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Author SHA1 Message Date
Zoltan Papp
66e149d361 [client] Declare GTK4/WebKitGTK runtime deps for the Linux UI packages
The 0.75.0 UI is built against GTK 4.14 (Ubuntu 24.04 runner) and Wails v3
calls gdk_monitor_get_scale (GTK 4.14+) unconditionally, but the deb/rpm
packages only depended on netbird. On distros shipping an older GTK4
(Ubuntu 22.04, RHEL 9, openSUSE Leap 15.6) the package installed fine and
then died at startup with a symbol lookup error (#6890).

Declare the real runtime dependencies so package managers reject the
install up front instead:

- deb: libgtk-4-1 (>= 4.14) and libwebkitgtk-6.0-4
- rpm: rich (boolean) dependencies that accept both the Fedora/RHEL and
  the SUSE package names, with the 4.14 floor:
    (gtk4 >= 4.14 or libgtk-4-1 >= 4.14)
    (webkitgtk6.0 or libwebkitgtk-6_0-4)

Rich deps are supported by dnf and zypper (RPM 4.13+); the pinned
goreleaser v2.16.0 -> nfpm v2.46.3 -> rpmpack v0.7.1 chain passes the
parenthesized form through verbatim. On RHEL/Alma/Rocky 10 the webkitgtk6.0
package comes from EPEL, which becomes an install prerequisite for the UI.

The wails3 packaging config (client/ui/build/linux/nfpm/nfpm.yaml, local
dev packaging only) is kept in sync.
2026-07-25 14:21:28 +02:00
5 changed files with 32 additions and 606 deletions

View File

@@ -88,6 +88,8 @@ nfpms:
dst: /usr/share/pixmaps/netbird.png
dependencies:
- netbird
- libgtk-4-1 (>= 4.14)
- libwebkitgtk-6.0-4
- maintainer: Netbird <dev@netbird.io>
description: Netbird client UI.
@@ -109,6 +111,8 @@ nfpms:
dst: /usr/share/pixmaps/netbird.png
dependencies:
- netbird
- (gtk4 >= 4.14 or libgtk-4-1 >= 4.14)
- (webkitgtk6.0 or libwebkitgtk-6_0-4)
rpm:
signature:

View File

@@ -26,17 +26,17 @@ contents:
# Default dependencies for the GTK4 + WebKitGTK 6.0 stack (Ubuntu 24.04+ / Debian 13+)
depends:
- libgtk-4-1
- libgtk-4-1 (>= 4.14)
- libwebkitgtk-6.0-4
- xdg-utils
# Distribution-specific overrides for different package formats
overrides:
# RPM packages for Fedora / RHEL / AlmaLinux / Rocky Linux
# RPM packages for Fedora / RHEL / AlmaLinux / Rocky Linux / openSUSE
rpm:
depends:
- gtk4
- webkitgtk6.0
- (gtk4 >= 4.14 or libgtk-4-1 >= 4.14)
- (webkitgtk6.0 or libwebkitgtk-6_0-4)
- xdg-utils
# Arch Linux packages

View File

@@ -1,336 +0,0 @@
package agentnetwork
import (
"context"
"errors"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/golang/mock/gomock"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/types"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/store"
)
// guardedPolicy builds an enabled, uncapped policy that authorises sourceGroups
// to reach providerID under the given guardrails. Uncapped keeps the selector's
// headroom scoring trivial so these tests isolate the model-allowlist gate.
func guardedPolicy(id, account string, sourceGroups []string, providerID string, guardrailIDs ...string) *types.Policy {
return &types.Policy{
ID: id,
AccountID: account,
Enabled: true,
SourceGroups: sourceGroups,
DestinationProviderIDs: []string{providerID},
GuardrailIDs: guardrailIDs,
CreatedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
}
}
// allowlistGuardrail builds a guardrail whose model allowlist is enabled and
// carries the given models.
func allowlistGuardrail(id, account string, models ...string) *types.Guardrail {
return &types.Guardrail{
ID: id,
AccountID: account,
Checks: types.GuardrailChecks{
ModelAllowlist: types.GuardrailModelAllowlist{Enabled: true, Models: models},
},
}
}
func expectPolicies(mockStore *store.MockStore, account string, policies ...*types.Policy) {
mockStore.EXPECT().
GetAccountAgentNetworkPolicies(gomock.Any(), gomock.Any(), account).
Return(policies, nil)
}
func expectGuardrails(mockStore *store.MockStore, account string, guardrails ...*types.Guardrail) {
mockStore.EXPECT().
GetAccountAgentNetworkGuardrails(gomock.Any(), gomock.Any(), account).
Return(guardrails, nil)
}
// TestSelectPolicy_ModelBlockedByAllowlist proves the authoritative allowlist
// decision: a policy authorises the (provider, group) but restricts the model,
// and the requested model isn't on the list, so the request is denied.
func TestSelectPolicy_ModelBlockedByAllowlist(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1")
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1", allowlistGuardrail("g-1", "acc-1", "gpt-4o"))
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
UserID: "user-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "claude-opus-4",
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, res.Allow, "a model outside the only applicable policy's allowlist must be denied")
assert.Equal(t, denyCodeModelBlocked, res.DenyCode, "deny code must be model_blocked")
assert.NotEmpty(t, res.DenyReason, "deny reason must be populated")
}
// TestSelectPolicy_ModelAllowedByAllowlist is the allow counterpart: the model
// is on the applicable policy's allowlist, so selection proceeds normally.
func TestSelectPolicy_ModelAllowedByAllowlist(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1")
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1", allowlistGuardrail("g-1", "acc-1", "gpt-4o", "claude-opus-4"))
expectConsumptionBatch(mockStore, nil)
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
UserID: "user-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "claude-opus-4",
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, res.Allow, "a model on the applicable policy's allowlist must be allowed")
assert.Equal(t, "pol-A", res.SelectedPolicyID)
}
// TestSelectPolicy_CaseInsensitiveModelMatch proves the compare tolerates case
// and surrounding whitespace, matching the proxy guardrail's normalisation.
func TestSelectPolicy_CaseInsensitiveModelMatch(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1")
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1", allowlistGuardrail("g-1", "acc-1", " GPT-4o "))
expectConsumptionBatch(mockStore, nil)
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "gpt-4o",
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, res.Allow, "case/whitespace variants must match the allowlist entry")
}
// TestSelectPolicy_UnguardedPolicyIsUnrestricted is the false-deny fix: when two
// policies authorise the same (provider, group) and one has no guardrail, that
// policy makes the request unrestricted — not caught by the other's allowlist.
func TestSelectPolicy_UnguardedPolicyIsUnrestricted(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
restricted := guardedPolicy("pol-restricted", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1")
open := guardedPolicy("pol-open", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1") // no guardrail
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", restricted, open)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1", allowlistGuardrail("g-1", "acc-1", "gpt-4o"))
expectConsumptionBatch(mockStore, nil)
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "claude-opus-4",
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, res.Allow, "an un-guardrailed policy for the same (provider, group) must leave the request unrestricted")
assert.Equal(t, "pol-open", res.SelectedPolicyID, "the unrestricted policy must be the one that pays")
}
// TestSelectPolicy_AllowlistDoesNotLeakAcrossGroups is the false-allow fix: a
// model allowlisted only for grp-b must not be usable by a grp-a caller. The
// selector considers only policies applicable to the caller's groups.
func TestSelectPolicy_AllowlistDoesNotLeakAcrossGroups(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
polA := guardedPolicy("pol-a", "acc-1", []string{"grp-a"}, "prov-1", "g-a")
polB := guardedPolicy("pol-b", "acc-1", []string{"grp-b"}, "prov-1", "g-b")
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", polA, polB)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1",
allowlistGuardrail("g-a", "acc-1", "gpt-4o"),
allowlistGuardrail("g-b", "acc-1", "claude-opus-4"),
)
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-a"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "claude-opus-4", // only allowed for grp-b
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, res.Allow, "grp-b's allowlisted model must not leak to a grp-a caller")
assert.Equal(t, denyCodeModelBlocked, res.DenyCode)
}
// TestSelectPolicy_UndeterminedModelFailsClosed proves the fail-closed contract
// mirrors the proxy: with a restricted applicable policy and an empty model
// (e.g. a path-routed shape the parser couldn't map), the request is denied.
func TestSelectPolicy_UndeterminedModelFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1")
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1", allowlistGuardrail("g-1", "acc-1", "gpt-4o"))
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "", // undetermined
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.False(t, res.Allow, "an undetermined model must fail closed against a restricted policy")
assert.Equal(t, denyCodeModelBlocked, res.DenyCode)
}
// TestSelectPolicy_DisabledAllowlistDoesNotRestrict proves a guardrail whose
// model allowlist is disabled imposes no model restriction, even though the
// policy references it.
func TestSelectPolicy_DisabledAllowlistDoesNotRestrict(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1")
disabled := &types.Guardrail{
ID: "g-1",
AccountID: "acc-1",
Checks: types.GuardrailChecks{
ModelAllowlist: types.GuardrailModelAllowlist{Enabled: false, Models: []string{"gpt-4o"}},
},
}
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1", disabled)
expectConsumptionBatch(mockStore, nil)
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "anything-goes",
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, res.Allow, "a disabled allowlist must not restrict the model")
assert.Equal(t, "pol-A", res.SelectedPolicyID)
}
// TestSelectPolicy_UnionAcrossPolicyGuardrails proves a policy with multiple
// allowlist guardrails permits the union of their models (not just the first).
func TestSelectPolicy_UnionAcrossPolicyGuardrails(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1", "g-2")
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1",
allowlistGuardrail("g-1", "acc-1", "gpt-4o"),
allowlistGuardrail("g-2", "acc-1", "claude-opus-4"),
)
expectConsumptionBatch(mockStore, nil)
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "claude-opus-4", // only in the second guardrail's list
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, res.Allow, "a model in any of the policy's allowlist guardrails must be permitted")
assert.Equal(t, "pol-A", res.SelectedPolicyID)
}
// TestSelectPolicy_GuardrailLookupErrorPropagates proves a store failure while
// resolving the candidate policies' guardrails surfaces as an error rather than
// silently allowing or denying the request.
func TestSelectPolicy_GuardrailLookupErrorPropagates(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1")
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
mockStore.EXPECT().
GetAccountAgentNetworkGuardrails(gomock.Any(), gomock.Any(), "acc-1").
Return(nil, errors.New("store unavailable"))
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "gpt-4o",
})
require.Error(t, err, "a guardrail-lookup failure must surface as an error, not a silent allow/deny")
assert.Nil(t, res)
}
// TestSelectPolicy_MissingGuardrailReferenceTreatedAsUnrestricted proves a
// policy referencing a guardrail ID absent from the account's guardrails (a
// stale/orphaned reference) imposes no model restriction on its own — it is
// treated the same as no guardrail at all rather than failing closed.
func TestSelectPolicy_MissingGuardrailReferenceTreatedAsUnrestricted(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
// pol-A references "g-missing", which does not exist in the returned
// guardrails set.
policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-missing")
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1")
expectConsumptionBatch(mockStore, nil)
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "anything-goes",
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, res.Allow, "an orphaned guardrail reference must not restrict the model")
assert.Equal(t, "pol-A", res.SelectedPolicyID)
}
// TestSelectPolicy_PartialCandidatesPermittedAfterModelFilter proves the
// model-allowlist gate narrows candidates before cap-based scoring runs: when
// two policies are otherwise applicable but only one permits the requested
// model, the permitting policy must be selected even though the other has a
// larger, more attractive cap.
func TestSelectPolicy_PartialCandidatesPermittedAfterModelFilter(t *testing.T) {
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
// pol-big has a much larger group token cap and would normally win the
// "bigger pool first" tiebreak, but its guardrail blocks the requested model.
polBig := guardedPolicy("pol-big", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-restrict")
polBig.Limits = types.PolicyLimits{
TokenLimit: types.PolicyTokenLimit{Enabled: true, GroupCap: 1_000_000, WindowSeconds: 3600},
}
polSmall := guardedPolicy("pol-small", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-permit")
polSmall.Limits = types.PolicyLimits{
TokenLimit: types.PolicyTokenLimit{Enabled: true, GroupCap: 100, WindowSeconds: 3600},
}
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", polBig, polSmall)
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1",
allowlistGuardrail("g-restrict", "acc-1", "gpt-4o"),
allowlistGuardrail("g-permit", "acc-1", "claude-opus-4"),
)
expectConsumptionBatch(mockStore, nil)
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
AccountID: "acc-1",
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
ProviderID: "prov-1",
Model: "claude-opus-4", // only pol-small's guardrail permits this
})
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.True(t, res.Allow)
assert.Equal(t, "pol-small", res.SelectedPolicyID,
"the model filter must exclude pol-big before cap scoring, even though it would otherwise outrank pol-small")
}

View File

@@ -1,145 +0,0 @@
package grpc
import (
"context"
"errors"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
grpcstatus "google.golang.org/grpc/status"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
)
// fakeAgentNetworkLimits is a minimal AgentNetworkLimitsService double that
// records the PolicySelectionInput it was invoked with and returns a
// pre-programmed result, so tests can assert exactly what CheckLLMPolicyLimits
// forwards to the selector.
type fakeAgentNetworkLimits struct {
gotInput agentnetwork.PolicySelectionInput
result *agentnetwork.PolicySelectionResult
err error
}
func (f *fakeAgentNetworkLimits) SelectPolicyForRequest(_ context.Context, in agentnetwork.PolicySelectionInput) (*agentnetwork.PolicySelectionResult, error) {
f.gotInput = in
if f.err != nil {
return nil, f.err
}
return f.result, nil
}
func (f *fakeAgentNetworkLimits) RecordUsage(_ context.Context, _ agentnetwork.RecordUsageInput) error {
return nil
}
// TestCheckLLMPolicyLimits_ForwardsModelToSelector proves the wiring added in
// this PR: the model the proxy extracted from the request body must reach the
// selector's PolicySelectionInput.Model unchanged, alongside the pre-existing
// account/user/group/provider fields.
func TestCheckLLMPolicyLimits_ForwardsModelToSelector(t *testing.T) {
fake := &fakeAgentNetworkLimits{result: &agentnetwork.PolicySelectionResult{Allow: true, SelectedPolicyID: "pol-1"}}
s := &ProxyServiceServer{}
s.SetAgentNetworkLimitsService(fake)
req := &proto.CheckLLMPolicyLimitsRequest{
AccountId: "acc-1",
UserId: "user-1",
GroupIds: []string{"grp-a", "grp-b"},
ProviderId: "prov-1",
Model: "claude-opus-4",
}
resp, err := s.CheckLLMPolicyLimits(context.Background(), req)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, resp)
assert.Equal(t, "acc-1", fake.gotInput.AccountID)
assert.Equal(t, "user-1", fake.gotInput.UserID)
assert.Equal(t, []string{"grp-a", "grp-b"}, fake.gotInput.GroupIDs)
assert.Equal(t, "prov-1", fake.gotInput.ProviderID)
assert.Equal(t, "claude-opus-4", fake.gotInput.Model,
"the request's model must be forwarded to the selector's PolicySelectionInput")
}
// TestCheckLLMPolicyLimits_EmptyModelForwardedAsEmpty proves an
// undetermined model (empty string) is forwarded as-is rather than defaulted
// to some sentinel — the selector is the one that decides how to treat it
// (fail closed when a restriction applies).
func TestCheckLLMPolicyLimits_EmptyModelForwardedAsEmpty(t *testing.T) {
fake := &fakeAgentNetworkLimits{result: &agentnetwork.PolicySelectionResult{Allow: true}}
s := &ProxyServiceServer{}
s.SetAgentNetworkLimitsService(fake)
req := &proto.CheckLLMPolicyLimitsRequest{
AccountId: "acc-1",
ProviderId: "prov-1",
}
_, err := s.CheckLLMPolicyLimits(context.Background(), req)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, "", fake.gotInput.Model, "an absent model must be forwarded as empty, not fabricated")
}
// TestCheckLLMPolicyLimits_DenyResponseCarriesModelBlockedCode proves the deny
// envelope surfaces the model-allowlist deny code + reason end to end through
// the gRPC response, matching the proxy guardrail's code so both layers agree.
func TestCheckLLMPolicyLimits_DenyResponseCarriesModelBlockedCode(t *testing.T) {
fake := &fakeAgentNetworkLimits{result: &agentnetwork.PolicySelectionResult{
Allow: false,
DenyCode: "llm_policy.model_blocked",
DenyReason: `model "claude-opus-4" is not permitted by any applicable policy allowlist`,
}}
s := &ProxyServiceServer{}
s.SetAgentNetworkLimitsService(fake)
resp, err := s.CheckLLMPolicyLimits(context.Background(), &proto.CheckLLMPolicyLimitsRequest{
AccountId: "acc-1",
ProviderId: "prov-1",
Model: "claude-opus-4",
})
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, resp)
assert.Equal(t, "deny", resp.Decision)
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_blocked", resp.DenyCode)
assert.NotEmpty(t, resp.DenyReason)
assert.Empty(t, resp.SelectedPolicyId, "a denied request must carry no selected policy")
}
// TestCheckLLMPolicyLimits_SelectorErrorSurfacesAsInternal proves a selector
// failure (e.g. a store error propagated from SelectPolicyForRequest) is
// surfaced as an Internal gRPC error rather than silently allowed.
func TestCheckLLMPolicyLimits_SelectorErrorSurfacesAsInternal(t *testing.T) {
fake := &fakeAgentNetworkLimits{err: errors.New("boom")}
s := &ProxyServiceServer{}
s.SetAgentNetworkLimitsService(fake)
_, err := s.CheckLLMPolicyLimits(context.Background(), &proto.CheckLLMPolicyLimitsRequest{
AccountId: "acc-1",
ProviderId: "prov-1",
Model: "gpt-4o",
})
require.Error(t, err)
st, ok := grpcstatus.FromError(err)
require.True(t, ok)
assert.Equal(t, codes.Internal, st.Code(), "selector errors must never fail open on the hot path")
}
// TestCheckLLMPolicyLimits_UnconfiguredServiceReturnsUnimplemented locks the
// documented fallback: with no AgentNetworkLimitsService wired, the RPC must
// return Unimplemented rather than panic or silently allow.
func TestCheckLLMPolicyLimits_UnconfiguredServiceReturnsUnimplemented(t *testing.T) {
s := &ProxyServiceServer{}
_, err := s.CheckLLMPolicyLimits(context.Background(), &proto.CheckLLMPolicyLimitsRequest{
AccountId: "acc-1",
ProviderId: "prov-1",
})
require.Error(t, err)
st, ok := grpcstatus.FromError(err)
require.True(t, ok)
assert.Equal(t, codes.Unimplemented, st.Code())
}

View File

@@ -26,25 +26,6 @@ func newInput(meta ...middleware.KV) *middleware.Input {
return &middleware.Input{Slot: middleware.SlotOnRequest, Metadata: meta}
}
const (
testProvider = "prov-1"
otherProvider = "prov-2"
)
// providerCfg builds a Config restricting testProvider to the given models.
func providerCfg(models ...string) Config {
return Config{ProviderAllowlists: map[string][]string{testProvider: models}}
}
// newInputProvider builds an input that carries a resolved provider id (as
// llm_router would stamp) plus any extra metadata.
func newInputProvider(provider string, meta ...middleware.KV) *middleware.Input {
all := make([]middleware.KV, 0, len(meta)+1)
all = append(all, middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMResolvedProviderID, Value: provider})
all = append(all, meta...)
return &middleware.Input{Slot: middleware.SlotOnRequest, Metadata: all}
}
func TestMiddlewareIdentity(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(Config{})
assert.Equal(t, ID, mw.ID(), "middleware ID must be llm_guardrail")
@@ -66,12 +47,12 @@ func TestMiddlewareIdentity(t *testing.T) {
func TestAllowlistEmptyAllowsAnyModel(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(Config{})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "no provider allowlists must allow any model")
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "empty allowlist must allow any model")
v, ok := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMPolicyDecision)
require.True(t, ok, "decision metadata must be emitted")
assert.Equal(t, "allow", v, "decision must be allow")
@@ -81,8 +62,8 @@ func TestAllowlistEmptyAllowsAnyModel(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestAllowlistMatchAllows(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o", "claude-opus-4"))
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
mw := New(Config{ModelAllowlist: []string{"gpt-4o", "claude-opus-4"}})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
@@ -90,8 +71,8 @@ func TestAllowlistMatchAllows(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestAllowlistMissDenies(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o"))
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
mw := New(Config{ModelAllowlist: []string{"gpt-4o"}})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "claude-opus-4"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
@@ -110,10 +91,10 @@ func TestAllowlistMissDenies(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestAllowlistCaseInsensitive(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(providerCfg(" GPT-4o ", "Claude-OPUS-4"))
mw := New(Config{ModelAllowlist: []string{" GPT-4o ", "Claude-OPUS-4"}})
cases := []string{"gpt-4o", "GPT-4O", " claude-opus-4 "}
for _, model := range cases {
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: model},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
@@ -122,15 +103,14 @@ func TestAllowlistCaseInsensitive(t *testing.T) {
}
func TestAllowlistMissingModelKeyDenies(t *testing.T) {
// Fail closed: with an allowlist in effect for the resolved provider, a
// request whose model the parser could not extract (URL/path-routed
// providers such as Bedrock or Vertex whose shape wasn't recognised) must be
// denied, not allowed.
mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o"))
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider))
// Fail closed: with an allowlist configured, a request whose model the
// parser could not extract (URL/path-routed providers such as Bedrock or
// Vertex whose shape wasn't recognised) must be denied, not allowed.
mw := New(Config{ModelAllowlist: []string{"gpt-4o"}})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput())
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "absent model must be denied when the provider is restricted")
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "absent model must be denied when an allowlist is set")
assert.Equal(t, 403, out.DenyStatus, "deny status must be 403")
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason, "deny reason must be populated")
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_unknown", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must be model_unknown")
@@ -142,86 +122,26 @@ func TestAllowlistMissingModelKeyDenies(t *testing.T) {
func TestAllowlistEmptyModelValueDenies(t *testing.T) {
// A present-but-empty model is as undeterminable as an absent one.
mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o"))
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
mw := New(Config{ModelAllowlist: []string{"gpt-4o"}})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: " "},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "empty model must be denied when the provider is restricted")
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "empty model must be denied when an allowlist is set")
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason, "deny reason must be populated")
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_unknown", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must be model_unknown")
}
func TestAllowlistEmptyListAllowsMissingModel(t *testing.T) {
// Without any provider allowlists there is nothing to enforce, so a missing
// model is still allowed — the fail-closed rule only applies when a
// restriction is in effect.
// Without an allowlist there is nothing to enforce, so a missing model is
// still allowed — the fail-closed rule only applies when a list is set.
mw := New(Config{})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput())
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "no allowlist must allow even without a model")
}
func TestUnrestrictedProviderAllowsAnyModel(t *testing.T) {
// The request resolved to otherProvider, which has no allowlist, so its
// traffic must not be caught by testProvider's restriction — the
// cross-provider-leak / false-deny guard.
mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o"))
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(otherProvider,
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "claude-opus-4"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "an unrestricted provider must not inherit another provider's allowlist")
}
func TestPerProviderAllowlistsAreIsolated(t *testing.T) {
// gpt-4o is allowed only on testProvider; claude-opus-4 only on
// otherProvider. A model allowlisted for one provider must not be usable on
// the other — the fail-closed layer never unions allowlists across providers.
mw := New(Config{ProviderAllowlists: map[string][]string{
testProvider: {"gpt-4o"},
otherProvider: {"claude-opus-4"},
}})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "claude-opus-4"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "claude-opus-4 is allowed only on otherProvider, not testProvider")
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason)
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_blocked", out.DenyReason.Code, "cross-provider model must be blocked, not model_unknown")
}
func TestRestrictionsButNoResolvedProviderFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
// Restrictions exist for the account but the resolved provider id is absent,
// so the request cannot be scoped to a provider. Fail closed rather than
// wave it through.
mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o"))
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "missing resolved provider must fail closed when restrictions exist")
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason)
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_unknown", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must be model_unknown")
}
func TestEnabledButEmptyAllowlistDeniesEveryModel(t *testing.T) {
// An allowlist-enabled provider with zero models is distinct from an
// unrestricted (absent) provider: it must deny every model, not allow
// everything through.
mw := New(providerCfg())
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "an enabled-but-empty allowlist must deny every model")
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason)
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_blocked", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must be model_blocked, not model_unknown")
}
func TestPromptCaptureDisabledEmitsNoPrompt(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(Config{})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
@@ -297,8 +217,8 @@ func TestFactoryAcceptsZeroConfigs(t *testing.T) {
func TestFactoryDecodesValidConfig(t *testing.T) {
cfg := Config{
ProviderAllowlists: map[string][]string{testProvider: {"gpt-4o"}},
PromptCapture: PromptCapture{Enabled: true, RedactPii: true},
ModelAllowlist: []string{"gpt-4o"},
PromptCapture: PromptCapture{Enabled: true, RedactPii: true},
}
raw, err := json.Marshal(cfg)
require.NoError(t, err, "marshalling test config must succeed")
@@ -313,33 +233,16 @@ func TestFactoryRejectsMalformedJSON(t *testing.T) {
assert.Nil(t, mw, "no middleware must be returned on malformed config")
}
func TestFactoryAllEmptyEntriesDenyEveryModel(t *testing.T) {
// All the provider's allowlist entries are blank/whitespace-only. They must
// collapse to a non-nil empty list (deny everything for that provider),
// not to "no restriction" for the provider.
raw := []byte(`{"provider_allowlists":{"prov-1":[""," "]}}`)
mw, err := Factory{}.New(raw)
require.NoError(t, err)
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "all-blank allowlist entries must still restrict the provider")
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason)
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_blocked", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must be model_blocked, confirming the provider is treated as restricted-to-none")
}
func TestFactoryNormalisesAllowlist(t *testing.T) {
raw := []byte(`{"provider_allowlists":{"prov-1":[" GPT-4o ","",""," Claude-3 "]}}`)
raw := []byte(`{"model_allowlist":[" GPT-4o ","",""," Claude-3 "]}`)
mw, err := Factory{}.New(raw)
require.NoError(t, err)
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "factory must lowercase + trim allowlist entries")
out2, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
out2, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "claude-3"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)