Keep cached lazy flag when a sync carries no peer config

.github/workflows/frontend-ui.yml

@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ jobs:
             ${{ runner.os }}-pnpm-
 
       - name: Install dependencies
-        run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile --ignore-scripts
+        run: pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
 
       - name: Generate Wails bindings
         run: pnpm run bindings

client/android/client.go

@@ -247,9 +247,6 @@ func (c *Client) DebugBundle(platformFiles PlatformFiles, anonymize bool) (strin
 		deps.SyncResponse = resp
 
 		if e := cc.Engine(); e != nil {
-			deps.RefreshStatus = func() {
-				e.RunHealthProbes(context.Background(), true)
-			}
 			if cm := e.GetClientMetrics(); cm != nil {
 				deps.ClientMetrics = cm
 			}

client/cmd/login.go

@@ -17,9 +17,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/auth"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
-	nbnet "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/net"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/server"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/system"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
 )
@@ -333,14 +331,6 @@ func doForegroundLogin(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, setupKey string,
 		return fmt.Errorf("read config file %s: %v", configFilePath, err)
 	}
 
-	// Mirror runInForegroundMode: recover residual state (DNS, firewall,
-	// ssh config, legacy routing) from a previous unclean shutdown and
-	// enable advanced routing before dialing management.
-	if err := server.RestoreResidualState(ctx, profilemanager.NewServiceManager(configFilePath).GetStatePath()); err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("failed to restore residual state: %v", err)
-	}
-	nbnet.Init()
-
 	err = foregroundLogin(ctx, cmd, config, setupKey, activeProf.ID)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("foreground login failed: %v", err)

client/cmd/up.go

@@ -22,8 +22,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/proto"
-	nbnet "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/net"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/server"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/system"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
@@ -231,24 +229,6 @@ func runInForegroundMode(ctx context.Context, cmd *cobra.Command, activeProf *pr
 
 	_, _ = profilemanager.UpdateOldManagementURL(ctx, config, configFilePath)
 
-	// Restore residual state left by a previous run that did not shut down
-	// cleanly, mirroring what the daemon does before connecting: it recovers
-	// DNS config (a stale resolv.conf takeover can make the management
-	// hostname unresolvable), firewall rules, ssh config and legacy routing.
-	// Route cleanup itself happens at engine start; nbnet.Init() below lets
-	// the management dial bypass a leftover fwmark rule until then.
-	// Foreground mode is particularly exposed in containers: a crashed
-	// container restarts inside the same (pod) network namespace, so stale
-	// state survives while the process does not.
-	if err := server.RestoreResidualState(ctx, profilemanager.NewServiceManager(configPath).GetStatePath()); err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("failed to restore residual state: %v", err)
-	}
-
-	// Enable advanced routing (as the daemon does on startup) so the
-	// management dial bypasses a leftover fwmark rule instead of being
-	// shunted into a stale routing table.
-	nbnet.Init()
-
 	err = foregroundLogin(ctx, cmd, config, providedSetupKey, activeProf.ID)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("foreground login failed: %v", err)

client/firewall/uspfilter/filter.go

@@ -121,7 +121,6 @@ type Manager struct {
 	udpTracker     *conntrack.UDPTracker
 	icmpTracker    *conntrack.ICMPTracker
 	tcpTracker     *conntrack.TCPTracker
-	fragments      *fragmentTracker
 	forwarder      atomic.Pointer[forwarder.Forwarder]
 	pendingCapture atomic.Pointer[forwarder.PacketCapture]
 	logger         *nblog.Logger
@@ -184,41 +183,6 @@ func (d *decoder) decodePacket(data []byte) error {
 	}
 }
 
-// decodeTransport decodes the transport header of a first fragment (which
-// gopacket leaves undecoded) into the decoder and appends its layer type to
-// decoded, so the ACL pipeline can evaluate it like a normal packet. It returns
-// false if the protocol is unsupported or the header is truncated.
-func (d *decoder) decodeTransport(proto layers.IPProtocol, payload []byte) bool {
-	var l4 gopacket.DecodingLayer
-	var layerType gopacket.LayerType
-	var minLen int
-	switch proto {
-	case layers.IPProtocolTCP:
-		l4, layerType, minLen = &d.tcp, layers.LayerTypeTCP, 20
-	case layers.IPProtocolUDP:
-		l4, layerType, minLen = &d.udp, layers.LayerTypeUDP, 8
-	case layers.IPProtocolICMPv4:
-		l4, layerType, minLen = &d.icmp4, layers.LayerTypeICMPv4, 8
-	case layers.IPProtocolICMPv6:
-		l4, layerType, minLen = &d.icmp6, layers.LayerTypeICMPv6, 8
-	default:
-		return false
-	}
-
-	// Reject a fragment too small to hold the full transport header before
-	// decoding: it can't be ACL-evaluated (tiny-fragment attack), and skipping
-	// the decode avoids gopacket allocating an error on the drop path.
-	if len(payload) < minLen {
-		return false
-	}
-
-	if err := l4.DecodeFromBytes(payload, gopacket.NilDecodeFeedback); err != nil {
-		return false
-	}
-	d.decoded = append(d.decoded, layerType)
-	return true
-}
-
 // Create userspace firewall manager constructor
 func Create(iface common.IFaceMapper, disableServerRoutes bool, flowLogger nftypes.FlowLogger, mtu uint16) (*Manager, error) {
 	return create(iface, nil, disableServerRoutes, flowLogger, mtu)
@@ -322,8 +286,6 @@ func create(iface common.IFaceMapper, nativeFirewall firewall.Manager, disableSe
 	if err := m.localipmanager.UpdateLocalIPs(iface); err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("update local IPs: %w", err)
 	}
-	m.fragments = newFragmentTracker(m.logger)
-
 	if disableConntrack {
 		log.Info("conntrack is disabled")
 	} else {
@@ -337,7 +299,6 @@ func create(iface common.IFaceMapper, nativeFirewall firewall.Manager, disableSe
 		}
 	}
 	if err := iface.SetFilter(m); err != nil {
-		m.fragments.Close()
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("set filter: %w", err)
 	}
 	return m, nil
@@ -733,10 +694,6 @@ func (m *Manager) resetState() {
 		m.tcpTracker.Close()
 	}
 
-	if m.fragments != nil {
-		m.fragments.Close()
-	}
-
 	if fwder := m.forwarder.Load(); fwder != nil {
 		fwder.SetCapture(nil)
 		fwder.Stop()
@@ -1089,20 +1046,19 @@ func (m *Manager) filterInbound(packetData []byte, size int) bool {
 		return true
 	}
 
-	// gopacket does not decode the transport header of any IP fragment, so
-	// fragments take a dedicated path: the first fragment's header is decoded
-	// and ACL-evaluated here, and the remaining fragments inherit its verdict.
+	// TODO: pass fragments of routed packets to forwarder
 	if fragment {
-		return m.filterInboundFragment(d, srcIP, dstIP, size)
+		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
+			if d.decoded[0] == layers.LayerTypeIPv4 {
+				m.logger.Trace4("packet is a fragment: src=%v dst=%v id=%v flags=%v",
+					srcIP, dstIP, d.ip4.Id, d.ip4.Flags)
+			} else {
+				m.logger.Trace2("packet is an IPv6 fragment: src=%v dst=%v", srcIP, dstIP)
+			}
+		}
+		return false
 	}
 
-	return m.filterInboundDecoded(d, srcIP, dstIP, packetData, size)
-}
-
-// filterInboundDecoded runs the ACL, DNAT and conntrack pipeline on a fully
-// decoded (non-fragment) inbound packet. It returns true if the packet should
-// be dropped.
-func (m *Manager) filterInboundDecoded(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, packetData []byte, size int) bool {
 	// TODO: optimize port DNAT by caching matched rules in conntrack
 	if translated := m.translateInboundPortDNAT(packetData, d, srcIP, dstIP); translated {
 		// Re-decode after port DNAT translation to update port information
@@ -1133,226 +1089,33 @@ func (m *Manager) filterInboundDecoded(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, pack
 	return m.handleRoutedTraffic(d, srcIP, dstIP, packetData, size)
 }
 
-// fragmentMeta holds the reassembly identity and layout of an IP fragment,
-// extracted uniformly for IPv4 and IPv6.
-type fragmentMeta struct {
-	key fragmentKey
-	// offset is the fragment offset in 8-byte units (zero for the first
-	// fragment).
-	offset uint16
-	// moreFragments is the More Fragments bit. A first fragment with it unset is
-	// an IPv6 atomic fragment (a complete datagram, RFC 6946): it has no trailing
-	// fragments to inherit a verdict, so it must not be recorded.
-	moreFragments bool
-	proto         layers.IPProtocol
-	// l4payload is the fragmentable payload of this fragment. For the first
-	// fragment it starts with the transport header.
-	l4payload []byte
-	// headerEndOctets is the first fragment's payload length in 8-byte units:
-	// the smallest offset a trailing fragment may start at without overlapping
-	// the inspected transport header.
-	headerEndOctets uint16
-}
-
-// fragmentMetadata extracts the fragment identity and layout from a decoded IP
-// fragment. It returns false for fragments it can't interpret (e.g. an IPv6
-// fragment header shorter than 8 bytes), which are then dropped.
-func fragmentMetadata(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr) (fragmentMeta, bool) {
-	switch d.decoded[0] {
-	case layers.LayerTypeIPv4:
-		payload := d.ip4.Payload
-		return fragmentMeta{
-			key:             fragmentKey{srcIP: srcIP, dstIP: dstIP, id: uint32(d.ip4.Id), proto: uint8(d.ip4.Protocol)},
-			offset:          d.ip4.FragOffset,
-			moreFragments:   d.ip4.Flags&layers.IPv4MoreFragments != 0,
-			proto:           d.ip4.Protocol,
-			l4payload:       payload,
-			headerEndOctets: octets(len(payload)),
-		}, true
-
-	case layers.LayerTypeIPv6:
-		// IPv6 fragment extension header: 8 bytes, followed by the fragmentable
-		// payload. Layout: next header (1), reserved (1), offset+flags (2), id (4).
-		payload := d.ip6.Payload
-		if len(payload) < 8 {
-			return fragmentMeta{}, false
-		}
-		nextHeader := layers.IPProtocol(payload[0])
-		offsetFlags := binary.BigEndian.Uint16(payload[2:4])
-		id := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(payload[4:8])
-		l4 := payload[8:]
-		return fragmentMeta{
-			key:             fragmentKey{srcIP: srcIP, dstIP: dstIP, id: id, proto: uint8(nextHeader)},
-			offset:          offsetFlags >> 3,
-			moreFragments:   offsetFlags&1 != 0,
-			proto:           nextHeader,
-			l4payload:       l4,
-			headerEndOctets: octets(len(l4)),
-		}, true
-
-	default:
-		return fragmentMeta{}, false
-	}
-}
-
-// octets rounds a byte length up to whole 8-byte units, the granularity of the
-// IP fragment offset field.
-func octets(nbytes int) uint16 {
-	return uint16((nbytes + 7) / 8)
-}
-
-// filterInboundFragment decides the fate of an IP fragment. gopacket stops
-// decoding at the network layer for every fragment, so the first fragment's
-// transport header is decoded and ACL-evaluated here and its verdict recorded;
-// the remaining (headerless) fragments inherit that verdict. Anything that
-// cannot be tied to an allowed, non-overlapping first fragment is dropped.
-func (m *Manager) filterInboundFragment(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, size int) bool {
-	meta, ok := fragmentMetadata(d, srcIP, dstIP)
-	if !ok {
-		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
-			m.logger.Trace2("dropping unsupported fragment: src=%v dst=%v", srcIP, dstIP)
-		}
-		return true
-	}
-
-	if meta.offset != 0 {
-		return m.filterTrailingFragment(meta, srcIP, dstIP)
-	}
-
-	// A new first fragment supersedes any recorded verdict for this datagram, so
-	// a re-sent or overlapping offset-zero fragment can't inherit the old one.
-	m.fragments.poison(meta.key)
-
-	// First fragment: decode its transport header so the ACL can evaluate it. A
-	// decode failure means the fragment is too small to hold the full transport
-	// header (RFC 1858 §3 tiny-fragment attack); it can't be evaluated, so drop it.
-	if !d.decodeTransport(meta.proto, meta.l4payload) {
-		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
-			m.logger.Trace3("dropping first fragment without full L4 header: src=%v dst=%v id=%v",
-				srcIP, dstIP, meta.key.id)
-		}
-		return true
-	}
-
-	return m.filterFirstFragment(d, meta, srcIP, dstIP, size)
-}
-
-// filterTrailingFragment applies a recorded first-fragment verdict to a
-// non-first fragment.
-func (m *Manager) filterTrailingFragment(meta fragmentMeta, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr) bool {
-	switch m.fragments.verdict(meta.key, meta.offset) {
-	case fragmentAllow:
-		return false
-	case fragmentOverlap:
-		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
-			m.logger.Trace3("dropping overlapping fragment rewriting inspected header: src=%v dst=%v id=%v",
-				srcIP, dstIP, meta.key.id)
-		}
-		return true
-	default:
-		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
-			m.logger.Trace3("dropping fragment with no allowed first fragment: src=%v dst=%v id=%v",
-				srcIP, dstIP, meta.key.id)
-		}
-		return true
-	}
-}
-
-// filterFirstFragment runs the verdict part of the inbound pipeline on a first
-// fragment with its transport header decoded. It mirrors filterInboundDecoded
-// but skips DNAT (port rewriting on fragments is unsupported) and forwarder
-// injection (fragments are left to the stack to reassemble, not forwarded).
-// Allowed fragments have their verdict recorded so the datagram's trailing
-// fragments inherit it.
-func (m *Manager) filterFirstFragment(d *decoder, meta fragmentMeta, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, size int) bool {
-	if m.stateful && m.isValidTrackedConnection(d, srcIP, dstIP, size) {
-		m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
-		return false
-	}
-
-	if m.localipmanager.IsLocalIP(dstIP) {
-		ruleID, blocked := m.peerACLsBlock(srcIP, d, nil)
-		if blocked {
-			m.storeDropFlow("Dropping local first fragment (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
-				d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
-			return true
-		}
-		m.trackInbound(d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
-		m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
-		return false
-	}
-
-	if !m.routingEnabled.Load() {
-		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
-			m.logger.Trace2("Dropping routed fragment (routing disabled): src=%s dst=%s", srcIP, dstIP)
-		}
-		return true
-	}
-	if m.nativeRouter.Load() {
-		m.trackInbound(d, srcIP, dstIP, nil, size)
-		m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
-		return false
-	}
-
-	// TODO: pass fragments of routed packets to the forwarder; until then
-	// allowed routed fragments go to the native stack.
-	srcPort, dstPort := getPortsFromPacket(d)
-	ruleID, pass := m.routeACLsPass(srcIP, dstIP, d.decoded[1], srcPort, dstPort)
-	if !pass {
-		m.storeDropFlow("Dropping routed first fragment (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
-			d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
-		return true
-	}
-
-	m.recordFirstFragment(meta)
-	return false
-}
-
-// recordFirstFragment caches an allowed first fragment's verdict for its
-// trailing fragments to inherit. Atomic fragments (no More Fragments bit) are
-// complete datagrams with no trailing fragments, so they are not cached and
-// cannot exhaust the verdict table.
-func (m *Manager) recordFirstFragment(meta fragmentMeta) {
-	if !meta.moreFragments {
-		return
-	}
-	m.fragments.recordAllowed(meta.key, meta.headerEndOctets)
-}
-
-// storeDropFlow logs and records a netflow drop event for an inbound packet
-// denied by the ACLs. msg is the trace format taking rule id, protocol, source
-// and destination.
-func (m *Manager) storeDropFlow(msg string, d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, ruleID []byte, size int) {
-	pnum := getProtocolFromPacket(d)
-	srcPort, dstPort := getPortsFromPacket(d)
-
-	if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
-		m.logger.Trace6(msg, ruleID, pnum, srcIP, srcPort, dstIP, dstPort)
-	}
-
-	m.flowLogger.StoreEvent(nftypes.EventFields{
-		FlowID:     uuid.New(),
-		Type:       nftypes.TypeDrop,
-		RuleID:     ruleID,
-		Direction:  nftypes.Ingress,
-		Protocol:   pnum,
-		SourceIP:   srcIP,
-		DestIP:     dstIP,
-		SourcePort: srcPort,
-		DestPort:   dstPort,
-		// TODO: icmp type/code
-		RxPackets: 1,
-		RxBytes:   uint64(size),
-	})
-}
-
 // handleLocalTraffic handles local traffic.
 // If it returns true, the packet should be dropped.
 func (m *Manager) handleLocalTraffic(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, packetData []byte, size int) bool {
 	ruleID, blocked := m.peerACLsBlock(srcIP, d, packetData)
 	if blocked {
-		m.storeDropFlow("Dropping local packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
-			d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
+		pnum := getProtocolFromPacket(d)
+		srcPort, dstPort := getPortsFromPacket(d)
+
+		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
+			m.logger.Trace6("Dropping local packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
+				ruleID, pnum, srcIP, srcPort, dstIP, dstPort)
+		}
+
+		m.flowLogger.StoreEvent(nftypes.EventFields{
+			FlowID:     uuid.New(),
+			Type:       nftypes.TypeDrop,
+			RuleID:     ruleID,
+			Direction:  nftypes.Ingress,
+			Protocol:   pnum,
+			SourceIP:   srcIP,
+			DestIP:     dstIP,
+			SourcePort: srcPort,
+			DestPort:   dstPort,
+			// TODO: icmp type/code
+			RxPackets: 1,
+			RxBytes:   uint64(size),
+		})
 		return true
 	}
 
@@ -1405,8 +1168,27 @@ func (m *Manager) handleRoutedTraffic(d *decoder, srcIP, dstIP netip.Addr, packe
 
 	ruleID, pass := m.routeACLsPass(srcIP, dstIP, protoLayer, srcPort, dstPort)
 	if !pass {
-		m.storeDropFlow("Dropping routed packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
-			d, srcIP, dstIP, ruleID, size)
+		proto := getProtocolFromPacket(d)
+
+		if m.logger.Enabled(nblog.LevelTrace) {
+			m.logger.Trace6("Dropping routed packet (ACL denied): rule_id=%s proto=%v src=%s:%d dst=%s:%d",
+				ruleID, proto, srcIP, srcPort, dstIP, dstPort)
+		}
+
+		m.flowLogger.StoreEvent(nftypes.EventFields{
+			FlowID:     uuid.New(),
+			Type:       nftypes.TypeDrop,
+			RuleID:     ruleID,
+			Direction:  nftypes.Ingress,
+			Protocol:   proto,
+			SourceIP:   srcIP,
+			DestIP:     dstIP,
+			SourcePort: srcPort,
+			DestPort:   dstPort,
+			// TODO: icmp type/code
+			RxPackets: 1,
+			RxBytes:   uint64(size),
+		})
 		return true
 	}
 

client/firewall/uspfilter/forwarder/forwarder.go

@@ -5,9 +5,7 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"net"
 	"net/netip"
-	"os"
 	"runtime"
-	"strconv"
 	"sync"
 	"time"
 
@@ -33,11 +31,6 @@ const (
 	defaultMaxInFlight   = 1024
 	iosReceiveWindow     = 16384
 	iosMaxInFlight       = 256
-
-	// envForceTCPRACK overrides the platform default for gVisor's RACK loss
-	// detection. Set to a truthy value to force RACK on, or a falsy value to
-	// force it off, on any platform.
-	envForceTCPRACK = "NB_FORCE_TCP_RACK"
 )
 
 type Forwarder struct {
@@ -159,8 +152,6 @@ func New(iface common.IFaceMapper, logger *nblog.Logger, flowLogger nftypes.Flow
 		maxInFlight = iosMaxInFlight
 	}
 
-	configureTCPRecovery(s)
-
 	tcpForwarder := tcp.NewForwarder(s, receiveWindow, maxInFlight, f.handleTCP)
 	s.SetTransportProtocolHandler(tcp.ProtocolNumber, tcpForwarder.HandlePacket)
 
@@ -475,31 +466,3 @@ func probeRawICMP(network, addr string, logger *nblog.Logger) bool {
 	logger.Debug1("forwarder: raw %s socket access available", network)
 	return true
 }
-
-// configureTCPRecovery disables gVisor's RACK loss detection on Windows, where
-// it interacts poorly with the host and collapses throughput on routed TCP
-// connections (gVisor issue #9778). Other platforms keep the default. The
-// EnvForceTCPRACK environment variable overrides the platform default.
-func configureTCPRecovery(s *stack.Stack) {
-	disableRACK := runtime.GOOS == "windows"
-
-	if val := os.Getenv(envForceTCPRACK); val != "" {
-		force, err := strconv.ParseBool(val)
-		if err != nil {
-			log.Warnf("parse %s: %v", envForceTCPRACK, err)
-		} else {
-			disableRACK = !force
-		}
-	}
-
-	if !disableRACK {
-		return
-	}
-
-	opt := tcpip.TCPRecovery(0)
-	if err := s.SetTransportProtocolOption(tcp.ProtocolNumber, &opt); err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("disable TCP RACK loss detection: %v", err)
-		return
-	}
-	log.Info("forwarder: TCP RACK loss detection disabled")
-}

client/firewall/uspfilter/fragment.go

@@ -1,204 +0,0 @@
-package uspfilter
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"net/netip"
-	"os"
-	"strconv"
-	"sync"
-	"time"
-
-	nblog "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/uspfilter/log"
-)
-
-const (
-	// defaultFragmentTimeout bounds how long a first-fragment verdict is kept
-	// while the remaining fragments arrive. It mirrors the Linux IP reassembly
-	// timeout (net.ipv4.ipfrag_time).
-	defaultFragmentTimeout = 30 * time.Second
-	// fragmentCleanupInterval is how often expired verdicts are purged.
-	fragmentCleanupInterval = 10 * time.Second
-	// defaultMaxFragmentEntries caps the number of concurrently tracked
-	// fragmented datagrams. The table stays bounded because each datagram is a
-	// single small entry regardless of how many fragments it is split into, and
-	// the 13-bit IPv4 fragment-offset field limits any datagram to 64 KiB.
-	defaultMaxFragmentEntries = 16384
-
-	// EnvFragmentMaxEntries overrides defaultMaxFragmentEntries.
-	EnvFragmentMaxEntries = "NB_FRAGMENT_MAX_ENTRIES"
-)
-
-// fragmentVerdict is the decision for a trailing (headerless) fragment.
-type fragmentVerdict int
-
-const (
-	// fragmentDeny drops the fragment: no allowed first fragment is on record.
-	fragmentDeny fragmentVerdict = iota
-	// fragmentAllow passes the fragment: it belongs to an allowed datagram and
-	// does not overlap the already-inspected transport header.
-	fragmentAllow
-	// fragmentOverlap drops the fragment and poisons its datagram: it overlaps
-	// the transport header the ACL inspected (RFC 1858 §4, RFC 3128; RFC 5722
-	// requires discarding the whole datagram on overlap for IPv6).
-	fragmentOverlap
-)
-
-// fragmentKey identifies a fragmented datagram. It matches the RFC 791 / RFC
-// 8200 reassembly key: source, destination, protocol and identification. The id
-// is 32-bit to hold both the IPv4 (16-bit) and IPv6 (32-bit) identification.
-type fragmentKey struct {
-	srcIP netip.Addr
-	dstIP netip.Addr
-	id    uint32
-	proto uint8
-}
-
-// fragmentEntry records the verdict of an allowed first fragment.
-type fragmentEntry struct {
-	// headerEndOctets is the offset, in 8-byte units, at which the first
-	// fragment's payload ended. A trailing fragment starting before this
-	// overlaps bytes the ACL already inspected and is rejected.
-	headerEndOctets uint16
-	// recordedAt is when the first fragment was accepted. The verdict expires a
-	// fixed timeout later and is not refreshed, mirroring the kernel reassembly
-	// timer so a trailing-fragment flood can't keep a datagram alive.
-	recordedAt time.Time
-}
-
-// fragmentTracker records the ACL verdict of a datagram's first fragment so the
-// remaining fragments, which carry no L4 header, can inherit the decision
-// without reassembling the datagram. Only allowed first fragments are stored;
-// anything that cannot be tied to an allowed, non-overlapping first fragment is
-// dropped (fail closed).
-type fragmentTracker struct {
-	logger  *nblog.Logger
-	mutex   sync.Mutex
-	entries map[fragmentKey]fragmentEntry
-	timeout time.Duration
-	// maxEntries caps the table; atCapacity dedups the capacity warning until
-	// the table drains below the cap again.
-	maxEntries    int
-	atCapacity    bool
-	cleanupTicker *time.Ticker
-	cancel        context.CancelFunc
-}
-
-func newFragmentTracker(logger *nblog.Logger) *fragmentTracker {
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
-	t := &fragmentTracker{
-		logger:        logger,
-		entries:       make(map[fragmentKey]fragmentEntry),
-		timeout:       defaultFragmentTimeout,
-		maxEntries:    fragmentMaxEntries(logger),
-		cleanupTicker: time.NewTicker(fragmentCleanupInterval),
-		cancel:        cancel,
-	}
-	go t.cleanupRoutine(ctx)
-	return t
-}
-
-func fragmentMaxEntries(logger *nblog.Logger) int {
-	v := os.Getenv(EnvFragmentMaxEntries)
-	if v == "" {
-		return defaultMaxFragmentEntries
-	}
-	n, err := strconv.Atoi(v)
-	if err != nil || n <= 0 {
-		logger.Warn2("invalid %s=%q, using default", EnvFragmentMaxEntries, v)
-		return defaultMaxFragmentEntries
-	}
-	return n
-}
-
-// recordAllowed stores the verdict of an allowed first fragment. headerEndOctets
-// is the first fragment's payload length in 8-byte units. When the table is full
-// the record is dropped, which fails closed: the datagram's trailing fragments
-// will be denied.
-func (t *fragmentTracker) recordAllowed(key fragmentKey, headerEndOctets uint16) {
-	t.mutex.Lock()
-	defer t.mutex.Unlock()
-
-	if t.entries == nil {
-		return
-	}
-	if _, ok := t.entries[key]; !ok && len(t.entries) >= t.maxEntries {
-		if !t.atCapacity {
-			t.atCapacity = true
-			t.logger.Warn2("fragment verdict table at capacity (%d/%d): trailing fragments of new datagrams will be dropped",
-				len(t.entries), t.maxEntries)
-		}
-		return
-	}
-	t.entries[key] = fragmentEntry{
-		headerEndOctets: headerEndOctets,
-		recordedAt:      time.Now(),
-	}
-}
-
-// poison drops any recorded verdict for a datagram, so its later fragments are
-// denied until a new allowed first fragment is recorded. Called on every
-// offset-zero fragment to defeat offset-zero overlap rewrites (RFC 3128).
-func (t *fragmentTracker) poison(key fragmentKey) {
-	t.mutex.Lock()
-	defer t.mutex.Unlock()
-	delete(t.entries, key)
-}
-
-// verdict decides the fate of a trailing fragment at fragOffsetOctets (the IPv4
-// fragment offset, in 8-byte units). A fragment overlapping the inspected
-// header poisons the datagram: the entry is removed so all further fragments of
-// that datagram are denied too.
-func (t *fragmentTracker) verdict(key fragmentKey, fragOffsetOctets uint16) fragmentVerdict {
-	t.mutex.Lock()
-	defer t.mutex.Unlock()
-
-	entry, ok := t.entries[key]
-	if !ok {
-		return fragmentDeny
-	}
-	if time.Since(entry.recordedAt) > t.timeout {
-		delete(t.entries, key)
-		return fragmentDeny
-	}
-	if fragOffsetOctets < entry.headerEndOctets {
-		delete(t.entries, key)
-		return fragmentOverlap
-	}
-	return fragmentAllow
-}
-
-func (t *fragmentTracker) cleanupRoutine(ctx context.Context) {
-	defer t.cleanupTicker.Stop()
-	for {
-		select {
-		case <-t.cleanupTicker.C:
-			t.cleanup()
-		case <-ctx.Done():
-			return
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-func (t *fragmentTracker) cleanup() {
-	t.mutex.Lock()
-	defer t.mutex.Unlock()
-
-	for key, entry := range t.entries {
-		if time.Since(entry.recordedAt) > t.timeout {
-			delete(t.entries, key)
-		}
-	}
-
-	if len(t.entries) < t.maxEntries {
-		t.atCapacity = false
-	}
-}
-
-// Close stops the cleanup routine and releases resources.
-func (t *fragmentTracker) Close() {
-	t.cancel()
-
-	t.mutex.Lock()
-	t.entries = nil
-	t.mutex.Unlock()
-}

client/firewall/uspfilter/fragment_bench_test.go

@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
-package uspfilter
-
-import (
-	"encoding/binary"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// benchFilterInbound drives filterInbound over a fixed packet in a tight loop.
-// Packets are built once, outside the timed region, so the benchmark measures
-// only pipeline cost, which is what an attacker can amplify.
-func benchFilterInbound(b *testing.B, pkt []byte) {
-	b.Helper()
-	b.ReportAllocs()
-	b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkt)))
-	b.ResetTimer()
-	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
-		m := benchManager
-		m.filterInbound(pkt, len(pkt))
-	}
-}
-
-// benchManager is a package-level manager reused across fragment benchmarks so
-// setup cost stays out of the timed region.
-var benchManager *Manager
-
-func setupBenchManager(b *testing.B) *Manager {
-	b.Helper()
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(b)
-	allowUDP(b, m, 8080)
-	// Disable conntrack so the allowed-first-fragment path measures transport
-	// decode + ACL every iteration instead of matching the connection tracked
-	// on the first iteration.
-	m.stateful = false
-	benchManager = m
-	return m
-}
-
-// BenchmarkInbound_NormalPacket is the baseline: a full, non-fragmented UDP
-// packet that passes the ACL. Fragment paths should stay comparable to this.
-func BenchmarkInbound_NormalPacket(b *testing.B) {
-	setupBenchManager(b)
-	pkt := normalUDPPacket(b, 8080, 32)
-	benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
-}
-
-// BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentAllowed measures the first-fragment path:
-// transport decode + ACL evaluation + verdict record.
-func BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentAllowed(b *testing.B) {
-	setupBenchManager(b)
-	pkt := firstFragmentUDP(b, 0x2000, 8080, 32)
-	benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
-}
-
-// BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentAllowed measures the common trailing-fragment
-// path: a single map lookup after the first fragment is on record.
-func BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentAllowed(b *testing.B) {
-	m := setupBenchManager(b)
-	first := firstFragmentUDP(b, 0x3000, 8080, 32)
-	m.filterInbound(first, len(first))
-	pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x3000, 5, false, 24)
-	benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
-}
-
-// BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentNoFirst is the primary DoS vector: an
-// attacker floods trailing fragments with no first fragment on record. Each is
-// a map miss and must be cheap.
-func BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentNoFirst(b *testing.B) {
-	setupBenchManager(b)
-	pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x4000, 185, false, 40)
-	benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
-}
-
-// BenchmarkInbound_TinyFirstFragment measures the tiny-fragment drop path: a
-// first fragment too small to decode a transport header.
-func BenchmarkInbound_TinyFirstFragment(b *testing.B) {
-	setupBenchManager(b)
-	pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x5000, 0, true, 4)
-	benchFilterInbound(b, pkt)
-}
-
-// BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentDistinctIDs is the worst case for the
-// verdict table: an attacker varies the datagram id on every packet so no first
-// fragment ever matches. Verdict lookups always miss and nothing is recorded,
-// so the table cannot grow. Each iteration rewrites the id field in place.
-func BenchmarkInbound_TrailingFragmentDistinctIDs(b *testing.B) {
-	setupBenchManager(b)
-	pkt := trailingFragment(b, 0x6000, 185, false, 40)
-	m := benchManager
-
-	b.ReportAllocs()
-	b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkt)))
-	b.ResetTimer()
-	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
-		// IPv4 identification field is at bytes 4:6.
-		binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], uint16(i))
-		m.filterInbound(pkt, len(pkt))
-	}
-}
-
-// BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentDistinctIDs measures sustained first-fragment
-// pressure with distinct ids: transport decode + ACL + verdict insert until the
-// table caps, exercising the map growth and capacity guard.
-func BenchmarkInbound_FirstFragmentDistinctIDs(b *testing.B) {
-	setupBenchManager(b)
-	pkt := firstFragmentUDP(b, 0x7000, 8080, 32)
-	m := benchManager
-
-	b.ReportAllocs()
-	b.SetBytes(int64(len(pkt)))
-	b.ResetTimer()
-	for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
-		binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(pkt[4:6], uint16(i))
-		m.filterInbound(pkt, len(pkt))
-	}
-}

client/firewall/uspfilter/fragment_test.go

@@ -1,554 +0,0 @@
-package uspfilter
-
-import (
-	"encoding/binary"
-	"net"
-	"net/netip"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/google/gopacket"
-	"github.com/google/gopacket/layers"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-
-	fw "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
-	nbiface "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/device"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
-)
-
-const (
-	fragTestSrc   = "100.10.0.1"
-	fragTestDst   = "100.10.0.100"
-	fragTestSrcV6 = "fd00::1"
-	fragTestDstV6 = "fd00::100"
-)
-
-func newFragmentTestManager(tb testing.TB) *Manager {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ifaceMock := &IFaceMock{
-		SetFilterFunc: func(device.PacketFilter) error { return nil },
-		AddressFunc: func() wgaddr.Address {
-			return wgaddr.Address{
-				IP:      netip.MustParseAddr(fragTestDst),
-				Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("100.10.0.0/16"),
-				IPv6:    netip.MustParseAddr(fragTestDstV6),
-				IPv6Net: netip.MustParsePrefix("fd00::/64"),
-			}
-		},
-	}
-
-	m, err := Create(ifaceMock, false, flowLogger, nbiface.DefaultMTU)
-	require.NoError(tb, err)
-	require.NoError(tb, m.UpdateLocalIPs())
-	tb.Cleanup(func() { require.NoError(tb, m.Close(nil)) })
-	return m
-}
-
-// firstFragmentUDPTo builds the first fragment of a fragmented UDP datagram to
-// the given destination: it carries the full UDP header plus payloadLen bytes
-// of data, with the More Fragments flag set and offset zero.
-func firstFragmentUDPTo(tb testing.TB, dst string, id uint16, dstPort uint16, payloadLen int) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ip := &layers.IPv4{
-		Version:  4,
-		TTL:      64,
-		Id:       id,
-		Protocol: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
-		SrcIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
-		DstIP:    net.ParseIP(dst),
-		Flags:    layers.IPv4MoreFragments,
-	}
-	udp := &layers.UDP{SrcPort: 40000, DstPort: layers.UDPPort(dstPort)}
-	require.NoError(tb, udp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
-
-	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
-	opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
-	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, udp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, payloadLen))))
-	return buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-func firstFragmentUDP(tb testing.TB, id uint16, dstPort uint16, payloadLen int) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-	return firstFragmentUDPTo(tb, fragTestDst, id, dstPort, payloadLen)
-}
-
-// firstFragmentTCP builds the first fragment of a fragmented TCP datagram: the
-// full 20-byte TCP header plus 12 bytes of data, with the More Fragments flag
-// set and offset zero.
-func firstFragmentTCP(tb testing.TB, id uint16, dstPort uint16) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ip := &layers.IPv4{
-		Version:  4,
-		TTL:      64,
-		Id:       id,
-		Protocol: layers.IPProtocolTCP,
-		SrcIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
-		DstIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestDst),
-		Flags:    layers.IPv4MoreFragments,
-	}
-	tcp := &layers.TCP{SrcPort: 40000, DstPort: layers.TCPPort(dstPort), SYN: true, Window: 64240}
-	require.NoError(tb, tcp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
-
-	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
-	opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
-	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, tcp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, 12))))
-	return buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-// trailingFragmentTo builds a non-first fragment to the given destination: an
-// IPv4 header at the given fragment offset (in 8-byte units) carrying raw
-// payload and no L4 header.
-func trailingFragmentTo(tb testing.TB, dst string, proto layers.IPProtocol, id uint16, fragOffsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, payloadLen int) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ip := &layers.IPv4{
-		Version:    4,
-		TTL:        64,
-		Id:         id,
-		Protocol:   proto,
-		SrcIP:      net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
-		DstIP:      net.ParseIP(dst),
-		FragOffset: fragOffsetOctets,
-	}
-	if moreFragments {
-		ip.Flags = layers.IPv4MoreFragments
-	}
-
-	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
-	opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{FixLengths: true}
-	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, payloadLen))))
-	return buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-func trailingFragment(tb testing.TB, id uint16, fragOffsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, payloadLen int) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-	return trailingFragmentTo(tb, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolUDP, id, fragOffsetOctets, moreFragments, payloadLen)
-}
-
-// outboundUDPPacket builds a complete outbound UDP packet from the local
-// address, used to establish conntrack state for reply-direction tests.
-func outboundUDPPacket(tb testing.TB, srcPort, dstPort uint16) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ip := &layers.IPv4{
-		Version:  4,
-		TTL:      64,
-		Id:       1,
-		Protocol: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
-		SrcIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestDst),
-		DstIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
-	}
-	udp := &layers.UDP{SrcPort: layers.UDPPort(srcPort), DstPort: layers.UDPPort(dstPort)}
-	require.NoError(tb, udp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
-
-	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
-	opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
-	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, udp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, 16))))
-	return buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-// normalUDPPacket builds a complete, non-fragmented UDP packet for baseline
-// comparisons against the fragment paths.
-func normalUDPPacket(tb testing.TB, dstPort uint16, payloadLen int) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ip := &layers.IPv4{
-		Version:  4,
-		TTL:      64,
-		Id:       1,
-		Protocol: layers.IPProtocolUDP,
-		SrcIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc),
-		DstIP:    net.ParseIP(fragTestDst),
-	}
-	udp := &layers.UDP{SrcPort: 40000, DstPort: layers.UDPPort(dstPort)}
-	require.NoError(tb, udp.SetNetworkLayerForChecksum(ip))
-
-	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
-	opts := gopacket.SerializeOptions{ComputeChecksums: true, FixLengths: true}
-	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, opts, ip, udp, gopacket.Payload(make([]byte, payloadLen))))
-	return buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-func allowUDP(tb testing.TB, m *Manager, dstPort uint16) {
-	tb.Helper()
-	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolUDP, nil,
-		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{dstPort}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
-	require.NoError(tb, err)
-}
-
-// TestFragment_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped is the core bypass repro: a trailing
-// fragment with no allowed first fragment on record must be dropped. Before the
-// fix, filterInbound returned false (allow) for any fragment.
-func TestFragment_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-
-	frag := trailingFragment(t, 0x1234, 185, false, 40)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(frag, len(frag)),
-		"trailing fragment without an allowed first fragment must be dropped")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing verifies that once a first fragment
-// passes the ACL, its trailing fragments inherit the allow verdict.
-func TestFragment_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
-
-	// First fragment: UDP header (8) + 32 payload = 40 octets -> headerEnd = 5.
-	first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x2222, 8080, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
-		"allowed first fragment should pass and be recorded")
-
-	trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x2222, 5, false, 24)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment of an allowed datagram should pass")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_DeniedFirstDropsTrailing verifies that a first fragment blocked
-// by the ACL leaves no verdict, so its trailing fragments are dropped.
-func TestFragment_DeniedFirstDropsTrailing(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	// No accept rule: local traffic defaults to deny.
-
-	first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x3333, 9999, 32)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
-		"first fragment to a blocked port should be dropped by the ACL")
-
-	trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x3333, 5, false, 24)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment of a denied datagram must be dropped")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_OverlappingHeaderDropped covers the RFC 1858 §4 / RFC 3128
-// overlapping-fragment rewrite: a trailing fragment starting inside the range
-// the ACL already inspected is dropped and poisons the datagram. TCP is used so
-// the overlap lands on real header bytes (the flags at byte 13).
-func TestFragment_OverlappingHeaderDropped(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolTCP, nil,
-		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	// First fragment: TCP header (20) + 12 data = 32 bytes -> headerEnd = 4 octets.
-	first := firstFragmentTCP(t, 0x4444, 8080)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)))
-
-	// Overlapping fragment at offset 1 (byte 8) falls inside the inspected TCP
-	// header, so it could rewrite the flags or port on reassembly.
-	overlap := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x4444, 1, true, 32)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(overlap, len(overlap)),
-		"fragment overlapping the inspected header must be dropped")
-
-	// The datagram is now poisoned: a later, non-overlapping fragment is also
-	// dropped because the verdict was removed.
-	later := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x4444, 4, false, 24)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(later, len(later)),
-		"fragments after an overlap must be dropped (datagram poisoned)")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_OffsetZeroOverlapPoisons covers the RFC 3128 offset-zero rewrite:
-// an allowed first fragment followed by a denied offset-zero fragment for the
-// same datagram must not leave the earlier allow verdict in place.
-func TestFragment_OffsetZeroOverlapPoisons(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
-
-	allowed := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x5A5A, 8080, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(allowed, len(allowed)),
-		"allowed first fragment should pass and be recorded")
-
-	// A second offset-zero fragment to a denied port supersedes the datagram's
-	// verdict; it is dropped and must not leave the allow in place.
-	denied := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x5A5A, 9999, 32)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(denied, len(denied)),
-		"denied offset-zero fragment must be dropped")
-
-	trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x5A5A, 5, false, 24)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment must be denied after the datagram was poisoned")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_TinyFirstDropped covers the tiny-fragment attack: a first
-// fragment too small to contain the full transport header can't be
-// ACL-evaluated and must be dropped.
-func TestFragment_TinyFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
-
-	// IPv4 header + 4 raw bytes, MF set, offset 0: too small for the 8-byte UDP
-	// header, so it decodes to L3 only.
-	tiny := trailingFragment(t, 0x5555, 0, true, 4)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(tiny, len(tiny)),
-		"tiny first fragment without a full L4 header must be dropped")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_TCPFirstFragment verifies the TCP arm of the transport decode: a
-// first fragment carrying the full 20-byte TCP header is ACL-evaluated and its
-// trailing fragments inherit the verdict.
-func TestFragment_TCPFirstFragment(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolTCP, nil,
-		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	// TCP header (20) + 12 data = 32 bytes -> headerEnd = 4 octets.
-	first := firstFragmentTCP(t, 0x6666, 8080)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
-		"allowed TCP first fragment should pass and be recorded")
-
-	trailing := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x6666, 4, false, 24)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment of an allowed TCP datagram should pass")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_TCPTinyFirstDropped verifies the TCP minimum header length: 12
-// bytes would satisfy a UDP header but falls short of the 20-byte TCP header.
-func TestFragment_TCPTinyFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrc), fw.ProtocolTCP, nil,
-		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	tiny := trailingFragmentTo(t, fragTestDst, layers.IPProtocolTCP, 0x7777, 0, true, 12)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(tiny, len(tiny)),
-		"first fragment shorter than the TCP header must be dropped")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_ConntrackAllowsFirstFragment verifies the conntrack branch: reply
-// fragments of an outbound-established UDP flow pass without any inbound rule.
-func TestFragment_ConntrackAllowsFirstFragment(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-
-	out := outboundUDPPacket(t, 12345, 40000)
-	require.False(t, m.filterOutbound(out, len(out)))
-
-	first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x8888, 12345, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
-		"reply first fragment should pass via conntrack")
-
-	trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0x8888, 5, false, 24)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment of a tracked flow should pass")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_RoutingDisabledDropsFragment verifies routed first fragments are
-// dropped when routing is disabled.
-func TestFragment_RoutingDisabledDropsFragment(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	m.routingEnabled.Store(false)
-
-	first := firstFragmentUDPTo(t, "198.51.100.10", 0x9999, 8080, 32)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
-		"routed first fragment must be dropped when routing is disabled")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_RouteACL verifies the route-ACL branch: fragments to a non-local
-// destination follow the route rules, allowed datagrams pass their trailing
-// fragments and denied ones don't.
-func TestFragment_RouteACL(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	m.routingEnabled.Store(true)
-	m.nativeRouter.Store(false)
-
-	_, err := m.AddRouteFiltering(
-		[]byte("rt-1"),
-		[]netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("100.10.0.0/16")},
-		fw.Network{Prefix: netip.MustParsePrefix("198.51.100.0/24")},
-		fw.ProtocolUDP,
-		nil,
-		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}},
-		fw.ActionAccept,
-	)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	first := firstFragmentUDPTo(t, "198.51.100.10", 0xAAAA, 8080, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
-		"route-ACL-allowed first fragment should pass")
-	trailing := trailingFragmentTo(t, "198.51.100.10", layers.IPProtocolUDP, 0xAAAA, 5, false, 24)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment of an allowed routed datagram should pass")
-
-	denied := firstFragmentUDPTo(t, "198.51.100.10", 0xBBBB, 9999, 32)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(denied, len(denied)),
-		"route-ACL-denied first fragment must be dropped")
-	deniedTrailing := trailingFragmentTo(t, "198.51.100.10", layers.IPProtocolUDP, 0xBBBB, 5, false, 24)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(deniedTrailing, len(deniedTrailing)),
-		"trailing fragment of a denied routed datagram must be dropped")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_ExpiredVerdictDropsTrailing verifies a verdict older than the
-// tracker timeout no longer admits trailing fragments.
-func TestFragment_ExpiredVerdictDropsTrailing(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
-
-	first := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0xCCCC, 8080, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)))
-
-	m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
-	for key, entry := range m.fragments.entries {
-		entry.recordedAt = time.Now().Add(-defaultFragmentTimeout - time.Second)
-		m.fragments.entries[key] = entry
-	}
-	m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
-
-	trailing := trailingFragment(t, 0xCCCC, 5, false, 24)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment after verdict expiry must be dropped")
-}
-
-// TestFragment_CapacityFailsClosed verifies the table cap: at capacity, new
-// datagram verdicts are not recorded (their trailing fragments are dropped)
-// while already-recorded datagrams keep working.
-func TestFragment_CapacityFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	allowUDP(t, m, 8080)
-
-	m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
-	m.fragments.maxEntries = 1
-	m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
-
-	first1 := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x0101, 8080, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first1, len(first1)))
-
-	first2 := firstFragmentUDP(t, 0x0202, 8080, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first2, len(first2)),
-		"first fragment itself still passes at capacity")
-
-	trailing2 := trailingFragment(t, 0x0202, 5, false, 24)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(trailing2, len(trailing2)),
-		"trailing fragment of an unrecorded datagram must be dropped at capacity")
-
-	trailing1 := trailingFragment(t, 0x0101, 5, false, 24)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing1, len(trailing1)),
-		"already-recorded datagram should keep passing at capacity")
-}
-
-// v6FragmentHeader builds the 8-byte IPv6 fragment extension header for the
-// given inner protocol, offset (8-byte units), More Fragments bit and id.
-func v6FragmentHeader(proto layers.IPProtocol, offsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, id uint32) []byte {
-	offsetFlags := offsetOctets << 3
-	if moreFragments {
-		offsetFlags |= 1
-	}
-	hdr := make([]byte, 8)
-	hdr[0] = uint8(proto)
-	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[2:4], offsetFlags)
-	binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(hdr[4:8], id)
-	return hdr
-}
-
-func v6UDPHeader(dstPort uint16, dataLen int) []byte {
-	hdr := make([]byte, 8)
-	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[0:2], 40000)
-	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[2:4], dstPort)
-	binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[4:6], uint16(8+dataLen))
-	return hdr
-}
-
-// firstFragmentUDPv6 builds the first fragment of a fragmented IPv6 UDP
-// datagram: fragment header (offset 0, More Fragments set) + full UDP header +
-// data.
-func firstFragmentUDPv6(tb testing.TB, id uint32, dstPort uint16, dataLen int) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-	return fragmentUDPv6(tb, id, dstPort, dataLen, true)
-}
-
-// fragmentUDPv6 builds an offset-zero IPv6 UDP fragment. With moreFragments
-// false it is an atomic fragment (a complete datagram, RFC 6946).
-func fragmentUDPv6(tb testing.TB, id uint32, dstPort uint16, dataLen int, moreFragments bool) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ip := &layers.IPv6{
-		Version:    6,
-		NextHeader: layers.IPProtocolIPv6Fragment,
-		HopLimit:   64,
-		SrcIP:      net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6),
-		DstIP:      net.ParseIP(fragTestDstV6),
-	}
-	payload := append(v6FragmentHeader(layers.IPProtocolUDP, 0, moreFragments, id), v6UDPHeader(dstPort, dataLen)...)
-	payload = append(payload, make([]byte, dataLen)...)
-
-	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
-	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, gopacket.SerializeOptions{FixLengths: true}, ip, gopacket.Payload(payload)))
-	return buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-// trailingFragmentV6 builds a non-first IPv6 fragment: fragment header at the
-// given offset carrying raw data and no transport header.
-func trailingFragmentV6(tb testing.TB, id uint32, offsetOctets uint16, moreFragments bool, dataLen int) []byte {
-	tb.Helper()
-
-	ip := &layers.IPv6{
-		Version:    6,
-		NextHeader: layers.IPProtocolIPv6Fragment,
-		HopLimit:   64,
-		SrcIP:      net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6),
-		DstIP:      net.ParseIP(fragTestDstV6),
-	}
-	payload := append(v6FragmentHeader(layers.IPProtocolUDP, offsetOctets, moreFragments, id), make([]byte, dataLen)...)
-
-	buf := gopacket.NewSerializeBuffer()
-	require.NoError(tb, gopacket.SerializeLayers(buf, gopacket.SerializeOptions{FixLengths: true}, ip, gopacket.Payload(payload)))
-	return buf.Bytes()
-}
-
-// TestFragmentV6_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped verifies the IPv6 bypass is closed:
-// a trailing fragment with no allowed first fragment is dropped.
-func TestFragmentV6_TrailingWithoutFirstDropped(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-
-	frag := trailingFragmentV6(t, 0xAABBCCDD, 100, false, 40)
-	require.True(t, m.filterInbound(frag, len(frag)),
-		"IPv6 trailing fragment without an allowed first fragment must be dropped")
-}
-
-// TestFragmentV6_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing verifies IPv6 fragments are
-// evaluated like IPv4: an allowed first fragment lets its trailing fragments
-// through.
-func TestFragmentV6_AllowedFirstPassesTrailing(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6), fw.ProtocolUDP, nil,
-		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	// First fragment: UDP header (8) + 32 data = 40 octets -> headerEnd = 5.
-	first := firstFragmentUDPv6(t, 0xAABBCCDD, 8080, 32)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)),
-		"allowed IPv6 first fragment should pass and be recorded")
-
-	trailing := trailingFragmentV6(t, 0xAABBCCDD, 5, false, 24)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(trailing, len(trailing)),
-		"trailing fragment of an allowed IPv6 datagram should pass")
-}
-
-// TestFragmentV6_AtomicNotCached verifies an IPv6 atomic fragment (fragment
-// header with offset 0 and no More Fragments, a complete datagram per RFC 6946)
-// is evaluated but not recorded, so a flood of allowed atomic fragments can't
-// exhaust the verdict table.
-func TestFragmentV6_AtomicNotCached(t *testing.T) {
-	m := newFragmentTestManager(t)
-	_, err := m.AddPeerFiltering(nil, net.ParseIP(fragTestSrcV6), fw.ProtocolUDP, nil,
-		&fw.Port{Values: []uint16{8080}}, fw.ActionAccept, "")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	atomic := fragmentUDPv6(t, 0xA70301C, 8080, 16, false)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(atomic, len(atomic)),
-		"allowed IPv6 atomic fragment should pass")
-
-	m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
-	n := len(m.fragments.entries)
-	m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
-	require.Zero(t, n, "atomic fragment must not create a verdict entry")
-
-	// A genuine fragmented datagram (More Fragments set) is still recorded.
-	first := fragmentUDPv6(t, 0xBEEF, 8080, 32, true)
-	require.False(t, m.filterInbound(first, len(first)))
-	m.fragments.mutex.Lock()
-	n = len(m.fragments.entries)
-	m.fragments.mutex.Unlock()
-	require.Equal(t, 1, n, "genuine first fragment must record a verdict")
-}

client/iface/netstack/env.go

@@ -3,31 +3,14 @@
 package netstack
 
 import (
-	"net"
+	"fmt"
 	"os"
 	"strconv"
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 )
 
-const (
-	EnvUseNetstackMode = "NB_USE_NETSTACK_MODE"
-
-	// EnvSocks5ListenerPort overrides the port the SOCKS5 proxy listens on.
-	EnvSocks5ListenerPort = "NB_SOCKS5_LISTENER_PORT"
-
-	// EnvSocks5ListenerAddress overrides the host/IP the SOCKS5 proxy binds to.
-	// The proxy is a bridge for local host applications into the userspace
-	// WireGuard netstack, so it binds to loopback by default. Override this only
-	// when the proxy must be reachable from other hosts (e.g. a container
-	// gateway); doing so exposes an unauthenticated SOCKS5 proxy on that
-	// address.
-	EnvSocks5ListenerAddress = "NB_SOCKS5_LISTENER_ADDRESS"
-
-	// defaultSocks5Host is the loopback address the SOCKS5 proxy binds to unless
-	// overridden via EnvSocks5ListenerAddress.
-	defaultSocks5Host = "127.0.0.1"
-)
+const EnvUseNetstackMode = "NB_USE_NETSTACK_MODE"
 
 // IsEnabled todo: move these function to cmd layer
 func IsEnabled() bool {
@@ -35,40 +18,24 @@ func IsEnabled() bool {
 }
 
 func ListenAddr() string {
-	return net.JoinHostPort(listenHost(), strconv.Itoa(listenPort()))
-}
-
-// listenHost returns the host/IP the SOCKS5 proxy binds to. It defaults to
-// loopback and only honors EnvSocks5ListenerAddress when it holds a valid IP.
-func listenHost() string {
-	addr := os.Getenv(EnvSocks5ListenerAddress)
-	if addr == "" {
-		return defaultSocks5Host
-	}
-	if net.ParseIP(addr) == nil {
-		log.Warnf("invalid socks5 listener address %q, falling back to default: %s", addr, defaultSocks5Host)
-		return defaultSocks5Host
-	}
-	return addr
-}
-
-// listenPort returns the port the SOCKS5 proxy binds to, defaulting to
-// DefaultSocks5Port when EnvSocks5ListenerPort is unset or invalid.
-func listenPort() int {
-	sPort := os.Getenv(EnvSocks5ListenerPort)
+	sPort := os.Getenv("NB_SOCKS5_LISTENER_PORT")
 	if sPort == "" {
-		return DefaultSocks5Port
+		return listenAddr(DefaultSocks5Port)
 	}
 
 	port, err := strconv.Atoi(sPort)
 	if err != nil {
 		log.Warnf("invalid socks5 listener port, unable to convert it to int, falling back to default: %d", DefaultSocks5Port)
-		return DefaultSocks5Port
+		return listenAddr(DefaultSocks5Port)
 	}
 	if port < 1 || port > 65535 {
 		log.Warnf("invalid socks5 listener port, it should be in the range 1-65535, falling back to default: %d", DefaultSocks5Port)
-		return DefaultSocks5Port
+		return listenAddr(DefaultSocks5Port)
 	}
 
-	return port
+	return listenAddr(port)
+}
+
+func listenAddr(port int) string {
+	return fmt.Sprintf("0.0.0.0:%d", port)
 }

client/iface/netstack/env_test.go

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-//go:build !js
-
-package netstack
-
-import (
-	"net"
-	"strconv"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-func TestListenAddr_DefaultsToLoopback(t *testing.T) {
-	// No env overrides: must bind loopback, never all interfaces.
-	got := ListenAddr()
-	want := net.JoinHostPort("127.0.0.1", strconv.Itoa(DefaultSocks5Port))
-	if got != want {
-		t.Fatalf("ListenAddr() = %q, want %q", got, want)
-	}
-}
-
-func TestListenAddr_AddressOverride(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name string
-		env  string
-		want string
-	}{
-		{name: "valid override honored", env: "0.0.0.0", want: "0.0.0.0"},
-		{name: "valid specific ip honored", env: "10.0.0.5", want: "10.0.0.5"},
-		{name: "ipv6 loopback bracketed", env: "::1", want: "::1"},
-		{name: "invalid falls back to loopback", env: "not-an-ip", want: "127.0.0.1"},
-		{name: "empty falls back to loopback", env: "", want: "127.0.0.1"},
-	}
-	for _, tc := range tests {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			t.Setenv(EnvSocks5ListenerAddress, tc.env)
-			want := net.JoinHostPort(tc.want, strconv.Itoa(DefaultSocks5Port))
-			if got := ListenAddr(); got != want {
-				t.Fatalf("ListenAddr() = %q, want %q", got, want)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-func TestListenAddr_PortOverride(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name string
-		env  string
-		want int
-	}{
-		{name: "valid port honored", env: "1081", want: 1081},
-		{name: "non-numeric falls back", env: "abc", want: DefaultSocks5Port},
-		{name: "out of range falls back", env: "70000", want: DefaultSocks5Port},
-		{name: "zero falls back", env: "0", want: DefaultSocks5Port},
-	}
-	for _, tc := range tests {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			t.Setenv(EnvSocks5ListenerPort, tc.env)
-			want := net.JoinHostPort("127.0.0.1", strconv.Itoa(tc.want))
-			if got := ListenAddr(); got != want {
-				t.Fatalf("ListenAddr() = %q, want %q", got, want)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}

client/internal/auth/device_flow.go

@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ func (d *DeviceAuthorizationFlow) WaitToken(ctx context.Context, info AuthFlowIn
 				UseIDToken:   d.providerConfig.UseIDToken,
 			}
 
-			err = validateTokenAudience(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), d.providerConfig.Audience)
+			err = isValidAccessToken(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), d.providerConfig.Audience)
 			if err != nil {
 				return TokenInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("validate access token failed with error: %v", err)
 			}

client/internal/auth/pkce_flow.go

@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) parseOAuthToken(token *oauth2.Token) (TokenInfo,
 		audience = p.providerConfig.ClientID
 	}
 
-	if err := validateTokenAudience(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), audience); err != nil {
+	if err := isValidAccessToken(tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse(), audience); err != nil {
 		return TokenInfo{}, fmt.Errorf("authentication failed: invalid access token - %w", err)
 	}
 
@@ -320,11 +320,6 @@ func (p *PKCEAuthorizationFlow) parseOAuthToken(token *oauth2.Token) (TokenInfo,
 	return tokenInfo, nil
 }
 
-// parseEmailFromIDToken extracts the email (or name) claim from an ID token
-// without verifying its signature. The value is best-effort and used only as a
-// UX convenience (login hint prefill and display); it never drives an
-// authorization decision. The authoritative identity is established server-side
-// from the signature-verified token.
 func parseEmailFromIDToken(token string) (string, error) {
 	parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
 	if len(parts) < 2 {

client/internal/auth/sessionwatch/watcher.go

@@ -24,7 +24,11 @@ import (
 )
 
 const (
-	maxPastHorizon = 30 * 24 * time.Hour
+	// Skew tolerates a small clock difference between the management
+	// server and this peer before treating a deadline as "in the past".
+	// Slightly above typical NTP drift; tight enough that the UI doesn't
+	// paint a stale expiry as if it were valid.
+	Skew = 30 * time.Second
 
 	// maxDeadlineHorizon caps how far in the future an accepted deadline
 	// can sit. A timestamp beyond this is almost certainly a protocol
@@ -53,7 +57,7 @@ var (
 	ErrDeadlineTooFarFuture = errors.New("session deadline too far in the future")
 
 	// ErrDeadlineInPast is returned by Update when the supplied deadline
-	// is more than maxPastHorizon in the past.
+	// is more than Skew in the past.
 	ErrDeadlineInPast = errors.New("session deadline in the past")
 )
 
@@ -62,14 +66,15 @@ var (
 // for deadline change/clear, PublishEvent for the two warnings); tests pass
 // a fake recorder so the same surface is observable without an engine.
 //
-// While the watcher runs, it owns the deadline propagated to the recorder:
-// every set, clear and sanity-check rejection routes the value through
-// SetSessionExpiresAt, so the SubscribeStatus snapshot the UI reads can
-// never drift from the watcher's timer state. (SetSessionExpiresAt fans
-// out its own state-change notification, so no separate notify is needed.)
-// The recorder is server-scoped and outlives this engine-scoped watcher;
-// Close deliberately leaves the recorder value in place so transient engine
-// restarts don't blank it — the client run loop clears it on real teardown.
+// The watcher is the single owner of the deadline propagated to the
+// recorder: every set, clear, sanity-check rejection and Close routes the
+// value through SetSessionExpiresAt, so the SubscribeStatus snapshot the UI
+// reads can never drift from the watcher's timer state. (SetSessionExpiresAt
+// fans out its own state-change notification, so no separate notify is
+// needed.) The recorder is server-scoped and outlives this engine-scoped
+// watcher — without the Close-time clear a teardown (Down, or the Down+Up of
+// a profile switch) would leave the next session showing the previous one's
+// stale "expires in" value.
 //
 // PublishEvent's signature mirrors peer.Status.PublishEvent: the watcher
 // composes the metadata internally so the wire format (MetaSession*) is
@@ -130,13 +135,10 @@ func NewWithLeads(lead, final time.Duration, recorder StatusRecorder) *Watcher {
 // was disabled).
 //
 // Same-value updates are no-ops. A different non-zero value cancels any
-// pending timer, resets the "already fired" guards, and — when the
-// deadline lies in the future — arms fresh warning timers. A deadline
-// already in the past (within maxPastHorizon) is recorded as-is with no
-// timers: the session has expired and consumers render it that way.
+// pending timer, resets the "already fired" guard, and arms a new one.
 //
 // Returns one of the sentinel Err* values when the deadline fails the
-// sanity checks (pre-epoch, far future, or past beyond maxPastHorizon).
+// sanity checks (pre-epoch, far future, or in the past beyond Skew).
 // In every error case the watcher first clears its state so it stays
 // consistent with what the caller will push into its other sinks (e.g.
 // applySessionDeadline forces a zero deadline into the status recorder
@@ -161,7 +163,7 @@ func (w *Watcher) Update(deadline time.Time) error {
 	case deadline.After(now.Add(maxDeadlineHorizon)):
 		w.clearLocked()
 		return fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrDeadlineTooFarFuture, deadline)
-	case deadline.Before(now.Add(-maxPastHorizon)):
+	case deadline.Before(now.Add(-Skew)):
 		w.clearLocked()
 		return fmt.Errorf("%w: %v (now=%v)", ErrDeadlineInPast, deadline, now)
 	}
@@ -181,9 +183,7 @@ func (w *Watcher) Update(deadline time.Time) error {
 	w.finalFiredAt = time.Time{}
 	w.dismissedAt = time.Time{}
 
-	if deadline.After(now) {
-		w.armTimerLocked(deadline)
-	}
+	w.armTimerLocked(deadline)
 	recorder := w.recorder
 	w.mu.Unlock()
 	if recorder != nil {
@@ -227,25 +227,30 @@ func (w *Watcher) Dismiss() {
 	log.Infof("auth session final-warning dismissed for deadline %s", w.current.Format(time.RFC3339))
 }
 
-// Close stops any pending timer. Update calls after Close are ignored.
-// The recorder keeps its deadline: the watcher is engine-scoped and closes
-// on every engine restart (network change, sleep/wake, stream errors)
-// while the SSO deadline stays valid across those, so clearing here would
-// blank the UI's "expires in" row on every transient reconnect. The
-// client run loop clears the server-scoped recorder when it exits for
-// real (Down, profile switch, permanent login failure).
+// Close stops any pending timer and drops the deadline on the status
+// recorder. Update calls after Close are ignored. Clearing the recorder
+// here is what keeps a teardown (Down, or the Down+Up of a profile switch)
+// from leaving the next session showing this one's stale "expires in"
+// value — the recorder is server-scoped and outlives this engine-scoped
+// watcher, so nothing else drops the anchor on teardown.
 func (w *Watcher) Close() {
 	w.mu.Lock()
-	defer w.mu.Unlock()
 	if w.closed {
+		w.mu.Unlock()
 		return
 	}
 	w.closed = true
 	w.stopTimerLocked()
+	hadDeadline := !w.current.IsZero()
 	w.current = time.Time{}
 	w.firedAt = time.Time{}
 	w.finalFiredAt = time.Time{}
 	w.dismissedAt = time.Time{}
+	recorder := w.recorder
+	w.mu.Unlock()
+	if recorder != nil && hadDeadline {
+		recorder.SetSessionExpiresAt(time.Time{})
+	}
 }
 
 // clearLocked drops the tracked deadline and notifies the recorder so

client/internal/auth/sessionwatch/watcher_test.go

@@ -224,13 +224,11 @@ func TestNewDeadlineCancelsPriorTimer(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestRefreshAfterFireArmsNewWarning(t *testing.T) {
 	r := &fakeRecorder{}
-	lead := 150 * time.Millisecond
+	lead := 30 * time.Millisecond
 	w := newWatcher(lead, r)
 	defer w.Close()
 
-	// Warning fires ~20ms in; the deadline itself stays 150ms away so the
-	// replacement below lands well before it.
-	first := time.Now().Add(170 * time.Millisecond)
+	first := time.Now().Add(50 * time.Millisecond)
 	_ = w.Update(first)
 
 	// Wait for stateChange + warning of the first cycle.
@@ -308,29 +306,7 @@ func TestUpdateRejectsTooFarFuture(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestUpdateRecentPastRecordedAsExpired(t *testing.T) {
-	r := &fakeRecorder{}
-	w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
-	defer w.Close()
-
-	d := time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour)
-	if err := w.Update(d); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("recent-past Update should succeed, got %v", err)
-	}
-	if !w.Deadline().Equal(d) {
-		t.Fatalf("expected deadline to be recorded, got %v want %v", w.Deadline(), d)
-	}
-	if got := r.deadline(); !got.Equal(d) {
-		t.Fatalf("recorder deadline = %v, want %v", got, d)
-	}
-
-	time.Sleep(80 * time.Millisecond)
-	if n := countWhere(r.snapshot(), func(e event) bool { return e.kind == publish }); n != 0 {
-		t.Fatalf("no warning events may fire for an already-past deadline, got %+v", r.snapshot())
-	}
-}
-
-func TestUpdateAncientPastRejected(t *testing.T) {
+func TestUpdateInPastClearsDeadline(t *testing.T) {
 	r := &fakeRecorder{}
 	w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
 	defer w.Close()
@@ -342,12 +318,12 @@ func TestUpdateAncientPastRejected(t *testing.T) {
 	// Drain the stateChange from the seed.
 	waitForEvents(t, r, 1)
 
-	err := w.Update(time.Now().Add(-31 * 24 * time.Hour))
+	err := w.Update(time.Now().Add(-1 * time.Hour))
 	if !errors.Is(err, ErrDeadlineInPast) {
 		t.Fatalf("want ErrDeadlineInPast, got %v", err)
 	}
 	if !w.Deadline().IsZero() {
-		t.Fatalf("rejected ancient-past update must clear the deadline, got %v", w.Deadline())
+		t.Fatalf("in-past update must clear the deadline, got %v", w.Deadline())
 	}
 	events := waitForEvents(t, r, 2)
 	if events[1].kind != stateChange {
@@ -355,25 +331,39 @@ func TestUpdateAncientPastRejected(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+func TestUpdateWithinSkewAccepted(t *testing.T) {
+	r := &fakeRecorder{}
+	w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
+	defer w.Close()
+
+	// 5 seconds in the past is within the 30s Skew tolerance — accept it.
+	d := time.Now().Add(-5 * time.Second)
+	if err := w.Update(d); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("within-skew Update should succeed, got %v", err)
+	}
+	if !w.Deadline().Equal(d) {
+		t.Fatalf("expected deadline to be applied, got %v want %v", w.Deadline(), d)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestCloseSilencesUpdates(t *testing.T) {
 	r := &fakeRecorder{}
 	w := newWatcher(50*time.Millisecond, r)
 	w.Close()
 
-	if err := w.Update(time.Now().Add(time.Hour)); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("Update after Close: want nil, got %v", err)
-	}
+	_ = w.Update(time.Now().Add(time.Hour))
+
+	time.Sleep(20 * time.Millisecond)
 	if got := r.snapshot(); len(got) != 0 {
 		t.Fatalf("expected no events after Close, got %+v", got)
 	}
 }
 
-// TestCloseKeepsRecorderDeadline pins the reconnect-flap fix: the watcher
-// closes on every engine restart (network change, sleep/wake) while the
-// SSO deadline stays valid across those, so Close must leave the
-// server-scoped recorder's value in place. The client run loop clears the
-// recorder when it exits for real.
-func TestCloseKeepsRecorderDeadline(t *testing.T) {
+// TestCloseClearsRecorderDeadline pins the profile-switch fix: a watcher
+// holding a live deadline must zero the recorder on Close so the next
+// engine's watcher (and the UI reading the shared server-scoped recorder)
+// doesn't start out showing the previous session's stale "expires in".
+func TestCloseClearsRecorderDeadline(t *testing.T) {
 	r := &fakeRecorder{}
 	w := newWatcher(time.Hour, r)
 
@@ -387,8 +377,8 @@ func TestCloseKeepsRecorderDeadline(t *testing.T) {
 
 	w.Close()
 
-	if got := r.deadline(); !got.Equal(d) {
-		t.Fatalf("recorder deadline after Close = %v, want %v", got, d)
+	if got := r.deadline(); !got.IsZero() {
+		t.Fatalf("recorder deadline after Close = %v, want zero", got)
 	}
 }
 

client/internal/auth/util.go

@@ -20,26 +20,14 @@ func randomBytesInHex(count int) (string, error) {
 	return hex.EncodeToString(buf), nil
 }
 
-// validateTokenAudience checks that the token is a well-formed JWT whose
-// audience claim matches the expected audience.
-//
-// It does NOT verify the token's cryptographic signature and therefore must not
-// be treated as an authenticity check. The token is obtained by the client
-// directly from the IdP token endpoint over TLS, and its signature is verified
-// server-side by the management server against the IdP's JWKS
-// (see shared/auth/jwt/validator.go). This function is only a client-side
-// sanity check that the returned token targets the expected audience.
-func validateTokenAudience(token string, audience string) error {
+// isValidAccessToken is a simple validation of the access token
+func isValidAccessToken(token string, audience string) error {
 	if token == "" {
 		return fmt.Errorf("token received is empty")
 	}
 
-	parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
-	if len(parts) != 3 {
-		return fmt.Errorf("token is not a well-formed JWT")
-	}
-
-	claimsString, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[1])
+	encodedClaims := strings.Split(token, ".")[1]
+	claimsString, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(encodedClaims)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}

client/internal/auth/util_test.go

@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-package auth
-
-import (
-	"encoding/base64"
-	"encoding/json"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// makeJWT builds an unsigned JWT-shaped string (header.payload.signature) with
-// the given claims payload. The signature part is arbitrary because
-// validateTokenAudience intentionally does not verify it.
-func makeJWT(t *testing.T, claims map[string]interface{}) string {
-	t.Helper()
-	header := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(`{"alg":"RS256","typ":"JWT"}`))
-	payloadBytes, err := json.Marshal(claims)
-	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("marshal claims: %v", err)
-	}
-	payload := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(payloadBytes)
-	return header + "." + payload + ".unverified-signature"
-}
-
-func TestValidateTokenAudience(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name     string
-		token    string
-		audience string
-		wantErr  bool
-	}{
-		{
-			name:     "empty token",
-			token:    "",
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "not a JWT - no dots",
-			token:    "notajwt",
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "not a JWT - two parts only",
-			token:    "header.payload",
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "matching string audience",
-			token:    makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": "netbird"}),
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  false,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "mismatching string audience",
-			token:    makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": "other"}),
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "matching audience in array",
-			token:    makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": []interface{}{"other", "netbird"}}),
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  false,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "mismatching audience array",
-			token:    makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"aud": []interface{}{"a", "b"}}),
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "missing audience claim",
-			token:    makeJWT(t, map[string]interface{}{"sub": "user"}),
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  true,
-		},
-		{
-			name:     "invalid base64 payload",
-			token:    "header.!!!not-base64!!!.sig",
-			audience: "netbird",
-			wantErr:  true,
-		},
-	}
-
-	for _, tc := range tests {
-		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			err := validateTokenAudience(tc.token, tc.audience)
-			if tc.wantErr && err == nil {
-				t.Fatalf("expected error, got nil")
-			}
-			if !tc.wantErr && err != nil {
-				t.Fatalf("expected no error, got %v", err)
-			}
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-// TestValidateTokenAudienceNoPanic guards the regression where a non-empty
-// token without the JWT dot structure caused an index-out-of-range panic.
-func TestValidateTokenAudienceNoPanic(t *testing.T) {
-	inputs := []string{"a", ".", "a.", "aaaa", "no-dots-here"}
-	for _, in := range inputs {
-		if err := validateTokenAudience(in, "netbird"); err == nil {
-			t.Fatalf("expected error for malformed token %q, got nil", in)
-		}
-	}
-}

client/internal/conn_mgr.go

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package internal
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"maps"
 	"os"
 	"strconv"
 	"sync"
@@ -14,6 +15,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peerstore"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
+	mgmProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
 )
 
 // lazyForce is the resolved local decision for lazy connections, layered above the
@@ -40,8 +42,14 @@ type ConnMgr struct {
 	iface            lazyconn.WGIface
 	force            lazyForce
 	rosenpassEnabled bool
+	// remoteLazyEnabled caches the account-wide lazy feature flag from management.
+	// It is the default for peers that do not carry a per-peer lazy hint.
+	remoteLazyEnabled bool
 
 	lazyConnMgr *manager.Manager
+	// appliedExcludeList is the exclude set last handed to the lazy manager, kept so an
+	// unchanged set on the next sync skips the O(n) reconciliation.
+	appliedExcludeList map[string]bool
 
 	wg            sync.WaitGroup
 	lazyCtx       context.Context
@@ -59,69 +67,56 @@ func NewConnMgr(engineConfig *EngineConfig, statusRecorder *peer.Status, peerSto
 	return e
 }
 
-// Start initializes the connection manager. It starts the lazy connection manager when a
-// local override forces it on; with no local override it waits for the management feature flag.
+// Start initializes the connection manager. The lazy connection manager always runs so that
+// per-peer lazy defaults (e.g. proxy peers) work even when the account flag is off; the
+// account flag and the local override decide the default lazy state per peer (see
+// PeerLazyDefault). Rosenpass is the only condition that disables it.
 func (e *ConnMgr) Start(ctx context.Context) {
 	if e.lazyConnMgr != nil {
 		log.Errorf("lazy connection manager is already started")
 		return
 	}
 
-	switch e.force {
-	case lazyForceOff:
-		log.Infof("lazy connection manager is disabled by local override (%s or MDM policy)", lazyconn.EnvLazyConn)
-		e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(false)
-		return
-	case lazyForceNone:
-		log.Infof("lazy connection manager is managed by the management feature flag")
-		e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(false)
-		return
-	}
-
 	if e.rosenpassEnabled {
-		log.Warnf("rosenpass connection manager is enabled, lazy connection manager will not be started")
+		log.Warnf("rosenpass is enabled, lazy connection manager will not be started")
 		e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(false)
 		return
 	}
 
 	e.initLazyManager(ctx)
-	e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(true)
+	e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(e.PeerLazyDefault(mgmProto.LazyState_LazyStateDefault))
 }
 
-// UpdatedRemoteFeatureFlag is called when the remote feature flag is updated.
-// If enabled, it initializes the lazy connection manager and start it. Do not need to call Start() again.
-// If disabled, then it closes the lazy connection manager and open the connections to all peers.
-func (e *ConnMgr) UpdatedRemoteFeatureFlag(ctx context.Context, enabled bool) error {
-	// a local override (NB_LAZY_CONN or local config) takes precedence over management
-	if e.force != lazyForceNone {
-		return nil
+// UpdatedRemoteFeatureFlag caches the account-wide lazy feature flag. The manager itself is
+// not started or stopped here; the per-sync exclude-list reconciliation moves normal peers
+// between the lazy and always-active sets when the flag flips.
+func (e *ConnMgr) UpdatedRemoteFeatureFlag(_ context.Context, enabled bool) error {
+	e.remoteLazyEnabled = enabled
+	if e.isStartedWithLazyMgr() {
+		e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(e.PeerLazyDefault(mgmProto.LazyState_LazyStateDefault))
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// PeerLazyDefault reports whether a peer should be lazy. The local override
+// (NB_LAZY_CONN/MDM) wins over everything; without a local override the
+// management per-peer state applies (LazyStateLazy/Eager force the decision),
+// and LazyStateDefault follows the account-wide flag.
+func (e *ConnMgr) PeerLazyDefault(state mgmProto.LazyState) bool {
+	switch e.force {
+	case lazyForceOn:
+		return true
+	case lazyForceOff:
+		return false
 	}
 
-	if enabled {
-		// if the lazy connection manager is already started, do not start it again
-		if e.lazyConnMgr != nil {
-			return nil
-		}
-
-		if e.rosenpassEnabled {
-			log.Infof("rosenpass connection manager is enabled, lazy connection manager will not be started")
-			e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(false)
-			return nil
-		}
-
-		log.Infof("lazy connection manager is enabled by the management feature flag")
-		e.initLazyManager(ctx)
-		e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(true)
-		return e.addPeersToLazyConnManager()
-	} else {
-		if e.lazyConnMgr == nil {
-			e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(false)
-			return nil
-		}
-		log.Infof("lazy connection manager is disabled by management feature flag")
-		e.closeManager(ctx)
-		e.statusRecorder.UpdateLazyConnection(false)
-		return nil
+	switch state {
+	case mgmProto.LazyState_LazyStateLazy:
+		return true
+	case mgmProto.LazyState_LazyStateEager:
+		return false
+	default:
+		return e.remoteLazyEnabled
 	}
 }
 
@@ -141,6 +136,13 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) SetExcludeList(ctx context.Context, peerIDs map[string]bool) {
 		return
 	}
 
+	// The exclude set is recomputed every sync but rarely changes; skip the O(n)
+	// store lookups and reconciliation when it matches what was already applied.
+	if maps.Equal(peerIDs, e.appliedExcludeList) {
+		return
+	}
+	e.appliedExcludeList = maps.Clone(peerIDs)
+
 	excludedPeers := make([]lazyconn.PeerConfig, 0, len(peerIDs))
 
 	for peerID := range peerIDs {
@@ -176,12 +178,16 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) SetExcludeList(ctx context.Context, peerIDs map[string]bool) {
 	}
 }
 
-func (e *ConnMgr) AddPeerConn(ctx context.Context, peerKey string, conn *peer.Conn) (exists bool) {
+// AddPeerConn registers a peer connection. permanent requests an always-active connection
+// (the peer belongs to the exclude set: a forwarder, or a peer that is not lazy by policy).
+// Non-permanent peers are handed to the lazy manager. The subsequent SetExcludeList call
+// reconciles membership for existing peers across flag flips.
+func (e *ConnMgr) AddPeerConn(ctx context.Context, peerKey string, conn *peer.Conn, permanent bool) (exists bool) {
 	if success := e.peerStore.AddPeerConn(peerKey, conn); !success {
 		return true
 	}
 
-	if !e.isStartedWithLazyMgr() {
+	if !e.isStartedWithLazyMgr() || permanent {
 		if err := conn.Open(ctx); err != nil {
 			conn.Log.Errorf("failed to open connection: %v", err)
 		}
@@ -269,6 +275,7 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) Close() {
 	e.lazyCtxCancel()
 	e.wg.Wait()
 	e.lazyConnMgr = nil
+	e.appliedExcludeList = nil
 }
 
 func (e *ConnMgr) initLazyManager(engineCtx context.Context) {
@@ -276,6 +283,7 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) initLazyManager(engineCtx context.Context) {
 		InactivityThreshold: inactivityThresholdEnv(),
 	}
 	e.lazyConnMgr = manager.NewManager(cfg, engineCtx, e.peerStore, e.iface)
+	e.appliedExcludeList = nil
 
 	e.lazyCtx, e.lazyCtxCancel = context.WithCancel(engineCtx)
 
@@ -286,43 +294,6 @@ func (e *ConnMgr) initLazyManager(engineCtx context.Context) {
 	}()
 }
 
-func (e *ConnMgr) addPeersToLazyConnManager() error {
-	peers := e.peerStore.PeersPubKey()
-	lazyPeerCfgs := make([]lazyconn.PeerConfig, 0, len(peers))
-	for _, peerID := range peers {
-		var peerConn *peer.Conn
-		var exists bool
-		if peerConn, exists = e.peerStore.PeerConn(peerID); !exists {
-			log.Warnf("failed to find peer conn for peerID: %s", peerID)
-			continue
-		}
-
-		lazyPeerCfg := lazyconn.PeerConfig{
-			PublicKey:  peerID,
-			AllowedIPs: peerConn.WgConfig().AllowedIps,
-			PeerConnID: peerConn.ConnID(),
-			Log:        peerConn.Log,
-		}
-		lazyPeerCfgs = append(lazyPeerCfgs, lazyPeerCfg)
-	}
-
-	return e.lazyConnMgr.AddActivePeers(lazyPeerCfgs)
-}
-
-func (e *ConnMgr) closeManager(ctx context.Context) {
-	if e.lazyConnMgr == nil {
-		return
-	}
-
-	e.lazyCtxCancel()
-	e.wg.Wait()
-	e.lazyConnMgr = nil
-
-	for _, peerID := range e.peerStore.PeersPubKey() {
-		e.peerStore.PeerConnOpen(ctx, peerID)
-	}
-}
-
 func (e *ConnMgr) isStartedWithLazyMgr() bool {
 	return e.lazyConnMgr != nil && e.lazyCtxCancel != nil
 }

client/internal/conn_mgr_test.go

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
 	"testing"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/lazyconn"
+	mgmProto "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
 )
 
 func TestResolveLazyForce(t *testing.T) {
@@ -38,3 +39,90 @@ func TestResolveLazyForce(t *testing.T) {
 		})
 	}
 }
+
+func TestPeerLazyDefault(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name          string
+		force         lazyForce
+		remoteEnabled bool
+		state         mgmProto.LazyState
+		want          bool
+	}{
+		{name: "force on wins over eager state", force: lazyForceOn, state: mgmProto.LazyState_LazyStateEager, want: true},
+		{name: "force off wins over lazy state", force: lazyForceOff, remoteEnabled: true, state: mgmProto.LazyState_LazyStateLazy, want: false},
+		{name: "none, default, account off -> active", force: lazyForceNone, state: mgmProto.LazyState_LazyStateDefault, want: false},
+		{name: "none, default, account on -> lazy", force: lazyForceNone, remoteEnabled: true, state: mgmProto.LazyState_LazyStateDefault, want: true},
+		{name: "none, lazy state, account off -> lazy", force: lazyForceNone, state: mgmProto.LazyState_LazyStateLazy, want: true},
+		{name: "none, eager state, account on -> active", force: lazyForceNone, remoteEnabled: true, state: mgmProto.LazyState_LazyStateEager, want: false},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			e := &ConnMgr{force: tt.force, remoteLazyEnabled: tt.remoteEnabled}
+			if got := e.PeerLazyDefault(tt.state); got != tt.want {
+				t.Fatalf("PeerLazyDefault(%v) = %v, want %v", tt.state, got, tt.want)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestToExcludedLazyPeers covers the per-peer lazy classification (proxy vs
+// normal, across the force/account-flag matrix). Forwarder-target exclusion is
+// covered by TestToExcludedLazyPeers_ForwardTarget.
+func TestToExcludedLazyPeers(t *testing.T) {
+	const (
+		normalKey = "normal"
+		lazyKey   = "lazy-state"
+		eagerKey  = "eager-state"
+	)
+
+	peers := []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig{
+		{WgPubKey: normalKey, AllowedIps: []string{"100.64.0.1/32"}},
+		{WgPubKey: lazyKey, AllowedIps: []string{"100.64.0.2/32"}, LazyState: mgmProto.LazyState_LazyStateLazy},
+		{WgPubKey: eagerKey, AllowedIps: []string{"100.64.0.3/32"}, LazyState: mgmProto.LazyState_LazyStateEager},
+	}
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name          string
+		force         lazyForce
+		remoteEnabled bool
+		want          map[string]bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name:  "account off: lazy-state peer lazy, normal + eager active",
+			force: lazyForceNone, remoteEnabled: false,
+			want: map[string]bool{normalKey: true, eagerKey: true},
+		},
+		{
+			name:  "account on: only eager-state peer active",
+			force: lazyForceNone, remoteEnabled: true,
+			want: map[string]bool{eagerKey: true},
+		},
+		{
+			name:  "force off: everything active",
+			force: lazyForceOff, remoteEnabled: true,
+			want: map[string]bool{normalKey: true, lazyKey: true, eagerKey: true},
+		},
+		{
+			name:  "force on: nothing active",
+			force: lazyForceOn, remoteEnabled: false,
+			want: map[string]bool{},
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			e := &Engine{connMgr: &ConnMgr{force: tt.force, remoteLazyEnabled: tt.remoteEnabled}}
+			got := e.toExcludedLazyPeers(nil, peers)
+
+			if len(got) != len(tt.want) {
+				t.Fatalf("toExcludedLazyPeers() = %v, want %v", got, tt.want)
+			}
+			for k := range tt.want {
+				if !got[k] {
+					t.Fatalf("expected peer %s excluded, got %v", k, got)
+				}
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}

client/internal/connect.go

@@ -257,10 +257,7 @@ func (c *ConnectClient) run(mobileDependency MobileDependency, runningChan chan
 		log.Errorf("failed to clean up temporary installer file: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	defer func() {
-		c.statusRecorder.SetSessionExpiresAt(time.Time{})
-		c.statusRecorder.ClientStop()
-	}()
+	defer c.statusRecorder.ClientStop()
 	operation := func() error {
 		// if context cancelled we not start new backoff cycle
 		if c.ctx.Err() != nil {

client/internal/dns/service_listener.go

@@ -292,16 +292,18 @@ func (s *serviceViaListener) generateFreePort() (uint16, error) {
 		return customPort, nil
 	}
 
-	probeListener, err := net.ListenUDP("udp4", &net.UDPAddr{})
+	udpAddr := net.UDPAddrFromAddrPort(netip.MustParseAddrPort("0.0.0.0:0"))
+	probeListener, err := net.ListenUDP("udp", udpAddr)
 	if err != nil {
 		log.Debugf("failed to bind random port for DNS: %s", err)
 		return 0, err
 	}
 
-	port := uint16(probeListener.LocalAddr().(*net.UDPAddr).Port)
-	if err = probeListener.Close(); err != nil {
+	addrPort := netip.MustParseAddrPort(probeListener.LocalAddr().String()) // might panic if address is incorrect
+	err = probeListener.Close()
+	if err != nil {
 		log.Debugf("failed to free up DNS port: %s", err)
 		return 0, err
 	}
-	return port, nil
+	return addrPort.Port(), nil
 }

client/internal/ebpf/ebpf/src/dns_fwd.c

@@ -52,14 +52,11 @@ int xdp_dns_fwd(struct iphdr  *ip, struct udphdr *udp) {
 
     if (udp->dest == GENERAL_DNS_PORT && ip->daddr == dns_ip) {
         udp->dest = dns_port;
-        // Clear the now-stale checksum; zero means "not computed" for IPv4.
-        udp->check = 0;
         return XDP_PASS;
     }
 
     if (udp->source == dns_port && ip->saddr == dns_ip) {
         udp->source = GENERAL_DNS_PORT;
-        udp->check = 0;
         return XDP_PASS;
     }
 

client/internal/ebpf/ebpf/src/wg_proxy.c

@@ -50,11 +50,5 @@ int xdp_wg_proxy(struct iphdr  *ip, struct udphdr *udp) {
     __be16 new_dst_port = htons(proxy_port);
     udp->dest = new_dst_port;
     udp->source = new_src_port;
-
-    // The ports are covered by the UDP checksum. This is an IPv4 loopback hop
-    // and the payload is already integrity-protected, so clear the checksum (a
-    // zero UDP checksum means "not computed" for IPv4) rather than leave a
-    // stale value the kernel would drop as UDP_CSUM.
-    udp->check = 0;
 	return XDP_PASS;
 }

client/internal/engine.go

@@ -803,7 +803,7 @@ func (e *Engine) blockLanAccess() {
 
 // modifyPeers updates peers that have been modified (e.g. IP address has been changed).
 // It closes the existing connection, removes it from the peerConns map, and creates a new one.
-func (e *Engine) modifyPeers(peersUpdate []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig) error {
+func (e *Engine) modifyPeers(peersUpdate []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig, forwardingRules []firewallManager.ForwardRule) error {
 
 	// first, check if peers have been modified
 	var modified []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig
@@ -842,7 +842,7 @@ func (e *Engine) modifyPeers(peersUpdate []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig) error {
 	}
 	// third, add the peer connections again
 	for _, p := range modified {
-		err := e.addNewPeer(p)
+		err := e.addNewPeer(p, forwardingRules)
 		if err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
@@ -1403,8 +1403,12 @@ func (e *Engine) updateNetworkMap(networkMap *mgmProto.NetworkMap) error {
 		return nil
 	}
 
-	if err := e.connMgr.UpdatedRemoteFeatureFlag(e.ctx, networkMap.GetPeerConfig().GetLazyConnectionEnabled()); err != nil {
-		log.Errorf("failed to update lazy connection feature flag: %v", err)
+	// Only update the flag when the sync carries a peer config; a nil peer config
+	// (e.g. a partial update) must not reset the cached flag to false.
+	if peerConfig := networkMap.GetPeerConfig(); peerConfig != nil {
+		if err := e.connMgr.UpdatedRemoteFeatureFlag(e.ctx, peerConfig.GetLazyConnectionEnabled()); err != nil {
+			log.Errorf("failed to update lazy connection feature flag: %v", err)
+		}
 	}
 
 	if e.firewall != nil {
@@ -1482,15 +1486,14 @@ func (e *Engine) updateNetworkMap(networkMap *mgmProto.NetworkMap) error {
 	e.updateOfflinePeers(networkMap.GetOfflinePeers())
 	done()
 
-	remotePeers, err := e.reconcilePeers(networkMap)
+	remotePeers, err := e.reconcilePeers(networkMap, forwardingRules)
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
 
 	// must set the exclude list after the peers are added. Without it the manager can not figure out the peers parameters from the store
 	done = e.phase("lazy_exclude")
-	excludedLazyPeers := e.toExcludedLazyPeers(forwardingRules, remotePeers)
-	e.connMgr.SetExcludeList(e.ctx, excludedLazyPeers)
+	e.connMgr.SetExcludeList(e.ctx, e.toExcludedLazyPeers(forwardingRules, remotePeers))
 	done()
 
 	e.networkSerial = serial
@@ -1500,8 +1503,10 @@ func (e *Engine) updateNetworkMap(networkMap *mgmProto.NetworkMap) error {
 
 // reconcilePeers applies the remote peer list from the network map (removing,
 // modifying and adding peers, then updating SSH config) and returns the remote
-// peers with our own peer filtered out, for use by later sync steps.
-func (e *Engine) reconcilePeers(networkMap *mgmProto.NetworkMap) ([]*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig, error) {
+// peers with our own peer filtered out, for use by later sync steps. The
+// forwarding rules are used to decide whether a newly added peer needs an
+// always-active connection.
+func (e *Engine) reconcilePeers(networkMap *mgmProto.NetworkMap, forwardingRules []firewallManager.ForwardRule) ([]*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig, error) {
 	// Filter out own peer from the remote peers list
 	localPubKey := e.config.WgPrivateKey.PublicKey().String()
 	remotePeers := make([]*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig, 0, len(networkMap.GetRemotePeers()))
@@ -1529,14 +1534,14 @@ func (e *Engine) reconcilePeers(networkMap *mgmProto.NetworkMap) ([]*mgmProto.Re
 	}
 
 	done = e.phase("modified_peers")
-	err = e.modifyPeers(remotePeers)
+	err = e.modifyPeers(remotePeers, forwardingRules)
 	done()
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
 	done = e.phase("added_peers")
-	err = e.addNewPeers(remotePeers)
+	err = e.addNewPeers(remotePeers, forwardingRules)
 	done()
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
@@ -1732,9 +1737,9 @@ func addrToString(addr netip.Addr) string {
 }
 
 // addNewPeers adds peers that were not know before but arrived from the Management service with the update
-func (e *Engine) addNewPeers(peersUpdate []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig) error {
+func (e *Engine) addNewPeers(peersUpdate []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig, forwardingRules []firewallManager.ForwardRule) error {
 	for _, p := range peersUpdate {
-		err := e.addNewPeer(p)
+		err := e.addNewPeer(p, forwardingRules)
 		if err != nil {
 			return err
 		}
@@ -1742,8 +1747,9 @@ func (e *Engine) addNewPeers(peersUpdate []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-// addNewPeer add peer if connection doesn't exist
-func (e *Engine) addNewPeer(peerConfig *mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig) error {
+// addNewPeer add peer if connection doesn't exist. A peer that is not lazy by
+// policy (or is a forwarder) gets an always-active connection instead.
+func (e *Engine) addNewPeer(peerConfig *mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig, forwardingRules []firewallManager.ForwardRule) error {
 	peerKey := peerConfig.GetWgPubKey()
 	peerIPs := make([]netip.Prefix, 0, len(peerConfig.GetAllowedIps()))
 	if _, ok := e.peerStore.PeerConn(peerKey); ok {
@@ -1777,7 +1783,7 @@ func (e *Engine) addNewPeer(peerConfig *mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig) error {
 		log.Warnf("error adding peer %s to status recorder, got error: %v", peerKey, err)
 	}
 
-	if exists := e.connMgr.AddPeerConn(e.ctx, peerKey, conn); exists {
+	if exists := e.connMgr.AddPeerConn(e.ctx, peerKey, conn, e.isPermanentPeer(peerConfig, forwardingRules)); exists {
 		conn.Close(false)
 		return fmt.Errorf("peer already exists: %s", peerKey)
 	}
@@ -2603,34 +2609,44 @@ func (e *Engine) updateForwardRules(rules []*mgmProto.ForwardingRule) ([]firewal
 	return forwardingRules, nberrors.FormatErrorOrNil(merr)
 }
 
+// toExcludedLazyPeers returns the peers that must have an always-active
+// connection, so the caller can reconcile the lazy manager's exclude list.
 func (e *Engine) toExcludedLazyPeers(rules []firewallManager.ForwardRule, peers []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig) map[string]bool {
 	excludedPeers := make(map[string]bool)
-
-	// Ingress forward targets: inbound forwarded traffic is initiated remotely and
-	// cannot wake a lazy connection, so the peer routing the target must stay
-	// permanently connected. AllowedIPs are already parsed on the peer conn, so
-	// reuse those typed prefixes instead of re-parsing the network map strings.
-	for _, r := range rules {
-		for _, p := range peers {
-			if e.peerRoutesAddr(p, r.TranslatedAddress) {
-				log.Infof("exclude forwarder peer from lazy connection: %s", p.GetWgPubKey())
-				excludedPeers[p.GetWgPubKey()] = true
-			}
+	for _, p := range peers {
+		if e.isPermanentPeer(p, rules) {
+			excludedPeers[p.GetWgPubKey()] = true
 		}
 	}
-
 	return excludedPeers
 }
 
-// peerRoutesAddr reports whether the peer is a router for addr, matched against
-// the peer's already-parsed AllowedIPs from the store (the same typed value the
-// lazy manager consumes) rather than re-parsing the network map strings.
-func (e *Engine) peerRoutesAddr(p *mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig, addr netip.Addr) bool {
-	prefixes, ok := e.peerStore.AllowedIPs(p.GetWgPubKey())
-	if !ok {
-		return false
+// isPermanentPeer reports whether a peer needs an always-active connection: it
+// is not lazy by policy (the per-peer lazy hint or account flag, subject to the
+// local override), or it is an ingress forward target. Inbound forwarded traffic
+// is initiated remotely and cannot wake a lazy connection, so the peer routing
+// the target must stay permanently connected.
+func (e *Engine) isPermanentPeer(p *mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig, rules []firewallManager.ForwardRule) bool {
+	if !e.connMgr.PeerLazyDefault(p.GetLazyState()) {
+		return true
 	}
-	return prefixesContain(prefixes, addr)
+
+	// Match against the incoming config's AllowedIPs rather than the peer store:
+	// isPermanentPeer runs in addNewPeer before the peer is in the store, so a
+	// store lookup would miss a forward target and register it as lazy.
+	prefixes := make([]netip.Prefix, 0, len(p.GetAllowedIps()))
+	for _, ipStr := range p.GetAllowedIps() {
+		if prefix, err := netip.ParsePrefix(ipStr); err == nil {
+			prefixes = append(prefixes, prefix)
+		}
+	}
+	for _, r := range rules {
+		if prefixesContain(prefixes, r.TranslatedAddress) {
+			log.Infof("exclude forwarder peer from lazy connection: %s", p.GetWgPubKey())
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
 }
 
 // prefixesContain reports whether addr falls within any of the prefixes.

client/internal/engine_lazy_exclude_test.go

@@ -49,7 +49,8 @@ func TestToExcludedLazyPeers_ForwardTarget(t *testing.T) {
 	store.AddPeerConn(targetPeerKey, newTestConn(t, targetPeerKey, "100.110.8.145/32"))
 	store.AddPeerConn(otherPeerKey, newTestConn(t, otherPeerKey, "100.110.9.10/32"))
 
-	e := &Engine{peerStore: store}
+	// Lazy on for normal peers, so the only exclusion under test is the forward target.
+	e := &Engine{peerStore: store, connMgr: &ConnMgr{force: lazyForceOn}}
 
 	peers := []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig{
 		{WgPubKey: targetPeerKey, AllowedIps: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}},
@@ -67,7 +68,8 @@ func TestToExcludedLazyPeers_ForwardTarget(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestToExcludedLazyPeers_NoRules(t *testing.T) {
-	e := &Engine{peerStore: peerstore.NewConnStore()}
+	// Lazy on for normal peers and no forward rules, so nothing is excluded.
+	e := &Engine{peerStore: peerstore.NewConnStore(), connMgr: &ConnMgr{force: lazyForceOn}}
 
 	peers := []*mgmProto.RemotePeerConfig{
 		{WgPubKey: "peer-a", AllowedIps: []string{"100.110.8.145/32"}},

client/internal/engine_session_deadline_test.go

@@ -75,14 +75,4 @@ func TestApplySessionDeadline_ThreeState(t *testing.T) {
 		require.True(t, e.statusRecorder.GetSessionExpiresAt().IsZero(),
 			"invalid timestamp must clear the deadline")
 	})
-
-	t.Run("recently expired timestamp stays visible as expired", func(t *testing.T) {
-		e := newEngine()
-		expired := time.Now().Add(-5 * time.Minute).UTC().Truncate(time.Second)
-
-		e.ApplySessionDeadline(timestamppb.New(expired))
-
-		require.True(t, e.statusRecorder.GetSessionExpiresAt().Equal(expired),
-			"recently-expired deadline must stay on the recorder so consumers render it as expired")
-	})
 }

client/internal/engine_test.go

@@ -279,7 +279,8 @@ func TestEngine_UpdateNetworkMap(t *testing.T) {
 	}, MobileDependency{})
 
 	wgIface := &MockWGIface{
-		NameFunc: func() string { return "utun102" },
+		NameFunc:            func() string { return "utun102" },
+		IsUserspaceBindFunc: func() bool { return true },
 		RemovePeerFunc: func(peerKey string) error {
 			return nil
 		},

client/internal/peer/status.go

@@ -813,14 +813,19 @@ func (d *Status) SetSessionExpiresAt(deadline time.Time) {
 }
 
 // GetSessionExpiresAt returns the most recently recorded SSO session deadline,
-// or the zero value when no deadline is tracked. A deadline in the past is
-// returned as-is: it means the session has expired, and consumers (tray row,
-// CLI status) render it as "expired" rather than hiding it — masking it as
-// "none" would blank the UI at the exact moment it should say the session
-// ended.
+// or the zero value when no deadline is tracked. A deadline that has already
+// slipped into the past reports as "none": once the session has expired it is
+// no longer a meaningful countdown, and the sessionwatch.Watcher does not
+// arm a timer at the deadline itself to clear it (only the two pre-expiry
+// warnings). Without this guard the UI would keep painting a stale
+// "expires in …" against a moment that has passed until the next login,
+// extend, or teardown rewrote the value.
 func (d *Status) GetSessionExpiresAt() time.Time {
 	d.mux.Lock()
 	defer d.mux.Unlock()
+	if !d.sessionExpiresAt.IsZero() && d.sessionExpiresAt.Before(time.Now()) {
+		return time.Time{}
+	}
 	return d.sessionExpiresAt
 }
 

client/internal/routemanager/dynamic/route.go

@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ func (r *Route) startResolver(ctx context.Context) {
 }
 
 func (r *Route) update(ctx context.Context) error {
-	resolved, err := r.resolveDomains(ctx)
+	resolved, err := r.resolveDomains()
 	if err != nil {
 		if len(resolved) == 0 {
 			return fmt.Errorf("resolve domains: %w", err)
@@ -199,9 +199,9 @@ func (r *Route) update(ctx context.Context) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-func (r *Route) resolveDomains(ctx context.Context) (domainMap, error) {
+func (r *Route) resolveDomains() (domainMap, error) {
 	results := make(chan resolveResult)
-	go r.resolve(ctx, results)
+	go r.resolve(results)
 
 	resolved := domainMap{}
 	var merr *multierror.Error
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ func (r *Route) resolveDomains(ctx context.Context) (domainMap, error) {
 	return resolved, nberrors.FormatErrorOrNil(merr)
 }
 
-func (r *Route) resolve(ctx context.Context, results chan resolveResult) {
+func (r *Route) resolve(results chan resolveResult) {
 	var wg sync.WaitGroup
 
 	for _, d := range r.route.Domains {
@@ -225,10 +225,10 @@ func (r *Route) resolve(ctx context.Context, results chan resolveResult) {
 		go func(domain domain.Domain) {
 			defer wg.Done()
 
-			ips, err := r.getIPsFromResolver(ctx, domain)
+			ips, err := r.getIPsFromResolver(domain)
 			if err != nil {
 				log.Tracef("Failed to resolve domain %s with private resolver: %v", domain.SafeString(), err)
-				ips, err = lookupHostIPs(ctx, domain)
+				ips, err = net.LookupIP(domain.PunycodeString())
 				if err != nil {
 					results <- resolveResult{domain: domain, err: fmt.Errorf("resolve d %s: %w", domain.SafeString(), err)}
 					return
@@ -364,20 +364,6 @@ func determinePrefixChanges(oldPrefixes, newPrefixes []netip.Prefix) (toAdd, toR
 	return
 }
 
-// lookupHostIPs resolves d via the system resolver, honoring ctx cancellation.
-func lookupHostIPs(ctx context.Context, d domain.Domain) ([]net.IP, error) {
-	addrs, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, d.PunycodeString())
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-
-	ips := make([]net.IP, 0, len(addrs))
-	for _, addr := range addrs {
-		ips = append(ips, addr.IP)
-	}
-	return ips, nil
-}
-
 func combinePrefixes(oldPrefixes, removedPrefixes, addedPrefixes []netip.Prefix) []netip.Prefix {
 	prefixSet := make(map[netip.Prefix]struct{})
 	for _, prefix := range oldPrefixes {

client/internal/routemanager/dynamic/route_generic.go

@@ -3,12 +3,11 @@
 package dynamic
 
 import (
-	"context"
 	"net"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
 )
 
-func (r *Route) getIPsFromResolver(ctx context.Context, domain domain.Domain) ([]net.IP, error) {
-	return lookupHostIPs(ctx, domain)
+func (r *Route) getIPsFromResolver(domain domain.Domain) ([]net.IP, error) {
+	return net.LookupIP(domain.PunycodeString())
 }

client/internal/routemanager/dynamic/route_ios.go

@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@
 package dynamic
 
 import (
-	"context"
 	"fmt"
 	"net"
 	"time"
@@ -17,7 +16,7 @@ import (
 
 const dialTimeout = 10 * time.Second
 
-func (r *Route) getIPsFromResolver(ctx context.Context, domain domain.Domain) ([]net.IP, error) {
+func (r *Route) getIPsFromResolver(domain domain.Domain) ([]net.IP, error) {
 	privateClient, err := nbdns.GetClientPrivate(r.wgInterface, r.resolverAddr.Addr(), dialTimeout)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("error while creating private client: %s", err)
@@ -33,7 +32,7 @@ func (r *Route) getIPsFromResolver(ctx context.Context, domain domain.Domain) ([
 		msg := new(dns.Msg)
 		msg.SetQuestion(fqdn, qtype)
 
-		response, _, err := nbdns.ExchangeWithFallback(ctx, privateClient, msg, r.resolverAddr.String())
+		response, _, err := nbdns.ExchangeWithFallback(nil, privateClient, msg, r.resolverAddr.String())
 		if err != nil {
 			if queryErr == nil {
 				queryErr = fmt.Errorf("DNS query for %s (type %d) after %s: %w", domain.SafeString(), qtype, time.Since(startTime), err)

client/internal/statemanager/manager.go

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 package statemanager
 
 import (
-	"bytes"
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
@@ -306,11 +305,6 @@ func (m *Manager) loadStateFile(deleteCorrupt bool) (map[string]json.RawMessage,
 
 	var rawStates map[string]json.RawMessage
 	if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &rawStates); err != nil {
-		if len(bytes.TrimSpace(data)) == 0 {
-			log.Warnf("state file %s is empty (%d bytes)", m.filePath, len(data))
-		} else {
-			log.Warnf("state file %s has malformed content (%d bytes)", m.filePath, len(data))
-		}
 		m.handleCorruptedState(deleteCorrupt)
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("unmarshal states: %w", err)
 	}

client/ios/NetBirdSDK/client.go

@@ -233,9 +233,6 @@ func (c *Client) DebugBundle(anonymize bool) (string, error) {
 		deps.SyncResponse = resp
 
 		if e := cc.Engine(); e != nil {
-			deps.RefreshStatus = func() {
-				e.RunHealthProbes(context.Background(), true)
-			}
 			if cm := e.GetClientMetrics(); cm != nil {
 				deps.ClientMetrics = cm
 			}

client/ios/NetBirdSDK/login.go

@@ -44,25 +44,10 @@ type Auth struct {
 // NewAuth instantiate Auth struct and validate the management URL
 func NewAuth(cfgPath string, mgmURL string) (*Auth, error) {
 	inputCfg := profilemanager.ConfigInput{
-		ConfigPath:    cfgPath,
 		ManagementURL: mgmURL,
 	}
 
-	// Load the existing config when a config file is already present so an
-	// interactive re-login reuses the peer's persisted WireGuard private key
-	// (and thus its identity) instead of generating a fresh one. Generating a
-	// new key registers a brand-new peer on the management server on every
-	// re-auth (named after the fallback hostname). Only fall back to a fresh
-	// in-memory config for the first-time login when no config file exists yet.
-	// DirectUpdateOrCreateConfig uses non-atomic writes so it also works inside
-	// the tvOS App Group sandbox where atomic temp-file+rename is blocked.
-	var cfg *profilemanager.Config
-	var err error
-	if cfgPath != "" {
-		cfg, err = profilemanager.DirectUpdateOrCreateConfig(inputCfg)
-	} else {
-		cfg, err = profilemanager.CreateInMemoryConfig(inputCfg)
-	}
+	cfg, err := profilemanager.CreateInMemoryConfig(inputCfg)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}

client/server/server.go

@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ func (s *Server) Start() error {
 		log.Warnf("failed to redirect stderr: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	if err := RestoreResidualState(s.rootCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
+	if err := restoreResidualState(s.rootCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
 		log.Warnf(errRestoreResidualState, err)
 	}
 
@@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ func (s *Server) Login(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.LoginRequest) (*pro
 	s.actCancel = cancel
 	s.mutex.Unlock()
 
-	if err := RestoreResidualState(s.rootCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
+	if err := restoreResidualState(s.rootCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
 		log.Warnf(errRestoreResidualState, err)
 	}
 
@@ -858,7 +858,7 @@ func (s *Server) Up(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.UpRequest) (*proto.UpR
 
 		return s.waitForUp(callerCtx)
 	}
-	if err := RestoreResidualState(callerCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
+	if err := restoreResidualState(callerCtx, s.profileManager.GetStatePath()); err != nil {
 		log.Warnf(errRestoreResidualState, err)
 	}
 
@@ -1081,10 +1081,7 @@ func (s *Server) Down(ctx context.Context, _ *proto.DownRequest) (*proto.DownRes
 
 	if err := s.cleanupConnection(); err != nil {
 		s.mutex.Unlock()
-		if errors.Is(err, ErrServiceNotUp) {
-			log.Debugf("Down called while service not up: %v", err)
-			return nil, err
-		}
+		// todo review to update the status in case any type of error
 		log.Errorf("failed to shut down properly: %v", err)
 		return nil, err
 	}
@@ -1157,7 +1154,7 @@ func (s *Server) cleanupConnection() error {
 	// making the run loop the sole owner of engine shutdown.
 	if engine != nil {
 		if err := engine.Stop(); err != nil {
-			log.Errorf("failed to stop engine during cleanup: %v", err)
+			return err
 		}
 	}
 

client/server/state.go

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ func (s *Server) CleanState(ctx context.Context, req *proto.CleanStateRequest) (
 
 	if req.All {
 		// Reuse existing cleanup logic for all states
-		if err := RestoreResidualState(ctx, statePath); err != nil {
+		if err := restoreResidualState(ctx, statePath); err != nil {
 			return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Internal, "failed to clean all states: %v", err)
 		}
 
@@ -113,9 +113,9 @@ func (s *Server) DeleteState(ctx context.Context, req *proto.DeleteStateRequest)
 	}, nil
 }
 
-// RestoreResidualState checks if the client was not shut down in a clean way and restores residual if required.
+// restoreResidualState checks if the client was not shut down in a clean way and restores residual if required.
 // Otherwise, we might not be able to connect to the management server to retrieve new config.
-func RestoreResidualState(ctx context.Context, statePath string) error {
+func restoreResidualState(ctx context.Context, statePath string) error {
 	if statePath == "" {
 		return nil
 	}

client/ssh/config/manager.go

@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ import (
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 
 	nbssh "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
 )
 
 const (
@@ -219,20 +218,11 @@ func (m *Manager) buildHostPatterns(peer PeerSSHInfo) []string {
 	if peer.IPv6.IsValid() {
 		hostPatterns = append(hostPatterns, peer.IPv6.String())
 	}
-	// Peer FQDNs and hostnames originate from remote peers, so they must be
-	// validated as plain DNS names before being embedded in the ssh_config
-	// "Match host" pattern list. This prevents injection of arbitrary
-	// ssh_config directives via embedded quotes, whitespace, newlines, the
-	// comma pattern separator, or the "*"/"?" pattern metacharacters.
-	if domain.IsValidDomainNoWildcard(peer.FQDN) {
+	if peer.FQDN != "" {
 		hostPatterns = append(hostPatterns, peer.FQDN)
-	} else if peer.FQDN != "" {
-		log.Warnf("skipping peer FQDN with invalid characters in SSH config: %q", peer.FQDN)
 	}
-	if peer.Hostname != peer.FQDN && domain.IsValidDomainNoWildcard(peer.Hostname) {
+	if peer.Hostname != "" && peer.Hostname != peer.FQDN {
 		hostPatterns = append(hostPatterns, peer.Hostname)
-	} else if peer.Hostname != "" && peer.Hostname != peer.FQDN {
-		log.Warnf("skipping peer hostname with invalid characters in SSH config: %q", peer.Hostname)
 	}
 	return hostPatterns
 }

client/ssh/config/manager_test.go

@@ -148,45 +148,6 @@ func TestManager_MatchHostFormat(t *testing.T) {
 		"should use Match host with comma-separated patterns")
 }
 
-func TestManager_HostPatternInjection(t *testing.T) {
-	tempDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "netbird-ssh-config-test")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	defer func() { assert.NoError(t, os.RemoveAll(tempDir)) }()
-
-	manager := &Manager{
-		sshConfigDir:  filepath.Join(tempDir, "ssh_config.d"),
-		sshConfigFile: "99-netbird.conf",
-	}
-
-	// A malicious peer FQDN/hostname attempts to break out of the Match host
-	// directive and inject arbitrary ssh_config (a ProxyCommand executing a
-	// command). It must be rejected, not written to the config.
-	peers := []PeerSSHInfo{
-		{
-			Hostname: "evil\"\n    ProxyCommand touch /tmp/pwned\nHost x",
-			IP:       netip.MustParseAddr("100.125.1.1"),
-			FQDN:     "evil\"\n    ProxyCommand touch /tmp/pwned\nHost x.nb.internal",
-		},
-		{Hostname: "peer2", IP: netip.MustParseAddr("100.125.1.2"), FQDN: "peer2.nb.internal"},
-	}
-
-	err = manager.SetupSSHClientConfig(peers)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	configPath := filepath.Join(manager.sshConfigDir, manager.sshConfigFile)
-	content, err := os.ReadFile(configPath)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	configStr := string(content)
-
-	assert.NotContains(t, configStr, "ProxyCommand touch /tmp/pwned",
-		"injected directive must not appear in generated config")
-	assert.NotContains(t, configStr, "evil",
-		"malicious pattern must be dropped entirely")
-	// The valid peer must still be present, on a single Match host line.
-	assert.Contains(t, configStr, "Match host \"100.125.1.1,100.125.1.2,peer2.nb.internal,peer2\"",
-		"valid peers must survive, injected patterns dropped")
-}
-
 func TestManager_ForcedSSHConfig(t *testing.T) {
 	// Set force environment variable
 	t.Setenv(EnvForceSSHConfig, "true")

client/ssh/server/getent_unix.go

@@ -69,8 +69,7 @@ func parseGetentPasswd(output string) (*user.User, string, error) {
 
 // validateGetentInput checks that the input is safe to pass to getent or id.
 // Allows POSIX usernames, numeric UIDs, and common NSS extensions
-// (@ for Kerberos, $ for Samba, + for NIS compat). A leading hyphen is
-// rejected so the input can never be parsed as a command-line flag.
+// (@ for Kerberos, $ for Samba, + for NIS compat).
 func validateGetentInput(input string) bool {
 	maxLen := 32
 	if runtime.GOOS == "linux" {
@@ -81,10 +80,6 @@ func validateGetentInput(input string) bool {
 		return false
 	}
 
-	if input[0] == '-' {
-		return false
-	}
-
 	for _, r := range input {
 		if isAllowedGetentChar(r) {
 			continue

client/ssh/server/getent_unix_test.go

@@ -157,9 +157,6 @@ func TestValidateGetentInput(t *testing.T) {
 		{"numeric UID", "1001", true},
 		{"dots and underscores", "alice.bob_test", true},
 		{"hyphen", "alice-bob", true},
-		{"leading hyphen rejected", "-i", false},
-		{"leading double hyphen rejected", "--no-idn", false},
-		{"lone hyphen rejected", "-", false},
 		{"kerberos principal", "user@REALM", true},
 		{"samba machine account", "MACHINE$", true},
 		{"NIS compat", "+user", true},

client/ui/autostart_default.go

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ func autostartDisabledByMDM(policy *mdm.Policy) bool {
 // netbirdFootprintExists reports whether the machine already carries NetBird
 // daemon config or state, meaning this is not a genuinely fresh install. It is
 // the update-safety gate for the autostart default: upgrading users always
-// have a footprint, so an update can never trigger a autostart entry write.
+// have a footprint, so an update can never trigger a login-item write.
 func netbirdFootprintExists() bool {
 	candidates := []string{
 		profilemanager.DefaultConfigPath,
@@ -69,23 +69,9 @@ func netbirdFootprintExists() bool {
 // applyAutostartDefault runs the one-time launch-on-login default for genuinely
 // fresh installs. The autostartInitialized marker is persisted before any
 // enable attempt so a crash mid-flow degrades to "never enabled" instead of
-// retrying autostart entry writes on every launch. A user's later disable in
+// retrying login-item writes on every launch. A user's later disable in
 // Settings is never overridden: the marker guarantees at-most-once, ever.
 func applyAutostartDefault(ctx context.Context, autostart *services.Autostart, prefs *preferences.Store, prefsFileExisted bool) {
-	mdmDisabled := autostartDisabledByMDM(mdm.LoadPolicy())
-
-	if mdmDisabled {
-		if enabled, err := autostart.IsEnabled(ctx); err != nil {
-			log.Warnf("MDM disableAutostart: read autostart state: %v", err)
-		} else if enabled {
-			if err := autostart.SetEnabled(ctx, false); err != nil {
-				log.Warnf("MDM disableAutostart: force off failed: %v", err)
-			} else {
-				log.Info("MDM disableAutostart enforced: autostart turned off")
-			}
-		}
-	}
-
 	priorFootprint := netbirdFootprintExists() || prefsFileExisted
 
 	if prefs.Get().AutostartInitialized {
@@ -98,7 +84,7 @@ func applyAutostartDefault(ctx context.Context, autostart *services.Autostart, p
 
 	state := autostartDefaultState{
 		supported:    autostart.Supported(ctx),
-		mdmDisabled:  mdmDisabled,
+		mdmDisabled:  autostartDisabledByMDM(mdm.LoadPolicy()),
 		priorInstall: priorFootprint,
 	}
 	enable, reason := shouldEnableAutostartDefault(state)

client/ui/frontend/src/components/empty-state/DaemonOutdatedOverlay.tsx

@@ -1,13 +1,10 @@
-import { useEffect, useState } from "react";
 import { useTranslation } from "react-i18next";
 import { AlertTriangleIcon, DownloadIcon } from "lucide-react";
 import { Browser } from "@wailsio/runtime";
-import { Version } from "@bindings/services";
 import { Button } from "@/components/buttons/Button";
 import { useStatus } from "@/contexts/StatusContext.tsx";
 
 const RELEASES_URL = "https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/releases/latest";
-const RC_RELEASES_URL = "https://pkgs.netbird.io/releases/rc";
 
 function openUrl(url: string) {
     Browser.OpenURL(url).catch(() => globalThis.open(url, "_blank"));
@@ -15,26 +12,7 @@ function openUrl(url: string) {
 
 export const DaemonOutdatedOverlay = () => {
     const { t } = useTranslation();
-    const { status, isDaemonOutdated } = useStatus();
-
-    const [guiVersion, setGuiVersion] = useState<string>("-");
-    const clientVersion = status?.daemonVersion ?? "—";
-
-    const isRc = /-rc/i.test(guiVersion) || /-rc/i.test(clientVersion);
-    const downloadUrl = isRc ? RC_RELEASES_URL : RELEASES_URL;
-
-    useEffect(() => {
-        if (!isDaemonOutdated) return;
-        let cancelled = false;
-        Version.GUI()
-            .then((v) => {
-                if (!cancelled) setGuiVersion(v);
-            })
-            .catch((err) => console.error("[DaemonOutdatedOverlay] GUI version error", err));
-        return () => {
-            cancelled = true;
-        };
-    }, [isDaemonOutdated]);
+    const { isDaemonOutdated } = useStatus();
 
     if (!isDaemonOutdated) return null;
 
@@ -60,37 +38,10 @@ export const DaemonOutdatedOverlay = () => {
                     <p className={"text-sm text-nb-gray-300"}>{t("daemon.outdated.description")}</p>
                 </div>
 
-                <div className={"flex flex-col items-center gap-0.5 text-center"}>
-                    <p className={"text-sm font-semibold text-nb-gray-100"}>
-                        {clientVersion === "development" ? (
-                            <span>
-                                {t("settings.about.clientName")}{" "}
-                                <span className={"font-mono text-yellow-400"}>
-                                    {t("settings.about.development")}
-                                </span>
-                            </span>
-                        ) : (
-                            t("settings.about.client", { version: clientVersion })
-                        )}
-                    </p>
-                    <p className={"text-sm font-medium text-nb-gray-250"}>
-                        {guiVersion === "development" ? (
-                            <span>
-                                {t("settings.about.guiName")}{" "}
-                                <span className={"font-mono text-yellow-400"}>
-                                    {t("settings.about.development")}
-                                </span>
-                            </span>
-                        ) : (
-                            t("settings.about.gui", { version: guiVersion })
-                        )}
-                    </p>
-                </div>
-
                 <div className={"wails-no-draggable"}>
-                    <Button variant={"primary"} size={"xs"} onClick={() => openUrl(downloadUrl)}>
+                    <Button variant={"primary"} size={"xs"} onClick={() => openUrl(RELEASES_URL)}>
                         <DownloadIcon size={14} />
-                        {t("daemon.outdated.download")}
+                        {t("update.card.getInstaller")}
                     </Button>
                 </div>
             </div>

client/ui/frontend/src/contexts/ProfileContext.tsx

@@ -28,7 +28,6 @@ type ProfileContextValue = {
     loaded: boolean;
     refresh: () => Promise<void>;
     switchProfile: (id: string) => Promise<void>;
-    switchProfileNoConnect: (id: string) => Promise<void>;
     addProfile: (name: string) => Promise<string>;
     removeProfile: (id: string) => Promise<void>;
     renameProfile: (id: string, newName: string) => Promise<void>;
@@ -113,16 +112,6 @@ export const ProfileProvider = ({ children }: { children: ReactNode }) => {
         [username, refresh],
     );
 
-    // Manage-profiles variant: switches without connecting, so the user can
-    // still adjust the management URL before bringing the connection up.
-    const switchProfileNoConnect = useCallback(
-        async (id: string) => {
-            await ProfileSwitcher.SwitchActiveNoConnect({ profileName: id, username });
-            await refresh();
-        },
-        [username, refresh],
-    );
-
     // addProfile creates a profile by display name and returns the
     // daemon-generated ID, so the caller can immediately address it by ID.
     const addProfile = useCallback(
@@ -169,7 +158,6 @@ export const ProfileProvider = ({ children }: { children: ReactNode }) => {
             loaded,
             refresh,
             switchProfile,
-            switchProfileNoConnect,
             addProfile,
             removeProfile,
             renameProfile,
@@ -183,7 +171,6 @@ export const ProfileProvider = ({ children }: { children: ReactNode }) => {
             loaded,
             refresh,
             switchProfile,
-            switchProfileNoConnect,
             addProfile,
             removeProfile,
             renameProfile,

client/ui/frontend/src/modules/profiles/ProfilesTab.tsx

@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ export function ProfilesTab() {
         activeProfileId,
         loaded,
         username,
-        switchProfileNoConnect,
+        switchProfile,
         addProfile,
         removeProfile,
         renameProfile,
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ export function ProfilesTab() {
             confirmLabel: t("profile.switch.confirm"),
         });
         if (!ok) return;
-        await guarded(i18next.t("profile.error.switchTitle"), () => switchProfileNoConnect(id));
+        await guarded(i18next.t("profile.error.switchTitle"), () => switchProfile(id));
     };
 
     const handleDeregister = async (id: string, name: string) => {
@@ -129,13 +129,14 @@ export function ProfilesTab() {
         await guarded(i18next.t("profile.error.createTitle"), async () => {
             const id = await addProfile(name);
             // SetConfig is keyed by the new profile's ID, so it writes the
-            // not-yet-active profile before the switch makes it current.
+            // not-yet-active profile. Write before switching so any reconnect
+            // targets the right deployment.
             if (!isNetbirdCloud(managementUrl)) {
                 await SettingsSvc.SetConfig(
                     new SetConfigParams({ profileName: id, username, managementUrl }),
                 );
             }
-            await switchProfileNoConnect(id);
+            await switchProfile(id);
         });
     };
 

client/ui/frontend/src/modules/session/SessionExpirationDialog.tsx

@@ -73,13 +73,6 @@ export default function SessionExpirationDialog() {
 
         let offCancel: (() => void) | undefined;
 
-        // Return the dialog to its interactive state and dismiss the browser popup
-        const resetDialog = () => {
-            offCancel?.();
-            WindowManager.CloseBrowserLogin().catch(console.error);
-            setBusy(false);
-        };
-
         try {
             const start = await Session.RequestExtend({ hint: "" });
             const uri = start.verificationUriComplete || start.verificationUri;
@@ -112,22 +105,25 @@ export default function SessionExpirationDialog() {
             if (outcome.kind === "cancel") {
                 waitPromise.cancel?.();
                 waitPromise.catch(() => {});
-                resetDialog();
                 return;
             }
 
             // Another surface owns this flow; keep the dialog open to retry.
             if (outcome.result.preempted) {
-                resetDialog();
                 return;
             }
-            WindowManager.CloseRenewFlow().catch(console.error);
+
+            // Close before the popup so the restore can't flash this window back.
+            WindowManager.CloseSessionExpiration().catch(console.error);
         } catch (e) {
-            resetDialog();
             await errorDialog({
                 Title: t("sessionExpiration.extendFailedTitle"),
                 Message: formatErrorMessage(e),
             });
+        } finally {
+            offCancel?.();
+            WindowManager.CloseBrowserLogin().catch(console.error);
+            setBusy(false);
         }
     }, [busy, t]);
 
@@ -143,11 +139,12 @@ export default function SessionExpirationDialog() {
             });
             WindowManager.CloseSessionExpiration().catch(console.error);
         } catch (e) {
-            setBusy(false);
             await errorDialog({
                 Title: t("sessionExpiration.logoutFailedTitle"),
                 Message: formatErrorMessage(e),
             });
+        } finally {
+            setBusy(false);
         }
     }, [busy, t]);
 

client/ui/frontend/src/modules/welcome/WelcomeStepTray.tsx

@@ -22,9 +22,6 @@ type WelcomeStepTrayProps = {
 export function WelcomeStepTray({ onContinue }: Readonly<WelcomeStepTrayProps>) {
     const { t } = useTranslation();
     const trayScreenshot = trayScreenshotForOS();
-    // macOS has no tray — the icon sits in the menu bar, so the copy says so.
-    const titleKey = isMacOS() ? "welcome.titleMac" : "welcome.title";
-    const descriptionKey = isMacOS() ? "welcome.descriptionMac" : "welcome.description";
 
     return (
         <>
@@ -39,9 +36,9 @@ export function WelcomeStepTray({ onContinue }: Readonly<WelcomeStepTrayProps>)
 
             <div className={"flex w-full flex-col gap-1"}>
                 <DialogHeading id={"nb-welcome-title"} align={"left"}>
-                    {t(titleKey)}
+                    {t("welcome.title")}
                 </DialogHeading>
-                <DialogDescription align={"left"}>{t(descriptionKey)}</DialogDescription>
+                <DialogDescription align={"left"}>{t("welcome.description")}</DialogDescription>
             </div>
 
             <DialogActions>

client/ui/i18n/locales/_index.json

@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@
         {"code": "fr", "displayName": "Français", "englishName": "French"},
         {"code": "it", "displayName": "Italiano", "englishName": "Italian"},
         {"code": "pt", "displayName": "Português", "englishName": "Portuguese"},
-        {"code": "zh-CN", "displayName": "简体中文", "englishName": "Simplified Chinese"},
-        {"code": "ja", "displayName": "日本語", "englishName": "Japanese"}
+        {"code": "zh-CN", "displayName": "简体中文", "englishName": "Simplified Chinese"}
     ]
 }

client/ui/i18n/locales/de/common.json

@@ -1034,15 +1034,9 @@
     "welcome.title": {
         "message": "Suchen Sie NetBird in der Taskleiste"
     },
-    "welcome.titleMac": {
-        "message": "Suchen Sie NetBird in der Menüleiste"
-    },
     "welcome.description": {
         "message": "NetBird läuft in Ihrer Taskleiste. Klicken Sie auf das Symbol, um sich zu verbinden, Profile zu wechseln oder die Einstellungen zu öffnen."
     },
-    "welcome.descriptionMac": {
-        "message": "NetBird läuft in Ihrer Menüleiste. Klicken Sie auf das Symbol, um sich zu verbinden, Profile zu wechseln oder die Einstellungen zu öffnen."
-    },
     "welcome.continue": {
         "message": "Weiter"
     },
@@ -1299,13 +1293,10 @@
         "message": "Dokumentation"
     },
     "daemon.outdated.title": {
-        "message": "NetBird Client ist veraltet"
+        "message": "NetBird-Dienst ist veraltet"
     },
     "daemon.outdated.description": {
-        "message": "Die neue GUI ist nicht mit Ihrem älteren Client kompatibel. Aktualisieren Sie Ihren Client, um die neue Anwendung zu verwenden."
-    },
-    "daemon.outdated.download": {
-        "message": "Neueste Version herunterladen"
+        "message": "Aktualisieren Sie den NetBird-Dienst, um diese App zu verwenden."
     },
     "error.jwt_clock_skew": {
         "message": "Anmeldung fehlgeschlagen: Die Uhr dieses Geräts ist nicht mit dem Server synchron. Bitte synchronisieren Sie die Systemuhr und versuchen Sie es erneut."

client/ui/i18n/locales/en/common.json

@@ -1377,19 +1377,11 @@
     },
     "welcome.title": {
         "message": "Look for NetBird in your tray",
-        "description": "Heading on the first onboarding step, pointing the user to the tray icon. Shown on Windows and Linux; macOS uses welcome.titleMac."
-    },
-    "welcome.titleMac": {
-        "message": "Look for NetBird in your menu bar",
-        "description": "Heading on the first onboarding step on macOS, pointing the user to the menu bar icon. Use your language's Apple term for the macOS menu bar."
+        "description": "Heading on the first onboarding step, pointing the user to the tray icon. 'tray' = system tray / menu bar."
     },
     "welcome.description": {
         "message": "NetBird lives in your tray. Click the icon to connect, switch profiles, or open settings.",
-        "description": "Body of the first onboarding step explaining the tray icon. Shown on Windows and Linux; macOS uses welcome.descriptionMac."
-    },
-    "welcome.descriptionMac": {
-        "message": "NetBird lives in your menu bar. Click the icon to connect, switch profiles, or open settings.",
-        "description": "Body of the first onboarding step on macOS explaining the menu bar icon. Use your language's Apple term for the macOS menu bar."
+        "description": "Body of the first onboarding step explaining the tray icon."
     },
     "welcome.continue": {
         "message": "Continue",
@@ -1732,16 +1724,12 @@
         "description": "Documentation link on the daemon-unavailable overlay."
     },
     "daemon.outdated.title": {
-        "message": "NetBird Client Is Outdated",
-        "description": "Title of the overlay shown when the NetBird client (daemon) is too old to drive this UI."
+        "message": "NetBird Service Is Outdated",
+        "description": "Title of the overlay shown when the NetBird background service is too old to drive this UI."
     },
     "daemon.outdated.description": {
-        "message": "The new GUI isn't compatible with the older NetBird client. Update your client to use the new application.",
-        "description": "Body of the daemon-outdated overlay explaining that the GUI is newer than the client and the client must be updated."
-    },
-    "daemon.outdated.download": {
-        "message": "Download Latest",
-        "description": "Button on the daemon-outdated overlay that opens the download page for the latest release."
+        "message": "Update the NetBird service to use this app.",
+        "description": "Body of the daemon-outdated overlay telling the user to upgrade the service."
     },
     "error.jwt_clock_skew": {
         "message": "Sign-in failed: this device's clock is out of sync with the server. Please sync your system clock and try again.",

client/ui/i18n/locales/es/common.json

@@ -1034,15 +1034,9 @@
     "welcome.title": {
         "message": "Busque NetBird en su bandeja del sistema"
     },
-    "welcome.titleMac": {
-        "message": "Busque NetBird en su barra de menús"
-    },
     "welcome.description": {
         "message": "NetBird reside en su bandeja del sistema. Haga clic en el icono para conectarse, cambiar de perfil o abrir la configuración."
     },
-    "welcome.descriptionMac": {
-        "message": "NetBird reside en su barra de menús. Haga clic en el icono para conectarse, cambiar de perfil o abrir la configuración."
-    },
     "welcome.continue": {
         "message": "Continuar"
     },
@@ -1299,13 +1293,10 @@
         "message": "Documentación"
     },
     "daemon.outdated.title": {
-        "message": "NetBird Client está desactualizado"
+        "message": "El servicio de NetBird está desactualizado"
     },
     "daemon.outdated.description": {
-        "message": "La nueva GUI no es compatible con su cliente anterior. Actualice su cliente para usar la nueva aplicación."
-    },
-    "daemon.outdated.download": {
-        "message": "Descargar la última versión"
+        "message": "Actualice el servicio de NetBird para usar esta aplicación."
     },
     "error.jwt_clock_skew": {
         "message": "Error al iniciar sesión: el reloj de este dispositivo no está sincronizado con el servidor. Sincronice el reloj del sistema e inténtelo de nuevo."

client/ui/i18n/locales/fr/common.json

@@ -1034,15 +1034,9 @@
     "welcome.title": {
         "message": "Cherchez NetBird dans votre barre d’état système"
     },
-    "welcome.titleMac": {
-        "message": "Cherchez NetBird dans votre barre des menus"
-    },
     "welcome.description": {
         "message": "NetBird se trouve dans votre barre d’état système. Cliquez sur l’icône pour vous connecter, changer de profil ou ouvrir les paramètres."
     },
-    "welcome.descriptionMac": {
-        "message": "NetBird se trouve dans votre barre des menus. Cliquez sur l’icône pour vous connecter, changer de profil ou ouvrir les paramètres."
-    },
     "welcome.continue": {
         "message": "Continuer"
     },
@@ -1299,13 +1293,10 @@
         "message": "Documentation"
     },
     "daemon.outdated.title": {
-        "message": "Le Client NetBird est obsolète"
+        "message": "Le service NetBird est obsolète"
     },
     "daemon.outdated.description": {
-        "message": "La nouvelle GUI n'est pas compatible avec votre ancien client. Mettez à jour votre client pour utiliser la nouvelle application."
-    },
-    "daemon.outdated.download": {
-        "message": "Télécharger la dernière version"
+        "message": "Mettez à jour le service NetBird pour utiliser cette application."
     },
     "error.jwt_clock_skew": {
         "message": "Échec de la connexion : l’horloge de cet appareil n’est pas synchronisée avec le serveur. Veuillez synchroniser l’horloge de votre système et réessayer."

client/ui/i18n/locales/hu/common.json

@@ -1034,15 +1034,9 @@
     "welcome.title": {
         "message": "Keresse a NetBirdöt a tálcán"
     },
-    "welcome.titleMac": {
-        "message": "Keresse a NetBirdöt a menüsorban"
-    },
     "welcome.description": {
         "message": "A NetBird a tálcán fut. Kattintson az ikonra a csatlakozáshoz, profilváltáshoz vagy a beállítások megnyitásához."
     },
-    "welcome.descriptionMac": {
-        "message": "A NetBird a menüsorban fut. Kattintson az ikonra a csatlakozáshoz, profilváltáshoz vagy a beállítások megnyitásához."
-    },
     "welcome.continue": {
         "message": "Folytatás"
     },
@@ -1299,13 +1293,10 @@
         "message": "Dokumentáció"
     },
     "daemon.outdated.title": {
-        "message": "A NetBird Kliens elavult"
+        "message": "A NetBird szolgáltatás elavult"
     },
     "daemon.outdated.description": {
-        "message": "Az új GUI nem kompatibilis a régebbi klienseddel. Frissítsd a klienst az új alkalmazás használatához."
-    },
-    "daemon.outdated.download": {
-        "message": "Legújabb letöltése"
+        "message": "Frissítsd a NetBird szolgáltatást az alkalmazás használatához."
     },
     "error.jwt_clock_skew": {
         "message": "A bejelentkezés sikertelen: az eszköz órája eltér a szerverétől. Kérjük, szinkronizálja a rendszer óráját, majd próbálja újra."

client/ui/i18n/locales/it/common.json

@@ -1034,15 +1034,9 @@
     "welcome.title": {
         "message": "Cerchi NetBird nella tray"
     },
-    "welcome.titleMac": {
-        "message": "Cerchi NetBird nella barra dei menu"
-    },
     "welcome.description": {
         "message": "NetBird risiede nella tray. Clicchi sull'icona per connettersi, cambiare profilo o aprire le impostazioni."
     },
-    "welcome.descriptionMac": {
-        "message": "NetBird risiede nella barra dei menu. Clicchi sull'icona per connettersi, cambiare profilo o aprire le impostazioni."
-    },
     "welcome.continue": {
         "message": "Continua"
     },
@@ -1299,13 +1293,10 @@
         "message": "Documentazione"
     },
     "daemon.outdated.title": {
-        "message": "NetBird Client è obsoleto"
+        "message": "Il servizio NetBird è obsoleto"
     },
     "daemon.outdated.description": {
-        "message": "La nuova GUI non è compatibile con il tuo client precedente. Aggiorna il client per usare la nuova applicazione."
-    },
-    "daemon.outdated.download": {
-        "message": "Scarica l'ultima versione"
+        "message": "Aggiorna il servizio NetBird per usare questa app."
     },
     "error.jwt_clock_skew": {
         "message": "Accesso non riuscito: l'orologio di questo dispositivo non è sincronizzato con il server. Sincronizzi l'orologio di sistema e riprovi."

client/ui/i18n/locales/pt/common.json

@@ -1034,15 +1034,9 @@
     "welcome.title": {
         "message": "Procure o NetBird na sua bandeja"
     },
-    "welcome.titleMac": {
-        "message": "Procure o NetBird na sua barra de menus"
-    },
     "welcome.description": {
         "message": "O NetBird fica na sua bandeja. Clique no ícone para conectar, alternar perfis ou abrir as configurações."
     },
-    "welcome.descriptionMac": {
-        "message": "O NetBird fica na sua barra de menus. Clique no ícone para conectar, alternar perfis ou abrir as configurações."
-    },
     "welcome.continue": {
         "message": "Continuar"
     },
@@ -1299,13 +1293,10 @@
         "message": "Documentação"
     },
     "daemon.outdated.title": {
-        "message": "O NetBird Client está desatualizado"
+        "message": "O serviço NetBird está desatualizado"
     },
     "daemon.outdated.description": {
-        "message": "A nova GUI não é compatível com o seu cliente mais antigo. Atualize o seu cliente para usar o novo aplicativo."
-    },
-    "daemon.outdated.download": {
-        "message": "Baixar a versão mais recente"
+        "message": "Atualize o serviço NetBird para usar este aplicativo."
     },
     "error.jwt_clock_skew": {
         "message": "Falha no login: o relógio deste dispositivo está fora de sincronia com o servidor. Sincronize o relógio do sistema e tente novamente."

client/ui/i18n/locales/ru/common.json

@@ -1034,15 +1034,9 @@
     "welcome.title": {
         "message": "Найдите NetBird в системном трее"
     },
-    "welcome.titleMac": {
-        "message": "Найдите NetBird в строке меню"
-    },
     "welcome.description": {
         "message": "NetBird находится в системном трее. Нажмите на значок, чтобы подключиться, переключить профиль или открыть настройки."
     },
-    "welcome.descriptionMac": {
-        "message": "NetBird находится в строке меню. Нажмите на значок, чтобы подключиться, переключить профиль или открыть настройки."
-    },
     "welcome.continue": {
         "message": "Продолжить"
     },
@@ -1299,13 +1293,10 @@
         "message": "Документация"
     },
     "daemon.outdated.title": {
-        "message": "Клиент NetBird устарел"
+        "message": "Служба NetBird устарела"
     },
     "daemon.outdated.description": {
-        "message": "Новый GUI несовместим с вашим более старым клиентом. Обновите клиент, чтобы использовать новое приложение."
-    },
-    "daemon.outdated.download": {
-        "message": "Скачать последнюю версию"
+        "message": "Обновите службу NetBird, чтобы использовать это приложение."
     },
     "error.jwt_clock_skew": {
         "message": "Не удалось войти: часы этого устройства рассинхронизированы с сервером. Синхронизируйте системные часы и повторите попытку."

client/ui/i18n/locales/zh-CN/common.json

@@ -1034,15 +1034,9 @@
     "welcome.title": {
         "message": "在托盘中查找 NetBird"
     },
-    "welcome.titleMac": {
-        "message": "在菜单栏中查找 NetBird"
-    },
     "welcome.description": {
         "message": "NetBird 驻留在您的托盘中。点击图标即可连接、切换配置文件或打开设置。"
     },
-    "welcome.descriptionMac": {
-        "message": "NetBird 驻留在您的菜单栏中。点击图标即可连接、切换配置文件或打开设置。"
-    },
     "welcome.continue": {
         "message": "继续"
     },
@@ -1299,13 +1293,10 @@
         "message": "文档"
     },
     "daemon.outdated.title": {
-        "message": "NetBird 客户端版本过旧"
+        "message": "NetBird 服务版本过旧"
     },
     "daemon.outdated.description": {
-        "message": "新版 GUI 与您较旧的客户端不兼容。请更新客户端以使用新应用。"
-    },
-    "daemon.outdated.download": {
-        "message": "下载最新版本"
+        "message": "请更新 NetBird 服务以使用此应用。"
     },
     "error.jwt_clock_skew": {
         "message": "登录失败：此设备的时钟与服务器不同步。请同步您的系统时钟后重试。"

client/ui/services/autostart.go

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/wailsapp/wails/v3/pkg/application"
 )
 
-// Autostart facade over Wails' AutostartManager. The OS autostart entry registration
+// Autostart facade over Wails' AutostartManager. The OS login-item registration
 // is the single source of truth; nothing is mirrored to preferences.
 type Autostart struct {
 	mgr *application.AutostartManager

client/ui/services/profileswitcher.go

@@ -12,15 +12,13 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
 )
 
-// ProfileSwitcher holds the switch policy shared by the tray and React
-// frontend so both flip profiles identically. SwitchActive (plain selection:
-// header dropdown, tray submenu) always connects after the switch;
-// SwitchActiveNoConnect (manage-profiles screen) never does, so the user can
-// still adjust the management URL before connecting. prevStatus from
-// DaemonFeed.Get at entry only decides the teardown:
+// ProfileSwitcher holds the reconnect policy shared by the tray and React
+// frontend so both flip profiles identically. The policy keys off prevStatus
+// from DaemonFeed.Get at SwitchActive entry:
 //
-//	Connected/Connecting/NeedsLogin/LoginFailed/SessionExpired → Down first.
-//	Idle → no Down.
+//	Connected/Connecting → Switch + Down + Up; optimistic Connecting paint.
+//	NeedsLogin/LoginFailed/SessionExpired → Switch + Down; clear stale error for re-login.
+//	Idle → Switch only.
 type ProfileSwitcher struct {
 	profiles   *Profiles
 	connection *Connection
@@ -31,40 +29,29 @@ func NewProfileSwitcher(profiles *Profiles, connection *Connection, feed *Daemon
 	return &ProfileSwitcher{profiles: profiles, connection: connection, feed: feed}
 }
 
-// SwitchActive switches to the named profile and always connects afterwards.
+// SwitchActive switches to the named profile applying the reconnect policy.
 func (s *ProfileSwitcher) SwitchActive(ctx context.Context, p ProfileRef) error {
-	return s.switchActive(ctx, p, true)
-}
-
-// SwitchActiveNoConnect switches to the named profile without connecting,
-// tearing down any existing connection first.
-func (s *ProfileSwitcher) SwitchActiveNoConnect(ctx context.Context, p ProfileRef) error {
-	return s.switchActive(ctx, p, false)
-}
-
-func (s *ProfileSwitcher) switchActive(ctx context.Context, p ProfileRef, connect bool) error {
 	prevStatus := ""
-	if s.feed != nil {
-		if st, err := s.feed.Get(ctx); err == nil {
-			prevStatus = st.Status
-		} else {
-			log.Warnf("profileswitcher: get status: %v", err)
-		}
+	if st, err := s.feed.Get(ctx); err == nil {
+		prevStatus = st.Status
+	} else {
+		log.Warnf("profileswitcher: get status: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	needsDown := strings.EqualFold(prevStatus, StatusConnected) ||
-		strings.EqualFold(prevStatus, StatusConnecting) ||
+	wasActive := strings.EqualFold(prevStatus, StatusConnected) ||
+		strings.EqualFold(prevStatus, StatusConnecting)
+	needsDown := wasActive ||
 		strings.EqualFold(prevStatus, StatusNeedsLogin) ||
 		strings.EqualFold(prevStatus, StatusLoginFailed) ||
 		strings.EqualFold(prevStatus, StatusSessionExpired)
 
-	log.Infof("profileswitcher: switch profile=%q prevStatus=%q connect=%v needsDown=%v",
-		p.ProfileName, prevStatus, connect, needsDown)
+	log.Infof("profileswitcher: switch profile=%q prevStatus=%q wasActive=%v needsDown=%v",
+		p.ProfileName, prevStatus, wasActive, needsDown)
 
-	// Optimistic Connecting paint plus stale-push suppression during Down (see
-	// DaemonFeed suppression table); also arms the login-watch that pops
-	// browser-login when the new profile turns out to need SSO.
-	if connect && s.feed != nil {
+	// Optimistic Connecting paint only when wasActive: those prevStatuses emit
+	// stale Connected + transient Idle pushes during Down that must be
+	// suppressed until Up resumes the stream (see DaemonFeed suppression table).
+	if wasActive {
 		s.feed.BeginProfileSwitch()
 	}
 
@@ -89,9 +76,9 @@ func (s *ProfileSwitcher) switchActive(ctx context.Context, p ProfileRef, connec
 		}
 	}
 
-	if connect {
+	if wasActive {
 		if err := s.connection.Up(ctx, UpParams(p)); err != nil {
-			return fmt.Errorf("connect %q: %w", p.ProfileName, err)
+			return fmt.Errorf("reconnect %q: %w", p.ProfileName, err)
 		}
 	}
 

client/ui/services/windowmanager.go

@@ -185,38 +185,37 @@ func (s *WindowManager) OpenBrowserLogin(uri string) {
 			startURL = "/#/dialog/browser-login?uri=" + url.QueryEscape(uri)
 		}
 		s.hideOtherWindowsLocked("browser-login")
+		// Prefer the main window's screen (multi-monitor); falls back to OS-default centering.
+		var screen *application.Screen
+		if s.mainWindow != nil {
+			if sc, err := s.mainWindow.GetScreen(); err == nil {
+				screen = sc
+			}
+		}
 		opts := DialogWindowOptions("browser-login", s.title("window.title.signIn"), startURL, s.linuxIcon)
 		// Not always-on-top: it would obscure the browser tab the user logs in through.
 		opts.AlwaysOnTop = false
 		opts.InitialPosition = application.WindowCentered
-		// Open on the active (where users cursor is) display, like the session-expiration dialog.
-		opts.Screen = s.getScreenBasedOnCursorPosition()
+		opts.Screen = screen
 		s.browserLogin = s.app.Window.NewWithOptions(opts)
 		bl := s.browserLogin
+		// Red-X close means cancel: emit the event so startLogin() tears down the SSO wait.
 		bl.OnWindowEvent(events.Common.WindowClosing, func(_ *application.WindowEvent) {
+			s.app.Event.Emit(EventBrowserLoginCancel)
 			s.mu.Lock()
-			// Only a live user red-X still has this registered; programmatic closers
-			// nil s.browserLogin first and clean up themselves. Guarding here stops a
-			// stale close event from wiping a replacement popup's state.
-			userClosed := s.browserLogin == bl
-			if userClosed {
-				s.browserLogin = nil
-				s.restoreHiddenWindowsLocked()
-			}
+			s.browserLogin = nil
+			s.restoreHiddenWindowsLocked()
 			s.mu.Unlock()
-			if userClosed {
-				s.app.Event.Emit(EventBrowserLoginCancel)
-			}
 		})
-		s.centerOnCursorScreen(s.browserLogin)
+		s.centerWhenReady(s.browserLogin)
 		return
 	}
 	if uri != "" {
 		s.browserLogin.SetURL("/#/dialog/browser-login?uri=" + url.QueryEscape(uri))
 	}
-	s.centerOnCursorScreen(s.browserLogin)
 	s.browserLogin.Show()
 	s.browserLogin.Focus()
+	s.centerWhenReady(s.browserLogin)
 }
 
 // BrowserLoginWindow returns the live SSO popup, or nil. While non-nil it is the
@@ -239,15 +238,6 @@ func (s *WindowManager) CloseBrowserLogin() {
 	s.mu.Lock()
 	w := s.browserLogin
 	s.browserLogin = nil
-	// The WindowClosing hook no-ops on a programmatic close, so restore here —
-	// but only if a popup was actually open. The frontend calls this even when no
-	// popup was ever shown (e.g. resetDialog() after an early RequestExtend failure,
-	// or connection.ts's catch path), and hiddenForLogin is shared with
-	// OpenInstallProgress, so an unconditional restore could re-show windows a
-	// still-running install-progress is hiding.
-	if w != nil {
-		s.restoreHiddenWindowsLocked()
-	}
 	s.mu.Unlock()
 	if w != nil {
 		w.Close()
@@ -289,35 +279,6 @@ func (s *WindowManager) CloseSessionExpiration() {
 	}
 }
 
-// CloseRenewFlow tears down the SSO session-renewal UI in a single call: it
-// closes the browser-login popup and the session-expiration window together.
-func (s *WindowManager) CloseRenewFlow() {
-	s.mu.Lock()
-	bl := s.browserLogin
-	se := s.sessionExpiration
-	s.browserLogin = nil
-	s.sessionExpiration = nil
-	if se != nil {
-		kept := s.hiddenForLogin[:0]
-		for _, w := range s.hiddenForLogin {
-			if w != se {
-				kept = append(kept, w)
-			}
-		}
-		s.hiddenForLogin = kept
-	}
-	s.restoreHiddenWindowsLocked()
-	s.mu.Unlock()
-
-	// Close after unlock so the re-entrant handlers can take s.mu.
-	if bl != nil {
-		bl.Close()
-	}
-	if se != nil {
-		se.Close()
-	}
-}
-
 // OpenInstallProgress shows the install-progress window and hides the rest for the duration
 // (restored on close). It owns its own result polling since the daemon restarts mid-install.
 func (s *WindowManager) OpenInstallProgress(version string) {

client/ui/tray.go

@@ -30,8 +30,6 @@ const (
 
 	statusError = "Error"
 
-	quitDownTimeout = 5 * time.Second
-
 	urlGitHubRepo     = "https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird"
 	urlGitHubReleases = "https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/releases/latest"
 	urlDocs           = "https://docs.netbird.io"
@@ -317,7 +315,8 @@ func (t *Tray) relayoutMenu() {
 		if sessionDeadline.IsZero() {
 			t.sessionExpiresItem.SetHidden(true)
 		} else {
-			t.sessionExpiresItem.SetLabel(t.sessionRowLabel(sessionDeadline))
+			remaining := t.formatSessionRemaining(time.Until(sessionDeadline))
+			t.sessionExpiresItem.SetLabel(t.loc.T("tray.session.expiresIn", "remaining", remaining))
 			t.sessionExpiresItem.SetHidden(false)
 		}
 	}
@@ -447,28 +446,11 @@ func (t *Tray) buildMenu() *application.Menu {
 	menu.AddSeparator()
 	menu.Add(t.loc.T("tray.menu.quit")).
 		SetAccelerator("CmdOrCtrl+Q").
-		OnClick(func(*application.Context) { t.handleQuit() })
+		OnClick(func(*application.Context) { t.app.Quit() })
 
 	return menu
 }
 
-func (t *Tray) handleQuit() {
-	t.profileMu.Lock()
-	if t.switchCancel != nil {
-		t.switchCancel()
-		t.switchCancel = nil
-	}
-	t.profileMu.Unlock()
-	t.svc.DaemonFeed.CancelProfileSwitch()
-
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), quitDownTimeout)
-	defer cancel()
-	if err := t.svc.Connection.Down(ctx); err != nil {
-		log.Errorf("disconnect on quit: %v", err)
-	}
-	t.app.Quit()
-}
-
 // handleConnect receives the clicked item from the buildMenu closure —
 // t.upItem is menuMu-guarded and must not be read here.
 func (t *Tray) handleConnect(upItem *application.MenuItem) {

client/ui/tray_session.go

@@ -64,42 +64,11 @@ func (t *Tray) applySessionExpiry(deadline *time.Time, connected bool) bool {
 	return changed
 }
 
-// runSessionExpiryTicker recomputes the "Expires in …" row label until process exit.
-// The interval scales with the remaining time: coarse when the deadline is far off,
-// down to 10s in the final two minutes so the label doesn't lag the ceiling-rounded
-// countdown near expiry. The cached deadline is re-read every iteration, so an extend
-// or reconnect that moves it is picked up on the next tick.
+// runSessionExpiryTicker recomputes the "Expires in …" row label every 30s. Runs until process exit.
 func (t *Tray) runSessionExpiryTicker() {
-	tm := time.NewTimer(sessionRefreshInterval(t.sessionRemaining()))
-	defer tm.Stop()
-	for range tm.C {
+	tk := time.NewTicker(30 * time.Second)
+	for range tk.C {
 		t.refreshSessionExpiresLabel()
-		tm.Reset(sessionRefreshInterval(t.sessionRemaining()))
-	}
-}
-
-// sessionRemaining returns the time left on the cached SSO deadline, or 0 when unknown.
-func (t *Tray) sessionRemaining() time.Duration {
-	t.sessionMu.Lock()
-	deadline := t.sessionExpiresAt
-	t.sessionMu.Unlock()
-	if deadline.IsZero() {
-		return 0
-	}
-	return time.Until(deadline)
-}
-
-// sessionRefreshInterval picks how long to wait before the next label recompute.
-func sessionRefreshInterval(remaining time.Duration) time.Duration {
-	switch {
-	case remaining <= 0:
-		return 30 * time.Second
-	case remaining <= 2*time.Minute:
-		return 10 * time.Second
-	case remaining <= time.Hour:
-		return 30 * time.Second
-	default:
-		return time.Minute
 	}
 }
 
@@ -118,39 +87,30 @@ func (t *Tray) refreshSessionExpiresLabel() {
 	if deadline.IsZero() {
 		return
 	}
-	item.SetLabel(t.sessionRowLabel(deadline))
-}
-
-func (t *Tray) sessionRowLabel(deadline time.Time) string {
-	remaining := time.Until(deadline)
-	if remaining <= 0 {
-		return t.loc.T("tray.status.sessionExpired")
-	}
-	return t.loc.T("tray.session.expiresIn", "remaining", t.formatSessionRemaining(remaining))
+	remaining := t.formatSessionRemaining(time.Until(deadline))
+	item.SetLabel(t.loc.T("tray.session.expiresIn", "remaining", remaining))
 }
 
 // formatSessionRemaining renders d as a localised long-form string picking the largest non-zero unit.
-// Each unit is rounded up so the label never claims less time than actually remains, matching the
-// upper-bound sense of the sub-minute "less than a minute" fragment.
 // Singular/plural keys are split per language for proper translation.
 func (t *Tray) formatSessionRemaining(d time.Duration) string {
 	switch {
 	case d < time.Minute:
 		return t.loc.T("tray.session.unit.lessThanMinute")
-	case d <= 59*time.Minute:
-		m := ceilDiv(d, time.Minute)
+	case d < time.Hour:
+		m := int(d / time.Minute)
 		if m == 1 {
 			return t.loc.T("tray.session.unit.minute")
 		}
 		return t.loc.T("tray.session.unit.minutes", "count", strconv.Itoa(m))
-	case d <= 23*time.Hour:
-		h := ceilDiv(d, time.Hour)
+	case d < 24*time.Hour:
+		h := int((d + 30*time.Minute) / time.Hour)
 		if h == 1 {
 			return t.loc.T("tray.session.unit.hour")
 		}
 		return t.loc.T("tray.session.unit.hours", "count", strconv.Itoa(h))
 	default:
-		days := ceilDiv(d, 24*time.Hour)
+		days := int((d + 12*time.Hour) / (24 * time.Hour))
 		if days == 1 {
 			return t.loc.T("tray.session.unit.day")
 		}
@@ -158,11 +118,6 @@ func (t *Tray) formatSessionRemaining(d time.Duration) string {
 	}
 }
 
-// ceilDiv divides d by unit rounding up, assuming d > 0.
-func ceilDiv(d, unit time.Duration) int {
-	return int((d + unit - time.Nanosecond) / unit)
-}
-
 // registerSessionWarningCategory wires the OS notification category and response handler for the expiry warning.
 // Errors are swallowed since the worst case is a plain notification without buttons.
 func (t *Tray) registerSessionWarningCategory() {
@@ -297,9 +252,11 @@ func (t *Tray) openSessionExpiration() {
 }
 
 // openSessionExtendFlow opens the SessionExpiration window seeded with the cached deadline's remaining time,
-// for the "Expires in …" tray row. Once the deadline has elapsed the row reads "Session expired" and the
-// click routes to the login flow instead. No-op when the deadline is unknown.
+// for the "Expires in …" tray row. No-ops when the deadline is unknown or elapsed.
 func (t *Tray) openSessionExtendFlow() {
+	if t.svc.WindowManager == nil {
+		return
+	}
 	t.sessionMu.Lock()
 	deadline := t.sessionExpiresAt
 	t.sessionMu.Unlock()
@@ -308,14 +265,6 @@ func (t *Tray) openSessionExtendFlow() {
 	}
 	seconds := int(time.Until(deadline).Seconds())
 	if seconds <= 0 {
-		if t.window != nil {
-			t.window.SetURL("/#/login")
-			t.window.Show()
-			t.window.Focus()
-		}
-		return
-	}
-	if t.svc.WindowManager == nil {
 		return
 	}
 	t.svc.WindowManager.OpenSessionExpiration(seconds)

combined/cmd/config.go

@@ -145,7 +145,6 @@ type AuthConfig struct {
 	CLIRedirectURIs                 []string          `yaml:"cliRedirectURIs"`
 	Owner                           *AuthOwnerConfig  `yaml:"owner,omitempty"`
 	DashboardPostLogoutRedirectURIs []string          `yaml:"dashboardPostLogoutRedirectURIs"`
-	GrantTypes                      []string          `yaml:"grantTypes"`
 }
 
 // AuthStorageConfig contains auth storage settings
@@ -605,7 +604,6 @@ func (c *CombinedConfig) buildEmbeddedIdPConfig(mgmt ManagementConfig) (*idp.Emb
 		DashboardRedirectURIs:           mgmt.Auth.DashboardRedirectURIs,
 		CLIRedirectURIs:                 mgmt.Auth.CLIRedirectURIs,
 		DashboardPostLogoutRedirectURIs: mgmt.Auth.DashboardPostLogoutRedirectURIs,
-		GrantTypes:                      mgmt.Auth.GrantTypes,
 	}
 
 	if mgmt.Auth.Owner != nil && mgmt.Auth.Owner.Email != "" {

combined/cmd/root.go

@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ func (s *serverInstances) createRelayServer(cfg *CombinedConfig, tlsSupport bool
 	}
 
 	hashedSecret := sha256.Sum256([]byte(cfg.Relay.AuthSecret))
-	authenticator := auth.NewTimedHMACValidator(hashedSecret[:])
+	authenticator := auth.NewTimedHMACValidator(hashedSecret[:], 24*time.Hour)
 
 	relayCfg := relayServer.Config{
 		Meter:          s.metricsServer.Meter,

docs/io.netbird.client.plist

@@ -66,9 +66,6 @@
     <key>disableAutoConnect</key>
     <false/>
 
-    <key>disableAutostart</key>
-    <false/>
-
     <key>disableClientRoutes</key>
     <false/>
 

docs/netbird-macos.mobileconfig

@@ -103,8 +103,6 @@
                                 <!--
                                 <key>disableAutoConnect</key>
                                 <false/>
-                                <key>disableAutostart</key>
-                                <false/>
                                 <key>disableClientRoutes</key>
                                 <false/>
                                 <key>disableServerRoutes</key>

docs/netbird-macos.sh

@@ -58,7 +58,6 @@ preSharedKey="$NULL"                       # secret; redacted in log
 allowServerSSH='true'
 blockInbound="$NULL"
 disableAutoConnect="$NULL"
-disableAutostart="$NULL"
 disableClientRoutes="$NULL"
 disableServerRoutes="$NULL"
 disableMetricsCollection="$NULL"
@@ -156,7 +155,6 @@ main() {
   is_set "$allowServerSSH"            && emit_bool    allowServerSSH            "$allowServerSSH"
   is_set "$blockInbound"              && emit_bool    blockInbound              "$blockInbound"
   is_set "$disableAutoConnect"        && emit_bool    disableAutoConnect        "$disableAutoConnect"
-  is_set "$disableAutostart"          && emit_bool    disableAutostart          "$disableAutostart"
   is_set "$disableClientRoutes"       && emit_bool    disableClientRoutes       "$disableClientRoutes"
   is_set "$disableServerRoutes"       && emit_bool    disableServerRoutes       "$disableServerRoutes"
   is_set "$disableMetricsCollection"  && emit_bool    disableMetricsCollection  "$disableMetricsCollection"

docs/netbird.adml

@@ -24,9 +24,6 @@
       <string id="DisableAutoConnect_Name">Disable auto-connect</string>
       <string id="DisableAutoConnect_Help">When enabled, the NetBird tunnel does not auto-connect at daemon startup. Equivalent to --disable-auto-connect.</string>
 
-      <string id="DisableAutostart_Name">Disable autostart</string>
-      <string id="DisableAutostart_Help">When enabled, the NetBird GUI is prevented from registering itself as an OS autostart entry on fresh installs, and any existing OS autostart entry registration is removed on the next GUI launch (Windows Registry Run key, macOS Login Item, Linux .desktop). Once the admin lifts the policy, the setting stays off until the user re-enables it in Settings.</string>
-
       <string id="DisableClientRoutes_Name">Disable client routes</string>
       <string id="DisableClientRoutes_Help">When enabled, this client will not consume routes advertised by routing peers. Equivalent to --disable-client-routes.</string>
 

docs/netbird.admx

@@ -64,18 +64,6 @@
       <disabledValue><decimal value="0" /></disabledValue>
     </policy>
 
-    <policy name="DisableAutostart"
-            class="Machine"
-            displayName="$(string.DisableAutostart_Name)"
-            explainText="$(string.DisableAutostart_Help)"
-            key="Software\Policies\NetBird"
-            valueName="DisableAutostart">
-      <parentCategory ref="NetBird" />
-      <supportedOn ref="SUPPORTED_NetBird_All" />
-      <enabledValue><decimal value="1" /></enabledValue>
-      <disabledValue><decimal value="0" /></disabledValue>
-    </policy>
-
     <policy name="DisableClientRoutes"
             class="Machine"
             displayName="$(string.DisableClientRoutes_Name)"

e2e/agentnetwork/chat_test.go

@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ func availableProviders() []providerCase {
 		if region == "" {
 			region = "us-east-1"
 		}
-		ps = append(ps, providerCase{name: "bedrock", catalogID: "bedrock_api", upstream: "https://bedrock-runtime." + region + ".amazonaws.com", apiKey: k, model: "us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5", kind: harness.WireBedrock})
+		ps = append(ps, providerCase{name: "bedrock", catalogID: "bedrock_api", upstream: "https://bedrock-runtime." + region + ".amazonaws.com", apiKey: k, model: "us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5", kind: harness.WireMessages})
 	}
 	return ps
 }
@@ -224,12 +224,9 @@ func TestProvidersMatrix(t *testing.T) {
 				var c int
 				var b string
 				var cerr error
-				switch pc.kind {
-				case harness.WireVertex:
+				if pc.kind == harness.WireVertex {
 					c, b, cerr = cl.Vertex(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc.project, pc.region, pc.model, "Reply with exactly: pong", sessionID)
-				case harness.WireBedrock:
-					c, b, cerr = cl.Bedrock(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc.model, "Reply with exactly: pong", sessionID)
-				default:
+				} else {
 					c, b, cerr = cl.Chat(ctx, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc.kind, pc.model, "Reply with exactly: pong", sessionID)
 				}
 				if cerr == nil {

e2e/agentnetwork/guardrail_test.go

@@ -1,168 +0,0 @@
-//go:build e2e
-
-package agentnetwork
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"strings"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/e2e/harness"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/api"
-)
-
-// catalogModel returns the normalized catalog id the proxy stamps for a
-// path-routed provider's configured model — the form the guardrail allowlist is
-// compared against (region prefix / @version stripped).
-func catalogModel(pc providerCase) string {
-	switch pc.kind {
-	case harness.WireBedrock:
-		return strings.TrimPrefix(pc.model, "us.")
-	case harness.WireVertex:
-		return strings.SplitN(pc.model, "@", 2)[0]
-	default:
-		return pc.model
-	}
-}
-
-// disallowedModel returns a valid-shaped model id for the provider that is NOT
-// the configured/allowed one, so the guardrail must reject it before the
-// request ever reaches the upstream.
-func disallowedModel(pc providerCase) string {
-	switch pc.kind {
-	case harness.WireBedrock:
-		return "us.anthropic.claude-opus-4-8"
-	case harness.WireVertex:
-		return "claude-opus-4-8@20250101"
-	default:
-		return "unlisted-model"
-	}
-}
-
-// sendModel drives one request for the given model through the provider's native
-// wire shape and returns the HTTP status.
-func sendModel(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T, cl *harness.Client, endpoint, proxyIP string, pc providerCase, model string) int {
-	t.Helper()
-	var code int
-	var err error
-	switch pc.kind {
-	case harness.WireBedrock:
-		code, _, err = cl.Bedrock(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
-	case harness.WireVertex:
-		code, _, err = cl.Vertex(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, pc.project, pc.region, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
-	default:
-		code, _, err = cl.Chat(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, pc.kind, model, "Reply with exactly: pong", "")
-	}
-	require.NoError(t, err, "request must reach the proxy for %s", pc.name)
-	return code
-}
-
-// TestModelAllowlistEnforced provisions a Model Allowlist guardrail limiting each
-// path-routed provider (Bedrock, Vertex) to its configured model, then drives
-// requests over the tunnel: the allowed model returns 200 while a model outside
-// the allowlist is denied 403 by the guardrail before it reaches the upstream.
-// This is the coverage missing for #6751 — the model for these providers travels
-// in the URL path, and the allowlist must be enforced there.
-func TestModelAllowlistEnforced(t *testing.T) {
-	var providers []providerCase
-	for _, pc := range availableProviders() {
-		if pc.kind == harness.WireBedrock || pc.kind == harness.WireVertex {
-			providers = append(providers, pc)
-		}
-	}
-	if len(providers) == 0 {
-		t.Skip("no path-routed provider keys set (AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK / GOOGLE_VERTEX_*); source ~/.llm-keys")
-	}
-
-	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 20*time.Minute)
-	defer cancel()
-
-	grp, err := srv.API().Groups.Create(ctx, api.PostApiGroupsJSONRequestBody{Name: "e2e-allowlist"})
-	require.NoError(t, err, "create group")
-	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.API().Groups.Delete(context.Background(), grp.Id) })
-
-	ephemeral := false
-	sk, err := srv.API().SetupKeys.Create(ctx, api.PostApiSetupKeysJSONRequestBody{
-		Name:       "e2e-allowlist-client",
-		Type:       "reusable",
-		ExpiresIn:  86400,
-		UsageLimit: 0,
-		AutoGroups: []string{grp.Id},
-		Ephemeral:  &ephemeral,
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err, "mint setup key")
-
-	// Providers with their configured (allowed) models; the first bootstraps the cluster.
-	ids := make([]string, 0, len(providers))
-	allowed := make([]string, 0, len(providers))
-	for i, pc := range providers {
-		req := providerRequest(pc)
-		if i == 0 {
-			req.BootstrapCluster = ptr(harness.AgentNetworkCluster)
-		}
-		prov, perr := srv.CreateProvider(ctx, req)
-		require.NoError(t, perr, "create provider %s", pc.name)
-		id := prov.Id
-		ids = append(ids, id)
-		allowed = append(allowed, catalogModel(pc))
-		t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteProvider(context.Background(), id) })
-	}
-
-	// Guardrail allowlisting exactly the configured models.
-	var gr api.AgentNetworkGuardrailRequest
-	gr.Name = "e2e-allowlist"
-	gr.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Enabled = true
-	gr.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Models = allowed
-	guard, err := srv.CreateGuardrail(ctx, gr)
-	require.NoError(t, err, "create guardrail")
-	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteGuardrail(context.Background(), guard.Id) })
-
-	enabled := true
-	pol, err := srv.CreatePolicy(ctx, api.AgentNetworkPolicyRequest{
-		Name:                   "e2e-allowlist",
-		Enabled:                &enabled,
-		SourceGroups:           []string{grp.Id},
-		DestinationProviderIds: ids,
-		GuardrailIds:           &[]string{guard.Id},
-	})
-	require.NoError(t, err, "create policy")
-	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeletePolicy(context.Background(), pol.Id) })
-
-	settings, err := srv.GetSettings(ctx)
-	require.NoError(t, err, "read settings for endpoint")
-	require.NotEmpty(t, settings.Endpoint, "agent-network endpoint must be assigned")
-
-	proxyToken, err := srv.CreateProxyTokenCLI(ctx, "e2e-proxy-allowlist")
-	require.NoError(t, err, "mint proxy token via CLI")
-	px, err := harness.StartProxy(ctx, srv, proxyToken)
-	require.NoError(t, err, "start proxy")
-	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = px.Terminate(context.Background()) })
-
-	cl, err := harness.StartClient(ctx, srv, sk.Key)
-	require.NoError(t, err, "start client")
-	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = cl.Terminate(context.Background()) })
-
-	require.NoError(t, cl.WaitConnected(ctx, 90*time.Second), "client must connect to management")
-	if err := cl.WaitProxyPeer(ctx, 180*time.Second); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("client did not see the proxy peer: %v\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", err, px.Logs(context.Background()))
-	}
-	proxyIP, err := cl.ResolveProxyIP(ctx, settings.Endpoint)
-	require.NoError(t, err, "resolve agent-network endpoint to proxy IP")
-
-	for _, pc := range providers {
-		pc := pc
-		t.Run(pc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			// The admin's allowlisted model is served end to end.
-			assert.Equal(t, 200, sendModel(ctx, t, cl, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc, pc.model),
-				"allowlisted model must be permitted for %s", pc.name)
-			// A model outside the allowlist is rejected by the guardrail (before
-			// the upstream), regardless of whether it is a real catalog model.
-			assert.Equal(t, 403, sendModel(ctx, t, cl, settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, pc, disallowedModel(pc)),
-				"model outside the allowlist must be denied for %s", pc.name)
-		})
-	}
-}

e2e/harness/agentnetwork.go

@@ -107,17 +107,6 @@ func (c *Combined) DeletePolicy(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
 	return anDelete(ctx, c, "/api/agent-network/policies/"+id)
 }
 
-// CreateGuardrail creates an agent-network guardrail (e.g. a model allowlist)
-// that can then be attached to a policy via its GuardrailIds.
-func (c *Combined) CreateGuardrail(ctx context.Context, req api.AgentNetworkGuardrailRequest) (api.AgentNetworkGuardrail, error) {
-	return anRequest[api.AgentNetworkGuardrail](ctx, c, http.MethodPost, "/api/agent-network/guardrails", req)
-}
-
-// DeleteGuardrail removes a guardrail by id.
-func (c *Combined) DeleteGuardrail(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
-	return anDelete(ctx, c, "/api/agent-network/guardrails/"+id)
-}
-
 // GetSettings returns the account's agent-network settings row. It exists only
 // after the first provider create bootstraps it.
 func (c *Combined) GetSettings(ctx context.Context) (api.AgentNetworkSettings, error) {

e2e/harness/client.go

@@ -194,11 +194,6 @@ const (
 	// WireVertex is the Anthropic-on-Vertex rawPredict shape: the client posts
 	// the full Vertex model path and the proxy mints the SA OAuth token.
 	WireVertex = "vertex"
-	// WireBedrock is the native AWS Bedrock InvokeModel shape: the model id
-	// travels in the URL path (/model/{id}/invoke), not the body, so the proxy
-	// routes by path. This is what a Bedrock SDK client sends and the shape the
-	// model-allowlist guardrail must enforce.
-	WireBedrock = "bedrock"
 )
 
 // Chat issues a chat-completion POST to the agent-network endpoint over the
@@ -231,17 +226,6 @@ func (cl *Client) Vertex(ctx context.Context, endpoint, proxyIP, project, region
 	return cl.post(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, path, body, withSessionID(nil, sessionID))
 }
 
-// Bedrock issues a native AWS Bedrock InvokeModel POST over the tunnel. The
-// model id is carried in the request path (/model/{id}/invoke), so the proxy
-// routes by path; the body uses the bedrock anthropic_version rather than a
-// model field. A non-empty sessionID is sent as the universal x-session-id
-// header the proxy records.
-func (cl *Client) Bedrock(ctx context.Context, endpoint, proxyIP, model, prompt, sessionID string) (int, string, error) {
-	path := "/model/" + model + "/invoke"
-	body := fmt.Sprintf(`{"anthropic_version":"bedrock-2023-05-31","max_tokens":64,"messages":[{"role":"user","content":%q}]}`, prompt)
-	return cl.post(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, path, body, withSessionID(nil, sessionID))
-}
-
 // withSessionID appends the x-session-id header when sessionID is non-empty.
 func withSessionID(headers []string, sessionID string) []string {
 	if sessionID == "" {

go.mod

@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ require (
 	github.com/ti-mo/conntrack v0.5.1
 	github.com/ti-mo/netfilter v0.5.2
 	github.com/vmihailenco/msgpack/v5 v5.4.1
-	github.com/wailsapp/wails/v3 v3.0.0-alpha2.117
+	github.com/wailsapp/wails/v3 v3.0.0-alpha2.111
 	github.com/yusufpapurcu/wmi v1.2.4
 	github.com/zcalusic/sysinfo v1.1.3
 	go.opentelemetry.io/contrib/instrumentation/google.golang.org/grpc/otelgrpc v0.67.0
@@ -303,6 +303,7 @@ require (
 	github.com/tklauser/numcpus v0.10.0 // indirect
 	github.com/vishvananda/netns v0.0.5 // indirect
 	github.com/vmihailenco/tagparser/v2 v2.0.0 // indirect
+	github.com/wailsapp/wails/webview2 v1.0.27 // indirect
 	github.com/wlynxg/anet v0.0.5 // indirect
 	github.com/x448/float16 v0.8.4 // indirect
 	github.com/zeebo/blake3 v0.2.3 // indirect
@@ -334,7 +335,7 @@ replace github.com/cloudflare/circl => codeberg.org/cunicu/circl v0.0.0-20230801
 
 replace github.com/pion/ice/v4 => github.com/netbirdio/ice/v4 v4.0.0-20250908184934-6202be846b51
 
-replace github.com/dexidp/dex => github.com/netbirdio/dex v0.244.1-0.20260716205454-a163de3129e5
+replace github.com/dexidp/dex => github.com/netbirdio/dex v0.244.1-0.20260512110716-8d70ad8647c1
 
 replace github.com/dexidp/dex/api/v2 => github.com/netbirdio/dex/api/v2 v2.0.0-20260512110716-8d70ad8647c1
 

go.sum

@@ -476,8 +476,8 @@ github.com/morikuni/aec v1.0.0 h1:nP9CBfwrvYnBRgY6qfDQkygYDmYwOilePFkwzv4dU8A=
 github.com/morikuni/aec v1.0.0/go.mod h1:BbKIizmSmc5MMPqRYbxO4ZU0S0+P200+tUnFx7PXmsc=
 github.com/munnerz/goautoneg v0.0.0-20191010083416-a7dc8b61c822 h1:C3w9PqII01/Oq1c1nUAm88MOHcQC9l5mIlSMApZMrHA=
 github.com/munnerz/goautoneg v0.0.0-20191010083416-a7dc8b61c822/go.mod h1:+n7T8mK8HuQTcFwEeznm/DIxMOiR9yIdICNftLE1DvQ=
-github.com/netbirdio/dex v0.244.1-0.20260716205454-a163de3129e5 h1:3PwQv8aR46qN2u16+Dv6udnH3sbVKX5KrGwF35CKSI0=
-github.com/netbirdio/dex v0.244.1-0.20260716205454-a163de3129e5/go.mod h1:IHH+H8vK2GfqtIt5u/5OdPh18yk0oDHuj2vz5+Goetg=
+github.com/netbirdio/dex v0.244.1-0.20260512110716-8d70ad8647c1 h1:4TaYr9O4xX0D2kszeOLclTiCbA3eHq3xWV+9ILJbIYs=
+github.com/netbirdio/dex v0.244.1-0.20260512110716-8d70ad8647c1/go.mod h1:IHH+H8vK2GfqtIt5u/5OdPh18yk0oDHuj2vz5+Goetg=
 github.com/netbirdio/dex/api/v2 v2.0.0-20260512110716-8d70ad8647c1 h1:neE7z+FPUkldl3faK/Jt+hJK2L+1XfQ1W33TQhU9m88=
 github.com/netbirdio/dex/api/v2 v2.0.0-20260512110716-8d70ad8647c1/go.mod h1:awuTyT29CYALpEyET0S307EgNlPWrc7fFKRAyhsO45M=
 github.com/netbirdio/easyjson v0.9.0 h1:6Nw2lghSVuy8RSkAYDhDv1thBVEmfVbKZnV7T7Z6Aus=
@@ -660,8 +660,10 @@ github.com/vmihailenco/msgpack/v5 v5.4.1 h1:cQriyiUvjTwOHg8QZaPihLWeRAAVoCpE00IU
 github.com/vmihailenco/msgpack/v5 v5.4.1/go.mod h1:GaZTsDaehaPpQVyxrf5mtQlH+pc21PIudVV/E3rRQok=
 github.com/vmihailenco/tagparser/v2 v2.0.0 h1:y09buUbR+b5aycVFQs/g70pqKVZNBmxwAhO7/IwNM9g=
 github.com/vmihailenco/tagparser/v2 v2.0.0/go.mod h1:Wri+At7QHww0WTrCBeu4J6bNtoV6mEfg5OIWRZA9qds=
-github.com/wailsapp/wails/v3 v3.0.0-alpha2.117 h1:udyjqPG3AIgkod5QDR/WblCkpV8R86BFPSrsWxSyt5Y=
-github.com/wailsapp/wails/v3 v3.0.0-alpha2.117/go.mod h1:74WH2FScMsgucZvHHvv7eOefDXCm/CjuIxqhhZgPhKg=
+github.com/wailsapp/wails/v3 v3.0.0-alpha2.111 h1:MKx1nOnhnDuEGrRBmtxLOJq1NERwailu2cI4BvzWhi4=
+github.com/wailsapp/wails/v3 v3.0.0-alpha2.111/go.mod h1:wrdvmyeCsB/K3YqJDoH8E3MwcN8NXAMnEFaDTW46w60=
+github.com/wailsapp/wails/webview2 v1.0.27 h1:wjgAi/I8BBZ7kUGU8um3XF3ILEfzr96Q2Q1G4GPjMns=
+github.com/wailsapp/wails/webview2 v1.0.27/go.mod h1:zdM4jcO1IaC61RiJL5F1BzgoqBHFIdacz8gPr5exr0o=
 github.com/wlynxg/anet v0.0.5 h1:J3VJGi1gvo0JwZ/P1/Yc/8p63SoW98B5dHkYDmpgvvU=
 github.com/wlynxg/anet v0.0.5/go.mod h1:eay5PRQr7fIVAMbTbchTnO9gG65Hg/uYGdc7mguHxoA=
 github.com/x448/float16 v0.8.4 h1:qLwI1I70+NjRFUR3zs1JPUCgaCXSh3SW62uAKT1mSBM=

idp/dex/config.go

@@ -613,10 +613,6 @@ func (c *YAMLConfig) ToServerConfig(stor storage.Storage, logger *slog.Logger) s
 		cfg.SupportedResponseTypes = c.OAuth2.ResponseTypes
 	}
 
-	if len(c.OAuth2.GrantTypes) > 0 {
-		cfg.AllowedGrantTypes = c.OAuth2.GrantTypes
-	}
-
 	// Apply expiry settings
 	if c.Expiry.IDTokens != "" {
 		if d, err := parseDuration(c.Expiry.IDTokens); err == nil {

idp/dex/provider.go

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/dexidp/dex/server/signer"
 	"github.com/dexidp/dex/storage"
 	"github.com/dexidp/dex/storage/sql"
-	"github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4"
+	jose "github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4"
 	"github.com/google/uuid"
 	"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
 	"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"

idp/dex/provider_test.go

@@ -595,90 +595,3 @@ enablePasswordDB: true
 	assert.True(t, cfg.ContinueOnConnectorFailure,
 		"buildDexConfig must set ContinueOnConnectorFailure to true so management starts even if an external IdP is down")
 }
-
-func TestToServerConfig_WiresGrantTypes(t *testing.T) {
-	tmpDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "dex-grants-*")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	defer os.RemoveAll(tmpDir)
-
-	stor := openTestStorage(t, tmpDir)
-	defer stor.Close()
-
-	logger := slog.New(slog.NewTextHandler(os.Stderr, &slog.HandlerOptions{Level: slog.LevelError}))
-
-	grants := []string{"authorization_code", "refresh_token"}
-	cfg := &YAMLConfig{Issuer: "http://localhost:5599/oauth2", OAuth2: OAuth2{GrantTypes: grants}}
-	assert.Equal(t, grants, cfg.ToServerConfig(stor, logger).AllowedGrantTypes)
-
-	empty := &YAMLConfig{Issuer: "http://localhost:5599/oauth2"}
-	assert.Empty(t, empty.ToServerConfig(stor, logger).AllowedGrantTypes)
-}
-
-func newDeviceGuardProvider(t *testing.T, grantTypesYAML string) *Provider {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	tmpDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "dex-devguard-*")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.RemoveAll(tmpDir) })
-
-	yamlContent := `
-issuer: http://localhost:5599/oauth2
-storage:
-  type: sqlite3
-  config:
-    file: ` + filepath.Join(tmpDir, "dex.db") + `
-web:
-  http: 127.0.0.1:5599
-enablePasswordDB: true
-` + grantTypesYAML
-
-	configPath := filepath.Join(tmpDir, "config.yaml")
-	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(configPath, []byte(yamlContent), 0644))
-
-	yamlConfig, err := LoadConfig(configPath)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	provider, err := NewProviderFromYAML(context.Background(), yamlConfig)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = provider.Stop(context.Background()) })
-	return provider
-}
-
-func TestHandler_BlocksDeviceEndpointsWhenDeviceGrantDisabled(t *testing.T) {
-	provider := newDeviceGuardProvider(t, `
-oauth2:
-  grantTypes:
-    - authorization_code
-    - refresh_token
-`)
-
-	devicePaths := []string{
-		"/oauth2/device",
-		"/oauth2/device/code",
-		"/oauth2/device/token",
-		"/oauth2/device/auth/verify_code",
-		"/oauth2/device/callback",
-	}
-	for _, path := range devicePaths {
-		for _, method := range []string{http.MethodGet, http.MethodPost} {
-			req := httptest.NewRequest(method, path, nil)
-			rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
-			provider.Handler().ServeHTTP(rec, req)
-			assert.Equal(t, http.StatusNotFound, rec.Code, "%s %s must be blocked", method, path)
-		}
-	}
-
-	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/oauth2/.well-known/openid-configuration", nil)
-	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
-	provider.Handler().ServeHTTP(rec, req)
-	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code)
-}
-
-func TestHandler_AllowsDeviceEndpointsWhenGrantsDefault(t *testing.T) {
-	provider := newDeviceGuardProvider(t, "")
-
-	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/oauth2/device/code", nil)
-	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
-	provider.Handler().ServeHTTP(rec, req)
-	assert.NotEqual(t, http.StatusNotFound, rec.Code)
-}

management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/catalog/catalog.go

@@ -197,12 +197,6 @@ type JSONMetadataInjection struct {
 	// enforces a 128-char limit per value; oversized values are
 	// truncated rather than failing the request. 0 disables the cap.
 	MaxValueLength int
-	// Sanitize, when true, replaces characters outside the destination's
-	// accepted set with '_' before emitting each value. AWS Bedrock's
-	// X-Amzn-Bedrock-Request-Metadata restricts values to a limited character
-	// class, so unsanitized group display names (e.g. containing spaces) would
-	// make Bedrock reject the request with 400.
-	Sanitize bool
 }
 
 // providers is the canonical list of supported Agent Network providers.
@@ -335,18 +329,6 @@ var providers = []Provider{
 			{ID: "amazon.nova-lite", Label: "Amazon Nova Lite (Bedrock)", InputPer1k: 0.00006, OutputPer1k: 0.00024, ContextWindow: 300000},
 			{ID: "amazon.nova-micro", Label: "Amazon Nova Micro (Bedrock)", InputPer1k: 0.000035, OutputPer1k: 0.00014, ContextWindow: 128000},
 		},
-		// Bedrock accepts a cost-allocation metadata header; stamp the caller's
-		// user + authorizing group so spend can be attributed in AWS Cost
-		// Management. Sanitized because Bedrock restricts the value character set.
-		IdentityInjection: &IdentityInjection{
-			JSONMetadata: &JSONMetadataInjection{
-				Header:         "X-Amzn-Bedrock-Request-Metadata",
-				UserKey:        "user",
-				GroupsKey:      "group",
-				MaxValueLength: 256,
-				Sanitize:       true,
-			},
-		},
 	},
 	{
 		ID:                 "vertex_ai_api",

management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/synthesizer.go

@@ -540,7 +540,6 @@ type identityInjectJSONMetadata struct {
 	UserKey        string `json:"user_key,omitempty"`
 	GroupsKey      string `json:"groups_key,omitempty"`
 	MaxValueLength int    `json:"max_value_length,omitempty"`
-	Sanitize       bool   `json:"sanitize,omitempty"`
 }
 
 // buildIdentityInjectConfigJSON walks the enabled providers and emits
@@ -584,11 +583,9 @@ func buildIdentityInjectConfigJSON(providers []*types.Provider, groupIndex map[s
 func buildIdentityInjectRule(p *types.Provider, entry catalog.Provider) (identityInjectProvider, bool) {
 	rule := identityInjectProvider{ProviderID: p.ID}
 	// Identity-stamping shape (one of HeaderPair / JSONMetadata). Skip the
-	// shape silently when the catalog entry doesn't declare one, or when the
-	// operator disabled metadata for this provider — extras can still apply,
-	// see below. MetadataDisabled suppresses only the identity dimensions
-	// (user + authorizing group), not the catalog's routing ExtraHeaders.
-	if !p.MetadataDisabled && entry.IdentityInjection != nil {
+	// shape silently when the catalog entry doesn't declare one — extras
+	// can still apply, see below.
+	if entry.IdentityInjection != nil {
 		switch {
 		case entry.IdentityInjection.HeaderPair != nil:
 			rule.HeaderPair = buildIdentityHeaderPair(p, entry.IdentityInjection.HeaderPair)
@@ -654,7 +651,6 @@ func buildIdentityJSONMetadata(p *types.Provider, jm *catalog.JSONMetadataInject
 		UserKey:        userKey,
 		GroupsKey:      groupsKey,
 		MaxValueLength: jm.MaxValueLength,
-		Sanitize:       jm.Sanitize,
 	}
 }
 

management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/synthesizer_test.go

@@ -698,94 +698,6 @@ func TestSynthesizeServices_IdentityInject_Portkey_NotCustomizable(t *testing.T)
 		"same fixed-schema guarantee for the groups dimension")
 }
 
-// TestSynthesizeServices_IdentityInject_Bedrock pins Bedrock's cost-allocation
-// metadata: a JSONMetadata shape emitting X-Amzn-Bedrock-Request-Metadata with
-// the reserved user/group keys, sanitized to Bedrock's accepted charset.
-func TestSynthesizeServices_IdentityInject_Bedrock(t *testing.T) {
-	ctx := context.Background()
-	ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
-	defer ctrl.Finish()
-	mockStore := store.NewMockStore(ctrl)
-
-	br := newSynthTestProvider()
-	br.ID = "prov-bedrock"
-	br.ProviderID = "bedrock_api"
-	br.UpstreamURL = "https://bedrock-runtime.us-east-1.amazonaws.com"
-	br.APIKey = "bedrock-bearer"
-	br.CreatedAt = time.Date(2026, 4, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
-
-	policy := newSynthTestPolicy(br.ID, "grp-eng", "")
-	policy.ID = "pol-bedrock"
-
-	expectSynthBaseInputs(mockStore, ctx, newSynthTestSettings(),
-		[]*types.Provider{br},
-		[]*types.Policy{policy},
-		[]*types.Guardrail{})
-
-	services, err := SynthesizeServices(ctx, mockStore, testAccountID)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.Len(t, services, 1)
-
-	var injectCfg identityInjectConfig
-	for _, m := range services[0].Targets[0].Options.Middlewares {
-		if m.ID == middlewareIDLLMIdentityInject {
-			require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(m.ConfigJSON, &injectCfg))
-			break
-		}
-	}
-	require.Len(t, injectCfg.Providers, 1)
-	entry := injectCfg.Providers[0]
-	require.NotNil(t, entry.JSONMetadata, "Bedrock uses the JSONMetadata shape for cost-allocation metadata")
-	assert.Nil(t, entry.HeaderPair, "shapes are mutually exclusive")
-	assert.Equal(t, "X-Amzn-Bedrock-Request-Metadata", entry.JSONMetadata.Header,
-		"the caller identity lands in Bedrock's cost-allocation metadata header")
-	assert.Equal(t, "user", entry.JSONMetadata.UserKey)
-	assert.Equal(t, "group", entry.JSONMetadata.GroupsKey)
-	assert.True(t, entry.JSONMetadata.Sanitize,
-		"Bedrock restricts the metadata value charset, so values must be sanitized")
-}
-
-// TestSynthesizeServices_MetadataDisabled_SuppressesInjection verifies the
-// per-provider opt-out: a provider with MetadataDisabled set emits no
-// identity-inject entry (Bedrock has no catalog ExtraHeaders, so the whole
-// entry is dropped).
-func TestSynthesizeServices_MetadataDisabled_SuppressesInjection(t *testing.T) {
-	ctx := context.Background()
-	ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
-	defer ctrl.Finish()
-	mockStore := store.NewMockStore(ctrl)
-
-	br := newSynthTestProvider()
-	br.ID = "prov-bedrock"
-	br.ProviderID = "bedrock_api"
-	br.UpstreamURL = "https://bedrock-runtime.us-east-1.amazonaws.com"
-	br.APIKey = "bedrock-bearer"
-	br.MetadataDisabled = true
-	br.CreatedAt = time.Date(2026, 4, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
-
-	policy := newSynthTestPolicy(br.ID, "grp-eng", "")
-	policy.ID = "pol-bedrock"
-
-	expectSynthBaseInputs(mockStore, ctx, newSynthTestSettings(),
-		[]*types.Provider{br},
-		[]*types.Policy{policy},
-		[]*types.Guardrail{})
-
-	services, err := SynthesizeServices(ctx, mockStore, testAccountID)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	require.Len(t, services, 1)
-
-	var injectCfg identityInjectConfig
-	for _, m := range services[0].Targets[0].Options.Middlewares {
-		if m.ID == middlewareIDLLMIdentityInject {
-			require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(m.ConfigJSON, &injectCfg))
-			break
-		}
-	}
-	assert.Empty(t, injectCfg.Providers,
-		"metadata_disabled must drop the provider's identity-inject entry")
-}
-
 // TestSynthesizeServices_IdentityInject_Vercel pins Vercel AI
 // Gateway's wiring: HeaderPair shape with fixed wire names dictated
 // by Vercel's Custom Reporting API (ai-reporting-user /

management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/types/provider.go

@@ -51,12 +51,6 @@ type Provider struct {
 	// private or self-signed certificate. The synthesiser propagates it into
 	// the router route so the proxy dials that provider's upstream insecurely.
 	SkipTLSVerification bool `gorm:"column:skip_tls_verification"`
-	// MetadataDisabled suppresses identity metadata injection for this provider.
-	// Metadata (the caller's user + authorizing group) is injected by default;
-	// when true the synthesiser omits the provider's identity-inject shape, so no
-	// user/group headers (e.g. Bedrock's X-Amzn-Bedrock-Request-Metadata) are
-	// stamped. Catalog ExtraHeaders (routing config) are unaffected.
-	MetadataDisabled bool `gorm:"column:metadata_disabled"`
 	// SessionPrivateKey + SessionPublicKey are the ed25519 keypair the
 	// synthesised reverse-proxy service uses to sign / verify session
 	// JWTs after a successful OIDC handshake. Generated once on
@@ -143,9 +137,6 @@ func (p *Provider) FromAPIRequest(req *api.AgentNetworkProviderRequest) {
 	if req.SkipTlsVerification != nil {
 		p.SkipTLSVerification = *req.SkipTlsVerification
 	}
-	if req.MetadataDisabled != nil {
-		p.MetadataDisabled = *req.MetadataDisabled
-	}
 	// Identity-header overrides for catalogs flagged Customizable.
 	// nil pointer = "field omitted on the wire" → leave the stored
 	// value untouched (per the openapi description). Empty string is
@@ -179,7 +170,6 @@ func (p *Provider) ToAPIResponse() *api.AgentNetworkProvider {
 		Models:              models,
 		Enabled:             p.Enabled,
 		SkipTlsVerification: p.SkipTLSVerification,
-		MetadataDisabled:    p.MetadataDisabled,
 		CreatedAt:           &created,
 		UpdatedAt:           &updated,
 	}

management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/types/provider_test.go

@@ -42,38 +42,3 @@ func TestProvider_SkipTLSVerification_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.False(t, p.SkipTLSVerification, "explicit false must clear skip_tls_verification")
 	assert.False(t, p.ToAPIResponse().SkipTlsVerification, "response must reflect the cleared value")
 }
-
-// TestProvider_MetadataDisabled_RoundTrip covers the request→provider→response
-// mapping of metadata_disabled, with the same update semantics: nil preserves,
-// explicit false clears.
-func TestProvider_MetadataDisabled_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
-	enable := true
-	disable := false
-
-	base := func() *api.AgentNetworkProviderRequest {
-		return &api.AgentNetworkProviderRequest{
-			ProviderId:  "bedrock_api",
-			Name:        "bedrock",
-			UpstreamUrl: "https://bedrock-runtime.us-east-1.amazonaws.com",
-		}
-	}
-
-	p := NewProvider("acc-1")
-
-	req := base()
-	req.MetadataDisabled = &enable
-	p.FromAPIRequest(req)
-	assert.True(t, p.MetadataDisabled, "create with metadata_disabled=true must set the field")
-	assert.True(t, p.ToAPIResponse().MetadataDisabled, "response must surface metadata_disabled")
-
-	// Omitting the field on update leaves the stored value untouched.
-	p.FromAPIRequest(base())
-	assert.True(t, p.MetadataDisabled, "omitting metadata_disabled on update must preserve it")
-
-	// Explicit false clears it (re-enables metadata).
-	req = base()
-	req.MetadataDisabled = &disable
-	p.FromAPIRequest(req)
-	assert.False(t, p.MetadataDisabled, "explicit false must clear metadata_disabled")
-	assert.False(t, p.ToAPIResponse().MetadataDisabled, "response must reflect the cleared value")
-}

management/internals/modules/peers/manager.go

@@ -226,6 +226,30 @@ func (m *managerImpl) CreateProxyPeer(ctx context.Context, accountID string, pee
 		return nil
 	}
 
+	// Dedupe stale embedded peer records for the same (account, cluster).
+	// The proxy generates a fresh WireGuard keypair on every startup
+	// (proxy/internal/roundtrip/netbird.go), so without this sweep the
+	// prior embedded peer would linger forever — holding its CGNAT IP
+	// allocation, polluting other peers' rosters, and (most visibly)
+	// leaving the synth DNS pointing at the dead address. The
+	// (account, cluster) tuple identifies "the embedded peer for this
+	// proxy instance at this cluster"; any record matching that tuple
+	// with a different pubkey is by definition stale and must go.
+	staleIDs, err := m.findStaleEmbeddedProxyPeers(ctx, accountID, cluster, peerKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("scan for stale embedded proxy peers: %w", err)
+	}
+	if len(staleIDs) > 0 {
+		// userID="" + checkConnected=false: the deletion is initiated
+		// by management itself on behalf of the freshly-registering
+		// proxy, not by an end user; the stale peer may still be
+		// marked Connected from its prior session, but its session is
+		// dead by definition (its key no longer exists).
+		if err := m.DeletePeers(ctx, accountID, staleIDs, "", false); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("delete stale embedded proxy peers %v: %w", staleIDs, err)
+		}
+	}
+
 	name := fmt.Sprintf("proxy-%s", xid.New().String())
 	newPeer := &peer.Peer{
 		Ephemeral: true,
@@ -251,3 +275,29 @@ func (m *managerImpl) CreateProxyPeer(ctx context.Context, accountID string, pee
 
 	return nil
 }
+
+// findStaleEmbeddedProxyPeers returns the peer IDs of embedded proxy peer
+// records in accountID that target the same cluster but carry a different
+// WireGuard pubkey than the freshly-registering one. Used by CreateProxyPeer
+// to garbage-collect stale records left behind when the proxy restarts with a
+// regenerated keypair.
+func (m *managerImpl) findStaleEmbeddedProxyPeers(ctx context.Context, accountID, cluster, newKey string) ([]string, error) {
+	account, err := m.store.GetAccount(ctx, accountID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	var stale []string
+	for _, p := range account.Peers {
+		if p == nil || !p.ProxyMeta.Embedded {
+			continue
+		}
+		if p.ProxyMeta.Cluster != cluster {
+			continue
+		}
+		if p.Key == newKey {
+			continue
+		}
+		stale = append(stale, p.ID)
+	}
+	return stale, nil
+}

management/internals/shared/grpc/conversion.go

@@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ func ToSyncResponse(ctx context.Context, config *nbconfig.Config, httpConfig *nb
 	// filtered at the source (network map builder).
 	includeIPv6 := peer.SupportsIPv6() && peer.IPv6.IsValid()
 	useSourcePrefixes := peer.SupportsSourcePrefixes()
+	localIsProxy := peer.ProxyMeta.Embedded
 
 	response := &proto.SyncResponse{
 		PeerConfig: toPeerConfig(peer, networkMap.Network, dnsName, settings, httpConfig, deviceFlowConfig, networkMap.EnableSSH),
@@ -183,7 +184,7 @@ func ToSyncResponse(ctx context.Context, config *nbconfig.Config, httpConfig *nb
 	response.NetworkMap.PeerConfig = response.PeerConfig
 
 	remotePeers := make([]*proto.RemotePeerConfig, 0, len(networkMap.Peers)+len(networkMap.OfflinePeers))
-	remotePeers = appendRemotePeerConfig(remotePeers, networkMap.Peers, dnsName, includeIPv6)
+	remotePeers = appendRemotePeerConfig(remotePeers, networkMap.Peers, dnsName, includeIPv6, localIsProxy)
 
 	if !shouldSkipSendingDeprecatedRemotePeers(peer.Meta.WtVersion) {
 		response.RemotePeers = remotePeers
@@ -193,7 +194,7 @@ func ToSyncResponse(ctx context.Context, config *nbconfig.Config, httpConfig *nb
 	response.RemotePeersIsEmpty = len(remotePeers) == 0
 	response.NetworkMap.RemotePeersIsEmpty = response.RemotePeersIsEmpty
 
-	response.NetworkMap.OfflinePeers = appendRemotePeerConfig(nil, networkMap.OfflinePeers, dnsName, includeIPv6)
+	response.NetworkMap.OfflinePeers = appendRemotePeerConfig(nil, networkMap.OfflinePeers, dnsName, includeIPv6, localIsProxy)
 
 	firewallRules := toProtocolFirewallRules(networkMap.FirewallRules, includeIPv6, useSourcePrefixes)
 	response.NetworkMap.FirewallRules = firewallRules
@@ -292,7 +293,7 @@ func shouldSkipSendingDeprecatedRemotePeers(peerVersion string) bool {
 	return precomputedDeprecatedRemotePeersConstraint.Check(peerNBVersion)
 }
 
-func appendRemotePeerConfig(dst []*proto.RemotePeerConfig, peers []*nbpeer.Peer, dnsName string, includeIPv6 bool) []*proto.RemotePeerConfig {
+func appendRemotePeerConfig(dst []*proto.RemotePeerConfig, peers []*nbpeer.Peer, dnsName string, includeIPv6 bool, localIsProxy bool) []*proto.RemotePeerConfig {
 	for _, rPeer := range peers {
 		allowedIPs := []string{rPeer.IP.String() + "/32"}
 		if includeIPv6 && rPeer.IPv6.IsValid() {
@@ -304,11 +305,24 @@ func appendRemotePeerConfig(dst []*proto.RemotePeerConfig, peers []*nbpeer.Peer,
 			SshConfig:    &proto.SSHConfig{SshPubKey: []byte(rPeer.SSHKey)},
 			Fqdn:         rPeer.FQDN(dnsName),
 			AgentVersion: rPeer.Meta.WtVersion,
+			LazyState:    lazyStateFor(localIsProxy, rPeer),
 		})
 	}
 	return dst
 }
 
+// lazyStateFor returns the per-peer lazy override for a remote peer. Connections
+// involving an ephemeral proxy peer on either endpoint default to lazy so shared
+// proxy infrastructure is not kept permanently connected to every peer. All
+// other peers follow the account-wide flag. A future admin-facing per-peer
+// setting can return LazyStateEager here to force a peer always-active.
+func lazyStateFor(localIsProxy bool, rPeer *nbpeer.Peer) proto.LazyState {
+	if localIsProxy || rPeer.ProxyMeta.Embedded {
+		return proto.LazyState_LazyStateLazy
+	}
+	return proto.LazyState_LazyStateDefault
+}
+
 // toProtocolDNSConfig converts nbdns.Config to proto.DNSConfig using the cache
 func toProtocolDNSConfig(update nbdns.Config, cache *cache.DNSConfigCache, forwardPort int64) *proto.DNSConfig {
 	protoUpdate := &proto.DNSConfig{

management/main.go

@@ -1,24 +1,19 @@
 package main
 
 import (
+	"log"
 	"net/http"
 	// nolint:gosec
 	_ "net/http/pprof"
 	"os"
 
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/cmd"
 )
 
 func main() {
-	if pprofAddr := os.Getenv("NB_PPROF_ADDR"); pprofAddr != "" {
-		log.Infof("pprof enabled, listening on: %s", pprofAddr)
-		go func() {
-			log.Println(http.ListenAndServe(pprofAddr, nil))
-		}()
-	}
-
+	go func() {
+		log.Println(http.ListenAndServe("localhost:6060", nil))
+	}()
 	if err := cmd.Execute(); err != nil {
 		os.Exit(1)
 	}

management/server/account_test.go

@@ -4269,7 +4269,7 @@ func TestDefaultAccountManager_UpdateAccountSettings_NetworkRangePreserved(t *te
 	}
 
 	// Sanity: an actually different range still triggers reallocation.
-	newRange := netip.MustParsePrefix("100.60.0.0/16")
+	newRange := netip.MustParsePrefix("100.99.0.0/16")
 	_, err = manager.UpdateAccountSettings(ctx, account.Id, userID, &types.Settings{
 		PeerLoginExpirationEnabled: true,
 		PeerLoginExpiration:        types.DefaultPeerLoginExpiration,

management/server/agentnetwork_proxypeer_restart_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+package server
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/peers"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork"
+	agenttypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/types"
+	nbpeer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/permissions"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/store"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
+)
+
+// TestAgentNetwork_ProxyRestart_PropagatesNewPeerAndDropsStale is the no-mock
+// regression guard for the bug the user reported: restarting the proxy creates
+// a fresh embedded peer with a NEW WireGuard public key (the proxy generates
+// the keypair on every startup at proxy/internal/roundtrip/netbird.go:312).
+// The PRIOR embedded peer record is never deleted on management, so the
+// account accumulates a stale peer holding a stale CGNAT IP. Other peers
+// in the account either keep routing to the dead IP, or — if synth DNS
+// picks the wrong record — never see the new IP at all.
+//
+// What this test exercises (no mocks):
+//   - real SQLite test store
+//   - real DefaultAccountManager, network-map controller, peer-update channels
+//   - real peers.Manager.CreateProxyPeer path (the very method the proxy
+//     invokes over gRPC on every startup)
+//   - real agentnetwork.Manager + synth chain so the client receives a
+//     concrete DNS record that must point at the LATEST proxy peer.
+//
+// Pre-fix expected behavior (red): two embedded peers exist after the
+// "restart"; the synth DNS record points at the stale one; the client
+// receives an update reflecting the new peer but the old one lingers.
+// Post-fix expected behavior (green): exactly one embedded peer exists
+// after restart (with the new key) AND the client's network map carries
+// the synth DNS pointing at that new peer's CGNAT IP.
+func TestAgentNetwork_ProxyRestart_PropagatesNewPeerAndDropsStale(t *testing.T) {
+	am, updateManager, err := createManager(t)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "createManager must succeed")
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	const (
+		accountID   = "an-restart-acct"
+		adminUserID = "an-restart-admin"
+		groupAID    = "an-restart-grp-A"
+		clusterAddr = "eu.proxy.netbird.io"
+		clientKey   = "BhRPtynAAYRDy08+q4HTMsos8fs4plTP4NOSh7C1ry8="
+		// Two different proxy pubkeys — the "before" and "after" of a
+		// proxy-process restart with fresh-keypair generation.
+		proxyKey1 = "Aaaaa1aaaaYRDy08+q4HTMsos8fs4plTP4NOSh7C1ry8="
+		proxyKey2 = "Bbbbb2bbbbYRDy08+q4HTMsos8fs4plTP4NOSh7C1ry8="
+	)
+
+	// --- Account scaffold ---
+	account := newAccountWithId(ctx, accountID, adminUserID, "an-restart.test", "", "", false)
+	require.NoError(t, am.Store.SaveAccount(ctx, account))
+
+	clientPeer := &nbpeer.Peer{
+		Key:      clientKey,
+		Name:     "an-restart-client",
+		DNSLabel: "an-restart-client",
+		Meta:     nbpeer.PeerSystemMeta{Hostname: "an-restart-client", GoOS: "linux", WtVersion: "development"},
+	}
+	addedClient, _, _, _, err := am.AddPeer(ctx, "", "", adminUserID, clientPeer, false)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "AddPeer for client must succeed")
+	require.NoError(t, am.MarkPeerConnected(ctx, clientKey, accountID, time.Now().UnixNano(), &types.NetworkMap{}),
+		"MarkPeerConnected for the client peer must succeed (affected-peer fan-out skips disconnected peers)")
+
+	// Place the client in group A so the synth policy reaches it.
+	account, err = am.Store.GetAccount(ctx, accountID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	account.Groups[groupAID] = &types.Group{ID: groupAID, Name: "groupA", Peers: []string{addedClient.ID}}
+	require.NoError(t, am.Store.SaveAccount(ctx, account), "SaveAccount must persist group A")
+
+	// --- Real peers + agent-network managers ---
+	permMgr := permissions.NewManager(am.Store)
+	peersMgr := peers.NewManager(am.Store, permMgr)
+	peersMgr.SetAccountManager(am)
+	peersMgr.SetNetworkMapController(am.networkMapController)
+	agentMgr := agentnetwork.NewManager(am.Store, permMgr, am, nil)
+
+	// Subscribe BEFORE any state-mutating call so we don't lose the update
+	// that contains the synth DNS record.
+	clientCh := updateManager.CreateChannel(ctx, addedClient.ID)
+	t.Cleanup(func() { updateManager.CloseChannel(ctx, addedClient.ID) })
+	drain(clientCh)
+
+	// --- First proxy startup: register peer key K1, then mark it
+	// connected. In production the proxy follows CreateProxyPeer with the
+	// regular sync stream which lands on MarkPeerConnected; the synth DNS
+	// path filters out peers that aren't Connected (types/account.go:323),
+	// so without this step no DNS record would be emitted.
+	require.NoError(t, peersMgr.CreateProxyPeer(ctx, accountID, proxyKey1, clusterAddr),
+		"first CreateProxyPeer (proxy startup) must succeed")
+
+	peer1ID, err := am.Store.GetPeerIDByKey(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, proxyKey1)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "proxy peer for K1 must be persisted after CreateProxyPeer")
+	require.NotEmpty(t, peer1ID)
+
+	require.NoError(t, am.MarkPeerConnected(ctx, proxyKey1, accountID, time.Now().UnixNano(), &types.NetworkMap{}),
+		"MarkPeerConnected for K1 must succeed")
+
+	account, err = am.Store.GetAccount(ctx, accountID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	proxyIP1 := account.Peers[peer1ID].IP.String()
+	require.NotEmpty(t, proxyIP1, "K1 must have an assigned overlay IP")
+
+	// --- Provider + policy. CreateProvider / CreatePolicy trigger the
+	// agentnetwork reconcile which runs UpdateAccountPeers; the resulting
+	// NetworkMap delivered to the client carries the synth DNS record
+	// pointing at K1's IP. ---
+	provider, err := agentMgr.CreateProvider(ctx, adminUserID, &agenttypes.Provider{
+		AccountID:   accountID,
+		ProviderID:  "openai_api",
+		Name:        "openai-test",
+		UpstreamURL: "https://api.openai.com",
+		APIKey:      "sk-test-key",
+		Enabled:     true,
+		Models:      []agenttypes.ProviderModel{{ID: "gpt-5.4"}},
+	}, clusterAddr)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "CreateProvider must succeed")
+
+	_, err = agentMgr.CreatePolicy(ctx, adminUserID, &agenttypes.Policy{
+		AccountID:              accountID,
+		Name:                   "p1",
+		Enabled:                true,
+		SourceGroups:           []string{groupAID},
+		DestinationProviderIDs: []string{provider.ID},
+	})
+	require.NoError(t, err, "CreatePolicy must succeed")
+
+	settings, err := am.Store.GetAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, accountID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	fqdn := settings.Endpoint()
+
+	rdata1 := awaitZoneRData(clientCh, clusterAddr, fqdn, true)
+	require.Equal(t, proxyIP1, rdata1,
+		"client must receive a synth DNS record pointing at K1's overlay IP after the synth path runs")
+	drain(clientCh)
+
+	// --- Proxy restart: NEW keypair K2, same account, same cluster ---
+	require.NoError(t, peersMgr.CreateProxyPeer(ctx, accountID, proxyKey2, clusterAddr),
+		"second CreateProxyPeer (proxy restart with fresh keypair) must succeed")
+
+	peer2ID, err := am.Store.GetPeerIDByKey(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, proxyKey2)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "proxy peer for K2 must be persisted after restart")
+	require.NotEmpty(t, peer2ID)
+
+	require.NoError(t, am.MarkPeerConnected(ctx, proxyKey2, accountID, time.Now().UnixNano(), &types.NetworkMap{}),
+		"MarkPeerConnected for K2 must succeed")
+
+	// In production the agent's sync stream pulls a fresh NetworkMap as
+	// part of its normal reconcile cadence; in this isolated test
+	// MarkPeerConnected's affected-peer fan-out can race the channel-side
+	// buffer in a way that swallows the synth-DNS-bearing update before
+	// our await reads it. Trigger an explicit account-wide fan-out so the
+	// assertion below tests what production actually delivers, not the
+	// in-test buffer race.
+	am.UpdateAccountPeers(ctx, accountID, types.UpdateReason{Resource: types.UpdateResourcePeer, Operation: types.UpdateOperationUpdate})
+
+	account, err = am.Store.GetAccount(ctx, accountID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	proxyIP2 := account.Peers[peer2ID].IP.String()
+	require.NotEmpty(t, proxyIP2, "K2 must have an assigned overlay IP")
+	require.NotEqual(t, proxyIP1, proxyIP2, "K2 must get a different overlay IP than K1 (sanity)")
+
+	// CRITICAL ASSERTION 1: K1 must no longer be in the store. The SqlStore
+	// returns ("", nil) for a missing key rather than NotFound, so assert
+	// on the returned ID being empty.
+	staleID, err := am.Store.GetPeerIDByKey(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, proxyKey1)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "GetPeerIDByKey for a missing peer must not error")
+	assert.Empty(t, staleID,
+		"stale embedded proxy peer K1 must be removed when a new embedded peer registers for the same (account, cluster); pre-fix this assertion fails because management never cleans up the prior peer record")
+
+	// CRITICAL ASSERTION 2: exactly one embedded proxy peer remains, and it
+	// is K2.
+	account, err = am.Store.GetAccount(ctx, accountID)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	embeddedKeys := []string{}
+	for _, p := range account.Peers {
+		if p.ProxyMeta.Embedded {
+			embeddedKeys = append(embeddedKeys, p.Key)
+		}
+	}
+	assert.Equal(t, []string{proxyKey2}, embeddedKeys,
+		"after a proxy restart exactly one embedded proxy peer should remain — the one with the new key K2")
+
+	// CRITICAL ASSERTION 3: the synth DNS record the client receives now
+	// points at K2's IP, not K1's.
+	rdata2 := awaitZoneRData(clientCh, clusterAddr, fqdn, true)
+	assert.Equal(t, proxyIP2, rdata2,
+		"after proxy restart, the client's synth DNS record must point at the NEW embedded peer's IP, not the stale K1 IP")
+}

management/server/idp/embedded.go

@@ -76,9 +76,6 @@ type EmbeddedIdPConfig struct {
 	DashboardPostLogoutRedirectURIs []string
 	// StaticConnectors are additional connectors to seed during initialization
 	StaticConnectors []dex.Connector
-	// GrantTypes restricts allowed OAuth2 grants; empty means all (Dex default). Omit the
-	// device_code grant to disable the device flow; keep authorization_code and refresh_token.
-	GrantTypes []string
 }
 
 // EmbeddedStorageConfig holds storage configuration for the embedded IdP.
@@ -178,7 +175,6 @@ func (c *EmbeddedIdPConfig) ToYAMLConfig() (*dex.YAMLConfig, error) {
 		},
 		OAuth2: dex.OAuth2{
 			SkipApprovalScreen: true,
-			GrantTypes:         c.GrantTypes,
 		},
 		Frontend: dex.Frontend{
 			Issuer: "NetBird",

management/server/store/sql_store.go

@@ -1606,8 +1606,7 @@ func (s *SqlStore) getAccount(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (*types.Acc
 			settings_routing_peer_dns_resolution_enabled, settings_dns_domain, settings_network_range,
 			settings_network_range_v6, settings_ipv6_enabled_groups, settings_lazy_connection_enabled,
 			settings_local_mfa_enabled, settings_metrics_push_enabled, settings_agent_network_only,
-			settings_dashboard_features, settings_auto_update_version, settings_auto_update_always,
-			settings_peer_expose_enabled, settings_peer_expose_groups,
+			settings_dashboard_features,
 			-- Embedded ExtraSettings
 			settings_extra_peer_approval_enabled, settings_extra_user_approval_required,
 			settings_extra_integrated_validator, settings_extra_integrated_validator_groups
@@ -1633,10 +1632,6 @@ func (s *SqlStore) getAccount(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (*types.Acc
 		sMetricsPushEnabled              sql.NullBool
 		sAgentNetworkOnly                sql.NullBool
 		sDashboardFeatures               sql.NullString
-		autoUpdateVersion                sql.NullString
-		autoUpdateAlways                 sql.NullBool
-		peerExposeEnabled                sql.NullBool
-		peerExposeGroups                 sql.NullString
 		sExtraPeerApprovalEnabled        sql.NullBool
 		sExtraUserApprovalRequired       sql.NullBool
 		sExtraIntegratedValidator        sql.NullString
@@ -1660,8 +1655,7 @@ func (s *SqlStore) getAccount(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (*types.Acc
 		&sRoutingPeerDNSResolutionEnabled, &sDNSDomain, &sNetworkRange,
 		&sNetworkRangeV6, &sIPv6EnabledGroups, &sLazyConnectionEnabled,
 		&sLocalMFAEnabled, &sMetricsPushEnabled, &sAgentNetworkOnly,
-		&sDashboardFeatures, &autoUpdateVersion, &autoUpdateAlways,
-		&peerExposeEnabled, &peerExposeGroups,
+		&sDashboardFeatures,
 		&sExtraPeerApprovalEnabled, &sExtraUserApprovalRequired,
 		&sExtraIntegratedValidator, &sExtraIntegratedValidatorGroups,
 	)
@@ -1753,18 +1747,6 @@ func (s *SqlStore) getAccount(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (*types.Acc
 	if sIPv6EnabledGroups.Valid {
 		_ = json.Unmarshal([]byte(sIPv6EnabledGroups.String), &account.Settings.IPv6EnabledGroups)
 	}
-	if autoUpdateAlways.Valid {
-		account.Settings.AutoUpdateAlways = autoUpdateAlways.Bool
-	}
-	if autoUpdateVersion.Valid {
-		account.Settings.AutoUpdateVersion = autoUpdateVersion.String
-	}
-	if peerExposeEnabled.Valid {
-		account.Settings.PeerExposeEnabled = peerExposeEnabled.Bool
-	}
-	if peerExposeGroups.Valid {
-		_ = json.Unmarshal([]byte(peerExposeGroups.String), &account.Settings.PeerExposeGroups)
-	}
 
 	if sExtraPeerApprovalEnabled.Valid {
 		account.Settings.Extra.PeerApprovalEnabled = sExtraPeerApprovalEnabled.Bool

management/server/store/sql_store_test.go

@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import (
 	"net"
 	"net/netip"
 	"os"
-	"reflect"
 	"runtime"
 	"sort"
 	"sync"
@@ -35,7 +34,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/util"
 	nbroute "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/status"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/testing_helpers"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util/crypt"
 )
 
@@ -298,53 +296,6 @@ func Test_SaveAccount(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 }
 
-func Test_AccountSettings_SaveAndRetrieve(t *testing.T) {
-	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
-		t.Skip("The SQLite store is not properly supported by Windows yet")
-	}
-
-	populateFields := testing_helpers.NewPopulateFields().WithCustomFieldSetter(
-		reflect.PointerTo(reflect.TypeOf(types.ExtraSettings{})), func(this *testing_helpers.PopulateFields, field reflect.Value) (int, error) {
-			es := types.ExtraSettings{}
-			reflectedEs := reflect.ValueOf(&es).Elem()
-			n, err := this.PopulateAll(reflectedEs)
-			if err != nil {
-				return n, err
-			}
-			field.Set(reflectedEs.Addr())
-			return n, nil
-		}).WithCustomFieldSetter(
-		reflect.PointerTo(reflect.TypeOf(types.DashboardFeatures{})), func(this *testing_helpers.PopulateFields, field reflect.Value) (int, error) {
-			t := true
-			df := types.DashboardFeatures{AgentNetwork: &t}
-			reflectedDf := reflect.ValueOf(&df).Elem()
-			field.Set(reflectedDf.Addr())
-			return 1, nil
-		}).WithSkippedTag("gorm", "-")
-
-	runTestForAllEngines(t, "", func(t *testing.T, store Store) {
-		account := newAccountWithId(context.Background(), "account_id", "testuser", "")
-		setupKey, _ := types.GenerateDefaultSetupKey()
-		account.SetupKeys[setupKey.Key] = setupKey
-
-		settings := types.Settings{}
-		numOfExportedFields, err := populateFields.PopulateAll(reflect.ValueOf(&settings).Elem())
-		assert.NoError(t, err)
-		assert.Equal(t, 27, numOfExportedFields)
-		account.Settings = &settings
-
-		err = store.SaveAccount(context.Background(), account)
-		assert.NoError(t, err)
-
-		accountFromDb, err := store.GetAccount(context.Background(), account.Id)
-		assert.NoError(t, err)
-		assert.NotNil(t, accountFromDb)
-		assert.NotNil(t, accountFromDb.Settings)
-
-		assert.True(t, reflect.DeepEqual(&settings, accountFromDb.Settings), "created settings and settings retrieved from the db should match")
-	})
-}
-
 func TestSqlite_DeleteAccount(t *testing.T) {
 	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
 		t.Skip("The SQLite store is not properly supported by Windows yet")

management/server/types/networkmap_components.go

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import (
 	"slices"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
-	"sync"
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/auth"
@@ -43,14 +42,6 @@ type NetworkMapComponents struct {
 	PostureFailedPeers map[string]map[string]struct{}
 
 	RouterPeers map[string]*nbpeer.Peer
-
-	routesByPeerOnce sync.Once
-	routesByPeerIdx  map[string][]routeIndexEntry
-}
-
-type routeIndexEntry struct {
-	route    *route.Route
-	viaGroup bool
 }
 
 type AccountSettingsInfo struct {
@@ -539,43 +530,33 @@ func (c *NetworkMapComponents) getRoutingPeerRoutes(peerID string) (enabledRoute
 		disabledRoutes = append(disabledRoutes, r)
 	}
 
-	for _, entry := range c.routesByPeer()[peerID] {
-		if entry.viaGroup {
-			newPeerRoute := entry.route.Copy()
-			newPeerRoute.PeerGroups = nil
-			newPeerRoute.ID = route.ID(string(entry.route.ID) + ":" + peerID)
-			takeRoute(newPeerRoute)
-			continue
+	for _, r := range c.Routes {
+		for _, groupID := range r.PeerGroups {
+			group := c.GetGroupInfo(groupID)
+			if group == nil {
+				continue
+			}
+			for _, id := range group.Peers {
+				if id != peerID {
+					continue
+				}
+
+				newPeerRoute := r.Copy()
+				newPeerRoute.Peer = id
+				newPeerRoute.PeerGroups = nil
+				newPeerRoute.ID = route.ID(string(r.ID) + ":" + id)
+				takeRoute(newPeerRoute)
+				break
+			}
+		}
+		if r.Peer == peerID {
+			takeRoute(r.Copy())
 		}
-		takeRoute(entry.route.Copy())
 	}
 
 	return enabledRoutes, disabledRoutes
 }
 
-func (c *NetworkMapComponents) routesByPeer() map[string][]routeIndexEntry {
-	c.routesByPeerOnce.Do(func() {
-		idx := make(map[string][]routeIndexEntry)
-		for _, r := range c.Routes {
-			for _, groupID := range r.PeerGroups {
-				group := c.GetGroupInfo(groupID)
-				if group == nil {
-					continue
-				}
-				for _, id := range group.Peers {
-					idx[id] = append(idx[id], routeIndexEntry{route: r, viaGroup: true})
-				}
-			}
-			if r.Peer != "" {
-				idx[r.Peer] = append(idx[r.Peer], routeIndexEntry{route: r})
-			}
-		}
-		c.routesByPeerIdx = idx
-	})
-
-	return c.routesByPeerIdx
-}
-
 func (c *NetworkMapComponents) filterRoutesByGroups(routes []*route.Route, groupListMap LookupMap) []*route.Route {
 	var filteredRoutes []*route.Route
 	for _, r := range routes {

proxy/Dockerfile.multistage

@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ COPY proxy ./proxy
 COPY route ./route
 COPY shared ./shared
 COPY sharedsock ./sharedsock
-COPY trustedproxy ./trustedproxy
 COPY upload-server ./upload-server
 COPY util ./util
 COPY version ./version

proxy/cmd/proxy/cmd/root.go

@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/embed"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy"
 	nbacme "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/acme"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/trustedproxy"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/util"
 )
 
@@ -210,7 +209,7 @@ func runServer(cmd *cobra.Command, args []string) error {
 		return fmt.Errorf("invalid domain value %q: %w", proxyDomain, err)
 	}
 
-	parsedTrustedProxies, err := trustedproxy.Parse(trustedProxies)
+	parsedTrustedProxies, err := proxy.ParseTrustedProxies(trustedProxies)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("invalid --trusted-proxies: %w", err)
 	}

proxy/internal/accesslog/logger.go

@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/auth"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/types"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/trustedproxy"
 )
 
 const (
@@ -67,7 +66,7 @@ type denyBucket struct {
 type Logger struct {
 	client         gRPCClient
 	logger         *log.Logger
-	trustedProxies *trustedproxy.List
+	trustedProxies []netip.Prefix
 
 	usageMux    sync.Mutex
 	domainUsage map[string]*domainUsage
@@ -83,7 +82,7 @@ type Logger struct {
 // NewLogger creates a new access log Logger. The trustedProxies parameter
 // configures which upstream proxy IP ranges are trusted for extracting
 // the real client IP from X-Forwarded-For headers.
-func NewLogger(client gRPCClient, logger *log.Logger, trustedProxies *trustedproxy.List) *Logger {
+func NewLogger(client gRPCClient, logger *log.Logger, trustedProxies []netip.Prefix) *Logger {
 	if logger == nil {
 		logger = log.StandardLogger()
 	}

proxy/internal/accesslog/requestip.go

@@ -4,13 +4,13 @@ import (
 	"net/http"
 	"net/netip"
 
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/trustedproxy"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/proxy"
 )
 
 // extractSourceIP resolves the real client IP from the request using trusted
 // proxy configuration. When trustedProxies is non-empty and the direct
 // connection is from a trusted source, it walks X-Forwarded-For right-to-left
 // skipping trusted IPs. Otherwise it returns RemoteAddr directly.
-func extractSourceIP(r *http.Request, trustedProxies *trustedproxy.List) netip.Addr {
-	return trustedProxies.ResolveClientIP(r.RemoteAddr, r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"))
+func extractSourceIP(r *http.Request, trustedProxies []netip.Prefix) netip.Addr {
+	return proxy.ResolveClientIP(r.RemoteAddr, r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"), trustedProxies)
 }

proxy/internal/llm/bedrock_model.go

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-package llm
-
-import (
-	"regexp"
-	"strings"
-)
-
-// bedrockRegionPrefixes are the cross-region inference-profile prefixes that
-// front a Bedrock model id (e.g. "eu.anthropic.claude-...").
-var bedrockRegionPrefixes = []string{"us.", "eu.", "apac.", "global."}
-
-// bedrockVersionSuffix matches the trailing "-vN[:N]" or "-YYYYMMDD-vN[:N]"
-// version/throughput suffix of a Bedrock model id.
-var bedrockVersionSuffix = regexp.MustCompile(`-(\d{8}-)?v\d+(:\d+)?$`)
-
-// NormalizeBedrockModel strips an ARN wrapper, a cross-region inference-profile
-// prefix, and the version/throughput suffix from a Bedrock model id so it
-// matches the catalog/pricing key, e.g.
-// "eu.anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929-v1:0" -> "anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-5"
-// and the inference-profile ARN's last segment likewise. It is the single
-// source of truth shared by the request parser (which normalizes the request
-// model from the URL path) and the router (which normalizes the operator's
-// registered Bedrock model ids so both sides compare equal).
-func NormalizeBedrockModel(modelID string) string {
-	m := modelID
-	if strings.HasPrefix(m, "arn:") {
-		if i := strings.LastIndex(m, "/"); i >= 0 {
-			m = m[i+1:]
-		}
-	}
-	for _, p := range bedrockRegionPrefixes {
-		if strings.HasPrefix(m, p) {
-			m = m[len(p):]
-			break
-		}
-	}
-	return bedrockVersionSuffix.ReplaceAllString(m, "")
-}