Merge branch 'main' of github.com:netbirdio/netbird into feature/shared-service-config-loader

2026-08-26 09:31:30 +02:00 · 2026-08-25 15:28:43 +02:00
parent 2545a3c30b 7d83a3902d
commit feedb82481
16 changed files with 915 additions and 281 deletions
--- a/client/ui/frontend/src/components/ReadySignal.tsx
+++ b/client/ui/frontend/src/components/ReadySignal.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+import { useEffect, useRef } from "react";
+import { Events } from "@wailsio/runtime";
+import { useStatus } from "@/contexts/StatusContext.tsx";
+
+const EVENT_WINDOW_PAINTED = "netbird:window-painted";
+
+export const ReadySignal = () => {
+    const { isReady } = useStatus();
+    const sent = useRef(false);
+
+    useEffect(() => {
+        if (!isReady || sent.current) return;
+        sent.current = true;
+        void Events.Emit(EVENT_WINDOW_PAINTED);
+    }, [isReady]);
+
+    return null;
+};
--- a/client/ui/frontend/src/layouts/AppLayout.tsx
+++ b/client/ui/frontend/src/layouts/AppLayout.tsx
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import { DebugBundleProvider } from "@/contexts/DebugBundleContext.tsx";
 import { ProfileProvider } from "@/contexts/ProfileContext.tsx";
 import { DialogProvider } from "@/contexts/DialogContext.tsx";
 import { RestrictionsProvider } from "@/contexts/RestrictionsContext.tsx";
+import { ReadySignal } from "@/components/ReadySignal.tsx";

 export const AppLayout = () => {
    return (
@@ -16,6 +17,7 @@ export const AppLayout = () => {
                            <DebugBundleProvider>
                                <ClientVersionProvider>
                                    <Outlet />
+                                    <ReadySignal />
                                </ClientVersionProvider>
                            </DebugBundleProvider>
                        </RestrictionsProvider>
--- a/client/ui/main.go
+++ b/client/ui/main.go
@@ -139,13 +139,11 @@ func main() {
 		prefStore:       prefStore,
 	})

-	window := newMainWindow(app, prefStore)
-
-	// Settings is created eagerly (hidden) so the first gear click paints
-	// instantly and React keeps per-tab state across reopens. The other
-	// auxiliary windows stay lazy + destroy-on-close so Wails's macOS
-	// dock-reopen handler can't resurrect them.
-	windowManager := services.NewWindowManager(app, window, bundle, prefStore, iconWindow)
+	windowManager := services.NewWindowManager(app, nil, bundle, prefStore, iconWindow)
+	windowManager.SetMainFactory(func(startURL string) *application.WebviewWindow {
+		return newMainWindow(app, prefStore, windowManager, startURL)
+	})
+	registerDockReopenHook(app, windowManager)
 	// Minimal WMs (XEmbed-tray path) neither center small windows nor restore
 	// position across hide -> show, dropping them top-left. Gate Go-side
 	// re-centering on that environment; nil leaves placement to the WM on full
@@ -168,7 +166,7 @@ func main() {
 	// RegisterStatusNotifierItem hits a watcher we control.
 	startStatusNotifierWatcher()

-	tray = NewTray(app, window, TrayServices{
+	tray = NewTray(app, nil, TrayServices{
 		Connection:      connection,
 		Settings:        settings,
 		Profiles:        profiles,
@@ -279,10 +277,12 @@ func newApplication(onSecondInstance func()) *application.App {
 			ActivationPolicy: application.ActivationPolicyAccessory,
 		},
 		Linux: application.LinuxOptions{
-			ProgramName: "netbird",
+			ProgramName:                   "netbird",
+			DisableQuitOnLastWindowClosed: true,
 		},
 		Windows: application.WindowsOptions{
-			WndProcInterceptor: endSessionInterceptor(),
+			WndProcInterceptor:            endSessionInterceptor(),
+			DisableQuitOnLastWindowClosed: true,
 		},
 		SingleInstance: &application.SingleInstanceOptions{
 			UniqueID: "io.netbird.ui",
@@ -338,9 +338,7 @@ func registerServices(app *application.App, conn *Conn, s registeredServices) {
 	app.RegisterService(application.NewService(s.compat))
 }

-// newMainWindow creates the hidden main window, sized to the user's last view
-// mode, and installs the hide-on-close and macOS dock-reopen hooks.
-func newMainWindow(app *application.App, prefStore *preferences.Store) *application.WebviewWindow {
+func newMainWindow(app *application.App, prefStore *preferences.Store, wm *services.WindowManager, startURL string) *application.WebviewWindow {
 	// Width matches the last view mode so Advanced-mode users don't see the
 	// window pop from 380px to 900px on launch. Height is mode-agnostic.
 	initialWidth := 380
@@ -357,7 +355,7 @@ func newMainWindow(app *application.App, prefStore *preferences.Store) *applicat
 		InitialPosition:     application.WindowCentered,
 		Hidden:              true,
 		BackgroundColour:    services.WindowBackgroundColour,
-		URL:                 "/",
+		URL:                 startURL,
 		DisableResize:       true,
 		MinimiseButtonState: application.ButtonHidden,
 		MaximiseButtonState: application.ButtonHidden,
@@ -368,29 +366,25 @@ func newMainWindow(app *application.App, prefStore *preferences.Store) *applicat
 		},
 	})

-	// Hide instead of quit on close; "really quit" is reached via tray -> Quit.
-	window.RegisterHook(events.Common.WindowClosing, func(e *application.WindowEvent) {
+	window.RegisterHook(events.Common.WindowClosing, func(_ *application.WindowEvent) {
 		if services.ShuttingDown() {
 			return
 		}
-		e.Cancel()
-		window.Hide()
+		wm.ForgetMain()
 	})

-	// On macOS, Wails' default applicationShouldHandleReopen handler Show()s
-	// every hidden window on dock-icon click, resurrecting hide-on-close
-	// surfaces like Settings. Cancel it in a hook (hooks run before listeners)
-	// and show only the main window. No-op elsewhere — the event never fires.
-	if runtime.GOOS == "darwin" {
-		app.Event.RegisterApplicationEventHook(events.Mac.ApplicationShouldHandleReopen, func(e *application.ApplicationEvent) {
-			e.Cancel()
-			if e.Context().HasVisibleWindows() {
-				return
-			}
-			window.Show()
-			window.Focus()
-		})
-	}
-
 	return window
 }
+
+func registerDockReopenHook(app *application.App, wm *services.WindowManager) {
+	if runtime.GOOS != "darwin" {
+		return
+	}
+	app.Event.RegisterApplicationEventHook(events.Mac.ApplicationShouldHandleReopen, func(e *application.ApplicationEvent) {
+		if e.Context().HasVisibleWindows() {
+			return
+		}
+		e.Cancel()
+		wm.ShowMain()
+	})
+}
--- a/client/ui/services/windowmanager.go
+++ b/client/ui/services/windowmanager.go
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
 	"sync"
 	"time"

+	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
 	"github.com/wailsapp/wails/v3/pkg/application"
 	"github.com/wailsapp/wails/v3/pkg/events"

@@ -29,6 +30,12 @@ const EventBrowserLoginCancel = "browser-login:cancel"
 // EventSettingsOpen tells the mounted settings window which tab to show.
 const EventSettingsOpen = "netbird:settings:open"

+const EventWindowPainted = "netbird:window-painted"
+
+const paintedFallback = 2 * time.Second
+
+const headlessTeardownDelay = 2 * time.Second
+
 var WindowBackgroundColour = application.NewRGB(24, 26, 29) // bg-nb-gray-950

 // WindowHeight is shared by the main and Settings windows.
@@ -94,9 +101,6 @@ func DialogWindowOptions(name, title, url string, linuxIcon []byte) application.
 	}
 }

-// WindowManager owns the auxiliary windows (main is created in main.go). Settings is created
-// eagerly and hidden on close to keep React state; the rest are created on open, destroyed on
-// close, so the macOS dock-reopen handler finds no hidden window to resurrect.
 type WindowManager struct {
 	app               *application.App
 	mainWindow        *application.WebviewWindow
@@ -112,15 +116,35 @@ type WindowManager struct {
 	// hiddenForLogin holds windows hidden while the BrowserLogin popup is open, restored on close.
 	hiddenForLogin []application.Window
 	mu             sync.Mutex
+	createMu       sync.Mutex
+	newMain        func(startURL string) *application.WebviewWindow
+	ready          map[uint]bool
+	showPending    map[uint]bool
+	pendingTab     map[uint]string
+	pendingEmits   map[uint][]string
+	fallbackTimers map[uint]*time.Timer
+	headlessMain   bool
+	headlessTimer  *time.Timer
 	// recenterOnShow is set only on the minimal-WM/XEmbed path, where the WM neither centers nor
 	// restores position; nil on full desktops so re-centering can't fight a user-moved window.
 	recenterOnShow func() bool
 }

-// NewWindowManager wires the manager to the main app; translator/prefs may be nil (tests). The
-// Settings window is created here (hidden) so the first OpenSettings is instant.
 func NewWindowManager(app *application.App, mainWindow *application.WebviewWindow, translator ErrorTranslator, prefs LanguagePreference, linuxIcon []byte) *WindowManager {
-	s := &WindowManager{app: app, mainWindow: mainWindow, translator: translator, prefs: prefs, linuxIcon: linuxIcon}
+	s := &WindowManager{
+		app:            app,
+		mainWindow:     mainWindow,
+		translator:     translator,
+		prefs:          prefs,
+		linuxIcon:      linuxIcon,
+		ready:          map[uint]bool{},
+		showPending:    map[uint]bool{},
+		pendingTab:     map[uint]string{},
+		pendingEmits:   map[uint][]string{},
+		fallbackTimers: map[uint]*time.Timer{},
+	}
+	s.watchPainted()
+	s.watchTriggerLogin()
 	// Re-title live windows on language flip. Wired internally so the binding generator
 	// doesn't try to expose the interface param.
 	if sub, ok := prefs.(LanguageSubscriber); ok && sub != nil {
@@ -136,7 +160,11 @@ func NewWindowManager(app *application.App, mainWindow *application.WebviewWindo
 			}
 		}()
 	}
-	s.settings = app.Window.NewWithOptions(application.WebviewWindowOptions{
+	return s
+}
+
+func (s *WindowManager) newSettingsWindow() *application.WebviewWindow {
+	w := s.app.Window.NewWithOptions(application.WebviewWindowOptions{
 		Name:                "settings",
 		Title:               s.title("window.title.settings"),
 		Width:               900,
@@ -150,18 +178,15 @@ func NewWindowManager(app *application.App, mainWindow *application.WebviewWindo
 		URL:                 "/#/settings",
 		Mac:                 AppleMacOSAppearanceOptions(),
 		Windows:             MicrosoftWindowsAppearanceOptions(),
-		Linux:               LinuxAppearanceOptions(linuxIcon),
+		Linux:               LinuxAppearanceOptions(s.linuxIcon),
 	})
-	// Hide (not destroy) on close to keep React state; reset to General for a flash-free reopen.
-	s.settings.RegisterHook(events.Common.WindowClosing, func(e *application.WindowEvent) {
-		if ShuttingDown() {
-			return
-		}
-		e.Cancel()
-		s.app.Event.Emit(EventSettingsOpen, "general")
-		s.settings.Hide()
+	w.RegisterHook(events.Common.WindowClosing, func(_ *application.WindowEvent) {
+		s.mu.Lock()
+		s.settings = nil
+		s.forgetWindowLocked(w)
+		s.mu.Unlock()
 	})
-	return s
+	return w
 }

 // OpenSettings shows the settings window on tab (empty → General), switching tab via
@@ -171,11 +196,20 @@ func (s *WindowManager) OpenSettings(tab string) {
 	if target == "" {
 		target = "general"
 	}
-	s.app.Event.Emit(EventSettingsOpen, target)
-	s.settings.Show()
-	s.settings.Focus()
-	// Re-center (minimal-WM only; see centerWhenReady).
-	s.centerWhenReady(s.settings)
+
+	w, _ := s.ensureWindow(&s.settings, s.newSettingsWindow)
+
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	ready := s.ready[w.ID()]
+	if !ready {
+		s.pendingTab[w.ID()] = target
+	}
+	s.mu.Unlock()
+
+	if ready {
+		s.app.Event.Emit(EventSettingsOpen, target)
+	}
+	s.showWhenReady(w)
 }

 // OpenBrowserLogin shows the SSO popup, creating it on first use.
@@ -440,13 +474,295 @@ func (s *WindowManager) OpenMain() {
 // ShowMain brings the main window forward (re-centering on minimal WMs). The single entry
 // point every surface (tray, SIGUSR1, welcome) should use so centering applies uniformly.
 func (s *WindowManager) ShowMain() {
-	if s.mainWindow == nil {
+	s.showWhenReady(s.MainWindow())
+}
+
+// ShowMainAndEmit brings the main window forward and emits event once its frontend is ready.
+func (s *WindowManager) ShowMainAndEmit(event string) {
+	w := s.MainWindow()
+	if w == nil {
 		return
 	}
-	s.mainWindow.Show()
-	s.mainWindow.Focus()
-	// Re-center (minimal-WM only; see centerWhenReady).
-	s.centerWhenReady(s.mainWindow)
+
+	id := w.ID()
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	ready := s.ready[id]
+	if !ready {
+		s.pendingEmits[id] = append(s.pendingEmits[id], event)
+	}
+	s.mu.Unlock()
+
+	s.showWhenReady(w)
+	if ready {
+		s.app.Event.Emit(event)
+	}
+}
+
+func (s *WindowManager) MainWindow() *application.WebviewWindow {
+	w, _ := s.ensureMain("/")
+	return w
+}
+
+func (s *WindowManager) ensureMain(startURL string) (*application.WebviewWindow, bool) {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	factory := s.newMain
+	s.mu.Unlock()
+	if factory == nil {
+		return s.ensureWindow(&s.mainWindow, nil)
+	}
+	return s.ensureWindow(&s.mainWindow, func() *application.WebviewWindow {
+		return factory(startURL)
+	})
+}
+
+func (s *WindowManager) ensureWindow(slot **application.WebviewWindow, factory func() *application.WebviewWindow) (*application.WebviewWindow, bool) {
+	s.createMu.Lock()
+	defer s.createMu.Unlock()
+
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	w := *slot
+	s.mu.Unlock()
+	if w != nil || factory == nil {
+		return w, false
+	}
+
+	w = factory()
+	s.armReady(w)
+
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	*slot = w
+	s.mu.Unlock()
+	return w, true
+}
+
+func (s *WindowManager) armReady(w *application.WebviewWindow) {
+	if w == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	w.RegisterHook(events.Common.WindowRuntimeReady, func(_ *application.WindowEvent) {
+		timer := time.AfterFunc(paintedFallback, func() {
+			log.Warnf("window %q never reported a first render, showing it anyway", w.Name())
+			s.markReady(w)
+		})
+		s.mu.Lock()
+		s.fallbackTimers[w.ID()] = timer
+		s.mu.Unlock()
+	})
+}
+
+func (s *WindowManager) watchPainted() {
+	s.app.Event.On(EventWindowPainted, func(e *application.CustomEvent) {
+		if w := s.windowByName(e.Sender); w != nil {
+			s.markReady(w)
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func (s *WindowManager) watchTriggerLogin() {
+	s.app.Event.On(EventTriggerLogin, func(_ *application.CustomEvent) {
+		s.mu.Lock()
+		if s.headlessTimer != nil {
+			s.headlessTimer.Stop()
+			s.headlessTimer = nil
+		}
+		w := s.mainWindow
+		ready := w != nil && s.ready[w.ID()]
+		s.mu.Unlock()
+		if ready {
+			return
+		}
+
+		w, created := s.ensureMain("/")
+		if w == nil {
+			return
+		}
+
+		s.mu.Lock()
+		if created {
+			s.headlessMain = true
+		}
+		pending := !s.ready[w.ID()]
+		if pending {
+			s.pendingEmits[w.ID()] = append(s.pendingEmits[w.ID()], EventTriggerLogin)
+		}
+		s.mu.Unlock()
+
+		if !pending {
+			s.app.Event.Emit(EventTriggerLogin)
+		}
+	})
+
+	s.app.Event.On(EventBrowserLoginCancel, func(_ *application.CustomEvent) {
+		s.scheduleHeadlessTeardown()
+	})
+
+	s.app.Event.On(EventStatusSnapshot, func(e *application.CustomEvent) {
+		st, ok := e.Data.(Status)
+		if !ok {
+			return
+		}
+		switch st.Status {
+		case StatusConnected, StatusLoginFailed, StatusDaemonUnavailable:
+			s.scheduleHeadlessTeardown()
+		}
+	})
+}
+
+func (s *WindowManager) scheduleHeadlessTeardown() {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	if !s.headlessMain || s.mainWindow == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	if s.headlessTimer != nil {
+		s.headlessTimer.Stop()
+	}
+	s.headlessTimer = time.AfterFunc(headlessTeardownDelay, s.closeHeadlessMain)
+}
+
+func (s *WindowManager) closeHeadlessMain() {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	w := s.mainWindow
+	headless := s.headlessMain
+	s.headlessTimer = nil
+	s.mu.Unlock()
+	if !headless || w == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	w.Close()
+}
+
+func (s *WindowManager) forgetWindowLocked(w *application.WebviewWindow) {
+	if w == nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	id := w.ID()
+	if timer := s.fallbackTimers[id]; timer != nil {
+		timer.Stop()
+	}
+	delete(s.fallbackTimers, id)
+	delete(s.ready, id)
+	delete(s.showPending, id)
+	delete(s.pendingTab, id)
+	delete(s.pendingEmits, id)
+
+	kept := s.hiddenForLogin[:0]
+	for _, hidden := range s.hiddenForLogin {
+		if hidden != application.Window(w) {
+			kept = append(kept, hidden)
+		}
+	}
+	s.hiddenForLogin = kept
+}
+
+func (s *WindowManager) windowByName(name string) *application.WebviewWindow {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	switch name {
+	case "main":
+		return s.mainWindow
+	case "settings":
+		return s.settings
+	default:
+		return nil
+	}
+}
+
+func (s *WindowManager) markReady(w *application.WebviewWindow) {
+	id := w.ID()
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	already := s.ready[id]
+	s.ready[id] = true
+	wanted := s.showPending[id]
+	tab, hasTab := s.pendingTab[id]
+	emits := s.pendingEmits[id]
+	if timer := s.fallbackTimers[id]; timer != nil {
+		timer.Stop()
+		delete(s.fallbackTimers, id)
+	}
+	delete(s.showPending, id)
+	delete(s.pendingTab, id)
+	delete(s.pendingEmits, id)
+	s.mu.Unlock()
+
+	if already {
+		return
+	}
+
+	if hasTab {
+		s.app.Event.Emit(EventSettingsOpen, tab)
+	}
+
+	if wanted {
+		s.showNow(w)
+	}
+
+	for _, event := range emits {
+		s.app.Event.Emit(event)
+	}
+}
+
+func (s *WindowManager) showWhenReady(w *application.WebviewWindow) {
+	if w == nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	id := w.ID()
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	ready := s.ready[id]
+	if !ready {
+		s.showPending[id] = true
+	}
+	s.mu.Unlock()
+
+	if ready {
+		s.showNow(w)
+	}
+}
+
+func (s *WindowManager) showNow(w *application.WebviewWindow) {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	if w == s.mainWindow {
+		s.headlessMain = false
+		if s.headlessTimer != nil {
+			s.headlessTimer.Stop()
+			s.headlessTimer = nil
+		}
+	}
+	s.mu.Unlock()
+	w.Show()
+	w.Focus()
+	s.centerWhenReady(w)
+}
+
+func (s *WindowManager) ShowMainAt(url string) {
+	w, created := s.ensureMain(url)
+	if w == nil {
+		return
+	}
+	if !created {
+		w.SetURL(url)
+	}
+	s.showWhenReady(w)
+}
+
+func (s *WindowManager) SetMainFactory(f func(startURL string) *application.WebviewWindow) {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	s.newMain = f
+}
+
+func (s *WindowManager) ForgetMain() {
+	s.mu.Lock()
+	defer s.mu.Unlock()
+	s.forgetWindowLocked(s.mainWindow)
+	s.mainWindow = nil
+	s.headlessMain = false
+	if s.headlessTimer != nil {
+		s.headlessTimer.Stop()
+		s.headlessTimer = nil
+	}
 }

 // SetRecenterOnShow installs the recenterOnShow predicate (see the field).
--- a/client/ui/tray.go
+++ b/client/ui/tray.go
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ func NewTray(app *application.App, window *application.WebviewWindow, svc TraySe
 		// in the right locale — no English flash then re-paint.
 		loc: svc.Localizer,
 	}
-	t.updater = newTrayUpdater(app, window, svc.Update, svc.Notifier, t.loc, func() { t.applyIcon() }, func() { t.relayoutMenu() })
+	t.updater = newTrayUpdater(app, t.showMainAt, svc.Update, svc.Notifier, t.loc, func() { t.applyIcon() }, func() { t.relayoutMenu() })
 	t.tray = app.SystemTray.New()
 	// Seed panel-theme detection before the first paint so the initial icon
 	// matches the panel's light/dark scheme (Linux only).
@@ -241,9 +241,6 @@ func (t *Tray) ShowWindow() {
 		w.Focus()
 		return
 	}
-	if t.window == nil {
-		return
-	}
 	// Route through WindowManager so the main window is centered on first
 	// show — minimal WMs (fluxbox, the XEmbed tray path) otherwise drop it in
 	// the top-left corner.
@@ -251,8 +248,49 @@ func (t *Tray) ShowWindow() {
 		t.svc.WindowManager.ShowMain()
 		return
 	}
-	t.window.Show()
-	t.window.Focus()
+	if w := t.mainWindow(); w != nil {
+		w.Show()
+		w.Focus()
+	}
+}
+
+func (t *Tray) mainWindow() *application.WebviewWindow {
+	if t.svc.WindowManager == nil {
+		return t.window
+	}
+	return t.svc.WindowManager.MainWindow()
+}
+
+func (t *Tray) showMainAt(url string) {
+	if t.svc.WindowManager != nil {
+		t.svc.WindowManager.ShowMainAt(url)
+		return
+	}
+	if w := t.mainWindow(); w != nil {
+		w.SetURL(url)
+		w.Show()
+		w.Focus()
+	}
+}
+
+func (t *Tray) showMain() {
+	if t.svc.WindowManager != nil {
+		t.svc.WindowManager.ShowMain()
+		return
+	}
+	if w := t.mainWindow(); w != nil {
+		w.Show()
+		w.Focus()
+	}
+}
+
+func (t *Tray) showMainAndEmit(event string) {
+	if t.svc.WindowManager != nil {
+		t.svc.WindowManager.ShowMainAndEmit(event)
+		return
+	}
+	t.showMain()
+	t.app.Event.Emit(event)
 }

 // applyLanguage re-renders every translated surface in the Localizer's current
@@ -479,7 +517,8 @@ func (t *Tray) handleConnect(upItem *application.MenuItem) {
 	// NeedsLogin/SessionExpired/LoginFailed won't honor a plain Up RPC — they
 	// need the Login → WaitSSOLogin → Up sequence. Emit EventTriggerLogin so
 	// the React startLogin() (which owns the BrowserLogin popup) drives it;
-	// the hidden main webview is alive and subscribed, so only the popup shows.
+	// the WindowManager materialises a hidden main webview when none is live,
+	// so only the popup shows.
 	t.statusMu.Lock()
 	needsLogin := strings.EqualFold(t.lastStatus, services.StatusNeedsLogin) ||
 		strings.EqualFold(t.lastStatus, services.StatusSessionExpired) ||
--- a/client/ui/tray_session.go
+++ b/client/ui/tray_session.go
@@ -30,10 +30,7 @@ const (
 // handleSessionExpired notifies and brings the window forward so the user can reconnect.
 func (t *Tray) handleSessionExpired() {
 	t.notify(t.loc.T("notify.sessionExpired.title"), t.loc.T("notify.sessionExpired.body"), notifyIDSessionExpired)
-	if t.window != nil {
-		t.window.Show()
-		t.window.Focus()
-	}
+	t.showMain()
 }

 // applySessionExpiry refreshes the cached SSO deadline and reports whether it changed.
@@ -307,7 +304,7 @@ func (t *Tray) openSessionExtendFlow() {
 	}
 	seconds := int(time.Until(deadline).Seconds())
 	if seconds <= 0 {
-		t.app.Event.Emit(services.EventTriggerLogin)
+		t.showMainAndEmit(services.EventTriggerLogin)
 		return
 	}
 	if t.svc.WindowManager == nil {
--- a/client/ui/tray_update.go
+++ b/client/ui/tray_update.go
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ package main

 import (
 	"context"
+	neturl "net/url"
 	"sync"
 	"time"

@@ -19,7 +20,7 @@ import (
 // trayUpdater owns the tray UI that reacts to auto-update. Composed inside Tray.
 type trayUpdater struct {
 	app          *application.App
-	window       *application.WebviewWindow
+	showMainAt   func(url string)
 	update       *services.Update
 	notifier     *Notifier
 	loc          *Localizer
@@ -36,10 +37,10 @@ type trayUpdater struct {
 	progressWindowOpen bool
 }

-func newTrayUpdater(app *application.App, window *application.WebviewWindow, update *services.Update, notifier *Notifier, loc *Localizer, onIconChange func(), onMenuChange func()) *trayUpdater {
+func newTrayUpdater(app *application.App, showMainAt func(url string), update *services.Update, notifier *Notifier, loc *Localizer, onIconChange func(), onMenuChange func()) *trayUpdater {
 	u := &trayUpdater{
 		app:          app,
-		window:       window,
+		showMainAt:   showMainAt,
 		update:       update,
 		notifier:     notifier,
 		loc:          loc,
@@ -185,14 +186,12 @@ func (u *trayUpdater) sendUpdateNotification(st updater.State) {
 // openProgressWindow points the main window at the /update progress page and
 // brings it forward.
 func (u *trayUpdater) openProgressWindow(version string) {
-	if u.window == nil {
+	if u.showMainAt == nil {
 		return
 	}
 	url := "/#/update"
 	if version != "" {
-		url += "?version=" + version
+		url += "?version=" + neturl.QueryEscape(version)
 	}
-	u.window.SetURL(url)
-	u.window.Show()
-	u.window.Focus()
+	u.showMainAt(url)
 }
--- a/go.mod
+++ b/go.mod
@@ -346,6 +346,6 @@ replace github.com/dexidp/dex/api/v2 => github.com/netbirdio/dex/api/v2 v2.0.0-2

 replace github.com/mailru/easyjson => github.com/netbirdio/easyjson v0.9.0

-replace github.com/wailsapp/wails/v3 => github.com/netbirdio/wails/v3 v3.0.0-beta.3.0.20260810103952-24e716aea4db
+replace github.com/wailsapp/wails/v3 => github.com/netbirdio/wails/v3 v3.0.0-beta.3.0.20260825085513-5f07a01f7a78

 tool go.uber.org/mock/mockgen
--- a/go.sum
+++ b/go.sum
@@ -488,8 +488,8 @@ github.com/netbirdio/service v0.0.0-20240911161631-f62744f42502 h1:3tHlFmhTdX9ax
 github.com/netbirdio/service v0.0.0-20240911161631-f62744f42502/go.mod h1:CIMRFEJVL+0DS1a3Nx06NaMn4Dz63Ng6O7dl0qH0zVM=
 github.com/netbirdio/signal-dispatcher/dispatcher v0.0.0-20250805121659-6b4ac470ca45 h1:ujgviVYmx243Ksy7NdSwrdGPSRNE3pb8kEDSpH0QuAQ=
 github.com/netbirdio/signal-dispatcher/dispatcher v0.0.0-20250805121659-6b4ac470ca45/go.mod h1:5/sjFmLb8O96B5737VCqhHyGRzNFIaN/Bu7ZodXc3qQ=
-github.com/netbirdio/wails/v3 v3.0.0-beta.3.0.20260810103952-24e716aea4db h1:gBOE2r4AW1soSmpYJC5/n9/1L8UQ8+HLjed8CY/TzZY=
-github.com/netbirdio/wails/v3 v3.0.0-beta.3.0.20260810103952-24e716aea4db/go.mod h1:bsdahLwBQxXjlmdPPeQyrTcDJfcqAr/ymFj0RXhwtWI=
+github.com/netbirdio/wails/v3 v3.0.0-beta.3.0.20260825085513-5f07a01f7a78 h1:B/jRv24jnFeoA+VccxoCx6K94PUgsqR9wnshpeu9M+8=
+github.com/netbirdio/wails/v3 v3.0.0-beta.3.0.20260825085513-5f07a01f7a78/go.mod h1:/6QR46/nhGCSADHbS++XtDb9dkTnenTHlGskTPRo9S0=
 github.com/netbirdio/wireguard-go v0.0.0-20260628102922-2834bebf6c1a h1:3CWK+yTvRKOcC0Q8VCTGy4l60TEb27CQVS7LkMxwjmw=
 github.com/netbirdio/wireguard-go v0.0.0-20260628102922-2834bebf6c1a/go.mod h1:rpwXGsirqLqN2L0JDJQlwOboGHmptD5ZD6T2VmcqhTw=
 github.com/nxadm/tail v1.4.4/go.mod h1:kenIhsEOeOJmVchQTgglprH7qJGnHDVpk1VPCcaMI8A=
--- a/management/internals/shared/grpc/proxy.go
+++ b/management/internals/shared/grpc/proxy.go
@@ -1311,7 +1311,7 @@ func (s *ProxyServiceServer) authenticateHeader(ctx context.Context, serviceID s
 			lastErr = err
 			continue
 		}
-		return true, "header-user", proxyauth.MethodHeader
+		return true, proxyauth.HeaderUserID, proxyauth.MethodHeader
 	}

 	if lastErr != nil {
--- a/proxy/auth/auth.go
+++ b/proxy/auth/auth.go
@@ -30,6 +30,12 @@ const (
 	SessionJWTIssuer     = "netbird-management"
 )

+// HeaderUserID is the synthetic user id recorded for header-authenticated
+// requests. Header auth validates a per-service secret and resolves no user
+// record, so proxy access logs and management-minted session tokens both
+// attribute the request to this id.
+const HeaderUserID = "header-user"
+
 // ResolveProto determines the protocol scheme based on the forwarded proto
 // configuration. When set to "http" or "https" the value is used directly.
 // Otherwise TLS state is used: if conn is non-nil "https" is returned, else "http".
--- a/proxy/internal/auth/header.go
+++ b/proxy/internal/auth/header.go
@@ -1,36 +1,33 @@
 package auth

 import (
+	"crypto/sha256"
 	"errors"
-	"fmt"
 	"net/http"
+	"sync"

 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/auth"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/types"
-	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/hash/argon2id"
 )

-// ErrHeaderAuthFailed indicates that the header was present but the
-// credential did not validate. Callers should return 401 instead of
-// falling through to other auth schemes.
-var ErrHeaderAuthFailed = errors.New("header authentication failed")
-
-// Header implements header-based authentication. The proxy checks for the
-// configured header in each request and validates its value via gRPC.
+// Header implements header-based authentication. The service mapping carries
+// the argon2id hash of every value accepted for the header, so the proxy
+// verifies the credential locally rather than round-tripping to management.
 type Header struct {
-	id         types.ServiceID
-	accountId  types.AccountID
 	headerName string
-	client     authenticator
+	hashes     []string
+	verified   *verifiedValues
 }

-// NewHeader creates a Header authentication scheme for the given header name.
-func NewHeader(client authenticator, id types.ServiceID, accountId types.AccountID, headerName string) Header {
+// NewHeader creates a Header authentication scheme accepting any value whose
+// argon2id hash appears in hashes. An empty hashes slice rejects every request
+// carrying the header, so a mapping that arrived without its hashes fails
+// closed instead of leaving the service unprotected.
+func NewHeader(headerName string, hashes []string) Header {
 	return Header{
-		id:         id,
-		accountId:  accountId,
-		headerName: headerName,
-		client:     client,
+		headerName: http.CanonicalHeaderKey(headerName),
+		hashes:     hashes,
+		verified:   &verifiedValues{seen: make(map[[32]byte]struct{}, len(hashes))},
 	}
 }

@@ -39,31 +36,64 @@ func (Header) Type() auth.Method {
 	return auth.MethodHeader
 }

-// Authenticate checks for the configured header in the request. If absent,
-// returns empty (unauthenticated). If present, validates via gRPC.
-func (h Header) Authenticate(r *http.Request) (string, string, error) {
+// Authenticate satisfies Scheme. Header credentials are resolved by Verify
+// before the scheme loop runs, so a request that reaches here never carries
+// the header and there is no credential to prompt for.
+func (Header) Authenticate(*http.Request) (string, string, error) {
+	return "", "", nil
+}
+
+// Verify reports whether the request carries the configured header and, when
+// it does, whether the value matches one of the service's hashes.
+//
+// A non-nil unusable is a diagnostic rather than a request error: a stored hash
+// could not be decoded, so no credential can ever match it and the header stays
+// unauthenticatable until the service is saved again. Folding that into an
+// ordinary mismatch would hide the misconfiguration behind a permanent 401.
+func (h Header) Verify(r *http.Request) (present, matched bool, unusable error) {
 	value := r.Header.Get(h.headerName)
 	if value == "" {
-		return "", "", nil
+		return false, false, nil
 	}

-	res, err := h.client.Authenticate(r.Context(), &proto.AuthenticateRequest{
-		Id:        string(h.id),
-		AccountId: string(h.accountId),
-		Request: &proto.AuthenticateRequest_HeaderAuth{
-			HeaderAuth: &proto.HeaderAuthRequest{
-				HeaderValue: value,
-				HeaderName:  h.headerName,
-			},
-		},
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("authenticate header: %w", err)
+	digest := sha256.Sum256([]byte(value))
+	if h.verified.has(digest) {
+		return true, true, nil
 	}

-	if res.GetSuccess() {
-		return res.GetSessionToken(), "", nil
+	for _, hash := range h.hashes {
+		err := argon2id.Verify(value, hash)
+		if err == nil {
+			h.verified.add(digest)
+			return true, true, nil
+		}
+		if !errors.Is(err, argon2id.ErrMismatchedHashAndPassword) {
+			unusable = err
+		}
 	}
-
-	return "", "", ErrHeaderAuthFailed
+	return true, false, unusable
+}
+
+// verifiedValues remembers which header values already passed argon2id
+// verification. argon2id is deliberately expensive (19 MiB, two passes) and
+// header credentials repeat on every request, so re-deriving per request would
+// dominate the hot path. The set cannot outgrow the number of configured
+// hashes, and a mapping update builds a fresh scheme with an empty set.
+// Values are keyed by digest so the plaintext credential is not retained.
+type verifiedValues struct {
+	mu   sync.Mutex
+	seen map[[32]byte]struct{}
+}
+
+func (v *verifiedValues) has(digest [32]byte) bool {
+	v.mu.Lock()
+	defer v.mu.Unlock()
+	_, ok := v.seen[digest]
+	return ok
+}
+
+func (v *verifiedValues) add(digest [32]byte) {
+	v.mu.Lock()
+	defer v.mu.Unlock()
+	v.seen[digest] = struct{}{}
 }
--- a/proxy/internal/auth/middleware.go
+++ b/proxy/internal/auth/middleware.go
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ func (mw *Middleware) Protect(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
 			return
 		}

-		if mw.forwardWithHeaderAuth(w, r, host, config, next) {
+		if mw.forwardWithHeaderAuth(w, r, config, next) {
 			return
 		}

@@ -325,6 +325,16 @@ func (mw *Middleware) forwardWithSessionCookie(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Re
 	if err != nil {
 		return false
 	}
+
+	// Header auth is checked per request against the mapping's hashes and mints
+	// no session, so a header-method token can only predate that. Honouring it
+	// would keep a rotated credential working until the token expired.
+	if method == auth.MethodHeader.String() {
+		mw.logger.WithField("host", host).
+			Debug("ignoring header-auth session cookie; the header is required on every request")
+		return false
+	}
+
 	if cd := proxy.CapturedDataFromContext(r.Context()); cd != nil {
 		cd.SetUserID(userID)
 		cd.SetUserEmail(email)
@@ -436,73 +446,44 @@ func isTunnelSourceIP(ip netip.Addr) bool {

 // forwardWithHeaderAuth checks for a Header auth scheme. If the header validates,
 // the request is forwarded directly (no redirect), which is important for API clients.
-func (mw *Middleware) forwardWithHeaderAuth(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, host string, config DomainConfig, next http.Handler) bool {
+func (mw *Middleware) forwardWithHeaderAuth(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, config DomainConfig, next http.Handler) bool {
+	var presented []string
 	for _, scheme := range config.Schemes {
 		hdr, ok := scheme.(Header)
 		if !ok {
 			continue
 		}

-		handled := mw.tryHeaderScheme(w, r, host, config, hdr, next)
-		if handled {
+		present, matched, unusable := hdr.Verify(r)
+		if matched {
+			if cd := proxy.CapturedDataFromContext(r.Context()); cd != nil {
+				cd.SetUserID(auth.HeaderUserID)
+				cd.SetAuthMethod(auth.MethodHeader.String())
+			}
+			next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
 			return true
 		}
+		if unusable != nil {
+			mw.logger.WithFields(log.Fields{
+				"host":   r.Host,
+				"header": hdr.headerName,
+			}).WithError(unusable).Error("header auth: a configured hash cannot be decoded, so this header can never authenticate; re-save the service")
+		}
+		if present {
+			presented = append(presented, hdr.headerName)
+		}
 	}
-	return false
-}

-func (mw *Middleware) tryHeaderScheme(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, host string, config DomainConfig, hdr Header, next http.Handler) bool {
-	token, _, err := hdr.Authenticate(r)
-	if err != nil {
-		return mw.handleHeaderAuthError(w, r, err)
-	}
-	if token == "" {
+	if len(presented) == 0 {
 		return false
 	}

-	result, err := mw.validateSessionToken(r.Context(), host, token, config.SessionPublicKey, auth.MethodHeader)
-	if err != nil {
-		setHeaderCapturedData(r.Context(), "", "", nil, nil)
-		status := http.StatusBadRequest
-		msg := "invalid session token"
-		if errors.Is(err, errValidationUnavailable) {
-			status = http.StatusBadGateway
-			msg = "authentication service unavailable"
-		}
-		http.Error(w, msg, status)
-		return true
-	}
-
-	if !result.Valid {
-		setHeaderCapturedData(r.Context(), result.UserID, result.UserEmail, result.Groups, result.GroupNames)
-		http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
-		return true
-	}
-
-	setSessionCookie(w, token, config.SessionExpiration)
-	if cd := proxy.CapturedDataFromContext(r.Context()); cd != nil {
-		cd.SetUserID(result.UserID)
-		cd.SetUserEmail(result.UserEmail)
-		cd.SetUserGroups(result.Groups)
-		cd.SetUserGroupNames(result.GroupNames)
-		cd.SetAuthMethod(auth.MethodHeader.String())
-	}
-
-	next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
-	return true
-}
-
-func (mw *Middleware) handleHeaderAuthError(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, err error) bool {
-	if errors.Is(err, ErrHeaderAuthFailed) {
-		setHeaderCapturedData(r.Context(), "", "", nil, nil)
-		http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
-		return true
-	}
-	mw.logger.WithField("scheme", "header").Warnf("header auth infrastructure error: %v", err)
-	if cd := proxy.CapturedDataFromContext(r.Context()); cd != nil {
-		cd.SetOrigin(proxy.OriginAuth)
-	}
-	http.Error(w, "authentication service unavailable", http.StatusBadGateway)
+	mw.logger.WithFields(log.Fields{
+		"host":    r.Host,
+		"headers": presented,
+	}).Debug("header auth rejected: no presented header matched a configured hash")
+	setHeaderCapturedData(r.Context(), "", "", nil, nil)
+	http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
 	return true
 }

--- a/proxy/internal/auth/middleware_test.go
+++ b/proxy/internal/auth/middleware_test.go
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import (
 	"time"

 	log "github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+	logtest "github.com/sirupsen/logrus/hooks/test"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
 	"google.golang.org/grpc"
@@ -25,6 +26,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/proxy"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/restrict"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/types"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/hash/argon2id"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
 )

@@ -1023,38 +1025,24 @@ func TestProtect_OIDCWithOtherMethodShowsLoginPage(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, rec.Code, "should show login page when multiple methods exist")
 }

-// mockAuthenticator is a minimal mock for the authenticator gRPC interface
-// used by the Header scheme.
-type mockAuthenticator struct {
-	fn func(ctx context.Context, req *proto.AuthenticateRequest) (*proto.AuthenticateResponse, error)
-}
-
-func (m *mockAuthenticator) Authenticate(ctx context.Context, in *proto.AuthenticateRequest, _ ...grpc.CallOption) (*proto.AuthenticateResponse, error) {
-	return m.fn(ctx, in)
-}
-
-// newHeaderSchemeWithToken creates a Header scheme backed by a mock that
-// returns a signed session token when the expected header value is provided.
-func newHeaderSchemeWithToken(t *testing.T, kp *sessionkey.KeyPair, headerName, expectedValue string) Header {
+// newHeaderScheme creates a Header scheme accepting each of the given values,
+// hashed the way management hashes them before putting them on the mapping.
+func newHeaderScheme(t *testing.T, headerName string, acceptedValues ...string) Header {
 	t.Helper()
-	token, err := sessionkey.SignToken(kp.PrivateKey, "header-user", "", "example.com", auth.MethodHeader, nil, nil, time.Hour)
-	require.NoError(t, err)
-
-	mock := &mockAuthenticator{fn: func(_ context.Context, req *proto.AuthenticateRequest) (*proto.AuthenticateResponse, error) {
-		ha := req.GetHeaderAuth()
-		if ha != nil && ha.GetHeaderValue() == expectedValue {
-			return &proto.AuthenticateResponse{Success: true, SessionToken: token}, nil
-		}
-		return &proto.AuthenticateResponse{Success: false}, nil
-	}}
-	return NewHeader(mock, "svc1", "acc1", headerName)
+	hashes := make([]string, 0, len(acceptedValues))
+	for _, v := range acceptedValues {
+		hash, err := argon2id.Hash(v)
+		require.NoError(t, err, "hashing an accepted header value must succeed")
+		hashes = append(hashes, hash)
+	}
+	return NewHeader(headerName, hashes)
 }

 func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_ForwardsOnSuccess(t *testing.T) {
 	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)

-	hdr := newHeaderSchemeWithToken(t, kp, "X-API-Key", "secret-key")
+	hdr := newHeaderScheme(t, "X-API-Key", "secret-key")
 	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{hdr}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false))

 	var backendCalled bool
@@ -1075,19 +1063,12 @@ func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_ForwardsOnSuccess(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code)
 	assert.Equal(t, "ok", rec.Body.String())

-	// Session cookie should be set.
-	var sessionCookie *http.Cookie
+	// The credential rides on every request, so no session cookie is issued.
 	for _, c := range rec.Result().Cookies() {
-		if c.Name == auth.SessionCookieName {
-			sessionCookie = c
-			break
-		}
+		assert.NotEqual(t, auth.SessionCookieName, c.Name, "header auth must not issue a session cookie")
 	}
-	require.NotNil(t, sessionCookie, "session cookie should be set after successful header auth")
-	assert.True(t, sessionCookie.HttpOnly)
-	assert.True(t, sessionCookie.Secure)

-	assert.Equal(t, "header-user", capturedData.GetUserID())
+	assert.Equal(t, auth.HeaderUserID, capturedData.GetUserID())
 	assert.Equal(t, "header", capturedData.GetAuthMethod())
 }

@@ -1095,7 +1076,7 @@ func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_MissingHeaderFallsThrough(t *testing.T) {
 	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)

-	hdr := newHeaderSchemeWithToken(t, kp, "X-API-Key", "secret-key")
+	hdr := newHeaderScheme(t, "X-API-Key", "secret-key")
 	// Also add a PIN scheme so we can verify fallthrough behavior.
 	pinScheme := &stubScheme{method: auth.MethodPIN, promptID: "pin"}
 	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{hdr, pinScheme}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false))
@@ -1114,10 +1095,7 @@ func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_WrongValueReturns401(t *testing.T) {
 	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)

-	mock := &mockAuthenticator{fn: func(_ context.Context, _ *proto.AuthenticateRequest) (*proto.AuthenticateResponse, error) {
-		return &proto.AuthenticateResponse{Success: false}, nil
-	}}
-	hdr := NewHeader(mock, "svc1", "acc1", "X-API-Key")
+	hdr := newHeaderScheme(t, "X-API-Key", "secret-key")
 	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{hdr}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false))

 	capturedData := proxy.NewCapturedData("")
@@ -1131,93 +1109,282 @@ func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_WrongValueReturns401(t *testing.T) {

 	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, rec.Code)
 	assert.Equal(t, "header", capturedData.GetAuthMethod())
+	assert.Empty(t, hdr.verified.seen, "a rejected value must not be memoized")
 }

-func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_InfraErrorReturns502(t *testing.T) {
+// TestProtect_HeaderAuth_MatchesAnyConfiguredHeader covers a client that carries
+// a valid credential on one configured header while also sending an unrelated
+// value on another — an app-level Authorization alongside an API key, say.
+// Schemes OR across header names, so the valid credential admits the request no
+// matter which order the mapping happened to list the headers in.
+func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_MatchesAnyConfiguredHeader(t *testing.T) {
+	tests := []struct {
+		name        string
+		matchedLast bool
+	}{
+		{name: "unmatched header listed first", matchedLast: true},
+		{name: "matched header listed first", matchedLast: false},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
+			kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
+
+			authz := newHeaderScheme(t, "Authorization", "Bearer proxy-secret")
+			apiKey := newHeaderScheme(t, "X-Api-Key", "secret-key")
+			schemes := []Scheme{apiKey, authz}
+			if tt.matchedLast {
+				schemes = []Scheme{authz, apiKey}
+			}
+			require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", schemes, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false))
+
+			var backendCalled bool
+			handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+				backendCalled = true
+				w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+			}))
+
+			req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
+			req.Header.Set("X-Api-Key", "secret-key")
+			req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer app-level-token")
+			rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+			handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+			assert.True(t, backendCalled, "a valid credential on one header must admit the request")
+			assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestProtect_HeaderAuth_RejectsWhenEveryPresentedHeaderFails is the other half
+// of the OR: trying all schemes before rejecting must not turn into admitting a
+// request that satisfied none of them.
+func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_RejectsWhenEveryPresentedHeaderFails(t *testing.T) {
 	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)

-	mock := &mockAuthenticator{fn: func(_ context.Context, _ *proto.AuthenticateRequest) (*proto.AuthenticateResponse, error) {
-		return nil, errors.New("gRPC unavailable")
-	}}
-	hdr := NewHeader(mock, "svc1", "acc1", "X-API-Key")
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{hdr}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false))
-
-	handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
-
-	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
-	req.Header.Set("X-API-Key", "some-key")
-	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
-	handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
-
-	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusBadGateway, rec.Code)
-}
-
-func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_SubsequentRequestUsesSessionCookie(t *testing.T) {
-	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
-	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
-
-	hdr := newHeaderSchemeWithToken(t, kp, "X-API-Key", "secret-key")
-	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{hdr}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false))
+	authz := newHeaderScheme(t, "Authorization", "Bearer proxy-secret")
+	apiKey := newHeaderScheme(t, "X-Api-Key", "secret-key")
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{authz, apiKey}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false))

+	var backendCalled bool
 	handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		backendCalled = true
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+	}))
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
+	req.Header.Set("X-Api-Key", "wrong-key")
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer wrong-token")
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+	assert.False(t, backendCalled)
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, rec.Code)
+}
+
+// TestProtect_HeaderAuth_ReportsUndecodableHash covers a stored hash the proxy
+// cannot decode. No credential can ever match it, so the header is permanently
+// unauthenticatable — an operator fault that has to surface loudly instead of
+// hiding behind the same quiet 401 a wrong credential earns.
+func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_ReportsUndecodableHash(t *testing.T) {
+	validHash, err := argon2id.Hash("secret-key")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	tests := []struct {
+		name       string
+		hashes     []string
+		wantErrLog bool
+	}{
+		{name: "stored hash cannot be decoded", hashes: []string{"$argon2id$v=19$garbage"}, wantErrLog: true},
+		{name: "wrong credential against a good hash", hashes: []string{validHash}, wantErrLog: false},
+	}
+
+	for _, tt := range tests {
+		t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			logger, hook := logtest.NewNullLogger()
+			logger.SetLevel(log.DebugLevel)
+			mw := NewMiddleware(logger, nil, nil)
+			kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
+
+			require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{NewHeader("X-Api-Key", tt.hashes)},
+				kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false))
+
+			handler := mw.Protect(newPassthroughHandler())
+
+			req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
+			req.Header.Set("X-Api-Key", "wrong-key")
+			rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+			handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+			require.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, rec.Code, "either way the request is denied")
+
+			var errored []string
+			for _, entry := range hook.AllEntries() {
+				if entry.Level == log.ErrorLevel {
+					errored = append(errored, entry.Message)
+				}
+			}
+
+			if !tt.wantErrLog {
+				assert.Empty(t, errored, "a wrong credential is not an operator fault")
+				return
+			}
+			require.Len(t, errored, 1, "an undecodable hash must be reported once")
+			assert.Contains(t, errored[0], "cannot be decoded")
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestProtect_HeaderAuth_NoHashesFailsClosed covers a mapping that names a
+// header but carries no hash for it: the check cannot be evaluated, so the
+// request must be denied rather than let through unauthenticated.
+func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_NoHashesFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
+	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
+	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
+
+	hdr := NewHeader("X-API-Key", nil)
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{hdr}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false))
+
+	var backendCalled bool
+	handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		backendCalled = true
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+	}))
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
+	req.Header.Set("X-API-Key", "any-key")
+	rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+	handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, rec.Code)
+	assert.False(t, backendCalled, "a header auth with no hashes must not admit the request")
+}
+
+// TestProtect_HeaderAuth_SubsequentRequestRequiresHeader verifies that header
+// auth grants no ambient session: a follow-up request that drops the header is
+// treated as unauthenticated.
+func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_SubsequentRequestRequiresHeader(t *testing.T) {
+	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
+	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
+
+	hdr := newHeaderScheme(t, "X-API-Key", "secret-key")
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{hdr}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false))
+
+	var backendCalls int
+	handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		backendCalls++
 		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
 	}))

-	// First request with header auth.
 	req1 := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
 	req1.Header.Set("X-API-Key", "secret-key")
 	req1 = req1.WithContext(proxy.WithCapturedData(req1.Context(), proxy.NewCapturedData("")))
 	rec1 := httptest.NewRecorder()
 	handler.ServeHTTP(rec1, req1)
 	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec1.Code)
+	require.Equal(t, 1, backendCalls)

-	// Extract session cookie.
-	var sessionCookie *http.Cookie
-	for _, c := range rec1.Result().Cookies() {
-		if c.Name == auth.SessionCookieName {
-			sessionCookie = c
-			break
-		}
-	}
-	require.NotNil(t, sessionCookie)
-
-	// Second request with only the session cookie (no header).
-	capturedData2 := proxy.NewCapturedData("")
+	// Same client, second request, header omitted: no cookie was handed out, so
+	// there is nothing to carry the earlier success forward.
 	req2 := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/other", nil)
-	req2.AddCookie(sessionCookie)
-	req2 = req2.WithContext(proxy.WithCapturedData(req2.Context(), capturedData2))
+	for _, c := range rec1.Result().Cookies() {
+		req2.AddCookie(c)
+	}
 	rec2 := httptest.NewRecorder()
 	handler.ServeHTTP(rec2, req2)

-	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec2.Code)
-	assert.Equal(t, "header-user", capturedData2.GetUserID())
-	assert.Equal(t, "header", capturedData2.GetAuthMethod())
+	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, rec2.Code, "dropping the header must revoke access")
+	assert.Equal(t, 1, backendCalls, "backend must not be reached without the header")
 }

-// TestProtect_HeaderAuth_MultipleValuesSameHeader verifies that the proxy
-// correctly handles multiple valid credentials for the same header name.
-// In production, the mgmt gRPC authenticateHeader iterates all configured
-// header auths and accepts if any hash matches (OR semantics). The proxy
-// creates one Header scheme per entry, but a single gRPC call checks all.
+// TestProtect_HeaderAuth_LegacySessionCookieIsIgnored covers the upgrade
+// window. Header auth used to mint a session token, so cookies with
+// method=header survive a proxy upgrade and stay signature-valid for their full
+// lifetime. They must not stand in for the header, or a credential rotated
+// right after the upgrade would keep working until every such token expired.
+func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_LegacySessionCookieIsIgnored(t *testing.T) {
+	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
+	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
+
+	hdr := newHeaderScheme(t, "X-API-Key", "secret-key")
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{hdr}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false))
+
+	// A token management would have minted for header auth before the upgrade.
+	legacyToken, err := sessionkey.SignToken(kp.PrivateKey, auth.HeaderUserID, "", "example.com", auth.MethodHeader, nil, nil, time.Hour)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	var backendCalls int
+	handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		backendCalls++
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+	}))
+
+	t.Run("cookie alone is rejected", func(t *testing.T) {
+		req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
+		req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: auth.SessionCookieName, Value: legacyToken})
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+		assert.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, rec.Code, "a header-auth cookie must not authenticate on its own")
+		assert.Equal(t, 0, backendCalls, "backend must not be reached without the header")
+	})
+
+	t.Run("cookie does not block the header path", func(t *testing.T) {
+		req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
+		req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: auth.SessionCookieName, Value: legacyToken})
+		req.Header.Set("X-API-Key", "secret-key")
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+		assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, rec.Code, "a client sending both must still be admitted by the header")
+		assert.Equal(t, 1, backendCalls)
+	})
+}
+
+// TestProtect_HeaderAuth_RepeatedValueIsMemoized verifies the KDF is run once
+// per distinct accepted value. argon2id is deliberately expensive, so a
+// credential that repeats on every request must not be re-derived each time.
+func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_RepeatedValueIsMemoized(t *testing.T) {
+	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
+	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)
+
+	hdr := newHeaderScheme(t, "X-API-Key", "key-a", "key-b")
+	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{hdr}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false))
+
+	handler := mw.Protect(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+	}))
+
+	get := func(value string) int {
+		req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
+		req.Header.Set("X-API-Key", value)
+		rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+		handler.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+		return rec.Code
+	}
+
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, get("key-a"))
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, get("key-a"))
+	assert.Len(t, hdr.verified.seen, 1, "the same value must be memoized once")
+
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, get("key-b"))
+	assert.Len(t, hdr.verified.seen, 2, "each accepted value gets its own entry")
+
+	require.Equal(t, http.StatusUnauthorized, get("key-c"))
+	assert.Len(t, hdr.verified.seen, 2, "rejected values must not grow the set")
+}
+
+// TestProtect_HeaderAuth_MultipleValuesSameHeader verifies that a service with
+// several accepted credentials for one header name accepts any of them.
+// Management applied these OR semantics while it still validated the value; the
+// proxy preserves them by carrying every hash for a name on one scheme.
 func TestProtect_HeaderAuth_MultipleValuesSameHeader(t *testing.T) {
 	mw := NewMiddleware(log.StandardLogger(), nil, nil)
 	kp := generateTestKeyPair(t)

-	// Mock simulates mgmt behavior: accepts either token-a or token-b.
-	accepted := map[string]bool{"Bearer token-a": true, "Bearer token-b": true}
-	mock := &mockAuthenticator{fn: func(_ context.Context, req *proto.AuthenticateRequest) (*proto.AuthenticateResponse, error) {
-		ha := req.GetHeaderAuth()
-		if ha != nil && accepted[ha.GetHeaderValue()] {
-			token, err := sessionkey.SignToken(kp.PrivateKey, "header-user", "", "example.com", auth.MethodHeader, nil, nil, time.Hour)
-			require.NoError(t, err)
-			return &proto.AuthenticateResponse{Success: true, SessionToken: token}, nil
-		}
-		return &proto.AuthenticateResponse{Success: false}, nil
-	}}
-
-	// Single Header scheme (as if one entry existed), but the mock checks both values.
-	hdr := NewHeader(mock, "svc1", "acc1", "Authorization")
+	hdr := newHeaderScheme(t, "Authorization", "Bearer token-a", "Bearer token-b")
 	require.NoError(t, mw.AddDomain("example.com", []Scheme{hdr}, kp.PublicKey, time.Hour, "acc1", "svc1", nil, false))

 	var backendCalled bool
--- a/proxy/server.go
+++ b/proxy/server.go
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ import (
 	"net/url"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"reflect"
+	"slices"
 	"sync"
 	"time"

@@ -2062,9 +2063,7 @@ func (s *Server) updateMapping(ctx context.Context, mapping *proto.ProxyMapping)
 	if mapping.GetAuth().GetOidc() {
 		schemes = append(schemes, auth.NewOIDC(s.mgmtClient, svcID, accountID, s.ForwardedProto))
 	}
-	for _, ha := range mapping.GetAuth().GetHeaderAuths() {
-		schemes = append(schemes, auth.NewHeader(s.mgmtClient, svcID, accountID, ha.GetHeader()))
-	}
+	schemes = append(schemes, headerAuthSchemes(mapping.GetAuth().GetHeaderAuths())...)

 	ipRestrictions := s.parseRestrictions(mapping)
 	s.warnIfGeoUnavailable(mapping.GetDomain(), mapping.GetAccessRestrictions())
@@ -2088,6 +2087,32 @@ func (s *Server) updateMapping(ctx context.Context, mapping *proto.ProxyMapping)
 	return nil
 }

+// headerAuthSchemes builds one scheme per canonical header name, carrying every
+// hash configured for that name so any of them is accepted — the OR semantics
+// management applied while it still validated the credential itself. No entry is
+// ever dropped: a name that arrives blank, or without a hash, still yields a
+// scheme, because a mapping that lost its only scheme would fall through
+// Protect's no-schemes pass-through and serve the domain unauthenticated.
+func headerAuthSchemes(headerAuths []*proto.HeaderAuth) []auth.Scheme {
+	names := make([]string, 0, len(headerAuths))
+	hashes := make(map[string][]string, len(headerAuths))
+	for _, ha := range headerAuths {
+		name := http.CanonicalHeaderKey(ha.GetHeader())
+		if !slices.Contains(names, name) {
+			names = append(names, name)
+		}
+		if hash := ha.GetHashedValue(); hash != "" {
+			hashes[name] = append(hashes[name], hash)
+		}
+	}
+
+	schemes := make([]auth.Scheme, 0, len(names))
+	for _, name := range names {
+		schemes = append(schemes, auth.NewHeader(name, hashes[name]))
+	}
+	return schemes
+}
+
 // initMiddlewareManager wires the middleware subsystem at boot. It configures
 // the per-process FactoryContext concrete middlewares consult, installs the
 // live-service check, and binds the resolver to the registry concrete
--- a/proxy/server_test.go
+++ b/proxy/server_test.go
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"net"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
 	"testing"
 	"time"

@@ -15,8 +17,10 @@ import (
 	"go.opentelemetry.io/otel/metric/noop"
 	"google.golang.org/grpc"

+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/auth"
 	proxymetrics "github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/metrics"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/proxy/internal/types"
+	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/hash/argon2id"
 	"github.com/netbirdio/netbird/shared/management/proto"
 )

@@ -209,6 +213,62 @@ func TestRedactMappingForLog_HandlesEmptyOrNilFields(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.Empty(t, redacted.Path, "empty Path must remain empty")
 }

+// headerSchemeAccepts reports whether the scheme admits value for headerName.
+func headerSchemeAccepts(t *testing.T, scheme auth.Scheme, headerName, value string) bool {
+	t.Helper()
+	hdr, ok := scheme.(auth.Header)
+	require.True(t, ok, "header auths must produce Header schemes")
+
+	req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://example.com/", nil)
+	req.Header.Set(headerName, value)
+	_, matched, _ := hdr.Verify(req)
+	return matched
+}
+
+func TestHeaderAuthSchemes_GroupsValuesByCanonicalHeaderName(t *testing.T) {
+	hashOf := func(v string) string {
+		hash, err := argon2id.Hash(v)
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+		return hash
+	}
+
+	schemes := headerAuthSchemes([]*proto.HeaderAuth{
+		{Header: "Authorization", HashedValue: hashOf("Bearer a")},
+		{Header: "authorization", HashedValue: hashOf("Bearer b")},
+		{Header: "X-Api-Key", HashedValue: hashOf("key-1")},
+	})
+
+	require.Len(t, schemes, 2, "entries differing only in header-name case must collapse into one scheme")
+
+	assert.True(t, headerSchemeAccepts(t, schemes[0], "Authorization", "Bearer a"), "first value for the header must be accepted")
+	assert.True(t, headerSchemeAccepts(t, schemes[0], "Authorization", "Bearer b"), "second value for the same header must be accepted")
+	assert.False(t, headerSchemeAccepts(t, schemes[0], "Authorization", "Bearer c"), "unconfigured value must be rejected")
+	assert.True(t, headerSchemeAccepts(t, schemes[1], "X-Api-Key", "key-1"), "a second header name keeps its own scheme")
+}
+
+// TestHeaderAuthSchemes_MissingHashFailsClosed covers a mapping that names a
+// header but carries no hash for it. Dropping the scheme would leave a service
+// whose only auth is that header wide open, so the scheme is kept and denies.
+func TestHeaderAuthSchemes_MissingHashFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
+	schemes := headerAuthSchemes([]*proto.HeaderAuth{{Header: "X-Api-Key"}})
+
+	require.Len(t, schemes, 1, "a header without a hash must still register a scheme")
+	assert.False(t, headerSchemeAccepts(t, schemes[0], "X-Api-Key", "anything"),
+		"a header auth without a hash must reject every value")
+}
+
+// TestHeaderAuthSchemes_BlankNameFailsClosed covers a mapping row whose header
+// name is empty. Skipping it would leave a service whose only auth is that entry
+// with no schemes at all, which Protect treats as an unprotected domain, so the
+// entry is kept and the domain stays gated.
+func TestHeaderAuthSchemes_BlankNameFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
+	schemes := headerAuthSchemes([]*proto.HeaderAuth{{Header: "", HashedValue: "$argon2id$not-a-real-hash"}})
+
+	require.Len(t, schemes, 1, "a blank header name must still register a scheme")
+	assert.False(t, headerSchemeAccepts(t, schemes[0], "X-Api-Key", "anything"),
+		"a blank header auth must not admit any request")
+}
+
 type statusUpdateOnlyClient struct {
 	proto.ProxyServiceClient
 }