Compare commits

..

2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Viktor Liu
af1f94bbe9 Merge branch 'main' into reverse-proxy-crowdsec-appsec
# Conflicts:
#	management/server/store/sql_store.go
#	management/server/store/sql_store_service_test.go
2026-07-31 22:00:33 +02:00
Viktor Liu
663468e199 Add CrowdSec AppSec request inspection to the reverse proxy 2026-07-28 10:51:54 +02:00
264 changed files with 6643 additions and 24712 deletions

View File

@@ -16,8 +16,6 @@ jobs:
const allowedTags = [
'management',
'client',
'android',
'ios',
'signal',
'proxy',
'relay',

View File

@@ -475,132 +475,6 @@ jobs:
path: dist/
retention-days: 3
release_ui_gtk3:
# Legacy GTK3/WebKit2GTK 4.1 UI build for distros without WebKitGTK 6.0
# (Ubuntu 22.04, Debian 12, RHEL 9, Fedora <=39). Runs on ubuntu-22.04 so
# the binary links against the oldest supported glibc.
runs-on: ubuntu-22.04
outputs:
release_ui_gtk3_artifact_url: ${{ steps.upload_release_ui_gtk3.outputs.artifact-url }}
steps:
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
with:
fetch-depth: 0 # It is required for GoReleaser to work properly
persist-credentials: false
- name: Parse semver string
id: semver_parser
uses: netbirdio/shared-actions/actions/parse-semver@be5df6047383da2236e02243cceb857d8567c27e # v0.0.2
- name: Set snapshot flag
if: ${{ !startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') }}
run: |
echo "flags=--snapshot" >> $GITHUB_ENV
- name: Set build vars
if: ${{ startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v') }}
run: |
if [[ "x-${{ steps.semver_parser.outputs.prerelease }}" == "x-" && "x-${{ github.repository }}" == "x-netbirdio/netbird" ]]; then
echo "x-${{ github.repository }}"
echo "x-${{ steps.semver_parser.outputs.prerelease }}"
echo "SKIP_PUBLISH=false" >> $GITHUB_ENV
else
echo "x-${{ github.repository }}"
echo "x-${{ steps.semver_parser.outputs.prerelease }}"
fi
- name: Set up Go
uses: actions/setup-go@924ae3a1cded613372ab5595356fb5720e22ba16 # v6.5.0
with:
go-version-file: "go.mod"
cache: false
- name: Cache Go modules
# Restore-only from the release_ui cache written by trusted runs; the
# module cache is identical (same go.sum) and stale build-cache
# entries just miss.
uses: actions/cache/restore@2c8a9bd7457de244a408f35966fab2fb45fda9c8 # v6.0.0
with:
path: |
~/go/pkg/mod
~/.cache/go-build
key: ${{ runner.os }}-ui-go-releaser-${{ hashFiles('**/go.sum') }}
restore-keys: |
${{ runner.os }}-ui-go-releaser-
- name: Install modules
run: go mod tidy
- name: check git status
run: git --no-pager diff --exit-code
- name: Set up Node.js
uses: actions/setup-node@49933ea5288caeca8642d1e84afbd3f7d6820020 # v4
with:
node-version: '22'
- name: Set up pnpm
uses: pnpm/action-setup@a3252b78c470c02df07e9d59298aecedc3ccdd6d # v3.0.0
with:
version: 11
- name: Install dependencies
run: sudo apt update && sudo apt install -y -q libgtk-3-dev libwebkit2gtk-4.1-dev
- name: Decode GPG signing key
if: github.event_name != 'pull_request' || github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name == github.repository
env:
GPG_RPM_PRIVATE_KEY: ${{ secrets.GPG_RPM_PRIVATE_KEY }}
run: |
echo "$GPG_RPM_PRIVATE_KEY" | base64 -d > /tmp/gpg-rpm-signing-key.asc
echo "GPG_RPM_KEY_FILE=/tmp/gpg-rpm-signing-key.asc" >> $GITHUB_ENV
- name: Install wails3 CLI
# Version derived from go.mod so the binding generator always matches
# the wails runtime the binary links against.
# -tags gtk3: the CLI links the wails runtime's cgo packages, and the
# default tags request gtk4/webkitgtk-6.0 pkg-config entries that do
# not exist on ubuntu-22.04.
run: |
WAILS_VERSION=$(go list -m -f '{{.Version}}' github.com/wailsapp/wails/v3)
go install -tags gtk3 github.com/wailsapp/wails/v3/cmd/wails3@$WAILS_VERSION
- name: Run GoReleaser
uses: goreleaser/goreleaser-action@5daf1e915a5f0af01ddbcd89a43b8061ff4f1a89 # v7.2.2
with:
version: ${{ env.GORELEASER_VER }}
args: release --config .goreleaser_ui_gtk3.yaml --clean ${{ env.flags }}
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
UPLOAD_DEBIAN_SECRET: ${{ secrets.PKG_UPLOAD_SECRET }}
UPLOAD_YUM_SECRET: ${{ secrets.PKG_UPLOAD_SECRET }}
GPG_RPM_KEY_FILE: ${{ env.GPG_RPM_KEY_FILE }}
NFPM_NETBIRD_UI_RPM_GTK3_PASSPHRASE: ${{ secrets.GPG_RPM_PASSPHRASE }}
SKIP_PUBLISH: ${{ env.SKIP_PUBLISH }}
- name: Verify RPM signatures
run: |
docker run --rm -v $(pwd)/dist:/dist fedora:41 bash -c '
dnf install -y -q rpm-sign curl >/dev/null 2>&1
curl -sSL https://pkgs.netbird.io/yum/repodata/repomd.xml.key -o /tmp/rpm-pub.key
rpm --import /tmp/rpm-pub.key
echo "=== Verifying RPM signatures ==="
for rpm_file in /dist/*.rpm; do
[ -f "$rpm_file" ] || continue
echo "--- $(basename $rpm_file) ---"
rpm -K "$rpm_file"
done
'
- name: Clean up GPG key
if: always()
run: rm -f /tmp/gpg-rpm-signing-key.asc
- name: upload non tags for debug purposes
id: upload_release_ui_gtk3
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a #v7.0.1
with:
name: release-ui-gtk3
path: dist/
retention-days: 3
release_ui_darwin:
runs-on: macos-latest
outputs:
@@ -814,7 +688,7 @@ jobs:
comment_release_artifacts:
name: Comment release artifacts
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: [release, release_ui, release_ui_gtk3, release_ui_darwin]
needs: [release, release_ui, release_ui_darwin]
if: ${{ always() && github.event_name == 'pull_request' && github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name == github.repository }}
permissions:
contents: read
@@ -826,14 +700,12 @@ jobs:
env:
RELEASE_RESULT: ${{ needs.release.result }}
RELEASE_UI_RESULT: ${{ needs.release_ui.result }}
RELEASE_UI_GTK3_RESULT: ${{ needs.release_ui_gtk3.result }}
RELEASE_UI_DARWIN_RESULT: ${{ needs.release_ui_darwin.result }}
RELEASE_ARTIFACT_URL: ${{ needs.release.outputs.release_artifact_url }}
LINUX_PACKAGES_ARTIFACT_URL: ${{ needs.release.outputs.linux_packages_artifact_url }}
WINDOWS_PACKAGES_ARTIFACT_URL: ${{ needs.release.outputs.windows_packages_artifact_url }}
MACOS_PACKAGES_ARTIFACT_URL: ${{ needs.release.outputs.macos_packages_artifact_url }}
RELEASE_UI_ARTIFACT_URL: ${{ needs.release_ui.outputs.release_ui_artifact_url }}
RELEASE_UI_GTK3_ARTIFACT_URL: ${{ needs.release_ui_gtk3.outputs.release_ui_gtk3_artifact_url }}
RELEASE_UI_DARWIN_ARTIFACT_URL: ${{ needs.release_ui_darwin.outputs.release_ui_darwin_artifact_url }}
GHCR_IMAGES_MARKDOWN: ${{ needs.release.outputs.ghcr_images }}
with:
@@ -856,7 +728,6 @@ jobs:
['Windows packages', process.env.WINDOWS_PACKAGES_ARTIFACT_URL, process.env.RELEASE_RESULT],
['macOS packages', process.env.MACOS_PACKAGES_ARTIFACT_URL, process.env.RELEASE_RESULT],
['UI artifacts', process.env.RELEASE_UI_ARTIFACT_URL, process.env.RELEASE_UI_RESULT],
['UI GTK3 artifacts', process.env.RELEASE_UI_GTK3_ARTIFACT_URL, process.env.RELEASE_UI_GTK3_RESULT],
['UI macOS artifacts', process.env.RELEASE_UI_DARWIN_ARTIFACT_URL, process.env.RELEASE_UI_DARWIN_RESULT],
];
@@ -913,7 +784,7 @@ jobs:
trigger_signer:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: [release, release_ui, release_ui_gtk3, release_ui_darwin, test_windows_installer]
needs: [release, release_ui, release_ui_darwin, test_windows_installer]
if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/')
steps:
- name: Trigger binaries sign pipelines

View File

@@ -257,15 +257,6 @@ jobs:
with:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Verify fresh-install session cookie key hardening
run: |
grep -Fxq ' SESSION_COOKIE_ENCRYPTION_KEY=$(openssl rand -base64 32)' infrastructure_files/getting-started.sh
grep -Fxq ' sessionCookieEncryptionKey: "$SESSION_COOKIE_ENCRYPTION_KEY"' infrastructure_files/getting-started.sh
grep -Fxq ' install -m 600 /dev/null config.yaml' infrastructure_files/getting-started.sh
grep -Fxq ' openssl rand -base64 32' infrastructure_files/getting-started-enterprise.sh
grep -Fxq ' NETBIRD_SESSION_COOKIE_ENCRYPTION_KEY=$(rand_b64_key)' infrastructure_files/getting-started-enterprise.sh
grep -Fxq ' sessionCookieEncryptionKey: "${NETBIRD_SESSION_COOKIE_ENCRYPTION_KEY}"' infrastructure_files/getting-started-enterprise.sh
- name: Verify Dex retirement notice
run: |
if infrastructure_files/getting-started-with-dex.sh >stdout.txt 2>stderr.txt; then

View File

@@ -93,10 +93,7 @@ nfpms:
- src: client/ui/build/appicon.png
dst: /usr/share/pixmaps/netbird.png
dependencies:
- netbird (>= 0.75.0)
- libgtk-4-1 (>= 4.14)
- libwebkitgtk-6.0-4
- xdg-utils
- netbird
- maintainer: Netbird <dev@netbird.io>
description: Netbird client UI.
@@ -117,10 +114,7 @@ nfpms:
- src: client/ui/build/appicon.png
dst: /usr/share/pixmaps/netbird.png
dependencies:
- netbird >= 0.75.0
- (gtk4 >= 4.14 or libgtk-4-1 >= 4.14)
- (webkitgtk6.0 or libwebkitgtk-6_0-4)
- xdg-utils
- netbird
rpm:
signature:

View File

@@ -1,136 +0,0 @@
version: 2
env:
- SKIP_PUBLISH={{ if index .Env "SKIP_PUBLISH" }}{{ .Env.SKIP_PUBLISH }}{{ else }}true{{ end }}
project_name: netbird-ui
before:
hooks:
# Bindings are gitignored; regenerate before the frontend build so
# the @wailsio/runtime Vite plugin can resolve them (vite refuses to
# build without them).
# -f '-tags gtk3': the generator type-checks client/ui, whose cgo imports
# would otherwise resolve gtk4/webkitgtk-6.0 pkg-config entries that do
# not exist on ubuntu-22.04.
- sh -c 'cd client/ui && wails3 generate bindings -clean=true -ts -f "-tags gtk3"'
- sh -c 'cd client/ui/frontend && pnpm install --frozen-lockfile && pnpm build'
builds:
# Legacy GTK3 / WebKit2GTK 4.1 build for distros without WebKitGTK 6.0
# (Ubuntu 22.04, Debian 12, RHEL 9, Fedora <=39). The gtk3 tag flips the
# Wails Linux backend to the GTK3 stack and swaps our GTK4-only XEmbed
# tray host for the pure-Go stub (client/ui/xembed_host_gtk3_linux.go).
# Must be built on the oldest supported glibc (ubuntu-22.04 runner).
- id: netbird-ui-gtk3
dir: client/ui
binary: netbird-ui
env:
- CGO_ENABLED=1
goos:
- linux
goarch:
- amd64
ldflags:
- -s -w -X github.com/netbirdio/netbird/version.version={{.Version}} -X main.commit={{.Commit}} -X main.date={{.CommitDate}} -X main.builtBy=goreleaser
mod_timestamp: "{{ .CommitTimestamp }}"
tags:
- production
- gtk3
archives:
- id: linux-gtk3-arch
name_template: "{{ .ProjectName }}-linux-gtk3_{{ .Version }}_{{ .Os }}_{{ .Arch }}"
builds:
- netbird-ui-gtk3
nfpms:
# Mutually-exclusive alternative to the GTK4 netbird-ui package -- both
# ship the same /usr/bin/netbird-ui from the shared stable/yum repos, so
# this one carries its own name and conflicts with the GTK4 package.
- maintainer: Netbird <dev@netbird.io>
description: Netbird client UI.
homepage: https://netbird.io/
license: BSD-3-Clause
vendor: NetBird
id: netbird_ui_deb_gtk3
package_name: netbird-ui-gtk3
file_name_template: "{{ .PackageName }}_{{ .Version }}_{{ .Os }}_{{ .Arch }}"
builds:
- netbird-ui-gtk3
formats:
- deb
scripts:
postinstall: "release_files/ui-post-install.sh"
contents:
- src: client/ui/build/linux/netbird.desktop
dst: /usr/share/applications/org.wails.netbird.desktop
- src: client/ui/build/appicon.png
dst: /usr/share/pixmaps/netbird.png
conflicts:
- netbird-ui
replaces:
- netbird-ui
dependencies:
- netbird (>= 0.75.0)
- libgtk-3-0
- libwebkit2gtk-4.1-0
- xdg-utils
- maintainer: Netbird <dev@netbird.io>
description: Netbird client UI.
homepage: https://netbird.io/
license: BSD-3-Clause
vendor: NetBird
id: netbird_ui_rpm_gtk3
package_name: netbird-ui-gtk3
file_name_template: "{{ .PackageName }}_{{ .Version }}_{{ .Os }}_{{ .Arch }}"
builds:
- netbird-ui-gtk3
formats:
- rpm
scripts:
postinstall: "release_files/ui-post-install.sh"
contents:
- src: client/ui/build/linux/netbird.desktop
dst: /usr/share/applications/org.wails.netbird.desktop
- src: client/ui/build/appicon.png
dst: /usr/share/pixmaps/netbird.png
# No `replaces` here: nfpm maps it to rpm Obsoletes, which would make
# dnf swap installed GTK4 netbird-ui packages for this one on upgrade.
conflicts:
- netbird-ui
dependencies:
- netbird >= 0.75.0
- (gtk3 or libgtk-3-0)
- (webkit2gtk4.1 or libwebkit2gtk-4_1-0)
- xdg-utils
rpm:
signature:
key_file: '{{ if index .Env "GPG_RPM_KEY_FILE" }}{{ .Env.GPG_RPM_KEY_FILE }}{{ end }}'
# The GTK4 UI job shares project_name, so the default checksum file name would
# collide with it on the shared GitHub release.
checksum:
name_template: "{{ .ProjectName }}_gtk3_checksums.txt"
changelog:
disable: true
uploads:
- name: debian
skip: "{{ .Env.SKIP_PUBLISH }}"
ids:
- netbird_ui_deb_gtk3
mode: archive
target: https://pkgs.wiretrustee.com/debian/pool/{{ .ArtifactName }};deb.distribution=stable;deb.component=main;deb.architecture={{ if .Arm }}armhf{{ else }}{{ .Arch }}{{ end }};deb.package=
username: dev@wiretrustee.com
method: PUT
- name: yum
skip: "{{ .Env.SKIP_PUBLISH }}"
ids:
- netbird_ui_rpm_gtk3
mode: archive
target: https://pkgs.wiretrustee.com/yum/{{ .Arch }}{{ if .Arm }}{{ .Arm }}{{ end }}
username: dev@wiretrustee.com
method: PUT

783
AGENTS.md
View File

@@ -1,783 +0,0 @@
# NetBird Agent Guidelines
**NetBird** is an open-source connectivity platform: a WireGuard®-based overlay
network with a control plane. The **agent** (`client/`) runs on user machines as
a privileged daemon and manages the WireGuard interface, routing, firewall, and
DNS. **Management** (`management/`) is the control plane and REST/gRPC API,
**Signal** (`signal/`) brokers peer handshakes, **Relay** (`relay/`) carries
traffic when a direct tunnel is impossible, and **Proxy** (`proxy/`) is the
identity-aware proxy behind Agent Network.
This file applies to the whole repository, and is the single source of truth for
agent guidance here. `CLAUDE.md` is a one-line pointer to it — keep the guidance
in this file, not duplicated there.
## Contents
- [STOP and ask the user before](#stop-and-ask-the-user-before)
- [Quick reference](#quick-reference)
- [Structure](#structure)
- [Where to look](#where-to-look)
- [Security](#security)
- [Agent conventions](#agent-conventions)
- [Repo-wide principles](#repo-wide-principles)
- [Type safety](#type-safety)
- [Concurrency and lifecycle](#concurrency-and-lifecycle)
- [Error handling](#error-handling)
- [Comments](#comments)
- [Testing](#testing)
- [Pitfalls](#pitfalls)
- [Commits, PRs, releases](#commits-prs-releases)
- [After you push: CI and review bots](#after-you-push-ci-and-review-bots)
- [Discussion and support](#discussion-and-support)
## STOP and ask the user before
- **Opening a pull request for anything beyond a trivial fix, without an agreed
ticket.** Ask the user directly: *"Is there a discussion or issue for this
change?"* NetBird is discussion-first — community reports start in
[Discussions](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/discussions), DevRel
validates them, and only validated discussions become issues. A PR that
changes behavior with no linked issue may be closed on arrival. If there is no
ticket, offer to draft the discussion post **instead of** the PR, and wait for
the user's call. Only typos, broken links, documentation corrections, and
one-line fixes that already have an issue can skip this.
- **Designing in any high-risk area** (see
[CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md#high-risk-areas)): public API and OpenAPI
schema, gRPC protos, behavior existing deployments would notice after an
upgrade, peer connectivity (ICE, NAT traversal, relay selection, WireGuard® or
Rosenpass key handling), client system integration (routing, firewall, DNS,
interface), authentication and authorization, CLI or service flags, config
file format, daemon IPC, store schema and migrations, or a new feature. The
design gets agreed in the ticket before code is written.
- **Writing a store migration or changing a persisted model.** Migrations are
one-way in the field and both the GORM and pgx paths may need the change.
- **Hand-editing generated code.** `*.pb.go`, `*.gen.go`, and mocks are outputs.
Edit the source (`.proto`, `openapi.yml`) and rerun the matching
`generate.sh`.
- **Adding, removing, or bumping a dependency**, and never vendor a fork.
- **Weakening a security control** — authentication, authorization, certificate
verification, privilege dropping, or peer identity checks — even when it is
the fastest way to make a test pass.
- **Force-pushing to `main`**, force-pushing any branch that is already under
review, amending pushed commits, or bypassing hooks with `--no-verify`.
## Quick reference
```bash
# Build
go build ./...
cd client && CGO_ENABLED=0 go build . # agent
cd management && go build . # management service
cd signal && go build . # signal service
# Verify (run before every push)
go fmt ./...
make lint # golangci-lint on files changed vs origin/main (also the pre-push hook)
make lint-all # full-repository lint, matches CI
make test-unit # host-safe unit tests, -tags devcert, no sudo
make test-privileged # privileged-tagged suite in a Docker container with NET_ADMIN
make setup-hooks # wire make lint into .githooks/pre-push
# Narrow runs
go test ./client/internal/dns/...
go test -race -run TestPeerConn ./client/internal/peer/...
PRIV_RUN=TestNftablesManager PRIV_PKGS=./client/firewall/nftables/... make test-privileged
# Code generation (never hand-edit the output)
./shared/management/http/api/generate.sh # REST types from openapi.yml
./shared/management/proto/generate.sh
./shared/signal/proto/generate.sh
./client/proto/generate.sh
./flow/proto/generate.sh
# Run locally (lab only, never on a machine you rely on)
sudo ./client/netbird up --log-level debug --log-file console
sudo ./client/netbird down # teardown: restores routing, firewall, DNS
./signal/signal run --log-level debug --log-file console
./management/management management --log-level debug --log-file console --config ./management.json
```
`netbird up` needs root and rewrites the host's routing table, firewall rules,
DNS configuration, and WireGuard® interface. Run it only in a disposable test
environment (a VM, container, or throwaway host) that you can rebuild, never on
a workstation or server whose connectivity matters. Run `sudo netbird down`
before you stop working, before rebuilding the binary, and on every failure
path, so the host's networking state is restored instead of left half-applied.
See [Pitfalls](#pitfalls) for why cleanup on every exit path matters.
## Structure
```text
netbird/
├── client/ NetBird agent
│ ├── cmd/ agent CLI
│ ├── internal/ agent business logic (engine, peer, dns, routemanager, ...)
│ ├── server/ daemon for background execution
│ ├── proto/ daemon gRPC protos
│ ├── iface/ WireGuard® interface management
│ ├── firewall/ nftables, iptables, pf, WFP, userspace backends
│ ├── ssh/ built-in SSH server and client
│ ├── ui/ desktop UI (Wails v3 + React)
│ ├── android/, ios/ mobile bindings
│ ├── wasm/ WebAssembly build
│ └── mdm/, system/ MDM policy, host information
├── management/ control plane
│ └── server/ account, peer, groups, networks, posture, permissions,
│ settings, store, http (REST), idp, integrations, migration
├── signal/ handshake broker (peer/, server/)
├── relay/ relay service (protocol/, server/, healthcheck/)
├── proxy/ identity-aware proxy (llm/, acme/, accesslog/, middleware/, tcp/, udp/)
├── agent-network/ Agent Network overview
├── shared/ imported by both agent and services
│ ├── management/ proto/, client/, http/api (OpenAPI + generated types)
│ ├── signal/ proto/, client/
│ └── relay/, auth/, sshauth/, metrics/
├── e2e/ end-to-end suites and harness
├── encryption/, dns/, route/, stun/, sharedsock/, util/, flow/
├── infrastructure_files/ docker compose and getting-started templates
└── release_files/ files packaged into releases
```
## Where to look
| Task | Location |
| --------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------ |
| REST API / OpenAPI | `shared/management/http/api/` + `management/server/http/` |
| Management gRPC protocol | `shared/management/proto/` |
| Signal protocol | `shared/signal/proto/` |
| Daemon IPC protocol | `client/proto/` |
| Peer connection and NAT | `client/internal/peer/` |
| Network map handling | `client/internal/engine.go`, `shared/management/networkmap/` |
| Routing | `client/internal/routemanager/`, `route/` |
| Firewall backends | `client/firewall/` |
| DNS | `client/internal/dns/`, `dns/` |
| WireGuard® interface | `client/iface/` |
| Persistence and migrations | `management/server/store/`, `management/server/migration/` |
| IdP integrations | `management/server/idp/` |
| Permissions model | `management/server/permissions/` |
| LLM routing / Agent Network | `proxy/internal/llm/`, `agent-network/` |
| End-to-end tests | `e2e/` |
## Security
### Never fail open
When a security check — access control, an IP restriction, an auth decision —
hits an error such as an unparseable value, an unavailable lookup, or a state it
does not recognize, it must **deny**. Never skip the check or allow the request
through because the check itself failed, and make the `default` and unknown cases
of a security-related `switch` deny rather than fall through.
### Daemon RPC input is untrusted
The agent runs as root (LocalSystem on Windows), so a daemon RPC crosses a
privilege boundary: treat every field as untrusted input rather than as something
the UI or CLI validated on the way in.
When you add or change an RPC, ask what the handler does with caller input while
running as root. If the answer touches a filesystem path, a URL or host, or a
privileged state change, it needs a gate **in the handler** — a check in the client
that normally calls it is not a check at all.
- **A caller-supplied path the daemon opens.** Never `os.Open` it as root.
Constrain it, then open it *as the caller* with `ipcauth.OpenOwnedFile`, which
opens `O_NOFOLLOW`, requires a regular file, and refuses a file the caller does
not own — so a symlink or hardlink aimed at a root-only file is rejected.
- **A caller-supplied URL or host the daemon fetches.** Restrict the scheme and
allow only known hosts for unprivileged callers. Prefer a lexical host
allowlist plus TLS verification over "resolve the host, then reject private
IPs": the resolve-then-trust pattern has a DNS-rebinding race (public IP at
check time, attacker IP at connect time), while a name allowlist has no IP
check to race. Never accept `http://` where `https://` is expected.
- **A privileged state change** (SSH root login, management URL, deregistration)
gates on the caller identity from `ipcauth.CallerIdentity(ctx)`.
Caller identity comes from the kernel — `SO_PEERCRED`, `LOCAL_PEERCRED`, or the
named-pipe client token — and never from an RPC field. When
`ipcauth.CallerIdentity` reports that it could not determine an identity, **deny**;
do not fall back to treating the caller as the transport peer.
## Agent conventions
### Three networking modes
Where packets actually flow depends on the mode the agent is running in. The
three are not interchangeable, so establish which one a change applies to — and
what it should do in the other two — before you write it.
- **kernel mode** (Linux only): in-kernel WireGuard®. The kernel handles both
peer-to-peer and routed traffic, and ACLs are iptables or nftables rules. The
client programs kernel facilities but never sees the traffic itself.
- **userspace mode** (wireguard-go with a TUN): wireguard-go runs in-process. The
kernel handles peer-to-peer traffic once it leaves the TUN, while routed traffic
— exit nodes and network routes — goes through the userspace forwarder, which
terminates the connection and re-establishes it over OS sockets. Used on
platforms without kernel WireGuard® or when the user opts out.
- **netstack mode**: wireguard-go in-process with no TUN and no kernel
networking. The forwarder does all routing by stitching userspace sockets, and
listeners such as the embedded SSH and DNS servers bind on a gVisor netstack.
Used where the process cannot create a TUN device, such as the embedded client
(`client/embed/`) and the WASM build.
### The overlay interface is not "WireGuard"
Do not put "WireGuard" in identifiers or comments unless the code is genuinely
coupled to WireGuard® specifically — a wireguard-go call, a handshake field, a
kernel WireGuard® netlink attribute. For the interface, the host, peers, or
traffic in general, say "the NetBird interface", "the interface", or "the overlay".
Most firewall, routing, and DNS code is transport-agnostic, so a WireGuard®
reference there is simply inaccurate and rots as the transports change.
### IPv6 is a soft feature
The IPv6 overlay is opt-in dual-stack, and capability can change at runtime. Treat
it as soft rather than a requirement:
- Gate local v6 paths on the interface accessor (`wgIface.Address().HasIPv6()`),
not on raw state fields, and skip the v6 path when the host has no v6 rather
than returning an error.
- Treat an empty or unparseable peer v6 address as "no v6 for that peer" and skip
it, keeping the v4 path working.
- Never let a missing v6 break v4. Fail-closed is for security checks; a
capability mismatch skips the v6 work and carries on.
### Environment variables
Name the variable in a constant and parse booleans with `strconv.ParseBool` rather
than comparing strings inline, so an unexpected value is logged instead of
silently meaning false:
```go
const EnvDisableFeature = "NB_DISABLE_FEATURE"
func isDisabledByEnv() bool {
val := os.Getenv(EnvDisableFeature)
if val == "" {
return false
}
disabled, err := strconv.ParseBool(val)
if err != nil {
log.Warnf("failed to parse %s: %v", EnvDisableFeature, err)
return false
}
return disabled
}
```
### Validating against protocol specs
When a change depends on what a protocol actually mandates, read the specification
text from the [IETF datatracker](https://datatracker.ietf.org/) rather than a
summary, and check that you have the current RFC — the widely cited one for a
protocol is often superseded. Cite the section, not just the document, so a
reviewer can jump straight to the rule.
## Repo-wide principles
1. **Run `go fmt` on every modified Go file.** Formatting is not optional.
2. **Zero unaddressed linter warnings.** Fix what `golangci-lint` reports on code
you touch, and delete imports, helpers, and parameters your refactor orphaned.
Exception: unused parameters in shared code may be consumed by builds outside
this repository — do not remove them, ask instead.
3. **Function comments are mandatory for exported functions**, written as full
sentences with a period, starting with the identifier name.
4. **Prefer private functions and constants.** Export only what a caller outside
the package genuinely needs.
5. **Early returns and guard clauses.** Handle errors and edge cases first
instead of nesting `if`/`else` chains.
6. **Split complex functions.** If a function trips a complexity warning, break
it into named helpers rather than silencing the warning.
7. **Avoid LLM-slop tells:** em dashes, hedging narration, restating the diff in
prose, trailing summaries. Defaults, not absolute bans. Applies to code,
comments, commit messages, and PR descriptions alike.
8. **Concurrency: do a two-pass race analysis after every change** that touches
shared state, including reads of existing maps and slices. Guard them with a
mutex (or an atomic or channel where that fits better), keep critical
sections short, and run `go test -race` on the touched packages. See
[Concurrency and lifecycle](#concurrency-and-lifecycle) for the failure modes
to check for.
9. **Cross-platform builds must keep working.** The agent targets Linux, macOS,
Windows, FreeBSD, Android, and iOS. When you add a platform-specific file,
add the counterpart or a build-tagged fallback for the others.
10. **Never hand-edit generated files.** Change the source and regenerate.
11. **Never log secrets** — private keys, setup keys, tokens, PAT values — and
keep peer IPs and hostnames out of logs above debug level.
## Type safety
**No bare primitives for domain concepts.** A `string` parameter for an account
ID next to a `string` parameter for a peer ID is two bugs waiting to happen,
because the compiler cannot catch the swap. Declare the type once and use it
throughout, converting only at the boundaries where data enters or leaves —
protobuf, gRPC, HTTP, an external library.
```go
type ServiceID string
type AccountID string
// Internal: typed all the way through
func (r *Router) RemoveRoute(host SNIHost, svcID ServiceID) { ... }
// Proto boundary: convert once, on the way in and on the way out
svcID := ServiceID(mapping.GetId())
req.ServiceId = string(svcID)
```
- **IP addresses are `netip.Addr`**, not `string` and not `net.IP`. Parse at the
boundary and pass the typed value inward.
- **Always `Unmap()`** after parsing an address, after converting from `net.IP`,
and after extracting one from `RemoteAddr()`. This normalizes a v4-mapped v6
address (`::ffff:10.1.2.3`) to plain v4 so IPv4 rules match it. A stored or
compared mapped address silently fails to match those rules.
- **Ports are `uint16`** internally; use `int` only where a library forces it and
convert immediately.
- **Enums are a typed string with constants**, so the valid set is discoverable
and a typo fails to compile.
- **Map keys follow the same rule**, and must be a real type (`type ServiceID
string`) rather than an alias (`type serviceID = string`) — an alias silently
accepts bare strings.
## Concurrency and lifecycle
Beyond the mutex hygiene in the principles above, check for these failure
modes.
- **Never read a struct field inside a goroutine** when another goroutine may nil
or reassign it. Pass the value as a parameter, or capture it into a local before
launching. This matters most when `Stop()` nils a field without waiting for the
goroutine to finish.
```go
go func(ifaceName string) { // good: passed in, cannot be nilled underneath
m.Start(ctx, ifaceName)
}(iface.Name())
```
- **Never wait on a channel while holding a lock the sender needs.** Copy what you
need out from under the lock, release it, then wait.
```go
func (m *Manager) Stop() {
m.mu.Lock()
cancel, done := m.cancel, m.done
m.mu.Unlock()
if cancel != nil {
cancel()
<-done
}
}
```
- **`Stop`/`Close` must be idempotent** — guard on an already-stopped flag or a
nil cancel — and must release the state they guarded. Clear maps and caches;
a cancelled goroutine holding a live map still pins that memory. Note that a
nil map only panics on writes; reads and iteration behave like an empty map,
so where post-close use must be rejected, check the stopped flag explicitly.
- **Publish coupled state only after every fallible step succeeds.** When several
fields form an invariant, build them into locals and assign them to the receiver
at the end. Assigning as you go leaves the object half-initialized when a later
step fails, so a readiness predicate reports ready while a coupled field is nil.
If an earlier step already had an external side effect — a created chain, an
opened handle, an inserted rule — roll it back before returning the error.
- **Clean up what you own on constructor error paths.** Once a constructor has
started something, every later error path must undo it: cancel a goroutine and
wait for it to exit, stop a ticker, close a watcher. The object is never
returned, so its `Close` will never run.
- **A failed `Start` must undo everything it started.** When a component brings up
several subsystems in sequence — connection manager, watchers, routing, DNS,
flow, persisted state — a failure partway through has to tear down the ones
already running, not just close the handle the error came from. Put the
already-started guard *before* that teardown path, so a rejected second `Start`
cannot dismantle the one that is running.
## Error handling
Use single-assignment form when the error is only needed inside the `if`:
```go
// Good
if err := someCall(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("context: %w", err)
}
// Bad - unnecessary split
err := someCall()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("context: %w", err)
}
```
Use multiple assignment when the value is needed after the block:
```go
result, err := someCall()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("context: %w", err)
}
```
Add short, meaningful context, and **do not** start `fmt.Errorf` messages with
obvious words like "failed to" or "error":
```go
// Good
return fmt.Errorf("parse remote address: %w", err)
return fmt.Errorf("listen on %s: %w", addr, err)
// Bad
return fmt.Errorf("failed to parse remote address: %w", err)
return fmt.Errorf("error listening on %s: %w", addr, err)
// "failed" is fine in log messages
log.Debugf("failed to parse remote address: %v", err)
```
Skip the wrapping when a function only extracts or delegates and the wrap would
add nothing:
```go
func parseAddr(addr string) (string, int, error) {
host, portStr, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
if err != nil {
return "", 0, err
}
// ...
}
```
Log the errors you choose not to act on:
- `log.Debugf()` for errors that do not affect program flow but help debugging.
- `log.Tracef()` for very verbose errors that would otherwise spam logs.
- **Never ignore** errors from writes, network sends, or critical cleanup.
- Close errors may be ignored for read-only operations; log them at debug for
writes.
**Do not log and return the same error.** It gets reported twice, from two places,
and the second reader cannot tell whether it happened once or twice. Return it and
let the caller decide. The exception is an API handler that has already written a
response. Internal helpers return errors rather than logging and swallowing them.
**Never return a typed nil as an error.** A nil `*MyError` stored in an `error`
interface is not nil, so `err != nil` is true and callers take the failure path on
success. Return the error only where it is actually set:
```go
if _, err := conn.Write(buf); err != nil { // good
return err
}
return nil
```
**Accumulate with `multierror` when an operation should continue past individual
failures** — teardown, cleanup, or setup where partial success is acceptable.
`client/errors.FormatErrorOrNil` returns nil for an empty accumulator, so callers
still see a plain nil on full success:
```go
func (m *Manager) Cleanup() error {
var merr *multierror.Error
for _, r := range m.resources {
if err := r.Close(); err != nil {
merr = multierror.Append(merr, fmt.Errorf("close %s: %w", r.Name, err))
}
}
return nberrors.FormatErrorOrNil(merr)
}
```
| Scenario | Approach | Why |
| --------------------- | --------------------- | ----------------------------------------- |
| Cleanup / teardown | Accumulate | Clean up as much as possible |
| Setup with rollback | Abort on first error | Partial state is invalid; undo what stuck |
| Setup with partial OK | Accumulate | Degraded operation is still useful |
## Comments
Comment the **why**, never the **what**. Default to no comment, and add one only
when a hidden constraint or workaround would surprise a future reader. Never
reference the current task, PR, or your own changes in a comment.
```go
// Bad - trailing comments explaining the obvious
defer localConn.Close() // Close the connection
if err != nil { // Check if error occurred
// Good
defer localConn.Close()
// Good - explains a non-obvious constraint
// Use incremental checksum update per RFC 1624 for performance.
checksum = updateChecksum(checksum, oldPort, newPort)
```
### Length budget
Neither of these is linter-enforced, so they are conventions the surrounding code
mostly follows rather than hard limits:
- **Around 90 characters per line.** Wrap the comment rather than running well past
it.
- **Roughly 250 characters per comment**, about three wrapped lines. Doc comments
on exported identifiers may exceed it when the API genuinely needs the
explanation; inline comments inside a function body rarely should.
The budget is a smell detector, not a rule to game. Do not compress a needed
explanation into cryptic shorthand to fit — if a block of code needs more than
250 characters of prose, the code is doing too much. Fix the code:
- **Extract a named function.** A well-named function replaces the comment: the
name says *what*, the body shows *how*, and the comment you no longer write
was the *what* anyway. Clean Code calls this "explain yourself in code".
- **Extract a named constant or predicate.** `if isExpiredSetupKey(key)` needs
no comment; `if key.ExpiresAt.Before(now) && !key.Revoked && key.UsageLimit > 0`
does.
- **Keep the surviving comment for the why** — the RFC, the kernel quirk, the
ordering constraint. That part is usually one or two lines.
### Long switch and if/else chains
A `switch` whose cases carry multi-line explanations is the usual place this
budget is breached, and the comment is a symptom. In order of preference:
1. **Extract each case body into a named function.** The case becomes one line,
the name carries the meaning, and the switch reads as a table of contents.
2. **Replace the switch with a lookup table** — `map[Kind]handlerFunc` — when the
branches are uniform. Adding a case stops meaning editing a growing function.
3. **Replace conditional with polymorphism** when branches vary by type and the
same switch shape starts appearing in more than one place. Clean Code's rule
of thumb: tolerate a switch statement if it appears **once**, is buried in a
factory that returns an interface, and no other switch dispatches on the same
type. A second switch over the same enum is the signal to introduce the
interface.
Do not restructure a switch purely to satisfy the budget when the cases are one
line each and self-evident — a flat, boring `switch` over an enum is fine and
needs no comments at all.
Explanatory comments in tests are welcome — they document the scenario being set
up, and the 250-character budget does not apply to them.
## Testing
- **Unit tests** live beside the code as `_test.go`. `make test-unit` runs the
host-safe set with `-tags devcert` and no sudo.
- **Privileged tests** carry the `privileged` build tag and mutate host
networking. They run through `make test-privileged`, inside a Docker container
with `NET_ADMIN`. Never bypass that harness by running them directly on the
host.
- **End-to-end suites** live in `e2e/` with a shared harness.
- **Test real behavior, not API existence.** Assert on the observable end state
a consumer would see — bytes that arrived, the packet after translation, the
row after the write — not merely that a method exists or returns an error.
- **Avoid mocks for code we own.** Exercise the real store, manager, or
controller and assert what the caller actually receives.
- **`require` for setup and preconditions, `assert` for the conditions under
test.** Use `require` whenever a later line would panic or be meaningless
otherwise.
- **Message guidance:** optional for `NoError`/`Error`; always give context for
comparison, boolean, and collection assertions.
- **Reproduce a bug before fixing it.** Write the test, watch it fail *for the
reason you expect* — a test that fails for an unrelated reason proves nothing —
then apply the fix and confirm it passes. Add the thin surrounding cases while
you are there.
- **Use `t.Setenv`** rather than `os.Setenv` so the previous value is restored on
cleanup. To test the unset case, call `t.Setenv` first to register the restore,
then `os.Unsetenv`.
- **Prefer `t.Cleanup` over `defer`** in any test with parallel subtests: the
parent function returns, running its `defer`s, while parallel subtests are
still suspended. Sequential subtests finish inside `t.Run`, so `defer` is safe
there, but `t.Cleanup` works in both cases.
- **Explanatory comments in tests are welcome.** Describe the scenario being set
up; the comment budget below does not apply to them.
```go
server, err := StartTestServer()
require.NoError(t, err, "Test server setup must succeed")
defer server.Close()
result, err := client.DoOperation()
assert.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, expectedResult, result, "Result should match expected")
```
## Pitfalls
- **The agent runs as root.** Anything touching routing, firewall, DNS, or the
interface can take a user's machine off the network. Prefer a reversible
change and make sure cleanup runs on every exit path.
- **Management has two account loaders** (GORM and pgx). Adding a relation to an
account often means updating both, or it silently comes back empty in
production.
- **`go test ./...` without `-tags devcert` skips tests** that need the
development certificate. Use `make test-unit`.
- **`make lint` only checks the diff against `origin/main`.** CI runs
`make lint-all`; run it too before pushing a large change.
- **Protos are consumed by released clients.** An old agent must keep working
against a new Management, so fields are added, never renumbered or removed.
- **Windows requires the wintun driver**, and the daemon serves a named pipe
(`npipe://netbird`) rather than loopback TCP. Loopback TCP carries no caller
identity, so privileged operations are refused over it.
## Commits, PRs, releases
- **PR titles must start with a bracketed tag.** Before you propose a title,
**read [`.github/workflows/pr-title-check.yml`](.github/workflows/pr-title-check.yml)
and take the allowed tags from the `allowedTags` array in that file.** It is
the only source of truth, it changes as components are added, and the check
runs on every title edit — a tag that is not in that array is a red build. Do
not rely on a list memorized from anywhere else, including this file.
```text
[client] Authorize daemon IPC callers by their local identity
[management,client] Add MDM policy support
```
Multiple tags are comma-separated inside one pair of brackets. Match the tag
to the component you actually changed, not to the one you read the most.
- **Use the repository's PR template.** Fill in
[`.github/pull_request_template.md`](.github/pull_request_template.md) rather
than replacing it with your own summary: describe the change, link the issue,
tick the checklist honestly (including "ran locally" and "single purpose"),
and complete the documentation section. Do not tick a box you have not
verified, and do not delete rows that do not apply — the docs gate in CI reads
that section and fails when it is missing.
- **Keep the PR description short.** Under 1000 words on top of the template's
own text, and usually far less — a few paragraphs. Reviewers read the diff;
the description exists to explain what the diff cannot say for itself. This is
well below what an agent will produce by default, so cut before you post.
- **Body: why before what.** Lead with the problem and the reason for this
approach, then the shape of the change. No bullet list of files changed, no
per-function walkthrough, no restating the diff in prose, no trailing summary
section, no self-congratulatory closing line.
- **No `Co-Authored-By` or tool-attribution trailers in the PR description**,
and none in commits either. Contributors own their contributions. Whatever
tooling produced the diff, the person opening the PR is its author: they have
read every line, they can explain why it works, they can answer review
questions without going back to a model, and they are accountable for the
consequences of merging it. Do not add a trailer, footer, or description line
that spreads that ownership onto a tool.
- **Commit subjects follow the same `[scope] Subject` convention.** Keep the
subject short, and use the body for why before what. No bullet lists of files
changed.
- **Push review fixes as separate commits.** The PR is squashed on merge, so
there is no reason to rewrite history mid-review; many small commits make the
re-review readable.
- **Do not force-push a branch that is under review.** A force-push detaches
existing review comments from the lines they were written against, destroys
the "changes since your last review" diff a reviewer relies on, and discards
the CI history that showed which commit broke what. Add commits instead —
including for fixups and reverts. Force-push only when there is no
alternative: a rebase to clear a genuine conflict, or removing a secret or a
large binary that was committed by mistake. When you must, ask the user first,
then say so in a PR comment so reviewers know their anchors moved. Never
force-push `main`, and never force-push a branch you do not own.
- **One PR, one purpose.** Split refactors out of fixes and fixes out of
features.
- **Keep the PR small.** Size is the single strongest predictor of how long a PR
waits. Aim for **under ~400 changed lines across under ~20 files**; past
roughly **1000 lines or 50 files** a community PR is likely to be sent back to
be split, or left unreviewed until it is. Large PRs from outside the core team
may be blocked outright when the size was never agreed in the ticket —
reviewing a sprawling change against a privileged networking daemon is a
security risk in itself, not just a time cost.
Judge the size by hand-written code: exclude generated output, `go.sum`,
vendored files, and test fixtures from the estimate, but do not use their
presence to argue a 3000-line PR is small.
When a change genuinely cannot be small — a protocol migration, a
cross-component rename — agree the split in the ticket **before** writing
code, and land it as a sequence of PRs that each build, test, and make sense
on their own. Propose that split to the user rather than opening one large PR
and hoping.
Prefer GitHub's stacked pull requests for such a sequence, rather than
hand-managing base branches: open each PR against the branch below it instead of
`main`, so every PR's diff shows only its own change. Merging a layer retargets
the PRs above it, and branch protections and required checks on the base branch
still apply to each one.
- **User-facing changes need a docs PR** in
[netbirdio/docs](https://github.com/netbirdio/docs), linked from the PR
description.
## After you push: CI and review bots
Opening the PR is not the end of the task. Watch the run, read what the bots
say, and drive the PR to green before you report the work as done.
```bash
gh pr checks <pr> --watch # all checks, live
gh run view <run-id> --log-failed # only the failing steps
gh pr view <pr> --comments # bot and human review comments
```
**Never report a change as finished while checks are pending or red**, and never
describe a red PR as passing. If you ran out of turn before CI finished, say
which checks were still running.
### The checks
- **Go tests** — `golang-test-{linux,darwin,windows,freebsd}.yml`, sharded per
component. A failure in a component you did not touch is usually a real
interaction, not noise; read the log before assuming flake.
- **golangci-lint** — `golangci-lint.yml` runs the full repository, while
`make lint` only checks your diff. A clean local lint does not guarantee green
CI on a large change.
- **PR Title Check** — `pr-title-check.yml`, see above.
- **Codecov** — uploaded from the Linux test workflow with per-component flags
(`unit,client`, `unit,management`, `unit,relay`, `unit,proxy`, `unit,signal`,
`integration,management`). Coverage on new code should not go backwards. Add
tests for the paths you introduced; do not adjust thresholds or exclude files
to clear the report.
- **CodeRabbit** — configured in [`.coderabbit.yaml`](.coderabbit.yaml): `chill`
profile, auto-review on every non-draft PR, TypeScript/JavaScript/SVG paths
filtered out. Chat auto-reply is on, so `@coderabbitai` in a comment reaches
it.
- **SonarCloud** — project `netbirdio_netbird`, quality gate on new code (bugs,
vulnerabilities, code smells, duplication, coverage).
- **Snyk** — dependency and code scanning.
Sonar and Snyk report as GitHub App checks rather than workflows in this
repository, so their detail lives on the PR check, not in the Actions logs.
### Handling bot findings
- **Read every comment and act on it.** Either fix it, or reply with the reason
it does not apply. Do not bulk-resolve threads to clear the count, and do not
silently ignore a finding because the check is advisory.
- **Bots are frequently wrong here.** NetBird has privileged, platform-specific,
and concurrency-heavy code that static analysis reads poorly. A confident
CodeRabbit or Sonar comment can still be nonsense. Verify the claim against
the code before you change anything — never edit correct code just to silence
a bot.
- **Security findings get the opposite default.** For a Snyk or Sonar
vulnerability, or a CodeRabbit comment about authentication, authorization,
certificate verification, or key handling, assume it is real until you have
disproved it. Surface it to the user rather than dismissing it yourself.
- **A new vulnerable dependency is a stop.** Bumping or replacing dependencies
needs the user's decision, as above.
- **Never change a workflow, threshold, lint exclusion, or bot config to make a
check pass.** If a check is genuinely wrong, say so and let the user decide.
- **Do not paper over flakes with blind re-runs.** Identify the failure first. If
it is a known flake, name it; if you cannot tell, report it as unresolved
rather than re-running until it goes green.
## Discussion and support
- Discussions: <https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/discussions>
- Slack: <https://docs.netbird.io/slack-url>
- Docs: <https://docs.netbird.io>
- Security: <https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/security/policy> — never in public
- Contribution process: [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md)

View File

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
See [AGENTS.md](AGENTS.md) for the agent guidelines in this repository.

View File

@@ -66,41 +66,11 @@ Typical bug fixes, internal refactors, documentation updates, and tests do not
need a design discussion, but should still be tied to an issue so the work is
visible and nobody duplicates it.
### Using AI coding agents
We have no policy for or against using an AI agent to write NetBird code. That
choice is yours, and we are not going to interrogate anyone about their tools.
What we do have is a lot of incoming contributions that were plainly drafted with
one, and enough experience reviewing them to see the same avoidable problems
again and again: no ticket behind the change, a diff far too large to review, a
description longer than the code it describes, an approach that was never going
to be accepted, and an author who cannot answer questions about their own PR.
None of that is caused by the tooling — it is what happens when a tool is pointed
at a repository whose expectations it has never been told.
So rather than a rule, there is a guide. [AGENTS.md](AGENTS.md) restates the
expectations from this document in the form agents read automatically
(`CLAUDE.md` points to it), so pointing your tool at the repository is usually
enough. Among other things it tells the agent to ask you for the
discussion or issue before drafting a PR, to keep the change small and
single-purpose, to run the tests locally, to use this repository's PR template
and title tags, and to write a description a reviewer can get through.
The guardrails are the point, and they are the same ones we apply to everyone: an
agreed ticket, a change you have actually run, a diff small enough to review with
care, and an author who can explain it. Whatever wrote the diff, you are its
author — you own every line you submit and the consequences of opening a PR with it.
We may assess whether a contribution is maintainable and whether its merged code
aligns with our security standards and design expectations.
## Contents
- [Contributing to NetBird](#contributing-to-netbird)
- [Ticket first, PR second](#ticket-first-pr-second)
- [High-risk areas](#high-risk-areas)
- [Using AI coding agents](#using-ai-coding-agents)
- [Contents](#contents)
- [Code of conduct](#code-of-conduct)
- [Directory structure](#directory-structure)
@@ -112,7 +82,6 @@ aligns with our security standards and design expectations.
- [Test suite](#test-suite)
- [Checklist before submitting a PR](#checklist-before-submitting-a-pr)
- [When we close a PR](#when-we-close-a-pr)
- [Translations](#translations)
- [Other project repositories](#other-project-repositories)
- [Contributor License Agreement](#contributor-license-agreement)
@@ -613,17 +582,6 @@ A closed PR is not a rejected idea. Take it back to the
[discussion](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/discussions), settle the
approach, and reopen the work from there.
## Translations
Desktop UI translations are not contributed through pull requests. Translate on
[Crowdin](https://crowdin.com/project/netbird) instead: no ticket needed, just
join the project and pick your language. Crowdin syncs with this repository and
opens the service PRs itself, so hand-edited locale files would conflict with
the next sync. Style, terminology, and review guidance live in
[client/ui/i18n/TRANSLATING.md](client/ui/i18n/TRANSLATING.md). To request a
language the project does not offer yet, ask on the Crowdin project page or in
a [discussion](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/discussions).
## Other project repositories
NetBird project is composed of 3 main repositories:

View File

@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ import (
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
nbAnonymize "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/anonymize"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/device"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/debug"
@@ -33,13 +32,6 @@ import (
types "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/upload-server/types"
)
// AnonymizeLevelDefault and AnonymizeLevelStrict are the accepted
// anonymizeLevel values for DebugBundle.
const (
AnonymizeLevelDefault = nbAnonymize.LevelDefaultString
AnonymizeLevelStrict = nbAnonymize.LevelStrictString
)
// ConnectionListener export internal Listener for mobile
type ConnectionListener interface {
peer.Listener
@@ -65,12 +57,6 @@ type DnsReadyListener interface {
dns.ReadyListener
}
// TunSettings is a snapshot of the settings the TUN device is rebuilt with
type TunSettings struct {
Routes string
SearchDomains string
}
func init() {
formatter.SetLogcatFormatter(log.StandardLogger())
}
@@ -90,8 +76,6 @@ type Client struct {
connectClient *internal.ConnectClient
config *profilemanager.Config
cacheDir string
// Identifies the running profile for the SSO login hint; see profile_state.go.
cfgPath string
stateChangeMu sync.Mutex
stateChangeSubID string
@@ -112,12 +96,11 @@ type Client struct {
extendCancel context.CancelFunc
}
func (c *Client) setState(cfg *profilemanager.Config, cacheDir string, cfgPath string, cc *internal.ConnectClient) {
func (c *Client) setState(cfg *profilemanager.Config, cacheDir string, cc *internal.ConnectClient) {
c.stateMu.Lock()
defer c.stateMu.Unlock()
c.config = cfg
c.cacheDir = cacheDir
c.cfgPath = cfgPath
c.connectClient = cc
}
@@ -127,16 +110,6 @@ func (c *Client) stateSnapshot() (*profilemanager.Config, string, *internal.Conn
return c.config, c.cacheDir, c.connectClient
}
// authSnapshot returns the config together with the path it was loaded from, in
// one lock: the path identifies the profile whose account email backs the login
// hint, so reading it separately could pair one profile's config with another's
// hint when a profile switch lands in between.
func (c *Client) authSnapshot() (*profilemanager.Config, string, *internal.ConnectClient) {
c.stateMu.RLock()
defer c.stateMu.RUnlock()
return c.config, c.cfgPath, c.connectClient
}
func (c *Client) getConnectClient() *internal.ConnectClient {
c.stateMu.RLock()
defer c.stateMu.RUnlock()
@@ -189,7 +162,7 @@ func (c *Client) Run(platformFiles PlatformFiles, urlOpener URLOpener, isAndroid
defer c.ctxCancel()
c.ctxCancelLock.Unlock()
auth := NewAuthWithConfig(ctx, cfg, cfgFile)
auth := NewAuthWithConfig(ctx, cfg)
err = auth.login(urlOpener, isAndroidTV)
if err != nil {
return err
@@ -197,7 +170,7 @@ func (c *Client) Run(platformFiles PlatformFiles, urlOpener URLOpener, isAndroid
// todo do not throw error in case of cancelled context
ctx = internal.CtxInitState(ctx)
connectClient := internal.NewConnectClient(ctx, cfg, c.recorder)
c.setState(cfg, cacheDir, cfgFile, connectClient)
c.setState(cfg, cacheDir, connectClient)
// This path runs the interactive SSO flow, so reaching here means the peer
// is authenticated again — release the latch Status() reports from. Clear
// only once the fresh connect client is installed: until then Status()
@@ -238,7 +211,7 @@ func (c *Client) RunWithoutLogin(platformFiles PlatformFiles, dns *DNSList, dnsR
// todo do not throw error in case of cancelled context
ctx = internal.CtxInitState(ctx)
connectClient := internal.NewConnectClient(ctx, cfg, c.recorder)
c.setState(cfg, cacheDir, cfgFile, connectClient)
c.setState(cfg, cacheDir, connectClient)
return connectClient.RunOnAndroid(c.tunAdapter, c.iFaceDiscover, c.networkChangeListener, slices.Clone(dns.items), dnsReadyListener, stateFile, cacheDir)
}
@@ -267,29 +240,9 @@ func (c *Client) RenewTun(fd int) error {
return e.RenewTun(fd)
}
func (c *Client) GetTunSettings() (*TunSettings, error) {
cc := c.getConnectClient()
if cc == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("engine not running")
}
e := cc.Engine()
if e == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("engine not initialized")
}
routes, searchDomains := e.TunSettings()
return &TunSettings{
Routes: strings.Join(routes, ";"),
SearchDomains: strings.Join(searchDomains, ";"),
}, nil
}
// DebugBundle generates a debug bundle, uploads it, and returns the upload key.
// It works both with and without a running engine. anonymizeLevel is "default"
// or "strict"; strict also anonymizes internal IP ranges, peer names, and
// WireGuard public keys, and implies anonymize.
func (c *Client) DebugBundle(platformFiles PlatformFiles, anonymize bool, anonymizeLevel string) (string, error) {
// It works both with and without a running engine.
func (c *Client) DebugBundle(platformFiles PlatformFiles, anonymize bool) (string, error) {
cfg, cacheDir, cc := c.stateSnapshot()
// If the engine hasn't been started, load config from disk
@@ -308,7 +261,6 @@ func (c *Client) DebugBundle(platformFiles PlatformFiles, anonymize bool, anonym
InternalConfig: cfg,
StatusRecorder: c.recorder,
TempDir: cacheDir,
StatePath: platformFiles.StateFilePath(),
}
if cc != nil {
@@ -332,7 +284,6 @@ func (c *Client) DebugBundle(platformFiles PlatformFiles, anonymize bool, anonym
deps,
debug.BundleConfig{
Anonymize: anonymize,
AnonymizeLevel: nbAnonymize.ParseLevel(anonymizeLevel),
IncludeSystemInfo: true,
},
)

View File

@@ -4,8 +4,6 @@ import (
"context"
"fmt"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/auth"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/system"
@@ -38,20 +36,12 @@ type Auth struct {
}
// NewAuth instantiate Auth struct and validate the management URL
//
// The configuration at cfgPath is reused when one is already there, and only created when it is
// not. Building a fresh in-memory config unconditionally gives the client a new WireGuard key on
// every call: the peer registers under that key, the key is written out, and any peer registered by
// an earlier call is orphaned on the server. It also breaks a client that enrols and then runs from
// the persisted config, because the identity it registered is not the one it runs with — the
// management stream rejects it with "no peer auth method provided".
func NewAuth(cfgPath string, mgmURL string) (*Auth, error) {
inputCfg := profilemanager.ConfigInput{
ConfigPath: cfgPath,
ManagementURL: mgmURL,
}
cfg, err := profilemanager.UpdateOrCreateConfig(inputCfg)
cfg, err := profilemanager.CreateInMemoryConfig(inputCfg)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -63,14 +53,11 @@ func NewAuth(cfgPath string, mgmURL string) (*Auth, error) {
}, nil
}
// NewAuthWithConfig instantiate Auth based on existing config. cfgPath is the
// file the config was loaded from; it identifies the profile whose account email
// backs the login_hint.
func NewAuthWithConfig(ctx context.Context, config *profilemanager.Config, cfgPath string) *Auth {
// NewAuthWithConfig instantiate Auth based on existing config
func NewAuthWithConfig(ctx context.Context, config *profilemanager.Config) *Auth {
return &Auth{
ctx: ctx,
config: config,
cfgPath: cfgPath,
ctx: ctx,
config: config,
}
}
@@ -163,14 +150,12 @@ func (a *Auth) login(urlOpener URLOpener, isAndroidTV bool) error {
}
jwtToken := ""
email := ""
if needsLogin {
tokenInfo, err := a.foregroundGetTokenInfo(authClient, urlOpener, isAndroidTV)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("interactive sso login failed: %v", err)
}
jwtToken = tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse()
email = tokenInfo.Email
}
err, _ = authClient.Login(a.ctx, "", jwtToken)
@@ -178,42 +163,17 @@ func (a *Auth) login(urlOpener URLOpener, isAndroidTV bool) error {
return fmt.Errorf("login failed: %v", err)
}
// Stored after Login, not before: a rejected token must not leave a hint
// pointing at an account that cannot be used.
if email != "" && a.cfgPath != "" {
if err := writeProfileEmail(a.cfgPath, email); err != nil {
log.Warnf("failed to store profile account email: %v", err)
}
}
go urlOpener.OnLoginSuccess()
return nil
}
// loginHintSetter is implemented by both concrete flows (PKCE and device code)
// but absent from the OAuthFlow interface, hence the assertion below — the same
// way internal/auth wires it in authenticateWithPKCEFlow.
type loginHintSetter interface {
SetLoginHint(hint string)
}
func (a *Auth) foregroundGetTokenInfo(authClient *auth.Auth, urlOpener URLOpener, isAndroidTV bool) (*auth.TokenInfo, error) {
oAuthFlow, err := authClient.GetOAuthFlow(a.ctx, isAndroidTV)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get OAuth flow: %v", err)
}
// An empty hint is deliberate, not a fallback: a fresh or logged-out profile
// leaves the choice to the IdP, which is how accounts get switched.
if a.cfgPath != "" {
if hint := readProfileEmail(a.cfgPath); hint != "" {
if setter, ok := oAuthFlow.(loginHintSetter); ok {
setter.SetLoginHint(hint)
}
}
}
flowInfo, err := oAuthFlow.RequestAuthInfo(context.TODO())
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("getting a request OAuth flow info failed: %v", err)

View File

@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
package android
import (
"path/filepath"
"testing"
)
// NewAuth must reuse the configuration already at cfgPath rather than building a fresh one.
//
// Creating a new in-memory config on every call gives the client a new WireGuard private key each
// time. The peer registers under that key and the key is written out, so a peer registered by an
// earlier call is orphaned on the server — a client that enrols twice leaves two entries and owns
// neither. It also breaks enrol-then-run: RunWithoutLogin reloads the configuration from disk, so
// the identity that registered is not the identity that runs, and the management stream rejects it
// with "no peer auth method provided, please use a setup key or interactive SSO login".
func TestNewAuth_ReusesPersistedIdentity(t *testing.T) {
cfgPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
first, err := NewAuth(cfgPath, "https://api.example.com:443")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("first NewAuth: %v", err)
}
if first.config.PrivateKey == "" {
t.Fatal("first NewAuth produced no private key")
}
second, err := NewAuth(cfgPath, "https://api.example.com:443")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("second NewAuth: %v", err)
}
if second.config.PrivateKey != first.config.PrivateKey {
t.Errorf("private key changed between calls: a second enrolment would orphan the peer registered by the first")
}
}
// A missing configuration is still created, so a first enrolment works unchanged.
func TestNewAuth_CreatesConfigWhenAbsent(t *testing.T) {
cfgPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "config.json")
auth, err := NewAuth(cfgPath, "https://api.example.com:443")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewAuth: %v", err)
}
if auth.config == nil || auth.config.PrivateKey == "" {
t.Fatal("NewAuth did not create a usable configuration")
}
if auth.cfgPath != cfgPath {
t.Errorf("cfgPath = %q, want %q", auth.cfgPath, cfgPath)
}
}

View File

@@ -13,17 +13,18 @@ import (
)
const (
// Android-specific config filename (different from desktop default.json)
defaultConfigFilename = "netbird.cfg"
// Subdirectory for non-default profiles (must match Java Preferences.java)
profilesSubdir = "profiles"
// Android uses a single user context per app (non-empty username required by ServiceManager)
androidUsername = "android"
)
// Profile represents a profile for gomobile
type Profile struct {
ID string
Name string
// Email is the account this profile last logged in with, "" if it never
// completed an SSO login or was logged out. See profile_state.go.
Email string
ID string
Name string
IsActive bool
}
@@ -100,7 +101,6 @@ func (pm *ProfileManager) ListProfiles() (*ProfileArray, error) {
profiles = append(profiles, &Profile{
ID: p.ID.String(),
Name: p.Name,
Email: pm.profileEmail(p.ID.String()),
IsActive: p.IsActive,
})
}
@@ -123,22 +123,7 @@ func (pm *ProfileManager) GetActiveProfile() (*Profile, error) {
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to resolve active profile %q: %w", activeState.ID, err)
}
return &Profile{
ID: prof.ID.String(),
Name: prof.Name,
Email: pm.profileEmail(prof.ID.String()),
IsActive: true,
}, nil
}
// profileEmail returns the account email recorded for a profile. Display-only, so
// an unresolvable path degrades to "" rather than an error.
func (pm *ProfileManager) profileEmail(id string) string {
configPath, err := pm.getProfileConfigPath(id)
if err != nil {
return ""
}
return readProfileEmail(configPath)
return &Profile{ID: prof.ID.String(), Name: prof.Name, IsActive: true}, nil
}
// SwitchProfile switches to a different profile
@@ -200,11 +185,6 @@ func (pm *ProfileManager) LogoutProfile(id string) error {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to save config: %w", err)
}
// Not fatal: a stale hint costs an account switch, not the logout itself.
if err := removeProfileEmail(configPath); err != nil {
log.Warnf("failed to clear stored account email for profile %s: %v", id, err)
}
log.Infof("logged out from profile: %s", id)
return nil
}

View File

@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
package android
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
)
const (
// Android-specific config filename (different from desktop default.json)
defaultConfigFilename = "netbird.cfg"
// Subdirectory for non-default profiles (must match Java Preferences.java)
profilesSubdir = "profiles"
// profileAccountSuffix names the file holding the profile's account email.
// Deliberately not ".state.json", which desktop uses for the same data:
// there the email and the engine's state manager live in different
// directories, but on Android both resolve under files/, so sharing the name
// would have the two overwrite each other — the state manager rewrites the
// whole file from its own keys (see statemanager.Manager.PersistState), and
// this package's writer does the same in reverse.
profileAccountSuffix = ".account.json"
)
// profileAccountPathFor derives the account file path from a profile's config
// path: netbird.cfg -> netbird.account.json, <id>.json -> <id>.account.json.
//
// Deriving from the config path rather than resolving the active profile keeps
// the write on the profile the login actually ran for: Auth.login runs in a
// goroutine, so the active profile can change under a flow already in flight.
func profileAccountPathFor(configPath string) (string, error) {
if configPath == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("empty config path")
}
base := filepath.Base(configPath)
stem := strings.TrimSuffix(base, filepath.Ext(base))
if stem == "" || stem == "." {
return "", fmt.Errorf("config path %q has no filename stem", configPath)
}
return filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(configPath), stem+profileAccountSuffix), nil
}
// readProfileEmail returns the account email stored for the profile whose config
// lives at configPath. A missing or unreadable file yields "", which leaves the
// account choice to the IdP.
func readProfileEmail(configPath string) string {
accountPath, err := profileAccountPathFor(configPath)
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("no profile account path for login hint: %v", err)
return ""
}
var state profilemanager.ProfileState
if _, err := util.ReadJson(accountPath, &state); err != nil {
if !os.IsNotExist(err) {
log.Debugf("failed to read profile account for login hint: %v", err)
}
return ""
}
return state.Email
}
// writeProfileEmail records the account email for the profile whose config lives
// at configPath, so later logins can pass it as an OIDC login_hint. An empty
// email is ignored rather than blanking what is already stored.
func writeProfileEmail(configPath string, email string) error {
if email == "" {
return nil
}
accountPath, err := profileAccountPathFor(configPath)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("resolve profile account path: %w", err)
}
state := profilemanager.ProfileState{Email: email}
if err := util.WriteJsonWithRestrictedPermission(context.Background(), accountPath, state); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write profile account: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// removeProfileEmail drops the stored account email. Called on logout: while the
// email is on disk it goes out as a login_hint, which would steer the next login
// straight back into the account just logged out of. Mirrors the desktop UI's
// RemoveProfileState call.
func removeProfileEmail(configPath string) error {
accountPath, err := profileAccountPathFor(configPath)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("resolve profile account path: %w", err)
}
if err := os.Remove(accountPath); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
return fmt.Errorf("remove profile account: %w", err)
}
return nil
}

View File

@@ -1,161 +0,0 @@
package android
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"testing"
)
func TestProfileAccountPathFor(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
configPath string
want string
wantErr bool
}{
{
name: "default profile",
configPath: "/data/data/io.netbird.client/files/netbird.cfg",
want: filepath.FromSlash("/data/data/io.netbird.client/files/netbird.account.json"),
},
{
name: "id profile",
configPath: "/data/data/io.netbird.client/files/profiles/4c5f5c8198c3989cffb5b5394f5a7ae0.json",
want: filepath.FromSlash("/data/data/io.netbird.client/files/profiles/4c5f5c8198c3989cffb5b5394f5a7ae0.account.json"),
},
{
name: "legacy name-keyed profile is handled the same way",
configPath: "/data/data/io.netbird.client/files/profiles/work.json",
want: filepath.FromSlash("/data/data/io.netbird.client/files/profiles/work.account.json"),
},
{
name: "empty path is rejected",
configPath: "",
wantErr: true,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got, err := profileAccountPathFor(tt.configPath)
if tt.wantErr {
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected an error, got path %q", got)
}
return
}
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("got %q, want %q", got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestProfileAccountPathForDefaultDoesNotCollide(t *testing.T) {
root := "/data/data/io.netbird.client/files"
defaultAccount, err := profileAccountPathFor(filepath.Join(root, defaultConfigFilename))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("default profile: %v", err)
}
idAccount, err := profileAccountPathFor(filepath.Join(root, profilesSubdir, "abc123.json"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("id profile: %v", err)
}
if defaultAccount == idAccount {
t.Fatalf("default and id profile share an account file: %q", defaultAccount)
}
}
// The account file must never land on the engine state file: on Android both
// resolve under files/, and the state manager rewrites the whole file from its
// own keys, so sharing a path would have the two overwrite each other. The
// expected names here mirror ProfileManager.GetStateFilePath.
func TestProfileAccountPathAvoidsEngineStateFile(t *testing.T) {
root := "/data/data/io.netbird.client/files"
cases := []struct {
configPath string
engineState string
}{
{
configPath: filepath.Join(root, defaultConfigFilename),
engineState: filepath.Join(root, "state.json"),
},
{
configPath: filepath.Join(root, profilesSubdir, "abc123.json"),
engineState: filepath.Join(root, profilesSubdir, "abc123.state.json"),
},
}
for _, c := range cases {
account, err := profileAccountPathFor(c.configPath)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("%s: %v", c.configPath, err)
}
if account == c.engineState {
t.Errorf("account file collides with the engine state file: %q", account)
}
}
}
func TestWriteThenReadProfileEmail(t *testing.T) {
configPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "profiles", "abc123.json")
if err := ensureDirFor(t, configPath); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("prepare dir: %v", err)
}
if got := readProfileEmail(configPath); got != "" {
t.Errorf("expected no email before a login, got %q", got)
}
const email = "user@example.com"
if err := writeProfileEmail(configPath, email); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
}
if got := readProfileEmail(configPath); got != email {
t.Errorf("got %q, want %q", got, email)
}
if err := removeProfileEmail(configPath); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("remove: %v", err)
}
if got := readProfileEmail(configPath); got != "" {
t.Errorf("expected no email after logout, got %q", got)
}
// Logout may run on a never-logged-in profile, so a second remove must pass.
if err := removeProfileEmail(configPath); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("second remove should be a no-op: %v", err)
}
}
func TestWriteProfileEmailIgnoresEmpty(t *testing.T) {
configPath := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "profiles", "abc123.json")
if err := ensureDirFor(t, configPath); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("prepare dir: %v", err)
}
const email = "user@example.com"
if err := writeProfileEmail(configPath, email); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
}
if err := writeProfileEmail(configPath, ""); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write empty: %v", err)
}
if got := readProfileEmail(configPath); got != email {
t.Errorf("empty write clobbered the stored email: got %q, want %q", got, email)
}
}
func ensureDirFor(t *testing.T, path string) error {
t.Helper()
return os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(path), 0o700)
}

View File

@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ func (c *Client) endExtend() {
}
func (c *Client) extendAuthSession(ctx context.Context, urlOpener URLOpener, isAndroidTV bool) error {
cfg, cfgPath, cc := c.authSnapshot()
cfg, _, cc := c.stateSnapshot()
if cfg == nil || cc == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("engine is not running")
}
@@ -293,10 +293,7 @@ func (c *Client) extendAuthSession(ctx context.Context, urlOpener URLOpener, isA
}
defer authClient.Close()
// Passing the config path makes the flow pick up the login_hint: an extend
// renews the session of the account already signed in, so it must not stop to
// offer a choice.
a := NewAuthWithConfig(ctx, cfg, cfgPath)
a := &Auth{ctx: ctx, config: cfg}
tokenInfo, err := a.foregroundGetTokenInfo(authClient, urlOpener, isAndroidTV)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("interactive sso login failed: %v", err)

View File

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package anonymize
import (
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/base64"
"fmt"
"math/big"
"net"
@@ -16,88 +15,13 @@ import (
const anonTLD = ".domain"
// Level selects how much the anonymizer redacts. Levels are ordered: a higher
// level redacts strictly more. On the wire (protos, flags) levels travel as
// their string form.
type Level int
const (
// LevelDefault anonymizes public IP addresses, IPv6 ULA, domains, and MAC
// addresses. Internal IPv4 ranges (RFC 1918, CGNAT, link-local) are
// preserved so support can reason about the real topology.
LevelDefault Level = iota
// LevelStrict additionally anonymizes internal IP ranges, peer names, and
// WireGuard public keys.
LevelStrict
)
// LevelDefaultString and LevelStrictString are the wire forms of the levels,
// for boundaries that pass levels as strings (flags, protos, mobile bindings).
const (
LevelDefaultString = "default"
LevelStrictString = "strict"
)
// ParseLevel maps s to a Level. Empty means LevelDefault; anything
// unrecognized maps to LevelStrict so an unknown request never yields less
// anonymization than intended.
func ParseLevel(s string) Level {
switch strings.ToLower(s) {
case "", LevelDefaultString:
return LevelDefault
default:
return LevelStrict
}
}
// String returns the wire form of the level: "default" or "strict".
func (l Level) String() string {
if l >= LevelStrict {
return LevelStrictString
}
return LevelDefaultString
}
// protectedDomains are NetBird-operated suffixes that stay recognizable in an
// anonymized bundle. At LevelStrict the labels in front of them (the peer
// name) are still replaced, except under netbird.io, which only hosts
// NetBird infrastructure (api, signal, flow), never peer names.
var protectedDomains = []string{"netbird.io", "netbird.selfhosted", "netbird.cloud", "netbird.stage"}
const infraDomain = "netbird.io"
var (
macColonRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`\b[0-9a-fA-F]{2}(?::[0-9a-fA-F]{2}){5}\b`)
macDashRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`\b[0-9a-fA-F]{2}(?:-[0-9a-fA-F]{2}){5}\b`)
wgKeyRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`\b[A-Za-z0-9+/]{43}=`)
)
type Anonymizer struct {
ipAnonymizer map[netip.Addr]netip.Addr
domainAnonymizer map[string]string
// domainOrder caches the keys of domainAnonymizer sorted longest-first
// for AnonymizeString; it is rebuilt when the map gains entries.
domainOrder []string
labelAnonymizer map[string]string
labelAnonymized map[string]struct{}
labelCounter uint32
macAnonymizer map[string]string
macCounter uint32
wgKeyAnonymizer map[string]string
wgKeyAnonymized map[string]struct{}
currentAnonIPv4 netip.Addr
currentAnonIPv6 netip.Addr
startAnonIPv4 netip.Addr
startAnonIPv6 netip.Addr
// LevelStrict also anonymizes internal ranges (RFC 1918, CGNAT,
// link-local), replacing them from the dedicated internal pools below so
// a reader can still tell an internal address from a public one.
level Level
currentAnonInternalIPv4 netip.Addr
currentAnonInternalIPv6 netip.Addr
startAnonInternalIPv4 netip.Addr
startAnonInternalIPv6 netip.Addr
currentAnonIPv4 netip.Addr
currentAnonIPv6 netip.Addr
startAnonIPv4 netip.Addr
startAnonIPv6 netip.Addr
domainKeyRegex *regexp.Regexp
}
@@ -108,50 +32,25 @@ func DefaultAddresses() (netip.Addr, netip.Addr) {
return netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{198, 51, 100, 0}), netip.MustParseAddr("2001:db8:ffff::")
}
// InternalAddresses returns the pool starts used in strict mode for internal
// ranges. Both are reserved ranges that cannot collide with real addressing:
// 198.18.0.0 (RFC 2544 benchmarking), 2001:db8:1:: (RFC 3849 documentation).
func InternalAddresses() (netip.Addr, netip.Addr) {
return netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{198, 18, 0, 0}), netip.MustParseAddr("2001:db8:1::")
}
func NewAnonymizer(startIPv4, startIPv6 netip.Addr) *Anonymizer {
internalIPv4, internalIPv6 := InternalAddresses()
return &Anonymizer{
ipAnonymizer: map[netip.Addr]netip.Addr{},
domainAnonymizer: map[string]string{},
labelAnonymizer: map[string]string{},
labelAnonymized: map[string]struct{}{},
macAnonymizer: map[string]string{},
wgKeyAnonymizer: map[string]string{},
wgKeyAnonymized: map[string]struct{}{},
currentAnonIPv4: startIPv4,
currentAnonIPv6: startIPv6,
startAnonIPv4: startIPv4,
startAnonIPv6: startIPv6,
level: LevelDefault,
currentAnonInternalIPv4: internalIPv4,
currentAnonInternalIPv6: internalIPv6,
startAnonInternalIPv4: internalIPv4,
startAnonInternalIPv6: internalIPv6,
domainKeyRegex: regexp.MustCompile(`\bdomain=([^\s,:"]+)`),
}
}
// SetLevel selects the anonymization level. The zero value of a new
// Anonymizer is LevelDefault.
func (a *Anonymizer) SetLevel(level Level) {
a.level = level
}
func (a *Anonymizer) AnonymizeIP(ip netip.Addr) netip.Addr {
// Normalize 4-in-6 addresses so ::ffff:192.168.1.1 classifies and maps
// like 192.168.1.1.
ip = ip.Unmap()
if ip.IsLoopback() ||
ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() ||
ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() ||
ip.IsInterfaceLocalMulticast() ||
(ip.Is4() && ip.IsPrivate()) ||
ip.IsUnspecified() ||
ip.IsMulticast() ||
isWellKnown(ip) ||
@@ -160,100 +59,18 @@ func (a *Anonymizer) AnonymizeIP(ip netip.Addr) netip.Addr {
return ip
}
if isInternal(ip) && a.level < LevelStrict {
return ip
}
if _, ok := a.ipAnonymizer[ip]; !ok {
a.ipAnonymizer[ip] = a.nextAnonIP(ip)
if ip.Is4() {
a.ipAnonymizer[ip] = a.currentAnonIPv4
a.currentAnonIPv4 = a.currentAnonIPv4.Next()
} else {
a.ipAnonymizer[ip] = a.currentAnonIPv6
a.currentAnonIPv6 = a.currentAnonIPv6.Next()
}
}
return a.ipAnonymizer[ip]
}
func (a *Anonymizer) nextAnonIP(ip netip.Addr) netip.Addr {
// At the strict level, internal addresses (including IPv6 ULA, matched
// by IsPrivate) come from the internal pools so they remain recognizable
// as internal without disclosing the real values.
if a.level >= LevelStrict && (isInternal(ip) || ip.IsPrivate()) {
if ip.Is4() {
anon := a.currentAnonInternalIPv4
a.currentAnonInternalIPv4 = a.currentAnonInternalIPv4.Next()
return anon
}
anon := a.currentAnonInternalIPv6
a.currentAnonInternalIPv6 = a.currentAnonInternalIPv6.Next()
return anon
}
if ip.Is4() {
anon := a.currentAnonIPv4
a.currentAnonIPv4 = a.currentAnonIPv4.Next()
return anon
}
anon := a.currentAnonIPv6
a.currentAnonIPv6 = a.currentAnonIPv6.Next()
return anon
}
// AnonymizeMAC replaces a MAC address with a consistent placeholder from the
// locally administered range starting at 02:00:00:00:00:01, at every
// anonymization level. Broadcast, multicast, all-zero, and already assigned
// placeholder addresses are preserved. The colon and dash spellings of the
// same address share one placeholder; the output keeps the input's separator.
func (a *Anonymizer) AnonymizeMAC(mac string) string {
hw, err := net.ParseMAC(mac)
if err != nil || len(hw) != 6 {
return mac
}
if isWellKnownMAC(hw) || a.isAnonymizedMAC(hw) {
return mac
}
key := hw.String()
anon, ok := a.macAnonymizer[key]
if !ok {
a.macCounter++
anon = fmt.Sprintf("02:00:00:%02x:%02x:%02x", byte(a.macCounter>>16), byte(a.macCounter>>8), byte(a.macCounter))
a.macAnonymizer[key] = anon
}
if strings.Contains(mac, "-") {
anon = strings.ReplaceAll(anon, ":", "-")
}
return anon
}
// isAnonymizedMAC reports whether hw is a placeholder this anonymizer already
// handed out, so a second pass over anonymized output leaves it unchanged.
func (a *Anonymizer) isAnonymizedMAC(hw net.HardwareAddr) bool {
if hw[0] != 0x02 || hw[1] != 0 || hw[2] != 0 {
return false
}
value := uint32(hw[3])<<16 | uint32(hw[4])<<8 | uint32(hw[5])
return value <= a.macCounter
}
// AnonymizeWGKey replaces a WireGuard public key with a consistent random
// placeholder of the same shape. Keys are only anonymized at LevelStrict;
// placeholders already handed out pass through unchanged.
func (a *Anonymizer) AnonymizeWGKey(key string) string {
if a.level < LevelStrict || !looksLikeWGKey(key) {
return key
}
if _, ok := a.wgKeyAnonymized[key]; ok {
return key
}
anon, ok := a.wgKeyAnonymizer[key]
if !ok {
anon = generateAnonymousKey()
a.wgKeyAnonymizer[key] = anon
a.wgKeyAnonymized[anon] = struct{}{}
}
return anon
}
func (a *Anonymizer) AnonymizeUDPAddr(addr net.UDPAddr) net.UDPAddr {
// Convert IP to netip.Addr
ip, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(addr.IP)
@@ -272,12 +89,12 @@ func (a *Anonymizer) AnonymizeUDPAddr(addr net.UDPAddr) net.UDPAddr {
// isInAnonymizedRange checks if an IP is within the range of already assigned anonymized IPs
func (a *Anonymizer) isInAnonymizedRange(ip netip.Addr) bool {
if ip.Is4() {
return inPoolRange(ip, a.startAnonIPv4, a.currentAnonIPv4) ||
inPoolRange(ip, a.startAnonInternalIPv4, a.currentAnonInternalIPv4)
if ip.Is4() && ip.Compare(a.startAnonIPv4) >= 0 && ip.Compare(a.currentAnonIPv4) <= 0 {
return true
} else if !ip.Is4() && ip.Compare(a.startAnonIPv6) >= 0 && ip.Compare(a.currentAnonIPv6) <= 0 {
return true
}
return inPoolRange(ip, a.startAnonIPv6, a.currentAnonIPv6) ||
inPoolRange(ip, a.startAnonInternalIPv6, a.currentAnonInternalIPv6)
return false
}
func (a *Anonymizer) AnonymizeIPString(ip string) string {
@@ -301,17 +118,14 @@ func (a *Anonymizer) AnonymizeDomain(domain string) string {
baseDomain = domain[:len(domain)-1]
}
if strings.HasSuffix(baseDomain, anonTLD) {
if strings.HasSuffix(baseDomain, "netbird.io") ||
strings.HasSuffix(baseDomain, "netbird.selfhosted") ||
strings.HasSuffix(baseDomain, "netbird.cloud") ||
strings.HasSuffix(baseDomain, "netbird.stage") ||
strings.HasSuffix(baseDomain, anonTLD) {
return domain
}
if suffix := protectedSuffix(baseDomain); suffix != "" {
if a.level < LevelStrict || baseDomain == suffix || suffix == infraDomain {
return domain
}
return withTrailingDot(a.anonymizePeerName(baseDomain, suffix), hasDot)
}
parts := strings.Split(baseDomain, ".")
if len(parts) < 2 {
return domain
@@ -327,53 +141,12 @@ func (a *Anonymizer) AnonymizeDomain(domain string) string {
}
result := strings.Replace(baseDomain, baseForLookup, anonymized, 1)
if a.level >= LevelStrict && len(parts) > 2 {
prefix := strings.TrimSuffix(baseDomain, "."+baseForLookup)
result = a.anonymizeLabels(prefix, "host") + "." + anonymized
// The full mapping feeds AnonymizeString so seeded FQDNs are caught
// in log lines as a whole, labels included.
a.domainAnonymizer[baseDomain] = result
}
return withTrailingDot(result, hasDot)
}
// anonymizePeerName replaces the labels in front of a protected suffix with
// numbered peer placeholders, keeping the suffix, and records the full
// mapping for string replacement in logs. The numbering keeps a peer
// recognizable across the whole bundle without disclosing its name.
func (a *Anonymizer) anonymizePeerName(baseDomain, suffix string) string {
prefix := strings.TrimSuffix(baseDomain, "."+suffix)
result := a.anonymizeLabels(prefix, "peer") + "." + suffix
if result != baseDomain {
a.domainAnonymizer[baseDomain] = result
if hasDot {
result += "."
}
return result
}
// anonymizeLabels replaces each dot-separated label with a consistent
// numbered placeholder ("<placeholder>-<n>"). Wildcard labels and
// placeholders already handed out pass through unchanged.
func (a *Anonymizer) anonymizeLabels(prefix, placeholder string) string {
labels := strings.Split(prefix, ".")
for i, label := range labels {
if label == "*" {
continue
}
if _, ok := a.labelAnonymized[label]; ok {
continue
}
anon, ok := a.labelAnonymizer[label]
if !ok {
a.labelCounter++
anon = fmt.Sprintf("%s-%d", placeholder, a.labelCounter)
a.labelAnonymizer[label] = anon
a.labelAnonymized[anon] = struct{}{}
}
labels[i] = anon
}
return strings.Join(labels, ".")
}
func (a *Anonymizer) AnonymizeURI(uri string) string {
u, err := url.Parse(uri)
if err != nil {
@@ -408,70 +181,16 @@ func (a *Anonymizer) AnonymizeString(str string) string {
str = ipv4Regex.ReplaceAllStringFunc(str, a.AnonymizeIPString)
str = ipv6Regex.ReplaceAllStringFunc(str, a.AnonymizeIPString)
for _, domain := range a.sortedDomains() {
str = strings.ReplaceAll(str, domain, a.domainAnonymizer[domain])
for domain, anonDomain := range a.domainAnonymizer {
str = strings.ReplaceAll(str, domain, anonDomain)
}
str = a.AnonymizeSchemeURI(str)
str = a.AnonymizeDNSLogLine(str)
// MAC handling runs after the IP passes so preserved IPv6 addresses are
// already out of the way; the separator guard skips matches embedded in a
// longer colon- or dash-separated sequence (such as an IPv6 tail).
str = a.anonymizeMACsInString(str, macColonRegex, ':')
str = a.anonymizeMACsInString(str, macDashRegex, '-')
if a.level >= LevelStrict {
str = wgKeyRegex.ReplaceAllStringFunc(str, a.AnonymizeWGKey)
}
return str
}
// sortedDomains returns the domain mappings longest-first, so a full-FQDN
// mapping (strict level) is applied before the base-domain mapping it
// contains. The order is rebuilt only when domainAnonymizer has grown.
func (a *Anonymizer) sortedDomains() []string {
if len(a.domainOrder) == len(a.domainAnonymizer) {
return a.domainOrder
}
a.domainOrder = a.domainOrder[:0]
for domain := range a.domainAnonymizer {
a.domainOrder = append(a.domainOrder, domain)
}
slices.SortFunc(a.domainOrder, func(x, y string) int {
if d := len(y) - len(x); d != 0 {
return d
}
return strings.Compare(x, y)
})
return a.domainOrder
}
// anonymizeMACsInString replaces MAC addresses matched by re, skipping
// matches that directly adjoin another sep so a six-group run inside a longer
// separated sequence is left alone.
func (a *Anonymizer) anonymizeMACsInString(str string, re *regexp.Regexp, sep byte) string {
matches := re.FindAllStringIndex(str, -1)
if len(matches) == 0 {
return str
}
var b strings.Builder
last := 0
for _, m := range matches {
if (m[0] > 0 && str[m[0]-1] == sep) || (m[1] < len(str) && str[m[1]] == sep) {
continue
}
b.WriteString(str[last:m[0]])
b.WriteString(a.AnonymizeMAC(str[m[0]:m[1]]))
last = m[1]
}
b.WriteString(str[last:])
return b.String()
}
// AnonymizeSchemeURI finds and anonymizes URIs with ws, wss, rel, rels, stun, stuns, turn, and turns schemes.
func (a *Anonymizer) AnonymizeSchemeURI(text string) string {
re := regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)\b(wss?://|rels?://|stuns?:|turns?:|https?://)\S+\b`)
@@ -520,79 +239,10 @@ func isWellKnown(addr netip.Addr) bool {
"128.0.0.0", "8000::", // 2nd split subnet for default routes
}
return slices.Contains(wellKnown, addr.String())
}
// isInternal reports whether ip identifies a host only within the local
// network: IPv4 private (RFC 1918), CGNAT (RFC 6598), and link-local (v4 and
// v6). These are preserved at the default level so support can reason about
// the real topology, and replaced from the internal pools at the strict
// level. IPv6 ULA is deliberately not internal: its random global ID uniquely
// fingerprints the network, so it is anonymized at every level.
func isInternal(ip netip.Addr) bool {
return (ip.Is4() && ip.IsPrivate()) ||
ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() ||
isCGNAT(ip)
}
func inPoolRange(ip, start, current netip.Addr) bool {
return ip.Compare(start) >= 0 && ip.Compare(current) <= 0
}
// isWellKnownMAC reports whether hw carries no stable host identity: all-zero
// or a group address (broadcast and multicast).
func isWellKnownMAC(hw net.HardwareAddr) bool {
if hw[0]&1 == 1 {
if slices.Contains(wellKnown, addr.String()) {
return true
}
for _, b := range hw {
if b != 0 {
return false
}
}
return true
}
// looksLikeWGKey reports whether s has the shape of a WireGuard key:
// 44 base64 characters decoding to 32 bytes.
func looksLikeWGKey(s string) bool {
if len(s) != 44 || s[43] != '=' {
return false
}
decoded, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(s)
return err == nil && len(decoded) == 32
}
func generateAnonymousKey() string {
buf := make([]byte, 32)
if _, err := rand.Read(buf); err != nil {
return strings.Repeat("A", 43) + "="
}
return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(buf)
}
// protectedSuffix returns the protected NetBird suffix baseDomain ends with,
// or empty. The match is label-anchored so an unrelated domain that merely
// ends in the same characters is not preserved.
func protectedSuffix(baseDomain string) string {
for _, d := range protectedDomains {
if baseDomain == d || strings.HasSuffix(baseDomain, "."+d) {
return d
}
}
return ""
}
func withTrailingDot(domain string, hasDot bool) string {
if hasDot {
return domain + "."
}
return domain
}
// isCGNAT reports whether addr is in 100.64.0.0/10 (RFC 6598), the range
// NetBird assigns overlay peer addresses from.
func isCGNAT(addr netip.Addr) bool {
cgnatRangeStart := netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{100, 64, 0, 0})
cgnatRange := netip.PrefixFrom(cgnatRangeStart, 10)

View File

@@ -1,11 +1,8 @@
package anonymize_test
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/base64"
"net/netip"
"regexp"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
@@ -47,301 +44,6 @@ func TestAnonymizeIP(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestParseLevel(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
input string
expect anonymize.Level
}{
{"", anonymize.LevelDefault},
{"default", anonymize.LevelDefault},
{"DEFAULT", anonymize.LevelDefault},
{"strict", anonymize.LevelStrict},
{"STRICT", anonymize.LevelStrict},
// Unknown values must never yield less anonymization than requested.
{"garbage", anonymize.LevelStrict},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run("input="+tc.input, func(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, tc.expect, anonymize.ParseLevel(tc.input), "parsed level should match")
})
}
}
func TestAnonymizeIP_DefaultLevelInternalRanges(t *testing.T) {
anonymizer := anonymize.NewAnonymizer(anonymize.DefaultAddresses())
tests := []struct {
name string
ip string
expect string
}{
{"RFC1918 10/8", "10.1.2.3", "10.1.2.3"},
{"RFC1918 172.16/12", "172.16.5.5", "172.16.5.5"},
{"RFC1918 192.168/16", "192.168.1.1", "192.168.1.1"},
{"CGNAT", "100.64.0.5", "100.64.0.5"},
{"IPv4 link-local", "169.254.1.1", "169.254.1.1"},
{"IPv6 link-local", "fe80::1", "fe80::1"},
// ULA is anonymized even at the default level: its random global ID
// uniquely fingerprints the network, unlike shared RFC 1918 space.
{"IPv6 ULA", "fd12:3456:789a::1", "2001:db8:ffff::"},
// 4-in-6 addresses classify like their unmapped IPv4 form.
{"4-in-6 RFC1918", "::ffff:192.168.1.1", "192.168.1.1"},
{"4-in-6 CGNAT", "::ffff:100.64.0.5", "100.64.0.5"},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
result := anonymizer.AnonymizeIP(netip.MustParseAddr(tc.ip))
assert.Equal(t, tc.expect, result.String(), "default level should preserve internal ranges except ULA")
})
}
}
func TestAnonymizeIP_StrictLevel(t *testing.T) {
anonymizer := anonymize.NewAnonymizer(anonymize.DefaultAddresses())
anonymizer.SetLevel(anonymize.LevelStrict)
// Order matters: internal pool addresses are assigned sequentially.
tests := []struct {
name string
ip string
expect string
}{
{"RFC1918 192.168/16", "192.168.1.1", "198.18.0.0"},
{"Second RFC1918", "192.168.1.2", "198.18.0.1"},
{"Repeated RFC1918", "192.168.1.1", "198.18.0.0"},
{"RFC1918 10/8", "10.1.2.3", "198.18.0.2"},
{"RFC1918 172.16/12", "172.16.5.5", "198.18.0.3"},
{"CGNAT", "100.64.0.5", "198.18.0.4"},
{"IPv4 link-local", "169.254.1.1", "198.18.0.5"},
{"Public IPv4 uses public pool", "1.2.3.4", "198.51.100.0"},
{"IPv6 link-local", "fe80::1", "2001:db8:1::"},
{"IPv6 ULA", "fd12:3456:789a::1", "2001:db8:1::1"},
{"Public IPv6 uses public pool", "2607:f8b0:4005:805::200e", "2001:db8:ffff::"},
{"Loopback IPv4", "127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.1"},
{"Loopback IPv6", "::1", "::1"},
{"Unspecified", "0.0.0.0", "0.0.0.0"},
{"Multicast", "224.0.0.251", "224.0.0.251"},
{"Well known resolver", "8.8.8.8", "8.8.8.8"},
{"Well known split marker", "128.0.0.0", "128.0.0.0"},
{"In internal pool range", "198.18.0.3", "198.18.0.3"},
{"In public pool range", "198.51.100.0", "198.51.100.0"},
{"4-in-6 repeated RFC1918", "::ffff:192.168.1.1", "198.18.0.0"},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
result := anonymizer.AnonymizeIP(netip.MustParseAddr(tc.ip))
assert.Equal(t, tc.expect, result.String(), "strict level should replace internal ranges from the internal pools")
})
}
}
func TestAnonymizeString_StrictInternalIPs(t *testing.T) {
anonymizer := anonymize.NewAnonymizer(anonymize.DefaultAddresses())
anonymizer.SetLevel(anonymize.LevelStrict)
input := "route 10.20.30.0/24 via 192.168.1.1 dev eth0 src 100.64.0.7"
firstPass := anonymizer.AnonymizeString(input)
secondPass := anonymizer.AnonymizeString(firstPass)
assert.NotContains(t, firstPass, "10.20.30.0", "private network address should be anonymized")
assert.NotContains(t, firstPass, "192.168.1.1", "private gateway should be anonymized")
assert.NotContains(t, firstPass, "100.64.0.7", "CGNAT address should be anonymized")
assert.Contains(t, firstPass, "/24", "prefix length should be preserved")
assert.Equal(t, firstPass, secondPass, "second pass should not further anonymize the string")
}
func TestAnonymizeMAC(t *testing.T) {
anonymizer := anonymize.NewAnonymizer(anonymize.DefaultAddresses())
first := anonymizer.AnonymizeMAC("aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:0f")
assert.Equal(t, "02:00:00:00:00:01", first, "first MAC should get the first placeholder")
assert.Equal(t, first, anonymizer.AnonymizeMAC("aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:0f"), "repeated MAC should map to the same placeholder")
assert.Equal(t, first, anonymizer.AnonymizeMAC("AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:0F"), "case should not affect the mapping")
assert.Equal(t, "02-00-00-00-00-01", anonymizer.AnonymizeMAC("AA-BB-CC-DD-EE-0F"), "dash form should keep its separator but share the mapping")
second := anonymizer.AnonymizeMAC("10:22:33:44:55:66")
assert.Equal(t, "02:00:00:00:00:02", second, "second distinct MAC should get the next placeholder")
tests := []struct {
name string
mac string
}{
{"Broadcast", "ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff"},
{"IPv4 multicast", "01:00:5e:00:00:fb"},
{"IPv6 multicast", "33:33:00:00:00:01"},
{"All zero", "00:00:00:00:00:00"},
{"Assigned placeholder", "02:00:00:00:00:01"},
{"Invalid", "not-a-mac"},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, tc.mac, anonymizer.AnonymizeMAC(tc.mac), "should be preserved")
})
}
}
func TestAnonymizeString_MACAddresses(t *testing.T) {
anonymizer := anonymize.NewAnonymizer(anonymize.DefaultAddresses())
tests := []struct {
name string
input string
expect string
}{
{
name: "nftables ether rule",
input: "ether saddr aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff drop",
expect: "ether saddr 02:00:00:00:00:01 drop",
},
{
name: "Windows dash form",
input: "Physical Address : AA-BB-CC-DD-EE-FF",
expect: "Physical Address : 02-00-00-00-00-01",
},
{
name: "IPv6 address tail is not treated as MAC",
input: "addr fe80:0:11:22:33:44:55:66 scope link",
expect: "addr fe80:0:11:22:33:44:55:66 scope link",
},
{
name: "broadcast MAC preserved",
input: "dst ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff type ARP",
expect: "dst ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff type ARP",
},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
result := anonymizer.AnonymizeString(tc.input)
assert.Equal(t, tc.expect, result, "MAC addresses should be anonymized at every level")
assert.Equal(t, result, anonymizer.AnonymizeString(result), "second pass should not change the result")
})
}
}
func TestAnonymizeWGKey(t *testing.T) {
key := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x42}, 32))
t.Run("default level preserves keys", func(t *testing.T) {
anonymizer := anonymize.NewAnonymizer(anonymize.DefaultAddresses())
assert.Equal(t, key, anonymizer.AnonymizeWGKey(key), "default level should not touch WireGuard keys")
})
t.Run("strict level replaces keys", func(t *testing.T) {
anonymizer := anonymize.NewAnonymizer(anonymize.DefaultAddresses())
anonymizer.SetLevel(anonymize.LevelStrict)
anon := anonymizer.AnonymizeWGKey(key)
assert.NotEqual(t, key, anon, "strict level should replace the key")
assert.Regexp(t, `^[A-Za-z0-9+/]{43}=$`, anon, "placeholder should keep the WireGuard key shape")
assert.Equal(t, anon, anonymizer.AnonymizeWGKey(key), "repeated key should map to the same placeholder")
assert.Equal(t, anon, anonymizer.AnonymizeWGKey(anon), "an assigned placeholder should pass through unchanged")
assert.Equal(t, "not-a-key", anonymizer.AnonymizeWGKey("not-a-key"), "non-key values should be preserved")
})
}
func TestAnonymizeString_WGKeys(t *testing.T) {
key := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x42}, 32))
input := "peer " + key + " handshake completed"
t.Run("default level preserves keys", func(t *testing.T) {
anonymizer := anonymize.NewAnonymizer(anonymize.DefaultAddresses())
assert.Equal(t, input, anonymizer.AnonymizeString(input), "default level should not touch WireGuard keys in strings")
})
t.Run("strict level replaces keys", func(t *testing.T) {
anonymizer := anonymize.NewAnonymizer(anonymize.DefaultAddresses())
anonymizer.SetLevel(anonymize.LevelStrict)
firstPass := anonymizer.AnonymizeString(input)
assert.NotContains(t, firstPass, key, "the key should not survive strict anonymization")
assert.Equal(t, anonymizer.AnonymizeWGKey(key), extractKey(t, firstPass), "string replacement should be consistent with AnonymizeWGKey")
assert.Equal(t, firstPass, anonymizer.AnonymizeString(firstPass), "second pass should not change the result")
})
}
func extractKey(t *testing.T, logLine string) string {
t.Helper()
fields := strings.Fields(logLine)
require.Len(t, fields, 4, "log line should keep its structure")
return fields[1]
}
func TestAnonymizeDomain_StrictLevel(t *testing.T) {
anonymizer := anonymize.NewAnonymizer(anonymize.DefaultAddresses())
anonymizer.SetLevel(anonymize.LevelStrict)
t.Run("netbird peer name", func(t *testing.T) {
result := anonymizer.AnonymizeDomain("my-laptop.netbird.cloud")
assert.Regexp(t, `^peer-\d+\.netbird\.cloud$`, result, "peer name should be anonymized, suffix kept")
assert.NotContains(t, result, "my-laptop", "the peer name should not survive")
assert.Equal(t, result, anonymizer.AnonymizeDomain("my-laptop.netbird.cloud"), "repeated domain should map consistently")
assert.Equal(t, result, anonymizer.AnonymizeDomain(result), "an anonymized domain should pass through unchanged")
})
t.Run("bare netbird domain", func(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, "netbird.cloud", anonymizer.AnonymizeDomain("netbird.cloud"), "the bare protected suffix should be preserved")
})
t.Run("netbird infrastructure preserved", func(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, "api.netbird.io", anonymizer.AnonymizeDomain("api.netbird.io"),
"netbird.io hosts infrastructure, not peer names, and should stay readable")
})
t.Run("leading labels of other domains", func(t *testing.T) {
result := anonymizer.AnonymizeDomain("host1.corp.example.com")
assert.Regexp(t, `^host-\d+\.host-\d+\.anon-[a-zA-Z0-9]+\.domain$`, result, "every label should be anonymized")
for _, label := range []string{"host1", "corp", "example"} {
assert.NotContains(t, result, label, "no original label should survive")
}
assert.Equal(t, result, anonymizer.AnonymizeDomain("host1.corp.example.com"), "repeated domain should map consistently")
})
t.Run("same label maps consistently across domains", func(t *testing.T) {
first := anonymizer.AnonymizeDomain("shared.one.com")
second := anonymizer.AnonymizeDomain("shared.two.com")
assert.Equal(t, strings.Split(first, ".")[0], strings.Split(second, ".")[0], "the shared host label should get one placeholder")
})
t.Run("wildcard label preserved", func(t *testing.T) {
result := anonymizer.AnonymizeDomain("*.example.com")
assert.Regexp(t, `^\*\.anon-[a-zA-Z0-9]+\.domain$`, result, "the wildcard label should stay a wildcard")
})
}
func TestAnonymizeDomain_DefaultLevelKeepsPeerNames(t *testing.T) {
anonymizer := anonymize.NewAnonymizer(anonymize.DefaultAddresses())
assert.Equal(t, "my-laptop.netbird.cloud", anonymizer.AnonymizeDomain("my-laptop.netbird.cloud"),
"default level should preserve netbird FQDNs including the peer name")
assert.Regexp(t, `^sub\.anon-[a-zA-Z0-9]+\.domain$`, anonymizer.AnonymizeDomain("sub.example.com"),
"default level should keep subdomain labels")
}
func TestAnonymizeString_StrictPeerNames(t *testing.T) {
anonymizer := anonymize.NewAnonymizer(anonymize.DefaultAddresses())
anonymizer.SetLevel(anonymize.LevelStrict)
// Seed like the bundle generator does from the status: base first, then
// the full FQDN, so replacement must prefer the longer mapping.
anonBase := anonymizer.AnonymizeDomain("example.com")
anonPeer := anonymizer.AnonymizeDomain("peer1.netbird.cloud")
anonHost := anonymizer.AnonymizeDomain("host1.example.com")
logLine := "connected to peer1.netbird.cloud via host1.example.com endpoint"
firstPass := anonymizer.AnonymizeString(logLine)
assert.NotContains(t, firstPass, "peer1", "the peer name should not survive in logs")
assert.NotContains(t, firstPass, "host1", "the host label should not survive in logs")
assert.Contains(t, firstPass, anonPeer, "the seeded peer mapping should be applied")
assert.Contains(t, firstPass, anonHost, "the seeded host mapping should be applied, not just the base mapping")
assert.NotContains(t, firstPass, "host1."+anonBase, "the base mapping must not preempt the longer FQDN mapping")
assert.Equal(t, firstPass, anonymizer.AnonymizeString(firstPass), "second pass should not change the result")
}
func TestAnonymizeDNSLogLine(t *testing.T) {
anonymizer := anonymize.NewAnonymizer(netip.Addr{}, netip.Addr{})
tests := []struct {

View File

@@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ import (
const errCloseConnection = "Failed to close connection: %v"
var (
logFileCount uint32
systemInfoFlag bool
logFileCount uint32
systemInfoFlag bool
uploadBundleFlag bool
uploadBundleURLFlag string
uploadBundleInsecureFlag bool
@@ -156,11 +156,6 @@ func debugConfigDump(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
// request. Returns an error if the RPC fails or if the daemon reports
// an upload failure reason.
func debugBundle(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
anonymizeEnabled, anonymizeLevel, err := effectiveAnonymize()
if err != nil {
return err
}
conn, err := getClient(cmd)
if err != nil {
return err
@@ -173,11 +168,10 @@ func debugBundle(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
client := proto.NewDaemonServiceClient(conn)
request := &proto.DebugBundleRequest{
Anonymize: anonymizeEnabled,
AnonymizeLevel: anonymizeLevel.String(),
SystemInfo: systemInfoFlag,
LogFileCount: logFileCount,
CliVersion: version.NetbirdVersion(),
Anonymize: anonymizeFlag,
SystemInfo: systemInfoFlag,
LogFileCount: logFileCount,
CliVersion: version.NetbirdVersion(),
}
if uploadBundleFlag {
request.UploadURL = uploadBundleURLFlag
@@ -235,11 +229,6 @@ func runForDuration(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid duration format: %v", err)
}
anonymizeEnabled, anonymizeLevel, err := effectiveAnonymize()
if err != nil {
return err
}
conn, err := getClient(cmd)
if err != nil {
return err
@@ -379,11 +368,10 @@ func runForDuration(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
cmd.Println("Creating debug bundle...")
request := &proto.DebugBundleRequest{
Anonymize: anonymizeEnabled,
AnonymizeLevel: anonymizeLevel.String(),
SystemInfo: systemInfoFlag,
LogFileCount: logFileCount,
CliVersion: version.NetbirdVersion(),
Anonymize: anonymizeFlag,
SystemInfo: systemInfoFlag,
LogFileCount: logFileCount,
CliVersion: version.NetbirdVersion(),
}
if uploadBundleFlag {
request.UploadURL = uploadBundleURLFlag

View File

@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ import (
"github.com/spf13/pflag"
"google.golang.org/grpc"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/anonymize"
daddr "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/daemonaddr"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
)
@@ -70,7 +69,6 @@ var (
autoConnectDisabled bool
extraIFaceBlackList []string
anonymizeFlag bool
anonymizeLevelFlag string
dnsRouteInterval time.Duration
// lazyConnEnabled is the parse target for the deprecated --enable-lazy-connection
// flag. The flag is inert; the value is no longer read (use NB_LAZY_CONN instead).
@@ -158,8 +156,7 @@ func init() {
rootCmd.MarkFlagsMutuallyExclusive("setup-key", "setup-key-file")
rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&preSharedKey, preSharedKeyFlag, "", "Sets WireGuard PreSharedKey property. If set, then only peers that have the same key can communicate.")
rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVarP(&hostName, "hostname", "n", "", "Sets a custom hostname for the device")
rootCmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVarP(&anonymizeFlag, "anonymize", "A", false, "anonymize public IP addresses, MAC addresses, and non-netbird.io domains in logs and status output; private, CGNAT, and link-local IP ranges are kept (see --anonymize-level strict)")
rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVar(&anonymizeLevelFlag, "anonymize-level", "", "anonymization level: \"default\" or \"strict\"; strict also anonymizes private, CGNAT, and link-local IP ranges, peer names, and WireGuard public keys. Setting this flag implies --anonymize")
rootCmd.PersistentFlags().BoolVarP(&anonymizeFlag, "anonymize", "A", false, "anonymize IP addresses and non-netbird.io domains in logs and status output")
rootCmd.PersistentFlags().StringVarP(&configPath, "config", "c", profilemanager.DefaultConfigPath, "Overrides the default profile file location")
rootCmd.AddCommand(upCmd)
@@ -296,19 +293,6 @@ var CLIBackOffSettings = &backoff.ExponentialBackOff{
Clock: backoff.SystemClock,
}
// effectiveAnonymize resolves the --anonymize and --anonymize-level flags:
// setting a level implies anonymization, and an invalid level is rejected.
func effectiveAnonymize() (bool, anonymize.Level, error) {
if anonymizeLevelFlag == "" {
return anonymizeFlag, anonymize.LevelDefault, nil
}
level := anonymize.ParseLevel(anonymizeLevelFlag)
if !strings.EqualFold(anonymizeLevelFlag, level.String()) {
return false, anonymize.LevelDefault, fmt.Errorf("invalid anonymize level %q: use %q or %q", anonymizeLevelFlag, anonymize.LevelDefault.String(), anonymize.LevelStrict.String())
}
return true, level, nil
}
func getSetupKey() (string, error) {
if setupKeyPath != "" && setupKey == "" {
return getSetupKeyFromFile(setupKeyPath)

View File

@@ -121,14 +121,8 @@ func statusFunc(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
sessionExpiresAt = ts.AsTime().UTC()
}
anonymizeEnabled, anonymizeLevel, err := effectiveAnonymize()
if err != nil {
return err
}
var outputInformationHolder = nbstatus.ConvertToStatusOutputOverview(resp.GetFullStatus(), nbstatus.ConvertOptions{
Anonymize: anonymizeEnabled,
AnonymizeLevel: anonymizeLevel,
Anonymize: anonymizeFlag,
DaemonVersion: resp.GetDaemonVersion(),
DaemonStatus: nbstatus.ParseDaemonStatus(status),
StatusFilter: statusFilter,

View File

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@
// its wg interface into firewalld's "trusted" zone. This is required because
// firewalld's nftables chains are created with NFT_CHAIN_OWNER on recent
// versions, which returns EPERM to any other process that tries to insert
// rules into them. Trusting the interface makes firewalld itself add the
// accept rules to its own chains instead.
// rules into them. The workaround mirrors what Tailscale does: let firewalld
// itself add the accept rules to its own chains by trusting the interface.
package firewalld
// TrustedZone is the firewalld zone name used for interfaces whose traffic

View File

@@ -42,12 +42,11 @@ type aclManager struct {
optionalEntries map[string][]entry
ipsetStore *ipsetStore
v6 bool
ipsetSupport *ipsetSupport
stateManager *statemanager.Manager
}
func newAclManager(iptablesClient *iptables.IPTables, wgIface iFaceMapper, ipsetSupport *ipsetSupport) (*aclManager, error) {
func newAclManager(iptablesClient *iptables.IPTables, wgIface iFaceMapper) (*aclManager, error) {
return &aclManager{
iptablesClient: iptablesClient,
wgIface: wgIface,
@@ -55,7 +54,6 @@ func newAclManager(iptablesClient *iptables.IPTables, wgIface iFaceMapper, ipset
optionalEntries: make(map[string][]entry),
ipsetStore: newIpsetStore(),
v6: iptablesClient.Proto() == iptables.ProtocolIPv6,
ipsetSupport: ipsetSupport,
}, nil
}
@@ -86,78 +84,13 @@ func (m *aclManager) AddPeerFiltering(
dPort *firewall.Port,
action firewall.Action,
ipsetName string,
) ([]firewall.Rule, error) {
ipsetName = m.resolveIPSetName(ipsetName, sPort, dPort, action)
if ipsetName == "" {
return m.addPeerRule(ip, protocol, sPort, dPort, action, "")
}
// A set that is already in the store backs rules installed earlier, so it must
// survive this call's failure.
_, preexisting := m.ipsetStore.ipset(ipsetName)
rules, err := m.addPeerRule(ip, protocol, sPort, dPort, action, ipsetName)
if err == nil {
return rules, nil
}
var unusable *ipsetUnusableError
if !errors.As(err, &unusable) {
return nil, err
}
// The set could not be created or matched. Drop the one this call created and
// retry the rule matching the IP directly; only if that succeeds do we know
// ipset was to blame and latch it off for subsequent rules.
if !preexisting {
m.discardIPSet(ipsetName)
}
rules, retryErr := m.addPeerRule(ip, protocol, sPort, dPort, action, "")
if retryErr != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("add peer rule (ipset: %w): %w", unusable.cause, retryErr)
}
m.ipsetSupport.markUnsupported(unusable.cause)
return rules, nil
}
// resolveIPSetName derives the ipset name for a rule, returning "" when the rule
// must match the IP directly: either no set was requested or ipset is unusable.
func (m *aclManager) resolveIPSetName(ipsetName string, sPort, dPort *firewall.Port, action firewall.Action) string {
ipsetName = transformIPsetName(ipsetName, sPort, dPort, action)
if ipsetName == "" || !m.ipsetSupport.supported() {
return ""
}
if m.v6 {
ipsetName += "-v6"
}
return ipsetName
}
// discardIPSet removes a set that turned out to be unusable, so a later rule
// does not find it in the store and assume it works.
func (m *aclManager) discardIPSet(ipsetName string) {
m.ipsetStore.deleteIpset(ipsetName)
if err := m.destroyIPSet(ipsetName); err != nil {
log.Debugf("destroy unusable ipset %s: %v", ipsetName, err)
}
}
func (m *aclManager) addPeerRule(
ip net.IP,
protocol firewall.Protocol,
sPort *firewall.Port,
dPort *firewall.Port,
action firewall.Action,
ipsetName string,
) ([]firewall.Rule, error) {
chain := chainNameInputRules
ipsetName = transformIPsetName(ipsetName, sPort, dPort, action)
if m.v6 && ipsetName != "" {
ipsetName += "-v6"
}
proto := protoForFamily(protocol, m.v6)
specs := filterRuleSpecs(ip, proto, sPort, dPort, action, ipsetName)
@@ -172,7 +105,7 @@ func (m *aclManager) addPeerRule(
if ipsetName != "" {
if ipList, ipsetExists := m.ipsetStore.ipset(ipsetName); ipsetExists {
if err := m.addToIPSet(ipsetName, ip); err != nil {
return nil, ipsetUnusable(fmt.Errorf("add IP to ipset: %w", err))
return nil, fmt.Errorf("add IP to ipset: %w", err)
}
// if ruleset already exists it means we already have the firewall rule
// so we need to update IPs in the ruleset and return new fw.Rule object for ACL manager.
@@ -195,10 +128,10 @@ func (m *aclManager) addPeerRule(
}
}
if err := m.createIPSet(ipsetName); err != nil {
return nil, ipsetUnusable(fmt.Errorf("create ipset: %w", err))
return nil, fmt.Errorf("create ipset: %w", err)
}
if err := m.addToIPSet(ipsetName, ip); err != nil {
return nil, ipsetUnusable(fmt.Errorf("add IP to ipset: %w", err))
return nil, fmt.Errorf("add IP to ipset: %w", err)
}
ipList := newIpList(ip.String())
@@ -207,7 +140,7 @@ func (m *aclManager) addPeerRule(
ok, err := m.iptablesClient.Exists(tableFilter, chain, specs...)
if err != nil {
return nil, maybeIPSetUnusable(ipsetName, fmt.Errorf("check rule: %w", err))
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to check rule: %w", err)
}
if ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("rule already exists")
@@ -221,7 +154,7 @@ func (m *aclManager) addPeerRule(
err = m.iptablesClient.Append(tableFilter, chain, specs...)
}
if err != nil {
return nil, maybeIPSetUnusable(ipsetName, err)
return nil, err
}
if err := m.iptablesClient.Append(tableMangle, chainRTPRE, mangleSpecs...); err != nil {

View File

@@ -1,240 +0,0 @@
//go:build privileged
package iptables
import (
"net/netip"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
fw "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
)
func iptRefcountIfaceV4() *iFaceMock {
return &iFaceMock{
NameFunc: func() string { return "wt-refcount" },
AddressFunc: func() wgaddr.Address {
return wgaddr.Address{
IP: netip.MustParseAddr("10.20.0.1"),
Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("10.20.0.0/24"),
}
},
}
}
func iptRefcountIfaceDual() *iFaceMock {
return &iFaceMock{
NameFunc: func() string { return "wt-refcount" },
AddressFunc: func() wgaddr.Address {
return wgaddr.Address{
IP: netip.MustParseAddr("10.20.0.1"),
Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("10.20.0.0/24"),
IPv6: netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::1"),
IPv6Net: netip.MustParsePrefix("fd00::/64"),
}
},
}
}
func newIptRefcountManager(t *testing.T, dual bool) *Manager {
t.Helper()
var ifMock *iFaceMock
if dual {
ifMock = iptRefcountIfaceDual()
} else {
ifMock = iptRefcountIfaceV4()
}
m, err := Create(ifMock, iface.DefaultMTU)
require.NoError(t, err, "create manager")
require.NoError(t, m.Init(nil), "init manager")
t.Cleanup(func() {
require.NoError(t, m.Close(nil), "close manager")
})
return m
}
func iptDnatV4(port uint16) fw.ForwardRule {
return fw.ForwardRule{
Protocol: fw.ProtocolTCP,
DestinationPort: fw.Port{Values: []uint16{port}},
TranslatedAddress: netip.MustParseAddr("10.20.0.2"),
TranslatedPort: fw.Port{Values: []uint16{80}},
}
}
func iptDnatV6(port uint16) fw.ForwardRule {
return fw.ForwardRule{
Protocol: fw.ProtocolTCP,
DestinationPort: fw.Port{Values: []uint16{port}},
TranslatedAddress: netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::2"),
TranslatedPort: fw.Port{Values: []uint16{80}},
}
}
// TestIptablesRouting_RepeatedEnableSingleReference verifies that EnableRouting
// (called on every network-map update) holds at most one reference per family
// and a single DisableRouting drops both back to zero.
func TestIptablesRouting_RepeatedEnableSingleReference(t *testing.T) {
m := newIptRefcountManager(t, true)
state := m.router.ipFwdState
require.NoError(t, m.EnableRouting(), "first enable")
require.NoError(t, m.EnableRouting(), "second enable")
require.NoError(t, m.EnableRouting(), "third enable")
v4, v6 := state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "repeated enable holds a single v4 reference")
assert.Equal(t, 1, v6, "repeated enable holds a single v6 reference")
require.NoError(t, m.DisableRouting(), "disable")
v4, v6 = state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "single disable releases the v4 reference")
assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "single disable releases the v6 reference")
}
// TestIptablesRouting_DisableKeepsDNATReference verifies that an unpaired
// DisableRouting does not release references held by active DNAT rules.
func TestIptablesRouting_DisableKeepsDNATReference(t *testing.T) {
m := newIptRefcountManager(t, true)
state := m.router.ipFwdState
r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(iptDnatV6(9095))
require.NoError(t, err, "add v6 dnat")
require.NoError(t, m.DisableRouting(), "unpaired disable")
_, v6 := state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 1, v6, "DNAT-held reference survives unpaired DisableRouting")
require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1), "delete v6 dnat")
_, v6 = state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "delete releases the DNAT reference")
}
// TestIptablesDNAT_RefcountBalancedV4 covers a Balanced Add/Delete pair on v4.
func TestIptablesDNAT_RefcountBalancedV4(t *testing.T) {
m := newIptRefcountManager(t, false)
state := m.router.ipFwdState
r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(iptDnatV4(7081))
require.NoError(t, err, "add v4 dnat 1")
v4, v6 := state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "v4 refcount after first add")
assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount unchanged")
r2, err := m.AddDNATRule(iptDnatV4(7082))
require.NoError(t, err, "add v4 dnat 2")
v4, v6 = state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 2, v4, "v4 refcount after second add")
assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount unchanged")
require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1))
v4, v6 = state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "v4 refcount after first delete")
assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount unchanged")
require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r2))
v4, v6 = state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "v4 refcount after second delete")
assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount unchanged")
}
// TestIptablesDNAT_RefcountBalancedV6 checks the v6 path increments v6 only and
// decrements back to zero.
func TestIptablesDNAT_RefcountBalancedV6(t *testing.T) {
m := newIptRefcountManager(t, true)
require.NotNil(t, m.router6, "v6 router")
require.Same(t, m.router.ipFwdState, m.router6.ipFwdState, "shared state")
state := m.router.ipFwdState
r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(iptDnatV6(9081))
require.NoError(t, err, "add v6 dnat 1")
v4, v6 := state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 0, v4)
assert.Equal(t, 1, v6, "v6 refcount after first add")
r2, err := m.AddDNATRule(iptDnatV6(9082))
require.NoError(t, err, "add v6 dnat 2")
v4, v6 = state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "v4 refcount unchanged")
assert.Equal(t, 2, v6, "v6 refcount after second add")
require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1))
v4, v6 = state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "v4 refcount unchanged")
assert.Equal(t, 1, v6, "v6 refcount after first delete")
require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r2))
v4, v6 = state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 0, v4)
assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount after second delete")
}
// TestIptablesDNAT_DuplicateAddNoLeak verifies the duplicate-rule path returns
// without bumping the refcount.
func TestIptablesDNAT_DuplicateAddNoLeak(t *testing.T) {
m := newIptRefcountManager(t, true)
state := m.router.ipFwdState
rule := iptDnatV4(7083)
r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(rule)
require.NoError(t, err)
v4, _ := state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 1, v4)
_, err = m.AddDNATRule(rule)
require.NoError(t, err, "duplicate add")
v4, _ = state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "duplicate add must not increment")
require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1))
v4, _ = state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "single delete must drop to zero")
}
// TestIptablesDNAT_DeleteMissingNoUnderflow verifies Delete on an unknown rule
// neither errors nor releases the refcount.
func TestIptablesDNAT_DeleteMissingNoUnderflow(t *testing.T) {
m := newIptRefcountManager(t, true)
state := m.router.ipFwdState
phantom := iptDnatV4(7099)
require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(&phantom), "delete missing v4")
v4, v6 := state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 0, v4)
assert.Equal(t, 0, v6)
phantom6 := iptDnatV6(9099)
require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(&phantom6), "delete missing v6")
v4, v6 = state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 0, v4)
assert.Equal(t, 0, v6)
r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(iptDnatV4(7100))
require.NoError(t, err)
v4, _ = state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "real add still increments after phantom delete")
require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1))
}
// TestIptablesDNAT_DoubleDeleteNoUnderflow verifies a second Delete on the same
// rule is a no-op.
func TestIptablesDNAT_DoubleDeleteNoUnderflow(t *testing.T) {
m := newIptRefcountManager(t, true)
state := m.router.ipFwdState
r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(iptDnatV6(9083))
require.NoError(t, err)
_, v6 := state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 1, v6)
require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1), "first delete")
_, v6 = state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 0, v6)
require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1), "second delete must be no-op")
_, v6 = state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "double delete must not underflow")
}

View File

@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
package iptables
import (
"sync"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
)
// ipsetSupport tracks whether ipset-backed firewall rules can be installed.
//
// It starts optimistic and latches to unsupported the first time the kernel
// proves otherwise: either the hash:net set type is missing (ip_set_hash_net) or
// iptables cannot match against a set (xt_set). Callers then emit per-IP and
// per-prefix rules instead. Without the fallback, a rule referencing an unusable
// set is never installed and the catch-all DROP silently blocks traffic the
// policy permits.
//
// One instance is shared by the ACL managers and routers of both address
// families, because ipset availability is a property of the kernel rather than
// of any single table.
type ipsetSupport struct {
mu sync.RWMutex
unsupported bool
}
func newIPSetSupport() *ipsetSupport {
return &ipsetSupport{}
}
func (s *ipsetSupport) supported() bool {
s.mu.RLock()
defer s.mu.RUnlock()
return !s.unsupported
}
// markUnsupported records that ipset cannot be used, logging the reason once.
func (s *ipsetSupport) markUnsupported(cause error) {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
if s.unsupported {
return
}
s.unsupported = true
log.Warnf("ipset is unavailable (%v); falling back to per-IP firewall rules. "+
"Ensure the kernel provides ip_set_hash_net and xt_set; without them rule "+
"sets are larger and slower to converge on networks with many peers", cause)
}
// ipsetUnusableError marks a failure attributable to ipset, so the caller can
// retry the same rule in its per-IP form before latching the capability off.
type ipsetUnusableError struct {
cause error
}
func (e *ipsetUnusableError) Error() string { return e.cause.Error() }
func (e *ipsetUnusableError) Unwrap() error { return e.cause }
func ipsetUnusable(cause error) error {
return &ipsetUnusableError{cause: cause}
}
// maybeIPSetUnusable marks an iptables failure as ipset-attributable only when the
// rule actually carried a set match, since the same call can fail for unrelated
// reasons on a rule that matches addresses directly.
func maybeIPSetUnusable(ipsetName string, err error) error {
if ipsetName == "" {
return err
}
return ipsetUnusable(err)
}

View File

@@ -33,10 +33,6 @@ type Manager struct {
router *router
rawSupported bool
// ipsetSupport is shared by the ACL managers and routers of both families,
// so a kernel without usable ipset support degrades them together.
ipsetSupport *ipsetSupport
// IPv6 counterparts, nil when no v6 overlay
ipv6Client *iptables.IPTables
aclMgr6 *aclManager
@@ -57,17 +53,16 @@ func Create(wgIface iFaceMapper, mtu uint16) (*Manager, error) {
}
m := &Manager{
wgIface: wgIface,
ipv4Client: iptablesClient,
ipsetSupport: newIPSetSupport(),
wgIface: wgIface,
ipv4Client: iptablesClient,
}
m.router, err = newRouter(iptablesClient, wgIface, mtu, m.ipsetSupport)
m.router, err = newRouter(iptablesClient, wgIface, mtu)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("create router: %w", err)
}
m.aclMgr, err = newAclManager(iptablesClient, wgIface, m.ipsetSupport)
m.aclMgr, err = newAclManager(iptablesClient, wgIface)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("create acl manager: %w", err)
}
@@ -88,16 +83,16 @@ func (m *Manager) createIPv6Components(wgIface iFaceMapper, mtu uint16) error {
}
m.ipv6Client = ip6Client
m.router6, err = newRouter(ip6Client, wgIface, mtu, m.ipsetSupport)
m.router6, err = newRouter(ip6Client, wgIface, mtu)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create v6 router: %w", err)
}
// Share the same IP forwarding state with the v4 router, since
// Forwarding refcounter is per-family but shared between v4 and v6 routers.
// EnableIPForwarding controls both v4 and v6 sysctls.
m.router6.ipFwdState = m.router.ipFwdState
m.aclMgr6, err = newAclManager(ip6Client, wgIface, m.ipsetSupport)
m.aclMgr6, err = newAclManager(ip6Client, wgIface)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create v6 acl manager: %w", err)
}
@@ -407,12 +402,17 @@ func (m *Manager) SetLogLevel(log.Level) {
}
func (m *Manager) EnableRouting() error {
// v6 only when the overlay actually has v6.
return m.router.ipFwdState.RequestRouting(m.router6 != nil)
if err := m.router.ipFwdState.RequestForwarding(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("enable IP forwarding: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
func (m *Manager) DisableRouting() error {
return m.router.ipFwdState.ReleaseRouting()
if err := m.router.ipFwdState.ReleaseForwarding(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("disable IP forwarding: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// AddDNATRule adds a DNAT rule

View File

@@ -291,98 +291,3 @@ func TestIptablesCreatePerformance(t *testing.T) {
})
}
}
// newACLTestManager returns a started manager. Create()/Init() is used so the
// router-owned chains (chainRTFWDIN/OUT) exist before the ACL manager's
// createDefaultChains() references them.
func newACLTestManager(t *testing.T) *Manager {
t.Helper()
manager, err := Create(ifaceMock, iface.DefaultMTU)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, manager.Init(nil))
t.Cleanup(func() {
require.NoError(t, manager.Close(nil))
})
return manager
}
// TestIptablesACLUsesIPSetOnHealthyKernel guards the default: on a kernel that
// does have ipset, rules must keep matching a set. A regression that reported
// ipset as unusable would silently move every Linux client to per-IP rules.
func TestIptablesACLUsesIPSetOnHealthyKernel(t *testing.T) {
ipv4Client, err := iptables.NewWithProtocol(iptables.ProtocolIPv4)
require.NoError(t, err)
manager := newACLTestManager(t)
ip := netip.MustParseAddr("10.20.0.42")
port := &fw.Port{Values: []uint16{22}}
rules, err := manager.aclMgr.AddPeerFiltering(nil, ip.AsSlice(), "tcp", nil, port, fw.ActionAccept, "nb0000001")
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotEmpty(t, rules)
rule := rules[0].(*Rule)
require.Equal(t, "nb0000001-dport", rule.ipsetName, "healthy kernel must use an ipset")
require.Contains(t, rule.specs, "--match-set")
require.True(t, manager.ipsetSupport.supported(), "ipset must not be latched off on a healthy kernel")
checkRuleSpecs(t, ipv4Client, rule.chain, true, rule.specs...)
}
// TestIptablesACLFallsBackWhenIPSetUnusable drives the real failure path: an
// oversized set name is rejected by the kernel, which stands in for a kernel
// without ip_set_hash_net or xt_set. The rule must still land in the chain,
// matching the IP directly, and the capability must latch off so later rules skip
// ipset. Before the fallback existed, the rule was dropped and the catch-all DROP
// silently blocked traffic the policy permits.
func TestIptablesACLFallsBackWhenIPSetUnusable(t *testing.T) {
ipv4Client, err := iptables.NewWithProtocol(iptables.ProtocolIPv4)
require.NoError(t, err)
manager := newACLTestManager(t)
// ipset names are limited to 31 characters, so creating this set fails.
unusableName := strings.Repeat("a", 40)
ip := netip.MustParseAddr("10.20.0.42")
port := &fw.Port{Values: []uint16{22}}
rules, err := manager.aclMgr.AddPeerFiltering(nil, ip.AsSlice(), "tcp", nil, port, fw.ActionAccept, unusableName)
require.NoError(t, err, "AddPeerFiltering must succeed by falling back")
require.NotEmpty(t, rules)
rule := rules[0].(*Rule)
require.Empty(t, rule.ipsetName, "fallback rule must not reference an ipset")
require.Contains(t, strings.Join(rule.specs, " "), "-s 10.20.0.42", "fallback rule must match the source IP")
require.NotContains(t, strings.Join(rule.specs, " "), "--match-set")
// The rule must actually be present, not silently missing.
checkRuleSpecs(t, ipv4Client, rule.chain, true, rule.specs...)
require.False(t, manager.ipsetSupport.supported(), "failure must latch ipset off")
// A subsequent rule with a perfectly valid set name now skips ipset too.
next, err := manager.aclMgr.AddPeerFiltering(nil, netip.MustParseAddr("10.20.0.43").AsSlice(), "tcp", nil, port, fw.ActionAccept, "nb0000001")
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotEmpty(t, next)
require.Empty(t, next[0].(*Rule).ipsetName, "later rules must skip ipset once latched")
}
// TestIptablesACLLeavesNoIPSetAfterFallback verifies the set created before the
// failure is destroyed, so a later rule does not find a half-built set and assume
// ipset works.
func TestIptablesACLLeavesNoIPSetAfterFallback(t *testing.T) {
manager := newACLTestManager(t)
port := &fw.Port{Values: []uint16{22}}
ip := netip.MustParseAddr("10.20.0.42")
_, err := manager.aclMgr.AddPeerFiltering(nil, ip.AsSlice(), "tcp", nil, port, fw.ActionAccept, strings.Repeat("a", 40))
require.NoError(t, err)
_, exists := manager.aclMgr.ipsetStore.ipset(strings.Repeat("a", 40) + "-dport")
require.False(t, exists, "unusable set must not stay in the store")
}

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
package iptables
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"maps"
"net/netip"
@@ -52,10 +51,6 @@ const (
markManglePost = "mark-mangle-post"
matchSet = "--match-set"
// routeSourceSuffix names the extra rules a route ACL needs when ipset is
// unusable and each source prefix has to be matched by its own rule.
routeSourceSuffix = "_src"
dnatSuffix = "_dnat"
snatSuffix = "_snat"
fwdSuffix = "_fwd"
@@ -73,6 +68,7 @@ type ruleInfo struct {
}
type routeFilteringRuleParams struct {
Source firewall.Network
Destination firewall.Network
Proto firewall.Protocol
SPort *firewall.Port
@@ -94,21 +90,19 @@ type router struct {
legacyManagement bool
mtu uint16
v6 bool
ipsetSupport *ipsetSupport
stateManager *statemanager.Manager
ipFwdState *ipfwdstate.IPForwardingState
}
func newRouter(iptablesClient *iptables.IPTables, wgIface iFaceMapper, mtu uint16, ipsetSupport *ipsetSupport) (*router, error) {
func newRouter(iptablesClient *iptables.IPTables, wgIface iFaceMapper, mtu uint16) (*router, error) {
r := &router{
iptablesClient: iptablesClient,
rules: make(map[string][]string),
wgIface: wgIface,
mtu: mtu,
v6: iptablesClient.Proto() == iptables.ProtocolIPv6,
ipFwdState: ipfwdstate.NewIPForwardingState(wgIface.Name()),
ipsetSupport: ipsetSupport,
ipFwdState: ipfwdstate.NewIPForwardingState(),
}
r.ipsetCounter = refcounter.New(
@@ -157,113 +151,6 @@ func (r *router) AddRouteFiltering(
return ruleKey, nil
}
params := routeFilteringRuleParams{
Destination: destination,
Proto: proto,
SPort: sPort,
DPort: dPort,
Action: action,
}
err := r.installRouteRules(string(ruleKey), params, sources, r.ipsetSupport.supported())
var unusable *ipsetUnusableError
if errors.As(err, &unusable) {
// The set could not be created or matched. Retry matching each source
// prefix on its own; only if that works do we know ipset was to blame.
r.removeRouteRules(string(ruleKey))
if retryErr := r.installRouteRules(string(ruleKey), params, sources, false); retryErr != nil {
r.removeRouteRules(string(ruleKey))
return nil, fmt.Errorf("add route rule (ipset: %w): %w", unusable.cause, retryErr)
}
r.ipsetSupport.markUnsupported(unusable.cause)
err = nil
}
if err != nil {
// Leave nothing half-installed: a later call finding the rule key would
// report success while some sources were never installed, which for a
// drop rule would leave them unblocked.
r.removeRouteRules(string(ruleKey))
return nil, fmt.Errorf("add route rule: %w", err)
}
r.updateState()
return ruleKey, nil
}
// installRouteRules installs every rule needed for one route ACL and records them
// under ruleKey. It is more than one rule only when useIPSet is false and the
// sources have to be matched one prefix at a time.
func (r *router) installRouteRules(ruleKey string, params routeFilteringRuleParams, sources []netip.Prefix, useIPSet bool) error {
specs, err := r.genRouteRuleSpecs(params, sources, useIPSet)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("generate route rule spec: %w", err)
}
for i, spec := range specs {
if err := r.insertRouteRule(params.Action, spec); err != nil {
if len(r.findSets(spec)) > 0 {
return ipsetUnusable(err)
}
return err
}
r.rules[routeRuleKey(ruleKey, i)] = spec
}
return nil
}
// genRouteRuleSpecs builds the rules for one route ACL. With ipset available that
// is a single rule matching a set of sources; without it, one rule per source
// prefix, which is the only form a stripped kernel can express.
func (r *router) genRouteRuleSpecs(params routeFilteringRuleParams, sources []netip.Prefix, useIPSet bool) ([][]string, error) {
destExp, err := r.applyNetwork("-d", params.Destination, nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("apply network -d: %w", err)
}
specs, err := r.genSourceRules(params, sources, useIPSet, destExp)
if err != nil {
// The destination match may have taken a set reference already.
if decErr := r.decrementSetCounter(destExp); decErr != nil {
log.Debugf("release destination set after failed rule generation: %v", decErr)
}
return nil, err
}
return specs, nil
}
func (r *router) genSourceRules(params routeFilteringRuleParams, sources []netip.Prefix, useIPSet bool, destExp []string) ([][]string, error) {
if useIPSet || len(sources) <= 1 {
sourceExp, err := r.applyNetwork("-s", sourceNetwork(sources), sources)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("apply network -s: %w", err)
}
return [][]string{assembleRouteRule(sourceExp, destExp, params, r.v6)}, nil
}
specs := make([][]string, 0, len(sources))
for _, source := range sources {
sourceExp, err := r.applyNetwork("-s", firewall.Network{Prefix: source}, nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("apply network -s: %w", err)
}
specs = append(specs, assembleRouteRule(sourceExp, destExp, params, r.v6))
}
return specs, nil
}
func sourceNetwork(sources []netip.Prefix) firewall.Network {
var source firewall.Network
if len(sources) > 1 {
source.Set = firewall.NewPrefixSet(sources)
@@ -271,48 +158,37 @@ func sourceNetwork(sources []netip.Prefix) firewall.Network {
source.Prefix = sources[0]
}
return source
}
params := routeFilteringRuleParams{
Source: source,
Destination: destination,
Proto: proto,
SPort: sPort,
DPort: dPort,
Action: action,
}
rule, err := r.genRouteRuleSpec(params, sources)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("generate route rule spec: %w", err)
}
func (r *router) insertRouteRule(action firewall.Action, spec []string) error {
// Insert DROP rules at the beginning, append ACCEPT rules at the end
if action == firewall.ActionDrop {
// after the established rule
return r.iptablesClient.Insert(tableFilter, chainRTFWDIN, 2, spec...)
err = r.iptablesClient.Insert(tableFilter, chainRTFWDIN, 2, rule...)
} else {
err = r.iptablesClient.Append(tableFilter, chainRTFWDIN, rule...)
}
return r.iptablesClient.Append(tableFilter, chainRTFWDIN, spec...)
}
// removeRouteRules deletes the rules recorded for ruleKey, used to undo a partial
// install before retrying without ipset.
func (r *router) removeRouteRules(ruleKey string) {
for i := 0; ; i++ {
key := routeRuleKey(ruleKey, i)
spec, exists := r.rules[key]
if !exists {
return
}
if err := r.iptablesClient.DeleteIfExists(tableFilter, chainRTFWDIN, spec...); err != nil {
log.Debugf("delete partial route rule %s: %v", key, err)
}
delete(r.rules, key)
if err := r.decrementSetCounter(spec); err != nil {
log.Debugf("decrement ipset counter for %s: %v", key, err)
}
}
}
// routeRuleKey names the i-th rule of a route ACL. The first keeps the plain rule
// key so single-rule ACLs, which is every ACL when ipset works, are unaffected.
func routeRuleKey(ruleKey string, i int) string {
if i == 0 {
return ruleKey
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("add route rule: %v", err)
}
return fmt.Sprintf("%s%s%d", ruleKey, routeSourceSuffix, i)
r.rules[string(ruleKey)] = rule
r.updateState()
return ruleKey, nil
}
func (r *router) hasRule(id string) bool {
@@ -323,29 +199,17 @@ func (r *router) hasRule(id string) bool {
func (r *router) DeleteRouteRule(rule firewall.Rule) error {
ruleKey := rule.ID()
if _, exists := r.rules[ruleKey]; !exists {
log.Debugf("route rule %s not found", ruleKey)
r.updateState()
return nil
}
// In the ipset fallback one ACL is several rules, one per source prefix.
for i := 0; ; i++ {
key := routeRuleKey(ruleKey, i)
rule, exists := r.rules[key]
if !exists {
break
}
if rule, exists := r.rules[ruleKey]; exists {
if err := r.iptablesClient.Delete(tableFilter, chainRTFWDIN, rule...); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("delete route rule: %v", err)
}
delete(r.rules, key)
delete(r.rules, ruleKey)
if err := r.decrementSetCounter(rule); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("decrement ipset counter: %w", err)
}
} else {
log.Debugf("route rule %s not found", ruleKey)
}
r.updateState()
@@ -906,6 +770,10 @@ func (r *router) updateState() {
}
func (r *router) AddDNATRule(rule firewall.ForwardRule) (firewall.Rule, error) {
if err := r.ipFwdState.RequestForwarding(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
ruleKey := rule.ID()
if _, exists := r.rules[ruleKey+dnatSuffix]; exists {
return rule, nil
@@ -972,34 +840,18 @@ func (r *router) AddDNATRule(rule firewall.ForwardRule) (firewall.Rule, error) {
for key, ruleInfo := range rules {
if err := r.iptablesClient.Append(ruleInfo.table, ruleInfo.chain, ruleInfo.rule...); err != nil {
r.cleanupFailedDNATAdd(rules)
if rollbackErr := r.rollbackRules(rules); rollbackErr != nil {
log.Errorf("rollback failed: %v", rollbackErr)
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("add rule %s: %w", key, err)
}
r.rules[key] = ruleInfo.rule
}
if err := r.ipFwdState.RequestForwarding(r.v6); err != nil {
r.cleanupFailedDNATAdd(rules)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("enable forwarding: %w", err)
}
r.updateState()
return rule, nil
}
// cleanupFailedDNATAdd removes the bookkeeping written by a partially applied
// AddDNATRule before rolling back the kernel rules, so no entries remain that
// never got a forwarding refcount. rollbackRules re-adds entries it failed to
// remove from the kernel.
func (r *router) cleanupFailedDNATAdd(rules map[string]ruleInfo) {
for key := range rules {
delete(r.rules, key)
}
if err := r.rollbackRules(rules); err != nil {
log.Errorf("rollback failed: %v", err)
}
}
func (r *router) rollbackRules(rules map[string]ruleInfo) error {
var merr *multierror.Error
for key, ruleInfo := range rules {
@@ -1016,70 +868,63 @@ func (r *router) rollbackRules(rules map[string]ruleInfo) error {
}
func (r *router) DeleteDNATRule(rule firewall.Rule) error {
ruleKey := rule.ID()
_, hadDNAT := r.rules[ruleKey+dnatSuffix]
_, hadSNAT := r.rules[ruleKey+snatSuffix]
_, hadFWD := r.rules[ruleKey+fwdSuffix]
if !hadDNAT && !hadSNAT && !hadFWD {
return nil
if err := r.ipFwdState.ReleaseForwarding(); err != nil {
log.Errorf("%v", err)
}
ruleKey := rule.ID()
var merr *multierror.Error
if dnatRule, exists := r.rules[ruleKey+dnatSuffix]; exists {
if err := r.iptablesClient.Delete(tableNat, chainRTRDR, dnatRule...); err != nil {
merr = multierror.Append(merr, fmt.Errorf("delete DNAT rule: %w", err))
} else {
delete(r.rules, ruleKey+dnatSuffix)
}
delete(r.rules, ruleKey+dnatSuffix)
}
if snatRule, exists := r.rules[ruleKey+snatSuffix]; exists {
if err := r.iptablesClient.Delete(tableNat, chainRTNAT, snatRule...); err != nil {
merr = multierror.Append(merr, fmt.Errorf("delete SNAT rule: %w", err))
} else {
delete(r.rules, ruleKey+snatSuffix)
}
delete(r.rules, ruleKey+snatSuffix)
}
if fwdRule, exists := r.rules[ruleKey+fwdSuffix]; exists {
if err := r.iptablesClient.Delete(tableFilter, chainRTFWDOUT, fwdRule...); err != nil {
merr = multierror.Append(merr, fmt.Errorf("delete forward rule: %w", err))
} else {
delete(r.rules, ruleKey+fwdSuffix)
}
}
// Release the refcount only once all rules are gone from the kernel. On
// partial failure the failed entries stay in r.rules so a retry can remove
// them and release then.
if merr == nil {
if err := r.ipFwdState.ReleaseForwarding(r.v6); err != nil {
log.Errorf("%v", err)
}
delete(r.rules, ruleKey+fwdSuffix)
}
r.updateState()
return nberrors.FormatErrorOrNil(merr)
}
// assembleRouteRule joins the pre-built source and destination matches with the
// protocol, ports and target of a route ACL.
func assembleRouteRule(sourceExp, destExp []string, params routeFilteringRuleParams, v6 bool) []string {
func (r *router) genRouteRuleSpec(params routeFilteringRuleParams, sources []netip.Prefix) ([]string, error) {
var rule []string
sourceExp, err := r.applyNetwork("-s", params.Source, sources)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("apply network -s: %w", err)
}
destExp, err := r.applyNetwork("-d", params.Destination, nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("apply network -d: %w", err)
}
rule = append(rule, sourceExp...)
rule = append(rule, destExp...)
if params.Proto != firewall.ProtocolALL {
rule = append(rule, "-p", strings.ToLower(protoForFamily(params.Proto, v6)))
rule = append(rule, "-p", strings.ToLower(protoForFamily(params.Proto, r.v6)))
rule = append(rule, applyPort("--sport", params.SPort)...)
rule = append(rule, applyPort("--dport", params.DPort)...)
}
rule = append(rule, "-j", actionToStr(params.Action))
return rule
return rule, nil
}
func (r *router) applyNetwork(flag string, network firewall.Network, prefixes []netip.Prefix) ([]string, error) {
@@ -1089,17 +934,9 @@ func (r *router) applyNetwork(flag string, network firewall.Network, prefixes []
}
if network.IsSet() {
// A destination set is populated later from DNS results, so unlike a
// source set it cannot be expanded into per-prefix rules here. Without
// ipset such a rule is not expressible; report it instead of installing
// something broader than the policy allows.
if flag == "-d" && !r.ipsetSupport.supported() {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("destination set %s requires ipset (ip_set_hash_net and xt_set)", network.Set.HashedName())
}
name := r.ipsetName(network.Set.HashedName())
if _, err := r.ipsetCounter.Increment(name, prefixes); err != nil {
return nil, ipsetUnusable(fmt.Errorf("create or get ipset: %w", err))
return nil, fmt.Errorf("create or get ipset: %w", err)
}
return []string{"-m", "set", matchSet, name, direction}, nil

View File

@@ -3,11 +3,9 @@
package iptables
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"net/netip"
"os/exec"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/coreos/go-iptables/iptables"
@@ -17,9 +15,7 @@ import (
firewall "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/test"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface"
nbid "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/acl/id"
nbnet "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/net"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
)
func isIptablesSupported() bool {
@@ -35,7 +31,7 @@ func TestIptablesManager_RestoreOrCreateContainers(t *testing.T) {
iptablesClient, err := iptables.NewWithProtocol(iptables.ProtocolIPv4)
require.NoError(t, err, "failed to init iptables client")
manager, err := newRouter(iptablesClient, ifaceMock, iface.DefaultMTU, newIPSetSupport())
manager, err := newRouter(iptablesClient, ifaceMock, iface.DefaultMTU)
require.NoError(t, err, "should return a valid iptables manager")
require.NoError(t, manager.init(nil))
@@ -88,7 +84,7 @@ func TestIptablesManager_AddNatRule(t *testing.T) {
iptablesClient, err := iptables.NewWithProtocol(iptables.ProtocolIPv4)
require.NoError(t, err, "failed to init iptables client")
manager, err := newRouter(iptablesClient, ifaceMock, iface.DefaultMTU, newIPSetSupport())
manager, err := newRouter(iptablesClient, ifaceMock, iface.DefaultMTU)
require.NoError(t, err, "shouldn't return error")
require.NoError(t, manager.init(nil))
@@ -161,7 +157,7 @@ func TestIptablesManager_RemoveNatRule(t *testing.T) {
t.Run(testCase.Name, func(t *testing.T) {
iptablesClient, _ := iptables.NewWithProtocol(iptables.ProtocolIPv4)
manager, err := newRouter(iptablesClient, ifaceMock, iface.DefaultMTU, newIPSetSupport())
manager, err := newRouter(iptablesClient, ifaceMock, iface.DefaultMTU)
require.NoError(t, err, "shouldn't return error")
require.NoError(t, manager.init(nil))
defer func() {
@@ -223,7 +219,7 @@ func TestRouter_AddRouteFiltering(t *testing.T) {
iptablesClient, err := iptables.NewWithProtocol(iptables.ProtocolIPv4)
require.NoError(t, err, "Failed to create iptables client")
r, err := newRouter(iptablesClient, ifaceMock, iface.DefaultMTU, newIPSetSupport())
r, err := newRouter(iptablesClient, ifaceMock, iface.DefaultMTU)
require.NoError(t, err, "Failed to create router manager")
require.NoError(t, r.init(nil))
@@ -341,26 +337,27 @@ func TestRouter_AddRouteFiltering(t *testing.T) {
ruleKey, err := r.AddRouteFiltering(nil, tt.sources, firewall.Network{Prefix: tt.destination}, tt.proto, tt.sPort, tt.dPort, tt.action)
require.NoError(t, err, "AddRouteFiltering failed")
// A kernel without usable ipset splits a multi-source ACL into one
// rule per source, so compare against whichever form is in effect.
useIPSet := r.ipsetSupport.supported()
// Check if the rule is in the internal map
rule, ok := r.rules[ruleKey.ID()]
assert.True(t, ok, "Rule not found in internal map")
// Check if the rules are in the internal map
rules := routeRuleSpecs(t, r, ruleKey.ID())
require.NotEmpty(t, rules, "Rule not found in internal map")
// Log the internal rule
t.Logf("Internal rule: %v", rule)
// Log the internal rules
t.Logf("Internal rules: %v", rules)
// Check if the rule exists in iptables
exists, err := iptablesClient.Exists(tableFilter, chainRTFWDIN, rule...)
assert.NoError(t, err, "Failed to check rule existence")
assert.True(t, exists, "Rule not found in iptables")
// Check if the rules exist in iptables
for _, rule := range rules {
exists, err := iptablesClient.Exists(tableFilter, chainRTFWDIN, rule...)
assert.NoError(t, err, "Failed to check rule existence")
assert.True(t, exists, "Rule not found in iptables")
var source firewall.Network
if len(tt.sources) > 1 {
source.Set = firewall.NewPrefixSet(tt.sources)
} else if len(tt.sources) > 0 {
source.Prefix = tt.sources[0]
}
// Verify rule content
params := routeFilteringRuleParams{
Source: source,
Destination: firewall.Network{Prefix: tt.destination},
Proto: tt.proto,
SPort: tt.sPort,
@@ -368,18 +365,20 @@ func TestRouter_AddRouteFiltering(t *testing.T) {
Action: tt.action,
}
expectedRules, err := r.genRouteRuleSpecs(params, tt.sources, useIPSet)
expectedRule, err := r.genRouteRuleSpec(params, nil)
require.NoError(t, err, "Failed to generate expected rule spec")
if tt.expectSet && useIPSet {
if tt.expectSet {
setName := firewall.NewPrefixSet(tt.sources).HashedName()
expectedRule, err = r.genRouteRuleSpec(params, nil)
require.NoError(t, err, "Failed to generate expected rule spec with set")
// Check if the set was created
_, exists := r.ipsetCounter.Get(setName)
assert.True(t, exists, "IPSet not created")
}
assert.Equal(t, expectedRules, rules, "Rule content mismatch")
assert.Equal(t, expectedRule, rule, "Rule content mismatch")
// Clean up
err = r.DeleteRouteRule(ruleKey)
@@ -446,145 +445,3 @@ func TestFindSetNameInRule(t *testing.T) {
})
}
}
// TestRouter_AddRouteFilteringIPSetFallback covers a kernel that cannot use ipset:
// a multi-source route ACL must become one rule per source prefix, all present in
// the chain, and deleting the ACL must remove every one of them. Without the
// fallback the rule was never installed and the interface-wide DROP in FORWARD
// silently dropped routed traffic.
func TestRouter_AddRouteFilteringIPSetFallback(t *testing.T) {
if !isIptablesSupported() {
t.Skip("iptables not supported on this system")
}
iptablesClient, err := iptables.NewWithProtocol(iptables.ProtocolIPv4)
require.NoError(t, err)
support := newIPSetSupport()
support.markUnsupported(errors.New("test: pretend the kernel has no ipset"))
r, err := newRouter(iptablesClient, ifaceMock, iface.DefaultMTU, support)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, r.init(nil))
t.Cleanup(func() {
require.NoError(t, r.Reset())
})
sources := []netip.Prefix{
netip.MustParsePrefix("172.16.0.0/16"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("192.168.0.0/16"),
}
destination := firewall.Network{Prefix: netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8")}
rule, err := r.AddRouteFiltering(nil, sources, destination, firewall.ProtocolTCP, nil,
&firewall.Port{Values: []uint16{443}}, firewall.ActionAccept)
require.NoError(t, err, "route ACL must install without ipset")
specs := routeRuleSpecs(t, r, rule.ID())
require.Len(t, specs, len(sources), "each source prefix needs its own rule")
for i, spec := range specs {
joined := strings.Join(spec, " ")
require.Contains(t, joined, "-s "+sources[i].String(), "rule must match the source prefix directly")
require.NotContains(t, joined, matchSet, "fallback rule must not reference a set")
exists, err := iptablesClient.Exists(tableFilter, chainRTFWDIN, spec...)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.True(t, exists, "rule %d must be present in %s", i, chainRTFWDIN)
}
require.NoError(t, r.DeleteRouteRule(rule))
for i, spec := range specs {
exists, err := iptablesClient.Exists(tableFilter, chainRTFWDIN, spec...)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.False(t, exists, "rule %d must be removed", i)
}
require.Empty(t, routeRuleSpecs(t, r, rule.ID()), "no rule may be left recorded")
}
// TestRouter_DestinationSetRequiresIPSet documents that a dynamic (domain)
// destination cannot be expressed without ipset: its prefixes are only known
// after DNS resolution, so there is nothing to expand into per-prefix rules. The
// call must report that rather than install a broader rule than the policy allows.
func TestRouter_DestinationSetRequiresIPSet(t *testing.T) {
if !isIptablesSupported() {
t.Skip("iptables not supported on this system")
}
iptablesClient, err := iptables.NewWithProtocol(iptables.ProtocolIPv4)
require.NoError(t, err)
support := newIPSetSupport()
support.markUnsupported(errors.New("test: pretend the kernel has no ipset"))
r, err := newRouter(iptablesClient, ifaceMock, iface.DefaultMTU, support)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, r.init(nil))
t.Cleanup(func() {
require.NoError(t, r.Reset())
})
destination := firewall.Network{Set: firewall.NewDomainSet(domain.List{"example.com"})}
_, err = r.AddRouteFiltering(nil, []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("172.16.0.0/16")},
destination, firewall.ProtocolALL, nil, nil, firewall.ActionAccept)
require.Error(t, err, "a domain destination is not expressible without ipset")
require.ErrorContains(t, err, "requires ipset")
}
// TestRouter_RouteFilteringRollsBackPartialInstall covers a fallback ACL whose
// second rule cannot be installed. Nothing may be left behind: if the rule key
// survived, a later call would short-circuit on it and report success while some
// sources were never installed, leaving them unblocked for a drop rule.
func TestRouter_RouteFilteringRollsBackPartialInstall(t *testing.T) {
if !isIptablesSupported() {
t.Skip("iptables not supported on this system")
}
iptablesClient, err := iptables.NewWithProtocol(iptables.ProtocolIPv4)
require.NoError(t, err)
support := newIPSetSupport()
support.markUnsupported(errors.New("test: pretend the kernel has no ipset"))
r, err := newRouter(iptablesClient, ifaceMock, iface.DefaultMTU, support)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, r.init(nil))
t.Cleanup(func() {
require.NoError(t, r.Reset())
})
// The v6 prefix is rejected by the v4 iptables binary, so the second rule of
// the expansion fails after the first has been installed.
good := netip.MustParsePrefix("172.16.0.0/16")
sources := []netip.Prefix{good, netip.MustParsePrefix("2001:db8::/32")}
destination := firewall.Network{Prefix: netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8")}
_, err = r.AddRouteFiltering(nil, sources, destination, firewall.ProtocolALL, nil, nil, firewall.ActionDrop)
require.Error(t, err, "a source that iptables rejects must fail the whole ACL")
ruleKey := nbid.GenerateRouteRuleKey(sources, destination, firewall.ProtocolALL, nil, nil, firewall.ActionDrop)
require.Empty(t, routeRuleSpecs(t, r, string(ruleKey)), "no rule may stay recorded")
// The rule that did get installed must be gone from the chain.
installed := []string{"-s", good.String(), "-d", "10.0.0.0/8", "-j", "DROP"}
exists, err := iptablesClient.Exists(tableFilter, chainRTFWDIN, installed...)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.False(t, exists, "the already-installed rule must be rolled back")
}
// routeRuleSpecs collects the rules recorded for one route ACL, which is more than
// one when the ipset fallback splits it per source prefix.
func routeRuleSpecs(t *testing.T, r *router, ruleKey string) [][]string {
t.Helper()
var specs [][]string
for i := 0; ; i++ {
spec, exists := r.rules[routeRuleKey(ruleKey, i)]
if !exists {
return specs
}
specs = append(specs, spec)
}
}

View File

@@ -1,249 +0,0 @@
//go:build privileged
package nftables
import (
"net/netip"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
fw "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
)
func nftRefcountIfaceV4() *iFaceMock {
return &iFaceMock{
NameFunc: func() string { return "wt-refcount" },
AddressFunc: func() wgaddr.Address {
return wgaddr.Address{
IP: netip.MustParseAddr("100.96.0.1"),
Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("100.96.0.0/16"),
}
},
}
}
func nftRefcountIfaceDual() *iFaceMock {
return &iFaceMock{
NameFunc: func() string { return "wt-refcount" },
AddressFunc: func() wgaddr.Address {
return wgaddr.Address{
IP: netip.MustParseAddr("100.96.0.1"),
Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("100.96.0.0/16"),
IPv6: netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::1"),
IPv6Net: netip.MustParsePrefix("fd00::/64"),
}
},
}
}
func newNftRefcountManager(t *testing.T, dual bool) *Manager {
t.Helper()
if check() != NFTABLES {
t.Skip("nftables not supported on this system")
}
var ifMock *iFaceMock
if dual {
ifMock = nftRefcountIfaceDual()
} else {
ifMock = nftRefcountIfaceV4()
}
m, err := Create(ifMock, iface.DefaultMTU)
require.NoError(t, err, "create manager")
require.NoError(t, m.Init(nil), "init manager")
t.Cleanup(func() {
require.NoError(t, m.Close(nil), "close manager")
})
return m
}
func dnatV4(port uint16) fw.ForwardRule {
return fw.ForwardRule{
Protocol: fw.ProtocolTCP,
DestinationPort: fw.Port{Values: []uint16{port}},
TranslatedAddress: netip.MustParseAddr("100.96.0.2"),
TranslatedPort: fw.Port{Values: []uint16{80}},
}
}
func dnatV6(port uint16) fw.ForwardRule {
return fw.ForwardRule{
Protocol: fw.ProtocolTCP,
DestinationPort: fw.Port{Values: []uint16{port}},
TranslatedAddress: netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::2"),
TranslatedPort: fw.Port{Values: []uint16{80}},
}
}
// TestNftablesDNAT_RefcountBalancedV4 verifies that Add/Delete pairs leave the
// v4 refcount at zero.
func TestNftablesDNAT_RefcountBalancedV4(t *testing.T) {
m := newNftRefcountManager(t, false)
state := m.router.ipFwdState
r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(dnatV4(8081))
require.NoError(t, err, "add v4 dnat 1")
v4, v6 := state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "v4 refcount after first add")
assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount unchanged")
r2, err := m.AddDNATRule(dnatV4(8082))
require.NoError(t, err, "add v4 dnat 2")
v4, v6 = state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 2, v4, "v4 refcount after second add")
assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount unchanged")
require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1), "delete v4 dnat 1")
v4, v6 = state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "v4 refcount after first delete")
assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount unchanged")
require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r2), "delete v4 dnat 2")
v4, v6 = state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "v4 refcount after second delete")
assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount unchanged")
}
// TestNftablesDNAT_RefcountBalancedV6 verifies the v6 path increments v6 only
// and decrements back to zero on Delete.
func TestNftablesDNAT_RefcountBalancedV6(t *testing.T) {
m := newNftRefcountManager(t, true)
require.NotNil(t, m.router6, "v6 router")
require.Same(t, m.router.ipFwdState, m.router6.ipFwdState, "shared state")
state := m.router.ipFwdState
r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(dnatV6(9091))
require.NoError(t, err, "add v6 dnat 1")
v4, v6 := state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "v4 refcount unchanged")
assert.Equal(t, 1, v6, "v6 refcount after first add")
r2, err := m.AddDNATRule(dnatV6(9092))
require.NoError(t, err, "add v6 dnat 2")
v4, v6 = state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 0, v4)
assert.Equal(t, 2, v6, "v6 refcount after second add")
require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1), "delete v6 dnat 1")
v4, v6 = state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "v4 refcount unchanged")
assert.Equal(t, 1, v6, "v6 refcount after first delete")
require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r2), "delete v6 dnat 2")
v4, v6 = state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 0, v4)
assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount after second delete")
}
// TestNftablesDNAT_DuplicateAddNoLeak verifies that a duplicate Add (same
// ForwardRule) does not double-increment the refcount.
func TestNftablesDNAT_DuplicateAddNoLeak(t *testing.T) {
m := newNftRefcountManager(t, true)
state := m.router.ipFwdState
rule := dnatV4(8083)
r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(rule)
require.NoError(t, err, "add v4 dnat")
v4, _ := state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 1, v4)
// duplicate add: same rule ID, must be a no-op for the refcount.
_, err = m.AddDNATRule(rule)
require.NoError(t, err, "duplicate add")
v4, _ = state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "duplicate add must not increment")
require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1), "delete v4 dnat")
v4, _ = state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "single delete must drop to zero")
}
// TestNftablesDNAT_DeleteMissingNoUnderflow verifies deleting a rule that was
// never added does not underflow the refcount.
func TestNftablesDNAT_DeleteMissingNoUnderflow(t *testing.T) {
m := newNftRefcountManager(t, true)
state := m.router.ipFwdState
// Construct a Rule reference for something never added. The router stores
// rules by ID(), and DeleteDNATRule looks them up in r.rules; a missing
// entry must be a no-op rather than calling Release.
phantom := dnatV4(8099)
require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(&phantom), "delete missing v4 dnat")
v4, v6 := state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "v4 refcount unaffected by missing delete")
assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount unaffected")
phantom6 := dnatV6(9099)
require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(&phantom6), "delete missing v6 dnat")
v4, v6 = state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 0, v4)
assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount unaffected by missing delete")
// And after a phantom delete, a real add still results in count=1.
r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(dnatV4(8100))
require.NoError(t, err, "add v4 dnat after phantom delete")
v4, _ = state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "real add still increments after phantom delete")
require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1))
}
// TestNftablesRouting_RepeatedEnableSingleReference verifies that EnableRouting
// (called on every network-map update) holds at most one reference per family
// and a single DisableRouting drops both back to zero.
func TestNftablesRouting_RepeatedEnableSingleReference(t *testing.T) {
m := newNftRefcountManager(t, true)
state := m.router.ipFwdState
require.NoError(t, m.EnableRouting(), "first enable")
require.NoError(t, m.EnableRouting(), "second enable")
require.NoError(t, m.EnableRouting(), "third enable")
v4, v6 := state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "repeated enable holds a single v4 reference")
assert.Equal(t, 1, v6, "repeated enable holds a single v6 reference")
require.NoError(t, m.DisableRouting(), "disable")
v4, v6 = state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "single disable releases the v4 reference")
assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "single disable releases the v6 reference")
}
// TestNftablesRouting_DisableKeepsDNATReference verifies that an unpaired
// DisableRouting does not release references held by active DNAT rules.
func TestNftablesRouting_DisableKeepsDNATReference(t *testing.T) {
m := newNftRefcountManager(t, true)
state := m.router.ipFwdState
r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(dnatV6(9095))
require.NoError(t, err, "add v6 dnat")
require.NoError(t, m.DisableRouting(), "unpaired disable")
_, v6 := state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 1, v6, "DNAT-held reference survives unpaired DisableRouting")
require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1), "delete v6 dnat")
_, v6 = state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "delete releases the DNAT reference")
}
// TestNftablesDNAT_DoubleDeleteNoUnderflow verifies that deleting the same rule
// twice does not underflow the refcount (the second delete is a no-op).
func TestNftablesDNAT_DoubleDeleteNoUnderflow(t *testing.T) {
m := newNftRefcountManager(t, true)
state := m.router.ipFwdState
r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(dnatV6(9093))
require.NoError(t, err)
_, v6 := state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 1, v6)
require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1), "first delete")
_, v6 = state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 0, v6)
require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1), "second delete must be no-op")
_, v6 = state.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "double delete must not underflow")
}

View File

@@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ func (m *Manager) createIPv6Components(tableName string, wgIface iFaceMapper, mt
return fmt.Errorf("create v6 router: %w", err)
}
// Share the per-family forwarding refcounter with the v4 router so a v4
// rule and a v6 rule against the same state machine cooperate cleanly.
// Share the same IP forwarding state with the v4 router, since
// EnableIPForwarding controls both v4 and v6 sysctls.
m.router6.ipFwdState = m.router.ipFwdState
m.aclManager6, err = newAclManager(workTable6, wgIface, chainNameRoutingFw)
@@ -530,12 +530,17 @@ func (m *Manager) SetLogLevel(log.Level) {
}
func (m *Manager) EnableRouting() error {
// v6 only when the overlay actually has v6.
return m.router.ipFwdState.RequestRouting(m.router6 != nil)
if err := m.router.ipFwdState.RequestForwarding(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("enable IP forwarding: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
func (m *Manager) DisableRouting() error {
return m.router.ipFwdState.ReleaseRouting()
if err := m.router.ipFwdState.ReleaseForwarding(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("disable IP forwarding: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// Flush rule/chain/set operations from the buffer

View File

@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ func newRouter(workTable *nftables.Table, wgIface iFaceMapper, mtu uint16) (*rou
rules: make(map[string]*nftables.Rule),
af: familyForAddr(workTable.Family == nftables.TableFamilyIPv4),
wgIface: wgIface,
ipFwdState: ipfwdstate.NewIPForwardingState(wgIface.Name()),
ipFwdState: ipfwdstate.NewIPForwardingState(),
mtu: mtu,
}
@@ -1553,6 +1553,10 @@ func (r *router) refreshRulesMap() error {
}
func (r *router) AddDNATRule(rule firewall.ForwardRule) (firewall.Rule, error) {
if err := r.ipFwdState.RequestForwarding(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
ruleKey := rule.ID()
if _, exists := r.rules[ruleKey+dnatSuffix]; exists {
return rule, nil
@@ -1563,18 +1567,7 @@ func (r *router) AddDNATRule(rule firewall.ForwardRule) (firewall.Rule, error) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("convert protocol to number: %w", err)
}
// Request forwarding before queueing rules: addDnatRedirect/addDnatMasq
// buffer netlink messages on r.conn that the next caller's Flush would
// commit if we returned without flushing them ourselves.
v6 := r.af.tableFamily == nftables.TableFamilyIPv6
if err := r.ipFwdState.RequestForwarding(v6); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("enable forwarding: %w", err)
}
if err := r.addDnatRedirect(rule, protoNum, ruleKey); err != nil {
if rerr := r.ipFwdState.ReleaseForwarding(v6); rerr != nil {
log.Warnf("rollback forwarding refcount: %v", rerr)
}
return nil, err
}
@@ -1586,11 +1579,6 @@ func (r *router) AddDNATRule(rule firewall.ForwardRule) (firewall.Rule, error) {
// TODO: find chains with drop policies and add rules there
if err := r.conn.Flush(); err != nil {
if rerr := r.ipFwdState.ReleaseForwarding(v6); rerr != nil {
log.Warnf("rollback forwarding refcount: %v", rerr)
}
delete(r.rules, ruleKey+dnatSuffix)
delete(r.rules, ruleKey+snatSuffix)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("flush rules: %w", err)
}
@@ -1793,18 +1781,16 @@ func (r *router) addDnatMasq(rule firewall.ForwardRule, protoNum uint8, ruleKey
}
func (r *router) DeleteDNATRule(rule firewall.Rule) error {
if err := r.ipFwdState.ReleaseForwarding(); err != nil {
log.Errorf("%v", err)
}
ruleKey := rule.ID()
if err := r.refreshRulesMap(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf(refreshRulesMapError, err)
}
_, hadDNAT := r.rules[ruleKey+dnatSuffix]
_, hadSNAT := r.rules[ruleKey+snatSuffix]
if !hadDNAT && !hadSNAT {
return nil
}
var merr *multierror.Error
var needsFlush bool
@@ -1836,16 +1822,9 @@ func (r *router) DeleteDNATRule(rule firewall.Rule) error {
}
}
// Release the refcount only once the rules are gone from the kernel. On
// failure (including the refreshRulesMap error above) the rules and their
// map entries remain, keeping forwarding on until a retry removes them.
if merr == nil {
delete(r.rules, ruleKey+dnatSuffix)
delete(r.rules, ruleKey+snatSuffix)
if err := r.ipFwdState.ReleaseForwarding(r.af.tableFamily == nftables.TableFamilyIPv6); err != nil {
log.Errorf("%v", err)
}
}
return nberrors.FormatErrorOrNil(merr)

View File

@@ -22,16 +22,6 @@ import (
nbnet "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/net"
)
const (
// wgMsgTypeHandshakeInitiation is the lowest WireGuard message type.
wgMsgTypeHandshakeInitiation uint32 = 1
// wgMsgTypeTransport is the highest WireGuard message type.
wgMsgTypeTransport uint32 = 4
// wgMinMsgSize is the smallest WireGuard message: transport data with an empty
// payload, which is what a keepalive is.
wgMinMsgSize = 32
)
type receiverCreator struct {
iceBind *ICEBind
}
@@ -226,15 +216,8 @@ func (s *ICEBind) createReceiverFn(pc wgConn.BatchReader, conn *net.UDPConn, rxO
for i := 0; i < numMsgs; i++ {
msg := &(*msgs)[i]
if ok, err := s.filterOutStunMessages(msg.Buffers, msg.N, msg.Addr); ok {
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("failed to handle STUN packet from %s: %v", msg.Addr, err)
}
// WireGuard reuses sizes and eps across reads and only skips a slot
// whose size is below the minimum message size. Leaving a consumed
// slot untouched makes it process this buffer again under the
// previous packet's length and endpoint.
sizes[i] = 0
// todo: handle err
if ok, _ := s.filterOutStunMessages(msg.Buffers, msg.N, msg.Addr); ok {
continue
}
sizes[i] = msg.N
@@ -288,16 +271,11 @@ func (s *ICEBind) createOrUpdateMux() {
func (s *ICEBind) filterOutStunMessages(buffers [][]byte, n int, addr net.Addr) (bool, error) {
for i := range buffers {
if n > len(buffers[i]) {
continue
}
pkt := buffers[i][:n]
if isWireGuardMsg(pkt) || !stun.IsMessage(pkt) {
if !stun.IsMessage(buffers[i]) {
continue
}
msg, err := s.parseSTUNMessage(pkt)
msg, err := s.parseSTUNMessage(buffers[i][:n])
if err != nil {
buffers[i] = []byte{}
return true, err
@@ -369,34 +347,18 @@ func putMessages(msgs *[]ipv6.Message, msgsPool *sync.Pool) {
msgsPool.Put(msgs)
}
// isWireGuardMsg reports whether the packet carries a WireGuard message header: a
// little-endian uint32 message type in the range 1..4, which leaves the three bytes
// after the type byte zero, in a packet long enough to hold any WireGuard message.
//
// A well formed STUN message cannot take that shape. Its length field sits in the two
// bytes the type must leave zero, and for a message of at least wgMinMsgSize bytes that
// field holds at least 12, so the two framings do not overlap. The test has to be this
// tight because stun.IsMessage only looks at the magic cookie, which in a WireGuard
// message overlaps the receiver index: a session whose index happens to equal the cookie
// would otherwise have all of its inbound data misrouted to the STUN handler until the
// next rekey.
func isWireGuardMsg(pkt []byte) bool {
if len(pkt) < wgMinMsgSize {
return false
}
msgType := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(pkt[:4])
return msgType >= wgMsgTypeHandshakeInitiation && msgType <= wgMsgTypeTransport
}
// isTransportPkg reports whether the packet is WireGuard transport data carrying a
// payload, which is what counts as peer activity. A keepalive holds no payload and is
// exactly wgMinMsgSize bytes.
func isTransportPkg(buffers [][]byte, n int) bool {
if n < 4 || n > len(buffers[0]) {
return false
// The first buffer should contain at least 4 bytes for type
if len(buffers[0]) < 4 {
return true
}
msgType := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(buffers[0][:4])
return msgType == wgMsgTypeTransport && n > wgMinMsgSize
// WireGuard packet type is a little-endian uint32 at start
packetType := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(buffers[0][:4])
// Check if packetType matches known WireGuard message types
if packetType == 4 && n > 32 {
return true
}
return false
}

View File

@@ -1,215 +0,0 @@
//go:build !js
package bind
import (
"encoding/binary"
"net"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/pion/stun/v3"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"golang.org/x/net/ipv4"
wgConn "golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/conn"
)
// magicCookieBytes is the STUN magic cookie as it appears on the wire. In a
// WireGuard message the same offset holds the receiver (or sender) index, which is
// a random uint32, so a session can draw exactly this value.
var magicCookieBytes = []byte{0x21, 0x12, 0xA4, 0x42}
const testBufSize = 1500
// wgMsg builds a WireGuard message of the given type and size, with the index field
// at bytes 4:8 set to index.
func wgMsg(msgType uint32, size int, index []byte) []byte {
pkt := make([]byte, size)
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(pkt[:4], msgType)
copy(pkt[4:8], index)
return pkt
}
// intoBuffer copies pkt into a full-size receive buffer, the way the kernel read
// does, so tests see the same buffer/length split as the hot path.
func intoBuffer(pkt []byte) [][]byte {
buf := make([]byte, testBufSize)
copy(buf, pkt)
return [][]byte{buf}
}
func TestFilterOutStunMessages_PassesWireGuardWithCookieShapedIndex(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
msgType uint32
size int
}{
{"transport data", wgMsgTypeTransport, 128},
{"keepalive", wgMsgTypeTransport, wgMinMsgSize},
{"handshake initiation", wgMsgTypeHandshakeInitiation, 148},
{"handshake response", 2, 92},
{"cookie reply", 3, 64},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
pkt := wgMsg(tc.msgType, tc.size, magicCookieBytes)
require.True(t, stun.IsMessage(pkt), "precondition: pion sees this as STUN")
buffers := intoBuffer(pkt)
bind := &ICEBind{}
filtered, err := bind.filterOutStunMessages(buffers, tc.size, &net.UDPAddr{})
assert.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, filtered, "WireGuard message must be handed to WireGuard, not the STUN handler")
assert.Len(t, buffers[0], testBufSize, "buffer must be left intact for WireGuard")
})
}
}
func TestFilterOutStunMessages_FiltersRealSTUNMessage(t *testing.T) {
msg, err := stun.Build(stun.BindingRequest, stun.TransactionID, stun.Fingerprint)
require.NoError(t, err)
buffers := intoBuffer(msg.Raw)
bind := &ICEBind{}
filtered, err := bind.filterOutStunMessages(buffers, len(msg.Raw), &net.UDPAddr{})
assert.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, filtered, "STUN message must be consumed by the STUN handler")
assert.Empty(t, buffers[0], "consumed buffer must be emptied so WireGuard does not see it")
}
// TestIsWireGuardMsg_DisjointFromSTUN locks the invariant the filter relies on: a
// well formed STUN message long enough to be a WireGuard message always has a
// non-zero length field, so it cannot be mistaken for a WireGuard header.
func TestIsWireGuardMsg_DisjointFromSTUN(t *testing.T) {
types := []stun.MessageType{
stun.BindingRequest,
stun.BindingSuccess,
stun.BindingError,
{Method: stun.MethodBinding, Class: stun.ClassIndication},
}
for _, msgType := range types {
// Long enough that the length guard is not what makes this pass.
msg, err := stun.Build(msgType, stun.TransactionID,
stun.NewUsername("remoteUfrag:localUfrag"), stun.Fingerprint)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.GreaterOrEqual(t, len(msg.Raw), wgMinMsgSize, "precondition: %s", msgType)
assert.False(t, isWireGuardMsg(msg.Raw),
"%s must not look like a WireGuard message", msgType)
}
}
func TestIsWireGuardMsg(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
pkt []byte
want bool
}{
{"transport data", wgMsg(wgMsgTypeTransport, 128, nil), true},
{"handshake initiation", wgMsg(wgMsgTypeHandshakeInitiation, 148, nil), true},
{"unknown type 5", wgMsg(5, 128, nil), false},
{"type 0", wgMsg(0, 128, nil), false},
{"non-zero reserved byte", []byte{0x04, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00}, false},
{"too short", []byte{0x04, 0x00, 0x00}, false},
{"empty", nil, false},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, tc.want, isWireGuardMsg(tc.pkt), "wrong classification for %s", tc.name)
})
}
}
// TestFilterOutStunMessages_IgnoresBytesBeyondPacket guards against classifying on
// buffer contents left over from an earlier, longer packet.
func TestFilterOutStunMessages_IgnoresBytesBeyondPacket(t *testing.T) {
buf := make([]byte, testBufSize)
copy(buf[4:8], magicCookieBytes)
buffers := [][]byte{buf}
bind := &ICEBind{}
filtered, err := bind.filterOutStunMessages(buffers, 2, &net.UDPAddr{})
assert.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, filtered, "a 2 byte packet must not be classified from stale buffer bytes")
}
// TestReceiveFn_ClearsSizeOfConsumedPacket covers the accounting WireGuard relies
// on: sizes is reused across reads, so a slot whose packet was consumed as STUN must
// be reported as empty. Otherwise WireGuard reprocesses the same buffer under the
// previous packet's length, which for a WireGuard-shaped packet means it is handled
// twice.
func TestReceiveFn_ClearsSizeOfConsumedPacket(t *testing.T) {
conn := listenUDP(t, "udp4", "127.0.0.1:0")
defer conn.Close()
recvFn := receiverCreator{setupICEBind(t)}.CreateReceiverFn(
ipv4.NewPacketConn(conn), conn, false, createMsgPool(),
)
msg, err := stun.Build(stun.BindingRequest, stun.TransactionID, stun.Fingerprint)
require.NoError(t, err)
sender := listenUDP(t, "udp4", "127.0.0.1:0")
defer sender.Close()
_, err = sender.WriteTo(msg.Raw, conn.LocalAddr())
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, conn.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(3*time.Second)))
bufs := [][]byte{make([]byte, 1500)}
// A leftover size from an earlier read, which is what makes the missing reset
// observable.
sizes := []int{148}
eps := make([]wgConn.Endpoint, 1)
n, err := recvFn(bufs, sizes, eps)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, 1, n)
assert.Zero(t, sizes[0], "consumed STUN packet must not leave a size behind for WireGuard")
}
func TestIsTransportPkg(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
pkt []byte
n int
want bool
}{
{"transport data with payload", wgMsg(wgMsgTypeTransport, 128, nil), 128, true},
{"keepalive", wgMsg(wgMsgTypeTransport, wgMinMsgSize, nil), wgMinMsgSize, false},
{"handshake initiation", wgMsg(wgMsgTypeHandshakeInitiation, 148, nil), 148, false},
{"stale type bytes beyond packet", wgMsg(wgMsgTypeTransport, 128, nil), 2, false},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, tc.want, isTransportPkg(intoBuffer(tc.pkt), tc.n),
"wrong activity classification for %s", tc.name)
})
}
}
// TestFilterOutStunMessages_ConsumesSTUNWithWireGuardShapedType covers the one STUN
// encoding whose leading bytes collide with a WireGuard message type: method 0x080 as a
// request encodes to 0x0200, so the type byte reads as a handshake response and the byte
// after it is zero. Only the length check keeps such a message out of WireGuard's hands.
// pion implements no method in that range, so this is a synthetic worst case rather than
// traffic ICE produces.
func TestFilterOutStunMessages_ConsumesSTUNWithWireGuardShapedType(t *testing.T) {
msg, err := stun.Build(stun.NewType(stun.Method(0x080), stun.ClassRequest), stun.TransactionID)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, []byte{0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}, msg.Raw[:4],
"precondition: the leading bytes read as a WireGuard message type")
buffers := intoBuffer(msg.Raw)
bind := &ICEBind{}
filtered, err := bind.filterOutStunMessages(buffers, len(msg.Raw), &net.UDPAddr{})
assert.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, filtered, "STUN message must be consumed despite its WireGuard-shaped type")
}

View File

@@ -113,14 +113,11 @@ func (c *ConnectClient) RunOnAndroid(
stateFilePath string,
cacheDir string,
) error {
notifier := tunnelnotifier.New(networkChangeListener, nil)
defer notifier.Close()
// in case of non Android os these variables will be nil
mobileDependency := MobileDependency{
TunAdapter: tunAdapter,
IFaceDiscover: iFaceDiscover,
NetworkChangeListener: notifier,
NetworkChangeListener: networkChangeListener,
HostDNSAddresses: dnsAddresses,
DnsReadyListener: dnsReadyListener,
StateFilePath: stateFilePath,

View File

@@ -34,8 +34,9 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/netiputil"
)
const readmeContent = `This debug bundle contains the following files.
If anonymization is enabled (--anonymize / --anonymize-level), the files are anonymized to protect sensitive information.
const readmeContent = `Netbird debug bundle
This debug bundle contains the following files.
If the --anonymize flag is set, the files are anonymized to protect sensitive information.
status.txt: Anonymized status information of the NetBird client.
client.log: Most recent, anonymized client log file of the NetBird client.
@@ -69,34 +70,21 @@ capture.pcap: Packet capture in pcap format. Only present when capture was runni
Anonymization Process
The files in this bundle have been anonymized to protect sensitive information. The level applied to this bundle is recorded at the top of this file. Here's how the anonymization was applied:
The files in this bundle have been anonymized to protect sensitive information. Here's how the anonymization was applied:
IP Addresses
Default level:
- Public IPv4 addresses are replaced with addresses starting from 198.51.100.0
- Public IPv6 addresses are replaced with addresses starting from 2001:db8:ffff::
- IPv6 unique local addresses (fc00::/7) are anonymized as well: their random global ID uniquely identifies the network.
- IP addresses from internal IPv4 ranges and well-known addresses are not anonymized (e.g. 8.8.8.8, 100.64.0.0/10, addresses starting with 192.168., 172.16., 10., 169.254., fe80::).
Strict level (--anonymize-level strict), in addition to the default level:
- Private (RFC 1918), CGNAT (100.64.0.0/10), and link-local (169.254.0.0/16, fe80::/10) addresses are anonymized too.
- Internal IPv4 addresses are replaced with addresses starting from 198.18.0.0 and internal IPv6 addresses with addresses starting from 2001:db8:1::, so internal addresses remain distinguishable from public ones.
- Addresses are mapped in order of first appearance: subnet structure, allocation scheme, and gateway conventions are not preserved. Prefix lengths of networks are preserved.
- Peer names in front of NetBird domains are replaced with numbered placeholders (e.g. peer-1.netbird.cloud), and subdomain labels of other domains with host-N placeholders.
- WireGuard public keys are replaced with consistent placeholder keys.
IPv4 addresses are replaced with addresses starting from 198.51.100.0
IPv6 addresses are replaced with addresses starting from 100::
IP addresses from non public ranges and well known addresses are not anonymized (e.g. 8.8.8.8, 100.64.0.0/10, addresses starting with 192.168., 172.16., 10., etc.).
Reoccuring IP addresses are replaced with the same anonymized address.
Note: The anonymized IP addresses in the status file do not match those in the log and routes files. However, the anonymized IP addresses are consistent within the status file and across the routes and log files.
MAC Addresses
MAC addresses are replaced at every anonymization level with consistent placeholders counting up from 02:00:00:00:00:01. Broadcast, multicast, and all-zero addresses are kept. At the default level a preserved IPv6 link-local address may still embed a MAC address (EUI-64); the strict level anonymizes those addresses.
Domains
All domain names (except for the netbird domains) are replaced with randomly generated strings ending in ".domain". Anonymized domains are consistent across all files in the bundle.
Reoccuring domain names are replaced with the same anonymized domain.
At the strict level, the peer name labels in front of netbird domains are anonymized as well.
Sync Response
The network_map.json file contains the following anonymized information:
@@ -293,7 +281,6 @@ type BundleGenerator struct {
cliVersion string
anonymize bool
anonymizeLevel anonymize.Level
includeSystemInfo bool
logFileCount uint32
@@ -301,10 +288,7 @@ type BundleGenerator struct {
}
type BundleConfig struct {
Anonymize bool
// AnonymizeLevel selects how much the anonymizer redacts.
// anonymize.LevelStrict implies Anonymize.
AnonymizeLevel anonymize.Level
Anonymize bool
IncludeSystemInfo bool
LogFileCount uint32
}
@@ -343,11 +327,8 @@ func NewBundleGenerator(deps GeneratorDependencies, cfg BundleConfig) *BundleGen
uiLogOpener = openLogFile
}
anonymizer := anonymize.NewAnonymizer(anonymize.DefaultAddresses())
anonymizer.SetLevel(cfg.AnonymizeLevel)
return &BundleGenerator{
anonymizer: anonymizer,
anonymizer: anonymize.NewAnonymizer(anonymize.DefaultAddresses()),
internalConfig: deps.InternalConfig,
statusRecorder: deps.StatusRecorder,
@@ -364,8 +345,7 @@ func NewBundleGenerator(deps GeneratorDependencies, cfg BundleConfig) *BundleGen
daemonVersion: deps.DaemonVersion,
cliVersion: deps.CliVersion,
anonymize: cfg.Anonymize || cfg.AnonymizeLevel >= anonymize.LevelStrict,
anonymizeLevel: cfg.AnonymizeLevel,
anonymize: cfg.Anonymize,
includeSystemInfo: cfg.IncludeSystemInfo,
logFileCount: logFileCount,
}
@@ -505,13 +485,7 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addSystemInfo() {
}
func (g *BundleGenerator) addReadme() error {
level := "none (anonymization disabled)"
if g.anonymize {
level = g.anonymizeLevel.String()
}
header := fmt.Sprintf("Netbird debug bundle\nAnonymization level applied to this bundle: %s\n", level)
readmeReader := strings.NewReader(header + readmeContent)
readmeReader := strings.NewReader(readmeContent)
if err := g.addFileToZip(readmeReader, "README.txt"); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("add README file to zip: %w", err)
}
@@ -533,10 +507,9 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addStatus() error {
fullStatus := g.statusRecorder.GetFullStatus()
protoFullStatus := nbstatus.ToProtoFullStatus(fullStatus)
overview := nbstatus.ConvertToStatusOutputOverview(protoFullStatus, nbstatus.ConvertOptions{
Anonymize: g.anonymize,
AnonymizeLevel: g.anonymizeLevel,
ProfileName: profName,
DaemonVersion: g.daemonVersion,
Anonymize: g.anonymize,
ProfileName: profName,
DaemonVersion: g.daemonVersion,
})
overview.CliVersion = g.cliVersion
statusOutput := overview.FullDetailSummary()
@@ -689,7 +662,7 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addCommonConfigFields(configContent *strings.Builder)
configContent.WriteString("NetBird Client Configuration:\n\n")
if key, err := wgtypes.ParseKey(g.internalConfig.PrivateKey); err == nil {
configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("PublicKey: %s\n", g.anonymizer.AnonymizeWGKey(key.PublicKey().String())))
configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("PublicKey: %s\n", key.PublicKey().String()))
}
configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("WgIface: %s\n", g.internalConfig.WgIface))
configContent.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("WgPort: %d\n", g.internalConfig.WgPort))
@@ -979,11 +952,6 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addUpdateLogs() error {
}
baseName := filepath.Base(logFile)
data, err = g.anonymizeBytes(data)
if err != nil {
log.Warnf("skipping update log file %s: %v", baseName, err)
continue
}
if err := g.addFileToZip(bytes.NewReader(data), filepath.Join("update-logs", baseName)); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("add update log file %s to zip: %w", baseName, err)
}
@@ -1011,13 +979,6 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addCorruptedStateFiles() error {
}
fileName := filepath.Base(match)
// Corrupted state files usually fail structured JSON anonymization,
// so run them through the string anonymizer instead.
data, err = g.anonymizeBytes(data)
if err != nil {
log.Warnf("skipping corrupted state file %s: %v", fileName, err)
continue
}
if err := g.addFileToZip(bytes.NewReader(data), "corrupted_states/"+fileName); err != nil {
log.Warnf("Failed to add corrupted state file %s to zip: %v", fileName, err)
continue
@@ -1029,27 +990,6 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) addCorruptedStateFiles() error {
return nil
}
// anonymizeBytes runs raw file content through the string anonymizer line by
// line when anonymization is enabled. It errors instead of returning partial
// content, so a caller never adds an unanonymized fallback to the bundle.
func (g *BundleGenerator) anonymizeBytes(data []byte) ([]byte, error) {
if !g.anonymize {
return data, nil
}
var buf bytes.Buffer
scanner := bufio.NewScanner(bytes.NewReader(data))
scanner.Buffer(make([]byte, 1024*1024), 1024*1024)
for scanner.Scan() {
buf.WriteString(g.anonymizer.AnonymizeString(scanner.Text()))
buf.WriteByte('\n')
}
if err := scanner.Err(); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("anonymize content: %w", err)
}
return buf.Bytes(), nil
}
func (g *BundleGenerator) addMetrics() error {
if g.clientMetrics == nil {
log.Debugf("skipping metrics in debug bundle: no metrics collector")
@@ -1522,7 +1462,6 @@ func anonymizeRemotePeer(peer *mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig, anonymizer *anonymize.
}
peer.Fqdn = anonymizer.AnonymizeDomain(peer.Fqdn)
peer.WgPubKey = anonymizer.AnonymizeWGKey(peer.WgPubKey)
anonymizeSSHConfig(peer.SshConfig)
}

View File

@@ -844,10 +844,6 @@ func collectSysctls() string {
[]string{"net.ipv4.conf.all.src_valid_mark", "net.ipv4.conf.default.src_valid_mark"},
listInterfaceSysctls("ipv4", "src_valid_mark")...,
))
writeSysctlGroup(&builder, "accept_ra", append(
[]string{"net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra", "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra"},
listInterfaceSysctls("ipv6", "accept_ra")...,
))
writeSysctlGroup(&builder, "conntrack", []string{
"net.netfilter.nf_conntrack_acct",
"net.netfilter.nf_conntrack_tcp_loose",

View File

@@ -35,14 +35,14 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) toWGShowFormat(s *configurer.Stats) string {
var sb strings.Builder
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("interface: %s\n", s.DeviceName))
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf(" public key: %s\n", g.anonymizer.AnonymizeWGKey(s.PublicKey)))
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf(" public key: %s\n", s.PublicKey))
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf(" listen port: %d\n", s.ListenPort))
if s.FWMark != 0 {
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf(" fwmark: %#x\n", s.FWMark))
}
for _, peer := range s.Peers {
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("\npeer: %s\n", g.anonymizer.AnonymizeWGKey(peer.PublicKey)))
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf("\npeer: %s\n", peer.PublicKey))
if peer.Endpoint.IP != nil {
if g.anonymize {
anonEndpoint := g.anonymizer.AnonymizeUDPAddr(peer.Endpoint)
@@ -54,11 +54,7 @@ func (g *BundleGenerator) toWGShowFormat(s *configurer.Stats) string {
if len(peer.AllowedIPs) > 0 {
var ipStrings []string
for _, ipnet := range peer.AllowedIPs {
ipStr := ipnet.String()
if g.anonymize {
ipStr = g.anonymizer.AnonymizeIPString(ipStr)
}
ipStrings = append(ipStrings, ipStr)
ipStrings = append(ipStrings, ipnet.String())
}
sb.WriteString(fmt.Sprintf(" allowed ips: %s\n", strings.Join(ipStrings, ", ")))
}

View File

@@ -267,38 +267,18 @@ func (s *systemConfigurator) getSystemDNSSettings() (SystemDNSSettings, error) {
return SystemDNSSettings{}, fmt.Errorf("sending the command: %w", err)
}
dnsSettings, serverAddresses, err := parseSystemDNSSettings(b)
if err != nil {
return dnsSettings, err
}
s.mu.Lock()
s.origNameservers = serverAddresses
s.mu.Unlock()
return dnsSettings, nil
}
// parseSystemDNSSettings parses the output of `scutil show State:/Network/Service/<id>/DNS`.
// Lines that don't match the expected "index : value" shape are skipped: hosts with unusual
// network services (e.g. orphaned hardware ports) can produce entries without a value.
func parseSystemDNSSettings(out []byte) (SystemDNSSettings, []netip.Addr, error) {
// port is not exposed by scutil, default to 53
dnsSettings := SystemDNSSettings{ServerPort: DefaultPort}
var dnsSettings SystemDNSSettings
var serverAddresses []netip.Addr
inSearchDomainsArray := false
inServerAddressesArray := false
scanner := bufio.NewScanner(bytes.NewReader(out))
scanner := bufio.NewScanner(bytes.NewReader(b))
for scanner.Scan() {
line := strings.TrimSpace(scanner.Text())
switch {
case strings.HasPrefix(line, "DomainName :"):
domainName := strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(line, "DomainName :"))
if domainName != "" {
dnsSettings.Domains = append(dnsSettings.Domains, domainName)
}
continue
domainName := strings.TrimSpace(strings.Split(line, ":")[1])
dnsSettings.Domains = append(dnsSettings.Domains, domainName)
case line == "SearchDomains : <array> {":
inSearchDomainsArray = true
continue
@@ -308,45 +288,36 @@ func parseSystemDNSSettings(out []byte) (SystemDNSSettings, []netip.Addr, error)
case line == "}":
inSearchDomainsArray = false
inServerAddressesArray = false
continue
}
if !inSearchDomainsArray && !inServerAddressesArray {
continue
}
parts := strings.SplitN(line, " : ", 2)
if len(parts) != 2 {
log.Debugf("skipping unexpected scutil DNS line %q", line)
continue
}
value := strings.TrimSpace(parts[1])
if value == "" {
continue
}
if inSearchDomainsArray {
dnsSettings.Domains = append(dnsSettings.Domains, value)
continue
}
ip, err := netip.ParseAddr(value)
if err != nil || ip.IsUnspecified() {
continue
}
ip = ip.Unmap()
serverAddresses = append(serverAddresses, ip)
// Prefer the first IPv4 server as ServerIP since our DNS listener is IPv4.
if !dnsSettings.ServerIP.IsValid() && ip.Is4() {
dnsSettings.ServerIP = ip
searchDomain := strings.Split(line, " : ")[1]
dnsSettings.Domains = append(dnsSettings.Domains, searchDomain)
} else if inServerAddressesArray {
address := strings.Split(line, " : ")[1]
if ip, err := netip.ParseAddr(address); err == nil && !ip.IsUnspecified() {
ip = ip.Unmap()
serverAddresses = append(serverAddresses, ip)
// Prefer the first IPv4 server as ServerIP since our DNS listener is IPv4.
if !dnsSettings.ServerIP.IsValid() && ip.Is4() {
dnsSettings.ServerIP = ip
}
}
}
}
if err := scanner.Err(); err != nil {
return dnsSettings, serverAddresses, err
return dnsSettings, err
}
return dnsSettings, serverAddresses, nil
// default to 53 port
dnsSettings.ServerPort = DefaultPort
s.mu.Lock()
s.origNameservers = serverAddresses
s.mu.Unlock()
return dnsSettings, nil
}
func (s *systemConfigurator) getOriginalNameservers() []netip.Addr {
@@ -464,15 +435,11 @@ func (s *systemConfigurator) getPrimaryService() (string, string, error) {
router := ""
for scanner.Scan() {
text := scanner.Text()
parts := strings.SplitN(text, ":", 2)
if len(parts) != 2 {
continue
}
if strings.Contains(text, "PrimaryService") {
primaryService = strings.TrimSpace(parts[1])
primaryService = strings.TrimSpace(strings.Split(text, ":")[1])
}
if strings.Contains(text, "Router") {
router = strings.TrimSpace(parts[1])
router = strings.TrimSpace(strings.Split(text, ":")[1])
}
}
if err := scanner.Err(); err != nil && err != io.EOF {

View File

@@ -328,120 +328,6 @@ func removeTestDNSKey(key string) error {
return err
}
func TestParseSystemDNSSettings(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
output string
expectedDomains []string
expectedServers []netip.Addr
expectedIP netip.Addr
}{
{
name: "well_formed",
output: `<dictionary> {
DomainName : example.com
SearchDomains : <array> {
0 : example.com
1 : corp.example.com
}
ServerAddresses : <array> {
0 : 192.168.1.1
1 : fd00::53
}
}
`,
expectedDomains: []string{"example.com", "example.com", "corp.example.com"},
expectedServers: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1"), netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::53")},
expectedIP: netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1"),
},
{
// entries without a value after the separator used to panic with
// "index out of range [1] with length 1"
name: "malformed_array_entries_skipped",
output: `<dictionary> {
SearchDomains : <array> {
0 :
(null)
1 : corp.example.com
}
ServerAddresses : <array> {
0 :
1 : 192.168.1.1
}
}
`,
expectedDomains: []string{"corp.example.com"},
expectedServers: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1")},
expectedIP: netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1"),
},
{
name: "domain_name_without_value_skipped",
output: `<dictionary> {
DomainName :
ServerAddresses : <array> {
0 : 192.168.1.1
}
}
`,
expectedServers: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1")},
expectedIP: netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1"),
},
{
name: "ipv6_first_prefers_ipv4_server_ip",
output: `<dictionary> {
ServerAddresses : <array> {
0 : fd00::53
1 : 192.168.1.1
}
}
`,
expectedServers: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::53"), netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1")},
expectedIP: netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1"),
},
{
name: "invalid_and_unspecified_addresses_skipped",
output: `<dictionary> {
ServerAddresses : <array> {
0 : (null)
1 : 0.0.0.0
2 : 192.168.1.1
}
}
`,
expectedServers: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1")},
expectedIP: netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1"),
},
{
name: "v4_mapped_address_unmapped",
output: `<dictionary> {
ServerAddresses : <array> {
0 : ::ffff:192.168.1.1
}
}
`,
expectedServers: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1")},
expectedIP: netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1"),
},
{
name: "empty_output",
output: "",
},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
settings, servers, err := parseSystemDNSSettings([]byte(tc.output))
require.NoError(t, err, "parsing should not fail")
assert.Equal(t, tc.expectedDomains, settings.Domains, "domains should match")
assert.Equal(t, tc.expectedServers, servers, "server addresses should match")
assert.Equal(t, tc.expectedIP, settings.ServerIP, "server IP should match")
assert.Equal(t, DefaultPort, settings.ServerPort, "server port should default to 53")
})
}
}
func TestGetOriginalNameservers(t *testing.T) {
configurator := &systemConfigurator{
createdKeys: make(map[string]struct{}),

View File

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
package dns
import (
"fmt"
"net"
)
func getInterfaceIndex(interfaceName string) (int, error) {
iface, err := net.InterfaceByName(interfaceName)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("lookup interface %q: %w", interfaceName, err)
}
return iface.Index, nil
}

View File

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
package dns
import (
"net"
"testing"
)
func TestGetInterfaceIndexExisting(t *testing.T) {
interfaces, err := net.Interfaces()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("list network interfaces: %v", err)
}
if len(interfaces) == 0 {
t.Fatal("expected at least one network interface")
}
iface := interfaces[0]
index, err := getInterfaceIndex(iface.Name)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("look up existing interface %q: %v", iface.Name, err)
}
if index != iface.Index {
t.Fatalf("expected interface index %d, got %d", iface.Index, index)
}
}
func TestGetInterfaceIndexMissing(t *testing.T) {
index, err := getInterfaceIndex("netbird-interface-that-does-not-exist")
if index != 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected missing interface index to be 0, got %d", index)
}
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected missing interface lookup to return an error")
}
}

View File

@@ -51,5 +51,7 @@ func (n *notifier) notify() {
return
}
n.listener.OnNetworkChanged("")
go func(l listener.NetworkChangeListener) {
l.OnNetworkChanged("")
}(n.listener)
}

View File

@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ func NewDefaultServerPermanentUpstream(
ds.hostsDNSHolder.set(hostsDnsList)
ds.permanent = true
ds.currentConfig = dnsConfigToHostDNSConfig(config, ds.service.RuntimeIP(), ds.service.RuntimePort())
ds.searchDomainNotifier = newNotifier(ds.searchDomains())
ds.searchDomainNotifier = newNotifier(ds.SearchDomains())
ds.searchDomainNotifier.setListener(listener)
setServerDns(ds)
return ds
@@ -602,12 +602,6 @@ func (s *DefaultServer) UpdateDNSServer(serial uint64, update nbdns.Config) erro
}
func (s *DefaultServer) SearchDomains() []string {
s.mux.Lock()
defer s.mux.Unlock()
return s.searchDomains()
}
func (s *DefaultServer) searchDomains() []string {
var searchDomains []string
for _, dConf := range s.currentConfig.Domains {
@@ -692,7 +686,7 @@ func (s *DefaultServer) applyConfiguration(update nbdns.Config) error {
}()
if s.searchDomainNotifier != nil {
s.searchDomainNotifier.onNewSearchDomains(s.searchDomains())
s.searchDomainNotifier.onNewSearchDomains(s.SearchDomains())
}
s.updateNSGroupStates(update.NameServerGroups)

View File

@@ -130,3 +130,8 @@ func GetClientPrivate(iface privateClientIface, upstreamIP netip.Addr, dialTimeo
}
return client, nil
}
func getInterfaceIndex(interfaceName string) (int, error) {
iface, err := net.InterfaceByName(interfaceName)
return iface.Index, err
}

View File

@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ import (
"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/tun/netstack"
"golang.zx2c4.com/wireguard/wgctrl/wgtypes"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/anonymize"
nberrors "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/errors"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/firewalld"
@@ -573,7 +572,12 @@ func (e *Engine) Start(netbirdConfig *mgmProto.NetbirdConfig, mgmtURL *url.URL)
}
e.stateManager.Start()
dnsServer, err := e.newDnsServer()
initialRoutes, dnsConfig, dnsFeatureFlag, err := e.readInitialSettings()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("read initial settings: %w", err)
}
dnsServer, err := e.newDnsServer(dnsConfig)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("create dns server: %w", err)
}
@@ -591,8 +595,10 @@ func (e *Engine) Start(netbirdConfig *mgmProto.NetbirdConfig, mgmtURL *url.URL)
WGInterface: e.wgInterface,
StatusRecorder: e.statusRecorder,
RelayManager: e.relayManager,
InitialRoutes: initialRoutes,
StateManager: e.stateManager,
DNSServer: dnsServer,
DNSFeatureFlag: dnsFeatureFlag,
PeerStore: e.peerStore,
DisableClientRoutes: e.config.DisableClientRoutes,
DisableServerRoutes: e.config.DisableServerRoutes,
@@ -1386,7 +1392,6 @@ func (e *Engine) handleBundle(params *mgmProto.BundleParameters) (*mgmProto.JobR
bundleJobParams := debug.BundleConfig{
Anonymize: params.Anonymize,
AnonymizeLevel: anonymize.ParseLevel(params.AnonymizeLevel),
IncludeSystemInfo: true,
LogFileCount: uint32(params.LogFileCount),
}
@@ -2097,6 +2102,42 @@ func (e *Engine) close() {
}
}
func (e *Engine) readInitialSettings() ([]*route.Route, *nbdns.Config, bool, error) {
if runtime.GOOS != "android" {
// nolint:nilnil
return nil, nil, false, nil
}
info := system.GetInfo(e.ctx)
info.SetFlags(
e.config.RosenpassEnabled,
e.config.RosenpassPermissive,
&e.config.ServerSSHAllowed,
e.config.DisableClientRoutes,
e.config.DisableServerRoutes,
e.config.DisableDNS,
e.config.DisableFirewall,
e.config.BlockLANAccess,
e.config.BlockInbound,
e.config.DisableIPv6,
e.config.SyncMessageVersion,
e.config.EnableSSHRoot,
e.config.EnableSSHSFTP,
e.config.EnableSSHLocalPortForwarding,
e.config.EnableSSHRemotePortForwarding,
e.config.DisableSSHAuth,
)
netMap, err := e.mgmClient.GetNetworkMap(info)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, false, err
}
routes := toRoutes(netMap.GetRoutes())
dnsCfg := toDNSConfig(netMap.GetDNSConfig(), e.wgInterface.Address())
dnsFeatureFlag := toDNSFeatureFlag(netMap)
return routes, &dnsCfg, dnsFeatureFlag, nil
}
func (e *Engine) newWgIface() (*iface.WGIface, error) {
transportNet, err := e.newStdNet()
if err != nil {
@@ -2131,7 +2172,7 @@ func (e *Engine) newWgIface() (*iface.WGIface, error) {
func (e *Engine) wgInterfaceCreate() (err error) {
switch runtime.GOOS {
case "android":
err = e.wgInterface.CreateOnAndroid(e.routeManager.CurrentRouteRange(), e.dnsServer.DnsIP().String(), e.dnsServer.SearchDomains())
err = e.wgInterface.CreateOnAndroid(e.routeManager.InitialRouteRange(), e.dnsServer.DnsIP().String(), e.dnsServer.SearchDomains())
case "ios":
e.mobileDep.NetworkChangeListener.SetInterfaceIP(e.config.WgAddr.String())
if e.config.WgAddr.HasIPv6() {
@@ -2144,7 +2185,7 @@ func (e *Engine) wgInterfaceCreate() (err error) {
return err
}
func (e *Engine) newDnsServer() (dns.Server, error) {
func (e *Engine) newDnsServer(dnsConfig *nbdns.Config) (dns.Server, error) {
// due to tests where we are using a mocked version of the DNS server
if e.dnsServer != nil {
return e.dnsServer, nil
@@ -2156,7 +2197,7 @@ func (e *Engine) newDnsServer() (dns.Server, error) {
e.ctx,
e.wgInterface,
e.mobileDep.HostDNSAddresses,
nbdns.Config{},
*dnsConfig,
e.mobileDep.NetworkChangeListener,
e.statusRecorder,
e.config.DisableDNS,

View File

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
package internal
func (e *Engine) TunSettings() ([]string, []string) {
e.syncMsgMux.Lock()
routeManager := e.routeManager
dnsServer := e.dnsServer
e.syncMsgMux.Unlock()
var routes []string
if routeManager != nil {
routes = routeManager.CurrentRouteRange()
}
var searchDomains []string
if dnsServer != nil {
searchDomains = dnsServer.SearchDomains()
}
return routes, searchDomains
}

View File

@@ -4,17 +4,11 @@ package metrics
type ConnectionType string
const (
// ConnectionTypeICEP2P represents a direct peer-to-peer connection using ICE
ConnectionTypeICEP2P ConnectionType = "ice_p2p"
// ConnectionTypeICETurn represents an ICE connection through a TURN server
ConnectionTypeICETurn ConnectionType = "ice_turn"
// ConnectionTypeICE represents a direct peer-to-peer connection using ICE
ConnectionTypeICE ConnectionType = "ice"
// ConnectionTypeRelay represents a relayed connection
ConnectionTypeRelay ConnectionType = "relay"
// ConnectionTypeUnknown represents a connection with no active transport. It is not pushed.
ConnectionTypeUnknown ConnectionType = "unknown"
)
// String returns the string representation of the connection type

View File

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ func TestInfluxDBMetrics_RecordAndExport(t *testing.T) {
WgHandshakeSuccess: time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Second),
}
m.RecordConnectionStages(context.Background(), agentInfo, "pair123", ConnectionTypeICEP2P, false, ts)
m.RecordConnectionStages(context.Background(), agentInfo, "pair123", ConnectionTypeICE, false, ts)
var buf bytes.Buffer
err := m.Export(&buf)
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ func TestInfluxDBMetrics_ExportDeterministicFieldOrder(t *testing.T) {
// Record multiple times and verify consistent field order
for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
m.RecordConnectionStages(context.Background(), agentInfo, "pair123", ConnectionTypeICEP2P, false, ts)
m.RecordConnectionStages(context.Background(), agentInfo, "pair123", ConnectionTypeICE, false, ts)
}
var buf bytes.Buffer

View File

@@ -56,33 +56,14 @@ Measurement: `netbird_peer_connection`
Tags:
- `deployment_type`: "cloud" | "selfhosted" | "unknown"
- `connection_type`: "ice_p2p" | "ice_turn" | "relay" (see below)
- `connection_type`: "ice" | "relay"
- `attempt_type`: "initial" | "reconnection"
- `version`: NetBird version string
- `os`: Operating system (linux, darwin, windows, android, ios, etc.)
- `arch`: CPU architecture (amd64, arm64, etc.)
- `peer_id`: anonymised peer identifier (truncated SHA-256 of the WireGuard public key)
- `connection_pair_id`: deterministic identifier for the peer pair, identical on both sides
**Note:** `SignalingReceived` is set when the first offer or answer arrives from the remote peer (in both initial and reconnection paths). It excludes the potentially unbounded wait for the remote peer to come online.
#### `connection_type` values
Derived from the connection priority (`conntype.ConnPriority`) by `metricsConnType` in `client/internal/peer/conn.go`:
| Value | Priority | Traffic is |
|-------|----------|------------|
| `ice_p2p` | `ICEP2P` | direct peer-to-peer |
| `ice_turn` | `ICETurn` | relayed, through a TURN server |
| `relay` | `Relay` | relayed, through a NetBird relay |
| `unknown` | `None` or unrecognised | no active transport — **the sample is not pushed** |
**Direct traffic is `ice_p2p` only.** `ice_turn` is relayed despite being negotiated by ICE, matching `Conn.isRelayed`.
`None` means no transport is active: not established yet, or reset after a relay drop or a peer-state reset. Such a sample cannot be attributed to a transport, so `recordConnectionMetrics` drops it instead of pushing it — `unknown` therefore never appears in the bucket. Connection counts are counts of connections whose transport was known at sampling time.
**Samples recorded before 0.77 used a single `ice` value** which covered `ICEP2P`, `ICETurn` *and* `None`, so historical `ice` samples overstate direct connections by an unknown amount and must not be compared with `ice_p2p`.
### Sync Duration
Measurement: `netbird_sync`

View File

@@ -307,8 +307,6 @@ func (conn *Conn) Close(signalToRemote bool) {
if conn.wgWatcherCancel != nil {
conn.wgWatcherCancel()
conn.wgWatcher = nil
conn.wgWatcherCancel = nil
}
conn.workerRelay.CloseConn()
if conn.workerICE != nil {
@@ -961,9 +959,12 @@ func (conn *Conn) recordConnectionMetrics() {
priority := conn.currentConnPriority
conn.mu.Unlock()
connType := metricsConnType(priority)
if connType == metrics.ConnectionTypeUnknown {
return
var connType metrics.ConnectionType
switch priority {
case conntype.Relay:
connType = metrics.ConnectionTypeRelay
default:
connType = metrics.ConnectionTypeICE
}
// Record metrics with timestamps - duration calculation happens in metrics package
@@ -1064,16 +1065,3 @@ func boolToConnStatus(connected bool) guard.ConnStatus {
}
return guard.ConnStatusDisconnected
}
func metricsConnType(priority conntype.ConnPriority) metrics.ConnectionType {
switch priority {
case conntype.Relay:
return metrics.ConnectionTypeRelay
case conntype.ICETurn:
return metrics.ConnectionTypeICETurn
case conntype.ICEP2P:
return metrics.ConnectionTypeICEP2P
default:
return metrics.ConnectionTypeUnknown
}
}

View File

@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@ import (
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/metrics"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/conntype"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/dispatcher"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/guard"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer/ice"
@@ -388,33 +386,3 @@ func TestConn_onWGDisconnected_NoEscalationWithoutRosenpass(t *testing.T) {
}
assert.Empty(t, disconnected, "escalation must be limited to rosenpass connections")
}
func TestMetricsConnType(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
priority conntype.ConnPriority
expected metrics.ConnectionType
}{
{"relay", conntype.Relay, metrics.ConnectionTypeRelay},
{"ice over turn is relayed, not p2p", conntype.ICETurn, metrics.ConnectionTypeICETurn},
{"direct p2p", conntype.ICEP2P, metrics.ConnectionTypeICEP2P},
{"unset priority is unknown, not p2p", conntype.None, metrics.ConnectionTypeUnknown},
{"unrecognised priority is unknown", conntype.ConnPriority(99), metrics.ConnectionTypeUnknown},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, tc.expected, metricsConnType(tc.priority))
})
}
}
func TestMetricsConnType_RelayedMatchesIsRelayed(t *testing.T) {
for _, priority := range []conntype.ConnPriority{conntype.None, conntype.Relay, conntype.ICETurn, conntype.ICEP2P} {
conn := &Conn{currentConnPriority: priority}
tag := metricsConnType(priority)
relayedTag := tag == metrics.ConnectionTypeRelay || tag == metrics.ConnectionTypeICETurn
assert.Equal(t, conn.isRelayed(), relayedTag,
"priority %s: isRelayed and the %q metric tag must agree", priority, tag)
}
}

View File

@@ -45,35 +45,12 @@ func (pm *ProfileManager) GetProfileState(id ID) (*ProfileState, error) {
return &state, nil
}
// SetProfileState writes the state file of the profile identified by id. Prefer
// it over SetActiveProfileState whenever the caller knows which profile the data
// belongs to: an SSO login spans seconds of user interaction, and the active
// profile can change during it, which would file the account email under
// whichever profile happened to be active when the flow returned.
func (pm *ProfileManager) SetProfileState(id ID, state *ProfileState) error {
func (pm *ProfileManager) SetActiveProfileState(state *ProfileState) error {
configDir, err := getConfigDir()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("get config directory: %w", err)
}
if id == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("empty profile ID")
}
if id != defaultProfileName && !IsValidProfileFilenameStem(id) {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid profile ID: %q", id)
}
stateFile := filepath.Join(configDir, id.String()+".state.json")
if err := util.WriteJsonWithRestrictedPermission(context.Background(), stateFile, state); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write profile state: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// SetActiveProfileState writes the state file of whichever profile is active at
// call time. Use SetProfileState when the target profile is known.
func (pm *ProfileManager) SetActiveProfileState(state *ProfileState) error {
activeProf, err := pm.GetActiveProfile()
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, ErrNoActiveProfile) {
@@ -82,7 +59,18 @@ func (pm *ProfileManager) SetActiveProfileState(state *ProfileState) error {
return fmt.Errorf("get active profile: %w", err)
}
return pm.SetProfileState(activeProf.ID, state)
id := activeProf.ID
if id != defaultProfileName && !IsValidProfileFilenameStem(id) {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid active profile ID: %q", id)
}
stateFile := filepath.Join(configDir, id.String()+".state.json")
err = util.WriteJsonWithRestrictedPermission(context.Background(), stateFile, state)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write profile state: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// RemoveProfileState deletes the per-profile state file (which holds the

View File

@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ func (d *DnsInterceptor) removeDNATMappings(realPrefixes []netip.Prefix, logger
// internalDnatFw checks if the firewall supports internal DNAT
func (d *DnsInterceptor) internalDnatFw() (internalDNATer, bool) {
if d.firewall == nil || d.fakeIPManager == nil || runtime.GOOS != "android" {
if d.firewall == nil || runtime.GOOS != "android" {
return nil, false
}
fw, ok := d.firewall.(internalDNATer)

View File

@@ -2,183 +2,54 @@ package ipfwdstate
import (
"fmt"
"sync"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/routemanager/systemops"
)
// IPForwardingState tracks v4 and v6 IP-forwarding sysctl enables with
// independent refcounts so a v4-only routing setup doesn't flip v6 sysctls.
// IPForwardingState is a struct that keeps track of the IP forwarding state.
// todo: read initial state of the IP forwarding from the system and reset the state based on it.
// todo: separate v4/v6 forwarding state, since the sysctls are independent
// (net.ipv4.ip_forward vs net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding). Currently the nftables
// manager shares one instance between both routers, which works only because
// EnableIPForwarding enables both sysctls in a single call.
type IPForwardingState struct {
mu sync.Mutex
v4Count int
v6Count int
// routingV4/routingV6 track whether the routing path currently holds a
// reference, so repeated EnableRouting calls (one per network-map update)
// hold at most one reference per family and an unpaired DisableRouting
// can't release references held by DNAT rules.
routingV4 bool
routingV6 bool
wgIfaceName string
v6Saved map[string]int
enabledCounter int
}
// NewIPForwardingState returns a state tracker for the IP-forwarding sysctls.
// wgIfaceName is excluded from the per-interface accept_ra handling.
func NewIPForwardingState(wgIfaceName string) *IPForwardingState {
return &IPForwardingState{wgIfaceName: wgIfaceName}
func NewIPForwardingState() *IPForwardingState {
return &IPForwardingState{}
}
// Counts returns the current v4 and v6 refcounts. Intended for diagnostics
// and tests.
func (f *IPForwardingState) Counts() (v4, v6 int) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
return f.v4Count, f.v6Count
}
// RequestRouting takes the forwarding references for the routing path. It is
// idempotent: while routing already holds a reference, further calls don't
// increment the refcounts, and a v4-only request releases a previously held v6
// reference. A v6 sysctl failure is logged and not returned so it can't take
// down v4 routing (the sysctl may be unwritable, e.g. read-only /proc/sys or
// IPv6 disabled on the kernel command line); v6 is retried on the next call.
func (f *IPForwardingState) RequestRouting(v6 bool) error {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
if !f.routingV4 {
if err := f.requestV4(); err != nil {
return err
}
f.routingV4 = true
}
if !v6 {
if !f.routingV6 {
return nil
}
f.routingV6 = false
return f.releaseV6()
}
if f.routingV6 {
return nil
}
if err := f.requestV6(); err != nil {
log.Warnf("enable IPv6 forwarding for routing: %v", err)
return nil
}
f.routingV6 = true
return nil
}
// ReleaseRouting releases the references RequestRouting holds. Calls without a
// held reference are no-ops.
func (f *IPForwardingState) ReleaseRouting() error {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
if f.routingV4 {
f.routingV4 = false
f.releaseV4()
}
if f.routingV6 {
f.routingV6 = false
return f.releaseV6()
}
return nil
}
// RequestForwarding enables the family's forwarding sysctl on first request.
func (f *IPForwardingState) RequestForwarding(v6 bool) error {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
if v6 {
return f.requestV6()
}
return f.requestV4()
}
// ReleaseForwarding decrements the family counter. The last v6 release restores
// what enable captured. v4 stays on: net.ipv4.ip_forward is co-owned by other
// tooling (docker, k8s, libvirt).
func (f *IPForwardingState) ReleaseForwarding(v6 bool) error {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
if v6 {
return f.releaseV6()
}
f.releaseV4()
return nil
}
func (f *IPForwardingState) requestV4() error {
if f.v4Count == 0 {
if err := systemops.EnableV4IPForwarding(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("enable IPv4 forwarding: %w", err)
}
log.Info("IPv4 forwarding enabled")
}
f.v4Count++
return nil
}
func (f *IPForwardingState) releaseV4() {
if f.v4Count > 0 {
f.v4Count--
}
}
func (f *IPForwardingState) requestV6() error {
if f.v6Count == 0 {
saved, err := systemops.EnableV6IPForwarding(f.wgIfaceName)
if err != nil {
if rerr := systemops.DisableV6IPForwarding(saved); rerr != nil {
log.Warnf("rollback partial v6 sysctls: %v", rerr)
}
return fmt.Errorf("enable IPv6 forwarding: %w", err)
}
// A failed restore on a previous release keeps its saved values; those
// are the true originals, so keep them over what this enable captured.
if f.v6Saved == nil {
f.v6Saved = saved
} else {
for k, v := range saved {
if _, ok := f.v6Saved[k]; !ok {
f.v6Saved[k] = v
}
}
}
log.Info("IPv6 forwarding enabled")
}
f.v6Count++
return nil
}
func (f *IPForwardingState) releaseV6() error {
if f.v6Count == 0 {
return nil
}
f.v6Count--
if f.v6Count > 0 {
func (f *IPForwardingState) RequestForwarding() error {
if f.enabledCounter != 0 {
f.enabledCounter++
return nil
}
// Keep the saved values on failure so a later release or enable/release
// cycle can still restore them; re-restoring an already-restored key is a
// no-op since the sysctl already holds the desired value.
if err := systemops.DisableV6IPForwarding(f.v6Saved); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("disable IPv6 forwarding: %w", err)
if err := systemops.EnableIPForwarding(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to enable IP forwarding with sysctl: %w", err)
}
f.v6Saved = nil
log.Info("IPv6 forwarding disabled")
f.enabledCounter = 1
log.Info("IP forwarding enabled")
return nil
}
func (f *IPForwardingState) ReleaseForwarding() error {
if f.enabledCounter == 0 {
return nil
}
if f.enabledCounter > 1 {
f.enabledCounter--
return nil
}
// if failed to disable IP forwarding we anyway decrement the counter
f.enabledCounter = 0
// todo call systemops.DisableIPForwarding()
return nil
}

View File

@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
//go:build privileged
package ipfwdstate
import (
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// TestRequestRoutingV6ToV4Transition verifies that a v4-only routing request
// releases a previously held routing-owned v6 reference without touching
// references held by DNAT rules.
func TestRequestRoutingV6ToV4Transition(t *testing.T) {
f := NewIPForwardingState("wt-fwd-test")
require.NoError(t, f.RequestRouting(true), "request routing with v6")
v4, v6 := f.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "v4 reference held")
assert.Equal(t, 1, v6, "v6 reference held")
require.NoError(t, f.RequestRouting(false), "request routing v4-only")
v4, v6 = f.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "v4 reference kept")
assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "routing-owned v6 reference released")
// A DNAT-held reference survives a v4-only routing request.
require.NoError(t, f.RequestForwarding(true), "dnat v6 reference")
require.NoError(t, f.RequestRouting(false), "repeat v4-only request")
_, v6 = f.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 1, v6, "dnat-held v6 reference survives")
require.NoError(t, f.ReleaseForwarding(true), "release dnat v6 reference")
require.NoError(t, f.ReleaseRouting(), "release routing")
v4, v6 = f.Counts()
assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "all v4 references released")
assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "all v6 references released")
}

View File

@@ -8,13 +8,14 @@ import (
"net/netip"
"net/url"
"runtime"
"sort"
"slices"
"strings"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"syscall"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/hashicorp/go-multierror"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"golang.org/x/exp/maps"
@@ -61,7 +62,7 @@ type Manager interface {
GetActiveClientRoutes() route.HAMap
GetClientRoutesWithNetID() map[route.NetID][]*route.Route
SetRouteChangeListener(listener listener.NetworkChangeListener)
CurrentRouteRange() []string
InitialRouteRange() []string
SetFirewall(firewall.Manager) error
SetDNSForwarderPort(port uint16)
ReconcilePeerAllowedIPs(peerKey string) error
@@ -75,8 +76,10 @@ type ManagerConfig struct {
WGInterface iface.WGIface
StatusRecorder *peer.Status
RelayManager *relayClient.Manager
InitialRoutes []*route.Route
StateManager *statemanager.Manager
DNSServer dns.Server
DNSFeatureFlag bool
PeerStore *peerstore.Store
DisableClientRoutes bool
DisableServerRoutes bool
@@ -146,12 +149,45 @@ func NewManager(config ManagerConfig) *DefaultManager {
useNoop := netstack.IsEnabled() || config.DisableClientRoutes
dm.setupRefCounters(useNoop)
// don't proceed with client routes if it is disabled
if config.DisableClientRoutes {
return dm
}
if runtime.GOOS == "android" {
dm.setupAndroidRoutes(config)
}
return dm
}
func (m *DefaultManager) setupAndroidRoutes(config ManagerConfig) {
cr := m.initialClientRoutes(config.InitialRoutes)
func (m *DefaultManager) enableFakeIPRoutes() {
m.fakeIPManager = fakeip.NewManager()
m.notifier.NotifyRouteChange()
routesForComparison := slices.Clone(cr)
if config.DNSFeatureFlag {
m.fakeIPManager = fakeip.NewManager()
v4ID := uuid.NewString()
fakeIPRoute := &route.Route{
ID: route.ID(v4ID),
Network: m.fakeIPManager.GetFakeIPBlock(),
NetID: route.NetID(v4ID),
Peer: m.pubKey,
NetworkType: route.IPv4Network,
}
v6ID := uuid.NewString()
fakeIPv6Route := &route.Route{
ID: route.ID(v6ID),
Network: m.fakeIPManager.GetFakeIPv6Block(),
NetID: route.NetID(v6ID),
Peer: m.pubKey,
NetworkType: route.IPv6Network,
}
cr = append(cr, fakeIPRoute, fakeIPv6Route)
m.notifier.SetFakeIPRoutes([]*route.Route{fakeIPRoute, fakeIPv6Route})
}
m.notifier.SetInitialClientRoutes(cr, routesForComparison)
}
func (m *DefaultManager) setupRefCounters(useNoop bool) {
@@ -428,9 +464,6 @@ func (m *DefaultManager) UpdateRoutes(
var merr *multierror.Error
if !m.disableClientRoutes {
if runtime.GOOS == "android" && useNewDNSRoute && m.fakeIPManager == nil {
m.enableFakeIPRoutes()
}
// Update route selector based on management server's isSelected status
m.updateRouteSelectorFromManagement(clientRoutes)
@@ -467,32 +500,9 @@ func (m *DefaultManager) SetRouteChangeListener(listener listener.NetworkChangeL
m.notifier.SetListener(listener)
}
// CurrentRouteRange returns the current TUN route list. It is used by mobile systems
func (m *DefaultManager) CurrentRouteRange() []string {
m.mux.Lock()
defer m.mux.Unlock()
if m.disableClientRoutes {
return nil
}
filtered := m.routeSelector.FilterSelectedExitNodes(m.clientRoutes)
var nets []string
for _, routes := range filtered {
for _, r := range routes {
if r.IsDynamic() {
continue
}
nets = append(nets, r.NetString())
}
}
if m.fakeIPManager != nil {
nets = append(nets, m.fakeIPManager.GetFakeIPBlock().String(), m.fakeIPManager.GetFakeIPv6Block().String())
}
sort.Strings(nets)
return nets
// InitialRouteRange return the list of initial routes. It used by mobile systems
func (m *DefaultManager) InitialRouteRange() []string {
return m.notifier.GetInitialRouteRanges()
}
// GetRouteSelector returns the route selector
@@ -690,6 +700,16 @@ func (m *DefaultManager) ClassifyRoutes(newRoutes []*route.Route) (map[route.ID]
return newServerRoutesMap, newClientRoutesIDMap
}
func (m *DefaultManager) initialClientRoutes(initialRoutes []*route.Route) []*route.Route {
_, crMap := m.ClassifyRoutes(initialRoutes)
rs := make([]*route.Route, 0, len(crMap))
for _, routes := range crMap {
rs = append(rs, routes...)
}
return rs
}
func isRouteSupported(route *route.Route) bool {
if netstack.IsEnabled() || !nbnet.CustomRoutingDisabled() || route.IsDynamic() {
return true

View File

@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@ func (m *MockManager) Init() error {
return nil
}
// CurrentRouteRange mock implementation of CurrentRouteRange from Manager interface
func (m *MockManager) CurrentRouteRange() []string {
// InitialRouteRange mock implementation of InitialRouteRange from Manager interface
func (m *MockManager) InitialRouteRange() []string {
return nil
}

View File

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
"net/netip"
"slices"
"sort"
"strings"
"sync"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/listener"
@@ -13,15 +14,12 @@ import (
)
type Notifier struct {
mu sync.Mutex
// currentRoutes is the last announced route set. It exists only to
// suppress noise: without it every network map sync would trigger the
// Java side, even when the routes did not change. The actual TUN route
// state is owned by the route manager and pulled from there.
initialRoutes []*route.Route
currentRoutes []*route.Route
fakeIPRoutes []*route.Route
listener listener.NetworkChangeListener
listener listener.NetworkChangeListener
listenerMux sync.Mutex
}
func NewNotifier() *Notifier {
@@ -29,15 +27,20 @@ func NewNotifier() *Notifier {
}
func (n *Notifier) SetListener(listener listener.NetworkChangeListener) {
n.mu.Lock()
defer n.mu.Unlock()
n.listenerMux.Lock()
defer n.listenerMux.Unlock()
n.listener = listener
}
func (n *Notifier) NotifyRouteChange() {
n.mu.Lock()
defer n.mu.Unlock()
n.notifyLocked()
// SetInitialClientRoutes stores the initial route sets for TUN configuration.
func (n *Notifier) SetInitialClientRoutes(initialRoutes []*route.Route, routesForComparison []*route.Route) {
n.initialRoutes = filterStatic(initialRoutes)
n.currentRoutes = filterStatic(routesForComparison)
}
// SetFakeIPRoutes stores the fake IP routes to be included in every TUN rebuild.
func (n *Notifier) SetFakeIPRoutes(routes []*route.Route) {
n.fakeIPRoutes = routes
}
func (n *Notifier) OnNewRoutes(idMap route.HAMap) {
@@ -51,32 +54,46 @@ func (n *Notifier) OnNewRoutes(idMap route.HAMap) {
}
}
n.mu.Lock()
defer n.mu.Unlock()
if !hasRouteDiff(n.currentRoutes, newRoutes) {
if !n.hasRouteDiff(n.currentRoutes, newRoutes) {
return
}
n.currentRoutes = newRoutes
n.notifyLocked()
n.notify()
}
func (n *Notifier) OnNewPrefixes([]netip.Prefix) {
// Not used on Android
}
func (n *Notifier) notifyLocked() {
func (n *Notifier) notify() {
n.listenerMux.Lock()
defer n.listenerMux.Unlock()
if n.listener == nil {
return
}
n.listener.OnNetworkChanged("")
allRoutes := slices.Clone(n.currentRoutes)
allRoutes = append(allRoutes, n.fakeIPRoutes...)
routeStrings := n.routesToStrings(allRoutes)
sort.Strings(routeStrings)
go func(l listener.NetworkChangeListener) {
l.OnNetworkChanged(strings.Join(routeStrings, ","))
}(n.listener)
}
func (n *Notifier) Close() {
// unused
func filterStatic(routes []*route.Route) []*route.Route {
out := make([]*route.Route, 0, len(routes))
for _, r := range routes {
if !r.IsDynamic() {
out = append(out, r)
}
}
return out
}
func routesToStrings(routes []*route.Route) []string {
func (n *Notifier) routesToStrings(routes []*route.Route) []string {
nets := make([]string, 0, len(routes))
for _, r := range routes {
nets = append(nets, r.NetString())
@@ -84,10 +101,25 @@ func routesToStrings(routes []*route.Route) []string {
return nets
}
func hasRouteDiff(a []*route.Route, b []*route.Route) bool {
as := routesToStrings(a)
bs := routesToStrings(b)
sort.Strings(as)
sort.Strings(bs)
return !slices.Equal(as, bs)
func (n *Notifier) hasRouteDiff(a []*route.Route, b []*route.Route) bool {
slices.SortFunc(a, func(x, y *route.Route) int {
return strings.Compare(x.NetString(), y.NetString())
})
slices.SortFunc(b, func(x, y *route.Route) int {
return strings.Compare(x.NetString(), y.NetString())
})
return !slices.EqualFunc(a, b, func(x, y *route.Route) bool {
return x.NetString() == y.NetString()
})
}
func (n *Notifier) GetInitialRouteRanges() []string {
initialStrings := n.routesToStrings(n.initialRoutes)
sort.Strings(initialStrings)
return initialStrings
}
func (n *Notifier) Close() {
// unused
}

View File

@@ -29,7 +29,11 @@ func (n *Notifier) SetListener(listener listener.NetworkChangeListener) {
n.listener = listener
}
func (n *Notifier) NotifyRouteChange() {
func (n *Notifier) SetInitialClientRoutes([]*route.Route, []*route.Route) {
// iOS doesn't care about initial routes
}
func (n *Notifier) SetFakeIPRoutes([]*route.Route) {
// Not used on iOS
}

View File

@@ -19,7 +19,11 @@ func (n *Notifier) SetListener(listener listener.NetworkChangeListener) {
// Not used on non-mobile platforms
}
func (n *Notifier) NotifyRouteChange() {
func (n *Notifier) SetInitialClientRoutes([]*route.Route, []*route.Route) {
// Not used on non-mobile platforms
}
func (n *Notifier) SetFakeIPRoutes([]*route.Route) {
// Not used on non-mobile platforms
}
@@ -31,6 +35,10 @@ func (n *Notifier) OnNewPrefixes(prefixes []netip.Prefix) {
// Not used on non-mobile platforms
}
func (n *Notifier) GetInitialRouteRanges() []string {
return []string{}
}
func (n *Notifier) Close() {
// unused
}

View File

@@ -58,7 +58,11 @@ func Setup(wgIface iface) (map[string]int, error) {
continue
}
i := fmt.Sprintf(rpFilterInterfacePath, EscapeInterfaceName(intf.Name))
// Escape '%' and '.' so they survive the dot-to-slash conversion in Set()
safeName := strings.ReplaceAll(intf.Name, "%", percentEscape)
safeName = strings.ReplaceAll(safeName, ".", dotEscape)
i := fmt.Sprintf(rpFilterInterfacePath, safeName)
oldVal, err := Set(i, 2, true)
if err != nil {
result = multierror.Append(result, err)
@@ -70,13 +74,6 @@ func Setup(wgIface iface) (map[string]int, error) {
return keys, nberrors.FormatErrorOrNil(result)
}
// EscapeInterfaceName escapes '%' and '.' in an interface name (e.g. VLANs
// like eth0.100) so the name survives the dot-to-slash conversion in Set.
func EscapeInterfaceName(name string) string {
safe := strings.ReplaceAll(name, "%", percentEscape)
return strings.ReplaceAll(safe, ".", dotEscape)
}
// Set sets a sysctl configuration, if onlyIfOne is true it will only set the new value if it's set to 1
func Set(key string, desiredValue int, onlyIfOne bool) (int, error) {
path := strings.ReplaceAll(key, ".", "/")

View File

@@ -32,17 +32,8 @@ func (r *SysOps) removeFromRouteTable(netip.Prefix, Nexthop) error {
return nil
}
func EnableV4IPForwarding() error {
log.Infof("Enable IPv4 forwarding is not implemented on %s", runtime.GOOS)
return nil
}
func EnableV6IPForwarding(string) (map[string]int, error) {
log.Infof("Enable IPv6 forwarding is not implemented on %s", runtime.GOOS)
return map[string]int{}, nil
}
func DisableV6IPForwarding(map[string]int) error {
func EnableIPForwarding() error {
log.Infof("Enable IP forwarding is not implemented on %s", runtime.GOOS)
return nil
}

View File

@@ -58,17 +58,8 @@ func (r *SysOps) removeFromRouteTable(netip.Prefix, Nexthop) error {
return nil
}
func EnableV4IPForwarding() error {
log.Infof("Enable IPv4 forwarding is not implemented on %s", runtime.GOOS)
return nil
}
func EnableV6IPForwarding(string) (map[string]int, error) {
log.Infof("Enable IPv6 forwarding is not implemented on %s", runtime.GOOS)
return map[string]int{}, nil
}
func DisableV6IPForwarding(map[string]int) error {
func EnableIPForwarding() error {
log.Infof("Enable IP forwarding is not implemented on %s", runtime.GOOS)
return nil
}

View File

@@ -763,10 +763,13 @@ func flushRoutes(tableID, family int) error {
return nberrors.FormatErrorOrNil(result)
}
func EnableV4IPForwarding() error {
func EnableIPForwarding() error {
if _, err := sysctl.Set(ipv4ForwardingPath, 1, false); err != nil {
return err
}
if _, err := sysctl.Set(ipv6ForwardingPath, 1, false); err != nil {
log.Warnf("failed to enable IPv6 forwarding: %v", err)
}
return nil
}

View File

@@ -43,17 +43,8 @@ func (r *SysOps) RemoveVPNRoute(prefix netip.Prefix, intf *net.Interface) error
return r.genericRemoveVPNRoute(prefix, intf)
}
func EnableV4IPForwarding() error {
log.Infof("Enable IPv4 forwarding is not implemented on %s", runtime.GOOS)
return nil
}
func EnableV6IPForwarding(string) (map[string]int, error) {
log.Infof("Enable IPv6 forwarding is not implemented on %s", runtime.GOOS)
return map[string]int{}, nil
}
func DisableV6IPForwarding(map[string]int) error {
func EnableIPForwarding() error {
log.Infof("Enable IP forwarding is not implemented on %s", runtime.GOOS)
return nil
}

View File

@@ -1,92 +0,0 @@
//go:build !android
package systemops
import (
"fmt"
"net"
"os"
"github.com/hashicorp/go-multierror"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
nberrors "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/errors"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/routemanager/sysctl"
)
const (
// 1 (default) accepts RAs only while forwarding is off; 2 keeps RA
// acceptance on regardless, so RA-installed host defaults survive our
// v6 forwarding flip.
acceptRAInterfacePath = "net.ipv6.conf.%s.accept_ra"
acceptRADefaultPath = "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra"
acceptRAProcPathFormat = "/proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/%s/accept_ra"
)
// EnableV6IPForwarding bumps accept_ra=2 on host v6 interfaces before flipping
// forwarding=1, so RA-installed host defaults survive. Returns the prior values
// of sysctls we actually changed; entries already at the target are omitted.
func EnableV6IPForwarding(wgIfaceName string) (map[string]int, error) {
saved := map[string]int{}
bumpAcceptRA(saved, wgIfaceName)
oldVal, err := sysctl.Set(ipv6ForwardingPath, 1, false)
if err != nil {
return saved, err
}
if oldVal != 1 {
saved[ipv6ForwardingPath] = oldVal
}
return saved, nil
}
// DisableV6IPForwarding restores what EnableV6IPForwarding captured.
func DisableV6IPForwarding(saved map[string]int) error {
var result *multierror.Error
for key, value := range saved {
if _, err := sysctl.Set(key, value, false); err != nil {
result = multierror.Append(result, fmt.Errorf("restore %s: %w", key, err))
}
}
return nberrors.FormatErrorOrNil(result)
}
func bumpAcceptRA(saved map[string]int, wgIfaceName string) {
// Also bump conf.default so interfaces created while forwarding is on
// (hotplug, new Wi-Fi/dock) inherit accept_ra=2 and keep accepting RAs.
bumpAcceptRAKey(saved, acceptRADefaultPath)
interfaces, err := net.Interfaces()
if err != nil {
log.Warnf("list interfaces for accept_ra: %v", err)
return
}
for _, intf := range interfaces {
if intf.Name == "lo" || intf.Name == wgIfaceName {
continue
}
bumpAcceptRAForInterface(saved, intf.Name)
}
}
func bumpAcceptRAForInterface(saved map[string]int, name string) {
// Build procfs path from name, not the dotted key: VLAN names like eth0.100.
if _, err := os.Stat(fmt.Sprintf(acceptRAProcPathFormat, name)); err != nil {
return
}
bumpAcceptRAKey(saved, fmt.Sprintf(acceptRAInterfacePath, sysctl.EscapeInterfaceName(name)))
}
func bumpAcceptRAKey(saved map[string]int, key string) {
// onlyIfOne=true: leave admin overrides (0, 2) alone.
oldVal, err := sysctl.Set(key, 2, true)
if err != nil {
log.Warnf("bump %s: %v", key, err)
return
}
// With onlyIfOne, a write only happened when the old value was 1; values
// left untouched (0, 2) must not be recorded for restore.
if oldVal == 1 {
saved[key] = oldVal
}
}

View File

@@ -98,44 +98,47 @@ func (u *Installer) startDaemon(daemonFolder string) error {
func (u *Installer) startUIAsUser() error {
log.Infof("starting netbird-ui: %s", uiBinary)
username, err := consoleUser()
// Get the current console user
cmd := exec.Command("stat", "-f", "%Su", "/dev/console")
output, err := cmd.Output()
if err != nil {
return err
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get console user: %w", err)
}
username := strings.TrimSpace(string(output))
if username == "" || username == "root" {
return fmt.Errorf("no active user session found")
}
log.Infof("starting UI for user: %s", username)
// Get user's UID
userInfo, err := user.Lookup(username)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("lookup user %s: %w", username, err)
return fmt.Errorf("failed to lookup user %s: %w", username, err)
}
log.Infof("starting UI for user: %s (uid %s)", username, userInfo.Uid)
launchCmd := exec.Command("launchctl", "asuser", userInfo.Uid, "sudo", "-u", username, "-H", "open", "-a", uiBinary)
// Start the UI process as the console user using launchctl
// This ensures the app runs in the user's context with proper GUI access
launchCmd := exec.Command("launchctl", "asuser", userInfo.Uid, "open", "-a", uiBinary)
log.Infof("launchCmd: %s", launchCmd.String())
// Set the user's home directory for proper macOS app behavior
launchCmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "HOME="+userInfo.HomeDir)
log.Infof("set HOME environment variable: %s", userInfo.HomeDir)
if err := launchCmd.Run(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("run UI launch: %w", err)
if err := launchCmd.Start(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to start UI process: %w", err)
}
// Release the process so it can run independently
if err := launchCmd.Process.Release(); err != nil {
log.Warnf("failed to release UI process: %v", err)
}
log.Infof("netbird-ui started successfully for user %s", username)
return nil
}
func consoleUser() (string, error) {
output, err := exec.Command("stat", "-f", "%Su", "/dev/console").Output()
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("get console user: %w", err)
}
username := strings.TrimSpace(string(output))
switch username {
case "", "root", "loginwindow", "_mbsetupuser":
return "", fmt.Errorf("no active GUI user session, console user: %q", username)
}
return username, nil
}
func (u *Installer) installPkgFile(ctx context.Context, path string) error {
log.Infof("installing pkg file: %s", path)

View File

@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ import (
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
nbAnonymize "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/anonymize"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/auth"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/debug"
@@ -29,13 +28,6 @@ import (
types "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/upload-server/types"
)
// AnonymizeLevelDefault and AnonymizeLevelStrict are the accepted
// anonymizeLevel values for DebugBundle.
const (
AnonymizeLevelDefault = nbAnonymize.LevelDefaultString
AnonymizeLevelStrict = nbAnonymize.LevelStrictString
)
// ConnectionListener export internal Listener for mobile
type ConnectionListener interface {
peer.Listener
@@ -166,19 +158,13 @@ func (c *Client) Run(fd int32, interfaceName string, envList *EnvList) error {
defer c.ctxCancel()
c.ctxCancelLock.Unlock()
// No login pre-flight here. The engine's own loginToManagement (connect.go) performs
// the authoritative Login immediately before the first Sync, so a LoginSync() call at
// this point only duplicated it — costing two extra Login RPCs (IsLoginRequired +
// Login) on every engine start, since IsLoginRequired is itself a full Login RPC.
//
// Auth failures still reach the caller through the engine path: loginToManagement
// returns PermissionDenied, which marks the shared status recorder
// (MarkManagementDisconnected) and fires ClientStop → onDisconnected, where
// IsLoginRequiredCached() reports login-required. The error is also returned out of Run().
//
// A pre-flight was also actively harmful when the server is unreachable: its 2-minute
// backoff blocked the start and then reported "login required" for what was really a
// timeout. The engine instead keeps retrying and recovers when the server returns.
auth := NewAuthWithConfig(ctx, cfg)
err = auth.LoginSync()
if err != nil {
return err
}
log.Infof("Auth successful")
// todo do not throw error in case of cancelled context
ctx = internal.CtxInitState(ctx)
c.onHostDnsFn = func([]string) {}
@@ -208,10 +194,8 @@ func (c *Client) Stop() {
// DebugBundle generates a debug bundle, uploads it and returns the upload key.
// It works with or without a running engine: when the engine is up it reuses
// the live config, sync response and client metrics; otherwise it loads the
// config from disk (or the preloaded tvOS config). anonymizeLevel is "default"
// or "strict"; strict also anonymizes internal IP ranges, peer names, and
// WireGuard public keys, and implies anonymize.
func (c *Client) DebugBundle(anonymize bool, anonymizeLevel string) (string, error) {
// config from disk (or the preloaded tvOS config).
func (c *Client) DebugBundle(anonymize bool) (string, error) {
cfg, cc := c.stateSnapshot()
// If the engine hasn't been started, load config so we can reach management.
@@ -261,7 +245,6 @@ func (c *Client) DebugBundle(anonymize bool, anonymizeLevel string) (string, err
deps,
debug.BundleConfig{
Anonymize: anonymize,
AnonymizeLevel: nbAnonymize.ParseLevel(anonymizeLevel),
IncludeSystemInfo: true,
},
)

View File

@@ -222,36 +222,17 @@ func (a *Auth) Login(resultListener ErrListener, urlOpener URLOpener, forceDevic
// LoginWithDeviceName performs interactive login with device authentication support
// The deviceName parameter allows specifying a custom device name (required for tvOS)
func (a *Auth) LoginWithDeviceName(resultListener ErrListener, urlOpener URLOpener, forceDeviceAuth bool, deviceName string) {
a.startLogin(resultListener, urlOpener, forceDeviceAuth, deviceName, false)
}
// LoginInteractive performs the same interactive login as LoginWithDeviceName but skips the
// IsLoginRequired() pre-flight and goes straight to the browser / device-code flow.
//
// IsLoginRequired() is itself a full Login RPC against the management server, so when the
// caller has ALREADY established that login is required it is a pure duplicate. On iOS the
// main app decides to show the browser based on its own isLoginRequired() check and then
// calls straight into this method, so re-asking the server would add another Login RPC to
// every interactive login.
//
// Use LoginWithDeviceName when the auth state is unknown and a silent (browser-less) login
// must still be possible; use this when the browser is going to be shown regardless.
func (a *Auth) LoginInteractive(resultListener ErrListener, urlOpener URLOpener, forceDeviceAuth bool, deviceName string) {
a.startLogin(resultListener, urlOpener, forceDeviceAuth, deviceName, true)
}
func (a *Auth) startLogin(resultListener ErrListener, urlOpener URLOpener, forceDeviceAuth bool, deviceName string, skipLoginCheck bool) {
if resultListener == nil {
log.Errorf("startLogin: resultListener is nil")
log.Errorf("LoginWithDeviceName: resultListener is nil")
return
}
if urlOpener == nil {
log.Errorf("startLogin: urlOpener is nil")
log.Errorf("LoginWithDeviceName: urlOpener is nil")
resultListener.OnError(fmt.Errorf("urlOpener is nil"))
return
}
go func() {
err := a.login(urlOpener, forceDeviceAuth, deviceName, skipLoginCheck)
err := a.login(urlOpener, forceDeviceAuth, deviceName)
if err != nil {
resultListener.OnError(err)
} else {
@@ -260,7 +241,7 @@ func (a *Auth) startLogin(resultListener ErrListener, urlOpener URLOpener, force
}()
}
func (a *Auth) login(urlOpener URLOpener, forceDeviceAuth bool, deviceName string, skipLoginCheck bool) error {
func (a *Auth) login(urlOpener URLOpener, forceDeviceAuth bool, deviceName string) error {
// Create context with device name if provided
ctx := a.ctx
if deviceName != "" {
@@ -274,13 +255,10 @@ func (a *Auth) login(urlOpener URLOpener, forceDeviceAuth bool, deviceName strin
}
defer authClient.Close()
// check if we need to generate JWT token (skipped when the caller already knows)
needsLogin := true
if !skipLoginCheck {
needsLogin, err = authClient.IsLoginRequired(ctx)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to check login requirement: %v", err)
}
// check if we need to generate JWT token
needsLogin, err := authClient.IsLoginRequired(ctx)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to check login requirement: %v", err)
}
jwtToken := ""

View File

@@ -2781,11 +2781,6 @@ type DebugBundleRequest struct {
// untrusted TLS certificate. Restricted to privileged callers; for
// self-hosted upload servers.
UploadInsecure bool `protobuf:"varint,7,opt,name=uploadInsecure,proto3" json:"uploadInsecure,omitempty"`
// anonymizeLevel selects how much the anonymizer redacts: "default"
// (or empty) keeps internal IP ranges, "strict" also anonymizes them.
// Unknown values are treated as "strict". Only meaningful with anonymize;
// "strict" implies it.
AnonymizeLevel string `protobuf:"bytes,8,opt,name=anonymizeLevel,proto3" json:"anonymizeLevel,omitempty"`
unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields
sizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache
}
@@ -2862,13 +2857,6 @@ func (x *DebugBundleRequest) GetUploadInsecure() bool {
return false
}
func (x *DebugBundleRequest) GetAnonymizeLevel() string {
if x != nil {
return x.AnonymizeLevel
}
return ""
}
type DebugBundleResponse struct {
state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"`
Path string `protobuf:"bytes,1,opt,name=path,proto3" json:"path,omitempty"`
@@ -7265,7 +7253,7 @@ const file_daemon_proto_rawDesc = "" +
"\x12translatedHostname\x18\x04 \x01(\tR\x12translatedHostname\x128\n" +
"\x0etranslatedPort\x18\x05 \x01(\v2\x10.daemon.PortInfoR\x0etranslatedPort\"G\n" +
"\x17ForwardingRulesResponse\x12,\n" +
"\x05rules\x18\x01 \x03(\v2\x16.daemon.ForwardingRuleR\x05rules\"\x84\x02\n" +
"\x05rules\x18\x01 \x03(\v2\x16.daemon.ForwardingRuleR\x05rules\"\xdc\x01\n" +
"\x12DebugBundleRequest\x12\x1c\n" +
"\tanonymize\x18\x01 \x01(\bR\tanonymize\x12\x1e\n" +
"\n" +
@@ -7276,8 +7264,7 @@ const file_daemon_proto_rawDesc = "" +
"\n" +
"cliVersion\x18\x06 \x01(\tR\n" +
"cliVersion\x12&\n" +
"\x0euploadInsecure\x18\a \x01(\bR\x0euploadInsecure\x12&\n" +
"\x0eanonymizeLevel\x18\b \x01(\tR\x0eanonymizeLevel\"}\n" +
"\x0euploadInsecure\x18\a \x01(\bR\x0euploadInsecure\"}\n" +
"\x13DebugBundleResponse\x12\x12\n" +
"\x04path\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x04path\x12 \n" +
"\vuploadedKey\x18\x02 \x01(\tR\vuploadedKey\x120\n" +

View File

@@ -540,11 +540,6 @@ message DebugBundleRequest {
// untrusted TLS certificate. Restricted to privileged callers; for
// self-hosted upload servers.
bool uploadInsecure = 7;
// anonymizeLevel selects how much the anonymizer redacts: "default"
// (or empty) keeps internal IP ranges, "strict" also anonymizes them.
// Unknown values are treated as "strict". Only meaningful with anonymize;
// "strict" implies it.
string anonymizeLevel = 8;
}
message DebugBundleResponse {

View File

@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ import (
"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
gstatus "google.golang.org/grpc/status"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/anonymize"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/debug"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/ipcauth"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
@@ -123,7 +122,6 @@ func (s *Server) generateDebugBundle(req *proto.DebugBundleRequest, uiOpener deb
},
debug.BundleConfig{
Anonymize: req.GetAnonymize(),
AnonymizeLevel: anonymize.ParseLevel(req.GetAnonymizeLevel()),
IncludeSystemInfo: req.GetSystemInfo(),
LogFileCount: req.GetLogFileCount(),
},

View File

@@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
package server
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"os"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
)
// A login that never reached Management is not a decision about the peer's
// credentials, so it must come back as a retryable error rather than an SSO
// prompt: the user cannot finish a browser login while Management is down, and
// the CLI's own backoff resolves the outage on its own once the daemon reports
// the failure. Reproduces `netbird down; netbird up` printing a device-code URL
// because Management happened to be restarting when the daemon dialed it.
func TestLogin_ManagementUnreachableIsReturnedInsteadOfDemandingSSO(t *testing.T) {
s, _, _, username, _ := setupServerWithProfile(t)
s.rootCtx = internal.CtxInitState(context.Background())
unreachable := errors.New("create connection: dial context: context deadline exceeded")
attempts := 0
s.isLoginRequiredFn = func(context.Context) (bool, error) {
attempts++
return false, unreachable
}
resp, err := s.Login(userCtx(), &proto.LoginRequest{Username: &username})
require.Error(t, err)
require.ErrorIs(t, err, unreachable, "the transport failure was replaced by something else")
require.Nil(t, resp, "a failed login must not answer with a login response")
require.Equal(t, 1, attempts)
require.Nil(t, s.oauthAuthFlow.flow, "the daemon started an SSO flow for a peer whose login was never decided")
status, err := internal.CtxGetState(s.rootCtx).Status()
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, internal.StatusLoginFailed, status,
"a peer that could not reach Management is not waiting on a login")
}
// The counterpart: Management refusing the peer's credentials is a decision, and
// the SSO flow still has to start for it. The profile carries an unusable
// private key so the flow setup fails immediately instead of dialing, which is
// enough to show the branch was entered — the refusal itself is never what comes
// back out.
func TestLogin_AuthRefusalStartsSSOFlow(t *testing.T) {
s, _, _, username, cfgPath := setupServerWithProfile(t)
s.rootCtx = internal.CtxInitState(context.Background())
breakProfilePrivateKey(t, cfgPath)
s.isLoginRequiredFn = func(context.Context) (bool, error) {
return true, nil
}
_, err := s.Login(userCtx(), &proto.LoginRequest{Username: &username})
require.Error(t, err)
status, stateErr := internal.CtxGetState(s.rootCtx).Status()
require.NoError(t, stateErr)
require.Equal(t, internal.StatusLoginFailed, status,
"the SSO flow setup was never reached with the broken key")
}
func TestLogin_SetupKeyStillRunsWhenPeerNeedsLogin(t *testing.T) {
s, _, _, username, _ := setupServerWithProfile(t)
s.rootCtx = internal.CtxInitState(context.Background())
s.isLoginRequiredFn = func(context.Context) (bool, error) {
return true, nil
}
var keysTried []string
s.loginAttemptFn = func(_ context.Context, setupKey, _ string) (internal.StatusType, error) {
keysTried = append(keysTried, setupKey)
return "", nil
}
setupKey := "A2C8E32F-AEB2-4B45-8FD3-8A0C1B2D3E4F"
resp, err := s.Login(userCtx(), &proto.LoginRequest{Username: &username, SetupKey: setupKey})
require.NoError(t, err, "the probe's outcome leaked out as the login result")
require.NotNil(t, resp)
require.Equal(t, []string{setupKey}, keysTried, "the setup key never reached the login attempt")
require.Nil(t, s.oauthAuthFlow.flow, "a setup-key login started an SSO flow")
status, err := internal.CtxGetState(s.rootCtx).Status()
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, internal.StatusIdle, status)
}
// breakProfilePrivateKey replaces the profile's private key with an unparseable
// one, which makes any attempt to build a Management client fail on the spot.
func breakProfilePrivateKey(t *testing.T, cfgPath string) {
t.Helper()
raw, err := os.ReadFile(cfgPath)
require.NoError(t, err)
var cfg map[string]any
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(raw, &cfg))
cfg["PrivateKey"] = "not-a-key"
patched, err := json.Marshal(cfg)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(cfgPath, patched, 0o600))
}

View File

@@ -135,13 +135,6 @@ type Server struct {
updateManager *updater.Manager
jwtCache *jwtCache
// loginAttemptFn stands in for the Management login round trip. Tests set
// it to drive the login outcomes that need a server on the other end;
// production leaves it nil, and every login goes through loginAttempt.
loginAttemptFn func(ctx context.Context, setupKey, jwtToken string) (internal.StatusType, error)
isLoginRequiredFn func(ctx context.Context) (bool, error)
}
type oauthAuthFlow struct {
@@ -377,34 +370,7 @@ func (s *Server) connectionGoroutineRunning() bool {
}
}
// attemptLogin runs a login round trip against Management, or the stand-in a
// test installed in place of it.
func (s *Server) attemptLogin(ctx context.Context, setupKey, jwtToken string) (internal.StatusType, error) {
if s.loginAttemptFn != nil {
return s.loginAttemptFn(ctx, setupKey, jwtToken)
}
return s.loginAttempt(ctx, setupKey, jwtToken)
}
func (s *Server) isLoginRequired(ctx context.Context) (bool, error) {
if s.isLoginRequiredFn != nil {
return s.isLoginRequiredFn(ctx)
}
authClient, err := auth.NewAuth(ctx, s.config.PrivateKey, s.config.ManagementURL, s.config)
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("failed to create auth client: %v", err)
return false, err
}
defer authClient.Close()
return authClient.IsLoginRequired(ctx)
}
// loginAttempt attempts to login using the provided information. It returns
// StatusNeedsLogin when Management refused the peer's credentials and
// StatusLoginFailed for every other failure, so callers can tell an
// authentication decision apart from a login that never got made.
// loginAttempt attempts to login using the provided information. it returns a status in case something fails
func (s *Server) loginAttempt(ctx context.Context, setupKey, jwtToken string) (internal.StatusType, error) {
authClient, err := auth.NewAuth(ctx, s.config.PrivateKey, s.config.ManagementURL, s.config)
if err != nil {
@@ -657,19 +623,7 @@ func (s *Server) Login(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.LoginRequest) (*pro
s.config = config
s.mutex.Unlock()
// A probe that errors leaves the login undecided: Management unreachable, a
// restart mid-request, an internal error. Those are returned for the caller
// to retry, because turning them into an SSO prompt asks the user to solve
// something that is not theirs to solve, and a browser login cannot succeed
// while Management is unreachable anyway. Only Management refusing the
// peer's key is a decision, and IsLoginRequired reports that as
// needsLogin=true rather than an error.
needsLogin, err := s.isLoginRequired(ctx)
if err != nil {
state.Set(internal.StatusLoginFailed)
return nil, err
}
if !needsLogin {
if _, err := s.loginAttempt(ctx, "", ""); err == nil {
state.Set(internal.StatusIdle)
return &proto.LoginResponse{}, nil
}
@@ -730,7 +684,7 @@ func (s *Server) Login(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.LoginRequest) (*pro
// which returns NeedsLogin and parks on the browser leg.
state.Set(internal.StatusConnecting)
if loginStatus, err := s.attemptLogin(ctx, msg.SetupKey, ""); err != nil {
if loginStatus, err := s.loginAttempt(ctx, msg.SetupKey, ""); err != nil {
state.Set(loginStatus)
return nil, err
}
@@ -885,7 +839,7 @@ func (s *Server) WaitSSOLogin(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.WaitSSOLogin
s.oauthAuthFlow.expiresAt = time.Now()
s.mutex.Unlock()
if loginStatus, err := s.attemptLogin(ctx, "", tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse()); err != nil {
if loginStatus, err := s.loginAttempt(ctx, "", tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse()); err != nil {
state.Set(loginStatus)
return nil, err
}
@@ -1815,9 +1769,6 @@ func (s *Server) RequestExtendAuthSession(
if connectClient == nil {
return nil, gstatus.Errorf(codes.FailedPrecondition, "client is not running")
}
if connectClient.Engine() == nil {
return nil, gstatus.Errorf(codes.FailedPrecondition, "session can no longer be extended, log in again to reconnect")
}
hint := ""
if msg.Hint != nil {

View File

@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ func (s *Server) setUserEnvironmentVariables(envMap map[string]string, userProfi
// prepareCommandEnv prepares environment variables for command execution on Windows
func (s *Server) prepareCommandEnv(logger *log.Entry, localUser *user.User, session ssh.Session) []string {
username, domain := parseUsername(localUser.Username)
username, domain := s.parseUsername(localUser.Username)
userEnv, err := s.getUserEnvironment(logger, username, domain)
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("failed to get user environment for %s\\%s, using fallback: %v", domain, username, err)
@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ func (s *Server) executeCommandWithPty(logger *log.Entry, session ssh.Session, _
return false
}
username, domain := parseUsername(localUser.Username)
username, domain := s.parseUsername(localUser.Username)
shell := getUserShell(localUser.Uid)
req := PtyExecutionRequest{

View File

@@ -133,12 +133,7 @@ func (s *Server) checkPrivilegedPortAccess(forwardType string, port uint32, resu
return nil
}
// Only uid 0 may bind below the threshold, which is the kernel's own rule and
// is asked directly rather than through isPrivilegedOrUnknown: that helper
// reports an account it cannot evaluate as privileged, which is safe for a
// refusal and unsafe for a grant such as this one. Windows has returned
// above, so Uid here is a Unix uid and never a SID.
if result.User != nil && result.User.Uid == "0" {
if result.User != nil && isPrivilegedUsername(result.User.Username) {
return nil
}

View File

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
//go:build !windows
package server
// isProcessElevated is only meaningful on Windows; other platforms use the
// effective UID check in isCurrentProcessPrivileged.
func isProcessElevated() bool {
return false
}
// isWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown is only reachable on Windows. Report
// privileged on other platforms so a caller refusing privileged accounts fails
// closed.
func isWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown(string) bool {
return true
}

View File

@@ -1,228 +0,0 @@
//go:build windows
package server
import (
"fmt"
"strings"
"unsafe"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
)
var (
netapi32 = windows.NewLazySystemDLL("netapi32.dll")
procNetUserGetLocalGroups = netapi32.NewProc("NetUserGetLocalGroups")
)
const (
// lgIncludeIndirect makes NetUserGetLocalGroups also return local groups
// the user belongs to through a global group.
lgIncludeIndirect = 0x1
maxPreferredLength = 0xFFFFFFFF
)
// localGroupUsersInfo0 mirrors LOCALGROUP_USERS_INFO_0.
type localGroupUsersInfo0 struct {
name *uint16
}
// isProcessElevated reports whether the current process token is elevated
// (TokenElevation): true for elevated administrators, the built-in
// Administrator, administrators with UAC disabled, and SYSTEM; false for
// standard users and administrators running with a UAC-filtered token.
func isProcessElevated() bool {
return windows.GetCurrentProcessToken().IsElevated()
}
// isWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown reports whether the account is privileged
// on this machine: a well-known service account, a built-in Administrator
// (RID 500), or a member of the local Administrators group, directly or through
// nested groups.
//
// An account whose privilege cannot be determined counts as privileged, which
// is why the name says "or unknown". That is fail-closed for a caller that
// refuses privileged accounts, and fail-open for a caller that grants something
// to them, so only the former may use this.
func isWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown(username string) bool {
sid, _, _, err := windows.LookupSID("", username)
if err != nil {
log.Warnf("privilege check: SID lookup for %q failed, treating as privileged: %v", username, err)
return true
}
if isPrivilegedUserSID(sid) {
return true
}
member, err := isLocalAdminsMember(username)
if err != nil {
log.Warnf("privilege check: cannot determine Administrators membership for %q, treating as privileged: %v", username, err)
return true
}
return member
}
// isPrivilegedUserSID reports whether the SID itself identifies a privileged
// principal, without consulting group membership.
func isPrivilegedUserSID(sid *windows.SID) bool {
wellKnown := []windows.WELL_KNOWN_SID_TYPE{
windows.WinLocalSystemSid,
windows.WinLocalServiceSid,
windows.WinNetworkServiceSid,
windows.WinBuiltinAdministratorsSid,
}
for _, sidType := range wellKnown {
if sid.IsWellKnown(sidType) {
return true
}
}
return isBuiltinAdministratorSID(sid)
}
// isBuiltinAdministratorSID reports whether the SID is a machine or domain
// built-in Administrator account (S-1-5-21-...-500). RID 500 is reserved for
// that account; it can be renamed but cannot be removed from the
// Administrators group.
func isBuiltinAdministratorSID(sid *windows.SID) bool {
if sid.IdentifierAuthority() != windows.SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY {
return false
}
count := sid.SubAuthorityCount()
if count < 2 || sid.SubAuthority(0) != 21 {
return false
}
return sid.SubAuthority(uint32(count-1)) == 500
}
// isLocalAdminsMember reports whether the account is a member of the local
// Administrators group.
//
// Local accounts are checked against the local SAM, which is authoritative for
// them and, unlike a token, cannot under-report: UAC filters the tokens of
// local administrators, and a filtered token carries Administrators as
// deny-only, which a membership check on the token would read as "not a
// member". Domain accounts are exempt from that filtering, so for them an S4U
// token is preferred because its group list is LSA's transitive expansion and
// therefore covers nested and universal groups plus the machine's own local
// groups. NetUserGetLocalGroups expands only one global-group hop but needs no
// logon, so it serves as the fallback when no token can be obtained.
func isLocalAdminsMember(username string) (bool, error) {
adminSid, err := windows.CreateWellKnownSid(windows.WinBuiltinAdministratorsSid)
if err != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("create Administrators SID: %w", err)
}
account, domain := parseUsername(username)
if NewPrivilegeDropper().isLocalUser(domain) {
return localGroupsContainSID(account, adminSid)
}
member, s4uErr := s4uTokenIsMember(account, domain, adminSid)
if s4uErr == nil {
return member, nil
}
log.Debugf("privilege check: S4U membership check for %q failed, falling back to local group enumeration: %v", username, s4uErr)
member, err = localGroupsContainSID(buildUserCpn(account, domain), adminSid)
if err != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("S4U check: %w; local group enumeration: %w", s4uErr, err)
}
return member, nil
}
// s4uTokenIsMember obtains an S4U token for the account and checks whether the
// given SID is enabled in it.
func s4uTokenIsMember(account, domain string, sid *windows.SID) (bool, error) {
token, err := generateS4UUserToken(log.NewEntry(log.StandardLogger()), account, domain)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
defer func() {
if err := windows.CloseHandle(token); err != nil {
log.Debugf("close S4U token: %v", err)
}
}()
return windows.Token(token).IsMember(sid)
}
// localGroupsContainSID reports whether the wanted group is among the local
// groups the account belongs to, directly or through a global group.
//
// The wanted SID is resolved to its group name once and compared against the
// enumerated names. Well-known SIDs resolve from a static table, so that lookup
// needs no domain controller, and it keeps the comparison correct for a renamed
// or localized group because both sides then carry the new name. Resolving each
// enumerated name back to a SID instead would add a lookup per group that can
// block until it times out while a domain controller is unreachable, and cannot
// change the outcome: the names enumerated here are local groups of this
// machine, whose names are unique, so a name match identifies the group.
//
// A failure to resolve the wanted SID is returned rather than reported as
// "not a member", so a privilege check built on this fails closed.
func localGroupsContainSID(username string, want *windows.SID) (bool, error) {
wantName, _, _, err := want.LookupAccount("")
if err != nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("resolve group SID %s to a name: %w", want, err)
}
groups, err := netUserGetLocalGroups(username)
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
for _, group := range groups {
if strings.EqualFold(group, wantName) {
return true, nil
}
}
return false, nil
}
// netUserGetLocalGroups returns the names of the local groups the account is a
// member of, including indirect membership through global groups.
func netUserGetLocalGroups(username string) ([]string, error) {
name16, err := windows.UTF16PtrFromString(username)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("convert username: %w", err)
}
var buf *byte
var entriesRead, totalEntries uint32
status, _, _ := procNetUserGetLocalGroups.Call(
0, // local server
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(name16)),
0, // level 0: LOCALGROUP_USERS_INFO_0
lgIncludeIndirect,
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&buf)),
maxPreferredLength,
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&entriesRead)),
uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&totalEntries)),
)
if status != 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("NetUserGetLocalGroups for %q: status %d", username, status)
}
if buf == nil {
return nil, nil
}
defer func() {
if err := windows.NetApiBufferFree(buf); err != nil {
log.Debugf("free NetApi buffer: %v", err)
}
}()
// MAX_PREFERRED_LENGTH makes the API allocate as much as it needs, so a
// short read is not expected. Report it rather than silently returning a
// subset of the account's groups.
if entriesRead != totalEntries {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("NetUserGetLocalGroups for %q returned %d of %d groups", username, entriesRead, totalEntries)
}
entries := unsafe.Slice((*localGroupUsersInfo0)(unsafe.Pointer(buf)), entriesRead)
groups := make([]string, 0, entriesRead)
for _, entry := range entries {
groups = append(groups, windows.UTF16PtrToString(entry.name))
}
return groups, nil
}

View File

@@ -1,293 +0,0 @@
//go:build windows
package server
import (
"os/user"
"testing"
"unsafe"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
)
// filterNormalAccount limits NetUserEnum to normal user accounts.
const filterNormalAccount = 0x2
// TOKEN_ELEVATION_TYPE values.
const (
tokenElevationTypeDefault = 1
tokenElevationTypeFull = 2
tokenElevationTypeLimited = 3
)
// tokenElevationType reads TokenElevationType from a token.
func tokenElevationType(token windows.Token) (uint32, error) {
var elevationType, returnedLen uint32
err := windows.GetTokenInformation(token, windows.TokenElevationType,
(*byte)(unsafe.Pointer(&elevationType)), uint32(unsafe.Sizeof(elevationType)), &returnedLen)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
return elevationType, nil
}
// userInfo0 mirrors USER_INFO_0.
type userInfo0 struct {
name *uint16
}
func mustParseSID(t *testing.T, s string) *windows.SID {
t.Helper()
sid, err := windows.StringToSid(s)
require.NoError(t, err, "parse SID %s", s)
return sid
}
// localAccountNames returns the names of the local user accounts.
func localAccountNames(t *testing.T) []string {
t.Helper()
var buf *byte
var entriesRead, totalEntries, resume uint32
err := windows.NetUserEnum(nil, 0, filterNormalAccount, &buf, maxPreferredLength,
&entriesRead, &totalEntries, &resume)
require.NoError(t, err, "enumerate local users")
t.Cleanup(func() {
require.NoError(t, windows.NetApiBufferFree(buf), "free NetApi buffer")
})
entries := unsafe.Slice((*userInfo0)(unsafe.Pointer(buf)), entriesRead)
names := make([]string, 0, entriesRead)
for _, entry := range entries {
names = append(names, windows.UTF16PtrToString(entry.name))
}
return names
}
// localAccountNameByRID returns the name of the local account carrying the
// given RID. Accounts such as Administrator and Guest can be renamed and are
// localized, so tests must not name them literally.
func localAccountNameByRID(t *testing.T, rid uint32) string {
t.Helper()
for _, name := range localAccountNames(t) {
sid, _, _, err := windows.LookupSID("", name)
if err != nil {
continue
}
if sid.IdentifierAuthority() != windows.SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY {
continue
}
count := sid.SubAuthorityCount()
if count < 2 || sid.SubAuthority(0) != 21 {
continue
}
if sid.SubAuthority(uint32(count-1)) == rid {
return name
}
}
t.Fatalf("no local account with RID %d", rid)
return ""
}
// wellKnownAccountName resolves a well-known SID to the qualified account name
// the local system uses for it, which is localized.
func wellKnownAccountName(t *testing.T, sidType windows.WELL_KNOWN_SID_TYPE) string {
t.Helper()
sid, err := windows.CreateWellKnownSid(sidType)
require.NoError(t, err, "create well-known SID")
name, domain, _, err := sid.LookupAccount("")
require.NoError(t, err, "resolve %s to an account name", sid)
if domain == "" {
return name
}
return domain + `\` + name
}
func TestIsBuiltinAdministratorSID(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
sid string
want bool
}{
{"machine_administrator", "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-500", true},
{"domain_administrator", "S-1-5-21-3390233681-4087452608-412898826-500", true},
{"regular_user", "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-1001", false},
{"guest_account", "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-501", false},
{"domain_admins_group", "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-512", false},
{"system", "S-1-5-18", false},
{"administrators_group", "S-1-5-32-544", false},
{"non_nt_authority", "S-1-1-0", false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
result := isBuiltinAdministratorSID(mustParseSID(t, tt.sid))
assert.Equal(t, tt.want, result, "RID 500 detection for %s", tt.sid)
})
}
}
func TestIsPrivilegedUserSID(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
sid string
want bool
}{
{"local_system", "S-1-5-18", true},
{"local_service", "S-1-5-19", true},
{"network_service", "S-1-5-20", true},
{"administrators_group", "S-1-5-32-544", true},
{"builtin_administrator", "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-500", true},
{"regular_user", "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-1001", false},
{"users_group", "S-1-5-32-545", false},
{"everyone", "S-1-1-0", false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
result := isPrivilegedUserSID(mustParseSID(t, tt.sid))
assert.Equal(t, tt.want, result, "SID privilege classification for %s", tt.sid)
})
}
}
func TestIsWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
username string
want bool
}{
{"system", wellKnownAccountName(t, windows.WinLocalSystemSid), true},
{"local_service", wellKnownAccountName(t, windows.WinLocalServiceSid), true},
{"network_service", wellKnownAccountName(t, windows.WinNetworkServiceSid), true},
{"administrators_group", wellKnownAccountName(t, windows.WinBuiltinAdministratorsSid), true},
// The built-in Administrator (RID 500) and Guest (RID 501) accounts
// exist on every Windows installation, though they may be disabled.
{"builtin_administrator", localAccountNameByRID(t, 500), true},
{"guest", localAccountNameByRID(t, 501), false},
// Unresolvable accounts fail closed.
{"nonexistent_user", "netbird-no-such-user", true},
{"empty_username", "", true},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
result := isWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown(tt.username)
assert.Equal(t, tt.want, result, "account privilege classification for %q", tt.username)
})
}
}
func TestIsProcessElevated(t *testing.T) {
elevated := isProcessElevated()
// TokenElevationType is a second, independent view of the same token:
// Full means elevated and Limited means a filtered administrator, while
// Default covers both a standard user and an administrator with no linked
// token (UAC off, the built-in Administrator, SYSTEM), so it implies nothing.
elevationType, err := tokenElevationType(windows.GetCurrentProcessToken())
require.NoError(t, err, "read token elevation type")
adminSid, err := windows.CreateWellKnownSid(windows.WinBuiltinAdministratorsSid)
require.NoError(t, err, "create Administrators SID")
// Token(0) makes CheckTokenMembership evaluate the caller's own token. It
// counts only enabled SIDs, so a filtered administrator reports false here.
member, err := windows.Token(0).IsMember(adminSid)
require.NoError(t, err, "check own Administrators membership")
t.Logf("elevated=%v elevationType=%d memberOfAdministrators=%v", elevated, elevationType, member)
switch elevationType {
case tokenElevationTypeFull:
assert.True(t, elevated, "a token of elevation type Full must report elevated")
case tokenElevationTypeLimited:
assert.False(t, elevated, "a filtered administrator token must not report elevated")
}
// Administrators enabled in the token means the token wields administrative
// rights, which is what elevation reports.
if member {
assert.True(t, elevated, "token with enabled Administrators membership must report elevated")
}
}
// TestS4UMembershipAgreesWithLocalGroups exercises the S4U token path used
// for domain accounts. S4U logons need the TCB privilege, so the test runs
// only as SYSTEM (which is how CI executes the suite). For local accounts the
// token's Administrators membership must agree with the SAM enumeration.
func TestS4UMembershipAgreesWithLocalGroups(t *testing.T) {
system, err := windows.CreateWellKnownSid(windows.WinLocalSystemSid)
require.NoError(t, err, "create SYSTEM SID")
current, err := user.Current()
require.NoError(t, err, "get current user")
if current.Uid != system.String() {
t.Skipf("S4U logon requires SYSTEM (running as %s)", current.Username)
}
adminSid, err := windows.CreateWellKnownSid(windows.WinBuiltinAdministratorsSid)
require.NoError(t, err, "create Administrators SID")
checked := 0
for _, name := range localAccountNames(t) {
viaToken, err := s4uTokenIsMember(name, ".", adminSid)
if err != nil {
// Disabled or logon-restricted accounts cannot get an S4U logon.
t.Logf("skipping %s: %v", name, err)
continue
}
viaSAM, err := localGroupsContainSID(name, adminSid)
require.NoError(t, err, "enumerate local groups for %s", name)
assert.Equal(t, viaSAM, viaToken, "S4U token and SAM enumeration must agree on Administrators membership for %s", name)
checked++
}
// Ineligible accounts are skipped, so without this the test could report
// success while comparing nothing at all.
require.Positive(t, checked, "no local account completed an S4U logon, so nothing was compared")
t.Logf("checked %d local accounts via S4U", checked)
}
// TestLocalGroupsContainSID_Administrator checks the positive case against the
// built-in Administrator, a member of Administrators on every installation.
func TestLocalGroupsContainSID_Administrator(t *testing.T) {
adminSid, err := windows.CreateWellKnownSid(windows.WinBuiltinAdministratorsSid)
require.NoError(t, err, "create Administrators SID")
administrator := localAccountNameByRID(t, 500)
member, err := localGroupsContainSID(administrator, adminSid)
require.NoError(t, err, "enumerate local groups for %s", administrator)
assert.True(t, member, "%s is a member of the Administrators group", administrator)
}
// TestLocalGroupsContainSID_UnresolvableGroupFailsClosed covers a wanted SID
// that resolves to no group: the error must surface rather than being reported
// as "not a member", so the privilege check treats the account as privileged.
func TestLocalGroupsContainSID_UnresolvableGroupFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
unknown := mustParseSID(t, "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-4444")
_, err := localGroupsContainSID(localAccountNameByRID(t, 500), unknown)
require.Error(t, err, "must report an error when the wanted group cannot be identified")
}
func TestLocalGroupsContainSID_Guest(t *testing.T) {
guestsSid, err := windows.CreateWellKnownSid(windows.WinBuiltinGuestsSid)
require.NoError(t, err, "create Guests SID")
adminsSid, err := windows.CreateWellKnownSid(windows.WinBuiltinAdministratorsSid)
require.NoError(t, err, "create Administrators SID")
guest := localAccountNameByRID(t, 501)
inGuests, err := localGroupsContainSID(guest, guestsSid)
require.NoError(t, err, "enumerate local groups for %s", guest)
assert.True(t, inGuests, "%s is a member of the Guests group", guest)
inAdmins, err := localGroupsContainSID(guest, adminsSid)
require.NoError(t, err, "enumerate local groups for %s", guest)
assert.False(t, inAdmins, "%s is not a member of the Administrators group", guest)
}

View File

@@ -239,7 +239,6 @@ func TestServer_PrivilegedPortAccess(t *testing.T) {
forwardType string
port uint32
username string
uid string
expectError bool
errorMsg string
skipOnWindows bool
@@ -249,7 +248,6 @@ func TestServer_PrivilegedPortAccess(t *testing.T) {
forwardType: "remote",
port: 80,
username: "testuser",
uid: "1000",
expectError: true,
errorMsg: "cannot bind to privileged port",
skipOnWindows: true,
@@ -259,7 +257,6 @@ func TestServer_PrivilegedPortAccess(t *testing.T) {
forwardType: "tcpip-forward",
port: 443,
username: "testuser",
uid: "1000",
expectError: true,
errorMsg: "cannot bind to privileged port",
skipOnWindows: true,
@@ -269,7 +266,6 @@ func TestServer_PrivilegedPortAccess(t *testing.T) {
forwardType: "remote",
port: 8080,
username: "testuser",
uid: "1000",
expectError: false,
},
{
@@ -277,7 +273,6 @@ func TestServer_PrivilegedPortAccess(t *testing.T) {
forwardType: "remote",
port: 0,
username: "testuser",
uid: "1000",
expectError: false,
},
{
@@ -285,35 +280,13 @@ func TestServer_PrivilegedPortAccess(t *testing.T) {
forwardType: "remote",
port: 22,
username: "root",
uid: "0",
expectError: false,
},
{
// Only uid 0 is privileged, whatever the account is called.
name: "uid 0 under another name may bind a privileged port",
forwardType: "remote",
port: 22,
username: "toor",
uid: "0",
expectError: false,
skipOnWindows: true,
},
{
name: "account named root without uid 0 may not",
forwardType: "remote",
port: 22,
username: "root",
uid: "1000",
expectError: true,
errorMsg: "cannot bind to privileged port",
skipOnWindows: true,
},
{
name: "local forward privileged port allowed for non-root",
forwardType: "local",
port: 80,
username: "testuser",
uid: "1000",
expectError: false,
},
}
@@ -326,7 +299,7 @@ func TestServer_PrivilegedPortAccess(t *testing.T) {
result := PrivilegeCheckResult{
Allowed: true,
User: &user.User{Username: tt.username, Uid: tt.uid},
User: &user.User{Username: tt.username},
}
err := server.checkPrivilegedPortAccess(tt.forwardType, tt.port, result)
@@ -447,13 +420,6 @@ func TestServer_PortConflictHandling(t *testing.T) {
func TestServer_IsPrivilegedUser(t *testing.T) {
// Windows classification depends on account SIDs and group membership, and
// the accounts involved carry localized, renameable names. It is covered by
// TestIsWindowsAccountPrivileged, which resolves them from well-known SIDs.
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
t.Skip("covered by TestIsWindowsAccountPrivileged")
}
tests := []struct {
username string
expected bool
@@ -474,16 +440,44 @@ func TestServer_IsPrivilegedUser(t *testing.T) {
expected: false,
description: "empty username should not be privileged",
},
{
username: "Administrator",
expected: false,
description: "Administrator should not be privileged on non-Windows systems",
},
}
// Add Windows-specific tests
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
tests = append(tests, []struct {
username string
expected bool
description string
}{
{
username: "Administrator",
expected: true,
description: "Administrator should be considered privileged on Windows",
},
{
username: "administrator",
expected: true,
description: "administrator should be considered privileged on Windows (case insensitive)",
},
}...)
} else {
// On non-Windows systems, Administrator should not be privileged
tests = append(tests, []struct {
username string
expected bool
description string
}{
{
username: "Administrator",
expected: false,
description: "Administrator should not be privileged on non-Windows systems",
},
}...)
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.description, func(t *testing.T) {
result := isPrivilegedOrUnknown(tt.username)
result := isPrivilegedUsername(tt.username)
assert.Equal(t, tt.expected, result, tt.description)
})
}

View File

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ import (
// createSftpCommand creates a Windows SFTP command with user switching.
// The caller must close the returned token handle after starting the process.
func (s *Server) createSftpCommand(targetUser *user.User, sess ssh.Session) (*exec.Cmd, windows.Token, error) {
username, domain := parseUsername(targetUser.Username)
username, domain := s.parseUsername(targetUser.Username)
netbirdPath, err := os.Executable()
if err != nil {

View File

@@ -16,6 +16,11 @@ var (
ErrPrivilegedUserSwitch = errors.New("cannot switch to privileged user - current user lacks required privileges")
)
// isPlatformUnix returns true for Unix-like platforms (Linux, macOS, etc.)
func isPlatformUnix() bool {
return getCurrentOS() != "windows"
}
// Dependency injection variables for testing - allows mocking dynamic runtime checks
var (
getCurrentUser = currentUserWithGetent
@@ -24,9 +29,6 @@ var (
getIsProcessPrivileged = isCurrentProcessPrivileged
getEuid = os.Geteuid
getProcessElevated = isProcessElevated
getWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown = isWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown
)
const (
@@ -63,13 +65,6 @@ type PrivilegeCheckResult struct {
RequiresUserSwitching bool
}
// privilegeCheckContext holds all context needed for privilege checking
type privilegeCheckContext struct {
currentUser *user.User
currentUserPrivileged bool
allowRoot bool
}
// CheckPrivileges performs comprehensive privilege checking for all SSH features.
// This is the single source of truth for privilege decisions across the SSH server.
func (s *Server) CheckPrivileges(req PrivilegeCheckRequest) PrivilegeCheckResult {
@@ -80,7 +75,7 @@ func (s *Server) CheckPrivileges(req PrivilegeCheckRequest) PrivilegeCheckResult
// Handle empty username case - but still check root access controls
if req.RequestedUsername == "" {
if isPrivilegedOrUnknown(context.currentUser.Username) && !context.allowRoot {
if isPrivilegedUsername(context.currentUser.Username) && !context.allowRoot {
return PrivilegeCheckResult{
Allowed: false,
Error: &PrivilegedUserError{Username: context.currentUser.Username},
@@ -140,7 +135,7 @@ func (s *Server) checkUserRequest(ctx *privilegeCheckContext, req PrivilegeCheck
needsUserSwitching := !isSameResolvedUser(resolvedUser, ctx.currentUser)
if isPrivilegedOrUnknown(resolvedUser.Username) && !ctx.allowRoot {
if isPrivilegedUsername(resolvedUser.Username) && !ctx.allowRoot {
return PrivilegeCheckResult{
Allowed: false,
Error: &PrivilegedUserError{Username: resolvedUser.Username},
@@ -180,42 +175,6 @@ func (s *Server) resolveRequestedUser(requestedUsername string) (*user.User, err
return u, nil
}
// SetAllowRootLogin configures root login access
func (s *Server) SetAllowRootLogin(allow bool) {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
s.allowRootLogin = allow
}
// userNameLookup performs user lookup with root login permission check
func (s *Server) userNameLookup(username string) (*user.User, error) {
result, err := s.userPrivilegeCheck(username)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return result.User, nil
}
// userPrivilegeCheck performs user lookup with full privilege check result
func (s *Server) userPrivilegeCheck(username string) (PrivilegeCheckResult, error) {
result := s.CheckPrivileges(PrivilegeCheckRequest{
RequestedUsername: username,
FeatureSupportsUserSwitch: true,
FeatureName: FeatureSSHLogin,
})
if !result.Allowed {
return result, result.Error
}
return result, nil
}
// isPlatformUnix returns true for Unix-like platforms (Linux, macOS, etc.)
func isPlatformUnix() bool {
return getCurrentOS() != "windows"
}
// isSameResolvedUser compares two resolved user identities
func isSameResolvedUser(user1, user2 *user.User) bool {
if user1 == nil || user2 == nil {
@@ -224,6 +183,13 @@ func isSameResolvedUser(user1, user2 *user.User) bool {
return user1.Uid == user2.Uid
}
// privilegeCheckContext holds all context needed for privilege checking
type privilegeCheckContext struct {
currentUser *user.User
currentUserPrivileged bool
allowRoot bool
}
// isSameUser checks if two usernames refer to the same user
// SECURITY: This function must be conservative - it should only return true
// when we're certain both usernames refer to the exact same user identity
@@ -287,30 +253,159 @@ func isWindowsSameUser(requestedUsername, currentUsername string) bool {
return strings.EqualFold(reqDomain, curDomain)
}
// isPrivilegedOrUnknown reports whether the given username represents a
// privileged user, or on Windows an account whose privilege could not be
// determined.
// On Unix: root.
// On Windows: well-known service accounts, built-in Administrator accounts,
// and members of the local Administrators group; handles domain-qualified
// usernames like "DOMAIN\user" or "user@domain.com". An account that cannot be
// resolved or evaluated is reported as privileged.
//
// Use this to refuse privileged accounts, never to grant them anything: the
// undetermined case is safe for a refusal and unsafe for a grant.
func isPrivilegedOrUnknown(username string) bool {
// SetAllowRootLogin configures root login access
func (s *Server) SetAllowRootLogin(allow bool) {
s.mu.Lock()
defer s.mu.Unlock()
s.allowRootLogin = allow
}
// userNameLookup performs user lookup with root login permission check
func (s *Server) userNameLookup(username string) (*user.User, error) {
result := s.CheckPrivileges(PrivilegeCheckRequest{
RequestedUsername: username,
FeatureSupportsUserSwitch: true,
FeatureName: FeatureSSHLogin,
})
if !result.Allowed {
return nil, result.Error
}
return result.User, nil
}
// userPrivilegeCheck performs user lookup with full privilege check result
func (s *Server) userPrivilegeCheck(username string) (PrivilegeCheckResult, error) {
result := s.CheckPrivileges(PrivilegeCheckRequest{
RequestedUsername: username,
FeatureSupportsUserSwitch: true,
FeatureName: FeatureSSHLogin,
})
if !result.Allowed {
return result, result.Error
}
return result, nil
}
// isPrivilegedUsername checks if the given username represents a privileged user across platforms.
// On Unix: root
// On Windows: Administrator, SYSTEM (case-insensitive)
// Handles domain-qualified usernames like "DOMAIN\Administrator" or "user@domain.com"
func isPrivilegedUsername(username string) bool {
if getCurrentOS() != "windows" {
return username == "root"
}
return getWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown(username)
bareUsername := username
// Handle Windows domain format: DOMAIN\username
if idx := strings.LastIndex(username, `\`); idx != -1 {
bareUsername = username[idx+1:]
}
// Handle email-style format: username@domain.com
if idx := strings.Index(bareUsername, "@"); idx != -1 {
bareUsername = bareUsername[:idx]
}
return isWindowsPrivilegedUser(bareUsername)
}
// isWindowsPrivilegedUser checks if a bare username (domain already stripped) represents a Windows privileged account
func isWindowsPrivilegedUser(bareUsername string) bool {
// common privileged usernames (case insensitive)
privilegedNames := []string{
"administrator",
"admin",
"root",
"system",
"localsystem",
"networkservice",
"localservice",
}
usernameLower := strings.ToLower(bareUsername)
for _, privilegedName := range privilegedNames {
if usernameLower == privilegedName {
return true
}
}
// computer accounts (ending with $) are not privileged by themselves
// They only gain privileges through group membership or specific SIDs
if targetUser, err := lookupUser(bareUsername); err == nil {
return isWindowsPrivilegedSID(targetUser.Uid)
}
return false
}
// isWindowsPrivilegedSID checks if a Windows SID represents a privileged account
func isWindowsPrivilegedSID(sid string) bool {
privilegedSIDs := []string{
"S-1-5-18", // Local System (SYSTEM)
"S-1-5-19", // Local Service (NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE)
"S-1-5-20", // Network Service (NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE)
"S-1-5-32-544", // Administrators group (BUILTIN\Administrators)
"S-1-5-500", // Built-in Administrator account (local machine RID 500)
}
for _, privilegedSID := range privilegedSIDs {
if sid == privilegedSID {
return true
}
}
// Check for domain administrator accounts (RID 500 in any domain)
// Format: S-1-5-21-domain-domain-domain-500
// This is reliable as RID 500 is reserved for the domain Administrator account
if strings.HasPrefix(sid, "S-1-5-21-") && strings.HasSuffix(sid, "-500") {
return true
}
// Check for other well-known privileged RIDs in domain contexts
// RID 512 = Domain Admins group, RID 516 = Domain Controllers group
if strings.HasPrefix(sid, "S-1-5-21-") {
if strings.HasSuffix(sid, "-512") || // Domain Admins group
strings.HasSuffix(sid, "-516") || // Domain Controllers group
strings.HasSuffix(sid, "-519") { // Enterprise Admins group
return true
}
}
return false
}
// isCurrentProcessPrivileged checks if the current process is running with elevated privileges.
// On Unix systems, this means running as root (UID 0).
// On Windows, this means the process token is elevated (administrators, SYSTEM).
// On Windows, this means running as Administrator or SYSTEM.
func isCurrentProcessPrivileged() bool {
if getCurrentOS() == "windows" {
return getProcessElevated()
return isWindowsElevated()
}
return getEuid() == 0
}
// isWindowsElevated checks if the current process is running with elevated privileges on Windows
func isWindowsElevated() bool {
currentUser, err := getCurrentUser()
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("failed to get current user for privilege check, assuming non-privileged: %v", err)
return false
}
if isWindowsPrivilegedSID(currentUser.Uid) {
log.Debugf("Windows user switching supported: running as privileged SID %s", currentUser.Uid)
return true
}
if isPrivilegedUsername(currentUser.Username) {
log.Debugf("Windows user switching supported: running as privileged username %s", currentUser.Username)
return true
}
log.Debugf("Windows user switching not supported: not running as privileged user (current: %s)", currentUser.Uid)
return false
}

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import (
"errors"
"os/user"
"runtime"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
@@ -28,8 +27,8 @@ func setupTestDependencies(currentUser *user.User, currentUserErr error, os stri
originalLookupUser := lookupUser
originalGetCurrentOS := getCurrentOS
originalGetEuid := getEuid
originalGetProcessElevated := getProcessElevated
originalGetWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown := getWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown
// Reset caches to ensure clean test state
// Set test values - inject platform dependencies
getCurrentUser = func() (*user.User, error) {
@@ -54,31 +53,16 @@ func setupTestDependencies(currentUser *user.User, currentUserErr error, os stri
return euid
}
// Simulate the Windows token elevation check based on the fixture user:
// the built-in Administrator (RID 500) and SYSTEM run elevated.
getProcessElevated = func() bool {
// Mock privilege detection based on the test user
getIsProcessPrivileged = func() bool {
if currentUser == nil {
return false
}
return currentUser.Uid == "S-1-5-18" || strings.HasSuffix(currentUser.Uid, "-500")
}
// Simulate the Windows account classifier for the fixture accounts.
// "root" does not exist on Windows; the real classifier fails closed on
// unresolvable accounts, so it counts as privileged here too.
getWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown = func(username string) bool {
bare := username
if idx := strings.LastIndex(bare, `\`); idx != -1 {
bare = bare[idx+1:]
}
if idx := strings.Index(bare, "@"); idx != -1 {
bare = bare[:idx]
}
switch strings.ToLower(bare) {
case "administrator", "system", "root":
// Check both username and SID for Windows systems
if os == "windows" && isWindowsPrivilegedSID(currentUser.Uid) {
return true
}
return false
return isPrivilegedUsername(currentUser.Username)
}
// Return cleanup function
@@ -87,8 +71,10 @@ func setupTestDependencies(currentUser *user.User, currentUserErr error, os stri
lookupUser = originalLookupUser
getCurrentOS = originalGetCurrentOS
getEuid = originalGetEuid
getProcessElevated = originalGetProcessElevated
getWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown = originalGetWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown
getIsProcessPrivileged = isCurrentProcessPrivileged
// Reset caches after test
}
}
@@ -435,9 +421,6 @@ func TestUsedFallback_MeansNoPrivilegeDropping(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestPrivilegedUsernameDetection(t *testing.T) {
// Windows classification is syscall-backed (SID resolution, group
// membership) and is covered by privileges_windows_test.go; here only the
// Unix logic and the platform dispatch are exercised.
tests := []struct {
name string
username string
@@ -449,9 +432,25 @@ func TestPrivilegedUsernameDetection(t *testing.T) {
{"unix_regular_user", "alice", "linux", false},
{"unix_root_capital", "Root", "linux", false}, // Case-sensitive
// Windows dispatch to the (mocked) account classifier
// Windows tests
{"windows_administrator", "Administrator", "windows", true},
{"windows_system", "SYSTEM", "windows", true},
{"windows_admin", "admin", "windows", true},
{"windows_admin_lowercase", "administrator", "windows", true}, // Case-insensitive
{"windows_domain_admin", "DOMAIN\\Administrator", "windows", true},
{"windows_email_admin", "admin@domain.com", "windows", true},
{"windows_regular_user", "alice", "windows", false},
{"windows_domain_user", "DOMAIN\\alice", "windows", false},
{"windows_localsystem", "localsystem", "windows", true},
{"windows_networkservice", "networkservice", "windows", true},
{"windows_localservice", "localservice", "windows", true},
// Computer accounts (these depend on current user context in real implementation)
{"windows_computer_account", "WIN2K19-C2$", "windows", false}, // Computer account by itself not privileged
{"windows_domain_computer", "DOMAIN\\COMPUTER$", "windows", false}, // Domain computer account
// Cross-platform
{"root_on_windows", "root", "windows", true}, // Root should be privileged everywhere
}
for _, tt := range tests {
@@ -460,8 +459,50 @@ func TestPrivilegedUsernameDetection(t *testing.T) {
cleanup := setupTestDependencies(nil, nil, tt.platform, 1000, nil, nil)
defer cleanup()
result := isPrivilegedOrUnknown(tt.username)
assert.Equal(t, tt.privileged, result, "privilege classification for %s on %s", tt.username, tt.platform)
result := isPrivilegedUsername(tt.username)
assert.Equal(t, tt.privileged, result)
})
}
}
func TestWindowsPrivilegedSIDDetection(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
sid string
privileged bool
description string
}{
// Well-known system accounts
{"system_account", "S-1-5-18", true, "Local System (SYSTEM)"},
{"local_service", "S-1-5-19", true, "Local Service"},
{"network_service", "S-1-5-20", true, "Network Service"},
{"administrators_group", "S-1-5-32-544", true, "Administrators group"},
{"builtin_administrator", "S-1-5-500", true, "Built-in Administrator"},
// Domain accounts
{"domain_administrator", "S-1-5-21-1234567890-1234567890-1234567890-500", true, "Domain Administrator (RID 500)"},
{"domain_admins_group", "S-1-5-21-1234567890-1234567890-1234567890-512", true, "Domain Admins group"},
{"domain_controllers_group", "S-1-5-21-1234567890-1234567890-1234567890-516", true, "Domain Controllers group"},
{"enterprise_admins_group", "S-1-5-21-1234567890-1234567890-1234567890-519", true, "Enterprise Admins group"},
// Regular users
{"regular_user", "S-1-5-21-1234567890-1234567890-1234567890-1001", false, "Regular domain user"},
{"another_regular_user", "S-1-5-21-1234567890-1234567890-1234567890-1234", false, "Another regular user"},
{"local_user", "S-1-5-21-1234567890-1234567890-1234567890-1000", false, "Local regular user"},
// Groups that are not privileged
{"domain_users", "S-1-5-21-1234567890-1234567890-1234567890-513", false, "Domain Users group"},
{"power_users", "S-1-5-32-547", false, "Power Users group"},
// Invalid SIDs
{"malformed_sid", "S-1-5-invalid", false, "Malformed SID"},
{"empty_sid", "", false, "Empty SID"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
result := isWindowsPrivilegedSID(tt.sid)
assert.Equal(t, tt.privileged, result, "Failed for %s: %s", tt.description, tt.sid)
})
}
}

View File

@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ func validateUsernameFormat(username string) error {
func (s *Server) createExecutorCommand(logger *log.Entry, session ssh.Session, localUser *user.User, hasPty bool) (*exec.Cmd, func(), error) {
logger.Debugf("creating Windows executor command for user %s (Pty: %v)", localUser.Username, hasPty)
username, _ := parseUsername(localUser.Username)
username, _ := s.parseUsername(localUser.Username)
if err := validateUsername(username); err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid username %q: %w", username, err)
}
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ func (s *Server) createExecutorCommand(logger *log.Entry, session ssh.Session, l
// createUserSwitchCommand creates a command with Windows user switching.
// Returns the command and a cleanup function that must be called after starting the process.
func (s *Server) createUserSwitchCommand(logger *log.Entry, session ssh.Session, localUser *user.User) (*exec.Cmd, func(), error) {
username, domain := parseUsername(localUser.Username)
username, domain := s.parseUsername(localUser.Username)
shell := getUserShell(localUser.Uid)
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ func (s *Server) createUserSwitchCommand(logger *log.Entry, session ssh.Session,
}
// parseUsername extracts username and domain from a Windows username
func parseUsername(fullUsername string) (username, domain string) {
func (s *Server) parseUsername(fullUsername string) (username, domain string) {
// Handle DOMAIN\username format
if idx := strings.LastIndex(fullUsername, `\`); idx != -1 {
domain = fullUsername[:idx]

View File

@@ -46,10 +46,7 @@ func ParseDaemonStatus(s string) DaemonStatus {
// ConvertOptions holds parameters for ConvertToStatusOutputOverview.
type ConvertOptions struct {
Anonymize bool
// AnonymizeLevel selects how much the anonymizer redacts. Only
// meaningful when Anonymize is set.
AnonymizeLevel anonymize.Level
Anonymize bool
DaemonVersion string
DaemonStatus DaemonStatus
StatusFilter string
@@ -220,7 +217,6 @@ func ConvertToStatusOutputOverview(pbFullStatus *proto.FullStatus, opts ConvertO
if opts.Anonymize {
anonymizer := anonymize.NewAnonymizer(anonymize.DefaultAddresses())
anonymizer.SetLevel(opts.AnonymizeLevel)
anonymizeOverview(anonymizer, &overview)
}
@@ -980,7 +976,6 @@ func timeAgo(t time.Time) string {
func anonymizePeerDetail(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, peer *PeerStateDetailOutput) {
peer.FQDN = a.AnonymizeDomain(peer.FQDN)
peer.PubKey = a.AnonymizeWGKey(peer.PubKey)
if localIP, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(peer.IceCandidateEndpoint.Local); err == nil {
peer.IceCandidateEndpoint.Local = fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", a.AnonymizeIPString(localIP), port)
}
@@ -1012,7 +1007,6 @@ func anonymizeOverview(a *anonymize.Anonymizer, overview *OutputOverview) {
overview.SignalState.URL = a.AnonymizeURI(overview.SignalState.URL)
overview.SignalState.Error = a.AnonymizeString(overview.SignalState.Error)
overview.PubKey = a.AnonymizeWGKey(overview.PubKey)
overview.IP = a.AnonymizeIPString(overview.IP)
overview.IPv6 = a.AnonymizeIPString(overview.IPv6)
for i, detail := range overview.Relays.Details {

View File

@@ -26,17 +26,17 @@ contents:
# Default dependencies for the GTK4 + WebKitGTK 6.0 stack (Ubuntu 24.04+ / Debian 13+)
depends:
- libgtk-4-1 (>= 4.14)
- libgtk-4-1
- libwebkitgtk-6.0-4
- xdg-utils
# Distribution-specific overrides for different package formats
overrides:
# RPM packages for Fedora / RHEL / AlmaLinux / Rocky Linux / openSUSE
# RPM packages for Fedora / RHEL / AlmaLinux / Rocky Linux
rpm:
depends:
- (gtk4 >= 4.14 or libgtk-4-1 >= 4.14)
- (webkitgtk6.0 or libwebkitgtk-6_0-4)
- gtk4
- webkitgtk6.0
- xdg-utils
# Arch Linux packages

View File

@@ -71,12 +71,10 @@ type BundleOptions = {
hasWindow: boolean;
totalSec: number;
uploadUrl: string;
anonymizeLevel: AnonymizeLevel;
anonymize: boolean;
systemInfo: boolean;
};
export type AnonymizeLevel = "none" | "default" | "strict";
const startCaptureBestEffort = async (totalSec: number, pcap: CaptureState) => {
try {
// Mirror the CLI's safety margin: window + 30s, server caps at 10m.
@@ -189,10 +187,7 @@ const runBundleFlow = async (
if (opts.uploadUrl) setStage({ kind: "uploading" });
const result = await DebugSvc.Bundle({
anonymize: opts.anonymizeLevel !== "none",
// The daemon only knows "default" and "strict"; "none" is expressed
// through the anonymize flag being off.
anonymizeLevel: opts.anonymizeLevel === "strict" ? "strict" : "default",
anonymize: opts.anonymize,
systemInfo: opts.systemInfo,
uploadUrl: opts.uploadUrl,
logFileCount,
@@ -203,7 +198,7 @@ const runBundleFlow = async (
};
const useDebugBundle = () => {
const [anonymizeLevel, setAnonymizeLevel] = useState<AnonymizeLevel>("none");
const [anonymize, setAnonymize] = useState(false);
const [systemInfo, setSystemInfo] = useState(true);
const [upload, setUpload] = useState(true);
const [trace, setTrace] = useState(true);
@@ -245,7 +240,7 @@ const useDebugBundle = () => {
hasWindow: capture && totalSec > 0,
totalSec,
uploadUrl: upload ? NETBIRD_UPLOAD_URL : "",
anonymizeLevel,
anonymize,
systemInfo,
};
@@ -277,8 +272,8 @@ const useDebugBundle = () => {
};
return {
anonymizeLevel,
setAnonymizeLevel,
anonymize,
setAnonymize,
systemInfo,
setSystemInfo,
upload,

View File

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
import { useCallback, useEffect, useState } from "react";
import { Preferences } from "@bindings/services";
export const useKeepConnectedOnQuit = () => {
const [keepConnected, setKeepConnected] = useState<boolean | null>(null);
useEffect(() => {
let cancelled = false;
Preferences.Get()
.then((prefs) => {
if (cancelled) return;
setKeepConnected(prefs?.keepConnectedOnQuit ?? false);
})
.catch((err: unknown) => {
if (cancelled) return;
console.warn("[useKeepConnectedOnQuit] load preferences failed", err);
setKeepConnected(false);
});
return () => {
cancelled = true;
};
}, []);
const setKeepConnectedOnQuit = useCallback(async (keep: boolean) => {
setKeepConnected(keep);
try {
await Preferences.SetKeepConnectedOnQuit(keep);
} catch (err: unknown) {
setKeepConnected(!keep);
console.error("[useKeepConnectedOnQuit] SetKeepConnectedOnQuit failed", err);
}
}, []);
return { keepConnected, setKeepConnectedOnQuit };
};

View File

@@ -43,12 +43,7 @@ function buildSsoCancelPromise(state: SsoState, signal?: AbortSignal): Promise<v
}
async function runSsoLogin(
result: {
verificationUri: string;
verificationUriComplete: string;
userCode: string;
profileId: string;
},
result: { verificationUri: string; verificationUriComplete: string; userCode: string },
state: SsoState,
signal?: AbortSignal,
): Promise<void> {
@@ -61,7 +56,7 @@ async function runSsoLogin(
// suspended, so a frontend-driven Up (a promise continuation) would not
// fire until the user woke the window (e.g. hovering the tray icon).
const waitPromise = Connection.WaitSSOLoginAndUp(
{ userCode: result.userCode, hostname: "", profileId: result.profileId },
{ userCode: result.userCode, hostname: "" },
{ profileName: "", username: "" },
);

View File

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import { DialogHeading } from "@/components/dialog/DialogHeading";
import { SquareIcon } from "@/components/SquareIcon";
import { Connection, Profiles as ProfilesSvc, Session, WindowManager } from "@bindings/services";
import { useAutoSizeWindow } from "@/hooks/useAutoSizeWindow";
import { EVENT_BROWSER_LOGIN_CANCEL, EVENT_TRIGGER_LOGIN } from "@/lib/connection";
import { EVENT_BROWSER_LOGIN_CANCEL } from "@/lib/connection";
import { errorDialog, formatErrorMessage } from "@/lib/errors.ts";
import { formatRemaining } from "@/lib/formatters";
@@ -131,21 +131,6 @@ export default function SessionExpirationDialog() {
}
}, [busy, t]);
const authenticate = useCallback(async () => {
if (busy) return;
setBusy(true);
try {
await Events.Emit(EVENT_TRIGGER_LOGIN);
await WindowManager.CloseSessionExpiration();
} catch (e) {
setBusy(false);
await errorDialog({
Title: t("connect.error.loginTitle"),
Message: formatErrorMessage(e),
});
}
}, [busy, t]);
const logout = useCallback(async () => {
if (busy) return;
setBusy(true);
@@ -200,7 +185,7 @@ export default function SessionExpirationDialog() {
variant={"primary"}
size={"md"}
className={"w-full"}
onClick={expired ? authenticate : stay}
onClick={stay}
disabled={busy}
>
{expired ? t("sessionExpiration.authenticate") : t("sessionExpiration.stay")}

View File

@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import { ManagementServerSwitch } from "@/components/ManagementServerSwitch.tsx"
import { ManagementMode, useManagementUrl } from "@/hooks/useManagementUrl.ts";
import { LanguagePicker } from "@/components/LanguagePicker.tsx";
import { useRestrictions } from "@/contexts/RestrictionsContext.tsx";
import { useKeepConnectedOnQuit } from "@/hooks/useKeepConnectedOnQuit.ts";
export function SettingsGeneral() {
const { t } = useTranslation();
@@ -20,7 +19,6 @@ export function SettingsGeneral() {
const { mode, setMode, setUrl, displayUrl, showError, canSave, save, checking, unreachable } =
useManagementUrl();
const { mdm, features } = useRestrictions();
const { keepConnected, setKeepConnectedOnQuit } = useKeepConnectedOnQuit();
const inputRef = useRef<HTMLInputElement>(null);
const managementUrlId = useId();
@@ -59,15 +57,6 @@ export function SettingsGeneral() {
helpText={t("settings.general.autostart.help")}
/>
)}
<FancyToggleSwitch
value={keepConnected ?? false}
onChange={(v) => {
void setKeepConnectedOnQuit(v);
}}
loading={keepConnected === null}
label={t("settings.general.keepConnectedOnQuit.label")}
helpText={t("settings.general.keepConnectedOnQuit.help")}
/>
</SectionGroup>
{!mdm.managementURL && !features.disableUpdateSettings && (

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
import { useId, type ReactNode } from "react";
import { Trans, useTranslation } from "react-i18next";
import { ChevronDown, CircleCheckBig, FolderOpen, Info, Loader2 } from "lucide-react";
import { CircleCheckBig, FolderOpen, Loader2 } from "lucide-react";
import { Browser } from "@wailsio/runtime";
import { Debug as DebugSvc } from "@bindings/services";
import type { DebugBundleResult } from "@bindings/services/models.js";
@@ -8,22 +8,13 @@ import { Button } from "@/components/buttons/Button";
import { DialogActions } from "@/components/dialog/DialogActions";
import { DialogDescription } from "@/components/dialog/DialogDescription";
import { DialogHeading } from "@/components/dialog/DialogHeading";
import {
DropdownMenu,
DropdownMenuContent,
DropdownMenuRadioGroup,
DropdownMenuRadioItem,
DropdownMenuTrigger,
} from "@/components/DropdownMenu";
import FancyToggleSwitch from "@/components/switches/FancyToggleSwitch";
import HelpText from "@/components/typography/HelpText.tsx";
import { Input } from "@/components/inputs/Input";
import { Label } from "@/components/typography/Label";
import { SquareIcon } from "@/components/SquareIcon";
import { Tooltip } from "@/components/Tooltip";
import { cn } from "@/lib/cn";
import { formatRemaining } from "@/lib/formatters";
import type { AnonymizeLevel, DebugStage } from "@/contexts/DebugBundleContext";
import type { DebugStage } from "@/contexts/DebugBundleContext";
import { useDebugBundleContext } from "@/contexts/DebugBundleContext";
import { SectionGroup, SettingsBottomBar } from "@/modules/settings/SettingsSection.tsx";
@@ -33,8 +24,8 @@ export function SettingsTroubleshooting() {
const { t } = useTranslation();
const durationId = useId();
const {
anonymizeLevel,
setAnonymizeLevel,
anonymize,
setAnonymize,
systemInfo,
setSystemInfo,
upload,
@@ -64,71 +55,12 @@ export function SettingsTroubleshooting() {
return (
<SectionGroup title={t("settings.troubleshooting.section.title")}>
<div className={"flex items-center justify-between gap-6"}>
<div className={"max-w-md flex-1"}>
<Label as={"div"}>
<span className={"inline-flex items-center gap-1.5"}>
{t("settings.troubleshooting.anonymize.label")}
<Tooltip
content={
<div className={"max-w-xs whitespace-normal leading-relaxed"}>
{t("settings.troubleshooting.anonymize.info")}
</div>
}
>
<Info
size={14}
aria-label={t("settings.troubleshooting.anonymize.label")}
className={"shrink-0 cursor-default text-nb-gray-400"}
/>
</Tooltip>
</span>
</Label>
<HelpText margin={false}>
{t("settings.troubleshooting.anonymize.help")}
</HelpText>
</div>
<div className={"shrink-0"}>
<DropdownMenu>
<DropdownMenuTrigger asChild>
<button
type={"button"}
aria-label={t("settings.troubleshooting.anonymize.label")}
className={cn(
"inline-flex h-[40px] min-w-[160px] items-center justify-between gap-2 px-3",
"rounded-md border bg-white dark:bg-nb-gray-900",
"border-neutral-200 dark:border-nb-gray-700",
"cursor-default text-xs font-semibold text-nb-gray-100 outline-none",
"hover:border-nb-gray-600 data-[state=open]:border-nb-gray-600",
)}
>
{t(`settings.troubleshooting.anonymize.${anonymizeLevel}`)}
<ChevronDown
size={16}
aria-hidden={"true"}
className={"shrink-0 text-nb-gray-200"}
/>
</button>
</DropdownMenuTrigger>
<DropdownMenuContent align={"end"} className={"min-w-[160px]"}>
<DropdownMenuRadioGroup
value={anonymizeLevel}
onValueChange={(v) => setAnonymizeLevel(v as AnonymizeLevel)}
>
<DropdownMenuRadioItem value={"none"}>
{t("settings.troubleshooting.anonymize.none")}
</DropdownMenuRadioItem>
<DropdownMenuRadioItem value={"default"}>
{t("settings.troubleshooting.anonymize.default")}
</DropdownMenuRadioItem>
<DropdownMenuRadioItem value={"strict"}>
{t("settings.troubleshooting.anonymize.strict")}
</DropdownMenuRadioItem>
</DropdownMenuRadioGroup>
</DropdownMenuContent>
</DropdownMenu>
</div>
</div>
<FancyToggleSwitch
value={anonymize}
onChange={setAnonymize}
label={t("settings.troubleshooting.anonymize.label")}
helpText={t("settings.troubleshooting.anonymize.help")}
/>
<FancyToggleSwitch
value={systemInfo}
onChange={setSystemInfo}

View File

@@ -2,24 +2,9 @@
A short brief for translating the desktop UI — for any translator, human or AI agent (*"you"* = whoever's translating).
**Translations are managed on Crowdin: <https://crowdin.com/project/netbird>.** Join the project, pick your language, and translate in the editor. Each string carries a context note (the `description` from the source file) telling you what it is and where it shows up, and the project's glossary, style guide, and QA checks mirror this document.
**Drive an agent with:** *"Read `i18n/TRANSLATING.md` and translate the UI to Russian"* — or *"…and review the existing German translation."*
> 💡 **The one habit that matters most:** read each string's context before translating it. Labels are terse and ambiguous on their own; the context tells you what the string is, where it shows up, what to keep verbatim, and what it actually means.
---
## How contributions flow
```text
i18n/locales/en/common.json ──sync──▶ Crowdin ──service PR──▶ i18n/locales/<code>/common.json
```
- `i18n/locales/en/common.json` is the source of truth. New and changed strings sync to Crowdin automatically (see `crowdin.yml` in the repository root).
- Crowdin opens and updates a service pull request with the translated bundles, keeping the source's file shape and key order. Keys nobody has translated yet are left out of the export; the app falls back to English for them at runtime. Maintainers review and merge that PR.
- Don't hand-edit `i18n/locales/<code>/common.json` in your own PRs: the next sync would conflict with or overwrite your changes. Translate on Crowdin instead.
- Missing your language? Request it on the Crowdin project page or in a [GitHub discussion](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/discussions). When a language first ships, a maintainer adds its row to `i18n/locales/_index.json` with `code`, `displayName` (the native name), and `englishName`, which puts it in the app's language picker.
**Prefer translating with an AI agent?** That still works: drive it with *"Read `i18n/TRANSLATING.md` and translate the UI to Russian"* as before, but deliver the result to Crowdin instead of a pull request. Download your language's file from the Crowdin editor, let the agent translate it, and upload it back (the editor's offline translation flow). Crowdin runs its QA checks on upload, and the next service PR carries the strings into the repo.
> 💡 **The one habit that matters most:** read each key's `description` before translating it. Labels are terse and ambiguous on their own; the `description` tells you what the string is, where it shows up, what to keep verbatim, and what it actually means.
---
@@ -45,6 +30,25 @@ A **business zero-trust VPN** — an encrypted **overlay mesh** between a compan
---
## The files
```
i18n/locales/_index.json shipped-language list
i18n/locales/en/common.json source of truth — message + description
i18n/locales/<code>/common.json a target — message only
```
Chrome-extension JSON, each key → `{ "message", "description" }`. You translate the **`message`**.
| ✅ Do | ❌ Don't |
|---|---|
| Keep **every key** from `en`, in the same order | Translate, rename, reorder, drop, or add keys (they're identifiers; the set grows over time) |
| Put **only `message`** in target bundles | Copy `description` into a target bundle |
| Give every key a non-empty `message` | Leave keys missing or empty |
| Save valid UTF-8 JSON, no BOM | Add trailing commas or break the JSON |
---
## Hard rules — get these exactly right
These are the usual ways a translation *breaks the app*, not just reads oddly.
@@ -54,7 +58,7 @@ These are the usual ways a translation *breaks the app*, not just reads oddly.
| Copy `{placeholders}` verbatim — `{version}`, `{count}`, `{name}`… | Translate the word inside the braces (`{verbleibend}` breaks it) |
| Reposition a placeholder so the sentence flows | Drop or duplicate a placeholder |
| Preserve every `\n`, leading/trailing space, and trailing `...` | Trim "invisible" spaces or the `...` (they're load-bearing) |
| Keep `®` in WireGuard® and quotes around `{name}` | Strip punctuation the context flags |
| Keep `®` in WireGuard® and quotes around `{name}` | Strip punctuation the description flags |
**Plurals:** the app has only a *one / other* split — the singular key fires only when `count == 1`; the `{count}` key covers everything else (0, 2, 5, 100…). Languages with more than two forms (ru, pl, uk) can't be fully correct here — use the form that fits the widest range (Russian genitive plural: `минут` / `часов` / `дней`). Don't invent extra keys or cram multiple forms into one string. When no single form fits every value — a unit label after a number field, say — reach for a number-agnostic form (an abbreviation, or wording that reads the same for 1 and 100) instead of forcing a plural the *one / other* split can't supply.
@@ -74,15 +78,13 @@ When a brand sits beside a common noun, keep its exact spelling but join them th
> **Use the word that language's IT users actually say.** Translate when a natural, common term exists; keep the English term *only* when the literal translation would be awkward or no one in that field really uses it.
Apply each term **consistently** — same English term → same translation everywhere — and keep a term once you've settled it. Whether a term stays English or takes a native word is **language-dependent**: a technical loanword (e.g. *Daemon*, *Handshake*) often stays, an everyday word (e.g. *Latency*, *Public key*) usually localizes, and some (*Exit Node*, *Peer*) go either way depending on the language. Decide per term with the rule above — a foreign origin alone is no reason to keep English. **Your main reference is the existing translation:** match how a term was already rendered for your language rather than re-deciding it.
Apply each term **consistently** — same English term → same translation everywhere — and keep a term once you've settled it. Whether a term stays English or takes a native word is **language-dependent**: a technical loanword (e.g. *Daemon*, *Handshake*) often stays, an everyday word (e.g. *Latency*, *Public key*) usually localizes, and some (*Exit Node*, *Peer*) go either way depending on the language. Decide per term with the rule above — a foreign origin alone is no reason to keep English. **Your main reference is the existing bundles:** match how a term was already rendered for your language rather than re-deciding it.
Two checks before you commit a term:
- **Prefer established localized wording.** If a widely used tool in this space (for example WireGuard) ships your language, its wording for a shared term such as *handshake* is what users already expect — look at the translated app, not just English docs. For generic UI verbs and formal address, follow your OS vendor's style guide (Microsoft / Apple / Google).
- **Watch for false friends.** A literal translation can collide with a *different* established term in your field — confirm your word doesn't already mean something else in this domain before using it.
These tiers are mirrored in the Crowdin project glossary, so the editor highlights them inline. When you settle a new Tier C term for your language, add its translation to the glossary entry so it sticks for everyone who comes after you.
---
## Style
@@ -96,7 +98,7 @@ These tiers are mirrored in the Crowdin project glossary, so the editor highligh
Where it reads naturally, aim to keep each string **roughly the same length** as the English — the UI is tight and over-long strings can wrap or truncate. It's a soft preference, not a rule: if your language simply needs more words, use them.
A few habits that keep a translation reading like one product rather than a word-for-word port:
A few habits that keep a bundle reading like one product rather than a word-for-word port:
- **Translate meaning, not words.** Render what a string *does*. An idiom or an awkward source phrase should become natural in your language, not a literal calque.
- **Keep one voice within a family.** Sibling strings — the connection states, every settings *help* caption, every "… Failed" title — should share a grammatical form. If one member sounds wrong in that form, re-voice the whole family rather than leave one odd sibling.
@@ -105,26 +107,27 @@ A few habits that keep a translation reading like one product rather than a word
---
## Reviewing a language
## Procedure
**On Crowdin:** proofread in the editor — context, glossary highlights, and QA flags sit inline next to each string.
**New language** — read `en/common.json` *with* descriptions → settle your Tier C terms → write `i18n/locales/<code>/common.json` (same keys and order as `en`, `message` only, placeholders & brands preserved) → add a row to `_index.json` (`{"code","displayName"` = native name`,"englishName"}`) → run the QA list. Use the locale-code style the existing entries use (e.g. `fr`, `pt`, `zh-CN`).
**In the repo** — e.g. driving an AI agent with *"Read `i18n/TRANSLATING.md` and review the existing German translation"* — read source and target side by side; for each key check glossary conformance (e.g. de `Exit-Node``Exit Node`, hu `Kilépő csomópont``Exit Node`), placeholder/`\n` integrity, consistency, tone, and that the meaning matches the English `description`. Report what you found, and apply the fixes **on Crowdin** — direct edits to the locale files are overwritten by the next sync.
**Review (de / hu / …)** — read source and target side by side; for each key check glossary conformance (e.g. de `Exit-Node``Exit Node`, hu `Kilépő csomópont``Exit Node`), placeholder/`\n` integrity, consistency, tone, and that the meaning matches the English `description`. Fix in place, then report what you changed (especially term standardizations) so a native speaker can sanity-check.
---
## QA before you finish
- [ ] Valid JSON · **every `en` key** present, same order · **no `description`** fields
- [ ] Every `{placeholder}`, `\n`, and intentional space preserved · `...` / `… Failed` / `{name}` quotes kept
- [ ] Tier A/B left intact · Tier C applied consistently (and matching the existing translation for your language)
- [ ] Tier A/B left intact · Tier C applied consistently (and matching the existing bundle for your language)
- [ ] Buttons & tray short · locale punctuation and capitalization applied
- [ ] Crowdin QA flags resolved (variables, glossary terms, punctuation)
- [ ] New language added to `_index.json`
- [ ] **Tested in the running app**
---
## Test it in the app
A translation can pass every check above and still read wrong on screen. **Run the app, switch to your language, and click through the real surfaces** — tray menu, main window, every Settings tab, the dialogs. Watch for text overflow or truncation, labels that are technically right but wrong *for what the control does*, leaked placeholders, and terms that drift between screens.
A bundle can pass every check above and still read wrong on screen. **Run the app, switch to your language, and click through the real surfaces** — tray menu, main window, every Settings tab, the dialogs. Watch for text overflow or truncation, labels that are technically right but wrong *for what the control does*, leaked placeholders, and terms that drift between screens.
How to run the app and switch language: see the project README. Can't run it (e.g. a headless agent)? Say so in your summary — don't silently skip this step.

View File

@@ -551,14 +551,6 @@
"settings.general.autostart.errorTitle": {
"message": "Ändern des Autostarts fehlgeschlagen"
},
"settings.general.keepConnectedOnQuit.label": {
"message": "Nach dem Beenden verbunden bleiben",
"description": "Toggle label: keep the VPN connection up after quitting the UI."
},
"settings.general.keepConnectedOnQuit.help": {
"message": "Die Verbindung bleibt im Hintergrund bestehen, nachdem Sie NetBird schließen. Sie endet erst, wenn Sie sie selbst trennen.",
"description": "Helper text for the stay-connected-after-quitting toggle."
},
"settings.general.language.label": {
"message": "Anzeigesprache"
},

View File

@@ -735,14 +735,6 @@
"message": "Autostart Change Failed",
"description": "Error-dialog title when changing the autostart setting fails."
},
"settings.general.keepConnectedOnQuit.label": {
"message": "Stay Connected After Quitting",
"description": "Toggle label: keep the VPN connection up after quitting the UI."
},
"settings.general.keepConnectedOnQuit.help": {
"message": "The connection stays up in the background after you close NetBird. It only stops when you disconnect it yourself.",
"description": "Helper text for the stay-connected-after-quitting toggle."
},
"settings.general.language.label": {
"message": "Display Language",
"description": "Label for the display-language picker."
@@ -1013,27 +1005,11 @@
},
"settings.troubleshooting.anonymize.label": {
"message": "Anonymize Sensitive Information",
"description": "Label for the anonymization level dropdown (None, Default, Strict)."
"description": "Toggle label: anonymize sensitive information in the bundle."
},
"settings.troubleshooting.anonymize.help": {
"message": "Hides IP addresses, domains, and other sensitive values.",
"description": "Helper text under the anonymization dropdown. The level details live in the info tooltip."
},
"settings.troubleshooting.anonymize.info": {
"message": "Default keeps internal IPv4 addresses and peer names readable for support. Strict additionally anonymizes private (RFC 1918), CGNAT, and link-local IP addresses, peer names, and WireGuard public keys. Recurring values map to the same placeholder, so peers stay distinguishable. Use Strict when sharing the bundle outside your organization.",
"description": "Info tooltip explaining the anonymization levels. 'RFC 1918', 'CGNAT', 'link-local', and 'WireGuard' are technical terms — keep them."
},
"settings.troubleshooting.anonymize.none": {
"message": "None",
"description": "Dropdown option: no anonymization."
},
"settings.troubleshooting.anonymize.default": {
"message": "Default",
"description": "Dropdown option: default anonymization level."
},
"settings.troubleshooting.anonymize.strict": {
"message": "Strict",
"description": "Dropdown option: strict anonymization level."
"message": "Hides public IP addresses and non-NetBird domains from logs.",
"description": "Helper text for anonymizing logs (hides public IPs and non-NetBird domains)."
},
"settings.troubleshooting.systemInfo.label": {
"message": "Include System Information",

View File

@@ -551,14 +551,6 @@
"settings.general.autostart.errorTitle": {
"message": "Error al cambiar el inicio automático"
},
"settings.general.keepConnectedOnQuit.label": {
"message": "Permanecer conectado al salir",
"description": "Toggle label: keep the VPN connection up after quitting the UI."
},
"settings.general.keepConnectedOnQuit.help": {
"message": "La conexión sigue activa en segundo plano después de cerrar NetBird. Solo se detiene cuando la desconectas tú.",
"description": "Helper text for the stay-connected-after-quitting toggle."
},
"settings.general.language.label": {
"message": "Idioma de la interfaz"
},

View File

@@ -551,14 +551,6 @@
"settings.general.autostart.errorTitle": {
"message": "Échec de la modification du démarrage automatique"
},
"settings.general.keepConnectedOnQuit.label": {
"message": "Rester connecté après la fermeture",
"description": "Toggle label: keep the VPN connection up after quitting the UI."
},
"settings.general.keepConnectedOnQuit.help": {
"message": "La connexion reste active en arrière-plan après la fermeture de NetBird. Elle ne s'arrête que si vous la coupez vous-même.",
"description": "Helper text for the stay-connected-after-quitting toggle."
},
"settings.general.language.label": {
"message": "Langue daffichage"
},

View File

@@ -551,14 +551,6 @@
"settings.general.autostart.errorTitle": {
"message": "Az automatikus indítás módosítása sikertelen"
},
"settings.general.keepConnectedOnQuit.label": {
"message": "Kapcsolat megtartása kilépéskor",
"description": "Toggle label: keep the VPN connection up after quitting the UI."
},
"settings.general.keepConnectedOnQuit.help": {
"message": "A kapcsolat a háttérben megmarad, miután bezárod a NetBirdöt. Csak akkor szakad meg, ha te magad bontod.",
"description": "Helper text for the stay-connected-after-quitting toggle."
},
"settings.general.language.label": {
"message": "Megjelenítési nyelv"
},

View File

@@ -551,14 +551,6 @@
"settings.general.autostart.errorTitle": {
"message": "Modifica avvio automatico non riuscita"
},
"settings.general.keepConnectedOnQuit.label": {
"message": "Resta connesso dopo la chiusura",
"description": "Toggle label: keep the VPN connection up after quitting the UI."
},
"settings.general.keepConnectedOnQuit.help": {
"message": "La connessione resta attiva in background dopo la chiusura di NetBird. Si interrompe solo quando la disconnetti tu.",
"description": "Helper text for the stay-connected-after-quitting toggle."
},
"settings.general.language.label": {
"message": "Lingua dell'interfaccia"
},

View File

@@ -551,14 +551,6 @@
"settings.general.autostart.errorTitle": {
"message": "自動起動の変更に失敗しました"
},
"settings.general.keepConnectedOnQuit.label": {
"message": "終了後も接続を維持",
"description": "Toggle label: keep the VPN connection up after quitting the UI."
},
"settings.general.keepConnectedOnQuit.help": {
"message": "NetBird を閉じたあとも接続はバックグラウンドで維持されます。自分で切断したときにだけ停止します。",
"description": "Helper text for the stay-connected-after-quitting toggle."
},
"settings.general.language.label": {
"message": "表示言語"
},

Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More