Preserve pre-existing ipsets and roll back partial route ACL installs

e2e/harness documents itself as feature-agnostic, but three details
assumed the caller lives in this repo, so the terraform provider's
acceptance suite would otherwise carry a second harness for the same
product.

repoRoot took the first module root above the working directory as the
Docker build context, which from another module is the caller's own
root, with no combined/Dockerfile.multistage in it. It now requires that
ancestor to be this module, and otherwise asks the go tool for the
source: for a dependent, the extracted directory of the version it pins,
so the server matches the client library it was compiled against. That
lookup uses -mod=readonly, since automatic vendor mode otherwise reports
an empty Dir.

Geolocation was disabled unconditionally. Agent-network ingest does not
use it, but location-based posture checks need the database, and a rule
management cannot evaluate fails rather than passing.
StartClient pinned one network alias and set no hostname, so a second
agent could not start and a peer's name was arbitrary. Management
records that hostname, making it the peer's name in the API.
The client entrypoint is copied with an explicit mode: git tracks it
100755, but the module cache extracts 0444, so a dependent's build
produced a container exiting with "permission denied".

Adds CombinedOption, WithGeolocation, WithServerEnv, ClientOption and
WithClientName.

.goreleaser_ui_gtk3.yaml

@@ -43,19 +43,17 @@ archives:
       - netbird-ui-gtk3
 
 nfpms:
-  # Same package_name as the GTK4 packages -- the two are mutually-exclusive
-  # alternatives served from separate repo paths (see uploads below); a given
-  # distro points at exactly one of them. The file names must still differ:
-  # the Debian pool is shared storage keyed by file name, so a default-named
-  # gtk3 .deb would overwrite the stable one.
+  # Mutually-exclusive alternative to the GTK4 netbird-ui package -- both
+  # ship the same /usr/bin/netbird-ui from the shared stable/yum repos, so
+  # this one carries its own name and conflicts with the GTK4 package.
   - maintainer: Netbird <dev@netbird.io>
     description: Netbird client UI.
     homepage: https://netbird.io/
     license: BSD-3-Clause
     vendor: NetBird
     id: netbird_ui_deb_gtk3
-    package_name: netbird-ui
-    file_name_template: "{{ .PackageName }}-gtk3_{{ .Version }}_{{ .Os }}_{{ .Arch }}"
+    package_name: netbird-ui-gtk3
+    file_name_template: "{{ .PackageName }}_{{ .Version }}_{{ .Os }}_{{ .Arch }}"
     builds:
       - netbird-ui-gtk3
     formats:
@@ -67,6 +65,10 @@ nfpms:
         dst: /usr/share/applications/org.wails.netbird.desktop
       - src: client/ui/build/appicon.png
         dst: /usr/share/pixmaps/netbird.png
+    conflicts:
+      - netbird-ui
+    replaces:
+      - netbird-ui
     dependencies:
       - netbird (>= 0.75.0)
       - libgtk-3-0
@@ -79,8 +81,8 @@ nfpms:
     license: BSD-3-Clause
     vendor: NetBird
     id: netbird_ui_rpm_gtk3
-    package_name: netbird-ui
-    file_name_template: "{{ .PackageName }}-gtk3_{{ .Version }}_{{ .Os }}_{{ .Arch }}"
+    package_name: netbird-ui-gtk3
+    file_name_template: "{{ .PackageName }}_{{ .Version }}_{{ .Os }}_{{ .Arch }}"
     builds:
       - netbird-ui-gtk3
     formats:
@@ -92,6 +94,10 @@ nfpms:
         dst: /usr/share/applications/org.wails.netbird.desktop
       - src: client/ui/build/appicon.png
         dst: /usr/share/pixmaps/netbird.png
+    # No `replaces` here: nfpm maps it to rpm Obsoletes, which would make
+    # dnf swap installed GTK4 netbird-ui packages for this one on upgrade.
+    conflicts:
+      - netbird-ui
     dependencies:
       - netbird >= 0.75.0
       - (gtk3 or libgtk-3-0)
@@ -111,32 +117,20 @@ changelog:
   disable: true
 
 uploads:
-  # The gtk3 packages reuse the netbird-ui package name, so they live in
-  # dedicated repo paths (deb distribution `gtk3`, yum path `yum-gtk3`) that
-  # legacy distros point their repo config at.
-  #
-  # GoReleaser derives the credential env var from the upload name, so these
-  # would look for UPLOAD_DEBIAN-GTK3_SECRET / UPLOAD_YUM-GTK3_SECRET. The
-  # release workflow only exports UPLOAD_DEBIAN_SECRET / UPLOAD_YUM_SECRET, and
-  # a missing secret is a silent skip rather than a failure -- the packages
-  # reached the GitHub release but never the package repositories. Point
-  # `password` at the exported vars so both uploads authenticate.
-  - name: debian-gtk3
+  - name: debian
     skip: "{{ .Env.SKIP_PUBLISH }}"
     ids:
       - netbird_ui_deb_gtk3
     mode: archive
-    target: https://pkgs.wiretrustee.com/debian/pool/{{ .ArtifactName }};deb.distribution=gtk3;deb.component=main;deb.architecture={{ if .Arm }}armhf{{ else }}{{ .Arch }}{{ end }};deb.package=
+    target: https://pkgs.wiretrustee.com/debian/pool/{{ .ArtifactName }};deb.distribution=stable;deb.component=main;deb.architecture={{ if .Arm }}armhf{{ else }}{{ .Arch }}{{ end }};deb.package=
     username: dev@wiretrustee.com
-    password: "{{ .Env.UPLOAD_DEBIAN_SECRET }}"
     method: PUT
 
-  - name: yum-gtk3
+  - name: yum
     skip: "{{ .Env.SKIP_PUBLISH }}"
     ids:
       - netbird_ui_rpm_gtk3
     mode: archive
-    target: https://pkgs.wiretrustee.com/yum-gtk3/{{ .Arch }}{{ if .Arm }}{{ .Arm }}{{ end }}
+    target: https://pkgs.wiretrustee.com/yum/{{ .Arch }}{{ if .Arm }}{{ .Arm }}{{ end }}
     username: dev@wiretrustee.com
-    password: "{{ .Env.UPLOAD_YUM_SECRET }}"
     method: PUT

CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ aligns with our security standards and design expectations.
         - [Test suite](#test-suite)
     - [Checklist before submitting a PR](#checklist-before-submitting-a-pr)
     - [When we close a PR](#when-we-close-a-pr)
+    - [Translations](#translations)
     - [Other project repositories](#other-project-repositories)
     - [Contributor License Agreement](#contributor-license-agreement)
 
@@ -612,6 +613,17 @@ A closed PR is not a rejected idea. Take it back to the
 [discussion](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/discussions), settle the
 approach, and reopen the work from there.
 
+## Translations
+
+Desktop UI translations are not contributed through pull requests. Translate on
+[Crowdin](https://crowdin.com/project/netbird) instead: no ticket needed, just
+join the project and pick your language. Crowdin syncs with this repository and
+opens the service PRs itself, so hand-edited locale files would conflict with
+the next sync. Style, terminology, and review guidance live in
+[client/ui/i18n/TRANSLATING.md](client/ui/i18n/TRANSLATING.md). To request a
+language the project does not offer yet, ask on the Crowdin project page or in
+a [discussion](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/discussions).
+
 ## Other project repositories
 
 NetBird project is composed of 3 main repositories:

client/firewall/iptables/acl_linux.go

@@ -42,11 +42,12 @@ type aclManager struct {
 	optionalEntries map[string][]entry
 	ipsetStore      *ipsetStore
 	v6              bool
+	ipsetSupport    *ipsetSupport
 
 	stateManager *statemanager.Manager
 }
 
-func newAclManager(iptablesClient *iptables.IPTables, wgIface iFaceMapper) (*aclManager, error) {
+func newAclManager(iptablesClient *iptables.IPTables, wgIface iFaceMapper, ipsetSupport *ipsetSupport) (*aclManager, error) {
 	return &aclManager{
 		iptablesClient:  iptablesClient,
 		wgIface:         wgIface,
@@ -54,6 +55,7 @@ func newAclManager(iptablesClient *iptables.IPTables, wgIface iFaceMapper) (*acl
 		optionalEntries: make(map[string][]entry),
 		ipsetStore:      newIpsetStore(),
 		v6:              iptablesClient.Proto() == iptables.ProtocolIPv6,
+		ipsetSupport:    ipsetSupport,
 	}, nil
 }
 
@@ -85,12 +87,77 @@ func (m *aclManager) AddPeerFiltering(
 	action firewall.Action,
 	ipsetName string,
 ) ([]firewall.Rule, error) {
-	chain := chainNameInputRules
+	ipsetName = m.resolveIPSetName(ipsetName, sPort, dPort, action)
+	if ipsetName == "" {
+		return m.addPeerRule(ip, protocol, sPort, dPort, action, "")
+	}
 
+	// A set that is already in the store backs rules installed earlier, so it must
+	// survive this call's failure.
+	_, preexisting := m.ipsetStore.ipset(ipsetName)
+
+	rules, err := m.addPeerRule(ip, protocol, sPort, dPort, action, ipsetName)
+	if err == nil {
+		return rules, nil
+	}
+
+	var unusable *ipsetUnusableError
+	if !errors.As(err, &unusable) {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	// The set could not be created or matched. Drop the one this call created and
+	// retry the rule matching the IP directly; only if that succeeds do we know
+	// ipset was to blame and latch it off for subsequent rules.
+	if !preexisting {
+		m.discardIPSet(ipsetName)
+	}
+
+	rules, retryErr := m.addPeerRule(ip, protocol, sPort, dPort, action, "")
+	if retryErr != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("add peer rule (ipset: %w): %w", unusable.cause, retryErr)
+	}
+
+	m.ipsetSupport.markUnsupported(unusable.cause)
+
+	return rules, nil
+}
+
+// resolveIPSetName derives the ipset name for a rule, returning "" when the rule
+// must match the IP directly: either no set was requested or ipset is unusable.
+func (m *aclManager) resolveIPSetName(ipsetName string, sPort, dPort *firewall.Port, action firewall.Action) string {
 	ipsetName = transformIPsetName(ipsetName, sPort, dPort, action)
-	if m.v6 && ipsetName != "" {
+	if ipsetName == "" || !m.ipsetSupport.supported() {
+		return ""
+	}
+
+	if m.v6 {
 		ipsetName += "-v6"
 	}
+
+	return ipsetName
+}
+
+// discardIPSet removes a set that turned out to be unusable, so a later rule
+// does not find it in the store and assume it works.
+func (m *aclManager) discardIPSet(ipsetName string) {
+	m.ipsetStore.deleteIpset(ipsetName)
+
+	if err := m.destroyIPSet(ipsetName); err != nil {
+		log.Debugf("destroy unusable ipset %s: %v", ipsetName, err)
+	}
+}
+
+func (m *aclManager) addPeerRule(
+	ip net.IP,
+	protocol firewall.Protocol,
+	sPort *firewall.Port,
+	dPort *firewall.Port,
+	action firewall.Action,
+	ipsetName string,
+) ([]firewall.Rule, error) {
+	chain := chainNameInputRules
+
 	proto := protoForFamily(protocol, m.v6)
 	specs := filterRuleSpecs(ip, proto, sPort, dPort, action, ipsetName)
 
@@ -105,7 +172,7 @@ func (m *aclManager) AddPeerFiltering(
 	if ipsetName != "" {
 		if ipList, ipsetExists := m.ipsetStore.ipset(ipsetName); ipsetExists {
 			if err := m.addToIPSet(ipsetName, ip); err != nil {
-				return nil, fmt.Errorf("add IP to ipset: %w", err)
+				return nil, ipsetUnusable(fmt.Errorf("add IP to ipset: %w", err))
 			}
 			// if ruleset already exists it means we already have the firewall rule
 			// so we need to update IPs in the ruleset and return new fw.Rule object for ACL manager.
@@ -128,10 +195,10 @@ func (m *aclManager) AddPeerFiltering(
 			}
 		}
 		if err := m.createIPSet(ipsetName); err != nil {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("create ipset: %w", err)
+			return nil, ipsetUnusable(fmt.Errorf("create ipset: %w", err))
 		}
 		if err := m.addToIPSet(ipsetName, ip); err != nil {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("add IP to ipset: %w", err)
+			return nil, ipsetUnusable(fmt.Errorf("add IP to ipset: %w", err))
 		}
 
 		ipList := newIpList(ip.String())
@@ -140,7 +207,7 @@ func (m *aclManager) AddPeerFiltering(
 
 	ok, err := m.iptablesClient.Exists(tableFilter, chain, specs...)
 	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to check rule: %w", err)
+		return nil, maybeIPSetUnusable(ipsetName, fmt.Errorf("check rule: %w", err))
 	}
 	if ok {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("rule already exists")
@@ -154,7 +221,7 @@ func (m *aclManager) AddPeerFiltering(
 		err = m.iptablesClient.Append(tableFilter, chain, specs...)
 	}
 	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
+		return nil, maybeIPSetUnusable(ipsetName, err)
 	}
 
 	if err := m.iptablesClient.Append(tableMangle, chainRTPRE, mangleSpecs...); err != nil {

client/firewall/iptables/dnat_refcount_linux_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+//go:build privileged
+
+package iptables
+
+import (
+	"net/netip"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	fw "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
+)
+
+func iptRefcountIfaceV4() *iFaceMock {
+	return &iFaceMock{
+		NameFunc: func() string { return "wt-refcount" },
+		AddressFunc: func() wgaddr.Address {
+			return wgaddr.Address{
+				IP:      netip.MustParseAddr("10.20.0.1"),
+				Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("10.20.0.0/24"),
+			}
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+func iptRefcountIfaceDual() *iFaceMock {
+	return &iFaceMock{
+		NameFunc: func() string { return "wt-refcount" },
+		AddressFunc: func() wgaddr.Address {
+			return wgaddr.Address{
+				IP:      netip.MustParseAddr("10.20.0.1"),
+				Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("10.20.0.0/24"),
+				IPv6:    netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::1"),
+				IPv6Net: netip.MustParsePrefix("fd00::/64"),
+			}
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+func newIptRefcountManager(t *testing.T, dual bool) *Manager {
+	t.Helper()
+	var ifMock *iFaceMock
+	if dual {
+		ifMock = iptRefcountIfaceDual()
+	} else {
+		ifMock = iptRefcountIfaceV4()
+	}
+	m, err := Create(ifMock, iface.DefaultMTU)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "create manager")
+	require.NoError(t, m.Init(nil), "init manager")
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		require.NoError(t, m.Close(nil), "close manager")
+	})
+	return m
+}
+
+func iptDnatV4(port uint16) fw.ForwardRule {
+	return fw.ForwardRule{
+		Protocol:          fw.ProtocolTCP,
+		DestinationPort:   fw.Port{Values: []uint16{port}},
+		TranslatedAddress: netip.MustParseAddr("10.20.0.2"),
+		TranslatedPort:    fw.Port{Values: []uint16{80}},
+	}
+}
+
+func iptDnatV6(port uint16) fw.ForwardRule {
+	return fw.ForwardRule{
+		Protocol:          fw.ProtocolTCP,
+		DestinationPort:   fw.Port{Values: []uint16{port}},
+		TranslatedAddress: netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::2"),
+		TranslatedPort:    fw.Port{Values: []uint16{80}},
+	}
+}
+
+// TestIptablesRouting_RepeatedEnableSingleReference verifies that EnableRouting
+// (called on every network-map update) holds at most one reference per family
+// and a single DisableRouting drops both back to zero.
+func TestIptablesRouting_RepeatedEnableSingleReference(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newIptRefcountManager(t, true)
+	state := m.router.ipFwdState
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.EnableRouting(), "first enable")
+	require.NoError(t, m.EnableRouting(), "second enable")
+	require.NoError(t, m.EnableRouting(), "third enable")
+	v4, v6 := state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "repeated enable holds a single v4 reference")
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v6, "repeated enable holds a single v6 reference")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DisableRouting(), "disable")
+	v4, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "single disable releases the v4 reference")
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "single disable releases the v6 reference")
+}
+
+// TestIptablesRouting_DisableKeepsDNATReference verifies that an unpaired
+// DisableRouting does not release references held by active DNAT rules.
+func TestIptablesRouting_DisableKeepsDNATReference(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newIptRefcountManager(t, true)
+	state := m.router.ipFwdState
+
+	r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(iptDnatV6(9095))
+	require.NoError(t, err, "add v6 dnat")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DisableRouting(), "unpaired disable")
+	_, v6 := state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v6, "DNAT-held reference survives unpaired DisableRouting")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1), "delete v6 dnat")
+	_, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "delete releases the DNAT reference")
+}
+
+// TestIptablesDNAT_RefcountBalancedV4 covers a Balanced Add/Delete pair on v4.
+func TestIptablesDNAT_RefcountBalancedV4(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newIptRefcountManager(t, false)
+	state := m.router.ipFwdState
+
+	r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(iptDnatV4(7081))
+	require.NoError(t, err, "add v4 dnat 1")
+	v4, v6 := state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "v4 refcount after first add")
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount unchanged")
+
+	r2, err := m.AddDNATRule(iptDnatV4(7082))
+	require.NoError(t, err, "add v4 dnat 2")
+	v4, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 2, v4, "v4 refcount after second add")
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount unchanged")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1))
+	v4, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "v4 refcount after first delete")
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount unchanged")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r2))
+	v4, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "v4 refcount after second delete")
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount unchanged")
+}
+
+// TestIptablesDNAT_RefcountBalancedV6 checks the v6 path increments v6 only and
+// decrements back to zero.
+func TestIptablesDNAT_RefcountBalancedV6(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newIptRefcountManager(t, true)
+	require.NotNil(t, m.router6, "v6 router")
+	require.Same(t, m.router.ipFwdState, m.router6.ipFwdState, "shared state")
+	state := m.router.ipFwdState
+
+	r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(iptDnatV6(9081))
+	require.NoError(t, err, "add v6 dnat 1")
+	v4, v6 := state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4)
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v6, "v6 refcount after first add")
+
+	r2, err := m.AddDNATRule(iptDnatV6(9082))
+	require.NoError(t, err, "add v6 dnat 2")
+	v4, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "v4 refcount unchanged")
+	assert.Equal(t, 2, v6, "v6 refcount after second add")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1))
+	v4, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "v4 refcount unchanged")
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v6, "v6 refcount after first delete")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r2))
+	v4, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4)
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount after second delete")
+}
+
+// TestIptablesDNAT_DuplicateAddNoLeak verifies the duplicate-rule path returns
+// without bumping the refcount.
+func TestIptablesDNAT_DuplicateAddNoLeak(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newIptRefcountManager(t, true)
+	state := m.router.ipFwdState
+
+	rule := iptDnatV4(7083)
+	r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(rule)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	v4, _ := state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v4)
+
+	_, err = m.AddDNATRule(rule)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "duplicate add")
+	v4, _ = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "duplicate add must not increment")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1))
+	v4, _ = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "single delete must drop to zero")
+}
+
+// TestIptablesDNAT_DeleteMissingNoUnderflow verifies Delete on an unknown rule
+// neither errors nor releases the refcount.
+func TestIptablesDNAT_DeleteMissingNoUnderflow(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newIptRefcountManager(t, true)
+	state := m.router.ipFwdState
+
+	phantom := iptDnatV4(7099)
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(&phantom), "delete missing v4")
+	v4, v6 := state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4)
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6)
+
+	phantom6 := iptDnatV6(9099)
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(&phantom6), "delete missing v6")
+	v4, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4)
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6)
+
+	r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(iptDnatV4(7100))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	v4, _ = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "real add still increments after phantom delete")
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1))
+}
+
+// TestIptablesDNAT_DoubleDeleteNoUnderflow verifies a second Delete on the same
+// rule is a no-op.
+func TestIptablesDNAT_DoubleDeleteNoUnderflow(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newIptRefcountManager(t, true)
+	state := m.router.ipFwdState
+
+	r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(iptDnatV6(9083))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	_, v6 := state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v6)
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1), "first delete")
+	_, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6)
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1), "second delete must be no-op")
+	_, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "double delete must not underflow")
+}

client/firewall/iptables/ipset_support_linux.go

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+package iptables
+
+import (
+	"sync"
+
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+)
+
+// ipsetSupport tracks whether ipset-backed firewall rules can be installed.
+//
+// It starts optimistic and latches to unsupported the first time the kernel
+// proves otherwise: either the hash:net set type is missing (ip_set_hash_net) or
+// iptables cannot match against a set (xt_set). Callers then emit per-IP and
+// per-prefix rules instead. Without the fallback, a rule referencing an unusable
+// set is never installed and the catch-all DROP silently blocks traffic the
+// policy permits.
+//
+// One instance is shared by the ACL managers and routers of both address
+// families, because ipset availability is a property of the kernel rather than
+// of any single table.
+type ipsetSupport struct {
+	mu          sync.RWMutex
+	unsupported bool
+}
+
+func newIPSetSupport() *ipsetSupport {
+	return &ipsetSupport{}
+}
+
+func (s *ipsetSupport) supported() bool {
+	s.mu.RLock()
+	defer s.mu.RUnlock()
+
+	return !s.unsupported
+}
+
+// markUnsupported records that ipset cannot be used, logging the reason once.
+func (s *ipsetSupport) markUnsupported(cause error) {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+
+	if s.unsupported {
+		return
+	}
+	s.unsupported = true
+
+	log.Warnf("ipset is unavailable (%v); falling back to per-IP firewall rules. "+
+		"Ensure the kernel provides ip_set_hash_net and xt_set; without them rule "+
+		"sets are larger and slower to converge on networks with many peers", cause)
+}
+
+// ipsetUnusableError marks a failure attributable to ipset, so the caller can
+// retry the same rule in its per-IP form before latching the capability off.
+type ipsetUnusableError struct {
+	cause error
+}
+
+func (e *ipsetUnusableError) Error() string { return e.cause.Error() }
+
+func (e *ipsetUnusableError) Unwrap() error { return e.cause }
+
+func ipsetUnusable(cause error) error {
+	return &ipsetUnusableError{cause: cause}
+}
+
+// maybeIPSetUnusable marks an iptables failure as ipset-attributable only when the
+// rule actually carried a set match, since the same call can fail for unrelated
+// reasons on a rule that matches addresses directly.
+func maybeIPSetUnusable(ipsetName string, err error) error {
+	if ipsetName == "" {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	return ipsetUnusable(err)
+}

client/firewall/iptables/manager_linux.go

@@ -33,6 +33,10 @@ type Manager struct {
 	router       *router
 	rawSupported bool
 
+	// ipsetSupport is shared by the ACL managers and routers of both families,
+	// so a kernel without usable ipset support degrades them together.
+	ipsetSupport *ipsetSupport
+
 	// IPv6 counterparts, nil when no v6 overlay
 	ipv6Client *iptables.IPTables
 	aclMgr6    *aclManager
@@ -53,16 +57,17 @@ func Create(wgIface iFaceMapper, mtu uint16) (*Manager, error) {
 	}
 
 	m := &Manager{
-		wgIface:    wgIface,
-		ipv4Client: iptablesClient,
+		wgIface:      wgIface,
+		ipv4Client:   iptablesClient,
+		ipsetSupport: newIPSetSupport(),
 	}
 
-	m.router, err = newRouter(iptablesClient, wgIface, mtu)
+	m.router, err = newRouter(iptablesClient, wgIface, mtu, m.ipsetSupport)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("create router: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	m.aclMgr, err = newAclManager(iptablesClient, wgIface)
+	m.aclMgr, err = newAclManager(iptablesClient, wgIface, m.ipsetSupport)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("create acl manager: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -83,16 +88,16 @@ func (m *Manager) createIPv6Components(wgIface iFaceMapper, mtu uint16) error {
 	}
 	m.ipv6Client = ip6Client
 
-	m.router6, err = newRouter(ip6Client, wgIface, mtu)
+	m.router6, err = newRouter(ip6Client, wgIface, mtu, m.ipsetSupport)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("create v6 router: %w", err)
 	}
 
 	// Share the same IP forwarding state with the v4 router, since
-	// EnableIPForwarding controls both v4 and v6 sysctls.
+	// Forwarding refcounter is per-family but shared between v4 and v6 routers.
 	m.router6.ipFwdState = m.router.ipFwdState
 
-	m.aclMgr6, err = newAclManager(ip6Client, wgIface)
+	m.aclMgr6, err = newAclManager(ip6Client, wgIface, m.ipsetSupport)
 	if err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("create v6 acl manager: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -402,17 +407,12 @@ func (m *Manager) SetLogLevel(log.Level) {
 }
 
 func (m *Manager) EnableRouting() error {
-	if err := m.router.ipFwdState.RequestForwarding(); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("enable IP forwarding: %w", err)
-	}
-	return nil
+	// v6 only when the overlay actually has v6.
+	return m.router.ipFwdState.RequestRouting(m.router6 != nil)
 }
 
 func (m *Manager) DisableRouting() error {
-	if err := m.router.ipFwdState.ReleaseForwarding(); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("disable IP forwarding: %w", err)
-	}
-	return nil
+	return m.router.ipFwdState.ReleaseRouting()
 }
 
 // AddDNATRule adds a DNAT rule

client/firewall/iptables/manager_linux_test.go

@@ -291,3 +291,98 @@ func TestIptablesCreatePerformance(t *testing.T) {
 		})
 	}
 }
+
+// newACLTestManager returns a started manager. Create()/Init() is used so the
+// router-owned chains (chainRTFWDIN/OUT) exist before the ACL manager's
+// createDefaultChains() references them.
+func newACLTestManager(t *testing.T) *Manager {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	manager, err := Create(ifaceMock, iface.DefaultMTU)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NoError(t, manager.Init(nil))
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		require.NoError(t, manager.Close(nil))
+	})
+
+	return manager
+}
+
+// TestIptablesACLUsesIPSetOnHealthyKernel guards the default: on a kernel that
+// does have ipset, rules must keep matching a set. A regression that reported
+// ipset as unusable would silently move every Linux client to per-IP rules.
+func TestIptablesACLUsesIPSetOnHealthyKernel(t *testing.T) {
+	ipv4Client, err := iptables.NewWithProtocol(iptables.ProtocolIPv4)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	manager := newACLTestManager(t)
+
+	ip := netip.MustParseAddr("10.20.0.42")
+	port := &fw.Port{Values: []uint16{22}}
+
+	rules, err := manager.aclMgr.AddPeerFiltering(nil, ip.AsSlice(), "tcp", nil, port, fw.ActionAccept, "nb0000001")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NotEmpty(t, rules)
+
+	rule := rules[0].(*Rule)
+	require.Equal(t, "nb0000001-dport", rule.ipsetName, "healthy kernel must use an ipset")
+	require.Contains(t, rule.specs, "--match-set")
+	require.True(t, manager.ipsetSupport.supported(), "ipset must not be latched off on a healthy kernel")
+
+	checkRuleSpecs(t, ipv4Client, rule.chain, true, rule.specs...)
+}
+
+// TestIptablesACLFallsBackWhenIPSetUnusable drives the real failure path: an
+// oversized set name is rejected by the kernel, which stands in for a kernel
+// without ip_set_hash_net or xt_set. The rule must still land in the chain,
+// matching the IP directly, and the capability must latch off so later rules skip
+// ipset. Before the fallback existed, the rule was dropped and the catch-all DROP
+// silently blocked traffic the policy permits.
+func TestIptablesACLFallsBackWhenIPSetUnusable(t *testing.T) {
+	ipv4Client, err := iptables.NewWithProtocol(iptables.ProtocolIPv4)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	manager := newACLTestManager(t)
+
+	// ipset names are limited to 31 characters, so creating this set fails.
+	unusableName := strings.Repeat("a", 40)
+
+	ip := netip.MustParseAddr("10.20.0.42")
+	port := &fw.Port{Values: []uint16{22}}
+
+	rules, err := manager.aclMgr.AddPeerFiltering(nil, ip.AsSlice(), "tcp", nil, port, fw.ActionAccept, unusableName)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "AddPeerFiltering must succeed by falling back")
+	require.NotEmpty(t, rules)
+
+	rule := rules[0].(*Rule)
+	require.Empty(t, rule.ipsetName, "fallback rule must not reference an ipset")
+	require.Contains(t, strings.Join(rule.specs, " "), "-s 10.20.0.42", "fallback rule must match the source IP")
+	require.NotContains(t, strings.Join(rule.specs, " "), "--match-set")
+
+	// The rule must actually be present, not silently missing.
+	checkRuleSpecs(t, ipv4Client, rule.chain, true, rule.specs...)
+
+	require.False(t, manager.ipsetSupport.supported(), "failure must latch ipset off")
+
+	// A subsequent rule with a perfectly valid set name now skips ipset too.
+	next, err := manager.aclMgr.AddPeerFiltering(nil, netip.MustParseAddr("10.20.0.43").AsSlice(), "tcp", nil, port, fw.ActionAccept, "nb0000001")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NotEmpty(t, next)
+	require.Empty(t, next[0].(*Rule).ipsetName, "later rules must skip ipset once latched")
+}
+
+// TestIptablesACLLeavesNoIPSetAfterFallback verifies the set created before the
+// failure is destroyed, so a later rule does not find a half-built set and assume
+// ipset works.
+func TestIptablesACLLeavesNoIPSetAfterFallback(t *testing.T) {
+	manager := newACLTestManager(t)
+
+	port := &fw.Port{Values: []uint16{22}}
+	ip := netip.MustParseAddr("10.20.0.42")
+
+	_, err := manager.aclMgr.AddPeerFiltering(nil, ip.AsSlice(), "tcp", nil, port, fw.ActionAccept, strings.Repeat("a", 40))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	_, exists := manager.aclMgr.ipsetStore.ipset(strings.Repeat("a", 40) + "-dport")
+	require.False(t, exists, "unusable set must not stay in the store")
+}

client/firewall/iptables/router_linux.go

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 package iptables
 
 import (
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"maps"
 	"net/netip"
@@ -51,6 +52,10 @@ const (
 	markManglePost = "mark-mangle-post"
 	matchSet       = "--match-set"
 
+	// routeSourceSuffix names the extra rules a route ACL needs when ipset is
+	// unusable and each source prefix has to be matched by its own rule.
+	routeSourceSuffix = "_src"
+
 	dnatSuffix = "_dnat"
 	snatSuffix = "_snat"
 	fwdSuffix  = "_fwd"
@@ -68,7 +73,6 @@ type ruleInfo struct {
 }
 
 type routeFilteringRuleParams struct {
-	Source      firewall.Network
 	Destination firewall.Network
 	Proto       firewall.Protocol
 	SPort       *firewall.Port
@@ -90,19 +94,21 @@ type router struct {
 	legacyManagement bool
 	mtu              uint16
 	v6               bool
+	ipsetSupport     *ipsetSupport
 
 	stateManager *statemanager.Manager
 	ipFwdState   *ipfwdstate.IPForwardingState
 }
 
-func newRouter(iptablesClient *iptables.IPTables, wgIface iFaceMapper, mtu uint16) (*router, error) {
+func newRouter(iptablesClient *iptables.IPTables, wgIface iFaceMapper, mtu uint16, ipsetSupport *ipsetSupport) (*router, error) {
 	r := &router{
 		iptablesClient: iptablesClient,
 		rules:          make(map[string][]string),
 		wgIface:        wgIface,
 		mtu:            mtu,
 		v6:             iptablesClient.Proto() == iptables.ProtocolIPv6,
-		ipFwdState:     ipfwdstate.NewIPForwardingState(),
+		ipFwdState:     ipfwdstate.NewIPForwardingState(wgIface.Name()),
+		ipsetSupport:   ipsetSupport,
 	}
 
 	r.ipsetCounter = refcounter.New(
@@ -151,15 +157,7 @@ func (r *router) AddRouteFiltering(
 		return ruleKey, nil
 	}
 
-	var source firewall.Network
-	if len(sources) > 1 {
-		source.Set = firewall.NewPrefixSet(sources)
-	} else if len(sources) > 0 {
-		source.Prefix = sources[0]
-	}
-
 	params := routeFilteringRuleParams{
-		Source:      source,
 		Destination: destination,
 		Proto:       proto,
 		SPort:       sPort,
@@ -167,30 +165,156 @@ func (r *router) AddRouteFiltering(
 		Action:      action,
 	}
 
-	rule, err := r.genRouteRuleSpec(params, sources)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("generate route rule spec: %w", err)
-	}
+	err := r.installRouteRules(string(ruleKey), params, sources, r.ipsetSupport.supported())
 
-	// Insert DROP rules at the beginning, append ACCEPT rules at the end
-	if action == firewall.ActionDrop {
-		// after the established rule
-		err = r.iptablesClient.Insert(tableFilter, chainRTFWDIN, 2, rule...)
-	} else {
-		err = r.iptablesClient.Append(tableFilter, chainRTFWDIN, rule...)
+	var unusable *ipsetUnusableError
+	if errors.As(err, &unusable) {
+		// The set could not be created or matched. Retry matching each source
+		// prefix on its own; only if that works do we know ipset was to blame.
+		r.removeRouteRules(string(ruleKey))
+
+		if retryErr := r.installRouteRules(string(ruleKey), params, sources, false); retryErr != nil {
+			r.removeRouteRules(string(ruleKey))
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("add route rule (ipset: %w): %w", unusable.cause, retryErr)
+		}
+
+		r.ipsetSupport.markUnsupported(unusable.cause)
+		err = nil
 	}
 
 	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("add route rule: %v", err)
-	}
+		// Leave nothing half-installed: a later call finding the rule key would
+		// report success while some sources were never installed, which for a
+		// drop rule would leave them unblocked.
+		r.removeRouteRules(string(ruleKey))
 
-	r.rules[string(ruleKey)] = rule
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("add route rule: %w", err)
+	}
 
 	r.updateState()
 
 	return ruleKey, nil
 }
 
+// installRouteRules installs every rule needed for one route ACL and records them
+// under ruleKey. It is more than one rule only when useIPSet is false and the
+// sources have to be matched one prefix at a time.
+func (r *router) installRouteRules(ruleKey string, params routeFilteringRuleParams, sources []netip.Prefix, useIPSet bool) error {
+	specs, err := r.genRouteRuleSpecs(params, sources, useIPSet)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("generate route rule spec: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	for i, spec := range specs {
+		if err := r.insertRouteRule(params.Action, spec); err != nil {
+			if len(r.findSets(spec)) > 0 {
+				return ipsetUnusable(err)
+			}
+			return err
+		}
+		r.rules[routeRuleKey(ruleKey, i)] = spec
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// genRouteRuleSpecs builds the rules for one route ACL. With ipset available that
+// is a single rule matching a set of sources; without it, one rule per source
+// prefix, which is the only form a stripped kernel can express.
+func (r *router) genRouteRuleSpecs(params routeFilteringRuleParams, sources []netip.Prefix, useIPSet bool) ([][]string, error) {
+	destExp, err := r.applyNetwork("-d", params.Destination, nil)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("apply network -d: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	specs, err := r.genSourceRules(params, sources, useIPSet, destExp)
+	if err != nil {
+		// The destination match may have taken a set reference already.
+		if decErr := r.decrementSetCounter(destExp); decErr != nil {
+			log.Debugf("release destination set after failed rule generation: %v", decErr)
+		}
+
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	return specs, nil
+}
+
+func (r *router) genSourceRules(params routeFilteringRuleParams, sources []netip.Prefix, useIPSet bool, destExp []string) ([][]string, error) {
+	if useIPSet || len(sources) <= 1 {
+		sourceExp, err := r.applyNetwork("-s", sourceNetwork(sources), sources)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("apply network -s: %w", err)
+		}
+
+		return [][]string{assembleRouteRule(sourceExp, destExp, params, r.v6)}, nil
+	}
+
+	specs := make([][]string, 0, len(sources))
+	for _, source := range sources {
+		sourceExp, err := r.applyNetwork("-s", firewall.Network{Prefix: source}, nil)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("apply network -s: %w", err)
+		}
+
+		specs = append(specs, assembleRouteRule(sourceExp, destExp, params, r.v6))
+	}
+
+	return specs, nil
+}
+
+func sourceNetwork(sources []netip.Prefix) firewall.Network {
+	var source firewall.Network
+	if len(sources) > 1 {
+		source.Set = firewall.NewPrefixSet(sources)
+	} else if len(sources) > 0 {
+		source.Prefix = sources[0]
+	}
+
+	return source
+}
+
+func (r *router) insertRouteRule(action firewall.Action, spec []string) error {
+	// Insert DROP rules at the beginning, append ACCEPT rules at the end
+	if action == firewall.ActionDrop {
+		// after the established rule
+		return r.iptablesClient.Insert(tableFilter, chainRTFWDIN, 2, spec...)
+	}
+
+	return r.iptablesClient.Append(tableFilter, chainRTFWDIN, spec...)
+}
+
+// removeRouteRules deletes the rules recorded for ruleKey, used to undo a partial
+// install before retrying without ipset.
+func (r *router) removeRouteRules(ruleKey string) {
+	for i := 0; ; i++ {
+		key := routeRuleKey(ruleKey, i)
+		spec, exists := r.rules[key]
+		if !exists {
+			return
+		}
+
+		if err := r.iptablesClient.DeleteIfExists(tableFilter, chainRTFWDIN, spec...); err != nil {
+			log.Debugf("delete partial route rule %s: %v", key, err)
+		}
+		delete(r.rules, key)
+
+		if err := r.decrementSetCounter(spec); err != nil {
+			log.Debugf("decrement ipset counter for %s: %v", key, err)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// routeRuleKey names the i-th rule of a route ACL. The first keeps the plain rule
+// key so single-rule ACLs, which is every ACL when ipset works, are unaffected.
+func routeRuleKey(ruleKey string, i int) string {
+	if i == 0 {
+		return ruleKey
+	}
+
+	return fmt.Sprintf("%s%s%d", ruleKey, routeSourceSuffix, i)
+}
+
 func (r *router) hasRule(id string) bool {
 	_, ok := r.rules[id]
 	return ok
@@ -199,17 +323,29 @@ func (r *router) hasRule(id string) bool {
 func (r *router) DeleteRouteRule(rule firewall.Rule) error {
 	ruleKey := rule.ID()
 
-	if rule, exists := r.rules[ruleKey]; exists {
+	if _, exists := r.rules[ruleKey]; !exists {
+		log.Debugf("route rule %s not found", ruleKey)
+		r.updateState()
+
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// In the ipset fallback one ACL is several rules, one per source prefix.
+	for i := 0; ; i++ {
+		key := routeRuleKey(ruleKey, i)
+		rule, exists := r.rules[key]
+		if !exists {
+			break
+		}
+
 		if err := r.iptablesClient.Delete(tableFilter, chainRTFWDIN, rule...); err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("delete route rule: %v", err)
 		}
-		delete(r.rules, ruleKey)
+		delete(r.rules, key)
 
 		if err := r.decrementSetCounter(rule); err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("decrement ipset counter: %w", err)
 		}
-	} else {
-		log.Debugf("route rule %s not found", ruleKey)
 	}
 
 	r.updateState()
@@ -770,10 +906,6 @@ func (r *router) updateState() {
 }
 
 func (r *router) AddDNATRule(rule firewall.ForwardRule) (firewall.Rule, error) {
-	if err := r.ipFwdState.RequestForwarding(); err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-
 	ruleKey := rule.ID()
 	if _, exists := r.rules[ruleKey+dnatSuffix]; exists {
 		return rule, nil
@@ -840,18 +972,34 @@ func (r *router) AddDNATRule(rule firewall.ForwardRule) (firewall.Rule, error) {
 
 	for key, ruleInfo := range rules {
 		if err := r.iptablesClient.Append(ruleInfo.table, ruleInfo.chain, ruleInfo.rule...); err != nil {
-			if rollbackErr := r.rollbackRules(rules); rollbackErr != nil {
-				log.Errorf("rollback failed: %v", rollbackErr)
-			}
+			r.cleanupFailedDNATAdd(rules)
 			return nil, fmt.Errorf("add rule %s: %w", key, err)
 		}
 		r.rules[key] = ruleInfo.rule
 	}
 
+	if err := r.ipFwdState.RequestForwarding(r.v6); err != nil {
+		r.cleanupFailedDNATAdd(rules)
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("enable forwarding: %w", err)
+	}
+
 	r.updateState()
 	return rule, nil
 }
 
+// cleanupFailedDNATAdd removes the bookkeeping written by a partially applied
+// AddDNATRule before rolling back the kernel rules, so no entries remain that
+// never got a forwarding refcount. rollbackRules re-adds entries it failed to
+// remove from the kernel.
+func (r *router) cleanupFailedDNATAdd(rules map[string]ruleInfo) {
+	for key := range rules {
+		delete(r.rules, key)
+	}
+	if err := r.rollbackRules(rules); err != nil {
+		log.Errorf("rollback failed: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
 func (r *router) rollbackRules(rules map[string]ruleInfo) error {
 	var merr *multierror.Error
 	for key, ruleInfo := range rules {
@@ -868,63 +1016,70 @@ func (r *router) rollbackRules(rules map[string]ruleInfo) error {
 }
 
 func (r *router) DeleteDNATRule(rule firewall.Rule) error {
-	if err := r.ipFwdState.ReleaseForwarding(); err != nil {
-		log.Errorf("%v", err)
-	}
-
 	ruleKey := rule.ID()
 
+	_, hadDNAT := r.rules[ruleKey+dnatSuffix]
+	_, hadSNAT := r.rules[ruleKey+snatSuffix]
+	_, hadFWD := r.rules[ruleKey+fwdSuffix]
+	if !hadDNAT && !hadSNAT && !hadFWD {
+		return nil
+	}
+
 	var merr *multierror.Error
 	if dnatRule, exists := r.rules[ruleKey+dnatSuffix]; exists {
 		if err := r.iptablesClient.Delete(tableNat, chainRTRDR, dnatRule...); err != nil {
 			merr = multierror.Append(merr, fmt.Errorf("delete DNAT rule: %w", err))
+		} else {
+			delete(r.rules, ruleKey+dnatSuffix)
 		}
-		delete(r.rules, ruleKey+dnatSuffix)
 	}
 
 	if snatRule, exists := r.rules[ruleKey+snatSuffix]; exists {
 		if err := r.iptablesClient.Delete(tableNat, chainRTNAT, snatRule...); err != nil {
 			merr = multierror.Append(merr, fmt.Errorf("delete SNAT rule: %w", err))
+		} else {
+			delete(r.rules, ruleKey+snatSuffix)
 		}
-		delete(r.rules, ruleKey+snatSuffix)
 	}
 
 	if fwdRule, exists := r.rules[ruleKey+fwdSuffix]; exists {
 		if err := r.iptablesClient.Delete(tableFilter, chainRTFWDOUT, fwdRule...); err != nil {
 			merr = multierror.Append(merr, fmt.Errorf("delete forward rule: %w", err))
+		} else {
+			delete(r.rules, ruleKey+fwdSuffix)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Release the refcount only once all rules are gone from the kernel. On
+	// partial failure the failed entries stay in r.rules so a retry can remove
+	// them and release then.
+	if merr == nil {
+		if err := r.ipFwdState.ReleaseForwarding(r.v6); err != nil {
+			log.Errorf("%v", err)
 		}
-		delete(r.rules, ruleKey+fwdSuffix)
 	}
 
 	r.updateState()
 	return nberrors.FormatErrorOrNil(merr)
 }
 
-func (r *router) genRouteRuleSpec(params routeFilteringRuleParams, sources []netip.Prefix) ([]string, error) {
+// assembleRouteRule joins the pre-built source and destination matches with the
+// protocol, ports and target of a route ACL.
+func assembleRouteRule(sourceExp, destExp []string, params routeFilteringRuleParams, v6 bool) []string {
 	var rule []string
 
-	sourceExp, err := r.applyNetwork("-s", params.Source, sources)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("apply network -s: %w", err)
-
-	}
-	destExp, err := r.applyNetwork("-d", params.Destination, nil)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("apply network -d: %w", err)
-	}
-
 	rule = append(rule, sourceExp...)
 	rule = append(rule, destExp...)
 
 	if params.Proto != firewall.ProtocolALL {
-		rule = append(rule, "-p", strings.ToLower(protoForFamily(params.Proto, r.v6)))
+		rule = append(rule, "-p", strings.ToLower(protoForFamily(params.Proto, v6)))
 		rule = append(rule, applyPort("--sport", params.SPort)...)
 		rule = append(rule, applyPort("--dport", params.DPort)...)
 	}
 
 	rule = append(rule, "-j", actionToStr(params.Action))
 
-	return rule, nil
+	return rule
 }
 
 func (r *router) applyNetwork(flag string, network firewall.Network, prefixes []netip.Prefix) ([]string, error) {
@@ -934,9 +1089,17 @@ func (r *router) applyNetwork(flag string, network firewall.Network, prefixes []
 	}
 
 	if network.IsSet() {
+		// A destination set is populated later from DNS results, so unlike a
+		// source set it cannot be expanded into per-prefix rules here. Without
+		// ipset such a rule is not expressible; report it instead of installing
+		// something broader than the policy allows.
+		if flag == "-d" && !r.ipsetSupport.supported() {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("destination set %s requires ipset (ip_set_hash_net and xt_set)", network.Set.HashedName())
+		}
+
 		name := r.ipsetName(network.Set.HashedName())
 		if _, err := r.ipsetCounter.Increment(name, prefixes); err != nil {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("create or get ipset: %w", err)
+			return nil, ipsetUnusable(fmt.Errorf("create or get ipset: %w", err))
 		}
 
 		return []string{"-m", "set", matchSet, name, direction}, nil

client/firewall/iptables/router_linux_test.go

@@ -3,9 +3,11 @@
 package iptables
 
 import (
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"net/netip"
 	"os/exec"
+	"strings"
 	"testing"
 
 	"github.com/coreos/go-iptables/iptables"
@@ -15,7 +17,9 @@ import (
 	firewall "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/test"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface"
+	nbid "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/acl/id"
 	nbnet "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/net"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
 )
 
 func isIptablesSupported() bool {
@@ -31,7 +35,7 @@ func TestIptablesManager_RestoreOrCreateContainers(t *testing.T) {
 	iptablesClient, err := iptables.NewWithProtocol(iptables.ProtocolIPv4)
 	require.NoError(t, err, "failed to init iptables client")
 
-	manager, err := newRouter(iptablesClient, ifaceMock, iface.DefaultMTU)
+	manager, err := newRouter(iptablesClient, ifaceMock, iface.DefaultMTU, newIPSetSupport())
 	require.NoError(t, err, "should return a valid iptables manager")
 	require.NoError(t, manager.init(nil))
 
@@ -84,7 +88,7 @@ func TestIptablesManager_AddNatRule(t *testing.T) {
 			iptablesClient, err := iptables.NewWithProtocol(iptables.ProtocolIPv4)
 			require.NoError(t, err, "failed to init iptables client")
 
-			manager, err := newRouter(iptablesClient, ifaceMock, iface.DefaultMTU)
+			manager, err := newRouter(iptablesClient, ifaceMock, iface.DefaultMTU, newIPSetSupport())
 			require.NoError(t, err, "shouldn't return error")
 			require.NoError(t, manager.init(nil))
 
@@ -157,7 +161,7 @@ func TestIptablesManager_RemoveNatRule(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Run(testCase.Name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			iptablesClient, _ := iptables.NewWithProtocol(iptables.ProtocolIPv4)
 
-			manager, err := newRouter(iptablesClient, ifaceMock, iface.DefaultMTU)
+			manager, err := newRouter(iptablesClient, ifaceMock, iface.DefaultMTU, newIPSetSupport())
 			require.NoError(t, err, "shouldn't return error")
 			require.NoError(t, manager.init(nil))
 			defer func() {
@@ -219,7 +223,7 @@ func TestRouter_AddRouteFiltering(t *testing.T) {
 	iptablesClient, err := iptables.NewWithProtocol(iptables.ProtocolIPv4)
 	require.NoError(t, err, "Failed to create iptables client")
 
-	r, err := newRouter(iptablesClient, ifaceMock, iface.DefaultMTU)
+	r, err := newRouter(iptablesClient, ifaceMock, iface.DefaultMTU, newIPSetSupport())
 	require.NoError(t, err, "Failed to create router manager")
 	require.NoError(t, r.init(nil))
 
@@ -337,27 +341,26 @@ func TestRouter_AddRouteFiltering(t *testing.T) {
 			ruleKey, err := r.AddRouteFiltering(nil, tt.sources, firewall.Network{Prefix: tt.destination}, tt.proto, tt.sPort, tt.dPort, tt.action)
 			require.NoError(t, err, "AddRouteFiltering failed")
 
-			// Check if the rule is in the internal map
-			rule, ok := r.rules[ruleKey.ID()]
-			assert.True(t, ok, "Rule not found in internal map")
+			// A kernel without usable ipset splits a multi-source ACL into one
+			// rule per source, so compare against whichever form is in effect.
+			useIPSet := r.ipsetSupport.supported()
 
-			// Log the internal rule
-			t.Logf("Internal rule: %v", rule)
+			// Check if the rules are in the internal map
+			rules := routeRuleSpecs(t, r, ruleKey.ID())
+			require.NotEmpty(t, rules, "Rule not found in internal map")
 
-			// Check if the rule exists in iptables
-			exists, err := iptablesClient.Exists(tableFilter, chainRTFWDIN, rule...)
-			assert.NoError(t, err, "Failed to check rule existence")
-			assert.True(t, exists, "Rule not found in iptables")
+			// Log the internal rules
+			t.Logf("Internal rules: %v", rules)
 
-			var source firewall.Network
-			if len(tt.sources) > 1 {
-				source.Set = firewall.NewPrefixSet(tt.sources)
-			} else if len(tt.sources) > 0 {
-				source.Prefix = tt.sources[0]
+			// Check if the rules exist in iptables
+			for _, rule := range rules {
+				exists, err := iptablesClient.Exists(tableFilter, chainRTFWDIN, rule...)
+				assert.NoError(t, err, "Failed to check rule existence")
+				assert.True(t, exists, "Rule not found in iptables")
 			}
+
 			// Verify rule content
 			params := routeFilteringRuleParams{
-				Source:      source,
 				Destination: firewall.Network{Prefix: tt.destination},
 				Proto:       tt.proto,
 				SPort:       tt.sPort,
@@ -365,20 +368,18 @@ func TestRouter_AddRouteFiltering(t *testing.T) {
 				Action:      tt.action,
 			}
 
-			expectedRule, err := r.genRouteRuleSpec(params, nil)
+			expectedRules, err := r.genRouteRuleSpecs(params, tt.sources, useIPSet)
 			require.NoError(t, err, "Failed to generate expected rule spec")
 
-			if tt.expectSet {
+			if tt.expectSet && useIPSet {
 				setName := firewall.NewPrefixSet(tt.sources).HashedName()
-				expectedRule, err = r.genRouteRuleSpec(params, nil)
-				require.NoError(t, err, "Failed to generate expected rule spec with set")
 
 				// Check if the set was created
 				_, exists := r.ipsetCounter.Get(setName)
 				assert.True(t, exists, "IPSet not created")
 			}
 
-			assert.Equal(t, expectedRule, rule, "Rule content mismatch")
+			assert.Equal(t, expectedRules, rules, "Rule content mismatch")
 
 			// Clean up
 			err = r.DeleteRouteRule(ruleKey)
@@ -445,3 +446,145 @@ func TestFindSetNameInRule(t *testing.T) {
 		})
 	}
 }
+
+// TestRouter_AddRouteFilteringIPSetFallback covers a kernel that cannot use ipset:
+// a multi-source route ACL must become one rule per source prefix, all present in
+// the chain, and deleting the ACL must remove every one of them. Without the
+// fallback the rule was never installed and the interface-wide DROP in FORWARD
+// silently dropped routed traffic.
+func TestRouter_AddRouteFilteringIPSetFallback(t *testing.T) {
+	if !isIptablesSupported() {
+		t.Skip("iptables not supported on this system")
+	}
+
+	iptablesClient, err := iptables.NewWithProtocol(iptables.ProtocolIPv4)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	support := newIPSetSupport()
+	support.markUnsupported(errors.New("test: pretend the kernel has no ipset"))
+
+	r, err := newRouter(iptablesClient, ifaceMock, iface.DefaultMTU, support)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NoError(t, r.init(nil))
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		require.NoError(t, r.Reset())
+	})
+
+	sources := []netip.Prefix{
+		netip.MustParsePrefix("172.16.0.0/16"),
+		netip.MustParsePrefix("192.168.0.0/16"),
+	}
+	destination := firewall.Network{Prefix: netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8")}
+
+	rule, err := r.AddRouteFiltering(nil, sources, destination, firewall.ProtocolTCP, nil,
+		&firewall.Port{Values: []uint16{443}}, firewall.ActionAccept)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "route ACL must install without ipset")
+
+	specs := routeRuleSpecs(t, r, rule.ID())
+	require.Len(t, specs, len(sources), "each source prefix needs its own rule")
+
+	for i, spec := range specs {
+		joined := strings.Join(spec, " ")
+		require.Contains(t, joined, "-s "+sources[i].String(), "rule must match the source prefix directly")
+		require.NotContains(t, joined, matchSet, "fallback rule must not reference a set")
+
+		exists, err := iptablesClient.Exists(tableFilter, chainRTFWDIN, spec...)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		require.True(t, exists, "rule %d must be present in %s", i, chainRTFWDIN)
+	}
+
+	require.NoError(t, r.DeleteRouteRule(rule))
+
+	for i, spec := range specs {
+		exists, err := iptablesClient.Exists(tableFilter, chainRTFWDIN, spec...)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		require.False(t, exists, "rule %d must be removed", i)
+	}
+	require.Empty(t, routeRuleSpecs(t, r, rule.ID()), "no rule may be left recorded")
+}
+
+// TestRouter_DestinationSetRequiresIPSet documents that a dynamic (domain)
+// destination cannot be expressed without ipset: its prefixes are only known
+// after DNS resolution, so there is nothing to expand into per-prefix rules. The
+// call must report that rather than install a broader rule than the policy allows.
+func TestRouter_DestinationSetRequiresIPSet(t *testing.T) {
+	if !isIptablesSupported() {
+		t.Skip("iptables not supported on this system")
+	}
+
+	iptablesClient, err := iptables.NewWithProtocol(iptables.ProtocolIPv4)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	support := newIPSetSupport()
+	support.markUnsupported(errors.New("test: pretend the kernel has no ipset"))
+
+	r, err := newRouter(iptablesClient, ifaceMock, iface.DefaultMTU, support)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NoError(t, r.init(nil))
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		require.NoError(t, r.Reset())
+	})
+
+	destination := firewall.Network{Set: firewall.NewDomainSet(domain.List{"example.com"})}
+
+	_, err = r.AddRouteFiltering(nil, []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("172.16.0.0/16")},
+		destination, firewall.ProtocolALL, nil, nil, firewall.ActionAccept)
+	require.Error(t, err, "a domain destination is not expressible without ipset")
+	require.ErrorContains(t, err, "requires ipset")
+}
+
+// TestRouter_RouteFilteringRollsBackPartialInstall covers a fallback ACL whose
+// second rule cannot be installed. Nothing may be left behind: if the rule key
+// survived, a later call would short-circuit on it and report success while some
+// sources were never installed, leaving them unblocked for a drop rule.
+func TestRouter_RouteFilteringRollsBackPartialInstall(t *testing.T) {
+	if !isIptablesSupported() {
+		t.Skip("iptables not supported on this system")
+	}
+
+	iptablesClient, err := iptables.NewWithProtocol(iptables.ProtocolIPv4)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	support := newIPSetSupport()
+	support.markUnsupported(errors.New("test: pretend the kernel has no ipset"))
+
+	r, err := newRouter(iptablesClient, ifaceMock, iface.DefaultMTU, support)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NoError(t, r.init(nil))
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		require.NoError(t, r.Reset())
+	})
+
+	// The v6 prefix is rejected by the v4 iptables binary, so the second rule of
+	// the expansion fails after the first has been installed.
+	good := netip.MustParsePrefix("172.16.0.0/16")
+	sources := []netip.Prefix{good, netip.MustParsePrefix("2001:db8::/32")}
+	destination := firewall.Network{Prefix: netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8")}
+
+	_, err = r.AddRouteFiltering(nil, sources, destination, firewall.ProtocolALL, nil, nil, firewall.ActionDrop)
+	require.Error(t, err, "a source that iptables rejects must fail the whole ACL")
+
+	ruleKey := nbid.GenerateRouteRuleKey(sources, destination, firewall.ProtocolALL, nil, nil, firewall.ActionDrop)
+	require.Empty(t, routeRuleSpecs(t, r, string(ruleKey)), "no rule may stay recorded")
+
+	// The rule that did get installed must be gone from the chain.
+	installed := []string{"-s", good.String(), "-d", "10.0.0.0/8", "-j", "DROP"}
+	exists, err := iptablesClient.Exists(tableFilter, chainRTFWDIN, installed...)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.False(t, exists, "the already-installed rule must be rolled back")
+}
+
+// routeRuleSpecs collects the rules recorded for one route ACL, which is more than
+// one when the ipset fallback splits it per source prefix.
+func routeRuleSpecs(t *testing.T, r *router, ruleKey string) [][]string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var specs [][]string
+	for i := 0; ; i++ {
+		spec, exists := r.rules[routeRuleKey(ruleKey, i)]
+		if !exists {
+			return specs
+		}
+		specs = append(specs, spec)
+	}
+}

client/firewall/nftables/dnat_refcount_linux_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
+//go:build privileged
+
+package nftables
+
+import (
+	"net/netip"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	fw "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/firewall/manager"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/iface/wgaddr"
+)
+
+func nftRefcountIfaceV4() *iFaceMock {
+	return &iFaceMock{
+		NameFunc: func() string { return "wt-refcount" },
+		AddressFunc: func() wgaddr.Address {
+			return wgaddr.Address{
+				IP:      netip.MustParseAddr("100.96.0.1"),
+				Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("100.96.0.0/16"),
+			}
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+func nftRefcountIfaceDual() *iFaceMock {
+	return &iFaceMock{
+		NameFunc: func() string { return "wt-refcount" },
+		AddressFunc: func() wgaddr.Address {
+			return wgaddr.Address{
+				IP:      netip.MustParseAddr("100.96.0.1"),
+				Network: netip.MustParsePrefix("100.96.0.0/16"),
+				IPv6:    netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::1"),
+				IPv6Net: netip.MustParsePrefix("fd00::/64"),
+			}
+		},
+	}
+}
+
+func newNftRefcountManager(t *testing.T, dual bool) *Manager {
+	t.Helper()
+	if check() != NFTABLES {
+		t.Skip("nftables not supported on this system")
+	}
+	var ifMock *iFaceMock
+	if dual {
+		ifMock = nftRefcountIfaceDual()
+	} else {
+		ifMock = nftRefcountIfaceV4()
+	}
+	m, err := Create(ifMock, iface.DefaultMTU)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "create manager")
+	require.NoError(t, m.Init(nil), "init manager")
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		require.NoError(t, m.Close(nil), "close manager")
+	})
+	return m
+}
+
+func dnatV4(port uint16) fw.ForwardRule {
+	return fw.ForwardRule{
+		Protocol:          fw.ProtocolTCP,
+		DestinationPort:   fw.Port{Values: []uint16{port}},
+		TranslatedAddress: netip.MustParseAddr("100.96.0.2"),
+		TranslatedPort:    fw.Port{Values: []uint16{80}},
+	}
+}
+
+func dnatV6(port uint16) fw.ForwardRule {
+	return fw.ForwardRule{
+		Protocol:          fw.ProtocolTCP,
+		DestinationPort:   fw.Port{Values: []uint16{port}},
+		TranslatedAddress: netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::2"),
+		TranslatedPort:    fw.Port{Values: []uint16{80}},
+	}
+}
+
+// TestNftablesDNAT_RefcountBalancedV4 verifies that Add/Delete pairs leave the
+// v4 refcount at zero.
+func TestNftablesDNAT_RefcountBalancedV4(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newNftRefcountManager(t, false)
+	state := m.router.ipFwdState
+
+	r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(dnatV4(8081))
+	require.NoError(t, err, "add v4 dnat 1")
+	v4, v6 := state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "v4 refcount after first add")
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount unchanged")
+
+	r2, err := m.AddDNATRule(dnatV4(8082))
+	require.NoError(t, err, "add v4 dnat 2")
+	v4, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 2, v4, "v4 refcount after second add")
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount unchanged")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1), "delete v4 dnat 1")
+	v4, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "v4 refcount after first delete")
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount unchanged")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r2), "delete v4 dnat 2")
+	v4, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "v4 refcount after second delete")
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount unchanged")
+}
+
+// TestNftablesDNAT_RefcountBalancedV6 verifies the v6 path increments v6 only
+// and decrements back to zero on Delete.
+func TestNftablesDNAT_RefcountBalancedV6(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newNftRefcountManager(t, true)
+	require.NotNil(t, m.router6, "v6 router")
+	require.Same(t, m.router.ipFwdState, m.router6.ipFwdState, "shared state")
+	state := m.router.ipFwdState
+
+	r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(dnatV6(9091))
+	require.NoError(t, err, "add v6 dnat 1")
+	v4, v6 := state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "v4 refcount unchanged")
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v6, "v6 refcount after first add")
+
+	r2, err := m.AddDNATRule(dnatV6(9092))
+	require.NoError(t, err, "add v6 dnat 2")
+	v4, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4)
+	assert.Equal(t, 2, v6, "v6 refcount after second add")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1), "delete v6 dnat 1")
+	v4, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "v4 refcount unchanged")
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v6, "v6 refcount after first delete")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r2), "delete v6 dnat 2")
+	v4, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4)
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount after second delete")
+}
+
+// TestNftablesDNAT_DuplicateAddNoLeak verifies that a duplicate Add (same
+// ForwardRule) does not double-increment the refcount.
+func TestNftablesDNAT_DuplicateAddNoLeak(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newNftRefcountManager(t, true)
+	state := m.router.ipFwdState
+
+	rule := dnatV4(8083)
+	r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(rule)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "add v4 dnat")
+	v4, _ := state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v4)
+
+	// duplicate add: same rule ID, must be a no-op for the refcount.
+	_, err = m.AddDNATRule(rule)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "duplicate add")
+	v4, _ = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "duplicate add must not increment")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1), "delete v4 dnat")
+	v4, _ = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "single delete must drop to zero")
+}
+
+// TestNftablesDNAT_DeleteMissingNoUnderflow verifies deleting a rule that was
+// never added does not underflow the refcount.
+func TestNftablesDNAT_DeleteMissingNoUnderflow(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newNftRefcountManager(t, true)
+	state := m.router.ipFwdState
+
+	// Construct a Rule reference for something never added. The router stores
+	// rules by ID(), and DeleteDNATRule looks them up in r.rules; a missing
+	// entry must be a no-op rather than calling Release.
+	phantom := dnatV4(8099)
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(&phantom), "delete missing v4 dnat")
+	v4, v6 := state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "v4 refcount unaffected by missing delete")
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount unaffected")
+
+	phantom6 := dnatV6(9099)
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(&phantom6), "delete missing v6 dnat")
+	v4, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4)
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "v6 refcount unaffected by missing delete")
+
+	// And after a phantom delete, a real add still results in count=1.
+	r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(dnatV4(8100))
+	require.NoError(t, err, "add v4 dnat after phantom delete")
+	v4, _ = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "real add still increments after phantom delete")
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1))
+}
+
+// TestNftablesRouting_RepeatedEnableSingleReference verifies that EnableRouting
+// (called on every network-map update) holds at most one reference per family
+// and a single DisableRouting drops both back to zero.
+func TestNftablesRouting_RepeatedEnableSingleReference(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newNftRefcountManager(t, true)
+	state := m.router.ipFwdState
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.EnableRouting(), "first enable")
+	require.NoError(t, m.EnableRouting(), "second enable")
+	require.NoError(t, m.EnableRouting(), "third enable")
+	v4, v6 := state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "repeated enable holds a single v4 reference")
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v6, "repeated enable holds a single v6 reference")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DisableRouting(), "disable")
+	v4, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "single disable releases the v4 reference")
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "single disable releases the v6 reference")
+}
+
+// TestNftablesRouting_DisableKeepsDNATReference verifies that an unpaired
+// DisableRouting does not release references held by active DNAT rules.
+func TestNftablesRouting_DisableKeepsDNATReference(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newNftRefcountManager(t, true)
+	state := m.router.ipFwdState
+
+	r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(dnatV6(9095))
+	require.NoError(t, err, "add v6 dnat")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DisableRouting(), "unpaired disable")
+	_, v6 := state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v6, "DNAT-held reference survives unpaired DisableRouting")
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1), "delete v6 dnat")
+	_, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "delete releases the DNAT reference")
+}
+
+// TestNftablesDNAT_DoubleDeleteNoUnderflow verifies that deleting the same rule
+// twice does not underflow the refcount (the second delete is a no-op).
+func TestNftablesDNAT_DoubleDeleteNoUnderflow(t *testing.T) {
+	m := newNftRefcountManager(t, true)
+	state := m.router.ipFwdState
+
+	r1, err := m.AddDNATRule(dnatV6(9093))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	_, v6 := state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v6)
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1), "first delete")
+	_, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6)
+
+	require.NoError(t, m.DeleteDNATRule(r1), "second delete must be no-op")
+	_, v6 = state.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "double delete must not underflow")
+}

client/firewall/nftables/manager_linux.go

@@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ func (m *Manager) createIPv6Components(tableName string, wgIface iFaceMapper, mt
 		return fmt.Errorf("create v6 router: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	// Share the same IP forwarding state with the v4 router, since
-	// EnableIPForwarding controls both v4 and v6 sysctls.
+	// Share the per-family forwarding refcounter with the v4 router so a v4
+	// rule and a v6 rule against the same state machine cooperate cleanly.
 	m.router6.ipFwdState = m.router.ipFwdState
 
 	m.aclManager6, err = newAclManager(workTable6, wgIface, chainNameRoutingFw)
@@ -530,17 +530,12 @@ func (m *Manager) SetLogLevel(log.Level) {
 }
 
 func (m *Manager) EnableRouting() error {
-	if err := m.router.ipFwdState.RequestForwarding(); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("enable IP forwarding: %w", err)
-	}
-	return nil
+	// v6 only when the overlay actually has v6.
+	return m.router.ipFwdState.RequestRouting(m.router6 != nil)
 }
 
 func (m *Manager) DisableRouting() error {
-	if err := m.router.ipFwdState.ReleaseForwarding(); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("disable IP forwarding: %w", err)
-	}
-	return nil
+	return m.router.ipFwdState.ReleaseRouting()
 }
 
 // Flush rule/chain/set operations from the buffer

client/firewall/nftables/router_linux.go

@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ func newRouter(workTable *nftables.Table, wgIface iFaceMapper, mtu uint16) (*rou
 		rules:      make(map[string]*nftables.Rule),
 		af:         familyForAddr(workTable.Family == nftables.TableFamilyIPv4),
 		wgIface:    wgIface,
-		ipFwdState: ipfwdstate.NewIPForwardingState(),
+		ipFwdState: ipfwdstate.NewIPForwardingState(wgIface.Name()),
 		mtu:        mtu,
 	}
 
@@ -1553,10 +1553,6 @@ func (r *router) refreshRulesMap() error {
 }
 
 func (r *router) AddDNATRule(rule firewall.ForwardRule) (firewall.Rule, error) {
-	if err := r.ipFwdState.RequestForwarding(); err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-
 	ruleKey := rule.ID()
 	if _, exists := r.rules[ruleKey+dnatSuffix]; exists {
 		return rule, nil
@@ -1567,7 +1563,18 @@ func (r *router) AddDNATRule(rule firewall.ForwardRule) (firewall.Rule, error) {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("convert protocol to number: %w", err)
 	}
 
+	// Request forwarding before queueing rules: addDnatRedirect/addDnatMasq
+	// buffer netlink messages on r.conn that the next caller's Flush would
+	// commit if we returned without flushing them ourselves.
+	v6 := r.af.tableFamily == nftables.TableFamilyIPv6
+	if err := r.ipFwdState.RequestForwarding(v6); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("enable forwarding: %w", err)
+	}
+
 	if err := r.addDnatRedirect(rule, protoNum, ruleKey); err != nil {
+		if rerr := r.ipFwdState.ReleaseForwarding(v6); rerr != nil {
+			log.Warnf("rollback forwarding refcount: %v", rerr)
+		}
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
@@ -1579,6 +1586,11 @@ func (r *router) AddDNATRule(rule firewall.ForwardRule) (firewall.Rule, error) {
 	// TODO: find chains with drop policies and add rules there
 
 	if err := r.conn.Flush(); err != nil {
+		if rerr := r.ipFwdState.ReleaseForwarding(v6); rerr != nil {
+			log.Warnf("rollback forwarding refcount: %v", rerr)
+		}
+		delete(r.rules, ruleKey+dnatSuffix)
+		delete(r.rules, ruleKey+snatSuffix)
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("flush rules: %w", err)
 	}
 
@@ -1781,16 +1793,18 @@ func (r *router) addDnatMasq(rule firewall.ForwardRule, protoNum uint8, ruleKey
 }
 
 func (r *router) DeleteDNATRule(rule firewall.Rule) error {
-	if err := r.ipFwdState.ReleaseForwarding(); err != nil {
-		log.Errorf("%v", err)
-	}
-
 	ruleKey := rule.ID()
 
 	if err := r.refreshRulesMap(); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf(refreshRulesMapError, err)
 	}
 
+	_, hadDNAT := r.rules[ruleKey+dnatSuffix]
+	_, hadSNAT := r.rules[ruleKey+snatSuffix]
+	if !hadDNAT && !hadSNAT {
+		return nil
+	}
+
 	var merr *multierror.Error
 	var needsFlush bool
 
@@ -1822,9 +1836,16 @@ func (r *router) DeleteDNATRule(rule firewall.Rule) error {
 		}
 	}
 
+	// Release the refcount only once the rules are gone from the kernel. On
+	// failure (including the refreshRulesMap error above) the rules and their
+	// map entries remain, keeping forwarding on until a retry removes them.
 	if merr == nil {
 		delete(r.rules, ruleKey+dnatSuffix)
 		delete(r.rules, ruleKey+snatSuffix)
+
+		if err := r.ipFwdState.ReleaseForwarding(r.af.tableFamily == nftables.TableFamilyIPv6); err != nil {
+			log.Errorf("%v", err)
+		}
 	}
 
 	return nberrors.FormatErrorOrNil(merr)

client/internal/debug/debug_linux.go

@@ -844,6 +844,10 @@ func collectSysctls() string {
 		[]string{"net.ipv4.conf.all.src_valid_mark", "net.ipv4.conf.default.src_valid_mark"},
 		listInterfaceSysctls("ipv4", "src_valid_mark")...,
 	))
+	writeSysctlGroup(&builder, "accept_ra", append(
+		[]string{"net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra", "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra"},
+		listInterfaceSysctls("ipv6", "accept_ra")...,
+	))
 	writeSysctlGroup(&builder, "conntrack", []string{
 		"net.netfilter.nf_conntrack_acct",
 		"net.netfilter.nf_conntrack_tcp_loose",

client/internal/dns/host_darwin.go

@@ -267,18 +267,38 @@ func (s *systemConfigurator) getSystemDNSSettings() (SystemDNSSettings, error) {
 		return SystemDNSSettings{}, fmt.Errorf("sending the command: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	var dnsSettings SystemDNSSettings
+	dnsSettings, serverAddresses, err := parseSystemDNSSettings(b)
+	if err != nil {
+		return dnsSettings, err
+	}
+
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	s.origNameservers = serverAddresses
+	s.mu.Unlock()
+
+	return dnsSettings, nil
+}
+
+// parseSystemDNSSettings parses the output of `scutil show State:/Network/Service/<id>/DNS`.
+// Lines that don't match the expected "index : value" shape are skipped: hosts with unusual
+// network services (e.g. orphaned hardware ports) can produce entries without a value.
+func parseSystemDNSSettings(out []byte) (SystemDNSSettings, []netip.Addr, error) {
+	// port is not exposed by scutil, default to 53
+	dnsSettings := SystemDNSSettings{ServerPort: DefaultPort}
 	var serverAddresses []netip.Addr
 	inSearchDomainsArray := false
 	inServerAddressesArray := false
 
-	scanner := bufio.NewScanner(bytes.NewReader(b))
+	scanner := bufio.NewScanner(bytes.NewReader(out))
 	for scanner.Scan() {
 		line := strings.TrimSpace(scanner.Text())
 		switch {
 		case strings.HasPrefix(line, "DomainName :"):
-			domainName := strings.TrimSpace(strings.Split(line, ":")[1])
-			dnsSettings.Domains = append(dnsSettings.Domains, domainName)
+			domainName := strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(line, "DomainName :"))
+			if domainName != "" {
+				dnsSettings.Domains = append(dnsSettings.Domains, domainName)
+			}
+			continue
 		case line == "SearchDomains : <array> {":
 			inSearchDomainsArray = true
 			continue
@@ -288,36 +308,45 @@ func (s *systemConfigurator) getSystemDNSSettings() (SystemDNSSettings, error) {
 		case line == "}":
 			inSearchDomainsArray = false
 			inServerAddressesArray = false
+			continue
+		}
+
+		if !inSearchDomainsArray && !inServerAddressesArray {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		parts := strings.SplitN(line, " : ", 2)
+		if len(parts) != 2 {
+			log.Debugf("skipping unexpected scutil DNS line %q", line)
+			continue
+		}
+		value := strings.TrimSpace(parts[1])
+		if value == "" {
+			continue
 		}
 
 		if inSearchDomainsArray {
-			searchDomain := strings.Split(line, " : ")[1]
-			dnsSettings.Domains = append(dnsSettings.Domains, searchDomain)
-		} else if inServerAddressesArray {
-			address := strings.Split(line, " : ")[1]
-			if ip, err := netip.ParseAddr(address); err == nil && !ip.IsUnspecified() {
-				ip = ip.Unmap()
-				serverAddresses = append(serverAddresses, ip)
-				// Prefer the first IPv4 server as ServerIP since our DNS listener is IPv4.
-				if !dnsSettings.ServerIP.IsValid() && ip.Is4() {
-					dnsSettings.ServerIP = ip
-				}
-			}
+			dnsSettings.Domains = append(dnsSettings.Domains, value)
+			continue
+		}
+
+		ip, err := netip.ParseAddr(value)
+		if err != nil || ip.IsUnspecified() {
+			continue
+		}
+		ip = ip.Unmap()
+		serverAddresses = append(serverAddresses, ip)
+		// Prefer the first IPv4 server as ServerIP since our DNS listener is IPv4.
+		if !dnsSettings.ServerIP.IsValid() && ip.Is4() {
+			dnsSettings.ServerIP = ip
 		}
 	}
 
 	if err := scanner.Err(); err != nil {
-		return dnsSettings, err
+		return dnsSettings, serverAddresses, err
 	}
 
-	// default to 53 port
-	dnsSettings.ServerPort = DefaultPort
-
-	s.mu.Lock()
-	s.origNameservers = serverAddresses
-	s.mu.Unlock()
-
-	return dnsSettings, nil
+	return dnsSettings, serverAddresses, nil
 }
 
 func (s *systemConfigurator) getOriginalNameservers() []netip.Addr {
@@ -435,11 +464,15 @@ func (s *systemConfigurator) getPrimaryService() (string, string, error) {
 	router := ""
 	for scanner.Scan() {
 		text := scanner.Text()
+		parts := strings.SplitN(text, ":", 2)
+		if len(parts) != 2 {
+			continue
+		}
 		if strings.Contains(text, "PrimaryService") {
-			primaryService = strings.TrimSpace(strings.Split(text, ":")[1])
+			primaryService = strings.TrimSpace(parts[1])
 		}
 		if strings.Contains(text, "Router") {
-			router = strings.TrimSpace(strings.Split(text, ":")[1])
+			router = strings.TrimSpace(parts[1])
 		}
 	}
 	if err := scanner.Err(); err != nil && err != io.EOF {

client/internal/dns/host_darwin_test.go

@@ -328,6 +328,120 @@ func removeTestDNSKey(key string) error {
 	return err
 }
 
+func TestParseSystemDNSSettings(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name            string
+		output          string
+		expectedDomains []string
+		expectedServers []netip.Addr
+		expectedIP      netip.Addr
+	}{
+		{
+			name: "well_formed",
+			output: `<dictionary> {
+  DomainName : example.com
+  SearchDomains : <array> {
+    0 : example.com
+    1 : corp.example.com
+  }
+  ServerAddresses : <array> {
+    0 : 192.168.1.1
+    1 : fd00::53
+  }
+}
+`,
+			expectedDomains: []string{"example.com", "example.com", "corp.example.com"},
+			expectedServers: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1"), netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::53")},
+			expectedIP:      netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1"),
+		},
+		{
+			// entries without a value after the separator used to panic with
+			// "index out of range [1] with length 1"
+			name: "malformed_array_entries_skipped",
+			output: `<dictionary> {
+  SearchDomains : <array> {
+    0 :
+    (null)
+
+    1 : corp.example.com
+  }
+  ServerAddresses : <array> {
+    0 :
+    1 : 192.168.1.1
+  }
+}
+`,
+			expectedDomains: []string{"corp.example.com"},
+			expectedServers: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1")},
+			expectedIP:      netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1"),
+		},
+		{
+			name: "domain_name_without_value_skipped",
+			output: `<dictionary> {
+  DomainName :
+  ServerAddresses : <array> {
+    0 : 192.168.1.1
+  }
+}
+`,
+			expectedServers: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1")},
+			expectedIP:      netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1"),
+		},
+		{
+			name: "ipv6_first_prefers_ipv4_server_ip",
+			output: `<dictionary> {
+  ServerAddresses : <array> {
+    0 : fd00::53
+    1 : 192.168.1.1
+  }
+}
+`,
+			expectedServers: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::53"), netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1")},
+			expectedIP:      netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1"),
+		},
+		{
+			name: "invalid_and_unspecified_addresses_skipped",
+			output: `<dictionary> {
+  ServerAddresses : <array> {
+    0 : (null)
+    1 : 0.0.0.0
+    2 : 192.168.1.1
+  }
+}
+`,
+			expectedServers: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1")},
+			expectedIP:      netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1"),
+		},
+		{
+			name: "v4_mapped_address_unmapped",
+			output: `<dictionary> {
+  ServerAddresses : <array> {
+    0 : ::ffff:192.168.1.1
+  }
+}
+`,
+			expectedServers: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1")},
+			expectedIP:      netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1"),
+		},
+		{
+			name:   "empty_output",
+			output: "",
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range tests {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			settings, servers, err := parseSystemDNSSettings([]byte(tc.output))
+			require.NoError(t, err, "parsing should not fail")
+
+			assert.Equal(t, tc.expectedDomains, settings.Domains, "domains should match")
+			assert.Equal(t, tc.expectedServers, servers, "server addresses should match")
+			assert.Equal(t, tc.expectedIP, settings.ServerIP, "server IP should match")
+			assert.Equal(t, DefaultPort, settings.ServerPort, "server port should default to 53")
+		})
+	}
+}
+
 func TestGetOriginalNameservers(t *testing.T) {
 	configurator := &systemConfigurator{
 		createdKeys: make(map[string]struct{}),

client/internal/routemanager/ipfwdstate/ipfwdstate.go

@@ -2,54 +2,183 @@ package ipfwdstate
 
 import (
 	"fmt"
+	"sync"
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/routemanager/systemops"
 )
 
-// IPForwardingState is a struct that keeps track of the IP forwarding state.
-// todo: read initial state of the IP forwarding from the system and reset the state based on it.
-// todo: separate v4/v6 forwarding state, since the sysctls are independent
-// (net.ipv4.ip_forward vs net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding). Currently the nftables
-// manager shares one instance between both routers, which works only because
-// EnableIPForwarding enables both sysctls in a single call.
+// IPForwardingState tracks v4 and v6 IP-forwarding sysctl enables with
+// independent refcounts so a v4-only routing setup doesn't flip v6 sysctls.
 type IPForwardingState struct {
-	enabledCounter int
+	mu sync.Mutex
+
+	v4Count int
+	v6Count int
+
+	// routingV4/routingV6 track whether the routing path currently holds a
+	// reference, so repeated EnableRouting calls (one per network-map update)
+	// hold at most one reference per family and an unpaired DisableRouting
+	// can't release references held by DNAT rules.
+	routingV4 bool
+	routingV6 bool
+
+	wgIfaceName string
+	v6Saved     map[string]int
 }
 
-func NewIPForwardingState() *IPForwardingState {
-	return &IPForwardingState{}
+// NewIPForwardingState returns a state tracker for the IP-forwarding sysctls.
+// wgIfaceName is excluded from the per-interface accept_ra handling.
+func NewIPForwardingState(wgIfaceName string) *IPForwardingState {
+	return &IPForwardingState{wgIfaceName: wgIfaceName}
 }
 
-func (f *IPForwardingState) RequestForwarding() error {
-	if f.enabledCounter != 0 {
-		f.enabledCounter++
+// Counts returns the current v4 and v6 refcounts. Intended for diagnostics
+// and tests.
+func (f *IPForwardingState) Counts() (v4, v6 int) {
+	f.mu.Lock()
+	defer f.mu.Unlock()
+	return f.v4Count, f.v6Count
+}
+
+// RequestRouting takes the forwarding references for the routing path. It is
+// idempotent: while routing already holds a reference, further calls don't
+// increment the refcounts, and a v4-only request releases a previously held v6
+// reference. A v6 sysctl failure is logged and not returned so it can't take
+// down v4 routing (the sysctl may be unwritable, e.g. read-only /proc/sys or
+// IPv6 disabled on the kernel command line); v6 is retried on the next call.
+func (f *IPForwardingState) RequestRouting(v6 bool) error {
+	f.mu.Lock()
+	defer f.mu.Unlock()
+
+	if !f.routingV4 {
+		if err := f.requestV4(); err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		f.routingV4 = true
+	}
+
+	if !v6 {
+		if !f.routingV6 {
+			return nil
+		}
+		f.routingV6 = false
+		return f.releaseV6()
+	}
+
+	if f.routingV6 {
 		return nil
 	}
-
-	if err := systemops.EnableIPForwarding(); err != nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("failed to enable IP forwarding with sysctl: %w", err)
+	if err := f.requestV6(); err != nil {
+		log.Warnf("enable IPv6 forwarding for routing: %v", err)
+		return nil
 	}
-	f.enabledCounter = 1
-	log.Info("IP forwarding enabled")
-
+	f.routingV6 = true
 	return nil
 }
 
-func (f *IPForwardingState) ReleaseForwarding() error {
-	if f.enabledCounter == 0 {
-		return nil
+// ReleaseRouting releases the references RequestRouting holds. Calls without a
+// held reference are no-ops.
+func (f *IPForwardingState) ReleaseRouting() error {
+	f.mu.Lock()
+	defer f.mu.Unlock()
+
+	if f.routingV4 {
+		f.routingV4 = false
+		f.releaseV4()
 	}
-
-	if f.enabledCounter > 1 {
-		f.enabledCounter--
-		return nil
+	if f.routingV6 {
+		f.routingV6 = false
+		return f.releaseV6()
 	}
-
-	// if failed to disable IP forwarding we anyway decrement the counter
-	f.enabledCounter = 0
-
-	// todo call systemops.DisableIPForwarding()
+	return nil
+}
+
+// RequestForwarding enables the family's forwarding sysctl on first request.
+func (f *IPForwardingState) RequestForwarding(v6 bool) error {
+	f.mu.Lock()
+	defer f.mu.Unlock()
+
+	if v6 {
+		return f.requestV6()
+	}
+	return f.requestV4()
+}
+
+// ReleaseForwarding decrements the family counter. The last v6 release restores
+// what enable captured. v4 stays on: net.ipv4.ip_forward is co-owned by other
+// tooling (docker, k8s, libvirt).
+func (f *IPForwardingState) ReleaseForwarding(v6 bool) error {
+	f.mu.Lock()
+	defer f.mu.Unlock()
+
+	if v6 {
+		return f.releaseV6()
+	}
+	f.releaseV4()
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (f *IPForwardingState) requestV4() error {
+	if f.v4Count == 0 {
+		if err := systemops.EnableV4IPForwarding(); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("enable IPv4 forwarding: %w", err)
+		}
+		log.Info("IPv4 forwarding enabled")
+	}
+	f.v4Count++
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (f *IPForwardingState) releaseV4() {
+	if f.v4Count > 0 {
+		f.v4Count--
+	}
+}
+
+func (f *IPForwardingState) requestV6() error {
+	if f.v6Count == 0 {
+		saved, err := systemops.EnableV6IPForwarding(f.wgIfaceName)
+		if err != nil {
+			if rerr := systemops.DisableV6IPForwarding(saved); rerr != nil {
+				log.Warnf("rollback partial v6 sysctls: %v", rerr)
+			}
+			return fmt.Errorf("enable IPv6 forwarding: %w", err)
+		}
+		// A failed restore on a previous release keeps its saved values; those
+		// are the true originals, so keep them over what this enable captured.
+		if f.v6Saved == nil {
+			f.v6Saved = saved
+		} else {
+			for k, v := range saved {
+				if _, ok := f.v6Saved[k]; !ok {
+					f.v6Saved[k] = v
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		log.Info("IPv6 forwarding enabled")
+	}
+	f.v6Count++
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (f *IPForwardingState) releaseV6() error {
+	if f.v6Count == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	f.v6Count--
+	if f.v6Count > 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	// Keep the saved values on failure so a later release or enable/release
+	// cycle can still restore them; re-restoring an already-restored key is a
+	// no-op since the sysctl already holds the desired value.
+	if err := systemops.DisableV6IPForwarding(f.v6Saved); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("disable IPv6 forwarding: %w", err)
+	}
+	f.v6Saved = nil
+	log.Info("IPv6 forwarding disabled")
 	return nil
 }

client/internal/routemanager/ipfwdstate/ipfwdstate_privileged_linux_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+//go:build privileged
+
+package ipfwdstate
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// TestRequestRoutingV6ToV4Transition verifies that a v4-only routing request
+// releases a previously held routing-owned v6 reference without touching
+// references held by DNAT rules.
+func TestRequestRoutingV6ToV4Transition(t *testing.T) {
+	f := NewIPForwardingState("wt-fwd-test")
+
+	require.NoError(t, f.RequestRouting(true), "request routing with v6")
+	v4, v6 := f.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "v4 reference held")
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v6, "v6 reference held")
+
+	require.NoError(t, f.RequestRouting(false), "request routing v4-only")
+	v4, v6 = f.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v4, "v4 reference kept")
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "routing-owned v6 reference released")
+
+	// A DNAT-held reference survives a v4-only routing request.
+	require.NoError(t, f.RequestForwarding(true), "dnat v6 reference")
+	require.NoError(t, f.RequestRouting(false), "repeat v4-only request")
+	_, v6 = f.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, v6, "dnat-held v6 reference survives")
+	require.NoError(t, f.ReleaseForwarding(true), "release dnat v6 reference")
+
+	require.NoError(t, f.ReleaseRouting(), "release routing")
+	v4, v6 = f.Counts()
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v4, "all v4 references released")
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, v6, "all v6 references released")
+}

client/internal/routemanager/sysctl/sysctl_linux.go

@@ -58,11 +58,7 @@ func Setup(wgIface iface) (map[string]int, error) {
 			continue
 		}
 
-		// Escape '%' and '.' so they survive the dot-to-slash conversion in Set()
-		safeName := strings.ReplaceAll(intf.Name, "%", percentEscape)
-		safeName = strings.ReplaceAll(safeName, ".", dotEscape)
-
-		i := fmt.Sprintf(rpFilterInterfacePath, safeName)
+		i := fmt.Sprintf(rpFilterInterfacePath, EscapeInterfaceName(intf.Name))
 		oldVal, err := Set(i, 2, true)
 		if err != nil {
 			result = multierror.Append(result, err)
@@ -74,6 +70,13 @@ func Setup(wgIface iface) (map[string]int, error) {
 	return keys, nberrors.FormatErrorOrNil(result)
 }
 
+// EscapeInterfaceName escapes '%' and '.' in an interface name (e.g. VLANs
+// like eth0.100) so the name survives the dot-to-slash conversion in Set.
+func EscapeInterfaceName(name string) string {
+	safe := strings.ReplaceAll(name, "%", percentEscape)
+	return strings.ReplaceAll(safe, ".", dotEscape)
+}
+
 // Set sets a sysctl configuration, if onlyIfOne is true it will only set the new value if it's set to 1
 func Set(key string, desiredValue int, onlyIfOne bool) (int, error) {
 	path := strings.ReplaceAll(key, ".", "/")

client/internal/routemanager/systemops/systemops_android.go

@@ -32,8 +32,17 @@ func (r *SysOps) removeFromRouteTable(netip.Prefix, Nexthop) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-func EnableIPForwarding() error {
-	log.Infof("Enable IP forwarding is not implemented on %s", runtime.GOOS)
+func EnableV4IPForwarding() error {
+	log.Infof("Enable IPv4 forwarding is not implemented on %s", runtime.GOOS)
+	return nil
+}
+
+func EnableV6IPForwarding(string) (map[string]int, error) {
+	log.Infof("Enable IPv6 forwarding is not implemented on %s", runtime.GOOS)
+	return map[string]int{}, nil
+}
+
+func DisableV6IPForwarding(map[string]int) error {
 	return nil
 }
 

client/internal/routemanager/systemops/systemops_ios.go

@@ -58,8 +58,17 @@ func (r *SysOps) removeFromRouteTable(netip.Prefix, Nexthop) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-func EnableIPForwarding() error {
-	log.Infof("Enable IP forwarding is not implemented on %s", runtime.GOOS)
+func EnableV4IPForwarding() error {
+	log.Infof("Enable IPv4 forwarding is not implemented on %s", runtime.GOOS)
+	return nil
+}
+
+func EnableV6IPForwarding(string) (map[string]int, error) {
+	log.Infof("Enable IPv6 forwarding is not implemented on %s", runtime.GOOS)
+	return map[string]int{}, nil
+}
+
+func DisableV6IPForwarding(map[string]int) error {
 	return nil
 }
 

client/internal/routemanager/systemops/systemops_linux.go

@@ -763,13 +763,10 @@ func flushRoutes(tableID, family int) error {
 	return nberrors.FormatErrorOrNil(result)
 }
 
-func EnableIPForwarding() error {
+func EnableV4IPForwarding() error {
 	if _, err := sysctl.Set(ipv4ForwardingPath, 1, false); err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
-	if _, err := sysctl.Set(ipv6ForwardingPath, 1, false); err != nil {
-		log.Warnf("failed to enable IPv6 forwarding: %v", err)
-	}
 	return nil
 }
 

client/internal/routemanager/systemops/systemops_nonlinux.go

@@ -43,8 +43,17 @@ func (r *SysOps) RemoveVPNRoute(prefix netip.Prefix, intf *net.Interface) error
 	return r.genericRemoveVPNRoute(prefix, intf)
 }
 
-func EnableIPForwarding() error {
-	log.Infof("Enable IP forwarding is not implemented on %s", runtime.GOOS)
+func EnableV4IPForwarding() error {
+	log.Infof("Enable IPv4 forwarding is not implemented on %s", runtime.GOOS)
+	return nil
+}
+
+func EnableV6IPForwarding(string) (map[string]int, error) {
+	log.Infof("Enable IPv6 forwarding is not implemented on %s", runtime.GOOS)
+	return map[string]int{}, nil
+}
+
+func DisableV6IPForwarding(map[string]int) error {
 	return nil
 }
 

client/internal/routemanager/systemops/v6forwarding_linux.go

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+//go:build !android
+
+package systemops
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"net"
+	"os"
+
+	"github.com/hashicorp/go-multierror"
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+
+	nberrors "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/errors"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/routemanager/sysctl"
+)
+
+const (
+	// 1 (default) accepts RAs only while forwarding is off; 2 keeps RA
+	// acceptance on regardless, so RA-installed host defaults survive our
+	// v6 forwarding flip.
+	acceptRAInterfacePath  = "net.ipv6.conf.%s.accept_ra"
+	acceptRADefaultPath    = "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra"
+	acceptRAProcPathFormat = "/proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/%s/accept_ra"
+)
+
+// EnableV6IPForwarding bumps accept_ra=2 on host v6 interfaces before flipping
+// forwarding=1, so RA-installed host defaults survive. Returns the prior values
+// of sysctls we actually changed; entries already at the target are omitted.
+func EnableV6IPForwarding(wgIfaceName string) (map[string]int, error) {
+	saved := map[string]int{}
+	bumpAcceptRA(saved, wgIfaceName)
+
+	oldVal, err := sysctl.Set(ipv6ForwardingPath, 1, false)
+	if err != nil {
+		return saved, err
+	}
+	if oldVal != 1 {
+		saved[ipv6ForwardingPath] = oldVal
+	}
+	return saved, nil
+}
+
+// DisableV6IPForwarding restores what EnableV6IPForwarding captured.
+func DisableV6IPForwarding(saved map[string]int) error {
+	var result *multierror.Error
+	for key, value := range saved {
+		if _, err := sysctl.Set(key, value, false); err != nil {
+			result = multierror.Append(result, fmt.Errorf("restore %s: %w", key, err))
+		}
+	}
+	return nberrors.FormatErrorOrNil(result)
+}
+
+func bumpAcceptRA(saved map[string]int, wgIfaceName string) {
+	// Also bump conf.default so interfaces created while forwarding is on
+	// (hotplug, new Wi-Fi/dock) inherit accept_ra=2 and keep accepting RAs.
+	bumpAcceptRAKey(saved, acceptRADefaultPath)
+
+	interfaces, err := net.Interfaces()
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Warnf("list interfaces for accept_ra: %v", err)
+		return
+	}
+	for _, intf := range interfaces {
+		if intf.Name == "lo" || intf.Name == wgIfaceName {
+			continue
+		}
+		bumpAcceptRAForInterface(saved, intf.Name)
+	}
+}
+
+func bumpAcceptRAForInterface(saved map[string]int, name string) {
+	// Build procfs path from name, not the dotted key: VLAN names like eth0.100.
+	if _, err := os.Stat(fmt.Sprintf(acceptRAProcPathFormat, name)); err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+	bumpAcceptRAKey(saved, fmt.Sprintf(acceptRAInterfacePath, sysctl.EscapeInterfaceName(name)))
+}
+
+func bumpAcceptRAKey(saved map[string]int, key string) {
+	// onlyIfOne=true: leave admin overrides (0, 2) alone.
+	oldVal, err := sysctl.Set(key, 2, true)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Warnf("bump %s: %v", key, err)
+		return
+	}
+	// With onlyIfOne, a write only happened when the old value was 1; values
+	// left untouched (0, 2) must not be recorded for restore.
+	if oldVal == 1 {
+		saved[key] = oldVal
+	}
+}

client/ssh/server/command_execution_windows.go

@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ func (s *Server) setUserEnvironmentVariables(envMap map[string]string, userProfi
 
 // prepareCommandEnv prepares environment variables for command execution on Windows
 func (s *Server) prepareCommandEnv(logger *log.Entry, localUser *user.User, session ssh.Session) []string {
-	username, domain := s.parseUsername(localUser.Username)
+	username, domain := parseUsername(localUser.Username)
 	userEnv, err := s.getUserEnvironment(logger, username, domain)
 	if err != nil {
 		log.Debugf("failed to get user environment for %s\\%s, using fallback: %v", domain, username, err)
@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ func (s *Server) executeCommandWithPty(logger *log.Entry, session ssh.Session, _
 		return false
 	}
 
-	username, domain := s.parseUsername(localUser.Username)
+	username, domain := parseUsername(localUser.Username)
 	shell := getUserShell(localUser.Uid)
 
 	req := PtyExecutionRequest{

client/ssh/server/port_forwarding.go

@@ -133,7 +133,12 @@ func (s *Server) checkPrivilegedPortAccess(forwardType string, port uint32, resu
 		return nil
 	}
 
-	if result.User != nil && isPrivilegedUsername(result.User.Username) {
+	// Only uid 0 may bind below the threshold, which is the kernel's own rule and
+	// is asked directly rather than through isPrivilegedOrUnknown: that helper
+	// reports an account it cannot evaluate as privileged, which is safe for a
+	// refusal and unsafe for a grant such as this one. Windows has returned
+	// above, so Uid here is a Unix uid and never a SID.
+	if result.User != nil && result.User.Uid == "0" {
 		return nil
 	}
 

client/ssh/server/privileges_other.go

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+//go:build !windows
+
+package server
+
+// isProcessElevated is only meaningful on Windows; other platforms use the
+// effective UID check in isCurrentProcessPrivileged.
+func isProcessElevated() bool {
+	return false
+}
+
+// isWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown is only reachable on Windows. Report
+// privileged on other platforms so a caller refusing privileged accounts fails
+// closed.
+func isWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown(string) bool {
+	return true
+}

client/ssh/server/privileges_windows.go

@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+//go:build windows
+
+package server
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"strings"
+	"unsafe"
+
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+	"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
+)
+
+var (
+	netapi32                  = windows.NewLazySystemDLL("netapi32.dll")
+	procNetUserGetLocalGroups = netapi32.NewProc("NetUserGetLocalGroups")
+)
+
+const (
+	// lgIncludeIndirect makes NetUserGetLocalGroups also return local groups
+	// the user belongs to through a global group.
+	lgIncludeIndirect  = 0x1
+	maxPreferredLength = 0xFFFFFFFF
+)
+
+// localGroupUsersInfo0 mirrors LOCALGROUP_USERS_INFO_0.
+type localGroupUsersInfo0 struct {
+	name *uint16
+}
+
+// isProcessElevated reports whether the current process token is elevated
+// (TokenElevation): true for elevated administrators, the built-in
+// Administrator, administrators with UAC disabled, and SYSTEM; false for
+// standard users and administrators running with a UAC-filtered token.
+func isProcessElevated() bool {
+	return windows.GetCurrentProcessToken().IsElevated()
+}
+
+// isWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown reports whether the account is privileged
+// on this machine: a well-known service account, a built-in Administrator
+// (RID 500), or a member of the local Administrators group, directly or through
+// nested groups.
+//
+// An account whose privilege cannot be determined counts as privileged, which
+// is why the name says "or unknown". That is fail-closed for a caller that
+// refuses privileged accounts, and fail-open for a caller that grants something
+// to them, so only the former may use this.
+func isWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown(username string) bool {
+	sid, _, _, err := windows.LookupSID("", username)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Warnf("privilege check: SID lookup for %q failed, treating as privileged: %v", username, err)
+		return true
+	}
+
+	if isPrivilegedUserSID(sid) {
+		return true
+	}
+
+	member, err := isLocalAdminsMember(username)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Warnf("privilege check: cannot determine Administrators membership for %q, treating as privileged: %v", username, err)
+		return true
+	}
+	return member
+}
+
+// isPrivilegedUserSID reports whether the SID itself identifies a privileged
+// principal, without consulting group membership.
+func isPrivilegedUserSID(sid *windows.SID) bool {
+	wellKnown := []windows.WELL_KNOWN_SID_TYPE{
+		windows.WinLocalSystemSid,
+		windows.WinLocalServiceSid,
+		windows.WinNetworkServiceSid,
+		windows.WinBuiltinAdministratorsSid,
+	}
+	for _, sidType := range wellKnown {
+		if sid.IsWellKnown(sidType) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return isBuiltinAdministratorSID(sid)
+}
+
+// isBuiltinAdministratorSID reports whether the SID is a machine or domain
+// built-in Administrator account (S-1-5-21-...-500). RID 500 is reserved for
+// that account; it can be renamed but cannot be removed from the
+// Administrators group.
+func isBuiltinAdministratorSID(sid *windows.SID) bool {
+	if sid.IdentifierAuthority() != windows.SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY {
+		return false
+	}
+	count := sid.SubAuthorityCount()
+	if count < 2 || sid.SubAuthority(0) != 21 {
+		return false
+	}
+	return sid.SubAuthority(uint32(count-1)) == 500
+}
+
+// isLocalAdminsMember reports whether the account is a member of the local
+// Administrators group.
+//
+// Local accounts are checked against the local SAM, which is authoritative for
+// them and, unlike a token, cannot under-report: UAC filters the tokens of
+// local administrators, and a filtered token carries Administrators as
+// deny-only, which a membership check on the token would read as "not a
+// member". Domain accounts are exempt from that filtering, so for them an S4U
+// token is preferred because its group list is LSA's transitive expansion and
+// therefore covers nested and universal groups plus the machine's own local
+// groups. NetUserGetLocalGroups expands only one global-group hop but needs no
+// logon, so it serves as the fallback when no token can be obtained.
+func isLocalAdminsMember(username string) (bool, error) {
+	adminSid, err := windows.CreateWellKnownSid(windows.WinBuiltinAdministratorsSid)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, fmt.Errorf("create Administrators SID: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	account, domain := parseUsername(username)
+	if NewPrivilegeDropper().isLocalUser(domain) {
+		return localGroupsContainSID(account, adminSid)
+	}
+
+	member, s4uErr := s4uTokenIsMember(account, domain, adminSid)
+	if s4uErr == nil {
+		return member, nil
+	}
+	log.Debugf("privilege check: S4U membership check for %q failed, falling back to local group enumeration: %v", username, s4uErr)
+
+	member, err = localGroupsContainSID(buildUserCpn(account, domain), adminSid)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, fmt.Errorf("S4U check: %w; local group enumeration: %w", s4uErr, err)
+	}
+	return member, nil
+}
+
+// s4uTokenIsMember obtains an S4U token for the account and checks whether the
+// given SID is enabled in it.
+func s4uTokenIsMember(account, domain string, sid *windows.SID) (bool, error) {
+	token, err := generateS4UUserToken(log.NewEntry(log.StandardLogger()), account, domain)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, err
+	}
+	defer func() {
+		if err := windows.CloseHandle(token); err != nil {
+			log.Debugf("close S4U token: %v", err)
+		}
+	}()
+	return windows.Token(token).IsMember(sid)
+}
+
+// localGroupsContainSID reports whether the wanted group is among the local
+// groups the account belongs to, directly or through a global group.
+//
+// The wanted SID is resolved to its group name once and compared against the
+// enumerated names. Well-known SIDs resolve from a static table, so that lookup
+// needs no domain controller, and it keeps the comparison correct for a renamed
+// or localized group because both sides then carry the new name. Resolving each
+// enumerated name back to a SID instead would add a lookup per group that can
+// block until it times out while a domain controller is unreachable, and cannot
+// change the outcome: the names enumerated here are local groups of this
+// machine, whose names are unique, so a name match identifies the group.
+//
+// A failure to resolve the wanted SID is returned rather than reported as
+// "not a member", so a privilege check built on this fails closed.
+func localGroupsContainSID(username string, want *windows.SID) (bool, error) {
+	wantName, _, _, err := want.LookupAccount("")
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, fmt.Errorf("resolve group SID %s to a name: %w", want, err)
+	}
+
+	groups, err := netUserGetLocalGroups(username)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false, err
+	}
+
+	for _, group := range groups {
+		if strings.EqualFold(group, wantName) {
+			return true, nil
+		}
+	}
+	return false, nil
+}
+
+// netUserGetLocalGroups returns the names of the local groups the account is a
+// member of, including indirect membership through global groups.
+func netUserGetLocalGroups(username string) ([]string, error) {
+	name16, err := windows.UTF16PtrFromString(username)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("convert username: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	var buf *byte
+	var entriesRead, totalEntries uint32
+	status, _, _ := procNetUserGetLocalGroups.Call(
+		0, // local server
+		uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(name16)),
+		0, // level 0: LOCALGROUP_USERS_INFO_0
+		lgIncludeIndirect,
+		uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&buf)),
+		maxPreferredLength,
+		uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&entriesRead)),
+		uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&totalEntries)),
+	)
+	if status != 0 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("NetUserGetLocalGroups for %q: status %d", username, status)
+	}
+	if buf == nil {
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	defer func() {
+		if err := windows.NetApiBufferFree(buf); err != nil {
+			log.Debugf("free NetApi buffer: %v", err)
+		}
+	}()
+
+	// MAX_PREFERRED_LENGTH makes the API allocate as much as it needs, so a
+	// short read is not expected. Report it rather than silently returning a
+	// subset of the account's groups.
+	if entriesRead != totalEntries {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("NetUserGetLocalGroups for %q returned %d of %d groups", username, entriesRead, totalEntries)
+	}
+
+	entries := unsafe.Slice((*localGroupUsersInfo0)(unsafe.Pointer(buf)), entriesRead)
+	groups := make([]string, 0, entriesRead)
+	for _, entry := range entries {
+		groups = append(groups, windows.UTF16PtrToString(entry.name))
+	}
+	return groups, nil
+}

client/ssh/server/privileges_windows_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+//go:build windows
+
+package server
+
+import (
+	"os/user"
+	"testing"
+	"unsafe"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
+)
+
+// filterNormalAccount limits NetUserEnum to normal user accounts.
+const filterNormalAccount = 0x2
+
+// TOKEN_ELEVATION_TYPE values.
+const (
+	tokenElevationTypeDefault = 1
+	tokenElevationTypeFull    = 2
+	tokenElevationTypeLimited = 3
+)
+
+// tokenElevationType reads TokenElevationType from a token.
+func tokenElevationType(token windows.Token) (uint32, error) {
+	var elevationType, returnedLen uint32
+	err := windows.GetTokenInformation(token, windows.TokenElevationType,
+		(*byte)(unsafe.Pointer(&elevationType)), uint32(unsafe.Sizeof(elevationType)), &returnedLen)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+	return elevationType, nil
+}
+
+// userInfo0 mirrors USER_INFO_0.
+type userInfo0 struct {
+	name *uint16
+}
+
+func mustParseSID(t *testing.T, s string) *windows.SID {
+	t.Helper()
+	sid, err := windows.StringToSid(s)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "parse SID %s", s)
+	return sid
+}
+
+// localAccountNames returns the names of the local user accounts.
+func localAccountNames(t *testing.T) []string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	var buf *byte
+	var entriesRead, totalEntries, resume uint32
+	err := windows.NetUserEnum(nil, 0, filterNormalAccount, &buf, maxPreferredLength,
+		&entriesRead, &totalEntries, &resume)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "enumerate local users")
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		require.NoError(t, windows.NetApiBufferFree(buf), "free NetApi buffer")
+	})
+
+	entries := unsafe.Slice((*userInfo0)(unsafe.Pointer(buf)), entriesRead)
+	names := make([]string, 0, entriesRead)
+	for _, entry := range entries {
+		names = append(names, windows.UTF16PtrToString(entry.name))
+	}
+	return names
+}
+
+// localAccountNameByRID returns the name of the local account carrying the
+// given RID. Accounts such as Administrator and Guest can be renamed and are
+// localized, so tests must not name them literally.
+func localAccountNameByRID(t *testing.T, rid uint32) string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	for _, name := range localAccountNames(t) {
+		sid, _, _, err := windows.LookupSID("", name)
+		if err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		if sid.IdentifierAuthority() != windows.SECURITY_NT_AUTHORITY {
+			continue
+		}
+		count := sid.SubAuthorityCount()
+		if count < 2 || sid.SubAuthority(0) != 21 {
+			continue
+		}
+		if sid.SubAuthority(uint32(count-1)) == rid {
+			return name
+		}
+	}
+
+	t.Fatalf("no local account with RID %d", rid)
+	return ""
+}
+
+// wellKnownAccountName resolves a well-known SID to the qualified account name
+// the local system uses for it, which is localized.
+func wellKnownAccountName(t *testing.T, sidType windows.WELL_KNOWN_SID_TYPE) string {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	sid, err := windows.CreateWellKnownSid(sidType)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "create well-known SID")
+	name, domain, _, err := sid.LookupAccount("")
+	require.NoError(t, err, "resolve %s to an account name", sid)
+	if domain == "" {
+		return name
+	}
+	return domain + `\` + name
+}
+
+func TestIsBuiltinAdministratorSID(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name string
+		sid  string
+		want bool
+	}{
+		{"machine_administrator", "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-500", true},
+		{"domain_administrator", "S-1-5-21-3390233681-4087452608-412898826-500", true},
+		{"regular_user", "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-1001", false},
+		{"guest_account", "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-501", false},
+		{"domain_admins_group", "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-512", false},
+		{"system", "S-1-5-18", false},
+		{"administrators_group", "S-1-5-32-544", false},
+		{"non_nt_authority", "S-1-1-0", false},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			result := isBuiltinAdministratorSID(mustParseSID(t, tt.sid))
+			assert.Equal(t, tt.want, result, "RID 500 detection for %s", tt.sid)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIsPrivilegedUserSID(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name string
+		sid  string
+		want bool
+	}{
+		{"local_system", "S-1-5-18", true},
+		{"local_service", "S-1-5-19", true},
+		{"network_service", "S-1-5-20", true},
+		{"administrators_group", "S-1-5-32-544", true},
+		{"builtin_administrator", "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-500", true},
+		{"regular_user", "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-1001", false},
+		{"users_group", "S-1-5-32-545", false},
+		{"everyone", "S-1-1-0", false},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			result := isPrivilegedUserSID(mustParseSID(t, tt.sid))
+			assert.Equal(t, tt.want, result, "SID privilege classification for %s", tt.sid)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIsWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name     string
+		username string
+		want     bool
+	}{
+		{"system", wellKnownAccountName(t, windows.WinLocalSystemSid), true},
+		{"local_service", wellKnownAccountName(t, windows.WinLocalServiceSid), true},
+		{"network_service", wellKnownAccountName(t, windows.WinNetworkServiceSid), true},
+		{"administrators_group", wellKnownAccountName(t, windows.WinBuiltinAdministratorsSid), true},
+		// The built-in Administrator (RID 500) and Guest (RID 501) accounts
+		// exist on every Windows installation, though they may be disabled.
+		{"builtin_administrator", localAccountNameByRID(t, 500), true},
+		{"guest", localAccountNameByRID(t, 501), false},
+		// Unresolvable accounts fail closed.
+		{"nonexistent_user", "netbird-no-such-user", true},
+		{"empty_username", "", true},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			result := isWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown(tt.username)
+			assert.Equal(t, tt.want, result, "account privilege classification for %q", tt.username)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestIsProcessElevated(t *testing.T) {
+	elevated := isProcessElevated()
+
+	// TokenElevationType is a second, independent view of the same token:
+	// Full means elevated and Limited means a filtered administrator, while
+	// Default covers both a standard user and an administrator with no linked
+	// token (UAC off, the built-in Administrator, SYSTEM), so it implies nothing.
+	elevationType, err := tokenElevationType(windows.GetCurrentProcessToken())
+	require.NoError(t, err, "read token elevation type")
+
+	adminSid, err := windows.CreateWellKnownSid(windows.WinBuiltinAdministratorsSid)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "create Administrators SID")
+
+	// Token(0) makes CheckTokenMembership evaluate the caller's own token. It
+	// counts only enabled SIDs, so a filtered administrator reports false here.
+	member, err := windows.Token(0).IsMember(adminSid)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "check own Administrators membership")
+
+	t.Logf("elevated=%v elevationType=%d memberOfAdministrators=%v", elevated, elevationType, member)
+
+	switch elevationType {
+	case tokenElevationTypeFull:
+		assert.True(t, elevated, "a token of elevation type Full must report elevated")
+	case tokenElevationTypeLimited:
+		assert.False(t, elevated, "a filtered administrator token must not report elevated")
+	}
+
+	// Administrators enabled in the token means the token wields administrative
+	// rights, which is what elevation reports.
+	if member {
+		assert.True(t, elevated, "token with enabled Administrators membership must report elevated")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestS4UMembershipAgreesWithLocalGroups exercises the S4U token path used
+// for domain accounts. S4U logons need the TCB privilege, so the test runs
+// only as SYSTEM (which is how CI executes the suite). For local accounts the
+// token's Administrators membership must agree with the SAM enumeration.
+func TestS4UMembershipAgreesWithLocalGroups(t *testing.T) {
+	system, err := windows.CreateWellKnownSid(windows.WinLocalSystemSid)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "create SYSTEM SID")
+	current, err := user.Current()
+	require.NoError(t, err, "get current user")
+	if current.Uid != system.String() {
+		t.Skipf("S4U logon requires SYSTEM (running as %s)", current.Username)
+	}
+
+	adminSid, err := windows.CreateWellKnownSid(windows.WinBuiltinAdministratorsSid)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "create Administrators SID")
+
+	checked := 0
+	for _, name := range localAccountNames(t) {
+		viaToken, err := s4uTokenIsMember(name, ".", adminSid)
+		if err != nil {
+			// Disabled or logon-restricted accounts cannot get an S4U logon.
+			t.Logf("skipping %s: %v", name, err)
+			continue
+		}
+		viaSAM, err := localGroupsContainSID(name, adminSid)
+		require.NoError(t, err, "enumerate local groups for %s", name)
+
+		assert.Equal(t, viaSAM, viaToken, "S4U token and SAM enumeration must agree on Administrators membership for %s", name)
+		checked++
+	}
+	// Ineligible accounts are skipped, so without this the test could report
+	// success while comparing nothing at all.
+	require.Positive(t, checked, "no local account completed an S4U logon, so nothing was compared")
+	t.Logf("checked %d local accounts via S4U", checked)
+}
+
+// TestLocalGroupsContainSID_Administrator checks the positive case against the
+// built-in Administrator, a member of Administrators on every installation.
+func TestLocalGroupsContainSID_Administrator(t *testing.T) {
+	adminSid, err := windows.CreateWellKnownSid(windows.WinBuiltinAdministratorsSid)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "create Administrators SID")
+
+	administrator := localAccountNameByRID(t, 500)
+	member, err := localGroupsContainSID(administrator, adminSid)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "enumerate local groups for %s", administrator)
+	assert.True(t, member, "%s is a member of the Administrators group", administrator)
+}
+
+// TestLocalGroupsContainSID_UnresolvableGroupFailsClosed covers a wanted SID
+// that resolves to no group: the error must surface rather than being reported
+// as "not a member", so the privilege check treats the account as privileged.
+func TestLocalGroupsContainSID_UnresolvableGroupFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
+	unknown := mustParseSID(t, "S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-4444")
+
+	_, err := localGroupsContainSID(localAccountNameByRID(t, 500), unknown)
+	require.Error(t, err, "must report an error when the wanted group cannot be identified")
+}
+
+func TestLocalGroupsContainSID_Guest(t *testing.T) {
+	guestsSid, err := windows.CreateWellKnownSid(windows.WinBuiltinGuestsSid)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "create Guests SID")
+	adminsSid, err := windows.CreateWellKnownSid(windows.WinBuiltinAdministratorsSid)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "create Administrators SID")
+
+	guest := localAccountNameByRID(t, 501)
+
+	inGuests, err := localGroupsContainSID(guest, guestsSid)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "enumerate local groups for %s", guest)
+	assert.True(t, inGuests, "%s is a member of the Guests group", guest)
+
+	inAdmins, err := localGroupsContainSID(guest, adminsSid)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "enumerate local groups for %s", guest)
+	assert.False(t, inAdmins, "%s is not a member of the Administrators group", guest)
+}

client/ssh/server/server_config_test.go

@@ -239,6 +239,7 @@ func TestServer_PrivilegedPortAccess(t *testing.T) {
 		forwardType   string
 		port          uint32
 		username      string
+		uid           string
 		expectError   bool
 		errorMsg      string
 		skipOnWindows bool
@@ -248,6 +249,7 @@ func TestServer_PrivilegedPortAccess(t *testing.T) {
 			forwardType:   "remote",
 			port:          80,
 			username:      "testuser",
+			uid:           "1000",
 			expectError:   true,
 			errorMsg:      "cannot bind to privileged port",
 			skipOnWindows: true,
@@ -257,6 +259,7 @@ func TestServer_PrivilegedPortAccess(t *testing.T) {
 			forwardType:   "tcpip-forward",
 			port:          443,
 			username:      "testuser",
+			uid:           "1000",
 			expectError:   true,
 			errorMsg:      "cannot bind to privileged port",
 			skipOnWindows: true,
@@ -266,6 +269,7 @@ func TestServer_PrivilegedPortAccess(t *testing.T) {
 			forwardType: "remote",
 			port:        8080,
 			username:    "testuser",
+			uid:         "1000",
 			expectError: false,
 		},
 		{
@@ -273,6 +277,7 @@ func TestServer_PrivilegedPortAccess(t *testing.T) {
 			forwardType: "remote",
 			port:        0,
 			username:    "testuser",
+			uid:         "1000",
 			expectError: false,
 		},
 		{
@@ -280,13 +285,35 @@ func TestServer_PrivilegedPortAccess(t *testing.T) {
 			forwardType: "remote",
 			port:        22,
 			username:    "root",
+			uid:         "0",
 			expectError: false,
 		},
+		{
+			// Only uid 0 is privileged, whatever the account is called.
+			name:          "uid 0 under another name may bind a privileged port",
+			forwardType:   "remote",
+			port:          22,
+			username:      "toor",
+			uid:           "0",
+			expectError:   false,
+			skipOnWindows: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:          "account named root without uid 0 may not",
+			forwardType:   "remote",
+			port:          22,
+			username:      "root",
+			uid:           "1000",
+			expectError:   true,
+			errorMsg:      "cannot bind to privileged port",
+			skipOnWindows: true,
+		},
 		{
 			name:        "local forward privileged port allowed for non-root",
 			forwardType: "local",
 			port:        80,
 			username:    "testuser",
+			uid:         "1000",
 			expectError: false,
 		},
 	}
@@ -299,7 +326,7 @@ func TestServer_PrivilegedPortAccess(t *testing.T) {
 
 			result := PrivilegeCheckResult{
 				Allowed: true,
-				User:    &user.User{Username: tt.username},
+				User:    &user.User{Username: tt.username, Uid: tt.uid},
 			}
 
 			err := server.checkPrivilegedPortAccess(tt.forwardType, tt.port, result)
@@ -420,6 +447,13 @@ func TestServer_PortConflictHandling(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestServer_IsPrivilegedUser(t *testing.T) {
 
+	// Windows classification depends on account SIDs and group membership, and
+	// the accounts involved carry localized, renameable names. It is covered by
+	// TestIsWindowsAccountPrivileged, which resolves them from well-known SIDs.
+	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
+		t.Skip("covered by TestIsWindowsAccountPrivileged")
+	}
+
 	tests := []struct {
 		username    string
 		expected    bool
@@ -440,44 +474,16 @@ func TestServer_IsPrivilegedUser(t *testing.T) {
 			expected:    false,
 			description: "empty username should not be privileged",
 		},
-	}
-
-	// Add Windows-specific tests
-	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
-		tests = append(tests, []struct {
-			username    string
-			expected    bool
-			description string
-		}{
-			{
-				username:    "Administrator",
-				expected:    true,
-				description: "Administrator should be considered privileged on Windows",
-			},
-			{
-				username:    "administrator",
-				expected:    true,
-				description: "administrator should be considered privileged on Windows (case insensitive)",
-			},
-		}...)
-	} else {
-		// On non-Windows systems, Administrator should not be privileged
-		tests = append(tests, []struct {
-			username    string
-			expected    bool
-			description string
-		}{
-			{
-				username:    "Administrator",
-				expected:    false,
-				description: "Administrator should not be privileged on non-Windows systems",
-			},
-		}...)
+		{
+			username:    "Administrator",
+			expected:    false,
+			description: "Administrator should not be privileged on non-Windows systems",
+		},
 	}
 
 	for _, tt := range tests {
 		t.Run(tt.description, func(t *testing.T) {
-			result := isPrivilegedUsername(tt.username)
+			result := isPrivilegedOrUnknown(tt.username)
 			assert.Equal(t, tt.expected, result, tt.description)
 		})
 	}

client/ssh/server/sftp_windows.go

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ import (
 // createSftpCommand creates a Windows SFTP command with user switching.
 // The caller must close the returned token handle after starting the process.
 func (s *Server) createSftpCommand(targetUser *user.User, sess ssh.Session) (*exec.Cmd, windows.Token, error) {
-	username, domain := s.parseUsername(targetUser.Username)
+	username, domain := parseUsername(targetUser.Username)
 
 	netbirdPath, err := os.Executable()
 	if err != nil {

client/ssh/server/user_utils.go

@@ -16,11 +16,6 @@ var (
 	ErrPrivilegedUserSwitch = errors.New("cannot switch to privileged user - current user lacks required privileges")
 )
 
-// isPlatformUnix returns true for Unix-like platforms (Linux, macOS, etc.)
-func isPlatformUnix() bool {
-	return getCurrentOS() != "windows"
-}
-
 // Dependency injection variables for testing - allows mocking dynamic runtime checks
 var (
 	getCurrentUser         = currentUserWithGetent
@@ -29,6 +24,9 @@ var (
 	getIsProcessPrivileged = isCurrentProcessPrivileged
 
 	getEuid = os.Geteuid
+
+	getProcessElevated                   = isProcessElevated
+	getWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown = isWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown
 )
 
 const (
@@ -65,6 +63,13 @@ type PrivilegeCheckResult struct {
 	RequiresUserSwitching bool
 }
 
+// privilegeCheckContext holds all context needed for privilege checking
+type privilegeCheckContext struct {
+	currentUser           *user.User
+	currentUserPrivileged bool
+	allowRoot             bool
+}
+
 // CheckPrivileges performs comprehensive privilege checking for all SSH features.
 // This is the single source of truth for privilege decisions across the SSH server.
 func (s *Server) CheckPrivileges(req PrivilegeCheckRequest) PrivilegeCheckResult {
@@ -75,7 +80,7 @@ func (s *Server) CheckPrivileges(req PrivilegeCheckRequest) PrivilegeCheckResult
 
 	// Handle empty username case - but still check root access controls
 	if req.RequestedUsername == "" {
-		if isPrivilegedUsername(context.currentUser.Username) && !context.allowRoot {
+		if isPrivilegedOrUnknown(context.currentUser.Username) && !context.allowRoot {
 			return PrivilegeCheckResult{
 				Allowed: false,
 				Error:   &PrivilegedUserError{Username: context.currentUser.Username},
@@ -135,7 +140,7 @@ func (s *Server) checkUserRequest(ctx *privilegeCheckContext, req PrivilegeCheck
 
 	needsUserSwitching := !isSameResolvedUser(resolvedUser, ctx.currentUser)
 
-	if isPrivilegedUsername(resolvedUser.Username) && !ctx.allowRoot {
+	if isPrivilegedOrUnknown(resolvedUser.Username) && !ctx.allowRoot {
 		return PrivilegeCheckResult{
 			Allowed:               false,
 			Error:                 &PrivilegedUserError{Username: resolvedUser.Username},
@@ -175,6 +180,42 @@ func (s *Server) resolveRequestedUser(requestedUsername string) (*user.User, err
 	return u, nil
 }
 
+// SetAllowRootLogin configures root login access
+func (s *Server) SetAllowRootLogin(allow bool) {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	s.allowRootLogin = allow
+}
+
+// userNameLookup performs user lookup with root login permission check
+func (s *Server) userNameLookup(username string) (*user.User, error) {
+	result, err := s.userPrivilegeCheck(username)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return result.User, nil
+}
+
+// userPrivilegeCheck performs user lookup with full privilege check result
+func (s *Server) userPrivilegeCheck(username string) (PrivilegeCheckResult, error) {
+	result := s.CheckPrivileges(PrivilegeCheckRequest{
+		RequestedUsername:         username,
+		FeatureSupportsUserSwitch: true,
+		FeatureName:               FeatureSSHLogin,
+	})
+
+	if !result.Allowed {
+		return result, result.Error
+	}
+
+	return result, nil
+}
+
+// isPlatformUnix returns true for Unix-like platforms (Linux, macOS, etc.)
+func isPlatformUnix() bool {
+	return getCurrentOS() != "windows"
+}
+
 // isSameResolvedUser compares two resolved user identities
 func isSameResolvedUser(user1, user2 *user.User) bool {
 	if user1 == nil || user2 == nil {
@@ -183,13 +224,6 @@ func isSameResolvedUser(user1, user2 *user.User) bool {
 	return user1.Uid == user2.Uid
 }
 
-// privilegeCheckContext holds all context needed for privilege checking
-type privilegeCheckContext struct {
-	currentUser           *user.User
-	currentUserPrivileged bool
-	allowRoot             bool
-}
-
 // isSameUser checks if two usernames refer to the same user
 // SECURITY: This function must be conservative - it should only return true
 // when we're certain both usernames refer to the exact same user identity
@@ -253,159 +287,30 @@ func isWindowsSameUser(requestedUsername, currentUsername string) bool {
 	return strings.EqualFold(reqDomain, curDomain)
 }
 
-// SetAllowRootLogin configures root login access
-func (s *Server) SetAllowRootLogin(allow bool) {
-	s.mu.Lock()
-	defer s.mu.Unlock()
-	s.allowRootLogin = allow
-}
-
-// userNameLookup performs user lookup with root login permission check
-func (s *Server) userNameLookup(username string) (*user.User, error) {
-	result := s.CheckPrivileges(PrivilegeCheckRequest{
-		RequestedUsername:         username,
-		FeatureSupportsUserSwitch: true,
-		FeatureName:               FeatureSSHLogin,
-	})
-
-	if !result.Allowed {
-		return nil, result.Error
-	}
-
-	return result.User, nil
-}
-
-// userPrivilegeCheck performs user lookup with full privilege check result
-func (s *Server) userPrivilegeCheck(username string) (PrivilegeCheckResult, error) {
-	result := s.CheckPrivileges(PrivilegeCheckRequest{
-		RequestedUsername:         username,
-		FeatureSupportsUserSwitch: true,
-		FeatureName:               FeatureSSHLogin,
-	})
-
-	if !result.Allowed {
-		return result, result.Error
-	}
-
-	return result, nil
-}
-
-// isPrivilegedUsername checks if the given username represents a privileged user across platforms.
-// On Unix: root
-// On Windows: Administrator, SYSTEM (case-insensitive)
-// Handles domain-qualified usernames like "DOMAIN\Administrator" or "user@domain.com"
-func isPrivilegedUsername(username string) bool {
+// isPrivilegedOrUnknown reports whether the given username represents a
+// privileged user, or on Windows an account whose privilege could not be
+// determined.
+// On Unix: root.
+// On Windows: well-known service accounts, built-in Administrator accounts,
+// and members of the local Administrators group; handles domain-qualified
+// usernames like "DOMAIN\user" or "user@domain.com". An account that cannot be
+// resolved or evaluated is reported as privileged.
+//
+// Use this to refuse privileged accounts, never to grant them anything: the
+// undetermined case is safe for a refusal and unsafe for a grant.
+func isPrivilegedOrUnknown(username string) bool {
 	if getCurrentOS() != "windows" {
 		return username == "root"
 	}
-
-	bareUsername := username
-	// Handle Windows domain format: DOMAIN\username
-	if idx := strings.LastIndex(username, `\`); idx != -1 {
-		bareUsername = username[idx+1:]
-	}
-	// Handle email-style format: username@domain.com
-	if idx := strings.Index(bareUsername, "@"); idx != -1 {
-		bareUsername = bareUsername[:idx]
-	}
-
-	return isWindowsPrivilegedUser(bareUsername)
-}
-
-// isWindowsPrivilegedUser checks if a bare username (domain already stripped) represents a Windows privileged account
-func isWindowsPrivilegedUser(bareUsername string) bool {
-	// common privileged usernames (case insensitive)
-	privilegedNames := []string{
-		"administrator",
-		"admin",
-		"root",
-		"system",
-		"localsystem",
-		"networkservice",
-		"localservice",
-	}
-
-	usernameLower := strings.ToLower(bareUsername)
-	for _, privilegedName := range privilegedNames {
-		if usernameLower == privilegedName {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-
-	// computer accounts (ending with $) are not privileged by themselves
-	// They only gain privileges through group membership or specific SIDs
-
-	if targetUser, err := lookupUser(bareUsername); err == nil {
-		return isWindowsPrivilegedSID(targetUser.Uid)
-	}
-
-	return false
-}
-
-// isWindowsPrivilegedSID checks if a Windows SID represents a privileged account
-func isWindowsPrivilegedSID(sid string) bool {
-	privilegedSIDs := []string{
-		"S-1-5-18",     // Local System (SYSTEM)
-		"S-1-5-19",     // Local Service (NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE)
-		"S-1-5-20",     // Network Service (NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE)
-		"S-1-5-32-544", // Administrators group (BUILTIN\Administrators)
-		"S-1-5-500",    // Built-in Administrator account (local machine RID 500)
-	}
-
-	for _, privilegedSID := range privilegedSIDs {
-		if sid == privilegedSID {
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-
-	// Check for domain administrator accounts (RID 500 in any domain)
-	// Format: S-1-5-21-domain-domain-domain-500
-	// This is reliable as RID 500 is reserved for the domain Administrator account
-	if strings.HasPrefix(sid, "S-1-5-21-") && strings.HasSuffix(sid, "-500") {
-		return true
-	}
-
-	// Check for other well-known privileged RIDs in domain contexts
-	// RID 512 = Domain Admins group, RID 516 = Domain Controllers group
-	if strings.HasPrefix(sid, "S-1-5-21-") {
-		if strings.HasSuffix(sid, "-512") || // Domain Admins group
-			strings.HasSuffix(sid, "-516") || // Domain Controllers group
-			strings.HasSuffix(sid, "-519") { // Enterprise Admins group
-			return true
-		}
-	}
-
-	return false
+	return getWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown(username)
 }
 
 // isCurrentProcessPrivileged checks if the current process is running with elevated privileges.
 // On Unix systems, this means running as root (UID 0).
-// On Windows, this means running as Administrator or SYSTEM.
+// On Windows, this means the process token is elevated (administrators, SYSTEM).
 func isCurrentProcessPrivileged() bool {
 	if getCurrentOS() == "windows" {
-		return isWindowsElevated()
+		return getProcessElevated()
 	}
 	return getEuid() == 0
 }
-
-// isWindowsElevated checks if the current process is running with elevated privileges on Windows
-func isWindowsElevated() bool {
-	currentUser, err := getCurrentUser()
-	if err != nil {
-		log.Errorf("failed to get current user for privilege check, assuming non-privileged: %v", err)
-		return false
-	}
-
-	if isWindowsPrivilegedSID(currentUser.Uid) {
-		log.Debugf("Windows user switching supported: running as privileged SID %s", currentUser.Uid)
-		return true
-	}
-
-	if isPrivilegedUsername(currentUser.Username) {
-		log.Debugf("Windows user switching supported: running as privileged username %s", currentUser.Username)
-		return true
-	}
-
-	log.Debugf("Windows user switching not supported: not running as privileged user (current: %s)", currentUser.Uid)
-	return false
-}

client/ssh/server/user_utils_test.go

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
 	"errors"
 	"os/user"
 	"runtime"
+	"strings"
 	"testing"
 
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
@@ -27,8 +28,8 @@ func setupTestDependencies(currentUser *user.User, currentUserErr error, os stri
 	originalLookupUser := lookupUser
 	originalGetCurrentOS := getCurrentOS
 	originalGetEuid := getEuid
-
-	// Reset caches to ensure clean test state
+	originalGetProcessElevated := getProcessElevated
+	originalGetWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown := getWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown
 
 	// Set test values - inject platform dependencies
 	getCurrentUser = func() (*user.User, error) {
@@ -53,16 +54,31 @@ func setupTestDependencies(currentUser *user.User, currentUserErr error, os stri
 		return euid
 	}
 
-	// Mock privilege detection based on the test user
-	getIsProcessPrivileged = func() bool {
+	// Simulate the Windows token elevation check based on the fixture user:
+	// the built-in Administrator (RID 500) and SYSTEM run elevated.
+	getProcessElevated = func() bool {
 		if currentUser == nil {
 			return false
 		}
-		// Check both username and SID for Windows systems
-		if os == "windows" && isWindowsPrivilegedSID(currentUser.Uid) {
+		return currentUser.Uid == "S-1-5-18" || strings.HasSuffix(currentUser.Uid, "-500")
+	}
+
+	// Simulate the Windows account classifier for the fixture accounts.
+	// "root" does not exist on Windows; the real classifier fails closed on
+	// unresolvable accounts, so it counts as privileged here too.
+	getWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown = func(username string) bool {
+		bare := username
+		if idx := strings.LastIndex(bare, `\`); idx != -1 {
+			bare = bare[idx+1:]
+		}
+		if idx := strings.Index(bare, "@"); idx != -1 {
+			bare = bare[:idx]
+		}
+		switch strings.ToLower(bare) {
+		case "administrator", "system", "root":
 			return true
 		}
-		return isPrivilegedUsername(currentUser.Username)
+		return false
 	}
 
 	// Return cleanup function
@@ -71,10 +87,8 @@ func setupTestDependencies(currentUser *user.User, currentUserErr error, os stri
 		lookupUser = originalLookupUser
 		getCurrentOS = originalGetCurrentOS
 		getEuid = originalGetEuid
-
-		getIsProcessPrivileged = isCurrentProcessPrivileged
-
-		// Reset caches after test
+		getProcessElevated = originalGetProcessElevated
+		getWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown = originalGetWindowsAccountPrivilegedOrUnknown
 	}
 }
 
@@ -421,6 +435,9 @@ func TestUsedFallback_MeansNoPrivilegeDropping(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestPrivilegedUsernameDetection(t *testing.T) {
+	// Windows classification is syscall-backed (SID resolution, group
+	// membership) and is covered by privileges_windows_test.go; here only the
+	// Unix logic and the platform dispatch are exercised.
 	tests := []struct {
 		name       string
 		username   string
@@ -432,25 +449,9 @@ func TestPrivilegedUsernameDetection(t *testing.T) {
 		{"unix_regular_user", "alice", "linux", false},
 		{"unix_root_capital", "Root", "linux", false}, // Case-sensitive
 
-		// Windows tests
+		// Windows dispatch to the (mocked) account classifier
 		{"windows_administrator", "Administrator", "windows", true},
-		{"windows_system", "SYSTEM", "windows", true},
-		{"windows_admin", "admin", "windows", true},
-		{"windows_admin_lowercase", "administrator", "windows", true}, // Case-insensitive
-		{"windows_domain_admin", "DOMAIN\\Administrator", "windows", true},
-		{"windows_email_admin", "admin@domain.com", "windows", true},
 		{"windows_regular_user", "alice", "windows", false},
-		{"windows_domain_user", "DOMAIN\\alice", "windows", false},
-		{"windows_localsystem", "localsystem", "windows", true},
-		{"windows_networkservice", "networkservice", "windows", true},
-		{"windows_localservice", "localservice", "windows", true},
-
-		// Computer accounts (these depend on current user context in real implementation)
-		{"windows_computer_account", "WIN2K19-C2$", "windows", false},      // Computer account by itself not privileged
-		{"windows_domain_computer", "DOMAIN\\COMPUTER$", "windows", false}, // Domain computer account
-
-		// Cross-platform
-		{"root_on_windows", "root", "windows", true}, // Root should be privileged everywhere
 	}
 
 	for _, tt := range tests {
@@ -459,50 +460,8 @@ func TestPrivilegedUsernameDetection(t *testing.T) {
 			cleanup := setupTestDependencies(nil, nil, tt.platform, 1000, nil, nil)
 			defer cleanup()
 
-			result := isPrivilegedUsername(tt.username)
-			assert.Equal(t, tt.privileged, result)
-		})
-	}
-}
-
-func TestWindowsPrivilegedSIDDetection(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name        string
-		sid         string
-		privileged  bool
-		description string
-	}{
-		// Well-known system accounts
-		{"system_account", "S-1-5-18", true, "Local System (SYSTEM)"},
-		{"local_service", "S-1-5-19", true, "Local Service"},
-		{"network_service", "S-1-5-20", true, "Network Service"},
-		{"administrators_group", "S-1-5-32-544", true, "Administrators group"},
-		{"builtin_administrator", "S-1-5-500", true, "Built-in Administrator"},
-
-		// Domain accounts
-		{"domain_administrator", "S-1-5-21-1234567890-1234567890-1234567890-500", true, "Domain Administrator (RID 500)"},
-		{"domain_admins_group", "S-1-5-21-1234567890-1234567890-1234567890-512", true, "Domain Admins group"},
-		{"domain_controllers_group", "S-1-5-21-1234567890-1234567890-1234567890-516", true, "Domain Controllers group"},
-		{"enterprise_admins_group", "S-1-5-21-1234567890-1234567890-1234567890-519", true, "Enterprise Admins group"},
-
-		// Regular users
-		{"regular_user", "S-1-5-21-1234567890-1234567890-1234567890-1001", false, "Regular domain user"},
-		{"another_regular_user", "S-1-5-21-1234567890-1234567890-1234567890-1234", false, "Another regular user"},
-		{"local_user", "S-1-5-21-1234567890-1234567890-1234567890-1000", false, "Local regular user"},
-
-		// Groups that are not privileged
-		{"domain_users", "S-1-5-21-1234567890-1234567890-1234567890-513", false, "Domain Users group"},
-		{"power_users", "S-1-5-32-547", false, "Power Users group"},
-
-		// Invalid SIDs
-		{"malformed_sid", "S-1-5-invalid", false, "Malformed SID"},
-		{"empty_sid", "", false, "Empty SID"},
-	}
-
-	for _, tt := range tests {
-		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			result := isWindowsPrivilegedSID(tt.sid)
-			assert.Equal(t, tt.privileged, result, "Failed for %s: %s", tt.description, tt.sid)
+			result := isPrivilegedOrUnknown(tt.username)
+			assert.Equal(t, tt.privileged, result, "privilege classification for %s on %s", tt.username, tt.platform)
 		})
 	}
 }

client/ssh/server/userswitching_windows.go

@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ func validateUsernameFormat(username string) error {
 func (s *Server) createExecutorCommand(logger *log.Entry, session ssh.Session, localUser *user.User, hasPty bool) (*exec.Cmd, func(), error) {
 	logger.Debugf("creating Windows executor command for user %s (Pty: %v)", localUser.Username, hasPty)
 
-	username, _ := s.parseUsername(localUser.Username)
+	username, _ := parseUsername(localUser.Username)
 	if err := validateUsername(username); err != nil {
 		return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid username %q: %w", username, err)
 	}
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ func (s *Server) createExecutorCommand(logger *log.Entry, session ssh.Session, l
 // createUserSwitchCommand creates a command with Windows user switching.
 // Returns the command and a cleanup function that must be called after starting the process.
 func (s *Server) createUserSwitchCommand(logger *log.Entry, session ssh.Session, localUser *user.User) (*exec.Cmd, func(), error) {
-	username, domain := s.parseUsername(localUser.Username)
+	username, domain := parseUsername(localUser.Username)
 
 	shell := getUserShell(localUser.Uid)
 
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ func (s *Server) createUserSwitchCommand(logger *log.Entry, session ssh.Session,
 }
 
 // parseUsername extracts username and domain from a Windows username
-func (s *Server) parseUsername(fullUsername string) (username, domain string) {
+func parseUsername(fullUsername string) (username, domain string) {
 	// Handle DOMAIN\username format
 	if idx := strings.LastIndex(fullUsername, `\`); idx != -1 {
 		domain = fullUsername[:idx]

client/ui/i18n/TRANSLATING.md

@@ -2,9 +2,24 @@
 
 A short brief for translating the desktop UI — for any translator, human or AI agent (*"you"* = whoever's translating).
 
-**Drive an agent with:** *"Read `i18n/TRANSLATING.md` and translate the UI to Russian"* — or *"…and review the existing German translation."*
+**Translations are managed on Crowdin: <https://crowdin.com/project/netbird>.** Join the project, pick your language, and translate in the editor. Each string carries a context note (the `description` from the source file) telling you what it is and where it shows up, and the project's glossary, style guide, and QA checks mirror this document.
 
-> 💡 **The one habit that matters most:** read each key's `description` before translating it. Labels are terse and ambiguous on their own; the `description` tells you what the string is, where it shows up, what to keep verbatim, and what it actually means.
+> 💡 **The one habit that matters most:** read each string's context before translating it. Labels are terse and ambiguous on their own; the context tells you what the string is, where it shows up, what to keep verbatim, and what it actually means.
+
+---
+
+## How contributions flow
+
+```text
+i18n/locales/en/common.json ──sync──▶ Crowdin ──service PR──▶ i18n/locales/<code>/common.json
+```
+
+- `i18n/locales/en/common.json` is the source of truth. New and changed strings sync to Crowdin automatically (see `crowdin.yml` in the repository root).
+- Crowdin opens and updates a service pull request with the translated bundles, keeping the source's file shape and key order. Keys nobody has translated yet are left out of the export; the app falls back to English for them at runtime. Maintainers review and merge that PR.
+- Don't hand-edit `i18n/locales/<code>/common.json` in your own PRs: the next sync would conflict with or overwrite your changes. Translate on Crowdin instead.
+- Missing your language? Request it on the Crowdin project page or in a [GitHub discussion](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/discussions). When a language first ships, a maintainer adds its row to `i18n/locales/_index.json` with `code`, `displayName` (the native name), and `englishName`, which puts it in the app's language picker.
+
+**Prefer translating with an AI agent?** That still works: drive it with *"Read `i18n/TRANSLATING.md` and translate the UI to Russian"* as before, but deliver the result to Crowdin instead of a pull request. Download your language's file from the Crowdin editor, let the agent translate it, and upload it back (the editor's offline translation flow). Crowdin runs its QA checks on upload, and the next service PR carries the strings into the repo.
 
 ---
 
@@ -30,25 +45,6 @@ A **business zero-trust VPN** — an encrypted **overlay mesh** between a compan
 
 ---
 
-## The files
-
-```
-i18n/locales/_index.json         shipped-language list
-i18n/locales/en/common.json      source of truth — message + description
-i18n/locales/<code>/common.json  a target — message only
-```
-
-Chrome-extension JSON, each key → `{ "message", "description" }`. You translate the **`message`**.
-
-| ✅ Do | ❌ Don't |
-|---|---|
-| Keep **every key** from `en`, in the same order | Translate, rename, reorder, drop, or add keys (they're identifiers; the set grows over time) |
-| Put **only `message`** in target bundles | Copy `description` into a target bundle |
-| Give every key a non-empty `message` | Leave keys missing or empty |
-| Save valid UTF-8 JSON, no BOM | Add trailing commas or break the JSON |
-
----
-
 ## Hard rules — get these exactly right
 
 These are the usual ways a translation *breaks the app*, not just reads oddly.
@@ -58,7 +54,7 @@ These are the usual ways a translation *breaks the app*, not just reads oddly.
 | Copy `{placeholders}` verbatim — `{version}`, `{count}`, `{name}`… | Translate the word inside the braces (`{verbleibend}` breaks it) |
 | Reposition a placeholder so the sentence flows | Drop or duplicate a placeholder |
 | Preserve every `\n`, leading/trailing space, and trailing `...` | Trim "invisible" spaces or the `...` (they're load-bearing) |
-| Keep `®` in WireGuard® and quotes around `{name}` | Strip punctuation the description flags |
+| Keep `®` in WireGuard® and quotes around `{name}` | Strip punctuation the context flags |
 
 **Plurals:** the app has only a *one / other* split — the singular key fires only when `count == 1`; the `{count}` key covers everything else (0, 2, 5, 100…). Languages with more than two forms (ru, pl, uk) can't be fully correct here — use the form that fits the widest range (Russian genitive plural: `минут` / `часов` / `дней`). Don't invent extra keys or cram multiple forms into one string. When no single form fits every value — a unit label after a number field, say — reach for a number-agnostic form (an abbreviation, or wording that reads the same for 1 and 100) instead of forcing a plural the *one / other* split can't supply.
 
@@ -78,13 +74,15 @@ When a brand sits beside a common noun, keep its exact spelling but join them th
 
 > **Use the word that language's IT users actually say.** Translate when a natural, common term exists; keep the English term *only* when the literal translation would be awkward or no one in that field really uses it.
 
-Apply each term **consistently** — same English term → same translation everywhere — and keep a term once you've settled it. Whether a term stays English or takes a native word is **language-dependent**: a technical loanword (e.g. *Daemon*, *Handshake*) often stays, an everyday word (e.g. *Latency*, *Public key*) usually localizes, and some (*Exit Node*, *Peer*) go either way depending on the language. Decide per term with the rule above — a foreign origin alone is no reason to keep English. **Your main reference is the existing bundles:** match how a term was already rendered for your language rather than re-deciding it.
+Apply each term **consistently** — same English term → same translation everywhere — and keep a term once you've settled it. Whether a term stays English or takes a native word is **language-dependent**: a technical loanword (e.g. *Daemon*, *Handshake*) often stays, an everyday word (e.g. *Latency*, *Public key*) usually localizes, and some (*Exit Node*, *Peer*) go either way depending on the language. Decide per term with the rule above — a foreign origin alone is no reason to keep English. **Your main reference is the existing translation:** match how a term was already rendered for your language rather than re-deciding it.
 
 Two checks before you commit a term:
 
 - **Prefer established localized wording.** If a widely used tool in this space (for example WireGuard) ships your language, its wording for a shared term such as *handshake* is what users already expect — look at the translated app, not just English docs. For generic UI verbs and formal address, follow your OS vendor's style guide (Microsoft / Apple / Google).
 - **Watch for false friends.** A literal translation can collide with a *different* established term in your field — confirm your word doesn't already mean something else in this domain before using it.
 
+These tiers are mirrored in the Crowdin project glossary, so the editor highlights them inline. When you settle a new Tier C term for your language, add its translation to the glossary entry so it sticks for everyone who comes after you.
+
 ---
 
 ## Style
@@ -98,7 +96,7 @@ Two checks before you commit a term:
 
 Where it reads naturally, aim to keep each string **roughly the same length** as the English — the UI is tight and over-long strings can wrap or truncate. It's a soft preference, not a rule: if your language simply needs more words, use them.
 
-A few habits that keep a bundle reading like one product rather than a word-for-word port:
+A few habits that keep a translation reading like one product rather than a word-for-word port:
 
 - **Translate meaning, not words.** Render what a string *does*. An idiom or an awkward source phrase should become natural in your language, not a literal calque.
 - **Keep one voice within a family.** Sibling strings — the connection states, every settings *help* caption, every "… Failed" title — should share a grammatical form. If one member sounds wrong in that form, re-voice the whole family rather than leave one odd sibling.
@@ -107,27 +105,26 @@ A few habits that keep a bundle reading like one product rather than a word-for-
 
 ---
 
-## Procedure
+## Reviewing a language
 
-**New language** — read `en/common.json` *with* descriptions → settle your Tier C terms → write `i18n/locales/<code>/common.json` (same keys and order as `en`, `message` only, placeholders & brands preserved) → add a row to `_index.json` (`{"code","displayName"` = native name`,"englishName"}`) → run the QA list. Use the locale-code style the existing entries use (e.g. `fr`, `pt`, `zh-CN`).
+**On Crowdin:** proofread in the editor — context, glossary highlights, and QA flags sit inline next to each string.
 
-**Review (de / hu / …)** — read source and target side by side; for each key check glossary conformance (e.g. de `Exit-Node` → `Exit Node`, hu `Kilépő csomópont` → `Exit Node`), placeholder/`\n` integrity, consistency, tone, and that the meaning matches the English `description`. Fix in place, then report what you changed (especially term standardizations) so a native speaker can sanity-check.
+**In the repo** — e.g. driving an AI agent with *"Read `i18n/TRANSLATING.md` and review the existing German translation"* — read source and target side by side; for each key check glossary conformance (e.g. de `Exit-Node` → `Exit Node`, hu `Kilépő csomópont` → `Exit Node`), placeholder/`\n` integrity, consistency, tone, and that the meaning matches the English `description`. Report what you found, and apply the fixes **on Crowdin** — direct edits to the locale files are overwritten by the next sync.
 
 ---
 
 ## QA before you finish
 
-- [ ] Valid JSON · **every `en` key** present, same order · **no `description`** fields
 - [ ] Every `{placeholder}`, `\n`, and intentional space preserved · `...` / `… Failed` / `{name}` quotes kept
-- [ ] Tier A/B left intact · Tier C applied consistently (and matching the existing bundle for your language)
+- [ ] Tier A/B left intact · Tier C applied consistently (and matching the existing translation for your language)
 - [ ] Buttons & tray short · locale punctuation and capitalization applied
-- [ ] New language added to `_index.json`
+- [ ] Crowdin QA flags resolved (variables, glossary terms, punctuation)
 - [ ] **Tested in the running app** ↓
 
 ---
 
 ## Test it in the app
 
-A bundle can pass every check above and still read wrong on screen. **Run the app, switch to your language, and click through the real surfaces** — tray menu, main window, every Settings tab, the dialogs. Watch for text overflow or truncation, labels that are technically right but wrong *for what the control does*, leaked placeholders, and terms that drift between screens.
+A translation can pass every check above and still read wrong on screen. **Run the app, switch to your language, and click through the real surfaces** — tray menu, main window, every Settings tab, the dialogs. Watch for text overflow or truncation, labels that are technically right but wrong *for what the control does*, leaked placeholders, and terms that drift between screens.
 
 How to run the app and switch language: see the project README. Can't run it (e.g. a headless agent)? Say so in your summary — don't silently skip this step.

crowdin.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+skip_untranslated_strings: true
+skip_untranslated_files: true
+import_eq_suggestions: true
+
+files:
+  - source: /client/ui/i18n/locales/en/common.json
+    translation: /client/ui/i18n/locales/%two_letters_code%/common.json
+    type: chrome
+    languages_mapping:
+      two_letters_code:
+        zh-CN: zh-CN

e2e/agentnetwork/chat_test.go

@@ -438,14 +438,10 @@ func TestProvidersMatrix(t *testing.T) {
 	// Create every provider, all enabled, each with a unique model string so the
 	// proxy's connect-time snapshot carries them all and model→provider routing
 	// is unambiguous (provider toggles after connect don't reconcile to the
-	// proxy, so we enable everything up front). The first create bootstraps the
-	// cluster.
+	// proxy, so we enable everything up front).
 	ids := make([]string, 0, len(matrix))
-	for i, pc := range matrix {
+	for _, pc := range matrix {
 		req := providerRequest(pc)
-		if i == 0 {
-			req.BootstrapCluster = ptr(harness.AgentNetworkCluster)
-		}
 		prov, perr := srv.CreateProvider(ctx, req)
 		require.NoError(t, perr, "create provider %s", pc.name)
 		ids = append(ids, prov.Id)

e2e/agentnetwork/custom_pricing_test.go

@@ -82,13 +82,12 @@ func provisionPricedProvider(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, name string, mod
 	// need NOT be in the catalog — the operator names it and prices it here.
 	dummyKey := "sk-price-e2e"
 	prov, err := srv.CreateProvider(ctx, api.AgentNetworkProviderRequest{
-		Name:             name,
-		ProviderId:       "openai_api",
-		UpstreamUrl:      vllm.URL,
-		ApiKey:           &dummyKey,
-		Enabled:          ptr(true),
-		BootstrapCluster: ptr(harness.AgentNetworkCluster),
-		Models:           &models,
+		Name:        name,
+		ProviderId:  "openai_api",
+		UpstreamUrl: vllm.URL,
+		ApiKey:      &dummyKey,
+		Enabled:     ptr(true),
+		Models:      &models,
 	})
 	require.NoError(t, err, "create provider")
 	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteProvider(context.Background(), prov.Id) })

e2e/agentnetwork/guardrail_block_test.go

@@ -113,15 +113,14 @@ func runPathRoutedGuardrailCase(t *testing.T, tc pathRoutedGuardrailCase) {
 
 	// Catch-all provider (no models) so the router forwards any model; a static
 	// bearer key means the router injects a static auth header instead of minting
-	// a GCP token. Bootstraps the cluster if it isn't already.
+	// a GCP token.
 	staticKey := "static-e2e-token"
 	prov, err := srv.CreateProvider(ctx, api.AgentNetworkProviderRequest{
-		Name:             tc.name,
-		ProviderId:       tc.catalogID,
-		UpstreamUrl:      vllm.URL,
-		ApiKey:           &staticKey,
-		Enabled:          ptr(true),
-		BootstrapCluster: ptr(harness.AgentNetworkCluster),
+		Name:        tc.name,
+		ProviderId:  tc.catalogID,
+		UpstreamUrl: vllm.URL,
+		ApiKey:      &staticKey,
+		Enabled:     ptr(true),
 	})
 	require.NoError(t, err, "create %s provider", tc.name)
 	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteProvider(context.Background(), prov.Id) })

e2e/agentnetwork/guardrail_groupswitch_test.go

@@ -73,7 +73,6 @@ func TestGuardrailGroupSwitchTakesEffectAfterTTL(t *testing.T) {
 			{Id: modelA, InputPer1k: 0.001, OutputPer1k: 0.001},
 			{Id: modelB, InputPer1k: 0.001, OutputPer1k: 0.001},
 		},
-		BootstrapCluster: ptr(harness.AgentNetworkCluster),
 	})
 	require.NoError(t, err, "create provider")
 	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteProvider(context.Background(), prov.Id) })

e2e/agentnetwork/guardrail_multipolicy_test.go

@@ -61,15 +61,14 @@ func TestGuardrailMultiPolicyModelAllowlist(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	// pRestricted declares the two guardrailed models so routing is deterministic
-	// (model -> provider). Created first, so it carries the bootstrap cluster.
+	// (model -> provider).
 	pRestricted, err := srv.CreateProvider(ctx, api.AgentNetworkProviderRequest{
-		Name:             "restricted",
-		ProviderId:       "openai_api",
-		UpstreamUrl:      vllm.URL,
-		ApiKey:           &staticKey,
-		Enabled:          ptr(true),
-		Models:           models(modelSelected, modelOther),
-		BootstrapCluster: ptr(harness.AgentNetworkCluster),
+		Name:        "restricted",
+		ProviderId:  "openai_api",
+		UpstreamUrl: vllm.URL,
+		ApiKey:      &staticKey,
+		Enabled:     ptr(true),
+		Models:      models(modelSelected, modelOther),
 	})
 	require.NoError(t, err, "create restricted provider")
 	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteProvider(context.Background(), pRestricted.Id) })

e2e/agentnetwork/guardrail_pergroup_providers_test.go

@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ func TestGuardrailPerGroupAllowlist_AllProviders(t *testing.T) {
 	staticKey := "static-e2e-token"
 	enabled := true
 
-	for i, c := range cases {
+	for _, c := range cases {
 		req := api.AgentNetworkProviderRequest{
 			Name:        "e2e-pergroup-" + c.name,
 			ProviderId:  c.catalogID,
@@ -124,9 +124,6 @@ func TestGuardrailPerGroupAllowlist_AllProviders(t *testing.T) {
 			Enabled:     ptr(true),
 			Models:      c.models,
 		}
-		if i == 0 {
-			req.BootstrapCluster = ptr(harness.AgentNetworkCluster)
-		}
 		prov, perr := srv.CreateProvider(ctx, req)
 		require.NoError(t, perr, "create provider %s", c.name)
 		c.providerID = prov.Id
@@ -283,13 +280,12 @@ func TestGuardrailMultiGroupUser(t *testing.T) {
 
 	// P1 — union scenario: two restricting policies, one per group.
 	p1, err := srv.CreateProvider(ctx, api.AgentNetworkProviderRequest{
-		Name:             "e2e-mg-union",
-		ProviderId:       "openai_api",
-		UpstreamUrl:      vllm.URL,
-		ApiKey:           &staticKey,
-		Enabled:          ptr(true),
-		Models:           priced(unionA, unionB, unionC),
-		BootstrapCluster: ptr(harness.AgentNetworkCluster),
+		Name:        "e2e-mg-union",
+		ProviderId:  "openai_api",
+		UpstreamUrl: vllm.URL,
+		ApiKey:      &staticKey,
+		Enabled:     ptr(true),
+		Models:      priced(unionA, unionB, unionC),
 	})
 	require.NoError(t, err, "create union provider")
 	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteProvider(context.Background(), p1.Id) })

e2e/agentnetwork/guardrail_test.go

@@ -115,14 +115,11 @@ func TestModelAllowlistEnforced(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 	require.NoError(t, err, "mint setup key")
 
-	// Providers with their configured (allowed) models; the first bootstraps the cluster.
+	// Providers with their configured (allowed) models
 	ids := make([]string, 0, len(providers))
 	allowed := make([]string, 0, len(providers))
-	for i, pc := range providers {
+	for _, pc := range providers {
 		req := providerRequest(pc)
-		if i == 0 {
-			req.BootstrapCluster = ptr(harness.AgentNetworkCluster)
-		}
 		prov, perr := srv.CreateProvider(ctx, req)
 		require.NoError(t, perr, "create provider %s", pc.name)
 		id := prov.Id

e2e/agentnetwork/main_test.go

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import (
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/e2e/harness"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/api"
 )
 
 // srv is the shared combined server for the package, ready (PAT-authenticated)
@@ -42,5 +43,14 @@ func run(m *testing.M) int {
 		return 1
 	}
 
+	// Bootstrap the account's agent-network endpoint once for the package:
+	// providers no longer have settings side effects, and every data-plane
+	// test expects the shared account pinned to the combined proxy cluster.
+	cluster := harness.AgentNetworkCluster
+	if _, err := srv.CreateSettings(ctx, api.AgentNetworkSettingsCreateRequest{ProxyAddress: &cluster}); err != nil {
+		fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "e2e: bootstrap agent-network endpoint: %v\n", err)
+		return 1
+	}
+
 	return m.Run()
 }

e2e/agentnetwork/management_test.go

@@ -21,11 +21,10 @@ func ptr[T any](v T) *T { return &v }
 func newProvider(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, name string) api.AgentNetworkProvider {
 	t.Helper()
 	prov, err := srv.CreateProvider(ctx, api.AgentNetworkProviderRequest{
-		Name:             name,
-		ProviderId:       "openai_api",
-		UpstreamUrl:      "https://api.openai.com",
-		ApiKey:           ptr("sk-dummy-e2e-key"),
-		BootstrapCluster: ptr("eu.proxy.netbird.test"),
+		Name:        name,
+		ProviderId:  "openai_api",
+		UpstreamUrl: "https://api.openai.com",
+		ApiKey:      ptr("sk-dummy-e2e-key"),
 	})
 	require.NoError(t, err, "create provider %q", name)
 	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteProvider(context.Background(), prov.Id) })
@@ -57,17 +56,11 @@ func TestProviderLifecycle(t *testing.T) {
 		}}
 	}
 
-	for i, pc := range cases {
-		i, pc := i, pc
+	for _, pc := range cases {
+		pc := pc
 		t.Run(pc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
 			req := providerRequest(pc)
 			req.Name = "lc-" + pc.name
-			// Bootstrap the cluster on the first create in case the matrix has
-			// not run (e.g. no provider keys → settings not yet bootstrapped).
-			if i == 0 {
-				req.BootstrapCluster = ptr(harness.AgentNetworkCluster)
-			}
-
 			prov, err := srv.CreateProvider(ctx, req)
 			require.NoError(t, err, "create %s provider", pc.name)
 			t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteProvider(context.Background(), prov.Id) })
@@ -137,45 +130,65 @@ func TestProviderValidation(t *testing.T) {
 	requireClientError(t, err)
 }
 
-// TestSettingsRoundTrip flips the collection toggles and confirms cluster /
-// subdomain stay immutable, then restores the original state.
+// TestSettingsRoundTrip flips the collection toggles and confirms the
+// endpoint and proxy address stay immutable, then restores the original
+// state. A second bootstrap attempt must be rejected as a conflict.
 func TestSettingsRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
 	ctx := context.Background()
 
-	// Settings are bootstrapped on first provider create.
-	newProvider(t, ctx, "Settings Bootstrap")
-
+	// The package's TestMain bootstrapped the shared account's endpoint.
 	before, err := srv.GetSettings(ctx)
 	require.NoError(t, err, "get settings")
-	require.NotEmpty(t, before.Cluster, "settings must carry an assigned cluster")
+	require.NotEmpty(t, before.Endpoint, "settings must carry the bootstrapped endpoint")
+	require.NotEmpty(t, before.ProxyAddress, "settings must carry the bootstrapped proxy address")
+
+	require.NotNil(t, before.AccessLogRetentionDays, "bootstrapped settings must carry a retention")
+	beforeRetention := *before.AccessLogRetentionDays
 
 	flipped, err := srv.UpdateSettings(ctx, api.AgentNetworkSettingsRequest{
+		Endpoint:               before.Endpoint,
+		ProxyAddress:           before.ProxyAddress,
 		EnableLogCollection:    !before.EnableLogCollection,
 		EnablePromptCollection: !before.EnablePromptCollection,
 		RedactPii:              !before.RedactPii,
+		AccessLogRetentionDays: beforeRetention,
 	})
 	require.NoError(t, err, "update settings")
 	assert.Equal(t, !before.EnableLogCollection, flipped.EnableLogCollection, "log collection toggle must flip")
 	assert.Equal(t, !before.EnablePromptCollection, flipped.EnablePromptCollection, "prompt collection toggle must flip")
-	assert.Equal(t, before.Cluster, flipped.Cluster, "cluster must be immutable across updates")
-	assert.Equal(t, before.Subdomain, flipped.Subdomain, "subdomain must be immutable across updates")
+	require.NotNil(t, flipped.AccessLogRetentionDays)
+	assert.Equal(t, beforeRetention, *flipped.AccessLogRetentionDays,
+		"retention sent unchanged must round-trip, not reset to the zero value")
+	assert.Equal(t, before.Endpoint, flipped.Endpoint, "endpoint must be immutable across updates")
+	assert.Equal(t, before.ProxyAddress, flipped.ProxyAddress, "proxy address must be immutable across updates")
 
-	// A cluster different from the pinned one must be rejected; echoing the
-	// pinned one back is valid.
+	// The account is already bootstrapped: a second bootstrap is a conflict,
+	// whatever shape it asks for.
+	_, err = srv.CreateSettings(ctx, api.AgentNetworkSettingsCreateRequest{
+		Endpoint: ptr("attacker.cluster.invalid"),
+	})
+	requireClientError(t, err)
+
+	// The identity fields ride along on the PUT as a required echo: a request
+	// carrying a different endpoint is rejected without applying anything.
 	_, err = srv.UpdateSettings(ctx, api.AgentNetworkSettingsRequest{
-		Cluster:                ptr("attacker.cluster.invalid"),
+		Endpoint:               "other.cluster.invalid",
+		ProxyAddress:           before.ProxyAddress,
 		EnableLogCollection:    before.EnableLogCollection,
 		EnablePromptCollection: before.EnablePromptCollection,
 		RedactPii:              before.RedactPii,
+		AccessLogRetentionDays: beforeRetention,
 	})
 	requireClientError(t, err)
 
 	// Restore the original toggles.
 	_, err = srv.UpdateSettings(ctx, api.AgentNetworkSettingsRequest{
-		Cluster:                ptr(before.Cluster),
+		Endpoint:               before.Endpoint,
+		ProxyAddress:           before.ProxyAddress,
 		EnableLogCollection:    before.EnableLogCollection,
 		EnablePromptCollection: before.EnablePromptCollection,
 		RedactPii:              before.RedactPii,
+		AccessLogRetentionDays: beforeRetention,
 	})
 	require.NoError(t, err, "restore settings")
 }

e2e/agentnetwork/settings_bootstrap_test.go

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ package agentnetwork
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"strings"
 	"testing"
 
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
@@ -14,7 +15,8 @@ import (
 )
 
 // harnessStartFresh boots a dedicated combined server with its own fresh
-// account and registers its teardown on t.
+// account and registers its teardown on t. Unlike the shared srv, the fresh
+// account has NOT had its agent-network endpoint bootstrapped.
 func harnessStartFresh(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T) (*harness.Combined, error) {
 	t.Helper()
 	fresh, err := harness.StartCombined(ctx)
@@ -28,16 +30,16 @@ func harnessStartFresh(ctx context.Context, t *testing.T) (*harness.Combined, er
 	return fresh, nil
 }
 
-// TestSettingsBootstrapViaPut covers the settings-first bootstrap path on an
+// TestSettingsBootstrapViaPost covers the explicit bootstrap contract on an
 // account that has never been bootstrapped: the GET reads as the defaults
-// with an empty cluster/subdomain/endpoint, a PUT without a cluster has
-// nothing to pin and fails, and a PUT carrying a cluster creates the row and
-// pins it immutably. The shared srv cannot provide that starting state (any
-// provider-creating test bootstraps it, and test order is deliberately not
-// relied on), so this boots a dedicated combined server — the image is
-// already built and cached by TestMain's StartCombined, so the extra cost is
-// one container start.
-func TestSettingsBootstrapViaPut(t *testing.T) {
+// with an empty endpoint/proxy_address, a PUT has no row to update and fails,
+// and a POST creates the row and assigns the immutable endpoint — labeled
+// beneath a proxy address here, with the toggle overrides from the same
+// request applied. The shared srv cannot provide that starting state
+// (TestMain bootstraps it), so this boots a dedicated combined server — the
+// image is already built and cached by TestMain's StartCombined, so the extra
+// cost is one container start.
+func TestSettingsBootstrapViaPost(t *testing.T) {
 	ctx := context.Background()
 
 	fresh, err := harnessStartFresh(ctx, t)
@@ -47,32 +49,35 @@ func TestSettingsBootstrapViaPut(t *testing.T) {
 	// as an error and not as a null body.
 	before, err := fresh.GetSettings(ctx)
 	require.NoError(t, err, "get settings on a fresh account must succeed")
-	assert.Empty(t, before.Cluster, "cluster must be empty before bootstrap")
-	assert.Empty(t, before.Subdomain, "subdomain must be empty before bootstrap")
-	assert.Empty(t, before.Endpoint, "endpoint must be empty before bootstrap, not a bare dot")
+	assert.Empty(t, before.Endpoint, "endpoint must be empty before bootstrap")
+	assert.Empty(t, before.ProxyAddress, "proxy address must be empty before bootstrap")
+	assert.False(t, before.Dedicated, "an unbootstrapped account has no serving shape")
 	assert.True(t, before.EnableLogCollection, "defaults must show log collection on, matching bootstrap")
 	assert.False(t, before.EnablePromptCollection, "defaults must show prompt collection off")
 
-	// A PUT without a cluster has nothing to pin the account to.
+	// A PUT has no row to update yet — bootstrap is the explicit POST.
 	_, err = fresh.UpdateSettings(ctx, api.AgentNetworkSettingsRequest{
-		EnableLogCollection: true,
+		EnableLogCollection:    true,
+		AccessLogRetentionDays: 30,
 	})
 	requireClientError(t, err)
 
-	// A PUT carrying a cluster bootstraps the account and applies the
-	// mutable fields from the same request. Every toggle is set away from
-	// its bootstrap default so each assertion can actually fail.
+	// A POST with a proxy address bootstraps a labeled endpoint and applies
+	// the toggles from the same request. Every toggle is set away from its
+	// bootstrap default so each assertion can actually fail.
 	const cluster = "e2e.bootstrap.netbird.selfhosted"
-	bootstrapped, err := fresh.UpdateSettings(ctx, api.AgentNetworkSettingsRequest{
-		Cluster:                ptr(cluster),
-		EnableLogCollection:    false,
-		EnablePromptCollection: true,
-		RedactPii:              true,
+	bootstrapped, err := fresh.CreateSettings(ctx, api.AgentNetworkSettingsCreateRequest{
+		ProxyAddress:           ptr(cluster),
+		EnableLogCollection:    ptr(false),
+		EnablePromptCollection: ptr(true),
+		RedactPii:              ptr(true),
 	})
-	require.NoError(t, err, "bootstrap settings via PUT must succeed")
-	assert.Equal(t, cluster, bootstrapped.Cluster, "cluster must be pinned from the request")
-	require.NotEmpty(t, bootstrapped.Subdomain, "subdomain must be assigned at bootstrap")
-	assert.Equal(t, bootstrapped.Subdomain+"."+cluster, bootstrapped.Endpoint, "endpoint must combine subdomain and cluster")
+	require.NoError(t, err, "bootstrap settings via POST must succeed")
+	assert.Equal(t, cluster, bootstrapped.ProxyAddress, "proxy address must be pinned from the request")
+	require.NotEmpty(t, bootstrapped.Endpoint, "endpoint must be assigned at bootstrap")
+	assert.True(t, strings.HasSuffix(bootstrapped.Endpoint, "."+cluster),
+		"labeled endpoint must hang one label beneath the proxy address: %s", bootstrapped.Endpoint)
+	assert.False(t, bootstrapped.Dedicated, "a labeled pin is not dedicated")
 	assert.False(t, bootstrapped.EnableLogCollection, "log collection from the bootstrap request must override the default")
 	assert.True(t, bootstrapped.EnablePromptCollection, "prompt collection from the bootstrap request must apply")
 	assert.True(t, bootstrapped.RedactPii, "redact toggle from the bootstrap request must apply")
@@ -85,30 +90,90 @@ func TestSettingsBootstrapViaPut(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Equal(t, bootstrapped.EnablePromptCollection, after.EnablePromptCollection, "prompt collection must persist")
 	assert.Equal(t, bootstrapped.RedactPii, after.RedactPii, "redact toggle must persist")
 
-	// Once bootstrapped, later updates may omit the cluster entirely.
+	// Once bootstrapped, PUT updates the toggles. The identity fields ride
+	// along as a required echo of the assigned values; a matching echo is
+	// accepted and never written.
 	persisted, err := fresh.UpdateSettings(ctx, api.AgentNetworkSettingsRequest{
+		Endpoint:               bootstrapped.Endpoint,
+		ProxyAddress:           bootstrapped.ProxyAddress,
 		EnableLogCollection:    true,
 		EnablePromptCollection: false,
 		RedactPii:              true,
+		AccessLogRetentionDays: 21,
 	})
-	require.NoError(t, err, "post-bootstrap update without cluster must succeed")
-	assert.Equal(t, cluster, persisted.Cluster, "omitted cluster must keep the pinned value")
+	require.NoError(t, err, "post-bootstrap update must succeed")
+	require.NotNil(t, persisted.AccessLogRetentionDays)
+	assert.Equal(t, 21, *persisted.AccessLogRetentionDays, "retention from the update must apply")
+	assert.Equal(t, bootstrapped.Endpoint, persisted.Endpoint, "endpoint must survive updates untouched")
+	assert.Equal(t, cluster, persisted.ProxyAddress, "proxy address must survive updates untouched")
 	assert.True(t, persisted.EnableLogCollection, "post-bootstrap toggle must apply")
 	assert.False(t, persisted.EnablePromptCollection, "post-bootstrap toggle must apply")
 
-	// The cluster is immutable: a different value is rejected rather than
-	// silently ignored, and the rejected update must not disturb anything.
+	// The endpoint is immutable: a PUT carrying a different endpoint is
+	// rejected, and a second bootstrap is rejected as a conflict. Neither
+	// rejected write may disturb anything.
 	_, err = fresh.UpdateSettings(ctx, api.AgentNetworkSettingsRequest{
-		Cluster:             ptr("other.cluster.invalid"),
-		EnableLogCollection: false,
+		Endpoint:               "other.cluster.invalid",
+		ProxyAddress:           persisted.ProxyAddress,
+		EnableLogCollection:    persisted.EnableLogCollection,
+		EnablePromptCollection: persisted.EnablePromptCollection,
+		RedactPii:              persisted.RedactPii,
+		AccessLogRetentionDays: 21,
+	})
+	requireClientError(t, err)
+
+	_, err = fresh.CreateSettings(ctx, api.AgentNetworkSettingsCreateRequest{
+		Endpoint: ptr("other.cluster.invalid"),
 	})
 	requireClientError(t, err)
 
 	final, err := fresh.GetSettings(ctx)
-	require.NoError(t, err, "get settings after the rejected cluster change must succeed")
-	assert.Equal(t, persisted.Cluster, final.Cluster, "rejected update must not change the cluster")
-	assert.Equal(t, persisted.Endpoint, final.Endpoint, "rejected update must not change the endpoint")
-	assert.Equal(t, persisted.EnableLogCollection, final.EnableLogCollection, "rejected update must not apply its toggles")
-	assert.Equal(t, persisted.EnablePromptCollection, final.EnablePromptCollection, "rejected update must not apply its toggles")
-	assert.Equal(t, persisted.RedactPii, final.RedactPii, "rejected update must not apply its toggles")
+	require.NoError(t, err, "get settings after the rejected bootstrap must succeed")
+	assert.Equal(t, persisted.Endpoint, final.Endpoint, "rejected bootstrap must not change the endpoint")
+	assert.Equal(t, persisted.ProxyAddress, final.ProxyAddress, "rejected bootstrap must not change the proxy address")
+	assert.Equal(t, persisted.EnableLogCollection, final.EnableLogCollection, "rejected bootstrap must not apply its toggles")
+	assert.Equal(t, persisted.EnablePromptCollection, final.EnablePromptCollection, "rejected bootstrap must not apply its toggles")
+	assert.Equal(t, persisted.RedactPii, final.RedactPii, "rejected bootstrap must not apply its toggles")
+}
+
+// TestSettingsBootstrapSelfAddressed covers the dedicated shape end to end:
+// a POST carrying an endpoint claims the hostname verbatim, the proxy address
+// equals it, and the pin reads as dedicated — the address-first flow a
+// self-hosted operator uses before deploying the proxy that will declare it.
+// The tail covers the recovery path the guarded DELETE exists for: with no
+// providers and no proxy at the address, the claim can be released and a
+// fresh bootstrap succeeds — the fix for a typo'd immutable endpoint.
+func TestSettingsBootstrapSelfAddressed(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	fresh, err := harnessStartFresh(ctx, t)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "start dedicated combined server")
+
+	created, err := fresh.CreateSettings(ctx, api.AgentNetworkSettingsCreateRequest{
+		Endpoint: ptr("gw.e2e.netbird.selfhosted"),
+	})
+	require.NoError(t, err, "self-addressed bootstrap must succeed")
+	assert.Equal(t, "gw.e2e.netbird.selfhosted", created.Endpoint, "endpoint must be claimed verbatim")
+	assert.Equal(t, created.Endpoint, created.ProxyAddress, "self-addressed: proxy address is the endpoint")
+	assert.True(t, created.Dedicated, "a self-addressed pin is dedicated")
+
+	// No providers exist and no proxy declares the address, so both delete
+	// guards are clear: the delete releases the claim and the account reads
+	// as unbootstrapped defaults again.
+	require.NoError(t, fresh.DeleteSettings(ctx), "guarded delete with both guards clear must succeed")
+
+	after, err := fresh.GetSettings(ctx)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "get settings after delete must succeed")
+	assert.Empty(t, after.Endpoint, "a deleted account must read as unbootstrapped")
+
+	// A second delete has nothing to remove.
+	requireClientError(t, fresh.DeleteSettings(ctx))
+
+	// Re-creating is a fresh bootstrap — the released hostname is free to be
+	// claimed again, or a different one chosen.
+	recreated, err := fresh.CreateSettings(ctx, api.AgentNetworkSettingsCreateRequest{
+		Endpoint: ptr("gw2.e2e.netbird.selfhosted"),
+	})
+	require.NoError(t, err, "bootstrap after delete must succeed")
+	assert.Equal(t, "gw2.e2e.netbird.selfhosted", recreated.Endpoint, "the fresh bootstrap claims the new hostname")
 }

e2e/agentnetwork/skiptls_test.go

@@ -66,9 +66,7 @@ func TestProviderSkipTLSVerification(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	}
 
-	// First create bootstraps the account cluster.
 	insecureReq := newReq("skip-tls", insecureModel, true)
-	insecureReq.BootstrapCluster = ptr(harness.AgentNetworkCluster)
 	insecureProv, err := srv.CreateProvider(ctx, insecureReq)
 	require.NoError(t, err, "create skip-tls provider")
 	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteProvider(context.Background(), insecureProv.Id) })

e2e/agentnetwork/vllm_test.go

@@ -57,12 +57,11 @@ func TestVLLMProvider(t *testing.T) {
 	// is enumerated so the router dispatches this model string to this provider.
 	dummyKey := "sk-vllm-e2e"
 	prov, err := srv.CreateProvider(ctx, api.AgentNetworkProviderRequest{
-		Name:             "vllm",
-		ProviderId:       "vllm",
-		UpstreamUrl:      vllm.URL,
-		ApiKey:           &dummyKey,
-		Enabled:          ptr(true),
-		BootstrapCluster: ptr(harness.AgentNetworkCluster),
+		Name:        "vllm",
+		ProviderId:  "vllm",
+		UpstreamUrl: vllm.URL,
+		ApiKey:      &dummyKey,
+		Enabled:     ptr(true),
 		Models: &[]api.AgentNetworkProviderModel{
 			{Id: harness.VLLMModel, InputPer1k: 0.001, OutputPer1k: 0.002},
 		},

e2e/harness/Dockerfile.client

@@ -20,5 +20,9 @@ ENV NETBIRD_BIN="/usr/local/bin/netbird" \
     NB_ENABLE_CAPTURE="false" \
     NB_ENTRYPOINT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT="30"
 ENTRYPOINT [ "/usr/local/bin/netbird-entrypoint.sh" ]
-COPY client/netbird-entrypoint.sh /usr/local/bin/netbird-entrypoint.sh
+# --chmod because the build context is not always a git checkout. A suite in
+# another module builds from this module's extracted copy in the module cache,
+# where every file is 0444 — the cache drops the executable bit git records — and
+# a bare COPY then produces an entrypoint the runtime cannot exec.
+COPY --chmod=0755 client/netbird-entrypoint.sh /usr/local/bin/netbird-entrypoint.sh
 COPY --from=builder /out/netbird /usr/local/bin/netbird

e2e/harness/agentnetwork.go

@@ -126,17 +126,33 @@ func (c *Combined) DeleteGuardrail(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
 	return anDelete(ctx, c, "/api/agent-network/guardrails/"+id)
 }
 
-// GetSettings returns the account's agent-network settings row. It exists only
-// after the first provider create bootstraps it.
+// CreateSettings bootstraps the account's agent-network settings row,
+// assigning the immutable endpoint. Exactly one of req.ProxyAddress (labeled
+// endpoint beneath that cluster) and req.Endpoint (self-addressed dedicated
+// endpoint) must be set; a second bootstrap returns a conflict.
+func (c *Combined) CreateSettings(ctx context.Context, req api.AgentNetworkSettingsCreateRequest) (api.AgentNetworkSettings, error) {
+	return anRequest[api.AgentNetworkSettings](ctx, c, http.MethodPost, "/api/agent-network/settings", req)
+}
+
+// GetSettings returns the account's agent-network settings row. Before the
+// CreateSettings bootstrap it reads as the defaults with an empty endpoint.
 func (c *Combined) GetSettings(ctx context.Context) (api.AgentNetworkSettings, error) {
 	return anRequest[api.AgentNetworkSettings](ctx, c, http.MethodGet, "/api/agent-network/settings", nil)
 }
 
-// UpdateSettings applies the mutable collection toggles.
+// UpdateSettings applies the mutable collection toggles. The request must
+// echo the assigned endpoint and proxy address unchanged — the server rejects
+// a PUT that tries to change them.
 func (c *Combined) UpdateSettings(ctx context.Context, req api.AgentNetworkSettingsRequest) (api.AgentNetworkSettings, error) {
 	return anRequest[api.AgentNetworkSettings](ctx, c, http.MethodPut, "/api/agent-network/settings", req)
 }
 
+// DeleteSettings removes the account's settings row, releasing the endpoint.
+// Refused while providers exist or a proxy is actively serving the endpoint.
+func (c *Combined) DeleteSettings(ctx context.Context) error {
+	return anDelete(ctx, c, "/api/agent-network/settings")
+}
+
 // ListConsumption returns the account's consumption rows (possibly empty).
 func (c *Combined) ListConsumption(ctx context.Context) ([]api.AgentNetworkConsumption, error) {
 	return anRequest[[]api.AgentNetworkConsumption](ctx, c, http.MethodGet, "/api/agent-network/consumption", nil)

e2e/harness/client.go

@@ -32,12 +32,36 @@ type Client struct {
 	container testcontainers.Container
 }
 
+// clientOptions is what the ClientOption values assemble.
+type clientOptions struct {
+	name string
+}
+
+// ClientOption adjusts how StartClient runs the agent.
+type ClientOption func(*clientOptions)
+
+// WithClientName names the agent, which sets both its network alias and its
+// container hostname. The hostname matters beyond addressing: the agent reports
+// it to management at registration, so it is the name the peer appears under in
+// the API.
+//
+// Required to run more than one agent against the same server — the default name
+// is shared, and two containers cannot hold the same alias on one network.
+func WithClientName(name string) ClientOption {
+	return func(o *clientOptions) { o.name = name }
+}
+
 // StartClient builds the client image and runs it on the combined server's
 // network, joining via the given setup key. The image entrypoint brings the
 // daemon up automatically; callers wait for connectivity with WaitConnected /
 // WaitProxyPeer.
-func StartClient(ctx context.Context, c *Combined, setupKey string) (*Client, error) {
-	root, err := repoRoot()
+func StartClient(ctx context.Context, c *Combined, setupKey string, opts ...ClientOption) (*Client, error) {
+	o := clientOptions{name: clientAlias}
+	for _, opt := range opts {
+		opt(&o)
+	}
+
+	root, err := repoRoot(ctx)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
@@ -47,9 +71,13 @@ func StartClient(ctx context.Context, c *Combined, setupKey string) (*Client, er
 	}
 
 	req := testcontainers.ContainerRequest{
-		Image:          clientImage,
+		Image: clientImage,
+		// The agent reports the container's hostname to management, so this is
+		// the name the peer is addressable by in the API as well as on the
+		// network. The entrypoint takes no hostname flag of its own.
+		Hostname:       o.name,
 		Networks:       []string{c.network.Name},
-		NetworkAliases: map[string][]string{c.network.Name: {clientAlias}},
+		NetworkAliases: map[string][]string{c.network.Name: {o.name}},
 		Env: map[string]string{
 			"NB_MANAGEMENT_URL": combinedExposedURL,
 			"NB_SETUP_KEY":      setupKey,

e2e/harness/combined.go

@@ -61,11 +61,68 @@ type Combined struct {
 	workDir string
 }
 
+// combinedOptions is what the CombinedOption values assemble.
+type combinedOptions struct {
+	geolocation bool
+	env         map[string]string
+}
+
+// CombinedOption adjusts how StartCombined boots the server. The defaults suit a
+// suite that only drives the API; the options exist for the ones that need more
+// of the product than that.
+type CombinedOption func(*combinedOptions)
+
+// WithGeolocation leaves the GeoLite database download enabled. It is off by
+// default because the download adds startup latency that most suites get nothing
+// for. A suite asserting on location-based posture checks needs it: management
+// evaluates those rules against the database, and without it the rule fails
+// instead of passing without having been checked.
+func WithGeolocation() CombinedOption {
+	return func(o *combinedOptions) { o.geolocation = true }
+}
+
+// WithServerEnv adds environment variables to the combined container, overriding
+// the defaults on a key collision. For settings this harness does not model
+// directly, so a suite needing one does not have to fork the harness to get it.
+func WithServerEnv(env map[string]string) CombinedOption {
+	return func(o *combinedOptions) {
+		if o.env == nil {
+			o.env = map[string]string{}
+		}
+		for k, v := range env {
+			o.env[k] = v
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// combinedEnv is the combined container's environment: setup-PAT enabled so the
+// caller can mint an admin token through /api/setup, geolocation off unless the
+// suite asked for it, and whatever the suite added on top.
+func combinedEnv(o combinedOptions) map[string]string {
+	env := map[string]string{
+		"NB_SETUP_PAT_ENABLED": "true",
+	}
+	if !o.geolocation {
+		// Skip the GeoLite DB download — it blocks startup and agent-network
+		// ingest doesn't use geolocation.
+		env["NB_DISABLE_GEOLOCATION"] = "true"
+	}
+	for k, v := range o.env {
+		env[k] = v
+	}
+	return env
+}
+
 // StartCombined builds the combined server from its multistage Dockerfile and
 // boots it with setup-PAT enabled on a fresh shared network, returning once the
 // API is serving. The caller still owns minting the admin PAT via Bootstrap.
-func StartCombined(ctx context.Context) (*Combined, error) {
-	root, err := repoRoot()
+func StartCombined(ctx context.Context, opts ...CombinedOption) (*Combined, error) {
+	var o combinedOptions
+	for _, opt := range opts {
+		opt(&o)
+	}
+
+	root, err := repoRoot(ctx)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
@@ -88,7 +145,7 @@ func StartCombined(ctx context.Context) (*Combined, error) {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("create work dir: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	cfg := fmt.Sprintf(combinedConfigYAML, combinedExposedURL, containerIssuer)
+	cfg := fmt.Sprintf(combinedConfigYAML, combinedExposedURL, !o.geolocation, containerIssuer)
 	if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(workDir, "config.yaml"), []byte(cfg), 0o644); err != nil { //nolint:gosec // non-secret config, bind-mounted and read by the container
 		_ = net.Remove(ctx)
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("write combined config: %w", err)
@@ -112,13 +169,8 @@ func StartCombined(ctx context.Context) (*Combined, error) {
 		ExposedPorts:   []string{combinedHTTPPort},
 		Networks:       []string{net.Name},
 		NetworkAliases: map[string][]string{net.Name: {combinedAlias}},
-		Env: map[string]string{
-			"NB_SETUP_PAT_ENABLED": "true",
-			// Skip the GeoLite DB download — it blocks startup and agent-network
-			// ingest doesn't use geolocation.
-			"NB_DISABLE_GEOLOCATION": "true",
-		},
-		Cmd: []string{"--config", "/nb/config.yaml"},
+		Env:            combinedEnv(o),
+		Cmd:            []string{"--config", "/nb/config.yaml"},
 		HostConfigModifier: func(hc *container.HostConfig) {
 			hc.Binds = append(hc.Binds, workDir+":/nb")
 		},

e2e/harness/config.go

@@ -15,6 +15,11 @@ package harness
 // server is required to load it — a broken path or malformed file fails startup
 // rather than silently falling back to the compiled-in rates, and TestMain then
 // fails with the container logs.
+//
+// disableGeoliteUpdate is a parameter rather than a fixed true because a suite
+// that exercises geolocation needs the database: management can only evaluate a
+// location rule with GeoLite loaded, and a rule it cannot evaluate fails rather
+// than passing vacuously. See WithGeolocation.
 const combinedConfigYAML = `server:
   listenAddress: ":8080"
   exposedAddress: "%s"
@@ -25,7 +30,7 @@ const combinedConfigYAML = `server:
   authSecret: "e2e-relay-secret"
   dataDir: "/nb/data"
   disableAnonymousMetrics: true
-  disableGeoliteUpdate: true
+  disableGeoliteUpdate: %t
   auth:
     issuer: "%s"
   store:

e2e/harness/options_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+//go:build e2e
+
+package harness
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"os/exec"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+// The options exist so a suite can ask for a deployment this harness would not
+// otherwise give it. What they configure is a container environment and a config
+// file, both assembled before anything is started, so they are checkable without
+// Docker — which is the point: a wiring mistake here would otherwise only show up
+// as a puzzling failure minutes into a container run.
+
+func TestCombinedEnvGeolocation(t *testing.T) {
+	var off combinedOptions
+	assert.Equal(t, "true", combinedEnv(off)["NB_DISABLE_GEOLOCATION"],
+		"geolocation should be off by default")
+
+	var on combinedOptions
+	WithGeolocation()(&on)
+	assert.NotContains(t, combinedEnv(on), "NB_DISABLE_GEOLOCATION",
+		"WithGeolocation must leave NB_DISABLE_GEOLOCATION unset, so the server downloads the database")
+	assert.Equal(t, "true", combinedEnv(on)["NB_SETUP_PAT_ENABLED"],
+		"the setup PAT must stay enabled whatever else is configured; Bootstrap depends on it")
+}
+
+// The config file carries the same decision as the environment variable, and the
+// server needs both to agree: disableGeoliteUpdate suppresses the download even
+// when geolocation itself is enabled.
+func TestCombinedConfigGeolocation(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name string
+		opts []CombinedOption
+		want string
+	}{
+		{name: "default", want: "disableGeoliteUpdate: true"},
+		{name: "with geolocation", opts: []CombinedOption{WithGeolocation()}, want: "disableGeoliteUpdate: false"},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			var o combinedOptions
+			for _, opt := range tc.opts {
+				opt(&o)
+			}
+			cfg := fmt.Sprintf(combinedConfigYAML, combinedExposedURL, !o.geolocation, containerIssuer)
+			assert.Contains(t, cfg, tc.want, "geolocation not rendered as expected")
+			// The issuer is the last verb; a mis-ordered argument list would put
+			// the boolean here instead and the server would fail to start.
+			assert.Contains(t, cfg, `issuer: "`+containerIssuer+`"`, "issuer not rendered")
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestWithServerEnvOverrides(t *testing.T) {
+	var o combinedOptions
+	WithServerEnv(map[string]string{"NB_LOG_LEVEL": "debug"})(&o)
+	WithServerEnv(map[string]string{"NB_SETUP_PAT_ENABLED": "false"})(&o)
+
+	env := combinedEnv(o)
+	assert.Equal(t, "debug", env["NB_LOG_LEVEL"], "added variable missing")
+	assert.Equal(t, "false", env["NB_SETUP_PAT_ENABLED"], "a suite must be able to override a default")
+}
+
+// Two agents on one network cannot share an alias, so the name has to reach both
+// the alias and the hostname. The hostname is the one management records, so it is
+// also what the peer is addressable by through the API.
+func TestWithClientName(t *testing.T) {
+	o := clientOptions{name: clientAlias}
+	require.Equal(t, "client", o.name, "unexpected default client name")
+
+	WithClientName("peer2")(&o)
+	assert.Equal(t, "peer2", o.name, "WithClientName did not take")
+}
+
+// repoRoot has to recognise this module rather than merely finding a go.mod, or a
+// suite in another module gets its own root and a build context without the
+// component Dockerfiles in it.
+func TestIsModule(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+
+	other := filepath.Join(dir, "go.mod")
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(other, []byte("module example.com/other\n\ngo 1.25\n"), 0o600))
+	assert.False(t, isModule(other, modulePath), "another module's go.mod must not be taken for this repo")
+
+	ours := filepath.Join(dir, "ours.mod")
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(ours, []byte("// a comment\n\nmodule "+modulePath+"\n\ngo 1.25\n"), 0o600))
+	assert.True(t, isModule(ours, modulePath), "this repo's go.mod was not recognised")
+
+	assert.False(t, isModule(filepath.Join(dir, "absent.mod"), modulePath),
+		"a missing go.mod must not report a match")
+}
+
+// Running from inside the repo, repoRoot finds it by walking up — the module
+// lookup is only the fallback, and this asserts the walk still wins so an in-repo
+// run never depends on the module cache.
+func TestRepoRootFindsThisRepo(t *testing.T) {
+	root, err := repoRoot(context.Background())
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.True(t, isModule(filepath.Join(root, "go.mod"), modulePath),
+		"repoRoot returned %s, which is not this module", root)
+
+	for _, f := range []string{combinedDockerfile, clientDockerfile} {
+		_, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(root, f))
+		assert.NoError(t, err, "%s is not present under the reported root %s", f, root)
+	}
+}
+
+// A caller that vendors its dependencies puts the go command in automatic vendor
+// mode, where `go list -m -f {{.Dir}}` succeeds and reports an EMPTY directory:
+// vendor/ holds packages, not module source. Without -mod=readonly the lookup
+// would come back empty and the harness would report a missing module for a
+// dependency that is present.
+func TestModuleDirResolvesUnderVendorMode(t *testing.T) {
+	if _, err := exec.LookPath("go"); err != nil {
+		t.Skip("no go tool on PATH")
+	}
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	base := t.TempDir()
+	dep := filepath.Join(base, "dep")
+	main := filepath.Join(base, "main")
+	require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(dep, 0o750))
+	require.NoError(t, os.MkdirAll(main, 0o750))
+
+	// A local replacement rather than a real dependency, so this needs no network.
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dep, "go.mod"),
+		[]byte("module example.com/dep\n\ngo 1.25\n"), 0o600))
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dep, "dep.go"),
+		[]byte("package dep\n"), 0o600))
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(main, "go.mod"),
+		[]byte("module example.com/main\n\ngo 1.25\n\nrequire example.com/dep v0.0.0\n\nreplace example.com/dep v0.0.0 => ../dep\n"), 0o600))
+	require.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(main, "main.go"),
+		[]byte("package main\n\nimport _ \"example.com/dep\"\n\nfunc main() {}\n"), 0o600))
+
+	t.Chdir(main)
+	vendor := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "go", "mod", "vendor")
+	out, err := vendor.CombinedOutput()
+	require.NoError(t, err, "go mod vendor: %s", out)
+
+	dir, err := moduleDir(ctx, "example.com/dep")
+	require.NoError(t, err, "the module must still resolve with a vendor directory present")
+	assert.Equal(t, dep, dir, "resolved the wrong directory")
+}
+
+// A cancelled context has to stop the lookup rather than leaving the caller
+// waiting on a subprocess it has already given up on.
+func TestModuleDirHonoursContext(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+	cancel()
+
+	_, err := moduleDir(ctx, modulePath)
+	assert.ErrorIs(t, err, context.Canceled, "a cancelled context must stop the lookup")
+}

e2e/harness/paths.go

@@ -3,27 +3,82 @@
 package harness
 
 import (
+	"context"
 	"fmt"
 	"os"
+	"os/exec"
 	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
 )
 
-// repoRoot walks up from the working directory to the module root (the
-// directory holding go.mod), so the Docker build context is correct no matter
-// which package the test runs from.
-func repoRoot() (string, error) {
+// modulePath is this module, used both to recognise the repo when walking up
+// from the working directory and to locate it when the suite lives elsewhere.
+const modulePath = "github.com/netbirdio/netbird"
+
+// repoRoot returns the directory the component Dockerfiles are built from.
+//
+// Walking up from the working directory finds it for any test inside this repo,
+// no matter which package it runs from. A suite in another module gets a
+// different answer that way — its own module root, where combined/Dockerfile
+// does not exist — so the ancestor has to be this module and not merely some
+// module. When it is not, the build context is the extracted module directory of
+// whichever version that suite depends on, which is the right one: the server it
+// tests against is then built from the same revision as the client library it
+// was compiled with.
+func repoRoot(ctx context.Context) (string, error) {
 	dir, err := os.Getwd()
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", err
 	}
 	for {
-		if _, statErr := os.Stat(filepath.Join(dir, "go.mod")); statErr == nil {
+		if isModule(filepath.Join(dir, "go.mod"), modulePath) {
 			return dir, nil
 		}
 		parent := filepath.Dir(dir)
 		if parent == dir {
-			return "", fmt.Errorf("go.mod not found above %s", dir)
+			break
 		}
 		dir = parent
 	}
+	return moduleDir(ctx, modulePath)
+}
+
+// isModule reports whether the go.mod at path declares the given module.
+func isModule(path, want string) bool {
+	b, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	for _, line := range strings.Split(string(b), "\n") {
+		if rest, ok := strings.CutPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(line), "module "); ok {
+			return strings.TrimSpace(rest) == want
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// moduleDir asks the go tool where a module's source is, which for a dependent
+// module is its extracted copy in the module cache. The cache is read-only, and
+// a Docker build context is only ever read.
+//
+// -mod=readonly is required rather than cosmetic. A caller that vendors its
+// dependencies puts the go command in automatic vendor mode, where this lookup
+// succeeds with an EMPTY directory — vendor/ holds packages, not module source,
+// so there is nothing to report. Asking in readonly mode resolves against the
+// module graph instead, which answers for both a cached module and a local
+// replacement, and neither writes to go.mod.
+func moduleDir(ctx context.Context, module string) (string, error) {
+	cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "go", "list", "-mod=readonly", "-m", "-f", "{{.Dir}}", module)
+	out, err := cmd.Output()
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("locate %s: %w", module, err)
+	}
+	dir := strings.TrimSpace(string(out))
+	if dir == "" {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("locate %s: the go tool reported no directory; run `go mod download %s`", module, module)
+	}
+	if _, err := os.Stat(dir); err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("locate %s: %w", module, err)
+	}
+	return dir, nil
 }

e2e/harness/proxy.go

@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ type Proxy struct {
 // or override any NB_PROXY_* var (e.g. NB_PROXY_TUNNEL_CACHE_TTL for tests that
 // need a short authorization-cache window).
 func StartProxy(ctx context.Context, c *Combined, proxyToken string, envOverrides ...map[string]string) (*Proxy, error) {
-	root, err := repoRoot()
+	root, err := repoRoot(ctx)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}

go.mod

@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ require (
 	github.com/pires/go-proxyproto v0.11.0
 	github.com/pkg/sftp v1.13.9
 	github.com/prometheus/client_golang v1.23.2
-	github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.55.0
+	github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.59.1
 	github.com/redis/go-redis/v9 v9.7.3
 	github.com/rs/xid v1.3.0
 	github.com/shirou/gopsutil/v4 v4.25.8
@@ -239,7 +239,6 @@ require (
 	github.com/jackc/pgservicefile v0.0.0-20221227161230-091c0ba34f0a // indirect
 	github.com/jackc/puddle/v2 v2.2.1 // indirect
 	github.com/jackpal/go-nat-pmp v1.0.2 // indirect
-	github.com/jchv/go-winloader v0.0.0-20250406163304-c1995be93bd1 // indirect
 	github.com/jinzhu/inflection v1.0.0 // indirect
 	github.com/jinzhu/now v1.1.5 // indirect
 	github.com/jmespath/go-jmespath v0.4.0 // indirect
@@ -340,4 +339,4 @@ replace github.com/dexidp/dex/api/v2 => github.com/netbirdio/dex/api/v2 v2.0.0-2
 
 replace github.com/mailru/easyjson => github.com/netbirdio/easyjson v0.9.0
 
-replace github.com/wailsapp/wails/v3 => github.com/netbirdio/wails/v3 v3.0.0-beta.3.0.20260807055527-fc03f984d701
+replace github.com/wailsapp/wails/v3 => github.com/netbirdio/wails/v3 v3.0.0-beta.3.0.20260810103952-24e716aea4db

go.sum

@@ -349,8 +349,6 @@ github.com/jackc/puddle/v2 v2.2.1 h1:RhxXJtFG022u4ibrCSMSiu5aOq1i77R3OHKNJj77OAk
 github.com/jackc/puddle/v2 v2.2.1/go.mod h1:vriiEXHvEE654aYKXXjOvZM39qJ0q+azkZFrfEOc3H4=
 github.com/jackpal/go-nat-pmp v1.0.2 h1:KzKSgb7qkJvOUTqYl9/Hg/me3pWgBmERKrTGD7BdWus=
 github.com/jackpal/go-nat-pmp v1.0.2/go.mod h1:QPH045xvCAeXUZOxsnwmrtiCoxIr9eob+4orBN1SBKc=
-github.com/jchv/go-winloader v0.0.0-20250406163304-c1995be93bd1 h1:njuLRcjAuMKr7kI3D85AXWkw6/+v9PwtV6M6o11sWHQ=
-github.com/jchv/go-winloader v0.0.0-20250406163304-c1995be93bd1/go.mod h1:alcuEEnZsY1WQsagKhZDsoPCRoOijYqhZvPwLG0kzVs=
 github.com/jcmturner/aescts/v2 v2.0.0 h1:9YKLH6ey7H4eDBXW8khjYslgyqG2xZikXP0EQFKrle8=
 github.com/jcmturner/aescts/v2 v2.0.0/go.mod h1:AiaICIRyfYg35RUkr8yESTqvSy7csK90qZ5xfvvsoNs=
 github.com/jcmturner/dnsutils/v2 v2.0.0 h1:lltnkeZGL0wILNvrNiVCR6Ro5PGU/SeBvVO/8c/iPbo=
@@ -490,8 +488,8 @@ github.com/netbirdio/service v0.0.0-20240911161631-f62744f42502 h1:3tHlFmhTdX9ax
 github.com/netbirdio/service v0.0.0-20240911161631-f62744f42502/go.mod h1:CIMRFEJVL+0DS1a3Nx06NaMn4Dz63Ng6O7dl0qH0zVM=
 github.com/netbirdio/signal-dispatcher/dispatcher v0.0.0-20250805121659-6b4ac470ca45 h1:ujgviVYmx243Ksy7NdSwrdGPSRNE3pb8kEDSpH0QuAQ=
 github.com/netbirdio/signal-dispatcher/dispatcher v0.0.0-20250805121659-6b4ac470ca45/go.mod h1:5/sjFmLb8O96B5737VCqhHyGRzNFIaN/Bu7ZodXc3qQ=
-github.com/netbirdio/wails/v3 v3.0.0-beta.3.0.20260807055527-fc03f984d701 h1:QL9nupfRom0L9jcY7N9l/Bc6QK2PtC6pHzC+ftpTqpw=
-github.com/netbirdio/wails/v3 v3.0.0-beta.3.0.20260807055527-fc03f984d701/go.mod h1:BzATbK71VFikMMMCo434wAi0QcaI03P+xeaWgDvQvjw=
+github.com/netbirdio/wails/v3 v3.0.0-beta.3.0.20260810103952-24e716aea4db h1:gBOE2r4AW1soSmpYJC5/n9/1L8UQ8+HLjed8CY/TzZY=
+github.com/netbirdio/wails/v3 v3.0.0-beta.3.0.20260810103952-24e716aea4db/go.mod h1:bsdahLwBQxXjlmdPPeQyrTcDJfcqAr/ymFj0RXhwtWI=
 github.com/netbirdio/wireguard-go v0.0.0-20260628102922-2834bebf6c1a h1:3CWK+yTvRKOcC0Q8VCTGy4l60TEb27CQVS7LkMxwjmw=
 github.com/netbirdio/wireguard-go v0.0.0-20260628102922-2834bebf6c1a/go.mod h1:rpwXGsirqLqN2L0JDJQlwOboGHmptD5ZD6T2VmcqhTw=
 github.com/nxadm/tail v1.4.4/go.mod h1:kenIhsEOeOJmVchQTgglprH7qJGnHDVpk1VPCcaMI8A=
@@ -582,8 +580,8 @@ github.com/prometheus/otlptranslator v1.0.0 h1:s0LJW/iN9dkIH+EnhiD3BlkkP5QVIUVEo
 github.com/prometheus/otlptranslator v1.0.0/go.mod h1:vRYWnXvI6aWGpsdY/mOT/cbeVRBlPWtBNDb7kGR3uKM=
 github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.19.2 h1:zUMhqEW66Ex7OXIiDkll3tl9a1ZdilUOd/F6ZXw4Vws=
 github.com/prometheus/procfs v0.19.2/go.mod h1:M0aotyiemPhBCM0z5w87kL22CxfcH05ZpYlu+b4J7mw=
-github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.55.0 h1:zccPQIqYCXDt5NmcEabyYvOnomjs8Tlwl7tISjJh9Mk=
-github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.55.0/go.mod h1:DR51ilwU1uE164KuWXhinFcKWGlEjzys2l8zUl5Ss1U=
+github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.59.1 h1:0Gmua0HW1Tv7ANR7hUYwRyD0MG5OJfgvYSZasGZzBic=
+github.com/quic-go/quic-go v0.59.1/go.mod h1:upnsH4Ju1YkqpLXC305eW3yDZ4NfnNbmQRCMWS58IKU=
 github.com/redis/go-redis/v9 v9.7.3 h1:YpPyAayJV+XErNsatSElgRZZVCwXX9QzkKYNvO7x0wM=
 github.com/redis/go-redis/v9 v9.7.3/go.mod h1:bGUrSggJ9X9GUmZpZNEOQKaANxSGgOEBRltRTZHSvrA=
 github.com/rogpeppe/go-internal v1.14.1 h1:UQB4HGPB6osV0SQTLymcB4TgvyWu6ZyliaW0tI/otEQ=
@@ -793,7 +791,6 @@ golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20190916202348-b4ddaad3f8a3/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7w
 golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20191005200804-aed5e4c7ecf9/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7wpKNCjG9DtNlClVuFLEZdDNbEs=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20191120155948-bd437916bb0e/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7wpKNCjG9DtNlClVuFLEZdDNbEs=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20200323222414-85ca7c5b95cd/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7wpKNCjG9DtNlClVuFLEZdDNbEs=
-golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20200810151505-1b9f1253b3ed/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7wpKNCjG9DtNlClVuFLEZdDNbEs=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20200930185726-fdedc70b468f/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7wpKNCjG9DtNlClVuFLEZdDNbEs=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20201015000850-e3ed0017c211/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7wpKNCjG9DtNlClVuFLEZdDNbEs=
 golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20201119102817-f84b799fce68/go.mod h1:h1NjWce9XRLGQEsW7wpKNCjG9DtNlClVuFLEZdDNbEs=

management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/handlers/budget_handler_test.go

@@ -102,8 +102,8 @@ func TestSettingsHandler_GetExposesCollectionToggles(t *testing.T) {
 
 	require.NoError(t, f.store.SaveAgentNetworkSettings(context.Background(), &agentNetworkTypes.Settings{
 		AccountID:              testAccountID,
-		Cluster:                "eu.proxy.netbird.io",
-		Subdomain:              "violet",
+		Domain:                 "violet.eu.proxy.netbird.io",
+		ProxyAddress:           "eu.proxy.netbird.io",
 		EnableLogCollection:    true,
 		EnablePromptCollection: true,
 		RedactPii:              false,

management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/handlers/providers_handler.go

@@ -155,12 +155,7 @@ func (h *handler) createProvider(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	provider := types.NewProvider(userAuth.AccountId)
 	provider.FromAPIRequest(&req)
 
-	bootstrapCluster := ""
-	if req.BootstrapCluster != nil {
-		bootstrapCluster = *req.BootstrapCluster
-	}
-
-	created, err := h.manager.CreateProvider(r.Context(), userAuth.UserId, provider, bootstrapCluster)
+	created, err := h.manager.CreateProvider(r.Context(), userAuth.UserId, provider)
 	if err != nil {
 		util.WriteError(r.Context(), err, w)
 		return

management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/handlers/settings_handler.go

@@ -12,13 +12,55 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/util"
 )
 
-// addSettingsEndpoints registers the Agent Network settings routes. The
-// settings row is bootstrapped server-side on first provider create or on the
-// first PUT carrying a cluster; GET reads it and PUT applies a partial update
-// of the mutable collection toggles (cluster/subdomain stay immutable).
+// addSettingsEndpoints registers the Agent Network settings routes. POST
+// bootstraps the settings row, assigning the account's immutable endpoint;
+// GET reads it (defaults with an empty endpoint before bootstrap); PUT
+// carries every field, replacing the mutable collection toggles and rejecting
+// any change to the identity fields; DELETE removes the row — guarded so it
+// stays a bootstrap-repair operation — releasing the endpoint for a fresh
+// bootstrap.
 func (h *handler) addSettingsEndpoints(router *mux.Router) {
 	router.HandleFunc("/agent-network/settings", h.getSettings).Methods("GET", "OPTIONS")
+	router.HandleFunc("/agent-network/settings", h.createSettings).Methods("POST", "OPTIONS")
 	router.HandleFunc("/agent-network/settings", h.updateSettings).Methods("PUT", "OPTIONS")
+	router.HandleFunc("/agent-network/settings", h.deleteSettings).Methods("DELETE", "OPTIONS")
+}
+
+// createSettings bootstraps the account's settings row. Exactly one of
+// proxy_address (labeled endpoint; the server allocates the label) and
+// endpoint (self-addressed, claimed verbatim) must be provided; optional
+// collection toggles ride along with defaults for omitted fields.
+func (h *handler) createSettings(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	userAuth, err := nbcontext.GetUserAuthFromContext(r.Context())
+	if err != nil {
+		util.WriteError(r.Context(), err, w)
+		return
+	}
+
+	var req api.AgentNetworkSettingsCreateRequest
+	if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
+		util.WriteErrorResponse("couldn't parse JSON request", http.StatusBadRequest, w)
+		return
+	}
+
+	settings := types.DefaultSettings(userAuth.AccountId)
+	settings.FromAPICreateRequest(&req)
+
+	proxyAddress := ""
+	if req.ProxyAddress != nil {
+		proxyAddress = *req.ProxyAddress
+	}
+	endpoint := ""
+	if req.Endpoint != nil {
+		endpoint = *req.Endpoint
+	}
+
+	created, err := h.manager.CreateSettings(r.Context(), userAuth.UserId, settings, proxyAddress, endpoint)
+	if err != nil {
+		util.WriteError(r.Context(), err, w)
+		return
+	}
+	util.WriteJSONObject(r.Context(), w, created.ToAPIResponse())
 }
 
 // updateSettings replaces the mutable settings fields on the account's row.
@@ -48,6 +90,24 @@ func (h *handler) updateSettings(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	util.WriteJSONObject(r.Context(), w, updated.ToAPIResponse())
 }
 
+// deleteSettings removes the account's settings row, releasing the endpoint.
+// The manager refuses (412) while providers exist or a proxy is actively
+// serving the endpoint; a later POST bootstraps fresh, allocating a new
+// endpoint.
+func (h *handler) deleteSettings(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	userAuth, err := nbcontext.GetUserAuthFromContext(r.Context())
+	if err != nil {
+		util.WriteError(r.Context(), err, w)
+		return
+	}
+
+	if err := h.manager.DeleteSettings(r.Context(), userAuth.AccountId, userAuth.UserId); err != nil {
+		util.WriteError(r.Context(), err, w)
+		return
+	}
+	util.WriteJSONObject(r.Context(), w, util.EmptyObject{})
+}
+
 // getSettings returns the account's agent-network settings. Accounts that
 // haven't been bootstrapped yet read as the defaults with an empty cluster,
 // subdomain and endpoint; the manager synthesises that view.

management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/handlers/settings_handler_test.go

@@ -1,20 +1,25 @@
 package handlers
 
 import (
+	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
 	"net/http"
+	"strings"
 	"testing"
+	"time"
 
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 
+	rpproxy "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/proxy"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/api"
 )
 
 // TestSettingsHandler_GetUnbootstrappedReturnsDefaults pins the settings-read
 // convention shared with the account and DNS settings endpoints: settings
 // always read as a JSON object. Before bootstrap that object carries the
-// defaults with an empty cluster/subdomain/endpoint (the "not bootstrapped"
+// defaults with an empty endpoint/proxy_address (the "not bootstrapped"
 // signal) and no timestamps — never a 404 and never the legacy null body.
 func TestSettingsHandler_GetUnbootstrappedReturnsDefaults(t *testing.T) {
 	f := newAgentNetworkHandlerFixture(t)
@@ -27,9 +32,9 @@ func TestSettingsHandler_GetUnbootstrappedReturnsDefaults(t *testing.T) {
 
 	var got api.AgentNetworkSettings
 	require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &got))
-	assert.Empty(t, got.Cluster, "cluster must be empty until bootstrapped")
-	assert.Empty(t, got.Subdomain, "subdomain must be empty until bootstrapped")
-	assert.Empty(t, got.Endpoint, "endpoint must be empty until bootstrapped, not a bare dot")
+	assert.Empty(t, got.Endpoint, "endpoint must be empty until bootstrapped")
+	assert.Empty(t, got.ProxyAddress, "proxy address must be empty until bootstrapped")
+	assert.False(t, got.Dedicated, "an unbootstrapped account has no serving shape")
 	assert.True(t, got.EnableLogCollection, "defaults must show log collection on, matching bootstrap")
 	assert.False(t, got.EnablePromptCollection, "defaults must show prompt collection off")
 	assert.False(t, got.RedactPii, "defaults must show redaction off")
@@ -39,62 +44,149 @@ func TestSettingsHandler_GetUnbootstrappedReturnsDefaults(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Nil(t, got.UpdatedAt, "no timestamps before a row exists")
 }
 
-// TestSettingsHandler_PutBootstrapsWithCluster covers the settings-first
-// bootstrap path: a PUT carrying a cluster on an unbootstrapped account
-// creates the row (cluster pinned, subdomain assigned) and applies the
-// mutable fields from the same request.
-func TestSettingsHandler_PutBootstrapsWithCluster(t *testing.T) {
+// TestSettingsHandler_PostBootstrapsLabeled covers the labeled bootstrap
+// shape: a POST carrying a proxy_address allocates a label beneath it, so the
+// endpoint hangs one label under the shared cluster's address and the pin is
+// not dedicated. Toggles riding along apply; omitted ones keep defaults.
+func TestSettingsHandler_PostBootstrapsLabeled(t *testing.T) {
 	f := newAgentNetworkHandlerFixture(t)
 
-	rec := f.do(t, http.MethodPut, "/agent-network/settings",
-		`{"cluster": "eu.proxy.netbird.io", "enable_log_collection": true, "enable_prompt_collection": true, "redact_pii": false, "access_log_retention_days": 30}`)
-	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code, "bootstrap PUT must succeed: %s", rec.Body.String())
+	rec := f.do(t, http.MethodPost, "/agent-network/settings",
+		`{"proxy_address": "eu.proxy.netbird.io", "enable_prompt_collection": true, "access_log_retention_days": 14}`)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code, "bootstrap POST must succeed: %s", rec.Body.String())
 
 	var got api.AgentNetworkSettings
 	require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &got))
-	assert.Equal(t, "eu.proxy.netbird.io", got.Cluster, "cluster must be pinned from the request")
-	assert.NotEmpty(t, got.Subdomain, "subdomain must be assigned at bootstrap")
-	assert.Equal(t, got.Subdomain+".eu.proxy.netbird.io", got.Endpoint, "endpoint must combine subdomain and cluster")
-	assert.True(t, got.EnableLogCollection, "toggle from the bootstrap request must apply")
+	assert.Equal(t, "eu.proxy.netbird.io", got.ProxyAddress, "proxy address must be pinned from the request")
+	require.NotEmpty(t, got.Endpoint, "endpoint must be allocated at bootstrap")
+	assert.True(t, strings.HasSuffix(got.Endpoint, ".eu.proxy.netbird.io"),
+		"labeled endpoint must hang off the proxy address: %s", got.Endpoint)
+	label := strings.TrimSuffix(got.Endpoint, ".eu.proxy.netbird.io")
+	assert.NotContains(t, label, ".", "the allocated label must be a single DNS label: %s", label)
+	assert.False(t, got.Dedicated, "a labeled pin is not dedicated")
+	assert.True(t, got.EnableLogCollection, "omitted toggle must keep its default")
 	assert.True(t, got.EnablePromptCollection, "toggle from the bootstrap request must apply")
 	require.NotNil(t, got.AccessLogRetentionDays)
-	assert.Equal(t, 30, *got.AccessLogRetentionDays, "retention from the bootstrap request must apply")
+	assert.Equal(t, 14, *got.AccessLogRetentionDays, "retention from the bootstrap request must apply")
+	assert.NotNil(t, got.CreatedAt, "a persisted row carries timestamps")
 
 	// The row is now readable via GET.
 	rec = f.do(t, http.MethodGet, "/agent-network/settings", "")
 	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code, "GET after bootstrap must succeed")
+	var read api.AgentNetworkSettings
+	require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &read))
+	assert.Equal(t, got.Endpoint, read.Endpoint, "GET must return the bootstrapped endpoint")
 }
 
-// TestSettingsHandler_PutWithoutClusterOnUnbootstrapped pins that a PUT
-// without a cluster cannot conjure a settings row out of nothing — there is
-// no cluster to pin — and surfaces as 404 like the GET.
-func TestSettingsHandler_PutWithoutClusterOnUnbootstrapped(t *testing.T) {
+// TestSettingsHandler_PostBootstrapsSelfAddressed covers the dedicated shape:
+// a POST carrying an endpoint claims the hostname verbatim, the proxy address
+// equals it, and the pin reads as dedicated. The claim is legitimate before
+// any proxy declares the address (address-first).
+func TestSettingsHandler_PostBootstrapsSelfAddressed(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newAgentNetworkHandlerFixture(t)
+
+	rec := f.do(t, http.MethodPost, "/agent-network/settings",
+		`{"endpoint": "Brave-Otter.Gateway.Example.com"}`)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code, "bootstrap POST must succeed: %s", rec.Body.String())
+
+	var got api.AgentNetworkSettings
+	require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &got))
+	assert.Equal(t, "brave-otter.gateway.example.com", got.Endpoint,
+		"endpoint must be claimed verbatim, lowercased")
+	assert.Equal(t, got.Endpoint, got.ProxyAddress, "self-addressed: the proxy address is the endpoint")
+	assert.True(t, got.Dedicated, "a self-addressed pin is dedicated")
+	assert.True(t, got.EnableLogCollection, "omitted toggles must keep their defaults")
+}
+
+// TestSettingsHandler_PostRequiresExactlyOneIdentityField pins the request
+// contract: proxy_address and endpoint are mutually exclusive and one is
+// required — both or neither is a validation error, not a guess.
+func TestSettingsHandler_PostRequiresExactlyOneIdentityField(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newAgentNetworkHandlerFixture(t)
+
+	rec := f.do(t, http.MethodPost, "/agent-network/settings", `{}`)
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnprocessableEntity, rec.Code,
+		"empty POST must be rejected: got %d body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+
+	rec = f.do(t, http.MethodPost, "/agent-network/settings",
+		`{"proxy_address": "eu.proxy.netbird.io", "endpoint": "brave-otter.gateway.example.com"}`)
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnprocessableEntity, rec.Code,
+		"POST with both identity fields must be rejected: got %d body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+}
+
+// TestSettingsHandler_PostRejectsMalformedHostnames pins per-write input
+// validation: shapes canonicalization cannot repair — trailing dots, embedded
+// whitespace, empty labels — are rejected with a validation error instead of
+// landing in an immutable column.
+func TestSettingsHandler_PostRejectsMalformedHostnames(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newAgentNetworkHandlerFixture(t)
+
+	for name, body := range map[string]string{
+		"trailing dot":     `{"endpoint": "gateway.example.com."}`,
+		"leading dot":      `{"endpoint": ".gateway.example.com"}`,
+		"inner whitespace": `{"endpoint": "gate way.example.com"}`,
+		"empty label":      `{"proxy_address": "eu..proxy.netbird.io"}`,
+	} {
+		rec := f.do(t, http.MethodPost, "/agent-network/settings", body)
+		assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnprocessableEntity, rec.Code,
+			"%s must be rejected: got %d body=%s", name, rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
+}
+
+// TestSettingsHandler_PostConflictsOnSecondBootstrap pins that bootstrap is a
+// one-time create: a second POST returns 409 and leaves the row untouched.
+func TestSettingsHandler_PostConflictsOnSecondBootstrap(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newAgentNetworkHandlerFixture(t)
+
+	rec := f.do(t, http.MethodPost, "/agent-network/settings", `{"proxy_address": "eu.proxy.netbird.io"}`)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code, "first bootstrap must succeed: %s", rec.Body.String())
+	var first api.AgentNetworkSettings
+	require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &first))
+
+	rec = f.do(t, http.MethodPost, "/agent-network/settings", `{"proxy_address": "us.proxy.netbird.io"}`)
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusConflict, rec.Code,
+		"second bootstrap must 409: got %d body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+
+	rec = f.do(t, http.MethodGet, "/agent-network/settings", "")
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code)
+	var got api.AgentNetworkSettings
+	require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &got))
+	assert.Equal(t, first.Endpoint, got.Endpoint, "the original endpoint must survive the rejected bootstrap")
+	assert.Equal(t, first.ProxyAddress, got.ProxyAddress, "the original proxy address must survive")
+}
+
+// TestSettingsHandler_PutBeforeBootstrapIs404 pins that a PUT cannot conjure a
+// settings row out of nothing — bootstrap is the explicit POST — and the
+// error points the caller there.
+func TestSettingsHandler_PutBeforeBootstrapIs404(t *testing.T) {
 	f := newAgentNetworkHandlerFixture(t)
 
 	rec := f.do(t, http.MethodPut, "/agent-network/settings",
 		`{"enable_log_collection": false, "enable_prompt_collection": false, "redact_pii": false}`)
 	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusNotFound, rec.Code,
-		"cluster-less PUT on an unbootstrapped account must 404: got %d body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
-	assert.Contains(t, rec.Body.String(), "cluster",
-		"the error must point the caller at the bootstrap paths: %s", rec.Body.String())
+		"PUT on an unbootstrapped account must 404: got %d body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	assert.Contains(t, rec.Body.String(), "/api/agent-network/settings",
+		"the error must point the caller at the bootstrap POST: %s", rec.Body.String())
 }
 
 // TestSettingsHandler_PutReplacesMutableFields pins the update contract shared
-// with the other PUT endpoints: the request replaces every mutable field, so a
-// toggle absent from the JSON lands as its zero value rather than being
-// preserved. Cluster and subdomain survive untouched.
+// with the other PUT endpoints: the request carries every field, replacing the
+// mutable ones. The identity fields ride along as a required echo of the
+// assigned values — compared, never written — so the endpoint and proxy
+// address survive every accepted update.
 func TestSettingsHandler_PutReplacesMutableFields(t *testing.T) {
 	f := newAgentNetworkHandlerFixture(t)
 
-	rec := f.do(t, http.MethodPut, "/agent-network/settings",
-		`{"cluster": "eu.proxy.netbird.io", "enable_log_collection": true, "enable_prompt_collection": true, "redact_pii": true, "access_log_retention_days": 14}`)
-	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code, "bootstrap PUT must succeed: %s", rec.Body.String())
+	rec := f.do(t, http.MethodPost, "/agent-network/settings",
+		`{"proxy_address": "eu.proxy.netbird.io", "enable_prompt_collection": true, "redact_pii": true, "access_log_retention_days": 14}`)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code, "bootstrap POST must succeed: %s", rec.Body.String())
 
 	var before api.AgentNetworkSettings
 	require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &before))
 
-	rec = f.do(t, http.MethodPut, "/agent-network/settings",
-		`{"enable_log_collection": true, "enable_prompt_collection": false, "redact_pii": false}`)
+	rec = f.do(t, http.MethodPut, "/agent-network/settings", fmt.Sprintf(
+		`{"endpoint": %q, "proxy_address": %q, "enable_log_collection": true, "enable_prompt_collection": false, "redact_pii": false, "access_log_retention_days": 7}`,
+		before.Endpoint, before.ProxyAddress))
 	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code, "update PUT must succeed: %s", rec.Body.String())
 
 	var got api.AgentNetworkSettings
@@ -103,35 +195,201 @@ func TestSettingsHandler_PutReplacesMutableFields(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.False(t, got.EnablePromptCollection, "sent toggle must apply")
 	assert.False(t, got.RedactPii, "sent toggle must apply")
 	require.NotNil(t, got.AccessLogRetentionDays)
-	assert.Equal(t, 0, *got.AccessLogRetentionDays,
-		"retention absent from the request must land as the zero value — PUT replaces all mutable fields")
-	assert.Equal(t, before.Cluster, got.Cluster, "cluster must survive updates untouched")
-	assert.Equal(t, before.Subdomain, got.Subdomain, "subdomain must survive updates untouched")
+	assert.Equal(t, 7, *got.AccessLogRetentionDays, "sent retention must apply")
+	assert.Equal(t, before.Endpoint, got.Endpoint, "endpoint must survive updates untouched")
+	assert.Equal(t, before.ProxyAddress, got.ProxyAddress, "proxy address must survive updates untouched")
 }
 
-// TestSettingsHandler_PutRejectsClusterChange pins cluster immutability: once
-// assigned, a differing cluster is rejected as a validation error instead of
-// being silently ignored, so callers never observe a value other than the one
-// they sent. Echoing the assigned cluster back stays valid, which lets
-// declarative clients send their full desired state idempotently.
-func TestSettingsHandler_PutRejectsClusterChange(t *testing.T) {
+// TestSettingsHandler_PutRejectsChangedIdentity pins the immutability contract:
+// the PUT carries the identity fields like every other field, but they are an
+// echo — a request carrying a different endpoint or proxy address is rejected
+// as a validation error and the row is left untouched. The comparison is
+// lenient about casing (the stored values are normalized lowercase), so a
+// client replaying a GET response with different casing is not rejected.
+func TestSettingsHandler_PutRejectsChangedIdentity(t *testing.T) {
 	f := newAgentNetworkHandlerFixture(t)
 
-	rec := f.do(t, http.MethodPut, "/agent-network/settings",
-		`{"cluster": "eu.proxy.netbird.io", "enable_log_collection": true, "enable_prompt_collection": false, "redact_pii": false}`)
-	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code, "bootstrap PUT must succeed: %s", rec.Body.String())
+	rec := f.do(t, http.MethodPost, "/agent-network/settings",
+		`{"proxy_address": "eu.proxy.netbird.io", "enable_prompt_collection": true}`)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code, "bootstrap POST must succeed: %s", rec.Body.String())
+	var before api.AgentNetworkSettings
+	require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &before))
 
-	rec = f.do(t, http.MethodPut, "/agent-network/settings",
-		`{"cluster": "us.proxy.netbird.io", "enable_log_collection": true, "enable_prompt_collection": false, "redact_pii": false}`)
-	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnprocessableEntity, rec.Code,
-		"cluster change must be rejected as a validation error: got %d body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	for name, body := range map[string]string{
+		"changed endpoint": fmt.Sprintf(
+			`{"endpoint": "other.gateway.example.com", "proxy_address": %q, "enable_log_collection": false, "enable_prompt_collection": false, "redact_pii": false, "access_log_retention_days": 30}`,
+			before.ProxyAddress),
+		"changed proxy_address": fmt.Sprintf(
+			`{"endpoint": %q, "proxy_address": "us.proxy.netbird.io", "enable_log_collection": false, "enable_prompt_collection": false, "redact_pii": false, "access_log_retention_days": 30}`,
+			before.Endpoint),
+		"omitted identity": `{"enable_log_collection": false, "enable_prompt_collection": false, "redact_pii": false, "access_log_retention_days": 30}`,
+	} {
+		rec = f.do(t, http.MethodPut, "/agent-network/settings", body)
+		assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnprocessableEntity, rec.Code,
+			"%s must be rejected: got %d body=%s", name, rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+	}
 
-	rec = f.do(t, http.MethodPut, "/agent-network/settings",
-		`{"cluster": "eu.proxy.netbird.io", "enable_log_collection": true, "enable_prompt_collection": false, "redact_pii": true}`)
-	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code, "echoing the assigned cluster must stay valid: %s", rec.Body.String())
+	// The rejected updates must not have applied anything — toggles included.
+	rec = f.do(t, http.MethodGet, "/agent-network/settings", "")
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code)
+	var got api.AgentNetworkSettings
+	require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &got))
+	assert.Equal(t, before.Endpoint, got.Endpoint, "rejected PUT must not change the endpoint")
+	assert.Equal(t, before.ProxyAddress, got.ProxyAddress, "rejected PUT must not change the proxy address")
+	assert.True(t, got.EnablePromptCollection, "rejected PUT must not apply its toggles")
+
+	// An uppercased echo of the assigned values still names the same host and
+	// must be accepted.
+	rec = f.do(t, http.MethodPut, "/agent-network/settings", fmt.Sprintf(
+		`{"endpoint": %q, "proxy_address": %q, "enable_log_collection": true, "enable_prompt_collection": true, "redact_pii": false, "access_log_retention_days": 30}`,
+		strings.ToUpper(before.Endpoint), strings.ToUpper(before.ProxyAddress)))
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code,
+		"an uppercased identity echo must be accepted: got %d body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+}
+
+// TestSettingsHandler_PutOmittedRetentionLandsAsZero documents a residual the
+// required-ness of access_log_retention_days does not remove. Marking the field
+// required changes the generated client type from *int to int, so a generated
+// client cannot omit it — but nothing validates OpenAPI required-ness at
+// runtime, so a hand-rolled body without the field still decodes as 0, which
+// the API documents as "keep indefinitely".
+//
+// That is the same latitude the three booleans already have, so it is left
+// consistent rather than special-cased. This test exists to make the gap
+// explicit: if request validation is ever added, this expectation is what
+// changes.
+func TestSettingsHandler_PutOmittedRetentionLandsAsZero(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newAgentNetworkHandlerFixture(t)
+
+	rec := f.do(t, http.MethodPost, "/agent-network/settings",
+		`{"proxy_address": "eu.proxy.netbird.io", "access_log_retention_days": 14}`)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code, "bootstrap POST must succeed: %s", rec.Body.String())
+	var before api.AgentNetworkSettings
+	require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &before))
+
+	rec = f.do(t, http.MethodPut, "/agent-network/settings", fmt.Sprintf(
+		`{"endpoint": %q, "proxy_address": %q, "enable_log_collection": true, "enable_prompt_collection": false, "redact_pii": false}`,
+		before.Endpoint, before.ProxyAddress))
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code, "update PUT must succeed: %s", rec.Body.String())
 
 	var got api.AgentNetworkSettings
 	require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &got))
-	assert.Equal(t, "eu.proxy.netbird.io", got.Cluster, "cluster must be unchanged")
-	assert.True(t, got.RedactPii, "toggle sent alongside the echoed cluster must apply")
+	require.NotNil(t, got.AccessLogRetentionDays)
+	assert.Equal(t, 0, *got.AccessLogRetentionDays,
+		"a non-conforming body that omits retention still replaces it with the zero value")
+}
+
+// TestSettingsHandler_DeleteBeforeBootstrapIs404 pins that DELETE on an
+// account with no settings row is a 404, mirroring the PUT.
+func TestSettingsHandler_DeleteBeforeBootstrapIs404(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newAgentNetworkHandlerFixture(t)
+
+	rec := f.do(t, http.MethodDelete, "/agent-network/settings", "")
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusNotFound, rec.Code,
+		"DELETE on an unbootstrapped account must 404: got %d body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+}
+
+// TestSettingsHandler_DeleteBlockedByProviders pins the first delete guard:
+// while any provider exists for the account, the delete is refused with 412
+// and the row survives. Providers route through the endpoint — the guard
+// keeps DELETE a bootstrap-repair operation rather than a way to abandon a
+// configured gateway.
+func TestSettingsHandler_DeleteBlockedByProviders(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newAgentNetworkHandlerFixture(t)
+
+	rec := f.do(t, http.MethodPost, "/agent-network/settings", `{"proxy_address": "eu.proxy.netbird.io"}`)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code, "bootstrap POST must succeed: %s", rec.Body.String())
+	var before api.AgentNetworkSettings
+	require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &before))
+
+	f.seedProvider(t, "prov-guard")
+
+	rec = f.do(t, http.MethodDelete, "/agent-network/settings", "")
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusPreconditionFailed, rec.Code,
+		"delete with a provider present must be refused: got %d body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+
+	rec = f.do(t, http.MethodGet, "/agent-network/settings", "")
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code)
+	var got api.AgentNetworkSettings
+	require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &got))
+	assert.Equal(t, before.Endpoint, got.Endpoint, "the refused delete must leave the row intact")
+}
+
+// TestSettingsHandler_DeleteBlockedByActiveProxy pins the second delete
+// guard: while a proxy is actively serving the endpoint — an active proxy
+// row declaring the endpoint hostname as its cluster address, the dedicated
+// shape — the delete is refused with 412. A proxy that has disconnected no
+// longer blocks: the guard is about a live serving path, not history.
+//
+// The proxy declares its address with mixed casing on purpose: Connect
+// stores the declared address verbatim while the settings row is normalized
+// lowercase, and hostnames are case-insensitive, so the guard must match
+// across the casing difference rather than be sidestepped by it.
+func TestSettingsHandler_DeleteBlockedByActiveProxy(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newAgentNetworkHandlerFixture(t)
+
+	const endpoint = "gw.dedicated.example.com"
+	rec := f.do(t, http.MethodPost, "/agent-network/settings", fmt.Sprintf(`{"endpoint": %q}`, endpoint))
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code, "bootstrap POST must succeed: %s", rec.Body.String())
+
+	now := time.Now()
+	accountID := testAccountID
+	proxyRow := &rpproxy.Proxy{
+		ID:             "proxy-guard",
+		SessionID:      "sess-1",
+		ClusterAddress: "GW.Dedicated.Example.Com",
+		AccountID:      &accountID,
+		LastSeen:       now,
+		ConnectedAt:    &now,
+		Status:         rpproxy.StatusConnected,
+	}
+	require.NoError(t, f.store.SaveProxy(context.Background(), proxyRow))
+
+	rec = f.do(t, http.MethodDelete, "/agent-network/settings", "")
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusPreconditionFailed, rec.Code,
+		"delete with an active proxy at the endpoint must be refused: got %d body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+
+	// Once the proxy disconnects it no longer serves the endpoint, so the
+	// delete goes through.
+	require.NoError(t, f.store.DisconnectProxy(context.Background(), proxyRow.ID, proxyRow.SessionID))
+	rec = f.do(t, http.MethodDelete, "/agent-network/settings", "")
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code,
+		"delete after the proxy disconnected must succeed: got %d body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+}
+
+// TestSettingsHandler_DeleteReleasesEndpointForFreshBootstrap pins the
+// full-reset semantic that gives replace-on-change clients (e.g. Terraform's
+// RequiresReplace) a real path: with both guards clear the delete succeeds,
+// the account reads as the defaults again, and a fresh bootstrap draws a
+// fresh label. The released hostname is not reserved — a fresh draw may even
+// legitimately re-pick it — so the assertions check the new row's shape, not
+// that the label differs.
+func TestSettingsHandler_DeleteReleasesEndpointForFreshBootstrap(t *testing.T) {
+	f := newAgentNetworkHandlerFixture(t)
+
+	rec := f.do(t, http.MethodPost, "/agent-network/settings",
+		`{"proxy_address": "eu.proxy.netbird.io", "enable_prompt_collection": true}`)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code, "bootstrap POST must succeed: %s", rec.Body.String())
+
+	rec = f.do(t, http.MethodDelete, "/agent-network/settings", "")
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code,
+		"delete with both guards clear must succeed: got %d body=%s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
+
+	rec = f.do(t, http.MethodGet, "/agent-network/settings", "")
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code)
+	var after api.AgentNetworkSettings
+	require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &after))
+	assert.Empty(t, after.Endpoint, "a deleted account must read as unbootstrapped defaults")
+	assert.False(t, after.EnablePromptCollection, "the deleted row's toggles must not linger")
+
+	rec = f.do(t, http.MethodPost, "/agent-network/settings", `{"proxy_address": "eu.proxy.netbird.io"}`)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code, "re-bootstrap after delete must succeed: %s", rec.Body.String())
+	var second api.AgentNetworkSettings
+	require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &second))
+	require.NotEmpty(t, second.Endpoint, "the fresh bootstrap must allocate an endpoint")
+	assert.True(t, strings.HasSuffix(second.Endpoint, ".eu.proxy.netbird.io"),
+		"the fresh endpoint must hang beneath the requested proxy address: %s", second.Endpoint)
+	assert.False(t, second.EnablePromptCollection,
+		"the fresh row must carry bootstrap defaults, not the deleted row's toggles")
+	assert.NotNil(t, second.CreatedAt, "the fresh row is persisted and carries timestamps")
 }

management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/labelgen/adjectives.go

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+package labelgen
+
+// adjectives is the descriptor half of a generated label. It pairs with the
+// noun pool in words.go to form `<adjective>-<noun>` labels, and is kept
+// separate because words.go is almost entirely nouns — drawing both halves
+// from it produced unreadable pairs like "millet-hammock". Entries are
+// lowercase ASCII, 4-12 chars, free of hyphens and digits, screened for
+// offensive/brand/region-specific terms, and disjoint from the noun pool
+// (enforced by TestAdjectives_AreDisjointFromNouns).
+var adjectives = []string{
+	"able", "active", "adept", "agile", "airy", "alert", "amiable", "ample",
+	"ancient", "ardent", "artful", "astute", "balmy", "blithe", "bold", "bonny",
+	"brave", "breezy", "brisk", "bubbly", "buoyant", "bushy", "candid", "canny",
+	"cheery", "chilly", "chipper", "chunky", "civil", "classic", "clever", "comely",
+	"compact", "cordial", "cosmic", "courtly", "crafty", "creamy", "crisp", "cuddly",
+	"curious", "dainty", "dapper", "daring", "dashing", "deft", "dewy", "diligent",
+	"downy", "dreamy", "dulcet", "durable", "dusky", "eager", "earnest", "earthy",
+	"easy", "elated", "elegant", "epic", "fabled", "faithful", "fancy", "fearless",
+	"feisty", "fervent", "fleet", "fluffy", "fond", "frisky", "frosty", "gallant",
+	"genial", "genteel", "gentle", "giddy", "gilded", "glad", "glassy", "gleaming",
+	"glossy", "graceful", "grand", "grainy", "hale", "hardy", "hearty", "hefty",
+	"honest", "hopeful", "humble", "hushed", "immense", "jaunty", "jolly", "jovial",
+	"joyful", "jubilant", "keen", "kindly", "kindred", "lanky", "leafy", "limber",
+	"lively", "lofty", "loyal", "lucent", "lucid", "luminous", "lush", "maroon",
+	"mellow", "merry", "mighty", "mindful", "mirthful", "misty", "modest", "muted",
+	"nifty", "nimble", "noble", "patient", "peaceful", "pearly", "peppy", "perky",
+	"petite", "placid", "playful", "pleasant", "plucky", "plush", "polite", "posh",
+	"prancing", "pristine", "prompt", "proud", "prudent", "quaint", "quick", "quirky",
+	"radiant", "ready", "regal", "restful", "robust", "rosy", "ruddy", "rugged",
+	"sandy", "satin", "saucy", "savvy", "sedate", "serene", "shady", "shiny",
+	"silken", "silky", "sincere", "sleek", "slender", "smart", "smooth", "snappy",
+	"snug", "soaring", "sparkly", "spiffy", "spirited", "sprightly", "spry", "stalwart",
+	"stately", "steady", "sterling", "stoic", "stormy", "stout", "sturdy", "sunlit",
+	"supple", "svelte", "tawny", "tender", "tidy", "timeless", "trusty", "upbeat",
+	"urbane", "valiant", "vast", "vernal", "vibrant", "vintage", "whimsy", "willing",
+	"windy", "winsome", "wintry", "witty", "worthy", "zesty", "zippy",
+}

management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/labelgen/labelgen.go

@@ -64,3 +64,20 @@ func PickUnique(rng *rand.Rand, taken map[string]struct{}, fallbackSuffix string
 	w := pool[rng.Intn(len(pool))]
 	return fmt.Sprintf("%s-%s", w, fallbackSuffix)
 }
+
+// PickTuple returns an adjective-noun label such as "brave-otter". It is still
+// a single DNS label.
+//
+// Unlike PickUnique it takes no `taken` set and has no fallback suffix. The
+// noun pool holds 857 entries, which is ample per cluster but a hard ceiling
+// once labels must be unique across one shared zone; pairing an adjective with
+// a noun spans len(adjectives) * 857 instead. Uniqueness is enforced by a
+// database constraint and retried by the caller, rather than guessed from a
+// pre-read set that a concurrent allocation can invalidate.
+func PickTuple(rng *rand.Rand) string {
+	nouns := uniqueWords()
+	if len(nouns) == 0 || len(adjectives) == 0 {
+		return ""
+	}
+	return adjectives[rng.Intn(len(adjectives))] + "-" + nouns[rng.Intn(len(nouns))]
+}

management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/labelgen/labelgen_test.go

@@ -99,3 +99,82 @@ func TestUniqueWords_DropsDuplicates(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	assert.GreaterOrEqual(t, len(pool), 500, "Pool must contain at least 500 unique words")
 }
+
+// TestPickTuple_ShapeAndPoolMembership locks the wire-visible shape: an
+// adjective and a noun, each from its own pool, joined by a single hyphen so
+// the result stays one DNS label.
+func TestPickTuple_ShapeAndPoolMembership(t *testing.T) {
+	nouns := uniqueWords()
+	inNouns := make(map[string]struct{}, len(nouns))
+	for _, w := range nouns {
+		inNouns[w] = struct{}{}
+	}
+	inAdjectives := make(map[string]struct{}, len(adjectives))
+	for _, a := range adjectives {
+		inAdjectives[a] = struct{}{}
+	}
+
+	rng := rand.New(rand.NewSource(7))
+	for i := 0; i < 200; i++ {
+		got := PickTuple(rng)
+
+		parts := strings.Split(got, "-")
+		require.Len(t, parts, 2, "PickTuple must produce exactly two hyphen-joined words; got %q", got)
+
+		_, adjOK := inAdjectives[parts[0]]
+		assert.True(t, adjOK, "First half must be an adjective; %q not in adjectives (from %q)", parts[0], got)
+		_, nounOK := inNouns[parts[1]]
+		assert.True(t, nounOK, "Second half must be a noun; %q not in words (from %q)", parts[1], got)
+
+		assert.LessOrEqual(t, len(got), 63, "Label must fit a DNS label; got %q (%d chars)", got, len(got))
+	}
+}
+
+// TestAdjectives_AreDisjointFromNouns keeps the namespace a clean product and
+// prevents nonsense like "azure-azure": a handful of the noun pool's entries
+// are adjectival, and any overlap would let the same word land on both sides.
+func TestAdjectives_AreDisjointFromNouns(t *testing.T) {
+	nouns := make(map[string]struct{}, len(uniqueWords()))
+	for _, w := range uniqueWords() {
+		nouns[w] = struct{}{}
+	}
+	for _, a := range adjectives {
+		_, clash := nouns[a]
+		assert.False(t, clash, "Adjective %q also appears in the noun pool; remove it from one list", a)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestAdjectives_AreDNSSafeAndDeduplicated mirrors the curation contract stated
+// in words.go: lowercase ASCII, 4-12 chars, no digits or hyphens, no repeats.
+func TestAdjectives_AreDNSSafeAndDeduplicated(t *testing.T) {
+	seen := make(map[string]struct{}, len(adjectives))
+	for _, a := range adjectives {
+		_, dup := seen[a]
+		assert.False(t, dup, "Duplicate adjective %q", a)
+		seen[a] = struct{}{}
+
+		assert.Regexp(t, `^[a-z]{4,12}$`, a, "Adjective %q must be 4-12 lowercase ASCII letters", a)
+	}
+	assert.Greater(t, len(adjectives), 150, "Adjective pool too small to give a useful namespace")
+}
+
+// TestPickTuple_DeterministicWithSeededRng documents that generation is a pure
+// function of the rng, which is what makes allocation retries reproducible in tests.
+func TestPickTuple_DeterministicWithSeededRng(t *testing.T) {
+	a := PickTuple(rand.New(rand.NewSource(42)))
+	b := PickTuple(rand.New(rand.NewSource(42)))
+	assert.Equal(t, a, b, "Same seed must yield the same tuple")
+}
+
+// TestPickTuple_SpansALargeNamespace guards the reason we moved to tuples: a
+// single-word pool caps the GLOBAL namespace at 857. Drawing many tuples must
+// yield overwhelmingly distinct values.
+func TestPickTuple_SpansALargeNamespace(t *testing.T) {
+	rng := rand.New(rand.NewSource(11))
+	seen := make(map[string]struct{}, 2000)
+	for i := 0; i < 2000; i++ {
+		seen[PickTuple(rng)] = struct{}{}
+	}
+	assert.Greater(t, len(seen), 1900,
+		"2000 draws should be nearly all distinct across a ~200k namespace; got %d unique", len(seen))
+}

management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/manager.go

@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/permissions/modules"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/permissions/operations"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/store"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/status"
 )
 
@@ -48,7 +47,7 @@ func ensureSessionKeys(p *types.Provider) error {
 type Manager interface {
 	GetAllProviders(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID string) ([]*types.Provider, error)
 	GetProvider(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID, providerID string) (*types.Provider, error)
-	CreateProvider(ctx context.Context, userID string, provider *types.Provider, bootstrapCluster string) (*types.Provider, error)
+	CreateProvider(ctx context.Context, userID string, provider *types.Provider) (*types.Provider, error)
 	UpdateProvider(ctx context.Context, userID string, provider *types.Provider) (*types.Provider, error)
 	DeleteProvider(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID, providerID string) error
 
@@ -71,7 +70,9 @@ type Manager interface {
 	DeleteBudgetRule(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID, ruleID string) error
 
 	GetSettings(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID string) (*types.Settings, error)
+	CreateSettings(ctx context.Context, userID string, settings *types.Settings, proxyAddress, endpoint string) (*types.Settings, error)
 	UpdateSettings(ctx context.Context, userID string, settings *types.Settings) (*types.Settings, error)
+	DeleteSettings(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID string) error
 
 	ListConsumption(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID string) ([]*types.Consumption, error)
 	ListAccessLogs(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID string, filter types.AgentNetworkAccessLogFilter) ([]*types.AgentNetworkAccessLog, int64, error)
@@ -123,11 +124,10 @@ type managerImpl struct {
 	proxyController    proxy.Controller
 
 	// reconcileCache holds the last set of synthesised proxy mappings
-	// per account so reconcile can emit precise Create/Update/Delete
-	// updates instead of a full re-push on every mutation. Keyed by
-	// accountID, then by synthesised service ID.
+	// per account, each paired with the proxy that served it, so a change
+	// of serving proxy can be diffed without re-deriving it.
 	reconcileMu    sync.Mutex
-	reconcileCache map[string]map[string]*proto.ProxyMapping
+	reconcileCache map[string]map[string]syntheticMapping
 
 	// labelRngMu guards labelRng. PickUnique consumes math/rand.Source
 	// state; concurrent provider creates would otherwise race.
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ func NewManager(
 		accountManager:     accountManager,
 		permissionsManager: permissionsManager,
 		proxyController:    proxyController,
-		reconcileCache:     make(map[string]map[string]*proto.ProxyMapping),
+		reconcileCache:     make(map[string]map[string]syntheticMapping),
 		labelRng:           rand.New(rand.NewSource(time.Now().UnixNano())),
 	}
 }
@@ -170,19 +170,14 @@ func (m *managerImpl) GetProvider(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID, provid
 	return m.store.GetAgentNetworkProviderByID(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, accountID, providerID)
 }
 
-// CreateProvider persists a new provider for the account. bootstrapCluster
-// is used only when the per-account agent-network Settings row hasn't
-// been created yet; otherwise it is ignored (the cluster is pinned on
-// Settings and every provider in the account routes through it).
-func (m *managerImpl) CreateProvider(ctx context.Context, userID string, provider *types.Provider, bootstrapCluster string) (*types.Provider, error) {
+// CreateProvider persists a new provider for the account. Providers have no
+// settings side effects: the account's endpoint is bootstrapped separately and
+// explicitly via CreateSettings, and every provider in the account routes
+// through it.
+func (m *managerImpl) CreateProvider(ctx context.Context, userID string, provider *types.Provider) (*types.Provider, error) {
 	if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, provider.AccountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkProviders, operations.Create); err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
-	if strings.TrimSpace(bootstrapCluster) != "" {
-		if err := m.requireSettingsBootstrapPermission(ctx, provider.AccountID, userID); err != nil {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-	}
 
 	// An empty api_key would silently produce a synthesised service
 	// that 401s on every upstream request. Surface the misconfiguration
@@ -206,16 +201,6 @@ func (m *managerImpl) CreateProvider(ctx context.Context, userID string, provide
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("save agent network provider: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	if strings.TrimSpace(bootstrapCluster) != "" {
-		if _, err := m.bootstrapSettingsIfNeeded(ctx, m.store, provider.AccountID, bootstrapCluster); err != nil {
-			// The provider create has already succeeded; logging the
-			// bootstrap miss matches the plan's PoC behaviour. The synth
-			// path treats a missing settings row as a no-op, and the next
-			// provider create retries the bootstrap.
-			log.WithContext(ctx).Debugf("agent-network bootstrap settings for account %s on cluster %s: %v", provider.AccountID, bootstrapCluster, err)
-		}
-	}
-
 	m.accountManager.StoreEvent(ctx, userID, provider.ID, provider.AccountID, activity.AgentNetworkProviderCreated, provider.EventMeta())
 	m.reconcile(ctx, provider.AccountID)
 
@@ -560,52 +545,44 @@ func (m *managerImpl) DeleteBudgetRule(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID, r
 }
 
 // UpdateSettings replaces the mutable account-level settings — the collection
-// toggles and retention — on the account's row. When the account has no
-// settings row yet, a non-empty settings.Cluster bootstraps one (same path as
-// first provider create); without it the update fails with NotFound. On an
-// existing row the cluster and subdomain are immutable: a differing
-// settings.Cluster is rejected rather than silently ignored so callers never
-// observe a value other than what they sent. Because the collection toggles
-// change the synthesised service config (prompt-capture gating, access-log
-// emission), a reconcile is triggered so the proxy and peer network maps
-// converge on the new state.
+// toggles and retention — on the account's row. The identity fields (Domain,
+// ProxyAddress) are assigned at bootstrap (CreateSettings) and immutable: the
+// request carries them, matching the PUT convention of every other endpoint,
+// but they are only compared against the stored row — a request carrying
+// different values is rejected, and the stored values are never overwritten.
+// When the account has no settings row yet the update fails with NotFound.
+// Because the collection toggles change the synthesised service config
+// (prompt-capture gating, access-log emission), a reconcile is triggered so
+// the proxy and peer network maps converge on the new state.
 func (m *managerImpl) UpdateSettings(ctx context.Context, userID string, settings *types.Settings) (*types.Settings, error) {
 	if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, settings.AccountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkSettings, operations.Update); err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
-	requestedCluster := strings.TrimSpace(settings.Cluster)
-
 	// The row lock from LockingStrengthUpdate only holds for the duration of
-	// the surrounding transaction, so the read, the cluster-immutability
-	// check, and the save must share one — otherwise concurrent PUTs could
-	// interleave between them.
+	// the surrounding transaction, so the read and the save must share one —
+	// otherwise concurrent PUTs could interleave between them.
 	var updated *types.Settings
 	err := m.store.ExecuteInTransaction(ctx, func(tx store.Store) error {
 		existing, err := tx.GetAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, store.LockingStrengthUpdate, settings.AccountID)
 		switch {
 		case err == nil:
-			if requestedCluster != "" && requestedCluster != existing.Cluster {
-				return status.Errorf(status.InvalidArgument, "cluster is immutable once assigned (current: %s)", existing.Cluster)
-			}
 		case isNotFound(err):
-			if requestedCluster == "" {
-				return status.Errorf(status.NotFound, "agent network settings have not been bootstrapped yet; pass cluster to bootstrap them, or create a provider with bootstrap_cluster set")
-			}
-			// Bootstrapping pins the cluster and subdomain — a settings
-			// create on top of the update the caller already passed, matching
-			// the gate on the provider-create bootstrap path.
-			if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, settings.AccountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkSettings, operations.Create); err != nil {
-				return err
-			}
-			existing, err = m.bootstrapSettingsIfNeeded(ctx, tx, settings.AccountID, requestedCluster)
-			if err != nil {
-				return err
-			}
+			return status.Errorf(status.NotFound, "agent network settings have not been bootstrapped yet; POST /api/agent-network/settings to bootstrap them")
 		default:
 			return fmt.Errorf("get agent network settings: %w", err)
 		}
 
+		// The identity echo is compared leniently (trimmed, case-insensitive):
+		// the stored values are normalized lowercase, and a client replaying a
+		// GET response must never be rejected over casing it didn't choose.
+		if !hostnamesEquivalent(settings.Domain, existing.Domain) {
+			return status.Errorf(status.InvalidArgument, "endpoint is immutable: it must match the assigned endpoint %q; delete the settings to release it and bootstrap again", existing.Domain)
+		}
+		if !hostnamesEquivalent(settings.ProxyAddress, existing.ProxyAddress) {
+			return status.Errorf(status.InvalidArgument, "proxy_address is immutable: it must match the assigned proxy address %q; delete the settings to release it and bootstrap again", existing.ProxyAddress)
+		}
+
 		existing.EnableLogCollection = settings.EnableLogCollection
 		existing.EnablePromptCollection = settings.EnablePromptCollection
 		existing.RedactPii = settings.RedactPii
@@ -632,6 +609,83 @@ func (m *managerImpl) UpdateSettings(ctx context.Context, userID string, setting
 	return updated, nil
 }
 
+// hostnamesEquivalent reports whether a caller-supplied hostname names the
+// same host as a stored (normalized, lowercase) one: equal after trimming and
+// case folding. No structural validation — an arbitrary mismatch and a
+// malformed value are both simply "not the assigned value".
+func hostnamesEquivalent(supplied, stored string) bool {
+	return strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(supplied), stored)
+}
+
+// DeleteSettings removes the account's settings row, releasing the endpoint.
+// Two guards make this a bootstrap-repair operation rather than a way to tear
+// down a serving gateway, both re-checked under the row lock:
+//
+//   - No Agent Network providers may exist for the account. Providers route
+//     through the endpoint; delete them first.
+//   - No proxy may be actively serving the endpoint — that is, no active proxy
+//     declares the endpoint hostname as its cluster address. This is the
+//     dedicated (self-addressed) shape's guard: the proxy at the address IS
+//     this account's gateway. A labeled endpoint hangs beneath a shared
+//     cluster's address, and with the account's providers already gone the
+//     shared proxy serves nothing of the account's, so the parent cluster
+//     being up does not block the delete.
+//
+// Bootstrapping again after a delete allocates fresh — the released hostname
+// is not reserved. That full-reset semantic is what gives clients that model
+// immutability as replace-on-change (e.g. Terraform's RequiresReplace) a real
+// path: tear down providers, delete, re-create.
+func (m *managerImpl) DeleteSettings(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID string) error {
+	if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkSettings, operations.Delete); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	var deleted *types.Settings
+	err := m.store.ExecuteInTransaction(ctx, func(tx store.Store) error {
+		existing, err := tx.GetAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, store.LockingStrengthUpdate, accountID)
+		switch {
+		case err == nil:
+		case isNotFound(err):
+			return status.Errorf(status.NotFound, "agent network settings have not been bootstrapped yet; there is nothing to delete")
+		default:
+			return fmt.Errorf("get agent network settings: %w", err)
+		}
+
+		providers, err := tx.GetAccountAgentNetworkProviders(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, accountID)
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("get agent network providers: %w", err)
+		}
+		if len(providers) > 0 {
+			return status.Errorf(status.PreconditionFailed, "agent network settings cannot be deleted while %d provider(s) exist; delete the providers first", len(providers))
+		}
+
+		serving, err := tx.HasActiveProxyAtClusterAddress(ctx, existing.Domain)
+		if err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("check for a proxy serving the endpoint: %w", err)
+		}
+		if serving {
+			return status.Errorf(status.PreconditionFailed, "agent network settings cannot be deleted while a proxy is actively serving the endpoint %q", existing.Domain)
+		}
+
+		if err := tx.DeleteAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, accountID); err != nil {
+			return fmt.Errorf("delete agent network settings: %w", err)
+		}
+		deleted = existing
+		return nil
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+
+	m.accountManager.StoreEvent(ctx, userID, accountID, accountID, activity.AgentNetworkSettingsDeleted, map[string]any{
+		"endpoint":      deleted.Domain,
+		"proxy_address": deleted.ProxyAddress,
+	})
+	m.reconcile(ctx, accountID)
+
+	return nil
+}
+
 // isNotFound reports whether err is a status.NotFound error.
 func isNotFound(err error) bool {
 	var sErr *status.Error
@@ -678,74 +732,162 @@ func (m *managerImpl) GetSettings(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID string)
 	}
 }
 
-// requireSettingsBootstrapPermission gates the one-time settings bootstrap a
-// first provider create performs. Pinning the account's cluster and subdomain
-// is a settings write, so it needs the settings permission on top of the
-// provider one. No-op once the settings row exists.
-func (m *managerImpl) requireSettingsBootstrapPermission(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID string) error {
-	_, err := m.store.GetAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, accountID)
-	if err == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-	if !isNotFound(err) {
-		return fmt.Errorf("get agent network settings: %w", err)
-	}
-	return m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkSettings, operations.Create)
-}
+// maxDomainAllocationAttempts bounds the label search when bootstrapping a
+// labeled endpoint. Package-level (rather than function-local) so tests can
+// assert on the exhaustion path without duplicating the literal.
+const maxDomainAllocationAttempts = 10
 
-// bootstrapSettingsIfNeeded creates the per-account agent-network
-// settings row when missing. The cluster comes from the create-time
-// hint the dashboard sends (auto-picked from the active cluster list);
-// the subdomain is picked from the curated wordlist avoiding
-// collisions on the same cluster. Idempotent: if a row already exists
-// it is returned untouched and the hint is ignored. st is the store to
-// operate on — pass the transaction store when calling from within one.
-func (m *managerImpl) bootstrapSettingsIfNeeded(ctx context.Context, st store.Store, accountID, providerCluster string) (*types.Settings, error) {
-	if accountID == "" {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("bootstrap settings: account id is required")
+// CreateSettings bootstraps the per-account settings row, assigning the
+// account's immutable endpoint. Exactly one of proxyAddress and endpoint must
+// be non-empty: proxyAddress allocates a labeled endpoint one label beneath
+// the given cluster address; endpoint claims the given hostname verbatim as a
+// self-addressed (dedicated) endpoint — a legitimate claim before any proxy
+// declares the address (address-first). settings carries the account ID and
+// the initial collection toggles; its identity fields are assigned here.
+func (m *managerImpl) CreateSettings(ctx context.Context, userID string, settings *types.Settings, proxyAddress, endpoint string) (*types.Settings, error) {
+	if settings == nil || settings.AccountID == "" {
+		return nil, status.Errorf(status.InvalidArgument, "account id is required")
 	}
-	if strings.TrimSpace(providerCluster) == "" {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("bootstrap settings: provider cluster is required")
+	if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, settings.AccountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkSettings, operations.Create); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
 	}
 
-	existing, err := st.GetAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, accountID)
-	if err == nil {
-		return existing, nil
+	hasProxyAddress := strings.TrimSpace(proxyAddress) != ""
+	hasEndpoint := strings.TrimSpace(endpoint) != ""
+	if hasProxyAddress == hasEndpoint {
+		return nil, status.Errorf(status.InvalidArgument, "exactly one of proxy_address and endpoint is required")
 	}
-	if !isNotFound(err) {
+
+	// Fail fast on an existing row for a clean 409; the insert below stays
+	// the authority against concurrent bootstraps (the primary key wins).
+	if _, err := m.store.GetAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, settings.AccountID); err == nil {
+		return nil, status.Errorf(status.AlreadyExists, "agent network settings already bootstrapped for account %s", settings.AccountID)
+	} else if !isNotFound(err) {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("get agent network settings: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	siblings, err := st.GetAgentNetworkSettingsByCluster(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, providerCluster)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("list agent network settings on cluster: %w", err)
-	}
-	taken := make(map[string]struct{}, len(siblings))
-	for _, s := range siblings {
-		taken[s.Subdomain] = struct{}{}
-	}
-
-	suffix := accountID
-	if len(suffix) > 4 {
-		suffix = suffix[:4]
-	}
-
-	m.labelRngMu.Lock()
-	subdomain := labelgen.PickUnique(m.labelRng, taken, suffix)
-	m.labelRngMu.Unlock()
-
 	now := time.Now().UTC()
-	settings := types.DefaultSettings(accountID)
-	settings.Cluster = providerCluster
-	settings.Subdomain = subdomain
 	settings.CreatedAt = now
 	settings.UpdatedAt = now
-	if err := st.SaveAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, settings); err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("save agent network settings: %w", err)
+
+	var err error
+	if hasEndpoint {
+		err = m.bootstrapSelfAddressed(ctx, settings, endpoint)
+	} else {
+		err = m.bootstrapLabeled(ctx, settings, proxyAddress)
 	}
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	m.accountManager.StoreEvent(ctx, userID, settings.AccountID, settings.AccountID, activity.AgentNetworkSettingsUpdated, map[string]any{
+		"bootstrapped": true,
+		"endpoint":     settings.Domain,
+		"dedicated":    settings.Dedicated(),
+	})
+	m.reconcile(ctx, settings.AccountID)
+
 	return settings, nil
 }
 
+// bootstrapSelfAddressed claims the given hostname as the account's endpoint,
+// served only by a proxy declaring exactly that address (Domain ==
+// ProxyAddress). The domain unique index is the arbiter of availability.
+func (m *managerImpl) bootstrapSelfAddressed(ctx context.Context, settings *types.Settings, endpoint string) error {
+	hostname, err := types.NormalizeHostname(endpoint)
+	if err != nil {
+		return status.Errorf(status.InvalidArgument, "invalid endpoint: %s", err)
+	}
+
+	settings.Domain = hostname
+	settings.ProxyAddress = hostname
+	if err := m.store.CreateAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, settings); err != nil {
+		if isUniqueConstraintError(err) {
+			// The violation is either the account primary key (a concurrent
+			// bootstrap for the same account won) or the domain index
+			// (another account holds the hostname). Distinguish by re-read.
+			if _, getErr := m.store.GetAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, settings.AccountID); getErr == nil {
+				return status.Errorf(status.AlreadyExists, "agent network settings already bootstrapped for account %s", settings.AccountID)
+			}
+			return status.Errorf(status.AlreadyExists, "endpoint %s is already taken", hostname)
+		}
+		return fmt.Errorf("create agent network settings: %w", err)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// bootstrapLabeled allocates a labeled endpoint one label beneath the given
+// cluster address: Domain = <label>.<proxyAddress>, served by whichever proxy
+// declares the parent. Labels are adjective-noun tuples; a candidate is
+// checked by read and the domain unique index stays the authority, so a
+// concurrent allocation of the same tuple surfaces as a unique violation and
+// another tuple is drawn.
+func (m *managerImpl) bootstrapLabeled(ctx context.Context, settings *types.Settings, proxyAddress string) error {
+	parent, err := types.NormalizeHostname(proxyAddress)
+	if err != nil {
+		return status.Errorf(status.InvalidArgument, "invalid proxy_address: %s", err)
+	}
+
+	for attempt := 1; attempt <= maxDomainAllocationAttempts; attempt++ {
+		m.labelRngMu.Lock()
+		label := labelgen.PickTuple(m.labelRng)
+		m.labelRngMu.Unlock()
+		if label == "" {
+			// Only reachable if either word pool were emptied. An empty label
+			// would produce a broken endpoint like ".example.com", so fail
+			// loudly rather than looping or inserting.
+			return fmt.Errorf("allocate agent network endpoint for account %s: label generator returned an empty label", settings.AccountID)
+		}
+
+		candidate, err := types.NormalizeHostname(label + "." + parent)
+		if err != nil {
+			return status.Errorf(status.InvalidArgument, "proxy_address leaves no room for a label: %s", err)
+		}
+
+		_, err = m.store.GetAgentNetworkSettingsByDomain(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, candidate)
+		if err == nil {
+			log.WithContext(ctx).Tracef("agent-network endpoint %q taken, retrying (attempt %d/%d)", candidate, attempt, maxDomainAllocationAttempts)
+			continue
+		}
+		if !isNotFound(err) {
+			return fmt.Errorf("check agent network endpoint availability: %w", err)
+		}
+
+		settings.Domain = candidate
+		settings.ProxyAddress = parent
+		if err := m.store.CreateAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, settings); err != nil {
+			if isUniqueConstraintError(err) {
+				// A concurrent bootstrap for the same account may have won on
+				// the primary key — return the conflict. A lost race on the
+				// domain index just means the tuple was taken between the
+				// read and the insert: draw another.
+				if _, getErr := m.store.GetAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, settings.AccountID); getErr == nil {
+					return status.Errorf(status.AlreadyExists, "agent network settings already bootstrapped for account %s", settings.AccountID)
+				}
+				log.WithContext(ctx).Tracef("agent-network endpoint %q lost an allocation race, retrying (attempt %d/%d)", candidate, attempt, maxDomainAllocationAttempts)
+				continue
+			}
+			return fmt.Errorf("create agent network settings: %w", err)
+		}
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	return fmt.Errorf("allocate agent network endpoint for account %s: %d attempts exhausted", settings.AccountID, maxDomainAllocationAttempts)
+}
+
+// isUniqueConstraintError reports whether err is a database unique-constraint
+// violation, matched on the driver message because CreateAgentNetworkSettings
+// deliberately returns the driver error unwrapped.
+func isUniqueConstraintError(err error) bool {
+	if err == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	msg := err.Error()
+	return strings.Contains(msg, "(SQLSTATE 23505)") || // postgres
+		strings.Contains(msg, "Error 1062 (23000)") || // mysql
+		strings.Contains(msg, "UNIQUE constraint failed") // sqlite
+}
+
 // ListConsumption returns every consumption row recorded for the
 // account, ordered window-newest-first. Backs the dashboard's basic
 // counter view; permission gate is the same Read role that gates
@@ -879,7 +1021,7 @@ func (*mockManager) GetProvider(_ context.Context, _, _, _ string) (*types.Provi
 	return &types.Provider{}, nil
 }
 
-func (*mockManager) CreateProvider(_ context.Context, _ string, p *types.Provider, _ string) (*types.Provider, error) {
+func (*mockManager) CreateProvider(_ context.Context, _ string, p *types.Provider) (*types.Provider, error) {
 	return p, nil
 }
 
@@ -947,10 +1089,23 @@ func (*mockManager) GetSettings(_ context.Context, accountID, _ string) (*types.
 	return types.DefaultSettings(accountID), nil
 }
 
+func (*mockManager) CreateSettings(_ context.Context, _ string, s *types.Settings, proxyAddress, endpoint string) (*types.Settings, error) {
+	if endpoint != "" {
+		s.Domain = endpoint
+		s.ProxyAddress = endpoint
+	} else {
+		s.Domain = "mock." + proxyAddress
+		s.ProxyAddress = proxyAddress
+	}
+	return s, nil
+}
+
 func (*mockManager) UpdateSettings(_ context.Context, _ string, s *types.Settings) (*types.Settings, error) {
 	return s, nil
 }
 
+func (*mockManager) DeleteSettings(_ context.Context, _, _ string) error { return nil }
+
 func (*mockManager) ListConsumption(_ context.Context, _, _ string) ([]*types.Consumption, error) {
 	return nil, nil
 }

management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/provider_bootstrap_test.go

@@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
-package agentnetwork
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"runtime"
-	"testing"
-
-	"github.com/golang/mock/gomock"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/types"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/account"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/permissions"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/permissions/modules"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/permissions/operations"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/store"
-	nbtypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/status"
-)
-
-// bootstrapFixture wires a real sqlite store to a gomock permissions manager
-// so tests can grant the provider permission while denying (or never
-// expecting) the settings one.
-type bootstrapFixture struct {
-	manager Manager
-	store   store.Store
-	perms   *permissions.MockManager
-}
-
-func newBootstrapFixture(t *testing.T) *bootstrapFixture {
-	t.Helper()
-	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
-		t.Skip("sqlite store not properly supported on Windows yet")
-	}
-	t.Setenv("NETBIRD_STORE_ENGINE", string(nbtypes.SqliteStoreEngine))
-
-	st, cleanUp, err := store.NewTestStoreFromSQL(context.Background(), "", t.TempDir())
-	require.NoError(t, err, "test store setup must succeed")
-	t.Cleanup(cleanUp)
-
-	ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
-	perms := permissions.NewMockManager(ctrl)
-
-	accounts := account.NewMockManager(ctrl)
-	accounts.EXPECT().StoreEvent(gomock.Any(), gomock.Any(), gomock.Any(), gomock.Any(), gomock.Any(), gomock.Any()).AnyTimes()
-	accounts.EXPECT().UpdateAccountPeers(gomock.Any(), gomock.Any(), gomock.Any()).AnyTimes()
-	accounts.EXPECT().BufferUpdateAccountPeers(gomock.Any(), gomock.Any(), gomock.Any()).AnyTimes()
-
-	return &bootstrapFixture{
-		manager: NewManager(st, perms, accounts, nil),
-		store:   st,
-		perms:   perms,
-	}
-}
-
-func (f *bootstrapFixture) expectPermission(accountID, userID string, module modules.Module, op operations.Operation, allowed bool) {
-	f.perms.EXPECT().
-		ValidateUserPermissions(gomock.Any(), accountID, userID, module, op).
-		Return(allowed, context.Background(), nil)
-}
-
-func newBootstrapProvider(accountID string) *types.Provider {
-	p := types.NewProvider(accountID)
-	p.Name = "openai"
-	p.UpstreamURL = "https://api.openai.com"
-	p.APIKey = "sk-test"
-	p.Enabled = true
-	return p
-}
-
-// TestCreateProviderBootstrapRequiresSettingsPermission pins the gate on the
-// one-time settings bootstrap: creating the first provider with a
-// bootstrap_cluster pins the account's cluster and subdomain, which is a
-// settings write and must not ride on the providers permission alone.
-func TestCreateProviderBootstrapRequiresSettingsPermission(t *testing.T) {
-	ctx := context.Background()
-
-	t.Run("denied without settings permission", func(t *testing.T) {
-		f := newBootstrapFixture(t)
-		f.expectPermission("account1", "user1", modules.AgentNetworkProviders, operations.Create, true)
-		f.expectPermission("account1", "user1", modules.AgentNetworkSettings, operations.Create, false)
-
-		_, err := f.manager.CreateProvider(ctx, "user1", newBootstrapProvider("account1"), "cluster1.example.com")
-		require.Error(t, err, "bootstrap without settings permission must fail")
-		var sErr *status.Error
-		require.ErrorAs(t, err, &sErr)
-		assert.Equal(t, status.PermissionDenied, sErr.Type(), "denial should surface as permission denied")
-
-		providers, err := f.store.GetAccountAgentNetworkProviders(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, "account1")
-		require.NoError(t, err)
-		assert.Empty(t, providers, "provider must not be persisted when bootstrap is denied")
-		_, err = f.store.GetAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, "account1")
-		assert.Error(t, err, "settings row must not be created when bootstrap is denied")
-	})
-
-	t.Run("allowed with settings permission", func(t *testing.T) {
-		f := newBootstrapFixture(t)
-		f.expectPermission("account1", "user1", modules.AgentNetworkProviders, operations.Create, true)
-		f.expectPermission("account1", "user1", modules.AgentNetworkSettings, operations.Create, true)
-
-		created, err := f.manager.CreateProvider(ctx, "user1", newBootstrapProvider("account1"), "cluster1.example.com")
-		require.NoError(t, err, "bootstrap with both permissions must succeed")
-		require.NotNil(t, created)
-
-		settings, err := f.store.GetAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, "account1")
-		require.NoError(t, err, "bootstrap must create the settings row")
-		assert.Equal(t, "cluster1.example.com", settings.Cluster, "settings should pin the bootstrap cluster")
-	})
-
-	t.Run("existing settings need no settings permission", func(t *testing.T) {
-		f := newBootstrapFixture(t)
-		require.NoError(t, f.store.SaveAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, &types.Settings{
-			AccountID: "account1",
-			Cluster:   "cluster1.example.com",
-			Subdomain: "existing",
-		}), "pre-existing settings row setup must succeed")
-
-		// Only the providers permission may be consulted: gomock fails the
-		// test on any unexpected settings-permission call.
-		f.expectPermission("account1", "user1", modules.AgentNetworkProviders, operations.Create, true)
-
-		_, err := f.manager.CreateProvider(ctx, "user1", newBootstrapProvider("account1"), "cluster1.example.com")
-		require.NoError(t, err, "create with existing settings must not require the settings permission")
-	})
-
-	t.Run("no bootstrap cluster needs no settings permission", func(t *testing.T) {
-		f := newBootstrapFixture(t)
-		f.expectPermission("account1", "user1", modules.AgentNetworkProviders, operations.Create, true)
-
-		_, err := f.manager.CreateProvider(ctx, "user1", newBootstrapProvider("account1"), "")
-		require.NoError(t, err, "create without bootstrap must not require the settings permission")
-	})
-}

management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/reconcile.go

@@ -10,6 +10,17 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
 )
 
+// syntheticMapping pairs a synthesised proxy mapping with the address of the
+// proxy that serves it. The cluster is recorded rather than derived from the
+// mapping's domain: ProxyMapping does not carry it, and the previous derivation
+// -- everything after the first DNS label -- is wrong whenever the service's
+// domain is not one label under its proxy's address, which silently addressed
+// updates to a cluster no proxy declares.
+type syntheticMapping struct {
+	mapping *proto.ProxyMapping
+	cluster string
+}
+
 // reconcile recomputes the synthesised reverse-proxy services for an
 // account, diffs them against the previously-synthesised set in the
 // in-memory cache, and emits Create / Update / Delete proxy mappings
@@ -45,18 +56,21 @@ func (m *managerImpl) reconcile(ctx context.Context, accountID string) {
 	}
 
 	oidcCfg := m.proxyController.GetOIDCValidationConfig()
-	current := make(map[string]*proto.ProxyMapping, len(services))
+	current := make(map[string]syntheticMapping, len(services))
 	for _, svc := range services {
 		if svc == nil || svc.ID == "" {
 			continue
 		}
-		current[svc.ID] = svc.ToProtoMapping(rpservice.Update, "", oidcCfg)
+		current[svc.ID] = syntheticMapping{
+			mapping: svc.ToProtoMapping(rpservice.Update, "", oidcCfg),
+			cluster: svc.ProxyCluster,
+		}
 	}
 
 	m.reconcileMu.Lock()
 	previous := m.reconcileCache[accountID]
 	if previous == nil {
-		previous = make(map[string]*proto.ProxyMapping)
+		previous = make(map[string]syntheticMapping)
 	}
 
 	creates, updates, deletes := diffMappings(previous, current)
@@ -67,34 +81,36 @@ func (m *managerImpl) reconcile(ctx context.Context, accountID string) {
 	}
 	m.reconcileMu.Unlock()
 
-	for _, mapping := range creates {
-		mapping.Type = proto.ProxyMappingUpdateType_UPDATE_TYPE_CREATED
-		m.proxyController.SendServiceUpdateToCluster(ctx, accountID, mapping, clusterFromMapping(mapping))
+	for _, entry := range creates {
+		entry.mapping.Type = proto.ProxyMappingUpdateType_UPDATE_TYPE_CREATED
+		m.proxyController.SendServiceUpdateToCluster(ctx, accountID, entry.mapping, entry.cluster)
 	}
-	for _, mapping := range updates {
-		mapping.Type = proto.ProxyMappingUpdateType_UPDATE_TYPE_MODIFIED
-		m.proxyController.SendServiceUpdateToCluster(ctx, accountID, mapping, clusterFromMapping(mapping))
+	for _, entry := range updates {
+		entry.mapping.Type = proto.ProxyMappingUpdateType_UPDATE_TYPE_MODIFIED
+		m.proxyController.SendServiceUpdateToCluster(ctx, accountID, entry.mapping, entry.cluster)
 	}
-	for _, mapping := range deletes {
-		mapping.Type = proto.ProxyMappingUpdateType_UPDATE_TYPE_REMOVED
-		m.proxyController.SendServiceUpdateToCluster(ctx, accountID, mapping, clusterFromMapping(mapping))
+	for _, entry := range deletes {
+		entry.mapping.Type = proto.ProxyMappingUpdateType_UPDATE_TYPE_REMOVED
+		m.proxyController.SendServiceUpdateToCluster(ctx, accountID, entry.mapping, entry.cluster)
 	}
 }
 
-// diffMappings classifies the previous→current transition for a
-// single account into Create / Update / Delete sets.
+// diffMappings classifies the previous→current transition for a single
+// account into Create / Update / Delete sets.
 //
-// Cluster moves (current.cluster != previous.cluster) are surfaced as
-// a Delete on the old cluster + Create on the new — handled by
-// emitting both a delete (on previous mapping) and a create (on the
-// current mapping) for that service ID.
-func diffMappings(previous, current map[string]*proto.ProxyMapping) (creates, updates, deletes []*proto.ProxyMapping) {
+// A change of serving proxy for the same service ID is surfaced as a Delete
+// addressed to the old proxy plus a Create addressed to the new one, so the
+// mapping actually moves. Comparing the recorded cluster is what makes that
+// detectable: with a placement-free endpoint the mapping's domain is identical
+// before and after the move, so nothing about the mapping itself reveals it.
+func diffMappings(previous, current map[string]syntheticMapping) (creates, updates, deletes []syntheticMapping) {
 	for id, cur := range current {
 		prev, existed := previous[id]
 		switch {
 		case !existed:
 			creates = append(creates, cur)
-		case prev.GetDomain() == "" || cur.GetAccountId() == prev.GetAccountId() && currentClusterChanged(prev, cur):
+		case prev.mapping.GetDomain() == "" ||
+			cur.mapping.GetAccountId() == prev.mapping.GetAccountId() && prev.cluster != cur.cluster:
 			deletes = append(deletes, prev)
 			creates = append(creates, cur)
 		default:
@@ -108,24 +124,3 @@ func diffMappings(previous, current map[string]*proto.ProxyMapping) (creates, up
 	}
 	return creates, updates, deletes
 }
-
-func currentClusterChanged(prev, cur *proto.ProxyMapping) bool {
-	return clusterFromMapping(prev) != clusterFromMapping(cur)
-}
-
-// clusterFromMapping returns the cluster the mapping should be sent
-// to. ProxyMapping doesn't carry the cluster directly, so we rely on
-// the synthesised service's domain (`<slug>.<cluster>`) and split on
-// the first '.'.
-func clusterFromMapping(m *proto.ProxyMapping) string {
-	if m == nil {
-		return ""
-	}
-	domain := m.GetDomain()
-	for i := 0; i < len(domain); i++ {
-		if domain[i] == '.' {
-			return domain[i+1:]
-		}
-	}
-	return ""
-}

management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/reconcile_test.go

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ func newReconcileMgr(t *testing.T, ctrl *gomock.Controller) (*managerImpl, *stor
 	return &managerImpl{
 		store:           mockStore,
 		proxyController: mockProxy,
-		reconcileCache:  make(map[string]map[string]*proto.ProxyMapping),
+		reconcileCache:  make(map[string]map[string]syntheticMapping),
 	}, mockStore, mockProxy
 }
 
@@ -52,9 +52,9 @@ func newReconcileTestPolicy(providerID, sourceGroupID string) *types.Policy {
 
 func newReconcileTestSettings() *types.Settings {
 	return &types.Settings{
-		AccountID: "acct-1",
-		Cluster:   "eu.proxy.netbird.io",
-		Subdomain: "violet",
+		AccountID:    "acct-1",
+		Domain:       "violet.eu.proxy.netbird.io",
+		ProxyAddress: "eu.proxy.netbird.io",
 	}
 }
 
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ func TestReconcile_PolicyRemoved_EmitsDelete(t *testing.T) {
 func TestReconcile_NilProxyController_NoOp(t *testing.T) {
 	ctx := context.Background()
 	mgr := &managerImpl{
-		reconcileCache: make(map[string]map[string]*proto.ProxyMapping),
+		reconcileCache: make(map[string]map[string]syntheticMapping),
 	}
 	// Must not panic; must not query the store.
 	mgr.reconcile(ctx, "acct-1")
@@ -212,21 +212,78 @@ func TestReconcile_EmptyAccountID_NoOp(t *testing.T) {
 	mgr.reconcile(ctx, "")
 }
 
-func TestClusterFromMapping(t *testing.T) {
-	tests := []struct {
-		name   string
-		domain string
-		want   string
-	}{
-		{"simple", "openai.eu.proxy.netbird.io", "eu.proxy.netbird.io"},
-		{"deeply nested", "a.b.c.d", "b.c.d"},
-		{"no dot", "openai", ""},
-		{"empty", "", ""},
+// TestDiffMappings_ServingProxyChange — when the proxy serving an account
+// changes, the same service ID must be deleted on the old proxy and created on
+// the new one. The cluster cannot be recovered from the mapping's domain: with a
+// placement-free endpoint the domain does not change at all when the serving
+// proxy does, so a domain-derived cluster sees no change and emits a plain
+// update, addressed to a proxy that does not exist.
+func TestDiffMappings_ServingProxyChange(t *testing.T) {
+	previous := map[string]syntheticMapping{
+		"svc-1": {
+			mapping: &proto.ProxyMapping{Id: "svc-1", AccountId: "acct-1", Domain: "brave-otter.gateway.example.com"},
+			cluster: "proxy.example.com",
+		},
 	}
-	for _, tt := range tests {
-		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
-			got := clusterFromMapping(&proto.ProxyMapping{Domain: tt.domain})
-			assert.Equal(t, tt.want, got)
-		})
+	current := map[string]syntheticMapping{
+		"svc-1": {
+			mapping: &proto.ProxyMapping{Id: "svc-1", AccountId: "acct-1", Domain: "brave-otter.gateway.example.com"},
+			cluster: "brave-otter.gateway.example.com",
+		},
+	}
+
+	creates, updates, deletes := diffMappings(previous, current)
+
+	if assert.Len(t, deletes, 1, "the old proxy must be told to drop the mapping") {
+		assert.Equal(t, "proxy.example.com", deletes[0].cluster)
+	}
+	if assert.Len(t, creates, 1, "the new proxy must be told to add it") {
+		assert.Equal(t, "brave-otter.gateway.example.com", creates[0].cluster)
+	}
+	assert.Empty(t, updates, "a serving-proxy move is a delete plus a create, not an update")
+}
+
+// TestDiffMappings_UnchangedClusterIsAnUpdate keeps the ordinary path: same
+// service, same proxy, changed contents.
+func TestDiffMappings_UnchangedClusterIsAnUpdate(t *testing.T) {
+	previous := map[string]syntheticMapping{
+		"svc-1": {
+			mapping: &proto.ProxyMapping{Id: "svc-1", AccountId: "acct-1", Domain: "otter.proxy.example.com"},
+			cluster: "proxy.example.com",
+		},
+	}
+	current := map[string]syntheticMapping{
+		"svc-1": {
+			mapping: &proto.ProxyMapping{Id: "svc-1", AccountId: "acct-1", Domain: "otter.proxy.example.com"},
+			cluster: "proxy.example.com",
+		},
+	}
+
+	creates, updates, deletes := diffMappings(previous, current)
+
+	assert.Empty(t, creates)
+	assert.Empty(t, deletes)
+	if assert.Len(t, updates, 1) {
+		assert.Equal(t, "proxy.example.com", updates[0].cluster)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestDiffMappings_RemovedServiceIsDeletedOnItsOwnCluster — a service that has
+// gone away is deleted on the cluster it was last served by, which is recorded
+// rather than re-derived.
+func TestDiffMappings_RemovedServiceIsDeletedOnItsOwnCluster(t *testing.T) {
+	previous := map[string]syntheticMapping{
+		"svc-1": {
+			mapping: &proto.ProxyMapping{Id: "svc-1", AccountId: "acct-1", Domain: "brave-otter.gateway.example.com"},
+			cluster: "brave-otter.gateway.example.com",
+		},
+	}
+
+	creates, updates, deletes := diffMappings(previous, map[string]syntheticMapping{})
+
+	assert.Empty(t, creates)
+	assert.Empty(t, updates)
+	if assert.Len(t, deletes, 1) {
+		assert.Equal(t, "brave-otter.gateway.example.com", deletes[0].cluster)
 	}
 }

management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/settings_bootstrap_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
+package agentnetwork
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"runtime"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/golang/mock/gomock"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/types"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/account"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/permissions"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/permissions/modules"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/permissions/operations"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/store"
+	nbtypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/status"
+)
+
+// bootstrapFixture wires a real sqlite store to a gomock permissions manager
+// so tests can grant or deny the settings permission per case.
+type bootstrapFixture struct {
+	manager Manager
+	store   store.Store
+	perms   *permissions.MockManager
+}
+
+func newBootstrapFixture(t *testing.T) *bootstrapFixture {
+	t.Helper()
+	if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
+		t.Skip("sqlite store not properly supported on Windows yet")
+	}
+	t.Setenv("NETBIRD_STORE_ENGINE", string(nbtypes.SqliteStoreEngine))
+
+	st, cleanUp, err := store.NewTestStoreFromSQL(context.Background(), "", t.TempDir())
+	require.NoError(t, err, "test store setup must succeed")
+	t.Cleanup(cleanUp)
+
+	ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
+	perms := permissions.NewMockManager(ctrl)
+
+	accounts := account.NewMockManager(ctrl)
+	accounts.EXPECT().StoreEvent(gomock.Any(), gomock.Any(), gomock.Any(), gomock.Any(), gomock.Any(), gomock.Any()).AnyTimes()
+	accounts.EXPECT().UpdateAccountPeers(gomock.Any(), gomock.Any(), gomock.Any()).AnyTimes()
+	accounts.EXPECT().BufferUpdateAccountPeers(gomock.Any(), gomock.Any(), gomock.Any()).AnyTimes()
+
+	return &bootstrapFixture{
+		manager: NewManager(st, perms, accounts, nil),
+		store:   st,
+		perms:   perms,
+	}
+}
+
+func (f *bootstrapFixture) expectPermission(accountID, userID string, module modules.Module, op operations.Operation, allowed bool) {
+	f.perms.EXPECT().
+		ValidateUserPermissions(gomock.Any(), accountID, userID, module, op).
+		Return(allowed, context.Background(), nil)
+}
+
+func (f *bootstrapFixture) createSettings(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID, proxyAddress, endpoint string) (*types.Settings, error) {
+	return f.manager.CreateSettings(ctx, userID, types.DefaultSettings(accountID), proxyAddress, endpoint)
+}
+
+// TestCreateSettingsRequiresPermission pins the gate: bootstrap assigns the
+// account's immutable endpoint, a settings write requiring the settings
+// Create permission — and a denial leaves no row behind.
+func TestCreateSettingsRequiresPermission(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	f := newBootstrapFixture(t)
+	f.expectPermission("account1", "user1", modules.AgentNetworkSettings, operations.Create, false)
+
+	_, err := f.createSettings(ctx, "account1", "user1", "cluster1.example.com", "")
+	require.Error(t, err, "bootstrap without the settings permission must fail")
+	var sErr *status.Error
+	require.ErrorAs(t, err, &sErr)
+	assert.Equal(t, status.PermissionDenied, sErr.Type(), "denial should surface as permission denied")
+
+	_, err = f.store.GetAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, "account1")
+	assert.Error(t, err, "settings row must not be created when bootstrap is denied")
+}
+
+// TestCreateSettingsLabeled pins the labeled shape: the server allocates an
+// adjective-noun label beneath the proxy address, the pin is not dedicated,
+// and the domain records the full endpoint hostname.
+func TestCreateSettingsLabeled(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	f := newBootstrapFixture(t)
+	f.expectPermission("account1", "user1", modules.AgentNetworkSettings, operations.Create, true)
+
+	created, err := f.createSettings(ctx, "account1", "user1", "Cluster1.Example.com", "")
+	require.NoError(t, err, "labeled bootstrap must succeed")
+	assert.Equal(t, "cluster1.example.com", created.ProxyAddress, "proxy address must be pinned lowercased")
+	require.True(t, strings.HasSuffix(created.Domain, ".cluster1.example.com"),
+		"domain must hang one label beneath the proxy address: %s", created.Domain)
+	label := strings.TrimSuffix(created.Domain, ".cluster1.example.com")
+	assert.NotContains(t, label, ".", "the allocated label must be a single DNS label: %s", label)
+	assert.False(t, created.Dedicated(), "a labeled pin is not dedicated")
+	assert.Equal(t, created.Domain, created.Endpoint(), "the endpoint is the domain column")
+
+	stored, err := f.store.GetAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, "account1")
+	require.NoError(t, err, "bootstrap must persist the row")
+	assert.Equal(t, created.Domain, stored.Domain)
+	assert.Equal(t, created.ProxyAddress, stored.ProxyAddress)
+}
+
+// TestCreateSettingsSelfAddressed pins the dedicated shape: the endpoint is
+// claimed verbatim (normalized), Domain == ProxyAddress, and the claim
+// succeeds with no proxy declaring the address yet (address-first).
+func TestCreateSettingsSelfAddressed(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	f := newBootstrapFixture(t)
+	f.expectPermission("account1", "user1", modules.AgentNetworkSettings, operations.Create, true)
+
+	created, err := f.createSettings(ctx, "account1", "user1", "", "Brave-Otter.GW.Example.com")
+	require.NoError(t, err, "self-addressed bootstrap must succeed")
+	assert.Equal(t, "brave-otter.gw.example.com", created.Domain, "endpoint must be claimed lowercased")
+	assert.Equal(t, created.Domain, created.ProxyAddress, "self-addressed: proxy address is the endpoint")
+	assert.True(t, created.Dedicated(), "a self-addressed pin is dedicated")
+}
+
+// TestCreateSettingsIdentityFieldValidation pins the request contract: exactly
+// one of proxyAddress and endpoint, and both must be well-formed hostnames.
+func TestCreateSettingsIdentityFieldValidation(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	cases := map[string]struct {
+		proxyAddress string
+		endpoint     string
+	}{
+		"neither":               {"", ""},
+		"both":                  {"cluster1.example.com", "gw.example.com"},
+		"trailing dot endpoint": {"", "gw.example.com."},
+		"leading dot endpoint":  {"", ".gw.example.com"},
+		"whitespace inside":     {"", "g w.example.com"},
+		"empty label in parent": {"eu..example.com", ""},
+		"hyphen-edged label":    {"", "-gw.example.com"},
+	}
+	for name, tc := range cases {
+		t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			f := newBootstrapFixture(t)
+			f.expectPermission("account1", "user1", modules.AgentNetworkSettings, operations.Create, true)
+
+			_, err := f.createSettings(ctx, "account1", "user1", tc.proxyAddress, tc.endpoint)
+			require.Error(t, err, "invalid identity input must be rejected")
+			var sErr *status.Error
+			require.ErrorAs(t, err, &sErr)
+			assert.Equal(t, status.InvalidArgument, sErr.Type(), "rejection must be a validation error")
+
+			_, err = f.store.GetAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, "account1")
+			assert.Error(t, err, "no row may be left behind by a rejected bootstrap")
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestCreateSettingsConflictsOnSecondBootstrap pins that bootstrap is a
+// one-time create per account: a second call is a conflict, whatever shape it
+// asks for, and the original row survives untouched.
+func TestCreateSettingsConflictsOnSecondBootstrap(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	f := newBootstrapFixture(t)
+	f.expectPermission("account1", "user1", modules.AgentNetworkSettings, operations.Create, true)
+
+	first, err := f.createSettings(ctx, "account1", "user1", "cluster1.example.com", "")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	f.expectPermission("account1", "user1", modules.AgentNetworkSettings, operations.Create, true)
+	_, err = f.createSettings(ctx, "account1", "user1", "", "other.example.com")
+	require.Error(t, err, "second bootstrap must fail")
+	var sErr *status.Error
+	require.ErrorAs(t, err, &sErr)
+	assert.Equal(t, status.AlreadyExists, sErr.Type(), "second bootstrap must surface as a conflict")
+
+	stored, err := f.store.GetAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, "account1")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Equal(t, first.Domain, stored.Domain, "the original endpoint must survive the rejected bootstrap")
+}
+
+// TestCreateSettingsEndpointTaken pins global hostname uniqueness: a hostname
+// held by one account cannot be claimed by another, in either direction —
+// self-addressed onto self-addressed, or self-addressed onto an allocated
+// labeled endpoint.
+func TestCreateSettingsEndpointTaken(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	f := newBootstrapFixture(t)
+
+	f.expectPermission("account1", "user1", modules.AgentNetworkSettings, operations.Create, true)
+	first, err := f.createSettings(ctx, "account1", "user1", "", "gw.example.com")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	f.expectPermission("account2", "user2", modules.AgentNetworkSettings, operations.Create, true)
+	_, err = f.createSettings(ctx, "account2", "user2", "", "gw.example.com")
+	require.Error(t, err, "a taken hostname must be refused")
+	var sErr *status.Error
+	require.ErrorAs(t, err, &sErr)
+	assert.Equal(t, status.AlreadyExists, sErr.Type(), "the refusal must surface as a conflict")
+
+	f.expectPermission("account3", "user3", modules.AgentNetworkSettings, operations.Create, true)
+	_, err = f.createSettings(ctx, "account3", "user3", "", first.Domain)
+	require.Error(t, err, "claiming another account's endpoint must be refused")
+}
+
+// TestCreateProviderHasNoSettingsSideEffects pins the decoupling: provider
+// create needs only the providers permission (gomock fails the test on any
+// settings-permission call) and never creates a settings row.
+func TestCreateProviderHasNoSettingsSideEffects(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	f := newBootstrapFixture(t)
+	f.expectPermission("account1", "user1", modules.AgentNetworkProviders, operations.Create, true)
+
+	provider := types.NewProvider("account1")
+	provider.Name = "openai"
+	provider.UpstreamURL = "https://api.openai.com"
+	provider.APIKey = "sk-test"
+	provider.Enabled = true
+
+	created, err := f.manager.CreateProvider(ctx, "user1", provider)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "provider create must succeed on the providers permission alone")
+	require.NotNil(t, created)
+
+	_, err = f.store.GetAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, "account1")
+	assert.Error(t, err, "provider create must not conjure a settings row")
+}

management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/synthesizer.go

@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ func SynthesizeServicesForCluster(ctx context.Context, s store.Store, clusterAdd
 		return nil, nil
 	}
 
-	settingsRows, err := s.GetAgentNetworkSettingsByCluster(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, clusterAddr)
+	settingsRows, err := s.GetAgentNetworkSettingsByProxyAddress(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, clusterAddr)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("list agent network settings on cluster: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -116,53 +116,41 @@ func SynthesizeServicesForCluster(ctx context.Context, s store.Store, clusterAdd
 }
 
 // SynthesizeServiceForDomain resolves a single agent-network service by its
-// public endpoint domain. It lists the (few) settings rows on the domain's
-// cluster, matches the one whose endpoint equals the domain, and synthesises
-// only that account — avoiding full per-account synthesis for every tenant on
-// the cluster, which is what auth/session paths previously paid. Returns nil
-// (no error) when no account owns the domain.
+// public endpoint domain — a point query on the settings domain unique index,
+// then synthesis of just that account. Returns nil (no error) when no account
+// owns the domain.
 func SynthesizeServiceForDomain(ctx context.Context, s store.Store, domain string) (*rpservice.Service, error) {
-	domain = strings.TrimSpace(domain)
-	cluster := clusterFromDomain(domain)
-	if domain != "" && cluster != "" {
-		settingsRows, err := s.GetAgentNetworkSettingsByCluster(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, cluster)
-		if err != nil {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("list agent network settings on cluster: %w", err)
+	domain = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(domain))
+	if domain == "" {
+		return nil, nil //nolint:nilnil // optional lookup: no account owns the domain
+	}
+
+	settings, err := s.GetAgentNetworkSettingsByDomain(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, domain)
+	if err != nil {
+		if isNotFound(err) {
+			return nil, nil //nolint:nilnil // optional lookup: no account owns the domain
 		}
-		for _, settings := range settingsRows {
-			if settings == nil || settings.Endpoint() != domain {
-				continue
-			}
-			services, serr := SynthesizeServices(ctx, s, settings.AccountID)
-			if serr != nil {
-				return nil, serr
-			}
-			for _, svc := range services {
-				if svc != nil && svc.Domain == domain {
-					return svc, nil
-				}
-			}
-			break
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("get agent network settings by domain: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	services, err := SynthesizeServices(ctx, s, settings.AccountID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	for _, svc := range services {
+		if svc != nil && svc.Domain == domain {
+			return svc, nil
 		}
 	}
 	return nil, nil //nolint:nilnil // optional lookup: no account owns the domain
 }
 
-// clusterFromDomain returns the cluster portion of an endpoint domain (every
-// label after the first).
-func clusterFromDomain(domain string) string {
-	if i := strings.IndexByte(domain, '.'); i >= 0 {
-		return domain[i+1:]
-	}
-	return ""
-}
-
 // SynthesizeServices builds the in-memory reverse-proxy service that
 // fronts the account's agent-network gateway. Returns nil when the
 // account has no settings row, no enabled providers, or no enabled
 // policies — in any of those cases there's nothing useful to expose.
 //
-// One service per (account, settings.Cluster) is emitted. The router
+// One service per (account, settings.ProxyAddress) is emitted. The router
 // middleware encodes a denormalised model→provider routing table
 // (auth headers + decrypted API keys baked in); the policy_check
 // middleware encodes per-provider authorised group IDs derived from
@@ -175,7 +163,7 @@ func SynthesizeServices(ctx context.Context, s store.Store, accountID string) ([
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
-	if !ok || strings.TrimSpace(settings.Cluster) == "" {
+	if !ok || strings.TrimSpace(settings.ProxyAddress) == "" {
 		return nil, nil
 	}
 
@@ -934,7 +922,7 @@ func buildAccountService(
 	middlewares []rpservice.MiddlewareConfig,
 	sessionPriv, sessionPub string,
 ) *rpservice.Service {
-	cluster := settings.Cluster
+	cluster := settings.ProxyAddress
 	domain := settings.Endpoint()
 	serviceID := SynthesizedServiceIDPrefix + accountID
 

management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/synthesizer_realstore_test.go

@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ func TestReconcile_RealStore_PushesPrivateAfterStatusToggle(t *testing.T) {
 		store:           s,
 		accountManager:  noopAccountManager{},
 		proxyController: ctrl,
-		reconcileCache:  make(map[string]map[string]*proto.ProxyMapping),
+		reconcileCache:  make(map[string]map[string]syntheticMapping),
 	}
 
 	m.reconcile(ctx, testAccountID) // initial, provider enabled

management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/synthesizer_test.go

@@ -19,15 +19,14 @@ import (
 const (
 	testAccountID = "acct-1"
 	testCluster   = "eu.proxy.netbird.io"
-	testSubdomain = "violet"
 	testEndpoint  = "violet.eu.proxy.netbird.io"
 )
 
 func newSynthTestSettings() *types.Settings {
 	return &types.Settings{
-		AccountID: testAccountID,
-		Cluster:   testCluster,
-		Subdomain: testSubdomain,
+		AccountID:    testAccountID,
+		Domain:       testEndpoint,
+		ProxyAddress: testCluster,
 	}
 }
 

management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/types/settings.go

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 package types
 
 import (
+	"fmt"
 	"strings"
 	"time"
 
@@ -12,13 +13,23 @@ import (
 // the long-term aggregate and are retained independently.
 const DefaultAccessLogRetentionDays = 30
 
-// Settings is the per-account agent-network configuration row. One
-// row per account. Cluster + Subdomain are immutable once written and
-// produce the public endpoint agents call (`<subdomain>.<cluster>`).
+// Settings is the per-account agent-network configuration row. One row per
+// account. Domain and ProxyAddress are assigned at bootstrap and immutable
+// thereafter; a persisted row is always fully allocated — there is no "row
+// exists, endpoint pending" state.
 type Settings struct {
 	AccountID string `gorm:"primaryKey"`
-	Cluster   string
-	Subdomain string `gorm:"index:idx_agent_network_settings_cluster_subdomain"`
+
+	// Domain is the gateway endpoint hostname agents call. Globally unique
+	// across accounts. Sized explicitly because MySQL cannot index an
+	// unbounded TEXT column; 255 covers the RFC 1035 253-octet bound.
+	Domain string `gorm:"type:varchar(255);uniqueIndex:idx_agent_network_settings_domain"`
+
+	// ProxyAddress is the declared cluster address of the proxy serving this
+	// account's gateway. Either equal to Domain — a proxy dedicated to this
+	// account, declaring the tenant's own hostname — or Domain's immediate
+	// parent, with the endpoint one label beneath it on a shared cluster.
+	ProxyAddress string `gorm:"type:varchar(255);index:idx_agent_network_settings_proxy_address"`
 
 	// Account-level collection controls sourced by the synthesizer.
 	// EnableLogCollection gates the per-request access-log trail and defaults
@@ -45,9 +56,9 @@ func (Settings) TableName() string { return "agent_network_settings" }
 
 // DefaultSettings returns the settings an account observes before its row is
 // bootstrapped: log collection on with the default retention, everything else
-// off, and no cluster/subdomain assigned yet. Bootstrap persists exactly these
-// values plus the assigned cluster and subdomain, so the pre-bootstrap read
-// and the freshly bootstrapped row agree.
+// off, and no domain or proxy address assigned yet. Bootstrap persists exactly
+// these values plus the assigned domain and proxy address, so the
+// pre-bootstrap read and the freshly bootstrapped row agree.
 func DefaultSettings(accountID string) *Settings {
 	return &Settings{
 		AccountID:              accountID,
@@ -56,14 +67,15 @@ func DefaultSettings(accountID string) *Settings {
 	}
 }
 
-// Endpoint returns the bare hostname agents reach this account at:
-// `<subdomain>.<cluster>`. Empty until both halves are assigned at bootstrap.
-func (s *Settings) Endpoint() string {
-	if s.Cluster == "" || s.Subdomain == "" {
-		return ""
-	}
-	return s.Subdomain + "." + s.Cluster
-}
+// Endpoint returns the bare hostname agents reach this account at — the
+// Domain column. Empty until the row is bootstrapped.
+func (s *Settings) Endpoint() string { return s.Domain }
+
+// Dedicated reports whether the account's gateway is served by a proxy
+// dedicated to it — the self-addressed shape, where the serving proxy declares
+// the endpoint hostname itself. The alternative (labeled) shape has the
+// endpoint one label beneath a shared cluster's address.
+func (s *Settings) Dedicated() bool { return s.Domain != "" && s.Domain == s.ProxyAddress }
 
 // ToAPIResponse renders the settings as the API representation. The
 // timestamps are omitted while zero — a default (not yet bootstrapped) view
@@ -71,9 +83,9 @@ func (s *Settings) Endpoint() string {
 func (s *Settings) ToAPIResponse() *api.AgentNetworkSettings {
 	retention := s.AccessLogRetentionDays
 	resp := &api.AgentNetworkSettings{
-		Cluster:                s.Cluster,
-		Subdomain:              s.Subdomain,
 		Endpoint:               s.Endpoint(),
+		ProxyAddress:           s.ProxyAddress,
+		Dedicated:              s.Dedicated(),
 		EnableLogCollection:    s.EnableLogCollection,
 		EnablePromptCollection: s.EnablePromptCollection,
 		RedactPii:              s.RedactPii,
@@ -90,19 +102,91 @@ func (s *Settings) ToAPIResponse() *api.AgentNetworkSettings {
 	return resp
 }
 
-// FromAPIRequest applies the request onto the receiver. The mutable
-// collection fields are always replaced with the request values. Cluster
-// participates only in bootstrap and the immutability check (see
-// Manager.UpdateSettings); Subdomain is server-assigned and never taken
-// from a request.
+// FromAPIRequest applies the update request onto the receiver: every mutable
+// field is replaced with the request value, and the identity fields (Domain,
+// ProxyAddress) carry the request's echo of the assigned values. The identity
+// fields are never written to the stored row — UpdateSettings compares them
+// against it and rejects the request when they differ, so PUT keeps the
+// house convention of requiring every field while the endpoint and proxy
+// address stay immutable.
+//
+// Every field is required by the schema, so none is presence-sensitive.
+// AccessLogRetentionDays in particular must stay required: the caller receives
+// a zero-valued Settings, and UpdateSettings copies each field onto the stored
+// row unconditionally, so an omitted value would be written as 0 — which the
+// API documents as "keep indefinitely". Making retention optional would
+// therefore let a client silently maximise log retention by leaving it out.
 func (s *Settings) FromAPIRequest(req *api.AgentNetworkSettingsRequest) {
-	if req.Cluster != nil {
-		s.Cluster = strings.TrimSpace(*req.Cluster)
-	}
+	s.Domain = req.Endpoint
+	s.ProxyAddress = req.ProxyAddress
 	s.EnableLogCollection = req.EnableLogCollection
 	s.EnablePromptCollection = req.EnablePromptCollection
 	s.RedactPii = req.RedactPii
+	s.AccessLogRetentionDays = req.AccessLogRetentionDays
+}
+
+// FromAPICreateRequest applies the optional collection toggles of a bootstrap
+// request onto the receiver (typically DefaultSettings), leaving defaults in
+// place for omitted fields. The identity fields are resolved by the manager
+// from the request's proxy_address / endpoint, not copied here.
+func (s *Settings) FromAPICreateRequest(req *api.AgentNetworkSettingsCreateRequest) {
+	if req.EnableLogCollection != nil {
+		s.EnableLogCollection = *req.EnableLogCollection
+	}
+	if req.EnablePromptCollection != nil {
+		s.EnablePromptCollection = *req.EnablePromptCollection
+	}
+	if req.RedactPii != nil {
+		s.RedactPii = *req.RedactPii
+	}
 	if req.AccessLogRetentionDays != nil {
 		s.AccessLogRetentionDays = *req.AccessLogRetentionDays
 	}
 }
+
+// maxHostnameLength is the RFC 1035 bound on a full domain name.
+const maxHostnameLength = 253
+
+// NormalizeHostname lowercases and trims a caller-supplied hostname and
+// validates its shape: non-empty DNS labels of letters, digits and inner
+// hyphens, joined by single dots, within length bounds. Shapes that
+// canonicalization cannot repair — leading/trailing dots, empty labels,
+// whitespace inside the name — are rejected rather than guessed at, because
+// the value lands in an immutable column.
+func NormalizeHostname(raw string) (string, error) {
+	hostname := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(raw))
+	if hostname == "" {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("hostname is empty")
+	}
+	if len(hostname) > maxHostnameLength {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("hostname exceeds %d characters", maxHostnameLength)
+	}
+	for _, label := range strings.Split(hostname, ".") {
+		if err := validateHostnameLabel(label); err != nil {
+			return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid hostname %q: %w", hostname, err)
+		}
+	}
+	return hostname, nil
+}
+
+func validateHostnameLabel(label string) error {
+	if label == "" {
+		return fmt.Errorf("empty label (leading, trailing or doubled dot)")
+	}
+	if len(label) > 63 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("label %q exceeds 63 characters", label)
+	}
+	if label[0] == '-' || label[len(label)-1] == '-' {
+		return fmt.Errorf("label %q must not start or end with a hyphen", label)
+	}
+	for _, r := range label {
+		switch {
+		case r >= 'a' && r <= 'z':
+		case r >= '0' && r <= '9':
+		case r == '-':
+		default:
+			return fmt.Errorf("label %q contains invalid character %q", label, r)
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}

management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/activity/interface.go

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+// Package activity records that a principal used a reverse proxy service, so
+// that activity accounting counts people and devices which reach services
+// through the proxy but never touch the dashboard or the management API.
+package activity
+
+import (
+	"context"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
+)
+
+// Manager records reverse proxy usage against the timestamps activity
+// accounting reads. Both methods are best effort from the caller's point of
+// view: a lost record is corrected by the next request, and no authorization
+// decision reads them back.
+type Manager interface {
+	// RecordUserLogin records a completed SSO sign-in to a proxied service.
+	// Service users have no interactive login and are ignored.
+	RecordUserLogin(ctx context.Context, accountID string, user *types.User) error
+	// RecordPeerSeen records that a peer reached a private service over the
+	// mesh, which is what lets its owner count as active. Peers activity
+	// accounting excludes, and peers already seen recently, are ignored.
+	RecordPeerSeen(ctx context.Context, accountID string, peer *peer.Peer) error
+}

management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/activity/manager/manager.go

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+package manager
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/activity"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/store"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
+)
+
+// peerSeenInterval is how stale a peer's LastSeen must be before reaching a
+// private service refreshes it. Positive tunnel validations are cached on the
+// proxy for five minutes, so without a floor a busy peer would rewrite its row
+// behind every request; an hour still sits well inside the window activity
+// accounting asks about.
+const peerSeenInterval = time.Hour
+
+type managerImpl struct {
+	store store.Store
+}
+
+// NewManager returns the activity manager backed by the management store.
+func NewManager(store store.Store) activity.Manager {
+	return &managerImpl{store: store}
+}
+
+// RecordUserLogin stamps the login the same way the dashboard and device login
+// paths do, so a person who only ever reaches proxied services still has a
+// login on record.
+func (m *managerImpl) RecordUserLogin(ctx context.Context, accountID string, user *types.User) error {
+	if user == nil || user.IsServiceUser {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	return m.store.SaveUserLastLogin(ctx, accountID, user.Id, time.Now().UTC())
+}
+
+// RecordPeerSeen stamps LastSeen, the column a peer activates its owner
+// through. The peer the caller already holds answers the throttle without a
+// query, so a peer seen inside the interval costs nothing to skip; the same
+// cutoff goes to the store, which enforces it inside the UPDATE so concurrent
+// requests for one peer cannot each write off their own stale read.
+func (m *managerImpl) RecordPeerSeen(ctx context.Context, accountID string, peer *peer.Peer) error {
+	if peer == nil || !countsTowardActivity(peer) {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	staleBefore := time.Now().UTC().Add(-peerSeenInterval)
+	if peer.Status != nil && peer.Status.LastSeen.After(staleBefore) {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	_, err := m.store.RefreshPeerLastSeen(ctx, accountID, peer.ID, staleBefore)
+
+	return err
+}
+
+// countsTowardActivity reports whether the peer represents a device a person
+// actually runs. Embedded proxy peers are infrastructure and browser (WASM)
+// clients are ephemeral sessions, so activity accounting ignores both and a
+// write for them could never count.
+func countsTowardActivity(peer *peer.Peer) bool {
+	return !peer.ProxyMeta.Embedded && peer.Meta.KernelVersion != "wasm"
+}

management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/activity/manager/manager_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+package manager
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/store"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
+)
+
+// recordingStore captures the two writes the activity manager makes. The
+// embedded interface satisfies the rest and panics if anything else is called,
+// which keeps the manager honest about its surface.
+type recordingStore struct {
+	store.Store
+	logins []loginWrite
+	seen   []seenWrite
+}
+
+type loginWrite struct {
+	accountID string
+	userID    string
+	at        time.Time
+}
+
+type seenWrite struct {
+	accountID   string
+	peerID      string
+	staleBefore time.Time
+}
+
+func (s *recordingStore) SaveUserLastLogin(_ context.Context, accountID, userID string, lastLogin time.Time) error {
+	s.logins = append(s.logins, loginWrite{accountID: accountID, userID: userID, at: lastLogin})
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (s *recordingStore) RefreshPeerLastSeen(_ context.Context, accountID, peerID string, staleBefore time.Time) (bool, error) {
+	s.seen = append(s.seen, seenWrite{accountID: accountID, peerID: peerID, staleBefore: staleBefore})
+	return true, nil
+}
+
+func TestRecordUserLogin(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name        string
+		user        *types.User
+		expectWrite bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name:        "regular user is recorded",
+			user:        &types.User{Id: "user1", AccountID: "account1"},
+			expectWrite: true,
+		},
+		{
+			// Activity accounting never counts service users, so a row for one
+			// would be noise.
+			name:        "service user is ignored",
+			user:        &types.User{Id: "svc1", AccountID: "account1", IsServiceUser: true},
+			expectWrite: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "missing user is ignored",
+			user:        nil,
+			expectWrite: false,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			st := &recordingStore{}
+			require.NoError(t, NewManager(st).RecordUserLogin(context.Background(), "account1", tt.user))
+
+			if !tt.expectWrite {
+				assert.Empty(t, st.logins, "no login should have been recorded")
+				return
+			}
+
+			require.Len(t, st.logins, 1, "exactly one login should have been recorded")
+			assert.Equal(t, "account1", st.logins[0].accountID, "login must be recorded against the service account")
+			assert.Equal(t, tt.user.Id, st.logins[0].userID, "login must be recorded against the signing-in user")
+			assert.Equal(t, time.UTC, st.logins[0].at.Location(), "timestamps are written in UTC")
+			assert.WithinDuration(t, time.Now().UTC(), st.logins[0].at, time.Minute, "login should be stamped now")
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRecordPeerSeen(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name        string
+		peer        *peer.Peer
+		expectWrite bool
+	}{
+		{
+			name:        "peer seen long ago is recorded",
+			peer:        &peer.Peer{ID: "peer1", Status: &peer.PeerStatus{LastSeen: time.Now().Add(-3 * time.Hour)}},
+			expectWrite: true,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "peer never seen is recorded",
+			peer:        &peer.Peer{ID: "peer1", Status: &peer.PeerStatus{}},
+			expectWrite: true,
+		},
+		{
+			// The throttle. The caller already holds the peer, so skipping a
+			// recently seen one costs nothing.
+			name:        "peer seen inside the interval is skipped",
+			peer:        &peer.Peer{ID: "peer1", Status: &peer.PeerStatus{LastSeen: time.Now().Add(-10 * time.Minute)}},
+			expectWrite: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "embedded proxy peer is skipped",
+			peer:        &peer.Peer{ID: "peer1", ProxyMeta: peer.ProxyMeta{Embedded: true}, Status: &peer.PeerStatus{LastSeen: time.Now().Add(-3 * time.Hour)}},
+			expectWrite: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "browser client is skipped",
+			peer:        &peer.Peer{ID: "peer1", Meta: peer.PeerSystemMeta{KernelVersion: "wasm"}, Status: &peer.PeerStatus{LastSeen: time.Now().Add(-3 * time.Hour)}},
+			expectWrite: false,
+		},
+		{
+			name:        "missing peer is ignored",
+			peer:        nil,
+			expectWrite: false,
+		},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			st := &recordingStore{}
+			require.NoError(t, NewManager(st).RecordPeerSeen(context.Background(), "account1", tt.peer))
+
+			if !tt.expectWrite {
+				assert.Empty(t, st.seen, "no activity should have been recorded")
+				return
+			}
+
+			require.Len(t, st.seen, 1, "exactly one activity write should have been recorded")
+			assert.Equal(t, "account1", st.seen[0].accountID, "activity must be recorded against the service account")
+			assert.Equal(t, tt.peer.ID, st.seen[0].peerID, "activity must be recorded against the calling peer")
+			assert.Equal(t, time.UTC, st.seen[0].staleBefore.Location(), "cutoffs are passed in UTC")
+			assert.WithinDuration(t, time.Now().UTC().Add(-peerSeenInterval), st.seen[0].staleBefore, time.Minute,
+				"the store must enforce the same interval the local check applies")
+		})
+	}
+}

management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/domain/manager/manager.go

@@ -2,24 +2,28 @@ package manager
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"net"
 	"strings"
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 
+	agentnetworkTypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/types"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/domain"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/account"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/activity"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/permissions"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/permissions/modules"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/permissions/operations"
+	nbstore "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/store"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/status"
 )
 
 type store interface {
 	GetAccount(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (*types.Account, error)
+	GetAgentNetworkSettings(ctx context.Context, lockStrength nbstore.LockingStrength, accountID string) (*agentnetworkTypes.Settings, error)
 
 	GetCustomDomain(ctx context.Context, accountID string, domainID string) (*domain.Domain, error)
 	ListFreeDomains(ctx context.Context, accountID string) ([]string, error)
@@ -311,17 +315,21 @@ func (m Manager) getClusterAllowList(ctx context.Context, accountID string) ([]s
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("get public cluster addresses: %w", err)
 	}
+	reserved, err := m.reservedGatewayAddress(ctx, accountID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
 	seen := make(map[string]struct{}, len(byopAddresses)+len(publicAddresses))
 	merged := make([]string, 0, len(byopAddresses)+len(publicAddresses))
 	for _, addr := range byopAddresses {
-		if _, ok := seen[addr]; ok {
+		if _, ok := seen[addr]; ok || addr == reserved {
 			continue
 		}
 		seen[addr] = struct{}{}
 		merged = append(merged, addr)
 	}
 	for _, addr := range publicAddresses {
-		if _, ok := seen[addr]; ok {
+		if _, ok := seen[addr]; ok || addr == reserved {
 			continue
 		}
 		seen[addr] = struct{}{}
@@ -330,6 +338,31 @@ func (m Manager) getClusterAllowList(ctx context.Context, accountID string) ([]s
 	return merged, nil
 }
 
+// reservedGatewayAddress returns the account's agent-network gateway address
+// when its settings pin is self-addressed — a proxy dedicated to serving
+// exactly the gateway. Dropping that address from the cluster allow list keeps
+// it from being offered as a cluster for ordinary services, and because the
+// free-domain suffix match is depth-independent, dropping the address rejects
+// every name beneath it as well as the bare one. Only the account's own
+// gateway address can ever appear in its allow list (another tenant's gateway
+// proxy is account-scoped to them), so this single-address exclusion is
+// sufficient. Returns "" when the account has no settings row or a labeled
+// (shared-cluster) pin.
+func (m Manager) reservedGatewayAddress(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (string, error) {
+	settings, err := m.store.GetAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, nbstore.LockingStrengthNone, accountID)
+	if err != nil {
+		var sErr *status.Error
+		if errors.As(err, &sErr) && sErr.Type() == status.NotFound {
+			return "", nil
+		}
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("get agent network settings: %w", err)
+	}
+	if settings == nil || !settings.Dedicated() {
+		return "", nil
+	}
+	return settings.ProxyAddress, nil
+}
+
 func extractClusterFromCustomDomains(serviceDomain string, customDomains []*domain.Domain) (string, bool) {
 	bestCluster := ""
 	bestLen := -1

management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/domain/manager/manager_test.go

@@ -7,6 +7,12 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	agentnetworkTypes "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/types"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/domain"
+	nbstore "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/store"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/status"
 )
 
 type mockProxyManager struct {
@@ -55,7 +61,7 @@ func TestGetClusterAllowList_BYOPMergedWithPublic(t *testing.T) {
 		},
 	}
 
-	mgr := Manager{proxyManager: pm}
+	mgr := Manager{store: &stubStore{}, proxyManager: pm}
 	result, err := mgr.getClusterAllowList(context.Background(), "acc-123")
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	assert.Equal(t, []string{"byop.example.com", "eu.proxy.netbird.io"}, result)
@@ -71,7 +77,7 @@ func TestGetClusterAllowList_DeduplicatesBYOPAndPublic(t *testing.T) {
 		},
 	}
 
-	mgr := Manager{proxyManager: pm}
+	mgr := Manager{store: &stubStore{}, proxyManager: pm}
 	result, err := mgr.getClusterAllowList(context.Background(), "acc-123")
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	assert.Equal(t, []string{"shared.example.com", "byop.example.com", "eu.proxy.netbird.io"}, result)
@@ -87,7 +93,7 @@ func TestGetClusterAllowList_NoBYOP_FallbackToShared(t *testing.T) {
 		},
 	}
 
-	mgr := Manager{proxyManager: pm}
+	mgr := Manager{store: &stubStore{}, proxyManager: pm}
 	result, err := mgr.getClusterAllowList(context.Background(), "acc-123")
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	assert.Equal(t, []string{"eu.proxy.netbird.io", "us.proxy.netbird.io"}, result)
@@ -100,7 +106,7 @@ func TestGetClusterAllowList_BYOPError_ReturnsError(t *testing.T) {
 		},
 	}
 
-	mgr := Manager{proxyManager: pm}
+	mgr := Manager{store: &stubStore{}, proxyManager: pm}
 	result, err := mgr.getClusterAllowList(context.Background(), "acc-123")
 	require.Error(t, err)
 	assert.Nil(t, result)
@@ -117,7 +123,7 @@ func TestGetClusterAllowList_PublicError_ReturnsError(t *testing.T) {
 		},
 	}
 
-	mgr := Manager{proxyManager: pm}
+	mgr := Manager{store: &stubStore{}, proxyManager: pm}
 	result, err := mgr.getClusterAllowList(context.Background(), "acc-123")
 	require.Error(t, err)
 	assert.Nil(t, result)
@@ -134,7 +140,7 @@ func TestGetClusterAllowList_BYOPEmptySlice_FallbackToShared(t *testing.T) {
 		},
 	}
 
-	mgr := Manager{proxyManager: pm}
+	mgr := Manager{store: &stubStore{}, proxyManager: pm}
 	result, err := mgr.getClusterAllowList(context.Background(), "acc-123")
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	assert.Equal(t, []string{"eu.proxy.netbird.io"}, result)
@@ -150,8 +156,138 @@ func TestGetClusterAllowList_PublicEmpty_BYOPOnly(t *testing.T) {
 		},
 	}
 
-	mgr := Manager{proxyManager: pm}
+	mgr := Manager{store: &stubStore{}, proxyManager: pm}
 	result, err := mgr.getClusterAllowList(context.Background(), "acc-123")
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	assert.Equal(t, []string{"byop.example.com"}, result)
 }
+
+// stubStore satisfies the manager's narrow store interface for allow-list
+// tests. Only the agent-network settings lookup participates; the default (a
+// nil func) reads as "no settings row", the state most accounts are in.
+type stubStore struct {
+	getAgentNetworkSettingsFunc func(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (*agentnetworkTypes.Settings, error)
+}
+
+func (s *stubStore) GetAccount(context.Context, string) (*types.Account, error) {
+	panic("not used in allow-list tests")
+}
+
+func (s *stubStore) GetAgentNetworkSettings(ctx context.Context, _ nbstore.LockingStrength, accountID string) (*agentnetworkTypes.Settings, error) {
+	if s.getAgentNetworkSettingsFunc != nil {
+		return s.getAgentNetworkSettingsFunc(ctx, accountID)
+	}
+	return nil, status.Errorf(status.NotFound, "agent network settings for account %s not found", accountID)
+}
+
+func (s *stubStore) GetCustomDomain(context.Context, string, string) (*domain.Domain, error) {
+	panic("not used in allow-list tests")
+}
+
+func (s *stubStore) ListFreeDomains(context.Context, string) ([]string, error) {
+	panic("not used in allow-list tests")
+}
+
+func (s *stubStore) ListCustomDomains(context.Context, string) ([]*domain.Domain, error) {
+	panic("not used in allow-list tests")
+}
+
+func (s *stubStore) CreateCustomDomain(context.Context, string, string, string, bool) (*domain.Domain, error) {
+	panic("not used in allow-list tests")
+}
+
+func (s *stubStore) UpdateCustomDomain(context.Context, string, *domain.Domain) (*domain.Domain, error) {
+	panic("not used in allow-list tests")
+}
+
+func (s *stubStore) DeleteCustomDomain(context.Context, string, string) error {
+	panic("not used in allow-list tests")
+}
+
+// TestGetClusterAllowList_DedicatedGatewayAddressExcluded pins invariant (B)'s
+// chokepoint: a self-addressed settings pin reserves the account's gateway
+// address, so it is dropped from the allow list — which, because the
+// free-domain suffix match is depth-independent, rejects every name beneath
+// it as well as the bare one. Other addresses are unaffected.
+func TestGetClusterAllowList_DedicatedGatewayAddressExcluded(t *testing.T) {
+	pm := &mockProxyManager{
+		getActiveClusterAddressesForAccountFunc: func(_ context.Context, _ string) ([]string, error) {
+			return []string{"brave-otter.gateway.example.com", "byop.example.com"}, nil
+		},
+		getActiveClusterAddressesFunc: func(_ context.Context) ([]string, error) {
+			return []string{"eu.proxy.netbird.io"}, nil
+		},
+	}
+	st := &stubStore{
+		getAgentNetworkSettingsFunc: func(_ context.Context, accountID string) (*agentnetworkTypes.Settings, error) {
+			assert.Equal(t, "acc-123", accountID,
+				"the exclusion must look up the requesting account's own settings")
+			return &agentnetworkTypes.Settings{
+				AccountID:    accountID,
+				Domain:       "brave-otter.gateway.example.com",
+				ProxyAddress: "brave-otter.gateway.example.com",
+			}, nil
+		},
+	}
+
+	mgr := Manager{store: st, proxyManager: pm}
+	result, err := mgr.getClusterAllowList(context.Background(), "acc-123")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Equal(t, []string{"byop.example.com", "eu.proxy.netbird.io"}, result,
+		"the dedicated gateway address must be reserved from cluster selection")
+}
+
+// TestGetClusterAllowList_LabeledPinDoesNotExclude pins the counterpart: a
+// labeled pin means the gateway rides on a shared cluster serving ordinary
+// services too, so nothing is reserved.
+func TestGetClusterAllowList_LabeledPinDoesNotExclude(t *testing.T) {
+	pm := &mockProxyManager{
+		getActiveClusterAddressesForAccountFunc: func(_ context.Context, _ string) ([]string, error) {
+			return []string{"byop.example.com"}, nil
+		},
+		getActiveClusterAddressesFunc: func(_ context.Context) ([]string, error) {
+			return []string{"eu.proxy.netbird.io"}, nil
+		},
+	}
+	st := &stubStore{
+		getAgentNetworkSettingsFunc: func(_ context.Context, accountID string) (*agentnetworkTypes.Settings, error) {
+			return &agentnetworkTypes.Settings{
+				AccountID:    accountID,
+				Domain:       "violet.eu.proxy.netbird.io",
+				ProxyAddress: "eu.proxy.netbird.io",
+			}, nil
+		},
+	}
+
+	mgr := Manager{store: st, proxyManager: pm}
+	result, err := mgr.getClusterAllowList(context.Background(), "acc-123")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Equal(t, []string{"byop.example.com", "eu.proxy.netbird.io"}, result,
+		"a labeled pin reserves nothing")
+}
+
+// TestGetClusterAllowList_SettingsLookupError_ReturnsError pins that a store
+// outage is surfaced rather than silently treated as "nothing reserved" —
+// failing open here would offer a reserved gateway address for ordinary
+// services.
+func TestGetClusterAllowList_SettingsLookupError_ReturnsError(t *testing.T) {
+	pm := &mockProxyManager{
+		getActiveClusterAddressesForAccountFunc: func(_ context.Context, _ string) ([]string, error) {
+			return []string{"byop.example.com"}, nil
+		},
+		getActiveClusterAddressesFunc: func(_ context.Context) ([]string, error) {
+			return []string{"eu.proxy.netbird.io"}, nil
+		},
+	}
+	st := &stubStore{
+		getAgentNetworkSettingsFunc: func(_ context.Context, _ string) (*agentnetworkTypes.Settings, error) {
+			return nil, status.Errorf(status.Internal, "store outage")
+		},
+	}
+
+	mgr := Manager{store: st, proxyManager: pm}
+	result, err := mgr.getClusterAllowList(context.Background(), "acc-123")
+	require.Error(t, err)
+	assert.Nil(t, result)
+	assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "agent network settings")
+}

management/internals/server/boot.go

@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/accesslogs"
 	accesslogsmanager "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/accesslogs/manager"
+	proxyactivity "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/activity"
+	proxyactivitymanager "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/activity/manager"
 	rpservice "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/service"
 	nbgrpc "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/shared/grpc"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/activity"
@@ -231,6 +233,7 @@ func (s *BaseServer) ReverseProxyGRPCServer() *nbgrpc.ProxyServiceServer {
 		proxyService := nbgrpc.NewProxyServiceServer(s.AccessLogsManager(), s.ProxyTokenStore(), s.PKCEVerifierStore(), s.proxyOIDCConfig(), s.PeersManager(), s.UsersManager(), s.IdpManager(), s.ProxyManager(), s.Store())
 		s.AfterInit(func(s *BaseServer) {
 			proxyService.SetServiceManager(s.ServiceManager())
+			proxyService.SetActivityManager(s.ProxyActivityManager())
 			proxyService.SetProxyController(s.ServiceProxyController())
 			proxyService.SetAgentNetworkSynthesizer(newAgentNetworkSynthesizer(s.Store()))
 			proxyService.SetAgentNetworkLimitsService(s.AgentNetworkManager())
@@ -290,6 +293,13 @@ func (s *BaseServer) PKCEVerifierStore() *nbgrpc.PKCEVerifierStore {
 	})
 }
 
+// ProxyActivityManager records reverse proxy usage for activity accounting.
+func (s *BaseServer) ProxyActivityManager() proxyactivity.Manager {
+	return Create(s, func() proxyactivity.Manager {
+		return proxyactivitymanager.NewManager(s.Store())
+	})
+}
+
 func (s *BaseServer) AccessLogsManager() accesslogs.Manager {
 	return Create(s, func() accesslogs.Manager {
 		accessLogManager := accesslogsmanager.NewManager(s.Store(), s.PermissionsManager(), s.GeoLocationManager())

management/internals/shared/grpc/proxy.go

@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ import (
 	"math"
 	"net"
 	"net/http"
-	"net/netip"
 	"net/url"
 	"os"
 	"strconv"
@@ -26,7 +25,6 @@ import (
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 	"golang.org/x/oauth2"
 	"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
 	"google.golang.org/grpc/status"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
@@ -34,6 +32,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/peers"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/accesslogs"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/activity"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/proxy"
 	rpservice "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/service"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/sessionkey"
@@ -63,6 +62,17 @@ type ProxyTokenChecker interface {
 	IsProxyAccessTokenValid(ctx context.Context, tokenID string) (bool, error)
 }
 
+// ProxyConnectAuthorizer authorizes a proxy's claim to the cluster address it
+// declares at connect time. Implementations are supplied by integrations; none
+// is installed by default, so every well-formed claim is authorized — the
+// declared address is otherwise only checked for availability. token is nil
+// when the connection carries no proxy access token. A returned status error
+// is sent to the proxy unchanged; any other error is wrapped as
+// PermissionDenied.
+type ProxyConnectAuthorizer interface {
+	AuthorizeProxyConnect(ctx context.Context, token *types.ProxyAccessToken, proxyID, address string) error
+}
+
 // ProxyServiceServer implements the ProxyService gRPC server
 // AgentNetworkSynthesizer produces in-memory reverse-proxy services from
 // Agent Network provider/policy state for the proxy snapshot path; synthesised
@@ -101,6 +111,9 @@ type ProxyServiceServer struct {
 	// and the post-flight consumption write (RecordLLMUsage). Optional — when
 	// nil both RPCs return Unimplemented.
 	agentNetworkLimits AgentNetworkLimitsService
+	// connectAuthorizer authorizes address claims at proxy connect time.
+	// Optional — when nil every well-formed claim is authorized.
+	connectAuthorizer ProxyConnectAuthorizer
 	// ProxyController for service updates and cluster management
 	proxyController proxy.Controller
 
@@ -116,6 +129,9 @@ type ProxyServiceServer struct {
 	// Manager for IdP-enriched user data (may be nil when no IdP is configured)
 	idpManager idp.Manager
 
+	// Manager that records reverse proxy usage for activity accounting
+	activityManager activity.Manager
+
 	// Store for one-time authentication tokens
 	tokenStore *OneTimeTokenStore
 
@@ -136,10 +152,6 @@ type ProxyServiceServer struct {
 	// initial snapshot delivery. Configurable via NB_PROXY_SNAPSHOT_BATCH_SIZE.
 	snapshotBatchSize int
 
-	authAttemptLimiter *authFailureLimiter
-	authClientLimiter  *authFailureLimiter
-	authFailureMAC     []byte
-
 	cancel context.CancelFunc
 }
 
@@ -210,10 +222,6 @@ func NewProxyServiceServer(accessLogMgr accesslogs.Manager, tokenStore *OneTimeT
 		snapshotBatchSize: snapshotBatchSizeFromEnv(),
 		cancel:            cancel,
 	}
-	s.authAttemptLimiter = newAuthFailureLimiter()
-	s.authClientLimiter = newAuthClientLimiter()
-	s.authFailureMAC = make([]byte, sha256.Size)
-	_, _ = rand.Read(s.authFailureMAC)
 	go s.cleanupStaleProxies(ctx)
 	return s
 }
@@ -246,6 +254,13 @@ func (s *ProxyServiceServer) SetServiceManager(manager rpservice.Manager) {
 	s.serviceManager = manager
 }
 
+// SetActivityManager wires the manager that records reverse proxy usage.
+func (s *ProxyServiceServer) SetActivityManager(manager activity.Manager) {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	s.activityManager = manager
+}
+
 // SetAgentNetworkSynthesizer wires the agent-network service synthesiser.
 // Optional — when nil the snapshot path skips agent-network synthesis. The
 // modules layer injects this after both the proxy server and the agent-network
@@ -272,6 +287,23 @@ func (s *ProxyServiceServer) agentNetworkSynthesizer() AgentNetworkSynthesizer {
 	return s.agentNetworkSynth
 }
 
+// SetProxyConnectAuthorizer wires the connect-time address-claim authorizer.
+// Optional — when nil (the default) every well-formed claim is authorized,
+// which is the behavior without the hook. The modules layer injects this
+// after the proxy server is constructed, like the other setters.
+func (s *ProxyServiceServer) SetProxyConnectAuthorizer(authorizer ProxyConnectAuthorizer) {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	s.connectAuthorizer = authorizer
+	s.mu.Unlock()
+}
+
+// proxyConnectAuthorizer returns the connect authorizer under read lock.
+func (s *ProxyServiceServer) proxyConnectAuthorizer() ProxyConnectAuthorizer {
+	s.mu.RLock()
+	defer s.mu.RUnlock()
+	return s.connectAuthorizer
+}
+
 // CheckLLMPolicyLimits is the pre-flight policy gate the proxy calls before
 // forwarding an LLM request upstream. Delegates to the agent-network selector,
 // which scores applicable policies by remaining headroom and returns the
@@ -456,8 +488,9 @@ func recvSyncInit(stream proto.ProxyService_SyncMappingsServer) (*proto.SyncMapp
 	return init, nil
 }
 
-// validateProxyConnect validates the proxy ID and address, and checks cluster
-// address availability for account-scoped tokens.
+// validateProxyConnect validates the proxy ID and address, checks cluster
+// address availability for account-scoped tokens, and finally consults the
+// connect authorizer (when installed) on the address claim.
 func (s *ProxyServiceServer) validateProxyConnect(proxyID, address string, ctx context.Context) (proxyConnectParams, error) {
 	if proxyID == "" {
 		return proxyConnectParams{}, status.Errorf(codes.InvalidArgument, "proxy_id is required")
@@ -477,6 +510,19 @@ func (s *ProxyServiceServer) validateProxyConnect(proxyID, address string, ctx c
 		}
 	}
 
+	// The authorizer runs last, outside the account-scoped branch, so it also
+	// sees management-wide and token-less connects. PermissionDenied keeps an
+	// authorization rejection distinguishable from the AlreadyExists address
+	// conflict above in proxy logs.
+	if authorizer := s.proxyConnectAuthorizer(); authorizer != nil {
+		if err := authorizer.AuthorizeProxyConnect(ctx, token, proxyID, address); err != nil {
+			if _, ok := status.FromError(err); ok {
+				return proxyConnectParams{}, err
+			}
+			return proxyConnectParams{}, status.Errorf(codes.PermissionDenied, "proxy connect not authorized: %v", err)
+		}
+	}
+
 	return proxyConnectParams{proxyID: proxyID, address: address}, nil
 }
 
@@ -1182,18 +1228,6 @@ func (s *ProxyServiceServer) Authenticate(ctx context.Context, req *proto.Authen
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
-	failureKey := s.authFailureKey(req)
-	limitFailures := failureKey != "" && s.authAttemptLimiter != nil && len(s.authFailureMAC) > 0
-	if limitFailures && s.authAttemptLimiter.isLimited(failureKey) {
-		return nil, status.Errorf(codes.ResourceExhausted, "too many failed authentication attempts for this credential, please try again later")
-	}
-
-	clientKey := s.authClientKey(ctx, req.GetId())
-	limitClient := clientKey != "" && s.authClientLimiter != nil
-	if limitClient && s.authClientLimiter.isLimited(clientKey) {
-		return nil, status.Errorf(codes.ResourceExhausted, "too many failed authentication attempts from this client, please try again later")
-	}
-
 	service, err := s.serviceManager.GetServiceByID(ctx, req.GetAccountId(), req.GetId())
 	if err != nil {
 		log.WithContext(ctx).Debugf("failed to get service from store: %v", err)
@@ -1201,14 +1235,6 @@ func (s *ProxyServiceServer) Authenticate(ctx context.Context, req *proto.Authen
 	}
 
 	authenticated, userId, method := s.authenticateRequest(ctx, req, service)
-	if !authenticated {
-		if limitFailures {
-			s.authAttemptLimiter.recordFailure(failureKey)
-		}
-		if limitClient {
-			s.authClientLimiter.recordFailure(clientKey)
-		}
-	}
 
 	// Non-OIDC schemes (PIN/Password/Header) authenticate against per-service
 	// secrets and have no user-level group context, so groups stay nil. Email
@@ -1224,40 +1250,6 @@ func (s *ProxyServiceServer) Authenticate(ctx context.Context, req *proto.Authen
 	}, nil
 }
 
-func (s *ProxyServiceServer) authClientKey(ctx context.Context, serviceID string) string {
-	md, ok := metadata.FromIncomingContext(ctx)
-	if !ok {
-		return ""
-	}
-	values := md.Get(proxyauth.ClientIPMetadataKey)
-	if len(values) == 0 {
-		return ""
-	}
-	addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(strings.TrimSpace(values[0]))
-	if err != nil {
-		return ""
-	}
-	return serviceID + "|" + addr.Unmap().String()
-}
-
-func (s *ProxyServiceServer) authFailureKey(req *proto.AuthenticateRequest) string {
-	var secret string
-	switch v := req.GetRequest().(type) {
-	case *proto.AuthenticateRequest_Pin:
-		secret = "pin|" + v.Pin.GetPin()
-	case *proto.AuthenticateRequest_Password:
-		secret = "password|" + v.Password.GetPassword()
-	case *proto.AuthenticateRequest_HeaderAuth:
-		secret = "header|" + v.HeaderAuth.GetHeaderName() + "|" + v.HeaderAuth.GetHeaderValue()
-	default:
-		return ""
-	}
-
-	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, s.authFailureMAC)
-	mac.Write([]byte(secret))
-	return req.GetId() + "|" + hex.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil))
-}
-
 func (s *ProxyServiceServer) authenticateRequest(ctx context.Context, req *proto.AuthenticateRequest, service *rpservice.Service) (bool, string, proxyauth.Method) {
 	switch v := req.GetRequest().(type) {
 	case *proto.AuthenticateRequest_Pin:
@@ -1736,7 +1728,7 @@ func (s *ProxyServiceServer) GenerateSessionToken(ctx context.Context, domain, u
 
 	groupIDs, groupNames := pairGroupIDsAndNames(userGroups)
 
-	return sessionkey.SignToken(
+	token, err := sessionkey.SignToken(
 		service.SessionPrivateKey,
 		userID,
 		user.Email,
@@ -1746,6 +1738,25 @@ func (s *ProxyServiceServer) GenerateSessionToken(ctx context.Context, domain, u
 		groupNames,
 		proxyauth.DefaultSessionExpiry,
 	)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+
+	s.recordUserLogin(ctx, service.AccountID, user)
+
+	return token, nil
+}
+
+// recordUserLogin hands the sign-in to the activity manager. The RPC must not
+// fail on it, so the error is logged and dropped here rather than returned.
+func (s *ProxyServiceServer) recordUserLogin(ctx context.Context, accountID string, user *types.User) {
+	if s.activityManager == nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	if err := s.activityManager.RecordUserLogin(ctx, accountID, user); err != nil {
+		log.WithContext(ctx).Debugf("record proxy login for user %s: %v", user.Id, err)
+	}
 }
 
 // ValidateUserGroupAccess checks if a user has access to a service.
@@ -2095,6 +2106,8 @@ func (s *ProxyServiceServer) ValidateTunnelPeer(ctx context.Context, req *proto.
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
+	s.recordPeerSeen(ctx, service.AccountID, peer)
+
 	log.WithFields(log.Fields{
 		"domain":       domain,
 		"tunnel_ip":    tunnelIPStr,
@@ -2112,6 +2125,18 @@ func (s *ProxyServiceServer) ValidateTunnelPeer(ctx context.Context, req *proto.
 	}, nil
 }
 
+// recordPeerSeen hands the mesh request to the activity manager. The RPC must
+// not fail on it, so the error is logged and dropped here rather than returned.
+func (s *ProxyServiceServer) recordPeerSeen(ctx context.Context, accountID string, peer *peer.Peer) {
+	if s.activityManager == nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	if err := s.activityManager.RecordPeerSeen(ctx, accountID, peer); err != nil {
+		log.WithContext(ctx).Debugf("record proxy activity for peer %s: %v", peer.ID, err)
+	}
+}
+
 // resolvePeerOwner returns the user a peer is linked to, once per request so
 // the status gate and the identity resolution below share a single lookup.
 // Unlinked peers (machine agents) have no owner. A lookup that fails returns

management/internals/shared/grpc/proxy_auth_attempts_test.go

@@ -1,189 +0,0 @@
-package grpc
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"crypto/rand"
-	"crypto/sha256"
-	"fmt"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	"github.com/golang/mock/gomock"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-	"golang.org/x/time/rate"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/status"
-
-	rpservice "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/service"
-	proxyauth "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/auth"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/hash/argon2id"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
-)
-
-const authAttemptsHeaderName = "X-API-Key"
-
-func newAuthAttemptsTestServer(t *testing.T) *ProxyServiceServer {
-	t.Helper()
-
-	firstHash, err := argon2id.Hash("first-key")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	secondHash, err := argon2id.Hash("second-key")
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	svc := &rpservice.Service{
-		ID:     "svc1",
-		Domain: "example.com",
-		Auth: rpservice.AuthConfig{
-			HeaderAuths: []*rpservice.HeaderAuthConfig{
-				{Enabled: true, Header: authAttemptsHeaderName, Value: firstHash},
-				{Enabled: true, Header: authAttemptsHeaderName, Value: secondHash},
-			},
-		},
-	}
-
-	ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
-	mgr := rpservice.NewMockManager(ctrl)
-	mgr.EXPECT().GetServiceByID(gomock.Any(), gomock.Any(), gomock.Any()).Return(svc, nil).AnyTimes()
-
-	limiter := newAuthFailureLimiter()
-	t.Cleanup(limiter.stop)
-	clientLimiter := newAuthClientLimiter()
-	t.Cleanup(clientLimiter.stop)
-
-	mac := make([]byte, sha256.Size)
-	_, err = rand.Read(mac)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	return &ProxyServiceServer{
-		serviceManager:     mgr,
-		authAttemptLimiter: limiter,
-		authClientLimiter:  clientLimiter,
-		authFailureMAC:     mac,
-	}
-}
-
-func clientIPContext(ip string) context.Context {
-	return metadata.NewIncomingContext(context.Background(), metadata.Pairs(proxyauth.ClientIPMetadataKey, ip))
-}
-
-func authAttemptsRequest(credential string) *proto.AuthenticateRequest {
-	return &proto.AuthenticateRequest{
-		Id:        "svc1",
-		AccountId: "acc1",
-		Request: &proto.AuthenticateRequest_HeaderAuth{
-			HeaderAuth: &proto.HeaderAuthRequest{
-				HeaderName:  authAttemptsHeaderName,
-				HeaderValue: credential,
-			},
-		},
-	}
-}
-
-func TestAuthenticate_ValidCredentialIsNeverRateLimited(t *testing.T) {
-	s := newAuthAttemptsTestServer(t)
-
-	for i := 0; i < proxyAuthFailureBurst*2; i++ {
-		resp, err := s.Authenticate(context.Background(), authAttemptsRequest("first-key"))
-		require.NoError(t, err, "a valid credential must never be throttled (attempt %d)", i)
-		require.True(t, resp.GetSuccess())
-	}
-}
-
-func TestAuthenticate_FailedCredentialIsRateLimited(t *testing.T) {
-	s := newAuthAttemptsTestServer(t)
-
-	for i := 0; i < proxyAuthFailureBurst; i++ {
-		resp, err := s.Authenticate(context.Background(), authAttemptsRequest("wrong-key"))
-		require.NoError(t, err, "attempt %d should be within the failure budget", i)
-		require.False(t, resp.GetSuccess())
-	}
-
-	_, err := s.Authenticate(context.Background(), authAttemptsRequest("wrong-key"))
-	require.Error(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, codes.ResourceExhausted, status.Code(err))
-}
-
-func TestAuthenticate_ThrottledCredentialDoesNotAffectOthers(t *testing.T) {
-	s := newAuthAttemptsTestServer(t)
-
-	for i := 0; i < proxyAuthFailureBurst+2; i++ {
-		_, _ = s.Authenticate(context.Background(), authAttemptsRequest("wrong-key"))
-	}
-
-	resp, err := s.Authenticate(context.Background(), authAttemptsRequest("first-key"))
-	require.NoError(t, err, "one throttled credential must not block a valid one")
-	assert.True(t, resp.GetSuccess())
-
-	resp, err = s.Authenticate(context.Background(), authAttemptsRequest("second-key"))
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.True(t, resp.GetSuccess())
-
-	_, err = s.Authenticate(context.Background(), authAttemptsRequest("another-wrong-key"))
-	require.NoError(t, err, "a different failing credential has its own budget")
-}
-
-func TestAuthenticate_DistinctCredentialsThrottledPerClient(t *testing.T) {
-	const budget = 3
-
-	s := newAuthAttemptsTestServer(t)
-	s.authClientLimiter.stop()
-	s.authClientLimiter = newAuthLimiter(rate.Every(time.Hour), budget)
-	t.Cleanup(s.authClientLimiter.stop)
-
-	ctx := clientIPContext("198.51.100.7")
-
-	for i := 0; i < budget; i++ {
-		resp, err := s.Authenticate(ctx, authAttemptsRequest(fmt.Sprintf("garbage-%d", i)))
-		require.NoError(t, err, "attempt %d should be within the client budget", i)
-		require.False(t, resp.GetSuccess())
-	}
-
-	_, err := s.Authenticate(ctx, authAttemptsRequest("garbage-final"))
-	require.Error(t, err, "a client rotating distinct credentials must be throttled")
-	assert.Equal(t, codes.ResourceExhausted, status.Code(err))
-
-	other := clientIPContext("198.51.100.8")
-	resp, err := s.Authenticate(other, authAttemptsRequest("first-key"))
-	require.NoError(t, err, "a different client must be unaffected")
-	assert.True(t, resp.GetSuccess())
-}
-
-func TestAuthenticate_OneStaleCredentialDoesNotExhaustSharedClientBudget(t *testing.T) {
-	s := newAuthAttemptsTestServer(t)
-	ctx := clientIPContext("198.51.100.9")
-
-	for i := 0; i < proxyAuthFailureBurst*4; i++ {
-		_, _ = s.Authenticate(ctx, authAttemptsRequest("stale-key"))
-	}
-
-	resp, err := s.Authenticate(ctx, authAttemptsRequest("first-key"))
-	require.NoError(t, err, "one client stuck on a stale key must not block others behind the same NAT")
-	assert.True(t, resp.GetSuccess())
-}
-
-func TestAuthenticate_ProxyWithoutClientIPIsNotClientLimited(t *testing.T) {
-	s := newAuthAttemptsTestServer(t)
-
-	for i := 0; i < proxyAuthFailureBurst*2; i++ {
-		_, _ = s.Authenticate(context.Background(), authAttemptsRequest(fmt.Sprintf("garbage-%d", i)))
-	}
-
-	resp, err := s.Authenticate(context.Background(), authAttemptsRequest("first-key"))
-	require.NoError(t, err, "an old proxy must not have its clients share one budget")
-	assert.True(t, resp.GetSuccess())
-}
-
-func TestAuthenticate_MalformedClientIPIsIgnored(t *testing.T) {
-	s := newAuthAttemptsTestServer(t)
-	ctx := clientIPContext("not-an-ip")
-
-	for i := 0; i < proxyAuthFailureBurst*2; i++ {
-		_, _ = s.Authenticate(ctx, authAttemptsRequest(fmt.Sprintf("garbage-%d", i)))
-	}
-
-	resp, err := s.Authenticate(ctx, authAttemptsRequest("first-key"))
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.True(t, resp.GetSuccess())
-}

management/internals/shared/grpc/proxy_auth_ratelimit.go

@@ -18,16 +18,12 @@ const (
 	proxyAuthLimiterCleanup = 5 * time.Minute
 	// proxyAuthLimiterTTL is how long a limiter is kept after the last failure.
 	proxyAuthLimiterTTL = 15 * time.Minute
-
-	proxyAuthClientBurst = 30
 )
 
 // defaultProxyAuthFailureRate is the token replenishment rate for failed auth attempts.
 // One token every 12 seconds = 5 per minute.
 var defaultProxyAuthFailureRate = rate.Every(12 * time.Second)
 
-var defaultProxyAuthClientRate = rate.Limit(1)
-
 // clientIP identifies a client by its IP address for rate limiting purposes.
 type clientIP = string
 
@@ -41,7 +37,6 @@ type authFailureLimiter struct {
 	mu          sync.Mutex
 	limiters    map[clientIP]*limiterEntry
 	failureRate rate.Limit
-	burst       int
 	cancel      context.CancelFunc
 }
 
@@ -50,19 +45,10 @@ func newAuthFailureLimiter() *authFailureLimiter {
 }
 
 func newAuthFailureLimiterWithRate(failureRate rate.Limit) *authFailureLimiter {
-	return newAuthLimiter(failureRate, proxyAuthFailureBurst)
-}
-
-func newAuthClientLimiter() *authFailureLimiter {
-	return newAuthLimiter(defaultProxyAuthClientRate, proxyAuthClientBurst)
-}
-
-func newAuthLimiter(failureRate rate.Limit, burst int) *authFailureLimiter {
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
 	l := &authFailureLimiter{
 		limiters:    make(map[clientIP]*limiterEntry),
 		failureRate: failureRate,
-		burst:       burst,
 		cancel:      cancel,
 	}
 	go l.cleanupLoop(ctx)
@@ -91,7 +77,7 @@ func (l *authFailureLimiter) recordFailure(ip clientIP) {
 	entry, exists := l.limiters[ip]
 	if !exists {
 		entry = &limiterEntry{
-			limiter: rate.NewLimiter(l.failureRate, l.burst),
+			limiter: rate.NewLimiter(l.failureRate, proxyAuthFailureBurst),
 		}
 		l.limiters[ip] = entry
 	}

management/internals/shared/grpc/proxy_connect_authorizer_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+package grpc
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/golang/mock/gomock"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
+	grpcstatus "google.golang.org/grpc/status"
+
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/proxy"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
+)
+
+// capturingAuthorizer records the arguments of the last AuthorizeProxyConnect
+// call and returns a fixed error.
+type capturingAuthorizer struct {
+	called  int
+	token   *types.ProxyAccessToken
+	proxyID string
+	address string
+	err     error
+}
+
+func (a *capturingAuthorizer) AuthorizeProxyConnect(_ context.Context, token *types.ProxyAccessToken, proxyID, address string) error {
+	a.called++
+	a.token = token
+	a.proxyID = proxyID
+	a.address = address
+	return a.err
+}
+
+// authorizerServer builds a ProxyServiceServer whose proxy manager reports
+// every cluster address as available, so the authorizer is the only thing
+// standing between a claim and success.
+func authorizerServer(t *testing.T) *ProxyServiceServer {
+	t.Helper()
+	ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
+	mgr := proxy.NewMockManager(ctrl)
+	mgr.EXPECT().IsClusterAddressAvailable(gomock.Any(), gomock.Any(), gomock.Any()).Return(true, nil).AnyTimes()
+	return &ProxyServiceServer{proxyManager: mgr}
+}
+
+// TestValidateProxyConnect_NilAuthorizerUnchanged guards the no-behavior-change
+// claim: with no authorizer installed — the OSS default — a well-formed claim
+// succeeds and malformed input is rejected exactly as before the hook existed.
+func TestValidateProxyConnect_NilAuthorizerUnchanged(t *testing.T) {
+	s := authorizerServer(t)
+
+	params, err := s.validateProxyConnect("proxy-1", "cluster.example.com", scopedCtx("acc-1"))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Equal(t, "proxy-1", params.proxyID)
+	assert.Equal(t, "cluster.example.com", params.address)
+
+	_, err = s.validateProxyConnect("", "cluster.example.com", scopedCtx("acc-1"))
+	require.Error(t, err)
+	st, ok := grpcstatus.FromError(err)
+	require.True(t, ok)
+	assert.Equal(t, codes.InvalidArgument, st.Code(), "missing proxy_id must stay InvalidArgument")
+
+	_, err = s.validateProxyConnect("proxy-1", "not a hostname", scopedCtx("acc-1"))
+	require.Error(t, err)
+	st, ok = grpcstatus.FromError(err)
+	require.True(t, ok)
+	assert.Equal(t, codes.InvalidArgument, st.Code(), "invalid address must stay InvalidArgument")
+}
+
+// TestValidateProxyConnect_AuthorizerReceivesClaim pins the hook contract: the
+// authorizer sees the presented token and the claimed proxy ID and address,
+// and an authorized claim proceeds.
+func TestValidateProxyConnect_AuthorizerReceivesClaim(t *testing.T) {
+	s := authorizerServer(t)
+	auth := &capturingAuthorizer{}
+	s.SetProxyConnectAuthorizer(auth)
+
+	params, err := s.validateProxyConnect("proxy-1", "cluster.example.com", scopedCtx("acc-1"))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.Equal(t, "cluster.example.com", params.address)
+
+	require.Equal(t, 1, auth.called, "authorizer must be consulted exactly once per connect")
+	assert.Equal(t, "proxy-1", auth.proxyID)
+	assert.Equal(t, "cluster.example.com", auth.address)
+	require.NotNil(t, auth.token, "the presented token must be handed to the authorizer")
+	require.NotNil(t, auth.token.AccountID)
+	assert.Equal(t, "acc-1", *auth.token.AccountID)
+}
+
+// TestValidateProxyConnect_PlainErrorBecomesPermissionDenied pins the error
+// mapping: a non-status error from the authorizer surfaces as
+// PermissionDenied — distinguishable from the AlreadyExists used for address
+// conflicts — and the claim does not proceed even though the address itself
+// was available.
+func TestValidateProxyConnect_PlainErrorBecomesPermissionDenied(t *testing.T) {
+	s := authorizerServer(t)
+	s.SetProxyConnectAuthorizer(&capturingAuthorizer{err: errors.New("not the assigned credential")})
+
+	_, err := s.validateProxyConnect("proxy-1", "cluster.example.com", scopedCtx("acc-1"))
+	require.Error(t, err)
+	st, ok := grpcstatus.FromError(err)
+	require.True(t, ok)
+	assert.Equal(t, codes.PermissionDenied, st.Code())
+	assert.Contains(t, st.Message(), "not the assigned credential", "the authorizer's reason must survive into the status message")
+}
+
+// TestValidateProxyConnect_StatusErrorPassesThrough pins that an authorizer
+// which chooses its own status code is not second-guessed.
+func TestValidateProxyConnect_StatusErrorPassesThrough(t *testing.T) {
+	s := authorizerServer(t)
+	s.SetProxyConnectAuthorizer(&capturingAuthorizer{
+		err: grpcstatus.Errorf(codes.ResourceExhausted, "try later"),
+	})
+
+	_, err := s.validateProxyConnect("proxy-1", "cluster.example.com", scopedCtx("acc-1"))
+	require.Error(t, err)
+	st, ok := grpcstatus.FromError(err)
+	require.True(t, ok)
+	assert.Equal(t, codes.ResourceExhausted, st.Code(), "a status error must pass through unchanged")
+	assert.Equal(t, "try later", st.Message())
+}
+
+// TestValidateProxyConnect_AuthorizerSeesGlobalAndTokenlessConnects pins the
+// call-site placement: the authorizer sits outside the account-scoped branch,
+// so management-wide tokens (AccountID == nil) and connections without any
+// token are also presented to it rather than bypassing policy.
+func TestValidateProxyConnect_AuthorizerSeesGlobalAndTokenlessConnects(t *testing.T) {
+	s := &ProxyServiceServer{} // no proxy manager: neither path may reach the availability check
+
+	auth := &capturingAuthorizer{}
+	s.SetProxyConnectAuthorizer(auth)
+
+	_, err := s.validateProxyConnect("proxy-1", "cluster.example.com", globalCtx())
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, 1, auth.called, "a management-wide token must still be presented to the authorizer")
+	require.NotNil(t, auth.token)
+	assert.Nil(t, auth.token.AccountID)
+
+	_, err = s.validateProxyConnect("proxy-1", "cluster.example.com", context.Background())
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Equal(t, 2, auth.called, "a token-less connect must still be presented to the authorizer")
+	assert.Nil(t, auth.token, "no token in context must surface as a nil token, not a zero value")
+}
+
+// TestValidateProxyConnect_AuthorizerRunsLast pins the ordering: input
+// validation and the availability check precede policy, so the authorizer is
+// never consulted about a claim that is malformed or already rejected.
+func TestValidateProxyConnect_AuthorizerRunsLast(t *testing.T) {
+	ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
+	mgr := proxy.NewMockManager(ctrl)
+	mgr.EXPECT().IsClusterAddressAvailable(gomock.Any(), gomock.Any(), gomock.Any()).Return(false, nil)
+	s := &ProxyServiceServer{proxyManager: mgr}
+
+	auth := &capturingAuthorizer{}
+	s.SetProxyConnectAuthorizer(auth)
+
+	_, err := s.validateProxyConnect("proxy-1", "not a hostname", scopedCtx("acc-1"))
+	require.Error(t, err)
+	assert.Zero(t, auth.called, "a malformed address must be rejected before policy runs")
+
+	_, err = s.validateProxyConnect("proxy-1", "cluster.example.com", scopedCtx("acc-1"))
+	require.Error(t, err)
+	st, ok := grpcstatus.FromError(err)
+	require.True(t, ok)
+	assert.Equal(t, codes.AlreadyExists, st.Code(), "an address conflict must keep its own status")
+	assert.Zero(t, auth.called, "a conflicting address must be rejected before policy runs")
+}

management/internals/shared/grpc/proxy_group_access_test.go

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import (
 	"errors"
 	"net"
 	"testing"
+	"time"
 
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
@@ -155,6 +156,27 @@ type mockTunnelPeersManager struct {
 	groupsErr error
 }
 
+// mockActivityManager records what the RPC handed to the activity manager. The
+// policy (throttling, exclusions) is the manager's and is tested there; these
+// tests only pin which requests reach it.
+type mockActivityManager struct {
+	seenMarks []seenMark
+}
+
+type seenMark struct {
+	accountID string
+	peerID    string
+}
+
+func (m *mockActivityManager) RecordUserLogin(_ context.Context, _ string, _ *types.User) error {
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (m *mockActivityManager) RecordPeerSeen(_ context.Context, accountID string, peer *peer.Peer) error {
+	m.seenMarks = append(m.seenMarks, seenMark{accountID: accountID, peerID: peer.ID})
+	return nil
+}
+
 func (m *mockTunnelPeersManager) GetPeerByTunnelIP(_ context.Context, _ string, _ net.IP) (*peer.Peer, error) {
 	return m.peer, m.peerErr
 }
@@ -745,6 +767,78 @@ func TestValidateTunnelPeerOwnerStatus(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestValidateTunnelPeerRecordsActivity pins that a granted mesh request is
+// handed to the activity manager. Which of those the manager then writes is its
+// own decision, covered by its tests.
+func TestValidateTunnelPeerRecordsActivity(t *testing.T) {
+	const (
+		domain    = "app.example.com"
+		accountID = "account1"
+		peerID    = "peer1"
+	)
+
+	activityManager := &mockActivityManager{}
+	server := &ProxyServiceServer{
+		activityManager: activityManager,
+		serviceManager: &mockReverseProxyManager{
+			proxiesByAccount: map[string][]*service.Service{
+				accountID: {{Domain: domain, AccountID: accountID}},
+			},
+		},
+		peersManager: &mockTunnelPeersManager{
+			peer: &peer.Peer{ID: peerID, Name: "agent", Status: &peer.PeerStatus{LastSeen: time.Now().Add(-3 * time.Hour)}},
+		},
+		usersManager: &mockUsersManager{users: map[string]*types.User{}},
+	}
+
+	resp, err := server.ValidateTunnelPeer(context.Background(), &proto.ValidateTunnelPeerRequest{
+		Domain:   domain,
+		TunnelIp: "100.64.0.1",
+	})
+
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.True(t, resp.GetValid(), "peer should be granted access")
+
+	require.Len(t, activityManager.seenMarks, 1, "a granted peer should reach the activity manager once")
+	assert.Equal(t, accountID, activityManager.seenMarks[0].accountID, "activity must be attributed to the service account")
+	assert.Equal(t, peerID, activityManager.seenMarks[0].peerID, "activity must be attributed to the calling peer")
+}
+
+// TestValidateTunnelPeerDeniedRecordsNoActivity keeps the write on the granted
+// path only: a refused peer is not evidence its owner was active.
+func TestValidateTunnelPeerDeniedRecordsNoActivity(t *testing.T) {
+	const (
+		domain    = "app.example.com"
+		accountID = "account1"
+	)
+
+	activityManager := &mockActivityManager{}
+	server := &ProxyServiceServer{
+		activityManager: activityManager,
+		serviceManager: &mockReverseProxyManager{
+			proxiesByAccount: map[string][]*service.Service{
+				accountID: {{Domain: domain, AccountID: accountID}},
+			},
+		},
+		peersManager: &mockTunnelPeersManager{
+			peer: &peer.Peer{ID: "peer1", Name: "agent", UserID: "user1", Status: &peer.PeerStatus{LastSeen: time.Now().Add(-3 * time.Hour)}},
+		},
+		// The owner is blocked, so the tunnel gate denies before the mint.
+		usersManager: &mockUsersManager{users: map[string]*types.User{
+			"user1": {Id: "user1", AccountID: accountID, Blocked: true},
+		}},
+	}
+
+	resp, err := server.ValidateTunnelPeer(context.Background(), &proto.ValidateTunnelPeerRequest{
+		Domain:   domain,
+		TunnelIp: "100.64.0.1",
+	})
+
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.False(t, resp.GetValid(), "blocked owner should be denied")
+	assert.Empty(t, activityManager.seenMarks, "a denied peer must not be marked seen")
+}
+
 func TestGetAccountProxyByDomain(t *testing.T) {
 	tests := []struct {
 		name             string

management/server/activity/codes.go

@@ -281,6 +281,9 @@ const (
 	// AccountMetricsPushDisabled indicates that a user disabled metrics push for the account
 	AccountMetricsPushDisabled Activity = 141
 
+	// AgentNetworkSettingsDeleted indicates that a user deleted the Agent Network account settings, releasing the endpoint
+	AgentNetworkSettingsDeleted Activity = 142
+
 	AccountDeleted Activity = 99999
 )
 
@@ -453,6 +456,7 @@ var activityMap = map[Activity]Code{
 	AgentNetworkBudgetRuleDeleted: {"Agent Network budget rule deleted", "agent_network.budget_rule.delete"},
 
 	AgentNetworkSettingsUpdated: {"Agent Network settings updated", "agent_network.settings.update"},
+	AgentNetworkSettingsDeleted: {"Agent Network settings deleted", "agent_network.settings.delete"},
 
 	AccountMetricsPushEnabled:  {"Account metrics push enabled", "account.setting.metrics.push.enable"},
 	AccountMetricsPushDisabled: {"Account metrics push disabled", "account.setting.metrics.push.disable"},

management/server/agentnetwork_budgetrule_realstack_test.go

@@ -68,7 +68,10 @@ func TestAgentNetwork_BudgetRuleCRUD_RealManager(t *testing.T) {
 
 // TestAgentNetwork_UpdateSettings_PreservesImmutableAndTogglesCollection is the
 // GC-1 guard for UpdateSettings: it must apply the collection toggles while
-// preserving the immutable Cluster/Subdomain pinned at bootstrap.
+// preserving the immutable Domain/ProxyAddress assigned at bootstrap. The
+// request echoes the identity fields back — the PUT convention every other
+// endpoint follows — and a request echoing anything else is rejected outright
+// rather than quietly ignored.
 func TestAgentNetwork_UpdateSettings_PreservesImmutableAndTogglesCollection(t *testing.T) {
 	am, _, err := createManager(t)
 	require.NoError(t, err, "createManager must succeed")
@@ -84,7 +87,14 @@ func TestAgentNetwork_UpdateSettings_PreservesImmutableAndTogglesCollection(t *t
 
 	mgr := agentnetwork.NewManager(am.Store, permissions.NewManager(am.Store), am, nil)
 
-	// Creating a provider bootstraps the settings row (cluster + subdomain).
+	// Bootstrap is an explicit settings create; providers have no settings
+	// side effects anymore.
+	before, err := mgr.CreateSettings(ctx, adminUserID, agenttypes.DefaultSettings(accountID), clusterAddr, "")
+	require.NoError(t, err, "CreateSettings must bootstrap the row")
+	require.Equal(t, clusterAddr, before.ProxyAddress, "proxy address pinned at bootstrap")
+	require.NotEmpty(t, before.Domain, "endpoint allocated at bootstrap")
+	assert.False(t, before.EnablePromptCollection, "prompt collection defaults off")
+
 	_, err = mgr.CreateProvider(ctx, adminUserID, &agenttypes.Provider{
 		AccountID:   accountID,
 		ProviderID:  "openai_api",
@@ -93,43 +103,64 @@ func TestAgentNetwork_UpdateSettings_PreservesImmutableAndTogglesCollection(t *t
 		APIKey:      "sk-test",
 		Enabled:     true,
 		Models:      []agenttypes.ProviderModel{{ID: "gpt-5.4"}},
-	}, clusterAddr)
-	require.NoError(t, err, "CreateProvider must bootstrap settings")
-
-	before, err := mgr.GetSettings(ctx, accountID, adminUserID)
-	require.NoError(t, err, "GetSettings must succeed after bootstrap")
-	require.Equal(t, clusterAddr, before.Cluster, "cluster pinned at bootstrap")
-	require.NotEmpty(t, before.Subdomain, "subdomain pinned at bootstrap")
-	assert.False(t, before.EnablePromptCollection, "prompt collection defaults off")
-
-	// A cluster different from the one pinned at bootstrap must be rejected
-	// outright — never silently swapped or ignored.
-	_, err = mgr.UpdateSettings(ctx, adminUserID, &agenttypes.Settings{
-		AccountID:           accountID,
-		Cluster:             "attacker.cluster",
-		EnableLogCollection: true,
 	})
-	require.Error(t, err, "UpdateSettings with a mismatched cluster must fail")
+	require.NoError(t, err, "CreateProvider must succeed")
 
-	// Flipping the toggles works with the pinned cluster echoed back (and
-	// with it omitted); the subdomain is never taken from the request.
+	// Flipping the toggles works when the request echoes the assigned
+	// identity. Retention is echoed too: UpdateSettings takes it verbatim, so
+	// omitting it would zero the account's retention.
 	updated, err := mgr.UpdateSettings(ctx, adminUserID, &agenttypes.Settings{
 		AccountID:              accountID,
-		Cluster:                clusterAddr,
-		Subdomain:              "evil",
+		Domain:                 before.Domain,
+		ProxyAddress:           before.ProxyAddress,
 		EnableLogCollection:    true,
 		EnablePromptCollection: true,
 		RedactPii:              true,
+		AccessLogRetentionDays: before.AccessLogRetentionDays,
 	})
 	require.NoError(t, err, "UpdateSettings must succeed")
-	assert.Equal(t, before.Cluster, updated.Cluster, "cluster is immutable and must be preserved")
-	assert.Equal(t, before.Subdomain, updated.Subdomain, "subdomain is immutable and must be preserved")
+	assert.Equal(t, before.Domain, updated.Domain, "domain is immutable and must be preserved")
+	assert.Equal(t, before.ProxyAddress, updated.ProxyAddress, "proxy address is immutable and must be preserved")
 	assert.True(t, updated.EnableLogCollection, "log collection toggle must apply")
 	assert.True(t, updated.EnablePromptCollection, "prompt collection toggle must apply")
 	assert.True(t, updated.RedactPii, "redact toggle must apply")
+	assert.Equal(t, before.AccessLogRetentionDays, updated.AccessLogRetentionDays, "echoed retention must survive")
+
+	// Neither identity field can be smuggled into the row: a hand-rolled
+	// Settings value carrying a different endpoint or proxy address is
+	// rejected, not silently ignored.
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name         string
+		domain       string
+		proxyAddress string
+	}{
+		{name: "foreign endpoint", domain: "evil.example.com", proxyAddress: before.ProxyAddress},
+		{name: "foreign proxy address", domain: before.Domain, proxyAddress: "attacker.cluster"},
+		{name: "empty identity echo", domain: "", proxyAddress: ""},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			_, err := mgr.UpdateSettings(ctx, adminUserID, &agenttypes.Settings{
+				AccountID:              accountID,
+				Domain:                 tc.domain,
+				ProxyAddress:           tc.proxyAddress,
+				EnableLogCollection:    false,
+				EnablePromptCollection: false,
+				RedactPii:              false,
+				AccessLogRetentionDays: before.AccessLogRetentionDays,
+			})
+			assert.Error(t, err, "a mismatched identity echo must be rejected")
+			assert.ErrorContains(t, err, "immutable", "the rejection must name the immutability rule")
+		})
+	}
+
+	// The rejected updates left the row exactly as the accepted one wrote it.
+	afterRejects, err := mgr.GetSettings(ctx, accountID, adminUserID)
+	require.NoError(t, err, "GetSettings must succeed")
+	assert.True(t, afterRejects.EnablePromptCollection, "a rejected update must not roll back the accepted toggles")
 
 	reloaded, err := am.Store.GetAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, accountID)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
-	assert.Equal(t, before.Cluster, reloaded.Cluster, "persisted cluster unchanged")
+	assert.Equal(t, before.Domain, reloaded.Domain, "persisted domain unchanged")
+	assert.Equal(t, before.ProxyAddress, reloaded.ProxyAddress, "persisted proxy address unchanged")
 	assert.True(t, reloaded.EnablePromptCollection, "persisted prompt collection toggled on")
 }

management/server/agentnetwork_realstack_test.go

@@ -92,6 +92,14 @@ func TestAgentNetwork_ProviderCRUD_FansOutToProxyAndClientPeers(t *testing.T) {
 	// UpdateAccountPeers, which is the path under test.
 	agentMgr := agentnetwork.NewManager(am.Store, permissions.NewManager(am.Store), am, nil)
 
+	_, err = agentMgr.CreateSettings(ctx, adminUserID, agenttypes.DefaultSettings(accountID), clusterAddr, "")
+	require.NoError(t, err, "CreateSettings must bootstrap the endpoint")
+	// The bootstrap itself reconciles and queues updates on both channels;
+	// drain them so the fan-out assertions below can only be satisfied by the
+	// operation under test, not by this leftover.
+	drain(clientCh)
+	drain(proxyCh)
+
 	provider, err := agentMgr.CreateProvider(ctx, adminUserID, &agenttypes.Provider{
 		AccountID:   accountID,
 		ProviderID:  "openai_api",
@@ -100,7 +108,7 @@ func TestAgentNetwork_ProviderCRUD_FansOutToProxyAndClientPeers(t *testing.T) {
 		APIKey:      "sk-test-key",
 		Enabled:     true,
 		Models:      []agenttypes.ProviderModel{{ID: "gpt-5.4"}},
-	}, clusterAddr)
+	})
 	require.NoError(t, err, "CreateProvider must succeed")
 
 	policy, err := agentMgr.CreatePolicy(ctx, adminUserID, &agenttypes.Policy{

management/server/http/handlers/proxy/auth_callback_integration_test.go

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/accesslogs"
+	activitymanager "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/activity/manager"
 	nbproxy "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/proxy"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/service"
 	nbgrpc "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/shared/grpc"
@@ -221,6 +222,7 @@ func setupAuthCallbackTest(t *testing.T) *testSetup {
 	)
 
 	proxyService.SetServiceManager(&testServiceManager{store: testStore})
+	proxyService.SetActivityManager(activitymanager.NewManager(testStore))
 
 	handler := NewAuthCallbackHandler(proxyService, nil)
 
@@ -538,6 +540,55 @@ func TestAuthCallback_UserAllowedToLogin(t *testing.T) {
 // TestAuthCallback_UserDeniedByAccountStatus asserts that a user whose account
 // is pending approval or blocked never receives a session token from the OIDC
 // callback, and that the redirect carries a description the proxy can render.
+// TestAuthCallback_RecordsUserLogin drives the real OIDC callback and asserts
+// the login lands on the user row. That timestamp is what activity accounting
+// reads, and it is the only signal that can ever count someone who reaches
+// proxy-protected services from a browser and never opens the dashboard.
+func TestAuthCallback_RecordsUserLogin(t *testing.T) {
+	setup := setupAuthCallbackTest(t)
+	defer setup.cleanup()
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	before, err := setup.store.GetUserByUserID(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, "allowedUserId")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Nil(t, before.LastLogin, "fixture user starts with no login on record")
+
+	setup.oidcServer.tokenSubject = "allowedUserId"
+	state := createTestState(t, setup.proxyService, "https://test-proxy.example.com/dashboard")
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/reverse-proxy/callback?code=test-auth-code&state="+url.QueryEscape(state), nil)
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	setup.router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusFound, rec.Code)
+
+	after, err := setup.store.GetUserByUserID(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, "allowedUserId")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.NotNil(t, after.LastLogin, "a completed proxy SSO login must be recorded on the user")
+	require.WithinDuration(t, time.Now().UTC(), after.LastLogin.UTC(), time.Minute, "login should be stamped at sign-in time")
+}
+
+// TestAuthCallback_DeniedUserLoginNotRecorded keeps the write on the granted
+// path: a refused sign-in is not a login.
+func TestAuthCallback_DeniedUserLoginNotRecorded(t *testing.T) {
+	setup := setupAuthCallbackTest(t)
+	defer setup.cleanup()
+
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	setup.oidcServer.tokenSubject = "blockedUserId"
+	state := createTestState(t, setup.proxyService, "https://test-proxy.example.com/dashboard")
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/reverse-proxy/callback?code=test-auth-code&state="+url.QueryEscape(state), nil)
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	setup.router.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusFound, rec.Code)
+
+	after, err := setup.store.GetUserByUserID(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, "blockedUserId")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.Nil(t, after.LastLogin, "a denied user must not be recorded as having logged in")
+}
+
 func TestAuthCallback_UserDeniedByAccountStatus(t *testing.T) {
 	tests := []struct {
 		name            string

management/server/migration/migration_agentnetwork.go

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+package migration
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+
+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+	"gorm.io/gorm"
+)
+
+// agentNetworkSettingsMigration is a local view of the agent_network_settings
+// table spanning both the legacy identity columns (cluster, subdomain) and
+// their replacement (domain, proxy_address), so the migrator can address all
+// four during the reshape without importing the current model.
+type agentNetworkSettingsMigration struct {
+	AccountID    string `gorm:"primaryKey"`
+	Cluster      string
+	Subdomain    string
+	Domain       string `gorm:"type:varchar(255)"`
+	ProxyAddress string `gorm:"type:varchar(255)"`
+}
+
+func (agentNetworkSettingsMigration) TableName() string { return "agent_network_settings" }
+
+// MigrateAgentNetworkSettingsToDomain reshapes agent_network_settings from the
+// legacy (cluster, subdomain) identity columns to (domain, proxy_address):
+// domain becomes `<subdomain>.<cluster>` — the endpoint hostname the old
+// columns derived — and proxy_address becomes the cluster address, preserving
+// which proxy serves the account. Runs before AutoMigrate, which then creates
+// the unique index on the freshly backfilled domain column.
+//
+// A legacy row missing either half cannot be given an endpoint; the old
+// bootstrap always wrote both, so such a row indicates corruption and the
+// migration fails loudly rather than leaving an empty domain to collide with
+// the unique index confusingly.
+//
+// The transaction is real only on sqlite and postgres, where DDL is
+// transactional. MySQL implicitly commits around every ALTER TABLE, so there
+// each step stands alone; what makes an interrupted run resumable on MySQL is
+// that every step is guarded by the schema state it changes — the entry check
+// fires while either legacy column remains, the adds skip existing columns,
+// the backfill and its loud-failure check run only while the legacy cluster
+// column exists (they provably completed before any drop), and each drop
+// skips what is already gone.
+func MigrateAgentNetworkSettingsToDomain(ctx context.Context, db *gorm.DB) error {
+	model := &agentNetworkSettingsMigration{}
+	migrator := db.Migrator()
+
+	if !migrator.HasTable(model) {
+		return nil
+	}
+	hasCluster := migrator.HasColumn(model, "cluster")
+	if !hasCluster && !migrator.HasColumn(model, "subdomain") {
+		// Fresh schema or already migrated — nothing to reshape.
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	return db.Transaction(func(tx *gorm.DB) error {
+		txMigrator := tx.Migrator()
+		for _, field := range []string{"Domain", "ProxyAddress"} {
+			if !txMigrator.HasColumn(model, field) {
+				if err := txMigrator.AddColumn(model, field); err != nil {
+					return fmt.Errorf("add %s column to agent_network_settings: %w", field, err)
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
+		if hasCluster {
+			concat := "subdomain || '.' || cluster"
+			if tx.Name() == "mysql" {
+				concat = "CONCAT(subdomain, '.', cluster)"
+			}
+			res := tx.Exec(fmt.Sprintf(
+				"UPDATE agent_network_settings SET domain = %s, proxy_address = cluster WHERE (domain IS NULL OR domain = '') AND cluster <> '' AND subdomain <> ''",
+				concat,
+			))
+			if res.Error != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("backfill agent_network_settings domain: %w", res.Error)
+			}
+
+			var unmigratable int64
+			if err := tx.Model(model).Where("domain IS NULL OR domain = ''").Count(&unmigratable).Error; err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("count unmigratable agent_network_settings rows: %w", err)
+			}
+			if unmigratable > 0 {
+				return fmt.Errorf(
+					"%d agent_network_settings row(s) have no cluster/subdomain to derive an endpoint from; resolve them manually before upgrading",
+					unmigratable,
+				)
+			}
+
+			if res.RowsAffected > 0 {
+				log.WithContext(ctx).Infof("migrated %d agent_network_settings row(s) to domain/proxy_address", res.RowsAffected)
+			}
+		}
+
+		if txMigrator.HasIndex(model, "idx_agent_network_settings_cluster_subdomain") {
+			if err := txMigrator.DropIndex(model, "idx_agent_network_settings_cluster_subdomain"); err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("drop legacy agent_network_settings index: %w", err)
+			}
+		}
+		for _, field := range []string{"Cluster", "Subdomain"} {
+			if txMigrator.HasColumn(model, field) {
+				if err := txMigrator.DropColumn(model, field); err != nil {
+					return fmt.Errorf("drop legacy agent_network_settings column %s: %w", field, err)
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
+		return nil
+	})
+}

management/server/migration/migration_test.go

@@ -736,3 +736,125 @@ func TestFoldCostAggregatesIntoBuckets_SkipsAlreadyMigrated(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.InDelta(t, 0.004, row.OutputCostUSD, 1e-9)
 	assert.InDelta(t, 0.01, row.TotalCostUSD(), 1e-9, "derived total sums the four buckets")
 }
+
+// legacyAgentNetworkSettings is the pre-reshape schema: identity carried as
+// (cluster, subdomain) instead of (domain, proxy_address).
+type legacyAgentNetworkSettings struct {
+	AccountID           string `gorm:"primaryKey"`
+	Cluster             string
+	Subdomain           string
+	EnableLogCollection bool
+}
+
+func (legacyAgentNetworkSettings) TableName() string { return "agent_network_settings" }
+
+// TestMigrateAgentNetworkSettingsToDomain_BackfillsAndDropsLegacyColumns pins
+// the reshape: domain becomes `<subdomain>.<cluster>`, proxy_address becomes
+// the cluster, the legacy columns are dropped, and non-identity fields ride
+// through untouched.
+func TestMigrateAgentNetworkSettingsToDomain_BackfillsAndDropsLegacyColumns(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	db := setupDatabase(t)
+	require.NoError(t, db.Migrator().DropTable(&legacyAgentNetworkSettings{}))
+	require.NoError(t, db.AutoMigrate(&legacyAgentNetworkSettings{}))
+	require.NoError(t, db.Create(&legacyAgentNetworkSettings{
+		AccountID: "acct-1", Cluster: "eu.proxy.netbird.io", Subdomain: "violet", EnableLogCollection: true,
+	}).Error)
+	require.NoError(t, db.Create(&legacyAgentNetworkSettings{
+		AccountID: "acct-2", Cluster: "us.proxy.netbird.io", Subdomain: "violet",
+	}).Error)
+
+	require.NoError(t, migration.MigrateAgentNetworkSettingsToDomain(ctx, db))
+	require.NoError(t, db.AutoMigrate(&agentNetworkTypes.Settings{}),
+		"AutoMigrate must create the domain unique index over the backfilled values")
+
+	var one, two agentNetworkTypes.Settings
+	require.NoError(t, db.First(&one, "account_id = ?", "acct-1").Error)
+	assert.Equal(t, "violet.eu.proxy.netbird.io", one.Domain, "domain must combine subdomain and cluster")
+	assert.Equal(t, "eu.proxy.netbird.io", one.ProxyAddress, "proxy address must carry the cluster")
+	assert.True(t, one.EnableLogCollection, "non-identity fields must ride through")
+	require.NoError(t, db.First(&two, "account_id = ?", "acct-2").Error)
+	assert.Equal(t, "violet.us.proxy.netbird.io", two.Domain,
+		"duplicate labels on different clusters are distinct hostnames and must both survive")
+
+	migrator := db.Migrator()
+	assert.False(t, migrator.HasColumn(&legacyAgentNetworkSettings{}, "cluster"), "legacy cluster column must be dropped")
+	assert.False(t, migrator.HasColumn(&legacyAgentNetworkSettings{}, "subdomain"), "legacy subdomain column must be dropped")
+}
+
+// TestMigrateAgentNetworkSettingsToDomain_SkipsAlreadyMigrated proves the
+// migration is safe to re-run: with no legacy column present it is a no-op.
+func TestMigrateAgentNetworkSettingsToDomain_SkipsAlreadyMigrated(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	db := setupDatabase(t)
+	require.NoError(t, db.Migrator().DropTable(&agentNetworkTypes.Settings{}))
+	require.NoError(t, db.AutoMigrate(&agentNetworkTypes.Settings{}))
+	require.NoError(t, db.Create(&agentNetworkTypes.Settings{
+		AccountID: "acct-1", Domain: "gw.example.com", ProxyAddress: "gw.example.com",
+	}).Error)
+
+	require.NoError(t, migration.MigrateAgentNetworkSettingsToDomain(ctx, db),
+		"running against an already-migrated table must be a no-op, not an error")
+
+	var row agentNetworkTypes.Settings
+	require.NoError(t, db.First(&row, "account_id = ?", "acct-1").Error)
+	assert.Equal(t, "gw.example.com", row.Domain, "migrated rows must be untouched")
+}
+
+// TestMigrateAgentNetworkSettingsToDomain_FailsOnUnmigratableRow pins the
+// loud-failure contract: a legacy row missing its identity halves cannot be
+// given an endpoint, and silently leaving an empty domain would collide with
+// the unique index confusingly later.
+func TestMigrateAgentNetworkSettingsToDomain_FailsOnUnmigratableRow(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	db := setupDatabase(t)
+	require.NoError(t, db.Migrator().DropTable(&legacyAgentNetworkSettings{}))
+	require.NoError(t, db.AutoMigrate(&legacyAgentNetworkSettings{}))
+	require.NoError(t, db.Create(&legacyAgentNetworkSettings{
+		AccountID: "acct-broken", Cluster: "", Subdomain: "",
+	}).Error)
+
+	err := migration.MigrateAgentNetworkSettingsToDomain(ctx, db)
+	require.Error(t, err, "a row with no identity to derive an endpoint from must fail the migration")
+	assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "resolve them manually", "the error must tell the operator what to do")
+}
+
+// partialAgentNetworkSettings models the one non-atomic state a MySQL run can
+// be interrupted in: DDL auto-commits there, so a crash between the two legacy
+// column drops leaves subdomain behind while cluster (and the completed
+// backfill) are already committed.
+type partialAgentNetworkSettings struct {
+	AccountID    string `gorm:"primaryKey"`
+	Subdomain    string
+	Domain       string `gorm:"type:varchar(255)"`
+	ProxyAddress string `gorm:"type:varchar(255)"`
+}
+
+func (partialAgentNetworkSettings) TableName() string { return "agent_network_settings" }
+
+// TestMigrateAgentNetworkSettingsToDomain_ResumesAfterPartialDrop pins MySQL
+// resumability: a rerun over the interrupted state must remove the leftover
+// subdomain column without re-running the backfill (the cluster column that
+// feeds it is gone) and without touching the migrated values.
+func TestMigrateAgentNetworkSettingsToDomain_ResumesAfterPartialDrop(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	db := setupDatabase(t)
+	require.NoError(t, db.Migrator().DropTable(&partialAgentNetworkSettings{}))
+	require.NoError(t, db.AutoMigrate(&partialAgentNetworkSettings{}))
+	require.NoError(t, db.Create(&partialAgentNetworkSettings{
+		AccountID: "acct-1", Subdomain: "violet",
+		Domain: "violet.eu.proxy.netbird.io", ProxyAddress: "eu.proxy.netbird.io",
+	}).Error)
+
+	require.NoError(t, migration.MigrateAgentNetworkSettingsToDomain(ctx, db),
+		"a rerun over a partially-dropped schema must resume, not error")
+
+	migrator := db.Migrator()
+	assert.False(t, migrator.HasColumn(&partialAgentNetworkSettings{}, "subdomain"),
+		"the leftover legacy column must be dropped on resume")
+
+	var row agentNetworkTypes.Settings
+	require.NoError(t, db.First(&row, "account_id = ?", "acct-1").Error)
+	assert.Equal(t, "violet.eu.proxy.netbird.io", row.Domain, "migrated values must be untouched")
+	assert.Equal(t, "eu.proxy.netbird.io", row.ProxyAddress, "migrated values must be untouched")
+}

management/server/store/sql_store.go

@@ -599,6 +599,34 @@ func (s *SqlStore) ApproveAccountPeers(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (i
 	return int(result.RowsAffected), nil
 }
 
+// RefreshPeerLastSeen updates only peer_status_last_seen. Every other status
+// column is left untouched: peer_status_connected and
+// peer_status_session_started_at belong to the sync stream that owns the
+// session, and a blind write here would corrupt the fencing
+// MarkPeerConnectedIfNewerSession relies on.
+//
+// LastSeen comes from the database clock for the same reason it does there: a
+// Go-side timestamp is taken before the write and can land after a connect that
+// used CURRENT_TIMESTAMP, dragging the column backwards.
+//
+// staleBefore carries the caller's throttle into the same statement, so
+// concurrent requests for one peer collapse into a single write instead of
+// each racing on its own stale read. The column is nullable — Status is an
+// embedded pointer, so a peer stored without one leaves it NULL — and NULL
+// loses every comparison, hence the explicit branch for a peer never seen.
+func (s *SqlStore) RefreshPeerLastSeen(ctx context.Context, accountID, peerID string, staleBefore time.Time) (bool, error) {
+	result := s.db.WithContext(ctx).
+		Model(&nbpeer.Peer{}).
+		Where(accountAndIDQueryCondition, accountID, peerID).
+		Where("(peer_status_last_seen IS NULL OR peer_status_last_seen < ?)", staleBefore).
+		Update("peer_status_last_seen", gorm.Expr("CURRENT_TIMESTAMP"))
+	if result.Error != nil {
+		return false, status.Errorf(status.Internal, "refresh peer last seen: %v", result.Error)
+	}
+
+	return result.RowsAffected > 0, nil
+}
+
 // SaveUsers saves the given list of users to the database.
 func (s *SqlStore) SaveUsers(ctx context.Context, users []*types.User) error {
 	if len(users) == 0 {
@@ -6340,6 +6368,30 @@ func (s *SqlStore) CountProxiesByAccountID(ctx context.Context, accountID string
 	return count, nil
 }
 
+// HasActiveProxyAtClusterAddress reports whether any proxy — shared or
+// account-scoped — is currently active at the given cluster address, using
+// the same connected-within-threshold window as the other active-proxy
+// queries. Backs the agent-network settings delete guard: settings cannot be
+// deleted while a proxy declares the endpoint hostname as its address.
+//
+// The comparison folds case on both sides: the caller passes a normalized
+// (lowercase) hostname, but proxies declare their cluster address verbatim
+// and Connect stores it unchanged, so on case-sensitive collations a proxy
+// declaring "GW.Example.com" would otherwise slip past the guard. Hostnames
+// are case-insensitive per RFC 4343; the guard must be too.
+func (s *SqlStore) HasActiveProxyAtClusterAddress(ctx context.Context, clusterAddress string) (bool, error) {
+	var count int64
+	result := s.db.
+		Model(&proxy.Proxy{}).
+		Where("LOWER(cluster_address) = LOWER(?) AND status = ? AND last_seen > ?", clusterAddress, proxy.StatusConnected, time.Now().Add(-proxyActiveThreshold)).
+		Count(&count)
+	if result.Error != nil {
+		log.WithContext(ctx).Errorf("failed to count active proxies at cluster address: %v", result.Error)
+		return false, status.Errorf(status.Internal, "failed to count active proxies at cluster address")
+	}
+	return count > 0, nil
+}
+
 func (s *SqlStore) IsClusterAddressConflicting(ctx context.Context, clusterAddress, accountID string) (bool, error) {
 	var count int64
 	result := s.db.

management/server/store/sql_store_activity_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+package store
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"net/netip"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+
+	nbpeer "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/peer"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
+)
+
+const activityAccountID = "activityAccountId"
+
+func newActivityTestStore(t *testing.T) Store {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	store, cleanUp, err := NewTestStoreFromSQL(context.Background(), "", t.TempDir())
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	t.Cleanup(cleanUp)
+
+	require.NoError(t, store.SaveAccount(context.Background(), &types.Account{
+		Id:        activityAccountID,
+		Domain:    "activity.example.com",
+		CreatedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
+	}))
+
+	return store
+}
+
+func TestRefreshPeerLastSeen(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	store := newActivityTestStore(t)
+	stored := time.Now().UTC().Add(-3 * time.Hour)
+	require.NoError(t, store.AddPeerToAccount(ctx, activityPeer(stored)))
+
+	refreshed, err := store.RefreshPeerLastSeen(ctx, activityAccountID, "activityPeer", time.Now().UTC().Add(-time.Hour))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.True(t, refreshed, "a peer seen three hours ago is stale enough to refresh")
+
+	peer, err := store.GetPeerByID(ctx, LockingStrengthNone, activityAccountID, "activityPeer")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.WithinDuration(t, time.Now().UTC(), peer.Status.LastSeen.UTC(), time.Minute, "last seen should be stamped at write time")
+	assert.True(t, peer.Status.LastSeen.After(stored), "last seen must move forward")
+}
+
+// TestRefreshPeerLastSeenHonoursCutoff covers the throttle the caller relies on:
+// two concurrent requests both read the same stale peer, but only the statement
+// that still finds LastSeen behind the cutoff writes.
+func TestRefreshPeerLastSeenHonoursCutoff(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	store := newActivityTestStore(t)
+	stored := time.Now().UTC().Add(-10 * time.Minute)
+	require.NoError(t, store.AddPeerToAccount(ctx, activityPeer(stored)))
+
+	refreshed, err := store.RefreshPeerLastSeen(ctx, activityAccountID, "activityPeer", time.Now().UTC().Add(-time.Hour))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.False(t, refreshed, "a peer seen inside the interval must not be written")
+
+	peer, err := store.GetPeerByID(ctx, LockingStrengthNone, activityAccountID, "activityPeer")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.WithinDuration(t, stored, peer.Status.LastSeen.UTC(), time.Second, "last seen must be left where it was")
+}
+
+// TestRefreshPeerLastSeenRecordsNeverSeenPeer covers the nullable column. Status
+// is an embedded pointer, so a peer stored without one leaves last seen NULL,
+// and NULL loses the cutoff comparison — such a peer would never record its
+// first activity.
+func TestRefreshPeerLastSeenRecordsNeverSeenPeer(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	store := newActivityTestStore(t)
+	stored := activityPeer(time.Time{})
+	stored.Status = nil
+	require.NoError(t, store.AddPeerToAccount(ctx, stored))
+
+	refreshed, err := store.RefreshPeerLastSeen(ctx, activityAccountID, "activityPeer", time.Now().UTC().Add(-time.Hour))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.True(t, refreshed, "a peer that was never seen must record its first activity")
+
+	peer, err := store.GetPeerByID(ctx, LockingStrengthNone, activityAccountID, "activityPeer")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.WithinDuration(t, time.Now().UTC(), peer.Status.LastSeen.UTC(), time.Minute, "last seen should be stamped at write time")
+}
+
+// TestRefreshPeerLastSeenLeavesSessionStateAlone pins the column boundary: the
+// connected flag and the session token belong to the sync stream that owns the
+// peer's session, and a blind write here would corrupt its fencing. This is why
+// SavePeerStatus is not reused for an activity bump.
+func TestRefreshPeerLastSeenLeavesSessionStateAlone(t *testing.T) {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	store := newActivityTestStore(t)
+
+	stored := activityPeer(time.Date(2026, 3, 1, 9, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC))
+	stored.Status.Connected = true
+	stored.Status.SessionStartedAt = 1234567890
+	require.NoError(t, store.AddPeerToAccount(ctx, stored))
+
+	refreshed, err := store.RefreshPeerLastSeen(ctx, activityAccountID, "activityPeer", time.Now().UTC().Add(-time.Hour))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	require.True(t, refreshed, "the peer is stale enough to refresh")
+
+	peer, err := store.GetPeerByID(ctx, LockingStrengthNone, activityAccountID, "activityPeer")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.WithinDuration(t, time.Now().UTC(), peer.Status.LastSeen.UTC(), time.Minute, "last seen should move forward")
+	assert.True(t, peer.Status.Connected, "connected flag must survive an activity write")
+	assert.Equal(t, int64(1234567890), peer.Status.SessionStartedAt, "session token must survive an activity write")
+}
+
+func activityPeer(lastSeen time.Time) *nbpeer.Peer {
+	return &nbpeer.Peer{
+		ID:        "activityPeer",
+		AccountID: activityAccountID,
+		Key:       "activityPeerKey",
+		IP:        netip.MustParseAddr("100.64.0.9"),
+		Name:      "activity-peer",
+		DNSLabel:  "activity-peer",
+		Status:    &nbpeer.PeerStatus{LastSeen: lastSeen},
+	}
+}

management/server/store/sql_store_agentnetwork.go

@@ -315,25 +315,65 @@ func (s *SqlStore) GetAllAgentNetworkSettings(ctx context.Context, lockStrength
 	return settings, nil
 }
 
-// GetAgentNetworkSettingsByCluster returns every Settings row pinned to
-// the given proxy cluster. Used by the bootstrap label generator to
-// build the set of subdomains already taken on a cluster.
-func (s *SqlStore) GetAgentNetworkSettingsByCluster(ctx context.Context, lockStrength LockingStrength, cluster string) ([]*agentNetworkTypes.Settings, error) {
+// GetAgentNetworkSettingsByProxyAddress returns every Settings row whose
+// gateway is served by the proxy declaring the given cluster address. Used by
+// cluster-scoped synthesis to find the accounts a shared proxy serves.
+func (s *SqlStore) GetAgentNetworkSettingsByProxyAddress(ctx context.Context, lockStrength LockingStrength, proxyAddress string) ([]*agentNetworkTypes.Settings, error) {
 	tx := s.db
 	if lockStrength != LockingStrengthNone {
 		tx = tx.Clauses(clause.Locking{Strength: string(lockStrength)})
 	}
 
 	var settings []*agentNetworkTypes.Settings
-	result := tx.Find(&settings, "cluster = ?", cluster)
+	result := tx.Find(&settings, "proxy_address = ?", proxyAddress)
 	if result.Error != nil {
-		log.WithContext(ctx).Errorf("failed to get agent network settings by cluster from store: %v", result.Error)
-		return nil, status.Errorf(status.Internal, "failed to get agent network settings by cluster from store")
+		log.WithContext(ctx).Errorf("failed to get agent network settings by proxy address from store: %v", result.Error)
+		return nil, status.Errorf(status.Internal, "failed to get agent network settings by proxy address from store")
 	}
 
 	return settings, nil
 }
 
+// GetAgentNetworkSettingsByDomain resolves the single Settings row holding the
+// given endpoint hostname — a point query on the domain unique index. Returns
+// status.NotFound when no account owns the domain.
+func (s *SqlStore) GetAgentNetworkSettingsByDomain(ctx context.Context, lockStrength LockingStrength, domain string) (*agentNetworkTypes.Settings, error) {
+	tx := s.db
+	if lockStrength != LockingStrengthNone {
+		tx = tx.Clauses(clause.Locking{Strength: string(lockStrength)})
+	}
+
+	var settings agentNetworkTypes.Settings
+	result := tx.Take(&settings, "domain = ?", domain)
+	if result.Error != nil {
+		if errors.Is(result.Error, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
+			return nil, status.Errorf(status.NotFound, "agent network settings for domain %s not found", domain)
+		}
+
+		log.WithContext(ctx).Errorf("failed to get agent network settings by domain from store: %v", result.Error)
+		return nil, status.Errorf(status.Internal, "failed to get agent network settings by domain from store")
+	}
+
+	return &settings, nil
+}
+
+// CreateAgentNetworkSettings inserts a new settings row.
+//
+// Unlike SaveAgentNetworkSettings (an upsert) this is a plain INSERT, and it
+// returns the driver error unwrapped. Both properties are required by the
+// bootstrap allocator: an upsert would overwrite whichever row it collided
+// with, and the allocator classifies the rejection by matching the driver's
+// message — a unique violation on the account primary key means a concurrent
+// bootstrap for the same account won, and one on the domain index means the
+// hostname is taken.
+func (s *SqlStore) CreateAgentNetworkSettings(ctx context.Context, settings *agentNetworkTypes.Settings) error {
+	if err := s.db.Create(settings).Error; err != nil {
+		log.WithContext(ctx).Debugf("failed to create agent network settings: %v", err)
+		return err
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
 // SaveAgentNetworkSettings upserts the per-account Agent Network
 // settings row.
 func (s *SqlStore) SaveAgentNetworkSettings(ctx context.Context, settings *agentNetworkTypes.Settings) error {
@@ -346,6 +386,25 @@ func (s *SqlStore) SaveAgentNetworkSettings(ctx context.Context, settings *agent
 	return nil
 }
 
+// DeleteAgentNetworkSettings removes the per-account Agent Network settings
+// row, releasing the account's endpoint. Returns status.NotFound when no row
+// exists. The guards on the delete (no providers, no proxy actively serving
+// the endpoint) live in the manager, which runs this inside a transaction
+// after re-checking them under a row lock.
+func (s *SqlStore) DeleteAgentNetworkSettings(ctx context.Context, accountID string) error {
+	result := s.db.Delete(&agentNetworkTypes.Settings{}, "account_id = ?", accountID)
+	if result.Error != nil {
+		log.WithContext(ctx).Errorf("failed to delete agent network settings from store: %v", result.Error)
+		return status.Errorf(status.Internal, "failed to delete agent network settings from store")
+	}
+
+	if result.RowsAffected == 0 {
+		return status.Errorf(status.NotFound, "agent network settings for account %s not found", accountID)
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
 // IncrementAgentNetworkConsumption atomically upserts the consumption
 // row keyed on (account, dim_kind, dim_id, window_seconds, window_start)
 // and adds the supplied deltas. Concurrent calls from multiple proxy

management/server/store/sql_store_agentnetwork_budgetrule_test.go

@@ -88,9 +88,9 @@ func TestAgentNetworkSettings_RealStore_CollectionTogglesRoundTrip(t *testing.T)
 
 	const accountID = "acc-settings-toggles"
 	require.NoError(t, s.SaveAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, &agentNetworkTypes.Settings{
-		AccountID: accountID,
-		Cluster:   "eu.proxy.netbird.io",
-		Subdomain: "violet",
+		AccountID:    accountID,
+		Domain:       "violet.eu.proxy.netbird.io",
+		ProxyAddress: "eu.proxy.netbird.io",
 	}))
 
 	got, err := s.GetAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, LockingStrengthNone, accountID)

management/server/store/store.go

@@ -180,6 +180,14 @@ type Store interface {
 	// Returns true when the update happened, false when this stream lost
 	// the race against a newer session.
 	MarkPeerConnectedIfNewerSession(ctx context.Context, accountID, peerID string, newSessionStartedAt int64) (bool, error)
+	// RefreshPeerLastSeen records that a peer was just seen, stamping the
+	// database clock like the other status writers. Connected and
+	// SessionStartedAt are left alone, so this never interferes with the
+	// session-ownership protocol MarkPeerConnectedIfNewerSession implements.
+	// The write only lands when the stored LastSeen is older than
+	// staleBefore, which keeps a caller's throttle atomic under concurrent
+	// requests for the same peer. Returns true when the update happened.
+	RefreshPeerLastSeen(ctx context.Context, accountID, peerID string, staleBefore time.Time) (bool, error)
 	// MarkPeerDisconnectedIfSameSession sets the peer to disconnected and
 	// resets SessionStartedAt to zero, but only when the stored
 	// SessionStartedAt equals the given sessionStartedAt. LastSeen is
@@ -328,6 +336,7 @@ type Store interface {
 	GetProxyByAccountID(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (*proxy.Proxy, error)
 	CountProxiesByAccountID(ctx context.Context, accountID string) (int64, error)
 	IsClusterAddressConflicting(ctx context.Context, clusterAddress, accountID string) (bool, error)
+	HasActiveProxyAtClusterAddress(ctx context.Context, clusterAddress string) (bool, error)
 	DeleteAccountCluster(ctx context.Context, clusterAddress, accountID string) error
 
 	GetCustomDomainsCounts(ctx context.Context) (total int64, validated int64, err error)
@@ -360,8 +369,11 @@ type Store interface {
 	DeleteAgentNetworkGuardrail(ctx context.Context, accountID, guardrailID string) error
 	GetAgentNetworkSettings(ctx context.Context, lockStrength LockingStrength, accountID string) (*agentNetworkTypes.Settings, error)
 	GetAllAgentNetworkSettings(ctx context.Context, lockStrength LockingStrength) ([]*agentNetworkTypes.Settings, error)
-	GetAgentNetworkSettingsByCluster(ctx context.Context, lockStrength LockingStrength, cluster string) ([]*agentNetworkTypes.Settings, error)
+	GetAgentNetworkSettingsByProxyAddress(ctx context.Context, lockStrength LockingStrength, proxyAddress string) ([]*agentNetworkTypes.Settings, error)
+	GetAgentNetworkSettingsByDomain(ctx context.Context, lockStrength LockingStrength, domain string) (*agentNetworkTypes.Settings, error)
+	CreateAgentNetworkSettings(ctx context.Context, settings *agentNetworkTypes.Settings) error
 	SaveAgentNetworkSettings(ctx context.Context, settings *agentNetworkTypes.Settings) error
+	DeleteAgentNetworkSettings(ctx context.Context, accountID string) error
 	IncrementAgentNetworkConsumption(ctx context.Context, accountID string, kind agentNetworkTypes.ConsumptionDimension, dimID string, windowSeconds int64, windowStart time.Time, tokensIn, tokensOut int64, costUSD float64) error
 	IncrementAgentNetworkConsumptionBatch(ctx context.Context, accountID string, keys []agentNetworkTypes.ConsumptionKey, tokensIn, tokensOut int64, costUSD float64) error
 	GetAgentNetworkConsumption(ctx context.Context, lockStrength LockingStrength, accountID string, kind agentNetworkTypes.ConsumptionDimension, dimID string, windowSeconds int64, windowStart time.Time) (*agentNetworkTypes.Consumption, error)
@@ -608,6 +620,9 @@ func getMigrationsPreAuto(ctx context.Context) []migrationFunc {
 		func(db *gorm.DB) error {
 			return migration.BackfillPublicIDs[posture.Checks](ctx, db)
 		},
+		func(db *gorm.DB) error {
+			return migration.MigrateAgentNetworkSettingsToDomain(ctx, db)
+		},
 	}
 }
 

management/server/store/store_mock.go

@@ -268,6 +268,20 @@ func (mr *MockStoreMockRecorder) CreateAgentNetworkAccessLog(ctx, entry, groups
 	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "CreateAgentNetworkAccessLog", reflect.TypeOf((*MockStore)(nil).CreateAgentNetworkAccessLog), ctx, entry, groups)
 }
 
+// CreateAgentNetworkSettings mocks base method.
+func (m *MockStore) CreateAgentNetworkSettings(ctx context.Context, settings *types.Settings) error {
+	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
+	ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "CreateAgentNetworkSettings", ctx, settings)
+	ret0, _ := ret[0].(error)
+	return ret0
+}
+
+// CreateAgentNetworkSettings indicates an expected call of CreateAgentNetworkSettings.
+func (mr *MockStoreMockRecorder) CreateAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, settings interface{}) *gomock.Call {
+	mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
+	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "CreateAgentNetworkSettings", reflect.TypeOf((*MockStore)(nil).CreateAgentNetworkSettings), ctx, settings)
+}
+
 // CreateAgentNetworkUsage mocks base method.
 func (m *MockStore) CreateAgentNetworkUsage(ctx context.Context, usage *types.AgentNetworkUsage, groups []types.AgentNetworkUsageGroup) error {
 	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
@@ -493,6 +507,20 @@ func (mr *MockStoreMockRecorder) DeleteAgentNetworkProvider(ctx, accountID, prov
 	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "DeleteAgentNetworkProvider", reflect.TypeOf((*MockStore)(nil).DeleteAgentNetworkProvider), ctx, accountID, providerID)
 }
 
+// DeleteAgentNetworkSettings mocks base method.
+func (m *MockStore) DeleteAgentNetworkSettings(ctx context.Context, accountID string) error {
+	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
+	ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "DeleteAgentNetworkSettings", ctx, accountID)
+	ret0, _ := ret[0].(error)
+	return ret0
+}
+
+// DeleteAgentNetworkSettings indicates an expected call of DeleteAgentNetworkSettings.
+func (mr *MockStoreMockRecorder) DeleteAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, accountID interface{}) *gomock.Call {
+	mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
+	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "DeleteAgentNetworkSettings", reflect.TypeOf((*MockStore)(nil).DeleteAgentNetworkSettings), ctx, accountID)
+}
+
 // DeleteCustomDomain mocks base method.
 func (m *MockStore) DeleteCustomDomain(ctx context.Context, accountID, domainID string) error {
 	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
@@ -1687,19 +1715,34 @@ func (mr *MockStoreMockRecorder) GetAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, lockStrength, acco
 	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "GetAgentNetworkSettings", reflect.TypeOf((*MockStore)(nil).GetAgentNetworkSettings), ctx, lockStrength, accountID)
 }
 
-// GetAgentNetworkSettingsByCluster mocks base method.
-func (m *MockStore) GetAgentNetworkSettingsByCluster(ctx context.Context, lockStrength LockingStrength, cluster string) ([]*types.Settings, error) {
+// GetAgentNetworkSettingsByDomain mocks base method.
+func (m *MockStore) GetAgentNetworkSettingsByDomain(ctx context.Context, lockStrength LockingStrength, domain string) (*types.Settings, error) {
 	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
-	ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "GetAgentNetworkSettingsByCluster", ctx, lockStrength, cluster)
+	ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "GetAgentNetworkSettingsByDomain", ctx, lockStrength, domain)
+	ret0, _ := ret[0].(*types.Settings)
+	ret1, _ := ret[1].(error)
+	return ret0, ret1
+}
+
+// GetAgentNetworkSettingsByDomain indicates an expected call of GetAgentNetworkSettingsByDomain.
+func (mr *MockStoreMockRecorder) GetAgentNetworkSettingsByDomain(ctx, lockStrength, domain interface{}) *gomock.Call {
+	mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
+	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "GetAgentNetworkSettingsByDomain", reflect.TypeOf((*MockStore)(nil).GetAgentNetworkSettingsByDomain), ctx, lockStrength, domain)
+}
+
+// GetAgentNetworkSettingsByProxyAddress mocks base method.
+func (m *MockStore) GetAgentNetworkSettingsByProxyAddress(ctx context.Context, lockStrength LockingStrength, proxyAddress string) ([]*types.Settings, error) {
+	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
+	ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "GetAgentNetworkSettingsByProxyAddress", ctx, lockStrength, proxyAddress)
 	ret0, _ := ret[0].([]*types.Settings)
 	ret1, _ := ret[1].(error)
 	return ret0, ret1
 }
 
-// GetAgentNetworkSettingsByCluster indicates an expected call of GetAgentNetworkSettingsByCluster.
-func (mr *MockStoreMockRecorder) GetAgentNetworkSettingsByCluster(ctx, lockStrength, cluster interface{}) *gomock.Call {
+// GetAgentNetworkSettingsByProxyAddress indicates an expected call of GetAgentNetworkSettingsByProxyAddress.
+func (mr *MockStoreMockRecorder) GetAgentNetworkSettingsByProxyAddress(ctx, lockStrength, proxyAddress interface{}) *gomock.Call {
 	mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
-	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "GetAgentNetworkSettingsByCluster", reflect.TypeOf((*MockStore)(nil).GetAgentNetworkSettingsByCluster), ctx, lockStrength, cluster)
+	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "GetAgentNetworkSettingsByProxyAddress", reflect.TypeOf((*MockStore)(nil).GetAgentNetworkSettingsByProxyAddress), ctx, lockStrength, proxyAddress)
 }
 
 // GetAgentNetworkUsageRows mocks base method.
@@ -2956,6 +2999,21 @@ func (mr *MockStoreMockRecorder) GetZoneDNSRecordsByName(ctx, lockStrength, acco
 	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "GetZoneDNSRecordsByName", reflect.TypeOf((*MockStore)(nil).GetZoneDNSRecordsByName), ctx, lockStrength, accountID, zoneID, name)
 }
 
+// HasActiveProxyAtClusterAddress mocks base method.
+func (m *MockStore) HasActiveProxyAtClusterAddress(ctx context.Context, clusterAddress string) (bool, error) {
+	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
+	ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "HasActiveProxyAtClusterAddress", ctx, clusterAddress)
+	ret0, _ := ret[0].(bool)
+	ret1, _ := ret[1].(error)
+	return ret0, ret1
+}
+
+// HasActiveProxyAtClusterAddress indicates an expected call of HasActiveProxyAtClusterAddress.
+func (mr *MockStoreMockRecorder) HasActiveProxyAtClusterAddress(ctx, clusterAddress interface{}) *gomock.Call {
+	mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
+	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "HasActiveProxyAtClusterAddress", reflect.TypeOf((*MockStore)(nil).HasActiveProxyAtClusterAddress), ctx, clusterAddress)
+}
+
 // IncrementAgentNetworkConsumption mocks base method.
 func (m *MockStore) IncrementAgentNetworkConsumption(ctx context.Context, accountID string, kind types.ConsumptionDimension, dimID string, windowSeconds int64, windowStart time.Time, tokensIn, tokensOut int64, costUSD float64) error {
 	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
@@ -3203,6 +3261,21 @@ func (mr *MockStoreMockRecorder) MarkProxyAccessTokenUsed(ctx, tokenID interface
 	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "MarkProxyAccessTokenUsed", reflect.TypeOf((*MockStore)(nil).MarkProxyAccessTokenUsed), ctx, tokenID)
 }
 
+// RefreshPeerLastSeen mocks base method.
+func (m *MockStore) RefreshPeerLastSeen(ctx context.Context, accountID, peerID string, staleBefore time.Time) (bool, error) {
+	m.ctrl.T.Helper()
+	ret := m.ctrl.Call(m, "RefreshPeerLastSeen", ctx, accountID, peerID, staleBefore)
+	ret0, _ := ret[0].(bool)
+	ret1, _ := ret[1].(error)
+	return ret0, ret1
+}
+
+// RefreshPeerLastSeen indicates an expected call of RefreshPeerLastSeen.
+func (mr *MockStoreMockRecorder) RefreshPeerLastSeen(ctx, accountID, peerID, staleBefore interface{}) *gomock.Call {
+	mr.mock.ctrl.T.Helper()
+	return mr.mock.ctrl.RecordCallWithMethodType(mr.mock, "RefreshPeerLastSeen", reflect.TypeOf((*MockStore)(nil).RefreshPeerLastSeen), ctx, accountID, peerID, staleBefore)
+}
+
 // RemovePeerFromAllGroups mocks base method.
 func (m *MockStore) RemovePeerFromAllGroups(ctx context.Context, peerID string) error {
 	m.ctrl.T.Helper()

proxy/auth/auth.go

@@ -30,8 +30,6 @@ const (
 	SessionJWTIssuer     = "netbird-management"
 )
 
-const ClientIPMetadataKey = "nb-client-ip"
-
 // ResolveProto determines the protocol scheme based on the forwarded proto
 // configuration. When set to "http" or "https" the value is used directly.
 // Otherwise TLS state is used: if conn is non-nil "https" is returned, else "http".

proxy/internal/auth/header_cache.go

@@ -1,188 +0,0 @@
-package auth
-
-import (
-	"crypto/hmac"
-	"crypto/rand"
-	"crypto/sha256"
-	"os"
-	"strings"
-	"sync"
-	"time"
-
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-	"golang.org/x/sync/singleflight"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/types"
-)
-
-const headerAuthCacheTTL = 60 * time.Second
-
-const envHeaderAuthCacheTTL = "NB_PROXY_HEADER_AUTH_CACHE_TTL"
-
-const headerAuthCachePerService = 1024
-
-const headerAuthCacheSkew = 30 * time.Second
-
-const headerAuthRPCTimeout = 10 * time.Second
-
-type headerCacheKey struct {
-	serviceID  types.ServiceID
-	headerName string
-	credential [sha256.Size]byte
-}
-
-type headerCacheEntry struct {
-	token     string
-	expiresAt time.Time
-}
-
-type headerAuthCache struct {
-	mu      sync.Mutex
-	entries map[types.ServiceID]*headerServiceBucket
-	flight  singleflight.Group
-	ttl     time.Duration
-	maxSize int
-	macKey  []byte
-	now     func() time.Time
-}
-
-type headerServiceBucket struct {
-	items map[headerCacheKey]headerCacheEntry
-	order []headerCacheKey
-}
-
-func newHeaderAuthCache() *headerAuthCache {
-	macKey := make([]byte, sha256.Size)
-	_, _ = rand.Read(macKey)
-
-	return &headerAuthCache{
-		entries: make(map[types.ServiceID]*headerServiceBucket),
-		ttl:     headerAuthCacheTTLFromEnv(),
-		maxSize: headerAuthCachePerService,
-		macKey:  macKey,
-		now:     time.Now,
-	}
-}
-
-func headerAuthCacheTTLFromEnv() time.Duration {
-	raw := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(envHeaderAuthCacheTTL))
-	if raw == "" {
-		return headerAuthCacheTTL
-	}
-	d, err := time.ParseDuration(raw)
-	if err != nil || d <= 0 {
-		log.Warnf("ignoring invalid %s=%q (want a positive Go duration like 30s or 2m); using default %s",
-			envHeaderAuthCacheTTL, raw, headerAuthCacheTTL)
-		return headerAuthCacheTTL
-	}
-	return d
-}
-
-func (c *headerAuthCache) key(serviceID types.ServiceID, headerName, credential string) headerCacheKey {
-	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, c.macKey)
-	mac.Write([]byte(credential))
-
-	key := headerCacheKey{serviceID: serviceID, headerName: headerName}
-	copy(key.credential[:], mac.Sum(nil))
-	return key
-}
-
-func (c *headerAuthCache) get(key headerCacheKey) string {
-	c.mu.Lock()
-	defer c.mu.Unlock()
-
-	bucket, ok := c.entries[key.serviceID]
-	if !ok {
-		return ""
-	}
-	entry, ok := bucket.items[key]
-	if !ok {
-		return ""
-	}
-	if !c.now().Before(entry.expiresAt) {
-		delete(bucket.items, key)
-		bucket.order = removeKey(bucket.order, key)
-		return ""
-	}
-	return entry.token
-}
-
-func (c *headerAuthCache) put(key headerCacheKey, token string, sessionExpiration time.Duration) {
-	lifetime := c.ttl
-	if sessionExpiration > 0 && sessionExpiration-headerAuthCacheSkew < lifetime {
-		lifetime = sessionExpiration - headerAuthCacheSkew
-	}
-	if lifetime <= 0 {
-		return
-	}
-
-	c.mu.Lock()
-	defer c.mu.Unlock()
-
-	bucket, ok := c.entries[key.serviceID]
-	if !ok {
-		bucket = &headerServiceBucket{items: make(map[headerCacheKey]headerCacheEntry)}
-		c.entries[key.serviceID] = bucket
-	}
-	if _, exists := bucket.items[key]; !exists {
-		bucket.order = append(bucket.order, key)
-	}
-	bucket.items[key] = headerCacheEntry{token: token, expiresAt: c.now().Add(lifetime)}
-
-	for len(bucket.order) > c.maxSize {
-		oldest := bucket.order[0]
-		bucket.order = bucket.order[1:]
-		delete(bucket.items, oldest)
-	}
-}
-
-func (c *headerAuthCache) invalidate(key headerCacheKey) {
-	c.mu.Lock()
-	defer c.mu.Unlock()
-
-	bucket, ok := c.entries[key.serviceID]
-	if !ok {
-		return
-	}
-	delete(bucket.items, key)
-	bucket.order = removeKey(bucket.order, key)
-}
-
-func (c *headerAuthCache) invalidateService(serviceID types.ServiceID) {
-	c.mu.Lock()
-	defer c.mu.Unlock()
-
-	delete(c.entries, serviceID)
-}
-
-type authenticateHeaderFn func() (string, error)
-
-func (c *headerAuthCache) fetch(key headerCacheKey, sessionExpiration time.Duration, authenticate authenticateHeaderFn) (string, bool, error) {
-	if token := c.get(key); token != "" {
-		return token, true, nil
-	}
-
-	res, err, _ := c.flight.Do(headerFlightKey(key), func() (any, error) {
-		if token := c.get(key); token != "" {
-			return token, nil
-		}
-		token, err := authenticate()
-		if err != nil {
-			return "", err
-		}
-		if token != "" {
-			c.put(key, token, sessionExpiration)
-		}
-		return token, nil
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", false, err
-	}
-
-	token, _ := res.(string)
-	return token, false, nil
-}
-
-func headerFlightKey(key headerCacheKey) string {
-	return string(key.serviceID) + "|" + key.headerName + "|" + string(key.credential[:])
-}

proxy/internal/auth/header_cache_test.go

@@ -1,244 +0,0 @@
-package auth
-
-import (
-	"context"
-	"fmt"
-	"net/http"
-	"net/http/httptest"
-	"sync"
-	"sync/atomic"
-	"testing"
-	"time"
-
-	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
-	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
-
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/reverseproxy/sessionkey"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/auth"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/proxy"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
-)
-
-func newCountingHeaderScheme(t *testing.T, kp *sessionkey.KeyPair, headerName, expectedValue string, calls *atomic.Int32) Header {
-	t.Helper()
-	token, err := sessionkey.SignToken(kp.PrivateKey, "header-user", "", "example.com", auth.MethodHeader, nil, nil, time.Hour)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	mock := &mockAuthenticator{fn: func(_ context.Context, req *proto.AuthenticateRequest) (*proto.AuthenticateResponse, error) {
-		calls.Add(1)
-		ha := req.GetHeaderAuth()
-		if ha != nil && ha.GetHeaderValue() == expectedValue {
-			return &proto.AuthenticateResponse{Success: true, SessionToken: token}, nil
-		}
-		return &proto.AuthenticateResponse{Success: false}, nil
-	}}
-	return NewHeader(mock, "svc1", "acc1", headerName)
-}
-
-func doHeaderRequest(t *testing.T, mw *Middleware, credential string) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
-	t.Helper()
-	handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
-		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
-	}))
-
-	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/path", nil)
-	req.Header.Set("X-API-Key", credential)
-	req = req.WithContext(proxy.WithCapturedData(req.Context(), proxy.NewCapturedData("")))
-
-	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
-	handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
-	return rec
-}
-
-func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_ReusesSessionTokenAcrossRequests(t *testing.T) {
-	var calls atomic.Int32
-	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
-	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
-	hdr := newCountingHeaderScheme(t, kp, "X-API-Key", "secret-key", &calls)
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{hdr}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false))
-
-	for i := 0; i < 25; i++ {
-		rec := doHeaderRequest(t, mw, "secret-key")
-		require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code)
-	}
-
-	assert.Equal(t, int32(1), calls.Load(), "a repeated credential must be verified once")
-}
-
-func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_DoesNotCacheFailures(t *testing.T) {
-	var calls atomic.Int32
-	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
-	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
-	hdr := newCountingHeaderScheme(t, kp, "X-API-Key", "secret-key", &calls)
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{hdr}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false))
-
-	for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
-		rec := doHeaderRequest(t, mw, "wrong-key")
-		require.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, rec.Code)
-	}
-
-	assert.Equal(t, int32(3), calls.Load(), "rejected credentials must not be cached")
-}
-
-func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_MissingHeaderSkipsRPC(t *testing.T) {
-	var calls atomic.Int32
-	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
-	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
-	hdr := newCountingHeaderScheme(t, kp, "X-API-Key", "secret-key", &calls)
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{hdr}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false))
-
-	rec := doHeaderRequest(t, mw, "")
-	assert.NotEqual(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code)
-	assert.Zero(t, calls.Load(), "an absent header must not reach management")
-}
-
-func TestHeaderAuthCache_EvictsExpiredEntries(t *testing.T) {
-	c := newHeaderAuthCache()
-	now := time.Now()
-	c.now = func() time.Time { return now }
-
-	key := c.key("svc1", "X-API-Key", "secret")
-	c.put(key, "token", time.Hour)
-	require.Equal(t, "token", c.get(key))
-
-	now = now.Add(c.ttl + time.Second)
-	assert.Empty(t, c.get(key))
-}
-
-func TestHeaderAuthCache_SkipsCacheWhenSessionExpiresWithinSkew(t *testing.T) {
-	c := newHeaderAuthCache()
-
-	key := c.key("svc1", "X-API-Key", "secret")
-	c.put(key, "token", headerAuthCacheSkew)
-
-	assert.Empty(t, c.get(key), "a token must never outlive the session it was minted for")
-}
-
-func TestHeaderAuthCache_SessionExpirationShortensTTL(t *testing.T) {
-	c := newHeaderAuthCache()
-	now := time.Now()
-	c.now = func() time.Time { return now }
-
-	key := c.key("svc1", "X-API-Key", "secret")
-	c.put(key, "token", headerAuthCacheSkew+10*time.Second)
-	require.Equal(t, "token", c.get(key))
-
-	now = now.Add(11 * time.Second)
-	assert.Empty(t, c.get(key))
-}
-
-func TestHeaderAuthCache_BoundsEntriesPerService(t *testing.T) {
-	c := newHeaderAuthCache()
-	c.maxSize = 4
-
-	var first headerCacheKey
-	for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
-		key := c.key("svc1", "X-API-Key", fmt.Sprintf("secret-%d", i))
-		if i == 0 {
-			first = key
-		}
-		c.put(key, "token", time.Hour)
-	}
-
-	assert.Len(t, c.entries["svc1"].items, 4)
-	assert.Empty(t, c.get(first), "the oldest entry must be evicted")
-}
-
-func TestHeaderAuthCache_DistinguishesCredentials(t *testing.T) {
-	c := newHeaderAuthCache()
-
-	good := c.key("svc1", "X-API-Key", "good")
-	other := c.key("svc1", "X-API-Key", "other")
-	c.put(good, "token", time.Hour)
-
-	assert.Equal(t, "token", c.get(good))
-	assert.Empty(t, c.get(other))
-}
-
-func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_MappingUpdateInvalidatesCache(t *testing.T) {
-	var calls atomic.Int32
-	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
-	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
-	hdr := newCountingHeaderScheme(t, kp, "X-API-Key", "secret-key", &calls)
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{hdr}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false))
-
-	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, doHeaderRequest(t, mw, "secret-key").Code)
-	require.Equal(t, int32(1), calls.Load())
-
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{hdr}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false))
-
-	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, doHeaderRequest(t, mw, "secret-key").Code)
-	assert.Equal(t, int32(2), calls.Load(), "a mapping update must drop the service's cached credentials")
-}
-
-func TestHeaderAuthCache_InvalidateService(t *testing.T) {
-	c := newHeaderAuthCache()
-
-	key := c.key("svc1", "X-API-Key", "secret")
-	other := c.key("svc2", "X-API-Key", "secret")
-	c.put(key, "token", time.Hour)
-	c.put(other, "token", time.Hour)
-
-	c.invalidateService("svc1")
-
-	assert.Empty(t, c.get(key))
-	assert.Equal(t, "token", c.get(other), "other services must be untouched")
-}
-
-func TestHeaderAuthCache_Invalidate(t *testing.T) {
-	c := newHeaderAuthCache()
-
-	key := c.key("svc1", "X-API-Key", "secret")
-	other := c.key("svc1", "X-API-Key", "second")
-	c.put(key, "token", time.Hour)
-	c.put(other, "token", time.Hour)
-
-	c.invalidate(key)
-
-	assert.Empty(t, c.get(key))
-	assert.Equal(t, "token", c.get(other))
-}
-
-func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_RevalidatesWhenCachedTokenRejected(t *testing.T) {
-	var calls atomic.Int32
-	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
-	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
-	hdr := newCountingHeaderScheme(t, kp, "X-API-Key", "secret-key", &calls)
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{hdr}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false))
-
-	key := mw.headerCache.key("svc1", "X-API-Key", "secret-key")
-	mw.headerCache.put(key, "not-a-valid-token", time.Hour)
-
-	rec := doHeaderRequest(t, mw, "secret-key")
-
-	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code, "an unusable cached token must not fail the request")
-	assert.Equal(t, int32(1), calls.Load(), "the credential must be re-verified once")
-}
-
-func TestHeaderAuthCache_CollapsesConcurrentMisses(t *testing.T) {
-	c := newHeaderAuthCache()
-	key := c.key("svc1", "X-API-Key", "secret")
-
-	var calls atomic.Int32
-	release := make(chan struct{})
-	var wg sync.WaitGroup
-
-	for i := 0; i < 20; i++ {
-		wg.Add(1)
-		go func() {
-			defer wg.Done()
-			_, _, _ = c.fetch(key, time.Hour, func() (string, error) {
-				calls.Add(1)
-				<-release
-				return "token", nil
-			})
-		}()
-	}
-
-	time.Sleep(50 * time.Millisecond)
-	close(release)
-	wg.Wait()
-
-	assert.Equal(t, int32(1), calls.Load(), "a burst of cold requests must collapse into one RPC")
-}

proxy/internal/auth/middleware.go

@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ import (
 
 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 	"google.golang.org/grpc"
-	"google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
 
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/auth"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/proxy"
@@ -83,7 +82,6 @@ type Middleware struct {
 	sessionValidator SessionValidator
 	geo              restrict.GeoResolver
 	tunnelCache      *tunnelValidationCache
-	headerCache      *headerAuthCache
 }
 
 // NewMiddleware creates a new authentication middleware. The sessionValidator is
@@ -98,7 +96,6 @@ func NewMiddleware(logger *log.Logger, sessionValidator SessionValidator, geo re
 		sessionValidator: sessionValidator,
 		geo:              geo,
 		tunnelCache:      newTunnelValidationCache(),
-		headerCache:      newHeaderAuthCache(),
 	}
 }
 
@@ -455,23 +452,7 @@ func (mw *Middleware) forwardWithHeaderAuth(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Reque
 }
 
 func (mw *Middleware) tryHeaderScheme(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, host string, config DomainConfig, hdr Header, next http.Handler) bool {
-	credential := r.Header.Get(hdr.headerName)
-	if credential == "" {
-		return false
-	}
-
-	key := mw.headerCache.key(hdr.id, hdr.headerName, credential)
-	authenticate := func() (string, error) {
-		ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.WithoutCancel(r.Context()), headerAuthRPCTimeout)
-		defer cancel()
-		if clientIP := mw.resolveClientIP(r); clientIP.IsValid() {
-			ctx = metadata.AppendToOutgoingContext(ctx, auth.ClientIPMetadataKey, clientIP.String())
-		}
-		token, _, err := hdr.Authenticate(r.WithContext(ctx))
-		return token, err
-	}
-
-	token, cached, err := mw.headerCache.fetch(key, config.SessionExpiration, authenticate)
+	token, _, err := hdr.Authenticate(r)
 	if err != nil {
 		return mw.handleHeaderAuthError(w, r, err)
 	}
@@ -480,17 +461,6 @@ func (mw *Middleware) tryHeaderScheme(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, ho
 	}
 
 	result, err := mw.validateSessionToken(r.Context(), host, token, config.SessionPublicKey, auth.MethodHeader)
-	if err != nil && cached {
-		mw.headerCache.invalidate(key)
-		if token, err = authenticate(); err != nil {
-			return mw.handleHeaderAuthError(w, r, err)
-		}
-		if token == "" {
-			return false
-		}
-		mw.headerCache.put(key, token, config.SessionExpiration)
-		result, err = mw.validateSessionToken(r.Context(), host, token, config.SessionPublicKey, auth.MethodHeader)
-	}
 	if err != nil {
 		setHeaderCapturedData(r.Context(), "", "", nil, nil)
 		status := http.StatusBadRequest
@@ -675,8 +645,6 @@ func wasCredentialSubmitted(r *http.Request, method auth.Method) bool {
 // AddDomain registers authentication schemes for the given domain. With schemes a valid session public key is required.
 // private=true forces ValidateTunnelPeer enforcement (403 on failure) regardless of the schemes list.
 func (mw *Middleware) AddDomain(domain string, schemes []Scheme, publicKeyB64 string, expiration time.Duration, accountID types.AccountID, serviceID types.ServiceID, ipRestrictions *restrict.Filter, private bool) error {
-	mw.headerCache.invalidateService(serviceID)
-
 	if len(schemes) == 0 {
 		mw.domainsMux.Lock()
 		defer mw.domainsMux.Unlock()
@@ -713,10 +681,6 @@ func (mw *Middleware) AddDomain(domain string, schemes []Scheme, publicKeyB64 st
 
 // RemoveDomain unregisters authentication for the given domain.
 func (mw *Middleware) RemoveDomain(domain string) {
-	if config, exists := mw.getDomainConfig(domain); exists {
-		mw.headerCache.invalidateService(config.ServiceID)
-	}
-
 	mw.domainsMux.Lock()
 	defer mw.domainsMux.Unlock()
 	delete(mw.domains, domain)