Compare commits

..

1 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
mlsmaycon
cdde472266 [management] Remove proxy peer stale deduplication test and related logic 2026-07-14 03:15:50 +02:00
30 changed files with 188 additions and 1009 deletions

View File

@@ -17,7 +17,8 @@ ENV \
NETBIRD_BIN="/usr/local/bin/netbird" \
NB_LOG_FILE="console,/var/log/netbird/client.log" \
NB_DAEMON_ADDR="unix:///var/run/netbird.sock" \
NB_ENABLE_CAPTURE="false"
NB_ENABLE_CAPTURE="false" \
NB_ENTRYPOINT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT="30"
ENTRYPOINT [ "/usr/local/bin/netbird-entrypoint.sh" ]
ARG TARGETPLATFORM

View File

@@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ ENV \
NB_DAEMON_ADDR="unix:///var/lib/netbird/netbird.sock" \
NB_LOG_FILE="console,/var/lib/netbird/client.log" \
NB_DISABLE_DNS="true" \
NB_ENABLE_CAPTURE="false"
NB_ENABLE_CAPTURE="false" \
NB_ENTRYPOINT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT="30"
ENTRYPOINT [ "/usr/local/bin/netbird-entrypoint.sh" ]
ARG TARGETPLATFORM

View File

@@ -1,176 +0,0 @@
package cmd
import (
"context"
"net"
"path/filepath"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"google.golang.org/grpc"
"google.golang.org/grpc/connectivity"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
)
// startUnixGRPCServer starts a bare gRPC server listening on a unix socket at path
// and returns a stop function. No services are registered; the connectivity-state
// wait only cares about the transport becoming READY.
func startUnixGRPCServer(t *testing.T, path string) func() {
t.Helper()
lis, err := net.Listen("unix", path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("listen unix %s: %v", path, err)
}
srv := grpc.NewServer()
go func() { _ = srv.Serve(lis) }()
return srv.Stop
}
func TestDialClientGRPCServer_ConnectsWhenServing(t *testing.T) {
sock := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "nb.sock")
stop := startUnixGRPCServer(t, sock)
defer stop()
conn, err := dialClientGRPCServer(context.Background(), "unix://"+sock, 5*time.Second)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected connection, got error: %v", err)
}
defer conn.Close()
if state := conn.GetState(); state != connectivity.Ready {
t.Fatalf("expected READY, got %s", state)
}
}
// TestDialClientGRPCServer_WaitsForLateServer is the core regression test: the
// daemon socket appears only after the dial has already started, mirroring
// "netbird service start" immediately followed by "netbird up".
func TestDialClientGRPCServer_WaitsForLateServer(t *testing.T) {
sock := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "nb.sock")
var stop func()
timer := time.AfterFunc(1*time.Second, func() {
stop = startUnixGRPCServer(t, sock)
})
defer timer.Stop()
defer func() {
if stop != nil {
stop()
}
}()
start := time.Now()
conn, err := dialClientGRPCServer(context.Background(), "unix://"+sock, 10*time.Second)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("expected connection after late server start, got error: %v", err)
}
defer conn.Close()
if elapsed := time.Since(start); elapsed < 500*time.Millisecond {
t.Fatalf("connected too fast (%s); server should not have been up yet", elapsed)
}
if state := conn.GetState(); state != connectivity.Ready {
t.Fatalf("expected READY, got %s", state)
}
}
// fakeStatusServer serves the Status RPC with a programmable response so we can
// exercise waitForDaemonStatus without spinning up a real engine.
type fakeStatusServer struct {
proto.UnimplementedDaemonServiceServer
resp func() *proto.StatusResponse
}
func (f *fakeStatusServer) Status(context.Context, *proto.StatusRequest) (*proto.StatusResponse, error) {
return f.resp(), nil
}
func startFakeStatusServer(t *testing.T, sock string, resp func() *proto.StatusResponse) func() {
t.Helper()
lis, err := net.Listen("unix", sock)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("listen unix %s: %v", sock, err)
}
srv := grpc.NewServer()
proto.RegisterDaemonServiceServer(srv, &fakeStatusServer{resp: resp})
go func() { _ = srv.Serve(lis) }()
return srv.Stop
}
func dialFake(t *testing.T, sock string) proto.DaemonServiceClient {
t.Helper()
conn, err := dialClientGRPCServer(context.Background(), "unix://"+sock, 5*time.Second)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("dial fake daemon: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { conn.Close() })
return proto.NewDaemonServiceClient(conn)
}
// New daemon that flips DaemonReady=true after a couple of polls: waitForDaemonStatus
// must block until the flag is set, then return.
func TestWaitForDaemonStatus_WaitsForDaemonReady(t *testing.T) {
sock := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "nb.sock")
var polls int32
stop := startFakeStatusServer(t, sock, func() *proto.StatusResponse {
n := atomic.AddInt32(&polls, 1)
return &proto.StatusResponse{
Status: string(internal.StatusConnecting),
DaemonReady: n >= 3, // ready only from the 3rd poll on
}
})
defer stop()
client := dialFake(t, sock)
status, err := waitForDaemonStatus(context.Background(), client)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if !status.GetDaemonReady() {
t.Fatalf("expected DaemonReady=true, got false")
}
if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&polls); got < 3 {
t.Fatalf("expected at least 3 polls before ready, got %d", got)
}
}
// Older daemon that never sets DaemonReady but reports a healthy (Connected)
// status: waitForDaemonStatus must return promptly via the readiness fallback,
// not block for the whole grace window.
func TestWaitForDaemonStatus_OlderDaemonHealthyStatus(t *testing.T) {
sock := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "nb.sock")
stop := startFakeStatusServer(t, sock, func() *proto.StatusResponse {
return &proto.StatusResponse{Status: string(internal.StatusConnected)} // DaemonReady unset
})
defer stop()
client := dialFake(t, sock)
start := time.Now()
status, err := waitForDaemonStatus(context.Background(), client)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
if status.GetDaemonReady() {
t.Fatalf("expected DaemonReady=false from older daemon")
}
if elapsed := time.Since(start); elapsed > 2*time.Second {
t.Fatalf("returned too slowly (%s); healthy status should short-circuit the grace", elapsed)
}
}
func TestDialClientGRPCServer_TimesOutWhenAbsent(t *testing.T) {
sock := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "never.sock")
start := time.Now()
conn, err := dialClientGRPCServer(context.Background(), "unix://"+sock, 1*time.Second)
if err == nil {
conn.Close()
t.Fatal("expected timeout error, got nil")
}
if elapsed := time.Since(start); elapsed < 900*time.Millisecond {
t.Fatalf("returned too early (%s); should have waited ~timeout", elapsed)
}
}

View File

@@ -17,9 +17,7 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/auth"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
nbnet "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/net"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/server"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/system"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
)
@@ -333,14 +331,6 @@ func doForegroundLogin(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, setupKey string,
return fmt.Errorf("read config file %s: %v", configFilePath, err)
}
// Mirror runInForegroundMode: recover residual state (DNS, firewall,
// ssh config, legacy routing) from a previous unclean shutdown and
// enable advanced routing before dialing management.
if err := server.RestoreResidualState(ctx, profilemanager.NewServiceManager(configFilePath).GetStatePath()); err != nil {
log.Warnf("failed to restore residual state: %v", err)
}
nbnet.Init()
err = foregroundLogin(ctx, cmd, config, setupKey, activeProf.ID)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("foreground login failed: %v", err)

View File

@@ -20,8 +20,6 @@ import (
"github.com/spf13/cobra"
"github.com/spf13/pflag"
"google.golang.org/grpc"
gbackoff "google.golang.org/grpc/backoff"
"google.golang.org/grpc/connectivity"
"google.golang.org/grpc/credentials/insecure"
daddr "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/daemonaddr"
@@ -266,70 +264,17 @@ func FlagNameToEnvVar(cmdFlag string, prefix string) string {
return prefix + upper
}
// defaultDaemonDialTimeout is how long DialClientGRPCServer waits for the daemon
// to become reachable. It is intentionally generous so that invoking the CLI
// right after "netbird service start" (e.g. from a container entrypoint) tolerates
// the window where the daemon has created its socket but is not yet serving.
const defaultDaemonDialTimeout = 30 * time.Second
// DialClientGRPCServer returns a client connection to the daemon server. It waits
// for the daemon to become reachable, retrying with backoff until the connection
// reports READY or defaultDaemonDialTimeout elapses. This handles the startup race
// where the daemon socket exists (or is about to) before the gRPC server is serving.
// DialClientGRPCServer returns client connection to the daemon server.
func DialClientGRPCServer(ctx context.Context, addr string) (*grpc.ClientConn, error) {
return dialClientGRPCServer(ctx, addr, defaultDaemonDialTimeout)
}
func dialClientGRPCServer(ctx context.Context, addr string, timeout time.Duration) (*grpc.ClientConn, error) {
conn, err := grpc.NewClient(
strings.TrimPrefix(addr, "tcp://"),
grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials()),
// Cap reconnect backoff at 5s; gRPC's default 120s MaxDelay would leave the
// CLI waiting far too long to notice a freshly-started daemon. Mirrors the GUI.
grpc.WithConnectParams(grpc.ConnectParams{
Backoff: gbackoff.Config{
BaseDelay: 1 * time.Second,
Multiplier: 1.6,
Jitter: 0.2,
MaxDelay: 5 * time.Second,
},
}),
)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("create daemon gRPC client: %w", err)
}
// grpc.NewClient is lazy: it does not connect until the first RPC or until we
// nudge it. Trigger connection attempts and wait until the channel reaches READY.
if err := waitForConnReady(ctx, conn, timeout); err != nil {
_ = conn.Close()
return nil, err
}
return conn, nil
}
// waitForConnReady drives the gRPC channel out of IDLE and blocks until it becomes
// READY, or until timeout/ctx expires. TRANSIENT_FAILURE (daemon not yet serving)
// is treated as retryable so the caller keeps waiting within the deadline.
func waitForConnReady(ctx context.Context, conn *grpc.ClientConn, timeout time.Duration) error {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, timeout)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, time.Second*10)
defer cancel()
for {
state := conn.GetState()
switch state {
case connectivity.Ready:
return nil
case connectivity.Idle:
// Kick the lazy channel into connecting.
conn.Connect()
}
if !conn.WaitForStateChange(ctx, state) {
// ctx expired while in `state`.
return fmt.Errorf("timed out after %s waiting for daemon to become ready (last state: %s)", timeout, state)
}
}
return grpc.DialContext(
ctx,
strings.TrimPrefix(addr, "tcp://"),
grpc.WithTransportCredentials(insecure.NewCredentials()),
grpc.WithBlock(),
)
}
// WithBackOff execute function in backoff cycle.

View File

@@ -78,10 +78,6 @@ func (p *program) Start(svc service.Service) error {
log.Fatalf("failed to start daemon: %v", err)
}
proto.RegisterDaemonServiceServer(p.serv, serverInstance)
// The engine is started and the service is registered: from here on the
// daemon serves RPCs backed by a running engine. Report readiness so
// clients (e.g. netbird up) can wait deterministically.
serverInstance.SetReady()
p.serverInstanceMu.Lock()
p.serverInstance = serverInstance

View File

@@ -22,8 +22,6 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
nbnet "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/net"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/server"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/system"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
@@ -231,24 +229,6 @@ func runInForegroundMode(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, activeProf *pr
_, _ = profilemanager.UpdateOldManagementURL(ctx, config, configFilePath)
// Restore residual state left by a previous run that did not shut down
// cleanly, mirroring what the daemon does before connecting: it recovers
// DNS config (a stale resolv.conf takeover can make the management
// hostname unresolvable), firewall rules, ssh config and legacy routing.
// Route cleanup itself happens at engine start; nbnet.Init() below lets
// the management dial bypass a leftover fwmark rule until then.
// Foreground mode is particularly exposed in containers: a crashed
// container restarts inside the same (pod) network namespace, so stale
// state survives while the process does not.
if err := server.RestoreResidualState(ctx, profilemanager.NewServiceManager(configPath).GetStatePath()); err != nil {
log.Warnf("failed to restore residual state: %v", err)
}
// Enable advanced routing (as the daemon does on startup) so the
// management dial bypasses a leftover fwmark rule instead of being
// shunted into a stale routing table.
nbnet.Init()
err = foregroundLogin(ctx, cmd, config, providedSetupKey, activeProf.ID)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("foreground login failed: %v", err)
@@ -295,7 +275,9 @@ func runInDaemonMode(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, pm *profilemanager
client := proto.NewDaemonServiceClient(conn)
status, err := waitForDaemonStatus(ctx, client)
status, err := client.Status(ctx, &proto.StatusRequest{
WaitForReady: func() *bool { b := true; return &b }(),
})
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("unable to get daemon status: %v", err)
}
@@ -334,79 +316,6 @@ func runInDaemonMode(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, pm *profilemanager
return nil
}
// daemonStatusPollTimeout bounds how long we poll the Status RPC waiting for the
// daemon to answer coherently. The transport is already READY at this point (see
// DialClientGRPCServer), so this only covers the brief window where the gRPC server
// is serving but the daemon engine is still starting up and the Status RPC races
// against server.Start().
const daemonStatusPollTimeout = 15 * time.Second
// daemonReadyGrace bounds how long we keep polling once the daemon answers but
// still reports DaemonReady=false. A freshly-started daemon flips it to true
// within this window; an older daemon that never sets the field simply falls
// through after the grace elapses, preserving backward compatibility.
const daemonReadyGrace = 10 * time.Second
// waitForDaemonStatus fetches the daemon status, waiting for the daemon to become
// ready. It handles two startup races:
//
// 1. The gRPC server is not yet serving: Status fails with Unavailable — retry.
// 2. The server serves but the engine is still starting: a DaemonReady-aware
// daemon reports DaemonReady=false until Start finishes; poll until it flips
// true (bounded by daemonReadyGrace). Older daemons never set DaemonReady, so
// we stop waiting on it after the grace and use the status as-is.
//
// It gives up after daemonStatusPollTimeout.
func waitForDaemonStatus(ctx context.Context, client proto.DaemonServiceClient) (*proto.StatusResponse, error) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, daemonStatusPollTimeout)
defer cancel()
waitForReady := true
req := &proto.StatusRequest{WaitForReady: &waitForReady}
var lastErr error
var firstAnswer time.Time
for {
status, err := client.Status(ctx, req)
if err != nil {
lastErr = err
// Only retry while the daemon is not yet answering; surface real errors.
if s, ok := gstatus.FromError(err); !ok || s.Code() != codes.Unavailable {
return nil, err
}
} else {
// Daemon answered. Explicitly ready (DaemonReady-aware daemon), or
// already fully connected — either way, done. Connected is the only
// status unambiguous enough to short-circuit on: a DaemonReady-aware
// daemon sets the flag at startup, so trusting Connected here can only
// help an older daemon that never sets the flag, without overriding a
// new daemon that legitimately reports DaemonReady=false while starting.
if status.GetDaemonReady() || internal.StatusType(status.GetStatus()) == internal.StatusConnected {
return status, nil
}
// Answered but neither ready-flagged nor connected yet: give a
// DaemonReady-aware daemon a bounded window to finish starting, then
// fall through so an older daemon that never sets the flag isn't
// blocked here.
if firstAnswer.IsZero() {
firstAnswer = time.Now()
} else if time.Since(firstAnswer) >= daemonReadyGrace {
return status, nil
}
lastErr = nil
}
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
if lastErr != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("daemon did not become ready: %w", lastErr)
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("daemon did not become ready within %s", daemonStatusPollTimeout)
case <-time.After(500 * time.Millisecond):
}
}
}
func doDaemonUp(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, client proto.DaemonServiceClient, pm *profilemanager.ProfileManager, activeProf *profilemanager.Profile, customDNSAddressConverted []byte, username string) error {
providedSetupKey, err := getSetupKey()

View File

@@ -292,16 +292,18 @@ func (s *serviceViaListener) generateFreePort() (uint16, error) {
return customPort, nil
}
probeListener, err := net.ListenUDP("udp4", &net.UDPAddr{})
udpAddr := net.UDPAddrFromAddrPort(netip.MustParseAddrPort("0.0.0.0:0"))
probeListener, err := net.ListenUDP("udp", udpAddr)
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("failed to bind random port for DNS: %s", err)
return 0, err
}
port := uint16(probeListener.LocalAddr().(*net.UDPAddr).Port)
if err = probeListener.Close(); err != nil {
addrPort := netip.MustParseAddrPort(probeListener.LocalAddr().String()) // might panic if address is incorrect
err = probeListener.Close()
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("failed to free up DNS port: %s", err)
return 0, err
}
return port, nil
return addrPort.Port(), nil
}

View File

@@ -2605,14 +2605,13 @@ func (e *Engine) updateForwardRules(rules []*mgmProto.ForwardingRule) ([]firewal
func (e *Engine) toExcludedLazyPeers(rules []firewallManager.ForwardRule, peers []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig) map[string]bool {
excludedPeers := make(map[string]bool)
// Ingress forward targets: inbound forwarded traffic is initiated remotely and
// cannot wake a lazy connection, so the peer routing the target must stay
// permanently connected. AllowedIPs are already parsed on the peer conn, so
// reuse those typed prefixes instead of re-parsing the network map strings.
for _, r := range rules {
ip := r.TranslatedAddress
for _, p := range peers {
if e.peerRoutesAddr(p, r.TranslatedAddress) {
for _, allowedIP := range p.GetAllowedIps() {
if allowedIP != ip.String() {
continue
}
log.Infof("exclude forwarder peer from lazy connection: %s", p.GetWgPubKey())
excludedPeers[p.GetWgPubKey()] = true
}
@@ -2622,27 +2621,6 @@ func (e *Engine) toExcludedLazyPeers(rules []firewallManager.ForwardRule, peers
return excludedPeers
}
// peerRoutesAddr reports whether the peer is a router for addr, matched against
// the peer's already-parsed AllowedIPs from the store (the same typed value the
// lazy manager consumes) rather than re-parsing the network map strings.
func (e *Engine) peerRoutesAddr(p *mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig, addr netip.Addr) bool {
prefixes, ok := e.peerStore.AllowedIPs(p.GetWgPubKey())
if !ok {
return false
}
return prefixesContain(prefixes, addr)
}
// prefixesContain reports whether addr falls within any of the prefixes.
func prefixesContain(prefixes []netip.Prefix, addr netip.Addr) bool {
for _, prefix := range prefixes {
if prefix.Contains(addr) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// isChecksEqual checks if two slices of checks are equal.
func isChecksEqual(checks1, checks2 []*mgmProto.Checks) bool {
normalize := func(checks []*mgmProto.Checks) []string {

View File

@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
package internal
import (
"net/netip"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
firewallManager "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peerstore"
mgmProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
)
func TestPrefixesContain(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
prefixes []string
addr string
want bool
}{
{name: "own overlay /32 matches", prefixes: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}, addr: "100.110.8.145", want: true},
{name: "addr inside routed subnet", prefixes: []string{"10.121.0.0/16"}, addr: "10.121.208.4", want: true},
{name: "addr outside subnet", prefixes: []string{"10.121.0.0/16"}, addr: "10.122.0.1", want: false},
{name: "different /32", prefixes: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}, addr: "100.110.8.146", want: false},
{name: "ipv6 /128 matches", prefixes: []string{"fd00::1/128"}, addr: "fd00::1", want: true},
{name: "no prefixes", prefixes: nil, addr: "10.121.208.4", want: false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
prefixes := make([]netip.Prefix, 0, len(tt.prefixes))
for _, p := range tt.prefixes {
prefixes = append(prefixes, netip.MustParsePrefix(p))
}
require.Equal(t, tt.want, prefixesContain(prefixes, netip.MustParseAddr(tt.addr)))
})
}
}
// TestToExcludedLazyPeers_ForwardTarget guards a regression: the forward-target
// peer (the peer routing a ForwardRule.TranslatedAddress) must be excluded from
// lazy connections, matched via the peer's already-parsed AllowedIPs.
func TestToExcludedLazyPeers_ForwardTarget(t *testing.T) {
const targetPeerKey = "cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc0="
const otherPeerKey = "dddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddddd0="
store := peerstore.NewConnStore()
store.AddPeerConn(targetPeerKey, newTestConn(t, targetPeerKey, "100.110.8.145/32"))
store.AddPeerConn(otherPeerKey, newTestConn(t, otherPeerKey, "100.110.9.10/32"))
e := &Engine{peerStore: store}
peers := []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig{
{WgPubKey: targetPeerKey, AllowedIps: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}},
{WgPubKey: otherPeerKey, AllowedIps: []string{"100.110.9.10/32"}},
}
rules := []firewallManager.ForwardRule{
{TranslatedAddress: netip.MustParseAddr("100.110.8.145")},
}
excluded := e.toExcludedLazyPeers(rules, peers)
require.True(t, excluded[targetPeerKey], "forward-target peer must be excluded from lazy connections")
require.False(t, excluded[otherPeerKey], "non-target peer must not be excluded")
require.Len(t, excluded, 1)
}
func TestToExcludedLazyPeers_NoRules(t *testing.T) {
e := &Engine{peerStore: peerstore.NewConnStore()}
peers := []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig{
{WgPubKey: "peer-a", AllowedIps: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}},
}
require.Empty(t, e.toExcludedLazyPeers(nil, peers))
}
func newTestConn(t *testing.T, key, allowedIP string) *peer.Conn {
t.Helper()
conn, err := peer.NewConn(peer.ConnConfig{
Key: key,
WgConfig: peer.WgConfig{AllowedIps: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix(allowedIP)}},
}, peer.ServiceDependencies{})
require.NoError(t, err)
return conn
}

View File

@@ -203,6 +203,7 @@ func NewConn(config ConnConfig, services ServiceDependencies) (*Conn, error) {
statusICE: worker.NewAtomicStatus(),
dumpState: dumpState,
endpointUpdater: NewEndpointUpdater(connLog, config.WgConfig, isController(config)),
wgWatcher: NewWGWatcher(connLog, config.WgConfig.WgInterface, config.Key, dumpState),
metricsRecorder: services.MetricsRecorder,
}
@@ -670,12 +671,11 @@ func (conn *Conn) onGuardEvent() {
}
}
func (conn *Conn) onWGDisconnected(watcherCtx context.Context) {
func (conn *Conn) onWGDisconnected() {
conn.mu.Lock()
defer conn.mu.Unlock()
// watcherCtx guards against a stale watcher tearing down a connection that already superseded it.
if conn.ctx.Err() != nil || watcherCtx.Err() != nil {
if conn.ctx.Err() != nil {
return
}
@@ -833,39 +833,25 @@ func (conn *Conn) isConnectedOnAllWay() (status guard.ConnStatus) {
})
}
// enableWgWatcherIfNeeded starts a fresh watcher instance per connection attempt, so its
// lifecycle stays bound to conn.mu and enable/disable can't race an old goroutine's shutdown.
// Caller must hold conn.mu.
func (conn *Conn) enableWgWatcherIfNeeded(enabledTime time.Time) {
if conn.wgWatcher != nil {
if !conn.wgWatcher.PrepareInitialHandshake() {
return
}
watcher := NewWGWatcher(conn.Log, conn.config.WgConfig.WgInterface, conn.config.Key, conn.dumpState)
watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
wgWatcherCtx, wgWatcherCancel := context.WithCancel(conn.ctx)
conn.wgWatcher = watcher
conn.wgWatcherCancel = wgWatcherCancel
conn.wgWatcherWg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer conn.wgWatcherWg.Done()
onDisconnected := func() { conn.onWGDisconnected(wgWatcherCtx) }
watcher.EnableWgWatcher(wgWatcherCtx, enabledTime, onDisconnected, conn.onWGHandshakeSuccess, conn.onWGCheckSuccess)
conn.wgWatcher.EnableWgWatcher(wgWatcherCtx, enabledTime, conn.onWGDisconnected, conn.onWGHandshakeSuccess, conn.onWGCheckSuccess)
}()
}
// disableWgWatcherIfNeeded cancels and drops the watcher once no transport is active. It never
// waits for the goroutine: the timeout path reentrantly calls back here under conn.mu, so
// blocking would deadlock. Caller must hold conn.mu.
func (conn *Conn) disableWgWatcherIfNeeded() {
if conn.currentConnPriority != conntype.None || conn.wgWatcher == nil {
return
if conn.currentConnPriority == conntype.None && conn.wgWatcherCancel != nil {
conn.wgWatcherCancel()
conn.wgWatcherCancel = nil
}
conn.wgWatcherCancel()
conn.wgWatcher = nil
conn.wgWatcherCancel = nil
}
func (conn *Conn) newProxy(remoteConn net.Conn) (wgproxy.Proxy, error) {
@@ -888,9 +874,7 @@ func (conn *Conn) resetEndpoint() {
return
}
conn.Log.Infof("reset wg endpoint")
if conn.wgWatcher != nil {
conn.wgWatcher.Reset()
}
conn.wgWatcher.Reset()
if err := conn.endpointUpdater.RemoveEndpointAddress(); err != nil {
conn.Log.Warnf("failed to remove endpoint address before update: %v", err)
}

View File

@@ -339,20 +339,20 @@ func TestConn_onWGDisconnected_EscalatesToRosenpassReset(t *testing.T) {
conn := newWGTimeoutTestConn(true, &disconnected)
for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
conn.onWGDisconnected()
}
assert.Empty(t, disconnected, "escalation must not fire below the threshold")
conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
conn.onWGDisconnected()
assert.Equal(t, []string{conn.config.WgConfig.RemoteKey}, disconnected,
"reaching the threshold must report the peer disconnected once")
for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
conn.onWGDisconnected()
}
assert.Len(t, disconnected, 1, "escalation must restart counting after firing")
conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
conn.onWGDisconnected()
assert.Len(t, disconnected, 2, "continued timeouts must escalate again")
}
@@ -364,12 +364,12 @@ func TestConn_onWGDisconnected_CheckSuccessResetsEscalation(t *testing.T) {
conn := newWGTimeoutTestConn(true, &disconnected)
for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
conn.onWGDisconnected()
}
conn.onWGCheckSuccess()
for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold-1; i++ {
conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
conn.onWGDisconnected()
}
assert.Empty(t, disconnected, "handshake success must reset the timeout count")
}
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ func TestConn_onWGDisconnected_NoEscalationWithoutRosenpass(t *testing.T) {
conn := newWGTimeoutTestConn(false, &disconnected)
for i := 0; i < wgTimeoutEscalationThreshold*3; i++ {
conn.onWGDisconnected(conn.ctx)
conn.onWGDisconnected()
}
assert.Empty(t, disconnected, "escalation must be limited to rosenpass connections")
}

View File

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package peer
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"sync"
"time"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
@@ -23,14 +24,14 @@ type WGInterfaceStater interface {
GetStats() (map[string]configurer.WGStats, error)
}
// WGWatcher is single-shot: one instance per connection attempt, run once, then discarded.
// Lifecycle is owned by Conn under conn.mu, so it keeps no "enabled" state to go stale.
type WGWatcher struct {
log *log.Entry
wgIfaceStater WGInterfaceStater
peerKey string
stateDump *stateDump
enabled bool
muEnabled sync.Mutex
// initialHandshake is not thread-safe; never call PrepareInitialHandshake and EnableWgWatcher concurrently.
initialHandshake time.Time
@@ -47,14 +48,25 @@ func NewWGWatcher(log *log.Entry, wgIfaceStater WGInterfaceStater, peerKey strin
}
}
// PrepareInitialHandshake reads the peer's current WireGuard handshake time. It must be
// called before the peer is (re)configured on the WireGuard interface, so the captured
// baseline reflects the state prior to this connection attempt instead of racing with
// that configuration.
func (w *WGWatcher) PrepareInitialHandshake() {
// PrepareInitialHandshake reserves the watcher and reads the peer's current WireGuard
// handshake time. It must be called before the peer is (re)configured on the WireGuard
// interface, so the captured baseline reflects the state prior to this connection attempt
// instead of racing with that configuration. Returns ok=false if the watcher is already
// running, in which case EnableWgWatcher must not be called.
func (w *WGWatcher) PrepareInitialHandshake() (ok bool) {
w.muEnabled.Lock()
if w.enabled {
w.muEnabled.Unlock()
return false
}
w.log.Debugf("enable WireGuard watcher")
w.enabled = true
w.muEnabled.Unlock()
handshake, _ := w.wgState()
w.initialHandshake = handshake
return true
}
// EnableWgWatcher runs the WireGuard watcher loop using the handshake baseline captured by
@@ -64,6 +76,10 @@ func (w *WGWatcher) PrepareInitialHandshake() {
// handshake, including the first.
func (w *WGWatcher) EnableWgWatcher(ctx context.Context, enabledTime time.Time, onDisconnectedFn func(), onHandshakeSuccessFn func(when time.Time), onCheckSuccessFn func()) {
w.periodicHandshakeCheck(ctx, onDisconnectedFn, onHandshakeSuccessFn, onCheckSuccessFn, enabledTime, w.initialHandshake)
w.muEnabled.Lock()
w.enabled = false
w.muEnabled.Unlock()
}
// Reset signals the watcher that the WireGuard peer has been reset and a new
@@ -89,7 +105,6 @@ func (w *WGWatcher) periodicHandshakeCheck(ctx context.Context, onDisconnectedFn
case <-timer.C:
handshake, ok := w.handshakeCheck(lastHandshake)
if !ok {
// early ctx cancel check return
if ctx.Err() != nil {
return
}
@@ -138,9 +153,9 @@ func (w *WGWatcher) handshakeCheck(lastHandshake time.Time) (*time.Time, bool) {
w.log.Tracef("previous handshake, handshake: %v, %v", lastHandshake, handshake)
// the current known handshake did not change
// the current know handshake did not change
if handshake.Equal(lastHandshake) {
w.log.Warnf("WireGuard handshake not updated: %v", handshake)
w.log.Warnf("WireGuard handshake timed out: %v", handshake)
return nil, false
}

View File

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
"time"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/configurer"
)
@@ -61,7 +62,7 @@ func TestWGWatcher_CheckSuccessCallback(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
require.True(t, watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake())
firstHandshake := make(chan struct{}, 1)
checkSuccess := make(chan struct{}, 1)
@@ -100,7 +101,8 @@ func TestWGWatcher_EnableWgWatcher(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
ok := watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
require.True(t, ok, "watcher should not be enabled yet")
onDisconnected := make(chan struct{}, 1)
go watcher.EnableWgWatcher(ctx, time.Now(), func() {
@@ -130,7 +132,8 @@ func TestWGWatcher_ReEnable(t *testing.T) {
watcher := NewWGWatcher(mlog, mocWgIface, "", newStateDump("peer", mlog, &Status{}))
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
ok := watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
require.True(t, ok, "watcher should not be enabled yet")
wg := &sync.WaitGroup{}
wg.Add(1)
@@ -146,7 +149,8 @@ func TestWGWatcher_ReEnable(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel = context.WithCancel(context.Background())
defer cancel()
watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
ok = watcher.PrepareInitialHandshake()
require.True(t, ok, "watcher should be re-enabled after the previous run stopped")
onDisconnected := make(chan struct{}, 1)
go watcher.EnableWgWatcher(ctx, time.Now(), func() {

View File

@@ -44,25 +44,10 @@ type Auth struct {
// NewAuth instantiate Auth struct and validate the management URL
func NewAuth(cfgPath string, mgmURL string) (*Auth, error) {
inputCfg := profilemanager.ConfigInput{
ConfigPath: cfgPath,
ManagementURL: mgmURL,
}
// Load the existing config when a config file is already present so an
// interactive re-login reuses the peer's persisted WireGuard private key
// (and thus its identity) instead of generating a fresh one. Generating a
// new key registers a brand-new peer on the management server on every
// re-auth (named after the fallback hostname). Only fall back to a fresh
// in-memory config for the first-time login when no config file exists yet.
// DirectUpdateOrCreateConfig uses non-atomic writes so it also works inside
// the tvOS App Group sandbox where atomic temp-file+rename is blocked.
var cfg *profilemanager.Config
var err error
if cfgPath != "" {
cfg, err = profilemanager.DirectUpdateOrCreateConfig(inputCfg)
} else {
cfg, err = profilemanager.CreateInMemoryConfig(inputCfg)
}
cfg, err := profilemanager.CreateInMemoryConfig(inputCfg)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}

View File

@@ -1,27 +1,71 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Runs the NetBird daemon and brings the connection up in one container process.
#
# A thin wrapper is needed (rather than a one-line ENTRYPOINT) for two reasons:
# 1. Two processes must run: the daemon (`service run`, long-lived) and a
# one-shot `up` that brings the connection up.
# 2. Signal handling: as PID 1 the wrapper must forward SIGTERM/SIGINT to the
# daemon so it tears down WireGuard and deregisters ephemeral peers on
# `docker stop`. Without this the daemon would be killed uncleanly.
#
# `netbird up` waits for the daemon to become ready on its own, so no readiness
# poll is needed here.
set -eEuo pipefail
: ${NB_ENTRYPOINT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT:="30"}
NETBIRD_BIN="${NETBIRD_BIN:-"netbird"}"
export NB_LOG_FILE="${NB_LOG_FILE:-"console,/var/log/netbird/client.log"}"
service_pids=()
daemon=""
cleanup() { [[ -n "${daemon}" ]] && kill -TERM "${daemon}" 2>/dev/null || true; }
trap cleanup SIGTERM SIGINT EXIT
_log() {
# mimic Go logger's output for easier parsing
# 2025-04-15T21:32:00+08:00 INFO client/internal/config.go:495: setting notifications to disabled by default
printf "$(date -Isec) ${1} ${BASH_SOURCE[1]}:${BASH_LINENO[1]}: ${2}\n" "${@:3}" >&2
}
"${NETBIRD_BIN}" service run &
daemon=$!
info() {
_log INFO "$@"
}
"${NETBIRD_BIN}" up
warn() {
_log WARN "$@"
}
wait "${daemon}"
on_exit() {
info "Shutting down NetBird daemon..."
if test "${#service_pids[@]}" -gt 0; then
info "terminating service process IDs: ${service_pids[@]@Q}"
kill -TERM "${service_pids[@]}" 2>/dev/null || true
wait "${service_pids[@]}" 2>/dev/null || true
else
info "there are no service processes to terminate"
fi
}
wait_for_daemon_startup() {
local timeout="${1}"
if [[ "${timeout}" -eq 0 ]]; then
info "not waiting for daemon startup due to zero timeout."
return
fi
local deadline=$((SECONDS + timeout))
while [[ "${SECONDS}" -lt "${deadline}" ]]; do
if "${NETBIRD_BIN}" status --check live 2>/dev/null; then
return
fi
sleep 1
done
warn "daemon did not become responsive after ${timeout} seconds, exiting..."
exit 1
}
connect() {
info "running 'netbird up'..."
"${NETBIRD_BIN}" up
return $?
}
main() {
trap 'on_exit' SIGTERM SIGINT EXIT
"${NETBIRD_BIN}" service run &
service_pids+=("$!")
info "registered new service process 'netbird service run', currently running: ${service_pids[@]@Q}"
wait_for_daemon_startup "${NB_ENTRYPOINT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT}"
connect
wait "${service_pids[@]}"
}
main "$@"

View File

@@ -995,13 +995,8 @@ type StatusResponse struct {
// Unset when the peer is not SSO-registered or login expiration is disabled.
// The UI derives "warning active" from this value and its own clock.
SessionExpiresAt *timestamppb.Timestamp `protobuf:"bytes,4,opt,name=sessionExpiresAt,proto3" json:"sessionExpiresAt,omitempty"`
// daemonReady reports whether the daemon has finished starting up and is
// serving RPCs backed by a running engine. Older daemons never set this
// (it defaults to false); clients must treat an unset value as "unknown"
// and fall back to their previous readiness heuristics for compatibility.
DaemonReady bool `protobuf:"varint,5,opt,name=daemonReady,proto3" json:"daemonReady,omitempty"`
unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields
sizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache
unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields
sizeCache protoimpl.SizeCache
}
func (x *StatusResponse) Reset() {
@@ -1062,13 +1057,6 @@ func (x *StatusResponse) GetSessionExpiresAt() *timestamppb.Timestamp {
return nil
}
func (x *StatusResponse) GetDaemonReady() bool {
if x != nil {
return x.DaemonReady
}
return false
}
type DownRequest struct {
state protoimpl.MessageState `protogen:"open.v1"`
unknownFields protoimpl.UnknownFields
@@ -7095,15 +7083,14 @@ const file_daemon_proto_rawDesc = "" +
"\x11getFullPeerStatus\x18\x01 \x01(\bR\x11getFullPeerStatus\x12(\n" +
"\x0fshouldRunProbes\x18\x02 \x01(\bR\x0fshouldRunProbes\x12'\n" +
"\fwaitForReady\x18\x03 \x01(\bH\x00R\fwaitForReady\x88\x01\x01B\x0f\n" +
"\r_waitForReady\"\xec\x01\n" +
"\r_waitForReady\"\xca\x01\n" +
"\x0eStatusResponse\x12\x16\n" +
"\x06status\x18\x01 \x01(\tR\x06status\x122\n" +
"\n" +
"fullStatus\x18\x02 \x01(\v2\x12.daemon.FullStatusR\n" +
"fullStatus\x12$\n" +
"\rdaemonVersion\x18\x03 \x01(\tR\rdaemonVersion\x12F\n" +
"\x10sessionExpiresAt\x18\x04 \x01(\v2\x1a.google.protobuf.TimestampR\x10sessionExpiresAt\x12 \n" +
"\vdaemonReady\x18\x05 \x01(\bR\vdaemonReady\"\r\n" +
"\x10sessionExpiresAt\x18\x04 \x01(\v2\x1a.google.protobuf.TimestampR\x10sessionExpiresAt\"\r\n" +
"\vDownRequest\"\x0e\n" +
"\fDownResponse\"P\n" +
"\x10GetConfigRequest\x12 \n" +

View File

@@ -291,11 +291,6 @@ message StatusResponse{
// Unset when the peer is not SSO-registered or login expiration is disabled.
// The UI derives "warning active" from this value and its own clock.
google.protobuf.Timestamp sessionExpiresAt = 4;
// daemonReady reports whether the daemon has finished starting up and is
// serving RPCs backed by a running engine. Older daemons never set this
// (it defaults to false); clients must treat an unset value as "unknown"
// and fall back to their previous readiness heuristics for compatibility.
bool daemonReady = 5;
}
message DownRequest {}

View File

@@ -104,12 +104,6 @@ type Server struct {
persistSyncResponse bool
isSessionActive atomic.Bool
// ready is set once the daemon has finished startup and is serving RPCs
// backed by a running engine (see SetReady, called after Start succeeds and
// the service is registered). Reported via StatusResponse.DaemonReady so
// clients can wait deterministically instead of polling heuristically.
ready atomic.Bool
cpuProfileBuf *bytes.Buffer
cpuProfiling bool
@@ -164,14 +158,6 @@ func New(ctx context.Context, logFile string, configFile string, profilesDisable
return s
}
// SetReady marks the daemon as fully started and serving RPCs. It is called by
// the service controller once Start has succeeded and the DaemonService is
// registered, so a subsequent Status RPC reports DaemonReady=true. Safe for
// concurrent use.
func (s *Server) SetReady() {
s.ready.Store(true)
}
func (s *Server) Start() error {
s.mutex.Lock()
defer s.mutex.Unlock()
@@ -195,7 +181,7 @@ func (s *Server) Start() error {
log.Warnf("failed to redirect stderr: %v", err)
}
if err := RestoreResidualState(s.rootCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
if err := restoreResidualState(s.rootCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
log.Warnf(errRestoreResidualState, err)
}
@@ -565,7 +551,7 @@ func (s *Server) Login(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.LoginRequest) (*pro
s.actCancel = cancel
s.mutex.Unlock()
if err := RestoreResidualState(s.rootCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
if err := restoreResidualState(s.rootCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
log.Warnf(errRestoreResidualState, err)
}
@@ -872,7 +858,7 @@ func (s *Server) Up(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.UpRequest) (*proto.UpR
return s.waitForUp(callerCtx)
}
if err := RestoreResidualState(callerCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
if err := restoreResidualState(callerCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
log.Warnf(errRestoreResidualState, err)
}
@@ -1436,7 +1422,7 @@ func (s *Server) buildStatusResponse(ctx context.Context, msg *proto.StatusReque
s.isSessionActive.Store(false)
}
statusResponse := proto.StatusResponse{Status: string(status), DaemonVersion: version.NetbirdVersion(), DaemonReady: s.ready.Load()}
statusResponse := proto.StatusResponse{Status: string(status), DaemonVersion: version.NetbirdVersion()}
if deadline := s.statusRecorder.GetSessionExpiresAt(); !deadline.IsZero() {
statusResponse.SessionExpiresAt = timestamppb.New(deadline)

View File

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ func (s *Server) CleanState(ctx context.Context, req *proto.CleanStateRequest) (
if req.All {
// Reuse existing cleanup logic for all states
if err := RestoreResidualState(ctx, statePath); err != nil {
if err := restoreResidualState(ctx, statePath); err != nil {
return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Internal, "failed to clean all states: %v", err)
}
@@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ func (s *Server) DeleteState(ctx context.Context, req *proto.DeleteStateRequest)
}, nil
}
// RestoreResidualState checks if the client was not shut down in a clean way and restores residual if required.
// restoreResidualState checks if the client was not shut down in a clean way and restores residual if required.
// Otherwise, we might not be able to connect to the management server to retrieve new config.
func RestoreResidualState(ctx context.Context, statePath string) error {
func restoreResidualState(ctx context.Context, statePath string) error {
if statePath == "" {
return nil
}

View File

@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ func availableProviders() []providerCase {
if region == "" {
region = "us-east-1"
}
ps = append(ps, providerCase{name: "bedrock", catalogID: "bedrock_api", upstream: "https://bedrock-runtime." + region + ".amazonaws.com", apiKey: k, model: "us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5", kind: harness.WireBedrock})
ps = append(ps, providerCase{name: "bedrock", catalogID: "bedrock_api", upstream: "https://bedrock-runtime." + region + ".amazonaws.com", apiKey: k, model: "us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5", kind: harness.WireMessages})
}
return ps
}
@@ -224,12 +224,9 @@ func TestProvidersMatrix(t *testing.T) {
var c int
var b string
var cerr error
switch pc.kind {
case harness.WireVertex:
if pc.kind == harness.WireVertex {
c, b, cerr = cl.Vertex(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc.project, pc.region, pc.model, "Reply with exactly: pong", sessionID)
case harness.WireBedrock:
c, b, cerr = cl.Bedrock(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc.model, "Reply with exactly: pong", sessionID)
default:
} else {
c, b, cerr = cl.Chat(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc.kind, pc.model, "Reply with exactly: pong", sessionID)
}
if cerr == nil {

View File

@@ -1,168 +0,0 @@
//go:build e2e
package agentnetwork
import (
"context"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/e2e/harness"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/api"
)
// catalogModel returns the normalized catalog id the proxy stamps for a
// path-routed provider's configured model — the form the guardrail allowlist is
// compared against (region prefix / @version stripped).
func catalogModel(pc providerCase) string {
switch pc.kind {
case harness.WireBedrock:
return strings.TrimPrefix(pc.model, "us.")
case harness.WireVertex:
return strings.SplitN(pc.model, "@", 2)[0]
default:
return pc.model
}
}
// disallowedModel returns a valid-shaped model id for the provider that is NOT
// the configured/allowed one, so the guardrail must reject it before the
// request ever reaches the upstream.
func disallowedModel(pc providerCase) string {
switch pc.kind {
case harness.WireBedrock:
return "us.anthropic.claude-opus-4-8"
case harness.WireVertex:
return "claude-opus-4-8@20250101"
default:
return "unlisted-model"
}
}
// sendModel drives one request for the given model through the provider's native
// wire shape and returns the HTTP status.
func sendModel(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, cl *harness.Client, endpoint, proxyIP string, pc providerCase, model string) int {
t.Helper()
var code int
var err error
switch pc.kind {
case harness.WireBedrock:
code, _, err = cl.Bedrock(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
case harness.WireVertex:
code, _, err = cl.Vertex(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, pc.project, pc.region, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
default:
code, _, err = cl.Chat(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, pc.kind, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
}
require.NoError(t, err, "request must reach the proxy for %s", pc.name)
return code
}
// TestModelAllowlistEnforced provisions a Model Allowlist guardrail limiting each
// path-routed provider (Bedrock, Vertex) to its configured model, then drives
// requests over the tunnel: the allowed model returns 200 while a model outside
// the allowlist is denied 403 by the guardrail before it reaches the upstream.
// This is the coverage missing for #6751 — the model for these providers travels
// in the URL path, and the allowlist must be enforced there.
func TestModelAllowlistEnforced(t *testing.T) {
var providers []providerCase
for _, pc := range availableProviders() {
if pc.kind == harness.WireBedrock || pc.kind == harness.WireVertex {
providers = append(providers, pc)
}
}
if len(providers) == 0 {
t.Skip("no path-routed provider keys set (AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK / GOOGLE_VERTEX_*); source ~/.llm-keys")
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 20*time.Minute)
defer cancel()
grp, err := srv.API().Groups.Create(ctx, api.PostApiGroupsJSONRequestBody{Name: "e2e-allowlist"})
require.NoError(t, err, "create group")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.API().Groups.Delete(context.Background(), grp.Id) })
ephemeral := false
sk, err := srv.API().SetupKeys.Create(ctx, api.PostApiSetupKeysJSONRequestBody{
Name: "e2e-allowlist-client",
Type: "reusable",
ExpiresIn: 86400,
UsageLimit: 0,
AutoGroups: []string{grp.Id},
Ephemeral: &ephemeral,
})
require.NoError(t, err, "mint setup key")
// Providers with their configured (allowed) models; the first bootstraps the cluster.
ids := make([]string, 0, len(providers))
allowed := make([]string, 0, len(providers))
for i, pc := range providers {
req := providerRequest(pc)
if i == 0 {
req.BootstrapCluster = ptr(harness.AgentNetworkCluster)
}
prov, perr := srv.CreateProvider(ctx, req)
require.NoError(t, perr, "create provider %s", pc.name)
id := prov.Id
ids = append(ids, id)
allowed = append(allowed, catalogModel(pc))
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteProvider(context.Background(), id) })
}
// Guardrail allowlisting exactly the configured models.
var gr api.AgentNetworkGuardrailRequest
gr.Name = "e2e-allowlist"
gr.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Enabled = true
gr.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Models = allowed
guard, err := srv.CreateGuardrail(ctx, gr)
require.NoError(t, err, "create guardrail")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteGuardrail(context.Background(), guard.Id) })
enabled := true
pol, err := srv.CreatePolicy(ctx, api.AgentNetworkPolicyRequest{
Name: "e2e-allowlist",
Enabled: &enabled,
SourceGroups: []string{grp.Id},
DestinationProviderIds: ids,
GuardrailIds: &[]string{guard.Id},
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create policy")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeletePolicy(context.Background(), pol.Id) })
settings, err := srv.GetSettings(ctx)
require.NoError(t, err, "read settings for endpoint")
require.NotEmpty(t, settings.Endpoint, "agent-network endpoint must be assigned")
proxyToken, err := srv.CreateProxyTokenCLI(ctx, "e2e-proxy-allowlist")
require.NoError(t, err, "mint proxy token via CLI")
px, err := harness.StartProxy(ctx, srv, proxyToken)
require.NoError(t, err, "start proxy")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = px.Terminate(context.Background()) })
cl, err := harness.StartClient(ctx, srv, sk.Key)
require.NoError(t, err, "start client")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = cl.Terminate(context.Background()) })
require.NoError(t, cl.WaitConnected(ctx, 90*time.Second), "client must connect to management")
if err := cl.WaitProxyPeer(ctx, 180*time.Second); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("client did not see the proxy peer: %v\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", err, px.Logs(context.Background()))
}
proxyIP, err := cl.ResolveProxyIP(ctx, settings.Endpoint)
require.NoError(t, err, "resolve agent-network endpoint to proxy IP")
for _, pc := range providers {
pc := pc
t.Run(pc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
// The admin's allowlisted model is served end to end.
assert.Equal(t, 200, sendModel(ctx, t, cl, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc, pc.model),
"allowlisted model must be permitted for %s", pc.name)
// A model outside the allowlist is rejected by the guardrail (before
// the upstream), regardless of whether it is a real catalog model.
assert.Equal(t, 403, sendModel(ctx, t, cl, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc, disallowedModel(pc)),
"model outside the allowlist must be denied for %s", pc.name)
})
}
}

View File

@@ -17,7 +17,8 @@ RUN apk add --no-cache bash ca-certificates ip6tables iproute2 iptables
ENV NETBIRD_BIN="/usr/local/bin/netbird" \
NB_LOG_FILE="console,/var/log/netbird/client.log" \
NB_DAEMON_ADDR="unix:///var/run/netbird.sock" \
NB_ENABLE_CAPTURE="false"
NB_ENABLE_CAPTURE="false" \
NB_ENTRYPOINT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT="30"
ENTRYPOINT [ "/usr/local/bin/netbird-entrypoint.sh" ]
COPY client/netbird-entrypoint.sh /usr/local/bin/netbird-entrypoint.sh
COPY --from=builder /out/netbird /usr/local/bin/netbird

View File

@@ -107,17 +107,6 @@ func (c *Combined) DeletePolicy(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
return anDelete(ctx, c, "/api/agent-network/policies/"+id)
}
// CreateGuardrail creates an agent-network guardrail (e.g. a model allowlist)
// that can then be attached to a policy via its GuardrailIds.
func (c *Combined) CreateGuardrail(ctx context.Context, req api.AgentNetworkGuardrailRequest) (api.AgentNetworkGuardrail, error) {
return anRequest[api.AgentNetworkGuardrail](ctx, c, http.MethodPost, "/api/agent-network/guardrails", req)
}
// DeleteGuardrail removes a guardrail by id.
func (c *Combined) DeleteGuardrail(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
return anDelete(ctx, c, "/api/agent-network/guardrails/"+id)
}
// GetSettings returns the account's agent-network settings row. It exists only
// after the first provider create bootstraps it.
func (c *Combined) GetSettings(ctx context.Context) (api.AgentNetworkSettings, error) {

View File

@@ -194,11 +194,6 @@ const (
// WireVertex is the Anthropic-on-Vertex rawPredict shape: the client posts
// the full Vertex model path and the proxy mints the SA OAuth token.
WireVertex = "vertex"
// WireBedrock is the native AWS Bedrock InvokeModel shape: the model id
// travels in the URL path (/model/{id}/invoke), not the body, so the proxy
// routes by path. This is what a Bedrock SDK client sends and the shape the
// model-allowlist guardrail must enforce.
WireBedrock = "bedrock"
)
// Chat issues a chat-completion POST to the agent-network endpoint over the
@@ -231,17 +226,6 @@ func (cl *Client) Vertex(ctx context.Context, endpoint, proxyIP, project, region
return cl.post(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, path, body, withSessionID(nil, sessionID))
}
// Bedrock issues a native AWS Bedrock InvokeModel POST over the tunnel. The
// model id is carried in the request path (/model/{id}/invoke), so the proxy
// routes by path; the body uses the bedrock anthropic_version rather than a
// model field. A non-empty sessionID is sent as the universal x-session-id
// header the proxy records.
func (cl *Client) Bedrock(ctx context.Context, endpoint, proxyIP, model, prompt, sessionID string) (int, string, error) {
path := "/model/" + model + "/invoke"
body := fmt.Sprintf(`{"anthropic_version":"bedrock-2023-05-31","max_tokens":64,"messages":[{"role":"user","content":%q}]}`, prompt)
return cl.post(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, path, body, withSessionID(nil, sessionID))
}
// withSessionID appends the x-session-id header when sessionID is non-empty.
func withSessionID(headers []string, sessionID string) []string {
if sessionID == "" {

View File

@@ -1,24 +1,19 @@
package main
import (
"log"
"net/http"
// nolint:gosec
_ "net/http/pprof"
"os"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/cmd"
)
func main() {
if pprofAddr := os.Getenv("NB_PPROF_ADDR"); pprofAddr != "" {
log.Infof("pprof enabled, listening on: %s", pprofAddr)
go func() {
log.Println(http.ListenAndServe(pprofAddr, nil))
}()
}
go func() {
log.Println(http.ListenAndServe("localhost:6060", nil))
}()
if err := cmd.Execute(); err != nil {
os.Exit(1)
}

View File

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import (
"slices"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/auth"
@@ -43,14 +42,6 @@ type NetworkMapComponents struct {
PostureFailedPeers map[string]map[string]struct{}
RouterPeers map[string]*nbpeer.Peer
routesByPeerOnce sync.Once
routesByPeerIdx map[string][]routeIndexEntry
}
type routeIndexEntry struct {
route *route.Route
viaGroup bool
}
type AccountSettingsInfo struct {
@@ -539,43 +530,33 @@ func (c *NetworkMapComponents) getRoutingPeerRoutes(peerID string) (enabledRoute
disabledRoutes = append(disabledRoutes, r)
}
for _, entry := range c.routesByPeer()[peerID] {
if entry.viaGroup {
newPeerRoute := entry.route.Copy()
newPeerRoute.PeerGroups = nil
newPeerRoute.ID = route.ID(string(entry.route.ID) + ":" + peerID)
takeRoute(newPeerRoute)
continue
for _, r := range c.Routes {
for _, groupID := range r.PeerGroups {
group := c.GetGroupInfo(groupID)
if group == nil {
continue
}
for _, id := range group.Peers {
if id != peerID {
continue
}
newPeerRoute := r.Copy()
newPeerRoute.Peer = id
newPeerRoute.PeerGroups = nil
newPeerRoute.ID = route.ID(string(r.ID) + ":" + id)
takeRoute(newPeerRoute)
break
}
}
if r.Peer == peerID {
takeRoute(r.Copy())
}
takeRoute(entry.route.Copy())
}
return enabledRoutes, disabledRoutes
}
func (c *NetworkMapComponents) routesByPeer() map[string][]routeIndexEntry {
c.routesByPeerOnce.Do(func() {
idx := make(map[string][]routeIndexEntry)
for _, r := range c.Routes {
for _, groupID := range r.PeerGroups {
group := c.GetGroupInfo(groupID)
if group == nil {
continue
}
for _, id := range group.Peers {
idx[id] = append(idx[id], routeIndexEntry{route: r, viaGroup: true})
}
}
if r.Peer != "" {
idx[r.Peer] = append(idx[r.Peer], routeIndexEntry{route: r})
}
}
c.routesByPeerIdx = idx
})
return c.routesByPeerIdx
}
func (c *NetworkMapComponents) filterRoutesByGroups(routes []*route.Route, groupListMap LookupMap) []*route.Route {
var filteredRoutes []*route.Route
for _, r := range routes {

View File

@@ -25,14 +25,6 @@ const (
denyCodeModel = "llm_policy.model_blocked"
denyReasonModel = "model_blocked"
denyMessageModel = "model is not in the policy allowlist"
// Deny reason used when an allowlist is configured but the request model
// could not be determined. URL/path-routed providers (AWS Bedrock, Google
// Vertex, ...) carry the model outside the JSON body, so a request shape the
// parser does not recognise reaches the guardrail with no model. Such a
// request must be denied (fail closed), never waved through.
denyCodeModelUnknown = "llm_policy.model_unknown"
denyReasonModelUnknown = "model_unknown"
denyMessageModelUnknown = "request model could not be determined for the policy allowlist"
)
// Middleware enforces the model allowlist and optionally captures the
@@ -116,37 +108,23 @@ func (m *Middleware) evaluateAllowlist(model string, modelPresent bool) *middlew
if len(m.cfg.ModelAllowlist) == 0 {
return nil
}
// Fail closed: with an allowlist configured, a request whose model the
// upstream parser could not extract (absent or empty) must be denied rather
// than allowed. This is what enforces the allowlist for URL/path-routed
// providers (Bedrock, Vertex, ...) whose model lives outside the JSON body.
if !modelPresent || normaliseModel(model) == "" {
return denyModel("", denyCodeModelUnknown, denyMessageModelUnknown, denyReasonModelUnknown)
if !modelPresent {
return nil
}
if m.modelInAllowlist(model) {
return nil
}
return denyModel(model, denyCodeModel, denyMessageModel, denyReasonModel)
}
// denyModel builds a 403 deny Output for a model-allowlist rejection. model is
// included in the details only when non-empty.
func denyModel(model, code, message, reason string) *middleware.Output {
details := map[string]string{}
if model != "" {
details["model"] = model
}
return &middleware.Output{
Decision: middleware.DecisionDeny,
DenyStatus: 403,
DenyReason: &middleware.DenyReason{
Code: code,
Message: message,
Details: details,
Code: denyCodeModel,
Message: denyMessageModel,
Details: map[string]string{"model": model},
},
Metadata: []middleware.KV{
{Key: middleware.KeyLLMPolicyDecision, Value: "deny"},
{Key: middleware.KeyLLMPolicyReason, Value: reason},
{Key: middleware.KeyLLMPolicyReason, Value: denyReasonModel},
},
}
}

View File

@@ -102,44 +102,13 @@ func TestAllowlistCaseInsensitive(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestAllowlistMissingModelKeyDenies(t *testing.T) {
// Fail closed: with an allowlist configured, a request whose model the
// parser could not extract (URL/path-routed providers such as Bedrock or
// Vertex whose shape wasn't recognised) must be denied, not allowed.
func TestAllowlistMissingModelKeyAllows(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(Config{ModelAllowlist: []string{"gpt-4o"}})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput())
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "absent model must be denied when an allowlist is set")
assert.Equal(t, 403, out.DenyStatus, "deny status must be 403")
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason, "deny reason must be populated")
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_unknown", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must be model_unknown")
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "missing model key must allow even with non-empty allowlist")
dec, _ := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMPolicyDecision)
assert.Equal(t, "deny", dec, "decision must be deny when model key is absent")
reason, _ := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMPolicyReason)
assert.Equal(t, "model_unknown", reason, "reason metadata must be model_unknown")
}
func TestAllowlistEmptyModelValueDenies(t *testing.T) {
// A present-but-empty model is as undeterminable as an absent one.
mw := New(Config{ModelAllowlist: []string{"gpt-4o"}})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: " "},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "empty model must be denied when an allowlist is set")
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason, "deny reason must be populated")
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_unknown", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must be model_unknown")
}
func TestAllowlistEmptyListAllowsMissingModel(t *testing.T) {
// Without an allowlist there is nothing to enforce, so a missing model is
// still allowed — the fail-closed rule only applies when a list is set.
mw := New(Config{})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput())
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "no allowlist must allow even without a model")
assert.Equal(t, "allow", dec, "decision must be allow when model key is absent")
}
func TestPromptCaptureDisabledEmitsNoPrompt(t *testing.T) {

View File

@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
package llm_request_parser
import (
"context"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/middleware"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/middleware/builtin/llm_guardrail"
)
// runParserGuardrail runs the request parser then the model-allowlist guardrail
// in SlotOnRequest order, threading the parser's metadata into the guardrail the
// same way the real chain does. It returns the guardrail decision so tests can
// assert allowlist enforcement for URL/path-routed providers end to end.
func runParserGuardrail(t *testing.T, url string, body []byte, allowlist []string) *middleware.Output {
t.Helper()
parser := newMiddleware(t)
parsed, err := parser.Invoke(context.Background(), &middleware.Input{
Slot: middleware.SlotOnRequest,
URL: url,
Body: body,
})
require.NoError(t, err, "parser must not error")
guard := llm_guardrail.New(llm_guardrail.Config{ModelAllowlist: allowlist})
out, err := guard.Invoke(context.Background(), &middleware.Input{
Slot: middleware.SlotOnRequest,
Metadata: parsed.Metadata,
})
require.NoError(t, err, "guardrail must not error")
require.NotNil(t, out, "guardrail must return an output")
return out
}
// TestModelAllowlist_URLRoutedProviders validates that the model allowlist is
// enforced for providers whose model travels in the URL path (AWS Bedrock,
// Google Vertex) rather than the JSON body. The "unknown action" case is the
// regression guard for #6751: a Bedrock request shape the parser cannot map to a
// model must fail closed under an allowlist instead of bypassing it.
func TestModelAllowlist_URLRoutedProviders(t *testing.T) {
const bedrockBody = `{"anthropic_version":"bedrock-2023-05-31","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}`
const vertexBody = `{"anthropic_version":"vertex-2023-10-16","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"hi"}]}`
tests := []struct {
name string
url string
body string
allowlist []string
decision middleware.Decision
denyCode string
}{
{
name: "bedrock allowed model passes",
url: "https://bedrock-runtime.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/model/us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-v1:0/invoke",
body: bedrockBody,
allowlist: []string{"anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5"},
decision: middleware.DecisionAllow,
},
{
name: "bedrock disallowed model denied",
url: "https://bedrock-runtime.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/model/us.anthropic.claude-opus-4-8-v1:0/invoke",
body: bedrockBody,
allowlist: []string{"anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5"},
decision: middleware.DecisionDeny,
denyCode: "llm_policy.model_blocked",
},
{
name: "bedrock unknown action fails closed",
url: "https://bedrock-runtime.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/model/us.anthropic.claude-opus-4-8-v1:0/some-future-action",
body: bedrockBody,
allowlist: []string{"anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5"},
decision: middleware.DecisionDeny,
denyCode: "llm_policy.model_unknown",
},
{
name: "vertex disallowed model denied",
url: "/v1/projects/p/locations/global/publishers/anthropic/models/claude-opus-4-8@20250101:rawPredict",
body: vertexBody,
allowlist: []string{"claude-haiku-4-5"},
decision: middleware.DecisionDeny,
denyCode: "llm_policy.model_blocked",
},
{
name: "vertex allowed model passes",
url: "/v1/projects/p/locations/global/publishers/anthropic/models/claude-haiku-4-5@20250101:rawPredict",
body: vertexBody,
allowlist: []string{"claude-haiku-4-5"},
decision: middleware.DecisionAllow,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
out := runParserGuardrail(t, tt.url, []byte(tt.body), tt.allowlist)
assert.Equal(t, tt.decision, out.Decision, "unexpected decision for %s", tt.name)
if tt.decision == middleware.DecisionDeny {
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason, "deny reason must be set for %s", tt.name)
assert.Equal(t, 403, out.DenyStatus, "deny status must be 403 for %s", tt.name)
assert.Equal(t, tt.denyCode, out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code for %s", tt.name)
}
})
}
}