Files
certctl/install-agent.sh
shankar0123 d64c1821a5 fix(install-agent): RED-007 — verify agent binary via SHA-256 + cosign before install
Acquisition-audit RED-007 closure (Sprint 7 ACQ, 2026-05-16).

Pre-2026-05-16, install-agent.sh downloaded the agent binary with
`curl -sSL -f` from GitHub Releases and ran chmod +x — no integrity
check, no signature verification. A tampered release-asset upload
(e.g. compromised maintainer GH token) or a misnamed asset would
install silently. HTTPS already prevents in-flight tampering, but
the release-surface tamper case was wide-open.

The download_binary() function now performs two independent
verifications BEFORE install_binary copies to $INSTALL_DIR:

1. SHA-256 against the release-published checksums.txt
   Every release publishes checksums.txt (sha256sum-format) at
   the same RELEASE_URL. The script downloads it, looks up the
   binary's expected hash by name, and compares against
   sha256sum (Linux) or shasum -a 256 (macOS — both fallbacks
   tried). Mismatch rejects the install and exits 1. A
   missing-entry rejection is also exit 1 because an
   inconsistent release surface is itself a supply-chain
   anomaly.

2. Cosign keyless verify against the GitHub Actions OIDC identity
   When cosign is installed, the script downloads
   <binary>.sigstore.json and runs:
     cosign verify-blob \\
       --bundle <bundle> \\
       --certificate-identity-regexp "^https://github.com/${GITHUB_REPO}/" \\
       --certificate-oidc-issuer "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com" \\
       <binary>
   This pins the signature to the certctl-io/certctl release
   workflow's OIDC identity (see .github/workflows/release.yml).
   When cosign is NOT installed, the script logs a clear WARN
   pointing at the cosign install snippet and proceeds with
   SHA-256 verification only. Operators in regulated environments
   MUST install cosign and re-run.

What this DOES NOT change
=========================
- The script's bash-piped install pattern (curl|bash) is not
  refactored. The audit prompt's NON-GOAL pin ("Stay shell. Do
  not refactor install-agent.sh into a binary distribution.") is
  honored.
- HTTPS-only download semantics are unchanged (already in place).
- The unsupported-platform refusal at L38-49 is unchanged (already
  in place).

Verified locally: bash -n syntax clean. The integration smoke test
(deploy/test/install-agent-smoke.sh) that the audit prompt
optionally suggested was NOT added — the verification logic is
straightforward enough that the inline if/else error paths are
self-documenting and the operator-visible failure messages are the
test.
2026-05-16 20:37:29 +00:00

27 KiB