Compare commits

..

3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Zoltán Papp
6c93581e56 Dummy file 2026-08-12 14:55:40 +02:00
Lamera
52faa202b2 [client] fall back to per-IP ACL rules when ipset is unavailable (#6332) 2026-08-12 14:37:48 +02:00
Viktor Liu
f5ce0bc65a [client] Fix macOS DNS panic on malformed scutil output (#7180) 2026-08-12 13:25:12 +02:00
10 changed files with 352 additions and 674 deletions

View File

@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ type aclManager struct {
optionalEntries map[string][]entry
ipsetStore *ipsetStore
v6 bool
ipsetSupported bool
stateManager *statemanager.Manager
}
@@ -60,6 +61,8 @@ func newAclManager(iptablesClient *iptables.IPTables, wgIface iFaceMapper) (*acl
func (m *aclManager) init(stateManager *statemanager.Manager) error {
m.stateManager = stateManager
m.ipsetSupported = m.probeIPSetSupport()
m.seedInitialEntries()
m.seedInitialOptionalEntries()
@@ -91,6 +94,12 @@ func (m *aclManager) AddPeerFiltering(
if m.v6 && ipsetName != "" {
ipsetName += "-v6"
}
// When the kernel lacks the required ipset hash module, fall back to
// per-IP iptables rules (pre-0.68 behavior) so ACLs keep working instead
// of silently leaving the chain empty.
if ipsetName != "" && !m.ipsetSupported {
ipsetName = ""
}
proto := protoForFamily(protocol, m.v6)
specs := filterRuleSpecs(ip, proto, sPort, dPort, action, ipsetName)
@@ -498,6 +507,40 @@ func transformIPsetName(ipsetName string, sPort, dPort *firewall.Port, action fi
}
}
// probeIPSetSupport checks whether the kernel can create the ipset type used for
// ACL rules. On kernels lacking the required ipset hash module, ipset creation
// fails (e.g. "invalid argument"), which would otherwise leave the ACL chain
// empty and silently drop all policy-permitted inbound traffic. When unsupported,
// the manager falls back to per-IP iptables rules.
func (m *aclManager) probeIPSetSupport() bool {
// Use a unique name so concurrent processes don't collide and we only ever
// destroy the set we created ourselves. ipset names are limited to 31 chars,
// so use a short random suffix.
probeName := "nb-probe-" + uuid.New().String()[:8]
opts := ipset.CreateOptions{
Replace: true,
}
if m.v6 {
opts.Family = ipset.FamilyIPV6
}
if err := ipset.Create(probeName, ipset.TypeHashNet, opts); err != nil {
log.Warnf("ipset is not available (failed to create probe set: %v); "+
"falling back to per-IP iptables ACL rules. Ensure the kernel provides "+
"the ipset hash:net module (ip_set_hash_net) for better performance with large rule sets", err)
return false
}
defer func() {
if err := ipset.Destroy(probeName); err != nil {
log.Debugf("destroy ipset probe set %q: %v", probeName, err)
}
}()
return true
}
func (m *aclManager) createIPSet(name string) error {
opts := ipset.CreateOptions{
Replace: true,

View File

@@ -291,3 +291,40 @@ func TestIptablesCreatePerformance(t *testing.T) {
})
}
}
// TestIptablesACLIPSetFallback verifies that when the kernel lacks ipset support,
// the ACL manager falls back to per-IP iptables rules (-s <ip>) instead of
// silently leaving the chain empty. See discussion #6125.
func TestIptablesACLIPSetFallback(t *testing.T) {
ipv4Client, err := iptables.NewWithProtocol(iptables.ProtocolIPv4)
require.NoError(t, err)
// Use Create()/Init() so the router-owned chains (chainRTFWDIN/OUT) are
// created before the ACL manager's createDefaultChains() references them.
manager, err := Create(ifaceMock, iface.DefaultMTU)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NoError(t, manager.Init(nil))
aclMgr := manager.aclMgr
// Simulate a kernel without the ipset hash module.
aclMgr.ipsetSupported = false
defer func() {
require.NoError(t, manager.Close(nil))
}()
ip := netip.MustParseAddr("10.20.0.42")
port := &fw.Port{Values: []uint16{22}}
rules, err := aclMgr.AddPeerFiltering(nil, ip.AsSlice(), "tcp", nil, port, fw.ActionAccept, "nb0000001")
require.NoError(t, err, "AddPeerFiltering should succeed via fallback")
require.NotEmpty(t, rules)
rule := rules[0].(*Rule)
require.Empty(t, rule.ipsetName, "fallback rule must not reference an ipset")
require.Contains(t, strings.Join(rule.specs, " "), "-s 10.20.0.42", "fallback rule must match by source IP")
require.NotContains(t, strings.Join(rule.specs, " "), "--match-set", "fallback rule must not use ipset matching")
// The rule must actually be present in the ACL chain (not silently dropped).
checkRuleSpecs(t, ipv4Client, rule.chain, true, rule.specs...)
}

View File

@@ -267,18 +267,38 @@ func (s *systemConfigurator) getSystemDNSSettings() (SystemDNSSettings, error) {
return SystemDNSSettings{}, fmt.Errorf("sending the command: %w", err)
}
var dnsSettings SystemDNSSettings
dnsSettings, serverAddresses, err := parseSystemDNSSettings(b)
if err != nil {
return dnsSettings, err
}
s.mu.Lock()
s.origNameservers = serverAddresses
s.mu.Unlock()
return dnsSettings, nil
}
// parseSystemDNSSettings parses the output of `scutil show State:/Network/Service/<id>/DNS`.
// Lines that don't match the expected "index : value" shape are skipped: hosts with unusual
// network services (e.g. orphaned hardware ports) can produce entries without a value.
func parseSystemDNSSettings(out []byte) (SystemDNSSettings, []netip.Addr, error) {
// port is not exposed by scutil, default to 53
dnsSettings := SystemDNSSettings{ServerPort: DefaultPort}
var serverAddresses []netip.Addr
inSearchDomainsArray := false
inServerAddressesArray := false
scanner := bufio.NewScanner(bytes.NewReader(b))
scanner := bufio.NewScanner(bytes.NewReader(out))
for scanner.Scan() {
line := strings.TrimSpace(scanner.Text())
switch {
case strings.HasPrefix(line, "DomainName :"):
domainName := strings.TrimSpace(strings.Split(line, ":")[1])
dnsSettings.Domains = append(dnsSettings.Domains, domainName)
domainName := strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(line, "DomainName :"))
if domainName != "" {
dnsSettings.Domains = append(dnsSettings.Domains, domainName)
}
continue
case line == "SearchDomains : <array> {":
inSearchDomainsArray = true
continue
@@ -288,36 +308,45 @@ func (s *systemConfigurator) getSystemDNSSettings() (SystemDNSSettings, error) {
case line == "}":
inSearchDomainsArray = false
inServerAddressesArray = false
continue
}
if !inSearchDomainsArray && !inServerAddressesArray {
continue
}
parts := strings.SplitN(line, " : ", 2)
if len(parts) != 2 {
log.Debugf("skipping unexpected scutil DNS line %q", line)
continue
}
value := strings.TrimSpace(parts[1])
if value == "" {
continue
}
if inSearchDomainsArray {
searchDomain := strings.Split(line, " : ")[1]
dnsSettings.Domains = append(dnsSettings.Domains, searchDomain)
} else if inServerAddressesArray {
address := strings.Split(line, " : ")[1]
if ip, err := netip.ParseAddr(address); err == nil && !ip.IsUnspecified() {
ip = ip.Unmap()
serverAddresses = append(serverAddresses, ip)
// Prefer the first IPv4 server as ServerIP since our DNS listener is IPv4.
if !dnsSettings.ServerIP.IsValid() && ip.Is4() {
dnsSettings.ServerIP = ip
}
}
dnsSettings.Domains = append(dnsSettings.Domains, value)
continue
}
ip, err := netip.ParseAddr(value)
if err != nil || ip.IsUnspecified() {
continue
}
ip = ip.Unmap()
serverAddresses = append(serverAddresses, ip)
// Prefer the first IPv4 server as ServerIP since our DNS listener is IPv4.
if !dnsSettings.ServerIP.IsValid() && ip.Is4() {
dnsSettings.ServerIP = ip
}
}
if err := scanner.Err(); err != nil {
return dnsSettings, err
return dnsSettings, serverAddresses, err
}
// default to 53 port
dnsSettings.ServerPort = DefaultPort
s.mu.Lock()
s.origNameservers = serverAddresses
s.mu.Unlock()
return dnsSettings, nil
return dnsSettings, serverAddresses, nil
}
func (s *systemConfigurator) getOriginalNameservers() []netip.Addr {
@@ -435,11 +464,15 @@ func (s *systemConfigurator) getPrimaryService() (string, string, error) {
router := ""
for scanner.Scan() {
text := scanner.Text()
parts := strings.SplitN(text, ":", 2)
if len(parts) != 2 {
continue
}
if strings.Contains(text, "PrimaryService") {
primaryService = strings.TrimSpace(strings.Split(text, ":")[1])
primaryService = strings.TrimSpace(parts[1])
}
if strings.Contains(text, "Router") {
router = strings.TrimSpace(strings.Split(text, ":")[1])
router = strings.TrimSpace(parts[1])
}
}
if err := scanner.Err(); err != nil && err != io.EOF {

View File

@@ -328,6 +328,120 @@ func removeTestDNSKey(key string) error {
return err
}
func TestParseSystemDNSSettings(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
output string
expectedDomains []string
expectedServers []netip.Addr
expectedIP netip.Addr
}{
{
name: "well_formed",
output: `<dictionary> {
DomainName : example.com
SearchDomains : <array> {
0 : example.com
1 : corp.example.com
}
ServerAddresses : <array> {
0 : 192.168.1.1
1 : fd00::53
}
}
`,
expectedDomains: []string{"example.com", "example.com", "corp.example.com"},
expectedServers: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1"), netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::53")},
expectedIP: netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1"),
},
{
// entries without a value after the separator used to panic with
// "index out of range [1] with length 1"
name: "malformed_array_entries_skipped",
output: `<dictionary> {
SearchDomains : <array> {
0 :
(null)
1 : corp.example.com
}
ServerAddresses : <array> {
0 :
1 : 192.168.1.1
}
}
`,
expectedDomains: []string{"corp.example.com"},
expectedServers: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1")},
expectedIP: netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1"),
},
{
name: "domain_name_without_value_skipped",
output: `<dictionary> {
DomainName :
ServerAddresses : <array> {
0 : 192.168.1.1
}
}
`,
expectedServers: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1")},
expectedIP: netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1"),
},
{
name: "ipv6_first_prefers_ipv4_server_ip",
output: `<dictionary> {
ServerAddresses : <array> {
0 : fd00::53
1 : 192.168.1.1
}
}
`,
expectedServers: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("fd00::53"), netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1")},
expectedIP: netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1"),
},
{
name: "invalid_and_unspecified_addresses_skipped",
output: `<dictionary> {
ServerAddresses : <array> {
0 : (null)
1 : 0.0.0.0
2 : 192.168.1.1
}
}
`,
expectedServers: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1")},
expectedIP: netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1"),
},
{
name: "v4_mapped_address_unmapped",
output: `<dictionary> {
ServerAddresses : <array> {
0 : ::ffff:192.168.1.1
}
}
`,
expectedServers: []netip.Addr{netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1")},
expectedIP: netip.MustParseAddr("192.168.1.1"),
},
{
name: "empty_output",
output: "",
},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
settings, servers, err := parseSystemDNSSettings([]byte(tc.output))
require.NoError(t, err, "parsing should not fail")
assert.Equal(t, tc.expectedDomains, settings.Domains, "domains should match")
assert.Equal(t, tc.expectedServers, servers, "server addresses should match")
assert.Equal(t, tc.expectedIP, settings.ServerIP, "server IP should match")
assert.Equal(t, DefaultPort, settings.ServerPort, "server port should default to 53")
})
}
}
func TestGetOriginalNameservers(t *testing.T) {
configurator := &systemConfigurator{
createdKeys: make(map[string]struct{}),

View File

@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/listener"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/peer"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/jwtcache"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/system"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/formatter"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/route"
@@ -93,14 +92,7 @@ type Client struct {
stateMu sync.RWMutex
connectClient *internal.ConnectClient
// config holds the active configuration once Run has loaded it. Consumed by
// the in-app SSH client for the NetBird SSH key and the OAuth flow.
config *profilemanager.Config
// sshJWTCache keeps the SSH JWT token between reconnects so the user is not
// forced through the browser OAuth flow on every session. Lives on Client
// (not SSHClient) because the app creates a new SSHClient per session.
sshJWTCache *jwtcache.Cache
config *profilemanager.Config
}
// NewClient instantiate a new Client
@@ -117,7 +109,6 @@ func NewClient(cfgFile, stateFile, cacheDir, logFilePath, deviceName string, osV
ctxCancelLock: &sync.Mutex{},
networkChangeListener: networkChangeListener,
dnsManager: dnsManager,
sshJWTCache: jwtcache.New(),
}
}
@@ -192,7 +183,6 @@ func (c *Client) Run(fd int32, interfaceName string, envList *EnvList) error {
ctx = internal.CtxInitState(ctx)
c.onHostDnsFn = func([]string) {}
cfg.WgIface = interfaceName
c.config = cfg
connectClient := internal.NewConnectClient(ctx, cfg, c.recorder)
c.setState(cfg, connectClient)
@@ -718,13 +708,6 @@ func (c *Client) stateSnapshot() (*profilemanager.Config, *internal.ConnectClien
return c.config, c.connectClient
}
// sshState returns the active config and the running connect client for the
// in-app SSH client. Both are nil until Run has loaded the config and started
// the tunnel.
func (c *Client) sshState() (*profilemanager.Config, *internal.ConnectClient) {
return c.stateSnapshot()
}
func formatDuration(d time.Duration) string {
ds := d.String()
dotIndex := strings.Index(ds, ".")

View File

@@ -1,512 +0,0 @@
//go:build ios
package NetBirdSDK
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync"
"syscall"
"time"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
gossh "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/auth"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
nbssh "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/detection"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/jwtcache"
)
const (
sshDialTimeout = 30 * time.Second
sshDetectionTimeout = 5 * time.Second
)
// SSHTerminalListener receives SSH session events. It is implemented in Swift.
//
// All callbacks are invoked from goroutines and may run concurrently with each
// other; the implementation must be safe to call from any thread.
type SSHTerminalListener interface {
OnConnected()
OnData(data []byte)
OnClose(reason string)
OnError(message string)
}
// SSHClient is a NetBird-aware SSH client exposed to Swift via gomobile.
//
// It dials through the running NetBird tunnel and runs a standard SSH session
// on top with PTY enabled. Host-key verification uses the NetBird-provided
// peer SSH host keys, identical to the desktop client.
type SSHClient struct {
nb *Client
mu sync.Mutex
listener SSHTerminalListener
urlOpener URLOpener
sshClient *gossh.Client
session *gossh.Session
stdin io.WriteCloser
closed bool
}
// NewSSHClient creates a new SSH client bound to the running NetBird Client.
func NewSSHClient(c *Client) *SSHClient {
return &SSHClient{nb: c}
}
// SetListener registers the Swift listener. Must be called before Connect to
// receive any events.
func (s *SSHClient) SetListener(l SSHTerminalListener) {
s.mu.Lock()
s.listener = l
s.mu.Unlock()
}
// SetURLOpener registers the Swift URL opener used to display the device-code
// authorization page in an in-app browser when the target peer requires JWT
// authentication. Must be set before Connect to be effective.
func (s *SSHClient) SetURLOpener(opener URLOpener) {
s.mu.Lock()
s.urlOpener = opener
s.mu.Unlock()
}
// Connect dials the SSH server through the NetBird tunnel and performs the
// SSH handshake. It auto-detects the server type via SSH banner inspection
// and selects the appropriate authentication path:
//
// - NetBird-SSH server requiring JWT: launches the OAuth 2.0 device-code
// flow, opens the verification URL through the registered URLOpener, and
// uses the resulting token as the SSH password. Host-key verification
// uses the NetBird peer registry.
// - NetBird-SSH server without JWT: authenticates with the NetBird SSH
// private key. Host-key verification uses the NetBird peer registry.
// - Regular SSH server (e.g. OpenSSH): authenticates with the NetBird key
// first (so a user-installed NetBird public key works), then falls back
// to the supplied password if non-empty. Host-key verification is
// disabled (TOFU pending).
//
// The password parameter is only consulted for regular SSH servers.
//
// This is the only way to open a session, deliberately so: the JWT is a bearer
// token, and detection is what proves the listener is a NetBird SSH service
// before the token is offered to it. A peer whose NetBird SSH is disabled is
// served by plain sshd and authenticates by key or password like any other
// host, so it stays reachable without an OAuth round trip.
func (s *SSHClient) Connect(host string, port int, user, password string) error {
cfg, cc := s.nb.sshState()
if cc == nil {
return errors.New("netbird client not running")
}
if cfg == nil {
return errors.New("netbird config not loaded")
}
engine := cc.Engine()
if engine == nil {
return errors.New("netbird engine not available")
}
wgDialer := makeWGDialer(cfg.WgIface, sshDialTimeout)
serverType := detectServerType(host, port, wgDialer)
log.Infof("SSH server type for %s:%d: %s", host, port, serverType)
authMethods, hostKeyCallback, err := s.buildAuth(cfg, engine, serverType, password)
if err != nil {
return err
}
clientConfig := &gossh.ClientConfig{
User: user,
Auth: authMethods,
HostKeyCallback: hostKeyCallback,
Timeout: sshDialTimeout,
}
if err := s.dialAndHandshake(host, port, clientConfig, wgDialer); err != nil {
return annotateAuthError(err, serverType, user)
}
return nil
}
// annotateAuthError adds NetBird-specific guidance to an authentication
// failure, but only for a server that detection identified as NetBird-SSH.
// There a rejection nearly always means the peer's dashboard SSH access is not
// configured for this account, which the raw gossh error does not convey.
func annotateAuthError(err error, serverType detection.ServerType, user string) error {
if !serverType.RequiresJWT() {
return err
}
msg := err.Error()
if !strings.Contains(msg, "no supported methods remain") &&
!strings.Contains(msg, "unable to authenticate") {
return err
}
return fmt.Errorf("NetBird SSH authentication rejected.\n\n"+
"Checklist:\n"+
" 1. SSH is enabled for this peer in the NetBird dashboard\n"+
" 2. Your account is listed under SSH access for this peer\n"+
" 3. The OS username (%q) is mapped to your account\n\n"+
"If SSH access is not configured, connect with a password instead.\n\n"+
"Original: %w", user, err)
}
// StartSession requests a PTY and starts an interactive shell. Output from
// the session is forwarded to the listener via OnData.
func (s *SSHClient) StartSession(cols, rows int) error {
log.Debugf("SSH: starting session %dx%d", cols, rows)
s.mu.Lock()
sshClient := s.sshClient
s.mu.Unlock()
if sshClient == nil {
return errors.New("ssh client not connected")
}
session, err := sshClient.NewSession()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("new session: %w", err)
}
modes := gossh.TerminalModes{
gossh.ECHO: 1,
gossh.TTY_OP_ISPEED: 14400,
gossh.TTY_OP_OSPEED: 14400,
gossh.VINTR: 3,
gossh.VQUIT: 28,
gossh.VERASE: 127,
}
if err := session.RequestPty("xterm-256color", rows, cols, modes); err != nil {
closeQuiet(session, "session after pty error")
return fmt.Errorf("request pty: %w", err)
}
stdin, err := session.StdinPipe()
if err != nil {
closeQuiet(session, "session after stdin error")
return fmt.Errorf("stdin pipe: %w", err)
}
stdout, err := session.StdoutPipe()
if err != nil {
closeQuiet(session, "session after stdout error")
return fmt.Errorf("stdout pipe: %w", err)
}
stderr, err := session.StderrPipe()
if err != nil {
closeQuiet(session, "session after stderr error")
return fmt.Errorf("stderr pipe: %w", err)
}
if err := session.Shell(); err != nil {
closeQuiet(session, "session after shell error")
return fmt.Errorf("start shell: %w", err)
}
s.mu.Lock()
s.session = session
s.stdin = stdin
s.mu.Unlock()
go s.readLoop(stdout, "stdout")
go s.readLoop(stderr, "stderr")
log.Debug("SSH: session started, shell running")
return nil
}
// Write sends data to the SSH session stdin.
func (s *SSHClient) Write(data []byte) error {
s.mu.Lock()
stdin := s.stdin
s.mu.Unlock()
if stdin == nil {
return errors.New("ssh session not started")
}
if _, err := stdin.Write(data); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("write stdin: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
// Resize updates the PTY window size.
func (s *SSHClient) Resize(cols, rows int) error {
s.mu.Lock()
session := s.session
s.mu.Unlock()
if session == nil {
return errors.New("ssh session not started")
}
return session.WindowChange(rows, cols)
}
// Close terminates the SSH session and underlying connection. Safe to call
// multiple times.
func (s *SSHClient) Close() error {
s.mu.Lock()
sshClient := s.sshClient
session := s.session
stdin := s.stdin
s.sshClient = nil
s.session = nil
s.stdin = nil
s.mu.Unlock()
if stdin != nil {
if err := stdin.Close(); err != nil {
log.Debugf("ssh: stdin close: %v", err)
}
}
if session != nil {
if err := session.Close(); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
log.Debugf("ssh: session close: %v", err)
}
}
var firstErr error
if sshClient != nil {
if err := sshClient.Close(); err != nil {
firstErr = err
}
}
s.notifyClose("closed by client")
return firstErr
}
func (s *SSHClient) buildAuth(cfg *profilemanager.Config, engine *internal.Engine,
serverType detection.ServerType, password string) ([]gossh.AuthMethod, gossh.HostKeyCallback, error) {
switch serverType {
case detection.ServerTypeNetBirdJWT:
token, err := s.requestJWTToken(cfg)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("jwt: %w", err)
}
auths := []gossh.AuthMethod{gossh.Password(token)}
return auths, nbssh.CreateHostKeyCallback(&engineHostKeyVerifier{engine: engine}), nil
case detection.ServerTypeNetBirdNoJWT:
if cfg.SSHKey == "" {
return nil, nil, errors.New("no NetBird SSH key available")
}
signer, err := gossh.ParsePrivateKey([]byte(cfg.SSHKey))
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("parse netbird ssh key: %w", err)
}
auths := []gossh.AuthMethod{gossh.PublicKeys(signer)}
return auths, nbssh.CreateHostKeyCallback(&engineHostKeyVerifier{engine: engine}), nil
default: // regular SSH
var auths []gossh.AuthMethod
if cfg.SSHKey != "" {
if signer, err := gossh.ParsePrivateKey([]byte(cfg.SSHKey)); err == nil {
auths = append(auths, gossh.PublicKeys(signer))
} else {
log.Debugf("ssh: parse netbird key for regular auth: %v", err)
}
}
if password != "" {
pw := password
auths = append(auths, gossh.Password(pw))
auths = append(auths, gossh.KeyboardInteractive(func(_, _ string, questions []string, _ []bool) ([]string, error) {
answers := make([]string, len(questions))
for i := range questions {
answers[i] = pw
}
return answers, nil
}))
}
if len(auths) == 0 {
return nil, nil, errors.New("no auth method available: provide a password or configure NetBird SSH key")
}
return auths, gossh.InsecureIgnoreHostKey(), nil // nolint:gosec // TOFU not yet implemented
}
}
func (s *SSHClient) requestJWTToken(cfg *profilemanager.Config) (string, error) {
// Reuse a cached token so the user is not forced through the browser OAuth
// flow on every reconnect. TTL comes from cfg.SSHJWTCacheTTL, same as the
// daemon's cache; unset/0 disables caching.
if token, ok := s.nb.sshJWTCache.Get(); ok {
log.Debug("SSH: reusing cached JWT token")
return token, nil
}
s.mu.Lock()
urlOpener := s.urlOpener
s.mu.Unlock()
if urlOpener == nil {
return "", errors.New("URL opener not configured for JWT auth")
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Minute)
defer cancel()
flow, err := auth.NewOAuthFlow(ctx, cfg, false, true, profilemanager.GetLoginHint())
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("create oauth flow: %w", err)
}
flowInfo, err := flow.RequestAuthInfo(ctx)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("request auth info: %w", err)
}
go urlOpener.Open(flowInfo.VerificationURIComplete, flowInfo.UserCode)
tokenInfo, err := flow.WaitToken(ctx, flowInfo)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("wait for token: %w", err)
}
token := tokenInfo.GetTokenToUse()
if token == "" {
return "", errors.New("empty token returned by IdP")
}
if ttl := jwtcache.ResolveTTL(cfg.SSHJWTCacheTTL); ttl > 0 {
s.nb.sshJWTCache.Store(token, ttl)
}
return token, nil
}
func (s *SSHClient) dialAndHandshake(host string, port int, clientConfig *gossh.ClientConfig, dialer *net.Dialer) error {
addr := net.JoinHostPort(host, strconv.Itoa(port))
log.Infof("SSH: connecting to %s as %s", addr, clientConfig.User)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), sshDialTimeout)
defer cancel()
conn, err := dialer.DialContext(ctx, "tcp", addr)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("dial %s: %w", addr, err)
}
sshConn, chans, reqs, err := gossh.NewClientConn(conn, addr, clientConfig)
if err != nil {
if cerr := conn.Close(); cerr != nil {
log.Debugf("ssh: close after handshake error: %v", cerr)
}
return fmt.Errorf("ssh handshake: %w", err)
}
s.mu.Lock()
s.sshClient = gossh.NewClient(sshConn, chans, reqs)
listener := s.listener
s.mu.Unlock()
log.Infof("SSH: connected to %s", addr)
if listener != nil {
listener.OnConnected()
}
return nil
}
func (s *SSHClient) readLoop(r io.Reader, name string) {
buf := make([]byte, 4096)
for {
n, err := r.Read(buf)
if n > 0 {
s.mu.Lock()
listener := s.listener
s.mu.Unlock()
if listener != nil {
chunk := make([]byte, n)
copy(chunk, buf[:n])
listener.OnData(chunk)
}
}
if err != nil {
if !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
log.Debugf("ssh %s read: %v", name, err)
}
s.notifyClose(err.Error())
return
}
}
}
func (s *SSHClient) notifyClose(reason string) {
s.mu.Lock()
if s.closed {
s.mu.Unlock()
return
}
s.closed = true
listener := s.listener
s.mu.Unlock()
if listener != nil {
listener.OnClose(reason)
}
}
// engineHostKeyVerifier adapts *internal.Engine to nbssh.HostKeyVerifier.
type engineHostKeyVerifier struct {
engine *internal.Engine
}
func (v *engineHostKeyVerifier) VerifySSHHostKey(peerAddress string, presented []byte) error {
storedKey, found := v.engine.GetPeerSSHKey(peerAddress)
if !found {
return nbssh.ErrPeerNotFound
}
return nbssh.VerifyHostKey(storedKey, presented, peerAddress)
}
func detectServerType(host string, port int, dialer *net.Dialer) detection.ServerType {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), sshDetectionTimeout)
defer cancel()
serverType, err := detection.DetectSSHServerType(ctx, dialer, host, port)
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("ssh: server detection for %s:%d failed: %v (assuming regular SSH)", host, port, err)
return detection.ServerTypeRegular
}
return serverType
}
// makeWGDialer returns a net.Dialer whose sockets are bound to the WireGuard
// interface (wgIface, e.g. "utun100"). This is required in the iOS Network
// Extension process, where the OS deliberately excludes the provider's own
// traffic from the VPN tunnel to prevent routing loops. Without binding to
// the WireGuard interface, TCP connections to NetBird peer IPs (100.x.x.x
// CGNAT space) would be sent over the physical network and fail with
// "network is unreachable". Falls back to an unbound dialer if the interface
// cannot be found (e.g. tunnel not yet up).
func makeWGDialer(wgIface string, timeout time.Duration) *net.Dialer {
return &net.Dialer{
Timeout: timeout,
Control: func(network, address string, c syscall.RawConn) error {
iface, err := net.InterfaceByName(wgIface)
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("ssh: WG interface %q not found, dialing without bind: %v", wgIface, err)
return nil
}
var innerErr error
if ctrlErr := c.Control(func(fd uintptr) {
// IP_BOUND_IF (Darwin) = 25: binds the socket to a specific interface index.
innerErr = syscall.SetsockoptInt(int(fd), syscall.IPPROTO_IP, 25, iface.Index)
}); ctrlErr != nil {
return ctrlErr
}
if innerErr != nil {
log.Debugf("ssh: IP_BOUND_IF bind to %q failed: %v", wgIface, innerErr)
}
return innerErr
},
}
}
func closeQuiet(c io.Closer, label string) {
if c == nil {
return
}
if err := c.Close(); err != nil && !errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
log.Debugf("ssh: close %s: %v", label, err)
}
}

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
package server
import (
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
)
type jwtCache struct {
mu sync.RWMutex
enclave *memguard.Enclave
expiresAt time.Time
timer *time.Timer
maxTokenSize int
}
func newJWTCache() *jwtCache {
return &jwtCache{
maxTokenSize: 8192,
}
}
func (c *jwtCache) store(token string, maxAge time.Duration) {
c.mu.Lock()
defer c.mu.Unlock()
c.cleanup()
if c.timer != nil {
c.timer.Stop()
}
tokenBytes := []byte(token)
c.enclave = memguard.NewEnclave(tokenBytes)
c.expiresAt = time.Now().Add(maxAge)
var timer *time.Timer
timer = time.AfterFunc(maxAge, func() {
c.mu.Lock()
defer c.mu.Unlock()
if c.timer != timer {
return
}
c.cleanup()
c.timer = nil
log.Debugf("JWT token cache expired after %v, securely wiped from memory", maxAge)
})
c.timer = timer
}
func (c *jwtCache) get() (string, bool) {
c.mu.RLock()
defer c.mu.RUnlock()
if c.enclave == nil || time.Now().After(c.expiresAt) {
return "", false
}
buffer, err := c.enclave.Open()
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("Failed to open JWT token enclave: %v", err)
return "", false
}
defer buffer.Destroy()
token := string(buffer.Bytes())
return token, true
}
// cleanup destroys the secure enclave, must be called with lock held
func (c *jwtCache) cleanup() {
if c.enclave != nil {
c.enclave = nil
}
c.expiresAt = time.Time{}
}

View File

@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ import (
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/profilemanager"
sleephandler "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/internal/sleep/handler"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/mdm"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/ssh/jwtcache"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/system"
mgm "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/client"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/domain"
@@ -51,6 +50,9 @@ const (
defaultMaxRetryTime = 14 * 24 * time.Hour
defaultRetryMultiplier = 1.7
// JWT token cache TTL for the client daemon (disabled by default)
defaultJWTCacheTTL = 0
errRestoreResidualState = "failed to restore residual state: %v"
errProfilesDisabled = "profiles are disabled, you cannot use this feature without profiles enabled"
errUpdateSettingsDisabled = "update settings are disabled, you cannot use this feature without update settings enabled"
@@ -132,7 +134,7 @@ type Server struct {
updateManager *updater.Manager
jwtCache *jwtcache.Cache
jwtCache *jwtCache
// loginAttemptFn stands in for the Management login round trip. Tests set
// it to drive the login outcomes that need a server on the other end;
@@ -161,7 +163,7 @@ func New(ctx context.Context, logFile string, configFile string, profilesDisable
updateSettingsDisabled: updateSettingsDisabled,
captureEnabled: captureEnabled,
networksDisabled: networksDisabled,
jwtCache: jwtcache.New(),
jwtCache: newJWTCache(),
extendAuthSessionFlow: auth.NewPendingFlow(),
probeThrottle: newProbeThrottle(probeThreshold),
}
@@ -1668,11 +1670,19 @@ func (s *Server) getJWTCacheTTL() time.Duration {
config := s.config
s.mutex.Unlock()
if config == nil {
return jwtcache.DefaultTTL
if config == nil || config.SSHJWTCacheTTL == nil {
return defaultJWTCacheTTL
}
return jwtcache.ResolveTTL(config.SSHJWTCacheTTL)
seconds := *config.SSHJWTCacheTTL
if seconds == 0 {
log.Debug("SSH JWT cache disabled (configured to 0)")
return 0
}
ttl := time.Duration(seconds) * time.Second
log.Debugf("SSH JWT cache TTL set to %v from config", ttl)
return ttl
}
// RequestJWTAuth initiates JWT authentication flow for SSH
@@ -1694,7 +1704,7 @@ func (s *Server) RequestJWTAuth(
jwtCacheTTL := s.getJWTCacheTTL()
if jwtCacheTTL > 0 {
if cachedToken, found := s.jwtCache.Get(); found {
if cachedToken, found := s.jwtCache.get(); found {
log.Debugf("JWT token found in cache, returning cached token for SSH authentication")
return &proto.RequestJWTAuthResponse{
@@ -1767,7 +1777,7 @@ func (s *Server) WaitJWTToken(
jwtCacheTTL := s.getJWTCacheTTL()
if jwtCacheTTL > 0 {
s.jwtCache.Store(token, jwtCacheTTL)
s.jwtCache.store(token, jwtCacheTTL)
log.Debugf("JWT token cached for SSH authentication, TTL: %v", jwtCacheTTL)
} else {
log.Debug("JWT caching disabled, not storing token")

View File

@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
// Package jwtcache provides an in-memory, TTL-bound cache for SSH JWT tokens.
// The token is kept in a secure memguard enclave and wiped from memory when it
// expires. It is shared by the daemon gRPC server and the mobile SDKs, which
// have no daemon process to delegate caching to.
package jwtcache
import (
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/awnumar/memguard"
log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
)
// DefaultTTL is used when no TTL is configured: caching disabled.
const DefaultTTL = 0
// Cache stores a single JWT token in a secure enclave until it expires.
type Cache struct {
mu sync.RWMutex
enclave *memguard.Enclave
expiresAt time.Time
timer *time.Timer
maxTokenSize int
}
// New creates an empty Cache.
func New() *Cache {
return &Cache{
maxTokenSize: 8192,
}
}
// Store caches the token for maxAge. A previously stored token is wiped.
func (c *Cache) Store(token string, maxAge time.Duration) {
c.mu.Lock()
defer c.mu.Unlock()
c.cleanup()
if c.timer != nil {
c.timer.Stop()
}
tokenBytes := []byte(token)
c.enclave = memguard.NewEnclave(tokenBytes)
c.expiresAt = time.Now().Add(maxAge)
var timer *time.Timer
timer = time.AfterFunc(maxAge, func() {
c.mu.Lock()
defer c.mu.Unlock()
if c.timer != timer {
return
}
c.cleanup()
c.timer = nil
log.Debugf("JWT token cache expired after %v, securely wiped from memory", maxAge)
})
c.timer = timer
}
// Get returns the cached token, or false if none is stored or it has expired.
func (c *Cache) Get() (string, bool) {
c.mu.RLock()
defer c.mu.RUnlock()
if c.enclave == nil || time.Now().After(c.expiresAt) {
return "", false
}
buffer, err := c.enclave.Open()
if err != nil {
log.Debugf("Failed to open JWT token enclave: %v", err)
return "", false
}
defer buffer.Destroy()
token := string(buffer.Bytes())
return token, true
}
// cleanup destroys the secure enclave, must be called with lock held
func (c *Cache) cleanup() {
if c.enclave != nil {
c.enclave = nil
}
c.expiresAt = time.Time{}
}
// ResolveTTL converts the configured TTL (seconds, from
// profilemanager.Config.SSHJWTCacheTTL) into a duration. Returns DefaultTTL
// when unset; 0 means caching is disabled.
func ResolveTTL(configuredSeconds *int) time.Duration {
if configuredSeconds == nil {
return DefaultTTL
}
seconds := *configuredSeconds
if seconds == 0 {
log.Debug("SSH JWT cache disabled (configured to 0)")
return 0
}
ttl := time.Duration(seconds) * time.Second
log.Debugf("SSH JWT cache TTL set to %v from config", ttl)
return ttl
}

0
dummy.txt Normal file
View File