stops the cleanup routine and releases resources.
func (t *fragmentTracker) Close() {
t.cancel()
t.mutex.Lock()
t.entries = nil
t.mutex.Unlock()
}

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@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
package uspfilter
import (
"encoding/binary"
"testing"
)
// benchFilterInbound drives filterInbound over a fixed packet in a tight loop.
// Packets are built once, outside the timed region, so the benchmark measures
// only pipeline cost, which is what an attacker can amplify.
func benchFilterInbound(b *testing.B, pkt []byte) {
b.Helper()
b.ReportAllocs()
b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkt)))
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
m := benchManager
m.filterInbound(pkt, len(pkt))
}
}
// benchManager is a package-level manager reused across fragment benchmarks so
// setup cost stays out of the timed region.
var benchManager *Manager
func setupBenchManager(b *testing.B) *Manager {
b.Helper()
m := newFragmentTestManager(b)
allowUDP(b, m, 8080)
// Disable conntrack so the allowed-first-fragment path measures transport
// decode + ACL every iteration instead of matching the connection tracked
// on the first iteration.
m.stateful = false
benchManager = m
return m
}
// BenchmarkInbound_NormalPacket is the baseline: a full, non-fragmented UDP
// packet that passes the ACL. Fragment paths should stay comparable to this.
func BenchmarkInbound_NormalPacket(b *testing.B) {
setupBenchManager(b)
pkt := normalUDPPacket(b, 8080, 32)
benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
}
// BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentAllowed measures the first-fragment path:
// transport decode + ACL evaluation + verdict record.
func BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentAllowed(b *testing.B) {
setupBenchManager(b)
pkt := firstFragmentUDP(b, 0x2000, 8080, 32)
benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
}
// BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentAllowed measures the common trailing-fragment
// path: a single map lookup after the first fragment is on record.
func BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentAllowed(b *testing.B) {
m := setupBenchManager(b)
first := firstFragmentUDP(b, 0x3000, 8080, 32)
m.filterInbound(first, len(first))
pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x3000, 5, false, 24)
benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
}
// BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentNoFirst is the primary DoS vector: an
// attacker floods trailing fragments with no first fragment on record. Each is
// a map miss and must be cheap.
func BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentNoFirst(b *testing.B) {
setupBenchManager(b)
pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x4000, 185, false, 40)
benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
}
// BenchmarkInbound_TinyFirstFragment measures the tiny-fragment drop path: a
// first fragment too small to decode a transport header.
func BenchmarkInbound_TinyFirstFragment(b *testing.B) {
setupBenchManager(b)
pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x5000, 0, true, 4)
benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
}
// BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentDistinctIDs is the worst case for the
// verdict table: an attacker varies the datagram id on every packet so no first
// fragment ever matches. Verdict lookups always miss and nothing is recorded,
// so the table cannot grow. Each iteration rewrites the id field in place.
func BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentDistinctIDs(b *testing.B) {
setupBenchManager(b)
pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x6000, 185, false, 40)
m := benchManager
b.ReportAllocs()
b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkt)))
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
// IPv4 identification field is at bytes 4:6.
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], uint16(i))
m.filterInbound(pkt, len(pkt))
}
}
// BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentDistinctIDs measures sustained first-fragment
// pressure with distinct ids: transport decode + ACL + verdict insert until the
// table caps, exercising the map growth and capacity guard.
func BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentDistinctIDs(b *testing.B) {
setupBenchManager(b)
pkt := firstFragmentUDP(b, 0x7000, 8080, 32)
m := benchManager
b.ReportAllocs()
b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkt)))
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], uint16(i))
m.filterInbound(pkt, len(pkt))
}
}

View File

@@ -1,554 +0,0 @@
package uspfilter
import (
"encoding/binary"
"net"
"net/netip"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/google/gopacket"
"github.com/google/gopacket/layers"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
fw "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
nbiface "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/device"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
)
const (
fragTestSrc = "100.10.0.1"
fragTestDst = "100.10.0.100"
fragTestSrcV6 = "fd00::1"
fragTestDstV6 = "fd00::100"
)
func newFragmentTestManager(tb testing.TB) *Manager {
tb.Helper()
ifaceMock := &IFaceMock{
SetFilterFunc: func(device.PacketFilter) error { return nil },
AddressFunc: func() wgaddr.Address {
return wgaddr.Address{
IP: netip.MustParseAddr(fragTestDst),
Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("100.10.0.0/16"),
IPv6: netip.MustParseAddr(fragTestDstV6),
IPv6Net: netip.MustParsePrefix("fd00::/64"),
}
},
}
m, err := Create(ifaceMock, false, flowLogger, nbiface.DefaultMTU)
require.NoError(tb, err)
require.NoError(tb, m.UpdateLocalIPs())
tb.Cleanup(func() { require.NoError(tb, m.Close(nil)) })
return m
}
// firstFragmentUDPTo builds the first fragment of a fragmented UDP datagram to
// the given destination: it carries the full UDP header plus payloadLen bytes
// of data, with the More Fragments flag set and offset zero.
func firstFragmentUDPTo(tb testing.TB, dst string, id uint16, dstPort uint16, payloadLen int) []byte {
tb.Helper()
ip := &layers.IPv4{
Version: 4,
TTL: 64,
Id: id,
Protocol: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
SrcIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
DstIP: net.ParseIP(dst),
Flags: layers.IPv4MoreFragments,
}
udp := &layers.UDP{SrcPort: 40000, DstPort: layers.UDPPort(dstPort)}
require.NoError(tb, udp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, udp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, payloadLen))))
return buf.Bytes()
}
func firstFragmentUDP(tb testing.TB, id uint16, dstPort uint16, payloadLen int) []byte {
tb.Helper()
return firstFragmentUDPTo(tb, fragTestDst, id, dstPort, payloadLen)
}
// firstFragmentTCP builds the first fragment of a fragmented TCP datagram: the
// full 20-byte TCP header plus 12 bytes of data, with the More Fragments flag
// set and offset zero.
func firstFragmentTCP(tb testing.TB, id uint16, dstPort uint16) []byte {
tb.Helper()
ip := &layers.IPv4{
Version: 4,
TTL: 64,
Id: id,
Protocol: layers.IPProtocolTCP,
SrcIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
DstIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestDst),
Flags: layers.IPv4MoreFragments,
}
tcp := &layers.TCP{SrcPort: 40000, DstPort: layers.TCPPort(dstPort), SYN: true, Window: 64240}
require.NoError(tb, tcp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, tcp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, 12))))
return buf.Bytes()
}
// trailingFragmentTo builds a non-first fragment to the given destination: an
// IPv4 header at the given fragment offset (in 8-byte units) carrying raw
// payload and no L4 header.
func trailingFragmentTo(tb testing.TB, dst string, proto layers.IPProtocol, id uint16, fragOffsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, payloadLen int) []byte {
tb.Helper()
ip := &layers.IPv4{
Version: 4,
TTL: 64,
Id: id,
Protocol: proto,
SrcIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
DstIP: net.ParseIP(dst),
FragOffset: fragOffsetOctets,
}
if moreFragments {
ip.Flags = layers.IPv4MoreFragments
}
buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{FixLengths: true}
require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, payloadLen))))
return buf.Bytes()
}
func trailingFragment(tb testing.TB, id uint16, fragOffsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, payloadLen int) []byte {
tb.Helper()
return trailingFragmentTo(tb, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolUDP, id, fragOffsetOctets, moreFragments, payloadLen)
}
// outboundUDPPacket builds a complete outbound UDP packet from the local
// address, used to establish conntrack state for reply-direction tests.
func outboundUDPPacket(tb testing.TB, srcPort, dstPort uint16) []byte {
tb.Helper()
ip := &layers.IPv4{
Version: 4,
TTL: 64,
Id: 1,
Protocol: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
SrcIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestDst),
DstIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
}
udp := &layers.UDP{SrcPort: layers.UDPPort(srcPort), DstPort: layers.UDPPort(dstPort)}
require.NoError(tb, udp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, udp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, 16))))
return buf.Bytes()
}
// normalUDPPacket builds a complete, non-fragmented UDP packet for baseline
// comparisons against the fragment paths.
func normalUDPPacket(tb testing.TB, dstPort uint16, payloadLen int) []byte {
tb.Helper()
ip := &layers.IPv4{
Version: 4,
TTL: 64,
Id: 1,
Protocol: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
SrcIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
DstIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestDst),
}
udp := &layers.UDP{SrcPort: 40000, DstPort: layers.UDPPort(dstPort)}
require.NoError(tb, udp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, udp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, payloadLen))))
return buf.Bytes()
}
func allowUDP(tb testing.TB, m *Manager, dstPort uint16) {
tb.Helper()
_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolUDP, nil,
&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{dstPort}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
require.NoError(tb, err)
}
// TestFragment_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped is the core bypass repro: a trailing
// fragment with no allowed first fragment on record must be dropped. Before the
// fix, filterInbound returned false (allow) for any fragment.
func TestFragment_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
frag := trailingFragment(t, 0x1234, 185, false, 40)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(frag, len(frag)),
"trailing fragment without an allowed first fragment must be dropped")
}
// TestFragment_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing verifies that once a first fragment
// passes the ACL, its trailing fragments inherit the allow verdict.
func TestFragment_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
// First fragment: UDP header (8) + 32 payload = 40 octets -> headerEnd = 5.
first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x2222, 8080, 32)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
"allowed first fragment should pass and be recorded")
trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x2222, 5, false, 24)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
"trailing fragment of an allowed datagram should pass")
}
// TestFragment_DeniedFirstDropsTrailing verifies that a first fragment blocked
// by the ACL leaves no verdict, so its trailing fragments are dropped.
func TestFragment_DeniedFirstDropsTrailing(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
// No accept rule: local traffic defaults to deny.
first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x3333, 9999, 32)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
"first fragment to a blocked port should be dropped by the ACL")
trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x3333, 5, false, 24)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
"trailing fragment of a denied datagram must be dropped")
}
// TestFragment_OverlappingHeaderDropped covers the RFC 1858 §4 / RFC 3128
// overlapping-fragment rewrite: a trailing fragment starting inside the range
// the ACL already inspected is dropped and poisons the datagram. TCP is used so
// the overlap lands on real header bytes (the flags at byte 13).
func TestFragment_OverlappingHeaderDropped(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolTCP, nil,
&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
require.NoError(t, err)
// First fragment: TCP header (20) + 12 data = 32 bytes -> headerEnd = 4 octets.
first := firstFragmentTCP(t, 0x4444, 8080)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)))
// Overlapping fragment at offset 1 (byte 8) falls inside the inspected TCP
// header, so it could rewrite the flags or port on reassembly.
overlap := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x4444, 1, true, 32)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(overlap, len(overlap)),
"fragment overlapping the inspected header must be dropped")
// The datagram is now poisoned: a later, non-overlapping fragment is also
// dropped because the verdict was removed.
later := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x4444, 4, false, 24)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(later, len(later)),
"fragments after an overlap must be dropped (datagram poisoned)")
}
// TestFragment_OffsetZeroOverlapPoisons covers the RFC 3128 offset-zero rewrite:
// an allowed first fragment followed by a denied offset-zero fragment for the
// same datagram must not leave the earlier allow verdict in place.
func TestFragment_OffsetZeroOverlapPoisons(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
allowed := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x5A5A, 8080, 32)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(allowed, len(allowed)),
"allowed first fragment should pass and be recorded")
// A second offset-zero fragment to a denied port supersedes the datagram's
// verdict; it is dropped and must not leave the allow in place.
denied := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x5A5A, 9999, 32)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(denied, len(denied)),
"denied offset-zero fragment must be dropped")
trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x5A5A, 5, false, 24)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
"trailing fragment must be denied after the datagram was poisoned")
}
// TestFragment_TinyFirstDropped covers the tiny-fragment attack: a first
// fragment too small to contain the full transport header can't be
// ACL-evaluated and must be dropped.
func TestFragment_TinyFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
// IPv4 header + 4 raw bytes, MF set, offset 0: too small for the 8-byte UDP
// header, so it decodes to L3 only.
tiny := trailingFragment(t, 0x5555, 0, true, 4)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(tiny, len(tiny)),
"tiny first fragment without a full L4 header must be dropped")
}
// TestFragment_TCPFirstFragment verifies the TCP arm of the transport decode: a
// first fragment carrying the full 20-byte TCP header is ACL-evaluated and its
// trailing fragments inherit the verdict.
func TestFragment_TCPFirstFragment(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolTCP, nil,
&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
require.NoError(t, err)
// TCP header (20) + 12 data = 32 bytes -> headerEnd = 4 octets.
first := firstFragmentTCP(t, 0x6666, 8080)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
"allowed TCP first fragment should pass and be recorded")
trailing := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x6666, 4, false, 24)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
"trailing fragment of an allowed TCP datagram should pass")
}
// TestFragment_TCPTinyFirstDropped verifies the TCP minimum header length: 12
// bytes would satisfy a UDP header but falls short of the 20-byte TCP header.
func TestFragment_TCPTinyFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolTCP, nil,
&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
require.NoError(t, err)
tiny := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x7777, 0, true, 12)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(tiny, len(tiny)),
"first fragment shorter than the TCP header must be dropped")
}
// TestFragment_ConntrackAllowsFirstFragment verifies the conntrack branch: reply
// fragments of an outbound-established UDP flow pass without any inbound rule.
func TestFragment_ConntrackAllowsFirstFragment(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
out := outboundUDPPacket(t, 12345, 40000)
require.False(t, m.filterOutbound(out, len(out)))
first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x8888, 12345, 32)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
"reply first fragment should pass via conntrack")
trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x8888, 5, false, 24)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
"trailing fragment of a tracked flow should pass")
}
// TestFragment_RoutingDisabledDropsFragment verifies routed first fragments are
// dropped when routing is disabled.
func TestFragment_RoutingDisabledDropsFragment(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
m.routingEnabled.Store(false)
first := firstFragmentUDPTo(t, "198.51.100.10", 0x9999, 8080, 32)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
"routed first fragment must be dropped when routing is disabled")
}
// TestFragment_RouteACL verifies the route-ACL branch: fragments to a non-local
// destination follow the route rules, allowed datagrams pass their trailing
// fragments and denied ones don't.
func TestFragment_RouteACL(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
m.routingEnabled.Store(true)
m.nativeRouter.Store(false)
_, err := m.AddRouteFiltering(
[]byte("rt-1"),
[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("100.10.0.0/16")},
fw.Network{Prefix: netip.MustParsePrefix("198.51.100.0/24")},
fw.ProtocolUDP,
nil,
&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}},
fw.ActionAccept,
)
require.NoError(t, err)
first := firstFragmentUDPTo(t, "198.51.100.10", 0xAAAA, 8080, 32)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
"route-ACL-allowed first fragment should pass")
trailing := trailingFragmentTo(t, "198.51.100.10", layers.IPProtocolUDP, 0xAAAA, 5, false, 24)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
"trailing fragment of an allowed routed datagram should pass")
denied := firstFragmentUDPTo(t, "198.51.100.10", 0xBBBB, 9999, 32)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(denied, len(denied)),
"route-ACL-denied first fragment must be dropped")
deniedTrailing := trailingFragmentTo(t, "198.51.100.10", layers.IPProtocolUDP, 0xBBBB, 5, false, 24)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(deniedTrailing, len(deniedTrailing)),
"trailing fragment of a denied routed datagram must be dropped")
}
// TestFragment_ExpiredVerdictDropsTrailing verifies a verdict older than the
// tracker timeout no longer admits trailing fragments.
func TestFragment_ExpiredVerdictDropsTrailing(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0xCCCC, 8080, 32)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)))
m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
for key, entry := range m.fragments.entries {
entry.recordedAt = time.Now().Add(-defaultFragmentTimeout - time.Second)
m.fragments.entries[key] = entry
}
m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0xCCCC, 5, false, 24)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
"trailing fragment after verdict expiry must be dropped")
}
// TestFragment_CapacityFailsClosed verifies the table cap: at capacity, new
// datagram verdicts are not recorded (their trailing fragments are dropped)
// while already-recorded datagrams keep working.
func TestFragment_CapacityFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
m.fragments.maxEntries = 1
m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
first1 := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x0101, 8080, 32)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first1, len(first1)))
first2 := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x0202, 8080, 32)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first2, len(first2)),
"first fragment itself still passes at capacity")
trailing2 := trailingFragment(t, 0x0202, 5, false, 24)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing2, len(trailing2)),
"trailing fragment of an unrecorded datagram must be dropped at capacity")
trailing1 := trailingFragment(t, 0x0101, 5, false, 24)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing1, len(trailing1)),
"already-recorded datagram should keep passing at capacity")
}
// v6FragmentHeader builds the 8-byte IPv6 fragment extension header for the
// given inner protocol, offset (8-byte units), More Fragments bit and id.
func v6FragmentHeader(proto layers.IPProtocol, offsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, id uint32) []byte {
offsetFlags := offsetOctets << 3
if moreFragments {
offsetFlags |= 1
}
hdr := make([]byte, 8)
hdr[0] = uint8(proto)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[2:4], offsetFlags)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(hdr[4:8], id)
return hdr
}
func v6UDPHeader(dstPort uint16, dataLen int) []byte {
hdr := make([]byte, 8)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[0:2], 40000)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[2:4], dstPort)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[4:6], uint16(8+dataLen))
return hdr
}
// firstFragmentUDPv6 builds the first fragment of a fragmented IPv6 UDP
// datagram: fragment header (offset 0, More Fragments set) + full UDP header +
// data.
func firstFragmentUDPv6(tb testing.TB, id uint32, dstPort uint16, dataLen int) []byte {
tb.Helper()
return fragmentUDPv6(tb, id, dstPort, dataLen, true)
}
// fragmentUDPv6 builds an offset-zero IPv6 UDP fragment. With moreFragments
// false it is an atomic fragment (a complete datagram, RFC 6946).
func fragmentUDPv6(tb testing.TB, id uint32, dstPort uint16, dataLen int, moreFragments bool) []byte {
tb.Helper()
ip := &layers.IPv6{
Version: 6,
NextHeader: layers.IPProtocolIPv6Fragment,
HopLimit: 64,
SrcIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6),
DstIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestDstV6),
}
payload := append(v6FragmentHeader(layers.IPProtocolUDP, 0, moreFragments, id), v6UDPHeader(dstPort, dataLen)...)
payload = append(payload, make([]byte, dataLen)...)
buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, gopacket.SerializeOptions{FixLengths: true}, ip, gopacket.Payload(payload)))
return buf.Bytes()
}
// trailingFragmentV6 builds a non-first IPv6 fragment: fragment header at the
// given offset carrying raw data and no transport header.
func trailingFragmentV6(tb testing.TB, id uint32, offsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, dataLen int) []byte {
tb.Helper()
ip := &layers.IPv6{
Version: 6,
NextHeader: layers.IPProtocolIPv6Fragment,
HopLimit: 64,
SrcIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6),
DstIP: net.ParseIP(fragTestDstV6),
}
payload := append(v6FragmentHeader(layers.IPProtocolUDP, offsetOctets, moreFragments, id), make([]byte, dataLen)...)
buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, gopacket.SerializeOptions{FixLengths: true}, ip, gopacket.Payload(payload)))
return buf.Bytes()
}
// TestFragmentV6_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped verifies the IPv6 bypass is closed:
// a trailing fragment with no allowed first fragment is dropped.
func TestFragmentV6_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
frag := trailingFragmentV6(t, 0xAABBCCDD, 100, false, 40)
require.True(t, m.filterInbound(frag, len(frag)),
"IPv6 trailing fragment without an allowed first fragment must be dropped")
}
// TestFragmentV6_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing verifies IPv6 fragments are
// evaluated like IPv4: an allowed first fragment lets its trailing fragments
// through.
func TestFragmentV6_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6), fw.ProtocolUDP, nil,
&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
require.NoError(t, err)
// First fragment: UDP header (8) + 32 data = 40 octets -> headerEnd = 5.
first := firstFragmentUDPv6(t, 0xAABBCCDD, 8080, 32)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
"allowed IPv6 first fragment should pass and be recorded")
trailing := trailingFragmentV6(t, 0xAABBCCDD, 5, false, 24)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
"trailing fragment of an allowed IPv6 datagram should pass")
}
// TestFragmentV6_AtomicNotCached verifies an IPv6 atomic fragment (fragment
// header with offset 0 and no More Fragments, a complete datagram per RFC 6946)
// is evaluated but not recorded, so a flood of allowed atomic fragments can't
// exhaust the verdict table.
func TestFragmentV6_AtomicNotCached(t *testing.T) {
m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6), fw.ProtocolUDP, nil,
&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
require.NoError(t, err)
atomic := fragmentUDPv6(t, 0xA70301C, 8080, 16, false)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(atomic, len(atomic)),
"allowed IPv6 atomic fragment should pass")
m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
n := len(m.fragments.entries)
m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
require.Zero(t, n, "atomic fragment must not create a verdict entry")
// A genuine fragmented datagram (More Fragments set) is still recorded.
first := fragmentUDPv6(t, 0xBEEF, 8080, 32, true)
require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)))
m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
n = len(m.fragments.entries)
m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
require.Equal(t, 1, n, "genuine first fragment must record a verdict")
}

View File

@@ -464,8 +464,6 @@ func Test_RemovePeer(t *testing.T) {
}
func Test_ConnectPeers(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("NB_DISABLE_EBPF_WG_PROXY", "true")
peer1ifaceName := fmt.Sprintf("utun%d", WgIntNumber+400)
peer1wgIP := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.99.99.17/30")
peer1Key, _ := wgtypes.GeneratePrivateKey()
@@ -507,8 +505,12 @@ func Test_ConnectPeers(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
localIP1 := "127.0.0.1"
peer1endpoint, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", localIP1, peer1wgPort))
localIP, err := getLocalIP()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
peer1endpoint, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", localIP, peer1wgPort))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
@@ -544,8 +546,7 @@ func Test_ConnectPeers(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
localIP2 := "127.0.0.1"
peer2endpoint, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", localIP2, peer2wgPort))
peer2endpoint, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", localIP, peer2wgPort))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
@@ -568,17 +569,17 @@ func Test_ConnectPeers(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// The peers use userspace WireGuard (stdnet transport). A tight busy-loop
// here starves the wireguard-go goroutines that process the handshake, so
// poll on a ticker instead and yield the CPU between checks. WireGuard also
// only retries a lost handshake initiation every REKEY_TIMEOUT (5s), which
// is why the overall wait can occasionally stretch to tens of seconds.
// todo: investigate why in some tests execution we need 30s
timeout := 30 * time.Second
timeoutChannel := time.After(timeout)
ticker := time.NewTicker(500 * time.Millisecond)
defer ticker.Stop()
for {
select {
case <-timeoutChannel:
t.Fatalf("waiting for peer handshake timeout after %s", timeout.String())
default:
}
peer, gpErr := getPeer(peer1ifaceName, peer2Key.PublicKey().String())
if gpErr != nil {
t.Fatal(gpErr)
@@ -587,12 +588,6 @@ func Test_ConnectPeers(t *testing.T) {
t.Log("peers successfully handshake")
break
}
select {
case <-timeoutChannel:
t.Fatalf("waiting for peer handshake timeout after %s", timeout.String())
case <-ticker.C:
}
}
}
@@ -620,3 +615,28 @@ func getPeer(ifaceName, peerPubKey string) (wgtypes.Peer, error) {
}
return wgtypes.Peer{}, fmt.Errorf("peer not found")
}
func getLocalIP() (string, error) {
// Get all interfaces
addrs, err := net.InterfaceAddrs()
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
for _, addr := range addrs {
ipNet, ok := addr.(*net.IPNet)
if !ok {
continue
}
if ipNet.IP.IsLoopback() {
continue
}
if ipNet.IP.To4() == nil {
continue
}
return ipNet.IP.String(), nil
}
return "", fmt.Errorf("no local IP found")
}

View File

@@ -3,31 +3,14 @@
package netstack
import (
"net"
"fmt"
"os"
"strconv"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
)
const (
EnvUseNetstackMode = "NB_USE_NETSTACK_MODE"
// EnvSocks5ListenerPort overrides the port the SOCKS5 proxy listens on.
EnvSocks5ListenerPort = "NB_SOCKS5_LISTENER_PORT"
// EnvSocks5ListenerAddress overrides the host/IP the SOCKS5 proxy binds to.
// The proxy is a bridge for local host applications into the userspace
// WireGuard netstack, so it binds to loopback by default. Override this only
// when the proxy must be reachable from other hosts (e.g. a container
// gateway); doing so exposes an unauthenticated SOCKS5 proxy on that
// address.
EnvSocks5ListenerAddress = "NB_SOCKS5_LISTENER_ADDRESS"
// defaultSocks5Host is the loopback address the SOCKS5 proxy binds to unless
// overridden via EnvSocks5ListenerAddress.
defaultSocks5Host = "127.0.0.1"
)
const EnvUseNetstackMode = "NB_USE_NETSTACK_MODE"
// IsEnabled todo: move these function to cmd layer
func IsEnabled() bool {
@@ -35,40 +18,24 @@ func IsEnabled() bool {
}
func ListenAddr() string {
return net.JoinHostPort(listenHost(), strconv.Itoa(listenPort()))
}
// listenHost returns the host/IP the SOCKS5 proxy binds to. It defaults to
// loopback and only honors EnvSocks5ListenerAddress when it holds a valid IP.
func listenHost() string {
addr := os.Getenv(EnvSocks5ListenerAddress)
if addr == "" {
return defaultSocks5Host
}
if net.ParseIP(addr) == nil {
log.Warnf("invalid socks5 listener address %q, falling back to default: %s", addr, defaultSocks5Host)
return defaultSocks5Host
}
return addr
}
// listenPort returns the port the SOCKS5 proxy binds to, defaulting to
// DefaultSocks5Port when EnvSocks5ListenerPort is unset or invalid.
func listenPort() int {
sPort := os.Getenv(EnvSocks5ListenerPort)
sPort := os.Getenv("NB_SOCKS5_LISTENER_PORT")
if sPort == "" {
return DefaultSocks5Port
return listenAddr(DefaultSocks5Port)
}
port, err := strconv.Atoi(sPort)
if err != nil {
log.Warnf("invalid socks5 listener port, unable to convert it to int, falling back to default: %d", DefaultSocks5Port)
return DefaultSocks5Port
return listenAddr(DefaultSocks5Port)
}
if port < 1 || port > 65535 {
log.Warnf("invalid socks5 listener port, it should be in the range 1-65535, falling back to default: %d", DefaultSocks5Port)
return DefaultSocks5Port
return listenAddr(DefaultSocks5Port)
}
return port
return listenAddr(port)
}
func listenAddr(port int) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("0.0.0.0:%d", port)
}

View File

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
//go:build !js
package netstack
import (
"net"
"strconv"
"testing"
)
func TestListenAddr_DefaultsToLoopback(t *testing.T) {
// No env overrides: must bind loopback, never all interfaces.
got := ListenAddr()
want := net.JoinHostPort("127.0.0.1", strconv.Itoa(DefaultSocks5Port))
if got != want {
t.Fatalf("ListenAddr() = %q, want %q", got, want)
}
}
func TestListenAddr_AddressOverride(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
env string
want string
}{
{name: "valid override honored", env: "0.0.0.0", want: "0.0.0.0"},
{name: "valid specific ip honored", env: "10.0.0.5", want: "10.0.0.5"},
{name: "ipv6 loopback bracketed", env: "::1", want: "::1"},
{name: "invalid falls back to loopback", env: "not-an-ip", want: "127.0.0.1"},
{name: "empty falls back to loopback", env: "", want: "127.0.0.1"},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(EnvSocks5ListenerAddress, tc.env)
want := net.JoinHostPort(tc.want, strconv.Itoa(DefaultSocks5Port))
if got := ListenAddr(); got != want {
t.Fatalf("ListenAddr() = %q, want %q", got, want)
}
})
}
}
func TestListenAddr_PortOverride(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
env string
want int
}{
{name: "valid port honored", env: "1081", want: 1081},
{name: "non-numeric falls back", env: "abc", want: DefaultSocks5Port},
{name: "out of range falls back", env: "70000", want: DefaultSocks5Port},
{name: "zero falls back", env: "0", want: DefaultSocks5Port},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(EnvSocks5ListenerPort, tc.env)
want := net.JoinHostPort("127.0.0.1", strconv.Itoa(tc.want))
if got := ListenAddr(); got != want {
t.Fatalf("ListenAddr() = %q, want %q", got, want)
}
})
}
}

View File

@@ -351,7 +351,6 @@ func (a *Auth) setSystemInfoFlags(info *system.Info) {
a.config.BlockLANAccess,
a.config.BlockInbound,
a.config.DisableIPv6,
a.config.SyncMessageVersion,
a.config.EnableSSHRoot,
a.config.EnableSSHSFTP,
a.config.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding,

View File

@@ -259,18 +259,12 @@ func (d *DeviceAuthorizationFlow) WaitToken(ctx context.Context, info AuthFlowIn
ticker := time.NewTicker(interval)
defer ticker.Stop()
log.Infof("device flow: waiting for user authorization, polling token endpoint every %s, code expires in %s", interval, timeout)
start := time.Now()
polls := 0
for {
select {
case <-waitCtx.Done():
return TokenInfo{}, waitCtx.Err()
case <-ticker.C:
polls++
tokenResponse, err := d.requestToken(info)
if err != nil {
return TokenInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("parsing token response failed with error: %v", err)
@@ -278,12 +272,10 @@ func (d *DeviceAuthorizationFlow) WaitToken(ctx context.Context, info AuthFlowIn
if tokenResponse.Error != "" {
if tokenResponse.Error == "authorization_pending" {
log.Tracef("device flow: authorization still pending after poll %d", polls)
continue
} else if tokenResponse.Error == "slow_down" {
interval += (3 * time.Second)
ticker.Reset(interval)
log.Infof("device flow: IdP requested slow_down, polling interval increased to %s", interval)
continue
}
@@ -299,12 +291,11 @@ func (d *DeviceAuthorizationFlow) WaitToken(ctx context.Context, info AuthFlowIn
UseIDToken: d.providerConfig.UseIDToken,
}
err = validateTokenAudience(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), d.providerConfig.Audience)
err = isValidAccessToken(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), d.providerConfig.Audience)
if err != nil {
return TokenInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("validate access token failed with error: %v", err)
}
log.Infof("device flow: user authorization confirmed after %d polls in %s", polls, time.Since(start).Round(time.Second))
return tokenInfo, err
}
}

View File

@@ -188,8 +188,6 @@ func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) WaitToken(ctx context.Context, info AuthFlowInfo
waitCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, timeout)
defer cancel()
log.Infof("pkce flow: waiting for authorization callback on %s, timeout %s", p.oAuthConfig.RedirectURL, timeout)
tokenChan := make(chan *oauth2.Token, 1)
errChan := make(chan error, 1)
@@ -223,7 +221,6 @@ func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) WaitToken(ctx context.Context, info AuthFlowInfo
func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) startServer(server *http.Server, tokenChan chan<- *oauth2.Token, errChan chan<- error) {
mux := http.NewServeMux()
mux.HandleFunc("/", func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
log.Infof("pkce flow: received authorization callback from IdP")
cert := p.providerConfig.ClientCertPair
if cert != nil {
tr := &http.Transport{
@@ -274,18 +271,11 @@ func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) handleRequest(req *http.Request) (*oauth2.Token,
return nil, fmt.Errorf("authentication failed: missing code")
}
exchangeStart := time.Now()
token, err := p.oAuthConfig.Exchange(
return p.oAuthConfig.Exchange(
req.Context(),
code,
oauth2.SetAuthURLParam("code_verifier", p.codeVerifier),
)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
log.Infof("pkce flow: authorization code exchanged for token in %s", time.Since(exchangeStart).Round(time.Millisecond))
return token, nil
}
func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) parseOAuthToken(token *oauth2.Token) (TokenInfo, error) {
@@ -306,7 +296,7 @@ func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) parseOAuthToken(token *oauth2.Token) (TokenInfo,
audience = p.providerConfig.ClientID
}
if err := validateTokenAudience(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), audience); err != nil {
if err := isValidAccessToken(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), audience); err != nil {
return TokenInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("authentication failed: invalid access token - %w", err)
}
@@ -320,11 +310,6 @@ func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) parseOAuthToken(token *oauth2.Token) (TokenInfo,
return tokenInfo, nil
}
// parseEmailFromIDToken extracts the email (or name) claim from an ID token
// without verifying its signature. The value is best-effort and used only as a
// UX convenience (login hint prefill and display); it never drives an
// authorization decision. The authoritative identity is established server-side
// from the signature-verified token.
func parseEmailFromIDToken(token string) (string, error) {
parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
if len(parts) < 2 {

View File

@@ -24,7 +24,11 @@ import (
)
const (
maxPastHorizon = 30 * 24 * time.Hour
// Skew tolerates a small clock difference between the management
// server and this peer before treating a deadline as "in the past".
// Slightly above typical NTP drift; tight enough that the UI doesn't
// paint a stale expiry as if it were valid.
Skew = 30 * time.Second
// maxDeadlineHorizon caps how far in the future an accepted deadline
// can sit. A timestamp beyond this is almost certainly a protocol
@@ -53,7 +57,7 @@ var (
ErrDeadlineTooFarFuture = errors.New("session deadline too far in the future")
// ErrDeadlineInPast is returned by Update when the supplied deadline
// is more than maxPastHorizon in the past.
// is more than Skew in the past.
ErrDeadlineInPast = errors.New("session deadline in the past")
)
@@ -62,14 +66,15 @@ var (
// for deadline change/clear, PublishEvent for the two warnings); tests pass
// a fake recorder so the same surface is observable without an engine.
//
// While the watcher runs, it owns the deadline propagated to the recorder:
// every set, clear and sanity-check rejection routes the value through
// SetSessionExpiresAt, so the SubscribeStatus snapshot the UI reads can
// never drift from the watcher's timer state. (SetSessionExpiresAt fans
// out its own state-change notification, so no separate notify is needed.)
// The recorder is server-scoped and outlives this engine-scoped watcher;
// Close deliberately leaves the recorder value in place so transient engine
// restarts don't blank it — the client run loop clears it on real teardown.
// The watcher is the single owner of the deadline propagated to the
// recorder: every set, clear, sanity-check rejection and Close routes the
// value through SetSessionExpiresAt, so the SubscribeStatus snapshot the UI
// reads can never drift from the watcher's timer state. (SetSessionExpiresAt
// fans out its own state-change notification, so no separate notify is
// needed.) The recorder is server-scoped and outlives this engine-scoped
// watcher — without the Close-time clear a teardown (Down, or the Down+Up of
// a profile switch) would leave the next session showing the previous one's
// stale "expires in" value.
//
// PublishEvent's signature mirrors peer.Status.PublishEvent: the watcher
// composes the metadata internally so the wire format (MetaSession*) is
@@ -130,13 +135,10 @@ func NewWithLeads(lead, final time.Duration, recorder StatusRecorder) *Watcher {
// was disabled).
//
// Same-value updates are no-ops. A different non-zero value cancels any
// pending timer, resets the "already fired" guards, and — when the
// deadline lies in the future — arms fresh warning timers. A deadline
// already in the past (within maxPastHorizon) is recorded as-is with no
// timers: the session has expired and consumers render it that way.
// pending timer, resets the "already fired" guard, and arms a new one.
//
// Returns one of the sentinel Err* values when the deadline fails the
// sanity checks (pre-epoch, far future, or past beyond maxPastHorizon).
// sanity checks (pre-epoch, far future, or in the past beyond Skew).
// In every error case the watcher first clears its state so it stays
// consistent with what the caller will push into its other sinks (e.g.
// applySessionDeadline forces a zero deadline into the status recorder
@@ -161,7 +163,7 @@ func (w *Watcher) Update(deadline time.Time) error {
case deadline.After(now.Add(maxDeadlineHorizon)):
w.clearLocked()
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrDeadlineTooFarFuture, deadline)
case deadline.Before(now.Add(-maxPastHorizon)):
case deadline.Before(now.Add(-Skew)):
w.clearLocked()
return fmt.Errorf("%w: %v (now=%v)", ErrDeadlineInPast, deadline, now)
}
@@ -181,9 +183,7 @@ func (w *Watcher) Update(deadline time.Time) error {
w.finalFiredAt = time.Time{}
w.dismissedAt = time.Time{}
if deadline.After(now) {
w.armTimerLocked(deadline)
}
w.armTimerLocked(deadline)
recorder := w.recorder
w.mu.Unlock()
if recorder != nil {
@@ -227,25 +227,30 @@ func (w *Watcher) Dismiss() {
log.Infof("auth session final-warning dismissed for deadline %s", w.current.Format(time.RFC3339))
}
// Close stops any pending timer. Update calls after Close are ignored.
// The recorder keeps its deadline: the watcher is engine-scoped and closes
// on every engine restart (network change, sleep/wake, stream errors)
// while the SSO deadline stays valid across those, so clearing here would
// blank the UI's "expires in" row on every transient reconnect. The
// client run loop clears the server-scoped recorder when it exits for
// real (Down, profile switch, permanent login failure).
// Close stops any pending timer and drops the deadline on the status
// recorder. Update calls after Close are ignored. Clearing the recorder
// here is what keeps a teardown (Down, or the Down+Up of a profile switch)
// from leaving the next session showing this one's stale "expires in"
// value — the recorder is server-scoped and outlives this engine-scoped
// watcher, so nothing else drops the anchor on teardown.
func (w *Watcher) Close() {
w.mu.Lock()
defer w.mu.Unlock()
if w.closed {
w.mu.Unlock()
return
}
w.closed = true
w.stopTimerLocked()
hadDeadline := !w.current.IsZero()
w.current = time.Time{}
w.firedAt = time.Time{}
w.finalFiredAt = time.Time{}
w.dismissedAt = time.Time{}
recorder := w.recorder
w.mu.Unlock()
if recorder != nil && hadDeadline {
recorder.SetSessionExpiresAt(time.Time{})
}
}
// clearLocked drops the tracked deadline and notifies the recorder so

View File

@@ -224,13 +224,11 @@ func TestNewDeadlineCancelsPriorTimer(t *testing.T) {
func TestRefreshAfterFireArmsNewWarning(t *testing.T) {
r := &fakeRecorder{}
lead := 150 * time.Millisecond
lead := 30 * time.Millisecond
w := newWatcher(lead, r)
defer w.Close()
// Warning fires ~20ms in; the deadline itself stays 150ms away so the
// replacement below lands well before it.
first := time.Now().Add(170 * time.Millisecond)
first := time.Now().Add(50 * time.Millisecond)
_ = w.Update(first)
// Wait for stateChange + warning of the first cycle.
@@ -308,29 +306,7 @@ func TestUpdateRejectsTooFarFuture(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestUpdateRecentPastRecordedAsExpired(t *testing.T) {
r := &fakeRecorder{}
w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
defer w.Close()
d := time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour)
if err := w.Update(d); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("recent-past Update should succeed, got %v", err)
}
if !w.Deadline().Equal(d) {
t.Fatalf("expected deadline to be recorded, got %v want %v", w.Deadline(), d)
}
if got := r.deadline(); !got.Equal(d) {
t.Fatalf("recorder deadline = %v, want %v", got, d)
}
time.Sleep(80 * time.Millisecond)
if n := countWhere(r.snapshot(), func(e event) bool { return e.kind == publish }); n != 0 {
t.Fatalf("no warning events may fire for an already-past deadline, got %+v", r.snapshot())
}
}
func TestUpdateAncientPastRejected(t *testing.T) {
func TestUpdateInPastClearsDeadline(t *testing.T) {
r := &fakeRecorder{}
w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
defer w.Close()
@@ -342,12 +318,12 @@ func TestUpdateAncientPastRejected(t *testing.T) {
// Drain the stateChange from the seed.
waitForEvents(t, r, 1)
err := w.Update(time.Now().Add(-31 * 24 * time.Hour))
err := w.Update(time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour))
if !errors.Is(err, ErrDeadlineInPast) {
t.Fatalf("want ErrDeadlineInPast, got %v", err)
}
if !w.Deadline().IsZero() {
t.Fatalf("rejected ancient-past update must clear the deadline, got %v", w.Deadline())
t.Fatalf("in-past update must clear the deadline, got %v", w.Deadline())
}
events := waitForEvents(t, r, 2)
if events[1].kind != stateChange {
@@ -355,25 +331,39 @@ func TestUpdateAncientPastRejected(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestUpdateWithinSkewAccepted(t *testing.T) {
r := &fakeRecorder{}
w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
defer w.Close()
// 5 seconds in the past is within the 30s Skew tolerance — accept it.
d := time.Now().Add(-5 * time.Second)
if err := w.Update(d); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("within-skew Update should succeed, got %v", err)
}
if !w.Deadline().Equal(d) {
t.Fatalf("expected deadline to be applied, got %v want %v", w.Deadline(), d)
}
}
func TestCloseSilencesUpdates(t *testing.T) {
r := &fakeRecorder{}
w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
w.Close()
if err := w.Update(time.Now().Add(time.Hour)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Update after Close: want nil, got %v", err)
}
_ = w.Update(time.Now().Add(time.Hour))
time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond)
if got := r.snapshot(); len(got) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected no events after Close, got %+v", got)
}
}
// TestCloseKeepsRecorderDeadline pins the reconnect-flap fix: the watcher
// closes on every engine restart (network change, sleep/wake) while the
// SSO deadline stays valid across those, so Close must leave the
// server-scoped recorder's value in place. The client run loop clears the
// recorder when it exits for real.
func TestCloseKeepsRecorderDeadline(t *testing.T) {
// TestCloseClearsRecorderDeadline pins the profile-switch fix: a watcher
// holding a live deadline must zero the recorder on Close so the next
// engine's watcher (and the UI reading the shared server-scoped recorder)
// doesn't start out showing the previous session's stale "expires in".
func TestCloseClearsRecorderDeadline(t *testing.T) {
r := &fakeRecorder{}
w := newWatcher(time.Hour, r)
@@ -387,8 +377,8 @@ func TestCloseKeepsRecorderDeadline(t *testing.T) {
w.Close()
if got := r.deadline(); !got.Equal(d) {
t.Fatalf("recorder deadline after Close = %v, want %v", got, d)
if got := r.deadline(); !got.IsZero() {
t.Fatalf("recorder deadline after Close = %v, want zero", got)
}
}

View File

@@ -20,26 +20,14 @@ func randomBytesInHex(count int) (string, error) {
return hex.EncodeToString(buf), nil
}
// validateTokenAudience checks that the token is a well-formed JWT whose
// audience claim matches the expected audience.
//
// It does NOT verify the token's cryptographic signature and therefore must not
// be treated as an authenticity check. The token is obtained by the client
// directly from the IdP token endpoint over TLS, and its signature is verified
// server-side by the management server against the IdP's JWKS
// (see shared/auth/jwt/validator.go). This function is only a client-side
// sanity check that the returned token targets the expected audience.
func validateTokenAudience(token string, audience string) error {
// isValidAccessToken is a simple validation of the access token
func isValidAccessToken(token string, audience string) error {
if token == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("token received is empty")
}
parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
if len(parts) != 3 {
return fmt.Errorf("token is not a well-formed JWT")
}
claimsString, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1])
encodedClaims := strings.Split(token, ".")[1]
claimsString, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(encodedClaims)
if err != nil {
return err
}

View File

@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
package auth
import (
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"testing"
)
// makeJWT builds an unsigned JWT-shaped string (header.payload.signature) with
// the given claims payload. The signature part is arbitrary because
// validateTokenAudience intentionally does not verify it.
func makeJWT(t *testing.T, claims map[string]interface{}) string {
t.Helper()
header := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(`{"alg":"RS256","typ":"JWT"}`))
payloadBytes, err := json.Marshal(claims)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("marshal claims: %v", err)
}
payload := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(payloadBytes)
return header + "." + payload + ".unverified-signature"
}
func TestValidateTokenAudience(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
token string
audience string
wantErr bool
}{
{
name: "empty token",
token: "",
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "not a JWT - no dots",
token: "notajwt",
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "not a JWT - two parts only",
token: "header.payload",
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "matching string audience",
token: makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": "netbird"}),
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: false,
},
{
name: "mismatching string audience",
token: makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": "other"}),
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "matching audience in array",
token: makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": []interface{}{"other", "netbird"}}),
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: false,
},
{
name: "mismatching audience array",
token: makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": []interface{}{"a", "b"}}),
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "missing audience claim",
token: makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"sub": "user"}),
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "invalid base64 payload",
token: "header.!!!not-base64!!!.sig",
audience: "netbird",
wantErr: true,
},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
err := validateTokenAudience(tc.token, tc.audience)
if tc.wantErr && err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected error, got nil")
}
if !tc.wantErr && err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected no error, got %v", err)
}
})
}
}
// TestValidateTokenAudienceNoPanic guards the regression where a non-empty
// token without the JWT dot structure caused an index-out-of-range panic.
func TestValidateTokenAudienceNoPanic(t *testing.T) {
inputs := []string{"a", ".", "a.", "aaaa", "no-dots-here"}
for _, in := range inputs {
if err := validateTokenAudience(in, "netbird"); err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected error for malformed token %q, got nil", in)
}
}
}

View File

@@ -34,8 +34,6 @@ const (
// - Handling connection establishment based on peer signaling
//
// The implementation is not thread-safe; it is protected by engine.syncMsgMux.
// The only exception is ActivatePeer, which is safe for concurrent use so the
// DNS warm-up path can call it without contending on the engine mutex.
type ConnMgr struct {
peerStore *peerstore.Store
statusRecorder *peer.Status
@@ -44,26 +42,12 @@ type ConnMgr struct {
rosenpassEnabled bool
lazyConnMgr *manager.Manager
// lazyConnMgrMu guards the lazyConnMgr pointer for readers outside the
// engine loop (ActivatePeer). Writers hold it in addition to
// engine.syncMsgMux; all other reads stay under engine.syncMsgMux only.
lazyConnMgrMu sync.RWMutex
// reconcileRoutedIPs re-applies a peer's routed allowed IPs after its lazy wake endpoint is
// (re)armed (Mode A at arm time). Injected by the engine; nil disables the reconcile.
reconcileRoutedIPs func(peerKey string) error
wg sync.WaitGroup
lazyCtx context.Context
lazyCtxCancel context.CancelFunc
}
// SetRoutedIPsReconciler injects the callback used to re-apply a peer's routed allowed IPs when
// its lazy wake endpoint is (re)armed. Must be called before the lazy manager starts.
func (e *ConnMgr) SetRoutedIPsReconciler(fn func(peerKey string) error) {
e.reconcileRoutedIPs = fn
}
func NewConnMgr(engineConfig *EngineConfig, statusRecorder *peer.Status, peerStore *peerstore.Store, iface lazyconn.WGIface) *ConnMgr {
e := &ConnMgr{
peerStore: peerStore,
@@ -125,7 +109,7 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) UpdatedRemoteFeatureFlag(ctx context.Context, enabled bool) er
return nil
}
log.Infof("lazy connection manager is enabled by the management feature flag")
log.Warnf("lazy connection manager is enabled by management feature flag")
e.initLazyManager(ctx)
e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(true)
return e.addPeersToLazyConnManager()
@@ -254,20 +238,12 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) RemovePeerConn(peerKey string) {
conn.Log.Infof("removed peer from lazy conn manager")
}
// ActivatePeer wakes an idle lazy connection. Unlike the rest of ConnMgr it is
// safe for concurrent use: the lazy manager pointer is read under lazyConnMgrMu
// and the manager itself is internally synchronized, so callers outside the
// engine loop (DNS warm-up) do not need engine.syncMsgMux.
func (e *ConnMgr) ActivatePeer(ctx context.Context, conn *peer.Conn) {
e.lazyConnMgrMu.RLock()
lazyConnMgr := e.lazyConnMgr
started := lazyConnMgr != nil && e.lazyCtxCancel != nil
e.lazyConnMgrMu.RUnlock()
if !started {
if !e.isStartedWithLazyMgr() {
return
}
if found := lazyConnMgr.ActivatePeer(conn.GetKey()); found {
if found := e.lazyConnMgr.ActivatePeer(conn.GetKey()); found {
if err := conn.Open(ctx); err != nil {
conn.Log.Errorf("failed to open connection: %v", err)
}
@@ -292,22 +268,16 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) Close() {
e.lazyCtxCancel()
e.wg.Wait()
e.lazyConnMgrMu.Lock()
e.lazyConnMgr = nil
e.lazyConnMgrMu.Unlock()
}
func (e *ConnMgr) initLazyManager(engineCtx context.Context) {
cfg := manager.Config{
InactivityThreshold: inactivityThresholdEnv(),
ReconcileAllowedIPs: e.reconcileRoutedIPs,
}
e.lazyConnMgrMu.Lock()
e.lazyConnMgr = manager.NewManager(cfg, engineCtx, e.peerStore, e.iface)
e.lazyCtx, e.lazyCtxCancel = context.WithCancel(engineCtx)
e.lazyConnMgrMu.Unlock()
e.wg.Add(1)
go func() {
@@ -346,10 +316,7 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) closeManager(ctx context.Context) {
e.lazyCtxCancel()
e.wg.Wait()
e.lazyConnMgrMu.Lock()
e.lazyConnMgr = nil
e.lazyConnMgrMu.Unlock()
for _, peerID := range e.peerStore.PeersPubKey() {
e.peerStore.PeerConnOpen(ctx, peerID)

View File

@@ -1,21 +1,10 @@
package internal
import (
"context"
"net"
"net/netip"
"os"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/lazyconn"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peerstore"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/monotime"
)
func TestResolveLazyForce(t *testing.T) {
@@ -49,58 +38,3 @@ func TestResolveLazyForce(t *testing.T) {
})
}
}
type mockLazyWGIface struct{}
func (mockLazyWGIface) RemovePeer(string) error { return nil }
func (mockLazyWGIface) UpdatePeer(string, []netip.Prefix, time.Duration, *net.UDPAddr, *wgtypes.Key) error {
return nil
}
func (mockLazyWGIface) IsUserspaceBind() bool { return false }
func (mockLazyWGIface) Address() wgaddr.Address { return wgaddr.Address{} }
func (mockLazyWGIface) LastActivities() map[string]monotime.Time { return nil }
func (mockLazyWGIface) MTU() uint16 { return 1280 }
// TestConnMgr_ActivatePeerConcurrentWithLifecycle exercises ActivatePeer from
// non-engine goroutines (the DNS warm-up path) racing the manager lifecycle,
// which stays on the engine loop. Run with -race: it fails if ActivatePeer
// still requires engine.syncMsgMux for safety.
func TestConnMgr_ActivatePeerConcurrentWithLifecycle(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv(lazyconn.EnvLazyConn, "on")
status := peer.NewRecorder("https://mgm")
store := peerstore.NewConnStore()
connMgr := NewConnMgr(&EngineConfig{}, status, store, mockLazyWGIface{})
conn := newTestPeerConn(t, "peerA")
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
connMgr.Start(ctx)
done := make(chan struct{})
var wg sync.WaitGroup
for range 4 {
wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
for {
select {
case <-done:
return
default:
connMgr.ActivatePeer(ctx, conn)
}
}
}()
}
// Let the activators spin against the started manager, then tear it down
// underneath them and let them spin against the stopped manager.
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
connMgr.Close()
time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
close(done)
wg.Wait()
}

View File

@@ -257,10 +257,7 @@ func (c *ConnectClient) run(mobileDependency MobileDependency, runningChan chan
log.Errorf("failed to clean up temporary installer file: %v", err)
}
defer func() {
c.statusRecorder.SetSessionExpiresAt(time.Time{})
c.statusRecorder.ClientStop()
}()
defer c.statusRecorder.ClientStop()
operation := func() error {
// if context cancelled we not start new backoff cycle
if c.ctx.Err() != nil {
@@ -621,7 +618,6 @@ func createEngineConfig(key wgtypes.Key, config *profilemanager.Config, peerConf
BlockLANAccess: config.BlockLANAccess,
BlockInbound: config.BlockInbound,
DisableIPv6: config.DisableIPv6,
SyncMessageVersion: config.SyncMessageVersion,
LazyConnection: lazyconn.ParseState(config.LazyConnection),
@@ -697,7 +693,6 @@ func loginToManagement(ctx context.Context, client mgm.Client, pubSSHKey []byte,
config.BlockLANAccess,
config.BlockInbound,
config.DisableIPv6,
config.SyncMessageVersion,
config.EnableSSHRoot,
config.EnableSSHSFTP,
config.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding,

View File

@@ -480,6 +480,7 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addStatus() error {
fullStatus := g.statusRecorder.GetFullStatus()
protoFullStatus := nbstatus.ToProtoFullStatus(fullStatus)
protoFullStatus.Events = g.statusRecorder.GetEventHistory()
overview := nbstatus.ConvertToStatusOutputOverview(protoFullStatus, nbstatus.ConvertOptions{
Anonymize: g.anonymize,
ProfileName: profName,
@@ -676,7 +677,6 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addCommonConfigFields(configContent *strings.Builder)
configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("BlockLANAccess: %v\n", g.internalConfig.BlockLANAccess))
configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("BlockInbound: %v\n", g.internalConfig.BlockInbound))
configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("DisableIPv6: %v\n", g.internalConfig.DisableIPv6))
configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("SyncMessageVersion: %v\n", g.internalConfig.SyncMessageVersion))
if g.internalConfig.DisableNotifications != nil {
configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("DisableNotifications: %v\n", *g.internalConfig.DisableNotifications))

View File

@@ -887,8 +887,6 @@ func TestAddConfig_AllFieldsCovered(t *testing.T) {
ClientCertKeyPath: "/tmp/key",
LazyConnection: "on",
MTU: 1280,
DisableIPv6: true,
SyncMessageVersion: func(v int) *int { return &v }(1),
}
for _, anonymize := range []bool{false, true} {

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ package dns
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"maps"
"math"
"net"
"slices"
@@ -32,26 +31,6 @@ type SubdomainMatcher interface {
MatchSubdomains() bool
}
// responseMeta holds the annotations handlers attach to a request to explain the
// response the chain ends up writing. It survives a deferral, so an answer that
// did not come from the handler that owns the name still says who stepped aside
// and why.
type responseMeta map[resutil.MetaKey]string
// format renders the annotations for the response log line. The order is stable
// so the same event reads the same way every time; a map's own order is not.
func (m responseMeta) format() string {
if len(m) == 0 {
return ""
}
var b strings.Builder
for _, k := range slices.Sorted(maps.Keys(m)) {
b.WriteString(" " + string(k) + "=" + m[k])
}
return b.String()
}
type HandlerEntry struct {
Handler dns.Handler
Priority int
@@ -73,19 +52,8 @@ type ResponseWriterChain struct {
origPattern string
requestID string
shouldContinue bool
// softNegative suppresses a poisoning negative verdict for this request. A
// handler that owns the name but cannot answer this query type sets it
// before deferring, and it stays set for every handler that runs after.
softNegative bool
// clientHasEdns records whether the original query advertised EDNS0, taken
// before any handler ran: handlers add EDNS0 to the query they forward
// upstream, so the message itself no longer answers the question later.
clientHasEdns bool
response *dns.Msg
// meta is handed to the next handler when this one defers, so the same map
// outlives the writer that created it. Handlers must only set metadata from
// within ServeDNS, never from a goroutine that outlives the call.
meta responseMeta
response *dns.Msg
meta map[string]string
}
// RequestID returns the request ID for tracing
@@ -94,64 +62,26 @@ func (w *ResponseWriterChain) RequestID() string {
}
// SetMeta sets a metadata key-value pair for logging
func (w *ResponseWriterChain) SetMeta(key resutil.MetaKey, value string) {
func (w *ResponseWriterChain) SetMeta(key, value string) {
if w.meta == nil {
w.meta = make(responseMeta)
w.meta = make(map[string]string)
}
w.meta[key] = value
}
// RequestSoftNegative marks the request so a downstream NXDOMAIN is turned into
// NODATA before it reaches the client. Set by a handler that defers a query for
// a name it owns but a type it cannot resolve.
func (w *ResponseWriterChain) RequestSoftNegative() {
w.softNegative = true
}
func (w *ResponseWriterChain) WriteMsg(m *dns.Msg) error {
// Check if this is a continue signal (NXDOMAIN with Zero bit set)
if m.Rcode == dns.RcodeNameError && m.MsgHdr.Zero {
w.shouldContinue = true
return nil
}
if w.softNegative && m.Rcode == dns.RcodeNameError {
m = softenNegative(m, w.clientHasEdns)
w.SetMeta(resutil.MetaKeySoftened, "nxdomain->nodata")
}
w.response = m
if m.MsgHdr.Truncated {
w.SetMeta(resutil.MetaKeyTruncated, "true")
w.SetMeta("truncated", "true")
}
return w.ResponseWriter.WriteMsg(m)
}
// softenNegative downgrades an NXDOMAIN to NODATA for a request a handler that
// owns the name deferred. NXDOMAIN is cached for the name and every type below
// it, so a resolver that has never heard of a routed name would take out the
// record types the route does serve; NODATA is cached for this name and type
// only. The authority section goes with it: the negative TTL of a zone we just
// overruled does not apply, and RFC 2308 keeps a negative answer that carries no
// SOA out of caches altogether, so the rewrite cannot outlive the route.
//
// The rewrite is ours, not the answering resolver's, so an EDNS0 client is told
// as much: the reply we hand back travels a path no capture on this host sees,
// and an empty answer is otherwise indistinguishable from a real one. Returns a
// copy so the answering handler keeps whatever it may hold on to.
func softenNegative(m *dns.Msg, clientHasEdns bool) *dns.Msg {
out := m.Copy()
out.Rcode = dns.RcodeSuccess
out.Ns = nil
if clientHasEdns {
resutil.AttachEDE(out, resutil.EDENetbirdSoftenedNegative,
"netbird: name is served locally, NXDOMAIN from the fallthrough resolver suppressed")
} else {
resutil.StripOPT(out)
}
return out
}
func NewHandlerChain() *HandlerChain {
return &HandlerChain{
handlers: make([]HandlerEntry, 0),
@@ -293,19 +223,6 @@ func (c *HandlerChain) dispatch(w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg, maxPriority in
handlers := slices.Clone(c.handlers)
c.mu.RUnlock()
// Carried across deferrals: once a handler that owns the name defers, no
// handler after it may answer with a verdict that poisons the name. The
// metadata of a handler that stepped aside is carried too, so the response
// log line explains an answer that did not come from the handler that owns
// the name.
var softNegative bool
var carried responseMeta
// Taken before any handler runs: handlers advertise EDNS0 on the query they
// forward upstream, so afterwards the message no longer tells us whether the
// client did.
clientHasEdns := r.IsEdns0() != nil
// Try handlers in priority order
for _, entry := range handlers {
if entry.Priority > maxPriority {
@@ -328,16 +245,11 @@ func (c *HandlerChain) dispatch(w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg, maxPriority in
ResponseWriter: w,
origPattern: entry.OrigPattern,
requestID: requestID,
softNegative: softNegative,
clientHasEdns: clientHasEdns,
meta: carried,
}
entry.Handler.ServeDNS(chainWriter, r)
// If handler wants to continue, try next handler
if chainWriter.shouldContinue {
softNegative = softNegative || chainWriter.softNegative
carried = chainWriter.meta
if entry.Priority != PriorityMgmtCache {
logger.Tracef("handler requested continue for domain=%s", qname)
}
@@ -353,59 +265,30 @@ func (c *HandlerChain) dispatch(w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg, maxPriority in
qname, dns.TypeToString[question.Qtype], dns.ClassToString[question.Qclass])
resp := &dns.Msg{}
resp.SetRcode(r, dns.RcodeRefused)
// A handler that owns the name deferred and nothing below it could answer
// (a client with no primary nameserver group). The name exists as far as
// this client is concerned, since the route serves its addresses, so REFUSED
// would contradict the route: a stub that takes it as "not served here" and
// retries another resolver can come back with an NXDOMAIN that takes the
// whole name down. Answer "no records of this type" instead, without an SOA,
// so RFC 2308 keeps it out of negative caches, and tell an EDNS0 client the
// empty answer is ours rather than a resolver's.
if softNegative {
resp.Rcode = dns.RcodeSuccess
if clientHasEdns {
resutil.AttachEDE(resp, resutil.EDENetbirdSoftenedNegative,
"netbird: name is served locally, no fallthrough resolver for this query type")
}
// logResponse never runs on this path, so the carried metadata is
// appended here or the reason for the deferral is lost in exactly the
// case that is hardest to diagnose.
logger.Tracef("no handler below the deferring one for domain=%s type=%s, answering NODATA%s",
qname, dns.TypeToString[question.Qtype], carried.format())
}
if err := w.WriteMsg(resp); err != nil {
logger.Errorf("failed to write DNS response: %v", err)
}
}
func (c *HandlerChain) logResponse(logger *log.Entry, cw *ResponseWriterChain, qname string, startTime time.Time) {
// Runs for every query, and the arguments below are not free: Len() packs
// the message to measure it, and formatting the answers and the metadata
// allocates. None of it is worth doing when the line is discarded.
if !log.IsLevelEnabled(log.TraceLevel) {
return
}
if cw.response == nil {
return
}
var meta string
for k, v := range cw.meta {
meta += " " + k + "=" + v
}
logger.Tracef("response: domain=%s rcode=%s answers=%s size=%dB%s took=%s",
qname, dns.RcodeToString[cw.response.Rcode], resutil.FormatAnswers(cw.response.Answer),
cw.response.Len(), cw.meta.format(), time.Since(startTime))
cw.response.Len(), meta, time.Since(startTime))
}
// ResolveInternal runs an in-process DNS query against the chain, skipping any
// handler with priority > maxPriority. Used by internal callers (e.g. the mgmt
// cache refresher) that must bypass themselves to avoid loops.
//
// "Nothing answered" is read off RcodeRefused, which a request soft-negatived by
// a deferring handler never carries: it ends in an empty NOERROR instead, and
// would look resolved. No caller can reach that today, since every handler that
// defers sits above the maxPriority any caller passes. Lowering one below it
// means this check needs the soft-negative case too.
//
// Honors ctx cancellation; on ctx.Done the dispatch goroutine is left to drain on its own
// cache refresher) that must bypass themselves to avoid loops. Honors ctx
// cancellation; on ctx.Done the dispatch goroutine is left to drain on its own
// (bounded by the invoked handler's internal timeout).
func (c *HandlerChain) ResolveInternal(ctx context.Context, r *dns.Msg, maxPriority int) (*dns.Msg, error) {
if len(r.Question) == 0 {

View File

@@ -3,19 +3,15 @@ package dns_test
import (
"context"
"net"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/miekg/dns"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
logtest "github.com/sirupsen/logrus/hooks/test"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/mock"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
nbdns "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns/resutil"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns/test"
)
@@ -1242,276 +1238,6 @@ func TestHandlerChain_ResolveInternal_HonorsContextTimeout(t *testing.T) {
assert.Less(t, elapsed, 500*time.Millisecond, "ResolveInternal must return shortly after ctx deadline")
}
// requestSoftNegative asks the chain to soften a negative verdict produced by
// the handlers that run after the caller defers, reporting whether the chain
// supports the signal. Written as a type assertion so these tests compile
// against a chain that does not support it yet.
func requestSoftNegative(w dns.ResponseWriter) bool {
sn, ok := w.(interface{ RequestSoftNegative() })
if ok {
sn.RequestSoftNegative()
}
return ok
}
// deferringHandler defers to the next handler in the chain, optionally asking
// for the negative verdict of whatever answers instead to be softened. This is
// what a DNS route handler does for a record type its routing peer cannot
// resolve.
type deferringHandler struct {
softNegative bool
called bool
supported bool
}
func (h *deferringHandler) ServeDNS(w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg) {
h.called = true
if h.softNegative {
h.supported = requestSoftNegative(w)
// The real handler records why it stepped aside, for the response log
// line of whichever handler answers instead.
resutil.SetMeta(w, resutil.MetaKeyDeferredBy, "test handler")
}
resp := new(dns.Msg)
resp.SetRcode(r, dns.RcodeNameError)
resp.MsgHdr.Zero = true
_ = w.WriteMsg(resp)
}
// nxdomainHandler answers an authoritative NXDOMAIN with an SOA in the
// authority section, the way a public resolver answers for a name that only
// exists inside the routed network.
type nxdomainHandler struct{}
func (h *nxdomainHandler) ServeDNS(w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg) {
resp := new(dns.Msg)
resp.SetRcode(r, dns.RcodeNameError)
resp.Ns = []dns.RR{&dns.SOA{
Hdr: dns.RR_Header{Name: "example.com.", Rrtype: dns.TypeSOA, Class: dns.ClassINET, Ttl: 3600},
Ns: "ns1.example.com.",
Mbox: "hostmaster.example.com.",
Minttl: 3600,
Expire: 604800,
Refresh: 7200,
Retry: 3600,
}}
_ = w.WriteMsg(resp)
}
// TestHandlerChain_SoftNegative_DowngradesDownstreamNXDOMAIN is the whole point
// of the soft-negative signal: a route handler may only defer a query to the
// public chain if the answer cannot poison the routed name. NXDOMAIN is cached
// for the name and every type under it (RFC 2308, RFC 8020), so it has to be
// rewritten to NODATA, which is cached per name and type only.
func TestHandlerChain_SoftNegative_DowngradesDownstreamNXDOMAIN(t *testing.T) {
chain := nbdns.NewHandlerChain()
route := &deferringHandler{softNegative: true}
chain.AddHandler("*.example.com.", route, nbdns.PriorityDNSRoute)
chain.AddHandler(".", &nxdomainHandler{}, nbdns.PriorityDefault)
r := new(dns.Msg)
r.SetQuestion("_mongodb._tcp.db.example.com.", dns.TypeSRV)
mw := &test.MockResponseWriter{}
chain.ServeDNS(&nbdns.ResponseWriterChain{ResponseWriter: mw}, r)
resp := mw.GetLastResponse()
require.NotNil(t, resp, "a response must reach the client")
assert.True(t, route.called, "the route handler must run first")
require.True(t, route.supported, "the chain writer must accept a soft-negative request")
assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, resp.Rcode, "NXDOMAIN must be softened to NODATA")
assert.Empty(t, resp.Answer, "a softened negative carries no answer")
assert.Empty(t, resp.Ns, "the downstream zone's SOA must not set the negative TTL for a name we overrode")
}
// responseLineFor returns the chain's response log line for one query. Raising
// the level to trace also unmutes whatever else is logging in this package, so
// the line has to be picked by the name it was asked about rather than by being
// the last one seen.
func responseLineFor(hook *logtest.Hook, qname string) string {
for _, e := range hook.AllEntries() {
if strings.HasPrefix(e.Message, "response:") && strings.Contains(e.Message, qname) {
return e.Message
}
}
return ""
}
// TestHandlerChain_SoftNegative_IsVisibleToTheClient covers observability of the
// rewrite. The reply we hand the application travels over loopback, which the
// bundle capture does not see, so a softened verdict has to say so on the wire:
// without it an empty answer is indistinguishable from a real "no such record"
// in a dig output or a capture taken next to the application.
func TestHandlerChain_SoftNegative_IsVisibleToTheClient(t *testing.T) {
// One hook for the whole test: logtest installs it on the standard logger
// and logrus has no way to take it off again, so a hook per subtest would
// leave several behind buffering every later line in the package.
hook := logtest.NewGlobal()
t.Cleanup(hook.Reset)
newChain := func() *nbdns.HandlerChain {
chain := nbdns.NewHandlerChain()
chain.AddHandler("*.example.com.", &deferringHandler{softNegative: true}, nbdns.PriorityDNSRoute)
chain.AddHandler(".", &nxdomainHandler{}, nbdns.PriorityDefault)
return chain
}
t.Run("EDNS0 client gets an extended error", func(t *testing.T) {
r := new(dns.Msg)
r.SetQuestion("_mongodb._tcp.db.example.com.", dns.TypeSRV)
r.SetEdns0(dns.DefaultMsgSize, false)
mw := &test.MockResponseWriter{}
newChain().ServeDNS(&nbdns.ResponseWriterChain{ResponseWriter: mw}, r)
resp := mw.GetLastResponse()
require.NotNil(t, resp)
require.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, resp.Rcode)
ede, ok := resutil.ExtractEDE(resp)
require.True(t, ok, "a softened verdict must carry an extended DNS error")
assert.Equal(t, resutil.EDENetbirdSoftenedNegative, ede.InfoCode)
assert.Contains(t, ede.ExtraText, "netbird", "the text must name us as the source of the rewrite")
})
t.Run("plain client gets no OPT", func(t *testing.T) {
r := new(dns.Msg)
r.SetQuestion("_mongodb._tcp.db.example.com.", dns.TypeSRV)
mw := &test.MockResponseWriter{}
newChain().ServeDNS(&nbdns.ResponseWriterChain{ResponseWriter: mw}, r)
resp := mw.GetLastResponse()
require.NotNil(t, resp)
assert.Nil(t, resp.IsEdns0(), "RFC 6891 forbids an OPT toward a client that did not advertise EDNS0")
})
// The response line is what support reads out of a debug bundle, and it now
// carries several annotations at once. Built from a map, their order would
// differ on every query, so the same event never looks the same twice.
t.Run("log fields keep a stable order", func(t *testing.T) {
const qname = "_mongodb._tcp.stable.example.com."
prev := log.GetLevel()
log.SetLevel(log.TraceLevel)
t.Cleanup(func() { log.SetLevel(prev) })
lineFor := func() string {
hook.Reset()
r := new(dns.Msg)
r.SetQuestion(qname, dns.TypeSRV)
mw := &test.MockResponseWriter{}
newChain().ServeDNS(&nbdns.ResponseWriterChain{ResponseWriter: mw}, r)
line := responseLineFor(hook, qname)
// The duration differs per query and is not what we compare.
line, _, _ = strings.Cut(line, " took=")
return line
}
first := lineFor()
require.NotEmpty(t, first, "the chain must log the response it wrote")
require.Contains(t, first, "deferred_by=", "the line must carry more than one annotation to be worth ordering")
require.Contains(t, first, "softened=")
for range 20 {
assert.Equal(t, first, lineFor(), "the same event must produce the same line")
}
})
t.Run("logged with the reason it was deferred", func(t *testing.T) {
const qname = "_mongodb._tcp.reason.example.com."
hook.Reset()
prev := log.GetLevel()
log.SetLevel(log.TraceLevel)
t.Cleanup(func() { log.SetLevel(prev) })
r := new(dns.Msg)
r.SetQuestion(qname, dns.TypeSRV)
mw := &test.MockResponseWriter{}
newChain().ServeDNS(&nbdns.ResponseWriterChain{ResponseWriter: mw}, r)
response := responseLineFor(hook, qname)
require.NotEmpty(t, response, "the chain must log the response it wrote")
assert.Contains(t, response, "softened=", "the log must show the verdict was rewritten")
assert.Contains(t, response, "deferred_by=", "the log must name the handler that deferred")
})
}
// TestHandlerChain_SoftNegative_NoHandlerBelow covers a client with no primary
// nameserver group: the deferred query reaches the end of the chain unanswered.
// REFUSED would say the name is not served here while the route serves its
// addresses, and a stub that acts on that by asking elsewhere can bring back an
// NXDOMAIN for the whole name. The answer must be an empty, uncacheable NODATA.
func TestHandlerChain_SoftNegative_NoHandlerBelow(t *testing.T) {
chain := nbdns.NewHandlerChain()
route := &deferringHandler{softNegative: true}
chain.AddHandler("*.example.com.", route, nbdns.PriorityDNSRoute)
r := new(dns.Msg)
r.SetQuestion("db.example.com.", dns.TypeHTTPS)
mw := &test.MockResponseWriter{}
chain.ServeDNS(&nbdns.ResponseWriterChain{ResponseWriter: mw}, r)
resp := mw.GetLastResponse()
require.NotNil(t, resp, "a response must reach the client")
assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, resp.Rcode, "an unanswered soft-negative query must be NODATA, not REFUSED")
assert.Empty(t, resp.Answer)
assert.Empty(t, resp.Ns,
"no SOA, so RFC 2308 keeps the empty answer out of negative caches and it cannot outlive the route")
}
// TestHandlerChain_SoftNegative_KeepsRealAnswers guards the other direction:
// softening applies to negative verdicts only. A real answer from a downstream
// handler must reach the client untouched.
func TestHandlerChain_SoftNegative_KeepsRealAnswers(t *testing.T) {
chain := nbdns.NewHandlerChain()
route := &deferringHandler{softNegative: true}
chain.AddHandler("*.example.com.", route, nbdns.PriorityDNSRoute)
chain.AddHandler(".", &answeringHandler{name: "public", ip: "203.0.113.10"}, nbdns.PriorityDefault)
r := new(dns.Msg)
r.SetQuestion("db.example.com.", dns.TypeA)
mw := &test.MockResponseWriter{}
chain.ServeDNS(&nbdns.ResponseWriterChain{ResponseWriter: mw}, r)
resp := mw.GetLastResponse()
require.NotNil(t, resp, "a response must reach the client")
assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, resp.Rcode)
require.Len(t, resp.Answer, 1, "the downstream answer must pass through")
}
// TestHandlerChain_NXDOMAINPreservedWithoutSoftNegative makes sure the
// softening is opt-in: an ordinary chain continuation still yields NXDOMAIN, so
// genuine non-existence keeps being reported.
func TestHandlerChain_NXDOMAINPreservedWithoutSoftNegative(t *testing.T) {
chain := nbdns.NewHandlerChain()
route := &deferringHandler{}
chain.AddHandler("*.example.com.", route, nbdns.PriorityDNSRoute)
chain.AddHandler(".", &nxdomainHandler{}, nbdns.PriorityDefault)
r := new(dns.Msg)
r.SetQuestion("nope.example.com.", dns.TypeA)
mw := &test.MockResponseWriter{}
chain.ServeDNS(&nbdns.ResponseWriterChain{ResponseWriter: mw}, r)
resp := mw.GetLastResponse()
require.NotNil(t, resp, "a response must reach the client")
assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeNameError, resp.Rcode, "without the signal a real NXDOMAIN must survive")
}
func TestHandlerChain_HasRootHandlerAtOrBelow(t *testing.T) {
chain := nbdns.NewHandlerChain()
h := &answeringHandler{name: "h", ip: "10.0.0.1"}

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
"fmt"
"net"
"net/netip"
"os"
"slices"
"strings"
"sync"
@@ -37,43 +36,7 @@ type resolver interface {
// record is left alone (it points at something outside our mesh, e.g.
// a non-peer upstream).
type PeerConnectivity interface {
IsConnectedByIP(ip netip.Addr) (known, connected bool)
}
// PeerActivator wakes lazy-connection peers on demand. The local resolver calls
// it with the tunnel IPs an answer points at, so a peer that is idle (lazily
// disconnected) starts connecting at DNS-resolution time rather than racing the
// client's first request packet. nil disables warm-up.
type PeerActivator interface {
// ActivatePeersByIP triggers wake-up for the peer(s) owning addrs and blocks
// until one is connected or ctx (a short per-query budget) expires. It is a
// fast no-op for unknown or already-connected addresses.
ActivatePeersByIP(ctx context.Context, addrs []netip.Addr)
}
const (
defaultLazyWarmupTimeout = 2 * time.Second
envLazyWarmupTimeout = "NB_DNS_LAZY_WARMUP_TIMEOUT"
)
// lazyWarmupTimeoutFromEnv returns the per-query budget for waking a
// lazy-connection peer a DNS answer points at. Tunable via
// NB_DNS_LAZY_WARMUP_TIMEOUT (a Go duration). Parsed once at construction time.
func lazyWarmupTimeoutFromEnv() time.Duration {
v := os.Getenv(envLazyWarmupTimeout)
if v == "" {
return defaultLazyWarmupTimeout
}
d, err := time.ParseDuration(v)
if err != nil {
log.Warnf("invalid %s value %q, using default %s: %v", envLazyWarmupTimeout, v, defaultLazyWarmupTimeout, err)
return defaultLazyWarmupTimeout
}
if d <= 0 {
log.Warnf("non-positive %s value %q, using default %s", envLazyWarmupTimeout, v, defaultLazyWarmupTimeout)
return defaultLazyWarmupTimeout
}
return d
IsConnectedByIP(ip string) (known, connected bool)
}
type Resolver struct {
@@ -88,12 +51,6 @@ type Resolver struct {
// filter and preserves the legacy "return whatever is registered"
// behaviour for callers that never wire a status source.
peerConn PeerConnectivity
// peerActivator, when non-nil, is called at resolution time to warm the
// lazy connection to the peer(s) an answer points at. nil disables warm-up.
peerActivator PeerActivator
// warmupTimeout is the per-query budget for the lazy-connection warm-up
// wait, resolved from the environment once at construction time.
warmupTimeout time.Duration
ctx context.Context
cancel context.CancelFunc
@@ -102,12 +59,11 @@ type Resolver struct {
func NewResolver() *Resolver {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
return &Resolver{
records: make(map[dns.Question][]dns.RR),
domains: make(map[domain.Domain]struct{}),
zones: make(map[domain.Domain]bool),
warmupTimeout: lazyWarmupTimeoutFromEnv(),
ctx: ctx,
cancel: cancel,
records: make(map[dns.Question][]dns.RR),
domains: make(map[domain.Domain]struct{}),
zones: make(map[domain.Domain]bool),
ctx: ctx,
cancel: cancel,
}
}
@@ -120,14 +76,6 @@ func (d *Resolver) SetPeerConnectivity(p PeerConnectivity) {
d.peerConn = p
}
// SetPeerActivator wires the DNS-time lazy-connection warm-up. Pass nil to
// disable. Safe to call multiple times; the latest value wins.
func (d *Resolver) SetPeerActivator(a PeerActivator) {
d.mu.Lock()
defer d.mu.Unlock()
d.peerActivator = a
}
func (d *Resolver) MatchSubdomains() bool {
return true
}
@@ -174,9 +122,6 @@ func (d *Resolver) ServeDNS(w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg) {
replyMessage.RecursionAvailable = true
result := d.lookupRecords(logger, question)
// Warm before filtering: activation flips a lazily-idle target to connected,
// which then lets it survive the disconnected-peer filter below.
d.warmLazyPeers(question, result.records)
result.records = d.filterDisconnectedPeerAnswers(logger, question, result.records)
replyMessage.Authoritative = !result.hasExternalData
replyMessage.Answer = result.records
@@ -550,8 +495,8 @@ func (d *Resolver) filterDisconnectedPeerAnswers(logger *log.Entry, question dns
kept := make([]dns.RR, 0, len(records))
var dropped int
for _, rr := range records {
ip, ok := extractRecordAddr(rr)
if !ok {
ip := extractRecordIP(rr)
if ip == "" {
kept = append(kept, rr)
continue
}
@@ -573,57 +518,22 @@ func (d *Resolver) filterDisconnectedPeerAnswers(logger *log.Entry, question dns
return kept
}
// warmLazyPeers triggers lazy-connection wake-up for the peers a resolved
// answer points at and waits briefly for one to connect, so the caller's first
// request doesn't race the connection establishment. Warm-up is scoped to
// match-only (non-authoritative) zones — the synthesized private-service zones
// and user-created zones whose records point at specific peers. The account's
// peer zone is authoritative, so plain peer-name lookups never trigger warm-up;
// otherwise resolving any peer's name would wake its idle connection, defeating
// laziness mesh-wide. No-op when no activator is wired (lazy connections
// disabled) or the answer carries no peer IPs.
func (d *Resolver) warmLazyPeers(question dns.Question, records []dns.RR) {
if len(records) < 2 {
return
}
d.mu.RLock()
activator := d.peerActivator
var nonAuth, found bool
if activator != nil {
nonAuth, found = d.findZone(question.Name)
}
d.mu.RUnlock()
if activator == nil || !found || !nonAuth {
return
}
var addrs []netip.Addr
for _, rr := range records {
if addr, ok := extractRecordAddr(rr); ok {
addrs = append(addrs, addr)
}
}
if len(addrs) == 0 {
return
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(d.ctx, d.warmupTimeout)
defer cancel()
activator.ActivatePeersByIP(ctx, addrs)
}
// extractRecordAddr returns the IP address carried by an A or AAAA record.
// ok is false for any other record type or a record with no address.
func extractRecordAddr(rr dns.RR) (netip.Addr, bool) {
// extractRecordIP returns the dotted-decimal / colon-hex IP carried by
// an A or AAAA record, or "" for any other record type.
func extractRecordIP(rr dns.RR) string {
switch r := rr.(type) {
case *dns.A:
addr, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(r.A)
return addr.Unmap(), ok
if r.A == nil {
return ""
}
return r.A.String()
case *dns.AAAA:
addr, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(r.AAAA)
return addr.Unmap(), ok
if r.AAAA == nil {
return ""
}
return r.AAAA.String()
}
return netip.Addr{}, false
return ""
}
// Update replaces all zones and their records

View File

@@ -37,8 +37,8 @@ type mockPeerConnectivity struct {
byIP map[string]struct{ known, connected bool }
}
func (m mockPeerConnectivity) IsConnectedByIP(ip netip.Addr) (known, connected bool) {
v, ok := m.byIP[ip.String()]
func (m mockPeerConnectivity) IsConnectedByIP(ip string) (known, connected bool) {
v, ok := m.byIP[ip]
if !ok {
return false, false
}

View File

@@ -1,204 +0,0 @@
package local
import (
"context"
"net"
"net/netip"
"sync"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/miekg/dns"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns/test"
nbdns "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/dns"
)
// recordingActivator records the addresses it was asked to warm and returns
// immediately, so ServeDNS is not blocked by the test.
type recordingActivator struct {
mu sync.Mutex
called bool
addrs []netip.Addr
}
func (r *recordingActivator) ActivatePeersByIP(_ context.Context, addrs []netip.Addr) {
r.mu.Lock()
defer r.mu.Unlock()
r.called = true
r.addrs = append(r.addrs, addrs...)
}
func serveA(t *testing.T, resolver *Resolver, name string) *dns.Msg {
t.Helper()
var resp *dns.Msg
w := &test.MockResponseWriter{WriteMsgFunc: func(m *dns.Msg) error { resp = m; return nil }}
resolver.ServeDNS(w, new(dns.Msg).SetQuestion(name, dns.TypeA))
return resp
}
// serviceZone registers rec in a match-only (non-authoritative) zone, the shape
// the synthesized private-service zones arrive in.
func serviceZone(t *testing.T, resolver *Resolver, zone string, records ...nbdns.SimpleRecord) {
t.Helper()
resolver.Update([]nbdns.CustomZone{{
Domain: zone,
Records: records,
NonAuthoritative: true,
}})
}
func TestLocalResolver_WarmsLazyPeerOnResolve(t *testing.T) {
// Warm-up fires only for multi-record answers (the HA / round-robin shape of
// the synthesized private-service zones), so register two peer targets.
const name = "svc.proxy.netbird.cloud."
recs := []nbdns.SimpleRecord{
{Name: name, Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "100.64.0.7"},
{Name: name, Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "100.64.0.8"},
}
resolver := NewResolver()
serviceZone(t, resolver, "proxy.netbird.cloud", recs...)
act := &recordingActivator{}
resolver.SetPeerActivator(act)
resp := serveA(t, resolver, name)
require.NotNil(t, resp, "resolver must answer")
require.NotEmpty(t, resp.Answer, "answer must carry the A records")
act.mu.Lock()
defer act.mu.Unlock()
assert.True(t, act.called, "activator must be invoked for a multi-record service-zone answer")
assert.Contains(t, act.addrs, netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.7"), "activator must receive the first peer IP")
assert.Contains(t, act.addrs, netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.8"), "activator must receive the second peer IP")
}
func TestLocalResolver_NoWarmupForSingleRecord(t *testing.T) {
// A single-record answer does not trigger warm-up; the resolver only warms
// multi-record answers.
rec := nbdns.SimpleRecord{Name: "svc.proxy.netbird.cloud.", Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "100.64.0.7"}
resolver := NewResolver()
serviceZone(t, resolver, "proxy.netbird.cloud", rec)
act := &recordingActivator{}
resolver.SetPeerActivator(act)
resp := serveA(t, resolver, rec.Name)
require.NotNil(t, resp, "resolver must answer")
require.NotEmpty(t, resp.Answer, "answer must carry the A record")
act.mu.Lock()
defer act.mu.Unlock()
assert.False(t, act.called, "activator must not be invoked for a single-record answer")
}
func TestLocalResolver_NoActivatorNoWarmup(t *testing.T) {
// With no activator wired the resolver behaves exactly as before.
rec := nbdns.SimpleRecord{Name: "svc.proxy.netbird.cloud.", Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "100.64.0.7"}
resolver := NewResolver()
serviceZone(t, resolver, "proxy.netbird.cloud", rec)
resp := serveA(t, resolver, rec.Name)
require.NotNil(t, resp, "resolver must still answer without an activator")
require.NotEmpty(t, resp.Answer, "answer must carry the A record")
}
func TestLocalResolver_NoWarmupForMissingRecord(t *testing.T) {
// A query that resolves to nothing must not invoke the activator (no IPs).
resolver := NewResolver()
serviceZone(t, resolver, "proxy.netbird.cloud",
nbdns.SimpleRecord{Name: "svc.proxy.netbird.cloud.", Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "100.64.0.7"})
act := &recordingActivator{}
resolver.SetPeerActivator(act)
serveA(t, resolver, "absent.proxy.netbird.cloud.")
act.mu.Lock()
defer act.mu.Unlock()
assert.False(t, act.called, "activator must not be invoked when there is no answer")
}
func TestLocalResolver_NoWarmupInAuthoritativeZone(t *testing.T) {
// The account's peer zone is authoritative; resolving a peer's name there
// must not wake its lazy connection — warm-up is scoped to match-only
// (non-authoritative) zones such as the synthesized private-service zones.
// Use a multi-record answer so the authoritative-zone scoping is the only
// reason warm-up is skipped, not the single-record guard.
const name = "peer.netbird.cloud."
recs := []nbdns.SimpleRecord{
{Name: name, Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "100.64.0.9"},
{Name: name, Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "100.64.0.10"},
}
resolver := NewResolver()
resolver.Update([]nbdns.CustomZone{{
Domain: "netbird.cloud",
Records: recs,
}})
act := &recordingActivator{}
resolver.SetPeerActivator(act)
resp := serveA(t, resolver, name)
require.NotNil(t, resp, "resolver must answer")
require.NotEmpty(t, resp.Answer, "answer must carry the A records")
act.mu.Lock()
defer act.mu.Unlock()
assert.False(t, act.called, "activator must not be invoked for authoritative-zone answers")
}
func TestLazyWarmupTimeoutFromEnv(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
value string
envSet bool
want time.Duration
}{
{name: "unset uses default", want: defaultLazyWarmupTimeout},
{name: "valid overrides", value: "5s", envSet: true, want: 5 * time.Second},
{name: "invalid falls back", value: "not-a-duration", envSet: true, want: defaultLazyWarmupTimeout},
{name: "negative falls back", value: "-1s", envSet: true, want: defaultLazyWarmupTimeout},
{name: "zero falls back", value: "0s", envSet: true, want: defaultLazyWarmupTimeout},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
if tt.envSet {
t.Setenv(envLazyWarmupTimeout, tt.value)
}
assert.Equal(t, tt.want, lazyWarmupTimeoutFromEnv())
assert.Equal(t, tt.want, NewResolver().warmupTimeout, "constructor must resolve the timeout once")
})
}
}
func TestExtractRecordAddr(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("A record yields unmapped v4", func(t *testing.T) {
// net.ParseIP returns the 16-byte v4-in-v6 form, the same shape
// miekg/dns stores after parsing an A record; the extracted address
// must compare equal to a plain v4 netip.Addr.
addr, ok := extractRecordAddr(&dns.A{A: net.ParseIP("100.64.0.7")})
require.True(t, ok)
assert.True(t, addr.Is4())
assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.7"), addr)
})
t.Run("AAAA record yields v6", func(t *testing.T) {
addr, ok := extractRecordAddr(&dns.AAAA{AAAA: net.ParseIP("fd00::1")})
require.True(t, ok)
assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::1"), addr)
})
t.Run("A record without address", func(t *testing.T) {
_, ok := extractRecordAddr(&dns.A{})
assert.False(t, ok)
})
t.Run("non-address record", func(t *testing.T) {
_, ok := extractRecordAddr(&dns.CNAME{Target: "target.netbird.cloud."})
assert.False(t, ok)
})
}

View File

@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import (
"github.com/miekg/dns"
dnsconfig "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns/config"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns/local"
nbdns "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/dns"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
@@ -93,11 +92,6 @@ func (m *MockServer) SetFirewall(Firewall) {
// Mock implementation - no-op
}
// SetPeerActivator mock implementation of SetPeerActivator from Server interface
func (m *MockServer) SetPeerActivator(local.PeerActivator) {
// Mock implementation - no-op
}
// BeginBatch mock implementation of BeginBatch from Server interface
func (m *MockServer) BeginBatch() {
// Mock implementation - no-op

View File

@@ -19,34 +19,6 @@ import (
// uses when a resolved host has no addresses of the requested family.
const errNoSuitableAddress = "no suitable address found"
// Extended DNS Error info codes NetBird emits so a client can see why an answer
// looks the way it does without reading this peer's logs. They live in the RFC
// 8914 Private Use range (49152-65535) and are registered here, in one place,
// because nothing else guarantees two NetBird components pick distinct codes.
const (
// EDENetbirdUpstreamTimeout: a DNS forwarder's upstream did not answer.
EDENetbirdUpstreamTimeout uint16 = 49152
// EDENetbirdUpstreamFailure: a DNS forwarder's upstream failed.
EDENetbirdUpstreamFailure uint16 = 49153
// EDENetbirdSoftenedNegative: the empty answer is ours, not the answering
// resolver's. A handler that owns the name deferred this query type, and the
// negative verdict that came back was downgraded so it cannot poison the
// name.
EDENetbirdSoftenedNegative uint16 = 49154
)
// AttachEDE adds an Extended DNS Error (RFC 8914) option to a message, creating
// the OPT pseudo-record if it has none. Callers must only use it toward a client
// that advertised EDNS0: per RFC 6891 an OPT must not appear otherwise.
func AttachEDE(msg *dns.Msg, code uint16, text string) {
opt := msg.IsEdns0()
if opt == nil {
msg.SetEdns0(dns.DefaultMsgSize, false)
opt = msg.IsEdns0()
}
opt.Option = append(opt.Option, &dns.EDNS0_EDE{InfoCode: code, ExtraText: text})
}
// GenerateRequestID creates a random 8-character hex string for request tracing.
func GenerateRequestID() string {
bytes := make([]byte, 4)
@@ -106,38 +78,10 @@ type resolver interface {
LookupNetIP(ctx context.Context, network, host string) ([]netip.Addr, error)
}
// MetaKey names an annotation a handler attaches to a request to explain the
// response the chain ends up writing. The set is closed and rendered onto a
// single log line, so an unrecognized key is a typo inventing a field rather
// than a new fact.
type MetaKey string
const (
// MetaKeyProtocol: the transport a query arrived on.
MetaKeyProtocol MetaKey = "protocol"
// MetaKeyUpstream: the upstream that answered.
MetaKeyUpstream MetaKey = "upstream"
// MetaKeyUpstreamProtocol: the transport used toward that upstream.
MetaKeyUpstreamProtocol MetaKey = "upstream_protocol"
// MetaKeyPeer: the routing peer whose forwarder answered.
MetaKeyPeer MetaKey = "peer"
// MetaKeyEDE: an Extended DNS Error carried by the answer.
MetaKeyEDE MetaKey = "ede"
// MetaKeyTruncated: the answer did not fit and was truncated.
MetaKeyTruncated MetaKey = "truncated"
// MetaKeySoftened: a negative verdict was rewritten so it cannot poison a
// name served locally.
MetaKeySoftened MetaKey = "softened"
// MetaKeyDeferredBy: the handler that owned the name and stepped aside.
MetaKeyDeferredBy MetaKey = "deferred_by"
// MetaKeyDeferredReason: why it stepped aside.
MetaKeyDeferredReason MetaKey = "deferred_reason"
)
// chainedWriter is implemented by ResponseWriters that carry request metadata
type chainedWriter interface {
RequestID() string
SetMeta(key MetaKey, value string)
SetMeta(key, value string)
}
// GetRequestID extracts a request ID from the ResponseWriter if available,
@@ -152,30 +96,12 @@ func GetRequestID(w dns.ResponseWriter) string {
}
// SetMeta sets metadata on the ResponseWriter if it supports it.
func SetMeta(w dns.ResponseWriter, key MetaKey, value string) {
func SetMeta(w dns.ResponseWriter, key, value string) {
if cw, ok := w.(chainedWriter); ok {
cw.SetMeta(key, value)
}
}
// softNegativeRequester is implemented by chain writers that can soften the
// negative verdict of the handlers a deferring handler falls through to.
type softNegativeRequester interface {
RequestSoftNegative()
}
// RequestSoftNegative asks the handler chain to downgrade an NXDOMAIN from the
// handlers that run after the caller defers. A handler that owns a name but
// cannot answer one query type for it needs this: the resolvers it falls
// through to cannot prove the name absent, and an NXDOMAIN from them is cached
// for the name and every type under it (RFC 2308, RFC 8020), taking the
// addresses the handler does serve down with it.
func RequestSoftNegative(w dns.ResponseWriter) {
if sn, ok := w.(softNegativeRequester); ok {
sn.RequestSoftNegative()
}
}
// LookupResult contains the result of an external DNS lookup
type LookupResult struct {
IPs []netip.Addr
@@ -273,27 +199,11 @@ type RecordResolver interface {
LookupAddr(ctx context.Context, addr string) ([]string, error)
}
// SupportedRecordQtype reports whether LookupRecords can resolve qtype. The
// set is bounded by the net.Resolver API, which exposes no way to query an
// arbitrary record type, and going around it with a raw exchange would mean
// picking nameservers ourselves instead of resolving the way the host does.
//
// Both ends read this: a DNS forwarder answers these types for the domains it
// routes, and a client uses it to tell which types are worth forwarding to a
// peer at all.
func SupportedRecordQtype(qtype uint16) bool {
switch qtype {
case dns.TypeMX, dns.TypeTXT, dns.TypeNS, dns.TypeSRV, dns.TypeCNAME, dns.TypePTR:
return true
default:
return false
}
}
// LookupRecords resolves a non-address DNS record type through the host
// resolver and returns the resource records and the DNS rcode. Types outside
// SupportedRecordQtype yield NODATA so that a routed name is never poisoned
// with NXDOMAIN for a type we cannot look up.
// resolver and returns the resource records and the DNS rcode. Types the host
// resolver cannot answer (anything not covered by the net.Resolver Lookup*
// methods) yield NODATA so that a routed name is never poisoned with NXDOMAIN
// for an unsupported type.
func LookupRecords(ctx context.Context, r RecordResolver, name string, qtype uint16, ttl uint32) ([]dns.RR, int) {
fqdn := dns.Fqdn(name)

View File

@@ -82,7 +82,6 @@ type Server interface {
PopulateManagementDomain(mgmtURL *url.URL) error
SetRouteSources(selected, active func() route.HAMap)
SetFirewall(Firewall)
SetPeerActivator(local.PeerActivator)
}
type nsGroupsByDomain struct {
@@ -492,13 +491,6 @@ func (s *DefaultServer) SetFirewall(fw Firewall) {
}
}
// SetPeerActivator wires the DNS-time lazy-connection warm-up on the local
// resolver. Injected after the connection manager exists (it does not at
// DNS-server construction time). Pass nil to disable.
func (s *DefaultServer) SetPeerActivator(a local.PeerActivator) {
s.localResolver.SetPeerActivator(a)
}
// Stop stops the server
func (s *DefaultServer) Stop() {
s.ctxCancel()
@@ -1443,11 +1435,11 @@ type localPeerConnectivity struct {
// IsConnectedByIP looks the IP up in the peerstore and surfaces both
// the known and connected bits. Used by Resolver.filterDisconnectedPeerAnswers.
func (l localPeerConnectivity) IsConnectedByIP(ip netip.Addr) (known, connected bool) {
func (l localPeerConnectivity) IsConnectedByIP(ip string) (known, connected bool) {
if l.status == nil {
return false, false
}
state, ok := l.status.PeerStateByIP(ip.String())
state, ok := l.status.PeerStateByIP(ip)
if !ok {
return false, false
}

View File

@@ -292,16 +292,18 @@ func (s *serviceViaListener) generateFreePort() (uint16, error) {
return customPort, nil
}
probeListener, err := net.ListenUDP("udp4", &net.UDPAddr{})
udpAddr := net.UDPAddrFromAddrPort(netip.MustParseAddrPort("0.0.0.0:0"))
probeListener, err := net.ListenUDP("udp", udpAddr)
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("failed to bind random port for DNS: %s", err)
return 0, err
}
port := uint16(probeListener.LocalAddr().(*net.UDPAddr).Port)
if err = probeListener.Close(); err != nil {
addrPort := netip.MustParseAddrPort(probeListener.LocalAddr().String()) // might panic if address is incorrect
err = probeListener.Close()
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("failed to free up DNS port: %s", err)
return 0, err
}
return port, nil
return addrPort.Port(), nil
}

View File

@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ func (u *upstreamResolverBase) ServeDNS(w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg) {
if addr := w.RemoteAddr(); addr != nil {
network := addr.Network()
ctx = contextWithDNSProtocol(ctx, network)
resutil.SetMeta(w, resutil.MetaKeyProtocol, network)
resutil.SetMeta(w, "protocol", network)
}
ok, failures := u.tryUpstreamServers(ctx, w, r, logger)
@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ func (u *upstreamResolverBase) tryOnlyRace(ctx context.Context, w dns.ResponseWr
return false, res.failures
}
if res.ede != "" {
resutil.SetMeta(w, resutil.MetaKeyEDE, res.ede)
resutil.SetMeta(w, "ede", res.ede)
}
u.writeSuccessResponse(w, res.msg, res.upstream, r.Question[0].Name, res.protocol, logger)
return true, res.failures
@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ func (u *upstreamResolverBase) raceAll(ctx context.Context, w dns.ResponseWriter
failures = append(failures, res.failures...)
if res.msg != nil {
if res.ede != "" {
resutil.SetMeta(w, resutil.MetaKeyEDE, res.ede)
resutil.SetMeta(w, "ede", res.ede)
}
u.writeSuccessResponse(w, res.msg, res.upstream, r.Question[0].Name, res.protocol, logger)
return true, failures
@@ -550,9 +550,9 @@ func (u *upstreamResolverBase) debugUpstreamTimeout(upstream netip.AddrPort) str
}
func (u *upstreamResolverBase) writeSuccessResponse(w dns.ResponseWriter, rm *dns.Msg, upstream netip.AddrPort, domain string, proto string, logger *log.Entry) {
resutil.SetMeta(w, resutil.MetaKeyUpstream, upstream.String())
resutil.SetMeta(w, "upstream", upstream.String())
if proto != "" {
resutil.SetMeta(w, resutil.MetaKeyUpstreamProtocol, proto)
resutil.SetMeta(w, "upstream_protocol", proto)
}
// Clear Zero bit from external responses to prevent upstream servers from

View File

@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
package internal
import (
"context"
"net/netip"
"time"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peerstore"
)
const dnsActivationPollInterval = 50 * time.Millisecond
// dnsPeerActivator wakes lazy-connection peers from the DNS resolution path. It
// implements dns/local.PeerActivator. DNS queries run on their own goroutines,
// so it only touches state that is safe for concurrent use — ConnMgr.ActivatePeer,
// peerstore.Store and peer.Status — and never takes the engine's syncMsgMux,
// keeping DNS resolution from contending with network-map processing.
type dnsPeerActivator struct {
connMgr *ConnMgr
peerStore *peerstore.Store
status *peer.Status
// ctx is the engine's long-lived context. The connection dial is tied to it
// (not the per-query DNS wait budget) so a handshake that outlasts the wait
// still completes in the background rather than being cancelled at the deadline.
ctx context.Context
}
// ActivatePeersByIP triggers wake-up for the peer(s) owning addrs and waits
// until one is connected or ctx (the per-query DNS wait budget) expires.
// Activation itself is tied to the engine's long-lived context so the dial
// survives a wait that times out. Unknown or already-connected addresses are
// skipped, so the steady-state (warm) path adds no latency.
func (a *dnsPeerActivator) ActivatePeersByIP(ctx context.Context, addrs []netip.Addr) {
if a == nil || a.connMgr == nil {
return
}
var pending []string
for _, addr := range addrs {
ip := addr.String()
st, ok := a.status.PeerStateByIP(ip)
if !ok || st.ConnStatus == peer.StatusConnected {
continue
}
conn, ok := a.peerStore.PeerConn(st.PubKey)
if !ok {
continue
}
a.connMgr.ActivatePeer(a.ctx, conn)
pending = append(pending, ip)
}
if len(pending) == 0 {
return
}
a.waitConnected(ctx, pending)
}
// waitConnected blocks until any of ips reports a connected peer or ctx expires.
func (a *dnsPeerActivator) waitConnected(ctx context.Context, ips []string) {
ticker := time.NewTicker(dnsActivationPollInterval)
defer ticker.Stop()
for {
for _, ip := range ips {
if st, ok := a.status.PeerStateByIP(ip); ok && st.ConnStatus == peer.StatusConnected {
return
}
}
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case <-ticker.C:
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
package internal
import (
"context"
"net/netip"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peerstore"
)
func newTestPeerConn(t *testing.T, key string) *peer.Conn {
t.Helper()
conn, err := peer.NewConn(peer.ConnConfig{
Key: key,
LocalKey: "local",
WgConfig: peer.WgConfig{
AllowedIps: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("100.64.0.1/32")},
},
}, peer.ServiceDependencies{})
require.NoError(t, err)
return conn
}
func newTestDNSPeerActivator(t *testing.T) (*dnsPeerActivator, *peer.Status, *peerstore.Store) {
t.Helper()
status := peer.NewRecorder("https://mgm")
store := peerstore.NewConnStore()
// ConnMgr without Start: the lazy manager is nil, so ActivatePeer is a
// no-op — these tests exercise the activator's skip/wait logic.
connMgr := NewConnMgr(&EngineConfig{}, status, store, nil)
return &dnsPeerActivator{
connMgr: connMgr,
peerStore: store,
status: status,
ctx: context.Background(),
}, status, store
}
func TestDNSPeerActivator_NilSafe(t *testing.T) {
var a *dnsPeerActivator
a.ActivatePeersByIP(context.Background(), []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1")})
}
// TestDNSPeerActivator_SkipsUnknownAndConnectedPeers verifies the steady-state
// (warm) path adds no latency: already-connected and unknown addresses never
// enter the wait loop.
func TestDNSPeerActivator_SkipsUnknownAndConnectedPeers(t *testing.T) {
a, status, store := newTestDNSPeerActivator(t)
require.NoError(t, status.AddPeer("peerA", "a.netbird.cloud", "100.64.0.1", "fd00::1"))
require.NoError(t, status.UpdatePeerState(peer.State{PubKey: "peerA", ConnStatus: peer.StatusConnected}))
store.AddPeerConn("peerA", newTestPeerConn(t, "peerA"))
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
start := time.Now()
a.ActivatePeersByIP(ctx, []netip.Addr{
netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1"), // known, connected -> skipped
netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::1"), // known via IPv6, connected -> skipped
netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.99"), // unknown -> skipped
})
require.Less(t, time.Since(start), time.Second, "no pending peer must mean no wait")
}
// TestDNSPeerActivator_WaitsForPendingPeerToConnect verifies the wait loop
// returns as soon as a pending peer reports connected, well before the
// per-query budget expires.
func TestDNSPeerActivator_WaitsForPendingPeerToConnect(t *testing.T) {
a, status, store := newTestDNSPeerActivator(t)
require.NoError(t, status.AddPeer("peerA", "a.netbird.cloud", "100.64.0.1", ""))
store.AddPeerConn("peerA", newTestPeerConn(t, "peerA"))
go func() {
time.Sleep(150 * time.Millisecond)
_ = status.UpdatePeerState(peer.State{PubKey: "peerA", ConnStatus: peer.StatusConnected})
}()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
start := time.Now()
a.ActivatePeersByIP(ctx, []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1")})
elapsed := time.Since(start)
require.GreaterOrEqual(t, elapsed, 100*time.Millisecond, "must wait for the pending peer")
require.Less(t, elapsed, 5*time.Second, "must return on connect, not at the deadline")
}
// TestDNSPeerActivator_ReturnsAtBudgetWhenPeerStaysIdle verifies a peer that
// never connects releases the DNS response at the per-query budget instead of
// blocking it indefinitely.
func TestDNSPeerActivator_ReturnsAtBudgetWhenPeerStaysIdle(t *testing.T) {
a, status, store := newTestDNSPeerActivator(t)
require.NoError(t, status.AddPeer("peerA", "a.netbird.cloud", "100.64.0.1", ""))
store.AddPeerConn("peerA", newTestPeerConn(t, "peerA"))
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 300*time.Millisecond)
defer cancel()
start := time.Now()
a.ActivatePeersByIP(ctx, []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1")})
elapsed := time.Since(start)
require.GreaterOrEqual(t, elapsed, 250*time.Millisecond, "must wait out the budget for a pending peer")
require.Less(t, elapsed, 5*time.Second, "must not block past the budget")
}
// TestDNSPeerActivator_NoWaitWithoutPeerConn verifies a known-but-idle peer
// with no connection object in the store is not waited on: there is nothing to
// activate, so waiting could only ever time out.
func TestDNSPeerActivator_NoWaitWithoutPeerConn(t *testing.T) {
a, status, _ := newTestDNSPeerActivator(t)
require.NoError(t, status.AddPeer("peerA", "a.netbird.cloud", "100.64.0.1", ""))
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
defer cancel()
start := time.Now()
a.ActivatePeersByIP(ctx, []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1")})
require.Less(t, time.Since(start), time.Second, "peer without a conn must not be waited on")
}

View File

@@ -26,6 +26,15 @@ import (
const errResolveFailed = "failed to resolve query for domain=%s: %v"
const upstreamTimeout = 15 * time.Second
// EDE info codes the forwarder emits on upstream failures so the querying
// client can see the reason without inspecting this peer's logs. They live in
// the RFC 8914 Private Use range (49152-65535); the Go resolver never exposes a
// real upstream EDE here, so these cannot collide with a genuine code.
const (
edeNetbirdUpstreamTimeout uint16 = 49152
edeNetbirdUpstreamFailure uint16 = 49153
)
type resolver interface {
LookupNetIP(ctx context.Context, network, host string) ([]netip.Addr, error)
LookupMX(ctx context.Context, name string) ([]*net.MX, error)
@@ -207,9 +216,6 @@ func (f *DNSForwarder) handleDNSQuery(logger *log.Entry, w dns.ResponseWriter, q
qname, dns.TypeToString[question.Qtype], dns.ClassToString[question.Qclass])
resp := query.SetReply(query)
// Every answer here comes from a recursive lookup on this peer. SetReply
// leaves RA unset, which reads to a client as a server that cannot recurse.
resp.RecursionAvailable = true
mostSpecificResId, matchingEntries := f.getMatchingEntries(strings.TrimSuffix(qname, "."))
if mostSpecificResId == "" {
@@ -223,22 +229,20 @@ func (f *DNSForwarder) handleDNSQuery(logger *log.Entry, w dns.ResponseWriter, q
reqHasEdns := query.IsEdns0() != nil
switch {
case question.Qtype == dns.TypeA || question.Qtype == dns.TypeAAAA:
switch question.Qtype {
case dns.TypeA, dns.TypeAAAA:
f.handleAddressQuery(ctx, logger, w, resp, mostSpecificResId, matchingEntries, reqHasEdns, startTime)
case resutil.SupportedRecordQtype(question.Qtype):
case dns.TypeMX, dns.TypeTXT, dns.TypeNS, dns.TypeSRV, dns.TypeCNAME, dns.TypePTR:
f.handleRecordQuery(ctx, logger, w, resp, startTime)
default:
// The domain is routed here, so any other type is answered NODATA
// (NOERROR, empty answer) rather than falling back to a resolver that
// would poison the name with NXDOMAIN. The Extended DNS Error lets a
// client tell this capability-driven NODATA apart from an
// authoritative one; a current client knows the type is unsupported and
// resolves it through its own handler chain instead of asking at all.
// The OPT pseudo-record must not appear unless the query advertised
// EDNS0.
// authoritative one. The OPT pseudo-record must not appear unless the
// query advertised EDNS0.
if reqHasEdns {
resutil.AttachEDE(resp, dns.ExtendedErrorCodeNotSupported, "netbird forwarder: unsupported query type")
attachEDE(resp, dns.ExtendedErrorCodeNotSupported, "netbird forwarder: unsupported query type")
}
f.writeResponse(logger, w, resp, qname, startTime)
}
@@ -437,7 +441,7 @@ func (f *DNSForwarder) handleDNSError(
}
if reqHasEdns {
resutil.AttachEDE(resp, edeCodeFor(dnsErr), edeText(dnsErr))
attachEDE(resp, edeCodeFor(dnsErr), edeText(dnsErr))
}
f.writeResponse(logger, w, resp, domain, startTime)
@@ -484,9 +488,9 @@ func (f *DNSForwarder) getMatchingEntries(domain string) (route.ResID, []*Forwar
// edeCodeFor maps an upstream lookup error to the NetBird EDE info code.
func edeCodeFor(dnsErr *net.DNSError) uint16 {
if dnsErr != nil && dnsErr.IsTimeout {
return resutil.EDENetbirdUpstreamTimeout
return edeNetbirdUpstreamTimeout
}
return resutil.EDENetbirdUpstreamFailure
return edeNetbirdUpstreamFailure
}
// edeText builds the EDE extra-text describing the class of upstream failure.
@@ -499,3 +503,14 @@ func edeText(dnsErr *net.DNSError) string {
}
return "netbird forwarder: upstream failure"
}
// attachEDE adds an Extended DNS Error (RFC 8914) option to the response,
// creating the OPT pseudo-record if the response does not already carry one.
func attachEDE(resp *dns.Msg, code uint16, text string) {
opt := resp.IsEdns0()
if opt == nil {
resp.SetEdns0(dns.DefaultMsgSize, false)
opt = resp.IsEdns0()
}
opt.Option = append(opt.Option, &dns.EDNS0_EDE{InfoCode: code, ExtraText: text})
}

View File

@@ -649,39 +649,6 @@ func TestDNSForwarder_ResponseCodes(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestDNSForwarder_RecursionAvailable covers the RA bit. Every answer this
// forwarder produces comes from a recursive lookup on the routing peer, but
// dns.Msg.SetReply leaves RA unset, so clients report "recursion not available"
// and some stub resolvers treat the server as unable to serve the query.
func TestDNSForwarder_RecursionAvailable(t *testing.T) {
t.Run("record answer", func(t *testing.T) {
mockResolver := &MockResolver{}
forwarder := newRecordTestForwarder(t, mockResolver, "example.com")
mockResolver.On("LookupMX", mock.Anything, "example.com.").
Return([]*net.MX{{Host: "mail.example.com.", Pref: 10}}, nil).Once()
resp := runRecordQuery(t, forwarder, "example.com", dns.TypeMX)
assert.True(t, resp.RecursionAvailable, "the forwarder resolves recursively")
})
t.Run("unsupported type NODATA", func(t *testing.T) {
forwarder := newRecordTestForwarder(t, &MockResolver{}, "example.com")
resp := runRecordQuery(t, forwarder, "example.com", dns.TypeCAA)
require.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, resp.Rcode)
assert.True(t, resp.RecursionAvailable, "RA describes the server, not the query type")
})
t.Run("unauthorized domain", func(t *testing.T) {
forwarder := newRecordTestForwarder(t, &MockResolver{}, "example.com")
resp := runRecordQuery(t, forwarder, "other.com", dns.TypeMX)
require.Equal(t, dns.RcodeRefused, resp.Rcode)
assert.True(t, resp.RecursionAvailable, "RA describes the server, not the verdict")
})
}
func hasEDE(m *dns.Msg, code uint16) bool {
opt := m.IsEdns0()
if opt == nil {
@@ -892,7 +859,7 @@ func TestDNSForwarder_UpstreamFailureEDE(t *testing.T) {
lookupErr: &net.DNSError{Err: "i/o timeout", Server: "10.0.0.53:53", IsTimeout: true},
reqEdns: true,
wantEDE: true,
wantCode: resutil.EDENetbirdUpstreamTimeout,
wantCode: edeNetbirdUpstreamTimeout,
wantTextHas: "netbird forwarder: upstream timeout",
},
{
@@ -900,7 +867,7 @@ func TestDNSForwarder_UpstreamFailureEDE(t *testing.T) {
lookupErr: &net.DNSError{Err: "server misbehaving", Server: "10.0.0.53:53"},
reqEdns: true,
wantEDE: true,
wantCode: resutil.EDENetbirdUpstreamFailure,
wantCode: edeNetbirdUpstreamFailure,
wantTextHas: "netbird forwarder: upstream failure",
},
{

View File

@@ -52,14 +52,11 @@ int xdp_dns_fwd(struct iphdr *ip, struct udphdr *udp) {
if (udp->dest == GENERAL_DNS_PORT && ip->daddr == dns_ip) {
udp->dest = dns_port;
// Clear the now-stale checksum; zero means "not computed" for IPv4.
udp->check = 0;
return XDP_PASS;
}
if (udp->source == dns_port && ip->saddr == dns_ip) {
udp->source = GENERAL_DNS_PORT;
udp->check = 0;
return XDP_PASS;
}

View File

@@ -50,11 +50,5 @@ int xdp_wg_proxy(struct iphdr *ip, struct udphdr *udp) {
__be16 new_dst_port = htons(proxy_port);
udp->dest = new_dst_port;
udp->source = new_src_port;
// The ports are covered by the UDP checksum. This is an IPv4 loopback hop
// and the payload is already integrity-protected, so clear the checksum (a
// zero UDP checksum means "not computed" for IPv4) rather than leave a
// stale value the kernel would drop as UDP_CSUM.
udp->check = 0;
return XDP_PASS;
}

View File

@@ -64,10 +64,7 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
mgm "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/client"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
sharedgrpc "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/grpc"
nbnetworkmap "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/networkmap"
mgmProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
types "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/types"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/netiputil"
auth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/relay/auth/hmac"
relayClient "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/relay/client"
@@ -150,7 +147,6 @@ type EngineConfig struct {
BlockLANAccess bool
BlockInbound bool
DisableIPv6 bool
SyncMessageVersion *int
// LazyConnection is the MDM-sourced lazy-connection override; StateUnset defers to
// the env var and management feature flag.
@@ -224,13 +220,6 @@ type Engine struct {
// networkSerial is the latest CurrentSerial (state ID) of the network sent by the Management service
networkSerial uint64
// latestComponents is the most-recent NetworkMapComponents decoded from
// a NetworkMapEnvelope (capability=3 peers only). Held alongside the
// NetworkMap that Calculate() produced from it so future incremental
// updates have a base to apply changes against. nil for legacy-format
// peers. Guarded by syncMsgMux.
latestComponents *types.NetworkMapComponents
networkMonitor *networkmonitor.NetworkMonitor
sshServer sshServer
@@ -562,7 +551,7 @@ func (e *Engine) Start(netbirdConfig *mgmProto.NetbirdConfig, mgmtURL *url.URL)
} else {
log.Infof("running rosenpass in strict mode")
}
e.rpManager, err = rosenpass.NewManager(e.config.PreSharedKey, e.config.WgIfaceName, publicKey)
e.rpManager, err = rosenpass.NewManager(e.config.PreSharedKey, e.config.WgIfaceName)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create rosenpass manager: %w", err)
}
@@ -663,24 +652,8 @@ func (e *Engine) Start(netbirdConfig *mgmProto.NetbirdConfig, mgmtURL *url.URL)
iceCfg := e.createICEConfig()
e.connMgr = NewConnMgr(e.config, e.statusRecorder, e.peerStore, wgIface)
e.connMgr.SetRoutedIPsReconciler(func(peerKey string) error {
if e.routeManager == nil {
return nil
}
return e.routeManager.ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs(peerKey)
})
e.connMgr.Start(e.ctx)
// Wire DNS-time lazy-connection warm-up now that the connection manager
// exists (it does not at DNS-server construction time). A DNS answer that
// points at an idle peer then wakes it before the client's first request.
e.dnsServer.SetPeerActivator(&dnsPeerActivator{
connMgr: e.connMgr,
peerStore: e.peerStore,
status: e.statusRecorder,
ctx: e.ctx,
})
e.srWatcher = guard.NewSRWatcher(e.signal, e.relayManager, e.mobileDep.IFaceDiscover, iceCfg)
e.srWatcher.Start(peer.IsForceRelayed())
@@ -990,12 +963,8 @@ func (e *Engine) handleSync(update *mgmProto.SyncResponse) error {
e.ApplySessionDeadline(update.GetSessionExpiresAt())
// Envelope sync responses carry PeerConfig at the top level; legacy
// NetworkMap syncs carry it under NetworkMap.PeerConfig.
if pc := update.GetPeerConfig(); pc != nil {
e.handleAutoUpdateVersion(pc.GetAutoUpdate())
} else if nm := update.GetNetworkMap(); nm != nil && nm.GetPeerConfig() != nil {
e.handleAutoUpdateVersion(nm.GetPeerConfig().GetAutoUpdate())
if update.NetworkMap != nil && update.NetworkMap.PeerConfig != nil {
e.handleAutoUpdateVersion(update.NetworkMap.PeerConfig.AutoUpdate)
}
done := e.phase("netbird_config")
@@ -1005,47 +974,12 @@ func (e *Engine) handleSync(update *mgmProto.SyncResponse) error {
return err
}
// Decode the network map from either the components envelope or the
// legacy proto.NetworkMap before the posture-check gating below, so the
// "is there a network map" decision covers both wire shapes.
var (
nm *mgmProto.NetworkMap
components *types.NetworkMapComponents
)
if version := update.GetVersion(); version == int32(sharedgrpc.ComponentNetworkMap) {
// Components-format peer: decode the envelope back to typed
// components, run Calculate() locally, and convert to the wire
// NetworkMap shape the rest of the engine consumes. Components are
// retained so future incremental updates can apply deltas instead
// of doing a full reconstruction.
envelope := update.GetNetworkMapEnvelope()
if envelope == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("received a SyncReponse indicating use of components network map, but components are missing")
}
localKey := e.config.WgPrivateKey.PublicKey().String()
dnsName := ""
if pc := update.GetPeerConfig(); pc != nil {
// PeerConfig.Fqdn = "<dns_label>.<dns_domain>" — extract the
// shared domain by stripping the peer's own label prefix. Falls
// back to empty if the FQDN doesn't have the expected shape.
dnsName = extractDNSDomainFromFQDN(pc.GetFqdn())
}
result, err := nbnetworkmap.EnvelopeToNetworkMap(e.ctx, envelope, localKey, dnsName)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("decode network map envelope: %w", err)
}
nm = result.NetworkMap
components = result.Components
} else {
nm = update.GetNetworkMap()
}
// Posture checks are bound to the network map presence:
// NetworkMap != nil, checks present -> apply the received checks
// NetworkMap != nil, checks nil -> posture checks were removed, clear them
// NetworkMap == nil -> config-only update (e.g. relay token rotation),
// leave the previously applied checks untouched
nm := update.GetNetworkMap()
if nm == nil {
return nil
}
@@ -1058,14 +992,6 @@ func (e *Engine) handleSync(update *mgmProto.SyncResponse) error {
}
done = e.phase("persist")
// Only retain the components view when the server sent the envelope
// path. A legacy proto.NetworkMap means components == nil; writing it
// here would clobber a previously-cached snapshot, breaking the
// incremental-delta base on a future envelope sync.
if components != nil {
e.latestComponents = components
}
e.persistSyncResponse(update)
done()
@@ -1079,19 +1005,6 @@ func (e *Engine) handleSync(update *mgmProto.SyncResponse) error {
return nil
}
// extractDNSDomainFromFQDN returns the trailing dotted domain part of the
// receiving peer's FQDN — the same value the management server fills as
// dnsName when it builds the legacy NetworkMap. "peer42.netbird.cloud" →
// "netbird.cloud". An empty string is returned for unrecognized formats.
func extractDNSDomainFromFQDN(fqdn string) string {
for i := 0; i < len(fqdn); i++ {
if fqdn[i] == '.' && i+1 < len(fqdn) {
return fqdn[i+1:]
}
}
return ""
}
// updateNetbirdConfig applies the management-provided NetBird configuration:
// STUN/TURN and relay servers, flow logging and DNS settings. A nil config is a no-op,
// which is the case for sync updates carrying only a network map.
@@ -1251,7 +1164,6 @@ func (e *Engine) applyInfoFlags(info *system.Info) {
e.config.BlockLANAccess,
e.config.BlockInbound,
e.config.DisableIPv6,
e.config.SyncMessageVersion,
e.config.EnableSSHRoot,
e.config.EnableSSHSFTP,
e.config.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding,
@@ -2120,7 +2032,6 @@ func (e *Engine) readInitialSettings() ([]*route.Route, *nbdns.Config, bool, err
e.config.BlockLANAccess,
e.config.BlockInbound,
e.config.DisableIPv6,
e.config.SyncMessageVersion,
e.config.EnableSSHRoot,
e.config.EnableSSHSFTP,
e.config.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding,
@@ -2694,14 +2605,13 @@ func (e *Engine) updateForwardRules(rules []*mgmProto.ForwardingRule) ([]firewal
func (e *Engine) toExcludedLazyPeers(rules []firewallManager.ForwardRule, peers []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig) map[string]bool {
excludedPeers := make(map[string]bool)
// Ingress forward targets: inbound forwarded traffic is initiated remotely and
// cannot wake a lazy connection, so the peer routing the target must stay
// permanently connected. AllowedIPs are already parsed on the peer conn, so
// reuse those typed prefixes instead of re-parsing the network map strings.
for _, r := range rules {
ip := r.TranslatedAddress
for _, p := range peers {
if e.peerRoutesAddr(p, r.TranslatedAddress) {
for _, allowedIP := range p.GetAllowedIps() {
if allowedIP != ip.String() {
continue
}
log.Infof("exclude forwarder peer from lazy connection: %s", p.GetWgPubKey())
excludedPeers[p.GetWgPubKey()] = true
}
@@ -2711,27 +2621,6 @@ func (e *Engine) toExcludedLazyPeers(rules []firewallManager.ForwardRule, peers
return excludedPeers
}
// peerRoutesAddr reports whether the peer is a router for addr, matched against
// the peer's already-parsed AllowedIPs from the store (the same typed value the
// lazy manager consumes) rather than re-parsing the network map strings.
func (e *Engine) peerRoutesAddr(p *mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig, addr netip.Addr) bool {
prefixes, ok := e.peerStore.AllowedIPs(p.GetWgPubKey())
if !ok {
return false
}
return prefixesContain(prefixes, addr)
}
// prefixesContain reports whether addr falls within any of the prefixes.
func prefixesContain(prefixes []netip.Prefix, addr netip.Addr) bool {
for _, prefix := range prefixes {
if prefix.Contains(addr) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// isChecksEqual checks if two slices of checks are equal.
func isChecksEqual(checks1, checks2 []*mgmProto.Checks) bool {
normalize := func(checks []*mgmProto.Checks) []string {

View File

@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
package internal
import (
"net/netip"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
firewallManager "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peerstore"
mgmProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
)
func TestPrefixesContain(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
prefixes []string
addr string
want bool
}{
{name: "own overlay /32 matches", prefixes: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}, addr: "100.110.8.145", want: true},
{name: "addr inside routed subnet", prefixes: []string{"10.121.0.0/16"}, addr: "10.121.208.4", want: true},
{name: "addr outside subnet", prefixes: []string{"10.121.0.0/16"}, addr: "10.122.0.1", want: false},
{name: "different /32", prefixes: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}, addr: "100.110.8.146", want: false},
{name: "ipv6 /128 matches", prefixes: []string{"fd00::1/128"}, addr: "fd00::1", want: true},
{name: "no prefixes", prefixes: nil, addr: "10.121.208.4", want: false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
prefixes := make([]netip.Prefix, 0, len(tt.prefixes))
for _, p := range tt.prefixes {
prefixes = append(prefixes, netip.MustParsePrefix(p))
}
require.Equal(t, tt.want, prefixesContain(prefixes, netip.MustParseAddr(tt.addr)))
})
}
}
// TestToExcludedLazyPeers_ForwardTarget guards a regression: the forward-target
// peer (the peer routing a ForwardRule.TranslatedAddress) must be excluded from
// lazy connections, matched via the peer's already-parsed AllowedIPs.
func TestToExcludedLazyPeers_ForwardTarget(t *testing.T) {
const targetPeerKey = "cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc0="
const otherPeerKey = "dddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd0="
store := peerstore.NewConnStore()
store.AddPeerConn(targetPeerKey, newTestConn(t, targetPeerKey, "100.110.8.145/32"))
store.AddPeerConn(otherPeerKey, newTestConn(t, otherPeerKey, "100.110.9.10/32"))
e := &Engine{peerStore: store}
peers := []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig{
{WgPubKey: targetPeerKey, AllowedIps: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}},
{WgPubKey: otherPeerKey, AllowedIps: []string{"100.110.9.10/32"}},
}
rules := []firewallManager.ForwardRule{
{TranslatedAddress: netip.MustParseAddr("100.110.8.145")},
}
excluded := e.toExcludedLazyPeers(rules, peers)
require.True(t, excluded[targetPeerKey], "forward-target peer must be excluded from lazy connections")
require.False(t, excluded[otherPeerKey], "non-target peer must not be excluded")
require.Len(t, excluded, 1)
}
func TestToExcludedLazyPeers_NoRules(t *testing.T) {
e := &Engine{peerStore: peerstore.NewConnStore()}
peers := []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig{
{WgPubKey: "peer-a", AllowedIps: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}},
}
require.Empty(t, e.toExcludedLazyPeers(nil, peers))
}
func newTestConn(t *testing.T, key, allowedIP string) *peer.Conn {
t.Helper()
conn, err := peer.NewConn(peer.ConnConfig{
Key: key,
WgConfig: peer.WgConfig{AllowedIps: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix(allowedIP)}},
}, peer.ServiceDependencies{})
require.NoError(t, err)
return conn
}

View File

@@ -75,14 +75,4 @@ func TestApplySessionDeadline_ThreeState(t *testing.T) {
require.True(t, e.statusRecorder.GetSessionExpiresAt().IsZero(),
"invalid timestamp must clear the deadline")
})
t.Run("recently expired timestamp stays visible as expired", func(t *testing.T) {
e := newEngine()
expired := time.Now().Add(-5 * time.Minute).UTC().Truncate(time.Second)
e.ApplySessionDeadline(timestamppb.New(expired))
require.True(t, e.statusRecorder.GetSessionExpiresAt().Equal(expired),
"recently-expired deadline must stay on the recorder so consumers render it as expired")
})
}

View File

@@ -29,11 +29,6 @@ type managedPeer struct {
type Config struct {
InactivityThreshold *time.Duration
// ReconcileAllowedIPs re-applies a peer's routed allowed IPs after its wake endpoint is
// armed. The activity listener creates the wake peer with the overlay /32 only; without the
// routed prefixes WireGuard would not steer subnet-bound traffic to the wake endpoint, so an
// idle routing peer could never be woken by that traffic. Optional; nil disables the reconcile.
ReconcileAllowedIPs func(peerKey string) error
}
// Manager manages lazy connections
@@ -61,9 +56,6 @@ type Manager struct {
peerToHAGroups map[string][]route.HAUniqueID // peer ID -> HA groups they belong to
haGroupToPeers map[route.HAUniqueID][]string // HA group -> peer IDs in the group
routesMu sync.RWMutex
// reconcileAllowedIPs re-applies a peer's routed allowed IPs after its wake endpoint is armed.
reconcileAllowedIPs func(peerKey string) error
}
// NewManager creates a new lazy connection manager
@@ -81,7 +73,6 @@ func NewManager(config Config, engineCtx context.Context, peerStore *peerstore.S
activityManager: activity.NewManager(wgIface),
peerToHAGroups: make(map[string][]route.HAUniqueID),
haGroupToPeers: make(map[route.HAUniqueID][]string),
reconcileAllowedIPs: config.ReconcileAllowedIPs,
}
if wgIface.IsUserspaceBind() {
@@ -210,7 +201,7 @@ func (m *Manager) AddPeer(peerCfg lazyconn.PeerConfig) (bool, error) {
return false, nil
}
if err := m.armActivityListener(peerCfg); err != nil {
if err := m.activityManager.MonitorPeerActivity(peerCfg); err != nil {
return false, err
}
@@ -297,7 +288,7 @@ func (m *Manager) DeactivatePeer(peerID peerid.ConnID) {
m.inactivityManager.RemovePeer(mp.peerCfg.PublicKey)
if err := m.armActivityListener(*mp.peerCfg); err != nil {
if err := m.activityManager.MonitorPeerActivity(*mp.peerCfg); err != nil {
mp.peerCfg.Log.Errorf("failed to create activity monitor: %v", err)
return
}
@@ -474,31 +465,6 @@ func (m *Manager) close() {
}
// shouldDeferIdleForHA checks if peer should stay connected due to HA group requirements
// armRoutedAllowedIPs re-applies the peer's routed allowed IPs onto its freshly armed wake
// endpoint. The activity listener creates the wake peer with the overlay /32 only, so without
// this the routed prefixes would be missing and traffic to a routed subnet could not wake the
// idle routing peer. It is a no-op when no reconciler is configured.
// armActivityListener (re)arms the peer's wake endpoint via the activity manager and then
// re-applies its routed allowed IPs, so traffic to a routed subnet can wake an idle routing
// peer. The routed prefixes must be re-applied after the wake endpoint exists because the
// listener creates it with the overlay /32 only.
func (m *Manager) armActivityListener(peerCfg lazyconn.PeerConfig) error {
if err := m.activityManager.MonitorPeerActivity(peerCfg); err != nil {
return err
}
m.armRoutedAllowedIPs(&peerCfg)
return nil
}
func (m *Manager) armRoutedAllowedIPs(peerCfg *lazyconn.PeerConfig) {
if m.reconcileAllowedIPs == nil {
return
}
if err := m.reconcileAllowedIPs(peerCfg.PublicKey); err != nil {
peerCfg.Log.Errorf("failed to reconcile routed allowed IPs on wake endpoint: %v", err)
}
}
func (m *Manager) shouldDeferIdleForHA(inactivePeers map[string]struct{}, peerID string) bool {
m.routesMu.RLock()
defer m.routesMu.RUnlock()
@@ -611,7 +577,7 @@ func (m *Manager) onPeerInactivityTimedOut(peerIDs map[string]struct{}) {
mp.peerCfg.Log.Infof("start activity monitor")
if err := m.armActivityListener(*mp.peerCfg); err != nil {
if err := m.activityManager.MonitorPeerActivity(*mp.peerCfg); err != nil {
mp.peerCfg.Log.Errorf("failed to create activity monitor: %v", err)
continue
}

View File

@@ -175,9 +175,7 @@ func TestFlowAggregationOfUnknownProtocols(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestResetAggregationWindow(t *testing.T) {
now := time.Now()
nowFunc := func() time.Time { return now }
store := NewAggregatingMemoryStoreWithTimeFunc(nowFunc)
store := NewAggregatingMemoryStore()
store.StoreEvent(&types.Event{
ID: uuid.New(),
Timestamp: time.Now(),
@@ -200,7 +198,6 @@ func TestResetAggregationWindow(t *testing.T) {
},
})
now = now.Add(1 * time.Second)
reset := store.ResetAggregationWindow()
previousEvents, ok := reset.(*AggregatingMemory)
assert.True(t, ok)

View File

@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ type AggregatingMemory struct {
WindowStart time.Time
WindowEnd time.Time
rnd *v2.PCG
nowFunc func() time.Time
}
func (m *Memory) StoreEvent(event *types.Event) {
@@ -63,19 +62,14 @@ func (m *Memory) DeleteEvents(ids []uuid.UUID) {
}
func NewAggregatingMemoryStore() *AggregatingMemory {
return NewAggregatingMemoryStoreWithTimeFunc(defaultNowFunc)
}
// used in tests when deterministic (less random) time intervals are required
func NewAggregatingMemoryStoreWithTimeFunc(nowFunc func() time.Time) *AggregatingMemory {
return &AggregatingMemory{WindowStart: nowFunc(), Memory: Memory{events: make(map[uuid.UUID]*types.Event)}, nowFunc: nowFunc, rnd: v2.NewPCG(rand.Uint64(), rand.Uint64())}
return &AggregatingMemory{WindowStart: time.Now(), Memory: Memory{events: make(map[uuid.UUID]*types.Event)}, rnd: v2.NewPCG(rand.Uint64(), rand.Uint64())}
}
func (am *AggregatingMemory) ResetAggregationWindow() types.FlowEventAggregator {
am.mux.Lock()
defer am.mux.Unlock()
now := am.nowFunc()
now := time.Now()
toret := AggregatingMemory{WindowStart: am.WindowStart, WindowEnd: now, Memory: Memory{events: am.events}, rnd: v2.NewPCG(rand.Uint64(), rand.Uint64())}
am.events = make(map[uuid.UUID]*types.Event)
@@ -158,7 +152,3 @@ func (am *AggregatingMemory) GetAggregatedEvents() []*types.Event {
return slices.Collect(maps.Values(aggregated)) // could return an iterator instead here
}
func defaultNowFunc() time.Time {
return time.Now()
}

View File

@@ -30,11 +30,6 @@ import (
relayClient "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/relay/client"
)
// wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold is the number of consecutive WireGuard
// handshake timeouts after which the rosenpass state for the peer is
// considered desynced and gets reset.
const wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold = 3
// MetricsRecorder is an interface for recording peer connection metrics
type MetricsRecorder interface {
RecordConnectionStages(
@@ -123,9 +118,6 @@ type Conn struct {
wgWatcher *WGWatcher
wgWatcherWg sync.WaitGroup
wgWatcherCancel context.CancelFunc
// wgTimeouts counts consecutive WireGuard handshake timeouts without a
// successful handshake in between. Guarded by mu.
wgTimeouts int
// used to store the remote Rosenpass key for Relayed connection in case of connection update from ice
rosenpassRemoteKey []byte
@@ -203,6 +195,7 @@ func NewConn(config ConnConfig, services ServiceDependencies) (*Conn, error) {
statusICE: worker.NewAtomicStatus(),
dumpState: dumpState,
endpointUpdater: NewEndpointUpdater(connLog, config.WgConfig, isController(config)),
wgWatcher: NewWGWatcher(connLog, config.WgConfig.WgInterface, config.Key, dumpState),
metricsRecorder: services.MetricsRecorder,
}
@@ -670,12 +663,11 @@ func (conn *Conn) onGuardEvent() {
}
}
func (conn *Conn) onWGDisconnected(watcherCtx context.Context) {
func (conn *Conn) onWGDisconnected() {
conn.mu.Lock()
defer conn.mu.Unlock()
// watcherCtx guards against a stale watcher tearing down a connection that already superseded it.
if conn.ctx.Err() != nil || watcherCtx.Err() != nil {
if conn.ctx.Err() != nil {
return
}
@@ -691,29 +683,6 @@ func (conn *Conn) onWGDisconnected(watcherCtx context.Context) {
default:
conn.Log.Debugf("No active connection to close on WG timeout")
}
conn.escalateWGTimeoutLocked()
}
// escalateWGTimeoutLocked resets the peer's rosenpass state after repeated
// handshake timeouts. With rosenpass enabled, persistent timeouts mean the
// preshared keys have desynced; the renewal exchange runs over the dead
// tunnel and cannot resync them. Reporting the peer disconnected drops its
// rosenpass state, so the next connection configuration programs the
// rendezvous key and the tunnel can bootstrap again. Callers must hold mu.
func (conn *Conn) escalateWGTimeoutLocked() {
if conn.config.RosenpassConfig.PubKey == nil {
return
}
conn.wgTimeouts++
if conn.wgTimeouts < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold || conn.onDisconnected == nil {
return
}
conn.wgTimeouts = 0
conn.Log.Warnf("%d consecutive WireGuard handshake timeouts, resetting rosenpass state for peer", wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold)
conn.onDisconnected(conn.config.WgConfig.RemoteKey)
}
func (conn *Conn) updateRelayStatus(relayServerAddr string, rosenpassPubKey []byte, updateTime time.Time) {
@@ -833,39 +802,25 @@ func (conn *Conn) isConnectedOnAllWay() (status guard.ConnStatus) {
})
}
// enableWgWatcherIfNeeded starts a fresh watcher instance per connection attempt, so its
// lifecycle stays bound to conn.mu and enable/disable can't race an old goroutine's shutdown.
// Caller must hold conn.mu.
func (conn *Conn) enableWgWatcherIfNeeded(enabledTime time.Time) {
if conn.wgWatcher != nil {
if !conn.wgWatcher.PrepareInitialHandshake() {
return
}
watcher := NewWGWatcher(conn.Log, conn.config.WgConfig.WgInterface, conn.config.Key, conn.dumpState)
watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
wgWatcherCtx, wgWatcherCancel := context.WithCancel(conn.ctx)
conn.wgWatcher = watcher
conn.wgWatcherCancel = wgWatcherCancel
conn.wgWatcherWg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer conn.wgWatcherWg.Done()
onDisconnected := func() { conn.onWGDisconnected(wgWatcherCtx) }
watcher.EnableWgWatcher(wgWatcherCtx, enabledTime, onDisconnected, conn.onWGHandshakeSuccess, conn.onWGCheckSuccess)
conn.wgWatcher.EnableWgWatcher(wgWatcherCtx, enabledTime, conn.onWGDisconnected, conn.onWGHandshakeSuccess)
}()
}
// disableWgWatcherIfNeeded cancels and drops the watcher once no transport is active. It never
// waits for the goroutine: the timeout path reentrantly calls back here under conn.mu, so
// blocking would deadlock. Caller must hold conn.mu.
func (conn *Conn) disableWgWatcherIfNeeded() {
if conn.currentConnPriority != conntype.None || conn.wgWatcher == nil {
return
if conn.currentConnPriority == conntype.None && conn.wgWatcherCancel != nil {
conn.wgWatcherCancel()
conn.wgWatcherCancel = nil
}
conn.wgWatcherCancel()
conn.wgWatcher = nil
conn.wgWatcherCancel = nil
}
func (conn *Conn) newProxy(remoteConn net.Conn) (wgproxy.Proxy, error) {
@@ -888,9 +843,7 @@ func (conn *Conn) resetEndpoint() {
return
}
conn.Log.Infof("reset wg endpoint")
if conn.wgWatcher != nil {
conn.wgWatcher.Reset()
}
conn.wgWatcher.Reset()
if err := conn.endpointUpdater.RemoveEndpointAddress(); err != nil {
conn.Log.Warnf("failed to remove endpoint address before update: %v", err)
}
@@ -939,15 +892,6 @@ func (conn *Conn) onWGHandshakeSuccess(when time.Time) {
conn.recordConnectionMetrics()
}
// onWGCheckSuccess is called for every watcher check that observed a fresh
// handshake, including handshakes of connections that were already up when
// the watcher started.
func (conn *Conn) onWGCheckSuccess() {
conn.mu.Lock()
conn.wgTimeouts = 0
conn.mu.Unlock()
}
// recordConnectionMetrics records connection stage timestamps as metrics
func (conn *Conn) recordConnectionMetrics() {
if conn.metricsRecorder == nil {

View File

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import (
"testing"
"time"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface"
@@ -305,84 +304,3 @@ func TestConn_presharedKey_RosenpassManaged(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatalf("expected non-nil presharedKey before Rosenpass manages PSK")
}
}
func newWGTimeoutTestConn(rosenpassEnabled bool, disconnected *[]string) *Conn {
cfg := ConnConfig{
Key: "LLHf3Ma6z6mdLbriAJbqhX7+nM/B71lgw2+91q3LfhU=",
LocalKey: "RRHf3Ma6z6mdLbriAJbqhX7+nM/B71lgw2+91q3LfhU=",
WgConfig: WgConfig{RemoteKey: "LLHf3Ma6z6mdLbriAJbqhX7+nM/B71lgw2+91q3LfhU="},
}
if rosenpassEnabled {
cfg.RosenpassConfig = RosenpassConfig{PubKey: []byte("dummykey")}
}
conn := &Conn{
ctx: context.Background(),
config: cfg,
Log: log.WithField("peer", cfg.Key),
metricsStages: &MetricsStages{},
}
conn.SetOnDisconnected(func(remotePeer string) {
*disconnected = append(*disconnected, remotePeer)
})
return conn
}
// TestConn_onWGDisconnected_EscalatesToRosenpassReset: repeated handshake
// timeouts with rosenpass enabled mean the preshared keys have desynced. The
// renewal exchange runs over the dead tunnel and cannot resync them, so after
// wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold consecutive timeouts the conn must report the
// peer disconnected, dropping its rosenpass state so the next configuration
// programs the rendezvous key.
func TestConn_onWGDisconnected_EscalatesToRosenpassReset(t *testing.T) {
var disconnected []string
conn := newWGTimeoutTestConn(true, &disconnected)
for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
}
assert.Empty(t, disconnected, "escalation must not fire below the threshold")
conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
assert.Equal(t, []string{conn.config.WgConfig.RemoteKey}, disconnected,
"reaching the threshold must report the peer disconnected once")
for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
}
assert.Len(t, disconnected, 1, "escalation must restart counting after firing")
conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
assert.Len(t, disconnected, 2, "continued timeouts must escalate again")
}
// TestConn_onWGDisconnected_CheckSuccessResetsEscalation: a successful
// handshake between timeouts means the tunnel recovered; the counter must
// start over.
func TestConn_onWGDisconnected_CheckSuccessResetsEscalation(t *testing.T) {
var disconnected []string
conn := newWGTimeoutTestConn(true, &disconnected)
for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
}
conn.onWGCheckSuccess()
for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
}
assert.Empty(t, disconnected, "handshake success must reset the timeout count")
}
// TestConn_onWGDisconnected_NoEscalationWithoutRosenpass: without rosenpass
// there is no per-peer key state to reset; repeated timeouts must not report
// disconnects.
func TestConn_onWGDisconnected_NoEscalationWithoutRosenpass(t *testing.T) {
var disconnected []string
conn := newWGTimeoutTestConn(false, &disconnected)
for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold*3; i++ {
conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
}
assert.Empty(t, disconnected, "escalation must be limited to rosenpass connections")
}

View File

@@ -813,14 +813,19 @@ func (d *Status) SetSessionExpiresAt(deadline time.Time) {
}
// GetSessionExpiresAt returns the most recently recorded SSO session deadline,
// or the zero value when no deadline is tracked. A deadline in the past is
// returned as-is: it means the session has expired, and consumers (tray row,
// CLI status) render it as "expired" rather than hiding it — masking it as
// "none" would blank the UI at the exact moment it should say the session
// ended.
// or the zero value when no deadline is tracked. A deadline that has already
// slipped into the past reports as "none": once the session has expired it is
// no longer a meaningful countdown, and the sessionwatch.Watcher does not
// arm a timer at the deadline itself to clear it (only the two pre-expiry
// warnings). Without this guard the UI would keep painting a stale
// "expires in …" against a moment that has passed until the next login,
// extend, or teardown rewrote the value.
func (d *Status) GetSessionExpiresAt() time.Time {
d.mux.Lock()
defer d.mux.Unlock()
if !d.sessionExpiresAt.IsZero() && d.sessionExpiresAt.Before(time.Now()) {
return time.Time{}
}
return d.sessionExpiresAt
}

View File

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package peer
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"sync"
"time"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
@@ -23,14 +24,14 @@ type WGInterfaceStater interface {
GetStats() (map[string]configurer.WGStats, error)
}
// WGWatcher is single-shot: one instance per connection attempt, run once, then discarded.
// Lifecycle is owned by Conn under conn.mu, so it keeps no "enabled" state to go stale.
type WGWatcher struct {
log *log.Entry
wgIfaceStater WGInterfaceStater
peerKey string
stateDump *stateDump
enabled bool
muEnabled sync.Mutex
// initialHandshake is not thread-safe; never call PrepareInitialHandshake and EnableWgWatcher concurrently.
initialHandshake time.Time
@@ -47,23 +48,36 @@ func NewWGWatcher(log *log.Entry, wgIfaceStater WGInterfaceStater, peerKey strin
}
}
// PrepareInitialHandshake reads the peer's current WireGuard handshake time. It must be
// called before the peer is (re)configured on the WireGuard interface, so the captured
// baseline reflects the state prior to this connection attempt instead of racing with
// that configuration.
func (w *WGWatcher) PrepareInitialHandshake() {
// PrepareInitialHandshake reserves the watcher and reads the peer's current WireGuard
// handshake time. It must be called before the peer is (re)configured on the WireGuard
// interface, so the captured baseline reflects the state prior to this connection attempt
// instead of racing with that configuration. Returns ok=false if the watcher is already
// running, in which case EnableWgWatcher must not be called.
func (w *WGWatcher) PrepareInitialHandshake() (ok bool) {
w.muEnabled.Lock()
if w.enabled {
w.muEnabled.Unlock()
return false
}
w.log.Debugf("enable WireGuard watcher")
w.enabled = true
w.muEnabled.Unlock()
handshake, _ := w.wgState()
w.initialHandshake = handshake
return true
}
// EnableWgWatcher runs the WireGuard watcher loop using the handshake baseline captured by
// PrepareInitialHandshake. The watcher runs until ctx is cancelled. Caller is responsible
// for context lifecycle management. onHandshakeSuccessFn is called only for the first
// handshake observed by this run, onCheckSuccessFn for every check that observed a fresh
// handshake, including the first.
func (w *WGWatcher) EnableWgWatcher(ctx context.Context, enabledTime time.Time, onDisconnectedFn func(), onHandshakeSuccessFn func(when time.Time), onCheckSuccessFn func()) {
w.periodicHandshakeCheck(ctx, onDisconnectedFn, onHandshakeSuccessFn, onCheckSuccessFn, enabledTime, w.initialHandshake)
// for context lifecycle management.
func (w *WGWatcher) EnableWgWatcher(ctx context.Context, enabledTime time.Time, onDisconnectedFn func(), onHandshakeSuccessFn func(when time.Time)) {
w.periodicHandshakeCheck(ctx, onDisconnectedFn, onHandshakeSuccessFn, enabledTime, w.initialHandshake)
w.muEnabled.Lock()
w.enabled = false
w.muEnabled.Unlock()
}
// Reset signals the watcher that the WireGuard peer has been reset and a new
@@ -76,7 +90,7 @@ func (w *WGWatcher) Reset() {
}
// wgStateCheck help to check the state of the WireGuard handshake and relay connection
func (w *WGWatcher) periodicHandshakeCheck(ctx context.Context, onDisconnectedFn func(), onHandshakeSuccessFn func(when time.Time), onCheckSuccessFn func(), enabledTime time.Time, initialHandshake time.Time) {
func (w *WGWatcher) periodicHandshakeCheck(ctx context.Context, onDisconnectedFn func(), onHandshakeSuccessFn func(when time.Time), enabledTime time.Time, initialHandshake time.Time) {
w.log.Infof("WireGuard watcher started")
timer := time.NewTimer(wgHandshakeOvertime)
@@ -89,7 +103,6 @@ func (w *WGWatcher) periodicHandshakeCheck(ctx context.Context, onDisconnectedFn
case <-timer.C:
handshake, ok := w.handshakeCheck(lastHandshake)
if !ok {
// early ctx cancel check return
if ctx.Err() != nil {
return
}
@@ -104,10 +117,6 @@ func (w *WGWatcher) periodicHandshakeCheck(ctx context.Context, onDisconnectedFn
}
}
if onCheckSuccessFn != nil && ctx.Err() == nil {
onCheckSuccessFn()
}
lastHandshake = *handshake
resetTime := time.Until(handshake.Add(checkPeriod))
@@ -138,9 +147,9 @@ func (w *WGWatcher) handshakeCheck(lastHandshake time.Time) (*time.Time, bool) {
w.log.Tracef("previous handshake, handshake: %v, %v", lastHandshake, handshake)
// the current known handshake did not change
// the current know handshake did not change
if handshake.Equal(lastHandshake) {
w.log.Warnf("WireGuard handshake not updated: %v", handshake)
w.log.Warnf("WireGuard handshake timed out: %v", handshake)
return nil, false
}

View File

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
"time"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/configurer"
)
@@ -23,72 +24,6 @@ func (m *MocWgIface) disconnect() {
m.stop = true
}
type mockHandshakeStats struct {
mu sync.Mutex
handshake time.Time
}
func (m *mockHandshakeStats) GetStats() (map[string]configurer.WGStats, error) {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
return map[string]configurer.WGStats{"": {LastHandshake: m.handshake}}, nil
}
func (m *mockHandshakeStats) advance() {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
m.handshake = time.Now()
}
// TestWGWatcher_CheckSuccessCallback: onCheckSuccessFn must fire for a fresh
// handshake even when the watcher started with an existing handshake baseline,
// the case where onHandshakeSuccessFn stays silent.
func TestWGWatcher_CheckSuccessCallback(t *testing.T) {
// checkPeriod bounds how stale a handshake may be before the watcher treats it
// as a suspended-machine timeout. The first check fires after wgHandshakeOvertime,
// so keep checkPeriod well above any scheduling jitter to avoid a false timeout
// converting the expected success into a disconnect on a loaded runner.
checkPeriod = 1 * time.Minute
wgHandshakeOvertime = 1 * time.Second
mlog := log.WithField("peer", "tet")
// Use an old baseline so advance() yields a strictly newer handshake even on
// platforms with coarse clock resolution (Windows), where two time.Now() calls
// microseconds apart can return the same instant and read as a timed-out handshake.
stats := &mockHandshakeStats{handshake: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)}
watcher := NewWGWatcher(mlog, stats, "", newStateDump("peer", mlog, &Status{}))
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
firstHandshake := make(chan struct{}, 1)
checkSuccess := make(chan struct{}, 1)
go watcher.EnableWgWatcher(ctx, time.Now(), func() {}, func(when time.Time) {
firstHandshake <- struct{}{}
}, func() {
select {
case checkSuccess <- struct{}{}:
default:
}
})
stats.advance()
select {
case <-checkSuccess:
case <-time.After(10 * time.Second):
t.Errorf("timeout waiting for check success callback")
}
select {
case <-firstHandshake:
t.Errorf("first-handshake callback must not fire for a non-zero baseline")
default:
}
}
func TestWGWatcher_EnableWgWatcher(t *testing.T) {
checkPeriod = 5 * time.Second
wgHandshakeOvertime = 1 * time.Second
@@ -100,7 +35,8 @@ func TestWGWatcher_EnableWgWatcher(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
ok := watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
require.True(t, ok, "watcher should not be enabled yet")
onDisconnected := make(chan struct{}, 1)
go watcher.EnableWgWatcher(ctx, time.Now(), func() {
@@ -108,7 +44,7 @@ func TestWGWatcher_EnableWgWatcher(t *testing.T) {
onDisconnected <- struct{}{}
}, func(when time.Time) {
mlog.Infof("onHandshakeSuccess: %v", when)
}, nil)
})
// wait for initial reading
time.Sleep(2 * time.Second)
@@ -130,13 +66,14 @@ func TestWGWatcher_ReEnable(t *testing.T) {
watcher := NewWGWatcher(mlog, mocWgIface, "", newStateDump("peer", mlog, &Status{}))
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
ok := watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
require.True(t, ok, "watcher should not be enabled yet")
wg := &sync.WaitGroup{}
wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
watcher.EnableWgWatcher(ctx, time.Now(), func() {}, func(when time.Time) {}, nil)
watcher.EnableWgWatcher(ctx, time.Now(), func() {}, func(when time.Time) {})
}()
cancel()
@@ -146,12 +83,13 @@ func TestWGWatcher_ReEnable(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel = context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
ok = watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
require.True(t, ok, "watcher should be re-enabled after the previous run stopped")
onDisconnected := make(chan struct{}, 1)
go watcher.EnableWgWatcher(ctx, time.Now(), func() {
onDisconnected <- struct{}{}
}, func(when time.Time) {}, nil)
}, func(when time.Time) {})
time.Sleep(2 * time.Second)
mocWgIface.disconnect()

View File

@@ -96,7 +96,6 @@ type ConfigInput struct {
BlockLANAccess *bool
BlockInbound *bool
DisableIPv6 *bool
SyncMessageVersion *int
DisableNotifications *bool
@@ -138,7 +137,6 @@ type Config struct {
BlockLANAccess bool
BlockInbound bool
DisableIPv6 bool
SyncMessageVersion *int
DisableNotifications *bool
@@ -589,12 +587,6 @@ func (config *Config) apply(input ConfigInput) (updated bool, err error) {
updated = true
}
if input.SyncMessageVersion != nil && *input.SyncMessageVersion != *config.SyncMessageVersion {
log.Infof("setting SyncMessageVersion to %v", *input.SyncMessageVersion)
*config.SyncMessageVersion = *input.SyncMessageVersion
updated = true
}
if input.DisableNotifications != nil && (config.DisableNotifications == nil || *input.DisableNotifications != *config.DisableNotifications) {
if *input.DisableNotifications {
log.Infof("disabling notifications")

View File

@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import (
"runtime"
"sort"
"strings"
"syscall"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
@@ -440,11 +439,7 @@ func (s *ServiceManager) GetStatePath() string {
activeProf, err := s.GetActiveProfileState()
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, syscall.ENOSYS) {
log.Debugf("active profile state unavailable on this platform: %v", err)
} else {
log.Warnf("failed to get active profile state: %v", err)
}
log.Warnf("failed to get active profile state: %v", err)
return defaultStatePath
}

View File

@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ type rpServer interface {
type Manager struct {
ifaceName string
localWgKey wgtypes.Key
spk []byte
ssk []byte
rpKeyHash string
@@ -52,9 +51,8 @@ type Manager struct {
wgIface PresharedKeySetter
}
// NewManager creates a new Rosenpass manager. localWgKey is the local
// WireGuard public key, used to derive the per-peer rendezvous key.
func NewManager(preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key, wgIfaceName string, localWgKey wgtypes.Key) (*Manager, error) {
// NewManager creates a new Rosenpass manager
func NewManager(preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key, wgIfaceName string) (*Manager, error) {
public, secret, err := rp.GenerateKeyPair()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
@@ -64,7 +62,6 @@ func NewManager(preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key, wgIfaceName string, localWgKey wgtype
log.Tracef("generated new rosenpass key pair with public key %s", rpKeyHash)
return &Manager{
ifaceName: wgIfaceName,
localWgKey: localWgKey,
rpKeyHash: rpKeyHash,
spk: public,
ssk: secret,
@@ -76,7 +73,7 @@ func NewManager(preSharedKey *wgtypes.Key, wgIfaceName string, localWgKey wgtype
// nil receiver in addPeer -> m.rpWgHandler.AddPeer. generateConfig will
// replace it with a fresh handler on each Run() to clear stale peer
// state from previous engine sessions.
rpWgHandler: NewNetbirdHandler((*[32]byte)(preSharedKey), localWgKey),
rpWgHandler: NewNetbirdHandler(),
lock: sync.Mutex{},
}, nil
}
@@ -164,7 +161,7 @@ func (m *Manager) generateConfig() (rp.Config, error) {
cfg.Peers = []rp.PeerConfig{}
m.lock.Lock()
m.rpWgHandler = NewNetbirdHandler(m.preSharedKey, m.localWgKey)
m.rpWgHandler = NewNetbirdHandler()
if m.wgIface != nil {
m.rpWgHandler.SetInterface(m.wgIface)
}

View File

@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ func newTestManager(spkFirstByte byte, mock *mockServer) *Manager {
ssk: make([]byte, 32),
rpKeyHash: "test-hash",
rpPeerIDs: make(map[string]*rp.PeerID),
rpWgHandler: NewNetbirdHandler(nil, wgtypes.Key{0x01}),
rpWgHandler: NewNetbirdHandler(),
server: mock,
}
}
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ func TestAddPeer_NilServer_ReturnsErrorNoCrash(t *testing.T) {
// issue #4341 cannot occur in the window between NewManager and Run().
func TestNewManager_PreInitializesHandler(t *testing.T) {
psk := wgtypes.Key{}
m, err := NewManager(&psk, "wt0", wgtypes.Key{0x01})
m, err := NewManager(&psk, "wt0")
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, m.rpWgHandler, "rpWgHandler must be initialized in NewManager")
}
@@ -329,10 +329,10 @@ func TestIsPresharedKeyInitialized_AddedButNotHandshaken_ReturnsFalse(t *testing
require.False(t, m.IsPresharedKeyInitialized(wgKey))
}
// --- NetbirdHandler.applyKey ----------------------------------------------
// --- NetbirdHandler.outputKey ----------------------------------------------
func TestHandler_ApplyKey_FirstCallUsesUpdateOnlyFalse(t *testing.T) {
h := NewNetbirdHandler(nil, wgtypes.Key{0x01})
func TestHandler_OutputKey_FirstCallUsesUpdateOnlyFalse(t *testing.T) {
h := NewNetbirdHandler()
iface := &mockIface{}
h.SetInterface(iface)
@@ -348,8 +348,8 @@ func TestHandler_ApplyKey_FirstCallUsesUpdateOnlyFalse(t *testing.T) {
require.Equal(t, wgKey.String(), iface.calls[0].peerKey)
}
func TestHandler_ApplyKey_SubsequentCallsUseUpdateOnlyTrue(t *testing.T) {
h := NewNetbirdHandler(nil, wgtypes.Key{0x01})
func TestHandler_OutputKey_SubsequentCallsUseUpdateOnlyTrue(t *testing.T) {
h := NewNetbirdHandler()
iface := &mockIface{}
h.SetInterface(iface)
@@ -364,8 +364,8 @@ func TestHandler_ApplyKey_SubsequentCallsUseUpdateOnlyTrue(t *testing.T) {
require.True(t, iface.calls[1].updateOnly, "subsequent rotations must use updateOnly=true")
}
func TestHandler_ApplyKey_NilInterface_NoCrashNoCall(t *testing.T) {
h := NewNetbirdHandler(nil, wgtypes.Key{0x01})
func TestHandler_OutputKey_NilInterface_NoCrashNoCall(t *testing.T) {
h := NewNetbirdHandler()
// no SetInterface — iface remains nil
pid := rp.PeerID{0x03}
h.AddPeer(pid, "wt0", rp.Key(wgtypes.Key{}))
@@ -374,8 +374,8 @@ func TestHandler_ApplyKey_NilInterface_NoCrashNoCall(t *testing.T) {
h.HandshakeCompleted(pid, rp.Key{})
}
func TestHandler_ApplyKey_UnknownPeer_NoCall(t *testing.T) {
h := NewNetbirdHandler(nil, wgtypes.Key{0x01})
func TestHandler_OutputKey_UnknownPeer_NoCall(t *testing.T) {
h := NewNetbirdHandler()
iface := &mockIface{}
h.SetInterface(iface)
@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ func TestHandler_ApplyKey_UnknownPeer_NoCall(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestHandler_RemovePeer_ClearsInitializedState(t *testing.T) {
h := NewNetbirdHandler(nil, wgtypes.Key{0x01})
h := NewNetbirdHandler()
iface := &mockIface{}
h.SetInterface(iface)
@@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ func TestHandler_RemovePeer_ClearsInitializedState(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestHandler_SetInterfaceAfterAddPeer_StillReceivesKey(t *testing.T) {
h := NewNetbirdHandler(nil, wgtypes.Key{0x01})
h := NewNetbirdHandler()
pid := rp.PeerID{0x05}
wgKey := wgtypes.Key{0xEE}
h.AddPeer(pid, "wt0", rp.Key(wgKey))

View File

@@ -18,34 +18,19 @@ type PresharedKeySetter interface {
type wireGuardPeer struct {
Interface string
PublicKey rp.Key
// initialized is true once a completed exchange has set a
// Rosenpass-managed PSK for this peer.
initialized bool
// chainKey is the key output by the last completed exchange, advanced by
// one ratchet step on expiry. Nil until the first exchange completes and
// after the peer has fallen back to the rendezvous key.
chainKey *wgtypes.Key
// expiries counts failed renewals since the last completed exchange.
expiries int
}
type NetbirdHandler struct {
mu sync.Mutex
iface PresharedKeySetter
// preSharedKey is the account-level preshared key, used as the rendezvous
// key when set. Nil means the deterministic seed key is used instead.
preSharedKey *[32]byte
// localWgKey is the local WireGuard public key, one of the two inputs to
// the deterministic seed key.
localWgKey wgtypes.Key
peers map[rp.PeerID]*wireGuardPeer
mu sync.Mutex
iface PresharedKeySetter
peers map[rp.PeerID]wireGuardPeer
initializedPeers map[rp.PeerID]bool
}
func NewNetbirdHandler(preSharedKey *[32]byte, localWgKey wgtypes.Key) *NetbirdHandler {
func NewNetbirdHandler() *NetbirdHandler {
return &NetbirdHandler{
preSharedKey: preSharedKey,
localWgKey: localWgKey,
peers: map[rp.PeerID]*wireGuardPeer{},
peers: map[rp.PeerID]wireGuardPeer{},
initializedPeers: map[rp.PeerID]bool{},
}
}
@@ -57,16 +42,10 @@ func (h *NetbirdHandler) SetInterface(iface PresharedKeySetter) {
h.iface = iface
}
// AddPeer registers a peer with the handler. Re-adding a known peer (every
// reconnection does) keeps its key recovery state.
func (h *NetbirdHandler) AddPeer(pid rp.PeerID, intf string, pk rp.Key) {
h.mu.Lock()
defer h.mu.Unlock()
if existing, ok := h.peers[pid]; ok && existing.PublicKey == pk {
existing.Interface = intf
return
}
h.peers[pid] = &wireGuardPeer{
h.peers[pid] = wireGuardPeer{
Interface: intf,
PublicKey: pk,
}
@@ -76,6 +55,7 @@ func (h *NetbirdHandler) RemovePeer(pid rp.PeerID) {
h.mu.Lock()
defer h.mu.Unlock()
delete(h.peers, pid)
delete(h.initializedPeers, pid)
}
// IsPeerInitialized returns true if Rosenpass has completed a handshake
@@ -83,120 +63,50 @@ func (h *NetbirdHandler) RemovePeer(pid rp.PeerID) {
func (h *NetbirdHandler) IsPeerInitialized(pid rp.PeerID) bool {
h.mu.Lock()
defer h.mu.Unlock()
peer, ok := h.peers[pid]
return ok && peer.initialized
return h.initializedPeers[pid]
}
// HandshakeCompleted programs the freshly exchanged output key and resets the
// peer's key recovery state.
func (h *NetbirdHandler) HandshakeCompleted(pid rp.PeerID, key rp.Key) {
psk := wgtypes.Key(key)
h.mu.Lock()
defer h.mu.Unlock()
peer, ok := h.peers[pid]
if !ok {
return
}
if peer.expiries > 0 {
log.Infof("rosenpass exchange completed for peer %s after %d expired renewals", wgtypes.Key(peer.PublicKey), peer.expiries)
}
// chainKey tracks the shared exchange output regardless of the local write
// outcome, so both ends still converge on the next expiry.
peer.chainKey = &psk
peer.expiries = 0
if !h.applyKeyLocked(pid, psk, peer.initialized) {
return
}
peer.initialized = true
h.outputKey(rp.KeyOutputReasonStale, pid, key)
}
// HandshakeExpired replaces the expired key. The renewal exchange runs over
// the tunnel keyed by the PSK itself, so the replacement must be derivable on
// both ends without communication: the first expiry ratchets the last shared
// key forward, repeated expiries (and expiries without a completed exchange)
// fall back to the rendezvous key and drop the peer out of the initialized
// state so connection reconfigurations reprogram the rendezvous key as well.
func (h *NetbirdHandler) HandshakeExpired(pid rp.PeerID) {
key, _ := rp.GeneratePresharedKey()
h.outputKey(rp.KeyOutputReasonStale, pid, key)
}
func (h *NetbirdHandler) outputKey(_ rp.KeyOutputReason, pid rp.PeerID, psk rp.Key) {
h.mu.Lock()
defer h.mu.Unlock()
iface := h.iface
wg, ok := h.peers[pid]
isInitialized := h.initializedPeers[pid]
h.mu.Unlock()
peer, ok := h.peers[pid]
if !ok {
return
}
peer.expiries++
var psk wgtypes.Key
if peer.chainKey != nil && peer.expiries == 1 {
log.Infof("rosenpass key for peer %s expired without renewal, advancing to ratcheted key", wgtypes.Key(peer.PublicKey))
psk = RatchetKey(*peer.chainKey)
peer.chainKey = &psk
} else {
rendezvous, err := h.rendezvousKey(peer)
if err != nil {
// Fail closed: without a rendezvous key the expired key must
// still be rotated out, even if the replacement is unusable.
log.Errorf("failed to derive rendezvous key, replacing expired key with a random one: %v", err)
h.applyRandomKeyLocked(pid)
return
}
log.Warnf("rosenpass key for peer %s expired %d times without renewal, falling back to the rendezvous key", wgtypes.Key(peer.PublicKey), peer.expiries)
psk = rendezvous
peer.chainKey = nil
peer.initialized = false
}
h.applyKeyLocked(pid, psk, true)
}
// rendezvousKey returns the key both ends converge on without communication:
// the account-level preshared key when configured, the deterministic seed key
// otherwise. It mirrors the key that peer connections program when Rosenpass
// does not manage the peer yet.
func (h *NetbirdHandler) rendezvousKey(peer *wireGuardPeer) (wgtypes.Key, error) {
if h.preSharedKey != nil {
return *h.preSharedKey, nil
}
seed, err := DeterministicSeedKey(h.localWgKey.String(), wgtypes.Key(peer.PublicKey).String())
if err != nil {
return wgtypes.Key{}, err
}
return *seed, nil
}
// applyKeyLocked writes the preshared key for the peer to the WireGuard
// interface and reports whether the write succeeded. Callers must hold h.mu
// for the whole state-mutation-plus-write so that a concurrent completion and
// expiry cannot reorder their writes relative to the in-memory chain key.
func (h *NetbirdHandler) applyKeyLocked(pid rp.PeerID, psk wgtypes.Key, updateOnly bool) bool {
peer, ok := h.peers[pid]
if !ok {
return false
}
if h.iface == nil {
if iface == nil {
log.Warn("rosenpass: interface not set, cannot update preshared key")
return false
}
peerKey := wgtypes.Key(peer.PublicKey).String()
if err := h.iface.SetPresharedKey(peerKey, psk, updateOnly); err != nil {
log.Errorf("Failed to apply rosenpass key: %v", err)
return false
}
return true
}
func (h *NetbirdHandler) applyRandomKeyLocked(pid rp.PeerID) {
key, err := rp.GeneratePresharedKey()
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("failed to generate random preshared key: %v", err)
return
}
h.applyKeyLocked(pid, wgtypes.Key(key), true)
if !ok {
return
}
peerKey := wgtypes.Key(wg.PublicKey).String()
pskKey := wgtypes.Key(psk)
// Use updateOnly=true for later rotations (peer already has Rosenpass PSK)
// Use updateOnly=false for first rotation (peer has original/empty PSK)
if err := iface.SetPresharedKey(peerKey, pskKey, isInitialized); err != nil {
log.Errorf("Failed to apply rosenpass key: %v", err)
return
}
// Mark peer as isInitialized after the successful first rotation
if !isInitialized {
h.mu.Lock()
if _, exists := h.peers[pid]; exists {
h.initializedPeers[pid] = true
}
h.mu.Unlock()
}
}

View File

@@ -1,250 +0,0 @@
package rosenpass
import (
"testing"
rp "cunicu.li/go-rosenpass"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
)
// handlerTestLink wires two NetbirdHandlers as the two ends of a single
// tunnel: handler A manages the rosenpass peer B and vice versa, the way two
// NetBird clients see each other.
type handlerTestLink struct {
handlerA, handlerB *NetbirdHandler
ifaceA, ifaceB *mockIface
pidA, pidB rp.PeerID
wgKeyA, wgKeyB wgtypes.Key
}
func newHandlerTestLink(t *testing.T, preSharedKey *[32]byte) *handlerTestLink {
t.Helper()
link := &handlerTestLink{
ifaceA: &mockIface{},
ifaceB: &mockIface{},
}
link.pidA[0] = 0xaa
link.pidB[0] = 0xbb
link.wgKeyA[31] = 1
link.wgKeyB[31] = 2
link.handlerA = NewNetbirdHandler(preSharedKey, link.wgKeyA)
link.handlerB = NewNetbirdHandler(preSharedKey, link.wgKeyB)
link.handlerA.SetInterface(link.ifaceA)
link.handlerB.SetInterface(link.ifaceB)
link.handlerA.AddPeer(link.pidB, "wt0", rp.Key(link.wgKeyB))
link.handlerB.AddPeer(link.pidA, "wt0", rp.Key(link.wgKeyA))
return link
}
// complete simulates a completed rosenpass exchange: both ends derive the
// same output key.
func (l *handlerTestLink) complete(osk rp.Key) {
l.handlerA.HandshakeCompleted(l.pidB, osk)
l.handlerB.HandshakeCompleted(l.pidA, osk)
}
// expire simulates a failed key renewal on both ends.
func (l *handlerTestLink) expire() {
l.handlerA.HandshakeExpired(l.pidB)
l.handlerB.HandshakeExpired(l.pidA)
}
func lastPSK(t *testing.T, m *mockIface) wgtypes.Key {
t.Helper()
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
require.NotEmpty(t, m.calls, "expected at least one SetPresharedKey call")
return m.calls[len(m.calls)-1].psk
}
func TestHandshakeCompleted_SetsKeyAndInitializes(t *testing.T) {
link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
var osk rp.Key
osk[0] = 0x42
link.complete(osk)
require.Equal(t, wgtypes.Key(osk), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA), "completed exchange must program the osk")
require.False(t, link.ifaceA.calls[0].updateOnly, "first rotation must not be update-only")
require.True(t, link.handlerA.IsPeerInitialized(link.pidB), "peer must be initialized after first completed exchange")
link.complete(osk)
require.True(t, link.ifaceA.calls[1].updateOnly, "later rotations must be update-only")
}
// TestHandshakeExpired_BothSidesConverge encodes the core recovery invariant:
// rosenpass renewals run over the tunnel that the PSK itself keys, so when a
// renewal fails on both ends, both ends must fall back to the same key or the
// tunnel can never handshake again.
func TestHandshakeExpired_BothSidesConverge(t *testing.T) {
link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
var osk rp.Key
osk[0] = 0x42
link.complete(osk)
link.expire()
keyA := lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA)
keyB := lastPSK(t, link.ifaceB)
require.NotEqual(t, wgtypes.Key(osk), keyA, "expired key must be rotated out")
require.Equal(t, keyA, keyB, "both ends must converge on the same key after expiry")
link.expire()
require.Equal(t, lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceB),
"both ends must still converge after repeated expiries")
}
// TestHandshakeExpired_ExpiryWithoutCompletionConverges covers the bootstrap
// case: the initial exchange never completed (the tunnel ran on the rendezvous
// key), so an expiry must not replace the working key with an unrecoverable
// one on either end.
func TestHandshakeExpired_ExpiryWithoutCompletionConverges(t *testing.T) {
link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
link.expire()
require.Equal(t, lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceB),
"both ends must converge when the exchange never completed")
}
// TestHandshakeExpired_RepeatedExpiryClearsInitialized: once renewals keep
// failing, the peer must drop out of the initialized state so the next
// connection reconfiguration reprograms the rendezvous key instead of
// preserving a poisoned rosenpass-managed key.
func TestHandshakeExpired_RepeatedExpiryClearsInitialized(t *testing.T) {
link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
var osk rp.Key
osk[0] = 0x42
link.complete(osk)
link.expire()
link.expire()
require.False(t, link.handlerA.IsPeerInitialized(link.pidB),
"repeated expiries must clear the initialized state")
require.False(t, link.handlerB.IsPeerInitialized(link.pidA),
"repeated expiries must clear the initialized state")
}
// TestHandshakeCompleted_AfterExpiryRecovers: a completed exchange after a
// desync must fully reset the recovery state.
func TestHandshakeCompleted_AfterExpiryRecovers(t *testing.T) {
link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
var osk1, osk2 rp.Key
osk1[0] = 1
osk2[0] = 2
link.complete(osk1)
link.expire()
link.expire()
link.complete(osk2)
require.Equal(t, wgtypes.Key(osk2), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA), "new exchange must program the fresh osk")
require.True(t, link.handlerA.IsPeerInitialized(link.pidB), "peer must be initialized again after recovery")
link.expire()
require.Equal(t, lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceB),
"recovered link must converge again on the next expiry")
require.NotEqual(t, wgtypes.Key(osk2), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA), "expired key must be rotated out")
}
// TestHandshakeExpired_FirstExpiryRatchetsLastKey: the first expiry must
// derive the replacement from the last shared key, so an attacker who only
// blocks the renewal exchange gains nothing over the previous key.
func TestHandshakeExpired_FirstExpiryRatchetsLastKey(t *testing.T) {
link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
var osk rp.Key
osk[0] = 0x42
link.complete(osk)
link.expire()
require.Equal(t, RatchetKey(wgtypes.Key(osk)), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA),
"first expiry must program the ratcheted key")
require.True(t, link.handlerA.IsPeerInitialized(link.pidB),
"ratchet step must keep the peer initialized so reconfigurations preserve the key")
}
// TestHandshakeExpired_RepeatedExpiryFallsBackToSeed: once the ratchet key
// also fails, both ends must land on the same key that peer connections
// program for uninitialized peers, so a reconnect completes the recovery.
func TestHandshakeExpired_RepeatedExpiryFallsBackToSeed(t *testing.T) {
link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
var osk rp.Key
osk[0] = 0x42
link.complete(osk)
link.expire()
link.expire()
seed, err := DeterministicSeedKey(link.wgKeyA.String(), link.wgKeyB.String())
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, *seed, lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA), "repeated expiry must fall back to the seed key")
require.Equal(t, *seed, lastPSK(t, link.ifaceB), "repeated expiry must fall back to the seed key")
}
// TestHandshakeExpired_ConfiguredPSKUsedAsRendezvous: with an account-level
// preshared key configured, the fallback must be that key, matching what peer
// connections program for uninitialized peers.
func TestHandshakeExpired_ConfiguredPSKUsedAsRendezvous(t *testing.T) {
psk := &[32]byte{0x77}
link := newHandlerTestLink(t, psk)
var osk rp.Key
osk[0] = 0x42
link.complete(osk)
link.expire()
link.expire()
require.Equal(t, wgtypes.Key(*psk), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA),
"fallback must be the configured preshared key")
require.Equal(t, wgtypes.Key(*psk), lastPSK(t, link.ifaceB),
"fallback must be the configured preshared key on both ends")
}
// TestHandshakeExpired_ExpiryWritesAreUpdateOnly: expiry replacements must
// never create a WireGuard peer that connection management has removed.
func TestHandshakeExpired_ExpiryWritesAreUpdateOnly(t *testing.T) {
link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
var osk rp.Key
osk[0] = 0x42
link.complete(osk)
link.expire()
link.expire()
for _, call := range link.ifaceA.calls[1:] {
require.True(t, call.updateOnly, "expiry writes must be update-only")
}
}
// TestAddPeer_ReAddKeepsRecoveryState: reconnections re-add the peer on every
// OnConnected; that must not reset the expiry chain state.
func TestAddPeer_ReAddKeepsRecoveryState(t *testing.T) {
link := newHandlerTestLink(t, nil)
var osk rp.Key
osk[0] = 0x42
link.complete(osk)
link.expire()
link.handlerA.AddPeer(link.pidB, "wt0", rp.Key(link.wgKeyB))
require.True(t, link.handlerA.IsPeerInitialized(link.pidB),
"re-adding a known peer must keep its state")
link.expire()
seed, err := DeterministicSeedKey(link.wgKeyA.String(), link.wgKeyB.String())
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, *seed, lastPSK(t, link.ifaceA),
"second expiry after re-add must continue to the seed fallback")
}

View File

@@ -1,28 +1,11 @@
package rosenpass
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"fmt"
"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
)
// ratchetLabel domain-separates the expiry ratchet from other uses of the
// rosenpass output key.
const ratchetLabel = "netbird-rosenpass-expiry-ratchet"
// RatchetKey derives the successor preshared key from the previous Rosenpass
// output key. When a key expires without a completed renewal, both peers
// advance their last shared key by one ratchet step: the expired key is
// rotated out while both ends still converge on an identical, non-public
// replacement without communicating.
func RatchetKey(prev wgtypes.Key) wgtypes.Key {
input := make([]byte, 0, len(ratchetLabel)+len(prev))
input = append(input, ratchetLabel...)
input = append(input, prev[:]...)
return sha256.Sum256(input)
}
// DeterministicSeedKey derives a 32-byte WireGuard preshared key from a pair
// of peer public keys. Both peers, given the same key pair, produce the same
// output regardless of which side runs the function: the inputs are ordered

View File

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ import (
nbdns "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns/resutil"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peerstore"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/routemanager/common"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/routemanager/fakeip"
iface "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/routemanager/iface"
@@ -39,61 +40,6 @@ type internalDNATer interface {
AddInternalDNATMapping(netip.Addr, netip.Addr) error
}
// peerAllowedIPs reports the tunnel address a peer is reachable on.
type peerAllowedIPs interface {
AllowedIP(pubKey string) (netip.Addr, bool)
}
// disposition says where a query for a given record type has to be answered.
type disposition int
const (
// dispositionPeer: the routing peer owns the answer. Address records are
// what a DNS route exists for, and their answer programs the routes,
// allowed IPs and firewall sets, so they are never resolved anywhere else.
dispositionPeer disposition = iota
// dispositionPeerFirst: the peer's forwarder resolves the type, and the
// records may only exist inside the routed network, so it has to be asked.
// A peer running a client that predates that support cannot answer, which
// only its reply reveals.
dispositionPeerFirst
// dispositionChain: no forwarder resolves the type, so asking would cost a
// tunnel round trip for a reply that says nothing. Public records for the
// name are still better than none, so the query goes to the rest of the
// chain.
dispositionChain
)
func dispositionFor(qtype uint16) disposition {
switch {
case qtype == dns.TypeA || qtype == dns.TypeAAAA:
return dispositionPeer
case resutil.SupportedRecordQtype(qtype):
return dispositionPeerFirst
default:
return dispositionChain
}
}
// peerCannotAnswer reports whether a forwarder reply means the peer is unable to
// resolve this query type, as opposed to having resolved it and found nothing.
// A forwarder older than the one that learned to resolve non-address types
// answers NOTIMP to all of them, before it even looks at the domain; FORMERR
// covers one that cannot parse the EDNS0 we add to the query.
//
// REFUSED is deliberately not here. It says the peer does not hold the name,
// which happens while the client and the peer disagree about the route set, and
// falling through then would hand the name of an internal-only domain to a
// public resolver. No forwarder version reports a missing record type that way.
func peerCannotAnswer(rcode int) bool {
switch rcode {
case dns.RcodeNotImplemented, dns.RcodeFormatError:
return true
default:
return false
}
}
type DnsInterceptor struct {
mu sync.RWMutex
route *route.Route
@@ -104,7 +50,7 @@ type DnsInterceptor struct {
currentPeerKey string
interceptedDomains domainMap
wgInterface iface.WGIface
peerStore peerAllowedIPs
peerStore *peerstore.Store
firewall firewall.Manager
fakeIPManager *fakeip.Manager
forwarderPort *atomic.Uint32
@@ -280,14 +226,11 @@ func (d *DnsInterceptor) ServeDNS(w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg) {
return
}
qtype := r.Question[0].Qtype
dispose := dispositionFor(qtype)
if dispose == dispositionChain {
d.deferToChain(w, r, logger, "unsupported-qtype")
return
}
// All query types for an intercepted domain are forwarded to the peer's
// DNS forwarder, which owns the name. Falling through to the system
// resolver would let it answer NXDOMAIN for a name it isn't authoritative
// for, poisoning the whole name (including the A/AAAA records the route
// does serve). The forwarder answers NODATA for types it cannot resolve.
d.mu.RLock()
peerKey := d.currentPeerKey
d.mu.RUnlock()
@@ -303,32 +246,35 @@ func (d *DnsInterceptor) ServeDNS(w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg) {
return
}
query, hadEdns := peerQuery(r)
if r.Extra == nil {
r.MsgHdr.AuthenticatedData = true
}
// Advertise EDNS0 to the forwarder so it may return an Extended DNS Error
// describing why a lookup failed. The OPT is stripped from the reply when
// the original client did not request EDNS0.
hadEdns := r.IsEdns0() != nil
if !hadEdns {
r.SetEdns0(dns.DefaultMsgSize, false)
}
upstream := net.JoinHostPort(upstreamIP.String(), strconv.FormatUint(uint64(d.forwarderPort.Load()), 10))
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), dnsTimeout)
defer cancel()
reply := d.queryUpstreamDNS(ctx, w, query, upstream, upstreamIP, peerKey, logger)
reply := d.queryUpstreamDNS(ctx, w, r, upstream, upstreamIP, peerKey, logger)
if reply == nil {
return
}
// The peer owns the name but its forwarder cannot resolve this type. No
// capability is announced anywhere, so the round trip above is the probe.
if dispose == dispositionPeerFirst && peerCannotAnswer(reply.Rcode) {
d.deferToChain(w, r, logger, "peer-rcode-"+dns.RcodeToString[reply.Rcode])
return
}
if ede, ok := resutil.ExtractEDE(reply); ok {
resutil.SetMeta(w, resutil.MetaKeyEDE, fmt.Sprintf("%d %s", ede.InfoCode, ede.ExtraText))
resutil.SetMeta(w, "ede", fmt.Sprintf("%d %s", ede.InfoCode, ede.ExtraText))
}
if !hadEdns {
resutil.StripOPT(reply)
}
resutil.SetMeta(w, resutil.MetaKeyPeer, peerKey)
resutil.SetMeta(w, "peer", peerKey)
reply.Id = r.Id
if err := d.writeMsg(w, reply, logger); err != nil {
@@ -336,30 +282,6 @@ func (d *DnsInterceptor) ServeDNS(w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg) {
}
}
// deferToChain hands the query to the next handler in the chain and asks the
// chain to soften the negative verdict of whatever answers instead. The
// resolvers below cannot prove a name inside the routed network absent, so their
// NXDOMAIN must not reach the client: it would be cached for the name and every
// type under it, taking the addresses this route does serve with it.
func (d *DnsInterceptor) deferToChain(w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg, logger *log.Entry, reason string) {
logger.Tracef("continuing to next handler for domain=%s type=%s reason=%s",
r.Question[0].Name, dns.TypeToString[r.Question[0].Qtype], reason)
resutil.RequestSoftNegative(w)
// Carried to the chain's response log line: without it the answer looks like
// it came from the fallthrough resolver on its own.
resutil.SetMeta(w, resutil.MetaKeyDeferredBy, "dns-route")
resutil.SetMeta(w, resutil.MetaKeyDeferredReason, reason)
resp := new(dns.Msg)
resp.SetRcode(r, dns.RcodeNameError)
// Set Zero bit to signal handler chain to continue
resp.MsgHdr.Zero = true
if err := w.WriteMsg(resp); err != nil {
logger.Errorf("failed writing DNS continue response: %v", err)
}
}
func (d *DnsInterceptor) writeDNSError(w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg, logger *log.Entry, reason string) {
logger.Warnf("failed to query upstream for domain=%s: %s", r.Question[0].Name, reason)
@@ -699,26 +621,3 @@ func (d *DnsInterceptor) debugPeerTimeout(peerIP netip.Addr, peerKey string) str
return fmt.Sprintf(" (peer %s)", nbdns.FormatPeerStatus(&peerState))
}
// peerQuery builds the query sent to a peer's DNS forwarder and reports whether
// the client itself advertised EDNS0. EDNS0 is added so the forwarder can return
// an Extended DNS Error describing an upstream failure, and the OPT is stripped
// from the reply again when the client did not ask for it. The client's message
// is left untouched: it may still be handed to the next handler in the chain,
// and neither the OPT nor the AD bit is ours to put on the wire on its behalf.
func peerQuery(r *dns.Msg) (query *dns.Msg, hadEdns bool) {
query = r.Copy()
hadEdns = query.IsEdns0() != nil
// AD tells the forwarder we understand authenticated data. Only set when the
// client sent no additional section of its own, so we never overrule what it
// asked for.
if len(query.Extra) == 0 {
query.MsgHdr.AuthenticatedData = true
}
if !hadEdns {
query.SetEdns0(dns.DefaultMsgSize, false)
}
return query, hadEdns
}

View File

@@ -1,399 +0,0 @@
package dnsinterceptor
import (
"net"
"net/netip"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/miekg/dns"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/tun/netstack"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/device"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns/resutil"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns/test"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
)
// softNegativeWriter records what the handler told the chain: whether to soften
// a negative verdict from the handlers it defers to, and the metadata that ends
// up on the chain's response log line.
type softNegativeWriter struct {
test.MockResponseWriter
softNegative bool
meta map[resutil.MetaKey]string
}
func (w *softNegativeWriter) RequestSoftNegative() { w.softNegative = true }
func (w *softNegativeWriter) RequestID() string { return "test" }
func (w *softNegativeWriter) SetMeta(key resutil.MetaKey, value string) {
if w.meta == nil {
w.meta = make(map[resutil.MetaKey]string)
}
w.meta[key] = value
}
// TestServeDNS_QtypeTheForwarderCannotResolve covers the record types no DNS
// forwarder can answer, because the host resolver exposes no API for them.
// Asking the peer only burns a tunnel round trip, so the query goes straight to
// the rest of the chain. No peer key is configured, proving no round trip is
// attempted.
func TestServeDNS_QtypeTheForwarderCannotResolve(t *testing.T) {
qtypes := []uint16{
dns.TypeHTTPS,
dns.TypeSVCB,
dns.TypeCAA,
dns.TypeNAPTR,
dns.TypeTLSA,
dns.TypeSOA,
}
for _, qtype := range qtypes {
t.Run(dns.TypeToString[qtype], func(t *testing.T) {
d := &DnsInterceptor{}
w := &softNegativeWriter{}
r := new(dns.Msg)
r.SetQuestion("db.example.com.", qtype)
d.ServeDNS(w, r)
resp := w.GetLastResponse()
require.NotNil(t, resp, "a response must be written")
assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeNameError, resp.Rcode, "chain continuation is signalled as NXDOMAIN")
assert.True(t, resp.MsgHdr.Zero, "Zero bit must be set so the chain continues")
assert.True(t, w.softNegative,
"a downstream NXDOMAIN must be softened, or the fallthrough poisons the routed name")
assert.Equal(t, "dns-route", w.meta[resutil.MetaKeyDeferredBy],
"the chain's response log line must name us as the handler that stepped aside")
assert.Equal(t, "unsupported-qtype", w.meta[resutil.MetaKeyDeferredReason],
"the reason must survive to the log line, or the fallthrough is invisible")
})
}
}
// TestServeDNS_AddressQtypeNeverFallsThrough locks in the opposite case: A and
// AAAA are what the route exists for, and the peer is authoritative for them.
// A missing peer is an error the client must see, never a fallthrough to a
// resolver that knows nothing about the routed name.
func TestServeDNS_AddressQtypeNeverFallsThrough(t *testing.T) {
for _, qtype := range []uint16{dns.TypeA, dns.TypeAAAA} {
t.Run(dns.TypeToString[qtype], func(t *testing.T) {
d := &DnsInterceptor{}
w := &softNegativeWriter{}
r := new(dns.Msg)
r.SetQuestion("db.example.com.", qtype)
d.ServeDNS(w, r)
resp := w.GetLastResponse()
require.NotNil(t, resp, "a response must be written")
assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeServerFailure, resp.Rcode, "an unusable route must fail, not fall through")
assert.False(t, resp.MsgHdr.Zero, "the chain must not continue for address queries")
assert.False(t, w.softNegative, "no fallthrough means nothing to soften")
})
}
}
// TestDispositionFor pins the query-type policy, and ties the types we ask a
// peer about to the types a forwarder can actually resolve, so the two ends
// cannot drift apart.
func TestDispositionFor(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
qtype uint16
want disposition
}{
{dns.TypeA, dispositionPeer},
{dns.TypeAAAA, dispositionPeer},
{dns.TypeMX, dispositionPeerFirst},
{dns.TypeTXT, dispositionPeerFirst},
{dns.TypeNS, dispositionPeerFirst},
{dns.TypeSRV, dispositionPeerFirst},
{dns.TypeCNAME, dispositionPeerFirst},
{dns.TypePTR, dispositionPeerFirst},
{dns.TypeHTTPS, dispositionChain},
{dns.TypeSVCB, dispositionChain},
{dns.TypeCAA, dispositionChain},
{dns.TypeNAPTR, dispositionChain},
{dns.TypeTLSA, dispositionChain},
{dns.TypeDS, dispositionChain},
{dns.TypeDNSKEY, dispositionChain},
{dns.TypeSOA, dispositionChain},
{dns.TypeANY, dispositionChain},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(dns.TypeToString[tt.qtype], func(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, tt.want, dispositionFor(tt.qtype), "disposition for %s", dns.TypeToString[tt.qtype])
// Address types are resolved by the forwarder's address path, not by
// its record path, so they are deliberately outside
// SupportedRecordQtype and their disposition does not depend on it.
if tt.want == dispositionPeer {
assert.False(t, resutil.SupportedRecordQtype(tt.qtype),
"address types take the forwarder's address path")
return
}
assert.Equal(t, tt.want == dispositionPeerFirst, resutil.SupportedRecordQtype(tt.qtype),
"only types a forwarder resolves may be sent to a peer")
})
}
}
// TestPeerCannotAnswer separates a peer that cannot resolve a type from one that
// resolved it and found nothing. Only the former may be retried elsewhere:
// treating NODATA or NXDOMAIN as a capability failure would send the client to a
// public resolver behind the peer's back and prefer a public record over the
// private one the route exists to reach.
func TestPeerCannotAnswer(t *testing.T) {
cannot := []int{dns.RcodeNotImplemented, dns.RcodeFormatError}
for _, rcode := range cannot {
assert.True(t, peerCannotAnswer(rcode), "%s means the peer cannot answer", dns.RcodeToString[rcode])
}
// REFUSED belongs here, not above: it says the peer does not hold the name,
// so retrying elsewhere would leak the name of an internal-only domain to a
// public resolver. No forwarder version reports a missing record type this
// way, so nothing is lost by keeping it out.
can := []int{
dns.RcodeSuccess,
dns.RcodeNameError,
dns.RcodeServerFailure,
dns.RcodeNotAuth,
dns.RcodeRefused,
}
for _, rcode := range can {
assert.False(t, peerCannotAnswer(rcode), "%s is the peer's answer, not a capability failure", dns.RcodeToString[rcode])
}
}
// fakeWGIface is the minimum an interceptor needs to reach a peer's DNS
// forwarder over a plain socket. A nil netstack keeps the exchange on the host
// stack so the test can point it at a loopback listener.
type fakeWGIface struct{}
func (fakeWGIface) AddAllowedIP(string, netip.Prefix) error { return nil }
func (fakeWGIface) RemoveAllowedIP(string, netip.Prefix) error { return nil }
func (fakeWGIface) Name() string { return "wt0" }
func (fakeWGIface) Address() wgaddr.Address { return wgaddr.Address{} }
func (fakeWGIface) ToInterface() *net.Interface { return nil }
func (fakeWGIface) IsUserspaceBind() bool { return false }
func (fakeWGIface) GetFilter() device.PacketFilter { return nil }
func (fakeWGIface) GetDevice() *device.FilteredDevice { return nil }
func (fakeWGIface) GetNet() *netstack.Net { return nil }
// fakePeerIPs resolves every peer key to the loopback address the test's
// forwarder stub listens on.
type fakePeerIPs struct {
addr netip.Addr
}
func (p fakePeerIPs) AllowedIP(string) (netip.Addr, bool) { return p.addr, p.addr.IsValid() }
// forwarderStub stands in for the DNS forwarder of a routing peer, recording
// what it was asked and answering with a canned reply.
type forwarderStub struct {
mu sync.Mutex
queries []*dns.Msg
reply func(q *dns.Msg) *dns.Msg
port uint16
shutdown func()
}
func (s *forwarderStub) received() []*dns.Msg {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
return append([]*dns.Msg(nil), s.queries...)
}
func newForwarderStub(t *testing.T, reply func(q *dns.Msg) *dns.Msg) *forwarderStub {
t.Helper()
conn, err := net.ListenUDP("udp", net.UDPAddrFromAddrPort(netip.MustParseAddrPort("127.0.0.1:0")))
require.NoError(t, err, "listen for the forwarder stub")
stub := &forwarderStub{reply: reply}
stub.port = uint16(conn.LocalAddr().(*net.UDPAddr).Port)
mux := dns.NewServeMux()
mux.HandleFunc(".", func(w dns.ResponseWriter, q *dns.Msg) {
stub.mu.Lock()
stub.queries = append(stub.queries, q.Copy())
stub.mu.Unlock()
_ = w.WriteMsg(stub.reply(q))
})
srv := &dns.Server{PacketConn: conn, Handler: mux}
started := make(chan struct{})
srv.NotifyStartedFunc = func() { close(started) }
go func() {
_ = srv.ActivateAndServe()
}()
select {
case <-started:
case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
t.Fatal("forwarder stub did not start")
}
stub.shutdown = func() { _ = srv.Shutdown() }
t.Cleanup(stub.shutdown)
return stub
}
func newTestInterceptor(t *testing.T, stub *forwarderStub) *DnsInterceptor {
t.Helper()
port := new(atomic.Uint32)
port.Store(uint32(stub.port))
return &DnsInterceptor{
route: &route.Route{Domains: nil},
statusRecorder: peer.NewRecorder("https://mgm"),
currentPeerKey: "peer-key",
interceptedDomains: make(domainMap),
wgInterface: fakeWGIface{},
peerStore: fakePeerIPs{addr: netip.MustParseAddr("127.0.0.1")},
forwarderPort: port,
}
}
// TestServeDNS_PeerCannotResolveQtype is the reported regression: a routing peer
// running a client older than the one that taught the forwarder about non-address
// record types answers NOTIMP for every SRV query, and the interceptor used to
// hand that straight to the application, breaking SRV-based service discovery.
// The client cannot know the peer's capability up front, so it must try the peer
// and fall back to the chain when the peer says it cannot answer.
func TestServeDNS_PeerCannotResolveQtype(t *testing.T) {
for _, rcode := range []int{dns.RcodeNotImplemented, dns.RcodeFormatError} {
t.Run(dns.RcodeToString[rcode], func(t *testing.T) {
stub := newForwarderStub(t, func(q *dns.Msg) *dns.Msg {
resp := new(dns.Msg)
resp.SetRcode(q, rcode)
return resp
})
d := newTestInterceptor(t, stub)
w := &softNegativeWriter{}
r := new(dns.Msg)
r.SetQuestion("_mongodb._tcp.db.example.com.", dns.TypeSRV)
d.ServeDNS(w, r)
require.Len(t, stub.received(), 1, "the peer must be asked before giving up on it")
resp := w.GetLastResponse()
require.NotNil(t, resp, "a response must be written")
assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeNameError, resp.Rcode, "chain continuation is signalled as NXDOMAIN")
assert.True(t, resp.MsgHdr.Zero, "Zero bit must be set so the chain continues")
assert.True(t, w.softNegative, "the fallthrough must not be allowed to poison the routed name")
assert.Equal(t, "dns-route", w.meta[resutil.MetaKeyDeferredBy])
assert.Equal(t, "peer-rcode-"+dns.RcodeToString[rcode], w.meta[resutil.MetaKeyDeferredReason],
"the peer's verdict must be visible in the log, it is the only trace of the probe")
})
}
}
// TestServeDNS_PeerVerdictPassesThrough covers the replies that are the peer's
// answer rather than a statement about its capability. The peer is authoritative
// for a name routed to it, so its verdict reaches the client as it is: retrying
// these elsewhere would send the name of an internal-only domain to a public
// resolver and prefer whatever that resolver says over the route.
func TestServeDNS_PeerVerdictPassesThrough(t *testing.T) {
// REFUSED means the peer does not consider the name routed to it, which
// happens while the client and the peer disagree about the route set. It is
// never how a peer reports a record type it cannot resolve: a forwarder too
// old for non-address types answers NOTIMP before it looks at the domain.
for _, rcode := range []int{dns.RcodeRefused, dns.RcodeNameError, dns.RcodeSuccess} {
t.Run(dns.RcodeToString[rcode], func(t *testing.T) {
stub := newForwarderStub(t, func(q *dns.Msg) *dns.Msg {
resp := new(dns.Msg)
resp.SetRcode(q, rcode)
return resp
})
d := newTestInterceptor(t, stub)
w := &softNegativeWriter{}
r := new(dns.Msg)
r.SetQuestion("_mongodb._tcp.db.example.com.", dns.TypeSRV)
d.ServeDNS(w, r)
require.Len(t, stub.received(), 1, "the peer must be asked exactly once")
resp := w.GetLastResponse()
require.NotNil(t, resp, "a response must be written")
assert.Equal(t, rcode, resp.Rcode, "the peer's verdict must reach the client unchanged")
assert.False(t, resp.MsgHdr.Zero, "the chain must not continue past an answered query")
assert.False(t, w.softNegative, "nothing was deferred, so nothing may be softened")
})
}
}
// TestServeDNS_PeerResolvesQtype guards the common case: a peer that can answer
// the type stays authoritative, and its records reach the client unchanged.
func TestServeDNS_PeerResolvesQtype(t *testing.T) {
stub := newForwarderStub(t, func(q *dns.Msg) *dns.Msg {
resp := new(dns.Msg)
resp.SetReply(q)
resp.Answer = []dns.RR{&dns.SRV{
Hdr: dns.RR_Header{Name: q.Question[0].Name, Rrtype: dns.TypeSRV, Class: dns.ClassINET, Ttl: 60},
Target: "shard-00.db.example.com.",
Port: 27017,
}}
return resp
})
d := newTestInterceptor(t, stub)
w := &softNegativeWriter{}
r := new(dns.Msg)
r.SetQuestion("_mongodb._tcp.db.example.com.", dns.TypeSRV)
d.ServeDNS(w, r)
resp := w.GetLastResponse()
require.NotNil(t, resp, "a response must be written")
assert.Equal(t, dns.RcodeSuccess, resp.Rcode)
require.Len(t, resp.Answer, 1, "the peer's records must pass through")
assert.False(t, resp.MsgHdr.Zero, "an answered query must not continue the chain")
assert.False(t, w.softNegative)
}
// TestServeDNS_DeferredQueryIsPristine covers what the fallthrough hands to the
// next handler. The interceptor advertises EDNS0 to the peer so the forwarder can
// return an Extended DNS Error, and sets AD, but neither belongs to the client's
// query: on the deferred path they would travel to the public resolver and the
// reply could come back carrying an OPT the client never advertised, which
// RFC 6891 forbids us from passing on.
func TestServeDNS_DeferredQueryIsPristine(t *testing.T) {
stub := newForwarderStub(t, func(q *dns.Msg) *dns.Msg {
resp := new(dns.Msg)
resp.SetRcode(q, dns.RcodeNotImplemented)
return resp
})
d := newTestInterceptor(t, stub)
w := &softNegativeWriter{}
r := new(dns.Msg)
r.SetQuestion("_mongodb._tcp.db.example.com.", dns.TypeSRV)
d.ServeDNS(w, r)
sent := stub.received()
require.Len(t, sent, 1)
assert.NotNil(t, sent[0].IsEdns0(), "the peer must be asked with EDNS0 so it can return an EDE")
assert.Nil(t, r.IsEdns0(), "the deferred query must not carry an OPT the client never sent")
assert.False(t, r.AuthenticatedData, "the deferred query must not carry an AD bit the client never set")
assert.Empty(t, r.Extra, "the deferred query must reach the next handler as the client sent it")
}

View File

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
//go:build windows
package dnsinterceptor
// GetInterfaceGUIDString completes iface.WGIface on Windows, which requires the
// interface GUID for DNS registration.
func (fakeWGIface) GetInterfaceGUIDString() (string, error) { return "", nil }

View File

@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ func (r *Route) startResolver(ctx context.Context) {
}
func (r *Route) update(ctx context.Context) error {
resolved, err := r.resolveDomains(ctx)
resolved, err := r.resolveDomains()
if err != nil {
if len(resolved) == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("resolve domains: %w", err)
@@ -199,9 +199,9 @@ func (r *Route) update(ctx context.Context) error {
return nil
}
func (r *Route) resolveDomains(ctx context.Context) (domainMap, error) {
func (r *Route) resolveDomains() (domainMap, error) {
results := make(chan resolveResult)
go r.resolve(ctx, results)
go r.resolve(results)
resolved := domainMap{}
var merr *multierror.Error
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ func (r *Route) resolveDomains(ctx context.Context) (domainMap, error) {
return resolved, nberrors.FormatErrorOrNil(merr)
}
func (r *Route) resolve(ctx context.Context, results chan resolveResult) {
func (r *Route) resolve(results chan resolveResult) {
var wg sync.WaitGroup
for _, d := range r.route.Domains {
@@ -225,10 +225,10 @@ func (r *Route) resolve(ctx context.Context, results chan resolveResult) {
go func(domain domain.Domain) {
defer wg.Done()
ips, err := r.getIPsFromResolver(ctx, domain)
ips, err := r.getIPsFromResolver(domain)
if err != nil {
log.Tracef("Failed to resolve domain %s with private resolver: %v", domain.SafeString(), err)
ips, err = lookupHostIPs(ctx, domain)
ips, err = net.LookupIP(domain.PunycodeString())
if err != nil {
results <- resolveResult{domain: domain, err: fmt.Errorf("resolve d %s: %w", domain.SafeString(), err)}
return
@@ -364,20 +364,6 @@ func determinePrefixChanges(oldPrefixes, newPrefixes []netip.Prefix) (toAdd, toR
return
}
// lookupHostIPs resolves d via the system resolver, honoring ctx cancellation.
func lookupHostIPs(ctx context.Context, d domain.Domain) ([]net.IP, error) {
addrs, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, d.PunycodeString())
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
ips := make([]net.IP, 0, len(addrs))
for _, addr := range addrs {
ips = append(ips, addr.IP)
}
return ips, nil
}
func combinePrefixes(oldPrefixes, removedPrefixes, addedPrefixes []netip.Prefix) []netip.Prefix {
prefixSet := make(map[netip.Prefix]struct{})
for _, prefix := range oldPrefixes {

View File

@@ -3,12 +3,11 @@
package dynamic
import (
"context"
"net"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
)
func (r *Route) getIPsFromResolver(ctx context.Context, domain domain.Domain) ([]net.IP, error) {
return lookupHostIPs(ctx, domain)
func (r *Route) getIPsFromResolver(domain domain.Domain) ([]net.IP, error) {
return net.LookupIP(domain.PunycodeString())
}

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
package dynamic
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"net"
"time"
@@ -17,7 +16,7 @@ import (
const dialTimeout = 10 * time.Second
func (r *Route) getIPsFromResolver(ctx context.Context, domain domain.Domain) ([]net.IP, error) {
func (r *Route) getIPsFromResolver(domain domain.Domain) ([]net.IP, error) {
privateClient, err := nbdns.GetClientPrivate(r.wgInterface, r.resolverAddr.Addr(), dialTimeout)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error while creating private client: %s", err)
@@ -33,7 +32,7 @@ func (r *Route) getIPsFromResolver(ctx context.Context, domain domain.Domain) ([
msg := new(dns.Msg)
msg.SetQuestion(fqdn, qtype)
response, _, err := nbdns.ExchangeWithFallback(ctx, privateClient, msg, r.resolverAddr.String())
response, _, err := nbdns.ExchangeWithFallback(nil, privateClient, msg, r.resolverAddr.String())
if err != nil {
if queryErr == nil {
queryErr = fmt.Errorf("DNS query for %s (type %d) after %s: %w", domain.SafeString(), qtype, time.Since(startTime), err)

View File

@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ import (
"strings"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"syscall"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
@@ -61,7 +60,6 @@ type Manager interface {
InitialRouteRange() []string
SetFirewall(firewall.Manager) error
SetDNSForwarderPort(port uint16)
ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs(peerKey string) error
Stop(stateManager *statemanager.Manager)
}
@@ -233,30 +231,6 @@ func (m *DefaultManager) setupRefCounters(useNoop bool) {
)
}
// ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs re-applies every routed allowed IP currently tracked for the peer
// onto the WireGuard device. The allowed-IP refcounter only calls its AddFunc (which pushes to
// the device) on a prefix's 0->1 transition, so a peer whose device entry was rebuilt without a
// matching refcounter change — e.g. a lazy connection cycling through idle->wake, which recreates
// the WireGuard peer with the overlay /32 only — ends up missing routed prefixes the refcounter
// still considers installed, and nothing retries. Calling this when the peer's WireGuard entry is
// (re)created restores convergence. It is add-only and idempotent: AddAllowedIP is update-only, so
// prefixes are re-added to an existing peer and an absent peer is left untouched.
func (m *DefaultManager) ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs(peerKey string) error {
if m.allowedIPsRefCounter == nil {
return nil
}
return m.allowedIPsRefCounter.ReapplyMatching(
func(out string) bool { return out == peerKey },
func(prefix netip.Prefix) error {
if err := m.wgInterface.AddAllowedIP(peerKey, prefix); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("add allowed IP %s for peer %s: %w", prefix, peerKey, err)
}
return nil
},
)
}
// Init sets up the routing
func (m *DefaultManager) Init() error {
m.routeSelector = m.initSelector()
@@ -290,11 +264,7 @@ func (m *DefaultManager) initSelector() *routeselector.RouteSelector {
// restore selector state if it exists
if err := m.stateManager.LoadState(state); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, syscall.ENOSYS) {
log.Debugf("route selector state unavailable on this platform: %v", err)
} else {
log.Warnf("failed to load state: %v", err)
}
log.Warnf("failed to load state: %v", err)
return routeselector.NewRouteSelector()
}

View File

@@ -112,11 +112,6 @@ func (m *MockManager) SetFirewall(firewall.Manager) error {
func (m *MockManager) SetDNSForwarderPort(port uint16) {
}
// ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs mock implementation of ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs from Manager interface
func (m *MockManager) ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs(peerKey string) error {
return nil
}
// Stop mock implementation of Stop from Manager interface
func (m *MockManager) Stop(stateManager *statemanager.Manager) {
if m.StopFunc != nil {

View File

@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
//go:build !windows
package routemanager
import (
"net"
"net/netip"
"sync"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/tun/netstack"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/device"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/routemanager/refcounter"
)
// reconcileWGMock is a minimal iface.WGIface that only records AddAllowedIP calls; every other
// method is an inert stub because ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs exercises none of them.
type reconcileWGMock struct {
mu sync.Mutex
adds map[string][]netip.Prefix
}
func (m *reconcileWGMock) AddAllowedIP(peerKey string, allowedIP netip.Prefix) error {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
if m.adds == nil {
m.adds = map[string][]netip.Prefix{}
}
m.adds[peerKey] = append(m.adds[peerKey], allowedIP)
return nil
}
func (m *reconcileWGMock) added(peerKey string) []netip.Prefix {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
return m.adds[peerKey]
}
func (m *reconcileWGMock) RemoveAllowedIP(string, netip.Prefix) error { return nil }
func (m *reconcileWGMock) Name() string { return "utun-test" }
func (m *reconcileWGMock) Address() wgaddr.Address { return wgaddr.Address{} }
func (m *reconcileWGMock) ToInterface() *net.Interface { return nil }
func (m *reconcileWGMock) IsUserspaceBind() bool { return false }
func (m *reconcileWGMock) GetFilter() device.PacketFilter { return nil }
func (m *reconcileWGMock) GetDevice() *device.FilteredDevice { return nil }
func (m *reconcileWGMock) GetNet() *netstack.Net { return nil }
// TestReconcilePeerAllowedIPs verifies the declarative reconcile re-applies every routed prefix
// tracked for the peer (self-heal, independent of refcount level) and stays scoped to that peer.
func TestReconcilePeerAllowedIPs(t *testing.T) {
wg := &reconcileWGMock{}
m := &DefaultManager{wgInterface: wg}
m.allowedIPsRefCounter = refcounter.New[netip.Prefix, string, string](
func(_ netip.Prefix, peerKey string) (string, error) { return peerKey, nil },
func(netip.Prefix, string) error { return nil },
)
peerA1 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/24")
peerA2 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.1.0.0/24")
peerB1 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.2.0.0/24")
for prefix, peer := range map[netip.Prefix]string{peerA1: "peerA", peerA2: "peerA", peerB1: "peerB"} {
_, err := m.allowedIPsRefCounter.Increment(prefix, peer)
require.NoError(t, err)
}
// Extra reference: reconcile must still re-apply the prefix even though its refcount never
// hit 0 again (the exact case the plain incremental path skips).
_, err := m.allowedIPsRefCounter.Increment(peerA1, "peerA")
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, m.ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs("peerA"))
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []netip.Prefix{peerA1, peerA2}, wg.added("peerA"),
"reconcile must re-apply all routed prefixes of the peer")
assert.Empty(t, wg.added("peerB"), "reconcile must not touch another peer's prefixes")
}
// TestReconcilePeerAllowedIPsNoCounter verifies reconcile is a safe no-op before the refcounter is
// set up.
func TestReconcilePeerAllowedIPsNoCounter(t *testing.T) {
wg := &reconcileWGMock{}
m := &DefaultManager{wgInterface: wg}
require.NoError(t, m.ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs("peerA"))
assert.Empty(t, wg.added("peerA"))
}

View File

@@ -94,26 +94,6 @@ func (rm *Counter[Key, I, O]) Get(key Key) (Ref[O], bool) {
return ref, ok
}
// ReapplyMatching calls apply for every key whose stored Out satisfies pred, holding the
// counter lock for the whole pass. Running apply under the lock keeps it atomic with respect
// to Increment/Decrement: a prefix dropped to zero is removed from the map (and had its
// RemoveFunc called) before this pass observes it, so a stale key can never be re-applied.
// pred and apply are invoked under the lock, so they must not call back into the counter.
func (rm *Counter[Key, I, O]) ReapplyMatching(pred func(out O) bool, apply func(key Key) error) error {
rm.mu.Lock()
defer rm.mu.Unlock()
var merr *multierror.Error
for key, ref := range rm.refCountMap {
if pred(ref.Out) {
if err := apply(key); err != nil {
merr = multierror.Append(merr, err)
}
}
}
return nberrors.FormatErrorOrNil(merr)
}
// Increment increments the reference count for the given key.
// If this is the first reference to the key, the AddFunc is called.
func (rm *Counter[Key, I, O]) Increment(key Key, in I) (Ref[O], error) {

View File

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
package refcounter
import (
"net/netip"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// TestReapplyMatching verifies ReapplyMatching invokes apply for exactly the keys whose stored
// Out satisfies the predicate (no duplicates for multiply-referenced keys) — the primitive
// ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs relies on to re-apply a single peer's routed prefixes.
func TestReapplyMatching(t *testing.T) {
rc := New[netip.Prefix, string, string](
func(_ netip.Prefix, peerKey string) (string, error) { return peerKey, nil },
func(netip.Prefix, string) error { return nil },
)
peerA1 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/24")
peerA2 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.1.0.0/24")
peerB1 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.2.0.0/24")
for prefix, peer := range map[netip.Prefix]string{peerA1: "peerA", peerA2: "peerA", peerB1: "peerB"} {
_, err := rc.Increment(prefix, peer)
require.NoError(t, err)
}
// a second reference must not make the key applied twice
_, err := rc.Increment(peerA1, "peerA")
require.NoError(t, err)
var applied []netip.Prefix
err = rc.ReapplyMatching(
func(out string) bool { return out == "peerA" },
func(key netip.Prefix) error { applied = append(applied, key); return nil },
)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []netip.Prefix{peerA1, peerA2}, applied)
var none []netip.Prefix
err = rc.ReapplyMatching(
func(out string) bool { return out == "missing" },
func(key netip.Prefix) error { none = append(none, key); return nil },
)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, none)
}

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
package statemanager
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
@@ -306,11 +305,6 @@ func (m *Manager) loadStateFile(deleteCorrupt bool) (map[string]json.RawMessage,
var rawStates map[string]json.RawMessage
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &rawStates); err != nil {
if len(bytes.TrimSpace(data)) == 0 {
log.Warnf("state file %s is empty (%d bytes)", m.filePath, len(data))
} else {
log.Warnf("state file %s has malformed content (%d bytes)", m.filePath, len(data))
}
m.handleCorruptedState(deleteCorrupt)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unmarshal states: %w", err)
}

View File

@@ -233,9 +233,6 @@ func (c *Client) DebugBundle(anonymize bool) (string, error) {
deps.SyncResponse = resp
if e := cc.Engine(); e != nil {
deps.RefreshStatus = func() {
e.RunHealthProbes(context.Background(), true)
}
if cm := e.GetClientMetrics(); cm != nil {
deps.ClientMetrics = cm
}

View File

@@ -44,25 +44,10 @@ type Auth struct {
// NewAuth instantiate Auth struct and validate the management URL
func NewAuth(cfgPath string, mgmURL string) (*Auth, error) {
inputCfg := profilemanager.ConfigInput{
ConfigPath: cfgPath,
ManagementURL: mgmURL,
}
// Load the existing config when a config file is already present so an
// interactive re-login reuses the peer's persisted WireGuard private key
// (and thus its identity) instead of generating a fresh one. Generating a
// new key registers a brand-new peer on the management server on every
// re-auth (named after the fallback hostname). Only fall back to a fresh
// in-memory config for the first-time login when no config file exists yet.
// DirectUpdateOrCreateConfig uses non-atomic writes so it also works inside
// the tvOS App Group sandbox where atomic temp-file+rename is blocked.
var cfg *profilemanager.Config
var err error
if cfgPath != "" {
cfg, err = profilemanager.DirectUpdateOrCreateConfig(inputCfg)
} else {
cfg, err = profilemanager.CreateInMemoryConfig(inputCfg)
}
cfg, err := profilemanager.CreateInMemoryConfig(inputCfg)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}

View File

@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ var allKeys = []string{
KeyDisableMetricsCollection,
KeyAllowServerSSH,
KeyDisableAutoConnect,
KeyDisableAutostart,
KeyPreSharedKey,
KeyRosenpassEnabled,
KeyRosenpassPermissive,

View File

@@ -20,10 +20,10 @@ import (
// names (lowerCamelCase) so the daemon can map a Policy key directly to a
// configuration field.
const (
KeyManagementURL = "managementURL"
KeyDisableUpdateSettings = "disableUpdateSettings"
KeyDisableProfiles = "disableProfiles"
KeyDisableNetworks = "disableNetworks"
KeyManagementURL = "managementURL"
KeyDisableUpdateSettings = "disableUpdateSettings"
KeyDisableProfiles = "disableProfiles"
KeyDisableNetworks = "disableNetworks"
// KeyDisableAdvancedView gates the advanced-view section in the
// upcoming UI revision. UI-only: NOT stored on Config, not
// applied by applyMDMPolicy, not rejectable via SetConfig. The
@@ -37,16 +37,10 @@ const (
KeyDisableMetricsCollection = "disableMetricsCollection"
KeyAllowServerSSH = "allowServerSSH"
KeyDisableAutoConnect = "disableAutoConnect"
// KeyDisableAutostart suppresses the GUI's fresh-install
// launch-on-login default and marks the Settings toggle as
// MDM-managed. UI-only: NOT stored on Config and not applied by
// applyMDMPolicy; the GUI reads it directly and it appears in
// GetConfigResponse.mDMManagedFields when set.
KeyDisableAutostart = "disableAutostart"
KeyPreSharedKey = "preSharedKey"
KeyRosenpassEnabled = "rosenpassEnabled"
KeyRosenpassPermissive = "rosenpassPermissive"
KeyWireguardPort = "wireguardPort"
KeyPreSharedKey = "preSharedKey"
KeyRosenpassEnabled = "rosenpassEnabled"
KeyRosenpassPermissive = "rosenpassPermissive"
KeyWireguardPort = "wireguardPort"
// Split tunnel is modeled as a single conceptual policy with two
// registry/plist values. KeySplitTunnelMode is the discriminator

View File

@@ -131,26 +131,6 @@ func local_request_DaemonService_Status_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime
return msg, metadata, err
}
func request_DaemonService_SubscribeStatus_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, client DaemonServiceClient, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (DaemonService_SubscribeStatusClient, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
var (
protoReq StatusRequest
metadata runtime.ServerMetadata
)
if err := marshaler.NewDecoder(req.Body).Decode(&protoReq); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
return nil, metadata, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "%v", err)
}
stream, err := client.SubscribeStatus(ctx, &protoReq)
if err != nil {
return nil, metadata, err
}
header, err := stream.Header()
if err != nil {
return nil, metadata, err
}
metadata.HeaderMD = header
return stream, metadata, nil
}
func request_DaemonService_Down_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, client DaemonServiceClient, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
var (
protoReq DownRequest
@@ -599,30 +579,6 @@ func local_request_DaemonService_GetEvents_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runt
return msg, metadata, err
}
func request_DaemonService_RegisterUILog_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, client DaemonServiceClient, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
var (
protoReq RegisterUILogRequest
metadata runtime.ServerMetadata
)
if err := marshaler.NewDecoder(req.Body).Decode(&protoReq); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
return nil, metadata, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "%v", err)
}
msg, err := client.RegisterUILog(ctx, &protoReq, grpc.Header(&metadata.HeaderMD), grpc.Trailer(&metadata.TrailerMD))
return msg, metadata, err
}
func local_request_DaemonService_RegisterUILog_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, server DaemonServiceServer, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
var (
protoReq RegisterUILogRequest
metadata runtime.ServerMetadata
)
if err := marshaler.NewDecoder(req.Body).Decode(&protoReq); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
return nil, metadata, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "%v", err)
}
msg, err := server.RegisterUILog(ctx, &protoReq)
return msg, metadata, err
}
func request_DaemonService_SwitchProfile_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, client DaemonServiceClient, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
var (
protoReq SwitchProfileRequest
@@ -935,78 +891,6 @@ func local_request_DaemonService_WaitJWTToken_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler r
return msg, metadata, err
}
func request_DaemonService_RequestExtendAuthSession_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, client DaemonServiceClient, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
var (
protoReq RequestExtendAuthSessionRequest
metadata runtime.ServerMetadata
)
if err := marshaler.NewDecoder(req.Body).Decode(&protoReq); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
return nil, metadata, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "%v", err)
}
msg, err := client.RequestExtendAuthSession(ctx, &protoReq, grpc.Header(&metadata.HeaderMD), grpc.Trailer(&metadata.TrailerMD))
return msg, metadata, err
}
func local_request_DaemonService_RequestExtendAuthSession_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, server DaemonServiceServer, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
var (
protoReq RequestExtendAuthSessionRequest
metadata runtime.ServerMetadata
)
if err := marshaler.NewDecoder(req.Body).Decode(&protoReq); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
return nil, metadata, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "%v", err)
}
msg, err := server.RequestExtendAuthSession(ctx, &protoReq)
return msg, metadata, err
}
func request_DaemonService_WaitExtendAuthSession_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, client DaemonServiceClient, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
var (
protoReq WaitExtendAuthSessionRequest
metadata runtime.ServerMetadata
)
if err := marshaler.NewDecoder(req.Body).Decode(&protoReq); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
return nil, metadata, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "%v", err)
}
msg, err := client.WaitExtendAuthSession(ctx, &protoReq, grpc.Header(&metadata.HeaderMD), grpc.Trailer(&metadata.TrailerMD))
return msg, metadata, err
}
func local_request_DaemonService_WaitExtendAuthSession_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, server DaemonServiceServer, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
var (
protoReq WaitExtendAuthSessionRequest
metadata runtime.ServerMetadata
)
if err := marshaler.NewDecoder(req.Body).Decode(&protoReq); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
return nil, metadata, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "%v", err)
}
msg, err := server.WaitExtendAuthSession(ctx, &protoReq)
return msg, metadata, err
}
func request_DaemonService_DismissSessionWarning_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, client DaemonServiceClient, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
var (
protoReq DismissSessionWarningRequest
metadata runtime.ServerMetadata
)
if err := marshaler.NewDecoder(req.Body).Decode(&protoReq); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
return nil, metadata, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "%v", err)
}
msg, err := client.DismissSessionWarning(ctx, &protoReq, grpc.Header(&metadata.HeaderMD), grpc.Trailer(&metadata.TrailerMD))
return msg, metadata, err
}
func local_request_DaemonService_DismissSessionWarning_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, server DaemonServiceServer, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
var (
protoReq DismissSessionWarningRequest
metadata runtime.ServerMetadata
)
if err := marshaler.NewDecoder(req.Body).Decode(&protoReq); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
return nil, metadata, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "%v", err)
}
msg, err := server.DismissSessionWarning(ctx, &protoReq)
return msg, metadata, err
}
func request_DaemonService_StartCPUProfile_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, client DaemonServiceClient, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
var (
protoReq StartCPUProfileRequest
@@ -1099,30 +983,6 @@ func request_DaemonService_ExposeService_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtim
return stream, metadata, nil
}
func request_DaemonService_WailsUIReady_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, client DaemonServiceClient, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
var (
protoReq WailsUIReadyRequest
metadata runtime.ServerMetadata
)
if err := marshaler.NewDecoder(req.Body).Decode(&protoReq); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
return nil, metadata, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "%v", err)
}
msg, err := client.WailsUIReady(ctx, &protoReq, grpc.Header(&metadata.HeaderMD), grpc.Trailer(&metadata.TrailerMD))
return msg, metadata, err
}
func local_request_DaemonService_WailsUIReady_0(ctx context.Context, marshaler runtime.Marshaler, server DaemonServiceServer, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) (proto.Message, runtime.ServerMetadata, error) {
var (
protoReq WailsUIReadyRequest
metadata runtime.ServerMetadata
)
if err := marshaler.NewDecoder(req.Body).Decode(&protoReq); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
return nil, metadata, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "%v", err)
}
msg, err := server.WailsUIReady(ctx, &protoReq)
return msg, metadata, err
}
// RegisterDaemonServiceHandlerServer registers the http handlers for service DaemonService to "mux".
// UnaryRPC :call DaemonServiceServer directly.
// StreamingRPC :currently unsupported pending https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/issues/906.
@@ -1209,13 +1069,6 @@ func RegisterDaemonServiceHandlerServer(ctx context.Context, mux *runtime.ServeM
}
forward_DaemonService_Status_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
})
mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_SubscribeStatus_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
err := status.Error(codes.Unimplemented, "streaming calls are not yet supported in the in-process transport")
_, outboundMarshaler := runtime.MarshalerForRequest(mux, req)
runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
})
mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_Down_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
defer cancel()
@@ -1570,26 +1423,6 @@ func RegisterDaemonServiceHandlerServer(ctx context.Context, mux *runtime.ServeM
}
forward_DaemonService_GetEvents_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
})
mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_RegisterUILog_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
defer cancel()
var stream runtime.ServerTransportStream
ctx = grpc.NewContextWithServerTransportStream(ctx, &stream)
inboundMarshaler, outboundMarshaler := runtime.MarshalerForRequest(mux, req)
annotatedContext, err := runtime.AnnotateIncomingContext(ctx, mux, req, "/daemon.DaemonService/RegisterUILog", runtime.WithHTTPPathPattern("/daemon.DaemonService/RegisterUILog"))
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
resp, md, err := local_request_DaemonService_RegisterUILog_0(annotatedContext, inboundMarshaler, server, req, pathParams)
md.HeaderMD, md.TrailerMD = metadata.Join(md.HeaderMD, stream.Header()), metadata.Join(md.TrailerMD, stream.Trailer())
annotatedContext = runtime.NewServerMetadataContext(annotatedContext, md)
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
forward_DaemonService_RegisterUILog_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
})
mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_SwitchProfile_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
defer cancel()
@@ -1850,66 +1683,6 @@ func RegisterDaemonServiceHandlerServer(ctx context.Context, mux *runtime.ServeM
}
forward_DaemonService_WaitJWTToken_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
})
mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_RequestExtendAuthSession_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
defer cancel()
var stream runtime.ServerTransportStream
ctx = grpc.NewContextWithServerTransportStream(ctx, &stream)
inboundMarshaler, outboundMarshaler := runtime.MarshalerForRequest(mux, req)
annotatedContext, err := runtime.AnnotateIncomingContext(ctx, mux, req, "/daemon.DaemonService/RequestExtendAuthSession", runtime.WithHTTPPathPattern("/daemon.DaemonService/RequestExtendAuthSession"))
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
resp, md, err := local_request_DaemonService_RequestExtendAuthSession_0(annotatedContext, inboundMarshaler, server, req, pathParams)
md.HeaderMD, md.TrailerMD = metadata.Join(md.HeaderMD, stream.Header()), metadata.Join(md.TrailerMD, stream.Trailer())
annotatedContext = runtime.NewServerMetadataContext(annotatedContext, md)
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
forward_DaemonService_RequestExtendAuthSession_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
})
mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_WaitExtendAuthSession_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
defer cancel()
var stream runtime.ServerTransportStream
ctx = grpc.NewContextWithServerTransportStream(ctx, &stream)
inboundMarshaler, outboundMarshaler := runtime.MarshalerForRequest(mux, req)
annotatedContext, err := runtime.AnnotateIncomingContext(ctx, mux, req, "/daemon.DaemonService/WaitExtendAuthSession", runtime.WithHTTPPathPattern("/daemon.DaemonService/WaitExtendAuthSession"))
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
resp, md, err := local_request_DaemonService_WaitExtendAuthSession_0(annotatedContext, inboundMarshaler, server, req, pathParams)
md.HeaderMD, md.TrailerMD = metadata.Join(md.HeaderMD, stream.Header()), metadata.Join(md.TrailerMD, stream.Trailer())
annotatedContext = runtime.NewServerMetadataContext(annotatedContext, md)
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
forward_DaemonService_WaitExtendAuthSession_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
})
mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_DismissSessionWarning_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
defer cancel()
var stream runtime.ServerTransportStream
ctx = grpc.NewContextWithServerTransportStream(ctx, &stream)
inboundMarshaler, outboundMarshaler := runtime.MarshalerForRequest(mux, req)
annotatedContext, err := runtime.AnnotateIncomingContext(ctx, mux, req, "/daemon.DaemonService/DismissSessionWarning", runtime.WithHTTPPathPattern("/daemon.DaemonService/DismissSessionWarning"))
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
resp, md, err := local_request_DaemonService_DismissSessionWarning_0(annotatedContext, inboundMarshaler, server, req, pathParams)
md.HeaderMD, md.TrailerMD = metadata.Join(md.HeaderMD, stream.Header()), metadata.Join(md.TrailerMD, stream.Trailer())
annotatedContext = runtime.NewServerMetadataContext(annotatedContext, md)
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
forward_DaemonService_DismissSessionWarning_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
})
mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_StartCPUProfile_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
defer cancel()
@@ -1977,26 +1750,6 @@ func RegisterDaemonServiceHandlerServer(ctx context.Context, mux *runtime.ServeM
runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
})
mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_WailsUIReady_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
defer cancel()
var stream runtime.ServerTransportStream
ctx = grpc.NewContextWithServerTransportStream(ctx, &stream)
inboundMarshaler, outboundMarshaler := runtime.MarshalerForRequest(mux, req)
annotatedContext, err := runtime.AnnotateIncomingContext(ctx, mux, req, "/daemon.DaemonService/WailsUIReady", runtime.WithHTTPPathPattern("/daemon.DaemonService/WailsUIReady"))
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
resp, md, err := local_request_DaemonService_WailsUIReady_0(annotatedContext, inboundMarshaler, server, req, pathParams)
md.HeaderMD, md.TrailerMD = metadata.Join(md.HeaderMD, stream.Header()), metadata.Join(md.TrailerMD, stream.Trailer())
annotatedContext = runtime.NewServerMetadataContext(annotatedContext, md)
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
forward_DaemonService_WailsUIReady_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
})
return nil
}
@@ -2105,23 +1858,6 @@ func RegisterDaemonServiceHandlerClient(ctx context.Context, mux *runtime.ServeM
}
forward_DaemonService_Status_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
})
mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_SubscribeStatus_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
defer cancel()
inboundMarshaler, outboundMarshaler := runtime.MarshalerForRequest(mux, req)
annotatedContext, err := runtime.AnnotateContext(ctx, mux, req, "/daemon.DaemonService/SubscribeStatus", runtime.WithHTTPPathPattern("/daemon.DaemonService/SubscribeStatus"))
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
resp, md, err := request_DaemonService_SubscribeStatus_0(annotatedContext, inboundMarshaler, client, req, pathParams)
annotatedContext = runtime.NewServerMetadataContext(annotatedContext, md)
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
forward_DaemonService_SubscribeStatus_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, func() (proto.Message, error) { return resp.Recv() }, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
})
mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_Down_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
defer cancel()
@@ -2445,23 +2181,6 @@ func RegisterDaemonServiceHandlerClient(ctx context.Context, mux *runtime.ServeM
}
forward_DaemonService_GetEvents_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
})
mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_RegisterUILog_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
defer cancel()
inboundMarshaler, outboundMarshaler := runtime.MarshalerForRequest(mux, req)
annotatedContext, err := runtime.AnnotateContext(ctx, mux, req, "/daemon.DaemonService/RegisterUILog", runtime.WithHTTPPathPattern("/daemon.DaemonService/RegisterUILog"))
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
resp, md, err := request_DaemonService_RegisterUILog_0(annotatedContext, inboundMarshaler, client, req, pathParams)
annotatedContext = runtime.NewServerMetadataContext(annotatedContext, md)
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
forward_DaemonService_RegisterUILog_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
})
mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_SwitchProfile_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
defer cancel()
@@ -2683,57 +2402,6 @@ func RegisterDaemonServiceHandlerClient(ctx context.Context, mux *runtime.ServeM
}
forward_DaemonService_WaitJWTToken_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
})
mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_RequestExtendAuthSession_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
defer cancel()
inboundMarshaler, outboundMarshaler := runtime.MarshalerForRequest(mux, req)
annotatedContext, err := runtime.AnnotateContext(ctx, mux, req, "/daemon.DaemonService/RequestExtendAuthSession", runtime.WithHTTPPathPattern("/daemon.DaemonService/RequestExtendAuthSession"))
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
resp, md, err := request_DaemonService_RequestExtendAuthSession_0(annotatedContext, inboundMarshaler, client, req, pathParams)
annotatedContext = runtime.NewServerMetadataContext(annotatedContext, md)
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
forward_DaemonService_RequestExtendAuthSession_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
})
mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_WaitExtendAuthSession_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
defer cancel()
inboundMarshaler, outboundMarshaler := runtime.MarshalerForRequest(mux, req)
annotatedContext, err := runtime.AnnotateContext(ctx, mux, req, "/daemon.DaemonService/WaitExtendAuthSession", runtime.WithHTTPPathPattern("/daemon.DaemonService/WaitExtendAuthSession"))
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
resp, md, err := request_DaemonService_WaitExtendAuthSession_0(annotatedContext, inboundMarshaler, client, req, pathParams)
annotatedContext = runtime.NewServerMetadataContext(annotatedContext, md)
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
forward_DaemonService_WaitExtendAuthSession_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
})
mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_DismissSessionWarning_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
defer cancel()
inboundMarshaler, outboundMarshaler := runtime.MarshalerForRequest(mux, req)
annotatedContext, err := runtime.AnnotateContext(ctx, mux, req, "/daemon.DaemonService/DismissSessionWarning", runtime.WithHTTPPathPattern("/daemon.DaemonService/DismissSessionWarning"))
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
resp, md, err := request_DaemonService_DismissSessionWarning_0(annotatedContext, inboundMarshaler, client, req, pathParams)
annotatedContext = runtime.NewServerMetadataContext(annotatedContext, md)
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
forward_DaemonService_DismissSessionWarning_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
})
mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_StartCPUProfile_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
defer cancel()
@@ -2802,23 +2470,6 @@ func RegisterDaemonServiceHandlerClient(ctx context.Context, mux *runtime.ServeM
}
forward_DaemonService_ExposeService_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, func() (proto.Message, error) { return resp.Recv() }, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
})
mux.Handle(http.MethodPost, pattern_DaemonService_WailsUIReady_0, func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, pathParams map[string]string) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(req.Context())
defer cancel()
inboundMarshaler, outboundMarshaler := runtime.MarshalerForRequest(mux, req)
annotatedContext, err := runtime.AnnotateContext(ctx, mux, req, "/daemon.DaemonService/WailsUIReady", runtime.WithHTTPPathPattern("/daemon.DaemonService/WailsUIReady"))
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(ctx, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
resp, md, err := request_DaemonService_WailsUIReady_0(annotatedContext, inboundMarshaler, client, req, pathParams)
annotatedContext = runtime.NewServerMetadataContext(annotatedContext, md)
if err != nil {
runtime.HTTPError(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, err)
return
}
forward_DaemonService_WailsUIReady_0(annotatedContext, mux, outboundMarshaler, w, req, resp, mux.GetForwardResponseOptions()...)
})
return nil
}
@@ -2827,7 +2478,6 @@ var (
pattern_DaemonService_WaitSSOLogin_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "WaitSSOLogin"}, ""))
pattern_DaemonService_Up_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "Up"}, ""))
pattern_DaemonService_Status_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "Status"}, ""))
pattern_DaemonService_SubscribeStatus_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "SubscribeStatus"}, ""))
pattern_DaemonService_Down_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "Down"}, ""))
pattern_DaemonService_GetConfig_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "GetConfig"}, ""))
pattern_DaemonService_ListNetworks_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "ListNetworks"}, ""))
@@ -2847,7 +2497,6 @@ var (
pattern_DaemonService_StopBundleCapture_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "StopBundleCapture"}, ""))
pattern_DaemonService_SubscribeEvents_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "SubscribeEvents"}, ""))
pattern_DaemonService_GetEvents_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "GetEvents"}, ""))
pattern_DaemonService_RegisterUILog_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "RegisterUILog"}, ""))
pattern_DaemonService_SwitchProfile_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "SwitchProfile"}, ""))
pattern_DaemonService_SetConfig_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "SetConfig"}, ""))
pattern_DaemonService_AddProfile_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "AddProfile"}, ""))
@@ -2861,14 +2510,10 @@ var (
pattern_DaemonService_GetPeerSSHHostKey_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "GetPeerSSHHostKey"}, ""))
pattern_DaemonService_RequestJWTAuth_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "RequestJWTAuth"}, ""))
pattern_DaemonService_WaitJWTToken_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "WaitJWTToken"}, ""))
pattern_DaemonService_RequestExtendAuthSession_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "RequestExtendAuthSession"}, ""))
pattern_DaemonService_WaitExtendAuthSession_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "WaitExtendAuthSession"}, ""))
pattern_DaemonService_DismissSessionWarning_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "DismissSessionWarning"}, ""))
pattern_DaemonService_StartCPUProfile_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "StartCPUProfile"}, ""))
pattern_DaemonService_StopCPUProfile_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "StopCPUProfile"}, ""))
pattern_DaemonService_GetInstallerResult_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "GetInstallerResult"}, ""))
pattern_DaemonService_ExposeService_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "ExposeService"}, ""))
pattern_DaemonService_WailsUIReady_0 = runtime.MustPattern(runtime.NewPattern(1, []int{2, 0, 2, 1}, []string{"daemon.DaemonService", "WailsUIReady"}, ""))
)
var (
@@ -2876,7 +2521,6 @@ var (
forward_DaemonService_WaitSSOLogin_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
forward_DaemonService_Up_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
forward_DaemonService_Status_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
forward_DaemonService_SubscribeStatus_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseStream
forward_DaemonService_Down_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
forward_DaemonService_GetConfig_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
forward_DaemonService_ListNetworks_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
@@ -2896,7 +2540,6 @@ var (
forward_DaemonService_StopBundleCapture_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
forward_DaemonService_SubscribeEvents_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseStream
forward_DaemonService_GetEvents_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
forward_DaemonService_RegisterUILog_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
forward_DaemonService_SwitchProfile_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
forward_DaemonService_SetConfig_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
forward_DaemonService_AddProfile_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
@@ -2910,12 +2553,8 @@ var (
forward_DaemonService_GetPeerSSHHostKey_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
forward_DaemonService_RequestJWTAuth_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
forward_DaemonService_WaitJWTToken_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
forward_DaemonService_RequestExtendAuthSession_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
forward_DaemonService_WaitExtendAuthSession_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
forward_DaemonService_DismissSessionWarning_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
forward_DaemonService_StartCPUProfile_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
forward_DaemonService_StopCPUProfile_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
forward_DaemonService_GetInstallerResult_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
forward_DaemonService_ExposeService_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseStream
forward_DaemonService_WailsUIReady_0 = runtime.ForwardResponseMessage
)

View File

@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ func (s *Server) Start() error {
log.Warnf("failed to redirect stderr: %v", err)
}
if err := RestoreResidualState(s.rootCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
if err := restoreResidualState(s.rootCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
log.Warnf(errRestoreResidualState, err)
}
@@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ func (s *Server) Login(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.LoginRequest) (*pro
s.actCancel = cancel
s.mutex.Unlock()
if err := RestoreResidualState(s.rootCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
if err := restoreResidualState(s.rootCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
log.Warnf(errRestoreResidualState, err)
}
@@ -828,7 +828,6 @@ func (s *Server) WaitSSOLogin(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.WaitSSOLogin
return nil, err
}
log.Infof("SSO login flow finished, returning success to caller")
return &proto.WaitSSOLoginResponse{
Email: tokenInfo.Email,
}, nil
@@ -836,7 +835,6 @@ func (s *Server) WaitSSOLogin(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.WaitSSOLogin
// Up starts engine work in the daemon.
func (s *Server) Up(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.UpRequest) (*proto.UpResponse, error) {
log.Infof("up request received")
s.mutex.Lock()
// clientRunning is the daemon-intent flag (set by previous Up/Start, cleared
// by Down). connectionGoroutineRunning() reports whether the previous retry-loop
@@ -858,7 +856,7 @@ func (s *Server) Up(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.UpRequest) (*proto.UpR
return s.waitForUp(callerCtx)
}
if err := RestoreResidualState(callerCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
if err := restoreResidualState(callerCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
log.Warnf(errRestoreResidualState, err)
}
@@ -1081,10 +1079,7 @@ func (s *Server) Down(ctx context.Context, _ *proto.DownRequest) (*proto.DownRes
if err := s.cleanupConnection(); err != nil {
s.mutex.Unlock()
if errors.Is(err, ErrServiceNotUp) {
log.Debugf("Down called while service not up: %v", err)
return nil, err
}
// todo review to update the status in case any type of error
log.Errorf("failed to shut down properly: %v", err)
return nil, err
}
@@ -1157,7 +1152,7 @@ func (s *Server) cleanupConnection() error {
// making the run loop the sole owner of engine shutdown.
if engine != nil {
if err := engine.Stop(); err != nil {
log.Errorf("failed to stop engine during cleanup: %v", err)
return err
}
}

View File

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ func (s *Server) CleanState(ctx context.Context, req *proto.CleanStateRequest) (
if req.All {
// Reuse existing cleanup logic for all states
if err := RestoreResidualState(ctx, statePath); err != nil {
if err := restoreResidualState(ctx, statePath); err != nil {
return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Internal, "failed to clean all states: %v", err)
}
@@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ func (s *Server) DeleteState(ctx context.Context, req *proto.DeleteStateRequest)
}, nil
}
// RestoreResidualState checks if the client was not shut down in a clean way and restores residual if required.
// restoreResidualState checks if the client was not shut down in a clean way and restores residual if required.
// Otherwise, we might not be able to connect to the management server to retrieve new config.
func RestoreResidualState(ctx context.Context, statePath string) error {
func restoreResidualState(ctx context.Context, statePath string) error {
if statePath == "" {
return nil
}

View File

@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ import (
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
nbssh "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
)
const (
@@ -219,20 +218,11 @@ func (m *Manager) buildHostPatterns(peer PeerSSHInfo) []string {
if peer.IPv6.IsValid() {
hostPatterns = append(hostPatterns, peer.IPv6.String())
}
// Peer FQDNs and hostnames originate from remote peers, so they must be
// validated as plain DNS names before being embedded in the ssh_config
// "Match host" pattern list. This prevents injection of arbitrary
// ssh_config directives via embedded quotes, whitespace, newlines, the
// comma pattern separator, or the "*"/"?" pattern metacharacters.
if domain.IsValidDomainNoWildcard(peer.FQDN) {
if peer.FQDN != "" {
hostPatterns = append(hostPatterns, peer.FQDN)
} else if peer.FQDN != "" {
log.Warnf("skipping peer FQDN with invalid characters in SSH config: %q", peer.FQDN)
}
if peer.Hostname != peer.FQDN && domain.IsValidDomainNoWildcard(peer.Hostname) {
if peer.Hostname != "" && peer.Hostname != peer.FQDN {
hostPatterns = append(hostPatterns, peer.Hostname)
} else if peer.Hostname != "" && peer.Hostname != peer.FQDN {
log.Warnf("skipping peer hostname with invalid characters in SSH config: %q", peer.Hostname)
}
return hostPatterns
}

View File

@@ -148,45 +148,6 @@ func TestManager_MatchHostFormat(t *testing.T) {
"should use Match host with comma-separated patterns")
}
func TestManager_HostPatternInjection(t *testing.T) {
tempDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "netbird-ssh-config-test")
require.NoError(t, err)
defer func() { assert.NoError(t, os.RemoveAll(tempDir)) }()
manager := &Manager{
sshConfigDir: filepath.Join(tempDir, "ssh_config.d"),
sshConfigFile: "99-netbird.conf",
}
// A malicious peer FQDN/hostname attempts to break out of the Match host
// directive and inject arbitrary ssh_config (a ProxyCommand executing a
// command). It must be rejected, not written to the config.
peers := []PeerSSHInfo{
{
Hostname: "evil\"\n ProxyCommand touch /tmp/pwned\nHost x",
IP: netip.MustParseAddr("100.125.1.1"),
FQDN: "evil\"\n ProxyCommand touch /tmp/pwned\nHost x.nb.internal",
},
{Hostname: "peer2", IP: netip.MustParseAddr("100.125.1.2"), FQDN: "peer2.nb.internal"},
}
err = manager.SetupSSHClientConfig(peers)
require.NoError(t, err)
configPath := filepath.Join(manager.sshConfigDir, manager.sshConfigFile)
content, err := os.ReadFile(configPath)
require.NoError(t, err)
configStr := string(content)
assert.NotContains(t, configStr, "ProxyCommand touch /tmp/pwned",
"injected directive must not appear in generated config")
assert.NotContains(t, configStr, "evil",
"malicious pattern must be dropped entirely")
// The valid peer must still be present, on a single Match host line.
assert.Contains(t, configStr, "Match host \"100.125.1.1,100.125.1.2,peer2.nb.internal,peer2\"",
"valid peers must survive, injected patterns dropped")
}
func TestManager_ForcedSSHConfig(t *testing.T) {
// Set force environment variable
t.Setenv(EnvForceSSHConfig, "true")

View File

@@ -69,8 +69,7 @@ func parseGetentPasswd(output string) (*user.User, string, error) {
// validateGetentInput checks that the input is safe to pass to getent or id.
// Allows POSIX usernames, numeric UIDs, and common NSS extensions
// (@ for Kerberos, $ for Samba, + for NIS compat). A leading hyphen is
// rejected so the input can never be parsed as a command-line flag.
// (@ for Kerberos, $ for Samba, + for NIS compat).
func validateGetentInput(input string) bool {
maxLen := 32
if runtime.GOOS == "linux" {
@@ -81,10 +80,6 @@ func validateGetentInput(input string) bool {
return false
}
if input[0] == '-' {
return false
}
for _, r := range input {
if isAllowedGetentChar(r) {
continue

View File

@@ -157,9 +157,6 @@ func TestValidateGetentInput(t *testing.T) {
{"numeric UID", "1001", true},
{"dots and underscores", "alice.bob_test", true},
{"hyphen", "alice-bob", true},
{"leading hyphen rejected", "-i", false},
{"leading double hyphen rejected", "--no-idn", false},
{"lone hyphen rejected", "-", false},
{"kerberos principal", "user@REALM", true},
{"samba machine account", "MACHINE$", true},
{"NIS compat", "+user", true},

View File

@@ -746,8 +746,6 @@ func ToProtoFullStatus(fullStatus peer.FullStatus) *proto.FullStatus {
pbFullStatus.DnsServers = append(pbFullStatus.DnsServers, pbDnsState)
}
pbFullStatus.Events = fullStatus.Events
return &pbFullStatus
}

View File

@@ -79,15 +79,13 @@ type Info struct {
EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding bool
EnableSSHRemotePortForwarding bool
DisableSSHAuth bool
SyncMessageVersion *int
}
func (i *Info) SetFlags(
rosenpassEnabled, rosenpassPermissive bool,
serverSSHAllowed *bool,
disableClientRoutes, disableServerRoutes,
disableDNS, disableFirewall, blockLANAccess, blockInbound, disableIPv6 bool, syncMessageVersion *int,
disableDNS, disableFirewall, blockLANAccess, blockInbound, disableIPv6 bool,
enableSSHRoot, enableSSHSFTP, enableSSHLocalPortForwarding, enableSSHRemotePortForwarding *bool,
disableSSHAuth *bool,
) {
@@ -105,8 +103,6 @@ func (i *Info) SetFlags(
i.BlockInbound = blockInbound
i.DisableIPv6 = disableIPv6
i.SyncMessageVersion = syncMessageVersion
if enableSSHRoot != nil {
i.EnableSSHRoot = *enableSSHRoot
}

View File

@@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
//go:build !android && !ios && !freebsd && !js
package main
import (
"context"
"os"
"path/filepath"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/mdm"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ui/preferences"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ui/services"
)
// autostartDefaultState carries the guard inputs of the one-time autostart
// default decision so the decision itself stays a pure, testable function.
type autostartDefaultState struct {
supported bool
mdmDisabled bool
priorInstall bool
}
// shouldEnableAutostartDefault applies the first-run guards in order and
// returns whether autostart may be enabled, plus the reason when it may not.
func shouldEnableAutostartDefault(s autostartDefaultState) (bool, string) {
switch {
case !s.supported:
return false, "autostart not supported on this platform"
case s.mdmDisabled:
return false, "autostart disabled by MDM policy"
case s.priorInstall:
return false, "existing NetBird installation"
}
return true, ""
}
// autostartDisabledByMDM reports whether the MDM policy manages the
// disableAutostart key in a way that must suppress the default. An
// unparseable managed value is treated as disabled to stay on the safe side.
func autostartDisabledByMDM(policy *mdm.Policy) bool {
if !policy.HasKey(mdm.KeyDisableAutostart) {
return false
}
disabled, ok := policy.GetBool(mdm.KeyDisableAutostart)
return !ok || disabled
}
// netbirdFootprintExists reports whether the machine already carries NetBird
// daemon config or state, meaning this is not a genuinely fresh install. It is
// the update-safety gate for the autostart default: upgrading users always
// have a footprint, so an update can never trigger a autostart entry write.
func netbirdFootprintExists() bool {
candidates := []string{
profilemanager.DefaultConfigPath,
filepath.Join(profilemanager.DefaultConfigPathDir, "config.json"),
filepath.Join(profilemanager.DefaultConfigPathDir, "state.json"),
}
for _, path := range candidates {
if path != "" && fileExists(path) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// applyAutostartDefault runs the one-time launch-on-login default for genuinely
// fresh installs. The autostartInitialized marker is persisted before any
// enable attempt so a crash mid-flow degrades to "never enabled" instead of
// retrying autostart entry writes on every launch. A user's later disable in
// Settings is never overridden: the marker guarantees at-most-once, ever.
func applyAutostartDefault(ctx context.Context, autostart *services.Autostart, prefs *preferences.Store, prefsFileExisted bool) {
mdmDisabled := autostartDisabledByMDM(mdm.LoadPolicy())
if mdmDisabled {
if enabled, err := autostart.IsEnabled(ctx); err != nil {
log.Warnf("MDM disableAutostart: read autostart state: %v", err)
} else if enabled {
if err := autostart.SetEnabled(ctx, false); err != nil {
log.Warnf("MDM disableAutostart: force off failed: %v", err)
} else {
log.Info("MDM disableAutostart enforced: autostart turned off")
}
}
}
priorFootprint := netbirdFootprintExists() || prefsFileExisted
if prefs.Get().AutostartInitialized {
return
}
if err := prefs.SetAutostartInitialized(true); err != nil {
log.Warnf("persist autostart marker, skipping autostart default: %v", err)
return
}
state := autostartDefaultState{
supported: autostart.Supported(ctx),
mdmDisabled: mdmDisabled,
priorInstall: priorFootprint,
}
enable, reason := shouldEnableAutostartDefault(state)
if !enable {
log.Debugf("skipping autostart default: %s", reason)
return
}
if err := autostart.SetEnabled(ctx, true); err != nil {
log.Warnf("enable autostart on fresh install: %v", err)
return
}
log.Info("autostart enabled by default on fresh install")
}
// fileExists reports whether path exists.
func fileExists(path string) bool {
_, err := os.Stat(path)
return err == nil
}

View File

@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
//go:build !android && !ios && !freebsd && !js
package main
import (
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/mdm"
)
func TestShouldEnableAutostartDefault(t *testing.T) {
allPass := autostartDefaultState{
supported: true,
mdmDisabled: false,
priorInstall: false,
}
tests := []struct {
name string
mutate func(*autostartDefaultState)
wantEnable bool
wantReason string
}{
{
name: "fresh install with all guards passing enables",
mutate: func(*autostartDefaultState) {},
wantEnable: true,
},
{
name: "unsupported platform skips",
mutate: func(s *autostartDefaultState) { s.supported = false },
wantReason: "autostart not supported on this platform",
},
{
name: "MDM disable skips",
mutate: func(s *autostartDefaultState) { s.mdmDisabled = true },
wantReason: "autostart disabled by MDM policy",
},
{
name: "existing installation (upgrade) skips",
mutate: func(s *autostartDefaultState) { s.priorInstall = true },
wantReason: "existing NetBird installation",
},
{
name: "unsupported wins over every other guard",
mutate: func(s *autostartDefaultState) {
s.supported = false
s.mdmDisabled = true
s.priorInstall = true
},
wantReason: "autostart not supported on this platform",
},
{
name: "MDM disable wins over prior install",
mutate: func(s *autostartDefaultState) {
s.mdmDisabled = true
s.priorInstall = true
},
wantReason: "autostart disabled by MDM policy",
},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
state := allPass
tc.mutate(&state)
enable, reason := shouldEnableAutostartDefault(state)
assert.Equal(t, tc.wantEnable, enable, "enable decision should match for state %+v", state)
assert.Equal(t, tc.wantReason, reason, "skip reason should identify the failing guard")
})
}
}
func TestAutostartDisabledByMDM(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
values map[string]any
want bool
}{
{
name: "empty policy does not disable",
values: nil,
want: false,
},
{
name: "unrelated managed keys do not disable",
values: map[string]any{mdm.KeyDisableAutoConnect: true},
want: false,
},
{
name: "disableAutostart true disables",
values: map[string]any{mdm.KeyDisableAutostart: true},
want: true,
},
{
name: "disableAutostart registry DWORD 1 disables",
values: map[string]any{mdm.KeyDisableAutostart: int64(1)},
want: true,
},
{
name: "disableAutostart string true disables",
values: map[string]any{mdm.KeyDisableAutostart: "true"},
want: true,
},
{
name: "disableAutostart explicit false allows",
values: map[string]any{mdm.KeyDisableAutostart: false},
want: false,
},
{
name: "unparseable managed value is treated as disabled",
values: map[string]any{mdm.KeyDisableAutostart: "not-a-bool"},
want: true,
},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := autostartDisabledByMDM(mdm.NewPolicy(tc.values))
assert.Equal(t, tc.want, got, "MDM disable decision should match for values %v", tc.values)
})
}
}

View File

@@ -16,13 +16,10 @@ import LoginWaitingForBrowserDialog from "@/modules/login/LoginWaitingForBrowser
import { initI18n } from "@/lib/i18n";
import { initPlatform } from "@/lib/platform";
import { initLogForwarding } from "@/lib/logs";
import { initStallWatch } from "@/lib/stallwatch";
// Must run first so even init-time logs reach the Go log pipeline.
initLogForwarding();
initStallWatch();
welcome();
Promise.all([

View File

@@ -1,13 +1,10 @@
import { useEffect, useState } from "react";
import { useTranslation } from "react-i18next";
import { AlertTriangleIcon, DownloadIcon } from "lucide-react";
import { Browser } from "@wailsio/runtime";
import { Version } from "@bindings/services";
import { Button } from "@/components/buttons/Button";
import { useStatus } from "@/contexts/StatusContext.tsx";
const RELEASES_URL = "https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/releases/latest";
const RC_RELEASES_URL = "https://pkgs.netbird.io/releases/rc";
function openUrl(url: string) {
Browser.OpenURL(url).catch(() => globalThis.open(url, "_blank"));
@@ -15,26 +12,7 @@ function openUrl(url: string) {
export const DaemonOutdatedOverlay = () => {
const { t } = useTranslation();
const { status, isDaemonOutdated } = useStatus();
const [guiVersion, setGuiVersion] = useState<string>("-");
const clientVersion = status?.daemonVersion ?? "—";
const isRc = /-rc/i.test(guiVersion) || /-rc/i.test(clientVersion);
const downloadUrl = isRc ? RC_RELEASES_URL : RELEASES_URL;
useEffect(() => {
if (!isDaemonOutdated) return;
let cancelled = false;
Version.GUI()
.then((v) => {
if (!cancelled) setGuiVersion(v);
})
.catch((err) => console.error("[DaemonOutdatedOverlay] GUI version error", err));
return () => {
cancelled = true;
};
}, [isDaemonOutdated]);
const { isDaemonOutdated } = useStatus();
if (!isDaemonOutdated) return null;
@@ -60,37 +38,10 @@ export const DaemonOutdatedOverlay = () => {
<p className={"text-sm text-nb-gray-300"}>{t("daemon.outdated.description")}</p>
</div>
<div className={"flex flex-col items-center gap-0.5 text-center"}>
<p className={"text-sm font-semibold text-nb-gray-100"}>
{clientVersion === "development" ? (
<span>
{t("settings.about.clientName")}{" "}
<span className={"font-mono text-yellow-400"}>
{t("settings.about.development")}
</span>
</span>
) : (
t("settings.about.client", { version: clientVersion })
)}
</p>
<p className={"text-sm font-medium text-nb-gray-250"}>
{guiVersion === "development" ? (
<span>
{t("settings.about.guiName")}{" "}
<span className={"font-mono text-yellow-400"}>
{t("settings.about.development")}
</span>
</span>
) : (
t("settings.about.gui", { version: guiVersion })
)}
</p>
</div>
<div className={"wails-no-draggable"}>
<Button variant={"primary"} size={"xs"} onClick={() => openUrl(downloadUrl)}>
<Button variant={"primary"} size={"xs"} onClick={() => openUrl(RELEASES_URL)}>
<DownloadIcon size={14} />
{t("daemon.outdated.download")}
{t("update.card.getInstaller")}
</Button>
</div>
</div>

View File

@@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ type ProfileContextValue = {
loaded: boolean;
refresh: () => Promise<void>;
switchProfile: (id: string) => Promise<void>;
switchProfileNoConnect: (id: string) => Promise<void>;
addProfile: (name: string) => Promise<string>;
removeProfile: (id: string) => Promise<void>;
renameProfile: (id: string, newName: string) => Promise<void>;
@@ -113,16 +112,6 @@ export const ProfileProvider = ({ children }: { children: ReactNode }) => {
[username, refresh],
);
// Manage-profiles variant: switches without connecting, so the user can
// still adjust the management URL before bringing the connection up.
const switchProfileNoConnect = useCallback(
async (id: string) => {
await ProfileSwitcher.SwitchActiveNoConnect({ profileName: id, username });
await refresh();
},
[username, refresh],
);
// addProfile creates a profile by display name and returns the
// daemon-generated ID, so the caller can immediately address it by ID.
const addProfile = useCallback(
@@ -169,7 +158,6 @@ export const ProfileProvider = ({ children }: { children: ReactNode }) => {
loaded,
refresh,
switchProfile,
switchProfileNoConnect,
addProfile,
removeProfile,
renameProfile,
@@ -183,7 +171,6 @@ export const ProfileProvider = ({ children }: { children: ReactNode }) => {
loaded,
refresh,
switchProfile,
switchProfileNoConnect,
addProfile,
removeProfile,
renameProfile,

View File

@@ -51,14 +51,7 @@ async function runSsoLogin(
if (uri) await openBrowserLoginUri(uri);
const cancelPromise = buildSsoCancelPromise(state, signal);
// Combine wait + up in Go so the connection comes up the moment SSO
// completes. During SSO the tray window is hidden and the webview is
// suspended, so a frontend-driven Up (a promise continuation) would not
// fire until the user woke the window (e.g. hovering the tray icon).
const waitPromise = Connection.WaitSSOLoginAndUp(
{ userCode: result.userCode, hostname: "" },
{ profileName: "", username: "" },
);
const waitPromise = Connection.WaitSSOLogin({ userCode: result.userCode, hostname: "" });
try {
await Promise.race([waitPromise, cancelPromise]);
@@ -96,13 +89,13 @@ export async function startConnection(onSettled?: () => void, signal?: AbortSign
if (signal?.aborted) state.cancelled = true;
if (!state.cancelled && result.needsSsoLogin) {
// runSsoLogin brings the connection up in Go once SSO completes.
await runSsoLogin(result, state, signal);
} else {
if (!state.cancelled && signal?.aborted) state.cancelled = true;
if (!state.cancelled) {
await Connection.Up({ profileName: "", username: "" });
}
}
if (!state.cancelled && signal?.aborted) state.cancelled = true;
if (!state.cancelled) {
await Connection.Up({ profileName: "", username: "" });
}
} catch (e) {
WindowManager.CloseBrowserLogin().catch(console.error);

View File

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
// Detects webview suspension (macOS App Nap / hidden-window timer throttling).
// While the webview is suspended no JS runs at all, so detection happens on
// resume: a 1s interval measures wall-clock drift and reports how long timers
// were frozen. Silent unless a stall actually occurred; a stalled webview is
// what delays promise continuations such as the WaitSSOLogin → Up handoff.
const INTERVAL_MS = 1000;
const STALL_THRESHOLD_MS = 5000;
const REPORT_COOLDOWN_MS = 60_000;
let started = false;
export function initStallWatch() {
if (started) return;
started = true;
let last = Date.now();
let lastReport = 0;
setInterval(() => {
const now = Date.now();
const stall = now - last - INTERVAL_MS;
last = now;
if (stall < STALL_THRESHOLD_MS) return;
if (now - lastReport < REPORT_COOLDOWN_MS) return;
lastReport = now;
console.warn(
`webview timers were suspended for ${(stall / 1000).toFixed(1)}s ` +
`(App Nap / hidden-window throttling); pending UI work ran late`,
);
}, INTERVAL_MS);
}

View File

@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ export function ProfilesTab() {
activeProfileId,
loaded,
username,
switchProfileNoConnect,
switchProfile,
addProfile,
removeProfile,
renameProfile,
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ export function ProfilesTab() {
confirmLabel: t("profile.switch.confirm"),
});
if (!ok) return;
await guarded(i18next.t("profile.error.switchTitle"), () => switchProfileNoConnect(id));
await guarded(i18next.t("profile.error.switchTitle"), () => switchProfile(id));
};
const handleDeregister = async (id: string, name: string) => {
@@ -129,13 +129,14 @@ export function ProfilesTab() {
await guarded(i18next.t("profile.error.createTitle"), async () => {
const id = await addProfile(name);
// SetConfig is keyed by the new profile's ID, so it writes the
// not-yet-active profile before the switch makes it current.
// not-yet-active profile. Write before switching so any reconnect
// targets the right deployment.
if (!isNetbirdCloud(managementUrl)) {
await SettingsSvc.SetConfig(
new SetConfigParams({ profileName: id, username, managementUrl }),
);
}
await switchProfileNoConnect(id);
await switchProfile(id);
});
};

View File

@@ -73,13 +73,6 @@ export default function SessionExpirationDialog() {
let offCancel: (() => void) | undefined;
// Return the dialog to its interactive state and dismiss the browser popup
const resetDialog = () => {
offCancel?.();
WindowManager.CloseBrowserLogin().catch(console.error);
setBusy(false);
};
try {
const start = await Session.RequestExtend({ hint: "" });
const uri = start.verificationUriComplete || start.verificationUri;
@@ -112,22 +105,25 @@ export default function SessionExpirationDialog() {
if (outcome.kind === "cancel") {
waitPromise.cancel?.();
waitPromise.catch(() => {});
resetDialog();
return;
}
// Another surface owns this flow; keep the dialog open to retry.
if (outcome.result.preempted) {
resetDialog();
return;
}
WindowManager.CloseRenewFlow().catch(console.error);
// Close before the popup so the restore can't flash this window back.
WindowManager.CloseSessionExpiration().catch(console.error);
} catch (e) {
resetDialog();
await errorDialog({
Title: t("sessionExpiration.extendFailedTitle"),
Message: formatErrorMessage(e),
});
} finally {
offCancel?.();
WindowManager.CloseBrowserLogin().catch(console.error);
setBusy(false);
}
}, [busy, t]);
@@ -143,11 +139,12 @@ export default function SessionExpirationDialog() {
});
WindowManager.CloseSessionExpiration().catch(console.error);
} catch (e) {
setBusy(false);
await errorDialog({
Title: t("sessionExpiration.logoutFailedTitle"),
Message: formatErrorMessage(e),
});
} finally {
setBusy(false);
}
}, [busy, t]);

View File

@@ -22,9 +22,6 @@ type WelcomeStepTrayProps = {
export function WelcomeStepTray({ onContinue }: Readonly<WelcomeStepTrayProps>) {
const { t } = useTranslation();
const trayScreenshot = trayScreenshotForOS();
// macOS has no tray — the icon sits in the menu bar, so the copy says so.
const titleKey = isMacOS() ? "welcome.titleMac" : "welcome.title";
const descriptionKey = isMacOS() ? "welcome.descriptionMac" : "welcome.description";
return (
<>
@@ -39,9 +36,9 @@ export function WelcomeStepTray({ onContinue }: Readonly<WelcomeStepTrayProps>)
<div className={"flex w-full flex-col gap-1"}>
<DialogHeading id={"nb-welcome-title"} align={"left"}>
{t(titleKey)}
{t("welcome.title")}
</DialogHeading>
<DialogDescription align={"left"}>{t(descriptionKey)}</DialogDescription>
<DialogDescription align={"left"}>{t("welcome.description")}</DialogDescription>
</div>
<DialogActions>

View File

@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@
{"code": "fr", "displayName": "Français", "englishName": "French"},
{"code": "it", "displayName": "Italiano", "englishName": "Italian"},
{"code": "pt", "displayName": "Português", "englishName": "Portuguese"},
{"code": "zh-CN", "displayName": "简体中文", "englishName": "Simplified Chinese"},
{"code": "ja", "displayName": "日本語", "englishName": "Japanese"}
{"code": "zh-CN", "displayName": "简体中文", "englishName": "Simplified Chinese"}
]
}

View File

@@ -1034,15 +1034,9 @@
"welcome.title": {
"message": "Suchen Sie NetBird in der Taskleiste"
},
"welcome.titleMac": {
"message": "Suchen Sie NetBird in der Menüleiste"
},
"welcome.description": {
"message": "NetBird läuft in Ihrer Taskleiste. Klicken Sie auf das Symbol, um sich zu verbinden, Profile zu wechseln oder die Einstellungen zu öffnen."
},
"welcome.descriptionMac": {
"message": "NetBird läuft in Ihrer Menüleiste. Klicken Sie auf das Symbol, um sich zu verbinden, Profile zu wechseln oder die Einstellungen zu öffnen."
},
"welcome.continue": {
"message": "Weiter"
},
@@ -1299,13 +1293,10 @@
"message": "Dokumentation"
},
"daemon.outdated.title": {
"message": "NetBird Client ist veraltet"
"message": "NetBird-Dienst ist veraltet"
},
"daemon.outdated.description": {
"message": "Die neue GUI ist nicht mit Ihrem älteren Client kompatibel. Aktualisieren Sie Ihren Client, um die neue Anwendung zu verwenden."
},
"daemon.outdated.download": {
"message": "Neueste Version herunterladen"
"message": "Aktualisieren Sie den NetBird-Dienst, um diese App zu verwenden."
},
"error.jwt_clock_skew": {
"message": "Anmeldung fehlgeschlagen: Die Uhr dieses Geräts ist nicht mit dem Server synchron. Bitte synchronisieren Sie die Systemuhr und versuchen Sie es erneut."

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