Files
netbird/client/internal/ipcauth/policy.go
2026-07-25 16:09:22 +02:00

102 lines
4.0 KiB
Go

package ipcauth
import "sync"
const servicePath = "/daemon.DaemonService/"
// ProfilePolicy exposes the active profile's ownership to the interceptor. The
// daemon server implements it. ConfigAdapter bridges the gap because the gRPC
// server (and its interceptor) is constructed before the server instance exists.
type ProfilePolicy interface {
// ActiveProfileOwnership returns the active profile's ownership policy.
ActiveProfileOwnership() Ownership
// ClaimActiveProfileOwnerIfUnowned atomically claims the active profile for
// id when it has no owners and is not shared (trust-on-first-use), and
// reports whether id is now an owner. A false return means the profile was
// already owned/shared or another caller won the claim.
ClaimActiveProfileOwnerIfUnowned(id Identity) (bool, error)
}
// handlerAuthorizedMethods bypass the active-profile gate. Peer identity is
// still required to reach them. Two groups:
//
// - Per-user / per-target-profile operations whose handler does its own
// authorization bound to the caller identity: AddProfile, ListProfiles,
// GetActiveProfile, RemoveProfile, RenameProfile, and SwitchProfile (gated
// on the TARGET profile's ownership via authorizeTargetProfile).
// - Connection-lifecycle operations on the single shared daemon connection
// that any authenticated local user may perform: Down. Gating these on the
// ACTIVE profile's owner would trap a user behind another user's profile —
// they could neither disconnect nor switch to their OWN profile. SwitchProfile
// is bounded by its target check; Down only tears the connection down.
var handlerAuthorizedMethods = map[string]bool{
servicePath + "AddProfile": true,
servicePath + "ListProfiles": true,
servicePath + "GetActiveProfile": true,
servicePath + "RemoveProfile": true,
servicePath + "RenameProfile": true,
servicePath + "SwitchProfile": true,
servicePath + "Down": true,
}
// auditMethods are worth an audit log line. Denials are always logged.
var auditMethods = map[string]bool{
servicePath + "GetConfig": true,
servicePath + "SetConfig": true,
servicePath + "Login": true,
servicePath + "WaitSSOLogin": true,
servicePath + "RequestJWTAuth": true,
servicePath + "WaitJWTToken": true,
servicePath + "StartCapture": true,
servicePath + "StartBundleCapture": true,
servicePath + "DebugBundle": true,
servicePath + "ExposeService": true,
servicePath + "Up": true,
servicePath + "Down": true,
servicePath + "SelectNetworks": true,
servicePath + "DeselectNetworks": true,
servicePath + "SwitchProfile": true,
servicePath + "TriggerUpdate": true,
servicePath + "Logout": true,
servicePath + "CleanState": true,
servicePath + "DeleteState": true,
}
// ConfigAdapter is a ProfilePolicy whose backend is set lazily, once the daemon
// server instance is created. Until then it reports an unowned profile
// (Ownership zero value), so non-privileged callers are denied.
type ConfigAdapter struct {
mu sync.RWMutex
backend ProfilePolicy
}
// SetBackend installs the real policy. Must be called before serving RPCs.
func (a *ConfigAdapter) SetBackend(backend ProfilePolicy) {
a.mu.Lock()
defer a.mu.Unlock()
a.backend = backend
}
// ActiveProfileOwnership delegates to the backend, or reports an unowned profile
// when no backend is set yet.
func (a *ConfigAdapter) ActiveProfileOwnership() Ownership {
a.mu.RLock()
defer a.mu.RUnlock()
if a.backend == nil {
return Ownership{}
}
return a.backend.ActiveProfileOwnership()
}
// ClaimActiveProfileOwnerIfUnowned delegates to the backend. Before the backend
// is set it cannot claim, so it reports not-owned (fail closed).
func (a *ConfigAdapter) ClaimActiveProfileOwnerIfUnowned(id Identity) (bool, error) {
a.mu.RLock()
defer a.mu.RUnlock()
if a.backend == nil {
return false, nil
}
return a.backend.ClaimActiveProfileOwnerIfUnowned(id)
}