* [management] Add a release-wired UBI image variant
OpenShift and other Red Hat environments expect UBI-based images that run
as an arbitrary non-root UID. The proxy, combined server and rootless
client already ship -ubi variants; this adds the same for management,
published as <version>-ubi and ubi-latest for amd64 and arm64.
The default --port of 80 cannot bind without root, so the image defaults
to 8080. For Let's Encrypt, public 443 forwards to --port and
--letsencrypt-listen-address is empty (#7706), so the main listener
answers the TLS-ALPN challenges.
* [management] Certify the management UBI image
Adds management to the Red Hat certification components. Its Partner
Connect component ID goes in the REDHAT_CERT_ID_MANAGEMENT repository
variable.
* [relay] Add a release-wired UBI image variant
* [relay] Align the UBI image with the shared UBI pattern
Main now ships UBI variants of the client, combined server and proxy that
share one license collector and one image layout, and the Red Hat
certification workflow expects every certified image to carry both amd64
and arm64. The relay variant predated that, kept its own copy of the
license script, built amd64 only, and ran as UID 65532 on the privileged
default port :443, so it would not start under OpenShift or rootless Podman.
Use release_files/collect-licenses.sh and build amd64 and arm64 like the
other UBI images. Run as 1000:0 with a group-0 writable /var/lib/netbird
for Let's Encrypt data, and default the listener to :8443 so an arbitrary
non-root UID can bind it; the relay's Let's Encrypt flow uses TLS-ALPN on
that same listener, so no separate challenge port is needed.
* [infrastructure] Certify the relay UBI image on release
Releases certify the UBI images through redhat-certify.yml, which only
lists the client, proxy and combined server, so a released relay UBI
image would never reach the Red Hat catalog.
Add relay to the component list and the manual dispatch options. Its
Partner Connect ID comes from REDHAT_CERT_ID_RELAY, which must exist
before this merges: the resolve step fails the whole run when any
component's variable is missing.
* [signal] Add an explicit non-root UBI image variant
Keep the existing signal image unchanged while making a separate UBI image available for local certification-readiness checks. Collect the linked Go dependency license terms as portable build inputs, and use SIGINT for the existing graceful stop handler.
* [signal] Wire the UBI variant into GoReleaser
Build the additive UBI signal variant through the existing release pipeline instead of relying on local Docker commands. Stage its licenses in the per-image build context and restrict the variant to validated AMD64 without changing existing image tags.
* [signal] Align the UBI image with the other UBI variants
Main now ships UBI images for the client, combined server and proxy with
a shared license collector and a common shape, so the signal variant
should look the same to reviewers and to Red Hat certification. Signal
also listens on port 80 by default, which an arbitrary non-root UID
cannot bind on OpenShift or Podman.
Use release_files/collect-licenses.sh instead of a signal-only copy,
build for amd64 and arm64 like the other UBI entries, and run as
1000:0 with a group-writable /var/lib/netbird that also holds Let's
Encrypt data. Default NB_PORT to the legacy gRPC port 10000 so the
image starts unprivileged and serves a single listener.
* [infrastructure] Certify the signal UBI image on release
The signal UBI image is published with every release, but only images
listed in the certification workflow reach the Red Hat catalog, so it
would otherwise need a manual run each time.
Add signal to the dispatch options and the component list, using the
same -ubi tag suffix as .goreleaser.yaml. The run reads its Partner
Connect ID from REDHAT_CERT_ID_SIGNAL.
* [signal] Answer Let's Encrypt challenges on the UBI image's port
The challenge listener defaults to :443, which a non-root UID cannot
bind on OpenShift or Podman, so Let's Encrypt could not work in the
UBI image. Now that the listener address is configurable, default it
to empty so the TLS listener on port 10000 answers the challenges
itself when public port 443 is forwarded to it.
Reaching an internal service meant installing the agent, which needs root
for a TUN device. nblink runs the embedded client in netstack mode and
forwards local HTTP listeners to upstreams inside the tunnel, so it works on
managed machines and in rootless containers. Upstream names resolve
in-process.
Forwards bind loopback unless --allow-public-bind is given. The listener
refuses rebound and cross-site browser requests and bounds stalled request
bodies. It ships as release archives and a distroless image that runs under
an arbitrary UID.
An embedded client given no StatePath now keeps its state in memory rather
than falling back to the installed agent's state file, which every embedded
client in a proxy process also shared. The state manager gets an explicit
in-memory store for it.
* implement certificate posture check
* log signal address
* add keychain and cert store support
* read the console user's keychain through a user session helper
A root daemon cannot reach a login keychain: securityd is per session and a
key ACL needs a session to prompt in, so dropping uid is not enough. The
daemon now answers certificate challenges from the System keychain itself,
where MDM installs device identities, and launches "netbird posture
cert-proof" into the console user's desktop session with launchctl asuser
for the login keychain. Only the signature and the chain cross back, never
the private key.
The console user comes from SCDynamicStoreCopyConsoleUser, bound with purego
like the keychain calls. The login window reports no user, root, or
"loginwindow", and all three are treated as no keychain to read, so a Mac at
the lock screen sends device proofs alone.
Adds info logging across the path: the keychain search list, per class query
status and item counts, the chain built per candidate, and the verification
error for every rejected candidate. A run that sends nothing now says why.
README.md documents the trust model, the console user limitation and how to
read the logs.
* read the signed-in user's certificate store on Windows
A service reads LocalMachine\MY, where AD and Intune enrol device
certificates. CurrentUser\MY lives in the signed-in user's registry hive
with keys protected against their profile, and a service that opens it does
not fail: "current user" resolves to HKU\S-1-5-18, so it silently reads the
service account's own empty store. The service therefore reads the machine
store itself and launches "netbird posture cert-proof" with the session
token for the rest, mirroring the macOS console user helper.
Windows lets a privileged service assume a user identity, so the token goes
straight into the child process and no external tooling is involved.
CREATE_NO_WINDOW keeps a console window from flashing on the desktop every
sync. In-process impersonation would also work but is per OS thread while
goroutines migrate, so the child process avoids that class of bug.
Session selection prefers the physical console and falls back to any active
session, so remote desktop and VDI hosts are covered. WTSQueryUserToken
needs SE_TCB_NAME, so a user-run client skips the helper and reads the
machine store alone.
SystemStore takes a store location, gaining NewUserStore alongside
NewSystemStore and the per candidate logging macOS already had. The request
building and proof merging move to helper_spawn.go, shared by both
platforms, and helperStore picks what the helper reads per platform.
* start TPM support
* split goreleaser to support pkcs11 and exclude on docker
* update goreleaser
* go mod tidy
* add tpm pin to netbird config
* split cert and key location and allow key lookup on tpm
* add unsupported flag for mobile devices
* Isolate the cert proof helper from the service environment and cap its output
* Read the PKCS#11 token PIN from NB_TPM_PIN instead of the profile config
* Bound certificate proof collection so a stuck token or keychain cannot hold the sync loop
* Stop retrying a PKCS#11 PIN the token rejected
* Log certificate posture details at debug level
* Sign only nonces and peer keys of the size management issues
* Skip certificate files whose key belongs to another certificate
* Bound PKCS#11 driver sizes, pin template values, and log out only a login the session owns
* Never pass NULL to CFRelease and skip unreadable keychain identities
* Keep the macOS keychain code out of iOS and the PKCS#11 driver out of Android
* Find a chain to each challenge's CAs through every intermediate the store holds
* Require a token label whenever a PKCS#11 PIN is set
* Read user certificates only from the session of the active profile's owner
* Collect certificate proofs again when the owner's session changes and report lost proofs
* Test the PKCS#11 build against SoftHSM in CI and warn once where the build has no driver
* Document where an inline PKCS#11 PIN is stored and how it is protected
* Refuse PKCS#11 URIs that this client cannot honour instead of widening the match
* Trust certificate and key files only when no other user can write or redirect them
* Explain a Windows certificate whose key only a legacy CryptoAPI provider holds
* Use platform absolute module paths in tests and add a real owner session test for Windows
* Match the Windows profile owner by name instead of resolving it through the domain controller
* Keep the certificate stores and TPM library out of the WebAssembly build
* [client] Read TSS2 key files on go-tpm, checked against the library it replaces
The TSS2 parser was the only reason this repository depended on a crypto suite
whose own build tooling it inherits. The replacement sits on go-tpm, which was
already a direct dependency and is in fact what that suite calls underneath, so
this removes a wrapper rather than porting onto a different library: the load,
the derived storage root key and the signing commands are the same calls.
Swapping a parser on the one path a customer actually runs is not something to
assert, so the two are held side by side for this commit. One test feeds the
replacement bytes the old library wrote and requires the same key type, empty
auth flag, parent handle, blobs and decoded public key; the other feeds both the
fixtures the tests are built on, so those are the shape the format calls for and
not merely the shape the new parser reads. The scaffolding goes away with the
dependency in the commit that follows.
The encoder behind the fixtures is written out separately from the parser under
test, so an encoder bug and a decoder bug cannot cancel each other out.
* [client] Drop go.step.sm/crypto and the repo-wide upgrades it imposed
The TSS2 parser was the only thing in the repository that used this module, and
it brought 302 modules into the graph to do it — 35 of them linters, along with
Google Cloud KMS and IAM, the AWS SDK and a terminal styling library. Those are
the module's own development dependencies, which minimal version selection turns
into floors in ours, and they are the whole reason gRPC, protobuf, the AWS SDK,
OpenTelemetry, logrus and five x/ packages had moved. Management, signal, relay
and proxy inherited every one of them for a feature none of them runs.
Removing the import is not enough, because tidy never downgrades: the raised
floors stay written in go.mod. Each one is pinned back to the version main had,
then tidy is left to raise again whatever something still genuinely needs. It
raised nothing: all 43 are back where they were, and go-tpm was already in the
graph at the same version, so the certificate feature now costs no new module at
all.
The differential tests go with it. They existed to check the swap against the
library while both were present, and there is nothing left to compare against.
* [client] Clear the lint findings only the macOS and Windows runners see
golangci-lint analyses one build at a time, so running it on Linux says nothing
about the two platforms CI also lints. Against those builds the feature's
packages reported eight findings, and the structural one is Config.dir: it is
dead on macOS and Windows because neither reads a directory at all, their
collectors take the configuration and discard it. Moving the method beside its
only callers makes that visible in the layout instead of in a linter, and leaves
the gap itself — no file or token store on those platforms — where it belongs,
as something to decide rather than something to silence.
An absent key file beside a certificate was reported as a nil signer with a nil
error, which the caller then had to recognise by its nilness. It is a sentinel
now, so the meaning is in the error rather than in the absence of one.
The rest follow the standard library: the elliptic coordinates and the private
scalar come from the encoding helpers rather than the deprecated big.Int fields,
and an error string loses its trailing colon.
Lint is clean on linux, darwin and windows; the hardware TPM path was exercised
separately against a real device and passes.
* Accept the TSS2 emptyAuth boolean OpenSSL writes and persistent parents on 32-bit builds
* Count the certificates field in the peer meta store test
* Check the store directory before listing it, refuse group-writable files, and reject a URI with two PIN sources
* Share a PKCS#11 login between sessions and send each PIN at most once at a time
* Collect certificate proofs again when the meta sync carrying them failed
* Use no Windows user store when a domainless owner matches accounts of several domains
* Use no user certificate store when the active profile's owner cannot be read
* Document the PIN sources on CertPKCS11URI and keep the README PIN example off the command line
* Test that the PKCS#11 URI stays out of the debug bundle and run the wrong-PIN test only on a disposable token
* Refuse a TPM PSS signature request for the maximum salt length
* Add the certificate fields to the network map golden data
* Retry posture checks whose meta sync timed out instead of dropping them
* Start no system info gathering while a timed-out one is still running
* Guard the applied posture checks across goroutines and keep refreshing proofs while a pending update times out
* Log what a successful certificate proof helper wrote to stderr
* Send recollected certificate proofs to management only when the proven chains changed
* Explain a macOS keychain key whose access list does not allow netbird
* Kill the whole macOS certificate helper process group when it times out
* End sudo option parsing before the macOS certificate helper binary
* Hold off system info gathering only while a timed-out one is still running
* Collect certificate proofs on the posture watcher instead of under the sync lock
* Read the certificate store directory and PKCS#11 URI from the daemon environment, not the profile config
* Install the RPM sysconfig file readable by root only and show the certificate posture variables
* Move the certificate posture README into the package doc and the docs site
* Name NB_CERT_PKCS11_URI in the PIN-without-token error
* Keep the file check results of the latest-started system info refresh
* Give the full import command for a keychain key netbird may not use, and correct the package doc
* Restrict the service environment file to root on every package install
* Search only the System keychain in the macOS daemon and only the login keychain in the user helper
* Let the certificate proof helper read the PKCS#11 token from the environment on Linux
* Ask a macOS user's keychain again only after an hour when it proved nothing
* Clear the lint findings in certificate posture
* Hold off the keychain helper only after a completed or timed-out run, independent of CA order
* Keep free functions out of the method lists of PKCS11Store, URI and Challenger
* Name the post-install permission helper in snake case and shorten the sysconfig certificate block
* Drop the certificate store directory from certproof.Config, which only NB_CERT_STORE_DIR sets
* [management] Renew certificate challenge nonces on quiet accounts
A certificate challenge nonce is accepted for its own window and the one before
it, and it only reaches a peer attached to a network map. An account where
nothing changes sends no map, so after a day the peer re-sends the nonce it
still holds, verification rejects its whole proof set, and the certificates
stored for it are dropped. It fails the certificate check and loses every policy
gated on it until some unrelated change happens to push a map. The outage
repairs itself in seconds, which is what makes it expensive: it is intermittent,
it only hits stable networks, and it is not reproducible on demand.
Push the account's peers an update often enough that the nonce they hold is
never close to expiring. Only accounts whose posture checks actually ask for a
certificate are tracked, so a deployment without the feature does no extra work.
The refresh runs from one goroutine over a map of accounts rather than a timer
per account: the period is hours, so one pass every few minutes costs nothing
next to it, and there is no timer to re-arm when an account that falls due
sooner appears. Each account's first run is offset by a hash of its ID, because
the challenge window is global and an instance restart would otherwise arm every
account in the same moment.
The push carries no administrative change, so it is counted as a refresh rather
than an update and stays out of the figures that track what was edited.
(cherry picked from commit 7ad4a0df37)
* [management] Make the certificate challenge window one knob to turn
Renewal was timed against the window in two different ways: the period derived
from it, the sweep interval did not. Shortening the window to watch a renewal in
an end-to-end run would have left the refresher still looking for due accounts
every quarter of an hour, so nothing would have been renewed in time and the
test would have reported the feature broken.
Derive the sweep from the period, within bounds that keep a very short window
from spinning and a normal one from checking less often than is useful, and
allow the window itself to be set through the environment so a run can take
seconds instead of half a day. A value that cannot be parsed or falls outside
the bounds keeps the default, because a window nobody intended is a security
property nobody chose, and an override is logged at warning level since it sets
how long a device keeps passing the check after its key is gone.
Every instance has to be given the same value: the window is part of the nonce,
so instances that disagree reject each other's.
(cherry picked from commit 0e38fcf409)
* [management] Pin the property that makes per-peer nonce state unnecessary
A nonce carries the window it was minted in, not the instant, and is accepted
for that window and the one before it. So a peer re-stamped at least once per
window can never be left holding one outside the accepted pair, whenever it was
last served and however much life its own nonce had left. That is the whole
reason management tracks nothing per peer, and it was resting on an argument
rather than a test.
The phases are part of the property, not decoration: accounts are deliberately
given a refresh phase of their own, so the guarantee has to hold off the window
boundary too. The negative case shows why that matters — a cadence of exactly
two windows lands inside the grace window when it is aligned to the boundary and
leaves a gap when it is not.
(cherry picked from commit dee68facfd)
* [management] Renew challenges only for the peers that answer one
The refresh pushed an update to every connected peer of the account, while only
the peers a certificate check applies to carry a nonce. On an account where a
handful of peers sit behind the check and the rest do not, everyone was woken
several times a day to be handed a map that changed nothing for them.
Push to the sources of the enabled policies whose posture checks include a
certificate check, which is exactly the set that is sent a challenge.
Resolving the set the other way round than the gRPC layer does is the risk here:
a peer the refresh forgets stops being renewed and falls out of its policies
silently, which is the failure this whole mechanism exists to prevent. So the
selection is held against processPeerPostureChecks, the per-peer rule that
decides who receives a challenge in the first place, by a test that asks both
the same question and requires the same answer.
(cherry picked from commit dc4d0e0274)
* [management] Derive certificate challenge nonces from the stored encryption key
The nonce secret came from the server's WireGuard key, which is generated afresh
in every process and never persisted. A nonce carries no state, so the only
thing that lets one instance verify what another issued is deriving the same
secret — and that premise, written in the comment above the challenger, was not
met: every instance had its own key.
A peer reconnecting after a restart therefore presented a nonce minted under the
previous secret, verification failed with a mismatch, its whole proof set was
rejected and the certificates stored for it were dropped until it signed again.
Reproduced three times on the lab, each one logging "nonce was not issued to
this peer", which only a changed secret produces. On a single instance it costs
seconds of lost policy access per restart; across instances it is not transient
at all, because every reconnect that lands elsewhere is rejected the same way.
Derive from the data store encryption key instead: it is generated once, written
back to the configuration and read by every instance, so it survives restarts
and is shared. Where none is configured the secret falls back to the WireGuard
key with a warning — degraded but still unpredictable, which is the property
that matters most: a peer able to guess it could mint the nonces of future
windows, sign them while its key is present and keep passing after it is gone.
The challenger is now built once and passed to the two places that need it,
rather than re-derived per message.
(cherry picked from commit 278f2f3807)
* [management] Register an account for renewal where its nonce is issued
Renewal was armed when a peer connected or when a posture check was saved, both
of which ask the store whether the account has a certificate check. That misses
the case it most needs to catch: the check is created through one instance while
the peers are connected to another, so the instance serving them never learns it
has anything to renew and their nonce expires. It also charged a query to every
peer connect in every account, including the ones that will never use the
feature, which a fleet reconnecting after a restart pays all at once.
Register where the nonce is actually stamped instead. A nonce is verified from a
shared secret and so travels between instances, but the renewal that keeps it
fresh cannot: only the instance holding a peer's stream can push to it. Issuing
and renewing now line up by construction — an instance renews exactly the
accounts it has issued nonces for — and an instance that never issues one has
nothing to renew, so there is no case left to miss.
The registration is a map insert with no store access, which is what lets it sit
on a path taken by every login and every initial sync.
Reported by Viktor Liu, who also proposed registering at the point of issue.
(cherry picked from commit 2d16dd7d7cf54762f2e64c5630ea092f32ef63ab)
* [management] Register for renewal on pushed updates, not only on connect
Registering where the nonce is stamped only covered the login and the initial
sync, which both happen when a peer opens a stream. That left out the path the
mechanism exists for.
On the cloud the network map controller is wrapped so that an update publishes
to an event bus instead of pushing locally: an instance handling a REST change
broadcasts, and every instance holding a peer of that account pushes to its own.
Those pushes stamp a nonce through the update handler, and nothing there
registered, so an instance learned about an account only when one of its peers
happened to reconnect. For a quiet fleet that is the original bug: the check is
created, the peers are told about it, and nobody renews what they were told.
Registering on the pushed update closes it, and is the difference between
stamping and marking a peer connected — one happens on every push, the other
only when a stream opens. Reported by Viktor Liu; the broadcast that makes it
work was pointed out by Pascal Fischer.
(cherry picked from commit 59efe8d93e53bacdf57cb546f4ab2c19dc4eddab)
* [management] Let the challenge refresh loop stop with the manager that owns it
The loop was started on a context explicitly detached from the caller's, so
nothing could ever stop it. Production is unaffected either way, since
BuildManager is called with context.Background(), but a test that builds a
manager leaked a sweeping goroutine for the rest of the run, and a shutdown
path added later would have had no way to reach it.
Take the manager's context as the request buffer built on the line above
already does. The test pins the contract the loop offers, so a detached
context cannot come back inside Start either.
* [management] Bound one account's challenge refresh so it cannot starve the rest
Resolving which peers answer a challenge reads the store three times, and the
refresher sweeps accounts one after another on a single goroutine. A read that
never returns held the sweep for the life of the process, so every other
account on the instance stopped being renewed and its peers fell out of the
policies gated on the check: one account's bad luck became an outage for all
of them.
Give each refresh the sweep interval it is allowed to occupy, capped at 30s so
a 12-hour window does not grant minutes to a query that should take
milliseconds. A refresh that runs out of time keeps its account tracked, since
a deadline says nothing about whether that account still has a certificate
check.
* [management] Send challenge refreshes down the path the rest of management uses
The refresh dispatched through UpdateAffectedPeers, the one variant that takes
no reason, so it was missing from the update counters and coalesced with
nothing. An administrator editing a policy while the sweep ran made the
account's network map twice over, and UpdateOperationRefresh, added for
exactly this caller, was never referenced.
Buffer it with a posture_check/refresh reason instead. The periodic push is
now visible in the metrics as what it is, distinct from an edit, and the send
detaches from the sweep deadline on its own, so that deadline bounds the store
reads it was meant for.
* [management] Keep the certificate challenge comments to what the history does not say
Four of these ran to three and four times the comment budget, the longest at
992 characters. Most of the excess argued against designs that were never
written or explained a bug that no longer exists in the code, which is what
the commit that fixed it is for.
What is left is the part a reader cannot recover from the code: that the
nonce secret has to be persisted and unpredictable, that stamping and
renewing are decided together because only the serving instance can push, and
that the target rule is the inverse of processPeerPostureChecks.
* Keep the newest posture checks pending whatever made their meta sync fail
* Report no lost certificate when the engine stops during a proof collection
* Share the proof collection single-flight across engine restarts
* Close a PKCS#11 module that loads but cannot be used
* Fix the pending checks comments
* Renew certificate challenges only for the peers streamed to this instance
* Ignore a challenge stamp from an older sync stream of the same peer
* Kill the Windows certificate proof helper with its whole process tree
* Expect the challenge untrack in the session ownership test
* Drop an invalid certificate proof without discarding the valid ones
* Start a system info gathering beside one that has been stuck for ten timeouts
---------
Co-authored-by: pascal <pascal@netbird.io>
Co-authored-by: mlsmaycon <mlsmaycon@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: riccardom <riccardomanfrin@gmail.com>
* [self-hosted] Add a UBI image variant for the combined server
OpenShift and other Red Hat environments expect UBI-based images that run
as an arbitrary non-root UID. The proxy and rootless client already ship
-ubi variants; this adds the same for netbird-server, published as
<version>-ubi and ubi-latest for amd64 and arm64.
* [self-hosted] Check the license output path before creating temp files
The existing-output exit ran before the cleanup trap was registered, so it
left the two mktemp files behind.
* [self-hosted] Certify the netbird-server UBI image
Adds netbird-server to the Red Hat certification components. Its Partner
Connect component ID goes in the REDHAT_CERT_ID_NETBIRD_SERVER repository
variable.
* [misc] Share one license collection script across the UBI images
The client, proxy and combined images each carried a near-identical copy of
collect-licenses.sh, and the signal and relay variants would add two more.
The copies differed only in the Go package, build tags, component license
and the proxy's web licenses, which are now options of one script in
release_files/. The client gains the staged write the others already had.
* [self-hosted] Add a UBI image variant for the combined server
OpenShift and other Red Hat environments expect UBI-based images that run
as an arbitrary non-root UID. The proxy and rootless client already ship
-ubi variants; this adds the same for netbird-server, published as
<version>-ubi and ubi-latest for amd64 and arm64.
* [self-hosted] Check the license output path before creating temp files
The existing-output exit ran before the cleanup trap was registered, so it
left the two mktemp files behind.
* [self-hosted] Certify the netbird-server UBI image
Adds netbird-server to the Red Hat certification components. Its Partner
Connect component ID goes in the REDHAT_CERT_ID_NETBIRD_SERVER repository
variable.
Add a UBI-based reverse-proxy image for the internal Red Hat certification requirement, without changing the existing image or deployment defaults. Includes non-root execution, licensing and image metadata, plus an AMD64 GoReleaser entry with separate UBI tags.
Preflight and TLS/overlay checks passed. An intermittent shutdown exit error remains deferred; this stays draft pending maintainer testing.
upload-server/Dockerfile only packaged the goreleaser-built binary, so
the image could not be built from a checkout. It is now a multi-stage
build on Chainguard static, running as the nonroot user (uid 65532),
with a VARIANT=debug build arg that swaps in busybox for a shell.
The goreleaser packaging file moves unchanged to Dockerfile.release and
.goreleaser.yaml points at it, so the published netbirdio/upload image
stays as it was: distroless and root.
The bases are pinned by digest, since Chainguard publishes only :latest
for free. A Dependabot docker entry for /upload-server moves them
weekly, leaving the release base alone and holding golang to patch
updates.
Goreleaser's RPM build is split into one nfpm entry per architecture, each pinned to a single-arch build, with the version substituted from the release job. The deb package, archives, and container images are unaffected.
Also fixes rpmlint: incoherent-version-in-changelog, found while investigating: nfpm writes the changelog title straight from semver and never appends the release, so entries read 0.79.0 against a 0.79.0-1 package.
Declare the runtime dependencies, generate the changelog from git tags with
chglog at release time, and ship LICENSE, README.md and an example
/etc/sysconfig/netbird as %license, %doc and %config(noreplace). The unit
generated by "netbird service install" already reads that path via
EnvironmentFile, so post_install.sh is unchanged.
* [client] Add a release-wired rootless UBI image variant
* [client] Add ARM64 to the rootless UBI image
* [client] Express license output validation as a guard
Prepares the repository for the release-branch process agreed internally:
one long-lived release-0.N branch per minor, with fixes backported by
cherry-pick and patch releases tagged from the branch.
Pushes to release-* branches now run the Release workflow and publish
immutable sha-* container images, the way pushes to main already do, so
a release branch can be tested before it is tagged. Release branches
never publish the floating "main" image tag. The push-to-main CI
workflows (Go tests on all platforms, frontend UI, install script,
mobile/wasm validation, infrastructure files, license check) also run
on release-* pushes; pull request triggers were already unfiltered, so
backport PRs were covered — this closes the post-merge gap.
Releases are no longer marked latest before signing: make_latest is
now false in all four goreleaser configs, so a release stays published
but not latest until the signing pipeline uploads the signed Windows
and macOS artifacts and marks it latest itself. Previously the release
became GitHub's "Latest release" at publish time, and the download
endpoints that resolve through the latest-release API could serve a
release whose signed installers did not exist yet. prerelease: auto
additionally labels rc tags as prereleases, so a release candidate can
never take the latest slot.
The trigger_sync_tag job is removed: it dispatched a downstream
image build on every v* tag (release candidates included), which would
race the deliberate release-branch build on every release. The android
and ios submodule bumps are unchanged.
Also sets perennial-regex = "^release-" so git-town never syncs or
ships a release branch into main.
- **Wails v3 application** (`client/ui`) with a React + TypeScript + Tailwind frontend replacing the Fyne UI: main connection view, exit-node switcher, networks/peers browser with detail panels, profile management, settings (general, network, SSH, security, troubleshooting, appearance), debug-bundle creation, and a first-run welcome flow.
- **Internationalization**: go-i18n bundle with 9 locales (en, de, es, fr, hu, it, pt, ru, zh-CN) shared between the tray and the frontend.
- **New system tray** implementation with per-platform theme-aware icons, including a native XEmbed host for Linux (`xembed_tray_linux.c`) and a Linux theme watcher.
- **Session handling**: auth session watcher (`client/internal/auth/sessionwatch`), pending login flow, session-expiration dialog and tray notifications, and `netbird login` improvements.
- **Daemon API extensions** (`daemon.proto`): status stream subscription, event stream, networks/exit-node selection endpoints, and richer full status — with probe throttling on the daemon side to protect against UI-driven request storms.
- **UI preferences store** persisted per profile, autostart management via the daemon (single source of truth in HKCU on Windows).
- **Build system**: Taskfile-based builds per platform (macOS, Linux, Windows), Docker cross-compilation images, MSIX/NSIS/nfpm/AppImage packaging, and a new `frontend-ui` CI workflow.
Co-authored-by: Zoltan Papp <zoltan.pmail@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Eduard Gert <kontakt@eduardgert.de>
Co-authored-by: braginini <bangvalo@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Pascal Fischer <32096965+pascal-fischer@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: riccardom <riccardomanfrin@gmail.com>
- introduce variables to avoid publishing latest docker tags and installers
- Refactor .goreleaser.yaml to simplify docker configurations and add environment-driven flags
- removed management debug containers (it was doing only log var)
- Stopped building arm v6 32bits in favor of v7 32 bits for services (not client)
- Add target argument to docker files
* Add condition to GPG key decoding to handle pull requests
* Add license field to deb and rpm package configurations
* Add condition to GPG key decoding for external pull requests
* [misc] Add GPG signing key support for deb and rpm packages
* [misc] Improve GPG key management for deb and rpm signing
* [misc] Extract GPG key import logic into a reusable script
* [misc] Add key fingerprint extraction and targeted export for GPG keys
* [misc] Remove passphrase from GPG keys before exporting
* [misc] Simplify GPG key management by removing import script
* [misc] Bump GoReleaser version to v2.14.3 in release workflow
* [misc] Replace GPG passphrase variables with NFPM-prefixed alternatives in workflows and configs
* [misc] Update naming conventions for package IDs and passphrase variables in workflows and configs
* [misc] Standardize NFPM variable naming in release workflow
* [misc] Adjust NFPM variable names for consistency in release workflow
* [misc] Remove Debian signing GPG key usage in workflows and configs
* Unified NetBird combined server (Management, Signal, Relay, STUN) as a single executable with richer YAML configuration, validation, and defaults.
* Official Dockerfile/image for single-container deployment.
* Optional in-process profiling endpoint for diagnostics.
* Multiplexing to route HTTP/gRPC/WebSocket traffic via one port; runtime hooks to inject custom handlers.
* **Chores**
* Updated deployment scripts, compose files, and reverse-proxy templates to target the combined server; added example configs and getting-started updates.
This will allow running netbird commands (including debugging) against the daemon and provide a flow similar to non-container usages.
It will by default both log to file and stderr so it can be handled more uniformly in container-native environments.
This PR refactors the release process to push all release images to the GitHub Container Registry.
Updated image naming in .goreleaser.yaml to include new registry references.
Added a GitHub Actions step in .github/workflows/release.yml to log in to the GitHub Container Registry.
Add an upload bundle option with the flag --upload-bundle; by default, the upload will use a NetBird address, which can be replaced using the flag --upload-bundle-url.
The upload server is available under the /upload-server path. The release change will push a docker image to netbirdio/upload image repository.
The server supports using s3 with pre-signed URL for direct upload and local file for storing bundles.
This update adds new relay integration for NetBird clients. The new relay is based on web sockets and listens on a single port.
- Adds new relay implementation with websocket with single port relaying mechanism
- refactor peer connection logic, allowing upgrade and downgrade from/to P2P connection
- peer connections are faster since it connects first to relay and then upgrades to P2P
- maintains compatibility with old clients by not using the new relay
- updates infrastructure scripts with new relay service
This will help us understand usage on self-hosted deployments
The collection may be disabled by using the flag --disable-anonymous-metrics or
NETBIRD_DISABLE_ANONYMOUS_METRICS in setup.env
decouple goreleaser ui might help us
parallelize workflow and run local tests
dividing the release workflow for each goreleaser
and making trigger sign a different job them
when small issues with sign happen
Send Desktop UI client version as user-agent to daemon
This is sent on every login request to the management
Parse the GRPC context on the system package and
retrieves the user-agent
Management receives the new UIVersion field and
store in the Peer's system meta
Updated windows installer package generation with
launch UI after install
remove older version
remove wiretrustee
added install and uninstall scripts
Updated brew cask:
run installer script to start daemon
Daemon conflicts with wiretrustee on brew
Removed migrate check on non-root commands like status
CLI CMD is now going to stdout
Added MacOS icons, plist, and cask template file
Adjusted goreleaser with the new name for all builds
Added Icon and update windows-ui build to include it and avoid console
migrated Docker builds to new namespace netbirdio
* rename wiretrustee-signal to netbird-signal
* Rename Signal repositories and source bin
* Adjust docker-compose with signal volume [skip ci]
Co-authored-by: mlsmaycon <mlsmaycon@gmail.com>
Nicolas Frati