[infrastructure] trigger release tests for stable and RC releases

.github/workflows/agent-network-e2e.yml

@@ -5,13 +5,6 @@ on:
   schedule:
     - cron: "0 3 * * *"
   workflow_dispatch:
-    inputs:
-      bedrock_model:
-        description: >-
-          Bedrock inference-profile id to drive the matrix with, exactly as
-          AWS issues it. Leave empty for the Sonnet 4.6 default.
-        required: false
-        default: ""
 
 concurrency:
   group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
@@ -58,9 +51,6 @@ jobs:
           # token (and URL, for gateways) is unset, so partial coverage is fine.
           OPENAI_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.E2E_OPENAI_TOKEN }}
           ANTHROPIC_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.E2E_ANTHROPIC_TOKEN }}
-          # Moonshot AI platform key (platform.kimi.ai); drives both Kimi wire
-          # shapes (OpenAI /v1 and Anthropic /anthropic) through kimi_api.
-          KIMI_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.E2E_KIMI_TOKEN }}
           VERCEL_URL: ${{ secrets.E2E_VERCEL_URL }}
           VERCEL_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.E2E_VERCEL_TOKEN }}
           OPENROUTER_URL: ${{ secrets.E2E_OPENROUTER_URL }}
@@ -69,8 +59,6 @@ jobs:
           CLOUDFLARE_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.E2E_CLOUDFLARE_TOKEN }}
           AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK: ${{ secrets.E2E_AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK }}
           AWS_REGION: ${{ secrets.E2E_AWS_REGION }}
-          # Bedrock model override: dispatch input wins, then the repo variable, else the test default.
-          AWS_BEDROCK_MODEL: ${{ inputs.bedrock_model || vars.E2E_AWS_BEDROCK_MODEL }}
           # Vertex (Anthropic-on-Vertex): SA + project required; region defaults
           # to "global", model to a pinned claude snapshot.
           GOOGLE_VERTEX_SA_BASE64: ${{ secrets.E2E_GOOGLE_VERTEX_SA_BASE64 }}

.github/workflows/frontend-ui.yml

@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ jobs:
             ${{ runner.os }}-pnpm-
 
       - name: Install dependencies
-        run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile --ignore-scripts
+        run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
 
       - name: Generate Wails bindings
         run: pnpm run bindings

.github/workflows/golangci-lint.yml

@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ jobs:
             display_name: Linux
     name: ${{ matrix.display_name }}
     runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
-    timeout-minutes: 25
+    timeout-minutes: 15
     steps:
       - name: Checkout code
         uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
@@ -79,4 +79,4 @@ jobs:
           skip-cache: true
           skip-save-cache: true
           cache-invalidation-interval: 0
-          args: --timeout=20m
+          args: --timeout=12m

.github/workflows/release-tests.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+name: Trigger release tests
+
+on:
+  push:
+    tags:
+      - "v*"
+  release:
+    types: [published]
+
+jobs:
+  trigger:
+    name: "Release tests / ${{ matrix.scenario }}"
+    if: >-
+      ${{ github.repository == 'netbirdio/netbird' &&
+          ((github.event_name == 'push' &&
+            (!contains(github.ref_name, '-') || contains(github.ref_name, '-rc.'))) ||
+           (github.event_name == 'release' && github.event.release.prerelease)) }}
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    timeout-minutes: 10
+    permissions:
+      contents: read
+    strategy:
+      fail-fast: false
+      matrix:
+        scenario: [prerelease, upgrade]
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout
+        uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
+        with:
+          ref: ${{ github.event.release.tag_name || github.ref }}
+          fetch-depth: 0
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      - name: Resolve test versions
+        id: versions
+        env:
+          RELEASE_TAG: ${{ github.event.release.tag_name || github.ref_name }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+
+          if [[ ! "$RELEASE_TAG" =~ ^v([0-9]+)\.([0-9]+)\.[0-9]+(-[0-9A-Za-z][0-9A-Za-z.-]*)?$ ]]; then
+            echo "Unsupported release tag: $RELEASE_TAG" >&2
+            exit 1
+          fi
+
+          major=$((10#${BASH_REMATCH[1]}))
+          minor=$((10#${BASH_REMATCH[2]}))
+          if (( minor < 2 )); then
+            echo "Cannot select an N-2 release for $RELEASE_TAG" >&2
+            exit 1
+          fi
+
+          old_minor=$((minor - 2))
+          old_version=$(git tag --list "v${major}.${old_minor}.*" --sort=-version:refname | grep -E "^v${major}\.${old_minor}\.[0-9]+$" | head -n 1)
+          if [[ -z "$old_version" ]]; then
+            echo "No stable v${major}.${old_minor}.x release found" >&2
+            exit 1
+          fi
+
+          echo "target=sha-$(git rev-parse --short HEAD)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+          echo "old=$old_version" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+
+      - name: Run prerelease scenarios
+        if: matrix.scenario == 'prerelease'
+        uses: benc-uk/workflow-dispatch@31e2b3319479a63f0ab15bf800eff9e913504e26 # v1.3.2
+        with:
+          workflow: netbird-prerelease.yml
+          repo: netbirdio/pre-release-tests
+          ref: main
+          token: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_TESTS_GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+          inputs: >-
+            { "netbird_version": "${{ steps.versions.outputs.target }}",
+              "netbird_server_version": "${{ steps.versions.outputs.target }}",
+              "netbird_server_image_repository": "ghcr.io/netbirdio/netbird-server" }
+
+      - name: Run upgrade scenarios
+        if: matrix.scenario == 'upgrade'
+        uses: benc-uk/workflow-dispatch@31e2b3319479a63f0ab15bf800eff9e913504e26 # v1.3.2
+        with:
+          workflow: netbird-selfhosted-upgrade.yml
+          repo: netbirdio/pre-release-tests
+          ref: main
+          token: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_TESTS_GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+          inputs: >-
+            { "netbird_version": "${{ steps.versions.outputs.target }}",
+              "old_netbird_server_version": "${{ steps.versions.outputs.old }}",
+              "netbird_server_version": "${{ steps.versions.outputs.target }}",
+              "netbird_server_image_repository": "ghcr.io/netbirdio/netbird-server" }

.github/workflows/test-infrastructure-files.yml

@@ -249,35 +249,78 @@ jobs:
           docker compose exec management ls -l /var/lib/netbird/ | grep -i GeoLite2-City_[0-9]*.mmdb
           docker compose exec management ls -l /var/lib/netbird/ | grep -i geonames_[0-9]*.db
 
-  test-legacy-getting-started-scripts:
+  test-getting-started-script:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
+      - name: Install jq
+        run: sudo apt-get install -y jq
+
       - name: Checkout code
         uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
         with:
           persist-credentials: false
 
-      - name: Verify Dex retirement notice
-        run: |
-          if infrastructure_files/getting-started-with-dex.sh >stdout.txt 2>stderr.txt; then
-            echo "Expected the retired Dex installer to fail"
-            exit 1
-          fi
-          test ! -s stdout.txt
-          grep -Fq "Dex support is not deprecated." stderr.txt
-          grep -Fq "https://docs.netbird.io/selfhosted/selfhosted-quickstart" stderr.txt
-          grep -Fq "https://docs.netbird.io/selfhosted/identity-providers/local" stderr.txt
-          grep -Fq "removed in NetBird v0.80" stderr.txt
+      - name: run script with Zitadel PostgreSQL
+        run: NETBIRD_DOMAIN=use-ip bash -x infrastructure_files/getting-started-with-zitadel.sh
 
-      - name: Verify Zitadel retirement notice
+      - name: test Caddy file gen postgres
+        run: test -f Caddyfile
+
+      - name: test docker-compose file gen postgres
+        run: test -f docker-compose.yml
+
+      - name: test management.json file gen postgres
+        run: test -f management.json
+
+      - name: test turnserver.conf file gen postgres
         run: |
-          if bash infrastructure_files/getting-started-with-zitadel.sh >stdout.txt 2>stderr.txt; then
-            echo "Expected the retired Zitadel installer to fail"
-            exit 1
-          fi
-          test ! -s stdout.txt
-          grep -Fq "Zitadel support and existing Zitadel deployments are not deprecated." stderr.txt
-          grep -Fq "https://docs.netbird.io/selfhosted/selfhosted-quickstart" stderr.txt
-          grep -Fq "https://docs.netbird.io/selfhosted/identity-providers/zitadel" stderr.txt
-          grep -Fq "https://docs.netbird.io/selfhosted/selfhosted-guide" stderr.txt
-          grep -Fq "removed in NetBird v0.80" stderr.txt
+          set -x
+          test -f turnserver.conf
+          grep external-ip turnserver.conf
+
+      - name: test zitadel.env file gen postgres
+        run: test -f zitadel.env
+
+      - name: test dashboard.env file gen postgres
+        run: test -f dashboard.env
+
+      - name: test relay.env file gen postgres
+        run: test -f relay.env
+
+      - name: test zdb.env file gen postgres
+        run: test -f zdb.env
+
+      - name: Postgres run cleanup
+        run: |
+          docker compose down --volumes --rmi all
+          rm -rf docker-compose.yml Caddyfile zitadel.env dashboard.env machinekey/zitadel-admin-sa.token turnserver.conf management.json zdb.env
+
+      - name: run script with Zitadel CockroachDB
+        run: bash -x infrastructure_files/getting-started-with-zitadel.sh
+        env:
+          NETBIRD_DOMAIN: use-ip
+          ZITADEL_DATABASE: cockroach
+
+      - name: test Caddy file gen CockroachDB
+        run: test -f Caddyfile
+
+      - name: test docker-compose file gen CockroachDB
+        run: test -f docker-compose.yml
+
+      - name: test management.json file gen CockroachDB
+        run: test -f management.json
+
+      - name: test turnserver.conf file gen CockroachDB
+        run: |
+          set -x
+          test -f turnserver.conf
+          grep external-ip turnserver.conf
+
+      - name: test zitadel.env file gen CockroachDB
+        run: test -f zitadel.env
+
+      - name: test dashboard.env file gen CockroachDB
+        run: test -f dashboard.env
+
+      - name: test relay.env file gen CockroachDB
+        run: test -f relay.env

.goreleaser.yaml

@@ -273,8 +273,8 @@ dockers_v2:
        - netbirdio/netbird
        - ghcr.io/netbirdio/netbird
      tags:
-       - "{{ .Version }}-rootless"
-       - "{{ if eq .Env.SKIP_PUBLISH \"false\" }}rootless-latest{{ end }}"
+       - "v{{ .Version }}-rootless"
+       - "{{ if eq .Env.SKIP_PUBLISH \"false\" }}latest{{ end }}"
      dockerfile: client/Dockerfile-rootless
      extra_files:
        - client/netbird-entrypoint.sh

.goreleaser_ui.yaml

@@ -24,8 +24,6 @@ builds:
     ldflags:
       - -s -w -X github.com/netbirdio/netbird/version.version={{.Version}} -X main.commit={{.Commit}} -X main.date={{.CommitDate}} -X main.builtBy=goreleaser
     mod_timestamp: "{{ .CommitTimestamp }}"
-    tags:
-      - production
 
   - id: netbird-ui-windows-amd64
     dir: client/ui
@@ -41,8 +39,6 @@ builds:
       - -s -w -X github.com/netbirdio/netbird/version.version={{.Version}} -X main.commit={{.Commit}} -X main.date={{.CommitDate}} -X main.builtBy=goreleaser
       - -H windowsgui
     mod_timestamp: "{{ .CommitTimestamp }}"
-    tags:
-      - production
 
   - id: netbird-ui-windows-arm64
     dir: client/ui
@@ -59,8 +55,6 @@ builds:
       - -s -w -X github.com/netbirdio/netbird/version.version={{.Version}} -X main.commit={{.Commit}} -X main.date={{.CommitDate}} -X main.builtBy=goreleaser
       - -H windowsgui
     mod_timestamp: "{{ .CommitTimestamp }}"
-    tags:
-      - production
 
 archives:
   - id: linux-arch

.goreleaser_ui_darwin.yaml

@@ -29,8 +29,6 @@ builds:
     ldflags:
       - -s -w -X github.com/netbirdio/netbird/version.version={{.Version}} -X main.commit={{.Commit}} -X main.date={{.CommitDate}} -X main.builtBy=goreleaser
     mod_timestamp: "{{ .CommitTimestamp }}"
-    tags:
-      - production
 
 universal_binaries:
   - id: netbird-ui-darwin

CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -234,22 +234,12 @@ cd client/ui
 task dev
 ```
 
-Pass daemon flags after `--`, pointing the UI at the socket the daemon serves:
+Pass daemon flags after `--`:
 
 ```
-task dev -- --daemon-addr=unix:///var/run/netbird.sock   # Linux, macOS
-task dev -- --daemon-addr=npipe://netbird                # Windows
+task dev -- --daemon-addr=tcp://127.0.0.1:41731
 ```
 
-On Windows the daemon serves a named pipe (`npipe://netbird`). Which path that
-ends up being depends on what the daemon may create: as a service or elevated it
-serves `\\.\pipe\ProtectedPrefix\Administrators\netbird`, which no unprivileged
-process can take from it, and otherwise it falls back to `\\.\pipe\netbird`.
-Clients try both and check who owns the pipe before using the plain one. Avoid
-`tcp://127.0.0.1:41731`: loopback TCP carries no caller identity, so the daemon
-refuses the operations that require an administrator and you will not exercise
-those paths.
-
 Production build (frontend assets embedded into the binary, output in `client/ui/bin/`):
 
 ```

client/android/client.go

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"os"
 	"slices"
-	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"time"
 
@@ -248,9 +247,6 @@ func (c *Client) DebugBundle(platformFiles PlatformFiles, anonymize bool) (strin
 		deps.SyncResponse = resp
 
 		if e := cc.Engine(); e != nil {
-			deps.RefreshStatus = func() {
-				e.RunHealthProbes(context.Background(), true)
-			}
 			if cm := e.GetClientMetrics(); cm != nil {
 				deps.ClientMetrics = cm
 			}
@@ -300,13 +296,6 @@ func (c *Client) SetInfoLogLevel() {
 // PeersList return with the list of the PeerInfos
 func (c *Client) PeersList() *PeerInfoArray {
 
-	// The recorder only caches transfer counters and handshake times; nothing
-	// refreshes them on its own, so without this they read as zero. The desktop
-	// daemon does the same before serving a full peer status.
-	if err := c.recorder.RefreshWireGuardStats(); err != nil {
-		log.Debugf("failed to refresh WireGuard stats: %v", err)
-	}
-
 	fullStatus := c.recorder.GetFullStatus()
 
 	peerInfos := make([]PeerInfo, len(fullStatus.Peers))
@@ -317,20 +306,6 @@ func (c *Client) PeersList() *PeerInfoArray {
 			FQDN:       p.FQDN,
 			ConnStatus: int(p.ConnStatus),
 			Routes:     PeerRoutes{routes: maps.Keys(p.GetRoutes())},
-
-			PubKey:                     p.PubKey,
-			Latency:                    formatDuration(p.Latency),
-			LatencyMs:                  p.Latency.Milliseconds(),
-			BytesRx:                    p.BytesRx,
-			BytesTx:                    p.BytesTx,
-			ConnStatusUpdate:           formatTime(p.ConnStatusUpdate),
-			Relayed:                    p.Relayed,
-			RosenpassEnabled:           p.RosenpassEnabled,
-			LastWireguardHandshake:     formatTime(p.LastWireguardHandshake),
-			LocalIceCandidateType:      p.LocalIceCandidateType,
-			RemoteIceCandidateType:     p.RemoteIceCandidateType,
-			LocalIceCandidateEndpoint:  p.LocalIceCandidateEndpoint,
-			RemoteIceCandidateEndpoint: p.RemoteIceCandidateEndpoint,
 		}
 		peerInfos[n] = pi
 	}
@@ -461,6 +436,10 @@ func (c *Client) RemoveConnectionListener() {
 	c.recorder.RemoveConnectionListener()
 }
 
+func (c *Client) toggleRoute(command routeCommand) error {
+	return command.toggleRoute()
+}
+
 func (c *Client) getRouteManager() (routemanager.Manager, error) {
 	client := c.getConnectClient()
 	if client == nil {
@@ -480,22 +459,22 @@ func (c *Client) getRouteManager() (routemanager.Manager, error) {
 	return manager, nil
 }
 
-func (c *Client) SelectRoute(id string) error {
+func (c *Client) SelectRoute(route string) error {
 	manager, err := c.getRouteManager()
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
 
-	return manager.SelectRoutes([]route.NetID{route.NetID(id)}, true)
+	return c.toggleRoute(selectRouteCommand{route: route, manager: manager})
 }
 
-func (c *Client) DeselectRoute(id string) error {
+func (c *Client) DeselectRoute(route string) error {
 	manager, err := c.getRouteManager()
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
 
-	return manager.DeselectRoutes([]route.NetID{route.NetID(id)})
+	return c.toggleRoute(deselectRouteCommand{route: route, manager: manager})
 }
 
 // getNetworkDomainsFromRoute extracts domains from a route and enriches each domain
@@ -530,28 +509,3 @@ func exportEnvList(list *EnvList) {
 		}
 	}
 }
-
-// formatDuration renders a duration for display, trimming the fractional part
-// to two digits so latencies read as "12.34ms" rather than "12.345678ms".
-func formatDuration(d time.Duration) string {
-	ds := d.String()
-	dotIndex := strings.Index(ds, ".")
-	if dotIndex == -1 {
-		return ds
-	}
-
-	endIndex := min(dotIndex+3, len(ds))
-
-	// Skip the remaining digits so only the unit suffix is appended back.
-	unitStart := endIndex
-	for unitStart < len(ds) && ds[unitStart] >= '0' && ds[unitStart] <= '9' {
-		unitStart++
-	}
-	return ds[:endIndex] + ds[unitStart:]
-}
-
-// formatTime renders a timestamp in UTC using a fixed layout. The zero time is
-// passed through as-is so the UI can recognise it and show "never" instead.
-func formatTime(t time.Time) string {
-	return t.UTC().Format("2006-01-02 15:04:05")
-}

client/android/peer_notifier.go

@@ -12,30 +12,12 @@ const (
 )
 
 // PeerInfo describe information about the peers. It designed for the UI usage
-//
-// The fields below ConnStatus back the peer detail screen. Durations and times
-// are pre-formatted into strings so the UI does not have to know Go's layouts;
-// Latency is additionally exposed as LatencyMs for colour coding.
 type PeerInfo struct {
 	IP         string
 	IPv6       string
 	FQDN       string
 	ConnStatus int
 	Routes     PeerRoutes
-
-	PubKey                     string
-	Latency                    string
-	LatencyMs                  int64
-	BytesRx                    int64
-	BytesTx                    int64
-	ConnStatusUpdate           string
-	Relayed                    bool
-	RosenpassEnabled           bool
-	LastWireguardHandshake     string
-	LocalIceCandidateType      string
-	RemoteIceCandidateType     string
-	LocalIceCandidateEndpoint  string
-	RemoteIceCandidateEndpoint string
 }
 
 func (p *PeerInfo) GetPeerRoutes() *PeerRoutes {

client/android/profile_manager.go

@@ -189,19 +189,6 @@ func (pm *ProfileManager) LogoutProfile(id string) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-// RenameProfile changes a profile's display name. The profile ID, and therefore
-// its on-disk filename, is left untouched: only the "name" field of the config
-// is rewritten. This works for the default profile too, whose config lives in
-// netbird.cfg rather than under profiles/.
-func (pm *ProfileManager) RenameProfile(id string, newName string) error {
-	if err := pm.serviceMgr.RenameProfile(profilemanager.ID(id), androidUsername, newName); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("failed to rename profile: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	log.Infof("renamed profile %s to: %s", id, newName)
-	return nil
-}
-
 // RemoveProfile deletes a profile
 func (pm *ProfileManager) RemoveProfile(id string) error {
 	// Use ServiceManager (removes profile from profiles/ directory)

client/android/route_command.go

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+//go:build android
+
+package android
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+	"golang.org/x/exp/maps"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/routemanager"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
+)
+
+func executeRouteToggle(id string, manager routemanager.Manager,
+	operationName string,
+	routeOperation func(routes []route.NetID, allRoutes []route.NetID) error) error {
+	netID := route.NetID(id)
+	routes := []route.NetID{netID}
+
+	routesMap := manager.GetClientRoutesWithNetID()
+	routes = route.ExpandV6ExitPairs(routes, routesMap)
+
+	log.Debugf("%s with ids: %v", operationName, routes)
+
+	if err := routeOperation(routes, maps.Keys(routesMap)); err != nil {
+		log.Debugf("error when %s: %s", operationName, err)
+		return fmt.Errorf("error %s: %w", operationName, err)
+	}
+
+	manager.TriggerSelection(manager.GetClientRoutes())
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+type routeCommand interface {
+	toggleRoute() error
+}
+
+type selectRouteCommand struct {
+	route   string
+	manager routemanager.Manager
+}
+
+func (s selectRouteCommand) toggleRoute() error {
+	routeSelector := s.manager.GetRouteSelector()
+	if routeSelector == nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("no route selector available")
+	}
+
+	routeOperation := func(routes []route.NetID, allRoutes []route.NetID) error {
+		return routeSelector.SelectRoutes(routes, true, allRoutes)
+	}
+
+	return executeRouteToggle(s.route, s.manager, "selecting route", routeOperation)
+}
+
+type deselectRouteCommand struct {
+	route   string
+	manager routemanager.Manager
+}
+
+func (d deselectRouteCommand) toggleRoute() error {
+	routeSelector := d.manager.GetRouteSelector()
+	if routeSelector == nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("no route selector available")
+	}
+
+	return executeRouteToggle(d.route, d.manager, "deselecting route", routeSelector.DeselectRoutes)
+}

client/cmd/daemon_error.go

@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
-package cmd
-
-import (
-	"errors"
-	"fmt"
-	"strings"
-
-	"google.golang.org/genproto/googleapis/rpc/errdetails"
-	gstatus "google.golang.org/grpc/status"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
-)
-
-// daemonCallError prepares a daemon error for display. A refusal the daemon
-// raised because the operation needs root/administrator is already guidance
-// written for the user, so it is surfaced on its own instead of buried under the
-// gRPC envelope and the name of the RPC that hit it. Anything else is wrapped
-// with context as usual.
-func daemonCallError(context string, err error) error {
-	if guidance, ok := privilegeGuidance(err); ok {
-		return errors.New(guidance)
-	}
-	return fmt.Errorf("%s: %w", context, err)
-}
-
-// privilegeGuidance renders the daemon's privilege refusal as a summary and the
-// command that performs the operation with the privileges it needs. It reports
-// false for any other error.
-func privilegeGuidance(err error) (string, bool) {
-	info, ok := privilegeErrorInfo(err)
-	if !ok {
-		return "", false
-	}
-
-	summary := info.GetMetadata()[ipcauth.ErrorMetaSummary]
-	command := info.GetMetadata()[ipcauth.ErrorMetaCommand]
-	if summary == "" {
-		// Detail without a summary: fall back to the status message, which
-		// carries the same text.
-		summary = strings.TrimSpace(gstatus.Convert(err).Message())
-	}
-	if command == "" {
-		return summary, true
-	}
-
-	return fmt.Sprintf("%s\n\n    %s\n", summary, command), true
-}
-
-// privilegeErrorInfo returns the daemon's privilege-refusal detail, if the error
-// carries one.
-func privilegeErrorInfo(err error) (*errdetails.ErrorInfo, bool) {
-	if err == nil {
-		return nil, false
-	}
-
-	for _, detail := range gstatus.Convert(err).Details() {
-		info, ok := detail.(*errdetails.ErrorInfo)
-		if !ok {
-			continue
-		}
-		if info.GetReason() == ipcauth.ErrorReasonPrivilegeRequired && info.GetDomain() == ipcauth.ErrorDomain {
-			return info, true
-		}
-	}
-	return nil, false
-}

client/cmd/logout.go

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ var logoutCmd = &cobra.Command{
 		}
 
 		if _, err := daemonClient.Logout(ctx, req); err != nil {
-			return daemonCallError("deregister", err)
+			return fmt.Errorf("deregister: %v", err)
 		}
 
 		cmd.Println("Deregistered successfully")

client/cmd/root.go

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
 	"github.com/spf13/pflag"
 	"google.golang.org/grpc"
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials/insecure"
 
 	daddr "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/daemonaddr"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
@@ -90,7 +91,6 @@ var (
 			// Don't resolve for service commands — they create the socket, not connect to it.
 			if !isServiceCmd(cmd) {
 				daemonAddr = daddr.ResolveUnixDaemonAddr(daemonAddr)
-				daemonAddr = daddr.ResolveDaemonAddr(daemonAddr)
 			}
 			return nil
 		},
@@ -143,10 +143,10 @@ func init() {
 
 	defaultDaemonAddr := "unix:///var/run/netbird.sock"
 	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
-		defaultDaemonAddr = daddr.WindowsPipeAddr
+		defaultDaemonAddr = "tcp://127.0.0.1:41731"
 	}
 
-	rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&daemonAddr, "daemon-addr", defaultDaemonAddr, "Daemon service address to serve CLI requests [unix|tcp|npipe]://[path|host:port|name]")
+	rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&daemonAddr, "daemon-addr", defaultDaemonAddr, "Daemon service address to serve CLI requests [unix|tcp]://[path|host:port]")
 	rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVarP(&managementURL, "management-url", "m", "", fmt.Sprintf("Management Service URL [http|https]://[host]:[port] (default \"%s\")", profilemanager.DefaultManagementURL))
 	rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&adminURL, "admin-url", "", fmt.Sprintf("Admin Panel URL [http|https]://[host]:[port] (default \"%s\")", profilemanager.DefaultAdminURL))
 	rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVarP(&logLevel, "log-level", "l", "info", "sets NetBird log level")
@@ -269,10 +269,12 @@ func DialClientGRPCServer(ctx context.Context, addr string) (*grpc.ClientConn, e
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, time.Second*10)
 	defer cancel()
 
-	target, opts := daddr.DialTarget(addr)
-	opts = append(opts, grpc.WithBlock())
-
-	return grpc.DialContext(ctx, target, opts...)
+	return grpc.DialContext(
+		ctx,
+		strings.TrimPrefix(addr, "tcp://"),
+		grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials()),
+		grpc.WithBlock(),
+	)
 }
 
 // WithBackOff execute function in backoff cycle.

client/cmd/service.go

@@ -33,15 +33,10 @@ var (
 )
 
 type program struct {
-	ctx      context.Context
-	cancel   context.CancelFunc
-	serv     *grpc.Server
-	jsonServ *http.Server
-	// jsonClient is the gateway's own connection to the daemon. It is held so
-	// shutting the gateway down also closes it: nothing else references it once
-	// the handlers are registered, so its transport goroutines would otherwise
-	// outlive the server.
-	jsonClient       *grpc.ClientConn
+	ctx              context.Context
+	cancel           context.CancelFunc
+	serv             *grpc.Server
+	jsonServ         *http.Server
 	jsonServMu       sync.Mutex
 	serverInstance   *server.Server
 	serverInstanceMu sync.Mutex

client/cmd/service_controller.go

@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ package cmd
 import (
 	"context"
 	"fmt"
-	"runtime"
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/kardianos/service"
@@ -14,8 +13,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
 	"google.golang.org/grpc"
 
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/daemonaddr"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/server"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/system"
@@ -29,31 +26,6 @@ func validateJSONSocketFlags() error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-// daemonServerOptions installs the transport credentials that expose each
-// caller's kernel-authenticated identity to the handlers, which is what lets
-// the daemon require root/administrator for privileged operations.
-//
-// The handshake exchanges no bytes, so older CLI and UI binaries still
-// interoperate. Callers on a TCP socket carry no identity at all: the daemon
-// keeps serving them, and the privileged operations deny them, so a warning is
-// logged to make the loss of functionality visible.
-func daemonServerOptions(network string) []grpc.ServerOption {
-	if network == "tcp" {
-		log.Warnf("daemon is listening on TCP (%s): callers carry no verifiable identity over TCP, "+
-			"so privileged operations (SSH root login, SSH auth, enabling the SSH server, management URL changes, "+
-			"deregistration) will be denied. Use a unix socket, or npipe:// on Windows", daemonAddr)
-		return nil
-	}
-
-	creds := ipcauth.NewTransportCredentials()
-	if creds == nil {
-		log.Warnf("daemon IPC has no peer-identity primitive on %s: privileged operations will be denied", runtime.GOOS)
-		return nil
-	}
-
-	return []grpc.ServerOption{grpc.Creds(creds)}
-}
-
 func (p *program) Start(svc service.Service) error {
 	// Start should not block. Do the actual work async.
 	log.Info("starting NetBird service") //nolint
@@ -65,106 +37,68 @@ func (p *program) Start(svc service.Service) error {
 	// Collect static system and platform information
 	system.UpdateStaticInfoAsync()
 
-	// A daemon installed before named-pipe support has the loopback TCP address
-	// persisted. Move it to the named pipe so an upgraded daemon can identify
-	// its callers instead of silently serving an unauthenticated socket.
-	if migrated, ok := daemonaddr.MigrateLegacy(daemonAddr); ok {
-		log.Infof("daemon address %q predates named-pipe support, listening on %q so callers can be identified", daemonAddr, migrated)
-		daemonAddr = migrated
-	}
-
-	network, _, err := parseListenAddress(daemonAddr)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("parse daemon address: %w", err)
-	}
-
 	// in any case, even if configuration does not exists we run daemon to serve CLI gRPC API.
-	p.serv = grpc.NewServer(daemonServerOptions(network)...)
+	p.serv = grpc.NewServer()
 
-	daemonListener, jsonListener, err := listenDaemonSockets()
+	daemonListener, err := listenOnAddress(daemonAddr)
 	if err != nil {
-		return err
+		return fmt.Errorf("listen daemon interface: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	var jsonListener *socketListener
+	if enableJSONSocket {
+		jsonListener, err = listenOnAddress(jsonSocket)
+		if err != nil {
+			_ = daemonListener.Close()
+			return fmt.Errorf("listen daemon JSON interface: %w", err)
+		}
+	} else {
+		removeStaleUnixSocketForAddress(jsonSocket)
 	}
 
 	go func() {
-		// Fatal here rather than inside serve, so serve's deferred listener
-		// closes run before the process exits.
-		if err := p.serve(daemonListener, jsonListener); err != nil {
-			log.Fatalf("failed to %v", err)
+		defer daemonListener.Close()
+		if jsonListener != nil {
+			defer jsonListener.Close()
+		}
+
+		if err := daemonListener.chmodUnixSocket("daemon"); err != nil {
+			log.Error(err)
+			return
+		}
+		if jsonListener != nil {
+			if err := jsonListener.chmodUnixSocket("daemon JSON"); err != nil {
+				log.Error(err)
+				return
+			}
+		}
+
+		serverInstance := server.New(p.ctx, util.FindFirstLogPath(logFiles), configPath, profilesDisabled, updateSettingsDisabled, captureEnabled, networksDisabled)
+		if err := serverInstance.Start(); err != nil {
+			log.Fatalf("failed to start daemon: %v", err)
+		}
+		proto.RegisterDaemonServiceServer(p.serv, serverInstance)
+
+		p.serverInstanceMu.Lock()
+		p.serverInstance = serverInstance
+		p.serverInstanceMu.Unlock()
+
+		if jsonListener != nil {
+			if err := p.startJSONGateway(jsonListener, daemonAddr); err != nil {
+				log.Fatalf("failed to start daemon JSON server: %v", err)
+			}
+		} else {
+			log.Debug("daemon JSON socket disabled")
+		}
+
+		log.Printf("started daemon server: %v", daemonListener.address)
+		if err := p.serv.Serve(daemonListener.Listener); err != nil {
+			log.Errorf("failed to serve daemon requests: %v", err)
 		}
 	}()
 	return nil
 }
 
-// listenDaemonSockets opens the daemon control socket and, when it is enabled, the
-// JSON gateway socket. The control socket is closed again if the second one fails,
-// so a failed start leaves nothing listening. The returned JSON listener is nil
-// when the socket is disabled.
-func listenDaemonSockets() (*socketListener, *socketListener, error) {
-	daemonListener, err := listenOnAddress(daemonAddr)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("listen daemon interface: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	if !enableJSONSocket {
-		removeStaleUnixSocketForAddress(jsonSocket)
-		return daemonListener, nil, nil
-	}
-
-	jsonListener, err := listenOnAddress(jsonSocket)
-	if err != nil {
-		if cerr := daemonListener.Close(); cerr != nil {
-			log.Debugf("close daemon listener: %v", cerr)
-		}
-		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("listen daemon JSON interface: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	return daemonListener, jsonListener, nil
-}
-
-// serve brings up the daemon server on an already-open control socket and blocks
-// until it stops. jsonListener is nil when the JSON socket is disabled. A returned
-// error means the daemon cannot run at all and the caller is expected to exit; the
-// failures it recovers from on its own are logged here.
-func (p *program) serve(daemonListener, jsonListener *socketListener) error {
-	defer daemonListener.Close()
-	if jsonListener != nil {
-		defer jsonListener.Close()
-	}
-
-	// chmodUnixSocket is a no-op for a nil listener and for a non-unix one.
-	if err := daemonListener.chmodUnixSocket("daemon"); err != nil {
-		log.Error(err)
-		return nil
-	}
-	if err := jsonListener.chmodUnixSocket("daemon JSON"); err != nil {
-		log.Error(err)
-		return nil
-	}
-
-	serverInstance := server.New(p.ctx, util.FindFirstLogPath(logFiles), configPath, profilesDisabled, updateSettingsDisabled, captureEnabled, networksDisabled)
-	if err := serverInstance.Start(); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("start daemon: %w", err)
-	}
-	proto.RegisterDaemonServiceServer(p.serv, serverInstance)
-
-	p.serverInstanceMu.Lock()
-	p.serverInstance = serverInstance
-	p.serverInstanceMu.Unlock()
-
-	if jsonListener == nil {
-		log.Debug("daemon JSON socket disabled")
-	} else if err := p.startJSONGateway(jsonListener, daemonAddr); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("start daemon JSON server: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	log.Printf("started daemon server: %v", daemonListener.address)
-	if err := p.serv.Serve(daemonListener.Listener); err != nil {
-		log.Errorf("failed to serve daemon requests: %v", err)
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
 func (p *program) Stop(srv service.Service) error {
 	p.serverInstanceMu.Lock()
 	if p.serverInstance != nil {
@@ -179,13 +113,8 @@ func (p *program) Stop(srv service.Service) error {
 	p.cancel()
 
 	p.jsonServMu.Lock()
-	jsonServ, jsonClient := p.jsonServ, p.jsonClient
+	jsonServ := p.jsonServ
 	p.jsonServMu.Unlock()
-	if jsonClient != nil {
-		if err := jsonClient.Close(); err != nil {
-			log.Debugf("close daemon JSON gateway client: %v", err)
-		}
-	}
 	if jsonServ != nil {
 		shutdownCtx, shutdownCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Second)
 		if err := jsonServ.Shutdown(shutdownCtx); err != nil {

client/cmd/service_json_gateway.go

@@ -5,123 +5,27 @@ package cmd
 import (
 	"context"
 	"errors"
-	"fmt"
 	"net"
 	"net/http"
-	"sync"
+	"strings"
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/grpc-ecosystem/grpc-gateway/v2/runtime"
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 	"google.golang.org/grpc"
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials/insecure"
 
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/daemonaddr"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
 )
 
-// jsonPeerIdentity is the context key under which the connecting HTTP client's
-// identity is stashed for the lifetime of its connection.
-type jsonPeerIdentity struct{}
-
-// jsonPeerIdentityValue pairs the identity with whether it could be read at
-// all, so an unreadable identity is forwarded as "unknown" rather than omitted.
-type jsonPeerIdentityValue struct {
-	id    ipcauth.Identity
-	known bool
-}
-
-// jsonConnContext reads the identity of the client connecting to the JSON
-// socket and stashes it on the connection's context. The gateway re-dials the
-// daemon in-process, so the daemon would otherwise see every JSON request as
-// coming from the daemon itself.
-func jsonConnContext(ctx context.Context, c net.Conn) context.Context {
-	value := jsonPeerIdentityValue{}
-	id, err := ipcauth.ConnIdentity(c)
-	if err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("json gateway: cannot read HTTP client identity, privileged operations will be denied for this connection: %v", err)
-	} else {
-		value.id = id
-		value.known = true
-	}
-	return context.WithValue(ctx, jsonPeerIdentity{}, value)
-}
-
-// forwardIdentity stamps the HTTP client's identity onto every call the gateway
-// makes to the daemon.
-//
-// It is an interceptor on the gateway's client connection rather than a
-// runtime.WithMetadata annotator because grpc-gateway skips annotators when no
-// request header maps to metadata, which an HTTP/1.0 request with no Host header
-// over a unix socket achieves. The daemon would then receive no marker, see its own
-// identity as the transport peer, and authorize the request as the daemon itself.
-// An interceptor runs for every RPC whatever the request looked like.
-func forwardIdentity(ctx context.Context) context.Context {
-	value, ok := ctx.Value(jsonPeerIdentity{}).(jsonPeerIdentityValue)
-	if !ok {
-		// No ConnContext ran for this request, so forward an unknown identity:
-		// the daemon must not mistake its own identity for the client's.
-		return ipcauth.WithForwardedIdentity(ctx, ipcauth.Identity{}, false)
-	}
-	return ipcauth.WithForwardedIdentity(ctx, value.id, value.known)
-}
-
-func forwardIdentityUnary(ctx context.Context, method string, req, reply any, cc *grpc.ClientConn, invoker grpc.UnaryInvoker, opts ...grpc.CallOption) error {
-	return invoker(forwardIdentity(ctx), method, req, reply, cc, opts...)
-}
-
-func forwardIdentityStream(ctx context.Context, desc *grpc.StreamDesc, cc *grpc.ClientConn, method string, streamer grpc.Streamer, opts ...grpc.CallOption) (grpc.ClientStream, error) {
-	return streamer(forwardIdentity(ctx), desc, cc, method, opts...)
-}
-
-// reservedHeaderWarning limits the dropped-header warning to the first occurrence.
-var reservedHeaderWarning sync.Once
-
-// jsonIncomingHeaderMatcher keeps an HTTP client from supplying the metadata the
-// gateway uses to forward its identity. grpc-gateway turns "Grpc-Metadata-<key>"
-// headers into gRPC metadata and joins them ahead of what its annotators add, so
-// without this filter a JSON client could send its own x-netbird-fwd-uid and the
-// daemon would authorize that instead of the client's real identity.
-func jsonIncomingHeaderMatcher(key string) (string, bool) {
-	mapped, ok := runtime.DefaultHeaderMatcher(key)
-	if !ok {
-		return "", false
-	}
-	if ipcauth.IsReservedForwardKey(mapped) {
-		// Warn once: any client can send these on every request, so warning each
-		// time hands it a way to fill the log. The rest are debug-level.
-		reservedHeaderWarning.Do(func() {
-			log.Warnf("json gateway: dropping reserved header %q from a request: only the gateway may set the caller's identity", key)
-		})
-		log.Debugf("json gateway: dropping reserved header %q", key)
-		return "", false
-	}
-	return mapped, true
+func grpcGatewayEndpoint(addr string) string {
+	return strings.TrimPrefix(addr, "tcp://")
 }
 
 func (p *program) startJSONGateway(jsonListener *socketListener, daemonEndpoint string) error {
-	if jsonListener.network == "tcp" {
-		log.Warnf("daemon JSON socket is listening on TCP (%s): callers carry no verifiable identity over TCP, "+
-			"so privileged operations will be denied for JSON clients", jsonListener.address)
-	}
-
-	mux := runtime.NewServeMux(runtime.WithIncomingHeaderMatcher(jsonIncomingHeaderMatcher))
-
-	// grpc.NewClient does not connect until the first request, so registering
-	// the handler here cannot block daemon startup.
-	target, opts := daemonaddr.DialTarget(daemonEndpoint)
-	opts = append(opts,
-		grpc.WithChainUnaryInterceptor(forwardIdentityUnary),
-		grpc.WithChainStreamInterceptor(forwardIdentityStream),
-	)
-	conn, err := grpc.NewClient(target, opts...)
-	if err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("create daemon client for JSON gateway: %w", err)
-	}
-	if err := proto.RegisterDaemonServiceHandler(p.ctx, mux, conn); err != nil {
-		if cerr := conn.Close(); cerr != nil {
-			log.Debugf("close daemon client after failed JSON gateway registration: %v", cerr)
-		}
+	mux := runtime.NewServeMux()
+	opts := []grpc.DialOption{grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials())}
+	if err := proto.RegisterDaemonServiceHandlerFromEndpoint(p.ctx, mux, grpcGatewayEndpoint(daemonEndpoint), opts); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
 
@@ -131,12 +35,10 @@ func (p *program) startJSONGateway(jsonListener *socketListener, daemonEndpoint
 		BaseContext: func(net.Listener) context.Context {
 			return p.ctx
 		},
-		ConnContext: jsonConnContext,
 	}
 
 	p.jsonServMu.Lock()
 	p.jsonServ = jsonServer
-	p.jsonClient = conn
 	p.jsonServMu.Unlock()
 
 	go func() {

client/cmd/service_json_gateway_test.go

@@ -1,261 +0,0 @@
-//go:build !windows && !ios && !android
-
-package cmd
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"net"
-	"net/http"
-	"path/filepath"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/grpc-ecosystem/grpc-gateway/v2/runtime"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/peer"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
-)
-
-// The JSON gateway runs inside the daemon and re-dials it locally, so every JSON
-// request reaches a handler with the daemon's own identity as the transport peer.
-// The gateway therefore forwards its HTTP client's identity as metadata, and the
-// daemon authorizes that instead of itself. These tests drive the real wiring
-// (jsonConnContext, forwardIdentity, jsonIncomingHeaderMatcher) and check the
-// identity a handler would end up authorizing.
-
-// daemonSideCtx is what a handler sees for a gateway-relayed call. The transport
-// peer must be this process's own identity: the gateway is the daemon, so the two
-// cannot differ, and hardcoding root here instead would describe a state that
-// never occurs.
-func daemonSideCtx(t *testing.T, md metadata.MD) context.Context {
-	t.Helper()
-	self, err := ipcauth.CurrentProcessIdentity()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Skipf("cannot read this process's identity: %v", err)
-	}
-	ctx := peer.NewContext(context.Background(), &peer.Peer{
-		AuthInfo: ipcauth.AuthInfo{
-			CommonAuthInfo: credentials.CommonAuthInfo{SecurityLevel: credentials.NoSecurity},
-			Identity:       self,
-		},
-	})
-	return metadata.NewIncomingContext(ctx, md)
-}
-
-// gatewayMetadata reproduces what the daemon receives for a JSON request: the
-// mux annotates the context from the request's headers, then the interceptor on the
-// gateway's client connection stamps the caller's identity. The order matters,
-// since the interceptor must win over anything a header put there.
-func gatewayMetadata(t *testing.T, req *http.Request, ctx context.Context) metadata.MD {
-	t.Helper()
-	mux := runtime.NewServeMux(runtime.WithIncomingHeaderMatcher(jsonIncomingHeaderMatcher))
-	annotated, err := runtime.AnnotateContext(ctx, mux, req,
-		"/daemon.DaemonService/SetConfig",
-		runtime.WithHTTPPathPattern("/daemon.DaemonService/SetConfig"))
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("annotate: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	md, ok := metadata.FromOutgoingContext(forwardIdentity(annotated))
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatal("the interceptor produced no metadata")
-	}
-	return md
-}
-
-// clientCtx is the connection context jsonConnContext would have produced for an
-// HTTP client whose identity the gateway could read.
-func clientCtx(id ipcauth.Identity, known bool) context.Context {
-	return context.WithValue(context.Background(), jsonPeerIdentity{},
-		jsonPeerIdentityValue{id: id, known: known})
-}
-
-// An HTTP client must not be able to name its own identity. grpc-gateway turns
-// Grpc-Metadata-<key> headers into gRPC metadata, so without the header filter and
-// the interceptor overwriting the reserved keys, this request would authorize as
-// uid 0.
-func TestJSONGateway_ForgedIdentityHeaderIsDropped(t *testing.T) {
-	req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "http://localhost/daemon.DaemonService/SetConfig", nil)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	req.Header.Set("Grpc-Metadata-X-Netbird-Fwd-Uid", "0")
-	req.Header.Set("Grpc-Metadata-X-Netbird-Fwd-Gid", "0")
-	req.Header.Set("Grpc-Metadata-X-Netbird-Fwd", "1")
-	req.Header.Set("Grpc-Metadata-X-Netbird-Fwd-Sid", "S-1-5-18")
-
-	caller := ipcauth.Identity{UID: 31000, GID: 31000}
-	md := gatewayMetadata(t, req, clientCtx(caller, true))
-
-	id, ok := ipcauth.CallerIdentity(daemonSideCtx(t, md))
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatal("the forwarded identity should be usable")
-	}
-	if id.IsPrivileged() {
-		t.Errorf("forged header was believed: authorized as %v", id)
-	}
-	if id.UID != caller.UID {
-		t.Errorf("authorized as uid %d, want the real client %d", id.UID, caller.UID)
-	}
-}
-
-// A request with no headers at all (HTTP/1.0 needs no Host, and a unix socket
-// yields no host:port) makes grpc-gateway produce no metadata whatsoever and skip
-// its annotators: "if len(pairs) == 0 { return ctx, nil, nil }" in
-// runtime/context.go. That is why the identity is stamped by an interceptor
-// instead. This is the case that previously reached the gate as the daemon itself.
-func TestJSONGateway_HeaderlessRequestIsStillMarkedForwarded(t *testing.T) {
-	req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "http://localhost/daemon.DaemonService/SetConfig", nil)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	req.Header = http.Header{}
-	req.Host = ""
-
-	caller := ipcauth.Identity{UID: 31000, GID: 31000}
-	ctx := clientCtx(caller, true)
-
-	// Pin the skip path itself: if grpc-gateway ever produced a pair here, this
-	// test would still pass below while no longer covering what it was written for.
-	mux := runtime.NewServeMux(runtime.WithIncomingHeaderMatcher(jsonIncomingHeaderMatcher))
-	annotated, err := runtime.AnnotateContext(ctx, mux, req,
-		"/daemon.DaemonService/SetConfig",
-		runtime.WithHTTPPathPattern("/daemon.DaemonService/SetConfig"))
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("annotate: %v", err)
-	}
-	if md, ok := metadata.FromOutgoingContext(annotated); ok {
-		t.Fatalf("grpc-gateway produced metadata %v for a headerless request; "+
-			"this test no longer covers the annotator-skip path", md)
-	}
-
-	md := gatewayMetadata(t, req, ctx)
-
-	id, ok := ipcauth.CallerIdentity(daemonSideCtx(t, md))
-	if !ok {
-		t.Fatal("the forwarded identity should be usable")
-	}
-	if id.UID != caller.UID || id.IsPrivileged() {
-		t.Errorf("authorized as %v, want the real client uid %d", id, caller.UID)
-	}
-}
-
-// When the gateway cannot read its client's identity (a TCP JSON socket, say) it
-// forwards the marker alone. The daemon must then report "unidentified" so the
-// privileged operations refuse, rather than falling back to the gateway's own
-// identity.
-func TestJSONGateway_UnreadableClientIdentityIsUnidentified(t *testing.T) {
-	req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "http://localhost/daemon.DaemonService/SetConfig", nil)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-
-	md := gatewayMetadata(t, req, clientCtx(ipcauth.Identity{}, false))
-
-	if id, ok := ipcauth.CallerIdentity(daemonSideCtx(t, md)); ok {
-		t.Errorf("a request with no client identity was authorized as %v", id)
-	}
-}
-
-// A request that never passed through jsonConnContext (no stashed identity) must
-// also come out unidentified rather than as the daemon.
-func TestJSONGateway_MissingConnContextIsUnidentified(t *testing.T) {
-	req, err := http.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "http://localhost/daemon.DaemonService/SetConfig", nil)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-
-	md := gatewayMetadata(t, req, context.Background())
-
-	if id, ok := ipcauth.CallerIdentity(daemonSideCtx(t, md)); ok {
-		t.Errorf("a request with no connection context was authorized as %v", id)
-	}
-}
-
-// End to end over a real unix socket: the gateway reads the connecting client's
-// identity from the socket itself, so a client cannot present anything else.
-func TestJSONGateway_IdentityComesFromTheSocket(t *testing.T) {
-	mux := runtime.NewServeMux(runtime.WithIncomingHeaderMatcher(jsonIncomingHeaderMatcher))
-
-	type observed struct {
-		md metadata.MD
-	}
-	seen := make(chan observed, 1)
-
-	srv := &http.Server{
-		Handler: http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-			ctx, err := runtime.AnnotateContext(r.Context(), mux, r,
-				"/daemon.DaemonService/SetConfig",
-				runtime.WithHTTPPathPattern("/daemon.DaemonService/SetConfig"))
-			if err != nil {
-				t.Errorf("annotate: %v", err)
-				return
-			}
-			md, _ := metadata.FromOutgoingContext(forwardIdentity(ctx))
-			seen <- observed{md: md}
-			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-		}),
-		ReadHeaderTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
-		ConnContext:       jsonConnContext,
-	}
-
-	sock := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "http.sock")
-	ln, err := net.Listen("unix", sock)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	t.Cleanup(func() {
-		if err := srv.Close(); err != nil {
-			t.Logf("close server: %v", err)
-		}
-	})
-	go func() {
-		if err := srv.Serve(ln); err != nil && err != http.ErrServerClosed {
-			t.Logf("serve: %v", err)
-		}
-	}()
-
-	conn, err := net.Dial("unix", sock)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	t.Cleanup(func() {
-		if err := conn.Close(); err != nil {
-			t.Logf("close conn: %v", err)
-		}
-	})
-
-	// Forge the identity headers on the wire as well.
-	request := "POST /daemon.DaemonService/SetConfig HTTP/1.1\r\n" +
-		"Host: localhost\r\n" +
-		"Grpc-Metadata-X-Netbird-Fwd: 1\r\n" +
-		"Grpc-Metadata-X-Netbird-Fwd-Uid: 0\r\n" +
-		"Content-Length: 0\r\n\r\n"
-	if _, err := conn.Write([]byte(request)); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-
-	select {
-	case got := <-seen:
-		self, err := ipcauth.CurrentProcessIdentity()
-		if err != nil {
-			t.Skipf("cannot read this process's identity: %v", err)
-		}
-		// The socket peer is this test process, so that is the identity the
-		// gateway must forward, not the uid 0 the request asked for.
-		if uids := got.md.Get("x-netbird-fwd-uid"); len(uids) != 1 {
-			t.Fatalf("x-netbird-fwd-uid = %v, want exactly the gateway's own value", uids)
-		}
-		id, ok := ipcauth.CallerIdentity(daemonSideCtx(t, got.md))
-		if !ok {
-			t.Fatal("the forwarded identity should be usable")
-		}
-		if id.UID != self.UID {
-			t.Errorf("authorized as uid %d, want the socket peer %d", id.UID, self.UID)
-		}
-	case <-time.After(5 * time.Second):
-		t.Fatal("the gateway never handled the request")
-	}
-}

client/cmd/service_params.go

@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/configs"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/daemonaddr"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
 )
 
@@ -126,13 +125,6 @@ func applyServiceParams(cmd *cobra.Command, params *serviceParams) {
 
 	if !rootCmd.PersistentFlags().Changed("daemon-addr") && params.DaemonAddr != "" {
 		daemonAddr = params.DaemonAddr
-		// An install that predates named-pipe support has the loopback TCP
-		// address saved. Callers carry no identity over TCP, so move it to the
-		// pipe instead of restoring a socket the daemon cannot authorize on.
-		if migrated, ok := daemonaddr.MigrateLegacy(daemonAddr); ok {
-			cmd.Printf("Moving the saved daemon address from %s to %s so the daemon can identify its callers\n", daemonAddr, migrated)
-			daemonAddr = migrated
-		}
 	}
 
 	if !serviceCmd.PersistentFlags().Changed("json-socket") && params.JSONSocket != "" {

client/cmd/service_pipe_other.go

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-//go:build !windows
-
-package cmd
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"net"
-)
-
-// listenNamedPipe is Windows-only: no other platform serves the daemon on a
-// named pipe.
-func listenNamedPipe(string) (net.Listener, string, error) {
-	return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("named pipes are only supported on Windows")
-}

client/cmd/service_pipe_windows.go

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-//go:build windows
-
-package cmd
-
-import (
-	"errors"
-	"fmt"
-	"net"
-
-	"github.com/Microsoft/go-winio"
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/daemonaddr"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
-)
-
-// listenNamedPipe creates the daemon control pipe and reports the path it ended
-// up on. The security descriptor lets any local caller connect, as a Unix socket
-// at 0666 does, and the privileged operations are authorized separately from the
-// caller's token.
-//
-// The protected name comes first so that an unprivileged process cannot take the
-// name before the service does. Creating it requires being an administrator or
-// LocalSystem, so a daemon an ordinary user runs themselves, as in netstack mode,
-// falls back to the plain name; clients try both and check who serves them.
-func listenNamedPipe(name string) (net.Listener, string, error) {
-	var errs []error
-	for _, path := range daemonaddr.PipePaths(name) {
-		listener, err := winio.ListenPipe(path, &winio.PipeConfig{
-			SecurityDescriptor: ipcauth.DefaultPipeSDDL(),
-		})
-		if err != nil {
-			log.Debugf("not serving the daemon on %s: %v", path, err)
-			errs = append(errs, fmt.Errorf("%s: %w", path, err))
-			continue
-		}
-		return listener, path, nil
-	}
-
-	return nil, "", errors.Join(errs...)
-}

client/cmd/service_socket.go

@@ -26,14 +26,6 @@ func listenOnAddress(addr string) (*socketListener, error) {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
-	if network == "npipe" {
-		listener, path, err := listenNamedPipe(address)
-		if err != nil {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-		return &socketListener{Listener: listener, network: network, address: path}, nil
-	}
-
 	if network == "unix" {
 		removeStaleUnixSocket(address)
 	}
@@ -49,11 +41,11 @@ func listenOnAddress(addr string) (*socketListener, error) {
 func parseListenAddress(addr string) (string, string, error) {
 	network, address, ok := strings.Cut(addr, "://")
 	if !ok || network == "" || address == "" {
-		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("address must be in [unix|tcp|npipe]://[path|host:port|name] format: %q", addr)
+		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("address must be in [unix|tcp]://[path|host:port] format: %q", addr)
 	}
 
 	switch network {
-	case "unix", "tcp", "npipe":
+	case "unix", "tcp":
 		return network, address, nil
 	default:
 		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("unsupported daemon address protocol: %v", network)

client/cmd/up.go

@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ func runInDaemonMode(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, pm *profilemanager
 		if st, ok := gstatus.FromError(err); ok && st.Code() == codes.Unavailable {
 			log.Warnf("setConfig method is not available in the daemon: %s", st.Message())
 		} else {
-			return daemonCallError("call service setConfig method", err)
+			return fmt.Errorf("call service setConfig method: %v", err)
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ func doDaemonUp(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, client proto.DaemonServ
 	}
 
 	if loginErr != nil {
-		return daemonCallError("login failed", loginErr)
+		return fmt.Errorf("login failed: %v", loginErr)
 	}
 
 	if loginResp.NeedsSSOLogin {
@@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ func doDaemonUp(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, client proto.DaemonServ
 		ProfileName: &profileID,
 		Username:    &username,
 	}); err != nil {
-		return daemonCallError("call service up method", err)
+		return fmt.Errorf("call service up method: %v", err)
 	}
 
 	return nil

client/firewall/uspfilter/filter.go

@@ -121,7 +121,6 @@ type Manager struct {
 	udpTracker     *conntrack.UDPTracker
 	icmpTracker    *conntrack.ICMPTracker
 	tcpTracker     *conntrack.TCPTracker
-	fragments      *fragmentTracker
 	forwarder      atomic.Pointer[forwarder.Forwarder]
 	pendingCapture atomic.Pointer[forwarder.PacketCapture]
 	logger         *nblog.Logger
@@ -184,41 +183,6 @@ func (d *decoder) decodePacket(data []byte) error {
 	}
 }
 
-// decodeTransport decodes the transport header of a first fragment (which
-// gopacket leaves undecoded) into the decoder and appends its layer type to
-// decoded, so the ACL pipeline can evaluate it like a normal packet. It returns
-// false if the protocol is unsupported or the header is truncated.
-func (d *decoder) decodeTransport(proto layers.IPProtocol, payload []byte) bool {
-	var l4 gopacket.DecodingLayer
-	var layerType gopacket.LayerType
-	var minLen int
-	switch proto {
-	case layers.IPProtocolTCP:
-		l4, layerType, minLen = &d.tcp, layers.LayerTypeTCP, 20
-	case layers.IPProtocolUDP:
-		l4, layerType, minLen = &d.udp, layers.LayerTypeUDP, 8
-	case layers.IPProtocolICMPv4:
-		l4, layerType, minLen = &d.icmp4, layers.LayerTypeICMPv4, 8
-	case layers.IPProtocolICMPv6:
-		l4, layerType, minLen = &d.icmp6, layers.LayerTypeICMPv6, 8
-	default:
-		return false
-	}
-
-	// Reject a fragment too small to hold the full transport header before
-	// decoding: it can't be ACL-evaluated (tiny-fragment attack), and skipping
-	// the decode avoids gopacket allocating an error on the drop path.
-	if len(payload) < minLen {
-		return false
-	}
-
-	if err := l4.DecodeFromBytes(payload, gopacket.NilDecodeFeedback); err != nil {
-		return false
-	}
-	d.decoded = append(d.decoded, layerType)
-	return true
-}
-
 // Create userspace firewall manager constructor
 func Create(iface common.IFaceMapper, disableServerRoutes bool, flowLogger nftypes.FlowLogger, mtu uint16) (*Manager, error) {
 	return create(iface, nil, disableServerRoutes, flowLogger, mtu)
@@ -322,8 +286,6 @@ func create(iface common.IFaceMapper, nativeFirewall firewall.Manager, disableSe
 	if err := m.localipmanager.UpdateLocalIPs(iface); err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("update local IPs: %w", err)
 	}
-	m.fragments = newFragmentTracker(m.logger)
-
 	if disableConntrack {
 		log.Info("conntrack is disabled")
 	} else {
@@ -337,7 +299,6 @@ func create(iface common.IFaceMapper, nativeFirewall firewall.Manager, disableSe
 		}
 	}
 	if err := iface.SetFilter(m); err != nil {
-		m.fragments.Close()
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("set filter: %w", err)
 	}
 	return m, nil
@@ -733,10 +694,6 @@ func (m *Manager) resetState() {
 		m.tcpTracker.Close()
 	}
 
-	if m.fragments != nil {
-		m.fragments.Close()
-	}
-
 	if fwder := m.forwarder.Load(); fwder != nil {
 		fwder.SetCapture(nil)
 		fwder.Stop()
@@ -1089,20 +1046,19 @@ func (m *Manager) filterInbound(packetData []byte, size int) bool {
 		return true
 	}
 
-	// gopacket does not decode the transport header of any IP fragment, so
-	// fragments take a dedicated path: the first fragment's header is decoded
-	// and ACL-evaluated here, and the remaining fragments inherit its verdict.
+	// TODO: pass fragments of routed packets to forwarder
 	if fragment {
-		return m.filterInboundFragment(d, srcIP, dstIP, size)
+		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
+			if d.decoded[0] == layers.LayerTypeIPv4 {
+				m.logger.Trace4("packet is a fragment: src=%v dst=%v id=%v flags=%v",
+					srcIP, dstIP, d.ip4.Id, d.ip4.Flags)
+			} else {
+				m.logger.Trace2("packet is an IPv6 fragment: src=%v dst=%v", srcIP, dstIP)
+			}
+		}
+		return false
 	}
 
-	return m.filterInboundDecoded(d, srcIP, dstIP, packetData, size)
-}
-
-// filterInboundDecoded runs the ACL, DNAT and conntrack pipeline on a fully
-// decoded (non-fragment) inbound packet. It returns true if the packet should
-// be dropped.
-func (m *Manager) filterInboundDecoded(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, packetData []byte, size int) bool {
 	// TODO: optimize port DNAT by caching matched rules in conntrack
 	if translated := m.translateInboundPortDNAT(packetData, d, srcIP, dstIP); translated {
 		// Re-decode after port DNAT translation to update port information
@@ -1133,226 +1089,33 @@ func (m *Manager) filterInboundDecoded(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, pack
 	return m.handleRoutedTraffic(d, srcIP, dstIP, packetData, size)
 }
 
-// fragmentMeta holds the reassembly identity and layout of an IP fragment,
-// extracted uniformly for IPv4 and IPv6.
-type fragmentMeta struct {
-	key fragmentKey
-	// offset is the fragment offset in 8-byte units (zero for the first
-	// fragment).
-	offset uint16
-	// moreFragments is the More Fragments bit. A first fragment with it unset is
-	// an IPv6 atomic fragment (a complete datagram, RFC 6946): it has no trailing
-	// fragments to inherit a verdict, so it must not be recorded.
-	moreFragments bool
-	proto         layers.IPProtocol
-	// l4payload is the fragmentable payload of this fragment. For the first
-	// fragment it starts with the transport header.
-	l4payload []byte
-	// headerEndOctets is the first fragment's payload length in 8-byte units:
-	// the smallest offset a trailing fragment may start at without overlapping
-	// the inspected transport header.
-	headerEndOctets uint16
-}
-
-// fragmentMetadata extracts the fragment identity and layout from a decoded IP
-// fragment. It returns false for fragments it can't interpret (e.g. an IPv6
-// fragment header shorter than 8 bytes), which are then dropped.
-func fragmentMetadata(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr) (fragmentMeta, bool) {
-	switch d.decoded[0] {
-	case layers.LayerTypeIPv4:
-		payload := d.ip4.Payload
-		return fragmentMeta{
-			key:             fragmentKey{srcIP: srcIP, dstIP: dstIP, id: uint32(d.ip4.Id), proto: uint8(d.ip4.Protocol)},
-			offset:          d.ip4.FragOffset,
-			moreFragments:   d.ip4.Flags&layers.IPv4MoreFragments != 0,
-			proto:           d.ip4.Protocol,
-			l4payload:       payload,
-			headerEndOctets: octets(len(payload)),
-		}, true
-
-	case layers.LayerTypeIPv6:
-		// IPv6 fragment extension header: 8 bytes, followed by the fragmentable
-		// payload. Layout: next header (1), reserved (1), offset+flags (2), id (4).
-		payload := d.ip6.Payload
-		if len(payload) < 8 {
-			return fragmentMeta{}, false
-		}
-		nextHeader := layers.IPProtocol(payload[0])
-		offsetFlags := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(payload[2:4])
-		id := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(payload[4:8])
-		l4 := payload[8:]
-		return fragmentMeta{
-			key:             fragmentKey{srcIP: srcIP, dstIP: dstIP, id: id, proto: uint8(nextHeader)},
-			offset:          offsetFlags >> 3,
-			moreFragments:   offsetFlags&1 != 0,
-			proto:           nextHeader,
-			l4payload:       l4,
-			headerEndOctets: octets(len(l4)),
-		}, true
-
-	default:
-		return fragmentMeta{}, false
-	}
-}
-
-// octets rounds a byte length up to whole 8-byte units, the granularity of the
-// IP fragment offset field.
-func octets(nbytes int) uint16 {
-	return uint16((nbytes + 7) / 8)
-}
-
-// filterInboundFragment decides the fate of an IP fragment. gopacket stops
-// decoding at the network layer for every fragment, so the first fragment's
-// transport header is decoded and ACL-evaluated here and its verdict recorded;
-// the remaining (headerless) fragments inherit that verdict. Anything that
-// cannot be tied to an allowed, non-overlapping first fragment is dropped.
-func (m *Manager) filterInboundFragment(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, size int) bool {
-	meta, ok := fragmentMetadata(d, srcIP, dstIP)
-	if !ok {
-		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
-			m.logger.Trace2("dropping unsupported fragment: src=%v dst=%v", srcIP, dstIP)
-		}
-		return true
-	}
-
-	if meta.offset != 0 {
-		return m.filterTrailingFragment(meta, srcIP, dstIP)
-	}
-
-	// A new first fragment supersedes any recorded verdict for this datagram, so
-	// a re-sent or overlapping offset-zero fragment can't inherit the old one.
-	m.fragments.poison(meta.key)
-
-	// First fragment: decode its transport header so the ACL can evaluate it. A
-	// decode failure means the fragment is too small to hold the full transport
-	// header (RFC 1858 §3 tiny-fragment attack); it can't be evaluated, so drop it.
-	if !d.decodeTransport(meta.proto, meta.l4payload) {
-		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
-			m.logger.Trace3("dropping first fragment without full L4 header: src=%v dst=%v id=%v",
-				srcIP, dstIP, meta.key.id)
-		}
-		return true
-	}
-
-	return m.filterFirstFragment(d, meta, srcIP, dstIP, size)
-}
-
-// filterTrailingFragment applies a recorded first-fragment verdict to a
-// non-first fragment.
-func (m *Manager) filterTrailingFragment(meta fragmentMeta, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr) bool {
-	switch m.fragments.verdict(meta.key, meta.offset) {
-	case fragmentAllow:
-		return false
-	case fragmentOverlap:
-		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
-			m.logger.Trace3("dropping overlapping fragment rewriting inspected header: src=%v dst=%v id=%v",
-				srcIP, dstIP, meta.key.id)
-		}
-		return true
-	default:
-		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
-			m.logger.Trace3("dropping fragment with no allowed first fragment: src=%v dst=%v id=%v",
-				srcIP, dstIP, meta.key.id)
-		}
-		return true
-	}
-}
-
-// filterFirstFragment runs the verdict part of the inbound pipeline on a first
-// fragment with its transport header decoded. It mirrors filterInboundDecoded
-// but skips DNAT (port rewriting on fragments is unsupported) and forwarder
-// injection (fragments are left to the stack to reassemble, not forwarded).
-// Allowed fragments have their verdict recorded so the datagram's trailing
-// fragments inherit it.
-func (m *Manager) filterFirstFragment(d *decoder, meta fragmentMeta, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, size int) bool {
-	if m.stateful && m.isValidTrackedConnection(d, srcIP, dstIP, size) {
-		m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
-		return false
-	}
-
-	if m.localipmanager.IsLocalIP(dstIP) {
-		ruleID, blocked := m.peerACLsBlock(srcIP, d, nil)
-		if blocked {
-			m.storeDropFlow("Dropping local first fragment (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
-				d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
-			return true
-		}
-		m.trackInbound(d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
-		m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
-		return false
-	}
-
-	if !m.routingEnabled.Load() {
-		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
-			m.logger.Trace2("Dropping routed fragment (routing disabled): src=%s dst=%s", srcIP, dstIP)
-		}
-		return true
-	}
-	if m.nativeRouter.Load() {
-		m.trackInbound(d, srcIP, dstIP, nil, size)
-		m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
-		return false
-	}
-
-	// TODO: pass fragments of routed packets to the forwarder; until then
-	// allowed routed fragments go to the native stack.
-	srcPort, dstPort := getPortsFromPacket(d)
-	ruleID, pass := m.routeACLsPass(srcIP, dstIP, d.decoded[1], srcPort, dstPort)
-	if !pass {
-		m.storeDropFlow("Dropping routed first fragment (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
-			d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
-		return true
-	}
-
-	m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
-	return false
-}
-
-// recordFirstFragment caches an allowed first fragment's verdict for its
-// trailing fragments to inherit. Atomic fragments (no More Fragments bit) are
-// complete datagrams with no trailing fragments, so they are not cached and
-// cannot exhaust the verdict table.
-func (m *Manager) recordFirstFragment(meta fragmentMeta) {
-	if !meta.moreFragments {
-		return
-	}
-	m.fragments.recordAllowed(meta.key, meta.headerEndOctets)
-}
-
-// storeDropFlow logs and records a netflow drop event for an inbound packet
-// denied by the ACLs. msg is the trace format taking rule id, protocol, source
-// and destination.
-func (m *Manager) storeDropFlow(msg string, d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, ruleID []byte, size int) {
-	pnum := getProtocolFromPacket(d)
-	srcPort, dstPort := getPortsFromPacket(d)
-
-	if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
-		m.logger.Trace6(msg, ruleID, pnum, srcIP, srcPort, dstIP, dstPort)
-	}
-
-	m.flowLogger.StoreEvent(nftypes.EventFields{
-		FlowID:     uuid.New(),
-		Type:       nftypes.TypeDrop,
-		RuleID:     ruleID,
-		Direction:  nftypes.Ingress,
-		Protocol:   pnum,
-		SourceIP:   srcIP,
-		DestIP:     dstIP,
-		SourcePort: srcPort,
-		DestPort:   dstPort,
-		// TODO: icmp type/code
-		RxPackets: 1,
-		RxBytes:   uint64(size),
-	})
-}
-
 // handleLocalTraffic handles local traffic.
 // If it returns true, the packet should be dropped.
 func (m *Manager) handleLocalTraffic(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, packetData []byte, size int) bool {
 	ruleID, blocked := m.peerACLsBlock(srcIP, d, packetData)
 	if blocked {
-		m.storeDropFlow("Dropping local packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
-			d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
+		pnum := getProtocolFromPacket(d)
+		srcPort, dstPort := getPortsFromPacket(d)
+
+		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
+			m.logger.Trace6("Dropping local packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
+				ruleID, pnum, srcIP, srcPort, dstIP, dstPort)
+		}
+
+		m.flowLogger.StoreEvent(nftypes.EventFields{
+			FlowID:     uuid.New(),
+			Type:       nftypes.TypeDrop,
+			RuleID:     ruleID,
+			Direction:  nftypes.Ingress,
+			Protocol:   pnum,
+			SourceIP:   srcIP,
+			DestIP:     dstIP,
+			SourcePort: srcPort,
+			DestPort:   dstPort,
+			// TODO: icmp type/code
+			RxPackets: 1,
+			RxBytes:   uint64(size),
+		})
 		return true
 	}
 
@@ -1405,8 +1168,27 @@ func (m *Manager) handleRoutedTraffic(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, packe
 
 	ruleID, pass := m.routeACLsPass(srcIP, dstIP, protoLayer, srcPort, dstPort)
 	if !pass {
-		m.storeDropFlow("Dropping routed packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
-			d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
+		proto := getProtocolFromPacket(d)
+
+		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
+			m.logger.Trace6("Dropping routed packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
+				ruleID, proto, srcIP, srcPort, dstIP, dstPort)
+		}
+
+		m.flowLogger.StoreEvent(nftypes.EventFields{
+			FlowID:     uuid.New(),
+			Type:       nftypes.TypeDrop,
+			RuleID:     ruleID,
+			Direction:  nftypes.Ingress,
+			Protocol:   proto,
+			SourceIP:   srcIP,
+			DestIP:     dstIP,
+			SourcePort: srcPort,
+			DestPort:   dstPort,
+			// TODO: icmp type/code
+			RxPackets: 1,
+			RxBytes:   uint64(size),
+		})
 		return true
 	}
 

client/firewall/uspfilter/forwarder/forwarder.go

@@ -5,9 +5,7 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"net"
 	"net/netip"
-	"os"
 	"runtime"
-	"strconv"
 	"sync"
 	"time"
 
@@ -33,11 +31,6 @@ const (
 	defaultMaxInFlight   = 1024
 	iosReceiveWindow     = 16384
 	iosMaxInFlight       = 256
-
-	// envForceTCPRACK overrides the platform default for gVisor's RACK loss
-	// detection. Set to a truthy value to force RACK on, or a falsy value to
-	// force it off, on any platform.
-	envForceTCPRACK = "NB_FORCE_TCP_RACK"
 )
 
 type Forwarder struct {
@@ -159,8 +152,6 @@ func New(iface common.IFaceMapper, logger *nblog.Logger, flowLogger nftypes.Flow
 		maxInFlight = iosMaxInFlight
 	}
 
-	configureTCPRecovery(s)
-
 	tcpForwarder := tcp.NewForwarder(s, receiveWindow, maxInFlight, f.handleTCP)
 	s.SetTransportProtocolHandler(tcp.ProtocolNumber, tcpForwarder.HandlePacket)
 
@@ -475,31 +466,3 @@ func probeRawICMP(network, addr string, logger *nblog.Logger) bool {
 	logger.Debug1("forwarder: raw %s socket access available", network)
 	return true
 }
-
-// configureTCPRecovery disables gVisor's RACK loss detection on Windows, where
-// it interacts poorly with the host and collapses throughput on routed TCP
-// connections (gVisor issue #9778). Other platforms keep the default. The
-// EnvForceTCPRACK environment variable overrides the platform default.
-func configureTCPRecovery(s *stack.Stack) {
-	disableRACK := runtime.GOOS == "windows"
-
-	if val := os.Getenv(envForceTCPRACK); val != "" {
-		force, err := strconv.ParseBool(val)
-		if err != nil {
-			log.Warnf("parse %s: %v", envForceTCPRACK, err)
-		} else {
-			disableRACK = !force
-		}
-	}
-
-	if !disableRACK {
-		return
-	}
-
-	opt := tcpip.TCPRecovery(0)
-	if err := s.SetTransportProtocolOption(tcp.ProtocolNumber, &opt); err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("disable TCP RACK loss detection: %v", err)
-		return
-	}
-	log.Info("forwarder: TCP RACK loss detection disabled")
-}

client/firewall/uspfilter/fragment.go

@@ -1,204 +0,0 @@
-package uspfilter
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"net/netip"
-	"os"
-	"strconv"
-	"sync"
-	"time"
-
-	nblog "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/uspfilter/log"
-)
-
-const (
-	// defaultFragmentTimeout bounds how long a first-fragment verdict is kept
-	// while the remaining fragments arrive. It mirrors the Linux IP reassembly
-	// timeout (net.ipv4.ipfrag_time).
-	defaultFragmentTimeout = 30 * time.Second
-	// fragmentCleanupInterval is how often expired verdicts are purged.
-	fragmentCleanupInterval = 10 * time.Second
-	// defaultMaxFragmentEntries caps the number of concurrently tracked
-	// fragmented datagrams. The table stays bounded because each datagram is a
-	// single small entry regardless of how many fragments it is split into, and
-	// the 13-bit IPv4 fragment-offset field limits any datagram to 64 KiB.
-	defaultMaxFragmentEntries = 16384
-
-	// EnvFragmentMaxEntries overrides defaultMaxFragmentEntries.
-	EnvFragmentMaxEntries = "NB_FRAGMENT_MAX_ENTRIES"
-)
-
-// fragmentVerdict is the decision for a trailing (headerless) fragment.
-type fragmentVerdict int
-
-const (
-	// fragmentDeny drops the fragment: no allowed first fragment is on record.
-	fragmentDeny fragmentVerdict = iota
-	// fragmentAllow passes the fragment: it belongs to an allowed datagram and
-	// does not overlap the already-inspected transport header.
-	fragmentAllow
-	// fragmentOverlap drops the fragment and poisons its datagram: it overlaps
-	// the transport header the ACL inspected (RFC 1858 §4, RFC 3128; RFC 5722
-	// requires discarding the whole datagram on overlap for IPv6).
-	fragmentOverlap
-)
-
-// fragmentKey identifies a fragmented datagram. It matches the RFC 791 / RFC
-// 8200 reassembly key: source, destination, protocol and identification. The id
-// is 32-bit to hold both the IPv4 (16-bit) and IPv6 (32-bit) identification.
-type fragmentKey struct {
-	srcIP netip.Addr
-	dstIP netip.Addr
-	id    uint32
-	proto uint8
-}
-
-// fragmentEntry records the verdict of an allowed first fragment.
-type fragmentEntry struct {
-	// headerEndOctets is the offset, in 8-byte units, at which the first
-	// fragment's payload ended. A trailing fragment starting before this
-	// overlaps bytes the ACL already inspected and is rejected.
-	headerEndOctets uint16
-	// recordedAt is when the first fragment was accepted. The verdict expires a
-	// fixed timeout later and is not refreshed, mirroring the kernel reassembly
-	// timer so a trailing-fragment flood can't keep a datagram alive.
-	recordedAt time.Time
-}
-
-// fragmentTracker records the ACL verdict of a datagram's first fragment so the
-// remaining fragments, which carry no L4 header, can inherit the decision
-// without reassembling the datagram. Only allowed first fragments are stored;
-// anything that cannot be tied to an allowed, non-overlapping first fragment is
-// dropped (fail closed).
-type fragmentTracker struct {
-	logger  *nblog.Logger
-	mutex   sync.Mutex
-	entries map[fragmentKey]fragmentEntry
-	timeout time.Duration
-	// maxEntries caps the table; atCapacity dedups the capacity warning until
-	// the table drains below the cap again.
-	maxEntries    int
-	atCapacity    bool
-	cleanupTicker *time.Ticker
-	cancel        context.CancelFunc
-}
-
-func newFragmentTracker(logger *nblog.Logger) *fragmentTracker {
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-	t := &fragmentTracker{
-		logger:        logger,
-		entries:       make(map[fragmentKey]fragmentEntry),
-		timeout:       defaultFragmentTimeout,
-		maxEntries:    fragmentMaxEntries(logger),
-		cleanupTicker: time.NewTicker(fragmentCleanupInterval),
-		cancel:        cancel,
-	}
-	go t.cleanupRoutine(ctx)
-	return t
-}
-
-func fragmentMaxEntries(logger *nblog.Logger) int {
-	v := os.Getenv(EnvFragmentMaxEntries)
-	if v == "" {
-		return defaultMaxFragmentEntries
-	}
-	n, err := strconv.Atoi(v)
-	if err != nil || n <= 0 {
-		logger.Warn2("invalid %s=%q, using default", EnvFragmentMaxEntries, v)
-		return defaultMaxFragmentEntries
-	}
-	return n
-}
-
-// recordAllowed stores the verdict of an allowed first fragment. headerEndOctets
-// is the first fragment's payload length in 8-byte units. When the table is full
-// the record is dropped, which fails closed: the datagram's trailing fragments
-// will be denied.
-func (t *fragmentTracker) recordAllowed(key fragmentKey, headerEndOctets uint16) {
-	t.mutex.Lock()
-	defer t.mutex.Unlock()
-
-	if t.entries == nil {
-		return
-	}
-	if _, ok := t.entries[key]; !ok && len(t.entries) >= t.maxEntries {
-		if !t.atCapacity {
-			t.atCapacity = true
-			t.logger.Warn2("fragment verdict table at capacity (%d/%d): trailing fragments of new datagrams will be dropped",
-				len(t.entries), t.maxEntries)
-		}
-		return
-	}
-	t.entries[key] = fragmentEntry{
-		headerEndOctets: headerEndOctets,
-		recordedAt:      time.Now(),
-	}
-}
-
-// poison drops any recorded verdict for a datagram, so its later fragments are
-// denied until a new allowed first fragment is recorded. Called on every
-// offset-zero fragment to defeat offset-zero overlap rewrites (RFC 3128).
-func (t *fragmentTracker) poison(key fragmentKey) {
-	t.mutex.Lock()
-	defer t.mutex.Unlock()
-	delete(t.entries, key)
-}
-
-// verdict decides the fate of a trailing fragment at fragOffsetOctets (the IPv4
-// fragment offset, in 8-byte units). A fragment overlapping the inspected
-// header poisons the datagram: the entry is removed so all further fragments of
-// that datagram are denied too.
-func (t *fragmentTracker) verdict(key fragmentKey, fragOffsetOctets uint16) fragmentVerdict {
-	t.mutex.Lock()
-	defer t.mutex.Unlock()
-
-	entry, ok := t.entries[key]
-	if !ok {
-		return fragmentDeny
-	}
-	if time.Since(entry.recordedAt) > t.timeout {
-		delete(t.entries, key)
-		return fragmentDeny
-	}
-	if fragOffsetOctets < entry.headerEndOctets {
-		delete(t.entries, key)
-		return fragmentOverlap
-	}
-	return fragmentAllow
-}
-
-func (t *fragmentTracker) cleanupRoutine(ctx context.Context) {
-	defer t.cleanupTicker.Stop()
-	for {
-		select {
-		case <-t.cleanupTicker.C:
-			t.cleanup()
-		case <-ctx.Done():
-			return
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func (t *fragmentTracker) cleanup() {
-	t.mutex.Lock()
-	defer t.mutex.Unlock()
-
-	for key, entry := range t.entries {
-		if time.Since(entry.recordedAt) > t.timeout {
-			delete(t.entries, key)
-		}
-	}
-
-	if len(t.entries) < t.maxEntries {
-		t.atCapacity = false
-	}
-}
-
-// Close stops the cleanup routine and releases resources.
-func (t *fragmentTracker) Close() {
-	t.cancel()
-
-	t.mutex.Lock()
-	t.entries = nil
-	t.mutex.Unlock()
-}

client/firewall/uspfilter/fragment_bench_test.go

@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
-package uspfilter
-
-import (
-	"encoding/binary"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// benchFilterInbound drives filterInbound over a fixed packet in a tight loop.
-// Packets are built once, outside the timed region, so the benchmark measures
-// only pipeline cost, which is what an attacker can amplify.
-func benchFilterInbound(b *testing.B, pkt []byte) {
-	b.Helper()
-	b.ReportAllocs()
-	b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkt)))
-	b.ResetTimer()
-	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
-		m := benchManager
-		m.filterInbound(pkt, len(pkt))
-	}
-}
-
-// benchManager is a package-level manager reused across fragment benchmarks so
-// setup cost stays out of the timed region.
-var benchManager *Manager
-
-func setupBenchManager(b *testing.B) *Manager {
-	b.Helper()
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(b)
-	allowUDP(b, m, 8080)
-	// Disable conntrack so the allowed-first-fragment path measures transport
-	// decode + ACL every iteration instead of matching the connection tracked
-	// on the first iteration.
-	m.stateful = false
-	benchManager = m
-	return m
-}
-
-// BenchmarkInbound_NormalPacket is the baseline: a full, non-fragmented UDP
-// packet that passes the ACL. Fragment paths should stay comparable to this.
-func BenchmarkInbound_NormalPacket(b *testing.B) {
-	setupBenchManager(b)
-	pkt := normalUDPPacket(b, 8080, 32)
-	benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
-}
-
-// BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentAllowed measures the first-fragment path:
-// transport decode + ACL evaluation + verdict record.
-func BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentAllowed(b *testing.B) {
-	setupBenchManager(b)
-	pkt := firstFragmentUDP(b, 0x2000, 8080, 32)
-	benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
-}
-
-// BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentAllowed measures the common trailing-fragment
-// path: a single map lookup after the first fragment is on record.
-func BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentAllowed(b *testing.B) {
-	m := setupBenchManager(b)
-	first := firstFragmentUDP(b, 0x3000, 8080, 32)
-	m.filterInbound(first, len(first))
-	pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x3000, 5, false, 24)
-	benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
-}
-
-// BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentNoFirst is the primary DoS vector: an
-// attacker floods trailing fragments with no first fragment on record. Each is
-// a map miss and must be cheap.
-func BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentNoFirst(b *testing.B) {
-	setupBenchManager(b)
-	pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x4000, 185, false, 40)
-	benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
-}
-
-// BenchmarkInbound_TinyFirstFragment measures the tiny-fragment drop path: a
-// first fragment too small to decode a transport header.
-func BenchmarkInbound_TinyFirstFragment(b *testing.B) {
-	setupBenchManager(b)
-	pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x5000, 0, true, 4)
-	benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
-}
-
-// BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentDistinctIDs is the worst case for the
-// verdict table: an attacker varies the datagram id on every packet so no first
-// fragment ever matches. Verdict lookups always miss and nothing is recorded,
-// so the table cannot grow. Each iteration rewrites the id field in place.
-func BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentDistinctIDs(b *testing.B) {
-	setupBenchManager(b)
-	pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x6000, 185, false, 40)
-	m := benchManager
-
-	b.ReportAllocs()
-	b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkt)))
-	b.ResetTimer()
-	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
-		// IPv4 identification field is at bytes 4:6.
-		binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], uint16(i))
-		m.filterInbound(pkt, len(pkt))
-	}
-}
-
-// BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentDistinctIDs measures sustained first-fragment
-// pressure with distinct ids: transport decode + ACL + verdict insert until the
-// table caps, exercising the map growth and capacity guard.
-func BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentDistinctIDs(b *testing.B) {
-	setupBenchManager(b)
-	pkt := firstFragmentUDP(b, 0x7000, 8080, 32)
-	m := benchManager
-
-	b.ReportAllocs()
-	b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkt)))
-	b.ResetTimer()
-	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
-		binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], uint16(i))
-		m.filterInbound(pkt, len(pkt))
-	}
-}

client/firewall/uspfilter/fragment_test.go

@@ -1,554 +0,0 @@
-package uspfilter
-
-import (
-	"encoding/binary"
-	"net"
-	"net/netip"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/google/gopacket"
-	"github.com/google/gopacket/layers"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-
-	fw "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
-	nbiface "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/device"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
-)
-
-const (
-	fragTestSrc   = "100.10.0.1"
-	fragTestDst   = "100.10.0.100"
-	fragTestSrcV6 = "fd00::1"
-	fragTestDstV6 = "fd00::100"
-)
-
-func newFragmentTestManager(tb testing.TB) *Manager {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ifaceMock := &IFaceMock{
-		SetFilterFunc: func(device.PacketFilter) error { return nil },
-		AddressFunc: func() wgaddr.Address {
-			return wgaddr.Address{
-				IP:      netip.MustParseAddr(fragTestDst),
-				Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("100.10.0.0/16"),
-				IPv6:    netip.MustParseAddr(fragTestDstV6),
-				IPv6Net: netip.MustParsePrefix("fd00::/64"),
-			}
-		},
-	}
-
-	m, err := Create(ifaceMock, false, flowLogger, nbiface.DefaultMTU)
-	require.NoError(tb, err)
-	require.NoError(tb, m.UpdateLocalIPs())
-	tb.Cleanup(func() { require.NoError(tb, m.Close(nil)) })
-	return m
-}
-
-// firstFragmentUDPTo builds the first fragment of a fragmented UDP datagram to
-// the given destination: it carries the full UDP header plus payloadLen bytes
-// of data, with the More Fragments flag set and offset zero.
-func firstFragmentUDPTo(tb testing.TB, dst string, id uint16, dstPort uint16, payloadLen int) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ip := &layers.IPv4{
-		Version:  4,
-		TTL:      64,
-		Id:       id,
-		Protocol: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
-		SrcIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
-		DstIP:    net.ParseIP(dst),
-		Flags:    layers.IPv4MoreFragments,
-	}
-	udp := &layers.UDP{SrcPort: 40000, DstPort: layers.UDPPort(dstPort)}
-	require.NoError(tb, udp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
-
-	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
-	opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
-	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, udp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, payloadLen))))
-	return buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-func firstFragmentUDP(tb testing.TB, id uint16, dstPort uint16, payloadLen int) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-	return firstFragmentUDPTo(tb, fragTestDst, id, dstPort, payloadLen)
-}
-
-// firstFragmentTCP builds the first fragment of a fragmented TCP datagram: the
-// full 20-byte TCP header plus 12 bytes of data, with the More Fragments flag
-// set and offset zero.
-func firstFragmentTCP(tb testing.TB, id uint16, dstPort uint16) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ip := &layers.IPv4{
-		Version:  4,
-		TTL:      64,
-		Id:       id,
-		Protocol: layers.IPProtocolTCP,
-		SrcIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
-		DstIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestDst),
-		Flags:    layers.IPv4MoreFragments,
-	}
-	tcp := &layers.TCP{SrcPort: 40000, DstPort: layers.TCPPort(dstPort), SYN: true, Window: 64240}
-	require.NoError(tb, tcp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
-
-	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
-	opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
-	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, tcp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, 12))))
-	return buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-// trailingFragmentTo builds a non-first fragment to the given destination: an
-// IPv4 header at the given fragment offset (in 8-byte units) carrying raw
-// payload and no L4 header.
-func trailingFragmentTo(tb testing.TB, dst string, proto layers.IPProtocol, id uint16, fragOffsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, payloadLen int) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ip := &layers.IPv4{
-		Version:    4,
-		TTL:        64,
-		Id:         id,
-		Protocol:   proto,
-		SrcIP:      net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
-		DstIP:      net.ParseIP(dst),
-		FragOffset: fragOffsetOctets,
-	}
-	if moreFragments {
-		ip.Flags = layers.IPv4MoreFragments
-	}
-
-	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
-	opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{FixLengths: true}
-	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, payloadLen))))
-	return buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-func trailingFragment(tb testing.TB, id uint16, fragOffsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, payloadLen int) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-	return trailingFragmentTo(tb, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolUDP, id, fragOffsetOctets, moreFragments, payloadLen)
-}
-
-// outboundUDPPacket builds a complete outbound UDP packet from the local
-// address, used to establish conntrack state for reply-direction tests.
-func outboundUDPPacket(tb testing.TB, srcPort, dstPort uint16) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ip := &layers.IPv4{
-		Version:  4,
-		TTL:      64,
-		Id:       1,
-		Protocol: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
-		SrcIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestDst),
-		DstIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
-	}
-	udp := &layers.UDP{SrcPort: layers.UDPPort(srcPort), DstPort: layers.UDPPort(dstPort)}
-	require.NoError(tb, udp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
-
-	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
-	opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
-	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, udp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, 16))))
-	return buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-// normalUDPPacket builds a complete, non-fragmented UDP packet for baseline
-// comparisons against the fragment paths.
-func normalUDPPacket(tb testing.TB, dstPort uint16, payloadLen int) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ip := &layers.IPv4{
-		Version:  4,
-		TTL:      64,
-		Id:       1,
-		Protocol: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
-		SrcIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
-		DstIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestDst),
-	}
-	udp := &layers.UDP{SrcPort: 40000, DstPort: layers.UDPPort(dstPort)}
-	require.NoError(tb, udp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
-
-	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
-	opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
-	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, udp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, payloadLen))))
-	return buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-func allowUDP(tb testing.TB, m *Manager, dstPort uint16) {
-	tb.Helper()
-	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolUDP, nil,
-		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{dstPort}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
-	require.NoError(tb, err)
-}
-
-// TestFragment_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped is the core bypass repro: a trailing
-// fragment with no allowed first fragment on record must be dropped. Before the
-// fix, filterInbound returned false (allow) for any fragment.
-func TestFragment_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-
-	frag := trailingFragment(t, 0x1234, 185, false, 40)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(frag, len(frag)),
-		"trailing fragment without an allowed first fragment must be dropped")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing verifies that once a first fragment
-// passes the ACL, its trailing fragments inherit the allow verdict.
-func TestFragment_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
-
-	// First fragment: UDP header (8) + 32 payload = 40 octets -> headerEnd = 5.
-	first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x2222, 8080, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
-		"allowed first fragment should pass and be recorded")
-
-	trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x2222, 5, false, 24)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment of an allowed datagram should pass")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_DeniedFirstDropsTrailing verifies that a first fragment blocked
-// by the ACL leaves no verdict, so its trailing fragments are dropped.
-func TestFragment_DeniedFirstDropsTrailing(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	// No accept rule: local traffic defaults to deny.
-
-	first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x3333, 9999, 32)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
-		"first fragment to a blocked port should be dropped by the ACL")
-
-	trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x3333, 5, false, 24)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment of a denied datagram must be dropped")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_OverlappingHeaderDropped covers the RFC 1858 §4 / RFC 3128
-// overlapping-fragment rewrite: a trailing fragment starting inside the range
-// the ACL already inspected is dropped and poisons the datagram. TCP is used so
-// the overlap lands on real header bytes (the flags at byte 13).
-func TestFragment_OverlappingHeaderDropped(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolTCP, nil,
-		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	// First fragment: TCP header (20) + 12 data = 32 bytes -> headerEnd = 4 octets.
-	first := firstFragmentTCP(t, 0x4444, 8080)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)))
-
-	// Overlapping fragment at offset 1 (byte 8) falls inside the inspected TCP
-	// header, so it could rewrite the flags or port on reassembly.
-	overlap := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x4444, 1, true, 32)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(overlap, len(overlap)),
-		"fragment overlapping the inspected header must be dropped")
-
-	// The datagram is now poisoned: a later, non-overlapping fragment is also
-	// dropped because the verdict was removed.
-	later := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x4444, 4, false, 24)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(later, len(later)),
-		"fragments after an overlap must be dropped (datagram poisoned)")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_OffsetZeroOverlapPoisons covers the RFC 3128 offset-zero rewrite:
-// an allowed first fragment followed by a denied offset-zero fragment for the
-// same datagram must not leave the earlier allow verdict in place.
-func TestFragment_OffsetZeroOverlapPoisons(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
-
-	allowed := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x5A5A, 8080, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(allowed, len(allowed)),
-		"allowed first fragment should pass and be recorded")
-
-	// A second offset-zero fragment to a denied port supersedes the datagram's
-	// verdict; it is dropped and must not leave the allow in place.
-	denied := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x5A5A, 9999, 32)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(denied, len(denied)),
-		"denied offset-zero fragment must be dropped")
-
-	trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x5A5A, 5, false, 24)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment must be denied after the datagram was poisoned")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_TinyFirstDropped covers the tiny-fragment attack: a first
-// fragment too small to contain the full transport header can't be
-// ACL-evaluated and must be dropped.
-func TestFragment_TinyFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
-
-	// IPv4 header + 4 raw bytes, MF set, offset 0: too small for the 8-byte UDP
-	// header, so it decodes to L3 only.
-	tiny := trailingFragment(t, 0x5555, 0, true, 4)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(tiny, len(tiny)),
-		"tiny first fragment without a full L4 header must be dropped")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_TCPFirstFragment verifies the TCP arm of the transport decode: a
-// first fragment carrying the full 20-byte TCP header is ACL-evaluated and its
-// trailing fragments inherit the verdict.
-func TestFragment_TCPFirstFragment(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolTCP, nil,
-		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	// TCP header (20) + 12 data = 32 bytes -> headerEnd = 4 octets.
-	first := firstFragmentTCP(t, 0x6666, 8080)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
-		"allowed TCP first fragment should pass and be recorded")
-
-	trailing := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x6666, 4, false, 24)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment of an allowed TCP datagram should pass")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_TCPTinyFirstDropped verifies the TCP minimum header length: 12
-// bytes would satisfy a UDP header but falls short of the 20-byte TCP header.
-func TestFragment_TCPTinyFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolTCP, nil,
-		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	tiny := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x7777, 0, true, 12)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(tiny, len(tiny)),
-		"first fragment shorter than the TCP header must be dropped")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_ConntrackAllowsFirstFragment verifies the conntrack branch: reply
-// fragments of an outbound-established UDP flow pass without any inbound rule.
-func TestFragment_ConntrackAllowsFirstFragment(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-
-	out := outboundUDPPacket(t, 12345, 40000)
-	require.False(t, m.filterOutbound(out, len(out)))
-
-	first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x8888, 12345, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
-		"reply first fragment should pass via conntrack")
-
-	trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x8888, 5, false, 24)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment of a tracked flow should pass")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_RoutingDisabledDropsFragment verifies routed first fragments are
-// dropped when routing is disabled.
-func TestFragment_RoutingDisabledDropsFragment(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	m.routingEnabled.Store(false)
-
-	first := firstFragmentUDPTo(t, "198.51.100.10", 0x9999, 8080, 32)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
-		"routed first fragment must be dropped when routing is disabled")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_RouteACL verifies the route-ACL branch: fragments to a non-local
-// destination follow the route rules, allowed datagrams pass their trailing
-// fragments and denied ones don't.
-func TestFragment_RouteACL(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	m.routingEnabled.Store(true)
-	m.nativeRouter.Store(false)
-
-	_, err := m.AddRouteFiltering(
-		[]byte("rt-1"),
-		[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("100.10.0.0/16")},
-		fw.Network{Prefix: netip.MustParsePrefix("198.51.100.0/24")},
-		fw.ProtocolUDP,
-		nil,
-		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}},
-		fw.ActionAccept,
-	)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	first := firstFragmentUDPTo(t, "198.51.100.10", 0xAAAA, 8080, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
-		"route-ACL-allowed first fragment should pass")
-	trailing := trailingFragmentTo(t, "198.51.100.10", layers.IPProtocolUDP, 0xAAAA, 5, false, 24)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment of an allowed routed datagram should pass")
-
-	denied := firstFragmentUDPTo(t, "198.51.100.10", 0xBBBB, 9999, 32)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(denied, len(denied)),
-		"route-ACL-denied first fragment must be dropped")
-	deniedTrailing := trailingFragmentTo(t, "198.51.100.10", layers.IPProtocolUDP, 0xBBBB, 5, false, 24)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(deniedTrailing, len(deniedTrailing)),
-		"trailing fragment of a denied routed datagram must be dropped")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_ExpiredVerdictDropsTrailing verifies a verdict older than the
-// tracker timeout no longer admits trailing fragments.
-func TestFragment_ExpiredVerdictDropsTrailing(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
-
-	first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0xCCCC, 8080, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)))
-
-	m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
-	for key, entry := range m.fragments.entries {
-		entry.recordedAt = time.Now().Add(-defaultFragmentTimeout - time.Second)
-		m.fragments.entries[key] = entry
-	}
-	m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
-
-	trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0xCCCC, 5, false, 24)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment after verdict expiry must be dropped")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_CapacityFailsClosed verifies the table cap: at capacity, new
-// datagram verdicts are not recorded (their trailing fragments are dropped)
-// while already-recorded datagrams keep working.
-func TestFragment_CapacityFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
-
-	m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
-	m.fragments.maxEntries = 1
-	m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
-
-	first1 := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x0101, 8080, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first1, len(first1)))
-
-	first2 := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x0202, 8080, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first2, len(first2)),
-		"first fragment itself still passes at capacity")
-
-	trailing2 := trailingFragment(t, 0x0202, 5, false, 24)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing2, len(trailing2)),
-		"trailing fragment of an unrecorded datagram must be dropped at capacity")
-
-	trailing1 := trailingFragment(t, 0x0101, 5, false, 24)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing1, len(trailing1)),
-		"already-recorded datagram should keep passing at capacity")
-}
-
-// v6FragmentHeader builds the 8-byte IPv6 fragment extension header for the
-// given inner protocol, offset (8-byte units), More Fragments bit and id.
-func v6FragmentHeader(proto layers.IPProtocol, offsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, id uint32) []byte {
-	offsetFlags := offsetOctets << 3
-	if moreFragments {
-		offsetFlags |= 1
-	}
-	hdr := make([]byte, 8)
-	hdr[0] = uint8(proto)
-	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[2:4], offsetFlags)
-	binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(hdr[4:8], id)
-	return hdr
-}
-
-func v6UDPHeader(dstPort uint16, dataLen int) []byte {
-	hdr := make([]byte, 8)
-	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[0:2], 40000)
-	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[2:4], dstPort)
-	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[4:6], uint16(8+dataLen))
-	return hdr
-}
-
-// firstFragmentUDPv6 builds the first fragment of a fragmented IPv6 UDP
-// datagram: fragment header (offset 0, More Fragments set) + full UDP header +
-// data.
-func firstFragmentUDPv6(tb testing.TB, id uint32, dstPort uint16, dataLen int) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-	return fragmentUDPv6(tb, id, dstPort, dataLen, true)
-}
-
-// fragmentUDPv6 builds an offset-zero IPv6 UDP fragment. With moreFragments
-// false it is an atomic fragment (a complete datagram, RFC 6946).
-func fragmentUDPv6(tb testing.TB, id uint32, dstPort uint16, dataLen int, moreFragments bool) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ip := &layers.IPv6{
-		Version:    6,
-		NextHeader: layers.IPProtocolIPv6Fragment,
-		HopLimit:   64,
-		SrcIP:      net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6),
-		DstIP:      net.ParseIP(fragTestDstV6),
-	}
-	payload := append(v6FragmentHeader(layers.IPProtocolUDP, 0, moreFragments, id), v6UDPHeader(dstPort, dataLen)...)
-	payload = append(payload, make([]byte, dataLen)...)
-
-	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
-	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, gopacket.SerializeOptions{FixLengths: true}, ip, gopacket.Payload(payload)))
-	return buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-// trailingFragmentV6 builds a non-first IPv6 fragment: fragment header at the
-// given offset carrying raw data and no transport header.
-func trailingFragmentV6(tb testing.TB, id uint32, offsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, dataLen int) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ip := &layers.IPv6{
-		Version:    6,
-		NextHeader: layers.IPProtocolIPv6Fragment,
-		HopLimit:   64,
-		SrcIP:      net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6),
-		DstIP:      net.ParseIP(fragTestDstV6),
-	}
-	payload := append(v6FragmentHeader(layers.IPProtocolUDP, offsetOctets, moreFragments, id), make([]byte, dataLen)...)
-
-	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
-	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, gopacket.SerializeOptions{FixLengths: true}, ip, gopacket.Payload(payload)))
-	return buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-// TestFragmentV6_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped verifies the IPv6 bypass is closed:
-// a trailing fragment with no allowed first fragment is dropped.
-func TestFragmentV6_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-
-	frag := trailingFragmentV6(t, 0xAABBCCDD, 100, false, 40)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(frag, len(frag)),
-		"IPv6 trailing fragment without an allowed first fragment must be dropped")
-}
-
-// TestFragmentV6_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing verifies IPv6 fragments are
-// evaluated like IPv4: an allowed first fragment lets its trailing fragments
-// through.
-func TestFragmentV6_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6), fw.ProtocolUDP, nil,
-		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	// First fragment: UDP header (8) + 32 data = 40 octets -> headerEnd = 5.
-	first := firstFragmentUDPv6(t, 0xAABBCCDD, 8080, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
-		"allowed IPv6 first fragment should pass and be recorded")
-
-	trailing := trailingFragmentV6(t, 0xAABBCCDD, 5, false, 24)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment of an allowed IPv6 datagram should pass")
-}
-
-// TestFragmentV6_AtomicNotCached verifies an IPv6 atomic fragment (fragment
-// header with offset 0 and no More Fragments, a complete datagram per RFC 6946)
-// is evaluated but not recorded, so a flood of allowed atomic fragments can't
-// exhaust the verdict table.
-func TestFragmentV6_AtomicNotCached(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6), fw.ProtocolUDP, nil,
-		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	atomic := fragmentUDPv6(t, 0xA70301C, 8080, 16, false)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(atomic, len(atomic)),
-		"allowed IPv6 atomic fragment should pass")
-
-	m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
-	n := len(m.fragments.entries)
-	m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
-	require.Zero(t, n, "atomic fragment must not create a verdict entry")
-
-	// A genuine fragmented datagram (More Fragments set) is still recorded.
-	first := fragmentUDPv6(t, 0xBEEF, 8080, 32, true)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)))
-	m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
-	n = len(m.fragments.entries)
-	m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
-	require.Equal(t, 1, n, "genuine first fragment must record a verdict")
-}

client/iface/iface_test.go

@@ -464,8 +464,6 @@ func Test_RemovePeer(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func Test_ConnectPeers(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv("NB_DISABLE_EBPF_WG_PROXY", "true")
-
 	peer1ifaceName := fmt.Sprintf("utun%d", WgIntNumber+400)
 	peer1wgIP := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.99.99.17/30")
 	peer1Key, _ := wgtypes.GeneratePrivateKey()
@@ -507,8 +505,12 @@ func Test_ConnectPeers(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
 
-	localIP1 := "127.0.0.1"
-	peer1endpoint, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", localIP1, peer1wgPort))
+	localIP, err := getLocalIP()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	peer1endpoint, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", localIP, peer1wgPort))
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
@@ -544,8 +546,7 @@ func Test_ConnectPeers(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
 
-	localIP2 := "127.0.0.1"
-	peer2endpoint, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", localIP2, peer2wgPort))
+	peer2endpoint, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", localIP, peer2wgPort))
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
@@ -568,17 +569,17 @@ func Test_ConnectPeers(t *testing.T) {
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
-	// The peers use userspace WireGuard (stdnet transport). A tight busy-loop
-	// here starves the wireguard-go goroutines that process the handshake, so
-	// poll on a ticker instead and yield the CPU between checks. WireGuard also
-	// only retries a lost handshake initiation every REKEY_TIMEOUT (5s), which
-	// is why the overall wait can occasionally stretch to tens of seconds.
+	// todo: investigate why in some tests execution we need 30s
 	timeout := 30 * time.Second
 	timeoutChannel := time.After(timeout)
-	ticker := time.NewTicker(500 * time.Millisecond)
-	defer ticker.Stop()
 
 	for {
+		select {
+		case <-timeoutChannel:
+			t.Fatalf("waiting for peer handshake timeout after %s", timeout.String())
+		default:
+		}
+
 		peer, gpErr := getPeer(peer1ifaceName, peer2Key.PublicKey().String())
 		if gpErr != nil {
 			t.Fatal(gpErr)
@@ -587,12 +588,6 @@ func Test_ConnectPeers(t *testing.T) {
 			t.Log("peers successfully handshake")
 			break
 		}
-
-		select {
-		case <-timeoutChannel:
-			t.Fatalf("waiting for peer handshake timeout after %s", timeout.String())
-		case <-ticker.C:
-		}
 	}
 
 }
@@ -620,3 +615,28 @@ func getPeer(ifaceName, peerPubKey string) (wgtypes.Peer, error) {
 	}
 	return wgtypes.Peer{}, fmt.Errorf("peer not found")
 }
+
+func getLocalIP() (string, error) {
+	// Get all interfaces
+	addrs, err := net.InterfaceAddrs()
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+
+	for _, addr := range addrs {
+		ipNet, ok := addr.(*net.IPNet)
+		if !ok {
+			continue
+		}
+		if ipNet.IP.IsLoopback() {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		if ipNet.IP.To4() == nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		return ipNet.IP.String(), nil
+	}
+
+	return "", fmt.Errorf("no local IP found")
+}

client/iface/netstack/env.go

@@ -3,31 +3,14 @@
 package netstack
 
 import (
-	"net"
+	"fmt"
 	"os"
 	"strconv"
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 )
 
-const (
-	EnvUseNetstackMode = "NB_USE_NETSTACK_MODE"
-
-	// EnvSocks5ListenerPort overrides the port the SOCKS5 proxy listens on.
-	EnvSocks5ListenerPort = "NB_SOCKS5_LISTENER_PORT"
-
-	// EnvSocks5ListenerAddress overrides the host/IP the SOCKS5 proxy binds to.
-	// The proxy is a bridge for local host applications into the userspace
-	// WireGuard netstack, so it binds to loopback by default. Override this only
-	// when the proxy must be reachable from other hosts (e.g. a container
-	// gateway); doing so exposes an unauthenticated SOCKS5 proxy on that
-	// address.
-	EnvSocks5ListenerAddress = "NB_SOCKS5_LISTENER_ADDRESS"
-
-	// defaultSocks5Host is the loopback address the SOCKS5 proxy binds to unless
-	// overridden via EnvSocks5ListenerAddress.
-	defaultSocks5Host = "127.0.0.1"
-)
+const EnvUseNetstackMode = "NB_USE_NETSTACK_MODE"
 
 // IsEnabled todo: move these function to cmd layer
 func IsEnabled() bool {
@@ -35,40 +18,24 @@ func IsEnabled() bool {
 }
 
 func ListenAddr() string {
-	return net.JoinHostPort(listenHost(), strconv.Itoa(listenPort()))
-}
-
-// listenHost returns the host/IP the SOCKS5 proxy binds to. It defaults to
-// loopback and only honors EnvSocks5ListenerAddress when it holds a valid IP.
-func listenHost() string {
-	addr := os.Getenv(EnvSocks5ListenerAddress)
-	if addr == "" {
-		return defaultSocks5Host
-	}
-	if net.ParseIP(addr) == nil {
-		log.Warnf("invalid socks5 listener address %q, falling back to default: %s", addr, defaultSocks5Host)
-		return defaultSocks5Host
-	}
-	return addr
-}
-
-// listenPort returns the port the SOCKS5 proxy binds to, defaulting to
-// DefaultSocks5Port when EnvSocks5ListenerPort is unset or invalid.
-func listenPort() int {
-	sPort := os.Getenv(EnvSocks5ListenerPort)
+	sPort := os.Getenv("NB_SOCKS5_LISTENER_PORT")
 	if sPort == "" {
-		return DefaultSocks5Port
+		return listenAddr(DefaultSocks5Port)
 	}
 
 	port, err := strconv.Atoi(sPort)
 	if err != nil {
 		log.Warnf("invalid socks5 listener port, unable to convert it to int, falling back to default: %d", DefaultSocks5Port)
-		return DefaultSocks5Port
+		return listenAddr(DefaultSocks5Port)
 	}
 	if port < 1 || port > 65535 {
 		log.Warnf("invalid socks5 listener port, it should be in the range 1-65535, falling back to default: %d", DefaultSocks5Port)
-		return DefaultSocks5Port
+		return listenAddr(DefaultSocks5Port)
 	}
 
-	return port
+	return listenAddr(port)
+}
+
+func listenAddr(port int) string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("0.0.0.0:%d", port)
 }

client/iface/netstack/env_test.go

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-//go:build !js
-
-package netstack
-
-import (
-	"net"
-	"strconv"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-func TestListenAddr_DefaultsToLoopback(t *testing.T) {
-	// No env overrides: must bind loopback, never all interfaces.
-	got := ListenAddr()
-	want := net.JoinHostPort("127.0.0.1", strconv.Itoa(DefaultSocks5Port))
-	if got != want {
-		t.Fatalf("ListenAddr() = %q, want %q", got, want)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestListenAddr_AddressOverride(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name string
-		env  string
-		want string
-	}{
-		{name: "valid override honored", env: "0.0.0.0", want: "0.0.0.0"},
-		{name: "valid specific ip honored", env: "10.0.0.5", want: "10.0.0.5"},
-		{name: "ipv6 loopback bracketed", env: "::1", want: "::1"},
-		{name: "invalid falls back to loopback", env: "not-an-ip", want: "127.0.0.1"},
-		{name: "empty falls back to loopback", env: "", want: "127.0.0.1"},
-	}
-	for _, tc := range tests {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			t.Setenv(EnvSocks5ListenerAddress, tc.env)
-			want := net.JoinHostPort(tc.want, strconv.Itoa(DefaultSocks5Port))
-			if got := ListenAddr(); got != want {
-				t.Fatalf("ListenAddr() = %q, want %q", got, want)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-func TestListenAddr_PortOverride(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name string
-		env  string
-		want int
-	}{
-		{name: "valid port honored", env: "1081", want: 1081},
-		{name: "non-numeric falls back", env: "abc", want: DefaultSocks5Port},
-		{name: "out of range falls back", env: "70000", want: DefaultSocks5Port},
-		{name: "zero falls back", env: "0", want: DefaultSocks5Port},
-	}
-	for _, tc := range tests {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			t.Setenv(EnvSocks5ListenerPort, tc.env)
-			want := net.JoinHostPort("127.0.0.1", strconv.Itoa(tc.want))
-			if got := ListenAddr(); got != want {
-				t.Fatalf("ListenAddr() = %q, want %q", got, want)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}

client/internal/auth/auth.go

@@ -351,7 +351,6 @@ func (a *Auth) setSystemInfoFlags(info *system.Info) {
 		a.config.BlockLANAccess,
 		a.config.BlockInbound,
 		a.config.DisableIPv6,
-		a.config.SyncMessageVersion,
 		a.config.EnableSSHRoot,
 		a.config.EnableSSHSFTP,
 		a.config.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding,

client/internal/auth/device_flow.go

@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ func (d *DeviceAuthorizationFlow) WaitToken(ctx context.Context, info AuthFlowIn
 				UseIDToken:   d.providerConfig.UseIDToken,
 			}
 
-			err = validateTokenAudience(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), d.providerConfig.Audience)
+			err = isValidAccessToken(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), d.providerConfig.Audience)
 			if err != nil {
 				return TokenInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("validate access token failed with error: %v", err)
 			}

client/internal/auth/pkce_flow.go

@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) parseOAuthToken(token *oauth2.Token) (TokenInfo,
 		audience = p.providerConfig.ClientID
 	}
 
-	if err := validateTokenAudience(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), audience); err != nil {
+	if err := isValidAccessToken(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), audience); err != nil {
 		return TokenInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("authentication failed: invalid access token - %w", err)
 	}
 
@@ -320,11 +320,6 @@ func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) parseOAuthToken(token *oauth2.Token) (TokenInfo,
 	return tokenInfo, nil
 }
 
-// parseEmailFromIDToken extracts the email (or name) claim from an ID token
-// without verifying its signature. The value is best-effort and used only as a
-// UX convenience (login hint prefill and display); it never drives an
-// authorization decision. The authoritative identity is established server-side
-// from the signature-verified token.
 func parseEmailFromIDToken(token string) (string, error) {
 	parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
 	if len(parts) < 2 {

client/internal/auth/sessionwatch/watcher.go

@@ -24,7 +24,11 @@ import (
 )
 
 const (
-	maxPastHorizon = 30 * 24 * time.Hour
+	// Skew tolerates a small clock difference between the management
+	// server and this peer before treating a deadline as "in the past".
+	// Slightly above typical NTP drift; tight enough that the UI doesn't
+	// paint a stale expiry as if it were valid.
+	Skew = 30 * time.Second
 
 	// maxDeadlineHorizon caps how far in the future an accepted deadline
 	// can sit. A timestamp beyond this is almost certainly a protocol
@@ -53,7 +57,7 @@ var (
 	ErrDeadlineTooFarFuture = errors.New("session deadline too far in the future")
 
 	// ErrDeadlineInPast is returned by Update when the supplied deadline
-	// is more than maxPastHorizon in the past.
+	// is more than Skew in the past.
 	ErrDeadlineInPast = errors.New("session deadline in the past")
 )
 
@@ -62,14 +66,15 @@ var (
 // for deadline change/clear, PublishEvent for the two warnings); tests pass
 // a fake recorder so the same surface is observable without an engine.
 //
-// While the watcher runs, it owns the deadline propagated to the recorder:
-// every set, clear and sanity-check rejection routes the value through
-// SetSessionExpiresAt, so the SubscribeStatus snapshot the UI reads can
-// never drift from the watcher's timer state. (SetSessionExpiresAt fans
-// out its own state-change notification, so no separate notify is needed.)
-// The recorder is server-scoped and outlives this engine-scoped watcher;
-// Close deliberately leaves the recorder value in place so transient engine
-// restarts don't blank it — the client run loop clears it on real teardown.
+// The watcher is the single owner of the deadline propagated to the
+// recorder: every set, clear, sanity-check rejection and Close routes the
+// value through SetSessionExpiresAt, so the SubscribeStatus snapshot the UI
+// reads can never drift from the watcher's timer state. (SetSessionExpiresAt
+// fans out its own state-change notification, so no separate notify is
+// needed.) The recorder is server-scoped and outlives this engine-scoped
+// watcher — without the Close-time clear a teardown (Down, or the Down+Up of
+// a profile switch) would leave the next session showing the previous one's
+// stale "expires in" value.
 //
 // PublishEvent's signature mirrors peer.Status.PublishEvent: the watcher
 // composes the metadata internally so the wire format (MetaSession*) is
@@ -130,13 +135,10 @@ func NewWithLeads(lead, final time.Duration, recorder StatusRecorder) *Watcher {
 // was disabled).
 //
 // Same-value updates are no-ops. A different non-zero value cancels any
-// pending timer, resets the "already fired" guards, and — when the
-// deadline lies in the future — arms fresh warning timers. A deadline
-// already in the past (within maxPastHorizon) is recorded as-is with no
-// timers: the session has expired and consumers render it that way.
+// pending timer, resets the "already fired" guard, and arms a new one.
 //
 // Returns one of the sentinel Err* values when the deadline fails the
-// sanity checks (pre-epoch, far future, or past beyond maxPastHorizon).
+// sanity checks (pre-epoch, far future, or in the past beyond Skew).
 // In every error case the watcher first clears its state so it stays
 // consistent with what the caller will push into its other sinks (e.g.
 // applySessionDeadline forces a zero deadline into the status recorder
@@ -161,7 +163,7 @@ func (w *Watcher) Update(deadline time.Time) error {
 	case deadline.After(now.Add(maxDeadlineHorizon)):
 		w.clearLocked()
 		return fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrDeadlineTooFarFuture, deadline)
-	case deadline.Before(now.Add(-maxPastHorizon)):
+	case deadline.Before(now.Add(-Skew)):
 		w.clearLocked()
 		return fmt.Errorf("%w: %v (now=%v)", ErrDeadlineInPast, deadline, now)
 	}
@@ -181,9 +183,7 @@ func (w *Watcher) Update(deadline time.Time) error {
 	w.finalFiredAt = time.Time{}
 	w.dismissedAt = time.Time{}
 
-	if deadline.After(now) {
-		w.armTimerLocked(deadline)
-	}
+	w.armTimerLocked(deadline)
 	recorder := w.recorder
 	w.mu.Unlock()
 	if recorder != nil {
@@ -227,25 +227,30 @@ func (w *Watcher) Dismiss() {
 	log.Infof("auth session final-warning dismissed for deadline %s", w.current.Format(time.RFC3339))
 }
 
-// Close stops any pending timer. Update calls after Close are ignored.
-// The recorder keeps its deadline: the watcher is engine-scoped and closes
-// on every engine restart (network change, sleep/wake, stream errors)
-// while the SSO deadline stays valid across those, so clearing here would
-// blank the UI's "expires in" row on every transient reconnect. The
-// client run loop clears the server-scoped recorder when it exits for
-// real (Down, profile switch, permanent login failure).
+// Close stops any pending timer and drops the deadline on the status
+// recorder. Update calls after Close are ignored. Clearing the recorder
+// here is what keeps a teardown (Down, or the Down+Up of a profile switch)
+// from leaving the next session showing this one's stale "expires in"
+// value — the recorder is server-scoped and outlives this engine-scoped
+// watcher, so nothing else drops the anchor on teardown.
 func (w *Watcher) Close() {
 	w.mu.Lock()
-	defer w.mu.Unlock()
 	if w.closed {
+		w.mu.Unlock()
 		return
 	}
 	w.closed = true
 	w.stopTimerLocked()
+	hadDeadline := !w.current.IsZero()
 	w.current = time.Time{}
 	w.firedAt = time.Time{}
 	w.finalFiredAt = time.Time{}
 	w.dismissedAt = time.Time{}
+	recorder := w.recorder
+	w.mu.Unlock()
+	if recorder != nil && hadDeadline {
+		recorder.SetSessionExpiresAt(time.Time{})
+	}
 }
 
 // clearLocked drops the tracked deadline and notifies the recorder so

client/internal/auth/sessionwatch/watcher_test.go

@@ -224,13 +224,11 @@ func TestNewDeadlineCancelsPriorTimer(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestRefreshAfterFireArmsNewWarning(t *testing.T) {
 	r := &fakeRecorder{}
-	lead := 150 * time.Millisecond
+	lead := 30 * time.Millisecond
 	w := newWatcher(lead, r)
 	defer w.Close()
 
-	// Warning fires ~20ms in; the deadline itself stays 150ms away so the
-	// replacement below lands well before it.
-	first := time.Now().Add(170 * time.Millisecond)
+	first := time.Now().Add(50 * time.Millisecond)
 	_ = w.Update(first)
 
 	// Wait for stateChange + warning of the first cycle.
@@ -308,29 +306,7 @@ func TestUpdateRejectsTooFarFuture(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestUpdateRecentPastRecordedAsExpired(t *testing.T) {
-	r := &fakeRecorder{}
-	w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
-	defer w.Close()
-
-	d := time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour)
-	if err := w.Update(d); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("recent-past Update should succeed, got %v", err)
-	}
-	if !w.Deadline().Equal(d) {
-		t.Fatalf("expected deadline to be recorded, got %v want %v", w.Deadline(), d)
-	}
-	if got := r.deadline(); !got.Equal(d) {
-		t.Fatalf("recorder deadline = %v, want %v", got, d)
-	}
-
-	time.Sleep(80 * time.Millisecond)
-	if n := countWhere(r.snapshot(), func(e event) bool { return e.kind == publish }); n != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("no warning events may fire for an already-past deadline, got %+v", r.snapshot())
-	}
-}
-
-func TestUpdateAncientPastRejected(t *testing.T) {
+func TestUpdateInPastClearsDeadline(t *testing.T) {
 	r := &fakeRecorder{}
 	w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
 	defer w.Close()
@@ -342,12 +318,12 @@ func TestUpdateAncientPastRejected(t *testing.T) {
 	// Drain the stateChange from the seed.
 	waitForEvents(t, r, 1)
 
-	err := w.Update(time.Now().Add(-31 * 24 * time.Hour))
+	err := w.Update(time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour))
 	if !errors.Is(err, ErrDeadlineInPast) {
 		t.Fatalf("want ErrDeadlineInPast, got %v", err)
 	}
 	if !w.Deadline().IsZero() {
-		t.Fatalf("rejected ancient-past update must clear the deadline, got %v", w.Deadline())
+		t.Fatalf("in-past update must clear the deadline, got %v", w.Deadline())
 	}
 	events := waitForEvents(t, r, 2)
 	if events[1].kind != stateChange {
@@ -355,25 +331,39 @@ func TestUpdateAncientPastRejected(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestUpdateWithinSkewAccepted(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &fakeRecorder{}
+	w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
+	defer w.Close()
+
+	// 5 seconds in the past is within the 30s Skew tolerance — accept it.
+	d := time.Now().Add(-5 * time.Second)
+	if err := w.Update(d); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("within-skew Update should succeed, got %v", err)
+	}
+	if !w.Deadline().Equal(d) {
+		t.Fatalf("expected deadline to be applied, got %v want %v", w.Deadline(), d)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestCloseSilencesUpdates(t *testing.T) {
 	r := &fakeRecorder{}
 	w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
 	w.Close()
 
-	if err := w.Update(time.Now().Add(time.Hour)); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Update after Close: want nil, got %v", err)
-	}
+	_ = w.Update(time.Now().Add(time.Hour))
+
+	time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond)
 	if got := r.snapshot(); len(got) != 0 {
 		t.Fatalf("expected no events after Close, got %+v", got)
 	}
 }
 
-// TestCloseKeepsRecorderDeadline pins the reconnect-flap fix: the watcher
-// closes on every engine restart (network change, sleep/wake) while the
-// SSO deadline stays valid across those, so Close must leave the
-// server-scoped recorder's value in place. The client run loop clears the
-// recorder when it exits for real.
-func TestCloseKeepsRecorderDeadline(t *testing.T) {
+// TestCloseClearsRecorderDeadline pins the profile-switch fix: a watcher
+// holding a live deadline must zero the recorder on Close so the next
+// engine's watcher (and the UI reading the shared server-scoped recorder)
+// doesn't start out showing the previous session's stale "expires in".
+func TestCloseClearsRecorderDeadline(t *testing.T) {
 	r := &fakeRecorder{}
 	w := newWatcher(time.Hour, r)
 
@@ -387,8 +377,8 @@ func TestCloseKeepsRecorderDeadline(t *testing.T) {
 
 	w.Close()
 
-	if got := r.deadline(); !got.Equal(d) {
-		t.Fatalf("recorder deadline after Close = %v, want %v", got, d)
+	if got := r.deadline(); !got.IsZero() {
+		t.Fatalf("recorder deadline after Close = %v, want zero", got)
 	}
 }
 

client/internal/auth/util.go

@@ -20,26 +20,14 @@ func randomBytesInHex(count int) (string, error) {
 	return hex.EncodeToString(buf), nil
 }
 
-// validateTokenAudience checks that the token is a well-formed JWT whose
-// audience claim matches the expected audience.
-//
-// It does NOT verify the token's cryptographic signature and therefore must not
-// be treated as an authenticity check. The token is obtained by the client
-// directly from the IdP token endpoint over TLS, and its signature is verified
-// server-side by the management server against the IdP's JWKS
-// (see shared/auth/jwt/validator.go). This function is only a client-side
-// sanity check that the returned token targets the expected audience.
-func validateTokenAudience(token string, audience string) error {
+// isValidAccessToken is a simple validation of the access token
+func isValidAccessToken(token string, audience string) error {
 	if token == "" {
 		return fmt.Errorf("token received is empty")
 	}
 
-	parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
-	if len(parts) != 3 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("token is not a well-formed JWT")
-	}
-
-	claimsString, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1])
+	encodedClaims := strings.Split(token, ".")[1]
+	claimsString, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(encodedClaims)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}

client/internal/auth/util_test.go

@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-package auth
-
-import (
-	"encoding/base64"
-	"encoding/json"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// makeJWT builds an unsigned JWT-shaped string (header.payload.signature) with
-// the given claims payload. The signature part is arbitrary because
-// validateTokenAudience intentionally does not verify it.
-func makeJWT(t *testing.T, claims map[string]interface{}) string {
-	t.Helper()
-	header := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(`{"alg":"RS256","typ":"JWT"}`))
-	payloadBytes, err := json.Marshal(claims)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("marshal claims: %v", err)
-	}
-	payload := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(payloadBytes)
-	return header + "." + payload + ".unverified-signature"
-}
-
-func TestValidateTokenAudience(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name     string
-		token    string
-		audience string
-		wantErr  bool
-	}{
-		{
-			name:     "empty token",
-			token:    "",
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "not a JWT - no dots",
-			token:    "notajwt",
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "not a JWT - two parts only",
-			token:    "header.payload",
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "matching string audience",
-			token:    makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": "netbird"}),
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  false,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "mismatching string audience",
-			token:    makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": "other"}),
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "matching audience in array",
-			token:    makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": []interface{}{"other", "netbird"}}),
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  false,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "mismatching audience array",
-			token:    makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": []interface{}{"a", "b"}}),
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "missing audience claim",
-			token:    makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"sub": "user"}),
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "invalid base64 payload",
-			token:    "header.!!!not-base64!!!.sig",
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  true,
-		},
-	}
-
-	for _, tc := range tests {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			err := validateTokenAudience(tc.token, tc.audience)
-			if tc.wantErr && err == nil {
-				t.Fatalf("expected error, got nil")
-			}
-			if !tc.wantErr && err != nil {
-				t.Fatalf("expected no error, got %v", err)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestValidateTokenAudienceNoPanic guards the regression where a non-empty
-// token without the JWT dot structure caused an index-out-of-range panic.
-func TestValidateTokenAudienceNoPanic(t *testing.T) {
-	inputs := []string{"a", ".", "a.", "aaaa", "no-dots-here"}
-	for _, in := range inputs {
-		if err := validateTokenAudience(in, "netbird"); err == nil {
-			t.Fatalf("expected error for malformed token %q, got nil", in)
-		}
-	}
-}

client/internal/conn_mgr.go

@@ -34,8 +34,6 @@ const (
 // - Handling connection establishment based on peer signaling
 //
 // The implementation is not thread-safe; it is protected by engine.syncMsgMux.
-// The only exception is ActivatePeer, which is safe for concurrent use so the
-// DNS warm-up path can call it without contending on the engine mutex.
 type ConnMgr struct {
 	peerStore        *peerstore.Store
 	statusRecorder   *peer.Status
@@ -44,26 +42,12 @@ type ConnMgr struct {
 	rosenpassEnabled bool
 
 	lazyConnMgr *manager.Manager
-	// lazyConnMgrMu guards the lazyConnMgr pointer for readers outside the
-	// engine loop (ActivatePeer). Writers hold it in addition to
-	// engine.syncMsgMux; all other reads stay under engine.syncMsgMux only.
-	lazyConnMgrMu sync.RWMutex
-
-	// reconcileRoutedIPs re-applies a peer's routed allowed IPs after its lazy wake endpoint is
-	// (re)armed (Mode A at arm time). Injected by the engine; nil disables the reconcile.
-	reconcileRoutedIPs func(peerKey string) error
 
 	wg            sync.WaitGroup
 	lazyCtx       context.Context
 	lazyCtxCancel context.CancelFunc
 }
 
-// SetRoutedIPsReconciler injects the callback used to re-apply a peer's routed allowed IPs when
-// its lazy wake endpoint is (re)armed. Must be called before the lazy manager starts.
-func (e *ConnMgr) SetRoutedIPsReconciler(fn func(peerKey string) error) {
-	e.reconcileRoutedIPs = fn
-}
-
 func NewConnMgr(engineConfig *EngineConfig, statusRecorder *peer.Status, peerStore *peerstore.Store, iface lazyconn.WGIface) *ConnMgr {
 	e := &ConnMgr{
 		peerStore:        peerStore,
@@ -254,20 +238,12 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) RemovePeerConn(peerKey string) {
 	conn.Log.Infof("removed peer from lazy conn manager")
 }
 
-// ActivatePeer wakes an idle lazy connection. Unlike the rest of ConnMgr it is
-// safe for concurrent use: the lazy manager pointer is read under lazyConnMgrMu
-// and the manager itself is internally synchronized, so callers outside the
-// engine loop (DNS warm-up) do not need engine.syncMsgMux.
 func (e *ConnMgr) ActivatePeer(ctx context.Context, conn *peer.Conn) {
-	e.lazyConnMgrMu.RLock()
-	lazyConnMgr := e.lazyConnMgr
-	started := lazyConnMgr != nil && e.lazyCtxCancel != nil
-	e.lazyConnMgrMu.RUnlock()
-	if !started {
+	if !e.isStartedWithLazyMgr() {
 		return
 	}
 
-	if found := lazyConnMgr.ActivatePeer(conn.GetKey()); found {
+	if found := e.lazyConnMgr.ActivatePeer(conn.GetKey()); found {
 		if err := conn.Open(ctx); err != nil {
 			conn.Log.Errorf("failed to open connection: %v", err)
 		}
@@ -292,22 +268,16 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) Close() {
 
 	e.lazyCtxCancel()
 	e.wg.Wait()
-
-	e.lazyConnMgrMu.Lock()
 	e.lazyConnMgr = nil
-	e.lazyConnMgrMu.Unlock()
 }
 
 func (e *ConnMgr) initLazyManager(engineCtx context.Context) {
 	cfg := manager.Config{
 		InactivityThreshold: inactivityThresholdEnv(),
-		ReconcileAllowedIPs: e.reconcileRoutedIPs,
 	}
-
-	e.lazyConnMgrMu.Lock()
 	e.lazyConnMgr = manager.NewManager(cfg, engineCtx, e.peerStore, e.iface)
+
 	e.lazyCtx, e.lazyCtxCancel = context.WithCancel(engineCtx)
-	e.lazyConnMgrMu.Unlock()
 
 	e.wg.Add(1)
 	go func() {
@@ -346,10 +316,7 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) closeManager(ctx context.Context) {
 
 	e.lazyCtxCancel()
 	e.wg.Wait()
-
-	e.lazyConnMgrMu.Lock()
 	e.lazyConnMgr = nil
-	e.lazyConnMgrMu.Unlock()
 
 	for _, peerID := range e.peerStore.PeersPubKey() {
 		e.peerStore.PeerConnOpen(ctx, peerID)
@@ -385,20 +352,11 @@ func inactivityThresholdEnv() *time.Duration {
 		return nil
 	}
 
-	// Documented format: a Go duration such as "30m" or "1h".
-	if d, err := time.ParseDuration(envValue); err == nil {
-		if d <= 0 {
-			return nil
-		}
-		return &d
+	parsedMinutes, err := strconv.Atoi(envValue)
+	if err != nil || parsedMinutes <= 0 {
+		return nil
 	}
 
-	// Backwards compatibility: a bare integer used to be interpreted as minutes.
-	if parsedMinutes, err := strconv.Atoi(envValue); err == nil && parsedMinutes > 0 {
-		d := time.Duration(parsedMinutes) * time.Minute
-		return &d
-	}
-
-	log.Warnf("invalid %s value %q: expected a Go duration such as 30m or 1h", lazyconn.EnvInactivityThreshold, envValue)
-	return nil
+	d := time.Duration(parsedMinutes) * time.Minute
+	return &d
 }

client/internal/conn_mgr_test.go

@@ -1,21 +1,10 @@
 package internal
 
 import (
-	"context"
-	"net"
-	"net/netip"
 	"os"
-	"sync"
 	"testing"
-	"time"
 
-	"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/lazyconn"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peerstore"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/monotime"
 )
 
 func TestResolveLazyForce(t *testing.T) {
@@ -49,93 +38,3 @@ func TestResolveLazyForce(t *testing.T) {
 		})
 	}
 }
-
-type mockLazyWGIface struct{}
-
-func (mockLazyWGIface) RemovePeer(string) error { return nil }
-func (mockLazyWGIface) UpdatePeer(string, []netip.Prefix, time.Duration, *net.UDPAddr, *wgtypes.Key) error {
-	return nil
-}
-func (mockLazyWGIface) IsUserspaceBind() bool                    { return false }
-func (mockLazyWGIface) Address() wgaddr.Address                  { return wgaddr.Address{} }
-func (mockLazyWGIface) LastActivities() map[string]monotime.Time { return nil }
-func (mockLazyWGIface) MTU() uint16                              { return 1280 }
-
-// TestConnMgr_ActivatePeerConcurrentWithLifecycle exercises ActivatePeer from
-// non-engine goroutines (the DNS warm-up path) racing the manager lifecycle,
-// which stays on the engine loop. Run with -race: it fails if ActivatePeer
-// still requires engine.syncMsgMux for safety.
-func TestConnMgr_ActivatePeerConcurrentWithLifecycle(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Setenv(lazyconn.EnvLazyConn, "on")
-
-	status := peer.NewRecorder("https://mgm")
-	store := peerstore.NewConnStore()
-	connMgr := NewConnMgr(&EngineConfig{}, status, store, mockLazyWGIface{})
-
-	conn := newTestPeerConn(t, "peerA")
-
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-	defer cancel()
-	connMgr.Start(ctx)
-
-	done := make(chan struct{})
-	var wg sync.WaitGroup
-	for range 4 {
-		wg.Add(1)
-		go func() {
-			defer wg.Done()
-			for {
-				select {
-				case <-done:
-					return
-				default:
-					connMgr.ActivatePeer(ctx, conn)
-				}
-			}
-		}()
-	}
-
-	// Let the activators spin against the started manager, then tear it down
-	// underneath them and let them spin against the stopped manager.
-	time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
-	connMgr.Close()
-	time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
-
-	close(done)
-	wg.Wait()
-}
-
-func TestInactivityThresholdEnv(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name string
-		val  string
-		want *time.Duration
-	}{
-		{name: "unset", val: "", want: nil},
-		{name: "go duration minutes", val: "30m", want: durPtr(30 * time.Minute)},
-		{name: "go duration hours", val: "1h", want: durPtr(time.Hour)},
-		{name: "go duration seconds", val: "90s", want: durPtr(90 * time.Second)},
-		{name: "bare integer is minutes (backwards compat)", val: "5", want: durPtr(5 * time.Minute)},
-		{name: "zero duration", val: "0s", want: nil},
-		{name: "zero integer", val: "0", want: nil},
-		{name: "negative duration", val: "-5m", want: nil},
-		{name: "garbage", val: "abc", want: nil},
-	}
-
-	for _, tc := range tests {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			t.Setenv(lazyconn.EnvInactivityThreshold, tc.val)
-			got := inactivityThresholdEnv()
-			switch {
-			case tc.want == nil && got != nil:
-				t.Fatalf("want nil, got %v", *got)
-			case tc.want != nil && got == nil:
-				t.Fatalf("want %v, got nil", *tc.want)
-			case tc.want != nil && *got != *tc.want:
-				t.Fatalf("want %v, got %v", *tc.want, *got)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-func durPtr(d time.Duration) *time.Duration { return &d }

client/internal/connect.go

@@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/statemanager"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/stdnet"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/tunnelnotifier"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/updater"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/updater/installer"
 	nbnet "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/net"
@@ -137,13 +136,10 @@ func (c *ConnectClient) RunOniOS(
 	// Set GC percent to 5% to reduce memory usage as iOS only allows 50MB of memory for the extension.
 	debug.SetGCPercent(5)
 
-	notifier := tunnelnotifier.New(networkChangeListener, dnsManager)
-	defer notifier.Close()
-
 	mobileDependency := MobileDependency{
 		FileDescriptor:        fileDescriptor,
-		NetworkChangeListener: notifier,
-		DnsManager:            notifier,
+		NetworkChangeListener: networkChangeListener,
+		DnsManager:            dnsManager,
 		StateFilePath:         stateFilePath,
 		TempDir:               cacheDir,
 	}
@@ -261,10 +257,7 @@ func (c *ConnectClient) run(mobileDependency MobileDependency, runningChan chan
 		log.Errorf("failed to clean up temporary installer file: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	defer func() {
-		c.statusRecorder.SetSessionExpiresAt(time.Time{})
-		c.statusRecorder.ClientStop()
-	}()
+	defer c.statusRecorder.ClientStop()
 	operation := func() error {
 		// if context cancelled we not start new backoff cycle
 		if c.ctx.Err() != nil {
@@ -625,7 +618,6 @@ func createEngineConfig(key wgtypes.Key, config *profilemanager.Config, peerConf
 		BlockLANAccess:      config.BlockLANAccess,
 		BlockInbound:        config.BlockInbound,
 		DisableIPv6:         config.DisableIPv6,
-		SyncMessageVersion:  config.SyncMessageVersion,
 
 		LazyConnection: lazyconn.ParseState(config.LazyConnection),
 
@@ -701,7 +693,6 @@ func loginToManagement(ctx context.Context, client mgm.Client, pubSSHKey []byte,
 		config.BlockLANAccess,
 		config.BlockInbound,
 		config.DisableIPv6,
-		config.SyncMessageVersion,
 		config.EnableSSHRoot,
 		config.EnableSSHSFTP,
 		config.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding,

client/internal/daemonaddr/owner.go

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-package daemonaddr
-
-// DaemonRunsAsSelf reports whether the daemon listening at addr runs as this very
-// user. That is what makes an unprivileged daemon authorize this process for the
-// changes it otherwise restricts to root or an administrator, so a client can tell
-// up front whether those controls are usable instead of letting a save fail.
-//
-// It is answered from the ownership of the socket or pipe the daemon created, so it
-// costs no round trip and needs no cooperation from the daemon. Ownership that
-// cannot be read is reported as false, including for a TCP address, so a caller
-// reading this as "the daemon would allow it" fails closed. The daemon remains the
-// only thing that authorizes anything: this only decides what a client offers.
-func DaemonRunsAsSelf(addr string) bool {
-	return daemonRunsAsSelf(addr)
-}

client/internal/daemonaddr/owner_unix.go

@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-//go:build !windows
-
-package daemonaddr
-
-import (
-	"os"
-	"strings"
-	"syscall"
-
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-)
-
-// daemonRunsAsSelf compares the owner of the daemon's Unix socket with this
-// process's uid. Root is not treated specially here: a root caller is privileged
-// on its own merits, and a root-owned socket says nothing about the caller.
-func daemonRunsAsSelf(addr string) bool {
-	path, ok := strings.CutPrefix(addr, "unix://")
-	if !ok {
-		return false
-	}
-
-	info, err := os.Stat(path)
-	if err != nil {
-		log.Debugf("stat daemon socket %s: %v", path, err)
-		return false
-	}
-
-	// Only a socket says anything about a daemon. A directory or a leftover
-	// regular file at that path is not one, and reading it as "the daemon runs as
-	// us" would offer controls the daemon then refuses.
-	if info.Mode()&os.ModeSocket == 0 {
-		return false
-	}
-
-	stat, ok := info.Sys().(*syscall.Stat_t)
-	if !ok {
-		return false
-	}
-	return stat.Uid == uint32(os.Getuid())
-}

client/internal/daemonaddr/owner_unix_test.go

@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
-//go:build !windows
-
-package daemonaddr
-
-import (
-	"net"
-	"os"
-	"path/filepath"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// A socket this user created means the daemon runs as this user, which is the
-// rootless case where the daemon delegates its authority to its own identity.
-func TestDaemonRunsAsSelf_OwnSocket(t *testing.T) {
-	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "netbird.sock")
-	ln, err := net.Listen("unix", path)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
-	}
-	t.Cleanup(func() {
-		if err := ln.Close(); err != nil {
-			t.Logf("close listener: %v", err)
-		}
-	})
-
-	if !DaemonRunsAsSelf("unix://" + path) {
-		t.Error("a socket owned by this user must count as the daemon running as us")
-	}
-}
-
-// Everything that is not a readable socket of ours has to answer false, because
-// the caller reads a true as "the daemon would authorize me".
-func TestDaemonRunsAsSelf_FailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
-	dir := t.TempDir()
-
-	// A socket owned by another user, which is what a root-run daemon looks like
-	// to an unprivileged client. Only assertable when we are not root ourselves.
-	rootOwned := "unix:///var/run/netbird.sock"
-	if _, err := os.Stat("/var/run/netbird.sock"); err == nil && os.Getuid() != 0 {
-		if DaemonRunsAsSelf(rootOwned) {
-			t.Error("a socket owned by another user must not count as ours")
-		}
-	}
-
-	for name, addr := range map[string]string{
-		"missing socket":  "unix://" + filepath.Join(dir, "absent.sock"),
-		"tcp address":     "tcp://127.0.0.1:41731",
-		"named pipe":      "npipe://netbird",
-		"empty":           "",
-		"no scheme":       filepath.Join(dir, "absent.sock"),
-		"directory":       "unix://" + dir,
-		"unknown scheme":  "http://localhost:8080",
-		"scheme only":     "unix://",
-		"relative socket": "unix://netbird.sock",
-	} {
-		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			if DaemonRunsAsSelf(addr) {
-				t.Errorf("%q must not count as a daemon running as us", addr)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}

client/internal/daemonaddr/owner_windows.go

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-//go:build windows
-
-package daemonaddr
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"strings"
-
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
-)
-
-// daemonRunsAsSelf reads the owner of the daemon's pipe. A daemon running as the
-// service account owns its pipe as LocalSystem, and an elevated one as
-// BUILTIN\Administrators, so only a daemon the user started themselves matches.
-func daemonRunsAsSelf(addr string) bool {
-	name, ok := strings.CutPrefix(addr, pipeScheme)
-	if !ok {
-		return false
-	}
-
-	for _, path := range PipePaths(name) {
-		// Bounded: this runs on the UI's path for deciding which controls to
-		// offer, so a pipe that does not answer promptly must not stall it. A
-		// timeout leaves the caller unprivileged, which only disables controls.
-		ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), probeTimeout)
-		conn, err := dialPipe(ctx, path)
-		cancel()
-		if err != nil {
-			continue
-		}
-
-		owned := ipcauth.PipeOwnedBySelf(conn)
-		if cerr := conn.Close(); cerr != nil {
-			log.Debugf("close daemon pipe %s after ownership check: %v", path, cerr)
-		}
-		return owned
-	}
-
-	return false
-}

client/internal/daemonaddr/pipe.go

@@ -1,103 +0,0 @@
-package daemonaddr
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"net"
-	"runtime"
-	"strings"
-
-	"google.golang.org/grpc"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials/insecure"
-)
-
-const (
-	// WindowsPipeAddr is the default daemon address on Windows. A named pipe
-	// carries the connecting process's token, which loopback TCP does not, so
-	// it is the only Windows transport on which the daemon can tell who is
-	// calling it.
-	WindowsPipeAddr = "npipe://netbird"
-
-	// legacyWindowsAddr is the loopback-TCP address the Windows daemon used
-	// before named-pipe support.
-	legacyWindowsAddr = "tcp://127.0.0.1:41731"
-
-	pipeScheme = "npipe://"
-
-	// protectedPrefix is the NPFS namespace in which only LocalSystem and
-	// members of BUILTIN\Administrators may create a pipe. A daemon running as
-	// the service account creates its pipe there so that an unprivileged process
-	// cannot pre-create the name, which would keep the daemon from starting and
-	// leave callers talking to the squatter. Opening such a pipe needs no
-	// privilege, so unprivileged clients still reach the daemon.
-	protectedPrefix = `ProtectedPrefix\Administrators\`
-)
-
-// DialTarget returns the gRPC dial target and transport options for a daemon
-// address. The npipe scheme needs a context dialer because gRPC has no
-// named-pipe resolver; unix and tcp are handled by gRPC itself.
-func DialTarget(addr string) (string, []grpc.DialOption) {
-	opts := []grpc.DialOption{grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials())}
-
-	if name, ok := strings.CutPrefix(addr, pipeScheme); ok {
-		paths := PipePaths(name)
-		opts = append(opts, grpc.WithContextDialer(func(ctx context.Context, _ string) (net.Conn, error) {
-			return dialPipePaths(ctx, paths)
-		}))
-		return "passthrough:///netbird-daemon-pipe", opts
-	}
-
-	return strings.TrimPrefix(addr, "tcp://"), opts
-}
-
-// PipePath maps an npipe address name ("netbird", from "npipe://netbird") to a
-// Windows named-pipe path (\\.\pipe\netbird). A fully qualified path is left as
-// is.
-func PipePath(name string) string {
-	if strings.HasPrefix(name, `\\`) {
-		return name
-	}
-	return `\\.\pipe\` + name
-}
-
-// PipePaths returns the paths a daemon control pipe may live at for an npipe
-// address name, in the order both sides must try them: the protected name first,
-// then the plain one.
-//
-// The daemon serves the first it can create, which is the protected name when it
-// runs as the service account and the plain one when it runs as an ordinary user,
-// as it does in netstack mode. Clients therefore have to try both, and because a
-// client cannot tell from the name alone who created the pipe, the plain name is
-// only usable once the server's identity has been checked: see
-// verifyPipeServer.
-//
-// A fully qualified path is what the operator asked for and is used as is.
-func PipePaths(name string) []string {
-	if strings.HasPrefix(name, `\\`) {
-		return []string{name}
-	}
-	return []string{PipePath(protectedPrefix + name), PipePath(name)}
-}
-
-// IsProtectedPipePath reports whether a pipe path is in the namespace only an
-// administrator or LocalSystem can create in, which is what lets a client trust
-// such a pipe from its name alone.
-func IsProtectedPipePath(path string) bool {
-	return strings.HasPrefix(path, `\\.\pipe\`+protectedPrefix)
-}
-
-// MigrateLegacy upgrades the pre-named-pipe Windows daemon address to the named
-// pipe, reporting whether it rewrote the address. Existing installs persist the
-// daemon address, so without this an upgraded daemon would keep listening on
-// loopback TCP, where callers carry no identity and privileged operations would
-// have to be refused for everyone. Only the exact legacy default is rewritten:
-// a deliberately chosen custom address is left alone.
-func MigrateLegacy(addr string) (string, bool) {
-	return migrateLegacyForOS(runtime.GOOS, addr)
-}
-
-func migrateLegacyForOS(goos, addr string) (string, bool) {
-	if goos == "windows" && addr == legacyWindowsAddr {
-		return WindowsPipeAddr, true
-	}
-	return addr, false
-}

client/internal/daemonaddr/pipe_other.go

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-//go:build !windows
-
-package daemonaddr
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"fmt"
-	"net"
-)
-
-// dialPipePaths is Windows-only: no other platform serves the daemon on a named
-// pipe.
-func dialPipePaths(context.Context, []string) (net.Conn, error) {
-	return nil, fmt.Errorf("named pipes are only supported on Windows")
-}

client/internal/daemonaddr/pipe_test.go

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-package daemonaddr
-
-import (
-	"slices"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// The protected name must be tried before the plain one on both sides: it is the
-// one an unprivileged process cannot create, so preferring it is what keeps a
-// squatter from owning the name the service daemon would otherwise use.
-func TestPipePaths_PrefersTheProtectedName(t *testing.T) {
-	got := PipePaths("netbird")
-	want := []string{
-		`\\.\pipe\ProtectedPrefix\Administrators\netbird`,
-		`\\.\pipe\netbird`,
-	}
-	if !slices.Equal(got, want) {
-		t.Errorf("PipePaths = %q, want %q", got, want)
-	}
-}
-
-// An operator who passes a full path chose exactly one pipe, so neither side may
-// look anywhere else.
-func TestPipePaths_QualifiedPathIsUsedAsIs(t *testing.T) {
-	path := `\\.\pipe\custom-netbird`
-	got := PipePaths(path)
-	if !slices.Equal(got, []string{path}) {
-		t.Errorf("PipePaths = %q, want just %q", got, path)
-	}
-}

client/internal/daemonaddr/pipe_windows.go

@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-//go:build windows
-
-package daemonaddr
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"errors"
-	"fmt"
-	"net"
-
-	"github.com/Microsoft/go-winio"
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-	"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
-)
-
-// dialPipePaths connects to the first path that answers with a pipe server this
-// client may trust, and returns the last error when none does.
-func dialPipePaths(ctx context.Context, paths []string) (net.Conn, error) {
-	var lastErr error
-	for _, path := range paths {
-		conn, err := dialPipe(ctx, path)
-		if err != nil {
-			log.Debugf("dial daemon pipe %s: %v", path, err)
-			lastErr = err
-			continue
-		}
-
-		// A pipe in the protected namespace could only have been created by an
-		// administrator or LocalSystem, so its name is the guarantee. Any other
-		// name has to be checked, because any local user can create one.
-		if !IsProtectedPipePath(path) {
-			if err := ipcauth.PipeServerTrusted(conn); err != nil {
-				if closeErr := conn.Close(); closeErr != nil {
-					log.Debugf("close untrusted pipe %s: %v", path, closeErr)
-				}
-				lastErr = fmt.Errorf("%s: %w", path, err)
-				continue
-			}
-		}
-
-		return conn, nil
-	}
-
-	if lastErr == nil {
-		lastErr = errors.New("no daemon pipe to connect to")
-	}
-	return nil, lastErr
-}
-
-// dialPipe connects to the daemon control pipe at SECURITY_IDENTIFICATION.
-// winio's plain DialPipe connects at SECURITY_ANONYMOUS, under which the daemon
-// cannot read the caller's token at all. Identification lets the daemon read the
-// caller's SID and groups without granting it the ability to act as the caller.
-func dialPipe(ctx context.Context, path string) (net.Conn, error) {
-	access := uint32(windows.GENERIC_READ | windows.GENERIC_WRITE)
-	return winio.DialPipeAccessImpLevel(ctx, path, access, winio.PipeImpLevelIdentification)
-}

client/internal/daemonaddr/resolve_pipe_other.go

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-//go:build !windows
-
-package daemonaddr
-
-// ResolveDaemonAddr is a no-op off Windows, where there is no named-pipe
-// default to fall back from.
-func ResolveDaemonAddr(addr string) string {
-	return addr
-}

client/internal/daemonaddr/resolve_pipe_windows.go

@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
-//go:build windows
-
-package daemonaddr
-
-import (
-	"net"
-	"strings"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/Microsoft/go-winio"
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-)
-
-// probeTimeout bounds each transport probe. Both are local, so a daemon that is
-// listening answers immediately and one that is not fails immediately.
-const probeTimeout = 300 * time.Millisecond
-
-// ResolveDaemonAddr keeps a client on the named pipe and never silently moves it
-// off. When the pipe does not answer it checks the legacy loopback TCP address, so
-// a client meeting a daemon that has not restarted since the upgrade can say what
-// is wrong, but it does not connect there.
-//
-// Using that address automatically would be a downgrade the user never asked for:
-// any local process can bind 127.0.0.1 while the daemon is not listening, and the
-// transport carries no caller identity, so a client that accepted whatever answered
-// would hand a setup key, a pre-shared key or an SSO prompt to a local impostor. An
-// operator who needs the legacy address during the upgrade window can still pass
-// --daemon-addr explicitly, which is a deliberate choice and still refuses the
-// privileged operations.
-//
-// Only the pipe address is resolved. A custom address is left alone, though passing
-// --daemon-addr npipe://netbird explicitly is indistinguishable from the default
-// here, so it is treated the same way.
-func ResolveDaemonAddr(addr string) string {
-	if addr != WindowsPipeAddr {
-		return addr
-	}
-
-	for _, path := range PipePaths("netbird") {
-		if pipeAvailable(path) {
-			return addr
-		}
-	}
-
-	if tcpAvailable(legacyWindowsAddr) {
-		log.Warnf("the daemon is not serving %s, but something is listening on the legacy %s. "+
-			"Restart the NetBird service so it serves the pipe. That address is not used automatically: "+
-			"any local user can bind it and it carries no caller identity, so pass --daemon-addr %s "+
-			"explicitly if you accept that",
-			WindowsPipeAddr, legacyWindowsAddr, legacyWindowsAddr)
-	}
-
-	return addr
-}
-
-func pipeAvailable(path string) bool {
-	timeout := probeTimeout
-	conn, err := winio.DialPipe(path, &timeout)
-	if err != nil {
-		return false
-	}
-	if err := conn.Close(); err != nil {
-		log.Debugf("close daemon pipe probe: %v", err)
-	}
-	return true
-}
-
-func tcpAvailable(addr string) bool {
-	host := addr
-	if _, after, ok := strings.Cut(addr, "://"); ok {
-		host = after
-	}
-
-	conn, err := net.DialTimeout("tcp", host, probeTimeout)
-	if err != nil {
-		return false
-	}
-	if err := conn.Close(); err != nil {
-		log.Debugf("close daemon TCP probe: %v", err)
-	}
-	return true
-}

client/internal/debug/debug.go

@@ -676,7 +676,6 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addCommonConfigFields(configContent *strings.Builder)
 	configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("BlockLANAccess: %v\n", g.internalConfig.BlockLANAccess))
 	configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("BlockInbound: %v\n", g.internalConfig.BlockInbound))
 	configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("DisableIPv6: %v\n", g.internalConfig.DisableIPv6))
-	configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("SyncMessageVersion: %v\n", g.internalConfig.SyncMessageVersion))
 
 	if g.internalConfig.DisableNotifications != nil {
 		configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("DisableNotifications: %v\n", *g.internalConfig.DisableNotifications))

client/internal/debug/debug_test.go

@@ -887,8 +887,6 @@ func TestAddConfig_AllFieldsCovered(t *testing.T) {
 		ClientCertKeyPath:             "/tmp/key",
 		LazyConnection:                "on",
 		MTU:                           1280,
-		DisableIPv6:                   true,
-		SyncMessageVersion:            func(v int) *int { return &v }(1),
 	}
 
 	for _, anonymize := range []bool{false, true} {

client/internal/dns/local/local.go

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"net"
 	"net/netip"
-	"os"
 	"slices"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
@@ -37,43 +36,7 @@ type resolver interface {
 // record is left alone (it points at something outside our mesh, e.g.
 // a non-peer upstream).
 type PeerConnectivity interface {
-	IsConnectedByIP(ip netip.Addr) (known, connected bool)
-}
-
-// PeerActivator wakes lazy-connection peers on demand. The local resolver calls
-// it with the tunnel IPs an answer points at, so a peer that is idle (lazily
-// disconnected) starts connecting at DNS-resolution time rather than racing the
-// client's first request packet. nil disables warm-up.
-type PeerActivator interface {
-	// ActivatePeersByIP triggers wake-up for the peer(s) owning addrs and blocks
-	// until one is connected or ctx (a short per-query budget) expires. It is a
-	// fast no-op for unknown or already-connected addresses.
-	ActivatePeersByIP(ctx context.Context, addrs []netip.Addr)
-}
-
-const (
-	defaultLazyWarmupTimeout = 2 * time.Second
-	envLazyWarmupTimeout     = "NB_DNS_LAZY_WARMUP_TIMEOUT"
-)
-
-// lazyWarmupTimeoutFromEnv returns the per-query budget for waking a
-// lazy-connection peer a DNS answer points at. Tunable via
-// NB_DNS_LAZY_WARMUP_TIMEOUT (a Go duration). Parsed once at construction time.
-func lazyWarmupTimeoutFromEnv() time.Duration {
-	v := os.Getenv(envLazyWarmupTimeout)
-	if v == "" {
-		return defaultLazyWarmupTimeout
-	}
-	d, err := time.ParseDuration(v)
-	if err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("invalid %s value %q, using default %s: %v", envLazyWarmupTimeout, v, defaultLazyWarmupTimeout, err)
-		return defaultLazyWarmupTimeout
-	}
-	if d <= 0 {
-		log.Warnf("non-positive %s value %q, using default %s", envLazyWarmupTimeout, v, defaultLazyWarmupTimeout)
-		return defaultLazyWarmupTimeout
-	}
-	return d
+	IsConnectedByIP(ip string) (known, connected bool)
 }
 
 type Resolver struct {
@@ -88,12 +51,6 @@ type Resolver struct {
 	// filter and preserves the legacy "return whatever is registered"
 	// behaviour for callers that never wire a status source.
 	peerConn PeerConnectivity
-	// peerActivator, when non-nil, is called at resolution time to warm the
-	// lazy connection to the peer(s) an answer points at. nil disables warm-up.
-	peerActivator PeerActivator
-	// warmupTimeout is the per-query budget for the lazy-connection warm-up
-	// wait, resolved from the environment once at construction time.
-	warmupTimeout time.Duration
 
 	ctx    context.Context
 	cancel context.CancelFunc
@@ -102,12 +59,11 @@ type Resolver struct {
 func NewResolver() *Resolver {
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
 	return &Resolver{
-		records:       make(map[dns.Question][]dns.RR),
-		domains:       make(map[domain.Domain]struct{}),
-		zones:         make(map[domain.Domain]bool),
-		warmupTimeout: lazyWarmupTimeoutFromEnv(),
-		ctx:           ctx,
-		cancel:        cancel,
+		records: make(map[dns.Question][]dns.RR),
+		domains: make(map[domain.Domain]struct{}),
+		zones:   make(map[domain.Domain]bool),
+		ctx:     ctx,
+		cancel:  cancel,
 	}
 }
 
@@ -120,14 +76,6 @@ func (d *Resolver) SetPeerConnectivity(p PeerConnectivity) {
 	d.peerConn = p
 }
 
-// SetPeerActivator wires the DNS-time lazy-connection warm-up. Pass nil to
-// disable. Safe to call multiple times; the latest value wins.
-func (d *Resolver) SetPeerActivator(a PeerActivator) {
-	d.mu.Lock()
-	defer d.mu.Unlock()
-	d.peerActivator = a
-}
-
 func (d *Resolver) MatchSubdomains() bool {
 	return true
 }
@@ -174,9 +122,6 @@ func (d *Resolver) ServeDNS(w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg) {
 	replyMessage.RecursionAvailable = true
 
 	result := d.lookupRecords(logger, question)
-	// Warm before filtering: activation flips a lazily-idle target to connected,
-	// which then lets it survive the disconnected-peer filter below.
-	d.warmLazyPeers(question, result.records)
 	result.records = d.filterDisconnectedPeerAnswers(logger, question, result.records)
 	replyMessage.Authoritative = !result.hasExternalData
 	replyMessage.Answer = result.records
@@ -550,8 +495,8 @@ func (d *Resolver) filterDisconnectedPeerAnswers(logger *log.Entry, question dns
 	kept := make([]dns.RR, 0, len(records))
 	var dropped int
 	for _, rr := range records {
-		ip, ok := extractRecordAddr(rr)
-		if !ok {
+		ip := extractRecordIP(rr)
+		if ip == "" {
 			kept = append(kept, rr)
 			continue
 		}
@@ -573,57 +518,22 @@ func (d *Resolver) filterDisconnectedPeerAnswers(logger *log.Entry, question dns
 	return kept
 }
 
-// warmLazyPeers triggers lazy-connection wake-up for the peers a resolved
-// answer points at and waits briefly for one to connect, so the caller's first
-// request doesn't race the connection establishment. Warm-up is scoped to
-// match-only (non-authoritative) zones — the synthesized private-service zones
-// and user-created zones whose records point at specific peers. The account's
-// peer zone is authoritative, so plain peer-name lookups never trigger warm-up;
-// otherwise resolving any peer's name would wake its idle connection, defeating
-// laziness mesh-wide. No-op when no activator is wired (lazy connections
-// disabled) or the answer carries no peer IPs.
-func (d *Resolver) warmLazyPeers(question dns.Question, records []dns.RR) {
-	if len(records) < 2 {
-		return
-	}
-	d.mu.RLock()
-	activator := d.peerActivator
-	var nonAuth, found bool
-	if activator != nil {
-		nonAuth, found = d.findZone(question.Name)
-	}
-	d.mu.RUnlock()
-	if activator == nil || !found || !nonAuth {
-		return
-	}
-
-	var addrs []netip.Addr
-	for _, rr := range records {
-		if addr, ok := extractRecordAddr(rr); ok {
-			addrs = append(addrs, addr)
-		}
-	}
-	if len(addrs) == 0 {
-		return
-	}
-
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(d.ctx, d.warmupTimeout)
-	defer cancel()
-	activator.ActivatePeersByIP(ctx, addrs)
-}
-
-// extractRecordAddr returns the IP address carried by an A or AAAA record.
-// ok is false for any other record type or a record with no address.
-func extractRecordAddr(rr dns.RR) (netip.Addr, bool) {
+// extractRecordIP returns the dotted-decimal / colon-hex IP carried by
+// an A or AAAA record, or "" for any other record type.
+func extractRecordIP(rr dns.RR) string {
 	switch r := rr.(type) {
 	case *dns.A:
-		addr, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(r.A)
-		return addr.Unmap(), ok
+		if r.A == nil {
+			return ""
+		}
+		return r.A.String()
 	case *dns.AAAA:
-		addr, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(r.AAAA)
-		return addr.Unmap(), ok
+		if r.AAAA == nil {
+			return ""
+		}
+		return r.AAAA.String()
 	}
-	return netip.Addr{}, false
+	return ""
 }
 
 // Update replaces all zones and their records

client/internal/dns/local/local_test.go

@@ -37,8 +37,8 @@ type mockPeerConnectivity struct {
 	byIP map[string]struct{ known, connected bool }
 }
 
-func (m mockPeerConnectivity) IsConnectedByIP(ip netip.Addr) (known, connected bool) {
-	v, ok := m.byIP[ip.String()]
+func (m mockPeerConnectivity) IsConnectedByIP(ip string) (known, connected bool) {
+	v, ok := m.byIP[ip]
 	if !ok {
 		return false, false
 	}

client/internal/dns/local/warmup_test.go

@@ -1,204 +0,0 @@
-package local
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"net"
-	"net/netip"
-	"sync"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/miekg/dns"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns/test"
-	nbdns "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/dns"
-)
-
-// recordingActivator records the addresses it was asked to warm and returns
-// immediately, so ServeDNS is not blocked by the test.
-type recordingActivator struct {
-	mu     sync.Mutex
-	called bool
-	addrs  []netip.Addr
-}
-
-func (r *recordingActivator) ActivatePeersByIP(_ context.Context, addrs []netip.Addr) {
-	r.mu.Lock()
-	defer r.mu.Unlock()
-	r.called = true
-	r.addrs = append(r.addrs, addrs...)
-}
-
-func serveA(t *testing.T, resolver *Resolver, name string) *dns.Msg {
-	t.Helper()
-	var resp *dns.Msg
-	w := &test.MockResponseWriter{WriteMsgFunc: func(m *dns.Msg) error { resp = m; return nil }}
-	resolver.ServeDNS(w, new(dns.Msg).SetQuestion(name, dns.TypeA))
-	return resp
-}
-
-// serviceZone registers rec in a match-only (non-authoritative) zone, the shape
-// the synthesized private-service zones arrive in.
-func serviceZone(t *testing.T, resolver *Resolver, zone string, records ...nbdns.SimpleRecord) {
-	t.Helper()
-	resolver.Update([]nbdns.CustomZone{{
-		Domain:           zone,
-		Records:          records,
-		NonAuthoritative: true,
-	}})
-}
-
-func TestLocalResolver_WarmsLazyPeerOnResolve(t *testing.T) {
-	// Warm-up fires only for multi-record answers (the HA / round-robin shape of
-	// the synthesized private-service zones), so register two peer targets.
-	const name = "svc.proxy.netbird.cloud."
-	recs := []nbdns.SimpleRecord{
-		{Name: name, Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "100.64.0.7"},
-		{Name: name, Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "100.64.0.8"},
-	}
-	resolver := NewResolver()
-	serviceZone(t, resolver, "proxy.netbird.cloud", recs...)
-
-	act := &recordingActivator{}
-	resolver.SetPeerActivator(act)
-
-	resp := serveA(t, resolver, name)
-	require.NotNil(t, resp, "resolver must answer")
-	require.NotEmpty(t, resp.Answer, "answer must carry the A records")
-
-	act.mu.Lock()
-	defer act.mu.Unlock()
-	assert.True(t, act.called, "activator must be invoked for a multi-record service-zone answer")
-	assert.Contains(t, act.addrs, netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.7"), "activator must receive the first peer IP")
-	assert.Contains(t, act.addrs, netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.8"), "activator must receive the second peer IP")
-}
-
-func TestLocalResolver_NoWarmupForSingleRecord(t *testing.T) {
-	// A single-record answer does not trigger warm-up; the resolver only warms
-	// multi-record answers.
-	rec := nbdns.SimpleRecord{Name: "svc.proxy.netbird.cloud.", Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "100.64.0.7"}
-	resolver := NewResolver()
-	serviceZone(t, resolver, "proxy.netbird.cloud", rec)
-
-	act := &recordingActivator{}
-	resolver.SetPeerActivator(act)
-
-	resp := serveA(t, resolver, rec.Name)
-	require.NotNil(t, resp, "resolver must answer")
-	require.NotEmpty(t, resp.Answer, "answer must carry the A record")
-
-	act.mu.Lock()
-	defer act.mu.Unlock()
-	assert.False(t, act.called, "activator must not be invoked for a single-record answer")
-}
-
-func TestLocalResolver_NoActivatorNoWarmup(t *testing.T) {
-	// With no activator wired the resolver behaves exactly as before.
-	rec := nbdns.SimpleRecord{Name: "svc.proxy.netbird.cloud.", Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "100.64.0.7"}
-	resolver := NewResolver()
-	serviceZone(t, resolver, "proxy.netbird.cloud", rec)
-
-	resp := serveA(t, resolver, rec.Name)
-	require.NotNil(t, resp, "resolver must still answer without an activator")
-	require.NotEmpty(t, resp.Answer, "answer must carry the A record")
-}
-
-func TestLocalResolver_NoWarmupForMissingRecord(t *testing.T) {
-	// A query that resolves to nothing must not invoke the activator (no IPs).
-	resolver := NewResolver()
-	serviceZone(t, resolver, "proxy.netbird.cloud",
-		nbdns.SimpleRecord{Name: "svc.proxy.netbird.cloud.", Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "100.64.0.7"})
-
-	act := &recordingActivator{}
-	resolver.SetPeerActivator(act)
-
-	serveA(t, resolver, "absent.proxy.netbird.cloud.")
-
-	act.mu.Lock()
-	defer act.mu.Unlock()
-	assert.False(t, act.called, "activator must not be invoked when there is no answer")
-}
-
-func TestLocalResolver_NoWarmupInAuthoritativeZone(t *testing.T) {
-	// The account's peer zone is authoritative; resolving a peer's name there
-	// must not wake its lazy connection — warm-up is scoped to match-only
-	// (non-authoritative) zones such as the synthesized private-service zones.
-	// Use a multi-record answer so the authoritative-zone scoping is the only
-	// reason warm-up is skipped, not the single-record guard.
-	const name = "peer.netbird.cloud."
-	recs := []nbdns.SimpleRecord{
-		{Name: name, Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "100.64.0.9"},
-		{Name: name, Type: 1, Class: nbdns.DefaultClass, TTL: 300, RData: "100.64.0.10"},
-	}
-	resolver := NewResolver()
-	resolver.Update([]nbdns.CustomZone{{
-		Domain:  "netbird.cloud",
-		Records: recs,
-	}})
-
-	act := &recordingActivator{}
-	resolver.SetPeerActivator(act)
-
-	resp := serveA(t, resolver, name)
-	require.NotNil(t, resp, "resolver must answer")
-	require.NotEmpty(t, resp.Answer, "answer must carry the A records")
-
-	act.mu.Lock()
-	defer act.mu.Unlock()
-	assert.False(t, act.called, "activator must not be invoked for authoritative-zone answers")
-}
-
-func TestLazyWarmupTimeoutFromEnv(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name   string
-		value  string
-		envSet bool
-		want   time.Duration
-	}{
-		{name: "unset uses default", want: defaultLazyWarmupTimeout},
-		{name: "valid overrides", value: "5s", envSet: true, want: 5 * time.Second},
-		{name: "invalid falls back", value: "not-a-duration", envSet: true, want: defaultLazyWarmupTimeout},
-		{name: "negative falls back", value: "-1s", envSet: true, want: defaultLazyWarmupTimeout},
-		{name: "zero falls back", value: "0s", envSet: true, want: defaultLazyWarmupTimeout},
-	}
-
-	for _, tt := range tests {
-		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			if tt.envSet {
-				t.Setenv(envLazyWarmupTimeout, tt.value)
-			}
-			assert.Equal(t, tt.want, lazyWarmupTimeoutFromEnv())
-			assert.Equal(t, tt.want, NewResolver().warmupTimeout, "constructor must resolve the timeout once")
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-func TestExtractRecordAddr(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Run("A record yields unmapped v4", func(t *testing.T) {
-		// net.ParseIP returns the 16-byte v4-in-v6 form, the same shape
-		// miekg/dns stores after parsing an A record; the extracted address
-		// must compare equal to a plain v4 netip.Addr.
-		addr, ok := extractRecordAddr(&dns.A{A: net.ParseIP("100.64.0.7")})
-		require.True(t, ok)
-		assert.True(t, addr.Is4())
-		assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.7"), addr)
-	})
-
-	t.Run("AAAA record yields v6", func(t *testing.T) {
-		addr, ok := extractRecordAddr(&dns.AAAA{AAAA: net.ParseIP("fd00::1")})
-		require.True(t, ok)
-		assert.Equal(t, netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::1"), addr)
-	})
-
-	t.Run("A record without address", func(t *testing.T) {
-		_, ok := extractRecordAddr(&dns.A{})
-		assert.False(t, ok)
-	})
-
-	t.Run("non-address record", func(t *testing.T) {
-		_, ok := extractRecordAddr(&dns.CNAME{Target: "target.netbird.cloud."})
-		assert.False(t, ok)
-	})
-}

client/internal/dns/mock_server.go

@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/miekg/dns"
 
 	dnsconfig "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns/config"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/dns/local"
 	nbdns "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/dns"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
@@ -93,11 +92,6 @@ func (m *MockServer) SetFirewall(Firewall) {
 	// Mock implementation - no-op
 }
 
-// SetPeerActivator mock implementation of SetPeerActivator from Server interface
-func (m *MockServer) SetPeerActivator(local.PeerActivator) {
-	// Mock implementation - no-op
-}
-
 // BeginBatch mock implementation of BeginBatch from Server interface
 func (m *MockServer) BeginBatch() {
 	// Mock implementation - no-op

client/internal/dns/server.go

@@ -82,7 +82,6 @@ type Server interface {
 	PopulateManagementDomain(mgmtURL *url.URL) error
 	SetRouteSources(selected, active func() route.HAMap)
 	SetFirewall(Firewall)
-	SetPeerActivator(local.PeerActivator)
 }
 
 type nsGroupsByDomain struct {
@@ -492,13 +491,6 @@ func (s *DefaultServer) SetFirewall(fw Firewall) {
 	}
 }
 
-// SetPeerActivator wires the DNS-time lazy-connection warm-up on the local
-// resolver. Injected after the connection manager exists (it does not at
-// DNS-server construction time). Pass nil to disable.
-func (s *DefaultServer) SetPeerActivator(a local.PeerActivator) {
-	s.localResolver.SetPeerActivator(a)
-}
-
 // Stop stops the server
 func (s *DefaultServer) Stop() {
 	s.ctxCancel()
@@ -1443,11 +1435,11 @@ type localPeerConnectivity struct {
 
 // IsConnectedByIP looks the IP up in the peerstore and surfaces both
 // the known and connected bits. Used by Resolver.filterDisconnectedPeerAnswers.
-func (l localPeerConnectivity) IsConnectedByIP(ip netip.Addr) (known, connected bool) {
+func (l localPeerConnectivity) IsConnectedByIP(ip string) (known, connected bool) {
 	if l.status == nil {
 		return false, false
 	}
-	state, ok := l.status.PeerStateByIP(ip.String())
+	state, ok := l.status.PeerStateByIP(ip)
 	if !ok {
 		return false, false
 	}

client/internal/dns_peer_activator.go

@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
-package internal
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"net/netip"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peerstore"
-)
-
-const dnsActivationPollInterval = 50 * time.Millisecond
-
-// dnsPeerActivator wakes lazy-connection peers from the DNS resolution path. It
-// implements dns/local.PeerActivator. DNS queries run on their own goroutines,
-// so it only touches state that is safe for concurrent use — ConnMgr.ActivatePeer,
-// peerstore.Store and peer.Status — and never takes the engine's syncMsgMux,
-// keeping DNS resolution from contending with network-map processing.
-type dnsPeerActivator struct {
-	connMgr   *ConnMgr
-	peerStore *peerstore.Store
-	status    *peer.Status
-	// ctx is the engine's long-lived context. The connection dial is tied to it
-	// (not the per-query DNS wait budget) so a handshake that outlasts the wait
-	// still completes in the background rather than being cancelled at the deadline.
-	ctx context.Context
-}
-
-// ActivatePeersByIP triggers wake-up for the peer(s) owning addrs and waits
-// until one is connected or ctx (the per-query DNS wait budget) expires.
-// Activation itself is tied to the engine's long-lived context so the dial
-// survives a wait that times out. Unknown or already-connected addresses are
-// skipped, so the steady-state (warm) path adds no latency.
-func (a *dnsPeerActivator) ActivatePeersByIP(ctx context.Context, addrs []netip.Addr) {
-	if a == nil || a.connMgr == nil {
-		return
-	}
-
-	var pending []string
-	for _, addr := range addrs {
-		ip := addr.String()
-		st, ok := a.status.PeerStateByIP(ip)
-		if !ok || st.ConnStatus == peer.StatusConnected {
-			continue
-		}
-		conn, ok := a.peerStore.PeerConn(st.PubKey)
-		if !ok {
-			continue
-		}
-		a.connMgr.ActivatePeer(a.ctx, conn)
-		pending = append(pending, ip)
-	}
-
-	if len(pending) == 0 {
-		return
-	}
-	a.waitConnected(ctx, pending)
-}
-
-// waitConnected blocks until any of ips reports a connected peer or ctx expires.
-func (a *dnsPeerActivator) waitConnected(ctx context.Context, ips []string) {
-	ticker := time.NewTicker(dnsActivationPollInterval)
-	defer ticker.Stop()
-	for {
-		for _, ip := range ips {
-			if st, ok := a.status.PeerStateByIP(ip); ok && st.ConnStatus == peer.StatusConnected {
-				return
-			}
-		}
-		select {
-		case <-ctx.Done():
-			return
-		case <-ticker.C:
-		}
-	}
-}

client/internal/dns_peer_activator_test.go

@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
-package internal
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"net/netip"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peerstore"
-)
-
-func newTestPeerConn(t *testing.T, key string) *peer.Conn {
-	t.Helper()
-	conn, err := peer.NewConn(peer.ConnConfig{
-		Key:      key,
-		LocalKey: "local",
-		WgConfig: peer.WgConfig{
-			AllowedIps: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("100.64.0.1/32")},
-		},
-	}, peer.ServiceDependencies{})
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	return conn
-}
-
-func newTestDNSPeerActivator(t *testing.T) (*dnsPeerActivator, *peer.Status, *peerstore.Store) {
-	t.Helper()
-	status := peer.NewRecorder("https://mgm")
-	store := peerstore.NewConnStore()
-	// ConnMgr without Start: the lazy manager is nil, so ActivatePeer is a
-	// no-op — these tests exercise the activator's skip/wait logic.
-	connMgr := NewConnMgr(&EngineConfig{}, status, store, nil)
-	return &dnsPeerActivator{
-		connMgr:   connMgr,
-		peerStore: store,
-		status:    status,
-		ctx:       context.Background(),
-	}, status, store
-}
-
-func TestDNSPeerActivator_NilSafe(t *testing.T) {
-	var a *dnsPeerActivator
-	a.ActivatePeersByIP(context.Background(), []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1")})
-}
-
-// TestDNSPeerActivator_SkipsUnknownAndConnectedPeers verifies the steady-state
-// (warm) path adds no latency: already-connected and unknown addresses never
-// enter the wait loop.
-func TestDNSPeerActivator_SkipsUnknownAndConnectedPeers(t *testing.T) {
-	a, status, store := newTestDNSPeerActivator(t)
-
-	require.NoError(t, status.AddPeer("peerA", "a.netbird.cloud", "100.64.0.1", "fd00::1"))
-	require.NoError(t, status.UpdatePeerState(peer.State{PubKey: "peerA", ConnStatus: peer.StatusConnected}))
-	store.AddPeerConn("peerA", newTestPeerConn(t, "peerA"))
-
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
-	defer cancel()
-
-	start := time.Now()
-	a.ActivatePeersByIP(ctx, []netip.Addr{
-		netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1"),  // known, connected -> skipped
-		netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::1"),     // known via IPv6, connected -> skipped
-		netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.99"), // unknown -> skipped
-	})
-	require.Less(t, time.Since(start), time.Second, "no pending peer must mean no wait")
-}
-
-// TestDNSPeerActivator_WaitsForPendingPeerToConnect verifies the wait loop
-// returns as soon as a pending peer reports connected, well before the
-// per-query budget expires.
-func TestDNSPeerActivator_WaitsForPendingPeerToConnect(t *testing.T) {
-	a, status, store := newTestDNSPeerActivator(t)
-
-	require.NoError(t, status.AddPeer("peerA", "a.netbird.cloud", "100.64.0.1", ""))
-	store.AddPeerConn("peerA", newTestPeerConn(t, "peerA"))
-
-	go func() {
-		time.Sleep(150 * time.Millisecond)
-		_ = status.UpdatePeerState(peer.State{PubKey: "peerA", ConnStatus: peer.StatusConnected})
-	}()
-
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
-	defer cancel()
-
-	start := time.Now()
-	a.ActivatePeersByIP(ctx, []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1")})
-	elapsed := time.Since(start)
-
-	require.GreaterOrEqual(t, elapsed, 100*time.Millisecond, "must wait for the pending peer")
-	require.Less(t, elapsed, 5*time.Second, "must return on connect, not at the deadline")
-}
-
-// TestDNSPeerActivator_ReturnsAtBudgetWhenPeerStaysIdle verifies a peer that
-// never connects releases the DNS response at the per-query budget instead of
-// blocking it indefinitely.
-func TestDNSPeerActivator_ReturnsAtBudgetWhenPeerStaysIdle(t *testing.T) {
-	a, status, store := newTestDNSPeerActivator(t)
-
-	require.NoError(t, status.AddPeer("peerA", "a.netbird.cloud", "100.64.0.1", ""))
-	store.AddPeerConn("peerA", newTestPeerConn(t, "peerA"))
-
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 300*time.Millisecond)
-	defer cancel()
-
-	start := time.Now()
-	a.ActivatePeersByIP(ctx, []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1")})
-	elapsed := time.Since(start)
-
-	require.GreaterOrEqual(t, elapsed, 250*time.Millisecond, "must wait out the budget for a pending peer")
-	require.Less(t, elapsed, 5*time.Second, "must not block past the budget")
-}
-
-// TestDNSPeerActivator_NoWaitWithoutPeerConn verifies a known-but-idle peer
-// with no connection object in the store is not waited on: there is nothing to
-// activate, so waiting could only ever time out.
-func TestDNSPeerActivator_NoWaitWithoutPeerConn(t *testing.T) {
-	a, status, _ := newTestDNSPeerActivator(t)
-
-	require.NoError(t, status.AddPeer("peerA", "a.netbird.cloud", "100.64.0.1", ""))
-
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second)
-	defer cancel()
-
-	start := time.Now()
-	a.ActivatePeersByIP(ctx, []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.1")})
-	require.Less(t, time.Since(start), time.Second, "peer without a conn must not be waited on")
-}

client/internal/ebpf/ebpf/src/dns_fwd.c

@@ -52,14 +52,11 @@ int xdp_dns_fwd(struct iphdr  *ip, struct udphdr *udp) {
 
     if (udp->dest == GENERAL_DNS_PORT && ip->daddr == dns_ip) {
         udp->dest = dns_port;
-        // Clear the now-stale checksum; zero means "not computed" for IPv4.
-        udp->check = 0;
         return XDP_PASS;
     }
 
     if (udp->source == dns_port && ip->saddr == dns_ip) {
         udp->source = GENERAL_DNS_PORT;
-        udp->check = 0;
         return XDP_PASS;
     }
 

client/internal/ebpf/ebpf/src/wg_proxy.c

@@ -50,11 +50,5 @@ int xdp_wg_proxy(struct iphdr  *ip, struct udphdr *udp) {
     __be16 new_dst_port = htons(proxy_port);
     udp->dest = new_dst_port;
     udp->source = new_src_port;
-
-    // The ports are covered by the UDP checksum. This is an IPv4 loopback hop
-    // and the payload is already integrity-protected, so clear the checksum (a
-    // zero UDP checksum means "not computed" for IPv4) rather than leave a
-    // stale value the kernel would drop as UDP_CSUM.
-    udp->check = 0;
 	return XDP_PASS;
 }

client/internal/engine.go

@@ -64,10 +64,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
 	mgm "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/client"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
-	sharedgrpc "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/grpc"
-	nbnetworkmap "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/networkmap"
 	mgmProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
-	types "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/types"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/netiputil"
 	auth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/relay/auth/hmac"
 	relayClient "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/relay/client"
@@ -150,7 +147,6 @@ type EngineConfig struct {
 	BlockLANAccess      bool
 	BlockInbound        bool
 	DisableIPv6         bool
-	SyncMessageVersion  *int
 
 	// LazyConnection is the MDM-sourced lazy-connection override; StateUnset defers to
 	// the env var and management feature flag.
@@ -224,13 +220,6 @@ type Engine struct {
 	// networkSerial is the latest CurrentSerial (state ID) of the network sent by the Management service
 	networkSerial uint64
 
-	// latestComponents is the most-recent NetworkMapComponents decoded from
-	// a NetworkMapEnvelope (capability=3 peers only). Held alongside the
-	// NetworkMap that Calculate() produced from it so future incremental
-	// updates have a base to apply changes against. nil for legacy-format
-	// peers. Guarded by syncMsgMux.
-	latestComponents *types.NetworkMapComponents
-
 	networkMonitor *networkmonitor.NetworkMonitor
 
 	sshServer sshServer
@@ -663,24 +652,8 @@ func (e *Engine) Start(netbirdConfig *mgmProto.NetbirdConfig, mgmtURL *url.URL)
 	iceCfg := e.createICEConfig()
 
 	e.connMgr = NewConnMgr(e.config, e.statusRecorder, e.peerStore, wgIface)
-	e.connMgr.SetRoutedIPsReconciler(func(peerKey string) error {
-		if e.routeManager == nil {
-			return nil
-		}
-		return e.routeManager.ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs(peerKey)
-	})
 	e.connMgr.Start(e.ctx)
 
-	// Wire DNS-time lazy-connection warm-up now that the connection manager
-	// exists (it does not at DNS-server construction time). A DNS answer that
-	// points at an idle peer then wakes it before the client's first request.
-	e.dnsServer.SetPeerActivator(&dnsPeerActivator{
-		connMgr:   e.connMgr,
-		peerStore: e.peerStore,
-		status:    e.statusRecorder,
-		ctx:       e.ctx,
-	})
-
 	e.srWatcher = guard.NewSRWatcher(e.signal, e.relayManager, e.mobileDep.IFaceDiscover, iceCfg)
 	e.srWatcher.Start(peer.IsForceRelayed())
 
@@ -990,12 +963,8 @@ func (e *Engine) handleSync(update *mgmProto.SyncResponse) error {
 
 	e.ApplySessionDeadline(update.GetSessionExpiresAt())
 
-	// Envelope sync responses carry PeerConfig at the top level; legacy
-	// NetworkMap syncs carry it under NetworkMap.PeerConfig.
-	if pc := update.GetPeerConfig(); pc != nil {
-		e.handleAutoUpdateVersion(pc.GetAutoUpdate())
-	} else if nm := update.GetNetworkMap(); nm != nil && nm.GetPeerConfig() != nil {
-		e.handleAutoUpdateVersion(nm.GetPeerConfig().GetAutoUpdate())
+	if update.NetworkMap != nil && update.NetworkMap.PeerConfig != nil {
+		e.handleAutoUpdateVersion(update.NetworkMap.PeerConfig.AutoUpdate)
 	}
 
 	done := e.phase("netbird_config")
@@ -1005,47 +974,12 @@ func (e *Engine) handleSync(update *mgmProto.SyncResponse) error {
 		return err
 	}
 
-	// Decode the network map from either the components envelope or the
-	// legacy proto.NetworkMap before the posture-check gating below, so the
-	// "is there a network map" decision covers both wire shapes.
-	var (
-		nm         *mgmProto.NetworkMap
-		components *types.NetworkMapComponents
-	)
-	if version := update.GetVersion(); version == int32(sharedgrpc.ComponentNetworkMap) {
-		// Components-format peer: decode the envelope back to typed
-		// components, run Calculate() locally, and convert to the wire
-		// NetworkMap shape the rest of the engine consumes. Components are
-		// retained so future incremental updates can apply deltas instead
-		// of doing a full reconstruction.
-		envelope := update.GetNetworkMapEnvelope()
-		if envelope == nil {
-			return fmt.Errorf("received a SyncReponse indicating use of components network map, but components are missing")
-		}
-
-		localKey := e.config.WgPrivateKey.PublicKey().String()
-		dnsName := ""
-		if pc := update.GetPeerConfig(); pc != nil {
-			// PeerConfig.Fqdn = "<dns_label>.<dns_domain>" — extract the
-			// shared domain by stripping the peer's own label prefix. Falls
-			// back to empty if the FQDN doesn't have the expected shape.
-			dnsName = extractDNSDomainFromFQDN(pc.GetFqdn())
-		}
-		result, err := nbnetworkmap.EnvelopeToNetworkMap(e.ctx, envelope, localKey, dnsName)
-		if err != nil {
-			return fmt.Errorf("decode network map envelope: %w", err)
-		}
-		nm = result.NetworkMap
-		components = result.Components
-	} else {
-		nm = update.GetNetworkMap()
-	}
-
 	// Posture checks are bound to the network map presence:
 	//   NetworkMap != nil, checks present -> apply the received checks
 	//   NetworkMap != nil, checks nil     -> posture checks were removed, clear them
 	//   NetworkMap == nil                 -> config-only update (e.g. relay token rotation),
 	//                                        leave the previously applied checks untouched
+	nm := update.GetNetworkMap()
 	if nm == nil {
 		return nil
 	}
@@ -1058,14 +992,6 @@ func (e *Engine) handleSync(update *mgmProto.SyncResponse) error {
 	}
 
 	done = e.phase("persist")
-	// Only retain the components view when the server sent the envelope
-	// path. A legacy proto.NetworkMap means components == nil; writing it
-	// here would clobber a previously-cached snapshot, breaking the
-	// incremental-delta base on a future envelope sync.
-	if components != nil {
-		e.latestComponents = components
-	}
-
 	e.persistSyncResponse(update)
 	done()
 
@@ -1079,19 +1005,6 @@ func (e *Engine) handleSync(update *mgmProto.SyncResponse) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-// extractDNSDomainFromFQDN returns the trailing dotted domain part of the
-// receiving peer's FQDN — the same value the management server fills as
-// dnsName when it builds the legacy NetworkMap. "peer42.netbird.cloud" →
-// "netbird.cloud". An empty string is returned for unrecognized formats.
-func extractDNSDomainFromFQDN(fqdn string) string {
-	for i := 0; i < len(fqdn); i++ {
-		if fqdn[i] == '.' && i+1 < len(fqdn) {
-			return fqdn[i+1:]
-		}
-	}
-	return ""
-}
-
 // updateNetbirdConfig applies the management-provided NetBird configuration:
 // STUN/TURN and relay servers, flow logging and DNS settings. A nil config is a no-op,
 // which is the case for sync updates carrying only a network map.
@@ -1251,7 +1164,6 @@ func (e *Engine) applyInfoFlags(info *system.Info) {
 		e.config.BlockLANAccess,
 		e.config.BlockInbound,
 		e.config.DisableIPv6,
-		e.config.SyncMessageVersion,
 		e.config.EnableSSHRoot,
 		e.config.EnableSSHSFTP,
 		e.config.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding,
@@ -2120,7 +2032,6 @@ func (e *Engine) readInitialSettings() ([]*route.Route, *nbdns.Config, bool, err
 		e.config.BlockLANAccess,
 		e.config.BlockInbound,
 		e.config.DisableIPv6,
-		e.config.SyncMessageVersion,
 		e.config.EnableSSHRoot,
 		e.config.EnableSSHSFTP,
 		e.config.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding,

client/internal/engine_session_deadline_test.go

@@ -75,14 +75,4 @@ func TestApplySessionDeadline_ThreeState(t *testing.T) {
 		require.True(t, e.statusRecorder.GetSessionExpiresAt().IsZero(),
 			"invalid timestamp must clear the deadline")
 	})
-
-	t.Run("recently expired timestamp stays visible as expired", func(t *testing.T) {
-		e := newEngine()
-		expired := time.Now().Add(-5 * time.Minute).UTC().Truncate(time.Second)
-
-		e.ApplySessionDeadline(timestamppb.New(expired))
-
-		require.True(t, e.statusRecorder.GetSessionExpiresAt().Equal(expired),
-			"recently-expired deadline must stay on the recorder so consumers render it as expired")
-	})
 }

client/internal/ipcauth/creds_stub.go

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-//go:build !linux && !darwin && !freebsd && !windows
-
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"errors"
-	"net"
-
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
-)
-
-// errUnsupported is returned on platforms with no local peer-identity
-// primitive, so consumers fail closed instead of guessing an identity.
-var errUnsupported = errors.New("peer identity is not available on this platform")
-
-// NewTransportCredentials returns nil: without a peer-identity primitive the
-// daemon cannot authenticate local callers, and the caller must treat that as
-// "authorization cannot be enforced".
-func NewTransportCredentials() credentials.TransportCredentials {
-	return nil
-}
-
-// PeerIdentity always fails on this platform.
-func PeerIdentity(net.Conn) (Identity, error) {
-	return Identity{}, errUnsupported
-}
-
-// ConnIdentity always fails on this platform.
-func ConnIdentity(net.Conn) (Identity, error) {
-	return Identity{}, errUnsupported
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/creds_unix.go

@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-//go:build linux || darwin || freebsd
-
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"net"
-
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
-)
-
-// NewTransportCredentials returns gRPC transport credentials that expose the
-// caller's kernel-authenticated identity via IdentityFromContext. It returns
-// nil on platforms that have no peer-identity primitive, which the caller must
-// treat as "authorization cannot be enforced".
-//
-// The handshake exchanges no bytes on the wire, so a client dialing with
-// insecure credentials interoperates with a server using these. That keeps
-// older CLI and UI binaries working against an upgraded daemon.
-func NewTransportCredentials() credentials.TransportCredentials {
-	return unixCreds{}
-}
-
-// ConnIdentity extracts the caller's identity from an accepted local IPC
-// connection. It is shared by the gRPC transport credentials and by the JSON
-// gateway, which reads the identity of its own HTTP clients.
-func ConnIdentity(conn net.Conn) (Identity, error) {
-	return PeerIdentity(conn)
-}
-
-type unixCreds struct{}
-
-func (unixCreds) ClientHandshake(_ context.Context, _ string, conn net.Conn) (net.Conn, credentials.AuthInfo, error) {
-	return conn, AuthInfo{}, nil
-}
-
-// ServerHandshake extracts the peer identity and fails closed when it cannot
-// be read, so a connection whose caller is unknown never reaches a handler.
-func (unixCreds) ServerHandshake(conn net.Conn) (net.Conn, credentials.AuthInfo, error) {
-	id, err := ConnIdentity(conn)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, nil, err
-	}
-	return conn, AuthInfo{
-		CommonAuthInfo: credentials.CommonAuthInfo{SecurityLevel: credentials.NoSecurity},
-		Identity:       id,
-	}, nil
-}
-
-func (unixCreds) Info() credentials.ProtocolInfo {
-	return credentials.ProtocolInfo{SecurityProtocol: AuthInfo{}.AuthType()}
-}
-
-func (unixCreds) Clone() credentials.TransportCredentials { return unixCreds{} }
-
-func (unixCreds) OverrideServerName(string) error { return nil }

client/internal/ipcauth/creds_windows.go

@@ -1,194 +0,0 @@
-//go:build windows
-
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"fmt"
-	"net"
-	"runtime"
-
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-	"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
-)
-
-var (
-	modadvapi32                    = windows.NewLazySystemDLL("advapi32.dll")
-	procImpersonateNamedPipeClient = modadvapi32.NewProc("ImpersonateNamedPipeClient")
-)
-
-// DefaultPipeSDDL is the security descriptor for the daemon control pipe.
-//
-//	D:P          protected DACL, no inheritance
-//	(A;;GA;;;SY) allow GENERIC_ALL to LocalSystem (the daemon's service account)
-//	(A;;GA;;;WD) allow GENERIC_ALL to Everyone
-//
-// Any local caller may connect, as with a Unix socket at 0666; what a caller may
-// actually do is decided from its token, not from the DACL. Remote callers are not
-// a concern here: winio.ListenPipe creates the pipe with
-// FILE_PIPE_REJECT_REMOTE_CLIENTS, so NPFS rejects connections from other machines
-// before the descriptor is consulted.
-//
-// A deny ACE on the NETWORK SID would not add anything and would break callers:
-// that SID is present in any network-logon token, which includes OpenSSH and WinRM
-// sessions, so it denies administrators driving the CLI over SSH and denies the
-// daemon itself when started from such a session.
-func DefaultPipeSDDL() string {
-	return "D:P(A;;GA;;;SY)(A;;GA;;;WD)"
-}
-
-// NewTransportCredentials returns gRPC transport credentials that derive the
-// caller's identity from the named-pipe client token.
-//
-// The client must connect at SECURITY_IDENTIFICATION for the daemon to be able
-// to read its token, which is what DialNamedPipe does.
-func NewTransportCredentials() credentials.TransportCredentials {
-	return winpipeCreds{}
-}
-
-// ConnIdentity extracts the caller's identity from an accepted named-pipe
-// connection by impersonating the pipe client and reading its token. It is
-// shared by the gRPC transport credentials and by the JSON gateway, which
-// reads the identity of its own HTTP clients.
-func ConnIdentity(conn net.Conn) (Identity, error) {
-	// go-winio's pipe connection embeds *win32File, which exposes Fd().
-	fdConn, ok := conn.(interface{ Fd() uintptr })
-	if !ok {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("connection %T does not expose a pipe handle", conn)
-	}
-	return pipeClientIdentity(windows.Handle(fdConn.Fd()))
-}
-
-type winpipeCreds struct{}
-
-func (winpipeCreds) ClientHandshake(_ context.Context, _ string, conn net.Conn) (net.Conn, credentials.AuthInfo, error) {
-	return conn, AuthInfo{}, nil
-}
-
-// ServerHandshake extracts the connecting client's identity and fails closed
-// when the handle or token cannot be read, so a connection whose caller is
-// unknown never reaches a handler.
-func (winpipeCreds) ServerHandshake(conn net.Conn) (net.Conn, credentials.AuthInfo, error) {
-	id, err := ConnIdentity(conn)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, nil, err
-	}
-	return conn, AuthInfo{
-		CommonAuthInfo: credentials.CommonAuthInfo{SecurityLevel: credentials.NoSecurity},
-		Identity:       id,
-	}, nil
-}
-
-func (winpipeCreds) Info() credentials.ProtocolInfo {
-	return credentials.ProtocolInfo{SecurityProtocol: AuthInfo{}.AuthType()}
-}
-
-func (winpipeCreds) Clone() credentials.TransportCredentials { return winpipeCreds{} }
-
-func (winpipeCreds) OverrideServerName(string) error { return nil }
-
-// pipeClientIdentity reads the connecting client's user SID, usable group
-// SIDs, and elevation state by impersonating the pipe client on this thread
-// and reading the resulting impersonation token.
-func pipeClientIdentity(handle windows.Handle) (id Identity, err error) {
-	// Impersonation is per-thread, so the goroutine must stay on this thread
-	// until RevertToSelf, otherwise an unrelated goroutine could inherit the
-	// impersonated context.
-	runtime.LockOSThread()
-
-	// The thread only goes back to the runtime's pool once it is provably no
-	// longer impersonating the client. If the revert fails, leaving it locked
-	// makes Go terminate it when this goroutine exits, which costs one thread
-	// and keeps a thread running as the client from ever being reused.
-	clean := false
-	defer func() {
-		if clean {
-			runtime.UnlockOSThread()
-		}
-	}()
-
-	if err = impersonateNamedPipeClient(handle); err != nil {
-		clean = true
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("impersonate named pipe client: %w", err)
-	}
-	defer func() {
-		// Surface the revert failure only when nothing else failed: leaving
-		// the thread impersonated is worse than the original error.
-		revErr := windows.RevertToSelf()
-		if revErr != nil {
-			if err == nil {
-				err = fmt.Errorf("revert impersonation: %w", revErr)
-			}
-			return
-		}
-		clean = true
-	}()
-
-	// openAsSelf=true opens the token with the daemon's own process context
-	// rather than the impersonated client's, so the open cannot fail because
-	// the client lacks access to its own token.
-	var token windows.Token
-	if err = windows.OpenThreadToken(windows.CurrentThread(), windows.TOKEN_QUERY, true, &token); err != nil {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("open thread token: %w", err)
-	}
-	defer func() {
-		if cerr := token.Close(); cerr != nil {
-			log.Debugf("close client token: %v", cerr)
-		}
-	}()
-
-	return identityFromToken(token)
-}
-
-// identityFromToken reads the user SID, usable group SIDs and elevation state
-// out of a Windows token.
-func identityFromToken(token windows.Token) (Identity, error) {
-	user, err := token.GetTokenUser()
-	if err != nil {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("read token user: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	groups, err := tokenGroupSIDs(token)
-	if err != nil {
-		return Identity{}, err
-	}
-
-	return Identity{
-		SID:      user.User.Sid.String(),
-		Groups:   groups,
-		Elevated: token.IsElevated(),
-	}, nil
-}
-
-// tokenGroupSIDs returns the SIDs of the groups the token can actually
-// exercise. Groups that are disabled or marked deny-only are skipped: a
-// UAC-filtered administrator carries BUILTIN\Administrators as deny-only, and
-// treating that as membership would hand every admin account privilege it
-// cannot currently use.
-func tokenGroupSIDs(token windows.Token) ([]string, error) {
-	tg, err := token.GetTokenGroups()
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("read token groups: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	var sids []string
-	for _, g := range tg.AllGroups() {
-		if g.Attributes&windows.SE_GROUP_ENABLED == 0 {
-			continue
-		}
-		if g.Attributes&windows.SE_GROUP_USE_FOR_DENY_ONLY != 0 {
-			continue
-		}
-		sids = append(sids, g.Sid.String())
-	}
-	return sids, nil
-}
-
-func impersonateNamedPipeClient(h windows.Handle) error {
-	r, _, e := procImpersonateNamedPipeClient.Call(uintptr(h))
-	if r == 0 {
-		return e
-	}
-	return nil
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/forward.go

@@ -1,272 +0,0 @@
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"crypto/rand"
-	"crypto/subtle"
-	"encoding/hex"
-	"fmt"
-	"slices"
-	"strconv"
-	"strings"
-
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
-)
-
-// Metadata keys the local JSON gateway uses to forward the identity of its own
-// HTTP client to the daemon. The gateway runs inside the daemon process and
-// re-dials the daemon over the control socket, so without forwarding every
-// JSON request would appear to come from the daemon itself.
-const (
-	// mdFwd marks a request as forwarded by the JSON gateway. It is always
-	// set, even when the gateway could not read its client's identity, so the
-	// daemon can tell "no identity available" apart from "not forwarded".
-	mdFwd         = "x-netbird-fwd"
-	mdFwdUID      = "x-netbird-fwd-uid"      // Unix user ID
-	mdFwdGID      = "x-netbird-fwd-gid"      // Unix primary group ID
-	mdFwdSID      = "x-netbird-fwd-sid"      // Windows user SID
-	mdFwdGroup    = "x-netbird-fwd-group"    // Windows group SID, repeated
-	mdFwdElevated = "x-netbird-fwd-elevated" // Windows, "1" when elevated
-
-	// mdFwdProof proves the forwarded identity was stamped by this process. The
-	// gateway runs inside the daemon, so a secret held in memory is available to
-	// the only legitimate producer and to nothing else.
-	mdFwdProof = "x-netbird-fwd-proof"
-)
-
-// forwardKeys is every metadata key the gateway sets. An HTTP client must never
-// be able to supply one itself: see IsReservedForwardKey.
-var forwardKeys = []string{mdFwd, mdFwdUID, mdFwdGID, mdFwdSID, mdFwdGroup, mdFwdElevated, mdFwdProof}
-
-// forwardProof authenticates the gateway's forwarding metadata. It is generated
-// once per daemon process and never leaves it: it is not written to disk, not
-// logged, and not sent anywhere except over the daemon's own control socket to
-// itself.
-//
-// Without it, trusting a forwarded identity rests on every layer in front of it
-// stripping incoming forwarding keys, and on each key's value shape being
-// distinguishable from an injected one. A single injected group SID or an
-// injected "elevated" flag has the same shape as a legitimate one, so no
-// cardinality rule can catch it. Requiring the proof means metadata that did not
-// come from this process is refused whatever it contains.
-var forwardProof = mustForwardProof()
-
-func mustForwardProof() string {
-	var buf [32]byte
-	if _, err := rand.Read(buf[:]); err != nil {
-		// Continuing would leave the forwarded path authenticated by a
-		// predictable value, which is worse than not starting.
-		panic(fmt.Sprintf("generate identity forwarding proof: %v", err))
-	}
-	return hex.EncodeToString(buf[:])
-}
-
-// IsReservedForwardKey reports whether a gRPC metadata key belongs to the
-// gateway's identity forwarding, and therefore must be dropped when it arrives
-// from outside.
-//
-// grpc-gateway maps "Grpc-Metadata-<key>" request headers into gRPC metadata and
-// joins them ahead of the values its own annotators add. Without dropping these,
-// an HTTP client could hand the daemon "x-netbird-fwd-uid: 0" and be believed,
-// because the daemon trusts forwarded metadata when the transport peer is the
-// (privileged) gateway.
-func IsReservedForwardKey(key string) bool {
-	key = strings.ToLower(key)
-	return slices.Contains(forwardKeys, key)
-}
-
-// ForwardIdentityMetadata encodes an HTTP client's identity for the JSON
-// gateway to forward to the daemon. When known is false only the marker is
-// set, which makes the daemon treat the caller as unidentified rather than as
-// the daemon itself.
-func ForwardIdentityMetadata(id Identity, known bool) metadata.MD {
-	md := metadata.MD{}
-	md.Set(mdFwd, "1")
-	md.Set(mdFwdProof, forwardProof)
-	if !known {
-		return md
-	}
-
-	if id.IsWindows() {
-		md.Set(mdFwdSID, id.SID)
-		if len(id.Groups) > 0 {
-			md.Set(mdFwdGroup, id.Groups...)
-		}
-		if id.Elevated {
-			md.Set(mdFwdElevated, "1")
-		}
-		return md
-	}
-
-	md.Set(mdFwdUID, strconv.FormatUint(uint64(id.UID), 10))
-	md.Set(mdFwdGID, strconv.FormatUint(uint64(id.GID), 10))
-	return md
-}
-
-// CallerIdentity returns the identity to authorize a request against. For a
-// direct connection that is the transport peer's kernel identity. For a
-// request relayed by the local JSON gateway it is the identity the gateway
-// forwarded, since the transport peer is then the daemon itself.
-//
-// A forwarded identity is only honoured when the transport peer is the daemon's
-// own identity and the metadata carries this process's forwarding proof, so
-// forged forwarding metadata gains a caller nothing. A forwarded request that
-// carries no identity is reported as unidentified, never as the daemon.
-//
-// The second return value is false when no identity could be established, and
-// callers MUST fail closed in that case.
-func CallerIdentity(ctx context.Context) (Identity, bool) {
-	id, ok := IdentityFromContext(ctx)
-	if !ok {
-		return Identity{}, false
-	}
-
-	// A forwarding key that arrives more than once did not come from the gateway
-	// alone, so nothing about the request can be trusted to describe its caller.
-	// Refusing outright matters because the alternative reading, "not forwarded",
-	// would authorize the request as the transport peer, which on the gateway's
-	// connection is the daemon itself.
-	if duplicatedForwardKey(ctx) {
-		return Identity{}, false
-	}
-
-	forwarded := isForwarded(ctx)
-
-	// Our own process on the other end of the socket is the JSON gateway, the only
-	// thing that dials the daemon from inside it. Such a call must carry a
-	// forwarded identity; without one there is no caller to authorize, and
-	// treating it as the daemon would authorize whatever reached the JSON socket.
-	// Only Linux reports the peer PID, so this is a belt on top of the gateway's
-	// interceptor rather than the sole guarantee.
-	if id.PID != 0 && int(id.PID) == selfPID && !forwarded {
-		return Identity{}, false
-	}
-
-	// Only the gateway's own connection may speak for someone else. Being
-	// privileged is not enough and not the point: the gateway runs inside the
-	// daemon, so it dials as the daemon's identity whatever user that is, which
-	// also covers a rootless container.
-	if !forwarded || !IsDaemonSelf(id) {
-		return id, true
-	}
-
-	// Speaking for someone else additionally requires the proof only this process
-	// holds. Refusing is the only safe reading: the transport peer here is the
-	// daemon itself, so falling back to it would authorize the request as the
-	// daemon. This is also what makes the forwarded values trustworthy once
-	// accepted, so they need no shape checks of their own.
-	if !authenticForward(ctx) {
-		return Identity{}, false
-	}
-
-	return forwardedIdentity(ctx)
-}
-
-// duplicatedForwardKey reports whether any forwarding key carries more than one
-// value. The gateway's interceptor sets each key exactly once and replaces what
-// was already there, so a repeat means a second source supplied it.
-func duplicatedForwardKey(ctx context.Context) bool {
-	md, ok := metadata.FromIncomingContext(ctx)
-	if !ok {
-		return false
-	}
-	for _, key := range forwardKeys {
-		// Group SIDs are legitimately repeated; the rest identify the caller.
-		if key == mdFwdGroup {
-			continue
-		}
-		if len(md.Get(key)) > 1 {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}
-
-// authenticForward reports whether the request carries this process's forwarding
-// proof, which only the in-process JSON gateway can supply.
-func authenticForward(ctx context.Context) bool {
-	md, ok := metadata.FromIncomingContext(ctx)
-	if !ok {
-		return false
-	}
-	got := mdSingle(md, mdFwdProof)
-	return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(got), []byte(forwardProof)) == 1
-}
-
-// isForwarded reports whether the request carries the JSON gateway marker.
-func isForwarded(ctx context.Context) bool {
-	md, ok := metadata.FromIncomingContext(ctx)
-	if !ok {
-		return false
-	}
-	return mdSingle(md, mdFwd) != ""
-}
-
-// forwardedIdentity decodes the identity the JSON gateway attached.
-func forwardedIdentity(ctx context.Context) (Identity, bool) {
-	md, ok := metadata.FromIncomingContext(ctx)
-	if !ok {
-		return Identity{}, false
-	}
-
-	if sid := mdSingle(md, mdFwdSID); sid != "" {
-		return Identity{
-			SID: sid,
-			// Repeated by design, one value per group, and only reachable once
-			// the forwarding proof has been verified.
-			Groups:   md.Get(mdFwdGroup),
-			Elevated: mdSingle(md, mdFwdElevated) == "1",
-		}, true
-	}
-
-	uid, err := strconv.ParseUint(mdSingle(md, mdFwdUID), 10, 32)
-	if err != nil {
-		return Identity{}, false
-	}
-
-	id := Identity{UID: uint32(uid)}
-	if gid, err := strconv.ParseUint(mdSingle(md, mdFwdGID), 10, 32); err == nil {
-		id.GID = uint32(gid)
-	}
-	return id, true
-}
-
-// mdSingle returns the value of a forwarded key only when exactly one was
-// supplied. The gateway's interceptor sets each key exactly once, so more than one
-// value means something else also supplied it, and the whole identity is treated as
-// unknown rather than picking a winner. Defence in depth behind the gateway's
-// header filter.
-func mdSingle(md metadata.MD, key string) string {
-	if v := md.Get(key); len(v) == 1 {
-		return v[0]
-	}
-	return ""
-}
-
-// WithForwardedIdentity stamps id onto a context's outgoing metadata for the JSON
-// gateway's call to the daemon, replacing any forwarding keys already present so
-// values supplied from outside cannot survive alongside it.
-//
-// This is deliberately not done with runtime.WithMetadata: grpc-gateway skips its
-// annotators entirely when no request header maps to metadata ("if len(pairs) == 0
-// { return ctx, nil, nil }", runtime/context.go), which an HTTP/1.0 request with no
-// Host header over a unix socket achieves. The daemon would then see an unmarked
-// call whose transport peer is the daemon's own identity, and authorize it as the
-// daemon. A client interceptor runs for every RPC regardless of headers.
-func WithForwardedIdentity(ctx context.Context, id Identity, known bool) context.Context {
-	md, ok := metadata.FromOutgoingContext(ctx)
-	if !ok {
-		md = metadata.MD{}
-	} else {
-		md = md.Copy()
-	}
-
-	for _, key := range forwardKeys {
-		delete(md, key)
-	}
-	for key, values := range ForwardIdentityMetadata(id, known) {
-		md[key] = values
-	}
-
-	return metadata.NewOutgoingContext(ctx, md)
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/forward_test.go

@@ -1,214 +0,0 @@
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"testing"
-
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/peer"
-)
-
-// transportCtx builds a request context as the daemon's transport credentials
-// would: the identity of whoever opened the socket, plus whatever metadata the
-// request carried.
-func transportCtx(id Identity, md metadata.MD) context.Context {
-	ctx := peer.NewContext(context.Background(), &peer.Peer{
-		AuthInfo: AuthInfo{
-			CommonAuthInfo: credentials.CommonAuthInfo{SecurityLevel: credentials.NoSecurity},
-			Identity:       id,
-		},
-	})
-	if md != nil {
-		ctx = metadata.NewIncomingContext(ctx, md)
-	}
-	return ctx
-}
-
-var (
-	root       = Identity{UID: 0}
-	unprivUser = Identity{UID: 1000, GID: 1000}
-)
-
-// asDaemon pins which identity counts as this process for the duration of a test.
-// Without it the test binary's own uid decides, which silently changes what
-// "the gateway" means.
-func asDaemon(t *testing.T, id Identity) {
-	t.Helper()
-	prevID, prevKnown, prevDelegate := selfIdentity, selfKnown, selfMayDelegate
-	t.Cleanup(func() { selfIdentity, selfKnown, selfMayDelegate = prevID, prevKnown, prevDelegate })
-	selfIdentity, selfKnown = id, true
-	selfMayDelegate = !id.IsPrivileged()
-}
-
-func TestCallerIdentity_DirectConnections(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Run("no transport credentials is not an identity", func(t *testing.T) {
-		if _, ok := CallerIdentity(context.Background()); ok {
-			t.Fatal("a caller with no credentials must not be identified")
-		}
-	})
-
-	t.Run("a direct caller is its transport identity", func(t *testing.T) {
-		id, ok := CallerIdentity(transportCtx(unprivUser, nil))
-		if !ok || id.UID != 1000 {
-			t.Fatalf("got %v ok=%t, want uid 1000", id, ok)
-		}
-	})
-
-	// The whole point of honouring forwarded metadata only from a privileged
-	// transport peer: an unprivileged caller can set any metadata it likes on its
-	// own connection to the daemon socket.
-	t.Run("an unprivileged caller cannot forge an identity", func(t *testing.T) {
-		asDaemon(t, root)
-		forged := metadata.Pairs(mdFwd, "1", mdFwdUID, "0", mdFwdGID, "0")
-		id, ok := CallerIdentity(transportCtx(unprivUser, forged))
-		if !ok {
-			t.Fatal("caller should still be identified, as itself")
-		}
-		if id.IsPrivileged() || id.UID != 1000 {
-			t.Fatalf("forged metadata was believed: got %v", id)
-		}
-	})
-}
-
-func TestCallerIdentity_GatewayForwarding(t *testing.T) {
-	t.Run("the gateway's client identity is used, not the gateway's own", func(t *testing.T) {
-		asDaemon(t, root)
-		md := ForwardIdentityMetadata(unprivUser, true)
-		id, ok := CallerIdentity(transportCtx(root, md))
-		if !ok {
-			t.Fatal("forwarded identity should be usable")
-		}
-		if id.IsPrivileged() || id.UID != 1000 {
-			t.Fatalf("got %v, want the forwarded uid 1000 and not privileged", id)
-		}
-	})
-
-	t.Run("a privileged gateway client stays privileged", func(t *testing.T) {
-		asDaemon(t, root)
-		md := ForwardIdentityMetadata(root, true)
-		id, ok := CallerIdentity(transportCtx(root, md))
-		if !ok || !id.IsPrivileged() {
-			t.Fatalf("got %v ok=%t, want a privileged identity", id, ok)
-		}
-	})
-
-	// A JSON socket the gateway cannot read peer credentials from (a TCP socket,
-	// say) must not make every request look like the daemon itself.
-	t.Run("an unreadable client identity is unknown, not the daemon", func(t *testing.T) {
-		asDaemon(t, root)
-		md := ForwardIdentityMetadata(Identity{}, false)
-		if _, ok := CallerIdentity(transportCtx(root, md)); ok {
-			t.Fatal("a forwarded request with no identity must not be identified")
-		}
-	})
-
-	// grpc-gateway turns Grpc-Metadata-<key> headers into gRPC metadata and joins
-	// them ahead of its annotators' values. If an HTTP client's header survived
-	// that, this is the shape the daemon would see: the attacker's uid 0 first,
-	// the real uid second. The gateway filters those headers out, and reading a
-	// duplicated key as unknown makes the daemon safe even if it did not.
-	t.Run("a duplicated key from an injected header is not believed", func(t *testing.T) {
-		asDaemon(t, root)
-		md := metadata.MD{}
-		md.Append(mdFwd, "1")
-		md.Append(mdFwdUID, "0")    // injected by the HTTP client
-		md.Append(mdFwdUID, "1000") // appended by the gateway's annotator
-		if id, ok := CallerIdentity(transportCtx(root, md)); ok {
-			t.Fatalf("injected uid was accepted: got %v", id)
-		}
-	})
-
-	t.Run("a duplicated marker is not believed either", func(t *testing.T) {
-		asDaemon(t, root)
-		md := metadata.MD{}
-		md.Append(mdFwd, "1")
-		md.Append(mdFwd, "1")
-		md.Append(mdFwdUID, "1000")
-		// A repeated marker must not be read as "not forwarded": that would
-		// authorize the request as the transport peer, which on the gateway's
-		// connection is the daemon itself.
-		if id, ok := CallerIdentity(transportCtx(root, md)); ok {
-			t.Fatalf("a duplicated marker was believed: got %v", id)
-		}
-	})
-
-	// The layers in front of this (the gateway's header matcher, and its
-	// interceptor replacing every forwarding key) are what keep outside metadata
-	// from arriving at all. The proof is what the daemon can check for itself, and
-	// it is the only defence that works for a value whose legitimate shape is
-	// indistinguishable from an injected one: a lone group SID, or "elevated".
-	t.Run("forwarding metadata without this process's proof is refused", func(t *testing.T) {
-		asDaemon(t, root)
-		for name, md := range map[string]metadata.MD{
-			"no proof":    metadata.Pairs(mdFwd, "1", mdFwdUID, "0"),
-			"wrong proof": metadata.Pairs(mdFwd, "1", mdFwdUID, "0", mdFwdProof, "deadbeef"),
-			"windows identity without a proof": metadata.Pairs(mdFwd, "1",
-				mdFwdSID, "S-1-5-21-1-2-3-1001", mdFwdGroup, sidAdministrators, mdFwdElevated, "1"),
-		} {
-			t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
-				if id, ok := CallerIdentity(transportCtx(root, md)); ok {
-					t.Fatalf("unstamped forwarding metadata was believed: got %v", id)
-				}
-			})
-		}
-	})
-
-	// A caller that reaches the gateway cannot see the proof, so it cannot append
-	// a group of its own to a genuine forwarded identity: doing so would have to
-	// go through the interceptor, which replaces the whole set.
-	t.Run("a group appended to a stamped identity does not survive the interceptor", func(t *testing.T) {
-		asDaemon(t, root)
-		injected := metadata.MD{}
-		injected.Append(mdFwdGroup, sidAdministrators)
-
-		ctx := WithForwardedIdentity(metadata.NewOutgoingContext(context.Background(), injected),
-			Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-1-2-3-1001"}, true)
-		out, ok := metadata.FromOutgoingContext(ctx)
-		if !ok {
-			t.Fatal("no outgoing metadata")
-		}
-		if groups := out.Get(mdFwdGroup); len(groups) != 0 {
-			t.Fatalf("injected group survived: %v", groups)
-		}
-	})
-}
-
-func TestIsReservedForwardKey(t *testing.T) {
-	for _, key := range forwardKeys {
-		if !IsReservedForwardKey(key) {
-			t.Errorf("%q must be reserved", key)
-		}
-	}
-
-	// grpc-gateway canonicalises header names, so the check has to be
-	// case-insensitive.
-	if !IsReservedForwardKey("X-Netbird-Fwd-Uid") {
-		t.Error("the check must be case-insensitive")
-	}
-
-	for _, key := range []string{"authorization", "x-netbird", "x-netbird-fwd-uid-extra", ""} {
-		if IsReservedForwardKey(key) {
-			t.Errorf("%q must not be reserved", key)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func TestForwardIdentityMetadata_AlwaysMarksForwarded(t *testing.T) {
-	for _, tc := range []struct {
-		name  string
-		id    Identity
-		known bool
-	}{
-		{"known unix identity", unprivUser, true},
-		{"unknown identity", Identity{}, false},
-		{"windows identity", Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-1-2-3-1001", Elevated: true}, true},
-	} {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			md := ForwardIdentityMetadata(tc.id, tc.known)
-			if got := md.Get(mdFwd); len(got) != 1 || got[0] != "1" {
-				t.Fatalf("marker = %v, want exactly one \"1\"", got)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/identity.go

@@ -1,127 +0,0 @@
-// Package ipcauth provides the kernel-authenticated identity of a local IPC
-// (gRPC) caller and the transport credentials that surface it into the gRPC
-// context, so the daemon can authorize individual RPCs by caller identity.
-//
-// On Unix the identity is read from the kernel via SO_PEERCRED (Linux) or
-// LOCAL_PEERCRED (Darwin/FreeBSD). On Windows it is derived from the
-// named-pipe client token. Platforms without a peer-identity primitive get no
-// credentials, and every consumer must fail closed when no identity is
-// available.
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"fmt"
-	"slices"
-
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/peer"
-)
-
-// Well-known Windows SIDs that identify a fully privileged principal.
-const (
-	sidLocalSystem    = "S-1-5-18"     // NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
-	sidLocalService   = "S-1-5-19"     // NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE
-	sidNetworkService = "S-1-5-20"     // NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE
-	sidAdministrators = "S-1-5-32-544" // BUILTIN\Administrators
-)
-
-// Identity is the kernel-authenticated identity of a local IPC caller. The
-// zero value is not a valid identity: consumers must only use one obtained
-// with a true ok/nil error return.
-type Identity struct {
-	// UID and GID are the caller's Unix user ID and primary group ID. Both are
-	// zero on Windows, where SID is authoritative instead.
-	UID uint32
-	GID uint32
-
-	// SID is the caller's Windows security identifier, empty on Unix.
-	SID string
-
-	// Groups holds the caller's Windows group SIDs, captured from the client
-	// token at handshake time. Only groups that are enabled and not
-	// deny-only are captured, so a group listed here is one the caller can
-	// actually exercise. Empty on Unix.
-	Groups []string
-
-	// Elevated reports whether the Windows client token is elevated (running
-	// as administrator, or an administrator with UAC turned off). Always false
-	// on Unix, where privilege is uid 0.
-	Elevated bool
-
-	// PID is the caller's process ID where the platform reports it (Linux's
-	// SO_PEERCRED), and 0 where it does not. It identifies the daemon's own
-	// process dialling itself, which is what the JSON gateway does, and is never
-	// used to grant anything.
-	PID int32
-}
-
-// IsWindows reports whether this identity is a Windows principal (SID-based)
-// rather than a Unix uid/gid principal.
-func (i Identity) IsWindows() bool {
-	return i.SID != ""
-}
-
-// IsPrivileged reports whether the caller is the platform's administrative
-// principal, which is what the daemon requires for changes that cross the
-// user-to-root boundary.
-//
-// On Windows the decision comes from the caller's token rather than from
-// account names or group RIDs: an elevated token, one of the service accounts
-// the daemon itself may run as, or a token with BUILTIN\Administrators
-// enabled. A UAC-filtered administrator has that group marked deny-only, and
-// deny-only groups are dropped when the identity is captured, so such a
-// caller is correctly reported as unprivileged. Domain group memberships
-// (Domain Admins and friends) are deliberately not consulted: they say
-// nothing about what this token may do on this machine.
-func (i Identity) IsPrivileged() bool {
-	if !i.IsWindows() {
-		return i.UID == 0
-	}
-
-	if i.Elevated {
-		return true
-	}
-
-	switch i.SID {
-	case sidLocalSystem, sidLocalService, sidNetworkService:
-		return true
-	}
-
-	return slices.Contains(i.Groups, sidAdministrators)
-}
-
-// String renders the identity for audit logs and denial messages.
-func (i Identity) String() string {
-	if i.IsWindows() {
-		return fmt.Sprintf("sid=%s elevated=%t", i.SID, i.Elevated)
-	}
-	return fmt.Sprintf("uid=%d gid=%d", i.UID, i.GID)
-}
-
-// AuthInfo carries the peer Identity as a gRPC credentials.AuthInfo so
-// handlers can retrieve it from the request context via IdentityFromContext.
-type AuthInfo struct {
-	credentials.CommonAuthInfo
-	Identity Identity
-}
-
-// AuthType identifies the authentication scheme.
-func (AuthInfo) AuthType() string { return "netbird-ipc-peercred" }
-
-// IdentityFromContext extracts the caller's kernel-authenticated identity from
-// the gRPC peer context. The second return value is false when no IPC
-// transport credentials were negotiated, which happens on a TCP daemon socket
-// and on platforms without a peer-identity primitive. Callers MUST fail closed
-// in that case.
-func IdentityFromContext(ctx context.Context) (Identity, bool) {
-	p, ok := peer.FromContext(ctx)
-	if !ok {
-		return Identity{}, false
-	}
-	info, ok := p.AuthInfo.(AuthInfo)
-	if !ok {
-		return Identity{}, false
-	}
-	return info.Identity, true
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/peercred_bsd.go

@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-//go:build darwin || freebsd
-
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"net"
-
-	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
-)
-
-// PeerIdentity reads the kernel-authenticated identity of the process on the
-// other end of a Unix socket via LOCAL_PEERCRED. The xucred is recorded by the
-// kernel at connect() time and carries the peer's uid and its group list, of
-// which the first entry is the primary group.
-func PeerIdentity(conn net.Conn) (Identity, error) {
-	uc, ok := conn.(*net.UnixConn)
-	if !ok {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("connection is not a unix socket: %T", conn)
-	}
-
-	raw, err := uc.SyscallConn()
-	if err != nil {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("raw conn: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	var cred *unix.Xucred
-	var credErr error
-	if err := raw.Control(func(fd uintptr) {
-		cred, credErr = unix.GetsockoptXucred(int(fd), unix.SOL_LOCAL, unix.LOCAL_PEERCRED)
-	}); err != nil {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("control raw conn: %w", err)
-	}
-	if credErr != nil {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("read LOCAL_PEERCRED: %w", credErr)
-	}
-
-	id := Identity{UID: cred.Uid}
-	if cred.Ngroups > 0 {
-		id.GID = cred.Groups[0]
-	}
-	return id, nil
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/peercred_linux.go

@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-//go:build linux
-
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"net"
-
-	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
-)
-
-// PeerIdentity reads the kernel-authenticated identity of the process on the
-// other end of a Unix socket via SO_PEERCRED. The credentials are recorded by
-// the kernel at connect() time and cannot be changed for the life of the
-// connection, so they are not spoofable by the caller.
-func PeerIdentity(conn net.Conn) (Identity, error) {
-	uc, ok := conn.(*net.UnixConn)
-	if !ok {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("connection is not a unix socket: %T", conn)
-	}
-
-	raw, err := uc.SyscallConn()
-	if err != nil {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("raw conn: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	var cred *unix.Ucred
-	var credErr error
-	if err := raw.Control(func(fd uintptr) {
-		cred, credErr = unix.GetsockoptUcred(int(fd), unix.SOL_SOCKET, unix.SO_PEERCRED)
-	}); err != nil {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("control raw conn: %w", err)
-	}
-	if credErr != nil {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("read SO_PEERCRED: %w", credErr)
-	}
-
-	return Identity{UID: cred.Uid, GID: cred.Gid, PID: cred.Pid}, nil
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/pipeserver_windows.go

@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
-//go:build windows
-
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"net"
-
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-	"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
-)
-
-// PipeServerTrusted reports an error unless the pipe behind conn was created by a
-// principal this client may hand secrets to. Clients call it for a pipe whose name
-// carries no guarantee of its own, which is any name outside the
-// ProtectedPrefix\Administrators namespace: that namespace already restricts
-// creation to administrators and LocalSystem, while a plain name can be created by
-// any local user before the daemon gets there.
-//
-// The decision is made from the pipe object's owner, not from the serving process,
-// because a client cannot open a process running as another user at all, and the
-// legitimate case is precisely an unprivileged client talking to a privileged
-// daemon. Trusted owners are the service accounts, BUILTIN\Administrators, and
-// this client's own user, the last of which is the daemon a user runs themselves
-// as in netstack mode. A pipe owned by anyone else gets no setup key, pre-shared
-// key or SSO prompt out of this client.
-func PipeServerTrusted(conn net.Conn) error {
-	// go-winio's pipe connection embeds *win32File, which exposes Fd().
-	fdConn, ok := conn.(interface{ Fd() uintptr })
-	if !ok {
-		return fmt.Errorf("connection %T does not expose a pipe handle", conn)
-	}
-
-	owner, err := pipeOwnerSID(windows.Handle(fdConn.Fd()))
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-
-	if !trustedPipeOwner(owner) {
-		return fmt.Errorf("pipe owned by %s, which is neither an administrator nor this user", owner)
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// PipeOwnedBySelf reports whether the pipe behind conn was created by this very
-// user, which is how a client recognises a daemon running as itself. Ownership it
-// cannot read is reported as false.
-func PipeOwnedBySelf(conn net.Conn) bool {
-	fdConn, ok := conn.(interface{ Fd() uintptr })
-	if !ok {
-		return false
-	}
-
-	owner, err := pipeOwnerSID(windows.Handle(fdConn.Fd()))
-	if err != nil {
-		log.Debugf("read daemon pipe owner: %v", err)
-		return false
-	}
-	return selfKnown && selfIdentity.SID != "" && owner == selfIdentity.SID
-}
-
-// pipeOwnerSID reads the owner of the pipe object a client is connected to. The
-// handle was opened with GENERIC_READ, which includes READ_CONTROL, so no extra
-// access is needed.
-func pipeOwnerSID(handle windows.Handle) (string, error) {
-	sd, err := windows.GetSecurityInfo(handle, windows.SE_KERNEL_OBJECT, windows.OWNER_SECURITY_INFORMATION)
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("read pipe security info: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	owner, _, err := sd.Owner()
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("read pipe owner: %w", err)
-	}
-	return owner.String(), nil
-}
-
-// trustedPipeOwner reports whether a pipe's owner is a principal a client may
-// speak to. An elevated process's objects are owned by BUILTIN\Administrators by
-// default, an unelevated one's by the user, which is why both forms appear here.
-func trustedPipeOwner(owner string) bool {
-	switch owner {
-	case sidLocalSystem, sidLocalService, sidNetworkService, sidAdministrators:
-		return true
-	}
-	return selfKnown && selfIdentity.SID != "" && owner == selfIdentity.SID
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/privileged.go

@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"os"
-	"runtime"
-)
-
-// Fields of the ErrorInfo detail the daemon attaches to a PermissionDenied it
-// raises for an operation that requires root/administrator. Clients match on
-// Reason and Domain rather than on the message text, and render the summary and
-// command themselves so the user gets guidance instead of a gRPC error dump.
-const (
-	// ErrorReasonPrivilegeRequired identifies the detail.
-	ErrorReasonPrivilegeRequired = "PRIVILEGE_REQUIRED"
-	// ErrorDomain scopes the reason to the NetBird daemon.
-	ErrorDomain = "daemon.netbird.io"
-	// ErrorMetaSummary is the one-sentence explanation of what was refused.
-	ErrorMetaSummary = "summary"
-	// ErrorMetaCommand is the command that performs the same operation with the
-	// privileges it needs, ready to copy and run.
-	ErrorMetaCommand = "command"
-)
-
-// The identity of the process evaluating callers, captured once because it cannot
-// change. selfKnown is false when it could not be read, in which case nothing is
-// ever treated as this process. selfMayDelegate additionally requires this
-// process to be unprivileged: see IsPrivilegedCaller.
-var (
-	selfIdentity    Identity
-	selfKnown       bool
-	selfMayDelegate bool
-	// selfPID is this process's PID, used to recognise the daemon dialling itself.
-	selfPID = os.Getpid()
-)
-
-func init() {
-	id, err := CurrentProcessIdentity()
-	if err != nil {
-		return
-	}
-	selfIdentity, selfKnown = id, true
-	// Only an unprivileged daemon delegates its authority to its own identity.
-	// When it is root or LocalSystem, sharing its identity does not mean sharing
-	// its power: on Windows a filtered and a full token carry the same SID, so
-	// matching there would let a non-elevated shell of an administrator account
-	// act as an administrator, which is the boundary the token check exists to
-	// keep.
-	selfMayDelegate = !id.IsPrivileged()
-}
-
-// IsDaemonSelf reports whether an identity is this very process. The JSON gateway
-// runs inside the daemon and re-dials it locally, so this is what distinguishes
-// the gateway from any other caller, whatever user the daemon runs as.
-func IsDaemonSelf(id Identity) bool {
-	if !selfKnown || id.IsWindows() != selfIdentity.IsWindows() {
-		return false
-	}
-	if id.IsWindows() {
-		return id.SID != "" && id.SID == selfIdentity.SID
-	}
-	return id.UID == selfIdentity.UID
-}
-
-// IsPrivilegedCaller reports whether an identity may make the changes the daemon
-// restricts to the platform administrator. This is the daemon's own rule and
-// cannot be evaluated by a client, which does not know what the daemon runs as.
-//
-// Beyond root/administrator it accepts a caller running as the daemon's own
-// identity when the daemon is itself unprivileged. That keeps a rootless container
-// working, where there is no uid 0 at all, and a Windows daemon in netstack mode,
-// which needs no administrator rights. In those setups a caller sharing the
-// daemon's identity can already rewrite the config files it reads and replace the
-// binary it runs, so refusing it a config change would protect nothing; and an
-// unprivileged daemon cannot hand out a root shell in the first place.
-func IsPrivilegedCaller(id Identity) bool {
-	if id.IsPrivileged() {
-		return true
-	}
-	return selfMayDelegate && IsDaemonSelf(id)
-}
-
-// SelfDelegatesTo returns the identity this process delegates its authority to,
-// and whether it delegates at all. Only an unprivileged daemon does: see
-// IsPrivilegedCaller. It exists so a refusal can name who may actually perform the
-// operation, because on such a host root is neither required nor necessarily
-// available.
-func SelfDelegatesTo() (Identity, bool) {
-	if !selfKnown || !selfMayDelegate {
-		return Identity{}, false
-	}
-	return selfIdentity, true
-}
-
-// PrivilegedActor names the principal a privileged operation requires, for use
-// in messages shown to the user.
-func PrivilegedActor() string {
-	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
-		return "administrator privileges"
-	}
-	return "root"
-}
-
-// ElevatedCommand renders a command so that running it grants the privileges the
-// operation needs. Windows has no in-line equivalent of sudo, so the command is
-// returned unchanged and the user is expected to run it from an elevated
-// terminal.
-func ElevatedCommand(command string) string {
-	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
-		return command
-	}
-	return "sudo " + command
-}
-
-// UpCommand renders an elevated `netbird up` with the given flags, preceded by a
-// `down`. The down is what makes the command work on a connected client: `netbird
-// up` prints "Already connected" and returns without applying any config flag, so
-// on its own the command would appear to do nothing. It is a no-op, exit 0, when
-// the client is not connected.
-//
-// ";" rather than "&&" so the line can be pasted into any of the shells a user
-// might have: PowerShell 5.1, still the default on Windows Server, rejects "&&"
-// as a syntax error.
-func UpCommand(flags string) string {
-	return ElevatedCommand("netbird down") + "; " + ElevatedCommand("netbird up "+flags)
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/privileged_test.go

@@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
-package ipcauth
-
-import "testing"
-
-// The self rule is the one place privilege is granted to something other than the
-// platform administrator, so its two guards matter: it must apply only when the
-// daemon is itself unprivileged, and only to a caller with the daemon's identity.
-func TestIsPrivilegedCaller_SelfRule(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name string
-		// self stands in for the process the daemon runs as.
-		self      Identity
-		selfKnown bool
-		caller    Identity
-		want      bool
-	}{
-		{
-			name:      "root is privileged whatever the daemon runs as",
-			self:      Identity{UID: 1000},
-			selfKnown: true,
-			caller:    Identity{UID: 0},
-			want:      true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:      "an unprivileged daemon delegates to its own user (rootless container)",
-			self:      Identity{UID: 1000},
-			selfKnown: true,
-			caller:    Identity{UID: 1000},
-			want:      true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:      "an unprivileged daemon delegates to nobody else",
-			self:      Identity{UID: 1000},
-			selfKnown: true,
-			caller:    Identity{UID: 1001},
-			want:      false,
-		},
-		{
-			// The daemon is root on a normal install, so sharing its identity is
-			// already covered by being root; nothing else may match.
-			name:      "a root daemon delegates to nobody",
-			self:      Identity{UID: 0},
-			selfKnown: true,
-			caller:    Identity{UID: 1000},
-			want:      false,
-		},
-		{
-			// Windows netstack mode: the daemon needs no administrator rights.
-			name:      "an unprivileged windows daemon delegates to its own SID",
-			self:      Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-1-2-3-1001"},
-			selfKnown: true,
-			caller:    Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-1-2-3-1001"},
-			want:      true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:      "an unprivileged windows daemon delegates to no other SID",
-			self:      Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-1-2-3-1001"},
-			selfKnown: true,
-			caller:    Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-1-2-3-1002"},
-			want:      false,
-		},
-		{
-			// The UAC boundary: a filtered and a full token of the same account
-			// carry the same SID but not the same power, so an elevated daemon must
-			// never delegate to its own SID.
-			name:      "an elevated windows daemon does not delegate to its own SID",
-			self:      Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-1-2-3-500", Elevated: true},
-			selfKnown: true,
-			caller:    Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-1-2-3-500"},
-			want:      false,
-		},
-		{
-			name:      "LocalSystem is privileged on its own merits, not by delegation",
-			self:      Identity{SID: sidLocalSystem},
-			selfKnown: true,
-			caller:    Identity{SID: sidLocalSystem},
-			want:      true, // LocalSystem is privileged on its own merits
-		},
-		{
-			name:      "identities of different kinds never match",
-			self:      Identity{UID: 1000},
-			selfKnown: true,
-			caller:    Identity{SID: "S-1-5-21-1-2-3-1001"},
-			want:      false,
-		},
-		{
-			name:      "an unknown self identity delegates to nobody",
-			self:      Identity{},
-			selfKnown: false,
-			caller:    Identity{UID: 1000},
-			want:      false,
-		},
-	}
-
-	for _, tt := range tests {
-		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			prevID, prevKnown, prevDelegate := selfIdentity, selfKnown, selfMayDelegate
-			t.Cleanup(func() { selfIdentity, selfKnown, selfMayDelegate = prevID, prevKnown, prevDelegate })
-
-			selfIdentity, selfKnown = tt.self, tt.selfKnown
-			selfMayDelegate = tt.selfKnown && !tt.self.IsPrivileged()
-
-			if got := IsPrivilegedCaller(tt.caller); got != tt.want {
-				t.Fatalf("IsPrivilegedCaller(%v) with daemon %v = %t, want %t",
-					tt.caller, tt.self, got, tt.want)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// The real process must never accidentally delegate: a test binary running as a
-// normal user is unprivileged, so it may match itself, but nothing else.
-func TestIsPrivilegedCaller_ThisProcess(t *testing.T) {
-	id, err := CurrentProcessIdentity()
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Skipf("cannot read this process's identity: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	// This process is always allowed to act as itself: either it is privileged, or
-	// it is unprivileged and therefore delegates to its own identity.
-	if !IsPrivilegedCaller(id) {
-		t.Errorf("this process %v was refused its own identity", id)
-	}
-
-	// A caller that is neither root nor this process must be refused, whatever
-	// this process happens to be.
-	other := Identity{UID: id.UID + 1}
-	if id.IsWindows() {
-		other = Identity{SID: id.SID + "9"}
-	}
-	if IsPrivilegedCaller(other) {
-		t.Errorf("an unrelated identity %v was treated as privileged", other)
-	}
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/self_unix.go

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-//go:build !windows
-
-package ipcauth
-
-import "os"
-
-// CurrentProcessIdentity returns this process's identity as the daemon would
-// see it if this process connected to the local IPC. It lets a client (the UI)
-// decide up front whether a privileged operation can succeed, without a
-// round-trip and without duplicating the rules: the answer comes from the same
-// Identity.IsPrivileged the daemon applies.
-func CurrentProcessIdentity() (Identity, error) {
-	return Identity{
-		UID: uint32(os.Geteuid()),
-		GID: uint32(os.Getegid()),
-	}, nil
-}

client/internal/ipcauth/self_windows.go

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-//go:build windows
-
-package ipcauth
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-
-	"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
-)
-
-// CurrentProcessIdentity returns this process's identity as the daemon would see
-// it if this process connected to the local IPC. It lets a client (the UI)
-// decide up front whether a privileged operation can succeed, without a
-// round-trip and without duplicating the rules: the answer comes from the same
-// Identity.IsPrivileged the daemon applies to the token it reads off the pipe.
-func CurrentProcessIdentity() (Identity, error) {
-	// A pseudo-token, so it must not be closed.
-	token := windows.GetCurrentProcessToken()
-
-	user, err := token.GetTokenUser()
-	if err != nil {
-		return Identity{}, fmt.Errorf("read token user: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	groups, err := tokenGroupSIDs(token)
-	if err != nil {
-		return Identity{}, err
-	}
-
-	return Identity{
-		SID:      user.User.Sid.String(),
-		Groups:   groups,
-		Elevated: token.IsElevated(),
-	}, nil
-}

client/internal/lazyconn/manager/manager.go

@@ -29,11 +29,6 @@ type managedPeer struct {
 
 type Config struct {
 	InactivityThreshold *time.Duration
-	// ReconcileAllowedIPs re-applies a peer's routed allowed IPs after its wake endpoint is
-	// armed. The activity listener creates the wake peer with the overlay /32 only; without the
-	// routed prefixes WireGuard would not steer subnet-bound traffic to the wake endpoint, so an
-	// idle routing peer could never be woken by that traffic. Optional; nil disables the reconcile.
-	ReconcileAllowedIPs func(peerKey string) error
 }
 
 // Manager manages lazy connections
@@ -61,9 +56,6 @@ type Manager struct {
 	peerToHAGroups map[string][]route.HAUniqueID // peer ID -> HA groups they belong to
 	haGroupToPeers map[route.HAUniqueID][]string // HA group -> peer IDs in the group
 	routesMu       sync.RWMutex
-
-	// reconcileAllowedIPs re-applies a peer's routed allowed IPs after its wake endpoint is armed.
-	reconcileAllowedIPs func(peerKey string) error
 }
 
 // NewManager creates a new lazy connection manager
@@ -81,7 +73,6 @@ func NewManager(config Config, engineCtx context.Context, peerStore *peerstore.S
 		activityManager:      activity.NewManager(wgIface),
 		peerToHAGroups:       make(map[string][]route.HAUniqueID),
 		haGroupToPeers:       make(map[route.HAUniqueID][]string),
-		reconcileAllowedIPs:  config.ReconcileAllowedIPs,
 	}
 
 	if wgIface.IsUserspaceBind() {
@@ -210,7 +201,7 @@ func (m *Manager) AddPeer(peerCfg lazyconn.PeerConfig) (bool, error) {
 		return false, nil
 	}
 
-	if err := m.armActivityListener(peerCfg); err != nil {
+	if err := m.activityManager.MonitorPeerActivity(peerCfg); err != nil {
 		return false, err
 	}
 
@@ -297,7 +288,7 @@ func (m *Manager) DeactivatePeer(peerID peerid.ConnID) {
 
 	m.inactivityManager.RemovePeer(mp.peerCfg.PublicKey)
 
-	if err := m.armActivityListener(*mp.peerCfg); err != nil {
+	if err := m.activityManager.MonitorPeerActivity(*mp.peerCfg); err != nil {
 		mp.peerCfg.Log.Errorf("failed to create activity monitor: %v", err)
 		return
 	}
@@ -474,31 +465,6 @@ func (m *Manager) close() {
 }
 
 // shouldDeferIdleForHA checks if peer should stay connected due to HA group requirements
-// armRoutedAllowedIPs re-applies the peer's routed allowed IPs onto its freshly armed wake
-// endpoint. The activity listener creates the wake peer with the overlay /32 only, so without
-// this the routed prefixes would be missing and traffic to a routed subnet could not wake the
-// idle routing peer. It is a no-op when no reconciler is configured.
-// armActivityListener (re)arms the peer's wake endpoint via the activity manager and then
-// re-applies its routed allowed IPs, so traffic to a routed subnet can wake an idle routing
-// peer. The routed prefixes must be re-applied after the wake endpoint exists because the
-// listener creates it with the overlay /32 only.
-func (m *Manager) armActivityListener(peerCfg lazyconn.PeerConfig) error {
-	if err := m.activityManager.MonitorPeerActivity(peerCfg); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	m.armRoutedAllowedIPs(&peerCfg)
-	return nil
-}
-
-func (m *Manager) armRoutedAllowedIPs(peerCfg *lazyconn.PeerConfig) {
-	if m.reconcileAllowedIPs == nil {
-		return
-	}
-	if err := m.reconcileAllowedIPs(peerCfg.PublicKey); err != nil {
-		peerCfg.Log.Errorf("failed to reconcile routed allowed IPs on wake endpoint: %v", err)
-	}
-}
-
 func (m *Manager) shouldDeferIdleForHA(inactivePeers map[string]struct{}, peerID string) bool {
 	m.routesMu.RLock()
 	defer m.routesMu.RUnlock()
@@ -611,7 +577,7 @@ func (m *Manager) onPeerInactivityTimedOut(peerIDs map[string]struct{}) {
 
 		mp.peerCfg.Log.Infof("start activity monitor")
 
-		if err := m.armActivityListener(*mp.peerCfg); err != nil {
+		if err := m.activityManager.MonitorPeerActivity(*mp.peerCfg); err != nil {
 			mp.peerCfg.Log.Errorf("failed to create activity monitor: %v", err)
 			continue
 		}

client/internal/mobile_dependency.go

@@ -11,14 +11,12 @@ import (
 
 // MobileDependency collect all dependencies for mobile platform
 type MobileDependency struct {
-	// Android and iOS
-	NetworkChangeListener listener.NetworkChangeListener
-
 	// Android only
-	TunAdapter       device.TunAdapter
-	IFaceDiscover    stdnet.ExternalIFaceDiscover
-	HostDNSAddresses []netip.AddrPort
-	DnsReadyListener dns.ReadyListener
+	TunAdapter            device.TunAdapter
+	IFaceDiscover         stdnet.ExternalIFaceDiscover
+	NetworkChangeListener listener.NetworkChangeListener
+	HostDNSAddresses      []netip.AddrPort
+	DnsReadyListener      dns.ReadyListener
 
 	//	iOS only
 	DnsManager     dns.IosDnsManager

client/internal/peer/status.go

@@ -813,14 +813,19 @@ func (d *Status) SetSessionExpiresAt(deadline time.Time) {
 }
 
 // GetSessionExpiresAt returns the most recently recorded SSO session deadline,
-// or the zero value when no deadline is tracked. A deadline in the past is
-// returned as-is: it means the session has expired, and consumers (tray row,
-// CLI status) render it as "expired" rather than hiding it — masking it as
-// "none" would blank the UI at the exact moment it should say the session
-// ended.
+// or the zero value when no deadline is tracked. A deadline that has already
+// slipped into the past reports as "none": once the session has expired it is
+// no longer a meaningful countdown, and the sessionwatch.Watcher does not
+// arm a timer at the deadline itself to clear it (only the two pre-expiry
+// warnings). Without this guard the UI would keep painting a stale
+// "expires in …" against a moment that has passed until the next login,
+// extend, or teardown rewrote the value.
 func (d *Status) GetSessionExpiresAt() time.Time {
 	d.mux.Lock()
 	defer d.mux.Unlock()
+	if !d.sessionExpiresAt.IsZero() && d.sessionExpiresAt.Before(time.Now()) {
+		return time.Time{}
+	}
 	return d.sessionExpiresAt
 }
 

client/internal/profilemanager/config.go

@@ -96,7 +96,6 @@ type ConfigInput struct {
 	BlockLANAccess      *bool
 	BlockInbound        *bool
 	DisableIPv6         *bool
-	SyncMessageVersion  *int
 
 	DisableNotifications *bool
 
@@ -138,7 +137,6 @@ type Config struct {
 	BlockLANAccess      bool
 	BlockInbound        bool
 	DisableIPv6         bool
-	SyncMessageVersion  *int
 
 	DisableNotifications *bool
 
@@ -589,12 +587,6 @@ func (config *Config) apply(input ConfigInput) (updated bool, err error) {
 		updated = true
 	}
 
-	if input.SyncMessageVersion != nil && *input.SyncMessageVersion != *config.SyncMessageVersion {
-		log.Infof("setting SyncMessageVersion to %v", *input.SyncMessageVersion)
-		*config.SyncMessageVersion = *input.SyncMessageVersion
-		updated = true
-	}
-
 	if input.DisableNotifications != nil && (config.DisableNotifications == nil || *input.DisableNotifications != *config.DisableNotifications) {
 		if *input.DisableNotifications {
 			log.Infof("disabling notifications")
@@ -746,13 +738,6 @@ func (config *Config) applyMDMPolicy(policy *mdm.Policy) {
 // appended for https or ":80" for http. The serviceName parameter is
 // used to contextualise error messages. On success returns the parsed
 // *url.URL; on failure returns a non-nil error.
-// ParseServiceURL normalises a service URL exactly as the config layer does when
-// it stores one, so callers comparing a requested URL against a stored one do not
-// have to reimplement the scheme validation and default-port handling.
-func ParseServiceURL(serviceName, serviceURL string) (*url.URL, error) {
-	return parseURL(serviceName, serviceURL)
-}
-
 func parseURL(serviceName, serviceURL string) (*url.URL, error) {
 	parsedMgmtURL, err := url.ParseRequestURI(serviceURL)
 	if err != nil {

client/internal/routemanager/dnsinterceptor/handler.go

@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ func (d *DnsInterceptor) RemoveRoute() error {
 
 			// AllowedIPs should use real IPs
 			if d.currentPeerKey != "" {
-				if _, err := d.allowedIPsRefcounter.Decrement(prefix, d.currentPeerKey); err != nil {
+				if _, err := d.allowedIPsRefcounter.Decrement(prefix); err != nil {
 					merr = multierror.Append(merr, fmt.Errorf("remove allowed IP %s: %v", prefix, err))
 				}
 			}
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ func (d *DnsInterceptor) removeAllowedIP(realPrefix netip.Prefix) error {
 	}
 
 	// AllowedIPs use real IPs
-	if _, err := d.allowedIPsRefcounter.Decrement(realPrefix, d.currentPeerKey); err != nil {
+	if _, err := d.allowedIPsRefcounter.Decrement(realPrefix); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("remove allowed IP %s: %v", realPrefix, err)
 	}
 
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ func (d *DnsInterceptor) RemoveAllowedIPs() error {
 	for _, prefixes := range d.interceptedDomains {
 		for _, prefix := range prefixes {
 			// AllowedIPs use real IPs
-			if _, err := d.allowedIPsRefcounter.Decrement(prefix, d.currentPeerKey); err != nil {
+			if _, err := d.allowedIPsRefcounter.Decrement(prefix); err != nil {
 				merr = multierror.Append(merr, fmt.Errorf("remove allowed IP %s: %v", prefix, err))
 			}
 		}

client/internal/routemanager/dynamic/route.go

@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ func (r *Route) RemoveAllowedIPs() error {
 	var merr *multierror.Error
 	for _, domainPrefixes := range r.dynamicDomains {
 		for _, prefix := range domainPrefixes {
-			if _, err := r.allowedIPsRefcounter.Decrement(prefix, r.currentPeerKey); err != nil {
+			if _, err := r.allowedIPsRefcounter.Decrement(prefix); err != nil {
 				merr = multierror.Append(merr, fmt.Errorf("remove allowed IP %s: %w", prefix, err))
 			}
 		}
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ func (r *Route) startResolver(ctx context.Context) {
 }
 
 func (r *Route) update(ctx context.Context) error {
-	resolved, err := r.resolveDomains(ctx)
+	resolved, err := r.resolveDomains()
 	if err != nil {
 		if len(resolved) == 0 {
 			return fmt.Errorf("resolve domains: %w", err)
@@ -199,9 +199,9 @@ func (r *Route) update(ctx context.Context) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-func (r *Route) resolveDomains(ctx context.Context) (domainMap, error) {
+func (r *Route) resolveDomains() (domainMap, error) {
 	results := make(chan resolveResult)
-	go r.resolve(ctx, results)
+	go r.resolve(results)
 
 	resolved := domainMap{}
 	var merr *multierror.Error
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ func (r *Route) resolveDomains(ctx context.Context) (domainMap, error) {
 	return resolved, nberrors.FormatErrorOrNil(merr)
 }
 
-func (r *Route) resolve(ctx context.Context, results chan resolveResult) {
+func (r *Route) resolve(results chan resolveResult) {
 	var wg sync.WaitGroup
 
 	for _, d := range r.route.Domains {
@@ -225,10 +225,10 @@ func (r *Route) resolve(ctx context.Context, results chan resolveResult) {
 		go func(domain domain.Domain) {
 			defer wg.Done()
 
-			ips, err := r.getIPsFromResolver(ctx, domain)
+			ips, err := r.getIPsFromResolver(domain)
 			if err != nil {
 				log.Tracef("Failed to resolve domain %s with private resolver: %v", domain.SafeString(), err)
-				ips, err = lookupHostIPs(ctx, domain)
+				ips, err = net.LookupIP(domain.PunycodeString())
 				if err != nil {
 					results <- resolveResult{domain: domain, err: fmt.Errorf("resolve d %s: %w", domain.SafeString(), err)}
 					return
@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ func (r *Route) removeRoutes(prefixes []netip.Prefix) ([]netip.Prefix, error) {
 			merr = multierror.Append(merr, fmt.Errorf("remove dynamic route for IP %s: %w", prefix, err))
 		}
 		if r.currentPeerKey != "" {
-			if _, err := r.allowedIPsRefcounter.Decrement(prefix, r.currentPeerKey); err != nil {
+			if _, err := r.allowedIPsRefcounter.Decrement(prefix); err != nil {
 				merr = multierror.Append(merr, fmt.Errorf("remove allowed IP %s: %w", prefix, err))
 			}
 		}
@@ -364,20 +364,6 @@ func determinePrefixChanges(oldPrefixes, newPrefixes []netip.Prefix) (toAdd, toR
 	return
 }
 
-// lookupHostIPs resolves d via the system resolver, honoring ctx cancellation.
-func lookupHostIPs(ctx context.Context, d domain.Domain) ([]net.IP, error) {
-	addrs, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, d.PunycodeString())
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-
-	ips := make([]net.IP, 0, len(addrs))
-	for _, addr := range addrs {
-		ips = append(ips, addr.IP)
-	}
-	return ips, nil
-}
-
 func combinePrefixes(oldPrefixes, removedPrefixes, addedPrefixes []netip.Prefix) []netip.Prefix {
 	prefixSet := make(map[netip.Prefix]struct{})
 	for _, prefix := range oldPrefixes {

client/internal/routemanager/dynamic/route_generic.go

@@ -3,12 +3,11 @@
 package dynamic
 
 import (
-	"context"
 	"net"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
 )
 
-func (r *Route) getIPsFromResolver(ctx context.Context, domain domain.Domain) ([]net.IP, error) {
-	return lookupHostIPs(ctx, domain)
+func (r *Route) getIPsFromResolver(domain domain.Domain) ([]net.IP, error) {
+	return net.LookupIP(domain.PunycodeString())
 }

client/internal/routemanager/dynamic/route_ios.go

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
 package dynamic
 
 import (
-	"context"
 	"fmt"
 	"net"
 	"time"
@@ -17,7 +16,7 @@ import (
 
 const dialTimeout = 10 * time.Second
 
-func (r *Route) getIPsFromResolver(ctx context.Context, domain domain.Domain) ([]net.IP, error) {
+func (r *Route) getIPsFromResolver(domain domain.Domain) ([]net.IP, error) {
 	privateClient, err := nbdns.GetClientPrivate(r.wgInterface, r.resolverAddr.Addr(), dialTimeout)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("error while creating private client: %s", err)
@@ -33,7 +32,7 @@ func (r *Route) getIPsFromResolver(ctx context.Context, domain domain.Domain) ([
 		msg := new(dns.Msg)
 		msg.SetQuestion(fqdn, qtype)
 
-		response, _, err := nbdns.ExchangeWithFallback(ctx, privateClient, msg, r.resolverAddr.String())
+		response, _, err := nbdns.ExchangeWithFallback(nil, privateClient, msg, r.resolverAddr.String())
 		if err != nil {
 			if queryErr == nil {
 				queryErr = fmt.Errorf("DNS query for %s (type %d) after %s: %w", domain.SafeString(), qtype, time.Since(startTime), err)

client/internal/routemanager/manager.go

@@ -52,10 +52,6 @@ type Manager interface {
 	UpdateRoutes(updateSerial uint64, serverRoutes map[route.ID]*route.Route, clientRoutes route.HAMap, useNewDNSRoute bool) error
 	ClassifyRoutes(newRoutes []*route.Route) (map[route.ID]*route.Route, route.HAMap)
 	TriggerSelection(route.HAMap)
-	SelectRoutes(ids []route.NetID, appendRoute bool) error
-	DeselectRoutes(ids []route.NetID) error
-	SelectAllRoutes()
-	DeselectAllRoutes()
 	GetRouteSelector() *routeselector.RouteSelector
 	GetClientRoutes() route.HAMap
 	GetSelectedClientRoutes() route.HAMap
@@ -65,7 +61,6 @@ type Manager interface {
 	InitialRouteRange() []string
 	SetFirewall(firewall.Manager) error
 	SetDNSForwarderPort(port uint16)
-	ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs(peerKey string) error
 	Stop(stateManager *statemanager.Manager)
 }
 
@@ -220,7 +215,7 @@ func (m *DefaultManager) setupRefCounters(useNoop bool) {
 		)
 	}
 
-	m.allowedIPsRefCounter = refcounter.NewAllowedIPs(
+	m.allowedIPsRefCounter = refcounter.New(
 		func(prefix netip.Prefix, peerKey string) (string, error) {
 			// save peerKey to use it in the remove function
 			return peerKey, m.wgInterface.AddAllowedIP(peerKey, prefix)
@@ -237,30 +232,6 @@ func (m *DefaultManager) setupRefCounters(useNoop bool) {
 	)
 }
 
-// ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs re-applies every routed allowed IP currently tracked for the peer
-// onto the WireGuard device. The allowed-IP refcounter only calls its AddFunc (which pushes to
-// the device) on a prefix's 0->1 transition, so a peer whose device entry was rebuilt without a
-// matching refcounter change — e.g. a lazy connection cycling through idle->wake, which recreates
-// the WireGuard peer with the overlay /32 only — ends up missing routed prefixes the refcounter
-// still considers installed, and nothing retries. Calling this when the peer's WireGuard entry is
-// (re)created restores convergence. It is add-only and idempotent: AddAllowedIP is update-only, so
-// prefixes are re-added to an existing peer and an absent peer is left untouched.
-func (m *DefaultManager) ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs(peerKey string) error {
-	if m.allowedIPsRefCounter == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-
-	return m.allowedIPsRefCounter.ReapplyMatching(
-		func(out string) bool { return out == peerKey },
-		func(prefix netip.Prefix) error {
-			if err := m.wgInterface.AddAllowedIP(peerKey, prefix); err != nil {
-				return fmt.Errorf("add allowed IP %s for peer %s: %w", prefix, peerKey, err)
-			}
-			return nil
-		},
-	)
-}
-
 // Init sets up the routing
 func (m *DefaultManager) Init() error {
 	m.routeSelector = m.initSelector()
@@ -804,7 +775,7 @@ func (m *DefaultManager) collectExitNodeInfo(clientRoutes route.HAMap) exitNodeI
 	var info exitNodeInfo
 
 	for haID, routes := range clientRoutes {
-		if !isExitNodeRoutes(routes) {
+		if !m.isExitNodeRoute(routes) {
 			continue
 		}
 
@@ -824,6 +795,13 @@ func (m *DefaultManager) collectExitNodeInfo(clientRoutes route.HAMap) exitNodeI
 	return info
 }
 
+func (m *DefaultManager) isExitNodeRoute(routes []*route.Route) bool {
+	if len(routes) == 0 {
+		return false
+	}
+	return route.IsV4DefaultRoute(routes[0].Network) || route.IsV6DefaultRoute(routes[0].Network)
+}
+
 func (m *DefaultManager) categorizeUserSelection(netID route.NetID, info *exitNodeInfo) {
 	if m.routeSelector.IsSelected(netID) {
 		info.userSelected = append(info.userSelected, netID)

client/internal/routemanager/mock.go

@@ -16,8 +16,6 @@ type MockManager struct {
 	ClassifyRoutesFunc           func(routes []*route.Route) (map[route.ID]*route.Route, route.HAMap)
 	UpdateRoutesFunc             func(updateSerial uint64, serverRoutes map[route.ID]*route.Route, clientRoutes route.HAMap, useNewDNSRoute bool) error
 	TriggerSelectionFunc         func(haMap route.HAMap)
-	SelectRoutesFunc             func(ids []route.NetID, appendRoute bool) error
-	DeselectRoutesFunc           func(ids []route.NetID) error
 	GetRouteSelectorFunc         func() *routeselector.RouteSelector
 	GetClientRoutesFunc          func() route.HAMap
 	GetSelectedClientRoutesFunc  func() route.HAMap
@@ -57,30 +55,6 @@ func (m *MockManager) TriggerSelection(networks route.HAMap) {
 	}
 }
 
-// SelectRoutes mock implementation of SelectRoutes from Manager interface
-func (m *MockManager) SelectRoutes(ids []route.NetID, appendRoute bool) error {
-	if m.SelectRoutesFunc != nil {
-		return m.SelectRoutesFunc(ids, appendRoute)
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// DeselectRoutes mock implementation of DeselectRoutes from Manager interface
-func (m *MockManager) DeselectRoutes(ids []route.NetID) error {
-	if m.DeselectRoutesFunc != nil {
-		return m.DeselectRoutesFunc(ids)
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// SelectAllRoutes mock implementation of SelectAllRoutes from Manager interface
-func (m *MockManager) SelectAllRoutes() {
-}
-
-// DeselectAllRoutes mock implementation of DeselectAllRoutes from Manager interface
-func (m *MockManager) DeselectAllRoutes() {
-}
-
 // GetRouteSelector mock implementation of GetRouteSelector from Manager interface
 func (m *MockManager) GetRouteSelector() *routeselector.RouteSelector {
 	if m.GetRouteSelectorFunc != nil {
@@ -138,11 +112,6 @@ func (m *MockManager) SetFirewall(firewall.Manager) error {
 func (m *MockManager) SetDNSForwarderPort(port uint16) {
 }
 
-// ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs mock implementation of ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs from Manager interface
-func (m *MockManager) ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs(peerKey string) error {
-	return nil
-}
-
 // Stop mock implementation of Stop from Manager interface
 func (m *MockManager) Stop(stateManager *statemanager.Manager) {
 	if m.StopFunc != nil {

client/internal/routemanager/notifier/notifier_ios.go

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 package notifier
 
 import (
+	"container/list"
 	"net/netip"
 	"slices"
 	"sort"
@@ -15,12 +16,20 @@ import (
 
 type Notifier struct {
 	mu              sync.Mutex
+	cond            *sync.Cond
 	currentPrefixes []string
 	listener        listener.NetworkChangeListener
+	queue           *list.List
+	closed          bool
 }
 
 func NewNotifier() *Notifier {
-	return &Notifier{}
+	n := &Notifier{
+		queue: list.New(),
+	}
+	n.cond = sync.NewCond(&n.mu)
+	go n.deliverLoop()
+	return n
 }
 
 func (n *Notifier) SetListener(listener listener.NetworkChangeListener) {
@@ -50,19 +59,44 @@ func (n *Notifier) OnNewPrefixes(prefixes []netip.Prefix) {
 	sort.Strings(newNets)
 
 	n.mu.Lock()
-	defer n.mu.Unlock()
 	if slices.Equal(n.currentPrefixes, newNets) {
+		n.mu.Unlock()
 		return
 	}
 	n.currentPrefixes = newNets
-	if n.listener != nil {
-		n.listener.OnNetworkChanged(strings.Join(n.currentPrefixes, ","))
-	}
+	routes := strings.Join(n.currentPrefixes, ",")
+	n.queue.PushBack(routes)
+	n.cond.Signal()
+	n.mu.Unlock()
 }
 
 func (n *Notifier) Close() {
+	n.mu.Lock()
+	n.closed = true
+	n.cond.Signal()
+	n.mu.Unlock()
 }
 
 func (n *Notifier) GetInitialRouteRanges() []string {
 	return nil
 }
+
+func (n *Notifier) deliverLoop() {
+	for {
+		n.mu.Lock()
+		for n.queue.Len() == 0 && !n.closed {
+			n.cond.Wait()
+		}
+		if n.closed && n.queue.Len() == 0 {
+			n.mu.Unlock()
+			return
+		}
+		routes := n.queue.Remove(n.queue.Front()).(string)
+		l := n.listener
+		n.mu.Unlock()
+
+		if l != nil {
+			l.OnNetworkChanged(routes)
+		}
+	}
+}

client/internal/routemanager/reconcile_test.go

@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
-//go:build !windows
-
-package routemanager
-
-import (
-	"net"
-	"net/netip"
-	"sync"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-	"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/tun/netstack"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/device"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/routemanager/refcounter"
-)
-
-// reconcileWGMock is a minimal iface.WGIface that only records AddAllowedIP calls; every other
-// method is an inert stub because ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs exercises none of them.
-type reconcileWGMock struct {
-	mu   sync.Mutex
-	adds map[string][]netip.Prefix
-}
-
-func (m *reconcileWGMock) AddAllowedIP(peerKey string, allowedIP netip.Prefix) error {
-	m.mu.Lock()
-	defer m.mu.Unlock()
-	if m.adds == nil {
-		m.adds = map[string][]netip.Prefix{}
-	}
-	m.adds[peerKey] = append(m.adds[peerKey], allowedIP)
-	return nil
-}
-
-func (m *reconcileWGMock) added(peerKey string) []netip.Prefix {
-	m.mu.Lock()
-	defer m.mu.Unlock()
-	return m.adds[peerKey]
-}
-
-func (m *reconcileWGMock) RemoveAllowedIP(string, netip.Prefix) error { return nil }
-func (m *reconcileWGMock) Name() string                               { return "utun-test" }
-func (m *reconcileWGMock) Address() wgaddr.Address                    { return wgaddr.Address{} }
-func (m *reconcileWGMock) ToInterface() *net.Interface                { return nil }
-func (m *reconcileWGMock) IsUserspaceBind() bool                      { return false }
-func (m *reconcileWGMock) GetFilter() device.PacketFilter             { return nil }
-func (m *reconcileWGMock) GetDevice() *device.FilteredDevice          { return nil }
-func (m *reconcileWGMock) GetNet() *netstack.Net                      { return nil }
-
-// TestReconcilePeerAllowedIPs verifies the declarative reconcile re-applies every routed prefix
-// tracked for the peer (self-heal, independent of refcount level) and stays scoped to that peer.
-func TestReconcilePeerAllowedIPs(t *testing.T) {
-	wg := &reconcileWGMock{}
-	m := &DefaultManager{wgInterface: wg}
-	m.allowedIPsRefCounter = refcounter.NewAllowedIPs(
-		func(_ netip.Prefix, peerKey string) (string, error) { return peerKey, nil },
-		func(netip.Prefix, string) error { return nil },
-	)
-
-	peerA1 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/24")
-	peerA2 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.1.0.0/24")
-	peerB1 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.2.0.0/24")
-
-	for prefix, peer := range map[netip.Prefix]string{peerA1: "peerA", peerA2: "peerA", peerB1: "peerB"} {
-		_, err := m.allowedIPsRefCounter.Increment(prefix, peer)
-		require.NoError(t, err)
-	}
-	// Extra reference: reconcile must still re-apply the prefix even though its refcount never
-	// hit 0 again (the exact case the plain incremental path skips).
-	_, err := m.allowedIPsRefCounter.Increment(peerA1, "peerA")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	require.NoError(t, m.ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs("peerA"))
-
-	assert.ElementsMatch(t, []netip.Prefix{peerA1, peerA2}, wg.added("peerA"),
-		"reconcile must re-apply all routed prefixes of the peer")
-	assert.Empty(t, wg.added("peerB"), "reconcile must not touch another peer's prefixes")
-}
-
-// TestReconcilePeerAllowedIPsNoCounter verifies reconcile is a safe no-op before the refcounter is
-// set up.
-func TestReconcilePeerAllowedIPsNoCounter(t *testing.T) {
-	wg := &reconcileWGMock{}
-	m := &DefaultManager{wgInterface: wg}
-
-	require.NoError(t, m.ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs("peerA"))
-	assert.Empty(t, wg.added("peerA"))
-}

client/internal/routemanager/refcounter/allowedips.go

@@ -1,206 +0,0 @@
-package refcounter
-
-import (
-	"errors"
-	"fmt"
-	"net/netip"
-	"sort"
-	"sync"
-
-	"github.com/hashicorp/go-multierror"
-
-	nberrors "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/errors"
-)
-
-// allowedIPsEntry holds the per-peer reference counts for a single prefix and which peer is
-// currently installed in WireGuard. WireGuard allows a prefix on exactly one peer, so at most
-// one peer is active at a time even when several peers reference the prefix.
-type allowedIPsEntry struct {
-	// peers maps a peerKey to the number of references holding the prefix for that peer.
-	peers map[string]int
-	// active is the peerKey currently installed in WireGuard for this prefix ("" if none).
-	active string
-	// total is the sum of all per-peer reference counts (kept in sync with peers).
-	total int
-}
-
-// AllowedIPsRefCounter is a peer-aware reference counter for WireGuard AllowedIPs.
-//
-// The generic Counter keys only by prefix and remembers a single Out value set by the first
-// caller, which it never changes. That is wrong for AllowedIPs: two independent watchers (or
-// multiple resolved domains) can reference the same prefix through different peers, and when the
-// peer currently installed in WireGuard releases its last reference the prefix must be handed over
-// to a surviving peer instead of being left pointing at the released one.
-//
-// It calls add/remove (which program WireGuard) only on the transitions that matter:
-//   - add on the first reference for a prefix, or when swapping the active peer;
-//   - remove on the last reference for a prefix, or on the old peer during a swap.
-type AllowedIPsRefCounter struct {
-	mu      sync.Mutex
-	entries map[netip.Prefix]*allowedIPsEntry
-	add     AddFunc[netip.Prefix, string, string]
-	remove  RemoveFunc[netip.Prefix, string]
-}
-
-// NewAllowedIPs creates a new peer-aware AllowedIPs reference counter.
-// add programs a prefix on a peer in WireGuard and returns the peerKey to store as the active peer.
-// remove unprograms the prefix from the given peer.
-func NewAllowedIPs(add AddFunc[netip.Prefix, string, string], remove RemoveFunc[netip.Prefix, string]) *AllowedIPsRefCounter {
-	return &AllowedIPsRefCounter{
-		entries: map[netip.Prefix]*allowedIPsEntry{},
-		add:     add,
-		remove:  remove,
-	}
-}
-
-// Increment adds a reference to prefix for peerKey. WireGuard is programmed only for the first
-// reference to a prefix; while a different peer is already installed the prefix is left with it
-// (first peer wins, HA at the WireGuard layer is not possible) and only the reference count is kept.
-func (rm *AllowedIPsRefCounter) Increment(prefix netip.Prefix, peerKey string) (Ref[string], error) {
-	rm.mu.Lock()
-	defer rm.mu.Unlock()
-
-	e, ok := rm.entries[prefix]
-	if !ok {
-		e = &allowedIPsEntry{peers: map[string]int{}}
-		rm.entries[prefix] = e
-	}
-
-	logCallerF("Increasing allowed IP ref count for prefix %v peer %s [peer %d -> %d, total %d -> %d, active %q]",
-		prefix, peerKey, e.peers[peerKey], e.peers[peerKey]+1, e.total, e.total+1, e.active)
-
-	// Program WireGuard only when nothing is installed yet for this prefix.
-	if e.active == "" {
-		out, err := rm.add(prefix, peerKey)
-		if errors.Is(err, ErrIgnore) {
-			if e.total == 0 {
-				delete(rm.entries, prefix)
-			}
-			return Ref[string]{Count: e.total, Out: e.active}, nil
-		}
-		if err != nil {
-			if e.total == 0 {
-				delete(rm.entries, prefix)
-			}
-			return Ref[string]{}, fmt.Errorf("failed to add allowed IP %v for peer %s: %w", prefix, peerKey, err)
-		}
-		e.active = out
-	}
-
-	e.peers[peerKey]++
-	e.total++
-
-	return Ref[string]{Count: e.total, Out: e.active}, nil
-}
-
-// Decrement removes a reference to prefix for peerKey. When the peer currently installed in
-// WireGuard releases its last reference, the prefix is swapped to a surviving peer if one exists,
-// otherwise it is removed from WireGuard.
-func (rm *AllowedIPsRefCounter) Decrement(prefix netip.Prefix, peerKey string) (Ref[string], error) {
-	rm.mu.Lock()
-	defer rm.mu.Unlock()
-
-	e, ok := rm.entries[prefix]
-	if !ok {
-		logCallerF("No allowed IP reference found for prefix %v", prefix)
-		return Ref[string]{}, nil
-	}
-
-	if e.peers[peerKey] > 0 {
-		logCallerF("Decreasing allowed IP ref count for prefix %v peer %s [peer %d -> %d, total %d -> %d, active %q]",
-			prefix, peerKey, e.peers[peerKey], e.peers[peerKey]-1, e.total, e.total-1, e.active)
-		e.peers[peerKey]--
-		e.total--
-		if e.peers[peerKey] == 0 {
-			delete(e.peers, peerKey)
-		}
-	} else {
-		logCallerF("No allowed IP reference found for prefix %v peer %s", prefix, peerKey)
-	}
-
-	// If the peer currently installed in WireGuard still holds references, nothing to reprogram.
-	// Keying the check on the active peer (not the one just released) makes this self-healing:
-	// a prior swap whose remove/add failed leaves e.active pointing at a peer with no references,
-	// and this retries the hand-off on the next Decrement instead of getting stuck.
-	if e.active != "" && e.peers[e.active] > 0 {
-		return Ref[string]{Count: e.total, Out: e.active}, nil
-	}
-
-	// Detach the stale/gone active peer from WireGuard before reprogramming.
-	if e.active != "" {
-		if err := rm.remove(prefix, e.active); err != nil {
-			return Ref[string]{Count: e.total, Out: e.active}, fmt.Errorf("remove allowed IP %v for peer %s: %w", prefix, e.active, err)
-		}
-		e.active = ""
-	}
-
-	// Hand the prefix over to a surviving peer, or drop the entry when none remain.
-	if survivor, ok := pickSurvivor(e.peers); ok {
-		out, err := rm.add(prefix, survivor)
-		if err != nil {
-			return Ref[string]{Count: e.total, Out: ""}, fmt.Errorf("swap allowed IP %v to peer %s: %w", prefix, survivor, err)
-		}
-		e.active = out
-		return Ref[string]{Count: e.total, Out: e.active}, nil
-	}
-
-	delete(rm.entries, prefix)
-	return Ref[string]{Count: 0, Out: ""}, nil
-}
-
-// Flush removes all prefixes from WireGuard and clears the counter.
-func (rm *AllowedIPsRefCounter) Flush() error {
-	rm.mu.Lock()
-	defer rm.mu.Unlock()
-
-	var merr *multierror.Error
-	for prefix, e := range rm.entries {
-		if e.active == "" {
-			continue
-		}
-		logCallerF("Flushing allowed IP for prefix %v peer %s", prefix, e.active)
-		if err := rm.remove(prefix, e.active); err != nil {
-			merr = multierror.Append(merr, fmt.Errorf("remove allowed IP %v for peer %s: %w", prefix, e.active, err))
-		}
-	}
-
-	clear(rm.entries)
-
-	return nberrors.FormatErrorOrNil(merr)
-}
-
-// ReapplyMatching calls apply for every prefix whose currently installed (active) peer satisfies
-// pred, holding the lock for the whole pass. It is used to re-push allowed IPs onto a peer whose
-// WireGuard entry was rebuilt (e.g. a lazy connection cycling idle->wake) without a matching
-// refcounter change, which would otherwise leave the prefix installed in the counter but missing
-// on the device. Only the active peer is considered — a prefix that lost its installed peer to a
-// failed swap is skipped here and reconciled by the next Increment/Decrement.
-func (rm *AllowedIPsRefCounter) ReapplyMatching(pred func(out string) bool, apply func(key netip.Prefix) error) error {
-	rm.mu.Lock()
-	defer rm.mu.Unlock()
-
-	var merr *multierror.Error
-	for prefix, e := range rm.entries {
-		if e.active != "" && pred(e.active) {
-			if err := apply(prefix); err != nil {
-				merr = multierror.Append(merr, err)
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	return nberrors.FormatErrorOrNil(merr)
-}
-
-// pickSurvivor deterministically selects a peer still referencing the prefix. WireGuard cannot do
-// multipath for a single prefix, so any surviving peer is a valid winner; the choice is made stable
-// (lowest peerKey) for predictable behavior and testability.
-func pickSurvivor(peers map[string]int) (string, bool) {
-	if len(peers) == 0 {
-		return "", false
-	}
-	keys := make([]string, 0, len(peers))
-	for k := range peers {
-		keys = append(keys, k)
-	}
-	sort.Strings(keys)
-	return keys[0], true
-}

client/internal/routemanager/refcounter/allowedips_test.go

@@ -1,241 +0,0 @@
-package refcounter
-
-import (
-	"errors"
-	"net/netip"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// fakeWG models WireGuard's cryptokey routing: a prefix can be installed on exactly one peer.
-// failAdd/failRemove make the next add/remove fail once, to exercise the self-healing error paths.
-type fakeWG struct {
-	installed  map[netip.Prefix]string
-	adds       int
-	removes    int
-	failAdd    bool
-	failRemove bool
-}
-
-func newFakeWG() *fakeWG {
-	return &fakeWG{installed: map[netip.Prefix]string{}}
-}
-
-func (f *fakeWG) counter() *AllowedIPsRefCounter {
-	return NewAllowedIPs(
-		func(prefix netip.Prefix, peerKey string) (string, error) {
-			if f.failAdd {
-				f.failAdd = false
-				return "", errors.New("add failed")
-			}
-			f.adds++
-			f.installed[prefix] = peerKey
-			return peerKey, nil
-		},
-		func(prefix netip.Prefix, peerKey string) error {
-			if f.failRemove {
-				f.failRemove = false
-				return errors.New("remove failed")
-			}
-			f.removes++
-			// only clear if this peer is the one installed, mirroring wg semantics
-			if f.installed[prefix] == peerKey {
-				delete(f.installed, prefix)
-			}
-			return nil
-		},
-	)
-}
-
-func mustPrefix(t *testing.T, s string) netip.Prefix {
-	t.Helper()
-	p, err := netip.ParsePrefix(s)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("parse prefix %q: %v", s, err)
-	}
-	return p
-}
-
-func mustIncrement(t *testing.T, c *AllowedIPsRefCounter, p netip.Prefix, peer string) Ref[string] {
-	t.Helper()
-	ref, err := c.Increment(p, peer)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Increment(%v, %s): %v", p, peer, err)
-	}
-	return ref
-}
-
-func mustDecrement(t *testing.T, c *AllowedIPsRefCounter, p netip.Prefix, peer string) Ref[string] {
-	t.Helper()
-	ref, err := c.Decrement(p, peer)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Decrement(%v, %s): %v", p, peer, err)
-	}
-	return ref
-}
-
-// TestAllowedIPs_SwapOnActivePeerRemoval reproduces the reported bug: two networks with the same
-// prefix routed by different peers. Removing the network whose peer is installed must hand the
-// prefix over to the surviving peer instead of leaving it on the removed one.
-func TestAllowedIPs_SwapOnActivePeerRemoval(t *testing.T) {
-	f := newFakeWG()
-	c := f.counter()
-	p := mustPrefix(t, "10.44.8.0/24")
-
-	mustIncrement(t, c, p, "peerA")
-	mustIncrement(t, c, p, "peerB")
-	// First peer wins while both are present.
-	if got := f.installed[p]; got != "peerA" {
-		t.Fatalf("expected peerA installed, got %q", got)
-	}
-
-	// Remove the active peer's network -> must swap to peerB.
-	mustDecrement(t, c, p, "peerA")
-	if got := f.installed[p]; got != "peerB" {
-		t.Fatalf("BUG: prefix stuck on removed peer, want peerB got %q", got)
-	}
-
-	// Remove the last one -> prefix gone.
-	mustDecrement(t, c, p, "peerB")
-	if _, ok := f.installed[p]; ok {
-		t.Fatalf("expected prefix removed, still installed on %q", f.installed[p])
-	}
-}
-
-// TestAllowedIPs_RemoveNonActivePeer removing a non-installed peer must not touch WireGuard.
-func TestAllowedIPs_RemoveNonActivePeer(t *testing.T) {
-	f := newFakeWG()
-	c := f.counter()
-	p := mustPrefix(t, "10.44.8.0/24")
-
-	mustIncrement(t, c, p, "peerA")
-	mustIncrement(t, c, p, "peerB")
-	removesBefore := f.removes
-
-	mustDecrement(t, c, p, "peerB")
-	if f.installed[p] != "peerA" {
-		t.Fatalf("active peer must stay peerA, got %q", f.installed[p])
-	}
-	if f.removes != removesBefore {
-		t.Fatalf("removing a non-active peer must not call wg remove")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestAllowedIPs_SamePeerMultipleRefs two references via the same peer must keep the prefix until
-// the last reference is released (the reason the per-peer count must be an int, not a set).
-func TestAllowedIPs_SamePeerMultipleRefs(t *testing.T) {
-	f := newFakeWG()
-	c := f.counter()
-	p := mustPrefix(t, "10.44.8.0/24")
-
-	mustIncrement(t, c, p, "peerA")
-	mustIncrement(t, c, p, "peerA")
-	if f.adds != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("expected a single wg add for the same peer, got %d", f.adds)
-	}
-
-	mustDecrement(t, c, p, "peerA")
-	if f.installed[p] != "peerA" {
-		t.Fatalf("prefix must stay while a reference remains, got %q", f.installed[p])
-	}
-	if f.removes != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("no wg remove expected while a reference remains, got %d", f.removes)
-	}
-
-	mustDecrement(t, c, p, "peerA")
-	if _, ok := f.installed[p]; ok {
-		t.Fatalf("prefix must be removed after last reference")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestAllowedIPs_RefCountAndActive checks the Ref returned to callers (used for the HA-disabled log).
-func TestAllowedIPs_RefCountAndActive(t *testing.T) {
-	f := newFakeWG()
-	c := f.counter()
-	p := mustPrefix(t, "10.44.8.0/24")
-
-	ref := mustIncrement(t, c, p, "peerA")
-	if ref.Count != 1 || ref.Out != "peerA" {
-		t.Fatalf("want {1, peerA}, got {%d, %q}", ref.Count, ref.Out)
-	}
-	ref = mustIncrement(t, c, p, "peerB")
-	if ref.Count != 2 || ref.Out != "peerA" {
-		t.Fatalf("want {2, peerA}, got {%d, %q}", ref.Count, ref.Out)
-	}
-}
-
-// TestAllowedIPs_Flush removes everything installed and clears the counter.
-func TestAllowedIPs_Flush(t *testing.T) {
-	f := newFakeWG()
-	c := f.counter()
-	p1 := mustPrefix(t, "10.44.8.0/24")
-	p2 := mustPrefix(t, "10.44.9.0/24")
-
-	mustIncrement(t, c, p1, "peerA")
-	mustIncrement(t, c, p2, "peerB")
-
-	if err := c.Flush(); err != nil {
-		t.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	if len(f.installed) != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("expected all prefixes removed, got %v", f.installed)
-	}
-	// After flush, a fresh increment must add again.
-	mustIncrement(t, c, p1, "peerC")
-	if f.installed[p1] != "peerC" {
-		t.Fatalf("counter not reset after flush")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestAllowedIPs_SelfHealAfterSwapAddError ensures a failed add during a swap does not permanently
-// strand the prefix: the next Decrement (or Increment) must retry and install a surviving peer.
-func TestAllowedIPs_SelfHealAfterSwapAddError(t *testing.T) {
-	f := newFakeWG()
-	c := f.counter()
-	p := mustPrefix(t, "10.44.8.0/24")
-
-	mustIncrement(t, c, p, "peerA")
-	mustIncrement(t, c, p, "peerB")
-	mustIncrement(t, c, p, "peerC")
-
-	// Removing the active peerA triggers a swap to a survivor; make the add fail once.
-	f.failAdd = true
-	if _, err := c.Decrement(p, "peerA"); err == nil {
-		t.Fatalf("expected error from failed swap add")
-	}
-	if _, ok := f.installed[p]; ok {
-		t.Fatalf("nothing should be installed after a failed swap add, got %q", f.installed[p])
-	}
-
-	// A later Decrement of a non-active survivor must retry the hand-off (self-heal), not stay stuck.
-	ref := mustDecrement(t, c, p, "peerC")
-	if got := f.installed[p]; got == "" {
-		t.Fatalf("self-heal failed: prefix left unrouted after add recovered")
-	}
-	if ref.Out == "" {
-		t.Fatalf("expected an active peer after self-heal, got empty")
-	}
-}
-
-// TestAllowedIPs_SelfHealAfterRemoveError ensures a failed remove during a swap is retried instead
-// of leaving e.active stuck on a peer that no longer holds references.
-func TestAllowedIPs_SelfHealAfterRemoveError(t *testing.T) {
-	f := newFakeWG()
-	c := f.counter()
-	p := mustPrefix(t, "10.44.8.0/24")
-
-	mustIncrement(t, c, p, "peerA")
-	mustIncrement(t, c, p, "peerB")
-
-	// Releasing active peerA must detach it (remove) then add peerB; fail the remove once.
-	f.failRemove = true
-	if _, err := c.Decrement(p, "peerA"); err == nil {
-		t.Fatalf("expected error from failed remove")
-	}
-
-	// Next Decrement of the non-active survivor retries: removes stale peerA, installs peerB.
-	mustDecrement(t, c, p, "peerB")
-	// peerB had only one ref, so after retry the prefix is fully released.
-	if _, ok := f.installed[p]; ok {
-		t.Fatalf("expected prefix released after self-heal, still on %q", f.installed[p])
-	}
-}

client/internal/routemanager/refcounter/refcounter.go

@@ -94,26 +94,6 @@ func (rm *Counter[Key, I, O]) Get(key Key) (Ref[O], bool) {
 	return ref, ok
 }
 
-// ReapplyMatching calls apply for every key whose stored Out satisfies pred, holding the
-// counter lock for the whole pass. Running apply under the lock keeps it atomic with respect
-// to Increment/Decrement: a prefix dropped to zero is removed from the map (and had its
-// RemoveFunc called) before this pass observes it, so a stale key can never be re-applied.
-// pred and apply are invoked under the lock, so they must not call back into the counter.
-func (rm *Counter[Key, I, O]) ReapplyMatching(pred func(out O) bool, apply func(key Key) error) error {
-	rm.mu.Lock()
-	defer rm.mu.Unlock()
-
-	var merr *multierror.Error
-	for key, ref := range rm.refCountMap {
-		if pred(ref.Out) {
-			if err := apply(key); err != nil {
-				merr = multierror.Append(merr, err)
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	return nberrors.FormatErrorOrNil(merr)
-}
-
 // Increment increments the reference count for the given key.
 // If this is the first reference to the key, the AddFunc is called.
 func (rm *Counter[Key, I, O]) Increment(key Key, in I) (Ref[O], error) {

client/internal/routemanager/refcounter/refcounter_test.go

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-package refcounter
-
-import (
-	"net/netip"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-)
-
-// TestReapplyMatching verifies ReapplyMatching invokes apply for exactly the keys whose stored
-// Out satisfies the predicate (no duplicates for multiply-referenced keys) — the primitive
-// ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs relies on to re-apply a single peer's routed prefixes.
-func TestReapplyMatching(t *testing.T) {
-	rc := New[netip.Prefix, string, string](
-		func(_ netip.Prefix, peerKey string) (string, error) { return peerKey, nil },
-		func(netip.Prefix, string) error { return nil },
-	)
-
-	peerA1 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/24")
-	peerA2 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.1.0.0/24")
-	peerB1 := netip.MustParsePrefix("10.2.0.0/24")
-
-	for prefix, peer := range map[netip.Prefix]string{peerA1: "peerA", peerA2: "peerA", peerB1: "peerB"} {
-		_, err := rc.Increment(prefix, peer)
-		require.NoError(t, err)
-	}
-	// a second reference must not make the key applied twice
-	_, err := rc.Increment(peerA1, "peerA")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	var applied []netip.Prefix
-	err = rc.ReapplyMatching(
-		func(out string) bool { return out == "peerA" },
-		func(key netip.Prefix) error { applied = append(applied, key); return nil },
-	)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.ElementsMatch(t, []netip.Prefix{peerA1, peerA2}, applied)
-
-	var none []netip.Prefix
-	err = rc.ReapplyMatching(
-		func(out string) bool { return out == "missing" },
-		func(key netip.Prefix) error { none = append(none, key); return nil },
-	)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Empty(t, none)
-}

client/internal/routemanager/refcounter/types.go

@@ -5,7 +5,5 @@ import "net/netip"
 // RouteRefCounter is a Counter for Route, it doesn't take any input on Increment and doesn't use any output on Decrement
 type RouteRefCounter = Counter[netip.Prefix, struct{}, struct{}]
 
-// AllowedIPsRefCounter tracks WireGuard AllowedIPs per prefix. Unlike the generic Counter it is peer-aware:
-// a prefix can be claimed by several peers at once and WireGuard allows a given prefix on exactly one peer,
-// so the counter records the per-peer reference count and swaps the installed peer when the active one is released.
-// See allowedips.go.
+// AllowedIPsRefCounter is a Counter for AllowedIPs, it takes a peer key on Increment and passes it back to Decrement
+type AllowedIPsRefCounter = Counter[netip.Prefix, string, string]

client/internal/routemanager/selection.go

@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
-package routemanager
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"slices"
-
-	"github.com/hashicorp/go-multierror"
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-	"golang.org/x/exp/maps"
-
-	nberrors "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/errors"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
-)
-
-// SelectRoutes selects the routes with the given network IDs and applies the
-// new selection. V4/v6 exit-node pairs are expanded automatically. Exit nodes
-// are mutually exclusive: if the selection activates an exit node, every other
-// available exit node is deselected so two can't be active at once. With
-// appendRoute=false the previous selection is replaced instead of extended.
-func (m *DefaultManager) SelectRoutes(ids []route.NetID, appendRoute bool) error {
-	if err := m.selectRoutes(ids, appendRoute); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	m.TriggerSelection(m.GetClientRoutes())
-	return nil
-}
-
-// DeselectRoutes removes the routes with the given network IDs from the
-// selection and applies the change. V4/v6 exit-node pairs are expanded
-// automatically.
-func (m *DefaultManager) DeselectRoutes(ids []route.NetID) error {
-	if err := m.deselectRoutes(ids); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	m.TriggerSelection(m.GetClientRoutes())
-	return nil
-}
-
-func (m *DefaultManager) deselectRoutes(ids []route.NetID) error {
-	routesMap := m.GetClientRoutesWithNetID()
-	routes := route.ExpandV6ExitPairs(slices.Clone(ids), routesMap)
-
-	log.Debugf("deselecting routes with ids: %v", routes)
-
-	if err := m.routeSelector.DeselectRoutes(routes, maps.Keys(routesMap)); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("deselect routes: %w", err)
-	}
-
-	return nil
-}
-
-// SelectAllRoutes selects every available route and applies the selection.
-// Exit nodes stay mutually exclusive: at most one remains active.
-func (m *DefaultManager) SelectAllRoutes() {
-	m.selectAllRoutes()
-	m.TriggerSelection(m.GetClientRoutes())
-}
-
-func (m *DefaultManager) selectAllRoutes() {
-	m.routeSelector.SelectAllRoutes()
-
-	// Select-all wipes every explicit selection, so exit nodes fall back to
-	// management's auto-apply flags — which may mark several at once.
-	// Reconcile immediately so at most one exit node stays active instead of
-	// waiting for the next network map to enforce it.
-	m.mux.Lock()
-	defer m.mux.Unlock()
-	m.updateRouteSelectorFromManagement(m.clientRoutes)
-}
-
-// DeselectAllRoutes deselects every route and applies the change.
-func (m *DefaultManager) DeselectAllRoutes() {
-	m.routeSelector.DeselectAllRoutes()
-	m.TriggerSelection(m.GetClientRoutes())
-}
-
-func (m *DefaultManager) selectRoutes(ids []route.NetID, appendRoute bool) error {
-	routesMap := m.GetClientRoutesWithNetID()
-	routes := route.ExpandV6ExitPairs(slices.Clone(ids), routesMap)
-	allIDs := maps.Keys(routesMap)
-
-	log.Debugf("selecting routes with ids: %v", routes)
-
-	// A partial failure (e.g. an unknown ID in the request) still selects the
-	// valid routes, so exclusivity below must run regardless of the error.
-	var merr *multierror.Error
-	if err := m.routeSelector.SelectRoutes(routes, appendRoute, allIDs); err != nil {
-		merr = multierror.Append(merr, fmt.Errorf("select routes: %w", err))
-	}
-
-	// Exit nodes are mutually exclusive: if this selection activates an
-	// exit node, deselect every other available exit node so two can't be
-	// selected at once. Non-exit route selections are left untouched.
-	if requestActivatesExitNode(routes, routesMap) {
-		if others := otherExitNodeIDs(routesMap, routes); len(others) > 0 {
-			if err := m.routeSelector.DeselectRoutes(others, allIDs); err != nil {
-				merr = multierror.Append(merr, fmt.Errorf("deselect sibling exit nodes: %w", err))
-			}
-		}
-	}
-
-	return nberrors.FormatErrorOrNil(merr)
-}
-
-func isExitNodeRoutes(routes []*route.Route) bool {
-	return len(routes) > 0 && (route.IsV4DefaultRoute(routes[0].Network) || route.IsV6DefaultRoute(routes[0].Network))
-}
-
-// requestActivatesExitNode reports whether any requested NetID maps to an exit
-// node (default route) in the current route table.
-func requestActivatesExitNode(requested []route.NetID, routesMap map[route.NetID][]*route.Route) bool {
-	for _, id := range requested {
-		if isExitNodeRoutes(routesMap[id]) {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-	return false
-}
-
-// otherExitNodeIDs returns every available exit-node NetID that is not in the
-// requested set — the siblings to deselect so a single exit node stays active.
-func otherExitNodeIDs(routesMap map[route.NetID][]*route.Route, requested []route.NetID) []route.NetID {
-	keep := make(map[route.NetID]struct{}, len(requested))
-	for _, id := range requested {
-		keep[id] = struct{}{}
-	}
-	var others []route.NetID
-	for id, routes := range routesMap {
-		if !isExitNodeRoutes(routes) {
-			continue
-		}
-		if _, ok := keep[id]; ok {
-			continue
-		}
-		others = append(others, id)
-	}
-	return others
-}

client/internal/routemanager/selection_test.go

@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
-package routemanager
-
-import (
-	"net/netip"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/routeselector"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
-)
-
-func v6ExitRoute(netID, peer string) *route.Route {
-	return &route.Route{
-		NetID:   route.NetID(netID),
-		Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("::/0"),
-		Peer:    peer,
-	}
-}
-
-func newSelectionTestManager() *DefaultManager {
-	return &DefaultManager{
-		routeSelector: routeselector.NewRouteSelector(),
-		clientRoutes: route.HAMap{
-			"exitA|0.0.0.0/0":    {exitRoute("exitA", "p1", true)},
-			"exitA-v6|::/0":      {v6ExitRoute("exitA-v6", "p1")},
-			"exitB|0.0.0.0/0":    {exitRoute("exitB", "p2", true)},
-			"lan|192.168.1.0/24": {{NetID: "lan", Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("192.168.1.0/24"), Peer: "p3"}},
-		},
-	}
-}
-
-func TestSelectRoutes_ExitNodeExclusivity(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newSelectionTestManager()
-
-	// Selecting an exit node selects its v6 pair and deselects the sibling.
-	require.NoError(t, m.selectRoutes([]route.NetID{"exitA"}, true))
-	assert.True(t, m.routeSelector.IsSelected("exitA"), "exitA should be selected")
-	assert.True(t, m.routeSelector.IsSelected("exitA-v6"), "the v6 pair follows its v4 base")
-	assert.False(t, m.routeSelector.IsSelected("exitB"), "the sibling exit node must be deselected")
-
-	// Switching to the sibling deselects the previous exit node and its v6 pair.
-	require.NoError(t, m.selectRoutes([]route.NetID{"exitB"}, true))
-	assert.True(t, m.routeSelector.IsSelected("exitB"), "exitB should now be selected")
-	assert.False(t, m.routeSelector.IsSelected("exitA"), "the previous exit node must be deselected")
-	assert.False(t, m.routeSelector.IsSelected("exitA-v6"), "the previous exit node's v6 pair must be deselected")
-	assert.True(t, m.routeSelector.IsSelected("lan"), "non-exit route selection is untouched")
-
-	// Selecting a non-exit route leaves the active exit node alone.
-	require.NoError(t, m.selectRoutes([]route.NetID{"lan"}, true))
-	assert.True(t, m.routeSelector.IsSelected("exitB"), "selecting a non-exit route keeps the exit node")
-
-	// Deselecting the active exit node turns every exit node off.
-	require.NoError(t, m.deselectRoutes([]route.NetID{"exitB"}))
-	assert.False(t, m.routeSelector.IsSelected("exitB"), "exitB should be deselected")
-	assert.False(t, m.routeSelector.IsSelected("exitA"), "exitA stays deselected")
-	assert.True(t, m.routeSelector.IsSelected("lan"), "non-exit route selection is untouched")
-}
-
-func TestSelectRoutes_PartialErrorStillEnforcesExclusivity(t *testing.T) {
-	// The unknown ID must be reported, but the valid exit node in the same
-	// request is still selected — so its sibling must still be deselected.
-	// Both orderings are covered: processing must continue past the invalid
-	// ID wherever it sits in the request.
-	requests := map[string][]route.NetID{
-		"invalid id first": {"missing", "exitB"},
-		"invalid id last":  {"exitB", "missing"},
-	}
-
-	for name, ids := range requests {
-		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			m := newSelectionTestManager()
-
-			require.NoError(t, m.selectRoutes([]route.NetID{"exitA"}, true))
-
-			err := m.selectRoutes(ids, true)
-			assert.Error(t, err, "unknown id must be reported")
-			assert.True(t, m.routeSelector.IsSelected("exitB"), "valid exit node from the request is selected")
-			assert.False(t, m.routeSelector.IsSelected("exitA"), "sibling exit node must be deselected despite the error")
-			assert.False(t, m.routeSelector.IsSelected("exitA-v6"), "sibling's v6 pair must be deselected too")
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-func TestSelectAllRoutes_KeepsSingleExitNode(t *testing.T) {
-	// Both exit nodes are marked for auto-apply by management
-	// (SkipAutoApply=false), the state where select-all could turn on two at
-	// once without the immediate reconciliation.
-	m := &DefaultManager{
-		routeSelector: routeselector.NewRouteSelector(),
-		clientRoutes: route.HAMap{
-			"exitA|0.0.0.0/0":    {exitRoute("exitA", "p1", false)},
-			"exitB|0.0.0.0/0":    {exitRoute("exitB", "p2", false)},
-			"lan|192.168.1.0/24": {{NetID: "lan", Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("192.168.1.0/24"), Peer: "p3"}},
-		},
-	}
-
-	require.NoError(t, m.selectRoutes([]route.NetID{"exitB"}, true))
-
-	m.selectAllRoutes()
-
-	assert.True(t, m.routeSelector.IsSelected("lan"), "non-exit routes are all selected")
-	assert.True(t, m.routeSelector.IsSelected("exitA"), "the deterministic management pick stays active")
-	assert.False(t, m.routeSelector.IsSelected("exitB"), "select-all must not leave a second exit node active")
-}
-
-func TestSelectRoutes_UnknownRoute(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newSelectionTestManager()
-
-	assert.Error(t, m.selectRoutes([]route.NetID{"missing"}, true), "selecting an unavailable route must fail")
-	assert.Error(t, m.deselectRoutes([]route.NetID{"missing"}), "deselecting an unavailable route must fail")
-}
-
-func TestExitNodeSelectionHelpers(t *testing.T) {
-	routesMap := map[route.NetID][]*route.Route{
-		"exitA": {{Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("0.0.0.0/0")}},
-		"exitB": {{Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("::/0")}},
-		"lan":   {{Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("192.168.0.0/16")}},
-	}
-
-	assert.True(t, requestActivatesExitNode([]route.NetID{"exitA"}, routesMap), "v4 default route is an exit node")
-	assert.True(t, requestActivatesExitNode([]route.NetID{"exitB"}, routesMap), "v6 default route is an exit node")
-	assert.False(t, requestActivatesExitNode([]route.NetID{"lan"}, routesMap), "lan route is not an exit node")
-	assert.False(t, requestActivatesExitNode([]route.NetID{"missing"}, routesMap), "unknown id is not an exit node")
-
-	others := otherExitNodeIDs(routesMap, []route.NetID{"exitB"})
-	assert.ElementsMatch(t, []route.NetID{"exitA"}, others, "only the other exit node is a sibling; the lan route is ignored")
-}