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coderabbit
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fix/ui-dep
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
|
66e149d361 |
@@ -88,6 +88,8 @@ nfpms:
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dst: /usr/share/pixmaps/netbird.png
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dependencies:
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- netbird
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- libgtk-4-1 (>= 4.14)
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- libwebkitgtk-6.0-4
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- maintainer: Netbird <dev@netbird.io>
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description: Netbird client UI.
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@@ -109,6 +111,8 @@ nfpms:
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dst: /usr/share/pixmaps/netbird.png
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dependencies:
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- netbird
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- (gtk4 >= 4.14 or libgtk-4-1 >= 4.14)
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- (webkitgtk6.0 or libwebkitgtk-6_0-4)
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rpm:
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signature:
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@@ -26,17 +26,17 @@ contents:
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# Default dependencies for the GTK4 + WebKitGTK 6.0 stack (Ubuntu 24.04+ / Debian 13+)
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depends:
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- libgtk-4-1
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- libgtk-4-1 (>= 4.14)
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- libwebkitgtk-6.0-4
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- xdg-utils
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# Distribution-specific overrides for different package formats
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overrides:
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# RPM packages for Fedora / RHEL / AlmaLinux / Rocky Linux
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# RPM packages for Fedora / RHEL / AlmaLinux / Rocky Linux / openSUSE
|
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rpm:
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depends:
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- gtk4
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- webkitgtk6.0
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- (gtk4 >= 4.14 or libgtk-4-1 >= 4.14)
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- (webkitgtk6.0 or libwebkitgtk-6_0-4)
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- xdg-utils
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# Arch Linux packages
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@@ -1,336 +0,0 @@
|
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package agentnetwork
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/golang/mock/gomock"
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
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||||
|
||||
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork/types"
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||||
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/store"
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||||
)
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||||
|
||||
// guardedPolicy builds an enabled, uncapped policy that authorises sourceGroups
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// to reach providerID under the given guardrails. Uncapped keeps the selector's
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// headroom scoring trivial so these tests isolate the model-allowlist gate.
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func guardedPolicy(id, account string, sourceGroups []string, providerID string, guardrailIDs ...string) *types.Policy {
|
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return &types.Policy{
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ID: id,
|
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AccountID: account,
|
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Enabled: true,
|
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SourceGroups: sourceGroups,
|
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DestinationProviderIDs: []string{providerID},
|
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GuardrailIDs: guardrailIDs,
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CreatedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
|
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}
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}
|
||||
|
||||
// allowlistGuardrail builds a guardrail whose model allowlist is enabled and
|
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// carries the given models.
|
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func allowlistGuardrail(id, account string, models ...string) *types.Guardrail {
|
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return &types.Guardrail{
|
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ID: id,
|
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AccountID: account,
|
||||
Checks: types.GuardrailChecks{
|
||||
ModelAllowlist: types.GuardrailModelAllowlist{Enabled: true, Models: models},
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
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func expectPolicies(mockStore *store.MockStore, account string, policies ...*types.Policy) {
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mockStore.EXPECT().
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GetAccountAgentNetworkPolicies(gomock.Any(), gomock.Any(), account).
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Return(policies, nil)
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}
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||||
|
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func expectGuardrails(mockStore *store.MockStore, account string, guardrails ...*types.Guardrail) {
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mockStore.EXPECT().
|
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GetAccountAgentNetworkGuardrails(gomock.Any(), gomock.Any(), account).
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Return(guardrails, nil)
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}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestSelectPolicy_ModelBlockedByAllowlist proves the authoritative allowlist
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// decision: a policy authorises the (provider, group) but restricts the model,
|
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// and the requested model isn't on the list, so the request is denied.
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func TestSelectPolicy_ModelBlockedByAllowlist(t *testing.T) {
|
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ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
|
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mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
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|
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policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1")
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expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
|
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expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1", allowlistGuardrail("g-1", "acc-1", "gpt-4o"))
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|
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res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
|
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AccountID: "acc-1",
|
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UserID: "user-1",
|
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GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
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ProviderID: "prov-1",
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Model: "claude-opus-4",
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})
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require.NoError(t, err)
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assert.False(t, res.Allow, "a model outside the only applicable policy's allowlist must be denied")
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assert.Equal(t, denyCodeModelBlocked, res.DenyCode, "deny code must be model_blocked")
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assert.NotEmpty(t, res.DenyReason, "deny reason must be populated")
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}
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// TestSelectPolicy_ModelAllowedByAllowlist is the allow counterpart: the model
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// is on the applicable policy's allowlist, so selection proceeds normally.
|
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func TestSelectPolicy_ModelAllowedByAllowlist(t *testing.T) {
|
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ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
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mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
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|
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policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1")
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expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
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expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1", allowlistGuardrail("g-1", "acc-1", "gpt-4o", "claude-opus-4"))
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expectConsumptionBatch(mockStore, nil)
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|
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res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
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AccountID: "acc-1",
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UserID: "user-1",
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GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
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ProviderID: "prov-1",
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Model: "claude-opus-4",
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})
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require.NoError(t, err)
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assert.True(t, res.Allow, "a model on the applicable policy's allowlist must be allowed")
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assert.Equal(t, "pol-A", res.SelectedPolicyID)
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}
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// TestSelectPolicy_CaseInsensitiveModelMatch proves the compare tolerates case
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// and surrounding whitespace, matching the proxy guardrail's normalisation.
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func TestSelectPolicy_CaseInsensitiveModelMatch(t *testing.T) {
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ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
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mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
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|
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policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1")
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expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
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expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1", allowlistGuardrail("g-1", "acc-1", " GPT-4o "))
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expectConsumptionBatch(mockStore, nil)
|
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|
||||
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
|
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AccountID: "acc-1",
|
||||
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
|
||||
ProviderID: "prov-1",
|
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Model: "gpt-4o",
|
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})
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require.NoError(t, err)
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assert.True(t, res.Allow, "case/whitespace variants must match the allowlist entry")
|
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}
|
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|
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// TestSelectPolicy_UnguardedPolicyIsUnrestricted is the false-deny fix: when two
|
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// policies authorise the same (provider, group) and one has no guardrail, that
|
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// policy makes the request unrestricted — not caught by the other's allowlist.
|
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func TestSelectPolicy_UnguardedPolicyIsUnrestricted(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
|
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mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
|
||||
|
||||
restricted := guardedPolicy("pol-restricted", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1")
|
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open := guardedPolicy("pol-open", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1") // no guardrail
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expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", restricted, open)
|
||||
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1", allowlistGuardrail("g-1", "acc-1", "gpt-4o"))
|
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expectConsumptionBatch(mockStore, nil)
|
||||
|
||||
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
|
||||
AccountID: "acc-1",
|
||||
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
|
||||
ProviderID: "prov-1",
|
||||
Model: "claude-opus-4",
|
||||
})
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.True(t, res.Allow, "an un-guardrailed policy for the same (provider, group) must leave the request unrestricted")
|
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assert.Equal(t, "pol-open", res.SelectedPolicyID, "the unrestricted policy must be the one that pays")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestSelectPolicy_AllowlistDoesNotLeakAcrossGroups is the false-allow fix: a
|
||||
// model allowlisted only for grp-b must not be usable by a grp-a caller. The
|
||||
// selector considers only policies applicable to the caller's groups.
|
||||
func TestSelectPolicy_AllowlistDoesNotLeakAcrossGroups(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
|
||||
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
|
||||
|
||||
polA := guardedPolicy("pol-a", "acc-1", []string{"grp-a"}, "prov-1", "g-a")
|
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polB := guardedPolicy("pol-b", "acc-1", []string{"grp-b"}, "prov-1", "g-b")
|
||||
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", polA, polB)
|
||||
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1",
|
||||
allowlistGuardrail("g-a", "acc-1", "gpt-4o"),
|
||||
allowlistGuardrail("g-b", "acc-1", "claude-opus-4"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
|
||||
AccountID: "acc-1",
|
||||
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-a"},
|
||||
ProviderID: "prov-1",
|
||||
Model: "claude-opus-4", // only allowed for grp-b
|
||||
})
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.False(t, res.Allow, "grp-b's allowlisted model must not leak to a grp-a caller")
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, denyCodeModelBlocked, res.DenyCode)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestSelectPolicy_UndeterminedModelFailsClosed proves the fail-closed contract
|
||||
// mirrors the proxy: with a restricted applicable policy and an empty model
|
||||
// (e.g. a path-routed shape the parser couldn't map), the request is denied.
|
||||
func TestSelectPolicy_UndeterminedModelFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
|
||||
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
|
||||
|
||||
policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1")
|
||||
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
|
||||
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1", allowlistGuardrail("g-1", "acc-1", "gpt-4o"))
|
||||
|
||||
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
|
||||
AccountID: "acc-1",
|
||||
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
|
||||
ProviderID: "prov-1",
|
||||
Model: "", // undetermined
|
||||
})
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.False(t, res.Allow, "an undetermined model must fail closed against a restricted policy")
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, denyCodeModelBlocked, res.DenyCode)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestSelectPolicy_DisabledAllowlistDoesNotRestrict proves a guardrail whose
|
||||
// model allowlist is disabled imposes no model restriction, even though the
|
||||
// policy references it.
|
||||
func TestSelectPolicy_DisabledAllowlistDoesNotRestrict(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
|
||||
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
|
||||
|
||||
policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1")
|
||||
disabled := &types.Guardrail{
|
||||
ID: "g-1",
|
||||
AccountID: "acc-1",
|
||||
Checks: types.GuardrailChecks{
|
||||
ModelAllowlist: types.GuardrailModelAllowlist{Enabled: false, Models: []string{"gpt-4o"}},
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
|
||||
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1", disabled)
|
||||
expectConsumptionBatch(mockStore, nil)
|
||||
|
||||
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
|
||||
AccountID: "acc-1",
|
||||
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
|
||||
ProviderID: "prov-1",
|
||||
Model: "anything-goes",
|
||||
})
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.True(t, res.Allow, "a disabled allowlist must not restrict the model")
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, "pol-A", res.SelectedPolicyID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestSelectPolicy_UnionAcrossPolicyGuardrails proves a policy with multiple
|
||||
// allowlist guardrails permits the union of their models (not just the first).
|
||||
func TestSelectPolicy_UnionAcrossPolicyGuardrails(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
|
||||
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
|
||||
|
||||
policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1", "g-2")
|
||||
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
|
||||
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1",
|
||||
allowlistGuardrail("g-1", "acc-1", "gpt-4o"),
|
||||
allowlistGuardrail("g-2", "acc-1", "claude-opus-4"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
expectConsumptionBatch(mockStore, nil)
|
||||
|
||||
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
|
||||
AccountID: "acc-1",
|
||||
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
|
||||
ProviderID: "prov-1",
|
||||
Model: "claude-opus-4", // only in the second guardrail's list
|
||||
})
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.True(t, res.Allow, "a model in any of the policy's allowlist guardrails must be permitted")
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, "pol-A", res.SelectedPolicyID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestSelectPolicy_GuardrailLookupErrorPropagates proves a store failure while
|
||||
// resolving the candidate policies' guardrails surfaces as an error rather than
|
||||
// silently allowing or denying the request.
|
||||
func TestSelectPolicy_GuardrailLookupErrorPropagates(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
|
||||
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
|
||||
|
||||
policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-1")
|
||||
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
|
||||
mockStore.EXPECT().
|
||||
GetAccountAgentNetworkGuardrails(gomock.Any(), gomock.Any(), "acc-1").
|
||||
Return(nil, errors.New("store unavailable"))
|
||||
|
||||
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
|
||||
AccountID: "acc-1",
|
||||
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
|
||||
ProviderID: "prov-1",
|
||||
Model: "gpt-4o",
|
||||
})
|
||||
require.Error(t, err, "a guardrail-lookup failure must surface as an error, not a silent allow/deny")
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, res)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestSelectPolicy_MissingGuardrailReferenceTreatedAsUnrestricted proves a
|
||||
// policy referencing a guardrail ID absent from the account's guardrails (a
|
||||
// stale/orphaned reference) imposes no model restriction on its own — it is
|
||||
// treated the same as no guardrail at all rather than failing closed.
|
||||
func TestSelectPolicy_MissingGuardrailReferenceTreatedAsUnrestricted(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
|
||||
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
|
||||
|
||||
// pol-A references "g-missing", which does not exist in the returned
|
||||
// guardrails set.
|
||||
policy := guardedPolicy("pol-A", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-missing")
|
||||
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", policy)
|
||||
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1")
|
||||
expectConsumptionBatch(mockStore, nil)
|
||||
|
||||
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
|
||||
AccountID: "acc-1",
|
||||
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
|
||||
ProviderID: "prov-1",
|
||||
Model: "anything-goes",
|
||||
})
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.True(t, res.Allow, "an orphaned guardrail reference must not restrict the model")
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, "pol-A", res.SelectedPolicyID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestSelectPolicy_PartialCandidatesPermittedAfterModelFilter proves the
|
||||
// model-allowlist gate narrows candidates before cap-based scoring runs: when
|
||||
// two policies are otherwise applicable but only one permits the requested
|
||||
// model, the permitting policy must be selected even though the other has a
|
||||
// larger, more attractive cap.
|
||||
func TestSelectPolicy_PartialCandidatesPermittedAfterModelFilter(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
ctrl := gomock.NewController(t)
|
||||
mgr, mockStore := newSelectorMgr(t, ctrl)
|
||||
|
||||
// pol-big has a much larger group token cap and would normally win the
|
||||
// "bigger pool first" tiebreak, but its guardrail blocks the requested model.
|
||||
polBig := guardedPolicy("pol-big", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-restrict")
|
||||
polBig.Limits = types.PolicyLimits{
|
||||
TokenLimit: types.PolicyTokenLimit{Enabled: true, GroupCap: 1_000_000, WindowSeconds: 3600},
|
||||
}
|
||||
polSmall := guardedPolicy("pol-small", "acc-1", []string{"grp-eng"}, "prov-1", "g-permit")
|
||||
polSmall.Limits = types.PolicyLimits{
|
||||
TokenLimit: types.PolicyTokenLimit{Enabled: true, GroupCap: 100, WindowSeconds: 3600},
|
||||
}
|
||||
expectPolicies(mockStore, "acc-1", polBig, polSmall)
|
||||
expectGuardrails(mockStore, "acc-1",
|
||||
allowlistGuardrail("g-restrict", "acc-1", "gpt-4o"),
|
||||
allowlistGuardrail("g-permit", "acc-1", "claude-opus-4"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
expectConsumptionBatch(mockStore, nil)
|
||||
|
||||
res, err := mgr.SelectPolicyForRequest(context.Background(), PolicySelectionInput{
|
||||
AccountID: "acc-1",
|
||||
GroupIDs: []string{"grp-eng"},
|
||||
ProviderID: "prov-1",
|
||||
Model: "claude-opus-4", // only pol-small's guardrail permits this
|
||||
})
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.True(t, res.Allow)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, "pol-small", res.SelectedPolicyID,
|
||||
"the model filter must exclude pol-big before cap scoring, even though it would otherwise outrank pol-small")
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,145 +0,0 @@
|
||||
package grpc
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"context"
|
||||
"errors"
|
||||
"testing"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
|
||||
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
|
||||
"google.golang.org/grpc/codes"
|
||||
grpcstatus "google.golang.org/grpc/status"
|
||||
|
||||
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/internals/modules/agentnetwork"
|
||||
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// fakeAgentNetworkLimits is a minimal AgentNetworkLimitsService double that
|
||||
// records the PolicySelectionInput it was invoked with and returns a
|
||||
// pre-programmed result, so tests can assert exactly what CheckLLMPolicyLimits
|
||||
// forwards to the selector.
|
||||
type fakeAgentNetworkLimits struct {
|
||||
gotInput agentnetwork.PolicySelectionInput
|
||||
result *agentnetwork.PolicySelectionResult
|
||||
err error
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *fakeAgentNetworkLimits) SelectPolicyForRequest(_ context.Context, in agentnetwork.PolicySelectionInput) (*agentnetwork.PolicySelectionResult, error) {
|
||||
f.gotInput = in
|
||||
if f.err != nil {
|
||||
return nil, f.err
|
||||
}
|
||||
return f.result, nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func (f *fakeAgentNetworkLimits) RecordUsage(_ context.Context, _ agentnetwork.RecordUsageInput) error {
|
||||
return nil
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestCheckLLMPolicyLimits_ForwardsModelToSelector proves the wiring added in
|
||||
// this PR: the model the proxy extracted from the request body must reach the
|
||||
// selector's PolicySelectionInput.Model unchanged, alongside the pre-existing
|
||||
// account/user/group/provider fields.
|
||||
func TestCheckLLMPolicyLimits_ForwardsModelToSelector(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
fake := &fakeAgentNetworkLimits{result: &agentnetwork.PolicySelectionResult{Allow: true, SelectedPolicyID: "pol-1"}}
|
||||
s := &ProxyServiceServer{}
|
||||
s.SetAgentNetworkLimitsService(fake)
|
||||
|
||||
req := &proto.CheckLLMPolicyLimitsRequest{
|
||||
AccountId: "acc-1",
|
||||
UserId: "user-1",
|
||||
GroupIds: []string{"grp-a", "grp-b"},
|
||||
ProviderId: "prov-1",
|
||||
Model: "claude-opus-4",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
resp, err := s.CheckLLMPolicyLimits(context.Background(), req)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
require.NotNil(t, resp)
|
||||
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, "acc-1", fake.gotInput.AccountID)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, "user-1", fake.gotInput.UserID)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, []string{"grp-a", "grp-b"}, fake.gotInput.GroupIDs)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, "prov-1", fake.gotInput.ProviderID)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, "claude-opus-4", fake.gotInput.Model,
|
||||
"the request's model must be forwarded to the selector's PolicySelectionInput")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestCheckLLMPolicyLimits_EmptyModelForwardedAsEmpty proves an
|
||||
// undetermined model (empty string) is forwarded as-is rather than defaulted
|
||||
// to some sentinel — the selector is the one that decides how to treat it
|
||||
// (fail closed when a restriction applies).
|
||||
func TestCheckLLMPolicyLimits_EmptyModelForwardedAsEmpty(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
fake := &fakeAgentNetworkLimits{result: &agentnetwork.PolicySelectionResult{Allow: true}}
|
||||
s := &ProxyServiceServer{}
|
||||
s.SetAgentNetworkLimitsService(fake)
|
||||
|
||||
req := &proto.CheckLLMPolicyLimitsRequest{
|
||||
AccountId: "acc-1",
|
||||
ProviderId: "prov-1",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
_, err := s.CheckLLMPolicyLimits(context.Background(), req)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, "", fake.gotInput.Model, "an absent model must be forwarded as empty, not fabricated")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestCheckLLMPolicyLimits_DenyResponseCarriesModelBlockedCode proves the deny
|
||||
// envelope surfaces the model-allowlist deny code + reason end to end through
|
||||
// the gRPC response, matching the proxy guardrail's code so both layers agree.
|
||||
func TestCheckLLMPolicyLimits_DenyResponseCarriesModelBlockedCode(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
fake := &fakeAgentNetworkLimits{result: &agentnetwork.PolicySelectionResult{
|
||||
Allow: false,
|
||||
DenyCode: "llm_policy.model_blocked",
|
||||
DenyReason: `model "claude-opus-4" is not permitted by any applicable policy allowlist`,
|
||||
}}
|
||||
s := &ProxyServiceServer{}
|
||||
s.SetAgentNetworkLimitsService(fake)
|
||||
|
||||
resp, err := s.CheckLLMPolicyLimits(context.Background(), &proto.CheckLLMPolicyLimitsRequest{
|
||||
AccountId: "acc-1",
|
||||
ProviderId: "prov-1",
|
||||
Model: "claude-opus-4",
|
||||
})
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
require.NotNil(t, resp)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, "deny", resp.Decision)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_blocked", resp.DenyCode)
|
||||
assert.NotEmpty(t, resp.DenyReason)
|
||||
assert.Empty(t, resp.SelectedPolicyId, "a denied request must carry no selected policy")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestCheckLLMPolicyLimits_SelectorErrorSurfacesAsInternal proves a selector
|
||||
// failure (e.g. a store error propagated from SelectPolicyForRequest) is
|
||||
// surfaced as an Internal gRPC error rather than silently allowed.
|
||||
func TestCheckLLMPolicyLimits_SelectorErrorSurfacesAsInternal(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
fake := &fakeAgentNetworkLimits{err: errors.New("boom")}
|
||||
s := &ProxyServiceServer{}
|
||||
s.SetAgentNetworkLimitsService(fake)
|
||||
|
||||
_, err := s.CheckLLMPolicyLimits(context.Background(), &proto.CheckLLMPolicyLimitsRequest{
|
||||
AccountId: "acc-1",
|
||||
ProviderId: "prov-1",
|
||||
Model: "gpt-4o",
|
||||
})
|
||||
require.Error(t, err)
|
||||
st, ok := grpcstatus.FromError(err)
|
||||
require.True(t, ok)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, codes.Internal, st.Code(), "selector errors must never fail open on the hot path")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// TestCheckLLMPolicyLimits_UnconfiguredServiceReturnsUnimplemented locks the
|
||||
// documented fallback: with no AgentNetworkLimitsService wired, the RPC must
|
||||
// return Unimplemented rather than panic or silently allow.
|
||||
func TestCheckLLMPolicyLimits_UnconfiguredServiceReturnsUnimplemented(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
s := &ProxyServiceServer{}
|
||||
|
||||
_, err := s.CheckLLMPolicyLimits(context.Background(), &proto.CheckLLMPolicyLimitsRequest{
|
||||
AccountId: "acc-1",
|
||||
ProviderId: "prov-1",
|
||||
})
|
||||
require.Error(t, err)
|
||||
st, ok := grpcstatus.FromError(err)
|
||||
require.True(t, ok)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, codes.Unimplemented, st.Code())
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -26,25 +26,6 @@ func newInput(meta ...middleware.KV) *middleware.Input {
|
||||
return &middleware.Input{Slot: middleware.SlotOnRequest, Metadata: meta}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
testProvider = "prov-1"
|
||||
otherProvider = "prov-2"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
// providerCfg builds a Config restricting testProvider to the given models.
|
||||
func providerCfg(models ...string) Config {
|
||||
return Config{ProviderAllowlists: map[string][]string{testProvider: models}}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// newInputProvider builds an input that carries a resolved provider id (as
|
||||
// llm_router would stamp) plus any extra metadata.
|
||||
func newInputProvider(provider string, meta ...middleware.KV) *middleware.Input {
|
||||
all := make([]middleware.KV, 0, len(meta)+1)
|
||||
all = append(all, middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMResolvedProviderID, Value: provider})
|
||||
all = append(all, meta...)
|
||||
return &middleware.Input{Slot: middleware.SlotOnRequest, Metadata: all}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestMiddlewareIdentity(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
mw := New(Config{})
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, ID, mw.ID(), "middleware ID must be llm_guardrail")
|
||||
@@ -66,12 +47,12 @@ func TestMiddlewareIdentity(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAllowlistEmptyAllowsAnyModel(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
mw := New(Config{})
|
||||
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
|
||||
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
|
||||
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
|
||||
))
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
require.NotNil(t, out)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "no provider allowlists must allow any model")
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "empty allowlist must allow any model")
|
||||
v, ok := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMPolicyDecision)
|
||||
require.True(t, ok, "decision metadata must be emitted")
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, "allow", v, "decision must be allow")
|
||||
@@ -81,8 +62,8 @@ func TestAllowlistEmptyAllowsAnyModel(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAllowlistMatchAllows(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o", "claude-opus-4"))
|
||||
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
|
||||
mw := New(Config{ModelAllowlist: []string{"gpt-4o", "claude-opus-4"}})
|
||||
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
|
||||
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
|
||||
))
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
@@ -90,8 +71,8 @@ func TestAllowlistMatchAllows(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAllowlistMissDenies(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o"))
|
||||
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
|
||||
mw := New(Config{ModelAllowlist: []string{"gpt-4o"}})
|
||||
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
|
||||
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "claude-opus-4"},
|
||||
))
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
@@ -110,10 +91,10 @@ func TestAllowlistMissDenies(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAllowlistCaseInsensitive(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
mw := New(providerCfg(" GPT-4o ", "Claude-OPUS-4"))
|
||||
mw := New(Config{ModelAllowlist: []string{" GPT-4o ", "Claude-OPUS-4"}})
|
||||
cases := []string{"gpt-4o", "GPT-4O", " claude-opus-4 "}
|
||||
for _, model := range cases {
|
||||
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
|
||||
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
|
||||
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: model},
|
||||
))
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
@@ -122,15 +103,14 @@ func TestAllowlistCaseInsensitive(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAllowlistMissingModelKeyDenies(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// Fail closed: with an allowlist in effect for the resolved provider, a
|
||||
// request whose model the parser could not extract (URL/path-routed
|
||||
// providers such as Bedrock or Vertex whose shape wasn't recognised) must be
|
||||
// denied, not allowed.
|
||||
mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o"))
|
||||
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider))
|
||||
// Fail closed: with an allowlist configured, a request whose model the
|
||||
// parser could not extract (URL/path-routed providers such as Bedrock or
|
||||
// Vertex whose shape wasn't recognised) must be denied, not allowed.
|
||||
mw := New(Config{ModelAllowlist: []string{"gpt-4o"}})
|
||||
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput())
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
require.NotNil(t, out)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "absent model must be denied when the provider is restricted")
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "absent model must be denied when an allowlist is set")
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, 403, out.DenyStatus, "deny status must be 403")
|
||||
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason, "deny reason must be populated")
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_unknown", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must be model_unknown")
|
||||
@@ -142,86 +122,26 @@ func TestAllowlistMissingModelKeyDenies(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAllowlistEmptyModelValueDenies(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// A present-but-empty model is as undeterminable as an absent one.
|
||||
mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o"))
|
||||
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
|
||||
mw := New(Config{ModelAllowlist: []string{"gpt-4o"}})
|
||||
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
|
||||
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: " "},
|
||||
))
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
require.NotNil(t, out)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "empty model must be denied when the provider is restricted")
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "empty model must be denied when an allowlist is set")
|
||||
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason, "deny reason must be populated")
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_unknown", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must be model_unknown")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestAllowlistEmptyListAllowsMissingModel(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// Without any provider allowlists there is nothing to enforce, so a missing
|
||||
// model is still allowed — the fail-closed rule only applies when a
|
||||
// restriction is in effect.
|
||||
// Without an allowlist there is nothing to enforce, so a missing model is
|
||||
// still allowed — the fail-closed rule only applies when a list is set.
|
||||
mw := New(Config{})
|
||||
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput())
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "no allowlist must allow even without a model")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestUnrestrictedProviderAllowsAnyModel(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// The request resolved to otherProvider, which has no allowlist, so its
|
||||
// traffic must not be caught by testProvider's restriction — the
|
||||
// cross-provider-leak / false-deny guard.
|
||||
mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o"))
|
||||
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(otherProvider,
|
||||
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "claude-opus-4"},
|
||||
))
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "an unrestricted provider must not inherit another provider's allowlist")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestPerProviderAllowlistsAreIsolated(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// gpt-4o is allowed only on testProvider; claude-opus-4 only on
|
||||
// otherProvider. A model allowlisted for one provider must not be usable on
|
||||
// the other — the fail-closed layer never unions allowlists across providers.
|
||||
mw := New(Config{ProviderAllowlists: map[string][]string{
|
||||
testProvider: {"gpt-4o"},
|
||||
otherProvider: {"claude-opus-4"},
|
||||
}})
|
||||
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
|
||||
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "claude-opus-4"},
|
||||
))
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "claude-opus-4 is allowed only on otherProvider, not testProvider")
|
||||
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_blocked", out.DenyReason.Code, "cross-provider model must be blocked, not model_unknown")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestRestrictionsButNoResolvedProviderFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// Restrictions exist for the account but the resolved provider id is absent,
|
||||
// so the request cannot be scoped to a provider. Fail closed rather than
|
||||
// wave it through.
|
||||
mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o"))
|
||||
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
|
||||
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
|
||||
))
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
require.NotNil(t, out)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "missing resolved provider must fail closed when restrictions exist")
|
||||
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_unknown", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must be model_unknown")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestEnabledButEmptyAllowlistDeniesEveryModel(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// An allowlist-enabled provider with zero models is distinct from an
|
||||
// unrestricted (absent) provider: it must deny every model, not allow
|
||||
// everything through.
|
||||
mw := New(providerCfg())
|
||||
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
|
||||
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
|
||||
))
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
require.NotNil(t, out)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "an enabled-but-empty allowlist must deny every model")
|
||||
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_blocked", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must be model_blocked, not model_unknown")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestPromptCaptureDisabledEmitsNoPrompt(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
mw := New(Config{})
|
||||
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
|
||||
@@ -297,8 +217,8 @@ func TestFactoryAcceptsZeroConfigs(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
|
||||
func TestFactoryDecodesValidConfig(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
cfg := Config{
|
||||
ProviderAllowlists: map[string][]string{testProvider: {"gpt-4o"}},
|
||||
PromptCapture: PromptCapture{Enabled: true, RedactPii: true},
|
||||
ModelAllowlist: []string{"gpt-4o"},
|
||||
PromptCapture: PromptCapture{Enabled: true, RedactPii: true},
|
||||
}
|
||||
raw, err := json.Marshal(cfg)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err, "marshalling test config must succeed")
|
||||
@@ -313,33 +233,16 @@ func TestFactoryRejectsMalformedJSON(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
assert.Nil(t, mw, "no middleware must be returned on malformed config")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestFactoryAllEmptyEntriesDenyEveryModel(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
// All the provider's allowlist entries are blank/whitespace-only. They must
|
||||
// collapse to a non-nil empty list (deny everything for that provider),
|
||||
// not to "no restriction" for the provider.
|
||||
raw := []byte(`{"provider_allowlists":{"prov-1":[""," "]}}`)
|
||||
mw, err := Factory{}.New(raw)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
|
||||
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
|
||||
))
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
require.NotNil(t, out)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision, "all-blank allowlist entries must still restrict the provider")
|
||||
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_blocked", out.DenyReason.Code, "deny code must be model_blocked, confirming the provider is treated as restricted-to-none")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestFactoryNormalisesAllowlist(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
raw := []byte(`{"provider_allowlists":{"prov-1":[" GPT-4o ","",""," Claude-3 "]}}`)
|
||||
raw := []byte(`{"model_allowlist":[" GPT-4o ","",""," Claude-3 "]}`)
|
||||
mw, err := Factory{}.New(raw)
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
|
||||
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
|
||||
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
|
||||
))
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "factory must lowercase + trim allowlist entries")
|
||||
out2, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
|
||||
out2, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInput(
|
||||
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "claude-3"},
|
||||
))
|
||||
require.NoError(t, err)
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user