certctl

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Author	SHA1	Message	Date
shankar0123	95d0d85391	Bundle Q (Coverage Audit Closure): property-based pilot + hygiene — L-001/L-002/L-003/L-004/I-001 closed Five small closures wrapping the Low-tier and Info-tier audit findings. Q.1 — cmd/cli round-out (L-001 closed) ====================================== cmd/cli/dispatch_test.go: ~30 dispatch tests across handleCerts / handleAgents / handleJobs / handleImport / handleStatus. httptest.NewTLSServer mocks the API; cli.NewClient(_, _, _, _, true) constructs an insecure-skip-verify client. Each test pins the missing-args usage-print path AND the happy-path delegation. Result: 7.1% -> 63.5% coverage (gate: >=30%). Q.2 — awssm round-out (L-002 closed) ====================================== internal/connector/discovery/awssm/awssm_edge_test.go: New() default constructor, extractKeyInfo (ECDSA/Ed25519/unknown — was RSA-only), processSecret filter arms (NamePrefix mismatch / TagFilter mismatch / empty-value / GetSecretValue error), realSMClient stub-contract pin (ListSecrets / GetSecretValue / NewRealSMClient), and EmailAddresses SAN extraction. Result: 78.2% -> 96.0% coverage (gate: >=85%). Q.3 — Property-based testing pilot (L-003 closed) ====================================== gopter@v0.2.11 added to go.mod (test-only). internal/crypto/encryption_property_test.go: - TestProperty_EncryptDecryptRoundTrip — 50 successful tests, DecryptIfKeySet(EncryptIfKeySet(x, k), k) == x - TestProperty_WrongPassphraseRejected — 30 successful tests, AEAD never returns nil-error AND bytes-equal plaintext under wrong passphrase Both skipped under -short to keep developer loop fast (PBKDF2 600k rounds × 50 iters ≈ 15s on -race CI). internal/pkcs7/length_property_test.go: - TestProperty_ASN1LengthRoundTrip — three sub-properties: decodeLength(encode(x)) == x for x ∈ [0, 2³¹−1]; short-form invariant (length<128 → 1 byte == length); long-form invariant (length>=128 → high bit set + N bytes follow). 500 successful tests in <10ms. Q.4 — Architecture diagram multi-agent update (L-004 closed) ====================================== docs/qa-test-guide.md::Architecture: ASCII diagram updated to show 'certctl-agent (×N)' + callout explaining seed_demo.sql provisions 12 agent rows (1 active, 2 retired, 9 reserved/sentinel) for Parts 04, 05, 55 + FSM coverage. Operators running parallel-agent topologies guided to AGENT_COUNT=N + 'make qa-stats'. Q.5 — Test-naming CI guard (I-001 closed) ====================================== .github/workflows/ci.yml: Test-naming convention guard added after the QA-doc seed-count drift guard. Greps for func Test<X>( missing the <X>_<Scenario> suffix. Prints first 20 non-conformant as ::warning:: annotations. continue-on-error: true (informational). Excludes TestMain + TestProperty_*. Promotion to hard-fail tracked as I-001-extended. Verification ====================================== - python3 yaml.safe_load on ci.yml: OK - go vet ./cmd/cli/... ./internal/connector/discovery/awssm/... ./internal/crypto/... ./internal/pkcs7/...: clean - go test -short -count=1 across all four packages: PASS - go test -count=1 (full property tests): PASS - crypto 15.4s (50 + 30 × 600k PBKDF2) - pkcs7 5ms Audit deliverables ====================================== - gap-backlog.md: strikethroughs on L-001/L-002/L-003/L-004/I-001 with per-finding closure note - closure-plan.md: ticks Bundle Q [x] with per-item breakdown Closes: L-001, L-002, L-003, L-004, I-001 Bundle: Q (Property-Based + Hygiene)	2026-04-27 18:36:47 +00:00
shankar0123	1c099071d1	fix(bundle-4): EST/SCEP Attack Surface Hardening — 3 audit findings closed Closes 3 findings (1 High + 1 Medium + 1 Low) from /Users/shankar/Desktop/cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/. Bundle 4 hardens the only attack surface reachable by an anonymous network attacker in certctl: the unauthenticated EST + SCEP enrollment endpoints. Findings closed: - H-004 (High): Hand-rolled ASN.1 parser had no fuzz target. The audit's original framing pointed at internal/pkcs7/, but recon confirmed that package is an ASN.1 ENCODER (BuildCertsOnlyPKCS7, ASN1Wrap, ASN1EncodeLength) — not a parser. The actual hand-rolled PKCS#7 PARSING reachable via anonymous network is in internal/api/handler/scep.go::extractCSRFromPKCS7 + parseSignedDataForCSR. Added native go fuzz targets: internal/api/handler/scep_fuzz_test.go::FuzzExtractCSRFromPKCS7 * internal/api/handler/scep_fuzz_test.go::FuzzParseSignedDataForCSR * internal/pkcs7/pkcs7_fuzz_test.go::FuzzPEMToDERChain (defense-in-depth) * internal/pkcs7/pkcs7_fuzz_test.go::FuzzASN1EncodeLength (defense-in-depth) Local 15s fuzz session: 150k execs on FuzzExtractCSRFromPKCS7, 937k on FuzzPEMToDERChain, 925k on FuzzASN1EncodeLength — zero panics. - M-021 (Medium): EST TLS-Unique channel binding (RFC 7030 §3.2.3). Added internal/api/handler/est.go::verifyESTTransport — defense-in-depth TLS pre-conditions (r.TLS != nil; HandshakeComplete; TLS ≥ 1.2). The full §3.2.3 channel binding only applies when EST mTLS is in use; certctl does not currently support EST mTLS, so the §3.2.3 requirement is moot today. RFC 9266 (TLS 1.3 tls-exporter) and EST mTLS are documented as deferred follow-ups in the verifyESTTransport doc comment. - L-005 (Low): EST/SCEP issuer-binding fail-loud at startup. Pre-Bundle-4 cmd/server/main.go validated that CERTCTL_EST_ISSUER_ID and CERTCTL_SCEP_ISSUER_ID existed in the registry but did NOT validate the issuer TYPE could emit a CA cert. An operator binding EST to an ACME issuer (whose GetCACertPEM returns explicit error) booted successfully and only failed at first /est/cacerts request. Post-Bundle-4: new preflightEnrollmentIssuer helper calls GetCACertPEM(ctx) at startup with a 10s timeout. Failure logs the connector error + the candidate issuer types and os.Exit(1). Tests added/modified: - internal/api/handler/est_transport_test.go (new) — 5 verifyESTTransport table cases covering plaintext-rejected, incomplete-handshake-rejected, TLS 1.0 rejected, TLS 1.2/1.3 accepted - cmd/server/preflight_test.go (new) — TestPreflightEnrollmentIssuer covering nil-connector, error-from-issuer, empty-PEM, valid cases - internal/api/handler/est_handler_test.go (modified) — 7 POST sites now stamp r.TLS to satisfy the new transport pre-condition - internal/integration/negative_test.go (modified) — setupTestServer wraps the test handler with a fake-TLS-state injector so the EST handler receives r.TLS != nil; production paths still rely on the real TLS listener Threat model reference: TB-11 (EST/SCEP client ↔ Server) per cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/threat-model.md. Standards: RFC 7030 §3.2.3, RFC 8894 §3, RFC 5652, RFC 9266 (deferred).	2026-04-25 21:14:41 +00:00
shankar0123andClaude Opus 4.6	bcefb11e65	feat(M51): add SCEP server (RFC 8894) for MDM and network device enrollment Implements Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol with single-endpoint operation-based dispatch (GetCACaps, GetCACert, PKIOperation), PKCS#7 SignedData CSR extraction with fallback for raw/base64 CSR, challenge password authentication via CSR attributes, and shared internal/pkcs7 package extracted from EST handler to eliminate code duplication. 24 new tests (11 service + 13 handler) plus 5 shared pkcs7 package tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-04-15 16:47:18 -04:00

Author

SHA1

Message

Date

shankar0123

95d0d85391

Bundle Q (Coverage Audit Closure): property-based pilot + hygiene — L-001/L-002/L-003/L-004/I-001 closed

Five small closures wrapping the Low-tier and Info-tier audit findings.

Q.1 — cmd/cli round-out (L-001 closed)
======================================
cmd/cli/dispatch_test.go: ~30 dispatch tests across handleCerts /
handleAgents / handleJobs / handleImport / handleStatus. httptest.NewTLSServer
mocks the API; cli.NewClient(_, _, _, _, true) constructs an
insecure-skip-verify client. Each test pins the missing-args usage-print
path AND the happy-path delegation. Result: 7.1% -> 63.5% coverage
(gate: >=30%).

Q.2 — awssm round-out (L-002 closed)
======================================
internal/connector/discovery/awssm/awssm_edge_test.go: New() default
constructor, extractKeyInfo (ECDSA/Ed25519/unknown — was RSA-only),
processSecret filter arms (NamePrefix mismatch / TagFilter mismatch /
empty-value / GetSecretValue error), realSMClient stub-contract pin
(ListSecrets / GetSecretValue / NewRealSMClient), and EmailAddresses
SAN extraction. Result: 78.2% -> 96.0% coverage (gate: >=85%).

Q.3 — Property-based testing pilot (L-003 closed)
======================================
gopter@v0.2.11 added to go.mod (test-only).

internal/crypto/encryption_property_test.go:
- TestProperty_EncryptDecryptRoundTrip — 50 successful tests,
  DecryptIfKeySet(EncryptIfKeySet(x, k), k) == x
- TestProperty_WrongPassphraseRejected — 30 successful tests,
  AEAD never returns nil-error AND bytes-equal plaintext under
  wrong passphrase
Both skipped under -short to keep developer loop fast (PBKDF2 600k
rounds × 50 iters ≈ 15s on -race CI).

internal/pkcs7/length_property_test.go:
- TestProperty_ASN1LengthRoundTrip — three sub-properties:
  decodeLength(encode(x)) == x for x ∈ [0, 2³¹−1]; short-form
  invariant (length<128 → 1 byte == length); long-form invariant
  (length>=128 → high bit set + N bytes follow). 500 successful
  tests in <10ms.

Q.4 — Architecture diagram multi-agent update (L-004 closed)
======================================
docs/qa-test-guide.md::Architecture: ASCII diagram updated to show
'certctl-agent (×N)' + callout explaining seed_demo.sql provisions
12 agent rows (1 active, 2 retired, 9 reserved/sentinel) for Parts
04, 05, 55 + FSM coverage. Operators running parallel-agent topologies
guided to AGENT_COUNT=N + 'make qa-stats'.

Q.5 — Test-naming CI guard (I-001 closed)
======================================
.github/workflows/ci.yml: Test-naming convention guard added after
the QA-doc seed-count drift guard. Greps for func Test<X>( missing
the <X>_<Scenario> suffix. Prints first 20 non-conformant as
::warning:: annotations. continue-on-error: true (informational).
Excludes TestMain + TestProperty_*. Promotion to hard-fail tracked
as I-001-extended.

Verification
======================================
- python3 yaml.safe_load on ci.yml: OK
- go vet ./cmd/cli/... ./internal/connector/discovery/awssm/...
  ./internal/crypto/... ./internal/pkcs7/...: clean
- go test -short -count=1 across all four packages: PASS
- go test -count=1 (full property tests): PASS
  - crypto 15.4s (50 + 30 × 600k PBKDF2)
  - pkcs7 5ms

Audit deliverables
======================================
- gap-backlog.md: strikethroughs on L-001/L-002/L-003/L-004/I-001
  with per-finding closure note
- closure-plan.md: ticks Bundle Q [x] with per-item breakdown

Closes: L-001, L-002, L-003, L-004, I-001
Bundle: Q (Property-Based + Hygiene)

2026-04-27 18:36:47 +00:00

shankar0123

1c099071d1

fix(bundle-4): EST/SCEP Attack Surface Hardening — 3 audit findings closed

Closes 3 findings (1 High + 1 Medium + 1 Low) from
/Users/shankar/Desktop/cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/.

Bundle 4 hardens the only attack surface reachable by an anonymous network
attacker in certctl: the unauthenticated EST + SCEP enrollment endpoints.

Findings closed:

  - H-004 (High): Hand-rolled ASN.1 parser had no fuzz target.
    The audit's original framing pointed at internal/pkcs7/, but recon
    confirmed that package is an ASN.1 ENCODER (BuildCertsOnlyPKCS7,
    ASN1Wrap*, ASN1EncodeLength) — not a parser. The actual hand-rolled
    PKCS#7 PARSING reachable via anonymous network is in
    internal/api/handler/scep.go::extractCSRFromPKCS7 +
    parseSignedDataForCSR. Added native go fuzz targets:
      * internal/api/handler/scep_fuzz_test.go::FuzzExtractCSRFromPKCS7
      * internal/api/handler/scep_fuzz_test.go::FuzzParseSignedDataForCSR
      * internal/pkcs7/pkcs7_fuzz_test.go::FuzzPEMToDERChain (defense-in-depth)
      * internal/pkcs7/pkcs7_fuzz_test.go::FuzzASN1EncodeLength (defense-in-depth)
    Local 15s fuzz session: 150k execs on FuzzExtractCSRFromPKCS7,
    937k on FuzzPEMToDERChain, 925k on FuzzASN1EncodeLength — zero panics.

  - M-021 (Medium): EST TLS-Unique channel binding (RFC 7030 §3.2.3).
    Added internal/api/handler/est.go::verifyESTTransport — defense-in-depth
    TLS pre-conditions (r.TLS != nil; HandshakeComplete; TLS ≥ 1.2).
    The full §3.2.3 channel binding only applies when EST mTLS is in use;
    certctl does not currently support EST mTLS, so the §3.2.3 requirement
    is moot today. RFC 9266 (TLS 1.3 tls-exporter) and EST mTLS are
    documented as deferred follow-ups in the verifyESTTransport doc comment.

  - L-005 (Low): EST/SCEP issuer-binding fail-loud at startup.
    Pre-Bundle-4 cmd/server/main.go validated that CERTCTL_EST_ISSUER_ID and
    CERTCTL_SCEP_ISSUER_ID existed in the registry but did NOT validate the
    issuer TYPE could emit a CA cert. An operator binding EST to an ACME
    issuer (whose GetCACertPEM returns explicit error) booted successfully
    and only failed at first /est/cacerts request. Post-Bundle-4: new
    preflightEnrollmentIssuer helper calls GetCACertPEM(ctx) at startup
    with a 10s timeout. Failure logs the connector error + the candidate
    issuer types and os.Exit(1).

Tests added/modified:
  - internal/api/handler/est_transport_test.go (new) — 5 verifyESTTransport
    table cases covering plaintext-rejected, incomplete-handshake-rejected,
    TLS 1.0 rejected, TLS 1.2/1.3 accepted
  - cmd/server/preflight_test.go (new) — TestPreflightEnrollmentIssuer
    covering nil-connector, error-from-issuer, empty-PEM, valid cases
  - internal/api/handler/est_handler_test.go (modified) — 7 POST sites
    now stamp r.TLS to satisfy the new transport pre-condition
  - internal/integration/negative_test.go (modified) — setupTestServer
    wraps the test handler with a fake-TLS-state injector so the EST
    handler receives r.TLS != nil; production paths still rely on the
    real TLS listener

Threat model reference: TB-11 (EST/SCEP client ↔ Server) per
cowork/comprehensive-audit-2026-04-25/threat-model.md.
Standards: RFC 7030 §3.2.3, RFC 8894 §3, RFC 5652, RFC 9266 (deferred).

2026-04-25 21:14:41 +00:00

shankar0123andClaude Opus 4.6

bcefb11e65

feat(M51): add SCEP server (RFC 8894) for MDM and network device enrollment

Implements Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol with single-endpoint
operation-based dispatch (GetCACaps, GetCACert, PKIOperation), PKCS#7
SignedData CSR extraction with fallback for raw/base64 CSR, challenge
password authentication via CSR attributes, and shared internal/pkcs7
package extracted from EST handler to eliminate code duplication.

24 new tests (11 service + 13 handler) plus 5 shared pkcs7 package tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-04-15 16:47:18 -04:00