- Add docstrings to `mdm_integration`
- refactor for cognitive complexity
- mod tidy
This commit is contained in:
riccardom
2026-06-09 12:02:32 +02:00
parent 46602e4176
commit d806f25b33
14 changed files with 360 additions and 200 deletions

View File

@@ -95,6 +95,21 @@ var debugConfigCmd = &cobra.Command{
RunE: debugConfigDump,
}
// debugConfigDump implements `netbird debug config`. It resolves the
// active profile, queries the daemon for the effective configuration
// via GetConfig, and prints the resulting GetConfigResponse as JSON
// (via protojson with EmitUnpopulated=true so the output is stable
// across runs and includes zero-valued fields).
//
// Useful for verifying MDM enforcement end-to-end: the response's
// mDMManagedFields array is the single source of truth for "which
// fields is the daemon currently enforcing from the MDM source", and
// every config field side-by-side with that list confirms the
// merge result. Secrets in the response (e.g. PreSharedKey) are
// debugConfigDump requests the daemon for the resolved effective configuration and prints it as indented JSON.
// It resolves the active profile and current OS user, calls DaemonService.GetConfig with those values, and
// marshals the response using protojson with default/zero-valued fields included.
// Returns an error if profile or user lookup fails, the gRPC call fails, or the response cannot be marshaled.
func debugConfigDump(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
pm := profilemanager.NewProfileManager()
activeProf, err := pm.GetActiveProfile()
@@ -136,6 +151,11 @@ func debugConfigDump(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
return nil
}
// debugBundle requests the daemon to create a debug bundle and prints the resulting
// local file path and, if uploaded, the uploaded file key.
// It uses the package flags (anonymize, system info, log file count, CLI version and
// optional upload URL) to configure the bundle request. Returns an error if the RPC
// fails or if the daemon reports an upload failure reason.
func debugBundle(cmd *cobra.Command, _ []string) error {
conn, err := getClient(cmd)
if err != nil {

View File

@@ -103,6 +103,12 @@ func Execute() error {
return rootCmd.Execute()
}
// init initializes package-level defaults and the CLI command tree.
// init sets platform-specific default config and log directory paths and a default daemon address,
// registers persistent flags (daemon address, management/admin URLs, logging, setup key, preshared key,
// hostname, anonymize, config path), attaches top-level and nested subcommands to the root command,
// and configures `up` command specific flags (external IP maps, DNS resolver address, Rosenpass options,
// auto-connect disabling, and lazy connection).
func init() {
defaultConfigPathDir = "/etc/netbird/"
defaultLogFileDir = "/var/log/netbird/"

View File

@@ -681,36 +681,28 @@ func (config *Config) applyMDMPolicy(policy *mdm.Policy) {
}
}
if v, ok := policy.GetBool(mdm.KeyAllowServerSSH); ok {
bv := v
config.ServerSSHAllowed = &bv
logApplied(mdm.KeyAllowServerSSH, bv)
}
if v, ok := policy.GetBool(mdm.KeyDisableClientRoutes); ok {
config.DisableClientRoutes = v
logApplied(mdm.KeyDisableClientRoutes, v)
}
if v, ok := policy.GetBool(mdm.KeyDisableServerRoutes); ok {
config.DisableServerRoutes = v
logApplied(mdm.KeyDisableServerRoutes, v)
}
if v, ok := policy.GetBool(mdm.KeyBlockInbound); ok {
config.BlockInbound = v
logApplied(mdm.KeyBlockInbound, v)
}
if v, ok := policy.GetBool(mdm.KeyDisableAutoConnect); ok {
config.DisableAutoConnect = v
logApplied(mdm.KeyDisableAutoConnect, v)
}
if v, ok := policy.GetBool(mdm.KeyRosenpassEnabled); ok {
config.RosenpassEnabled = v
logApplied(mdm.KeyRosenpassEnabled, v)
}
if v, ok := policy.GetBool(mdm.KeyRosenpassPermissive); ok {
config.RosenpassPermissive = v
logApplied(mdm.KeyRosenpassPermissive, v)
// applyBool collapses the per-key "read + set + log" boilerplate
// for every plain bool MDM key into a single helper. Keeps the
// outer function's cognitive complexity below SonarCube's
// threshold; functional behaviour is identical to the inlined
// branches it replaces.
applyBool := func(key string, setter func(bool)) {
v, ok := policy.GetBool(key)
if !ok {
return
}
setter(v)
logApplied(key, v)
}
applyBool(mdm.KeyAllowServerSSH, func(v bool) { bv := v; config.ServerSSHAllowed = &bv })
applyBool(mdm.KeyDisableClientRoutes, func(v bool) { config.DisableClientRoutes = v })
applyBool(mdm.KeyDisableServerRoutes, func(v bool) { config.DisableServerRoutes = v })
applyBool(mdm.KeyBlockInbound, func(v bool) { config.BlockInbound = v })
applyBool(mdm.KeyDisableAutoConnect, func(v bool) { config.DisableAutoConnect = v })
applyBool(mdm.KeyRosenpassEnabled, func(v bool) { config.RosenpassEnabled = v })
applyBool(mdm.KeyRosenpassPermissive, func(v bool) { config.RosenpassPermissive = v })
if v, ok := policy.GetInt(mdm.KeyWireguardPort); ok {
// REG_DWORD is 32-bit; UDP port range is 1-65535. Clamp at the
// upper bound and reject obviously-invalid values to avoid the
@@ -724,7 +716,10 @@ func (config *Config) applyMDMPolicy(policy *mdm.Policy) {
}
}
// parseURL parses and validates a service URL
// parseURL parses and validates the URL for the named service.
// It requires the URL to use the http or https scheme and, if no port is present,
// appends ":443" for https or ":80" for http. On success it returns the parsed
// *url.URL; on failure it returns a non-nil error.
func parseURL(serviceName, serviceURL string) (*url.URL, error) {
parsedMgmtURL, err := url.ParseRequestURI(serviceURL)
if err != nil {

View File

@@ -96,7 +96,9 @@ type Policy struct {
}
// NewPolicy constructs a Policy from a key→value map. Pass nil or an empty
// map to construct an empty (no-enforcement) Policy.
// NewPolicy constructs a Policy backed by the provided key→value map.
// If values is nil it is replaced with an empty map so the returned *Policy
// is always non-nil and represents no active MDM enforcement when empty.
func NewPolicy(values map[string]any) *Policy {
if values == nil {
values = map[string]any{}
@@ -111,7 +113,9 @@ func NewPolicy(values map[string]any) *Policy {
// Diagnostic logging differentiates the three states:
// - source absent / unsupported platform: trace log only
// - source present, zero keys: info "MDM enrolled (no managed keys)"
// - source present, N keys: info "MDM enrolled with N managed keys: [...]"
// LoadPolicy loads MDM-managed configuration from the platform and returns a Policy representing the managed settings.
// If the platform loader fails or returns nil, LoadPolicy returns a non-nil empty Policy.
// When the loaded map contains zero keys it logs that MDM is enrolled with no managed keys; when it contains keys it logs the count and a stable, sorted list of key names.
func LoadPolicy() *Policy {
values, err := loadPlatformPolicy()
if err != nil {
@@ -169,6 +173,19 @@ func (p *Policy) GetString(key string) (string, bool) {
return s, true
}
// boolStringLiterals enumerates the textual boolean encodings the
// platform loaders may produce (Windows REG_SZ "true", iOS / Android
// managed-config booleans-as-strings, etc.). Lookup keeps GetBool flat
// (no nested switch on the string case).
var boolStringLiterals = map[string]bool{
"true": true,
"1": true,
"yes": true,
"false": false,
"0": false,
"no": false,
}
// GetBool returns the managed value for key coerced to bool, and whether the
// key was set. Accepts native bool and string literals "true"/"false"/"1"/"0".
func (p *Policy) GetBool(key string) (bool, bool) {
@@ -183,12 +200,8 @@ func (p *Policy) GetBool(key string) (bool, bool) {
case bool:
return t, true
case string:
switch t {
case "true", "1", "yes":
return true, true
case "false", "0", "no":
return false, true
}
b, known := boolStringLiterals[t]
return b, known
case int:
return t != 0, true
case int64:
@@ -257,6 +270,10 @@ func (p *Policy) GetStringSlice(key string) ([]string, bool) {
return nil, false
}
// sortedKeys returns the keys of m as a deterministic, lexicographically
// sorted slice. Used internally by Policy.ManagedKeys and LoadPolicy's
// diagnostic log line so callers see a stable key order across runs
// It produces a deterministic ordering for a map regardless of Go's randomized iteration.
func sortedKeys(m map[string]any) []string {
out := make([]string, 0, len(m))
for k := range m {

View File

@@ -37,7 +37,11 @@ const policyPlistPath = "/Library/Managed Preferences/io.netbird.client.plist"
// map naturally onto the Policy accessor expectations (GetString /
// GetBool / GetInt / GetStringSlice). Unknown top-level keys are
// logged and skipped so a stray entry in the payload does not block
// startup.
// loadPlatformPolicy reads the managed-preferences plist at policyPlistPath and returns recognised MDM key/value pairs.
//
// If the plist file does not exist, it returns (nil, nil). It returns a wrapped error on open/stat/decode failures.
// The function refuses to read a world-writable plist and returns an error in that case.
// Top-level plist keys are canonicalized (case-insensitive) to the internal MDM key names; unknown keys are logged and skipped.
func loadPlatformPolicy() (map[string]any, error) {
f, err := os.Open(policyPlistPath)
if err != nil {

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,8 @@ package mdm
// Kotlin/Java on Android) reads the OS managed-config store and pushes the
// resulting dictionary in-process via a gomobile entry point that lands in
// Phase 5 / Phase 6. The stub keeps the package compilable for mobile
// build targets.
// loadPlatformPolicy is a stub used on mobile (iOS/Android) builds that returns a nil policy map and no error.
// The actual managed-config policy is supplied by the native platform layer.
func loadPlatformPolicy() (map[string]any, error) {
return nil, nil
}

View File

@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@ package mdm
// loadPlatformPolicy returns no policy on platforms without an MDM channel
// (Linux, FreeBSD). MDM enforcement is off and the client behaves as if
// the feature did not exist.
// loadPlatformPolicy reports that no platform MDM policy is available on non-Windows/Darwin/iOS/Android builds.
// It returns a nil policy map and a nil error to indicate MDM enforcement is not present on this platform.
func loadPlatformPolicy() (map[string]any, error) {
return nil, nil
}

View File

@@ -31,7 +31,44 @@ const policyRegistryPath = `Software\Policies\NetBird`
// - REG_MULTI_SZ -> []string
//
// Unsupported value types (REG_BINARY, REG_NONE, ...) are skipped with a
// warning so a malformed deployment does not block startup.
// loadPlatformPolicy reads managed NetBird policy values from HKLM\Software\Policies\NetBird.
// If the registry key does not exist it returns (nil, nil).
// It returns a map whose keys are canonical policy names and whose values are coerced from registry types:
// REG_SZ/REG_EXPAND_SZ -> string, REG_DWORD/REG_QWORD -> int64, REG_MULTI_SZ -> []string.
// Unknown value names, unsupported value types, and per-value read errors are skipped and logged; failures opening the key or enumerating values are returned as errors.
func readRegistryValue(k registry.Key, name, canonical string, out map[string]any) {
_, valType, err := k.GetValue(name, nil)
if err != nil {
log.Warnf("MDM stat %s\\%s: %v", policyRegistryPath, name, err)
return
}
switch valType {
case registry.SZ, registry.EXPAND_SZ:
if v, _, err := k.GetStringValue(name); err == nil {
out[canonical] = v
} else {
log.Warnf("MDM read string %s\\%s: %v", policyRegistryPath, name, err)
}
case registry.DWORD, registry.QWORD:
if v, _, err := k.GetIntegerValue(name); err == nil {
// uint64 from the registry API; Policy.GetBool / GetInt
// helpers consume int64, so narrow safely.
out[canonical] = int64(v)
} else {
log.Warnf("MDM read int %s\\%s: %v", policyRegistryPath, name, err)
}
case registry.MULTI_SZ:
if v, _, err := k.GetStringsValue(name); err == nil {
out[canonical] = v
} else {
log.Warnf("MDM read multi-string %s\\%s: %v", policyRegistryPath, name, err)
}
default:
log.Warnf("MDM ignoring unsupported registry value type %d at %s\\%s",
valType, policyRegistryPath, name)
}
}
func loadPlatformPolicy() (map[string]any, error) {
k, err := registry.OpenKey(registry.LOCAL_MACHINE, policyRegistryPath, registry.QUERY_VALUE)
if err != nil {
@@ -63,37 +100,7 @@ func loadPlatformPolicy() (map[string]any, error) {
log.Warnf("MDM ignoring unknown registry value %s\\%s", policyRegistryPath, name)
continue
}
_, valType, err := k.GetValue(name, nil)
if err != nil {
log.Warnf("MDM stat %s\\%s: %v", policyRegistryPath, name, err)
continue
}
switch valType {
case registry.SZ, registry.EXPAND_SZ:
if v, _, err := k.GetStringValue(name); err == nil {
out[canonical] = v
} else {
log.Warnf("MDM read string %s\\%s: %v", policyRegistryPath, name, err)
}
case registry.DWORD, registry.QWORD:
if v, _, err := k.GetIntegerValue(name); err == nil {
// uint64 from the registry API; Policy.GetBool / GetInt
// helpers consume int64, so narrow safely.
out[canonical] = int64(v)
} else {
log.Warnf("MDM read int %s\\%s: %v", policyRegistryPath, name, err)
}
case registry.MULTI_SZ:
if v, _, err := k.GetStringsValue(name); err == nil {
out[canonical] = v
} else {
log.Warnf("MDM read multi-string %s\\%s: %v", policyRegistryPath, name, err)
}
default:
log.Warnf("MDM ignoring unsupported registry value type %d at %s\\%s",
valType, policyRegistryPath, name)
}
readRegistryValue(k, name, canonical, out)
}
return out, nil
}

View File

@@ -25,7 +25,8 @@ const testReloadInterval = 1 * time.Second
// reloadInterval returns the production cadence, or the accelerated test
// cadence when running under `go test`. Centralising the choice here keeps
// the prod/test split in one place and out of the ticker's call sites.
// reloadInterval selects the polling interval used to re-read the OS-native MDM policy.
// It returns testReloadInterval when tests are running (testing.Testing() == true) and defaultReloadInterval otherwise.
func reloadInterval() time.Duration {
if testing.Testing() {
return testReloadInterval
@@ -52,7 +53,9 @@ type Ticker struct {
// NewTicker constructs a Ticker that re-reads the OS-native policy every
// reloadInterval() and invokes onChange on any diff. The cadence is owned by
// reloadInterval (production default, accelerated under `go test`); callers
// do not supply it. onChange may be nil for a log-only ticker.
// NewTicker creates a Ticker that polls the OS-native MDM policy at the package reload interval and invokes onChange when a policy change is detected.
// If onChange is nil the ticker will only log detected changes.
// The ticker's initial snapshot is populated by loading the current policy.
func NewTicker(onChange func(prev, curr *Policy)) *Ticker {
return &Ticker{
interval: reloadInterval(),
@@ -91,7 +94,7 @@ func (t *Ticker) Run(ctx context.Context) {
}
// PoliciesEqual reports whether two Policy instances carry the same managed
// key set with identical values. Nil and empty policies compare equal.
// value maps for deep equality.
func PoliciesEqual(a, b *Policy) bool {
if a.IsEmpty() && b.IsEmpty() {
return true
@@ -103,7 +106,11 @@ func PoliciesEqual(a, b *Policy) bool {
}
// diffPolicies returns the keys added in curr, removed from prev, and whose
// value changed. Returned slices are sorted for stable log output.
// diffPolicies reports keys that were added, removed, or changed between two policies.
// The returned slices contain keys present only in `curr` (added), only in `prev` (removed),
// and present in both but whose values differ (changed). Each slice is sorted
// lexicographically for stable logging output; value differences are determined
// using deep equality.
func diffPolicies(prev, curr *Policy) (added, removed, changed []string) {
prevKeys := mapOf(prev)
currKeys := mapOf(curr)
@@ -127,7 +134,9 @@ func diffPolicies(prev, curr *Policy) (added, removed, changed []string) {
// mapOf returns a (possibly empty, never nil) copy of the underlying values
// map of a Policy so callers outside this package can compare across the
// public Policy boundary without touching unexported state.
// mapOf returns a non-nil copy of the given Policy's key/value map.
// If p is nil, mapOf returns an empty map; otherwise it returns a newly
// allocated map containing the same key/value pairs as p.values.
func mapOf(p *Policy) map[string]any {
if p == nil {
return map[string]any{}

View File

@@ -152,6 +152,97 @@ func (s *Server) restartEngineForMDM() error {
return nil
}
// preSharedKeyRedactedSentinel is the value GetConfig returns in place
// of an actual PSK, so a UI that round-trips the field back to the
// daemon (via SetConfig / Login) can be distinguished from a deliberate
// override. Any incoming PSK that equals this sentinel is treated as
// a no-op echo, never as a conflict with the policy.
const preSharedKeyRedactedSentinel = "**********"
// conflictCheck is a value-aware comparison between a single field in
// the incoming request and the corresponding MDM-enforced value. It
// runs only when the field was actually set in the request (presence
// already filtered upstream); ok=true reports the policy value, ok=false
// means the policy is silent on the key — both are treated as conflicts
// to be safe (an MDM key declared as managed must hold a value).
type conflictCheck struct {
key string
check func(*mdm.Policy) (match bool)
}
// conflictBool builds a check for a *bool field on an arbitrary request
// conflictBool builds a conflictCheck for a boolean MDM key.
// If p is nil the returned check treats the field as matching; otherwise the
// check returns true only when the policy contains the key and its boolean
// value equals *p.
func conflictBool(key string, p *bool) conflictCheck {
return conflictCheck{
key: key,
check: func(pol *mdm.Policy) bool {
if p == nil {
return true // absent → match by definition
}
want, ok := pol.GetBool(key)
return ok && want == *p
},
}
}
// conflictString builds a check for a string field. Empty string ("")
// conflictString returns a conflictCheck for the MDM string key identified by `key`.
// If `got` is empty the field is treated as unset and will not be considered a conflict.
// Otherwise the check succeeds only when the policy contains `key` and its value equals `got`.
func conflictString(key, got string) conflictCheck {
return conflictCheck{
key: key,
check: func(pol *mdm.Policy) bool {
if got == "" {
return true
}
want, ok := pol.GetString(key)
return ok && want == got
},
}
}
// conflictInt64 builds a conflictCheck that verifies an *int64 field against the MDM policy key.
// If p is nil the check always matches; otherwise the check requires the policy to contain the key and its integer value to equal *p.
func conflictInt64(key string, p *int64) conflictCheck {
return conflictCheck{
key: key,
check: func(pol *mdm.Policy) bool {
if p == nil {
return true
}
want, ok := pol.GetInt(key)
return ok && want == *p
},
}
}
// resolveConflicts walks a list of per-field checks against the active
// MDM policy and returns the names of keys whose requested value
// diverges from the policy-enforced value. Keys not managed by MDM are
// skipped silently (the gate fires only for keys the admin has actually
// resolveConflicts identifies MDM-managed policy keys whose values differ from the provided checks.
// If the policy is empty, it returns nil. Only keys present in the policy are considered; for each
// check whose predicate returns false the corresponding key is included in the returned slice.
func resolveConflicts(policy *mdm.Policy, checks []conflictCheck) []string {
if policy.IsEmpty() {
return nil
}
var conflicts []string
for _, c := range checks {
if !policy.HasKey(c.key) {
continue
}
if !c.check(policy) {
conflicts = append(conflicts, c.key)
}
}
return conflicts
}
// mdmManagedFieldConflicts returns the names of MDM-managed keys whose
// requested value in the SetConfigRequest differs from the MDM-enforced
// value. A field set to the same value the policy already enforces is
@@ -159,52 +250,39 @@ func (s *Server) restartEngineForMDM() error {
// every toggle, so most fields in a typical request match the policy
// exactly and must NOT be flagged as conflicts).
//
// The redacted PreSharedKey sentinel ("**********") that GetConfig
// returns is recognised and treated as no-op so the UI can safely round-
// trip it without tripping the gate.
// The redacted PreSharedKey sentinel that GetConfig returns is
// recognised and treated as no-op so the UI can safely round-trip it
// mdmManagedFieldConflicts reports which MDM-managed policy keys would be violated by
// the provided SetConfigRequest.
//
// If msg is nil, it returns nil. The function treats the PSK redaction sentinel
// ("**********") as an intentional no-op (equivalent to field not set). Only keys
// present in the supplied policy are considered; returned slice contains the policy
// key names that conflict with the values in msg.
func mdmManagedFieldConflicts(msg *proto.SetConfigRequest, policy *mdm.Policy) []string {
if msg == nil || policy.IsEmpty() {
if msg == nil {
return nil
}
var conflicts []string
mark := func(key string) { conflicts = append(conflicts, key) }
if msg.ManagementUrl != "" && policy.HasKey(mdm.KeyManagementURL) {
if want, ok := policy.GetString(mdm.KeyManagementURL); !ok || want != msg.ManagementUrl {
mark(mdm.KeyManagementURL)
}
// PSK round-trip echo: collapse the sentinel to empty so the
// shared check treats it as "field not set".
pskGot := ""
if msg.OptionalPreSharedKey != nil && *msg.OptionalPreSharedKey != preSharedKeyRedactedSentinel {
pskGot = *msg.OptionalPreSharedKey
}
if msg.OptionalPreSharedKey != nil && policy.HasKey(mdm.KeyPreSharedKey) {
// "**********" is the redacted echo from GetConfig — never a real
// override attempt regardless of what the policy holds.
if *msg.OptionalPreSharedKey != "**********" {
if want, ok := policy.GetString(mdm.KeyPreSharedKey); !ok || want != *msg.OptionalPreSharedKey {
mark(mdm.KeyPreSharedKey)
}
}
}
checkBool := func(key string, p *bool) {
if p == nil || !policy.HasKey(key) {
return
}
if want, ok := policy.GetBool(key); !ok || want != *p {
mark(key)
}
}
checkBool(mdm.KeyRosenpassEnabled, msg.RosenpassEnabled)
checkBool(mdm.KeyRosenpassPermissive, msg.RosenpassPermissive)
checkBool(mdm.KeyDisableAutoConnect, msg.DisableAutoConnect)
checkBool(mdm.KeyAllowServerSSH, msg.ServerSSHAllowed)
checkBool(mdm.KeyDisableClientRoutes, msg.DisableClientRoutes)
checkBool(mdm.KeyDisableServerRoutes, msg.DisableServerRoutes)
checkBool(mdm.KeyBlockInbound, msg.BlockInbound)
if msg.WireguardPort != nil && policy.HasKey(mdm.KeyWireguardPort) {
if want, ok := policy.GetInt(mdm.KeyWireguardPort); !ok || want != *msg.WireguardPort {
mark(mdm.KeyWireguardPort)
}
}
return conflicts
return resolveConflicts(policy, []conflictCheck{
conflictString(mdm.KeyManagementURL, msg.ManagementUrl),
conflictString(mdm.KeyPreSharedKey, pskGot),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyRosenpassEnabled, msg.RosenpassEnabled),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyRosenpassPermissive, msg.RosenpassPermissive),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableAutoConnect, msg.DisableAutoConnect),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyAllowServerSSH, msg.ServerSSHAllowed),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableClientRoutes, msg.DisableClientRoutes),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableServerRoutes, msg.DisableServerRoutes),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyBlockInbound, msg.BlockInbound),
conflictInt64(mdm.KeyWireguardPort, msg.WireguardPort),
})
}
// setConfigRequestHasConfigOverrides reports whether the SetConfigRequest
@@ -213,7 +291,13 @@ func mdmManagedFieldConflicts(msg *proto.SetConfigRequest, policy *mdm.Policy) [
// setupSetConfigReq in cmd/up.go), so a plain `netbird up` results in a
// SetConfig call with every field at its zero value; the gate must skip
// such no-op invocations or it would always fire even when the user did
// not pass any --flag.
// setConfigRequestHasConfigOverrides reports whether msg contains any fields that would mutate
// persisted daemon configuration rather than being purely authentication-only.
// It returns false if msg is nil; otherwise it returns true when any configuration-related
// field is present (for example: management/admin URLs, pre-shared key, DNS/NAT lists and
// cleaning flags, interface/port/MTU settings, auto-connect and routing toggles, DNS/firewall/IPv6
// controls, SSH-related flags, notification/lazy-connection options, or other persistent config
// toggles).
func setConfigRequestHasConfigOverrides(msg *proto.SetConfigRequest) bool {
if msg == nil {
return false
@@ -256,7 +340,10 @@ func setConfigRequestHasConfigOverrides(msg *proto.SetConfigRequest) bool {
// (as opposed to pure-auth fields like setupKey, hostname, hint,
// profileName, username). Used by the Login handler to decide whether
// the `--disable-update-settings` / MDM gates must run: a re-auth that
// changes nothing about the configuration is always allowed.
// loginRequestHasConfigOverrides reports whether a LoginRequest includes any fields that would change persisted daemon configuration.
// It returns true when the request carries any configuration-related values (for example: management/admin URLs, pre-shared key,
// DNS or NAT lists/cleanup flags, interface or WireGuard port, connection and policy toggles, route/DNS/firewall/notification flags,
// Rosenpass settings, lazy-connection or block-inbound), and false when the request is nil or contains only authentication/identity fields.
func loginRequestHasConfigOverrides(msg *proto.LoginRequest) bool {
if msg == nil {
return false
@@ -290,64 +377,46 @@ func loginRequestHasConfigOverrides(msg *proto.LoginRequest) bool {
// loginRequestMDMConflicts mirrors mdmManagedFieldConflicts but for the
// LoginRequest surface. Same value-aware semantics: a field set to the
// MDM-enforced value is a no-op echo, not a conflict; only a divergent
// value is flagged. PSK has two proto fields (PreSharedKey deprecated
// and OptionalPreSharedKey current); both routes are checked, and the
// "**********" redaction sentinel is accepted as a no-op.
// value is flagged. PSK has two proto fields PreSharedKey (deprecated)
// and OptionalPreSharedKey (current); either route trips the gate if it
// diverges from the MDM-enforced PSK. The redaction sentinel is treated
// loginRequestMDMConflicts reports MDM-managed keys that conflict between a LoginRequest and an active MDM policy.
//
// It returns a slice of policy keys that are managed by the given policy and whose values in the request
// differ from the policy. If msg is nil or the policy has no managed keys, it returns nil. The function
// prefers OptionalPreSharedKey over the legacy PreSharedKey when both are present and treats the redaction
// sentinel "**********" as an absent pre-shared key.
func loginRequestMDMConflicts(msg *proto.LoginRequest, policy *mdm.Policy) []string {
if msg == nil || policy.IsEmpty() {
if msg == nil {
return nil
}
var conflicts []string
mark := func(key string) { conflicts = append(conflicts, key) }
if msg.ManagementUrl != "" && policy.HasKey(mdm.KeyManagementURL) {
if want, ok := policy.GetString(mdm.KeyManagementURL); !ok || want != msg.ManagementUrl {
mark(mdm.KeyManagementURL)
}
// Collapse the two PSK fields + the redaction sentinel down to a
// single "got" string the shared check can compare against the
// policy: OptionalPreSharedKey wins if set; PreSharedKey (deprecated)
// is the fallback; sentinel echo is treated as "field not set".
pskGot := ""
if msg.OptionalPreSharedKey != nil {
pskGot = *msg.OptionalPreSharedKey
} else if msg.PreSharedKey != "" { //nolint:staticcheck // SA1019: legacy proto field still accepted by Login
pskGot = msg.PreSharedKey //nolint:staticcheck // SA1019
}
if pskGot == preSharedKeyRedactedSentinel {
pskGot = ""
}
// PSK: PreSharedKey (deprecated) and OptionalPreSharedKey are both
// accepted by Login; either trips the gate if it diverges from the
// MDM-enforced PSK.
if policy.HasKey(mdm.KeyPreSharedKey) {
psk := ""
set := false
if msg.OptionalPreSharedKey != nil {
psk = *msg.OptionalPreSharedKey
set = true
} else if msg.PreSharedKey != "" {
psk = msg.PreSharedKey
set = true
}
if set && psk != "**********" {
if want, ok := policy.GetString(mdm.KeyPreSharedKey); !ok || want != psk {
mark(mdm.KeyPreSharedKey)
}
}
}
checkBool := func(key string, p *bool) {
if p == nil || !policy.HasKey(key) {
return
}
if want, ok := policy.GetBool(key); !ok || want != *p {
mark(key)
}
}
checkBool(mdm.KeyRosenpassEnabled, msg.RosenpassEnabled)
checkBool(mdm.KeyRosenpassPermissive, msg.RosenpassPermissive)
checkBool(mdm.KeyDisableAutoConnect, msg.DisableAutoConnect)
checkBool(mdm.KeyAllowServerSSH, msg.ServerSSHAllowed)
checkBool(mdm.KeyDisableClientRoutes, msg.DisableClientRoutes)
checkBool(mdm.KeyDisableServerRoutes, msg.DisableServerRoutes)
checkBool(mdm.KeyBlockInbound, msg.BlockInbound)
if msg.WireguardPort != nil && policy.HasKey(mdm.KeyWireguardPort) {
if want, ok := policy.GetInt(mdm.KeyWireguardPort); !ok || want != *msg.WireguardPort {
mark(mdm.KeyWireguardPort)
}
}
return conflicts
return resolveConflicts(policy, []conflictCheck{
conflictString(mdm.KeyManagementURL, msg.ManagementUrl),
conflictString(mdm.KeyPreSharedKey, pskGot),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyRosenpassEnabled, msg.RosenpassEnabled),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyRosenpassPermissive, msg.RosenpassPermissive),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableAutoConnect, msg.DisableAutoConnect),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyAllowServerSSH, msg.ServerSSHAllowed),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableClientRoutes, msg.DisableClientRoutes),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyDisableServerRoutes, msg.DisableServerRoutes),
conflictBool(mdm.KeyBlockInbound, msg.BlockInbound),
conflictInt64(mdm.KeyWireguardPort, msg.WireguardPort),
})
}
// rejectMDMManagedFieldConflicts returns a FailedPrecondition gRPC error
@@ -355,7 +424,10 @@ func loginRequestMDMConflicts(msg *proto.LoginRequest, policy *mdm.Policy) []str
// fields tries to change an MDM-enforced value to something else, and
// nil otherwise. The whole request is rejected on any conflict; non-
// conflicting fields in the same request are not applied either (no
// partial apply).
// rejectMDMManagedFieldConflicts returns a gRPC FailedPrecondition error when any MDM-managed fields conflict.
// If `conflicts` is empty this function returns nil. When conflicts exist it produces a FailedPrecondition status
// whose message lists the conflicting fields and attempts to attach a `proto.MDMManagedFieldsViolation` detail;
// if attaching details fails the base status error is returned. A warning is logged listing the rejected keys.
func rejectMDMManagedFieldConflicts(policy *mdm.Policy, conflicts []string) error {
if len(conflicts) == 0 {
return nil

View File

@@ -343,50 +343,62 @@ func (s *Server) SetConfig(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.SetConfigReques
return nil, err
}
config, err := setConfigInputFromRequest(msg)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if _, err := profilemanager.UpdateConfig(config); err != nil {
log.Errorf("failed to update profile config: %v", err)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to update profile config: %w", err)
}
return &proto.SetConfigResponse{}, nil
}
// setConfigInputFromRequest translates a SetConfigRequest into the
// profilemanager.ConfigInput that profilemanager.UpdateConfig consumes.
// Pure mapping with no business logic beyond presence-aware copying of
// optional fields and the "empty / clean" semantics for the two slice
// fields (DNS labels, NAT external IPs). Extracted from SetConfig to
// keep the handler's cognitive complexity below the SonarCube
// threshold; the body of this function is intentionally linear and
// branchy because each proto field is its own optional case.
func setConfigInputFromRequest(msg *proto.SetConfigRequest) (profilemanager.ConfigInput, error) {
var config profilemanager.ConfigInput
profState := profilemanager.ActiveProfileState{
Name: msg.ProfileName,
Username: msg.Username,
}
profPath, err := profState.FilePath()
if err != nil {
log.Errorf("failed to get active profile file path: %v", err)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get active profile file path: %w", err)
return config, fmt.Errorf("failed to get active profile file path: %w", err)
}
var config profilemanager.ConfigInput
config.ConfigPath = profPath
if msg.ManagementUrl != "" {
config.ManagementURL = msg.ManagementUrl
}
if msg.AdminURL != "" {
config.AdminURL = msg.AdminURL
}
if msg.InterfaceName != nil {
config.InterfaceName = msg.InterfaceName
}
if msg.WireguardPort != nil {
wgPort := int(*msg.WireguardPort)
config.WireguardPort = &wgPort
}
if msg.OptionalPreSharedKey != nil {
if *msg.OptionalPreSharedKey != "" {
config.PreSharedKey = msg.OptionalPreSharedKey
}
if msg.OptionalPreSharedKey != nil && *msg.OptionalPreSharedKey != "" {
config.PreSharedKey = msg.OptionalPreSharedKey
}
if msg.CleanDNSLabels {
config.DNSLabels = domain.List{}
} else if msg.DnsLabels != nil {
dnsLabels := domain.FromPunycodeList(msg.DnsLabels)
config.DNSLabels = dnsLabels
config.DNSLabels = domain.FromPunycodeList(msg.DnsLabels)
}
if msg.CleanNATExternalIPs {
@@ -399,7 +411,6 @@ func (s *Server) SetConfig(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.SetConfigReques
if string(msg.CustomDNSAddress) == "empty" {
config.CustomDNSAddress = []byte{}
}
config.ExtraIFaceBlackList = msg.ExtraIFaceBlacklist
if msg.DnsRouteInterval != nil {
@@ -432,18 +443,11 @@ func (s *Server) SetConfig(callerCtx context.Context, msg *proto.SetConfigReques
ttl := int(*msg.SshJWTCacheTTL)
config.SSHJWTCacheTTL = &ttl
}
if msg.Mtu != nil {
mtu := uint16(*msg.Mtu)
config.MTU = &mtu
}
if _, err := profilemanager.UpdateConfig(config); err != nil {
log.Errorf("failed to update profile config: %v", err)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to update profile config: %w", err)
}
return &proto.SetConfigResponse{}, nil
return config, nil
}
// Login uses setup key to prepare configuration for the daemon.
@@ -1737,6 +1741,14 @@ func (s *Server) checkProfilesDisabled() bool {
return s.profilesDisabled
}
// checkNetworksDisabled reports whether the networks/exit-node feature
// is disabled on this daemon instance. Resolved MDM-first: when the
// active policy declares mdm.KeyDisableNetworks the policy value wins
// (regardless of true/false), so an admin can re-enable the feature
// via MDM even on a host that was installed with --disable-networks.
// Falls back to the s.networksDisabled CLI flag when the policy is
// silent on the key. Mirrors checkProfilesDisabled and
// checkUpdateSettingsDisabled.
func (s *Server) checkNetworksDisabled() bool {
if s.config != nil {
if v, ok := s.config.Policy().GetBool(mdm.KeyDisableNetworks); ok {

View File

@@ -65,6 +65,12 @@ const (
mdmFieldSuffix = " (MDM)"
)
// main is the entry point for the UI tray/client binary.
//
// It parses CLI flags, initializes logging, creates the Fyne application and tray icons,
// and constructs the service client (which may open a requested UI window). If a window-mode
// flag is set the Fyne event loop runs and main returns; otherwise it ensures only one
// instance is running, sets up signal handling and fonts, and starts the system tray loop.
func main() {
flags := parseFlags()
@@ -1705,7 +1711,7 @@ func (s *serviceClient) applyMDMLocks(managed []string) {
// Entry's placeholder slot. The placeholder is the only signal the user
// gets that a PSK is configured, because the entry's Text is forced to
// empty to keep the password reveal toggle from leaking the
// "**********" sentinel.
// It returns an empty string if no pre-shared key is present; returns "MDM-managed" if the pre-shared key is enforced by MDM; otherwise returns "configured".
func preSharedKeyPlaceholder(cfg *proto.GetConfigResponse) string {
if cfg == nil || cfg.PreSharedKey == "" {
return ""

12
docs/netbird-macos.sh Executable file → Normal file
View File

@@ -75,15 +75,19 @@ readonly PLIST_DIR='/Library/Managed Preferences'
readonly PLIST_PATH="$PLIST_DIR/io.netbird.client.plist"
readonly LOG_TAG='netbird-mdm'
# log sends a message to the system logger with the configured tag and echoes the message to stdout prefixed by an ISO 8601 UTC timestamp and the tag.
log() {
/usr/bin/logger -t "$LOG_TAG" "$*"
printf '%s [%s] %s\n' "$(date -u '+%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ')" "$LOG_TAG" "$*"
}
# is_set returns success if the provided value is non-empty and is not equal to the special NULL marker.
is_set() {
[[ -n "$1" && "$1" != "$NULL" ]]
local value="$1"
[[ -n "$value" && "$value" != "$NULL" ]]
}
# start_plist creates the temporary plist file at "$PLIST_PATH.tmp" containing the XML plist header and opening `<dict>` for the policy plist.
start_plist() {
cat > "$PLIST_PATH.tmp" <<'EOF'
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
@@ -93,6 +97,7 @@ start_plist() {
EOF
}
# end_plist appends the closing `</dict>` and `</plist>` tags to the temporary plist file.
end_plist() {
cat >> "$PLIST_PATH.tmp" <<'EOF'
</dict>
@@ -100,6 +105,7 @@ end_plist() {
EOF
}
# emit_string appends a plist `<key>/<string>` entry for a given key and value to "$PLIST_PATH.tmp", XML-escaping `&`, `<`, and `>` and logging the assignment; if the key is "preSharedKey" the logged value is masked.
emit_string() {
local key="$1" value="$2" log_value="$2"
# Escape XML entities in the value
@@ -112,6 +118,8 @@ emit_string() {
log "set $key = $log_value"
}
# emit_bool writes a boolean plist entry for a given key into the temporary plist file.
# emit_bool accepts `true/True/TRUE/1/yes` as true and `false/False/FALSE/0/no` as false; on invalid input it logs an error and skips emitting the key.
emit_bool() {
local key="$1" value="$2"
local xml_bool
@@ -124,6 +132,7 @@ emit_bool() {
log "set $key = $value"
}
# emit_int validates that VALUE contains only decimal digits and, if valid, appends an `<integer>` plist entry for KEY to the temporary plist (`$PLIST_PATH.tmp`) and logs the assignment; on invalid input it logs a skip and does not emit the key.
emit_int() {
local key="$1" value="$2"
if ! [[ "$value" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]]; then
@@ -134,6 +143,7 @@ emit_int() {
log "set $key = $value"
}
# main builds the NetBird MDM plist from configured policy variables, validates and installs it to /Library/Managed Preferences/io.netbird.client.plist (root:wheel, 644) and optionally triggers the NetBird daemon to reload.
main() {
log "applying NetBird MDM policy to $PLIST_PATH"
/bin/mkdir -p "$PLIST_DIR"

2
go.mod
View File

@@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ require (
gorm.io/driver/sqlite v1.5.7
gorm.io/gorm v1.25.12
gvisor.dev/gvisor v0.0.0-20260219192049-0f2374377e89
howett.net/plist v1.0.1
)
require (
@@ -328,7 +329,6 @@ require (
gopkg.in/square/go-jose.v2 v2.6.0 // indirect
gopkg.in/tomb.v1 v1.0.0-20141024135613-dd632973f1e7 // indirect
gopkg.in/yaml.v2 v2.4.0 // indirect
howett.net/plist v1.0.1 // indirect
rsc.io/qr v0.2.0 // indirect
)