mirror of
https://github.com/bolkedebruin/rdpgw.git
synced 2026-05-13 03:40:01 +00:00
de31bfe8a0
The auth daemon's gRPC socket was world-writable and accepted any local UID that could connect to it. On a multi-tenant host any user on the box could speak the gRPC API and run an arbitrary username/ password through PAM -- effectively an unauthenticated PAM oracle. Create the socket with mode 0660 (Umask(0117)) and gate Accept on SO_PEERCRED: only the daemon's own UID is allowed by default, plus any operator-supplied --allow-uid / --allow-gid. Privilege-separated deployments (rdpgw and rdpgw-auth as different users) need to list the gateway's UID, or share a group; the existing path otherwise would have been permissive. The peer-credentials check is Linux-only; the non-Linux build keeps the listener as-is and logs a warning, since rdpgw-auth itself requires libpam and is effectively Linux-only in practice.
104 lines
2.3 KiB
Go
104 lines
2.3 KiB
Go
//go:build linux
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package main
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import (
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"net"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"syscall"
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"testing"
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"time"
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)
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func startGatedListener(t *testing.T, allowUIDs, allowGIDs []int) (string, <-chan struct{}) {
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t.Helper()
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dir := t.TempDir()
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addr := filepath.Join(dir, "auth.sock")
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old := syscall.Umask(0117)
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raw, err := net.Listen("unix", addr)
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syscall.Umask(old)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
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}
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t.Cleanup(func() { raw.Close() })
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accepted := make(chan struct{}, 1)
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gated := newGatedListener(raw, allowUIDs, allowGIDs)
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go func() {
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for {
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conn, err := gated.Accept()
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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accepted <- struct{}{}
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conn.Close()
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}
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}()
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return addr, accepted
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}
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func TestGatedListenerAcceptsCurrentUID(t *testing.T) {
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addr, accepted := startGatedListener(t, []int{os.Getuid()}, nil)
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conn, err := net.DialTimeout("unix", addr, 1*time.Second)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("dial: %v", err)
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}
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defer conn.Close()
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select {
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case <-accepted:
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case <-time.After(500 * time.Millisecond):
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t.Fatalf("listener did not accept connection from current UID %d", os.Getuid())
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}
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}
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func TestGatedListenerRejectsForeignUID(t *testing.T) {
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// Allow a UID we are not running as.
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addr, accepted := startGatedListener(t, []int{os.Getuid() + 1}, nil)
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conn, err := net.DialTimeout("unix", addr, 1*time.Second)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("dial: %v", err)
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}
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defer conn.Close()
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if err := conn.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(500 * time.Millisecond)); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("set read deadline: %v", err)
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}
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buf := make([]byte, 1)
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if _, err := conn.Read(buf); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("expected EOF / closed conn after gate rejection, got data")
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}
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select {
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case <-accepted:
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t.Fatal("Accept handed a connection from a UID outside the allow-list to the application")
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case <-time.After(200 * time.Millisecond):
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}
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}
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func TestSocketModeUmask0117(t *testing.T) {
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dir := t.TempDir()
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addr := filepath.Join(dir, "auth.sock")
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old := syscall.Umask(0117)
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l, err := net.Listen("unix", addr)
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syscall.Umask(old)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err)
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}
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defer l.Close()
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st, err := os.Stat(addr)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("stat socket: %v", err)
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}
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mode := st.Mode().Perm()
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if mode&0007 != 0 {
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t.Errorf("socket mode = %#o, expected no permissions for `other`", mode)
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}
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}
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