[relay] only trust X-Real-Ip headers from configured trusted proxies (#6833)

The WS listener unconditionally trusted X-Real-Ip/X-Real-Port headers,
letting any client forge the source address the relay logs. Gate header
trust behind a trusted-proxy allowlist; ignore the headers unless the
immediate peer matches a configured prefix. Defaults to never trusting
the headers when the allowlist is empty.

## Describe your changes

## Issue ticket number and link

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functionality behavior, CLI / service flags, or introduce a new feature
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<!-- This is an auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai
-->
## Summary by CodeRabbit

* **New Features**
* Added `--trusted-proxies` to configure a comma-separated allowlist of
trusted upstream proxy IPs/CIDRs.
* **Behavior Changes**
* Relay WebSocket now uses `X-Real-Ip` / `X-Real-Port` only when the
immediate peer is from the configured trusted set; otherwise it falls
back to the direct remote address.
* Proxy client IP resolution is now consistent and honors
`X-Forwarded-For` only through trusted hops.
* **Operational**
  * Invalid `--trusted-proxies` values fail fast on startup.
<!-- end of auto-generated comment: release notes by coderabbit.ai -->
This commit is contained in:
Zoltan Papp
2026-07-20 18:15:03 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent d64e9542eb
commit 724c6a06e6
17 changed files with 446 additions and 408 deletions
+132
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
package trustedproxy
import (
"fmt"
"net/netip"
"strings"
)
// List holds a parsed set of trusted upstream proxy prefixes and answers trust
// questions against it. The zero value (and a nil *List) is a valid, empty list
// that never trusts any address, so callers can use it without a nil check.
type List struct {
prefixes []netip.Prefix
}
// Parse parses a comma-separated list of CIDR prefixes or bare IPs into a List.
// Bare IPs are converted to single-host prefixes (/32 or /128). An empty input
// yields an empty List that trusts nothing.
func Parse(raw string) (*List, error) {
if raw == "" {
return &List{}, nil
}
parts := strings.Split(raw, ",")
prefixes := make([]netip.Prefix, 0, len(parts))
for _, part := range parts {
part = strings.TrimSpace(part)
if part == "" {
continue
}
prefix, err := netip.ParsePrefix(part)
if err == nil {
prefixes = append(prefixes, prefix)
continue
}
addr, addrErr := netip.ParseAddr(part)
if addrErr != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("parse trusted proxy %q: not a valid CIDR or IP: %w", part, addrErr)
}
bits := 32
if addr.Is6() {
bits = 128
}
prefixes = append(prefixes, netip.PrefixFrom(addr, bits))
}
return &List{prefixes: prefixes}, nil
}
// FromPrefixes wraps an already-parsed set of prefixes in a List.
func FromPrefixes(prefixes []netip.Prefix) *List {
return &List{prefixes: prefixes}
}
// Empty reports whether the list contains no prefixes.
func (l *List) Empty() bool {
return l == nil || len(l.prefixes) == 0
}
// IsTrusted reports whether the given host:port or bare IP falls within the list.
func (l *List) IsTrusted(remoteAddr string) bool {
if l.Empty() {
return false
}
return l.Contains(ExtractHostIP(remoteAddr))
}
// Contains reports whether the given address falls within any trusted prefix.
func (l *List) Contains(addr netip.Addr) bool {
if l.Empty() || !addr.IsValid() {
return false
}
for _, prefix := range l.prefixes {
if prefix.Contains(addr) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// ResolveClientIP extracts the real client IP from X-Forwarded-For using the
// list. It walks the XFF chain right-to-left, skipping IPs that match trusted
// prefixes; the first untrusted IP is the real client. If the list is empty or
// remoteAddr is not trusted, it returns the remoteAddr IP directly, ignoring any
// forwarding headers.
func (l *List) ResolveClientIP(remoteAddr, xff string) netip.Addr {
remoteIP := ExtractHostIP(remoteAddr)
if l.Empty() || !l.Contains(remoteIP) {
return remoteIP
}
if xff == "" {
return remoteIP
}
parts := strings.Split(xff, ",")
for i := len(parts) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
ip := strings.TrimSpace(parts[i])
if ip == "" {
continue
}
addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(ip)
if err != nil {
continue
}
addr = addr.Unmap()
if !l.Contains(addr) {
return addr
}
}
if first := strings.TrimSpace(parts[0]); first != "" {
if addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(first); err == nil {
return addr.Unmap()
}
}
return remoteIP
}
// ExtractHostIP parses the IP from a host:port string and returns it unmapped.
func ExtractHostIP(hostPort string) netip.Addr {
if ap, err := netip.ParseAddrPort(hostPort); err == nil {
return ap.Addr().Unmap()
}
if addr, err := netip.ParseAddr(hostPort); err == nil {
return addr.Unmap()
}
return netip.Addr{}
}
+216
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@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
package trustedproxy
import (
"net/netip"
"testing"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestParse(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
raw string
want []netip.Prefix
wantErr bool
}{
{
name: "empty string returns empty list",
raw: "",
want: nil,
},
{
name: "single CIDR",
raw: "10.0.0.0/8",
want: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8")},
},
{
name: "single bare IPv4",
raw: "1.2.3.4",
want: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("1.2.3.4/32")},
},
{
name: "single bare IPv6",
raw: "::1",
want: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("::1/128")},
},
{
name: "comma-separated CIDRs",
raw: "10.0.0.0/8, 192.168.1.0/24",
want: []netip.Prefix{
netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("192.168.1.0/24"),
},
},
{
name: "mixed CIDRs and bare IPs",
raw: "10.0.0.0/8, 1.2.3.4, fd00::/8",
want: []netip.Prefix{
netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("1.2.3.4/32"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("fd00::/8"),
},
},
{
name: "whitespace around entries",
raw: " 10.0.0.0/8 , 192.168.0.0/16 ",
want: []netip.Prefix{
netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8"),
netip.MustParsePrefix("192.168.0.0/16"),
},
},
{
name: "trailing comma produces no extra entry",
raw: "10.0.0.0/8,",
want: []netip.Prefix{netip.MustParsePrefix("10.0.0.0/8")},
},
{
name: "invalid entry",
raw: "not-an-ip",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "partially invalid",
raw: "10.0.0.0/8, garbage",
wantErr: true,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got, err := Parse(tt.raw)
if tt.wantErr {
require.Error(t, err)
return
}
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, tt.want, got.prefixes)
})
}
}
func TestListIsTrusted(t *testing.T) {
list, err := Parse("10.0.0.0/8, 192.168.1.0/24, fd00::/8")
require.NoError(t, err)
tests := []struct {
name string
addr string
list *List
want bool
}{
{"nil list", "10.0.0.1", nil, false},
{"empty list", "10.0.0.1", &List{}, false},
{"IP within /8 prefix", "10.1.2.3", list, true},
{"IP within /24 prefix", "192.168.1.100", list, true},
{"IP outside all prefixes", "203.0.113.50", list, false},
{"boundary IP just outside prefix", "192.168.2.1", list, false},
{"unparsable IP", "not-an-ip", list, false},
{"IPv6 in trusted range", "fd00::1", list, true},
{"IPv6 outside range", "2001:db8::1", list, false},
{"empty string", "", list, false},
{"host:port within prefix", "10.1.2.3:9999", list, true},
{"host:port outside prefix", "203.0.113.50:9999", list, false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, tt.want, tt.list.IsTrusted(tt.addr))
})
}
}
func TestListResolveClientIP(t *testing.T) {
trusted, err := Parse("10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12")
require.NoError(t, err)
tests := []struct {
name string
remoteAddr string
xff string
list *List
want netip.Addr
}{
{
name: "empty list returns RemoteAddr",
remoteAddr: "203.0.113.50:9999",
xff: "1.2.3.4",
list: &List{},
want: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.50"),
},
{
name: "nil list returns RemoteAddr",
remoteAddr: "203.0.113.50:9999",
xff: "1.2.3.4",
list: nil,
want: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.50"),
},
{
name: "untrusted RemoteAddr ignores XFF",
remoteAddr: "203.0.113.50:9999",
xff: "1.2.3.4, 10.0.0.1",
list: trusted,
want: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.50"),
},
{
name: "trusted RemoteAddr with single client in XFF",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:5000",
xff: "203.0.113.50",
list: trusted,
want: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.50"),
},
{
name: "trusted RemoteAddr walks past trusted entries in XFF",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:5000",
xff: "203.0.113.50, 10.0.0.2, 172.16.0.5",
list: trusted,
want: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.50"),
},
{
name: "trusted RemoteAddr with empty XFF falls back to RemoteAddr",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:5000",
xff: "",
list: trusted,
want: netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.1"),
},
{
name: "all XFF IPs trusted returns leftmost",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:5000",
xff: "10.0.0.2, 172.16.0.1, 10.0.0.3",
list: trusted,
want: netip.MustParseAddr("10.0.0.2"),
},
{
name: "XFF with whitespace",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:5000",
xff: " 203.0.113.50 , 10.0.0.2 ",
list: trusted,
want: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.50"),
},
{
name: "XFF with empty segments",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:5000",
xff: "203.0.113.50,,10.0.0.2",
list: trusted,
want: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.50"),
},
{
name: "multi-hop with mixed trust",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1:5000",
xff: "8.8.8.8, 203.0.113.50, 172.16.0.1",
list: trusted,
want: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.50"),
},
{
name: "RemoteAddr without port",
remoteAddr: "10.0.0.1",
xff: "203.0.113.50",
list: trusted,
want: netip.MustParseAddr("203.0.113.50"),
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
assert.Equal(t, tt.want, tt.list.ResolveClientIP(tt.remoteAddr, tt.xff))
})
}
}