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5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
mlsmaycon
a3b9853f31 [management] Self-scope usage and log reads; give usage_viewer the filter resources
The usage overview and access-log listings no longer deny callers without
the account-wide grant: the filter is pinned to the caller (their own
user id, group filters dropped), so every authenticated user reads their
own usage and requests through the same endpoints the admin dashboard
uses. The dedicated /agent-network/me/usage/overview endpoint is removed
in favor of that fallback.

usage_viewer gains read-only access to the resources the usage view's
filters and columns resolve against: users, groups, peers, and the
provider list (provider and model filter options).
2026-08-18 17:20:08 +00:00
mlsmaycon
bd52434e36 [management] Regenerate API types for the me usage overview path
The release workflow's generated-files check diffs types.gen.go against
the spec; the new path's query-parameter types are generated too, not
just schemas.
2026-08-18 13:04:59 +00:00
mlsmaycon
2310ce7487 [management] Fix agent_network_admin account read and serve own usage overview
Field testing the role surfaced two gaps. GET /api/accounts validates
Settings read (the settings manager gates account settings), so an
agent_network_admin got permission denied on the endpoint the dashboard
needs to boot; grant Settings read-only, the same as network_admin.

The me/consumption endpoint returned raw per-window counter rows, which
reads nothing like the usage overview admins see. Replace it with
GET /api/agent-network/me/usage/overview: the same filter parsing,
bounds, granularity, and bucket aggregation as the admin overview, with
the user filter forced to the caller and group filters dropped, so the
dashboard renders My Usage with the exact component of the admin view
while never exposing another user's rows.
2026-08-18 13:02:02 +00:00
mlsmaycon
e2a09a648b [management] Save account row before users in setup realstore test
users.account_id is a foreign key into accounts on MySQL/Postgres, so
saving users for an account that has no row fails with a constraint
violation there while passing on sqlite.
2026-08-16 02:57:53 +00:00
mlsmaycon
a2be755b7d [management] Add Agent Network access roles and self-service endpoints
Delegating Agent Network today means handing out full account admin, and
regular users cannot see their own usage or how to connect a local tool.

Add two roles on top of the existing agent_network permission
submodules. agent_network_admin owns the whole area (providers,
policies, guardrails, budgets, usage, logs, settings) with read-only
users, groups, peers, and account info needed to build policies, and
nothing else in the account. usage_viewer is the regular User baseline
plus read on the aggregated usage and cost overview: no provider
configuration, no policies, no request-level logs, which can contain
captured prompts. billing_admin gets a proper permission-map entry with
the User baseline so role resolution stops failing with role-not-found;
its plan and invoice permissions stay enforced cloud-side.

Add the self-service endpoints behind the "My Agent Network" view,
available to every authenticated user because both answers are scoped
strictly to the caller. GET /api/agent-network/me/setup returns the
account endpoint plus the providers and models the caller's own groups
authorize, computed with the same rules the proxy enforces: policy
filtering as in policy selection, model allowlist union intersected
with declared models, orphan and disabled providers omitted. Not set up
and no access are deliberately indistinguishable, and the response
carries display metadata only. GET /api/agent-network/me/consumption
returns the caller's own user-dimension counters.

Linear: NET-1399
2026-08-15 17:54:52 +00:00
15 changed files with 1129 additions and 21 deletions

View File

@@ -67,6 +67,33 @@ components:
— the management-side control plane: providers, policies, guardrails, limits, routing,
and usage/access logs.
## Access roles
Agent Network permissions build on the account permission matrix
([`management/server/permissions/`](../management/server/permissions)). The
`agent_network` area is split into dotted submodules (`agent_network.providers`,
`.policies`, `.guardrails`, `.budgets`, `.usage`, `.logs`, `.settings`); a role may
grant a single submodule or the parent, which cascades to all of them.
Two roles delegate Agent Network access without account-admin rights:
- **`agent_network_admin`** — full control over the whole `agent_network` area plus
read-only users, groups, peers, and account info (needed to build policies).
Nothing else in the account.
- **`usage_viewer`** — the regular User baseline plus read on
`agent_network.usage` (the aggregated usage and cost overview) and read-only
access to the resources the usage filters resolve against: users, groups,
peers, and the provider list. No policies, no request-level access logs.
Every authenticated user, regardless of role, can read the caller-scoped
self-service endpoint `GET /api/agent-network/me/setup` (the endpoint, providers,
and models the caller's own policies allow — what a local AI tool needs and nothing
more). The regular usage and access-log endpoints self-scope instead of denying:
a caller without the account-wide grant gets their own rows back, so "my usage"
and "my requests" are the same endpoints the admin dashboard uses. Role
definitions live in
[`management/server/permissions/roles/`](../management/server/permissions/roles).
## Documentation
Full documentation, architecture, and quickstart:

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
package handlers
import (
"net/http"
"github.com/gorilla/mux"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/types"
nbcontext "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/context"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/api"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/util"
)
// addMeEndpoints registers the self-service "My Agent Network" route.
// It is available to every authenticated user regardless of role: the
// response is scoped strictly to the caller, which is tighter than any
// role gate could be. The caller's own usage and requests are served by
// the regular usage/logs endpoints, which self-scope for callers without
// the account-wide grants.
func (h *handler) addMeEndpoints(router *mux.Router) {
router.HandleFunc("/agent-network/me/setup", h.getMySetup).Methods("GET", "OPTIONS")
}
func (h *handler) getMySetup(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
userAuth, err := nbcontext.GetUserAuthFromContext(r.Context())
if err != nil {
util.WriteError(r.Context(), err, w)
return
}
setup, err := h.manager.GetSetupForUser(r.Context(), userAuth.AccountId, userAuth.UserId)
if err != nil {
util.WriteError(r.Context(), err, w)
return
}
util.WriteJSONObject(r.Context(), w, setupToAPI(setup))
}
func setupToAPI(setup *types.EffectiveSetup) api.AgentNetworkMeSetup {
providers := make([]api.AgentNetworkMeProvider, 0, len(setup.Providers))
for _, p := range setup.Providers {
providers = append(providers, api.AgentNetworkMeProvider{
Name: p.Name,
CatalogId: p.CatalogID,
ApiFlavor: p.APIFlavor,
AllModelsAllowed: p.AllModelsAllowed,
Models: p.Models,
})
}
return api.AgentNetworkMeSetup{
Configured: setup.Configured,
Endpoint: setup.Endpoint,
Providers: providers,
}
}

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@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ func RegisterEndpoints(manager agentnetwork.Manager, router *mux.Router) {
h.addConsumptionEndpoints(router)
h.addAccessLogEndpoints(router)
h.addBudgetRuleEndpoints(router)
h.addMeEndpoints(router)
}
func (h *handler) getCatalogProviders(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {

View File

@@ -83,6 +83,13 @@ type Manager interface {
RecordAccountBudgetUsage(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID string, groupIDs []string, tokensIn, tokensOut int64, costUSD float64) error
RecordUsage(ctx context.Context, in RecordUsageInput) error
SelectPolicyForRequest(ctx context.Context, in PolicySelectionInput) (*PolicySelectionResult, error)
// GetSetupForUser backs the self-service "My Agent Network" setup
// endpoint. Caller-scoped, so it skips the role permission gate; see
// the implementation. The caller's own usage and requests come
// through GetUsageOverview / ListAccessLogs, which self-scope when
// the account-wide grant is missing.
GetSetupForUser(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID string) (*types.EffectiveSetup, error)
}
// PolicySelectionInput is the per-request selection envelope. The
@@ -901,8 +908,11 @@ func (m *managerImpl) ListConsumption(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID str
// ListAccessLogs returns a paginated, server-side-filtered page of
// agent-network access logs plus the total count matching the filter.
// Callers without the account-wide logs grant get a self-scoped page —
// only their own requests — instead of a denial.
func (m *managerImpl) ListAccessLogs(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID string, filter types.AgentNetworkAccessLogFilter) ([]*types.AgentNetworkAccessLog, int64, error) {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkLogs, operations.Read); err != nil {
filter, err := m.scopeFilterToCaller(ctx, accountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkLogs, filter)
if err != nil {
return nil, 0, err
}
return m.store.GetAgentNetworkAccessLogs(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, accountID, filter)
@@ -910,18 +920,23 @@ func (m *managerImpl) ListAccessLogs(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID stri
// ListAccessLogSessions returns a paginated, server-side-filtered page of
// agent-network access logs grouped by session, plus the total number of
// sessions matching the filter.
// sessions matching the filter. Self-scoped like ListAccessLogs for
// callers without the account-wide logs grant.
func (m *managerImpl) ListAccessLogSessions(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID string, filter types.AgentNetworkAccessLogFilter) ([]*types.AgentNetworkAccessLogSession, int64, error) {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkLogs, operations.Read); err != nil {
filter, err := m.scopeFilterToCaller(ctx, accountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkLogs, filter)
if err != nil {
return nil, 0, err
}
return m.store.GetAgentNetworkAccessLogSessions(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, accountID, filter)
}
// GetUsageOverview returns the filtered usage rows aggregated into time buckets
// at the requested granularity, oldest-first.
// at the requested granularity, oldest-first. Callers without the
// account-wide usage grant get their own rows aggregated instead of a
// denial, so the dashboard serves "my usage" from the same endpoint.
func (m *managerImpl) GetUsageOverview(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID string, filter types.AgentNetworkAccessLogFilter, granularity types.UsageGranularity) ([]*types.AgentNetworkUsageBucket, error) {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkUsage, operations.Read); err != nil {
filter, err := m.scopeFilterToCaller(ctx, accountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkUsage, filter)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
rows, err := m.store.GetAgentNetworkUsageRows(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, accountID, filter)
@@ -931,6 +946,25 @@ func (m *managerImpl) GetUsageOverview(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID st
return types.AggregateUsageByGranularity(rows, granularity), nil
}
// scopeFilterToCaller applies the account-wide read gate for module and,
// when the caller lacks the grant, pins the filter to the caller instead
// of denying: their own user id replaces any requested one and group
// filters are dropped. A caller may always see their own rows — strictly
// tighter than any role gate — which is what lets every authenticated
// user read their usage and requests through the regular endpoints.
// Validation errors (not denials) still fail closed.
func (m *managerImpl) scopeFilterToCaller(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID string, module modules.Module, filter types.AgentNetworkAccessLogFilter) (types.AgentNetworkAccessLogFilter, error) {
ok, _, err := m.permissionsManager.ValidateUserPermissions(ctx, accountID, userID, module, operations.Read)
if err != nil {
return filter, status.NewPermissionValidationError(err)
}
if !ok {
filter.UserID = &userID
filter.GroupIDs = nil
}
return filter, nil
}
// StartAccessLogCleanup launches a background sweep that periodically deletes
// each account's agent-network access-log rows older than that account's
// AccessLogRetentionDays. Usage records are never swept. A non-positive

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@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
package agentnetwork
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"sort"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/catalog"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/types"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/store"
)
// GetSetupForUser returns the Agent Network setup the calling user's
// groups authorize. It deliberately performs no role permission check:
// the result is scoped to the caller's own groups, which is strictly
// tighter than any role gate, so every authenticated user (any role) may
// read it. Peers and users carry the same groups, so the answer matches
// what the proxy enforces for the caller's machines at request time.
func (m *managerImpl) GetSetupForUser(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID string) (*types.EffectiveSetup, error) {
user, err := m.store.GetUserByUserID(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, userID)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("get user: %w", err)
}
return m.effectiveSetupForGroups(ctx, accountID, user.AutoGroups)
}
// effectiveSetupForGroups computes the effective Agent Network setup for
// a set of caller groups: the account endpoint plus, per authorized
// provider, the effective model set. It mirrors what the proxy enforces
// at request time — the policy filter matches filterApplicablePolicies,
// the model logic matches policyPermitsModel, and orphan providers
// (enabled but referenced by no applicable policy) are omitted just like
// the router synthesizer omits them — so the answer never advertises
// anything the proxy would refuse.
//
// Every "nothing available" shape returns Configured=false rather than
// an error, and "account not set up" is indistinguishable from "caller
// has no access" by design: the response must not leak what exists for
// others.
func (m *managerImpl) effectiveSetupForGroups(ctx context.Context, accountID string, groupIDs []string) (*types.EffectiveSetup, error) {
notConfigured := &types.EffectiveSetup{Providers: []types.EffectiveProvider{}}
settings, err := m.store.GetAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, accountID)
switch {
case err == nil:
case isNotFound(err):
return notConfigured, nil
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("get agent network settings: %w", err)
}
if settings.Endpoint() == "" {
return notConfigured, nil
}
policies, err := m.store.GetAccountAgentNetworkPolicies(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, accountID)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("list account policies: %w", err)
}
applicable := filterPoliciesByGroups(policies, groupIDs)
if len(applicable) == 0 {
return notConfigured, nil
}
providers, err := m.store.GetAccountAgentNetworkProviders(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, accountID)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("list account providers: %w", err)
}
var guardrailsByID map[string]*types.Guardrail
if anyPolicyHasGuardrails(applicable) {
guardrailsByID, err = m.loadGuardrailsByID(ctx, accountID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
authorized := make([]*types.Provider, 0, len(providers))
for _, p := range providers {
if p == nil || !p.Enabled {
continue
}
if len(policiesForProvider(applicable, p.ID)) == 0 {
continue
}
authorized = append(authorized, p)
}
if len(authorized) == 0 {
return notConfigured, nil
}
// created_at order, ID tiebreak — same deterministic order the router
// synthesizer presents.
sort.SliceStable(authorized, func(i, j int) bool {
if !authorized[i].CreatedAt.Equal(authorized[j].CreatedAt) {
return authorized[i].CreatedAt.Before(authorized[j].CreatedAt)
}
return authorized[i].ID < authorized[j].ID
})
out := &types.EffectiveSetup{
Configured: true,
Endpoint: "https://" + settings.Endpoint(),
Providers: make([]types.EffectiveProvider, 0, len(authorized)),
}
for _, p := range authorized {
allAllowed, models := effectiveModelsForProvider(p, policiesForProvider(applicable, p.ID), guardrailsByID)
flavor := ""
if entry, ok := catalog.Lookup(p.ProviderID); ok {
flavor = entry.ParserID
}
out.Providers = append(out.Providers, types.EffectiveProvider{
Name: p.Name,
CatalogID: p.ProviderID,
APIFlavor: flavor,
AllModelsAllowed: allAllowed,
Models: models,
})
}
return out, nil
}
// filterPoliciesByGroups returns the enabled policies whose SourceGroups
// intersect the caller's groups. Same group matching as
// filterApplicablePolicies, without the per-provider filter — the setup
// answer spans every provider the caller can reach.
func filterPoliciesByGroups(policies []*types.Policy, groupIDs []string) []*types.Policy {
groupSet := make(map[string]struct{}, len(groupIDs))
for _, g := range groupIDs {
if g != "" {
groupSet[g] = struct{}{}
}
}
out := make([]*types.Policy, 0, len(policies))
for _, p := range policies {
if p == nil || !p.Enabled {
continue
}
if !anyGroupMatches(p.SourceGroups, groupSet) {
continue
}
out = append(out, p)
}
return out
}
// policiesForProvider returns the subset of policies targeting the
// provider, order preserved.
func policiesForProvider(policies []*types.Policy, providerID string) []*types.Policy {
out := make([]*types.Policy, 0, len(policies))
for _, p := range policies {
if sliceContains(p.DestinationProviderIDs, providerID) {
out = append(out, p)
}
}
return out
}
// effectiveModelsForProvider derives the caller's effective model set for
// one provider from the applicable policies that target it, mirroring
// policyPermitsModel: a policy with no allowlist-enabled guardrail is
// unrestricted, and one unrestricted policy makes the whole provider
// unrestricted (the proxy would admit any model through it). Otherwise
// the union of the policies' allowlists applies, intersected with the
// provider's declared models when the operator declared any — the router
// only claims declared models, so an allowlisted-but-undeclared model is
// unreachable and must not be advertised. With no declared models the
// router claims every model, so the allowlist union stands alone.
func effectiveModelsForProvider(provider *types.Provider, policies []*types.Policy, guardrailsByID map[string]*types.Guardrail) (bool, []string) {
restricted := true
union := make([]string, 0)
seen := make(map[string]struct{})
for _, p := range policies {
policyRestricted := false
for _, gID := range p.GuardrailIDs {
g, ok := guardrailsByID[gID]
if !ok || g == nil || !g.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Enabled {
continue
}
policyRestricted = true
for _, model := range g.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Models {
key := normaliseModelID(model)
if key == "" {
continue
}
if _, dup := seen[key]; dup {
continue
}
seen[key] = struct{}{}
union = append(union, key)
}
}
if !policyRestricted {
restricted = false
}
}
declared := declaredModelIDs(provider)
if !restricted {
return true, declared
}
if len(provider.Models) == 0 {
// No operator declaration: the router claims every model, so the
// allowlist union is the effective set as-is.
return false, union
}
out := make([]string, 0, len(declared))
for _, id := range declared {
if _, ok := seen[normaliseModelID(id)]; ok {
out = append(out, id)
}
}
return false, out
}
// declaredModelIDs returns the models a provider exposes: the operator's
// curated list when present, otherwise the catalog entry's models (an
// empty operator list means "all catalog models"). Gateway/custom catalog
// entries declare no models, so the result may be empty.
func declaredModelIDs(provider *types.Provider) []string {
if ids := providerModelIDs(provider); len(ids) > 0 {
return ids
}
entry, ok := catalog.Lookup(provider.ProviderID)
if !ok {
return []string{}
}
out := make([]string, 0, len(entry.Models))
for _, m := range entry.Models {
if m.ID != "" {
out = append(out, m.ID)
}
}
return out
}
// GetSetupForUser on the mock manager reports "not configured" so tests
// that don't care about setup still compile.
func (*mockManager) GetSetupForUser(_ context.Context, _, _ string) (*types.EffectiveSetup, error) {
return &types.EffectiveSetup{Providers: []types.EffectiveProvider{}}, nil
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,324 @@
package agentnetwork
import (
"context"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/types"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/accesslogs"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/permissions"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/store"
nbtypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
)
// These tests drive the effective-setup computation through the real
// sqlite store, mirroring the policyselect realstore suite: assert on
// observable answers (configured / providers / models), not on which
// store methods get called. The computation must agree with what the
// proxy enforces — policy filtering matches filterApplicablePolicies,
// model logic matches policyPermitsModel, and orphan providers are
// omitted like the router synthesizer omits them.
func newSetupTestMgr(t *testing.T) (*managerImpl, store.Store) {
t.Helper()
ctx := context.Background()
s, cleanup, err := store.NewTestStoreFromSQL(ctx, "", t.TempDir())
require.NoError(t, err, "real sqlite test store must come up")
t.Cleanup(cleanup)
return &managerImpl{store: s}, s
}
// newSetupTestGuardrail returns an allowlist-enabled guardrail.
func newSetupTestGuardrail(id string, models ...string) *types.Guardrail {
return &types.Guardrail{
ID: id,
AccountID: testAccountID,
Name: "allowlist " + id,
Checks: types.GuardrailChecks{
ModelAllowlist: types.GuardrailModelAllowlist{Enabled: true, Models: models},
},
}
}
func TestEffectiveSetup_RealStore_NoSettingsRow(t *testing.T) {
mgr, _ := newSetupTestMgr(t)
setup, err := mgr.effectiveSetupForGroups(context.Background(), testAccountID, []string{"grp-eng"})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, setup.Configured, "account without settings must read as not configured")
assert.Empty(t, setup.Endpoint)
assert.Empty(t, setup.Providers)
}
func TestEffectiveSetup_RealStore_NoApplicablePolicy(t *testing.T) {
mgr, s := newSetupTestMgr(t)
ctx := context.Background()
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, newSynthTestSettings()))
provider := newSynthTestProvider()
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkProvider(ctx, provider))
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkPolicy(ctx, newSynthTestPolicy(provider.ID, "grp-eng", "")))
setup, err := mgr.effectiveSetupForGroups(ctx, testAccountID, []string{"grp-other"})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, setup.Configured, "caller outside every policy's source groups must read as not configured")
assert.Empty(t, setup.Endpoint, "no-access answer must not leak the endpoint")
assert.Empty(t, setup.Providers)
}
func TestEffectiveSetup_RealStore_UnrestrictedPolicyListsDeclaredModels(t *testing.T) {
mgr, s := newSetupTestMgr(t)
ctx := context.Background()
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, newSynthTestSettings()))
provider := newSynthTestProvider()
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkProvider(ctx, provider))
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkPolicy(ctx, newSynthTestPolicy(provider.ID, "grp-eng", "")))
setup, err := mgr.effectiveSetupForGroups(ctx, testAccountID, []string{"grp-eng"})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, setup.Configured)
assert.Equal(t, "https://"+testEndpoint, setup.Endpoint)
require.Len(t, setup.Providers, 1)
p := setup.Providers[0]
assert.Equal(t, "OpenAI", p.Name)
assert.Equal(t, "openai_api", p.CatalogID)
assert.Equal(t, "openai", p.APIFlavor)
assert.True(t, p.AllModelsAllowed, "policy without allowlist guardrail is unrestricted")
assert.Equal(t, []string{"gpt-5.4"}, p.Models, "declared models listed as a courtesy")
}
func TestEffectiveSetup_RealStore_AllowlistIntersectsDeclaredModels(t *testing.T) {
mgr, s := newSetupTestMgr(t)
ctx := context.Background()
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, newSynthTestSettings()))
provider := newSynthTestProvider()
provider.Models = []types.ProviderModel{{ID: "gpt-5.4"}, {ID: "gpt-4o"}}
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkProvider(ctx, provider))
// Allowlist admits gpt-5.4 (declared, odd casing/spacing) and gpt-4.1
// (NOT declared — the router would never route it, so it must not be
// advertised).
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkGuardrail(ctx, newSetupTestGuardrail("guard-1", " GPT-5.4 ", "gpt-4.1")))
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkPolicy(ctx, newSynthTestPolicy(provider.ID, "grp-eng", "guard-1")))
setup, err := mgr.effectiveSetupForGroups(ctx, testAccountID, []string{"grp-eng"})
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, setup.Providers, 1)
p := setup.Providers[0]
assert.False(t, p.AllModelsAllowed)
assert.Equal(t, []string{"gpt-5.4"}, p.Models, "allowlist ∩ declared, in declared order and casing")
}
func TestEffectiveSetup_RealStore_UnrestrictedPolicyWinsOverRestricted(t *testing.T) {
mgr, s := newSetupTestMgr(t)
ctx := context.Background()
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, newSynthTestSettings()))
provider := newSynthTestProvider()
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkProvider(ctx, provider))
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkGuardrail(ctx, newSetupTestGuardrail("guard-1", "gpt-5.4")))
restricted := newSynthTestPolicy(provider.ID, "grp-eng", "guard-1")
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkPolicy(ctx, restricted))
open := newSynthTestPolicy(provider.ID, "grp-eng", "")
open.ID = "pol-2"
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkPolicy(ctx, open))
setup, err := mgr.effectiveSetupForGroups(ctx, testAccountID, []string{"grp-eng"})
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, setup.Providers, 1)
assert.True(t, setup.Providers[0].AllModelsAllowed,
"one applicable policy without an allowlist makes the provider unrestricted — the proxy would admit any model through it")
}
func TestEffectiveSetup_RealStore_AllowlistUnionAcrossPolicies(t *testing.T) {
mgr, s := newSetupTestMgr(t)
ctx := context.Background()
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, newSynthTestSettings()))
provider := newSynthTestProvider()
provider.Models = []types.ProviderModel{{ID: "gpt-5.4"}, {ID: "gpt-4o"}, {ID: "o4-mini"}}
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkProvider(ctx, provider))
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkGuardrail(ctx, newSetupTestGuardrail("guard-1", "gpt-5.4")))
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkGuardrail(ctx, newSetupTestGuardrail("guard-2", "gpt-4o")))
p1 := newSynthTestPolicy(provider.ID, "grp-eng", "guard-1")
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkPolicy(ctx, p1))
p2 := newSynthTestPolicy(provider.ID, "grp-eng", "guard-2")
p2.ID = "pol-2"
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkPolicy(ctx, p2))
setup, err := mgr.effectiveSetupForGroups(ctx, testAccountID, []string{"grp-eng"})
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, setup.Providers, 1)
p := setup.Providers[0]
assert.False(t, p.AllModelsAllowed)
assert.ElementsMatch(t, []string{"gpt-5.4", "gpt-4o"}, p.Models, "union of allowlists across applicable policies")
}
func TestEffectiveSetup_RealStore_OrphanAndDisabledProvidersOmitted(t *testing.T) {
mgr, s := newSetupTestMgr(t)
ctx := context.Background()
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, newSynthTestSettings()))
// Orphan: enabled but referenced by no policy.
orphan := newSynthTestProvider()
orphan.ID = "prov-orphan"
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkProvider(ctx, orphan))
// Disabled but referenced by an applicable policy.
disabled := newSynthTestProvider()
disabled.ID = "prov-disabled"
disabled.Enabled = false
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkProvider(ctx, disabled))
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkPolicy(ctx, newSynthTestPolicy(disabled.ID, "grp-eng", "")))
setup, err := mgr.effectiveSetupForGroups(ctx, testAccountID, []string{"grp-eng"})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, setup.Configured, "neither an orphan nor a disabled provider is reachable, so nothing is configured for the caller")
assert.Empty(t, setup.Providers)
}
func TestEffectiveSetup_RealStore_DisabledPolicyIgnored(t *testing.T) {
mgr, s := newSetupTestMgr(t)
ctx := context.Background()
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, newSynthTestSettings()))
provider := newSynthTestProvider()
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkProvider(ctx, provider))
policy := newSynthTestPolicy(provider.ID, "grp-eng", "")
policy.Enabled = false
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkPolicy(ctx, policy))
setup, err := mgr.effectiveSetupForGroups(ctx, testAccountID, []string{"grp-eng"})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, setup.Configured)
}
func TestEffectiveSetup_RealStore_UndeclaredModelsUseAllowlistAsIs(t *testing.T) {
mgr, s := newSetupTestMgr(t)
ctx := context.Background()
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, newSynthTestSettings()))
// Gateway-style provider: no declared models — the router claims every
// model, so the allowlist union is the effective set on its own.
provider := newSynthTestProvider()
provider.ProviderID = "litellm_proxy"
provider.Name = "LiteLLM"
provider.Models = nil
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkProvider(ctx, provider))
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkGuardrail(ctx, newSetupTestGuardrail("guard-1", "claude-sonnet-4-5")))
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkPolicy(ctx, newSynthTestPolicy(provider.ID, "grp-eng", "guard-1")))
setup, err := mgr.effectiveSetupForGroups(ctx, testAccountID, []string{"grp-eng"})
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, setup.Providers, 1)
p := setup.Providers[0]
assert.False(t, p.AllModelsAllowed)
assert.Equal(t, []string{"claude-sonnet-4-5"}, p.Models)
}
func TestEffectiveSetup_RealStore_ProvidersInCreatedAtOrder(t *testing.T) {
mgr, s := newSetupTestMgr(t)
ctx := context.Background()
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, newSynthTestSettings()))
newer := newSynthTestProvider()
newer.ID = "prov-newer"
newer.Name = "Newer"
newer.CreatedAt = time.Date(2026, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkProvider(ctx, newer))
older := newSynthTestProvider()
older.ID = "prov-older"
older.Name = "Older"
older.CreatedAt = time.Date(2026, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkProvider(ctx, older))
policy := newSynthTestPolicy(newer.ID, "grp-eng", "")
policy.DestinationProviderIDs = []string{newer.ID, older.ID}
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkPolicy(ctx, policy))
setup, err := mgr.effectiveSetupForGroups(ctx, testAccountID, []string{"grp-eng"})
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, setup.Providers, 2)
assert.Equal(t, "Older", setup.Providers[0].Name)
assert.Equal(t, "Newer", setup.Providers[1].Name)
}
// TestGetSetupForUser_RealStore pins the self-service entry point: the
// user's group memberships (AutoGroups — the same groups the user's peers
// carry) scope the answer, and users outside every policy get the
// indistinguishable not-configured shape.
func TestGetSetupForUser_RealStore(t *testing.T) {
mgr, s := newSetupTestMgr(t)
ctx := context.Background()
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, newSynthTestSettings()))
provider := newSynthTestProvider()
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkProvider(ctx, provider))
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkPolicy(ctx, newSynthTestPolicy(provider.ID, "grp-eng", "")))
// users.account_id is a foreign key into accounts, enforced on
// MySQL/Postgres, so the account row must exist before its users.
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAccount(ctx, &nbtypes.Account{Id: testAccountID}))
require.NoError(t, s.SaveUser(ctx, &nbtypes.User{
Id: "user-in", AccountID: testAccountID, Role: nbtypes.UserRoleUser, AutoGroups: []string{"grp-eng"},
}))
require.NoError(t, s.SaveUser(ctx, &nbtypes.User{
Id: "user-out", AccountID: testAccountID, Role: nbtypes.UserRoleUser, AutoGroups: []string{"grp-other"},
}))
setupIn, err := mgr.GetSetupForUser(ctx, testAccountID, "user-in")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, setupIn.Configured)
require.Len(t, setupIn.Providers, 1)
setupOut, err := mgr.GetSetupForUser(ctx, testAccountID, "user-out")
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, setupOut.Configured, "user outside the policy's source groups gets the not-configured answer")
}
// TestGetUsageOverview_RealStore_SelfScoped pins the self-scope fallback:
// a caller without the account-wide usage grant gets the same aggregation
// the admin overview serves, but only ever their own rows — a user_id
// filter for someone else must be overridden, not honored, and never
// denied. A caller holding the grant keeps the account-wide view.
func TestGetUsageOverview_RealStore_SelfScoped(t *testing.T) {
mgr, s := newSetupTestMgr(t)
mgr.permissionsManager = permissions.NewManager(s)
ctx := context.Background()
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, newSynthTestSettings()))
require.NoError(t, s.SaveAccount(ctx, &nbtypes.Account{Id: testAccountID}))
require.NoError(t, s.SaveUser(ctx, &nbtypes.User{
Id: "user-a", AccountID: testAccountID, Role: nbtypes.UserRoleUser,
}))
require.NoError(t, s.SaveUser(ctx, &nbtypes.User{
Id: "admin", AccountID: testAccountID, Role: nbtypes.UserRoleAdmin,
}))
own1 := newIngestTestEntry()
own1.ID, own1.UserId = "log-own-1", "user-a"
own2 := newIngestTestEntry()
own2.ID, own2.UserId = "log-own-2", "user-a"
other := newIngestTestEntry()
other.ID, other.UserId = "log-other", "user-b"
for _, e := range []*accesslogs.AccessLogEntry{own1, own2, other} {
require.NoError(t, IngestAccessLog(ctx, s, e))
}
otherID := "user-b"
filter := types.AgentNetworkAccessLogFilter{UserID: &otherID}
buckets, err := mgr.GetUsageOverview(ctx, testAccountID, "user-a", filter, types.ParseUsageGranularity(""))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, buckets, 1, "same-day rows aggregate into one daily bucket")
assert.Equal(t, int64(200), buckets[0].InputTokens, "only the caller's two rows count — the foreign user_id filter is overridden")
assert.Equal(t, int64(100), buckets[0].OutputTokens)
adminBuckets, err := mgr.GetUsageOverview(ctx, testAccountID, "admin", types.AgentNetworkAccessLogFilter{}, types.ParseUsageGranularity(""))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Len(t, adminBuckets, 1)
assert.Equal(t, int64(300), adminBuckets[0].InputTokens, "the account-wide grant keeps the unscoped view")
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
package types
// EffectiveSetup is the caller-scoped answer to "what may this caller
// use on the Agent Network?" — the account's proxy endpoint plus the
// providers and models the caller's groups authorize. It intentionally
// carries display metadata only: no keys, no upstream URLs, no policy or
// guardrail structure, and no hint of providers the caller cannot reach.
type EffectiveSetup struct {
// Configured is false when the account has no Agent Network set up or
// when nothing is authorized for the caller's groups — the two cases
// are deliberately indistinguishable so the response leaks nothing
// about what exists for others.
Configured bool
// Endpoint is the account's proxy base URL
// ("https://<subdomain>.<cluster>"), reachable over the NetBird tunnel
// only. Empty when Configured is false.
Endpoint string
// Providers lists the providers at least one applicable policy
// authorizes for the caller, in the account's created_at order.
Providers []EffectiveProvider
}
// EffectiveProvider is one authorized provider in an EffectiveSetup.
type EffectiveProvider struct {
// Name is the operator-assigned label, e.g. "Bedrock prod".
Name string
// CatalogID names the catalog entry, e.g. "anthropic_api".
CatalogID string
// APIFlavor is the request-body shape the provider speaks — the
// catalog entry's parser id ("anthropic", "openai"); empty when the
// proxy dispatches the provider by URL path instead.
APIFlavor string
// AllModelsAllowed is true when no model allowlist restricts this
// provider for the caller. Models then lists the declared/catalog
// models as a courtesy (possibly none for gateway-style providers).
AllModelsAllowed bool
// Models is the effective model allowlist for the caller, or the
// declared/catalog models when AllModelsAllowed is true.
Models []string
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
package permissions
import (
"context"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/permissions/modules"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/permissions/operations"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/permissions/roles"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
)
var allOps = []operations.Operation{operations.Read, operations.Create, operations.Update, operations.Delete}
// TestAgentNetworkAdminRole pins the delegated-admin contract: full control
// over the whole agent_network area (parent grant cascades to every
// submodule), read-only on the account objects needed to build policies,
// and nothing else in the account.
func TestAgentNetworkAdminRole(t *testing.T) {
manager := NewManager(nil)
ctx := context.Background()
role, ok := roles.RolesMap[types.UserRoleAgentNetworkAdmin]
require.True(t, ok, "agent_network_admin must exist in RolesMap")
agentNetworkModules := []modules.Module{
modules.AgentNetwork,
modules.AgentNetworkProviders,
modules.AgentNetworkPolicies,
modules.AgentNetworkGuardrails,
modules.AgentNetworkBudgets,
modules.AgentNetworkUsage,
modules.AgentNetworkLogs,
modules.AgentNetworkSettings,
}
for _, m := range agentNetworkModules {
for _, op := range allOps {
assert.True(t, manager.ValidateRoleModuleAccess(ctx, "account", role, m, op),
"agent_network_admin must have %s on %s", op, m)
}
}
// Settings read rides along because GET /api/accounts (which the
// dashboard needs to boot) validates it, like network_admin.
for _, m := range []modules.Module{modules.Users, modules.Groups, modules.Peers, modules.Accounts, modules.Settings} {
assert.True(t, manager.ValidateRoleModuleAccess(ctx, "account", role, m, operations.Read),
"agent_network_admin must read %s to build policies and load the dashboard", m)
for _, op := range []operations.Operation{operations.Create, operations.Update, operations.Delete} {
assert.False(t, manager.ValidateRoleModuleAccess(ctx, "account", role, m, op),
"agent_network_admin must not have %s on %s", op, m)
}
}
for _, m := range []modules.Module{modules.Networks, modules.Dns, modules.SetupKeys, modules.Routes} {
for _, op := range allOps {
assert.False(t, manager.ValidateRoleModuleAccess(ctx, "account", role, m, op),
"agent_network_admin must not have %s on %s", op, m)
}
}
}
// TestUsageViewerRole pins the least-privilege cost role: read on the
// aggregated usage overview plus read-only on the resources its filters
// and display columns resolve against (users, groups, peers, the provider
// list) — no policies, no request-level logs (which can contain captured
// prompts), nothing else in the account.
func TestUsageViewerRole(t *testing.T) {
manager := NewManager(nil)
ctx := context.Background()
role, ok := roles.RolesMap[types.UserRoleUsageViewer]
require.True(t, ok, "usage_viewer must exist in RolesMap")
readOnly := []modules.Module{
modules.AgentNetworkUsage,
modules.AgentNetworkProviders,
modules.Users,
modules.Groups,
modules.Peers,
}
for _, m := range readOnly {
assert.True(t, manager.ValidateRoleModuleAccess(ctx, "account", role, m, operations.Read),
"usage_viewer must read %s for the usage view and its filters", m)
for _, op := range []operations.Operation{operations.Create, operations.Update, operations.Delete} {
assert.False(t, manager.ValidateRoleModuleAccess(ctx, "account", role, m, op),
"usage_viewer must not have %s on %s", op, m)
}
}
denied := []modules.Module{
modules.AgentNetwork,
modules.AgentNetworkPolicies,
modules.AgentNetworkGuardrails,
modules.AgentNetworkBudgets,
modules.AgentNetworkLogs,
modules.AgentNetworkSettings,
modules.Networks,
modules.SetupKeys,
}
for _, m := range denied {
for _, op := range allOps {
assert.False(t, manager.ValidateRoleModuleAccess(ctx, "account", role, m, op),
"usage_viewer must not have %s on %s", op, m)
}
}
}
// TestBillingAdminRoleResolves pins that billing_admin has a proper entry
// in the permission map. Its plan/seat/invoice permissions are enforced
// outside this map; management-side it carries the regular User baseline
// instead of failing role resolution.
func TestBillingAdminRoleResolves(t *testing.T) {
manager := NewManager(nil)
ctx := context.Background()
role, ok := roles.RolesMap[types.UserRoleBillingAdmin]
require.True(t, ok, "billing_admin must exist in RolesMap")
permissions, err := manager.GetPermissionsByRole(ctx, types.UserRoleBillingAdmin)
require.NoError(t, err, "billing_admin role must resolve")
require.NotEmpty(t, permissions)
for _, m := range []modules.Module{modules.AgentNetwork, modules.Networks, modules.Users, modules.Peers} {
for _, op := range allOps {
assert.False(t, manager.ValidateRoleModuleAccess(ctx, "account", role, m, op),
"billing_admin must not have %s on %s", op, m)
}
}
}
// TestNewRolesParse pins the API role strings, which are permanent once
// released.
func TestNewRolesParse(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, types.UserRoleAgentNetworkAdmin, types.StrRoleToUserRole("agent_network_admin"))
assert.Equal(t, types.UserRoleUsageViewer, types.StrRoleToUserRole("usage_viewer"))
assert.Equal(t, types.UserRoleBillingAdmin, types.StrRoleToUserRole("billing_admin"))
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
package roles
import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/permissions/modules"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/permissions/operations"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
)
// AgentNetworkAdmin is the delegated administrator for the Agent Network
// area: full control over providers, policies, guardrails, budgets, usage,
// logs, and its settings, plus read-only visibility into the account
// objects needed to build policies (users, groups, peers) and the account
// settings/meta read the dashboard needs to boot (GET /api/accounts
// validates Settings read, same as network_admin). Nothing else in the
// account is visible.
var AgentNetworkAdmin = RolePermissions{
Role: types.UserRoleAgentNetworkAdmin,
AutoAllowNew: map[operations.Operation]bool{
operations.Read: false,
operations.Create: false,
operations.Update: false,
operations.Delete: false,
},
Permissions: Permissions{
modules.AgentNetwork: {
operations.Read: true,
operations.Create: true,
operations.Update: true,
operations.Delete: true,
},
modules.Users: {
operations.Read: true,
operations.Create: false,
operations.Update: false,
operations.Delete: false,
},
modules.Groups: {
operations.Read: true,
operations.Create: false,
operations.Update: false,
operations.Delete: false,
},
modules.Peers: {
operations.Read: true,
operations.Create: false,
operations.Update: false,
operations.Delete: false,
},
modules.Accounts: {
operations.Read: true,
operations.Create: false,
operations.Update: false,
operations.Delete: false,
},
modules.Settings: {
operations.Read: true,
operations.Create: false,
operations.Update: false,
operations.Delete: false,
},
},
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
package roles
import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/permissions/operations"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
)
// BillingAdmin manages plans, seats, and invoices, which are enforced
// outside this permission map (NetBird Cloud). Management-side it carries
// the regular User baseline; the explicit entry keeps role resolution from
// failing with a role-not-found error.
var BillingAdmin = RolePermissions{
Role: types.UserRoleBillingAdmin,
AutoAllowNew: map[operations.Operation]bool{
operations.Read: false,
operations.Create: false,
operations.Update: false,
operations.Delete: false,
},
}

View File

@@ -15,9 +15,12 @@ type RolePermissions struct {
type Permissions map[modules.Module]map[operations.Operation]bool
var RolesMap = map[types.UserRole]RolePermissions{
types.UserRoleOwner: Owner,
types.UserRoleAdmin: Admin,
types.UserRoleUser: User,
types.UserRoleAuditor: Auditor,
types.UserRoleNetworkAdmin: NetworkAdmin,
types.UserRoleOwner: Owner,
types.UserRoleAdmin: Admin,
types.UserRoleUser: User,
types.UserRoleAuditor: Auditor,
types.UserRoleNetworkAdmin: NetworkAdmin,
types.UserRoleAgentNetworkAdmin: AgentNetworkAdmin,
types.UserRoleUsageViewer: UsageViewer,
types.UserRoleBillingAdmin: BillingAdmin,
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
package roles
import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/permissions/modules"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/permissions/operations"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
)
// UsageViewer is the regular User baseline plus read access to the
// aggregated Agent Network usage and cost overview, and read-only access
// to the resources the usage filters and display columns resolve against:
// users and groups (identity filters and name resolution), peers (agent
// principals in the caller column), and the provider list (provider and
// model filter options). It sees no policies and no request-level access
// logs (which can contain captured prompts).
var UsageViewer = RolePermissions{
Role: types.UserRoleUsageViewer,
AutoAllowNew: map[operations.Operation]bool{
operations.Read: false,
operations.Create: false,
operations.Update: false,
operations.Delete: false,
},
Permissions: Permissions{
modules.AgentNetworkUsage: {
operations.Read: true,
operations.Create: false,
operations.Update: false,
operations.Delete: false,
},
modules.AgentNetworkProviders: {
operations.Read: true,
operations.Create: false,
operations.Update: false,
operations.Delete: false,
},
modules.Users: {
operations.Read: true,
operations.Create: false,
operations.Update: false,
operations.Delete: false,
},
modules.Groups: {
operations.Read: true,
operations.Create: false,
operations.Update: false,
operations.Delete: false,
},
modules.Peers: {
operations.Read: true,
operations.Create: false,
operations.Update: false,
operations.Delete: false,
},
},
}

View File

@@ -11,13 +11,15 @@ import (
)
const (
UserRoleOwner UserRole = "owner"
UserRoleAdmin UserRole = "admin"
UserRoleUser UserRole = "user"
UserRoleUnknown UserRole = "unknown"
UserRoleBillingAdmin UserRole = "billing_admin"
UserRoleAuditor UserRole = "auditor"
UserRoleNetworkAdmin UserRole = "network_admin"
UserRoleOwner UserRole = "owner"
UserRoleAdmin UserRole = "admin"
UserRoleUser UserRole = "user"
UserRoleUnknown UserRole = "unknown"
UserRoleBillingAdmin UserRole = "billing_admin"
UserRoleAuditor UserRole = "auditor"
UserRoleNetworkAdmin UserRole = "network_admin"
UserRoleAgentNetworkAdmin UserRole = "agent_network_admin"
UserRoleUsageViewer UserRole = "usage_viewer"
UserStatusActive UserStatus = "active"
UserStatusDisabled UserStatus = "disabled"
@@ -42,6 +44,10 @@ func StrRoleToUserRole(strRole string) UserRole {
return UserRoleAuditor
case "network_admin":
return UserRoleNetworkAdmin
case "agent_network_admin":
return UserRoleAgentNetworkAdmin
case "usage_viewer":
return UserRoleUsageViewer
default:
return UserRoleUnknown
}
@@ -140,7 +146,7 @@ func (u *User) IsRegularUser() bool {
// IsRestrictable checks whether a user is in a restrictable role.
func (u *User) IsRestrictable() bool {
return u.Role == UserRoleUser || u.Role == UserRoleBillingAdmin
return u.Role == UserRoleUser || u.Role == UserRoleBillingAdmin || u.Role == UserRoleUsageViewer
}
// ToUserInfo converts a User object to a UserInfo object.

View File

@@ -5729,6 +5729,57 @@ components:
required:
- name
- checks
AgentNetworkMeSetup:
type: object
description: The caller-scoped Agent Network connection info backing the "My Agent Network" self-service view. Available to every authenticated user; the answer is computed from the caller's own groups and carries display metadata only.
properties:
configured:
type: boolean
description: False when the account has no Agent Network set up or the caller's groups authorize none of it. The two cases are deliberately indistinguishable.
endpoint:
type: string
description: The account's Agent Network base URL, reachable over the NetBird tunnel only. Empty when configured is false.
example: https://calm-otter.proxy.example.com
providers:
type: array
description: The providers at least one of the caller's policies authorizes, in creation order.
items:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/AgentNetworkMeProvider'
required:
- configured
- endpoint
- providers
AgentNetworkMeProvider:
type: object
description: One provider the caller may use, reduced to what a local tool needs for configuration.
properties:
name:
type: string
description: Operator-assigned provider label.
example: Bedrock prod
catalog_id:
type: string
description: Catalog entry id naming the provider type.
example: bedrock_api
api_flavor:
type: string
description: Request-body shape the provider speaks ("anthropic", "openai"). Empty when the gateway dispatches it by URL path instead.
example: anthropic
all_models_allowed:
type: boolean
description: True when no model allowlist restricts this provider for the caller; models then lists the declared or catalog models as a courtesy.
models:
type: array
description: The effective model allowlist for the caller (or the declared/catalog models when all_models_allowed is true).
items:
type: string
example: [ "anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-5" ]
required:
- name
- catalog_id
- api_flavor
- all_models_allowed
- models
AgentNetworkConsumption:
type: object
description: One per-(dimension, window) consumption counter row. The proxy ticks one row per dimension on every served LLM request; the dashboard reads this listing to surface live counter growth.
@@ -13393,7 +13444,7 @@ paths:
/api/agent-network/access-logs:
get:
summary: List Agent Network access logs
description: Returns a paginated, server-side-filtered list of agent-network (LLM) access log entries. Available only when the account has log collection enabled; otherwise entries are not retained.
description: Returns a paginated, server-side-filtered list of agent-network (LLM) access log entries. Available only when the account has log collection enabled; otherwise entries are not retained. Callers without the account-wide grant are not denied - the response is scoped to their own requests (any user_id or group_id filter is overridden).
tags: [ Agent Network ]
security:
- BearerAuth: [ ]
@@ -13508,7 +13559,7 @@ paths:
/api/agent-network/access-log-sessions:
get:
summary: List Agent Network access logs grouped by session
description: Returns a paginated, server-side-filtered list of agent-network (LLM) access logs grouped by session. The page unit is a session (total_records counts sessions); each session carries an aggregate summary and its ordered entries. Requests the client sent no session id for each form their own singleton group. Accepts the same filters as the flat access-logs endpoint. Available only when the account has log collection enabled.
description: Returns a paginated, server-side-filtered list of agent-network (LLM) access logs grouped by session. The page unit is a session (total_records counts sessions); each session carries an aggregate summary and its ordered entries. Requests the client sent no session id for each form their own singleton group. Accepts the same filters as the flat access-logs endpoint. Available only when the account has log collection enabled. Callers without the account-wide grant are not denied - the response is scoped to their own requests (any user_id or group_id filter is overridden).
tags: [ Agent Network ]
security:
- BearerAuth: [ ]
@@ -13623,7 +13674,7 @@ paths:
/api/agent-network/usage/overview:
get:
summary: Agent Network usage overview
description: Returns agent-network token and cost usage aggregated into time buckets, server-side filtered. Usage is always collected (independent of log collection).
description: Returns agent-network token and cost usage aggregated into time buckets, server-side filtered. Usage is always collected (independent of log collection). Callers without the account-wide grant are not denied - the response is scoped to their own usage (any user_id or group_id filter is overridden).
tags: [ Agent Network ]
security:
- BearerAuth: [ ]
@@ -13723,6 +13774,25 @@ paths:
"$ref": "#/components/responses/forbidden"
'500':
"$ref": "#/components/responses/internal_error"
/api/agent-network/me/setup:
get:
summary: Retrieve the caller's Agent Network setup
description: Returns everything the caller needs to configure a local AI tool and nothing more - the account's Agent Network endpoint plus the providers and models the caller's own policies allow. Available to every authenticated user regardless of role; the response never contains provider credentials, policy or guardrail configuration, or providers the caller cannot reach.
tags: [ Agent Network ]
security:
- BearerAuth: [ ]
- TokenAuth: [ ]
responses:
'200':
description: The caller-scoped Agent Network connection info
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: '#/components/schemas/AgentNetworkMeSetup'
'401':
"$ref": "#/components/responses/requires_authentication"
'500':
"$ref": "#/components/responses/internal_error"
/api/agent-network/settings:
get:
summary: Retrieve Agent Network settings

View File

@@ -2167,6 +2167,36 @@ type AgentNetworkGuardrailRequest struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
}
// AgentNetworkMeProvider One provider the caller may use, reduced to what a local tool needs for configuration.
type AgentNetworkMeProvider struct {
// AllModelsAllowed True when no model allowlist restricts this provider for the caller; models then lists the declared or catalog models as a courtesy.
AllModelsAllowed bool `json:"all_models_allowed"`
// ApiFlavor Request-body shape the provider speaks ("anthropic", "openai"). Empty when the gateway dispatches it by URL path instead.
ApiFlavor string `json:"api_flavor"`
// CatalogId Catalog entry id naming the provider type.
CatalogId string `json:"catalog_id"`
// Models The effective model allowlist for the caller (or the declared/catalog models when all_models_allowed is true).
Models []string `json:"models"`
// Name Operator-assigned provider label.
Name string `json:"name"`
}
// AgentNetworkMeSetup The caller-scoped Agent Network connection info backing the "My Agent Network" self-service view. Available to every authenticated user; the answer is computed from the caller's own groups and carries display metadata only.
type AgentNetworkMeSetup struct {
// Configured False when the account has no Agent Network set up or the caller's groups authorize none of it. The two cases are deliberately indistinguishable.
Configured bool `json:"configured"`
// Endpoint The account's Agent Network base URL, reachable over the NetBird tunnel only. Empty when configured is false.
Endpoint string `json:"endpoint"`
// Providers The providers at least one of the caller's policies authorizes, in creation order.
Providers []AgentNetworkMeProvider `json:"providers"`
}
// AgentNetworkPolicy defines model for AgentNetworkPolicy.
type AgentNetworkPolicy struct {
// CreatedAt Timestamp when the policy was created.