Compare commits

..

3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
mlsmaycon
5585ceec85 [management,client] Normalize anonymize_level and sanity-check the bundle upload URL
Two review follow-ups.

The API validated anonymize_level after trimming and lowercasing but
persisted the value verbatim, so " default " passed as default yet reached
the client — which only lowercases — as an unrecognized value it resolves
to strict. Persist the normalized form so what was validated is what the
client parses.

The remote debug bundle job forwarded the management-supplied upload URL
to the uploader unchecked and logged it at info level, where it can leak a
host, credentials, or query tokens. Reject a malformed or non-https URL
before generating the bundle, and keep the URL out of the info-level line
while leaving the full parameters at debug. The accepted host is left
unrestricted for now, pending a decision on management-directed uploads.
2026-08-11 02:16:22 +00:00
mlsmaycon
725dc451ca [management] Validate anonymize_level on the debug bundle job API
The client resolves an unknown anonymization level to strict, a fail-safe
that is right for the wire but wrong for the API boundary: a caller that
misspells the level should be told so at job creation, not have a
different level than they asked for applied silently on the peer.

Reject any anonymize_level other than the known wire forms when building
a bundle job; an omitted or empty value still crosses the wire as empty
and defaults on the client. The accepted forms are taken from the client
anonymize package so the API and the consumer cannot drift.
2026-08-11 01:43:03 +00:00
mlsmaycon
9c889e4d5c [management,client] Plumb anonymize level and upload URL through remote debug bundle jobs
PR #7102 added an anonymization level to debug bundles and the
anonymize_level proto field, but nothing on the management side ever set
it: the remote-job builder dropped the field and the REST schema never
exposed it, so a remotely triggered bundle always ran at the default
level regardless of what an operator asked for. The upload destination
for remote jobs was likewise fixed to the default upload server, with no
way to direct a bundle to a self-hosted one.

Expose anonymize_level and a new upload_url on the REST BundleParameters
and the management proto, and map both onto the job request streamed to
the client. Both are optional: an omitted value crosses the wire as the
empty string, which the client resolves to its own defaults — the
default anonymization level and the default upload server — matching how
the netbird CLI defaults the same inputs.
2026-08-10 18:38:10 +00:00
44 changed files with 1461 additions and 3382 deletions

View File

@@ -40,35 +40,6 @@ You can then use this private endpoint to configure your AI agents, whether that
Full step-by-step setup:
**https://docs.netbird.io/agent-network/quickstart**
## Client settings that don't follow the endpoint
Most of an agent's traffic follows the base URL you hand it, but a few
client-side checks call their vendor directly and never reach the proxy. On a
network that blocks direct egress they fail even though inference works, so
they are worth setting once when you roll the endpoint out.
For Claude Code:
- **Fast mode** checks availability against `api.anthropic.com` rather than the
configured base URL. Set `CLAUDE_CODE_SKIP_FAST_MODE_ORG_CHECK=1` when the
agent authenticates with `ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN` alone (the usual shape when
the proxy injects the real provider key) or when a TLS-inspecting proxy
answers the check itself. Set
`CLAUDE_CODE_SKIP_FAST_MODE_NETWORK_ERRORS=1` when the network refuses the
connection outright. Fast mode is an Anthropic-API feature, so it is
unavailable on a Bedrock- or Vertex-backed endpoint whatever you set.
- **Model discovery** is off by default. Set
`CLAUDE_CODE_ENABLE_GATEWAY_MODEL_DISCOVERY=1` for the picker to list the
models your policies authorise; the proxy filters the response to that set.
The client gives discovery a three-second budget and treats any redirect as
a failure, so the endpoint must serve `/v1/models` directly.
- **The WebFetch domain safety check** also calls `api.anthropic.com` directly
and is unaffected by the variables above.
Allowing direct egress to `api.anthropic.com` covers the network cases but not
the credential one, where the check reaches Anthropic and is rejected because
the agent presents a proxy-issued key.
## Architecture
Agent Network is built on two existing NetBird capabilities:

View File

@@ -1365,7 +1365,17 @@ func (e *Engine) receiveJobEvents() {
}
func (e *Engine) handleBundle(params *mgmProto.BundleParameters) (*mgmProto.JobResponse_Bundle, error) {
log.Infof("handle remote debug bundle request: %s", params.String())
// The upload URL can carry a host, credentials, or query tokens, so it is
// kept out of the info-level line; the full parameters stay available at
// debug level for troubleshooting.
log.Infof("handle remote debug bundle request: anonymize=%v anonymize_level=%q log_file_count=%d bundle_for=%v bundle_for_time=%d",
params.GetAnonymize(), params.GetAnonymizeLevel(), params.GetLogFileCount(), params.GetBundleFor(), params.GetBundleForTime())
log.Debugf("remote debug bundle request parameters: %s", params.String())
if err := validateBundleUploadURL(params.GetUploadUrl()); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
syncResponse, err := e.GetLatestSyncResponse()
if err != nil {
log.Warnf("get latest sync response: %v", err)
@@ -1393,7 +1403,7 @@ func (e *Engine) handleBundle(params *mgmProto.BundleParameters) (*mgmProto.JobR
waitFor := time.Duration(params.BundleForTime) * time.Minute
uploadKey, err := e.jobExecutor.BundleJob(e.ctx, bundleDeps, bundleJobParams, waitFor, e.config.ProfileConfig.ManagementURL.String())
uploadKey, err := e.jobExecutor.BundleJob(e.ctx, bundleDeps, bundleJobParams, waitFor, e.config.ProfileConfig.ManagementURL.String(), params.GetUploadUrl())
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -1406,6 +1416,26 @@ func (e *Engine) handleBundle(params *mgmProto.BundleParameters) (*mgmProto.JobR
return response, nil
}
// validateBundleUploadURL sanity-checks a management-supplied upload URL for a
// remote debug bundle job. An empty value is accepted — the executor falls back
// to the default upload service. A non-empty value must be a well-formed https
// URL with a host; a malformed value or a plaintext scheme is rejected. This
// deliberately does not constrain which host may receive the bundle; that
// policy is left open pending a decision on management-directed uploads.
func validateBundleUploadURL(raw string) error {
if raw == "" {
return nil
}
parsed, err := url.Parse(raw)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("parse upload URL: %w", err)
}
if parsed.Scheme != "https" || parsed.Host == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("upload URL must be an https URL with a host")
}
return nil
}
// receiveManagementEvents connects to the Management Service event stream to receive updates from the management service
// E.g. when a new peer has been registered and we are allowed to connect to it.
func (e *Engine) receiveManagementEvents() {

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
package internal
import (
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// TestValidateBundleUploadURL covers the sanity check applied to a
// management-supplied upload URL before a remote debug bundle is generated.
func TestValidateBundleUploadURL(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
raw string
wantErr bool
}{
{name: "empty falls back to default", raw: ""},
{name: "https with host", raw: "https://upload.debug.netbird.io/upload"},
{name: "https self-hosted host", raw: "https://upload.example.com"},
{name: "plaintext rejected", raw: "http://upload.example.com", wantErr: true},
{name: "missing host rejected", raw: "https:///upload", wantErr: true},
{name: "non-url scheme rejected", raw: "ftp://upload.example.com", wantErr: true},
{name: "garbage rejected", raw: "://not a url", wantErr: true},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
err := validateBundleUploadURL(tc.raw)
if tc.wantErr {
require.Error(t, err, "an invalid upload URL must be rejected")
return
}
assert.NoError(t, err, "a valid or empty upload URL must be accepted")
})
}
}

View File

@@ -28,7 +28,11 @@ func NewExecutor() *Executor {
return &Executor{}
}
func (e *Executor) BundleJob(ctx context.Context, debugBundleDependencies debug.GeneratorDependencies, params debug.BundleConfig, waitForDuration time.Duration, mgmURL string) (string, error) {
func (e *Executor) BundleJob(ctx context.Context, debugBundleDependencies debug.GeneratorDependencies, params debug.BundleConfig, waitForDuration time.Duration, mgmURL, uploadURL string) (string, error) {
if uploadURL == "" {
uploadURL = types.DefaultBundleURL
}
if waitForDuration > MaxBundleWaitTime {
log.Warnf("bundle wait time %v exceeds maximum %v, capping to maximum", waitForDuration, MaxBundleWaitTime)
waitForDuration = MaxBundleWaitTime
@@ -54,7 +58,7 @@ func (e *Executor) BundleJob(ctx context.Context, debugBundleDependencies debug.
}
}()
key, err := debug.UploadDebugBundle(ctx, types.DefaultBundleURL, mgmURL, path, false)
key, err := debug.UploadDebugBundle(ctx, uploadURL, mgmURL, path, false)
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("failed to upload debug bundle: %v", err)
return "", fmt.Errorf("upload debug bundle: %w", err)

View File

@@ -23,10 +23,9 @@ import (
// model the client asks for. The proxy prices off the REQUEST model, not the
// upstream response model, so a made-up model id billed at operator rates lets
// these tests assert exact costs without a real vendor key.
// Sourced from the harness so the counts can't drift from the mock's config.
const (
vllmPromptTokens = harness.VLLMChatInputTokens
vllmCompletionTokens = harness.VLLMChatOutputTokens
vllmPromptTokens = 11
vllmCompletionTokens = 2
)
// pricedEnv is a connected single-provider agent-network deployment pointed at

View File

@@ -1,455 +0,0 @@
//go:build e2e
package agentnetwork
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"strings"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/e2e/harness"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/api"
)
// Models each catalog surface is registered with in the matrix below. They
// differ per provider so the router's choice is unambiguous: a request that
// lands on the wrong provider record fails the surface assertion instead of
// passing by coincidence.
const (
matrixAnthropicModel = "claude-sonnet-5"
matrixBedrockModel = "anthropic.claude-sonnet-5"
// matrixBedrockPathModel is what a Bedrock SDK client puts in the URL: a
// cross-region inference profile with a release date and version suffix.
// The proxy must normalise it back to matrixBedrockModel to route and price.
matrixBedrockPathModel = "us.anthropic.claude-sonnet-5-20250101-v1:0"
// matrixVertexModel differs from the Anthropic record's model on purpose:
// a shared id would leave two routes claiming it and make which one serves
// /v1/messages depend on declaration order.
matrixVertexModel = "claude-haiku-4-5"
matrixVertexProject = "e2e-project"
matrixVertexRegion = "us-east5"
)
// gatewayEnv is a connected client plus a set of provider records, all pointed
// at one mock upstream, so several wire shapes can be driven over a single
// tunnel.
type gatewayEnv struct {
endpoint string
proxyIP string
client *harness.Client
proxy *harness.Proxy
vllm *harness.VLLM
// providerIDs maps the catalog id to the created provider record id.
providerIDs map[string]string
}
// provisionGatewayMatrix brings up one mock upstream and one provider record
// per catalog surface, all authorised for the same group by a single policy.
// Sharing one proxy and client keeps the wire-shape cases to one tunnel setup;
// each case still creates its own session id so its access-log row is findable.
func provisionGatewayMatrix(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context) gatewayEnv {
t.Helper()
vllm, err := harness.StartVLLM(ctx, srv)
require.NoError(t, err, "start mock upstream")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = vllm.Terminate(context.Background()) })
grp, err := srv.API().Groups.Create(ctx, api.PostApiGroupsJSONRequestBody{Name: "e2e-gw-matrix"})
require.NoError(t, err, "create group")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.API().Groups.Delete(context.Background(), grp.Id) })
ephemeral := false
sk, err := srv.API().SetupKeys.Create(ctx, api.PostApiSetupKeysJSONRequestBody{
Name: "e2e-gw-matrix-client",
Type: "reusable",
ExpiresIn: 86400,
UsageLimit: 0,
AutoGroups: []string{grp.Id},
Ephemeral: &ephemeral,
})
require.NoError(t, err, "mint setup key")
require.NotEmpty(t, sk.Key, "setup key plaintext")
// The mock ignores auth, so a dummy credential satisfies each catalog
// entry's auth template. Vertex is the exception: its api_key is a GCP
// service-account keyfile the proxy mints an OAuth token from, and a dummy
// one cannot mint. That is deliberate — the Vertex case below asserts on
// routing, which happens before the token mint.
dummyKey := "sk-gw-e2e"
dummyKeyfile := "keyfile::" + "e2e-not-a-real-service-account-key"
specs := []struct {
name string
catalogID string
apiKey string
models []api.AgentNetworkProviderModel
}{
{
name: "openai", catalogID: "openai_api", apiKey: dummyKey,
models: []api.AgentNetworkProviderModel{{Id: harness.VLLMModel, InputPer1k: 0.001, OutputPer1k: 0.002}},
},
{
name: "anthropic", catalogID: "anthropic_api", apiKey: dummyKey,
models: []api.AgentNetworkProviderModel{{Id: matrixAnthropicModel, InputPer1k: 0.003, OutputPer1k: 0.015}},
},
{
name: "bedrock", catalogID: "bedrock_api", apiKey: dummyKey,
models: []api.AgentNetworkProviderModel{{Id: matrixBedrockModel, InputPer1k: 0.003, OutputPer1k: 0.015}},
},
{
name: "vertex", catalogID: "vertex_ai_api", apiKey: dummyKeyfile,
models: []api.AgentNetworkProviderModel{{Id: matrixVertexModel, InputPer1k: 0.001, OutputPer1k: 0.005}},
},
}
providerIDs := make(map[string]string, len(specs))
ids := make([]string, 0, len(specs))
for _, spec := range specs {
key := spec.apiKey
models := spec.models
prov, perr := srv.CreateProvider(ctx, api.AgentNetworkProviderRequest{
Name: "e2e-gw-" + spec.name,
ProviderId: spec.catalogID,
UpstreamUrl: vllm.URL,
ApiKey: &key,
Enabled: ptr(true),
Models: &models,
})
require.NoError(t, perr, "create %s provider", spec.name)
id := prov.Id
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteProvider(context.Background(), id) })
providerIDs[spec.catalogID] = id
ids = append(ids, id)
}
// Uncapped token limit: never blocks the handful of tokens driven here, but
// switches on usage metering so consumption and cost land in the row.
enabled := true
pol, err := srv.CreatePolicy(ctx, api.AgentNetworkPolicyRequest{
Name: "e2e-gw-matrix",
Enabled: &enabled,
SourceGroups: []string{grp.Id},
DestinationProviderIds: ids,
Limits: &api.AgentNetworkPolicyLimits{
TokenLimit: api.AgentNetworkPolicyTokenLimit{
Enabled: true,
GroupCap: 10_000_000,
UserCap: 10_000_000,
WindowSeconds: 60,
},
},
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create policy")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeletePolicy(context.Background(), pol.Id) })
endpoint, proxyIP, cl, px := connectClient(t, ctx, "gw-matrix", sk.Key)
return gatewayEnv{
endpoint: endpoint,
proxyIP: proxyIP,
client: cl,
proxy: px,
vllm: vllm,
providerIDs: providerIDs,
}
}
// connectClient starts a proxy and a tunnel client for the shared account and
// waits until the client can reach the proxy peer, returning the endpoint and
// the proxy's tunnel IP to pin requests to.
func connectClient(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, name, setupKey string) (string, string, *harness.Client, *harness.Proxy) {
t.Helper()
settings, err := srv.GetSettings(ctx)
require.NoError(t, err, "read settings")
require.NotEmpty(t, settings.Endpoint, "endpoint must be assigned")
proxyToken, err := srv.CreateProxyTokenCLI(ctx, "e2e-"+name+"-proxy")
require.NoError(t, err, "mint proxy token")
px, err := harness.StartProxy(ctx, srv, proxyToken)
require.NoError(t, err, "start proxy")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = px.Terminate(context.Background()) })
cl, err := harness.StartClient(ctx, srv, setupKey)
require.NoError(t, err, "start client")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = cl.Terminate(context.Background()) })
require.NoError(t, cl.WaitConnected(ctx, 90*time.Second), "client must connect to management")
// The probe resolves the endpoint and its first packet wakes the lazy proxy
// peer, so WaitProxyPeer then observes it connected.
proxyIP, err := cl.ResolveProxyIP(ctx, settings.Endpoint)
require.NoError(t, err, "resolve endpoint to proxy IP")
if err := cl.WaitProxyPeer(ctx, 180*time.Second); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("client did not see the proxy peer: %v\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s", err, px.Logs(context.Background()))
}
return settings.Endpoint, proxyIP, cl, px
}
// callUntil retries an HTTP call through the tunnel until it returns one of the
// wanted statuses or the deadline passes, absorbing the DNS and tunnel jitter
// the first call through a fresh tunnel can hit. The last status and body are
// returned either way so the caller can assert with real detail.
func callUntil(t *testing.T, call func() (int, string, error), want ...int) (int, string) {
t.Helper()
wanted := make(map[int]struct{}, len(want))
for _, w := range want {
wanted[w] = struct{}{}
}
var code int
var body string
deadline := time.Now().Add(90 * time.Second)
for time.Now().Before(deadline) {
c, b, err := call()
if err == nil {
code, body = c, b
if _, ok := wanted[code]; ok {
return code, body
}
}
time.Sleep(5 * time.Second)
}
return code, body
}
// TestGatewayProtocolProviderMatrix drives one request per wire shape over a
// single tunnel, with a provider record per catalog surface behind it. It is
// the regression net for the routing and parser-selection changes: each case
// asserts the surface the request was metered under and the token counts that
// surface's own usage block carries, so a request parsed by the wrong provider's
// parser meters zero and fails rather than passing on a coincidence.
func TestGatewayProtocolProviderMatrix(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 20*time.Minute)
defer cancel()
env := provisionGatewayMatrix(t, ctx)
diag := func() string {
return fmt.Sprintf("\n=== upstream logs ===\n%s\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s",
env.vllm.Logs(context.Background()), env.proxy.Logs(context.Background()))
}
t.Run("openai chat completions", func(t *testing.T) {
session := "e2e-gw-openai"
code, body := callUntil(t, func() (int, string, error) {
return env.client.Chat(ctx, env.endpoint, env.proxyIP, harness.WireChat, harness.VLLMModel, "ping", session)
}, 200)
require.Equal(t, 200, code, "openai chat must succeed; body: %s%s", body, diag())
require.Contains(t, body, "chat.completion", "body must be an OpenAI completion; got: %s", body)
row := findAccessLogBySession(t, ctx, session)
require.NotNil(t, row.Provider)
assert.Equal(t, "openai", *row.Provider, "the OpenAI chat path must meter under the openai surface")
assert.Equal(t, int64(harness.VLLMChatInputTokens), row.InputTokens, "OpenAI usage block must be read")
assert.Equal(t, int64(harness.VLLMChatOutputTokens), row.OutputTokens)
})
t.Run("anthropic messages", func(t *testing.T) {
session := "e2e-gw-anthropic"
code, body := callUntil(t, func() (int, string, error) {
return env.client.Chat(ctx, env.endpoint, env.proxyIP, harness.WireMessages, matrixAnthropicModel, "ping", session)
}, 200)
require.Equal(t, 200, code, "anthropic messages must succeed; body: %s%s", body, diag())
row := findAccessLogBySession(t, ctx, session)
require.NotNil(t, row.Provider)
assert.Equal(t, "anthropic", *row.Provider, "the /v1/messages path must meter under the anthropic surface")
// These counts only appear if the Anthropic parser read the response:
// its usage fields are named differently from the OpenAI block.
assert.Equal(t, int64(harness.VLLMMessagesInputTokens), row.InputTokens,
"Anthropic input_tokens must be read; zero here means the wrong parser ran")
assert.Equal(t, int64(harness.VLLMMessagesOutputTokens), row.OutputTokens)
assert.Positive(t, row.CachedInputTokens, "the Anthropic cache-read bucket must be recorded")
assert.Positive(t, row.CostUsd, "a metered request must carry a cost")
require.NotNil(t, row.ResolvedProviderId)
assert.Equal(t, env.providerIDs["anthropic_api"], *row.ResolvedProviderId,
"a vendor-tagged request must not cross to another provider's record")
})
t.Run("bedrock invoke normalises the path model", func(t *testing.T) {
session := "e2e-gw-bedrock"
code, body := callUntil(t, func() (int, string, error) {
return env.client.Bedrock(ctx, env.endpoint, env.proxyIP, matrixBedrockPathModel, "ping", session)
}, 200)
require.Equal(t, 200, code, "bedrock invoke must succeed; body: %s%s", body, diag())
row := findAccessLogBySession(t, ctx, session)
require.NotNil(t, row.Provider)
assert.Equal(t, "bedrock", *row.Provider, "a native Bedrock path must meter under the bedrock surface")
require.NotNil(t, row.Model)
assert.Equal(t, matrixBedrockModel, *row.Model,
"the inference-profile prefix, release date and version suffix must be normalised away")
assert.Equal(t, int64(harness.VLLMMessagesInputTokens), row.InputTokens)
})
t.Run("anthropic token counting", func(t *testing.T) {
code, body := callUntil(t, func() (int, string, error) {
return env.client.PostJSON(ctx, env.endpoint, env.proxyIP, "/v1/messages/count_tokens",
fmt.Sprintf(`{"model":%q,"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"ping"}]}`, matrixAnthropicModel),
[]string{"anthropic-version: 2023-06-01"})
}, 200)
assert.Equal(t, 200, code, "token counting must route rather than deny; body: %s%s", body, diag())
})
t.Run("bedrock token counting", func(t *testing.T) {
code, body := callUntil(t, func() (int, string, error) {
return env.client.PostJSON(ctx, env.endpoint, env.proxyIP,
"/model/"+matrixBedrockPathModel+"/count-tokens",
`{"input":{"converse":{"messages":[{"role":"user","content":[{"text":"ping"}]}]}}}`, nil)
}, 200)
assert.Equal(t, 200, code,
"the Bedrock count-tokens action must route; denying it pushes counting onto the billable inference path; body: %s%s",
body, diag())
})
t.Run("vertex token counting reaches its provider", func(t *testing.T) {
// The dummy service-account key cannot mint an OAuth token, so the
// request stops at the upstream credential. Both outcomes render as
// 403, so the deny code is what distinguishes them: upstream_auth_failed
// means the path resolved to the Vertex route and only the credential
// failed, while model_not_routable would mean the method segment was
// swallowed into the model id and no route ever claimed it.
path := fmt.Sprintf("/v1/projects/%s/locations/%s/publishers/anthropic/models/%s/count-tokens:rawPredict",
matrixVertexProject, matrixVertexRegion, matrixVertexModel)
_, body := callUntil(t, func() (int, string, error) {
return env.client.PostJSON(ctx, env.endpoint, env.proxyIP, path,
`{"anthropic_version":"vertex-2023-10-16","messages":[{"role":"user","content":"ping"}]}`, nil)
}, 403)
assert.NotContains(t, body, "model_not_routable",
"the count-tokens method segment must not be parsed as part of the model id; body: %s%s", body, diag())
assert.Contains(t, body, "llm_policy.upstream_auth_failed",
"the request must reach the Vertex route and fail only at the credential; body: %s%s", body, diag())
})
t.Run("connection warming probe", func(t *testing.T) {
code, body := callUntil(t, func() (int, string, error) {
return env.client.Get(ctx, env.endpoint, env.proxyIP, "/api/hello", nil)
}, 200)
assert.NotEqual(t, 403, code,
"the warm-up probe carries no model and must not be refused as unroutable; body: %s%s", body, diag())
})
t.Run("unknown model denies in the caller's error shape", func(t *testing.T) {
code, body := callUntil(t, func() (int, string, error) {
return env.client.Chat(ctx, env.endpoint, env.proxyIP, harness.WireMessages,
"claude-not-a-real-model-9", "ping", "e2e-gw-unknown")
}, 403)
require.Equal(t, 403, code, "a model no provider claims must still be refused; body: %s%s", body, diag())
// The NetBird fields stay where they were for existing consumers.
assert.Contains(t, body, "llm_policy.model_not_routable", "the deny code must be preserved")
// And the vendor's own envelope rides alongside, so the client can show
// the reason instead of an unexplained API error.
assert.Contains(t, body, `"type":"error"`, "an Anthropic caller must get the Anthropic error envelope")
assert.Contains(t, body, "permission_error", "403 must map to the vendor's permission error type")
})
}
// TestModelDiscoveryWithModelAllowlist covers gateway model discovery on an
// account that restricts models, which is the configuration that broke: the
// listing carries no model, and the per-model allowlist fails closed on an
// undetermined one, so discovery denied for exactly the accounts using the
// feature. It also asserts the allowlist still refuses a model outside it, so
// the exemption cannot be read as a way around the gate.
func TestModelDiscoveryWithModelAllowlist(t *testing.T) {
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 20*time.Minute)
defer cancel()
vllm, err := harness.StartVLLM(ctx, srv)
require.NoError(t, err, "start mock upstream")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = vllm.Terminate(context.Background()) })
grp, err := srv.API().Groups.Create(ctx, api.PostApiGroupsJSONRequestBody{Name: "e2e-gw-discovery"})
require.NoError(t, err, "create group")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.API().Groups.Delete(context.Background(), grp.Id) })
ephemeral := false
sk, err := srv.API().SetupKeys.Create(ctx, api.PostApiSetupKeysJSONRequestBody{
Name: "e2e-gw-discovery-client",
Type: "reusable",
ExpiresIn: 86400,
UsageLimit: 0,
AutoGroups: []string{grp.Id},
Ephemeral: &ephemeral,
})
require.NoError(t, err, "mint setup key")
require.NotEmpty(t, sk.Key, "setup key plaintext")
// One provider enumerating a single model, while the upstream's own listing
// advertises two. The proxy must serve the shorter list.
dummyKey := "sk-discovery-e2e"
prov, err := srv.CreateProvider(ctx, api.AgentNetworkProviderRequest{
Name: "e2e-gw-discovery",
ProviderId: "openai_api",
UpstreamUrl: vllm.URL,
ApiKey: &dummyKey,
Enabled: ptr(true),
Models: &[]api.AgentNetworkProviderModel{
{Id: harness.VLLMModel, InputPer1k: 0.001, OutputPer1k: 0.002},
},
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create provider")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteProvider(context.Background(), prov.Id) })
// The model allowlist is what makes this a regression test: without a
// guardrail enabled, discovery was never gated in the first place.
var gr api.AgentNetworkGuardrailRequest
gr.Name = "e2e-gw-discovery-allowlist"
gr.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Enabled = true
gr.Checks.ModelAllowlist.Models = []string{harness.VLLMModel}
guard, err := srv.CreateGuardrail(ctx, gr)
require.NoError(t, err, "create guardrail")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeleteGuardrail(context.Background(), guard.Id) })
enabled := true
pol, err := srv.CreatePolicy(ctx, api.AgentNetworkPolicyRequest{
Name: "e2e-gw-discovery",
Enabled: &enabled,
SourceGroups: []string{grp.Id},
DestinationProviderIds: []string{prov.Id},
GuardrailIds: &[]string{guard.Id},
})
require.NoError(t, err, "create policy")
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = srv.DeletePolicy(context.Background(), pol.Id) })
endpoint, proxyIP, cl, px := connectClient(t, ctx, "gw-discovery", sk.Key)
diag := func() string {
return fmt.Sprintf("\n=== upstream logs ===\n%s\n=== proxy logs ===\n%s",
vllm.Logs(context.Background()), px.Logs(context.Background()))
}
t.Run("listing is served and bounded by policy", func(t *testing.T) {
code, body := callUntil(t, func() (int, string, error) {
return cl.Get(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, "/v1/models?limit=1000", nil)
}, 200)
require.Equal(t, 200, code,
"discovery must not be refused because the request carries no model; body: %s%s", body, diag())
assert.Contains(t, body, harness.VLLMModel, "the authorised model must reach the picker")
assert.NotContains(t, body, harness.VLLMUnlistedModel,
"a model the policy does not authorise must not be offered; body: %s", body)
})
t.Run("allowlist still refuses a model outside it", func(t *testing.T) {
code, body := callUntil(t, func() (int, string, error) {
return cl.Chat(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, harness.WireChat,
harness.VLLMUnlistedModel, "ping", "e2e-gw-discovery-blocked")
}, 403)
require.Equal(t, 403, code,
"exempting model-less endpoints must not exempt inference; body: %s%s", body, diag())
assert.True(t,
strings.Contains(body, "llm_policy.model_blocked") || strings.Contains(body, "llm_policy.model_not_routable"),
"the refusal must name a model policy code; body: %s", body)
})
t.Run("allowlisted model still routes", func(t *testing.T) {
code, body := callUntil(t, func() (int, string, error) {
return cl.Chat(ctx, endpoint, proxyIP, harness.WireChat,
harness.VLLMModel, "ping", "e2e-gw-discovery-allowed")
}, 200)
require.Equal(t, 200, code, "the allowlisted model must still be served; body: %s%s", body, diag())
})
}

View File

@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"os/exec"
"strconv"
"strings"
@@ -295,29 +294,10 @@ func withSessionID(headers []string, sessionID string) []string {
return append(headers, "x-session-id: "+sessionID)
}
// Get issues a GET to the agent-network endpoint over the client's tunnel.
// Model discovery and the connection-warming probe are read-only endpoints
// that carry no body, so they can't go through the chat helpers.
func (cl *Client) Get(ctx context.Context, endpoint, proxyIP, path string, extraHeaders []string) (int, string, error) {
return cl.do(ctx, http.MethodGet, endpoint, proxyIP, path, "", extraHeaders)
}
// PostJSON issues an arbitrary JSON POST over the client's tunnel, for wire
// shapes the typed helpers don't cover (token counting, say).
func (cl *Client) PostJSON(ctx context.Context, endpoint, proxyIP, path, body string, extraHeaders []string) (int, string, error) {
return cl.do(ctx, http.MethodPost, endpoint, proxyIP, path, body, extraHeaders)
}
// post issues a JSON POST. Retained as the shorthand the chat helpers use.
func (cl *Client) post(ctx context.Context, endpoint, proxyIP, path, body string, extraHeaders []string) (int, string, error) {
return cl.do(ctx, http.MethodPost, endpoint, proxyIP, path, body, extraHeaders)
}
// do runs curl in a throwaway container sharing the client's network
// post runs curl in a throwaway container sharing the client's network
// namespace so the request traverses the WireGuard tunnel, pinning the endpoint
// to the proxy IP. It returns the HTTP status and response body. An empty body
// sends no payload, which is what a GET needs.
func (cl *Client) do(ctx context.Context, method, endpoint, proxyIP, path, body string, extraHeaders []string) (int, string, error) {
// to the proxy IP. It returns the HTTP status and response body.
func (cl *Client) post(ctx context.Context, endpoint, proxyIP, path, body string, extraHeaders []string) (int, string, error) {
url := "https://" + endpoint + path
args := []string{
"run", "--rm",
@@ -326,15 +306,13 @@ func (cl *Client) do(ctx context.Context, method, endpoint, proxyIP, path, body
"-sk", "--connect-timeout", "5", "--max-time", "90",
"--resolve", endpoint + ":443:" + proxyIP,
"-o", "/dev/stderr", "-w", "%{http_code}",
"-X", method, url,
"-X", "POST", url,
"-H", "Content-Type: application/json",
}
for _, h := range extraHeaders {
args = append(args, "-H", h)
}
if body != "" {
args = append(args, "--data", body)
}
args = append(args, "--data", body)
cmd := exec.CommandContext(ctx, "docker", args...)
// -w writes the status code to stdout; -o /dev/stderr writes the body to
// stderr so we can capture both separately.

View File

@@ -22,42 +22,14 @@ const (
// matches a real small model commonly served by vLLM so the provider's
// enumerated model and the client's request line up.
VLLMModel = "Qwen/Qwen2.5-0.5B-Instruct"
// VLLMUnlistedModel is a second id the mock's model listing advertises but
// no test provider enumerates, so a filtered listing is observably shorter
// than the upstream's own.
VLLMUnlistedModel = "Qwen/Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct"
)
// Token counts the mock reports per wire shape. Tests assert on these rather
// than on "> 0" so a response parsed with the wrong provider's parser (which
// would read a different field, or none) fails loudly instead of passing on
// a coincidental non-zero.
const (
// VLLMChatInputTokens / VLLMChatOutputTokens ride the OpenAI usage block.
VLLMChatInputTokens = 11
VLLMChatOutputTokens = 2
// VLLMMessagesInputTokens / VLLMMessagesOutputTokens ride the Anthropic
// usage block, whose field names the OpenAI parser cannot read.
VLLMMessagesInputTokens = 17
VLLMMessagesOutputTokens = 3
)
// vllmNginxConf emulates a vLLM OpenAI-compatible server over plain HTTP (vLLM's
// default: no TLS, port 8000), and additionally answers the wire shapes the
// other catalog surfaces speak so one mock can stand in for every provider the
// proxy routes to. Running actual vLLM in CI is infeasible (GPU + multi-GB model
// default: no TLS, port 8000). It answers /v1/models with a one-model list and
// any chat/completions path with a canned OpenAI-shaped chat completion carrying
// a non-zero usage block, so the proxy's OpenAI parser records real token
// consumption. Running actual vLLM in CI is infeasible (GPU + multi-GB model
// download), so this stands in for the wire contract the proxy depends on.
//
// Each shape answers with its own vendor's usage block, so a response parsed
// under the wrong surface meters zero rather than passing by accident:
//
// - /v1/chat/completions (and any unmatched path): OpenAI chat completion.
// - /v1/messages: Anthropic Messages, snake_case usage plus a cache bucket.
// - /model/{id}/invoke: Bedrock InvokeModel, which carries the Anthropic body.
// - the token-counting endpoints: a count, with no usage block at all.
//
// The model listing advertises two models so a policy that authorises one
// produces an observably shorter list than the upstream's own.
const vllmNginxConf = `pid /tmp/nginx.pid;
events {}
http {
@@ -65,26 +37,7 @@ http {
listen 8000;
location = /v1/models {
default_type application/json;
return 200 '{"object":"list","data":[{"id":"Qwen/Qwen2.5-0.5B-Instruct","object":"model","owned_by":"vllm"},{"id":"Qwen/Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct","object":"model","owned_by":"vllm"}]}';
}
location = /v1/messages {
default_type application/json;
return 200 '{"id":"msg_e2e","type":"message","role":"assistant","model":"claude-sonnet-5","content":[{"type":"text","text":"pong"}],"stop_reason":"end_turn","usage":{"input_tokens":17,"output_tokens":3,"cache_read_input_tokens":5}}';
}
location = /v1/messages/count_tokens {
default_type application/json;
return 200 '{"input_tokens":7}';
}
location ~ ^/model/.+/invoke$ {
default_type application/json;
return 200 '{"id":"msg_e2e_bedrock","type":"message","role":"assistant","content":[{"type":"text","text":"pong"}],"stop_reason":"end_turn","usage":{"input_tokens":17,"output_tokens":3,"cache_read_input_tokens":5}}';
}
location ~ ^/model/.+/count-tokens$ {
default_type application/json;
return 200 '{"inputTokens":9}';
}
location = /api/hello {
return 200;
return 200 '{"object":"list","data":[{"id":"Qwen/Qwen2.5-0.5B-Instruct","object":"model","owned_by":"vllm"}]}';
}
location / {
default_type application/json;

View File

@@ -296,8 +296,6 @@ var providers = []Provider{
// account to be on >= 30-day data retention or all requests
// 400.
Models: []Model{
{ID: "claude-opus-5", Label: "Claude Opus 5", InputPer1k: 0.005, OutputPer1k: 0.025, CacheReadPer1k: 0.0005, CacheCreationPer1k: 0.00625, ContextWindow: 1000000},
{ID: "claude-sonnet-5", Label: "Claude Sonnet 5", InputPer1k: 0.003, OutputPer1k: 0.015, CacheReadPer1k: 0.0003, CacheCreationPer1k: 0.00375, ContextWindow: 1000000},
{ID: "claude-fable-5", Label: "Claude Fable 5", InputPer1k: 0.010, OutputPer1k: 0.050, CacheReadPer1k: 0.001, CacheCreationPer1k: 0.0125, ContextWindow: 1000000},
{ID: "claude-opus-4-8", Label: "Claude Opus 4.8", InputPer1k: 0.005, OutputPer1k: 0.025, CacheReadPer1k: 0.0005, CacheCreationPer1k: 0.00625, ContextWindow: 1000000},
{ID: "claude-opus-4-7", Label: "Claude Opus 4.7", InputPer1k: 0.005, OutputPer1k: 0.025, CacheReadPer1k: 0.0005, CacheCreationPer1k: 0.00625, ContextWindow: 1000000},
@@ -357,8 +355,6 @@ var providers = []Provider{
// Llama 3.3 70B entry kept unchanged — LiteLLM tracks only
// per-region Llama 3 entries; standalone 3.3 not yet listed.
Models: []Model{
{ID: "anthropic.claude-opus-5", Label: "Claude Opus 5 (Bedrock)", InputPer1k: 0.005, OutputPer1k: 0.025, CacheReadPer1k: 0.0005, CacheCreationPer1k: 0.00625, ContextWindow: 1000000},
{ID: "anthropic.claude-sonnet-5", Label: "Claude Sonnet 5 (Bedrock)", InputPer1k: 0.003, OutputPer1k: 0.015, CacheReadPer1k: 0.0003, CacheCreationPer1k: 0.00375, ContextWindow: 1000000},
{ID: "anthropic.claude-opus-4-8", Label: "Claude Opus 4.8 (Bedrock)", InputPer1k: 0.005, OutputPer1k: 0.025, CacheReadPer1k: 0.0005, CacheCreationPer1k: 0.00625, ContextWindow: 1000000},
{ID: "anthropic.claude-opus-4-7", Label: "Claude Opus 4.7 (Bedrock)", InputPer1k: 0.005, OutputPer1k: 0.025, CacheReadPer1k: 0.0005, CacheCreationPer1k: 0.00625, ContextWindow: 1000000},
{ID: "anthropic.claude-opus-4-6", Label: "Claude Opus 4.6 (Bedrock)", InputPer1k: 0.005, OutputPer1k: 0.025, CacheReadPer1k: 0.0005, CacheCreationPer1k: 0.00625, ContextWindow: 1000000},
@@ -410,8 +406,6 @@ var providers = []Provider{
// exists — the router denies unmeterable publishers rather than forward
// them uncounted.
Models: []Model{
{ID: "claude-opus-5", Label: "Claude Opus 5 (Vertex)", InputPer1k: 0.005, OutputPer1k: 0.025, CacheReadPer1k: 0.0005, CacheCreationPer1k: 0.00625, ContextWindow: 1000000},
{ID: "claude-sonnet-5", Label: "Claude Sonnet 5 (Vertex)", InputPer1k: 0.003, OutputPer1k: 0.015, CacheReadPer1k: 0.0003, CacheCreationPer1k: 0.00375, ContextWindow: 1000000},
{ID: "claude-fable-5", Label: "Claude Fable 5 (Vertex)", InputPer1k: 0.010, OutputPer1k: 0.050, CacheReadPer1k: 0.001, CacheCreationPer1k: 0.0125, ContextWindow: 1000000},
{ID: "claude-opus-4-8", Label: "Claude Opus 4.8 (Vertex)", InputPer1k: 0.005, OutputPer1k: 0.025, CacheReadPer1k: 0.0005, CacheCreationPer1k: 0.00625, ContextWindow: 1000000},
{ID: "claude-opus-4-7", Label: "Claude Opus 4.7 (Vertex)", InputPer1k: 0.005, OutputPer1k: 0.025, CacheReadPer1k: 0.0005, CacheCreationPer1k: 0.00625, ContextWindow: 1000000},

View File

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
package catalog
import (
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// TestClaudeLineupSelectable pins the models Claude Code resolves to by
// default. A model absent from the lineup can't be ticked on a provider
// record, so llm_router denies it as not-routable and the operator has no
// way to authorise the client's own default.
func TestClaudeLineupSelectable(t *testing.T) {
for providerID, wanted := range map[string][]string{
"anthropic_api": {"claude-opus-5", "claude-sonnet-5", "claude-haiku-4-5"},
"bedrock_api": {"anthropic.claude-opus-5", "anthropic.claude-sonnet-5", "anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5"},
"vertex_ai_api": {"claude-opus-5", "claude-sonnet-5", "claude-haiku-4-5"},
} {
provider, ok := Lookup(providerID)
require.True(t, ok, "catalog must define %s", providerID)
selectable := make(map[string]Model, len(provider.Models))
for _, m := range provider.Models {
selectable[m.ID] = m
}
for _, id := range wanted {
model, found := selectable[id]
require.True(t, found, "%s must offer %s", providerID, id)
assert.NotEmpty(t, model.Label, "%s/%s needs a label for the picker", providerID, id)
assert.Positive(t, model.InputPer1k, "%s/%s needs an input rate", providerID, id)
assert.Positive(t, model.OutputPer1k, "%s/%s needs an output rate", providerID, id)
assert.Positive(t, model.ContextWindow, "%s/%s needs a context window", providerID, id)
}
}
}

View File

@@ -47,11 +47,17 @@ var supplementalDefaults = map[string]map[string]Entry{
"gpt-5-nano": {InputPer1k: 0.00005, OutputPer1k: 0.0004, CachedInputPer1k: 0.000005},
},
"anthropic": {
// claude-opus-5 is not yet in the catalog lineup but gateway /
// grandfathered traffic uses it; priced so it isn't skipped.
"claude-opus-5": {InputPer1k: 0.005, OutputPer1k: 0.025, CacheReadPer1k: 0.0005, CacheCreationPer1k: 0.00625},
// "kimi-k3[1m]" is the 1M-context alias some Claude Code guides
// configure against Moonshot's Anthropic-compatible endpoint;
// priced identically to kimi-k3 so those requests aren't skipped.
"kimi-k3[1m]": {InputPer1k: 0.003, OutputPer1k: 0.015, CacheReadPer1k: 0.0003},
},
"bedrock": {
"anthropic.claude-opus-5": {InputPer1k: 0.005, OutputPer1k: 0.025, CacheReadPer1k: 0.0005, CacheCreationPer1k: 0.00625},
},
}
var (

View File

@@ -82,11 +82,6 @@ anthropic:
output_per_1k: 0.015
cache_read_per_1k: 0.0003
cache_creation_per_1k: 0.00375
claude-sonnet-5:
input_per_1k: 0.003
output_per_1k: 0.015
cache_read_per_1k: 0.0003
cache_creation_per_1k: 0.00375
kimi-k3:
input_per_1k: 0.003
output_per_1k: 0.015
@@ -150,11 +145,6 @@ bedrock:
output_per_1k: 0.015
cache_read_per_1k: 0.0003
cache_creation_per_1k: 0.00375
anthropic.claude-sonnet-5:
input_per_1k: 0.003
output_per_1k: 0.015
cache_read_per_1k: 0.0003
cache_creation_per_1k: 0.00375
meta.llama3-3-70b-instruct:
input_per_1k: 0.00072
output_per_1k: 0.00072

View File

@@ -116,13 +116,11 @@ func TestDefaultTable_PinnedRates(t *testing.T) {
assert.InDelta(t, 0.010, fable.InputPer1k, 1e-9, "claude-fable-5 input")
assert.InDelta(t, 0.0125, fable.CacheCreationPer1k, 1e-9, "claude-fable-5 cache creation")
// Every id below must stay priced whichever source provides it: the
// catalog lineup for the current Claude 5 family, supplementalDefaults
// for the ids the dashboard deliberately doesn't offer.
// Supplementals present on their surfaces.
for surface, ids := range map[string][]string{
"openai": {"gpt-5", "gpt-5-mini", "gpt-5-nano"},
"anthropic": {"claude-opus-5", "claude-sonnet-5", "kimi-k3[1m]", "kimi-k3"},
"bedrock": {"anthropic.claude-opus-5", "anthropic.claude-sonnet-5"},
"anthropic": {"claude-opus-5", "kimi-k3[1m]", "kimi-k3"},
"bedrock": {"anthropic.claude-opus-5"},
} {
for _, id := range ids {
_, ok := table[surface][id]

View File

@@ -3,10 +3,12 @@ package types
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/client/anonymize"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/api"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/status"
@@ -150,6 +152,21 @@ func validateAndBuildBundleParams(req api.WorkloadRequest, workload *Workload) e
if bundle.Parameters.LogFileCount < 1 || bundle.Parameters.LogFileCount > 1000 {
return fmt.Errorf("log-file-count must be between 1 and 1000, got %d", bundle.Parameters.LogFileCount)
}
// validate anonymize_level: omitted or empty defaults on the client;
// otherwise it must name a known level. An unknown value is rejected here
// rather than silently escalated, so a typo surfaces at job creation. The
// normalized (trimmed, lowercased) value is persisted so it matches what
// the client parses — the client only lowercases, so a stored " default "
// would otherwise resolve to strict.
if lvl := bundle.Parameters.AnonymizeLevel; lvl != nil {
normalized := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(*lvl))
switch normalized {
case "", anonymize.LevelDefaultString, anonymize.LevelStrictString:
default:
return fmt.Errorf("anonymize_level must be %q or %q, got %q", anonymize.LevelDefaultString, anonymize.LevelStrictString, *lvl)
}
bundle.Parameters.AnonymizeLevel = &normalized
}
workload.Parameters, err = json.Marshal(bundle.Parameters)
if err != nil {
@@ -209,6 +226,17 @@ func (j *Job) ToStreamJobRequest() (*proto.JobRequest, error) {
}
}
// derefString returns the pointed-to string, or "" when the pointer is nil.
// The bundle parameters carry anonymize_level and upload_url as optional
// fields; an absent value maps to the empty proto string, which the client
// resolves to its default.
func derefString(s *string) string {
if s == nil {
return ""
}
return *s
}
func (j *Job) buildStreamBundleResponse() (*proto.JobRequest, error) {
var p api.BundleParameters
if err := json.Unmarshal(j.Workload.Parameters, &p); err != nil {
@@ -218,10 +246,12 @@ func (j *Job) buildStreamBundleResponse() (*proto.JobRequest, error) {
ID: []byte(j.ID),
WorkloadParameters: &proto.JobRequest_Bundle{
Bundle: &proto.BundleParameters{
BundleFor: p.BundleFor,
BundleForTime: int64(p.BundleForTime),
LogFileCount: int32(p.LogFileCount),
Anonymize: p.Anonymize,
BundleFor: p.BundleFor,
BundleForTime: int64(p.BundleForTime),
LogFileCount: int32(p.LogFileCount),
Anonymize: p.Anonymize,
AnonymizeLevel: derefString(p.AnonymizeLevel),
UploadUrl: derefString(p.UploadUrl),
},
},
}, nil

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
package types
import (
"encoding/json"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/http/api"
)
func strPtr(s string) *string { return &s }
// bundleJobFromParams builds a bundle Job whose stored workload parameters are
// the marshalled REST BundleParameters, mirroring what NewJob persists.
func bundleJobFromParams(t *testing.T, p api.BundleParameters) *Job {
t.Helper()
raw, err := json.Marshal(p)
require.NoError(t, err, "marshal bundle parameters")
return &Job{
ID: "job-1",
Workload: Workload{
Type: JobTypeBundle,
Parameters: raw,
Result: []byte("{}"),
},
}
}
// TestBuildStreamBundleResponse_CarriesIdentityAndUploadFields verifies the
// anonymize_level and upload_url REST fields are mapped onto the proto request
// the client receives.
func TestBuildStreamBundleResponse_CarriesIdentityAndUploadFields(t *testing.T) {
job := bundleJobFromParams(t, api.BundleParameters{
BundleFor: true,
BundleForTime: 2,
LogFileCount: 100,
Anonymize: true,
AnonymizeLevel: strPtr("strict"),
UploadUrl: strPtr("https://upload.example.com"),
})
req, err := job.ToStreamJobRequest()
require.NoError(t, err, "ToStreamJobRequest must succeed")
bundle := req.GetBundle()
require.NotNil(t, bundle, "the request must carry bundle parameters")
assert.Equal(t, "strict", bundle.GetAnonymizeLevel(), "anonymize_level must reach the client")
assert.Equal(t, "https://upload.example.com", bundle.GetUploadUrl(), "upload_url must reach the client")
assert.True(t, bundle.GetAnonymize(), "existing fields must still map")
assert.Equal(t, int32(100), bundle.GetLogFileCount(), "existing fields must still map")
}
// newBundleJobRequest builds an api.JobRequest carrying a bundle workload with
// the given parameters, mirroring what the REST handler decodes.
func newBundleJobRequest(t *testing.T, p api.BundleParameters) *api.JobRequest {
t.Helper()
var wr api.WorkloadRequest
require.NoError(t, wr.FromBundleWorkloadRequest(api.BundleWorkloadRequest{
Type: api.WorkloadTypeBundle,
Parameters: p,
}), "build bundle workload request")
return &api.JobRequest{Workload: wr}
}
// TestNewJob_AnonymizeLevelValidation verifies the management API accepts only
// known anonymization levels (empty defaults on the client) and rejects an
// unknown value instead of silently escalating it.
func TestNewJob_AnonymizeLevelValidation(t *testing.T) {
base := api.BundleParameters{BundleFor: false, LogFileCount: 100, Anonymize: true}
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
level *string
wantErr bool
}{
{name: "omitted", level: nil},
{name: "empty", level: strPtr("")},
{name: "default", level: strPtr("default")},
{name: "strict", level: strPtr("strict")},
{name: "mixed case", level: strPtr("Strict")},
{name: "padded", level: strPtr(" default ")},
{name: "unknown", level: strPtr("verbose"), wantErr: true},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
p := base
p.AnonymizeLevel = tc.level
_, err := NewJob("user-1", "acc-1", "peer-1", newBundleJobRequest(t, p))
if tc.wantErr {
require.Error(t, err, "an unknown anonymize_level must be rejected")
assert.Contains(t, err.Error(), "anonymize_level", "the error must name the offending field")
return
}
require.NoError(t, err, "a known anonymize_level must be accepted")
})
}
}
// TestNewJob_AnonymizeLevelNormalized verifies an accepted level is persisted
// trimmed and lowercased, so it reaches the client as a value the client's
// lowercase-only parser resolves correctly rather than escalating to strict.
func TestNewJob_AnonymizeLevelNormalized(t *testing.T) {
job, err := NewJob("user-1", "acc-1", "peer-1", newBundleJobRequest(t, api.BundleParameters{
BundleFor: false,
LogFileCount: 100,
Anonymize: true,
AnonymizeLevel: strPtr(" Default "),
}))
require.NoError(t, err, "a padded known level must be accepted")
req, err := job.ToStreamJobRequest()
require.NoError(t, err, "ToStreamJobRequest must succeed")
assert.Equal(t, "default", req.GetBundle().GetAnonymizeLevel(),
"the persisted level must be normalized so the client does not resolve it to strict")
}
// TestBuildStreamBundleResponse_OmittedFieldsMapToEmpty verifies that omitted
// optional fields map to the empty proto string, which the client resolves to
// its defaults (default anonymization level, default upload server).
func TestBuildStreamBundleResponse_OmittedFieldsMapToEmpty(t *testing.T) {
job := bundleJobFromParams(t, api.BundleParameters{
BundleFor: false,
BundleForTime: 1,
LogFileCount: 50,
Anonymize: false,
// AnonymizeLevel and UploadUrl intentionally nil.
})
req, err := job.ToStreamJobRequest()
require.NoError(t, err, "ToStreamJobRequest must succeed")
bundle := req.GetBundle()
require.NotNil(t, bundle, "the request must carry bundle parameters")
assert.Empty(t, bundle.GetAnonymizeLevel(), "an omitted anonymize_level must map to empty so the client defaults it")
assert.Empty(t, bundle.GetUploadUrl(), "an omitted upload_url must map to empty so the client defaults it")
}

View File

@@ -13,14 +13,6 @@ func NormalizeBedrockModel(modelID string) string {
return sharedllm.NormalizeBedrockModel(modelID)
}
// NormalizeAnthropicModel strips the trailing "-YYYYMMDD" release-date suffix
// from an Anthropic model id so a dated id a client pins matches the undated
// one the operator registered. Thin delegate to shared/llm for the same
// contract reason as the two below.
func NormalizeAnthropicModel(modelID string) string {
return sharedllm.NormalizeAnthropicModel(modelID)
}
// NormalizeVertexModel strips the "@version" suffix from a Vertex AI model id
// so it matches the catalog/pricing key. Thin delegate to shared/llm, kept
// beside NormalizeBedrockModel for the same contract reason.

View File

@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@ package pricing
import (
"fmt"
"math"
sharedllm "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/llm"
)
// Entry is a single model's input and output pricing, expressed in USD per
@@ -94,10 +92,7 @@ func NewTable(raw map[string]map[string]EntryJSON) (*Table, error) {
return &Table{entries: entries}, nil
}
// Lookup returns the entry for the given provider surface and model. A
// dated Anthropic id falls back to its undated form, so a client pinning
// "claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929" bills at the registered "claude-sonnet-4-5"
// rate instead of recording no cost at all.
// Lookup returns the entry for the given provider surface and model.
func (t *Table) Lookup(provider, model string) (Entry, bool) {
if t == nil {
return Entry{}, false
@@ -106,14 +101,7 @@ func (t *Table) Lookup(provider, model string) (Entry, bool) {
if !ok {
return Entry{}, false
}
if e, found := byModel[model]; found {
return e, true
}
undated := sharedllm.NormalizeAnthropicModel(model)
if undated == model {
return Entry{}, false
}
e, ok := byModel[undated]
e, ok := byModel[model]
return e, ok
}

View File

@@ -175,22 +175,3 @@ func TestNewTable_NilAndEmpty(t *testing.T) {
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Empty(t, entries, "nil in, empty (never-matching) map out for the per-record map")
}
// TestLookup_DatedAnthropicIDFallsBackToUndated covers a client pinning a
// release date on a model priced under its undated id. Without the
// fallback the request records no cost at all.
func TestLookup_DatedAnthropicIDFallsBackToUndated(t *testing.T) {
table, err := NewTable(map[string]map[string]EntryJSON{
"anthropic": {
"claude-sonnet-4-5": {InputPer1K: 0.003, OutputPer1K: 0.015},
},
})
require.NoError(t, err, "table must build from a valid defaults map")
entry, ok := table.Lookup("anthropic", "claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929")
require.True(t, ok, "a dated id must resolve to the undated entry")
assert.InDelta(t, 0.003, entry.InputPer1K, 1e-9, "dated id must bill at the registered rate")
_, ok = table.Lookup("anthropic", "claude-sonnet-9-9-20250929")
assert.False(t, ok, "an unknown family must stay unpriced")
}

View File

@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import (
"fmt"
"strconv"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/llm"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/llm/pricing"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/middleware"
)
@@ -176,28 +175,13 @@ func (m *Middleware) Invoke(_ context.Context, in *middleware.Input) (*middlewar
// Anthropic route still bills its cache buckets additively.
func (m *Middleware) lookupCosts(md []middleware.KV, surface, model string, inTokens, outTokens, cachedTokens, cacheCreationTokens int64) (pricing.Costs, bool) {
if recordID := lookupKV(md, middleware.KeyLLMResolvedProviderID); recordID != "" {
if entry, ok := perRecordEntry(m.perRecord[recordID], model); ok {
if entry, ok := m.perRecord[recordID][model]; ok {
return pricing.EntryCosts(entry, surface, inTokens, outTokens, cachedTokens, cacheCreationTokens), true
}
}
return m.defaults.Costs(surface, model, inTokens, outTokens, cachedTokens, cacheCreationTokens)
}
// perRecordEntry resolves the operator's stored price for a model on one
// provider record, falling back to the undated form of a dated Anthropic id
// so a client that pins a release date still bills at the registered rate.
func perRecordEntry(byModel map[string]pricing.Entry, model string) (pricing.Entry, bool) {
if entry, ok := byModel[model]; ok {
return entry, true
}
undated := llm.NormalizeAnthropicModel(model)
if undated == model {
return pricing.Entry{}, false
}
entry, ok := byModel[undated]
return entry, ok
}
// usd renders a cost as the fixed-precision string every cost.usd_* key
// carries, so the per-bucket values and the aggregates round identically.
//

View File

@@ -84,10 +84,8 @@ func (m *Middleware) MutationsSupported() bool { return false }
func (m *Middleware) Invoke(_ context.Context, in *middleware.Input) (*middleware.Output, error) {
model, modelPresent := lookupMetadata(in.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMModel)
providerID, _ := lookupMetadata(in.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMResolvedProviderID)
surface, _ := lookupMetadata(in.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMProvider)
nonInference, _ := lookupMetadata(in.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMNonInference)
if denial := m.evaluateAllowlist(providerID, surface, model, modelPresent, nonInference == "true"); denial != nil {
if denial := m.evaluateAllowlist(providerID, model, modelPresent); denial != nil {
return denial, nil
}
@@ -116,7 +114,7 @@ func (m *Middleware) Close() error { return nil }
// evaluateAllowlist denies when the resolved provider's allowlist rejects the
// model; nil means proceed. Scoped to the provider llm_router resolved, so an
// unrestricted provider (absent from config) is never caught by another's list.
func (m *Middleware) evaluateAllowlist(providerID, surface, model string, modelPresent, nonInference bool) *middleware.Output {
func (m *Middleware) evaluateAllowlist(providerID, model string, modelPresent bool) *middleware.Output {
if len(m.cfg.ProviderAllowlists) == 0 {
return nil
}
@@ -124,7 +122,7 @@ func (m *Middleware) evaluateAllowlist(providerID, surface, model string, modelP
// if this request targets a restricted provider — fail closed. llm_router
// normally stamps the provider first, so this is a defensive guard.
if providerID == "" {
return denyModel(surface, "", denyCodeModelUnknown, denyMessageModelUnknown, denyReasonModelUnknown)
return denyModel("", denyCodeModelUnknown, denyMessageModelUnknown, denyReasonModelUnknown)
}
allowlist, restricted := m.cfg.ProviderAllowlists[providerID]
if !restricted {
@@ -135,29 +133,18 @@ func (m *Middleware) evaluateAllowlist(providerID, surface, model string, modelP
// Fail closed: with an allowlist in effect for this provider, a request whose
// model the parser couldn't extract (absent/empty) is denied. This enforces
// the allowlist for path-routed providers (Bedrock, Vertex) with no body model.
//
// The exception is a non-inference endpoint the router already authorised.
// The model listing and the connection-warming probe name no model
// anywhere — not in a body, not in the path — so failing closed here
// rejected model discovery for exactly the accounts that configured an
// allowlist, which is the outage this endpoint is meant to avoid. The
// per-model lookup does name one (the router stamps it from the path), so
// it still falls through to the allowlist check below.
if !modelPresent || normaliseModel(model) == "" {
if nonInference {
return nil
}
return denyModel(surface, "", denyCodeModelUnknown, denyMessageModelUnknown, denyReasonModelUnknown)
return denyModel("", denyCodeModelUnknown, denyMessageModelUnknown, denyReasonModelUnknown)
}
if modelInAllowlist(allowlist, model) {
return nil
}
return denyModel(surface, model, denyCodeModel, denyMessageModel, denyReasonModel)
return denyModel(model, denyCodeModel, denyMessageModel, denyReasonModel)
}
// denyModel builds a 403 deny Output for a model-allowlist rejection. model is
// included in the details only when non-empty.
func denyModel(surface, model, code, message, reason string) *middleware.Output {
func denyModel(model, code, message, reason string) *middleware.Output {
details := map[string]string{}
if model != "" {
details["model"] = model
@@ -169,7 +156,6 @@ func denyModel(surface, model, code, message, reason string) *middleware.Output
Code: code,
Message: message,
Details: details,
Surface: surface,
},
Metadata: []middleware.KV{
{Key: middleware.KeyLLMPolicyDecision, Value: "deny"},

View File

@@ -343,52 +343,3 @@ func TestFactoryNormalisesAllowlist(t *testing.T) {
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out2.Decision, "trimmed entry must still match")
}
// TestAllowlistSkipsNonInferenceWithoutModel covers the reported regression:
// GET /v1/models carries no model anywhere, so the fail-closed rule above
// denied model discovery for exactly the accounts that configured a provider
// allowlist — the clients that read a 403 here render an empty model picker.
// The router authorises those endpoints by path before the guardrail sees
// them, so an absent model there is expected rather than undeterminable.
func TestAllowlistSkipsNonInferenceWithoutModel(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o"))
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMNonInference, Value: "true"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision,
"model discovery must not be refused because it names no model")
}
// TestAllowlistStillAppliesToNonInferenceWithModel pins that the exemption is
// scoped to requests that genuinely name nothing. The per-model lookup
// (GET /v1/models/{id}) is non-inference too, but the router stamps the model
// from its path, so the allowlist must still decide it — otherwise the
// exemption becomes a way to confirm a model the policy blocks.
func TestAllowlistStillAppliesToNonInferenceWithModel(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(providerCfg("gpt-4o"))
t.Run("model in the allowlist", func(t *testing.T) {
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMNonInference, Value: "true"},
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "gpt-4o"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision,
"an allowlisted model must stay reachable")
})
t.Run("model outside the allowlist", func(t *testing.T) {
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newInputProvider(testProvider,
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMNonInference, Value: "true"},
middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: "claude-opus-5"},
))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision,
"non-inference must not become a way past the allowlist")
require.NotNil(t, out.DenyReason)
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_blocked", out.DenyReason.Code,
"a named but blocked model is blocked, not unknown")
})
}

View File

@@ -217,32 +217,6 @@ func applyHeaderPair(rule *HeaderPairRule, in *middleware.Input) *middleware.Mut
return mutations
}
// bodyInjectableSurfaces are the request-body dialects that accept the
// OpenAI-standard identity fields this middleware writes. A surface
// outside this set gets header-only stamping: "user" and "metadata.tags"
// are not part of the Anthropic Messages schema, which rejects unknown
// top-level fields and permits only "user_id" under metadata, so writing
// them into an Anthropic-shaped body turns a working request into a 400.
// Claude Code speaks that shape through gateway records pinned to the
// OpenAI parser, so the check keys on the detected surface rather than
// on the provider record.
var bodyInjectableSurfaces = map[string]struct{}{
"openai": {},
// An empty surface means no parser claimed the path (a custom gateway
// base). Those upstreams are OpenAI-compatible by convention, so keep
// the long-standing behaviour rather than silently dropping identity.
"": {},
}
// bodyAcceptsOpenAIIdentity reports whether the request body may carry the
// OpenAI-standard identity fields, read from the surface llm_request_parser
// resolved from the request path.
func bodyAcceptsOpenAIIdentity(in *middleware.Input) bool {
surface, _ := lookupMetadata(in.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMProvider)
_, ok := bodyInjectableSurfaces[surface]
return ok
}
// injectIntoBody parses the request body and writes the supplied
// identity dimensions into it. Tags land at metadata.tags (creating
// the metadata object when absent); the user identity lands at the
@@ -251,8 +225,6 @@ func bodyAcceptsOpenAIIdentity(in *middleware.Input) bool {
// was written. Returns ok=false (no mutation) when:
//
// - both inputs are empty (nothing to write);
// - the body speaks a dialect without these fields (see
// bodyInjectableSurfaces);
// - the body is empty or truncated (we don't have the full document
// to safely round-trip);
// - the body isn't a JSON object (skip silently — this middleware
@@ -273,9 +245,6 @@ func injectIntoBody(in *middleware.Input, tags []string, userID string) ([]byte,
if in == nil || len(in.Body) == 0 || in.BodyTruncated {
return nil, false
}
if !bodyAcceptsOpenAIIdentity(in) {
return nil, false
}
var doc map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal(in.Body, &doc); err != nil {
return nil, false

View File

@@ -704,57 +704,3 @@ func TestInject_ExtraHeaders_EmptyValueSkipped(t *testing.T) {
"empty extra value must not be stamped")
}
}
// TestInject_AnthropicBodyIsNotRewritten pins the shape gate. Claude Code
// reaches a LiteLLM record on /v1/messages, where "user" is not a
// permitted top-level field and metadata accepts only "user_id", so
// writing the OpenAI-standard fields would turn a working request into a
// 400 naming a field the client never sent. Header stamping still runs, so
// spend tracking and per-end-user budgets keep working.
func TestInject_AnthropicBodyIsNotRewritten(t *testing.T) {
rule := liteLLMRuleWithBody()
rule.HeaderPair.EndUserIDInBody = true
mw := New(Config{Providers: []ProviderInjection{rule}})
in := newInput(litellmProvider, "alice", []string{"grp-eng"})
in.UserEmail = "alice@example.com"
in.Metadata = append(in.Metadata, middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMProvider, Value: "anthropic"})
in.Body = []byte(`{"model":"claude-sonnet-5","messages":[]}`)
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), in)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out.Mutations)
assert.Empty(t, out.Mutations.BodyReplace,
"an Anthropic-shaped body must reach the upstream unmodified")
var endUser string
for _, kv := range out.Mutations.HeadersAdd {
if kv.Key == "x-litellm-end-user-id" {
endUser = kv.Value
}
}
assert.Equal(t, "alice@example.com", endUser,
"header stamping must still carry identity when body inject is skipped")
}
// TestInject_OpenAIBodyStillRewritten guards the gate against
// over-reaching: the OpenAI surface must keep its body-level identity,
// which is the only path LiteLLM's tag-budget check reads.
func TestInject_OpenAIBodyStillRewritten(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(Config{Providers: []ProviderInjection{liteLLMRuleWithBody()}})
in := newInput(litellmProvider, "alice", []string{"grp-eng"})
in.Metadata = append(in.Metadata, middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMProvider, Value: "openai"})
in.Body = []byte(`{"model":"gpt-4o-mini","messages":[]}`)
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), in)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out.Mutations)
require.NotEmpty(t, out.Mutations.BodyReplace, "the OpenAI surface still gets body tags")
var doc map[string]any
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(out.Mutations.BodyReplace, &doc))
meta, ok := doc["metadata"].(map[string]any)
require.True(t, ok, "metadata must be an object")
assert.NotEmpty(t, meta["tags"], "metadata.tags must still be written")
}

View File

@@ -84,15 +84,6 @@ func (m *Middleware) Invoke(ctx context.Context, in *middleware.Input) (*middlew
return allowNoAttribution(), nil
}
// Model-listing and other non-inference endpoints carry no model, and
// management's per-model allowlist fails closed on an empty one. The
// router has already authorised the route against the caller's groups
// and the request consumes no tokens, so gating it on a model that
// cannot exist would only break gateway model discovery.
if lookupKV(in.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMNonInference) == "true" {
return allowNoAttribution(), nil
}
providerID := lookupKV(in.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMResolvedProviderID)
if providerID == "" {
// llm_router didn't emit a resolved provider id — usually
@@ -126,7 +117,7 @@ func (m *Middleware) Invoke(ctx context.Context, in *middleware.Input) (*middlew
}
if resp.GetDecision() == "deny" {
return denyFromManagement(resp, lookupKV(in.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMProvider)), nil
return denyFromManagement(resp), nil
}
return allowFromManagement(resp), nil
}
@@ -170,7 +161,7 @@ func allowFromManagement(resp *proto.CheckLLMPolicyLimitsResponse) *middleware.O
// envelope. The deny code surfaces verbatim through the framework's
// fixed JSON template; arbitrary middleware bytes can't reach the
// wire.
func denyFromManagement(resp *proto.CheckLLMPolicyLimitsResponse, surface string) *middleware.Output {
func denyFromManagement(resp *proto.CheckLLMPolicyLimitsResponse) *middleware.Output {
code := resp.GetDenyCode()
if code == "" {
code = "llm_policy.cap_exceeded"
@@ -185,7 +176,6 @@ func denyFromManagement(resp *proto.CheckLLMPolicyLimitsResponse, surface string
DenyReason: &middleware.DenyReason{
Code: code,
Message: denyMessageForCode(code),
Surface: surface,
},
Metadata: []middleware.KV{
{Key: middleware.KeyLLMPolicyDecision, Value: "deny"},

View File

@@ -224,35 +224,3 @@ func TestMetadataKeys_Allowlist(t *testing.T) {
}
assert.ElementsMatch(t, want, keys)
}
// TestInvoke_NonInferenceSkipsPreflight covers gateway model discovery:
// GET /v1/models carries no model, and management's per-model allowlist
// fails closed on an empty one, so a pre-flight would deny discovery for
// exactly the accounts that use the model allowlist. The router marks the
// request non-inference after authorising the route, and the gate must
// then allow without calling management at all.
func TestInvoke_NonInferenceSkipsPreflight(t *testing.T) {
mgmt := &fakeMgmt{
checkResp: &proto.CheckLLMPolicyLimitsResponse{
Decision: "deny",
DenyCode: "llm_policy.model_blocked",
},
}
m := New(mgmt, nil)
out := runInvoke(t, m, &middleware.Input{
AccountID: "acc-1",
UserID: "user-bob",
UserGroups: []string{"grp-engineers"},
Metadata: []middleware.KV{
{Key: middleware.KeyLLMResolvedProviderID, Value: "prov-1"},
{Key: middleware.KeyLLMNonInference, Value: "true"},
},
})
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "model-less endpoints must not be gated on a model")
assert.Nil(t, mgmt.checkReq, "no pre-flight may be sent for a non-inference request")
assert.Empty(t, lookupKV(out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMSelectedPolicyID),
"no policy is attributed when nothing was metered")
}

View File

@@ -1,13 +1,9 @@
package llm_request_parser
import (
"context"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/middleware"
)
func TestParseBedrockPath(t *testing.T) {
@@ -40,25 +36,3 @@ func TestParseBedrockPath(t *testing.T) {
}
}
}
// TestInvoke_BedrockCountTokens covers the dedicated token-counting
// endpoint. Denying it does not break the client, it just pushes context
// counting back onto the inference endpoint, which is billable.
func TestInvoke_BedrockCountTokens(t *testing.T) {
mw := newMiddleware(t)
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), &middleware.Input{
URL: "/model/us.anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929-v1:0/count-tokens",
Body: []byte(`{"input":{"converse":{"messages":[]}}}`),
})
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision)
model, ok := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMModel)
require.True(t, ok, "count-tokens carries a model in the path and must emit it")
assert.Equal(t, "anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-5", model, "model must be normalized like any other action")
stream, _ := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMStream)
assert.Equal(t, "false", stream, "count-tokens never streams")
}

View File

@@ -61,8 +61,6 @@ func (middlewareImpl) MetadataKeys() []string {
middleware.KeyLLMRequestPromptRaw,
middleware.KeyLLMCaptureTruncated,
middleware.KeyLLMSessionID,
middleware.KeyLLMAgentID,
middleware.KeyLLMParentAgentID,
}
}
@@ -74,9 +72,9 @@ func (middlewareImpl) Close() error { return nil }
// Invoke detects the LLM provider, parses request facts, and emits
// metadata. Always returns DecisionAllow; never errors. Provider
// selection prefers the request path, falling back to the configured
// providerID (synthesiser-stamped on agent-network targets) so requests
// routed to a custom upstream URL still resolve.
// selection prefers the configured providerID (synthesiser-stamped on
// agent-network targets) so requests routed to a custom upstream URL
// still resolve. Falls back to URL sniffing when no providerID is set.
func (m middlewareImpl) Invoke(_ context.Context, in *middleware.Input) (*middleware.Output, error) {
out := &middleware.Output{Decision: middleware.DecisionAllow}
if in == nil {
@@ -94,14 +92,9 @@ func (m middlewareImpl) Invoke(_ context.Context, in *middleware.Input) (*middle
return m.invokeBedrock(in, br), nil
}
// A path that names an API surface wins over the configured providerID:
// a gateway record pinned to "openai" still serves Claude Code on
// /v1/messages, and reading that body with the OpenAI parser loses the
// Anthropic usage block and prices the request on the wrong surface.
// providerID stays the fallback for upstreams whose path says nothing.
parser, ok := llm.DetectParser(extractPath(in.URL))
parser, ok := llm.ParserByName(m.providerID)
if !ok {
parser, ok = llm.ParserByName(m.providerID)
parser, ok = llm.DetectParser(extractPath(in.URL))
}
if !ok {
return out, nil
@@ -123,9 +116,9 @@ func (m middlewareImpl) Invoke(_ context.Context, in *middleware.Input) (*middle
}
appendSessionID := func(md []middleware.KV) []middleware.KV {
if sessionID != "" {
md = append(md, middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMSessionID, Value: sessionID})
return append(md, middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMSessionID, Value: sessionID})
}
return appendAgentIDs(md, in.Headers)
return md
}
facts, err := parser.ParseRequest(in.Body)
@@ -167,41 +160,6 @@ func (m middlewareImpl) Invoke(_ context.Context, in *middleware.Input) (*middle
return out, nil
}
// agentIDHeader and parentAgentIDHeader carry sub-agent attribution: a
// coding agent that spawns helpers stamps the spawned agent's id, plus the
// spawning agent's when that helper is itself nested. Both are opaque
// identifiers rather than content, so they're emitted regardless of the
// prompt-collection toggle, the same way the session id is.
const (
agentIDHeader = "x-claude-code-agent-id"
parentAgentIDHeader = "x-claude-code-parent-agent-id"
)
// appendAgentIDs stamps the sub-agent attribution headers onto the metadata
// bag, skipping either one the request doesn't carry.
func appendAgentIDs(md []middleware.KV, headers []middleware.KV) []middleware.KV {
for _, pair := range []struct{ key, header string }{
{middleware.KeyLLMAgentID, agentIDHeader},
{middleware.KeyLLMParentAgentID, parentAgentIDHeader},
} {
if v := headerValue(headers, pair.header); v != "" {
md = append(md, middleware.KV{Key: pair.key, Value: v})
}
}
return md
}
// headerValue returns the first non-empty value for the named header.
// Headers arrive in canonical form, so the match is case-insensitive.
func headerValue(headers []middleware.KV, want string) string {
for _, kv := range headers {
if strings.EqualFold(kv.Key, want) && kv.Value != "" {
return kv.Value
}
}
return ""
}
// sessionIDHeaders are request header names that may carry a client
// session identifier, checked in order, case-insensitively. Matching is
// against Go's canonical header form, so use the hyphenated names the
@@ -215,8 +173,10 @@ var sessionIDHeaders = []string{"x-claude-code-session-id", "session-id", "x-ses
// canonical form, so the match is case-insensitive.
func sessionIDFromHeaders(headers []middleware.KV) string {
for _, want := range sessionIDHeaders {
if v := headerValue(headers, want); v != "" {
return v
for _, kv := range headers {
if strings.EqualFold(kv.Key, want) && kv.Value != "" {
return kv.Value
}
}
}
return ""
@@ -292,12 +252,6 @@ func parseVertexPath(reqPath string) (vertexRequest, bool) {
if c := strings.LastIndex(rest, ":"); c >= 0 {
model, action = rest[:c], rest[c+1:]
}
// Token counting hangs off the model as its own path segment
// (".../models/{model}/count-tokens:rawPredict"), so anything past the
// first "/" belongs to the method rather than the model id.
if slash := strings.Index(model, "/"); slash >= 0 {
model = model[:slash]
}
model = llm.NormalizeVertexModel(model)
if model == "" {
return vertexRequest{}, false
@@ -344,7 +298,6 @@ func (m middlewareImpl) invokeVertex(in *middleware.Input, vx vertexRequest) *mi
if sessionID != "" {
md = append(md, middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMSessionID, Value: sessionID})
}
md = appendAgentIDs(md, in.Headers)
promptTruncated := false
if parser != nil && m.capturePrompt {
@@ -392,9 +345,7 @@ func trimBedrockNamespace(reqPath string) string {
//
// /model/{modelId}/{action}
//
// action ∈ {invoke, invoke-with-response-stream, converse, converse-stream,
// count-tokens}. Token counting carries a model and no usage, so it routes
// like any other action and meters to zero.
// action ∈ {invoke, invoke-with-response-stream, converse, converse-stream}.
// The modelId may be URL-encoded and may carry a cross-region inference-profile
// prefix and a version suffix; normalizeBedrockModel strips both so the model
// matches catalog pricing.
@@ -418,7 +369,7 @@ func parseBedrockPath(reqPath string) (bedrockRequest, bool) {
return bedrockRequest{}, false
}
switch action {
case "invoke", "converse", "count-tokens":
case "invoke", "converse":
return bedrockRequest{model: model}, true
case "invoke-with-response-stream", "converse-stream":
return bedrockRequest{model: model, stream: true}, true
@@ -446,7 +397,6 @@ func (m middlewareImpl) invokeBedrock(in *middleware.Input, br bedrockRequest) *
if sessionID != "" {
md = append(md, middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMSessionID, Value: sessionID})
}
md = appendAgentIDs(md, in.Headers)
promptTruncated := false
if parser != nil && m.capturePrompt {

View File

@@ -45,8 +45,6 @@ func TestMiddleware_StaticSurface(t *testing.T) {
middleware.KeyLLMRequestPromptRaw,
middleware.KeyLLMCaptureTruncated,
middleware.KeyLLMSessionID,
middleware.KeyLLMAgentID,
middleware.KeyLLMParentAgentID,
}
assert.Equal(t, expected, keys, "metadata key allowlist must match the spec")
}
@@ -232,31 +230,6 @@ func TestInvoke_ProviderIDConfigBypassesURLSniff(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, "gpt-4o-mini", model)
}
func TestInvoke_PathSurfaceBeatsProviderIDConfig(t *testing.T) {
// Gateway records (LiteLLM, Portkey, OpenRouter) pin provider_id
// "openai", but the same record serves Claude Code on /v1/messages.
// Parsing that body as OpenAI reads no usage off the Anthropic
// response and prices the request on a surface where no claude-*
// model exists, so the path has to win.
mw, err := Factory{}.New([]byte(`{"provider_id":"openai"}`))
require.NoError(t, err, "factory must accept provider_id config")
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), &middleware.Input{
URL: "/v1/messages",
Body: []byte(`{"model":"claude-sonnet-5","stream":true,"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"Hi"}]}`),
})
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out)
provider, ok := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMProvider)
require.True(t, ok, "provider must be emitted")
assert.Equal(t, "anthropic", provider, "the /v1/messages path selects the Anthropic surface")
model, ok := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMModel)
require.True(t, ok, "model must be extracted")
assert.Equal(t, "claude-sonnet-5", model)
}
func TestInvoke_UnknownProviderIDFallsBackToURL(t *testing.T) {
mw, err := Factory{}.New([]byte(`{"provider_id":"not-a-real-parser"}`))
require.NoError(t, err, "factory must accept any provider_id string")
@@ -443,81 +416,3 @@ func TestInvoke_NilInputAllows(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "nil input still allows")
assert.Empty(t, out.Metadata, "nil input emits no metadata")
}
// TestParseVertexPath_CountTokensKeepsModel covers Vertex token counting,
// where the method hangs off the model as its own path segment. Splitting
// only on the final colon swallowed "/count-tokens" into the model id, so
// the router saw a model no route could claim.
func TestParseVertexPath_CountTokensKeepsModel(t *testing.T) {
cases := map[string]struct {
model string
stream bool
}{
"/v1/projects/p/locations/global/publishers/anthropic/models/claude-sonnet-5:rawPredict": {model: "claude-sonnet-5"},
"/v1/projects/p/locations/global/publishers/anthropic/models/claude-sonnet-5:streamRawPredict": {model: "claude-sonnet-5", stream: true},
"/v1/projects/p/locations/global/publishers/anthropic/models/claude-sonnet-5/count-tokens:rawPredict": {model: "claude-sonnet-5"},
"/v1/projects/p/locations/global/publishers/anthropic/models/claude-sonnet-5@20250929/count-tokens:rawPredict": {model: "claude-sonnet-5"},
}
for path, want := range cases {
vx, ok := parseVertexPath(path)
require.True(t, ok, "must parse %q", path)
assert.Equal(t, want.model, vx.model, "model for %q", path)
assert.Equal(t, want.stream, vx.stream, "stream flag for %q", path)
assert.Equal(t, "anthropic", vx.publisher, "publisher for %q", path)
}
}
// TestInvoke_EmitsAgentIDs covers sub-agent attribution: several agents run
// in parallel inside one session, and without their ids every request in
// the session attributes to the session alone.
func TestInvoke_EmitsAgentIDs(t *testing.T) {
mw := newMiddleware(t)
t.Run("spawned agent", func(t *testing.T) {
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), &middleware.Input{
URL: "/v1/messages",
Body: []byte(`{"model":"claude-sonnet-5","messages":[]}`),
Headers: []middleware.KV{
{Key: "X-Claude-Code-Session-Id", Value: "sess-1"},
{Key: "X-Claude-Code-Agent-Id", Value: "agent-7"},
},
})
require.NoError(t, err)
agent, ok := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMAgentID)
require.True(t, ok, "the spawned agent's id must be emitted")
assert.Equal(t, "agent-7", agent)
_, ok = metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMParentAgentID)
assert.False(t, ok, "a top-level agent has no parent to emit")
})
t.Run("nested agent", func(t *testing.T) {
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), &middleware.Input{
URL: "/v1/messages",
Body: []byte(`{"model":"claude-sonnet-5","messages":[]}`),
Headers: []middleware.KV{
{Key: "X-Claude-Code-Agent-Id", Value: "agent-9"},
{Key: "X-Claude-Code-Parent-Agent-Id", Value: "agent-7"},
},
})
require.NoError(t, err)
agent, _ := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMAgentID)
assert.Equal(t, "agent-9", agent)
parent, ok := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMParentAgentID)
require.True(t, ok, "a nested agent must carry the spawning agent's id")
assert.Equal(t, "agent-7", parent)
})
t.Run("absent on a plain request", func(t *testing.T) {
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), &middleware.Input{
URL: "/v1/messages",
Body: []byte(`{"model":"claude-sonnet-5","messages":[]}`),
})
require.NoError(t, err)
_, ok := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMAgentID)
assert.False(t, ok, "no key is emitted when the client sends no agent id")
})
}

View File

@@ -1,13 +1,9 @@
package llm_router
import (
"context"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/middleware"
)
// TestRouteClaimsModel_BedrockNormalizesCandidate guards the fix for the native
@@ -32,86 +28,3 @@ func TestRouteClaimsModel_BedrockNormalizesCandidate(t *testing.T) {
assert.False(t, routeClaimsModel(openai, "us.gpt-4o"),
"non-Bedrock routes must not strip a us. prefix")
}
// TestRouter_BedrockCountTokensRoutes pins that the token-counting action
// reaches the Bedrock route instead of denying as not-routable.
func TestRouter_BedrockCountTokensRoutes(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(Config{Providers: []ProviderRoute{{
ID: "bedrock-prod",
Bedrock: true,
Models: []string{"anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-5"},
AllowedGroupIDs: []string{defaultTestGroup},
UpstreamScheme: "https",
UpstreamHost: "bedrock-runtime.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com",
}}})
in := newInputWithModelAndURL("anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-5",
"/model/anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929-v1:0/count-tokens")
in.Metadata = append(in.Metadata, middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMProvider, Value: "bedrock"})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), in)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "count-tokens must route, not deny")
require.NotNil(t, out.Mutations)
require.NotNil(t, out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream)
assert.Equal(t, "bedrock-runtime.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com", out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream.Host)
}
// TestRouter_BedrockInferenceProfilesRoutes covers the startup lookups a
// client makes to resolve a configured inference profile. They carry no
// model, so before they were recognised they denied and wrote a policy
// rejection into the access log on every session start.
func TestRouter_BedrockInferenceProfilesRoutes(t *testing.T) {
bedrock := ProviderRoute{
ID: "bedrock-prod",
Bedrock: true,
AllowedGroupIDs: []string{defaultTestGroup},
UpstreamScheme: "https",
UpstreamHost: "bedrock-runtime.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com",
}
openai := ProviderRoute{
ID: "openai-prod",
Models: []string{"gpt-4o"},
AllowedGroupIDs: []string{defaultTestGroup},
UpstreamScheme: "https",
UpstreamHost: "api.openai.com",
}
mw := New(Config{Providers: []ProviderRoute{openai, bedrock}})
for _, path := range []string{
"/inference-profiles?type=SYSTEM_DEFINED",
"/inference-profiles/us.anthropic.claude-sonnet-5",
} {
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newModellessInput(path))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "%s must route", path)
require.NotNil(t, out.Mutations)
require.NotNil(t, out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream)
assert.Equal(t, "bedrock-runtime.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com", out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream.Host,
"%s must reach the Bedrock provider, not the first authorised one", path)
nonInference, _ := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMNonInference)
assert.Equal(t, "true", nonInference, "%s carries no model to gate on", path)
}
}
// TestRouter_BedrockNamespacedInferenceProfilesStripsPrefix pins that the
// optional gateway namespace is removed before the request goes upstream.
func TestRouter_BedrockNamespacedInferenceProfilesStripsPrefix(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(Config{Providers: []ProviderRoute{{
ID: "bedrock-prod",
Bedrock: true,
AllowedGroupIDs: []string{defaultTestGroup},
UpstreamScheme: "https",
UpstreamHost: "bedrock-runtime.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com",
}}})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newModellessInput("/bedrock/inference-profiles"))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out.Mutations)
require.NotNil(t, out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream)
assert.Equal(t, "/bedrock", out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream.StripPathPrefix,
"the namespace prefix must not reach the real Bedrock endpoint")
}

View File

@@ -109,10 +109,6 @@ func (m *Middleware) MetadataKeys() []string {
middleware.KeyLLMAuthorisingGroups,
middleware.KeyLLMPolicyDecision,
middleware.KeyLLMPolicyReason,
middleware.KeyLLMNonInference,
// Emitted only for the per-model lookup, whose model lives in the path
// rather than a body the parser could read.
middleware.KeyLLMModel,
}
}
@@ -141,26 +137,29 @@ const (
// known to a provider that no policy authorises for the caller deny
// with no_authorised_provider.
func (m *Middleware) Invoke(_ context.Context, in *middleware.Input) (*middleware.Output, error) {
reqPath := requestPath(in.URL)
// The caller's API dialect, used to mirror a denial in the vendor's own
// error shape so the client can explain it to the user.
surface, _ := lookupMetadata(in.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMProvider)
model, _ := lookupMetadata(in.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMModel)
// Vertex AI carries the model in the URL path, not the body, and is
// selected by path rather than by the model/vendor table. Route it before
// the model lookup so a model the parser extracted from the path can't be
// claimed by a same-vendor direct provider (e.g. claude-* on api.anthropic.com).
reqPath := requestPath(in.URL)
if isVertexPath(reqPath) {
model, _ := lookupMetadata(in.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMModel)
// The request parser emits no llm.provider for a Vertex publisher it
// can't parse (e.g. google/gemini). Forwarding such a request would
// bypass token/budget metering, so deny it rather than serve it
// unmetered.
if surface == "" {
return denyUnmeterable(surface), nil
if vendor, _ := lookupMetadata(in.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMProvider); vendor == "" {
return denyUnmeterable(), nil
}
route, outcome := m.matchVertex(reqPath, model, in.UserGroups)
return m.decide(route, outcome, surface, model, in.UserGroups, nil), nil
switch outcome {
case matchOutcomeFound:
return m.allowWithRoute(route, in.UserGroups), nil
case matchOutcomeUnauthorised:
return denyNoAuthorisedRoute(model), nil
default:
return denyUnknownModel(model), nil
}
}
// Bedrock likewise carries the model in the URL path (/model/{id}/{action}),
@@ -168,120 +167,52 @@ func (m *Middleware) Invoke(_ context.Context, in *middleware.Input) (*middlewar
// before the model lookup; when the prefix is present, strip it from the
// forwarded path so the real Bedrock endpoint receives its native path.
if isBedrockPath(reqPath) {
model, _ := lookupMetadata(in.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMModel)
native, hadPrefix := splitBedrockNamespace(reqPath)
route, outcome := m.matchBedrock(native, model, in.UserGroups)
return m.decide(route, outcome, surface, model, in.UserGroups, func(out *middleware.Output) {
if hadPrefix {
stripBedrockNamespace(out)
switch outcome {
case matchOutcomeFound:
out := m.allowWithRoute(route, in.UserGroups)
if hadPrefix && out.Mutations != nil && out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream != nil {
out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream.StripPathPrefix = bedrockNamespacePrefix
}
}), nil
return out, nil
case matchOutcomeUnauthorised:
return denyNoAuthorisedRoute(model), nil
default:
return denyUnknownModel(model), nil
}
}
// GET /v1/models/{id} carries no body, so no model reaches the router in
// metadata — but the path names one, and answering it confirms a model
// exists and is reachable. Authorise it against the model table like any
// other per-model request, then mark it non-inference so it still skips
// the token pre-flight it would otherwise charge nothing against.
if detail, isDetail := modelDetailID(reqPath); isDetail && isNonInferenceMethod(in.Method) {
route, outcome := m.matchRoute(detail, surface, reqPath, in.UserGroups)
return m.decide(route, outcome, surface, detail, in.UserGroups, func(out *middleware.Output) {
markNonInference(out)
// The parser reads models from JSON bodies only, and this request
// has none, so stamp the one the path names. Without it the
// guardrail's own allowlist — a separate, possibly narrower list
// than the route's — never sees a model to check.
out.Metadata = append(out.Metadata, middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMModel, Value: detail})
}), nil
model, ok := lookupMetadata(in.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMModel)
if !ok || model == "" {
// Non-inference endpoints (model listing) carry no model but still
// need rewriting from the synth placeholder to a real upstream;
// clients such as Codex call GET /v1/models at startup to enumerate
// availability and read a 403 as "model unavailable".
route, outcome := m.matchModelless(requestPath(in.URL), in.UserGroups)
switch outcome {
case matchOutcomeFound:
return m.allowWithRoute(route, in.UserGroups), nil
case matchOutcomeUnauthorised:
// A recognised model-less endpoint exists but no provider
// authorises the caller — deny as an authorisation failure
// rather than masking it as a missing model.
return denyNoAuthorisedRoute(model), nil
default:
return denyMissingModel(), nil
}
}
if model == "" {
return m.routeModelless(reqPath, surface, in.Method, in.UserGroups), nil
}
route, outcome := m.matchRoute(model, surface, reqPath, in.UserGroups)
return m.decide(route, outcome, surface, model, in.UserGroups, nil), nil
}
// decide turns a per-model match result into the middleware's decision. Every
// surface that routes by model shares the same two denial arms — a model no
// route claims is not routable, one that some route claims but none authorises
// for this caller is an authorisation failure — so they live here once.
// decorate, when non-nil, adjusts the allow with whatever that surface needs.
func (m *Middleware) decide(
route ProviderRoute,
outcome matchOutcome,
surface, model string,
userGroups []string,
decorate func(*middleware.Output),
) *middleware.Output {
vendor, _ := lookupMetadata(in.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMProvider)
route, outcome := m.matchRoute(model, vendor, requestPath(in.URL), in.UserGroups)
switch outcome {
case matchOutcomeFound:
out := m.allowWithRoute(route, surface, userGroups)
if decorate != nil {
decorate(out)
}
return out
return m.allowWithRoute(route, in.UserGroups), nil
case matchOutcomeUnauthorised:
return denyNoAuthorisedRoute(surface, model)
return denyNoAuthorisedRoute(model), nil
default:
return denyUnknownModel(surface, model)
}
}
// routeModelless serves the endpoints that name no model at all: the model
// listing, the connection-warming probe, and the Bedrock inference-profile
// lookup. They still need rewriting from the synth placeholder to a real
// upstream — clients such as Codex call GET /v1/models at startup to enumerate
// availability and read a 403 as "model unavailable".
func (m *Middleware) routeModelless(reqPath, surface, method string, userGroups []string) *middleware.Output {
route, outcome := m.matchModelless(reqPath, method, userGroups)
switch outcome {
case matchOutcomeFound:
out := m.allowWithRoute(route, surface, userGroups)
markNonInference(out)
if _, hadPrefix := splitBedrockNamespace(reqPath); hadPrefix {
stripBedrockNamespace(out)
}
// A route that enumerates its models bounds what the caller may use,
// so the picker must not offer the rest: every entry outside the list
// is a request the chain will deny.
if reqPath == modelListingPath && len(route.Models) > 0 &&
out.Mutations != nil && out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream != nil {
out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream.DiscoveryModels = append([]string(nil), route.Models...)
}
return out
case matchOutcomeUnauthorised:
// A recognised model-less endpoint exists but no provider authorises
// the caller — deny as an authorisation failure rather than masking it
// as a missing model.
return denyNoAuthorisedRoute(surface, "")
default:
return denyMissingModel(surface)
}
}
// isNonInferenceMethod reports whether a request method is one the
// non-inference endpoints actually use: the listing and the per-model lookup
// are GET, the connection-warming probe is HEAD or GET. The method is the only
// thing separating "GET /v1/models/{id}" from a POST to the same path carrying
// an inference body, and the non-inference mark exempts a request from the
// token pre-flight — so anything else falls through to normal per-model
// routing, which denies when the request names no model.
func isNonInferenceMethod(method string) bool {
return method == http.MethodGet || method == http.MethodHead
}
// markNonInference tags an allow as a request that spends no tokens, so the
// limit check skips the management pre-flight it would charge nothing against.
func markNonInference(out *middleware.Output) {
out.Metadata = append(out.Metadata, middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMNonInference, Value: "true"})
}
// stripBedrockNamespace tells the rewrite to drop the optional "/bedrock"
// gateway namespace so the upstream receives its native Bedrock path.
func stripBedrockNamespace(out *middleware.Output) {
if out.Mutations != nil && out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream != nil {
out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream.StripPathPrefix = bedrockNamespacePrefix
return denyUnknownModel(model), nil
}
}
@@ -369,60 +300,12 @@ func (m *Middleware) matchRoute(model, vendor, reqPath string, userGroups []stri
return best, matchOutcomeFound
}
// connectionWarmPath is the probe Anthropic clients send before their first
// inference request to open the upstream connection early. Forwarding it
// warms the connection the request will actually use; denying it only fills
// the access log with rejections at every session start.
const connectionWarmPath = "/api/hello"
// modelListingPath is the endpoint clients read at startup to populate
// their model picker. Its response is a list the proxy can bound; the
// per-model "/v1/models/{id}" lookup returns a single object and is left
// alone.
const modelListingPath = "/v1/models"
// isModelLessPath reports whether reqPath is a known non-inference endpoint
// that legitimately carries no model at all: the model listing and the
// connection-warming probe. These must route to an upstream rather than
// deny, so model enumeration works end to end. The per-model
// "/v1/models/{id}" lookup is deliberately excluded — it names a model, so
// it is authorised against the model table instead (see modelDetailID).
// isModelLessPath reports whether reqPath is a known OpenAI-shaped
// non-inference endpoint that legitimately carries no model in its
// request (the model-listing endpoints). These must route to an upstream
// rather than deny, so model enumeration works end to end.
func isModelLessPath(reqPath string) bool {
return reqPath == modelListingPath || reqPath == connectionWarmPath
}
// modelDetailID returns the model id named by a "/v1/models/{id}" lookup.
// reqPath comes from url.URL.Path, which is already percent-decoded, so an
// id carrying a "/" (a self-hosted "Qwen/Qwen2.5-0.5B-Instruct" sent as
// "Qwen%2FQwen2.5-...") arrives whole and everything after the prefix is the
// id, separators included.
func modelDetailID(reqPath string) (string, bool) {
if !strings.HasPrefix(reqPath, modelListingPath+"/") {
return "", false
}
id := strings.TrimPrefix(reqPath, modelListingPath+"/")
if id == "" {
return "", false
}
return id, true
}
// isBedrockModelLessPath reports whether reqPath is a Bedrock
// inference-profile lookup, optionally behind the "/bedrock" gateway
// namespace. Clients read these at startup to resolve a configured profile
// to its underlying model. They carry no model of their own, so they route
// by path to a Bedrock provider rather than through the model table.
//
// On native AWS these live on the control plane ("bedrock.<region>") while a
// provider's upstream is normally the runtime host ("bedrock-runtime.<region>"),
// so forwarding yields a 404 there. That is deliberate: a client has one base
// URL, so pointing it straight at the runtime host 404s identically, and
// forwarding keeps the proxy transparent instead of inventing a policy denial
// the client would never otherwise see. Operators whose Bedrock upstream is a
// gateway that does serve the lookup get a working answer.
func isBedrockModelLessPath(reqPath string) bool {
native, _ := splitBedrockNamespace(reqPath)
return native == "/inference-profiles" || strings.HasPrefix(native, "/inference-profiles/")
return reqPath == "/v1/models" || strings.HasPrefix(reqPath, "/v1/models/")
}
// isVertexPath reports whether reqPath is a Google Vertex AI publisher
@@ -449,33 +332,20 @@ func splitBedrockNamespace(reqPath string) (string, bool) {
return reqPath, false
}
// bedrockActions are the runtime actions that follow the model id in a
// Bedrock path. count-tokens is here so a client can price its context
// against the dedicated endpoint; denying it pushes that work back onto
// the inference endpoint, which bills for it.
var bedrockActions = []string{
"/invoke",
"/invoke-with-response-stream",
"/converse",
"/converse-stream",
"/count-tokens",
}
// isBedrockPath reports whether reqPath is an AWS Bedrock runtime model
// endpoint: /model/{modelId}/{action} — optionally behind a "/bedrock"
// gateway-namespace prefix. The model lives in the path, so these requests
// are routed by path to the Bedrock provider.
// endpoint: /model/{modelId}/{action} where action is invoke,
// invoke-with-response-stream, converse, or converse-stream — optionally behind
// a "/bedrock" gateway-namespace prefix. The model lives in the path, so these
// requests are routed by path to the Bedrock provider.
func isBedrockPath(reqPath string) bool {
native, _ := splitBedrockNamespace(reqPath)
if !strings.HasPrefix(native, "/model/") {
return false
}
for _, action := range bedrockActions {
if strings.HasSuffix(native, action) {
return true
}
}
return false
return strings.HasSuffix(native, "/invoke") ||
strings.HasSuffix(native, "/invoke-with-response-stream") ||
strings.HasSuffix(native, "/converse") ||
strings.HasSuffix(native, "/converse-stream")
}
// matchVertex selects the Vertex provider authorised for the caller's groups
@@ -555,26 +425,19 @@ func (m *Middleware) matchPathRoute(reqPath, model string, userGroups []string,
// declaration order), matchOutcomeUnauthorised when no provider authorises
// the caller, or matchOutcomeUnknownModel when the path isn't a recognised
// model-less endpoint.
func (m *Middleware) matchModelless(reqPath, method string, userGroups []string) (ProviderRoute, matchOutcome) {
if !isNonInferenceMethod(method) {
func (m *Middleware) matchModelless(reqPath string, userGroups []string) (ProviderRoute, matchOutcome) {
if !isModelLessPath(reqPath) {
return ProviderRoute{}, matchOutcomeUnknownModel
}
var eligible func(ProviderRoute) bool
switch {
case isBedrockModelLessPath(reqPath):
eligible = func(r ProviderRoute) bool { return r.Bedrock }
case isModelLessPath(reqPath):
var candidates []ProviderRoute
for _, route := range m.cfg.Providers {
// Vertex/Bedrock are path-routed and don't serve OpenAI-style
// model-listing endpoints; including them here could rewrite a
// GET /v1/models to an upstream that 404s it.
eligible = func(r ProviderRoute) bool { return !r.Vertex && !r.Bedrock }
default:
return ProviderRoute{}, matchOutcomeUnknownModel
}
var candidates []ProviderRoute
for _, route := range m.cfg.Providers {
if eligible(route) && routeAuthorisesGroups(route, userGroups) {
if route.Vertex || route.Bedrock {
continue
}
if routeAuthorisesGroups(route, userGroups) {
candidates = append(candidates, route)
}
}
@@ -701,16 +564,6 @@ func routeClaimsModel(route ProviderRoute, model string) bool {
if route.Bedrock && llm.NormalizeBedrockModel(candidate) == model {
return true
}
// A client may pin a dated Anthropic id ("claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929")
// where the operator registered the undated one. Only an undated
// registration absorbs a dated request: normalising both sides would
// let a route pinned to one dated release claim a different one, so an
// operator who deliberately pinned a build would silently serve
// another — and with several such routes, ordering would decide which.
if candidate == llm.NormalizeAnthropicModel(candidate) &&
candidate == llm.NormalizeAnthropicModel(model) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
@@ -759,7 +612,7 @@ func requestPath(raw string) string {
// provider id so identity-stamping middlewares (llm_identity_inject)
// tag the request with ONLY the groups that authorised this specific
// route — not every group the peer happens to be in.
func (m *Middleware) allowWithRoute(route ProviderRoute, surface string, userGroups []string) *middleware.Output {
func (m *Middleware) allowWithRoute(route ProviderRoute, userGroups []string) *middleware.Output {
rewrite := &middleware.UpstreamRewrite{
Scheme: route.UpstreamScheme,
Host: route.UpstreamHost,
@@ -781,7 +634,7 @@ func (m *Middleware) allowWithRoute(route ProviderRoute, surface string, userGro
// request time (cached + auto-refreshed) instead of a static value.
bearer, err := m.gcpBearer(route.GCPServiceAccountKeyB64)
if err != nil {
return denyUpstreamAuth(surface)
return denyUpstreamAuth()
}
authValue = bearer
}
@@ -851,12 +704,11 @@ func (m *Middleware) gcpTokenSource(saKeyB64 string) (oauth2.TokenSource, error)
// denyUpstreamAuth is returned when the router cannot obtain the upstream
// credential (e.g. a malformed service-account key or an unreachable token
// endpoint). It surfaces as a 502 — an upstream problem, not a policy denial.
func denyUpstreamAuth(surface string) *middleware.Output {
func denyUpstreamAuth() *middleware.Output {
return &middleware.Output{
Decision: middleware.DecisionDeny,
DenyStatus: 502,
DenyReason: &middleware.DenyReason{
Surface: surface,
Code: denyCodeUpstreamAuth,
Message: "could not obtain upstream credential",
},
@@ -870,12 +722,11 @@ func denyUpstreamAuth(surface string) *middleware.Output {
// denyUnmeterable returns the deny envelope for a path-routed request whose
// publisher has no parser surface, so its usage can't be metered. Serving it
// would bypass token/budget caps, so it is rejected with a 403.
func denyUnmeterable(surface string) *middleware.Output {
func denyUnmeterable() *middleware.Output {
return &middleware.Output{
Decision: middleware.DecisionDeny,
DenyStatus: 403,
DenyReason: &middleware.DenyReason{
Surface: surface,
Code: denyCodeUnmeterable,
Message: "request publisher is not supported for metering",
},
@@ -888,12 +739,11 @@ func denyUnmeterable(surface string) *middleware.Output {
// denyMissingModel returns the deny envelope for a request whose
// envelope has no llm.model metadata.
func denyMissingModel(surface string) *middleware.Output {
func denyMissingModel() *middleware.Output {
return &middleware.Output{
Decision: middleware.DecisionDeny,
DenyStatus: 403,
DenyReason: &middleware.DenyReason{
Surface: surface,
Code: denyCodeNotRoutable,
Message: "missing llm.model on request envelope",
},
@@ -906,12 +756,11 @@ func denyMissingModel(surface string) *middleware.Output {
// denyUnknownModel returns the deny envelope for a model that no
// configured provider claims.
func denyUnknownModel(surface, model string) *middleware.Output {
func denyUnknownModel(model string) *middleware.Output {
return &middleware.Output{
Decision: middleware.DecisionDeny,
DenyStatus: 403,
DenyReason: &middleware.DenyReason{
Surface: surface,
Code: denyCodeNotRoutable,
Message: fmt.Sprintf("no provider configured for model %s", model),
Details: map[string]string{"model": model},
@@ -926,12 +775,11 @@ func denyUnknownModel(surface, model string) *middleware.Output {
// denyNoAuthorisedRoute returns the deny envelope for a model that one
// or more providers claim, but where no policy authorises the caller's
// groups for any of those providers.
func denyNoAuthorisedRoute(surface, model string) *middleware.Output {
func denyNoAuthorisedRoute(model string) *middleware.Output {
return &middleware.Output{
Decision: middleware.DecisionDeny,
DenyStatus: 403,
DenyReason: &middleware.DenyReason{
Surface: surface,
Code: denyCodeNoAuthorisedRoute,
Message: fmt.Sprintf("no policy authorises model %s for the caller's groups", model),
Details: map[string]string{"model": model},

View File

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ package llm_router
import (
"context"
"net/http"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
@@ -61,8 +60,6 @@ func TestMiddlewareIdentity(t *testing.T) {
[]string{
middleware.KeyLLMResolvedProviderID,
middleware.KeyLLMAuthorisingGroups,
middleware.KeyLLMNonInference,
middleware.KeyLLMModel,
middleware.KeyLLMPolicyDecision,
middleware.KeyLLMPolicyReason,
},
@@ -174,12 +171,8 @@ func TestRouter_MissingModel(t *testing.T) {
// from which a model could be parsed). UserGroups matches defaultTestGroup.
func newModellessInput(reqURL string) *middleware.Input {
return &middleware.Input{
Slot: middleware.SlotOnRequest,
URL: reqURL,
// The non-inference endpoints are read requests; the method is what
// separates them from an inference body posted to the same path, so
// state it rather than leaning on the zero value.
Method: http.MethodGet,
Slot: middleware.SlotOnRequest,
URL: reqURL,
UserGroups: []string{defaultTestGroup},
}
}
@@ -204,12 +197,6 @@ func TestRouter_ModelLessPath_RoutesToAuthorisedProvider(t *testing.T) {
provider, _ := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMResolvedProviderID)
assert.Equal(t, "openai-prod", provider, "resolved provider must be the authorised route")
// The limits gate reads this to tell "no model applies here" from
// "the model could not be determined", which fails closed.
nonInference, ok := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMNonInference)
require.True(t, ok, "model-less allow must mark the request non-inference")
assert.Equal(t, "true", nonInference)
}
func TestRouter_ModelLessPath_MultiProviderDeclarationOrder(t *testing.T) {
@@ -886,262 +873,3 @@ func TestRouter_EmptyModelsClaimsAnyModel(t *testing.T) {
resolved, _ := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMResolvedProviderID)
assert.Equal(t, "litellm", resolved)
}
// TestRouter_DatedAnthropicModelRoutes covers a client pinning a release
// date on a model the operator registered undated. Exact matches still win,
// so an operator who registers both dated releases keeps them distinct.
func TestRouter_DatedAnthropicModelRoutes(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(Config{Providers: []ProviderRoute{{
ID: "anthropic-prod",
Vendor: "anthropic",
Models: []string{"claude-sonnet-4-5"},
AllowedGroupIDs: []string{defaultTestGroup},
UpstreamScheme: "https",
UpstreamHost: "api.anthropic.com",
}}})
in := newInputWithModelAndURL("claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929", "/v1/messages")
in.Metadata = append(in.Metadata, middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMProvider, Value: "anthropic"})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), in)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "a dated id must route to the undated registration")
require.NotNil(t, out.Mutations)
require.NotNil(t, out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream)
assert.Equal(t, "api.anthropic.com", out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream.Host)
}
// TestRouter_ConnectionWarmProbeRoutes covers the HEAD /api/hello probe an
// Anthropic client sends before its first request. Forwarding it warms the
// connection that request will use; denying it only wrote a rejection into
// the access log at every session start.
func TestRouter_ConnectionWarmProbeRoutes(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(Config{Providers: []ProviderRoute{{
ID: "anthropic-prod",
Vendor: "anthropic",
Models: []string{"claude-sonnet-5"},
AllowedGroupIDs: []string{defaultTestGroup},
UpstreamScheme: "https",
UpstreamHost: "api.anthropic.com",
}}})
in := newModellessInput("/api/hello")
in.Method = http.MethodHead
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), in)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "the warm-up probe must reach the upstream")
require.NotNil(t, out.Mutations)
require.NotNil(t, out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream)
assert.Equal(t, "api.anthropic.com", out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream.Host)
nonInference, _ := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMNonInference)
assert.Equal(t, "true", nonInference, "the probe carries no model to gate on")
}
// TestRouter_ModelListingCarriesAuthorisedModels pins the list the proxy
// bounds the discovery response with. A catch-all route enumerates nothing,
// so it must not bound the upstream's list at all.
func TestRouter_ModelListingCarriesAuthorisedModels(t *testing.T) {
enumerated := ProviderRoute{
ID: "anthropic-prod",
Models: []string{"claude-sonnet-5", "claude-haiku-4-5"},
AllowedGroupIDs: []string{defaultTestGroup},
UpstreamScheme: "https",
UpstreamHost: "api.anthropic.com",
}
t.Run("enumerated route bounds the listing", func(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(Config{Providers: []ProviderRoute{enumerated}})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newModellessInput("/v1/models"))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out.Mutations)
require.NotNil(t, out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream)
assert.Equal(t, []string{"claude-sonnet-5", "claude-haiku-4-5"},
out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream.DiscoveryModels,
"the picker must be bounded by what the route authorises")
})
t.Run("catch-all route leaves the listing alone", func(t *testing.T) {
catchAll := enumerated
catchAll.Models = nil
mw := New(Config{Providers: []ProviderRoute{catchAll}})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newModellessInput("/v1/models"))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream)
assert.Empty(t, out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream.DiscoveryModels,
"a route that claims every model cannot bound the upstream's list")
})
t.Run("per-model lookup is not a listing", func(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(Config{Providers: []ProviderRoute{enumerated}})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newModellessInput("/v1/models/claude-sonnet-5"))
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream)
assert.Empty(t, out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream.DiscoveryModels,
"the single-object lookup has no data array to filter")
})
}
// TestRouter_ModelDetailHonoursAllowlist pins that GET /v1/models/{id} is
// authorised against the model table. It carries no body model, so treating
// it as a model-less endpoint would let a caller confirm a model the route
// does not list — the listing itself is bounded to the allowlist, so the
// detail lookup must be too.
func TestRouter_ModelDetailHonoursAllowlist(t *testing.T) {
enumerated := ProviderRoute{
ID: "anthropic-prod",
Models: []string{"claude-sonnet-5"},
AllowedGroupIDs: []string{defaultTestGroup},
UpstreamScheme: "https",
UpstreamHost: "api.anthropic.com",
}
t.Run("allowlisted model routes and skips metering", func(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(Config{Providers: []ProviderRoute{enumerated}})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newModellessInput("/v1/models/claude-sonnet-5"))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision)
require.NotNil(t, out.Mutations)
require.NotNil(t, out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream)
assert.Equal(t, "api.anthropic.com", out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream.Host)
nonInference, _ := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMNonInference)
assert.Equal(t, "true", nonInference, "a detail lookup spends no tokens")
})
t.Run("model outside the allowlist denies", func(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(Config{Providers: []ProviderRoute{enumerated}})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newModellessInput("/v1/models/claude-opus-5"))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision,
"a model no route lists must not be confirmed by the detail lookup")
})
t.Run("dated id matches its undated registration", func(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(Config{Providers: []ProviderRoute{enumerated}})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newModellessInput("/v1/models/claude-sonnet-5-20250929"))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision,
"a pinned release of an allowlisted family stays reachable")
})
t.Run("catch-all route still answers every lookup", func(t *testing.T) {
catchAll := enumerated
catchAll.Models = nil
mw := New(Config{Providers: []ProviderRoute{catchAll}})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), newModellessInput("/v1/models/anything-at-all"))
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision,
"a gateway that enumerates nothing cannot refuse a lookup")
})
}
// TestRouter_NonInferenceRequiresReadMethod pins that the non-inference mark —
// which exempts a request from the token pre-flight — is reachable only by the
// read methods these endpoints actually use. A POST to the same path could
// carry an inference body, so it must not buy the exemption; it falls through
// to normal per-model routing instead, which denies when no model is named.
func TestRouter_NonInferenceRequiresReadMethod(t *testing.T) {
route := ProviderRoute{
ID: "gateway",
AllowedGroupIDs: []string{defaultTestGroup},
UpstreamScheme: "https",
UpstreamHost: "gateway.example.com",
}
for _, path := range []string{"/v1/models", "/v1/models/claude-sonnet-5", "/api/hello"} {
t.Run("POST "+path, func(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(Config{Providers: []ProviderRoute{route}})
in := newModellessInput(path)
in.Method = http.MethodPost
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), in)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision,
"a write to a non-inference path must not route unmetered")
nonInference, _ := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMNonInference)
assert.NotEqual(t, "true", nonInference,
"only a read method may skip the token pre-flight")
})
}
t.Run("HEAD keeps the warm probe working", func(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(Config{Providers: []ProviderRoute{route}})
in := newModellessInput(connectionWarmPath)
in.Method = http.MethodHead
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), in)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision,
"the HEAD warm probe must still reach the upstream")
nonInference, _ := metaValue(t, out.Metadata, middleware.KeyLLMNonInference)
assert.Equal(t, "true", nonInference,
"the HEAD warm probe carries no model to meter")
})
}
// TestRouter_PinnedDatedModelStaysDistinct pins that a route registered
// against one dated Anthropic release does not claim another. Normalising
// both sides of the comparison made every dated build of a family
// interchangeable, so an operator who deliberately pinned a build would have
// served a different one — and with several such routes, declaration or path
// order would have decided which.
func TestRouter_PinnedDatedModelStaysDistinct(t *testing.T) {
pinned := ProviderRoute{
ID: "anthropic-pinned",
Vendor: "anthropic",
Models: []string{"claude-sonnet-4-5-20250101"},
AllowedGroupIDs: []string{defaultTestGroup},
UpstreamScheme: "https",
UpstreamHost: "pinned.example.com",
}
t.Run("a different dated release is not claimed", func(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(Config{Providers: []ProviderRoute{pinned}})
in := newInputWithModelAndURL("claude-sonnet-4-5-20250202", "/v1/messages")
in.Metadata = append(in.Metadata, middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMProvider, Value: "anthropic"})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), in)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionDeny, out.Decision,
"a route pinned to one dated build must not serve another")
})
t.Run("its own dated release still routes", func(t *testing.T) {
mw := New(Config{Providers: []ProviderRoute{pinned}})
in := newInputWithModelAndURL("claude-sonnet-4-5-20250101", "/v1/messages")
in.Metadata = append(in.Metadata, middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMProvider, Value: "anthropic"})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), in)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision, "the exact match must still route")
})
t.Run("two pinned builds each route to their own provider", func(t *testing.T) {
other := pinned
other.ID = "anthropic-pinned-newer"
other.Models = []string{"claude-sonnet-4-5-20250202"}
other.UpstreamHost = "newer.example.com"
mw := New(Config{Providers: []ProviderRoute{pinned, other}})
in := newInputWithModelAndURL("claude-sonnet-4-5-20250202", "/v1/messages")
in.Metadata = append(in.Metadata, middleware.KV{Key: middleware.KeyLLMProvider, Value: "anthropic"})
out, err := mw.Invoke(context.Background(), in)
require.NoError(t, err)
require.Equal(t, middleware.DecisionAllow, out.Decision)
require.NotNil(t, out.Mutations)
require.NotNil(t, out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream)
assert.Equal(t, "newer.example.com", out.Mutations.RewriteUpstream.Host,
"declaration order must not decide between two deliberately pinned builds")
})
}

View File

@@ -11,78 +11,11 @@ var codeRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-z][a-z0-9._-]{0,63}$`)
// denyResponse is the on-wire shape rendered by RenderDenyResponse.
// Keeping this as a typed struct ensures we never leak
// middleware-supplied bytes outside known fields.
//
// Type and Error mirror the denial in the vendor's own error shape when
// the request reached a known LLM surface. LLM clients only parse their
// provider's envelope, so without the mirror a budget stop reaches the
// user as an unexplained API error. The NetBird fields stay where they
// were, so the body is a superset and existing consumers are unaffected.
type denyResponse struct {
Code string `json:"code"`
Message string `json:"message,omitempty"`
Details map[string]string `json:"details,omitempty"`
Middleware string `json:"middleware,omitempty"`
Type string `json:"type,omitempty"`
Error *providerError `json:"error,omitempty"`
}
// providerError is the nested error object both vendor envelopes carry.
type providerError struct {
Type string `json:"type"`
Message string `json:"message,omitempty"`
Code string `json:"code,omitempty"`
}
// Vendor error types keyed by HTTP status, per each provider's published
// error reference.
const (
anthropicErrInvalidRequest = "invalid_request_error"
anthropicErrPermission = "permission_error"
anthropicErrRateLimit = "rate_limit_error"
anthropicErrAPI = "api_error"
openAIErrInvalidRequest = "invalid_request_error"
openAIErrRateLimit = "rate_limit_error"
)
// providerEnvelope returns the vendor-shaped mirror for a denial on the
// given surface, or nil when the surface has no envelope we can speak.
// message is the already-redacted public message.
func providerEnvelope(surface, code, message string, status int) (string, *providerError) {
switch surface {
case "anthropic":
return "error", &providerError{
Type: anthropicErrorType(status),
Message: message,
}
case "openai":
return "", &providerError{
Type: openAIErrorType(status),
Message: message,
Code: code,
}
default:
return "", nil
}
}
func anthropicErrorType(status int) string {
switch status {
case http.StatusForbidden:
return anthropicErrPermission
case http.StatusTooManyRequests:
return anthropicErrRateLimit
case http.StatusBadRequest:
return anthropicErrInvalidRequest
default:
return anthropicErrAPI
}
}
func openAIErrorType(status int) string {
if status == http.StatusTooManyRequests {
return openAIErrRateLimit
}
return openAIErrInvalidRequest
}
// RenderDenyResponse writes a structured JSON deny body. Status is
@@ -103,7 +36,6 @@ func RenderDenyResponse(w http.ResponseWriter, middlewareID string, reason *Deny
Message: truncate(Scan(reason.Message), 256),
Middleware: truncate(Scan(middlewareID), 64),
}
resp.Type, resp.Error = providerEnvelope(reason.Surface, resp.Code, resp.Message, status)
if n := len(reason.Details); n > 0 {
resp.Details = make(map[string]string, min(n, 8))
for k, v := range reason.Details {

View File

@@ -1,92 +0,0 @@
package middleware
import (
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// decodeDeny renders a denial and returns the parsed body plus the status.
func decodeDeny(t *testing.T, reason *DenyReason, status int) (map[string]any, int) {
t.Helper()
rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
RenderDenyResponse(rec, "llm_limit_check", reason, status)
var body map[string]any
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &body), "deny body must be valid JSON")
return body, rec.Code
}
// TestRenderDeny_AnthropicSurfaceMirrorsVendorShape covers a budget stop
// reaching Claude Code. The client only parses the Anthropic envelope, so
// without the mirror the user sees an unexplained API error instead of the
// reason their request was refused.
func TestRenderDeny_AnthropicSurfaceMirrorsVendorShape(t *testing.T) {
body, status := decodeDeny(t, &DenyReason{
Code: "llm_policy.budget_cap_exceeded",
Message: "LLM policy limit exceeded",
Surface: "anthropic",
}, http.StatusForbidden)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusForbidden, status)
assert.Equal(t, "error", body["type"], "Anthropic errors carry type=error at the top level")
errObj, ok := body["error"].(map[string]any)
require.True(t, ok, "error must be an object")
assert.Equal(t, "permission_error", errObj["type"], "403 maps to permission_error")
assert.Equal(t, "LLM policy limit exceeded", errObj["message"])
// The NetBird fields stay put so existing consumers keep working.
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.budget_cap_exceeded", body["code"])
assert.Equal(t, "LLM policy limit exceeded", body["message"])
assert.Equal(t, "llm_limit_check", body["middleware"])
}
// TestRenderDeny_OpenAISurfaceMirrorsVendorShape pins the OpenAI envelope,
// which nests the code and carries no top-level type.
func TestRenderDeny_OpenAISurfaceMirrorsVendorShape(t *testing.T) {
body, _ := decodeDeny(t, &DenyReason{
Code: "llm_policy.model_blocked",
Message: "model is not in the policy allowlist",
Surface: "openai",
}, http.StatusForbidden)
assert.NotContains(t, body, "type", "OpenAI errors have no top-level type")
errObj, ok := body["error"].(map[string]any)
require.True(t, ok, "error must be an object")
assert.Equal(t, "invalid_request_error", errObj["type"])
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_blocked", errObj["code"], "the NetBird code rides in the vendor code field")
assert.Equal(t, "model is not in the policy allowlist", errObj["message"])
}
// TestRenderDeny_RateLimitStatusMapsToVendorRateLimit pins the mapping a
// client's backoff keys on.
func TestRenderDeny_RateLimitStatusMapsToVendorRateLimit(t *testing.T) {
body, status := decodeDeny(t, &DenyReason{
Code: "llm_policy.token_cap_exceeded",
Message: "LLM policy limit exceeded",
Surface: "anthropic",
}, http.StatusTooManyRequests)
assert.Equal(t, http.StatusTooManyRequests, status, "429 must survive the status clamp")
errObj := body["error"].(map[string]any)
assert.Equal(t, "rate_limit_error", errObj["type"])
}
// TestRenderDeny_NoSurfaceKeepsLegacyShape guards non-LLM middlewares and
// denials raised before a surface is known.
func TestRenderDeny_NoSurfaceKeepsLegacyShape(t *testing.T) {
body, _ := decodeDeny(t, &DenyReason{
Code: "llm_policy.model_not_routable",
Message: "no provider configured for model x",
}, http.StatusForbidden)
assert.NotContains(t, body, "type", "no surface means no vendor mirror")
assert.NotContains(t, body, "error", "no surface means no vendor mirror")
assert.Equal(t, "llm_policy.model_not_routable", body["code"])
}

View File

@@ -22,15 +22,6 @@ const (
// body. Empty for clients that don't send one.
KeyLLMSessionID = "llm.session_id"
// Sub-agent attribution (emitted by llm_request_parser from the
// client's request headers). A coding agent that spawns helpers
// stamps the spawned agent's id, and the spawning agent's id when
// the helper is itself nested, so cost within one session can be
// split across the agents that ran in parallel. These identify an
// agent, not a person or a device: never treat them as a user id.
KeyLLMAgentID = "llm.agent_id"
KeyLLMParentAgentID = "llm.parent_agent_id"
// LLM response-side metadata (emitted by llm_response_parser).
//nolint:gosec // metadata key name, not a credential
KeyLLMInputTokens = "llm.input_tokens"
@@ -75,14 +66,6 @@ const (
// downstream gateways' spend logs.
KeyLLMAuthorisingGroups = "llm.authorising_groups"
// LLM non-inference marker (emitted by llm_router on the allow path
// for endpoints that legitimately carry no model, such as model
// listing). The router still authorises these against the caller's
// groups; the marker only tells the limits gate that a per-model
// allowlist has nothing to evaluate, so an empty model must not be
// read as an undetermined one. Never derived from client input.
KeyLLMNonInference = "llm.non_inference"
// LLM policy attribution (emitted by llm_limit_check on the allow
// path). Names the policy that paid for this request and the
// dimension counters the post-flight llm_limit_record middleware

View File

@@ -179,12 +179,6 @@ type DenyReason struct {
Code string
Message string
Details map[string]string
// Surface names the LLM API dialect the caller speaks (the
// llm.provider value), so the rendered body can mirror the denial in
// that vendor's error shape alongside the NetBird fields. Empty for
// non-LLM middlewares and for denials raised before a surface was
// resolved; the body then carries the NetBird fields alone.
Surface string
}
// Output is the value each middleware returns to the dispatcher. The
@@ -253,12 +247,6 @@ type UpstreamRewrite struct {
// without verifying its TLS certificate. Set by llm_router from the
// provider's skip_tls_verification for self-hosted / internal gateways.
SkipTLSVerify bool
// DiscoveryModels, when non-empty, is the set of model ids the resolved
// route authorises, and the proxy drops everything else from the
// model-listing response. Empty leaves the upstream's list untouched,
// which is what a route that claims every model wants. Set by
// llm_router on a model-listing request only.
DiscoveryModels []string
}
// AuthHeader is a single name/value pair the proxy injects on the

View File

@@ -1,191 +0,0 @@
package proxy
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"io"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"strings"
sharedllm "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/llm"
)
// maxDiscoveryBodyBytes bounds the model-listing response the filter will
// buffer. A listing is a few kilobytes of ids; anything larger is not a
// listing we recognise, and buffering it to rewrite would cost more than
// the filtering is worth.
const maxDiscoveryBodyBytes = 1 << 20
// modelDiscoveryFilter returns a ModifyResponse hook that drops models the
// caller's policy does not authorise from a model-listing response, then
// delegates to next (which may be nil).
//
// Clients populate their model picker from this endpoint, so an unfiltered
// list offers models the very next request denies. The filter is
// best-effort: a response it cannot safely rewrite passes through
// untouched rather than reaching the client corrupted.
func modelDiscoveryFilter(allowed []string, next func(*http.Response) error) func(*http.Response) error {
permitted := make(map[string]struct{}, len(allowed)*2)
for _, id := range allowed {
permitted[id] = struct{}{}
permitted[sharedllm.NormalizeAnthropicModel(id)] = struct{}{}
}
return func(resp *http.Response) error {
if err := filterModelListing(resp, permitted); err != nil {
return err
}
if next == nil {
return nil
}
return next(resp)
}
}
// filterModelListing rewrites the response body in place, keeping only the
// entries whose id the policy authorises. Responses that are not a plain
// JSON listing are left alone.
func filterModelListing(resp *http.Response, permitted map[string]struct{}) error {
if !isPlainJSONListing(resp) {
return nil
}
// One byte past the cap, so an oversized body is detectable without
// buffering all of it.
body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxDiscoveryBodyBytes+1))
if err != nil {
_ = resp.Body.Close()
return err
}
if len(body) > maxDiscoveryBodyBytes {
// Too large to filter. Put the bytes already read back in front of the
// unread remainder and forward the response exactly as the upstream
// sent it, headers included. Buffering what was read and closing here
// would truncate the body at the cap and hand the client a short,
// invalid listing — worse than not filtering at all.
resp.Body = spliceBody(body, resp.Body)
return nil
}
if err := resp.Body.Close(); err != nil {
return err
}
filtered, ok := filterListingBody(body, permitted)
if !ok {
restoreBody(resp, body)
return nil
}
restoreBody(resp, filtered)
return nil
}
// isPlainJSONListing reports whether the response is a JSON body the filter
// can parse. A content-encoded body is skipped: the transport only
// transparently decompresses what it negotiated itself, and the client
// negotiates its own encoding on this request.
func isPlainJSONListing(resp *http.Response) bool {
if resp == nil || resp.Body == nil {
return false
}
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
return false
}
if enc := resp.Header.Get("Content-Encoding"); enc != "" && !strings.EqualFold(enc, "identity") {
return false
}
return strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(resp.Header.Get("Content-Type")), "application/json")
}
// filterListingBody returns the listing with unauthorised entries removed.
// ok is false when the body is not a listing shape, in which case the
// caller must forward the original bytes.
func filterListingBody(body []byte, permitted map[string]struct{}) ([]byte, bool) {
var doc map[string]json.RawMessage
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &doc); err != nil {
return nil, false
}
raw, present := doc["data"]
if !present {
return nil, false
}
var entries []map[string]json.RawMessage
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &entries); err != nil {
return nil, false
}
kept := make([]map[string]json.RawMessage, 0, len(entries))
for _, entry := range entries {
if entryPermitted(entry, permitted) {
kept = append(kept, entry)
}
}
encoded, err := json.Marshal(kept)
if err != nil {
return nil, false
}
doc["data"] = encoded
out, err := json.Marshal(doc)
if err != nil {
return nil, false
}
return out, true
}
// entryPermitted reports whether a listing entry names a model the policy
// authorises, trying every form the same model is written in.
func entryPermitted(entry map[string]json.RawMessage, permitted map[string]struct{}) bool {
raw, ok := entry["id"]
if !ok {
return false
}
var id string
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &id); err != nil {
return false
}
for _, candidate := range modelIDForms(id) {
if _, ok := permitted[candidate]; ok {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// modelIDForms returns the forms a single model id may be written in: the id
// itself, its undated form, and the same two with a gateway's provider
// prefix removed ("vertex_ai/claude-sonnet-5"). The bare id is tried first,
// because a self-hosted id can legitimately contain a slash of its own
// ("Qwen/Qwen2.5-0.5B-Instruct") and must not be cut down to its tail.
func modelIDForms(id string) []string {
if id == "" {
return nil
}
forms := []string{id, sharedllm.NormalizeAnthropicModel(id)}
if slash := strings.LastIndex(id, "/"); slash >= 0 {
tail := id[slash+1:]
forms = append(forms, tail, sharedllm.NormalizeAnthropicModel(tail))
}
return forms
}
// restoreBody puts body back on the response and fixes the length headers
// so the client reads exactly what is there.
// spliceBody returns a ReadCloser that yields prefix followed by whatever is
// left in rest, closing rest when closed. It lets the filter put back bytes it
// consumed while deciding, without owning the rest of the stream.
func spliceBody(prefix []byte, rest io.ReadCloser) io.ReadCloser {
return struct {
io.Reader
io.Closer
}{
Reader: io.MultiReader(bytes.NewReader(prefix), rest),
Closer: rest,
}
}
func restoreBody(resp *http.Response, body []byte) {
resp.Body = io.NopCloser(bytes.NewReader(body))
resp.ContentLength = int64(len(body))
resp.Header.Set("Content-Length", strconv.Itoa(len(body)))
}

View File

@@ -1,217 +0,0 @@
package proxy
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"io"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
// jsonListingResponse builds a 200 model-listing response with the given
// body, as an upstream would return it.
func jsonListingResponse(body string) *http.Response {
resp := &http.Response{
StatusCode: http.StatusOK,
Header: http.Header{},
Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(body)),
ContentLength: int64(len(body)),
}
resp.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
return resp
}
// listedIDs runs the filter and returns the ids left in the response.
func listedIDs(t *testing.T, allowed []string, body string) []string {
t.Helper()
resp := jsonListingResponse(body) //nolint:bodyclose // in-memory body, replaced by the filter
require.NoError(t, modelDiscoveryFilter(allowed, nil)(resp)) //nolint:bodyclose // in-memory body, replaced by the filter
raw, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
require.NoError(t, err)
var doc struct {
Data []struct {
ID string `json:"id"`
} `json:"data"`
}
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(raw, &doc), "filtered body must stay valid JSON")
ids := make([]string, 0, len(doc.Data))
for _, entry := range doc.Data {
ids = append(ids, entry.ID)
}
return ids
}
// TestModelDiscoveryFilter_KeepsOnlyAuthorisedModels covers the picker a
// developer sees: an unfiltered upstream list offers every model the shared
// key can reach, and each one the policy excludes is a request the chain
// denies a moment later.
func TestModelDiscoveryFilter_KeepsOnlyAuthorisedModels(t *testing.T) {
ids := listedIDs(t, []string{"claude-sonnet-5", "claude-haiku-4-5"}, `{
"data": [
{"id": "claude-opus-5", "display_name": "Claude Opus 5"},
{"id": "claude-sonnet-5", "display_name": "Claude Sonnet 5"},
{"id": "claude-haiku-4-5"}
],
"has_more": false
}`)
assert.Equal(t, []string{"claude-sonnet-5", "claude-haiku-4-5"}, ids,
"only the models the route authorises may reach the picker")
}
// TestModelDiscoveryFilter_MatchesDatedAndPrefixedIDs pins the two id forms
// a gateway returns for a model the operator registered plainly.
func TestModelDiscoveryFilter_MatchesDatedAndPrefixedIDs(t *testing.T) {
ids := listedIDs(t, []string{"claude-sonnet-4-5", "anthropic.claude-opus-5"}, `{
"data": [
{"id": "claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929"},
{"id": "bedrock/anthropic.claude-opus-5"},
{"id": "gpt-4o"}
]
}`)
assert.Equal(t, []string{"claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929", "bedrock/anthropic.claude-opus-5"}, ids,
"a dated or provider-prefixed id must match its registered form")
}
// TestModelDiscoveryFilter_PreservesEnvelopeFields guards the rest of the
// document: clients read paging fields alongside data.
func TestModelDiscoveryFilter_PreservesEnvelopeFields(t *testing.T) {
resp := jsonListingResponse(`{"data":[{"id":"claude-sonnet-5"}],"has_more":true,"first_id":"x"}`) //nolint:bodyclose // in-memory body, replaced by the filter
require.NoError(t, modelDiscoveryFilter([]string{"claude-sonnet-5"}, nil)(resp)) //nolint:bodyclose // in-memory body, replaced by the filter
raw, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
require.NoError(t, err)
var doc map[string]any
require.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(raw, &doc))
assert.Equal(t, true, doc["has_more"], "paging fields must survive the rewrite")
assert.Equal(t, "x", doc["first_id"])
assert.Equal(t, strconv.Itoa(len(raw)), resp.Header.Get("Content-Length"),
"Content-Length must match the rewritten body")
}
// TestModelDiscoveryFilter_PassesThroughUnfilterable covers the responses
// the filter must not touch: a compressed body it cannot parse, a non-JSON
// body, an error status, and a document with no data array.
func TestModelDiscoveryFilter_PassesThroughUnfilterable(t *testing.T) {
cases := map[string]func() *http.Response{
"compressed": func() *http.Response {
resp := jsonListingResponse(`{"data":[{"id":"gpt-4o"}]}`)
resp.Header.Set("Content-Encoding", "gzip")
return resp
},
"not json": func() *http.Response {
resp := jsonListingResponse(`{"data":[{"id":"gpt-4o"}]}`)
resp.Header.Set("Content-Type", "text/html")
return resp
},
"error status": func() *http.Response {
resp := jsonListingResponse(`{"data":[{"id":"gpt-4o"}]}`)
resp.StatusCode = http.StatusInternalServerError
return resp
},
"no data array": func() *http.Response {
return jsonListingResponse(`{"object":"list"}`)
},
}
for name, build := range cases {
t.Run(name, func(t *testing.T) {
resp := build() //nolint:bodyclose // in-memory body, replaced by the filter
original, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
require.NoError(t, err)
resp.Body = io.NopCloser(bytes.NewReader(original))
require.NoError(t, modelDiscoveryFilter([]string{"claude-sonnet-5"}, nil)(resp)) //nolint:bodyclose // in-memory body, replaced by the filter
got, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, string(original), string(got), "an unfilterable response must reach the client unchanged")
})
}
}
// TestModelDiscoveryFilter_RunsNextHook pins that an existing
// ModifyResponse hook still runs after filtering.
func TestModelDiscoveryFilter_RunsNextHook(t *testing.T) {
called := false
next := func(*http.Response) error {
called = true
return nil
}
resp := jsonListingResponse(`{"data":[{"id":"claude-sonnet-5"}]}`) //nolint:bodyclose // in-memory body, replaced by the filter
require.NoError(t, modelDiscoveryFilter([]string{"claude-sonnet-5"}, next)(resp)) //nolint:bodyclose // in-memory body, replaced by the filter
assert.True(t, called, "the chained hook must still run")
}
// TestModelDiscoveryFilter_KeepsSlashBearingIDs covers self-hosted backends
// whose model ids carry a slash of their own. Treating the slash as a
// gateway prefix and keeping only the tail dropped every such model from
// the picker even though the policy named it exactly.
func TestModelDiscoveryFilter_KeepsSlashBearingIDs(t *testing.T) {
ids := listedIDs(t, []string{"Qwen/Qwen2.5-0.5B-Instruct"}, `{
"object": "list",
"data": [
{"id": "Qwen/Qwen2.5-0.5B-Instruct"},
{"id": "Qwen/Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct"}
]
}`)
assert.Equal(t, []string{"Qwen/Qwen2.5-0.5B-Instruct"}, ids,
"a slash inside the model id is part of the id, not a provider prefix")
}
// TestModelDiscoveryFilter_ForwardsOversizedBodyIntact covers a listing past
// the buffering cap. The filter reads one byte beyond the cap to detect the
// size; forwarding only what it read would hand the client a body truncated
// at exactly 1 MiB — valid-looking, short, and unparseable as JSON. The bytes
// already read must be spliced back in front of the unread remainder so the
// response reaches the client exactly as the upstream sent it.
func TestModelDiscoveryFilter_ForwardsOversizedBodyIntact(t *testing.T) {
// A well-formed listing whose single entry pads the body past the cap.
padding := strings.Repeat("x", maxDiscoveryBodyBytes)
body := `{"object":"list","data":[{"id":"gpt-4o","note":"` + padding + `"}]}`
require.Greater(t, len(body), maxDiscoveryBodyBytes+1,
"the fixture must exceed the cap by more than the one-byte probe")
resp := jsonListingResponse(body) //nolint:bodyclose // in-memory body
require.NoError(t, modelDiscoveryFilter(nil, nil)(resp)) //nolint:bodyclose // in-memory body
got, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, len(body), len(got),
"an oversized listing must reach the client whole, not truncated at the cap")
assert.Equal(t, body, string(got), "the forwarded bytes must be the upstream's own")
var doc map[string]json.RawMessage
assert.NoError(t, json.Unmarshal(got, &doc),
"the forwarded body must still parse as JSON")
}
// TestModelDiscoveryFilter_OversizedBodyKeepsUpstreamHeaders pins that the
// oversized path leaves the response metadata alone. Rewriting Content-Length
// to the truncated prefix is what made the corruption invisible to the client
// until it tried to parse.
func TestModelDiscoveryFilter_OversizedBodyKeepsUpstreamHeaders(t *testing.T) {
padding := strings.Repeat("x", maxDiscoveryBodyBytes)
body := `{"object":"list","data":[{"id":"gpt-4o","note":"` + padding + `"}]}`
resp := jsonListingResponse(body) //nolint:bodyclose // in-memory body
resp.Header.Set("Content-Length", strconv.Itoa(len(body)))
require.NoError(t, modelDiscoveryFilter(nil, nil)(resp)) //nolint:bodyclose // in-memory body
assert.Equal(t, int64(len(body)), resp.ContentLength,
"ContentLength must keep describing the body the client receives")
assert.Equal(t, strconv.Itoa(len(body)), resp.Header.Get("Content-Length"),
"the Content-Length header must not be rewritten to the truncated prefix")
}

View File

@@ -363,9 +363,6 @@ func (p *ReverseProxy) forwardUpstream(respWriter http.ResponseWriter, r *http.R
if result.rewriteRedirects {
rp.ModifyResponse = p.rewriteLocationFunc(effectiveURL, rewriteMatchedPath, r) //nolint:bodyclose
}
if upstreamRewrite != nil && len(upstreamRewrite.DiscoveryModels) > 0 {
rp.ModifyResponse = modelDiscoveryFilter(upstreamRewrite.DiscoveryModels, rp.ModifyResponse) //nolint:bodyclose // the hook replaces the body and closes the original
}
rp.ServeHTTP(respWriter, r.WithContext(ctx))
}

View File

@@ -46,27 +46,6 @@ func NormalizeBedrockModel(modelID string) string {
return bedrockVersionSuffix.ReplaceAllString(m, "")
}
// anthropicDatedModel matches a Claude model id carrying the trailing
// "-YYYYMMDD" release-date suffix Anthropic appends to a pinned release,
// capturing the id without it. The "claude" anchor is load-bearing: pricing
// looks every model up through this helper regardless of surface, and an
// operator may register a custom id with any shape at all, so an unanchored
// "-\d{8}$" would let "internal-llm-20250101" silently inherit the rate
// registered for "internal-llm". The anchor also covers the vendor-prefixed
// forms ("anthropic.claude-...", "us.anthropic.claude-...").
var anthropicDatedModel = regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)^(.*claude.*)-\d{8}$`)
// NormalizeAnthropicModel strips the trailing release-date suffix from a
// Claude model id, e.g. "claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929" -> "claude-sonnet-4-5",
// so a dated id a client pins matches the undated one the operator
// registered. Ids that are not Claude-family are returned untouched.
// Callers try the verbatim id first and fall back to this, so two dated
// releases of the same family stay distinct wherever both are registered
// explicitly.
func NormalizeAnthropicModel(modelID string) string {
return anthropicDatedModel.ReplaceAllString(modelID, "$1")
}
// NormalizeVertexModel strips the "@version" suffix from a Vertex AI model id
// (e.g. "claude-sonnet-4-5@20250929" -> "claude-sonnet-4-5") so it matches
// the catalog/pricing key. Vertex publisher models are priced under their

View File

@@ -34,29 +34,3 @@ func TestNormalizeVertexModel(t *testing.T) {
require.Equal(t, want, NormalizeVertexModel(in), "normalize %q", in)
}
}
func TestNormalizeAnthropicModel(t *testing.T) {
cases := map[string]string{
"claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929": "claude-sonnet-4-5",
"claude-3-5-haiku-20241022": "claude-3-5-haiku",
"claude-sonnet-5": "claude-sonnet-5",
"claude-opus-4-8": "claude-opus-4-8",
"anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5": "anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5",
"anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929": "anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-5",
"us.anthropic.claude-opus-4-8-20250101": "us.anthropic.claude-opus-4-8",
// Non-Claude ids must survive untouched even when they end in eight
// consecutive digits: an operator can register a custom model under
// any id, and pricing looks every one of them up through this helper.
"gpt-4o": "gpt-4o",
"gpt-4o-2024-08-06": "gpt-4o-2024-08-06",
"gpt-4o-20240806": "gpt-4o-20240806",
"internal-llm-20250101": "internal-llm-20250101",
"deepseek-r1-20250120": "deepseek-r1-20250120",
"Qwen/Qwen2.5-20250101": "Qwen/Qwen2.5-20250101",
"gemini-2-5-pro-20250101": "gemini-2-5-pro-20250101",
"": "",
}
for in, want := range cases {
require.Equal(t, want, NormalizeAnthropicModel(in), "normalize %q", in)
}
}

View File

@@ -154,6 +154,14 @@ components:
type: boolean
description: Whether sensitive data should be anonymized in the bundle.
example: false
anonymize_level:
type: string
description: How much the anonymizer redacts. "default" (or empty) keeps internal IP ranges, "strict" also anonymizes them.
example: strict
upload_url:
type: string
description: Service URL the client requests an upload URL from before uploading the bundle. Empty selects the default upload server.
example: https://upload.debug.netbird.io
required:
- bundle_for
- bundle_for_time

View File

@@ -2527,6 +2527,9 @@ type BundleParameters struct {
// Anonymize Whether sensitive data should be anonymized in the bundle.
Anonymize bool `json:"anonymize"`
// AnonymizeLevel How much the anonymizer redacts. "default" (or empty) keeps internal IP ranges, "strict" also anonymizes them.
AnonymizeLevel *string `json:"anonymize_level,omitempty"`
// BundleFor Whether to generate a bundle for the given timeframe.
BundleFor bool `json:"bundle_for"`
@@ -2535,6 +2538,9 @@ type BundleParameters struct {
// LogFileCount Maximum number of log files to include in the bundle.
LogFileCount int `json:"log_file_count"`
// UploadUrl Service URL the client requests an upload URL from before uploading the bundle. Empty selects the default upload server.
UploadUrl *string `json:"upload_url,omitempty"`
}
// BundleResult defines model for BundleResult.

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -114,6 +114,9 @@ message BundleParameters {
// (or empty) keeps internal IP ranges, "strict" also anonymizes them.
// Unknown values are treated as "strict".
string anonymize_level = 5;
// upload_url is the service URL the client requests an upload URL from
// before uploading the bundle. Empty selects the default upload server.
string upload_url = 6;
}
message BundleResult {