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Author SHA1 Message Date
Viktor Liu
d49bc93cb3 Merge branch 'main' into fix-ssh-authorized-users-multi-rule
# Conflicts:
#	management/server/types/account.go
#	shared/management/types/networkmap_components.go
2026-07-31 22:09:39 +02:00
Viktor Liu
be578368d8 Add test for bidirectional SSH rule authorized users on source peers 2026-07-15 19:16:56 +02:00
Viktor Liu
10ba4b368f Collect SSH authorized users for bidirectional rules on source peers 2026-07-15 19:16:56 +02:00
16 changed files with 107 additions and 859 deletions

514
AGENTS.md
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@@ -1,514 +0,0 @@
# NetBird Agent Guidelines
**NetBird** is an open-source connectivity platform: a WireGuard®-based overlay
network with a control plane. The **agent** (`client/`) runs on user machines as
a privileged daemon and manages the WireGuard interface, routing, firewall, and
DNS. **Management** (`management/`) is the control plane and REST/gRPC API,
**Signal** (`signal/`) brokers peer handshakes, **Relay** (`relay/`) carries
traffic when a direct tunnel is impossible, and **Proxy** (`proxy/`) is the
identity-aware proxy behind Agent Network.
This file applies to the whole repository, and is the single source of truth for
agent guidance here. `CLAUDE.md` is a one-line pointer to it — keep the guidance
in this file, not duplicated there.
## Contents
- [NetBird Agent Guidelines](#netbird-agent-guidelines)
- [Contents](#contents)
- [STOP and ask the user before](#stop-and-ask-the-user-before)
- [Quick reference](#quick-reference)
- [Structure](#structure)
- [Where to look](#where-to-look)
- [Repo-wide principles](#repo-wide-principles)
- [Error handling](#error-handling)
- [Comments](#comments)
- [Testing](#testing)
- [Pitfalls](#pitfalls)
- [Commits, PRs, releases](#commits-prs-releases)
- [After you push: CI and review bots](#after-you-push-ci-and-review-bots)
- [Discussion and support](#discussion-and-support)
## STOP and ask the user before
- **Opening a pull request for anything beyond a trivial fix, without an agreed
ticket.** Ask the user directly: *"Is there a discussion or issue for this
change?"* NetBird is discussion-first — community reports start in
[Discussions](https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/discussions), DevRel
validates them, and only validated discussions become issues. A PR that
changes behavior with no linked issue may be closed on arrival. If there is no
ticket, offer to draft the discussion post **instead of** the PR, and wait for
the user's call. Only typos, broken links, documentation corrections, and
one-line fixes that already have an issue can skip this.
- **Designing in any high-risk area** (see
[CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md#high-risk-areas)): public API and OpenAPI
schema, gRPC protos, behavior existing deployments would notice after an
upgrade, peer connectivity (ICE, NAT traversal, relay selection, WireGuard® or
Rosenpass key handling), client system integration (routing, firewall, DNS,
interface), authentication and authorization, CLI or service flags, config
file format, daemon IPC, store schema and migrations, or a new feature. The
design gets agreed in the ticket before code is written.
- **Writing a store migration or changing a persisted model.** Migrations are
one-way in the field and both the GORM and pgx paths may need the change.
- **Hand-editing generated code.** `*.pb.go`, `*.gen.go`, and mocks are outputs.
Edit the source (`.proto`, `openapi.yml`) and rerun the matching
`generate.sh`.
- **Adding, removing, or bumping a dependency**, and never vendor a fork.
- **Weakening a security control** — authentication, authorization, certificate
verification, privilege dropping, or peer identity checks — even when it is
the fastest way to make a test pass.
- **Force-pushing to `main`**, force-pushing any branch that is already under
review, amending pushed commits, or bypassing hooks with `--no-verify`.
## Quick reference
```bash
# Build
go build ./...
cd client && CGO_ENABLED=0 go build . # agent
cd management && go build . # management service
cd signal && go build . # signal service
# Verify (run before every push)
go fmt ./...
make lint # golangci-lint on files changed vs origin/main (also the pre-push hook)
make lint-all # full-repository lint, matches CI
make test-unit # host-safe unit tests, -tags devcert, no sudo
make test-privileged # privileged-tagged suite in a Docker container with NET_ADMIN
make setup-hooks # wire make lint into .githooks/pre-push
# Narrow runs
go test ./client/internal/dns/...
go test -race -run TestPeerConn ./client/internal/peer/...
PRIV_RUN=TestNftablesManager PRIV_PKGS=./client/firewall/nftables/... make test-privileged
# Code generation (never hand-edit the output)
./shared/management/http/api/generate.sh # REST types from openapi.yml
./shared/management/proto/generate.sh
./shared/signal/proto/generate.sh
./client/proto/generate.sh
./flow/proto/generate.sh
# Run locally (lab only, never on a machine you rely on)
sudo ./client/netbird up --log-level debug --log-file console
sudo ./client/netbird down # teardown: restores routing, firewall, DNS
./signal/signal run --log-level debug --log-file console
./management/management management --log-level debug --log-file console --config ./management.json
```
`netbird up` needs root and rewrites the host's routing table, firewall rules,
DNS configuration, and WireGuard® interface. Run it only in a disposable test
environment (a VM, container, or throwaway host) that you can rebuild, never on
a workstation or server whose connectivity matters. Run `sudo netbird down`
before you stop working, before rebuilding the binary, and on every failure
path, so the host's networking state is restored instead of left half-applied.
See [Pitfalls](#pitfalls) for why cleanup on every exit path matters.
## Structure
```text
netbird/
├── client/ NetBird agent
│ ├── cmd/ agent CLI
│ ├── internal/ agent business logic (engine, peer, dns, routemanager, ...)
│ ├── server/ daemon for background execution
│ ├── proto/ daemon gRPC protos
│ ├── iface/ WireGuard® interface management
│ ├── firewall/ nftables, iptables, pf, WFP, userspace backends
│ ├── ssh/ built-in SSH server and client
│ ├── ui/ desktop UI (Wails v3 + React)
│ ├── android/, ios/ mobile bindings
│ ├── wasm/ WebAssembly build
│ └── mdm/, system/ MDM policy, host information
├── management/ control plane
│ └── server/ account, peer, groups, networks, posture, permissions,
│ settings, store, http (REST), idp, integrations, migration
├── signal/ handshake broker (peer/, server/)
├── relay/ relay service (protocol/, server/, healthcheck/)
├── proxy/ identity-aware proxy (llm/, acme/, accesslog/, middleware/, tcp/, udp/)
├── agent-network/ Agent Network overview
├── shared/ imported by both agent and services
│ ├── management/ proto/, client/, http/api (OpenAPI + generated types)
│ ├── signal/ proto/, client/
│ └── relay/, auth/, sshauth/, metrics/
├── e2e/ end-to-end suites and harness
├── encryption/, dns/, route/, stun/, sharedsock/, util/, flow/
├── infrastructure_files/ docker compose and getting-started templates
└── release_files/ files packaged into releases
```
## Where to look
| Task | Location |
| --------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------ |
| REST API / OpenAPI | `shared/management/http/api/` + `management/server/http/` |
| Management gRPC protocol | `shared/management/proto/` |
| Signal protocol | `shared/signal/proto/` |
| Daemon IPC protocol | `client/proto/` |
| Peer connection and NAT | `client/internal/peer/` |
| Network map handling | `client/internal/engine.go`, `shared/management/networkmap/` |
| Routing | `client/internal/routemanager/`, `route/` |
| Firewall backends | `client/firewall/` |
| DNS | `client/internal/dns/`, `dns/` |
| WireGuard® interface | `client/iface/` |
| Persistence and migrations | `management/server/store/`, `management/server/migration/` |
| IdP integrations | `management/server/idp/` |
| Permissions model | `management/server/permissions/` |
| LLM routing / Agent Network | `proxy/internal/llm/`, `agent-network/` |
| End-to-end tests | `e2e/` |
## Repo-wide principles
1. **Run `go fmt` on every modified Go file.** Formatting is not optional.
2. **Zero unaddressed diagnostics.** Fix IDE and linter warnings on code you
touch, and delete imports, helpers, and parameters your refactor orphaned.
Exception: unused parameters in shared code may be consumed by builds outside
this repository — do not remove them, ask instead.
3. **Function comments are mandatory for exported functions**, written as full
sentences with a period, starting with the identifier name.
4. **Prefer private functions and constants.** Export only what a caller outside
the package genuinely needs.
5. **Early returns and guard clauses.** Handle errors and edge cases first
instead of nesting `if`/`else` chains.
6. **Split complex functions.** If a function trips a complexity warning, break
it into named helpers rather than silencing the warning.
7. **Avoid LLM-slop tells:** em dashes, hedging narration, restating the diff in
prose, trailing summaries. Defaults, not absolute bans. Applies to code,
comments, commit messages, and PR descriptions alike.
8. **Concurrency: do a two-pass race analysis after every change** that adds
shared state. Guard maps and slices with a mutex, keep critical sections
short, and run `go test -race` on the touched packages.
9. **Cross-platform builds must keep working.** The agent targets Linux, macOS,
Windows, FreeBSD, Android, and iOS. When you add a platform-specific file,
add the counterpart or a build-tagged fallback for the others.
10. **Never hand-edit generated files.** Change the source and regenerate.
11. **Never log secrets** — private keys, setup keys, tokens, PAT values — and
keep peer IPs and hostnames out of logs above debug level.
## Error handling
Use single-assignment form when the error is only needed inside the `if`:
```go
// Good
if err := someCall(); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("context: %w", err)
}
// Bad - unnecessary split
err := someCall()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("context: %w", err)
}
```
Use multiple assignment when the value is needed after the block:
```go
result, err := someCall()
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("context: %w", err)
}
```
Add short, meaningful context, and **do not** start `fmt.Errorf` messages with
obvious words like "failed to" or "error":
```go
// Good
return fmt.Errorf("parse remote address: %w", err)
return fmt.Errorf("listen on %s: %w", addr, err)
// Bad
return fmt.Errorf("failed to parse remote address: %w", err)
return fmt.Errorf("error listening on %s: %w", addr, err)
// "failed" is fine in log messages
log.Debugf("failed to parse remote address: %v", err)
```
Skip the wrapping when a function only extracts or delegates and the wrap would
add nothing:
```go
func parseAddr(addr string) (string, int, error) {
host, portStr, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
if err != nil {
return "", 0, err
}
// ...
}
```
Log the errors you choose not to act on:
- `log.Debugf()` for errors that do not affect program flow but help debugging.
- `log.Tracef()` for very verbose errors that would otherwise spam logs.
- **Never ignore** errors from writes, network sends, or critical cleanup.
- Close errors may be ignored for read-only operations; log them at debug for
writes.
## Comments
Comment the **why**, never the **what**. Default to no comment, and add one only
when a hidden constraint or workaround would surprise a future reader. Never
reference the current task, PR, or your own changes in a comment.
```go
// Bad - trailing comments explaining the obvious
defer localConn.Close() // Close the connection
if err != nil { // Check if error occurred
// Good
defer localConn.Close()
// Good - explains a non-obvious constraint
// Use incremental checksum update per RFC 1624 for performance.
checksum = updateChecksum(checksum, oldPort, newPort)
```
### Length budget
- **90 characters per line.** Wrap the comment, do not run past it.
- **250 characters per comment**, roughly three wrapped lines. Doc comments on
exported identifiers may exceed it when the API genuinely needs the
explanation; inline comments inside a function body may not.
The budget is a smell detector, not a rule to game. Do not compress a needed
explanation into cryptic shorthand to fit — if a block of code needs more than
250 characters of prose, the code is doing too much. Fix the code:
- **Extract a named function.** A well-named function replaces the comment: the
name says *what*, the body shows *how*, and the comment you no longer write
was the *what* anyway. Clean Code calls this "explain yourself in code".
- **Extract a named constant or predicate.** `if isExpiredSetupKey(key)` needs
no comment; `if key.ExpiresAt.Before(now) && !key.Revoked && key.UsageLimit > 0`
does.
- **Keep the surviving comment for the why** — the RFC, the kernel quirk, the
ordering constraint. That part is usually one or two lines.
### Long switch and if/else chains
A `switch` whose cases carry multi-line explanations is the usual place this
budget is breached, and the comment is a symptom. In order of preference:
1. **Extract each case body into a named function.** The case becomes one line,
the name carries the meaning, and the switch reads as a table of contents.
2. **Replace the switch with a lookup table**`map[Kind]handlerFunc` — when the
branches are uniform. Adding a case stops meaning editing a growing function.
3. **Replace conditional with polymorphism** when branches vary by type and the
same switch shape starts appearing in more than one place. Clean Code's rule
of thumb: tolerate a switch statement if it appears **once**, is buried in a
factory that returns an interface, and no other switch dispatches on the same
type. A second switch over the same enum is the signal to introduce the
interface.
Do not restructure a switch purely to satisfy the budget when the cases are one
line each and self-evident — a flat, boring `switch` over an enum is fine and
needs no comments at all.
Explanatory comments in tests are welcome — they document the scenario being set
up, and the 250-character budget does not apply to them.
## Testing
- **Unit tests** live beside the code as `_test.go`. `make test-unit` runs the
host-safe set with `-tags devcert` and no sudo.
- **Privileged tests** carry the `privileged` build tag and mutate host
networking. They run through `make test-privileged`, inside a Docker container
with `NET_ADMIN`. Never bypass that harness by running them directly on the
host.
- **End-to-end suites** live in `e2e/` with a shared harness.
- **Test real behavior, not API existence.** Assert on the observable end state
a consumer would see — bytes that arrived, the packet after translation, the
row after the write — not merely that a method exists or returns an error.
- **Avoid mocks for code we own.** Exercise the real store, manager, or
controller and assert what the caller actually receives.
- **`require` for setup and preconditions, `assert` for the conditions under
test.** Use `require` whenever a later line would panic or be meaningless
otherwise.
- **Message guidance:** optional for `NoError`/`Error`; always give context for
comparison, boolean, and collection assertions.
```go
server, err := StartTestServer()
require.NoError(t, err, "Test server setup must succeed")
defer server.Close()
result, err := client.DoOperation()
assert.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, expectedResult, result, "Result should match expected")
```
## Pitfalls
- **The agent runs as root.** Anything touching routing, firewall, DNS, or the
interface can take a user's machine off the network. Prefer a reversible
change and make sure cleanup runs on every exit path.
- **Management has two account loaders** (GORM and pgx). Adding a relation to an
account often means updating both, or it silently comes back empty in
production.
- **`go test ./...` without `-tags devcert` skips tests** that need the
development certificate. Use `make test-unit`.
- **`make lint` only checks the diff against `origin/main`.** CI runs
`make lint-all`; run it too before pushing a large change.
- **Protos are consumed by released clients.** An old agent must keep working
against a new Management, so fields are added, never renumbered or removed.
- **Windows requires the wintun driver**, and the daemon serves a named pipe
(`npipe://netbird`) rather than loopback TCP. Loopback TCP carries no caller
identity, so privileged operations are refused over it.
## Commits, PRs, releases
- **PR titles must start with a bracketed tag.** Before you propose a title,
**read [`.github/workflows/pr-title-check.yml`](.github/workflows/pr-title-check.yml)
and take the allowed tags from the `allowedTags` array in that file.** It is
the only source of truth, it changes as components are added, and the check
runs on every title edit — a tag that is not in that array is a red build. Do
not rely on a list memorized from anywhere else, including this file.
```text
[client] Authorize daemon IPC callers by their local identity
[management,client] Add MDM policy support
```
Multiple tags are comma-separated inside one pair of brackets. Match the tag
to the component you actually changed, not to the one you read the most.
- **Use the repository's PR template.** Fill in
[`.github/pull_request_template.md`](.github/pull_request_template.md) rather
than replacing it with your own summary: describe the change, link the issue,
tick the checklist honestly (including "ran locally" and "single purpose"),
and complete the documentation section. Do not tick a box you have not
verified, and do not delete rows that do not apply.
- **Keep the PR description short.** Under 1000 words on top of the template's
own text, and usually far less — a few paragraphs. Reviewers read the diff;
the description exists to explain what the diff cannot say for itself. This is
well below what an agent will produce by default, so cut before you post.
- **Body: why before what.** Lead with the problem and the reason for this
approach, then the shape of the change. No bullet list of files changed, no
per-function walkthrough, no restating the diff in prose, no trailing summary
section, no self-congratulatory closing line.
- **No `Co-Authored-By` or tool-attribution trailers in the PR description**,
and none in commits either. Contributors own their contributions. Whatever
tooling produced the diff, the person opening the PR is its author: they have
read every line, they can explain why it works, they can answer review
questions without going back to a model, and they are accountable for the
consequences of merging it. Do not add a trailer, footer, or description line
that spreads that ownership onto a tool.
- **Commit subjects follow the same `[scope] Subject` convention.** Keep the
subject short, and use the body for why before what. No bullet lists of files
changed.
- **Push review fixes as separate commits.** The PR is squashed on merge, so
there is no reason to rewrite history mid-review; many small commits make the
re-review readable.
- **Do not force-push a branch that is under review.** A force-push detaches
existing review comments from the lines they were written against, destroys
the "changes since your last review" diff a reviewer relies on, and discards
the CI history that showed which commit broke what. Add commits instead —
including for fixups and reverts. Force-push only when there is no
alternative: a rebase to clear a genuine conflict, or removing a secret or a
large binary that was committed by mistake. When you must, ask the user first,
then say so in a PR comment so reviewers know their anchors moved. Never
force-push `main`, and never force-push a branch you do not own.
- **One PR, one purpose.** Split refactors out of fixes and fixes out of
features.
- **Keep the PR small.** Size is the single strongest predictor of how long a PR
waits. Aim for **under ~400 changed lines across under ~20 files**; past
roughly **1000 lines or 50 files** a community PR is likely to be sent back to
be split, or left unreviewed until it is. Large PRs from outside the core team
may be blocked outright when the size was never agreed in the ticket —
reviewing a sprawling change against a privileged networking daemon is a
security risk in itself, not just a time cost.
Judge the size by hand-written code: exclude generated output, `go.sum`,
vendored files, and test fixtures from the estimate, but do not use their
presence to argue a 3000-line PR is small.
When a change genuinely cannot be small — a protocol migration, a
cross-component rename — agree the split in the ticket **before** writing
code, and land it as a sequence of PRs that each build, test, and make sense
on their own. Propose that split to the user rather than opening one large PR
and hoping.
- **User-facing changes need a docs PR** in
[netbirdio/docs](https://github.com/netbirdio/docs), linked from the PR
description.
## After you push: CI and review bots
Opening the PR is not the end of the task. Watch the run, read what the bots
say, and drive the PR to green before you report the work as done.
```bash
gh pr checks <pr> --watch # all checks, live
gh run view <run-id> --log-failed # only the failing steps
gh pr view <pr> --comments # bot and human review comments
```
**Never report a change as finished while checks are pending or red**, and never
describe a red PR as passing. If you ran out of turn before CI finished, say
which checks were still running.
### The checks
- **Go tests** — `golang-test-{linux,darwin,windows,freebsd}.yml`, sharded per
component. A failure in a component you did not touch is usually a real
interaction, not noise; read the log before assuming flake.
- **golangci-lint** — `golangci-lint.yml` runs the full repository, while
`make lint` only checks your diff. A clean local lint does not guarantee green
CI on a large change.
- **PR Title Check** — `pr-title-check.yml`, see above.
- **Codecov** — uploaded from the Linux test workflow with per-component flags
(`unit,client`, `unit,management`, `unit,relay`, `unit,proxy`, `unit,signal`,
`integration,management`). Coverage on new code should not go backwards. Add
tests for the paths you introduced; do not adjust thresholds or exclude files
to clear the report.
- **CodeRabbit** — configured in [`.coderabbit.yaml`](.coderabbit.yaml): `chill`
profile, auto-review on every non-draft PR, TypeScript/JavaScript/SVG paths
filtered out. Chat auto-reply is on, so `@coderabbitai` in a comment reaches
it.
- **SonarCloud** — project `netbirdio_netbird`, quality gate on new code (bugs,
vulnerabilities, code smells, duplication, coverage).
- **Snyk** — dependency and code scanning.
Sonar and Snyk report as GitHub App checks rather than workflows in this
repository, so their detail lives on the PR check, not in the Actions logs.
### Handling bot findings
- **Read every comment and act on it.** Either fix it, or reply with the reason
it does not apply. Do not bulk-resolve threads to clear the count, and do not
silently ignore a finding because the check is advisory.
- **Bots are frequently wrong here.** NetBird has privileged, platform-specific,
and concurrency-heavy code that static analysis reads poorly. A confident
CodeRabbit or Sonar comment can still be nonsense. Verify the claim against
the code before you change anything — never edit correct code just to silence
a bot.
- **Security findings get the opposite default.** For a Snyk or Sonar
vulnerability, or a CodeRabbit comment about authentication, authorization,
certificate verification, or key handling, assume it is real until you have
disproved it. Surface it to the user rather than dismissing it yourself.
- **A new vulnerable dependency is a stop.** Bumping or replacing dependencies
needs the user's decision, as above.
- **Never change a workflow, threshold, lint exclusion, or bot config to make a
check pass.** If a check is genuinely wrong, say so and let the user decide.
- **Do not paper over flakes with blind re-runs.** Identify the failure first. If
it is a known flake, name it; if you cannot tell, report it as unresolved
rather than re-running until it goes green.
## Discussion and support
- Discussions: <https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/discussions>
- Slack: <https://docs.netbird.io/slack-url>
- Docs: <https://docs.netbird.io>
- Security: <https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird/security/policy> — never in public
- Contribution process: [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md)

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@@ -1 +0,0 @@
See [AGENTS.md](AGENTS.md) for the agent guidelines in this repository.

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@@ -66,41 +66,11 @@ Typical bug fixes, internal refactors, documentation updates, and tests do not
need a design discussion, but should still be tied to an issue so the work is
visible and nobody duplicates it.
### Using AI coding agents
We have no policy for or against using an AI agent to write NetBird code. That
choice is yours, and we are not going to interrogate anyone about their tools.
What we do have is a lot of incoming contributions that were plainly drafted with
one, and enough experience reviewing them to see the same avoidable problems
again and again: no ticket behind the change, a diff far too large to review, a
description longer than the code it describes, an approach that was never going
to be accepted, and an author who cannot answer questions about their own PR.
None of that is caused by the tooling — it is what happens when a tool is pointed
at a repository whose expectations it has never been told.
So rather than a rule, there is a guide. [AGENTS.md](AGENTS.md) restates the
expectations from this document in the form agents read automatically
(`CLAUDE.md` points to it), so pointing your tool at the repository is usually
enough. Among other things it tells the agent to ask you for the
discussion or issue before drafting a PR, to keep the change small and
single-purpose, to run the tests locally, to use this repository's PR template
and title tags, and to write a description a reviewer can get through.
The guardrails are the point, and they are the same ones we apply to everyone: an
agreed ticket, a change you have actually run, a diff small enough to review with
care, and an author who can explain it. Whatever wrote the diff, you are its
author — you own every line you submit and the consequences of opening a PR with it.
We may assess whether a contribution is maintainable and whether its merged code
aligns with our security standards and design expectations.
## Contents
- [Contributing to NetBird](#contributing-to-netbird)
- [Ticket first, PR second](#ticket-first-pr-second)
- [High-risk areas](#high-risk-areas)
- [Using AI coding agents](#using-ai-coding-agents)
- [Contents](#contents)
- [Code of conduct](#code-of-conduct)
- [Directory structure](#directory-structure)

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@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
package dns
import (
"fmt"
"net"
)
func getInterfaceIndex(interfaceName string) (int, error) {
iface, err := net.InterfaceByName(interfaceName)
if err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("lookup interface %q: %w", interfaceName, err)
}
return iface.Index, nil
}

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@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
package dns
import (
"net"
"testing"
)
func TestGetInterfaceIndexExisting(t *testing.T) {
interfaces, err := net.Interfaces()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("list network interfaces: %v", err)
}
if len(interfaces) == 0 {
t.Fatal("expected at least one network interface")
}
iface := interfaces[0]
index, err := getInterfaceIndex(iface.Name)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("look up existing interface %q: %v", iface.Name, err)
}
if index != iface.Index {
t.Fatalf("expected interface index %d, got %d", iface.Index, index)
}
}
func TestGetInterfaceIndexMissing(t *testing.T) {
index, err := getInterfaceIndex("netbird-interface-that-does-not-exist")
if index != 0 {
t.Fatalf("expected missing interface index to be 0, got %d", index)
}
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("expected missing interface lookup to return an error")
}
}

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@@ -130,3 +130,8 @@ func GetClientPrivate(iface privateClientIface, upstreamIP netip.Addr, dialTimeo
}
return client, nil
}
func getInterfaceIndex(interfaceName string) (int, error) {
iface, err := net.InterfaceByName(interfaceName)
return iface.Index, err
}

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@@ -158,19 +158,13 @@ func (c *Client) Run(fd int32, interfaceName string, envList *EnvList) error {
defer c.ctxCancel()
c.ctxCancelLock.Unlock()
// No login pre-flight here. The engine's own loginToManagement (connect.go) performs
// the authoritative Login immediately before the first Sync, so a LoginSync() call at
// this point only duplicated it — costing two extra Login RPCs (IsLoginRequired +
// Login) on every engine start, since IsLoginRequired is itself a full Login RPC.
//
// Auth failures still reach the caller through the engine path: loginToManagement
// returns PermissionDenied, which marks the shared status recorder
// (MarkManagementDisconnected) and fires ClientStop → onDisconnected, where
// IsLoginRequiredCached() reports login-required. The error is also returned out of Run().
//
// A pre-flight was also actively harmful when the server is unreachable: its 2-minute
// backoff blocked the start and then reported "login required" for what was really a
// timeout. The engine instead keeps retrying and recovers when the server returns.
auth := NewAuthWithConfig(ctx, cfg)
err = auth.LoginSync()
if err != nil {
return err
}
log.Infof("Auth successful")
// todo do not throw error in case of cancelled context
ctx = internal.CtxInitState(ctx)
c.onHostDnsFn = func([]string) {}

View File

@@ -222,36 +222,17 @@ func (a *Auth) Login(resultListener ErrListener, urlOpener URLOpener, forceDevic
// LoginWithDeviceName performs interactive login with device authentication support
// The deviceName parameter allows specifying a custom device name (required for tvOS)
func (a *Auth) LoginWithDeviceName(resultListener ErrListener, urlOpener URLOpener, forceDeviceAuth bool, deviceName string) {
a.startLogin(resultListener, urlOpener, forceDeviceAuth, deviceName, false)
}
// LoginInteractive performs the same interactive login as LoginWithDeviceName but skips the
// IsLoginRequired() pre-flight and goes straight to the browser / device-code flow.
//
// IsLoginRequired() is itself a full Login RPC against the management server, so when the
// caller has ALREADY established that login is required it is a pure duplicate. On iOS the
// main app decides to show the browser based on its own isLoginRequired() check and then
// calls straight into this method, so re-asking the server would add another Login RPC to
// every interactive login.
//
// Use LoginWithDeviceName when the auth state is unknown and a silent (browser-less) login
// must still be possible; use this when the browser is going to be shown regardless.
func (a *Auth) LoginInteractive(resultListener ErrListener, urlOpener URLOpener, forceDeviceAuth bool, deviceName string) {
a.startLogin(resultListener, urlOpener, forceDeviceAuth, deviceName, true)
}
func (a *Auth) startLogin(resultListener ErrListener, urlOpener URLOpener, forceDeviceAuth bool, deviceName string, skipLoginCheck bool) {
if resultListener == nil {
log.Errorf("startLogin: resultListener is nil")
log.Errorf("LoginWithDeviceName: resultListener is nil")
return
}
if urlOpener == nil {
log.Errorf("startLogin: urlOpener is nil")
log.Errorf("LoginWithDeviceName: urlOpener is nil")
resultListener.OnError(fmt.Errorf("urlOpener is nil"))
return
}
go func() {
err := a.login(urlOpener, forceDeviceAuth, deviceName, skipLoginCheck)
err := a.login(urlOpener, forceDeviceAuth, deviceName)
if err != nil {
resultListener.OnError(err)
} else {
@@ -260,7 +241,7 @@ func (a *Auth) startLogin(resultListener ErrListener, urlOpener URLOpener, force
}()
}
func (a *Auth) login(urlOpener URLOpener, forceDeviceAuth bool, deviceName string, skipLoginCheck bool) error {
func (a *Auth) login(urlOpener URLOpener, forceDeviceAuth bool, deviceName string) error {
// Create context with device name if provided
ctx := a.ctx
if deviceName != "" {
@@ -274,13 +255,10 @@ func (a *Auth) login(urlOpener URLOpener, forceDeviceAuth bool, deviceName strin
}
defer authClient.Close()
// check if we need to generate JWT token (skipped when the caller already knows)
needsLogin := true
if !skipLoginCheck {
needsLogin, err = authClient.IsLoginRequired(ctx)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to check login requirement: %v", err)
}
// check if we need to generate JWT token
needsLogin, err := authClient.IsLoginRequired(ctx)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to check login requirement: %v", err)
}
jwtToken := ""

View File

@@ -157,14 +157,14 @@ func NewManager(
}
func (m *managerImpl) GetAllProviders(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID string) ([]*types.Provider, error) {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkProviders, operations.Read); err != nil {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, operations.Read); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return m.store.GetAccountAgentNetworkProviders(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, accountID)
}
func (m *managerImpl) GetProvider(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID, providerID string) (*types.Provider, error) {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkProviders, operations.Read); err != nil {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, operations.Read); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return m.store.GetAgentNetworkProviderByID(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, accountID, providerID)
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ func (m *managerImpl) GetProvider(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID, provid
// been created yet; otherwise it is ignored (the cluster is pinned on
// Settings and every provider in the account routes through it).
func (m *managerImpl) CreateProvider(ctx context.Context, userID string, provider *types.Provider, bootstrapCluster string) (*types.Provider, error) {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, provider.AccountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkProviders, operations.Create); err != nil {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, provider.AccountID, userID, operations.Create); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ func (m *managerImpl) CreateProvider(ctx context.Context, userID string, provide
}
func (m *managerImpl) UpdateProvider(ctx context.Context, userID string, provider *types.Provider) (*types.Provider, error) {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, provider.AccountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkProviders, operations.Update); err != nil {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, provider.AccountID, userID, operations.Update); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ func (m *managerImpl) UpdateProvider(ctx context.Context, userID string, provide
}
func (m *managerImpl) DeleteProvider(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID, providerID string) error {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkProviders, operations.Delete); err != nil {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, operations.Delete); err != nil {
return err
}
@@ -306,21 +306,21 @@ func pluralize(n int, singular, plural string) string {
}
func (m *managerImpl) GetAllPolicies(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID string) ([]*types.Policy, error) {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkPolicies, operations.Read); err != nil {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, operations.Read); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return m.store.GetAccountAgentNetworkPolicies(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, accountID)
}
func (m *managerImpl) GetPolicy(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID, policyID string) (*types.Policy, error) {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkPolicies, operations.Read); err != nil {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, operations.Read); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return m.store.GetAgentNetworkPolicyByID(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, accountID, policyID)
}
func (m *managerImpl) CreatePolicy(ctx context.Context, userID string, policy *types.Policy) (*types.Policy, error) {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, policy.AccountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkPolicies, operations.Create); err != nil {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, policy.AccountID, userID, operations.Create); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ func (m *managerImpl) CreatePolicy(ctx context.Context, userID string, policy *t
}
func (m *managerImpl) UpdatePolicy(ctx context.Context, userID string, policy *types.Policy) (*types.Policy, error) {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, policy.AccountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkPolicies, operations.Update); err != nil {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, policy.AccountID, userID, operations.Update); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ func (m *managerImpl) UpdatePolicy(ctx context.Context, userID string, policy *t
}
func (m *managerImpl) DeletePolicy(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID, policyID string) error {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkPolicies, operations.Delete); err != nil {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, operations.Delete); err != nil {
return err
}
@@ -393,21 +393,21 @@ func (m *managerImpl) DeletePolicy(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID, polic
}
func (m *managerImpl) GetAllGuardrails(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID string) ([]*types.Guardrail, error) {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkGuardrails, operations.Read); err != nil {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, operations.Read); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return m.store.GetAccountAgentNetworkGuardrails(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, accountID)
}
func (m *managerImpl) GetGuardrail(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID, guardrailID string) (*types.Guardrail, error) {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkGuardrails, operations.Read); err != nil {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, operations.Read); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return m.store.GetAgentNetworkGuardrailByID(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, accountID, guardrailID)
}
func (m *managerImpl) CreateGuardrail(ctx context.Context, userID string, guardrail *types.Guardrail) (*types.Guardrail, error) {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, guardrail.AccountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkGuardrails, operations.Create); err != nil {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, guardrail.AccountID, userID, operations.Create); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ func (m *managerImpl) CreateGuardrail(ctx context.Context, userID string, guardr
}
func (m *managerImpl) UpdateGuardrail(ctx context.Context, userID string, guardrail *types.Guardrail) (*types.Guardrail, error) {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, guardrail.AccountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkGuardrails, operations.Update); err != nil {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, guardrail.AccountID, userID, operations.Update); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ func (m *managerImpl) UpdateGuardrail(ctx context.Context, userID string, guardr
}
func (m *managerImpl) DeleteGuardrail(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID, guardrailID string) error {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkGuardrails, operations.Delete); err != nil {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, operations.Delete); err != nil {
return err
}
@@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ func (m *managerImpl) DeleteGuardrail(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID, gu
// GetAllBudgetRules returns every account-level budget rule for the account.
func (m *managerImpl) GetAllBudgetRules(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID string) ([]*types.AccountBudgetRule, error) {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkBudgets, operations.Read); err != nil {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, operations.Read); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return m.store.GetAccountAgentNetworkBudgetRules(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, accountID)
@@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ func (m *managerImpl) GetAllBudgetRules(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID s
// GetBudgetRule returns a single account-level budget rule.
func (m *managerImpl) GetBudgetRule(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID, ruleID string) (*types.AccountBudgetRule, error) {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkBudgets, operations.Read); err != nil {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, operations.Read); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return m.store.GetAgentNetworkBudgetRuleByID(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, accountID, ruleID)
@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ func (m *managerImpl) GetBudgetRule(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID, rule
// enforced at request time (CheckLLMPolicyLimits), not baked into the synth
// proxy config, so no reconcile is needed.
func (m *managerImpl) CreateBudgetRule(ctx context.Context, userID string, rule *types.AccountBudgetRule) (*types.AccountBudgetRule, error) {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, rule.AccountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkBudgets, operations.Create); err != nil {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, rule.AccountID, userID, operations.Create); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -513,7 +513,7 @@ func (m *managerImpl) CreateBudgetRule(ctx context.Context, userID string, rule
// UpdateBudgetRule updates an existing account-level budget rule.
func (m *managerImpl) UpdateBudgetRule(ctx context.Context, userID string, rule *types.AccountBudgetRule) (*types.AccountBudgetRule, error) {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, rule.AccountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkBudgets, operations.Update); err != nil {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, rule.AccountID, userID, operations.Update); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ func (m *managerImpl) UpdateBudgetRule(ctx context.Context, userID string, rule
// DeleteBudgetRule removes an account-level budget rule.
func (m *managerImpl) DeleteBudgetRule(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID, ruleID string) error {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkBudgets, operations.Delete); err != nil {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, operations.Delete); err != nil {
return err
}
@@ -561,7 +561,7 @@ func (m *managerImpl) DeleteBudgetRule(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID, r
// gating, access-log emission), a reconcile is triggered so the proxy and peer
// network maps converge on the new state.
func (m *managerImpl) UpdateSettings(ctx context.Context, userID string, settings *types.Settings) (*types.Settings, error) {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, settings.AccountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkSettings, operations.Update); err != nil {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, settings.AccountID, userID, operations.Update); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@@ -615,7 +615,7 @@ func (m *managerImpl) validateProviderRefs(ctx context.Context, accountID string
// Returns the underlying status.NotFound when no row has been
// bootstrapped yet (i.e. the account has no providers).
func (m *managerImpl) GetSettings(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID string) (*types.Settings, error) {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkSettings, operations.Read); err != nil {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, operations.Read); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return m.store.GetAgentNetworkSettings(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, accountID)
@@ -685,7 +685,7 @@ func (m *managerImpl) bootstrapSettingsIfNeeded(ctx context.Context, accountID,
// counter view; permission gate is the same Read role that gates
// every other agent-network surface.
func (m *managerImpl) ListConsumption(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID string) ([]*types.Consumption, error) {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkUsage, operations.Read); err != nil {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, operations.Read); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return m.store.ListAgentNetworkConsumption(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, accountID)
@@ -694,7 +694,7 @@ func (m *managerImpl) ListConsumption(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID str
// ListAccessLogs returns a paginated, server-side-filtered page of
// agent-network access logs plus the total count matching the filter.
func (m *managerImpl) ListAccessLogs(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID string, filter types.AgentNetworkAccessLogFilter) ([]*types.AgentNetworkAccessLog, int64, error) {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkLogs, operations.Read); err != nil {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, operations.Read); err != nil {
return nil, 0, err
}
return m.store.GetAgentNetworkAccessLogs(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, accountID, filter)
@@ -704,7 +704,7 @@ func (m *managerImpl) ListAccessLogs(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID stri
// agent-network access logs grouped by session, plus the total number of
// sessions matching the filter.
func (m *managerImpl) ListAccessLogSessions(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID string, filter types.AgentNetworkAccessLogFilter) ([]*types.AgentNetworkAccessLogSession, int64, error) {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkLogs, operations.Read); err != nil {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, operations.Read); err != nil {
return nil, 0, err
}
return m.store.GetAgentNetworkAccessLogSessions(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, accountID, filter)
@@ -713,7 +713,7 @@ func (m *managerImpl) ListAccessLogSessions(ctx context.Context, accountID, user
// GetUsageOverview returns the filtered usage rows aggregated into time buckets
// at the requested granularity, oldest-first.
func (m *managerImpl) GetUsageOverview(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID string, filter types.AgentNetworkAccessLogFilter, granularity types.UsageGranularity) ([]*types.AgentNetworkUsageBucket, error) {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, modules.AgentNetworkUsage, operations.Read); err != nil {
if err := m.requirePermission(ctx, accountID, userID, operations.Read); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
rows, err := m.store.GetAgentNetworkUsageRows(ctx, store.LockingStrengthNone, accountID, filter)
@@ -787,8 +787,8 @@ func (m *managerImpl) RecordConsumption(ctx context.Context, accountID string, k
return m.store.IncrementAgentNetworkConsumption(ctx, accountID, kind, dimID, windowSeconds, windowStart, tokensIn, tokensOut, costUSD)
}
func (m *managerImpl) requirePermission(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID string, module modules.Module, op operations.Operation) error {
ok, _, err := m.permissionsManager.ValidateUserPermissions(ctx, accountID, userID, module, op)
func (m *managerImpl) requirePermission(ctx context.Context, accountID, userID string, op operations.Operation) error {
ok, _, err := m.permissionsManager.ValidateUserPermissions(ctx, accountID, userID, modules.AgentNetwork, op)
if err != nil {
return status.NewPermissionValidationError(err)
}

View File

@@ -82,9 +82,6 @@ func (m *managerImpl) ValidateUserPermissions(
return m.ValidateRoleModuleAccess(ctx, accountID, role, module, operation), ctxEnriched, nil
}
// ValidateRoleModuleAccess resolves an operation against the role's explicit
// grant for the module, then the grant for its parent module when the module
// is a dotted submodule, and finally the role's AutoAllowNew default.
func (m *managerImpl) ValidateRoleModuleAccess(
ctx context.Context,
accountID string,
@@ -92,7 +89,7 @@ func (m *managerImpl) ValidateRoleModuleAccess(
module modules.Module,
operation operations.Operation,
) bool {
if permissions, ok := lookupModulePermissions(role, module); ok {
if permissions, ok := role.Permissions[module]; ok {
if allowed, exists := permissions[operation]; exists {
return allowed
}
@@ -103,21 +100,6 @@ func (m *managerImpl) ValidateRoleModuleAccess(
return role.AutoAllowNew[operation]
}
// lookupModulePermissions returns the role's explicit permission set for the
// module, falling back to the parent module's set for dotted submodules. The
// second return reports whether any explicit set was found.
func lookupModulePermissions(role roles.RolePermissions, module modules.Module) (map[operations.Operation]bool, bool) {
if permissions, ok := role.Permissions[module]; ok {
return permissions, true
}
if parent, hasParent := module.Parent(); hasParent {
if permissions, ok := role.Permissions[parent]; ok {
return permissions, true
}
}
return nil, false
}
func (m *managerImpl) ValidateAccountAccess(ctx context.Context, accountID string, user *types.User, allowOwnerAndAdmin bool) (context.Context, error) {
if user.AccountID != accountID {
return ctx, status.NewUserNotPartOfAccountError()
@@ -137,7 +119,7 @@ func (m *managerImpl) GetPermissionsByRole(ctx context.Context, role types.UserR
permissions := roles.Permissions{}
for k := range modules.All {
if rolePermissions, ok := lookupModulePermissions(roleMap, k); ok {
if rolePermissions, ok := roleMap.Permissions[k]; ok {
permissions[k] = rolePermissions
continue
}

View File

@@ -1,139 +0,0 @@
package permissions
import (
"context"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/permissions/modules"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/permissions/operations"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/permissions/roles"
"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/management/server/types"
)
func TestValidateRoleModuleAccessSubmoduleCascade(t *testing.T) {
manager := NewManager(nil)
ctx := context.Background()
fullAccess := map[operations.Operation]bool{
operations.Read: true,
operations.Create: true,
operations.Update: true,
operations.Delete: true,
}
readOnly := map[operations.Operation]bool{
operations.Read: true,
operations.Create: false,
operations.Update: false,
operations.Delete: false,
}
denyAll := map[operations.Operation]bool{
operations.Read: false,
operations.Create: false,
operations.Update: false,
operations.Delete: false,
}
t.Run("parent grant covers submodules", func(t *testing.T) {
role := roles.RolePermissions{
AutoAllowNew: denyAll,
Permissions: roles.Permissions{modules.AgentNetwork: fullAccess},
}
assert.True(t, manager.ValidateRoleModuleAccess(ctx, "account", role, modules.AgentNetworkProviders, operations.Create),
"parent full grant should allow create on a submodule")
assert.True(t, manager.ValidateRoleModuleAccess(ctx, "account", role, modules.AgentNetworkLogs, operations.Read),
"parent full grant should allow read on a submodule")
})
t.Run("submodule grant does not leak to parent or siblings", func(t *testing.T) {
role := roles.RolePermissions{
AutoAllowNew: denyAll,
Permissions: roles.Permissions{modules.AgentNetworkUsage: readOnly},
}
assert.True(t, manager.ValidateRoleModuleAccess(ctx, "account", role, modules.AgentNetworkUsage, operations.Read),
"explicit submodule read should be allowed")
assert.False(t, manager.ValidateRoleModuleAccess(ctx, "account", role, modules.AgentNetworkUsage, operations.Create),
"read-only submodule grant should not allow create")
assert.False(t, manager.ValidateRoleModuleAccess(ctx, "account", role, modules.AgentNetwork, operations.Read),
"submodule grant should not grant the parent module")
assert.False(t, manager.ValidateRoleModuleAccess(ctx, "account", role, modules.AgentNetworkProviders, operations.Read),
"submodule grant should not grant a sibling submodule")
})
t.Run("explicit submodule entry wins over parent grant", func(t *testing.T) {
role := roles.RolePermissions{
AutoAllowNew: denyAll,
Permissions: roles.Permissions{
modules.AgentNetwork: fullAccess,
modules.AgentNetworkLogs: denyAll,
},
}
assert.False(t, manager.ValidateRoleModuleAccess(ctx, "account", role, modules.AgentNetworkLogs, operations.Read),
"explicit submodule deny should override the parent grant")
assert.True(t, manager.ValidateRoleModuleAccess(ctx, "account", role, modules.AgentNetworkUsage, operations.Read),
"sibling submodules should still resolve through the parent grant")
})
t.Run("auto allow applies when neither submodule nor parent is granted", func(t *testing.T) {
role := roles.RolePermissions{
AutoAllowNew: readOnly,
}
assert.True(t, manager.ValidateRoleModuleAccess(ctx, "account", role, modules.AgentNetworkProviders, operations.Read),
"auto-allow read should apply to submodules")
assert.False(t, manager.ValidateRoleModuleAccess(ctx, "account", role, modules.AgentNetworkProviders, operations.Delete),
"auto-allow should not grant unlisted operations")
})
}
// TestExistingRolesKeepAgentNetworkBehaviorOnSubmodules pins the behavior the
// submodule split must not change: every built-in role resolves the new
// submodules exactly as it resolved the agent_network module before.
func TestExistingRolesKeepAgentNetworkBehaviorOnSubmodules(t *testing.T) {
manager := NewManager(nil)
ctx := context.Background()
submodules := []modules.Module{
modules.AgentNetworkProviders,
modules.AgentNetworkPolicies,
modules.AgentNetworkGuardrails,
modules.AgentNetworkBudgets,
modules.AgentNetworkUsage,
modules.AgentNetworkLogs,
modules.AgentNetworkSettings,
}
allOperations := []operations.Operation{operations.Read, operations.Create, operations.Update, operations.Delete}
for _, role := range []types.UserRole{types.UserRoleOwner, types.UserRoleAdmin, types.UserRoleAuditor, types.UserRoleNetworkAdmin, types.UserRoleUser} {
rolePermissions, ok := roles.RolesMap[role]
require.True(t, ok, "role %s must exist in RolesMap", role)
for _, sub := range submodules {
for _, op := range allOperations {
expected := manager.ValidateRoleModuleAccess(ctx, "account", rolePermissions, modules.AgentNetwork, op)
actual := manager.ValidateRoleModuleAccess(ctx, "account", rolePermissions, sub, op)
assert.Equal(t, expected, actual, "role %s: %s on %s should match the agent_network module", role, op, sub)
}
}
}
}
func TestGetPermissionsByRoleIncludesSubmodules(t *testing.T) {
manager := NewManager(nil)
ctx := context.Background()
permissions, err := manager.GetPermissionsByRole(ctx, types.UserRoleAuditor)
require.NoError(t, err, "auditor role must resolve")
usage, ok := permissions[modules.AgentNetworkUsage]
require.True(t, ok, "permissions map should contain the usage submodule")
assert.True(t, usage[operations.Read], "auditor should read the usage submodule")
assert.False(t, usage[operations.Update], "auditor should not update the usage submodule")
adminPermissions, err := manager.GetPermissionsByRole(ctx, types.UserRoleAdmin)
require.NoError(t, err, "admin role must resolve")
providers, ok := adminPermissions[modules.AgentNetworkProviders]
require.True(t, ok, "permissions map should contain the providers submodule")
assert.True(t, providers[operations.Delete], "admin should delete on the providers submodule")
}

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
package modules
import "strings"
type Module string
const (
@@ -22,17 +20,6 @@ const (
IdentityProviders Module = "identity_providers"
Services Module = "services"
AgentNetwork Module = "agent_network"
// Agent Network submodules. A role may grant one of these directly
// or grant the AgentNetwork parent, which covers all of them (see
// permissions.Manager cascade resolution).
AgentNetworkProviders Module = "agent_network.providers"
AgentNetworkPolicies Module = "agent_network.policies"
AgentNetworkGuardrails Module = "agent_network.guardrails"
AgentNetworkBudgets Module = "agent_network.budgets"
AgentNetworkUsage Module = "agent_network.usage"
AgentNetworkLogs Module = "agent_network.logs"
AgentNetworkSettings Module = "agent_network.settings"
)
var All = map[Module]struct{}{
@@ -53,21 +40,4 @@ var All = map[Module]struct{}{
IdentityProviders: {},
Services: {},
AgentNetwork: {},
AgentNetworkProviders: {},
AgentNetworkPolicies: {},
AgentNetworkGuardrails: {},
AgentNetworkBudgets: {},
AgentNetworkUsage: {},
AgentNetworkLogs: {},
AgentNetworkSettings: {},
}
// Parent returns the module owning a dotted submodule name and true, or the
// module itself and false when it has no parent.
func (m Module) Parent() (Module, bool) {
if i := strings.IndexByte(string(m), '.'); i > 0 {
return Module(string(m)[:i]), true
}
return m, false
}

View File

@@ -1019,7 +1019,12 @@ func (a *Account) GetPeerConnectionResources(ctx context.Context, peer *nbpeer.P
generateResources(rule, sourcePeers, FirewallRuleDirectionIN)
}
if peerInDestinations && rule.Protocol == PolicyRuleProtocolNetbirdSSH {
// Auth is collected when this peer serves the rule. For bidirectional
// rules the peer-in-sources side also serves inbound traffic, so it
// must be treated as a destination too.
peerServesAuth := peerInDestinations || (rule.Bidirectional && peerInSources)
if peerServesAuth && rule.Protocol == PolicyRuleProtocolNetbirdSSH {
sshEnabled = true
switch {
case len(rule.AuthorizedGroups) > 0:
@@ -1051,7 +1056,7 @@ func (a *Account) GetPeerConnectionResources(ctx context.Context, peer *nbpeer.P
default:
authorizedUsers[auth.Wildcard] = a.getAllowedUserIDs()
}
} else if peerInDestinations && PolicyRuleImpliesLegacySSH(rule) && peer.SSHEnabled {
} else if peerServesAuth && PolicyRuleImpliesLegacySSH(rule) && peer.SSHEnabled {
sshEnabled = true
authorizedUsers[auth.Wildcard] = a.getAllowedUserIDs()
}

View File

@@ -479,7 +479,12 @@ func (a *Account) getPeersGroupsPoliciesRoutes(
for _, srcGroupID := range rule.Sources {
relevantGroupIDs[srcGroupID] = a.GetGroup(srcGroupID)
}
}
// SSH auth requirements are gathered whenever this peer serves
// the rule. For bidirectional rules the peer-in-sources side
// also serves inbound traffic and must be treated as a destination.
if peerInDestinations || (rule.Bidirectional && peerInSources) {
if rule.Protocol == PolicyRuleProtocolNetbirdSSH {
switch {
case len(rule.AuthorizedGroups) > 0:

View File

@@ -983,6 +983,44 @@ func TestComponents_SSHAuthorizedUsersContent(t *testing.T) {
assert.True(t, hasRoot || hasAdmin, "AuthorizedUsers should contain 'root' or 'admin' machine user mapping")
}
// TestComponents_SSHAuthorizedUsersBidirectionalSource verifies that a peer
// on the sources side of a bidirectional NetbirdSSH rule receives the rule's
// authorized users. The reverse direction (destinations -> sources) makes
// the source-side peer a destination too, so it must be able to authorize
// inbound SSH from the rule's destinations.
func TestComponents_SSHAuthorizedUsersBidirectionalSource(t *testing.T) {
account, validatedPeers := scalableTestAccountWithoutDefaultPolicy(20, 2)
account.Users["user-dev"] = &types.User{Id: "user-dev", Role: types.UserRoleUser, AccountID: "test-account", AutoGroups: []string{"ssh-users"}}
account.Groups["ssh-users"] = &types.Group{ID: "ssh-users", Name: "SSH Users", Peers: []string{}}
account.Policies = append(account.Policies, &types.Policy{
ID: "policy-ssh-bidir", Name: "Bidirectional SSH", Enabled: true, AccountID: "test-account",
Rules: []*types.PolicyRule{{
ID: "rule-ssh-bidir", Name: "SSH both ways", Enabled: true,
Action: types.PolicyTrafficActionAccept, Protocol: types.PolicyRuleProtocolNetbirdSSH,
Bidirectional: true,
Sources: []string{"group-0"}, Destinations: []string{"group-1"},
AuthorizedGroups: map[string][]string{"ssh-users": {"root"}},
}},
})
nmSrc := componentsNetworkMap(account, "peer-0", validatedPeers)
require.NotNil(t, nmSrc)
assert.True(t, nmSrc.EnableSSH, "source-side peer of bidirectional SSH rule should have SSH enabled")
require.NotEmpty(t, nmSrc.AuthorizedUsers, "source-side peer should receive authorized users from bidirectional rule")
rootUsers, hasRoot := nmSrc.AuthorizedUsers["root"]
require.True(t, hasRoot, "source-side peer should map the 'root' local user")
_, hasDev := rootUsers["user-dev"]
assert.True(t, hasDev, "source-side peer should include 'user-dev' under 'root'")
nmDst := componentsNetworkMap(account, "peer-10", validatedPeers)
require.NotNil(t, nmDst)
assert.True(t, nmDst.EnableSSH, "destination-side peer should also have SSH enabled")
_, hasRoot = nmDst.AuthorizedUsers["root"]
assert.True(t, hasRoot, "destination-side peer should also map the 'root' local user")
}
// TestComponents_SSHLegacyImpliedSSH verifies that a non-SSH ALL protocol policy with
// SSHEnabled peer implies legacy SSH access.
func TestComponents_SSHLegacyImpliedSSH(t *testing.T) {

View File

@@ -256,7 +256,12 @@ func (c *NetworkMapComponents) getPeerConnectionResources(targetPeerID string) (
generateResources(rule, sourcePeers, FirewallRuleDirectionIN)
}
if peerInDestinations && rule.Protocol == PolicyRuleProtocolNetbirdSSH {
// Auth is collected when this peer serves the rule. For bidirectional
// rules the peer-in-sources side also serves inbound traffic, so it
// must be treated as a destination too.
peerServesAuth := peerInDestinations || (rule.Bidirectional && peerInSources)
if peerServesAuth && rule.Protocol == PolicyRuleProtocolNetbirdSSH {
sshEnabled = true
switch {
case len(rule.AuthorizedGroups) > 0:
@@ -287,7 +292,7 @@ func (c *NetworkMapComponents) getPeerConnectionResources(targetPeerID string) (
default:
authorizedUsers[auth.Wildcard] = c.getAllowedUserIDs()
}
} else if peerInDestinations && PolicyRuleImpliesLegacySSH(rule) && targetPeer.SSHEnabled {
} else if peerServesAuth && PolicyRuleImpliesLegacySSH(rule) && targetPeer.SSHEnabled {
sshEnabled = true
authorizedUsers[auth.Wildcard] = c.getAllowedUserIDs()
}