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* fix(proxy): gate tunnel-peer fast-path on inbound listener marker
forwardWithTunnelPeer previously accepted any RFC1918 / ULA / CGNAT
source IP, so a public client whose address happened to fall in those
ranges could bypass the configured operator auth scheme by colliding
with a known tunnel IP. The fast-path is now gated on
TunnelLookupFromContext(r.Context()) being present — that context value
is attached only by the per-account inbound (overlay) listener, so the
host-facing listener never enters this branch.
Tests updated to reflect the new requirement: requests that don't
carry the inbound marker now fall through to the regular auth flow.
* fix(proxy): harden inbound listener resource + startup-ctx handling
Three correctness fixes on the per-account inbound path, with tests:
- Close the logrus ErrorLog PipeWriter on tearDown. WriterLevel hands
back an *io.PipeWriter backed by a pipe + scanner goroutine that the
caller owns; the two writers per account (https + plain) were never
closed, leaking the pipe and goroutine on every teardown.
- Run the post-Start hooks on context.Background(). runClientStartup
is launched in a goroutine from AddPeer and was inheriting the
caller's request-scoped ctx, so a cancelled request could abort the
inbound bring-up or fail the management status notification. The
tail is split into notifyClientReady so the contract is testable.
Tests cover the PipeWriter close behaviour and assert the readyHandler
+ NotifyStatus calls receive a non-cancelled background context.
* feat(proxy): short-circuit peer-own-target loops with 421
When a peer that hosts the target of a private service dials its own
service URL the request was being looped through the proxy and back
over WireGuard to the same peer — twice the WG round-trip for no
benefit, with no signal to the caller that something was wrong.
Add isSelfTargetLoop to ReverseProxy.ServeHTTP: when the request
arrived on the per-account overlay listener (IsOverlayOrigin) and the
source tunnel IP matches the target host, refuse the request with 421
Misdirected Request and a body pointing the operator at the backend
directly.
The gate is scoped to overlay origin so requests on the public
listener that happen to share a source IP with the target host are
forwarded normally.
* fix(management): private-service validation + tunnel-IP lookup semantics
- Require an explicit port for L4 cluster targets. validateL4Target
exempted TargetTypeCluster from the port check, but buildPathMappings
serializes every L4 target via net.JoinHostPort(host, port) — port=0
shipped a ":0" upstream. Cluster targets use the same Host/Port
fields, so the same requirement applies.
- GetPeerByIP returns NotFound on a tunnel-IP miss instead of mapping
every error to Internal. The proxy's ValidateTunnelPeer probes IPs
that legitimately aren't in the roster; the miss is expected and now
distinguishable from a real store failure.
- Thread ctx into getClusterCapability's gorm query so a cancelled
request doesn't keep the store busy.
Tests updated for the L4-cluster port requirement and the GetPeerByIP
NotFound path.
* fix(client): include offlinePeers in PeerStateByIP lookup
ReplaceOfflinePeers moves peers into d.offlinePeers but PeerStateByIP
only scanned d.peers. Callers (the local DNS filter via
localPeerConnectivity, embed.Client.IdentityForIP used by the
proxy's tunnel-peer validator) were treating known-but-offline peers
as unknown, which:
- causes the DNS filter to keep returning records pointing at peers
that have no live tunnel, AND
- makes the proxy's local-roster check deny a request from such a
peer rather than letting the cached management RPC carry the
authorisation decision.
Search both slices in PeerStateByIP. Adds a unit test for the IPv4
and IPv6 offline-match paths.
* fix(rest): reject empty Delete path params in reverse-proxy clients
ReverseProxyClustersAPI.Delete and ReverseProxyTokensAPI.Delete passed
the path parameter into url.PathEscape without an empty check.
PathEscape("") returns "" which collapses the request onto the
collection endpoint ("/api/reverse-proxies/clusters/" /
"/api/reverse-proxies/proxy-tokens/"), so a caller bug delete with no
id reached a routable URL with surprising semantics (typically 405).
Short-circuit with a typed error before the request is built. Tests
mount a handler on the collection path that fails the test if hit, so
the regression is impossible to reintroduce silently.
* chore(api,ci,docs,test): private-service schema, proto-check, fixups
Non-functional cleanups and contract/CI hardening around the
private-service work:
API schema (openapi.yml):
- Require a non-empty access_groups and mode=http when private=true,
on both Service and ServiceRequest, mirroring
validatePrivateRequirements. mode stays optional-but-constrained
(empty defaults to http server-side), matching runtime.
CI (proto-version-check.yml):
- Cover renamed .pb.go files (read base via previous_filename).
- Match protoc-gen-go-grpc version headers (optional "- " prefix and
-gen-go-grpc suffix) so grpc-generated files are in scope.
Docs / comments:
- Reword Config field docs to say defaults are applied at Server.Start
(initDefaults), not New.
- Rename the obsolete --private-inbound flag to --private across
comments and the proto doc.
Pre-existing test fixups surfaced by review:
- Repair the integration-tagged validate_session_test.go (SignToken
signature growth + new Manager interface methods).
- Fix the CI-skip boolean precedence so Windows isn't skipped
unconditionally.
- Guard the router.HTTPListener type assertion with comma-ok.
* fix(proxy): background ctx for already-started AddPeer notification
The earlier ctx fix covered the async runClientStartup path but missed
the synchronous branch: when a service is added to an already-started
client, AddPeer called NotifyStatus with the caller's request-scoped
ctx. A cancelled request/stream could drop the connected notification
to management. Use context.Background() here too, matching
notifyClientReady.
Extends TestNetBird_AddPeer_ExistingStartedClient_NotifiesStatus to
pass a pre-cancelled caller ctx and assert the notification still ran
on a non-cancelled context.
* use the cmd context for roundtripper
379 lines
13 KiB
Protocol Buffer
379 lines
13 KiB
Protocol Buffer
syntax = "proto3";
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package management;
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option go_package = "/proto";
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import "google/protobuf/duration.proto";
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import "google/protobuf/timestamp.proto";
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// ProxyService - Management is the SERVER, Proxy is the CLIENT
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// Proxy initiates connection to management
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service ProxyService {
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rpc GetMappingUpdate(GetMappingUpdateRequest) returns (stream GetMappingUpdateResponse);
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// SyncMappings is a bidirectional stream that replaces GetMappingUpdate for
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// new proxies. The proxy sends an initial SyncMappingsRequest to start the
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// stream and then sends an ack after each batch is fully processed.
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// Management waits for the ack before sending the next batch, providing
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// application-level back-pressure during large initial syncs.
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// Old proxies continue using GetMappingUpdate; old management servers
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// return Unimplemented for this RPC and proxies fall back.
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rpc SyncMappings(stream SyncMappingsRequest) returns (stream SyncMappingsResponse);
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rpc SendAccessLog(SendAccessLogRequest) returns (SendAccessLogResponse);
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rpc Authenticate(AuthenticateRequest) returns (AuthenticateResponse);
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rpc SendStatusUpdate(SendStatusUpdateRequest) returns (SendStatusUpdateResponse);
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rpc CreateProxyPeer(CreateProxyPeerRequest) returns (CreateProxyPeerResponse);
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rpc GetOIDCURL(GetOIDCURLRequest) returns (GetOIDCURLResponse);
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// ValidateSession validates a session token and checks user access permissions.
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// Called by the proxy after receiving a session token from OIDC callback.
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rpc ValidateSession(ValidateSessionRequest) returns (ValidateSessionResponse);
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// ValidateTunnelPeer resolves an inbound peer by its WireGuard tunnel IP and
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// checks the resolved user's access against the service's access_groups.
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// Acts as a fast-path equivalent of OIDC for requests originating on the
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// netbird mesh: when the source IP maps to a known peer in the calling
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// account and that peer is in the service's access_groups, the proxy can
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// issue a session cookie without redirecting through the OIDC flow.
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// Mirrors ValidateSession's response shape.
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rpc ValidateTunnelPeer(ValidateTunnelPeerRequest) returns (ValidateTunnelPeerResponse);
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}
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// ProxyCapabilities describes what a proxy can handle.
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message ProxyCapabilities {
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// Whether the proxy can bind arbitrary ports for TCP/UDP/TLS services.
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optional bool supports_custom_ports = 1;
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// Whether the proxy requires a subdomain label in front of its cluster domain.
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// When true, accounts cannot use the cluster domain bare.
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optional bool require_subdomain = 2;
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// Whether the proxy has CrowdSec configured and can enforce IP reputation checks.
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optional bool supports_crowdsec = 3;
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// Whether the proxy is running embedded in the netbird client and serving
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// exclusively over the WireGuard tunnel (i.e. `netbird proxy` rather than
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// the standalone netbird-proxy binary). Surfaces upstream so dashboards can
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// distinguish per-peer / private clusters from centralised ones.
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optional bool private = 4;
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// Whether the proxy enforces ProxyMapping.private (fails closed on ValidateTunnelPeer failure). Management MUST NOT stream private mappings to proxies that don't claim this.
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optional bool supports_private_service = 5;
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}
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// GetMappingUpdateRequest is sent to initialise a mapping stream.
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message GetMappingUpdateRequest {
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string proxy_id = 1;
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string version = 2;
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google.protobuf.Timestamp started_at = 3;
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string address = 4;
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ProxyCapabilities capabilities = 5;
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}
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// GetMappingUpdateResponse contains zero or more ProxyMappings.
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// No mappings may be sent to test the liveness of the Proxy.
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// Mappings that are sent should be interpreted by the Proxy appropriately.
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message GetMappingUpdateResponse {
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repeated ProxyMapping mapping = 1;
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// initial_sync_complete is set on the last message of the initial snapshot.
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// The proxy uses this to signal that startup is complete.
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bool initial_sync_complete = 2;
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}
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enum ProxyMappingUpdateType {
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UPDATE_TYPE_CREATED = 0;
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UPDATE_TYPE_MODIFIED = 1;
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UPDATE_TYPE_REMOVED = 2;
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}
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enum PathRewriteMode {
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PATH_REWRITE_DEFAULT = 0;
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PATH_REWRITE_PRESERVE = 1;
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}
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message PathTargetOptions {
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bool skip_tls_verify = 1;
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google.protobuf.Duration request_timeout = 2;
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PathRewriteMode path_rewrite = 3;
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map<string, string> custom_headers = 4;
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// Send PROXY protocol v2 header to this backend.
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bool proxy_protocol = 5;
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// Idle timeout before a UDP session is reaped.
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google.protobuf.Duration session_idle_timeout = 6;
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// When true, the proxy dials this target via the host's network stack
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// instead of through the embedded NetBird client. Useful for upstreams
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// reachable without WireGuard (public APIs, LAN services, localhost
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// sidecars). Defaults to false — embedded client is the standard path.
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bool direct_upstream = 7;
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}
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message PathMapping {
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string path = 1;
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string target = 2;
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PathTargetOptions options = 3;
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}
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message HeaderAuth {
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// Header name to check, e.g. "Authorization", "X-API-Key".
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string header = 1;
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// argon2id hash of the expected full header value.
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string hashed_value = 2;
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}
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message Authentication {
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string session_key = 1;
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int64 max_session_age_seconds = 2;
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bool password = 3;
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bool pin = 4;
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bool oidc = 5;
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repeated HeaderAuth header_auths = 6;
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}
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message AccessRestrictions {
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repeated string allowed_cidrs = 1;
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repeated string blocked_cidrs = 2;
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repeated string allowed_countries = 3;
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repeated string blocked_countries = 4;
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// CrowdSec IP reputation mode: "", "off", "enforce", or "observe".
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string crowdsec_mode = 5;
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}
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message ProxyMapping {
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ProxyMappingUpdateType type = 1;
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string id = 2;
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string account_id = 3;
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string domain = 4;
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repeated PathMapping path = 5;
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string auth_token = 6;
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Authentication auth = 7;
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// When true, the original Host header from the client request is passed
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// through to the backend instead of being rewritten to the backend's address.
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bool pass_host_header = 8;
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// When true, Location headers in backend responses are rewritten to replace
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// the backend address with the public-facing domain.
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bool rewrite_redirects = 9;
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// Service mode: "http", "tcp", "udp", or "tls".
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string mode = 10;
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// For L4/TLS: the port the proxy listens on.
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int32 listen_port = 11;
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AccessRestrictions access_restrictions = 12;
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// NetBird-only: the proxy MUST call ValidateTunnelPeer and fail closed; operator auth schemes are bypassed.
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bool private = 13;
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}
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// SendAccessLogRequest consists of one or more AccessLogs from a Proxy.
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message SendAccessLogRequest {
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AccessLog log = 1;
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}
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// SendAccessLogResponse is intentionally empty to allow for future expansion.
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message SendAccessLogResponse {}
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message AccessLog {
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google.protobuf.Timestamp timestamp = 1;
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string log_id = 2;
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string account_id = 3;
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string service_id = 4;
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string host = 5;
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string path = 6;
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int64 duration_ms = 7;
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string method = 8;
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int32 response_code = 9;
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string source_ip = 10;
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string auth_mechanism = 11;
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string user_id = 12;
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bool auth_success = 13;
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int64 bytes_upload = 14;
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int64 bytes_download = 15;
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string protocol = 16;
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// Extra key-value metadata for the access log entry (e.g. crowdsec_verdict, scenario).
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map<string, string> metadata = 17;
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}
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message AuthenticateRequest {
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string id = 1;
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string account_id = 2;
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oneof request {
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PasswordRequest password = 3;
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PinRequest pin = 4;
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HeaderAuthRequest header_auth = 5;
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}
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}
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message HeaderAuthRequest {
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string header_value = 1;
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string header_name = 2;
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}
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message PasswordRequest {
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string password = 1;
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}
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message PinRequest {
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string pin = 1;
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}
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message AuthenticateResponse {
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bool success = 1;
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string session_token = 2;
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}
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enum ProxyStatus {
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PROXY_STATUS_PENDING = 0;
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PROXY_STATUS_ACTIVE = 1;
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PROXY_STATUS_TUNNEL_NOT_CREATED = 2;
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PROXY_STATUS_CERTIFICATE_PENDING = 3;
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PROXY_STATUS_CERTIFICATE_FAILED = 4;
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PROXY_STATUS_ERROR = 5;
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}
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// SendStatusUpdateRequest is sent by the proxy to update its status
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message SendStatusUpdateRequest {
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string service_id = 1;
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string account_id = 2;
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ProxyStatus status = 3;
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bool certificate_issued = 4;
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optional string error_message = 5;
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// Per-account inbound listener state for the account that owns
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// service_id. Populated only when --private is enabled and the
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// embedded client for the account is up. Field numbers >=50 reserved
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// for observability extensions.
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optional ProxyInboundListener inbound_listener = 50;
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}
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// ProxyInboundListener describes a per-account inbound listener that the
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// proxy has bound on the embedded netstack of the account's WireGuard
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// client. Surfaced so dashboards can render "this account is reachable
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// at <tunnel_ip>:<https_port> on this proxy".
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message ProxyInboundListener {
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// Tunnel IP the embedded netstack listens on. Same address other peers
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// in the account see for the proxy peer.
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string tunnel_ip = 1;
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// TLS port served on tunnel_ip (auto-detected, default 443).
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uint32 https_port = 2;
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// Plain-HTTP port served on tunnel_ip (auto-detected, default 80).
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uint32 http_port = 3;
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}
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// SendStatusUpdateResponse is intentionally empty to allow for future expansion
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message SendStatusUpdateResponse {}
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// CreateProxyPeerRequest is sent by the proxy to create a peer connection
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// The token is a one-time authentication token sent via ProxyMapping
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message CreateProxyPeerRequest {
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string service_id = 1;
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string account_id = 2;
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string token = 3;
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string wireguard_public_key = 4;
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string cluster = 5;
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}
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// CreateProxyPeerResponse contains the result of peer creation
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message CreateProxyPeerResponse {
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bool success = 1;
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optional string error_message = 2;
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}
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message GetOIDCURLRequest {
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string id = 1;
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string account_id = 2;
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string redirect_url = 3;
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}
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message GetOIDCURLResponse {
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string url = 1;
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}
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message ValidateSessionRequest {
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string domain = 1;
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string session_token = 2;
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}
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message ValidateSessionResponse {
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bool valid = 1;
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string user_id = 2;
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string user_email = 3;
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string denied_reason = 4;
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// peer_group_ids carries the calling user's group memberships so the
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// proxy can authorise policy-aware middlewares without an additional
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// management round-trip.
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repeated string peer_group_ids = 5;
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// peer_group_names carries the human-readable display names for the
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// ids in peer_group_ids, ordered identically (positional pairing).
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// Stamped onto upstream requests as X-NetBird-Groups so downstream
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// services can read names rather than opaque ids.
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repeated string peer_group_names = 6;
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}
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// ValidateTunnelPeerRequest carries the inbound peer's tunnel IP and the
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// service domain whose group requirements should gate access. The calling
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// account is inferred from the proxy's gRPC metadata (ProxyToken).
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message ValidateTunnelPeerRequest {
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string tunnel_ip = 1;
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string domain = 2;
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}
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// ValidateTunnelPeerResponse mirrors ValidateSessionResponse plus a freshly
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// minted session_token: when valid is true, the proxy installs the token as
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// a session cookie so subsequent requests skip the management round-trip,
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// matching the OIDC flow's UX. denied_reason values:
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// "peer_not_found" — no peer with that tunnel IP in the calling account
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// "no_user" — peer exists but is not bound to a user
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// "service_not_found"
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// "account_mismatch"
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// "not_in_group" — peer resolved but not in service.access_groups
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message ValidateTunnelPeerResponse {
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bool valid = 1;
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string user_id = 2;
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string user_email = 3;
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string denied_reason = 4;
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// session_token is set only when valid is true. Same shape as the JWT
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// the OIDC flow produces — proxy installs it via setSessionCookie so the
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// tunnel fast-path is indistinguishable from OIDC for subsequent requests.
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string session_token = 5;
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// peer_group_ids carries the resolved peer's user group memberships so
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// the proxy can authorise policy-aware middlewares without an additional
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// management round-trip.
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repeated string peer_group_ids = 6;
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// peer_group_names carries the human-readable display names for the
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// ids in peer_group_ids, ordered identically (positional pairing).
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// Stamped onto upstream requests as X-NetBird-Groups so downstream
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// services can read names rather than opaque ids.
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repeated string peer_group_names = 7;
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}
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// SyncMappingsRequest is sent by the proxy on the bidirectional SyncMappings
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// stream. The first message MUST be an init; all subsequent messages MUST be
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// acks.
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message SyncMappingsRequest {
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oneof msg {
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SyncMappingsInit init = 1;
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SyncMappingsAck ack = 2;
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}
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}
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// SyncMappingsInit is the first message on the stream, carrying the same
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// identification fields as GetMappingUpdateRequest.
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message SyncMappingsInit {
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string proxy_id = 1;
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string version = 2;
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google.protobuf.Timestamp started_at = 3;
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string address = 4;
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ProxyCapabilities capabilities = 5;
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}
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// SyncMappingsAck is sent by the proxy after it has fully processed a batch.
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// Management waits for this before sending the next batch.
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message SyncMappingsAck {}
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// SyncMappingsResponse is a batch of mappings sent by management.
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// Identical semantics to GetMappingUpdateResponse.
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message SyncMappingsResponse {
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repeated ProxyMapping mapping = 1;
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// initial_sync_complete is set on the last message of the initial snapshot.
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bool initial_sync_complete = 2;
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}
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