Describe session auth as SSH and VNC, cover the conflicting key path, fix de and ru wording

client/ui/i18n/locales/de/common.json

@@ -1076,7 +1076,7 @@
         "message": "Eingehende Verbindung zulassen?"
     },
     "approval.field.user": {
-        "message": "Von Benutzer"
+        "message": "Vom Benutzer"
     },
     "approval.field.keyFingerprint": {
         "message": "Schlüssel-Fingerabdruck"

client/ui/i18n/locales/ru/common.json

@@ -1427,15 +1427,15 @@
         "message": "Ожидание авторизации…"
     },
     "connect.activeSession.badge": {
-        "message": "Экран доступен",
+        "message": "Экран транслируется",
         "description": "Short label on the badge shown on the main screen while somebody is attached to this machine over VNC."
     },
     "connect.activeSession.tooltip": {
-        "message": "Этот экран просматривается по VNC ({sessionCount} сеанс(ов)). Отключение завершит его, и если вы подключены через VNC, вы потеряете доступ.",
+        "message": "Этот экран сейчас просматривают по VNC ({sessionCount} сеанс(ов)). Отключение завершит VNC-сеанс, и если вы подключены через VNC, вы потеряете доступ.",
         "description": "Tooltip on the screen-shared badge. {sessionCount} is how many VNC sessions are attached; wording covers any number since the bundle has no plural forms."
     },
     "connect.activeSession.tooltipNamed": {
-        "message": "Этот экран просматривает {who} по VNC ({sessionCount} сеанс(ов)). Отключение завершит его, и если вы подключены через VNC, вы потеряете доступ.",
+        "message": "Этот экран сейчас просматривает {who} по VNC ({sessionCount} сеанс(ов)). Отключение завершит VNC-сеанс, и если вы подключены через VNC, вы потеряете доступ.",
         "description": "As connect.activeSession.tooltip, with {who} naming the dashboard users who started the sessions."
     },
     "settings.privilege.hint": {

shared/sessionauth/auth.go

@@ -27,7 +27,9 @@ var (
 	ErrSessionKeyNotKnown    = errors.New("session pubkey not registered")
 )
 
-// Authorizer handles SSH fine-grained access control authorization
+// Authorizer handles fine-grained access control authorization for the
+// remote-access servers: SSH by hashed user identity and OS login name, VNC by
+// the session public key management issued for a temporary-access grant.
 type Authorizer struct {
 	// UserIDClaim is the JWT claim to extract the user ID from
 	userIDClaim string
@@ -53,7 +55,7 @@ type Authorizer struct {
 	mu sync.RWMutex
 }
 
-// Config contains configuration for the SSH authorizer
+// Config contains configuration for the session authorizer
 type Config struct {
 	// UserIDClaim is the JWT claim to extract the user ID from (e.g., "sub", "email")
 	UserIDClaim string
@@ -80,7 +82,7 @@ type SessionPubKey struct {
 	DisplayName string
 }
 
-// NewAuthorizer creates a new SSH authorizer with empty configuration
+// NewAuthorizer creates a new session authorizer with empty configuration
 func NewAuthorizer() *Authorizer {
 	a := &Authorizer{
 		userIDClaim:         DefaultUserIDClaim,

shared/sessionauth/auth_test.go

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ package sessionauth
 
 import (
 	"errors"
+	"sync"
 	"testing"
 
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
@@ -399,11 +400,27 @@ func TestAuthorizer_ConcurrentAuthorization(t *testing.T) {
 		}(i)
 	}
 
+	// Reapply the same config while the reads above are in flight: Update
+	// replaces authorizedUsers, machineUsers and sessionPubKeys wholesale, so
+	// the race detector has something to catch if any of them is read unguarded.
+	const numUpdaters = 10
+	var updaters sync.WaitGroup
+	updaters.Add(numUpdaters)
+	for range numUpdaters {
+		go func() {
+			defer updaters.Done()
+			for range 50 {
+				authorizer.Update(config)
+			}
+		}()
+	}
+
 	// Wait for all goroutines to complete and collect errors
 	for i := 0; i < numGoroutines; i++ {
 		err := <-errChan
 		assert.NoError(t, err)
 	}
+	updaters.Wait()
 }
 
 func TestAuthorizer_Wildcard_AllowsAllAuthorizedUsers(t *testing.T) {
@@ -662,6 +679,31 @@ func TestAuthorizer_LookupSessionKey_UpdateClears(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// A session pubkey configured twice with different user hashes cannot be
+// resolved to one identity, so Update drops the binding rather than picking a
+// winner: the key must not authenticate anybody.
+func TestAuthorizer_SessionKey_ConflictingDuplicateIsDropped(t *testing.T) {
+	pub := bytesRepeat(0x44, sessionPubKeyLen)
+	aliceHash, err := sshauth.HashUserID("alice")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	bobHash, err := sshauth.HashUserID("bob")
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	a := NewAuthorizer()
+	a.Update(&Config{
+		AuthorizedUsers: []sshauth.UserIDHash{aliceHash, bobHash},
+		MachineUsers:    map[string][]uint32{Wildcard: {0, 1}},
+		SessionPubKeys: []SessionPubKey{
+			{PubKey: pub, UserIDHash: aliceHash, DisplayName: "Alice"},
+			{PubKey: pub, UserIDHash: bobHash, DisplayName: "Bob"},
+		},
+	})
+
+	_, err = a.LookupSessionKey(pub)
+	require.ErrorIs(t, err, ErrSessionKeyNotKnown, "a conflicting key must authenticate nobody")
+	assert.Empty(t, a.LookupSessionDisplayName(pub), "the display name goes with the dropped binding")
+}
+
 func bytesRepeat(b byte, n int) []byte {
 	out := make([]byte, n)
 	for i := range out {